diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/54936-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/54936-0.txt | 21909 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 21909 deletions
diff --git a/old/54936-0.txt b/old/54936-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 819438d..0000000 --- a/old/54936-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21909 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, v. 6 (of 12), by George Grote - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: History of Greece, v. 6 (of 12) - -Author: George Grote - -Release Date: June 19, 2017 [EBook #54936] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, V. 6 (OF 12) *** - - - - -Produced by Henry Flower, Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares -Box, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/American -Libraries.) - - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE - - * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_. - * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. - * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ λοιπά~. - * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after - comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has - also been corrected after checking with this later edition and - with Perseus, when the reference was found. - * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, - but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant - usage was found. - - - - - HISTORY OF GREECE. - - BY - GEORGE GROTE, ESQ. - - VOL. VI. - - REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION - - NEW YORK: - HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, - 329 AND 331 PEARL STREET. - - 1879. - - - - -CONTENTS. - -VOL. VI. - - -PART II. - -CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE. - - - CHAPTER XLVII. - - FROM THE THIRTY YEARS’ TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE - PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR - BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. - - Personal activity now prevalent among the Athenian - citizens—empire of Athens again exclusively maritime, after - the Thirty years’ truce.—Chios, Samos, and Lesbos, were now - the only free allies of Athens, on the same footing as the - original confederates of Delos—the rest were subject and - tributary.—Athens took no pains to inspire her allies with the - idea of a common interest—nevertheless, the allies were gainers - by the continuance of her empire.—Conception of Periklês—Athens, - an imperial city, owing protection to the subject-allies; - who, on their part, owed obedience and tribute.—Large amount - of revenue laid by and accumulated by Athens, during the - years preceding the Peloponnesian war.—Pride felt by Athenian - citizens in the imperial power of their city.—Numerous Athenian - citizens planted out as kleruchs by Periklês.—Chersonesus - of Thrace. Sinôpê.—Active personal and commercial relations - between Athens and all parts of the Ægean.—Amphipolis in Thrace - founded by Athens.—Agnon is sent out as Œkist.—Situation - and importance of Amphipolis.—Foundation, by the Athenians, - of Thurii, on the southern coast of Italy.—Conduct of the - refugee inhabitants of the ruined Sybaris—their encroachments - in the foundation of Thurii: they are expelled, and Thurii - reconstituted.—Herodotus and Lysias—both domiciliated as - citizens at Thurii. Few Athenian citizens settled there as - colonists.—Period from 445-431 B.C. Athens at peace. Her - political condition. Rivalry of Periklês with Thucydidês son - of Melêsias.—Points of contention between the two parties: 1. - Peace with Persia. 2. Expenditure of money for the decoration of - Athens.—Defence of Periklês perfectly good against his political - rivals.—Pan-Hellenic schemes and sentiment of Periklês.—Bitter - contention of parties at Athens—vote of ostracism—Thucydidês - is ostracized about 443 B.C.—New works undertaken at Athens. - Third Long Wall. Docks in Peiræus—which is newly laid out - as a town, by the architect Hippodamus.—Odeon, Parthenon, - Propylæa. Other temples. Statues of Athênê.—Illustrious - artists and architects—Pheidias, Iktînus, Kallikratês.—Effect - of these creations of art and architecture upon the minds of - contemporaries.—Attempt of Periklês to convene a general congress - at Athens, of deputies from all the Grecian states.—Revolt of - Samos from the Athenians.—Athenian armament against Samos, - under Periklês, Sophoklês the tragedian, etc.—Doubtful and - prolonged contest—great power of Samos—it is at last reconquered, - disarmed, and dismantled.—None of the other allies of Athens, - except Byzantium, revolted at the same time.—Application of - the Samians to Sparta for aid against Athens—it is refused, - chiefly through the Corinthians.—Government of Samos after the - reconquest—doubtful whether the Athenians renewed the democracy - which they had recently established.—Funeral oration pronounced - by Periklês upon the Athenian citizens slain in the Samian - war.—Position of the Athenian empire—relation of Athens to her - subject allies—their feelings towards her generally were those - of indifference and acquiescence, not of hatred.—Particular - grievances complained of in the dealing of Athens with her - allies.—Annual tribute—changes made in its amount. Athenian - officers and inspectors throughout the empire.—Disputes and - offences in and among the subject-allies, were brought for - trial before the dikasteries at Athens. Productive of some - disadvantages, but of preponderance of advantage to the - subject-allies themselves.—Imperial Athens compared with imperial - Sparta.—Numerous Athenian citizens spread over the Ægean—the - allies had no redress against them, except through the Athenian - dikasteries.—The dikasteries afforded protection against - misconduct both of Athenian citizens and Athenian officers.—The - dikasteries, defective or not, were the same tribunals under - which every Athenian held his own security.—Athenian empire was - affected for the worse by the circumstances of the Peloponnesian - war: more violence was introduced into it by that war than had - prevailed before.—The subject-allies of Athens had few practical - grievances to complain of.—The Grecian world was now divided into - two great systems; with a right supposed to be vested in each, - of punishing its own refractory members.—Policy of Corinth, from - being pacific, becomes warlike.—Disputes arise between Corinth - and Korkyra—case of Epidamnus.—The Epidamnians apply for aid - in their distress to Korkyra; they are refused—the Corinthians - send aid to the place.—The Korkyræans attack Epidamnus—armament - sent thither by Corinth.—Remonstrance of the Korkyræans with - Corinth and the Peloponnesians.—Hostilities between Corinth and - Korkyra—naval victory of the latter.—Large preparations made - by Corinth for renewing the war.—Application of the Korkyræans - to be received among the allies of Athens.—Address of the - Korkyræan envoys to the Athenian public assembly. Principal - topics upon which it insists, as given in Thucydidês.—Envoys - from Corinth address the Athenian assembly in reply.—Decision - of the Athenians—a qualified compliance with the request of - Korkyra. The Athenian triremes sent to Korkyra.—Naval combat - between the Corinthians and Korkyræans: rude tactics on both - sides.—The Korkyræans are defeated.—Arrival of a reinforcement - from Athens—the Corinthian fleet retires, carrying off numerous - Korkyræan prisoners.—Hostilities not yet professedly begun - between Athens and Corinth.—Hatred conceived by the Corinthians - towards Athens.—They begin to stir up revolt among the Athenian - allies—Potidæa, colony of Corinth, but ally of Athens.—Relations - of Athens with Perdikkas king of Macedonia, his intrigues along - with Corinth against her—he induces the Chalkidians to revolt - from her—increase of Olynthus.—Revolt of Potidæa—armament - sent thither from Athens.—Combat near Potidæa, between the - Athenian force and the allied Corinthians. Potidæans, and - Chalkidians.—Victory of the Athenians.—Potidæa placed in blockade - by the Athenians. 1-75 - - - CHAPTER XLVIII. - - FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF - THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. - - State of feeling in Greece between the Thirty years’ truce and - the Peloponnesian war—recognized probability of war—Athens - at that time not encroaching—decree interdicting trade with - the Megarians.—Zealous importunity of the Corinthians in - bringing about a general war, for the purpose of preserving - Potidæa.—Relations of Sparta with her allies—they had a - determining vote, whether they would or would not approve of a - course of policy which had been previously revived by Sparta - separately.—Assembly of the Spartans separately addressed - by envoys of the allied powers, complaining that Athens had - violated the truce.—The Corinthian envoys address the assembly - last, after the envoys of the other allies have inflamed it - against Athens.—International customs of the time, as bearing - upon the points in dispute between Athens and Corinth.—Athens - in the right.—Tenor of the Corinthian address—little allusion - to recent wrong—strong efforts to raise hatred and alarm - against Athens.—Remarkable picture drawn of Athens by her - enemies.—Reply made by an Athenian envoy, accidentally present - in Sparta.—His account of the empire of Athens—how it had been - acquired, and how it was maintained.—He adjures them not to - break the truce, but to adjust all differences by that pacific - appeal which the truce provided.—The Spartans exclude strangers, - and discuss the point among themselves in the assembly.—Most - Spartan speakers are in favor of war. King Archidamus opposes - war. His speech.—The speech of Archidamus is ineffectual. - Short, but warlike appeal of the Ephor Stheneläidas.—Vote of - the Spartan assembly in favor of war.—The Spartans send to - Delphi—obtain an encouraging reply.—General congress of allies - at Sparta. Second speech of the Corinthian envoys, enforcing - the necessity and propriety of war.—Vote of the majority of - the allies in favor of war, B.C. 432.—Views and motives of - the opposing powers.—The hopes and confidence, on the side of - Sparta; the fears, on the side of Athens. Heralds sent from - Sparta to Athens with complaints and requisitions meanwhile - the preparations for war go on.—Requisitions addressed by - Sparta to Athens—demand for the expulsion of the Alkmæonidæ - as impious—aimed at Periklês.—Position of Periklês at - Athens: bitter hostility of his political opponents: attacks - made upon him.—Prosecution of Aspasia. Her character and - accomplishments.—Family relations of Periklês—his connection - with Aspasia. License of the comic writers in their attacks upon - both.—Prosecution of Anaxagoras the philosopher as well as of - Aspasia—Anaxagoras retires from Athens—Periklês defends Aspasia - before the dikastery, and obtains her acquittal.—Prosecution - of the sculptor Pheidias for embezzlement—instituted by the - political opponents of Periklês.—Charge of peculation against - Periklês himself.—Probability that Periklês was never even tried - for peculation, certainly that he was never found guilty of - it.—Requisition from the Lacedæmonians, for the banishment of - Periklês—arrived when Periklês was thus pressed by his political - enemies—rejected.—Counter-requisition sent by the Athenians to - Sparta, for expiation of sacrilege.—Fresh requisitions sent from - Sparta to Athens—to withdraw the troops from Potidæa—to leave - Ægina free—to readmit the Megarians to Athenian harbors.—Final - and peremptory requisition of Sparta—public assembly held at - Athens on the whole subject of war and peace.—Great difference of - opinion in the assembly—important speech of Periklês.—Periklês - strenuously urges the Athenians not to yield.—His review of - the comparative forces, and probable chances of success or - defeat, in the war.—The assembly adopts the recommendation of - Periklês—firm and determined reply sent to Sparta.—Views of - Thucydidês respecting the grounds, feelings, and projects of the - two parties now about to embark in war.—Equivocal period—war - not yet proclaimed—first blow struck, not by Athens, but by - her enemies.—Open violation of the truce by the Thebans—they - surprise Platæa in the night.—The gates of Platæa are opened by - an oligarchical party within—a Theban detachment are admitted - into the agora at night—at first apparently successful, - afterwards overpowered and captured.—Large force intended to - arrive from Thebes to support the assailants early in the - morning—they are delayed by the rain and the swelling of the - Asôpus—they commence hostilities against the Platæan persons - and property without the walls.—Parley between the Platæans and - the Theban force without—the latter evacuate the territory—the - Theban prisoners in Platæa are slain.—Messages from Platæa to - Athens—answer.—Grecian feeling, already predisposed to the war, - was wound up to the highest pitch by the striking incident at - Platæa.—Preparations for war on the part of Athens—intimations - sent round to her allies—Akarnanians recently acquired by - Athens as allies—recent capture of the Amphilochian Argos by - the Athenian Phormio.—Strength and resources of Athens and her - allies—military and naval means—treasure.—Ample grounds for the - confidence expressed by Periklês in the result.—Position and - power of Sparta and the Peloponnesian allies—they are full of - hope and confidence of putting down Athens speedily.—Efforts - of Sparta to get up a naval force.—Muster of the combined - Peloponnesian force at the isthmus of Corinth, under Archidamus, - to invade Attica.—Last envoy sent to Athens—he is dismissed - without being allowed to enter the town.—March of Archidamus into - Attica—his fruitless siege of Œnoê.—Expectation of Archidamus - that Athens would yield at the last moment.—Difficulty of - Periklês in persuading the Athenians to abandon their territory - and see it all ravaged.—Attica deserted—the population flock - within the walls of Athens. Hardships, privations, and distress - endured.—March of Archidamus into Attica.—Archidamus advances - to Acharnæ, within seven miles of Athens.—Intense clamor within - the walls of Athens—eagerness to go forth and fight.—Trying - position, firmness, and sustained ascendency, of Periklês, in - dissuading them from going forth.—The Athenians remain within - their walls: partial skirmishes only, no general action.—Athenian - fleet is despatched to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesus—first - notice of the Spartan Brasidas—operations of the Athenians in - Akarnania, Kephallênia, etc.—The Athenians expel the Æginetans - from Ægina, and people the island with Athenian kleruchs. The - Æginetans settle at Thyrea in Peloponnesus.—The Athenians invade - and ravage the Megarid: sufferings of the Megarians.—Measures - taken by Athens for permanent defence.—Sum put by in the - acropolis, against urgent need, not to be touched unless under - certain defined dangers.—Capital punishment against any who - should propose otherwise.—Remarks on this decree.—Blockade - of Potidæa—Sitalkês king of the Odrysian Thracians—alliance - made between him and Athens.—Periklês is chosen orator to - deliver the funeral discourse over the citizens slain during - the year.—Funeral oration of Periklês.—Sketch of Athenian - political constitution, and social life, as conceived by - Periklês.—Eulogy upon Athens and the Athenian character.—Mutual - tolerance of diversity of tastes and pursuits in Athens.—It - is only true partially and in some memorable instances that - the state interfered to an exorbitant degree with individual - liberty in Greece.—Free play of individual taste and impulse in - Athens—importance of this phenomenon in society.—Extraordinary - and many-sided activity of Athens.—Peculiar and interesting - moment at which the discourse of Periklês was delivered. Athens - now at the maximum of her power—declining tendency commences soon - afterwards. 75-153 - - - CHAPTER XLIX. - - FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE - THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. - - Barren results of the operations during the first year of - war.—Second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians—more - spreading and ruinous than the first.—Commencement of the - pestilence or epidemic at Athens.—Description of the epidemic by - Thucydidês—his conception of the duty of exactly observing and - recording.—Extensive and terrible suffering of Athens.—Inefficacy - of remedies—despair and demoralization of the Athenians.—Lawless - recklessness of conduct engendered.—Great loss of life among - the citizens—blow to the power of Athens.—Athenian armament - sent first against Peloponnesus, next, against Potidæa—it is - attacked and ruined by the epidemic.—Irritation of the Athenians - under their sufferings and losses—they become incensed against - Periklês—his unshaken firmness in defending himself.—Athenian - public assembly—last speech of Periklês—his high tone of - self-esteem against the public discontent. Powerful effect of his - address—new resolution shown for continuing the war—nevertheless, - the discontent against Periklês still continues. He is accused - and condemned in a fine.—Old age of Periklês—his family - misfortunes and suffering. He is reëlected stratêgus—restored - to power and to the confidence of the people.—Last moments - and death of Periklês. His life and character.—Judgment of - Thucydidês respecting Periklês.—Earlier and later political life - of Periklês—how far the one differed from the other.—Accusation - against Periklês of having corrupted the Athenian people—untrue, - and not believed by Thucydidês.—Great progress and improvement - of the Athenians under Periklês.—Periklês is not to blame - for the Peloponnesian war.—Operations of war languid, under - the pressure of the epidemic.—Attack of the Ambrakiots on - the Amphilochian Argos: the Athenian Phormio is sent with a - squadron to Naupaktus.—Injury done to Athenian commerce by - Peloponnesian privateers—The Lacedæmonians put to death all - their prisoners taken at sea, even neutrals.—Lacedæmonian - envoys seized in their way to Persia and put to death by - the Athenians.—Surrender of Potidæa—indulgent capitulation - granted by the Athenian generals.—Third year of the war—king - Archidamus marches to Platæa—no invasion of Attica.—Remonstrance - of the Platæans to Archidamus—his reply—he summons Platæa - in vain.—The Platæans resolve to stand out and defy the - Lacedæmonian force.—Invocation and excuse of Archidamus on - hearing the refusal of the Platæans.—Commencement of the siege - of Platæa.—Operations of attack and defence—the besiegers - make no progress, and are obliged to resort to blockade.—Wall - of circumvallation built round Platæa—the place completely - beleaguered and a force left to maintain the blockade.—Athenian - armament sent to Potidæa and Chalkidic Thrace—it is defeated and - returns.—Operations on the coast of Akarnania.—Joint attack upon - Akarnania, by land and sea, concerted between the Ambrakiots and - Peloponnesians.—Assemblage of the Ambrakiots, Peloponnesians, - and Epirotic allies—divisions of Epirots.—They march to attack - the Akarnanian town of Stratus.—Rashness of the Epirots—defeat - and repulse of the army.—The Peloponnesian fleet comes from - Corinth to Akarnania—movements of the Athenian Phormio to oppose - it.—Naval battle between Phormio and the Peloponnesian fleet—his - complete victory.—Reflections upon these two defeats of the - Peloponnesians.—Indignation of the Lacedæmonians at the late - naval defeat: they collect a larger fleet under Knêmus to act - against Phormio.—Inferior numbers of Phormio—his manœuvring.—The - Peloponnesian fleet forces Phormio to a battle on the line - of coast near Naupaktus. Dispositions and harangues on both - sides.—Battle near Naupaktus. The Peloponnesian fleet at first - successful, but afterwards defeated.—Retirement of the defeated - Peloponnesian fleet.—Phormio is reinforced—his operations in - Akarnania—he returns to Athens.—Attempt of Knêmus and Brasidas - to surprise Peiræus, starting from Corinth.—Alliance of the - Athenians with the Odrysian king Sitalkês.—Power of the Odrysians - in Thrace—their extensive dominion over the other Thracian - tribes.—Sitalkês, at the instigation of Athens, undertakes to - attack Perdikkas and the Chalkidians of Thrace.—His vast and - multifarious host of Thracians and other barbarians.—He invades - and ravages Macedonia and Chalkidikê.—He is forced to retire - by the severity of the season and want of Athenian coöperation. - 153-221 - - - CHAPTER L. - - FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR - DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA. - - Fourth year of the war—internal suffering at Athens.—Renewed - invasion of Attica.—Revolt of Mitylênê and most part of Lesbos - from Athens.—Proceedings of Athens—powerful condition of - Mitylênê—Athenian fleet sent thither under Kleïppidês.—Kleïppidês - fails in surprising Mitylênê—carries on an imperfect blockade.—He - receives reinforcements, and presses the siege with greater - vigor—want of resolution on the part of the Mitylenæans.—The - Mitylenæan envoys address themselves to the Spartans at the - Olympic festival, entreating aid.—Tone and topics of their - address.—Practical grounds of complaint on the part of the - Mitylenæans against Athens few or none.—The Peloponnesians - promise assistance to Mitylênê—energetic demonstrations of the - Athenians.—Asôpius son of Phormio in Akarnania.—The accumulated - treasure of Athens exhausted by her efforts—necessity for her - to raise a direct contribution.—Outbreak of the Platæans from - their blockaded town.—Their plan of escape—its extraordinary - difficulty and danger. Half of the garrison of Platæa escapes to - Athens.—Blockade of Mitylênê closely carried on by the Athenian - general Pachês—the Mitylenæans are encouraged to hold out by - the Lacedæmonians, who send thither Salæthus.—Mitylênê holds - out till provisions are exhausted—Salæthus arms all the people - of Mitylênê for a general sally—the people refuse to join—the - city is surrendered to Athens, at discretion.—The Peloponnesian - fleet under Alkidas arrives off the coast of Ionia—astonishment - and alarm which its presence creates.—Pachês, after the - capture of Mitylênê, pursues the fleet of Alkidas, which - returns to Peloponnesus without having done anything.—Pachês - at Notium—he captures the place—his perfidy towards Hippias, - the leader of the garrison.—Notium recolonized from Athens - as a separate town.—Pachês sends to Athens about a thousand - Mitylenæan prisoners, the persons chiefly concerned in the - late revolt, together with Salæthus.—Important debate in the - Athenian assembly upon the treatment of the prisoners.—First - mention of Kleon by Thucydidês—new class of politicians to - which he belonged.—Eukratês, Kleon, Lysiklês, Hyperbolus, - etc.—Character of Kleon.—Indignation of the Athenians against - Mitylênê—proposition of Kleon to put to death the whole male - population of military age is carried and passed.—Repentance - of the Athenians after the decree is passed. A fresh assembly - is convened to reconsider the decree.—Account of the second - assembly given by Thucydidês—speech of Kleon in support of the - resolution already passed.—Remarks on the speech of Kleon.—Speech - of Diodotus in opposition to Kleon—second decree mitigating - the former. Rapid voyage of the trireme which carries the - second decree to Mitylênê—it arrives just in time to prevent - the execution of the first.—Those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had - sent to Athens are put to death—treatment of Mitylênê by the - Athenians.—Enormities committed by Pachês at Mitylênê—his - death before the Athenian dikastery.—Surrender of Platæa to - the Lacedæmonians.—The Platæan captive garrison are put upon - their trial before Lacedæmonian judges.—Speech of the Platæan - deputies to these judges on behalf of themselves and their - comrades.—Reply of the Thebans.—The Platæans are sentenced to - death by the Lacedæmonian judges, and all slain.—Reason of the - severity of the Lacedæmonians—cases of Platæa and Mitylênê - compared.—Circumstances of Korkyra—the Korkyræan captives are - sent back from Corinth, under agreement to effect a revolution in - the government and foreign politics of the island.—Their attempts - to bring about a revolution—they prosecute the democratical - leader Peithias—he prosecutes five of them in revenge—they - are found guilty.—They assassinate Peithias and several other - senators, and make themselves masters of the government—they - decree neutrality—their unavailing mission to Athens.—The - oligarchical party at Korkyra attack the people—obstinate battle - in the city—victory of the people—arrival of the Athenian admiral - Nikostratus.—Moderation of Nikostratus—proceedings of the people - towards the vanquished oligarchs.—Arrival of the Lacedæmonian - admiral Alkidas, with a fleet of fifty-three triremes. Renewed - terror and struggle in the island.—Naval battle off Korkyra - between Nikostratus and Alkidas.—Confusion and defenceless - state of Korkyra—Alkidas declines to attack it—arrival of the - Athenian fleet under Eurymedon—flight of Alkidas.—Vengeance - of the victorious Demos in Korkyra against the prostrate - oligarchs—fearful bloodshed.—Lawless and ferocious murders—base - connivance of Eurymedon.—Band of oligarchical fugitives escape to - the mainland—afterwards land again on the island and establish - themselves on Mount Istônê.—Political reflections introduced by - Thucydidês on occasion of the Korkyræan massacre.—The political - enormities of Korkyra were the worst that occurred in the whole - war.—How these enormities began and became exaggerated. Conduct - of the opposing parties.—Contrast between the bloody character - of revolutions at Korkyra and the mild character of analogous - phenomena at Athens.—Bad morality of the rich and great men - throughout the Grecian cities. 221-285 - - - CHAPTER LI. - - FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE - PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR. - - Capture of Minôa, opposite Megara, by the Athenians under - Nikias.—Nikias—his first introduction, position, and - character.—Varying circumstances and condition of the - oligarchical party at Athens.—Points of analogy between Nikias - and Periklês—material differences.—Care of Nikias in maintaining - his popularity and not giving offence; his very religious - character.—His diligence in increasing his fortune—speculations - in the mines of Laurium—letting out of slaves for hire.—Nikias - first opposed to Kleon—next to Alkibiadês.—Oligarchical - clubs, or Hetæries, at Athens, for political and judicial - purposes.—Kleon—his real function that of opposition—real - power inferior to Nikias.—Revival of the epidemic distemper - at Athens for another year—atmospheric and terrestrial - disturbances in Greece. Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica - suspended for this year.—Foundation of the colony of Herakleia - by the Lacedæmonians, near Thermopylæ—its numerous settlers, - great promise, and unprosperous career.—Athenian expedition - against Melos, under Nikias.—Proceedings of the Athenians under - Demosthenês in Akarnania.—Expedition of Demosthenês against - Ætolia—his large plans.—March of Demosthenês—impracticability - of the territory of Ætolia.—rudeness and bravery of the - inhabitants.—He is completely beaten and obliged to retire with - loss.—Attack of Ætolians and Peloponnesians under Eurylochus - upon Naupaktus.—Naupaktus is saved by Demosthenês and the - Akarnanians.—Eurylochus, repulsed from Naupaktus, concerts - with the Ambrakiots an attack on Argos.—Demosthenês and the - Athenians, as well as the Akarnanians, come to the protection - of Argos.—March of Eurylochus across Akarnania to join the - Ambrakiots.—Their united army is defeated by Demosthenês at - Olpæ—Eurylochus slain.—The surviving Spartan commander makes - a separate capitulation for himself and the Peloponnesians, - deserting the Ambrakiots.—The Ambrakiots sustain much loss in - their retreat.—Another large body of Ambrakiots, coming from the - city as a reinforcement, is intercepted by Demosthenês at Idomenê - and cut to pieces.—Despair of the Ambrakiot herald on seeing - the great number of slain.—Defenceless and feeble condition of - Ambrakia after this ruinous loss.—Attempt to calculate the loss - of the Ambrakiots.—Convention concluded between Ambrakia on one - side, and the Akarnanians and Amphilochians on the other.—Return - of Demosthenês in triumph to Athens.—Purification of Delos by the - Athenians. Revival of the Delian festival with peculiar splendor. - 285-313 - - - CHAPTER LII. - - SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA. - - Seventh year of the war—invasion of Attica.—Distress in Korkyra - from the attack of the oligarchical exiles. A Peloponnesian fleet - and an Athenian fleet are both sent thither.—Demosthenês goes - on board the Athenian fleet with a separate command.—He fixes - upon Pylus in Laconia for the erection of a fort. Locality of - Pylus and Sphakteria.—Eurymedon the admiral of the fleet insists - upon going on to Korkyra, without stopping at Pylus. The fleet - are driven into Pylus by a storm.—Demosthenês fortifies the - place, through the voluntary zeal of the soldiers. He is left - there with a garrison while the fleet goes on to Korkyra.—Slow - march of the Lacedæmonians to recover Pylus.—Preparations of - Demosthenês to defend Pylus against them.—Proceedings of the - Lacedæmonian army—they send a detachment to occupy the island - of Sphakteria, opposite Pylus.—They attack the place by sea - and land—gallant conduct of Brasidas in the attack on the - sea-side.—Return of Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet to Pylus.—He - defeats the Lacedæmonian fleet in the harbor of Pylus.—The - Lacedæmonian detachment is blocked up by the Athenian fleet in - the island of Sphakteria—armistice concluded at Pylus.—Mission - of Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens, to propose peace and solicit - the release of their soldiers in Sphakteria.—The Athenians, - at the instance of Kleon, require the restoration of Nisæa, - Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia, as conditions of giving up the men - in Sphakteria and making peace.—The envoys will not consent to - these demands—Kleon prevents negotiation—they are sent back - to Pylus without any result.—Remarks on this assembly and on - the conduct of Athens.—The armistice is terminated, and war - resumed at Pylus. Eurymedon keeps possession of the Lacedæmonian - fleet.—Blockade of Sphakteria by the Athenian fleet—difficulty - and hardships to the sea men of the fleet.—Protracted duration - and seeming uncertainty of the blockade—Demosthenês sends to - Athens for reinforcements to attack the island.—Proceedings in - the Athenian assembly on receiving this news—proposition of - Kleon—manœuvre of his political enemies to send him against his - will as general to Pylus.—Reflections upon this proceeding and - upon the conduct of parties at Athens.—Kleon goes to Pylus with - a reinforcement—condition of the island of Sphakteria—numbers - and positions of the Lacedæmonians in it.—Kleon and Demosthenês - land their forces in the island, and attack it.—Numerous light - troops of Demosthenês employed against the Lacedæmonians in - Sphakteria.—Distress of the Lacedæmonians—their bravery and - long resistance. They retreat to their last redoubt at the - extremity of the island. They are surrounded and forced to - surrender.—Astonishment caused throughout Greece by the - surrender of Lacedæmonian hoplites—diminished lustre of Spartan - arms.—Judgment pronounced by Thucydidês himself—reflections - upon it.—Prejudice of Thucydidês in regard to Kleon. Kleon - displayed sound judgment and decision, and was one of the - essential causes of the success.—Effect produced at Athens - by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian prisoners.—The Athenians - prosecute the war with increased hopefulness and vigor. - The Lacedæmonians make new advances for peace without - effect.—Remarks upon the policy of Athens—her chance was now - universally believed to be most favorable in prosecuting the - war.—Fluctuations in Athenian feeling for or against the war: - there were two occasions on which Kleon contributed to influence - them towards it.—Expedition of Nikias against the Corinthian - territory.—He reëmbarks—ravages Epidaurus—establishes a post - on the peninsula of Methana.—Eurymedon with the Athenian fleet - goes to Korkyra. Defeat and captivity of the Korkyræan exiles in - the island.—The captives are put to death—cruelty and horrors - in the proceeding.—Capture of Anaktorium by the Athenians - and Akarnanians.—Proceedings of the Athenians at Chios and - Lesbos.—The Athenians capture Artaphernes, a Persian envoy, on - his way to Sparta.—Succession of Persian kings—Xerxes, Artaxerxes - Longimanus, etc., Darius Nothus. 313-363 - - - CHAPTER LIII. - - EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR. - - Important operations of the eighth year of the war.—Capture - of Kythêra by the Athenians. Nikias ravages the Laconian - coast.—Capture of Thyrea—all the Æginetans resident there - are either slain in the attack or put to death afterwards as - prisoners.—Alarm and depression among the Lacedæmonians—their - insecurity in regard to the Helots.—They entrap, and cause to - be assassinated, two thousand of the bravest Helots.—Request - from the Chalkidians and Perdikkas that Spartan aid may be sent - to them under Brasidas.—Brasidas is ordered to go thither, - with Helot and Peloponnesian hoplites.—Elate and enterprising - dispositions prevalent at Athens. Plan formed against Megara. - Condition of Megara.—The Athenians, under Hippokratês and - Demosthenês, attempt to surprise Nisæa and Megara.—Conspirators - within open the gate, and admit them into the Megarian Long - Walls. They master the whole line of the Long Walls.—The - Athenians march to the gates of Megara—failure of the scheme - of the party within to open them.—The Athenians attack - Nisæa—the place surrenders to them.—Dissension of parties in - Megara—intervention of Brasidas.—Brasidas gets together an - army, and relieves Megara—no battle takes place—the Athenians - retire.—Revolution at Megara—return of the exiles from Pegæ, - under pledge of amnesty—they violate their oaths, and effect a - forcible oligarchical revolution.—Combined plan by Hippokratês - and Demosthenês for the invasion of Bœotia on three sides at - once.—Demosthenês, with an Akarnanian force, makes a descent - on Bœotia at Siphæ in the Corinthian gulf—his scheme fails and - he retires.—Disappointment of the Athenian plans—no internal - movements take place in Bœotia. Hippokratês marches with the - army from Athens to Delium in Bœotia.—Hippokratês fortifies - Delium, after which the army retires homeward.—Gathering - of the Bœotian military force at Tanagra. Pagondas, the - Theban bœotarch, determines them to fight.—Marshalling of - the Bœotian army—great depth of the Theban hoplites—special - Theban band of Three Hundred.—Order of battle of the Athenian - army.—Battle of Delium—vigorously contested—advantage derived - from the depth of the Theban phalanx.—Defeat and flight of - the Athenians—Hippokratês, with one thousand hoplites, is - slain.—Interchange of heralds—remonstrance of the Bœotians - against the Athenians for desecrating the temple of Delium—they - refuse permission to bury the slain except on condition of - quitting Delium.—Answer of the Athenian herald—he demands - permission to bury the bodies of the slain.—The Bœotians - persist in demanding the evacuation of Delium as a condition - for granting permission to bury the dead. Debate on the - subject. Remarks on the debate.—Siege and capture of Delium - by the Bœotians.—Sokratês and Alkibiadês, personally engaged - at Delium.—March of Brasidas through Thessaly to Thrace and - Macedonia. Rapidity and address with which he gets through - Thessaly.—Relations between Brasidas and Perdikkas—Brasidas - enters into an accommodation with Arrhibæus—Perdikkas is - offended.—Brasidas marches against Akanthus. State of parties - in the town.—He is admitted personally into the town to explain - his views—his speech before the Akanthian assembly.—Debate in - the Akanthian assembly, and decision of the majority voting - secretly to admit him, after much opposition.—Reflections upon - this proceeding—good political habits of the Akanthians.—Evidence - which this proceeding affords, that the body of citizens (among - the Athenian allies) did not hate Athens, and were not anxious - to revolt.—Brasidas establishes intelligences in Argilus. He - lays his plan for the surprise of Amphipolis.—Night-march of - Brasidas from Arnê, through Argilus to the river Strymon and - Amphipolis.—He becomes master of the lands round Amphipolis, - but is disappointed in gaining admission into the town.—He - offers to the citizens the most favorable terms of capitulation, - which they accept.—Amphipolis capitulates.—Thucydidês arrives - at Eion from Thasus with his squadron—not in time to preserve - Amphipolis—he preserves Eion.—Alarm and dismay produced at - Athens by the capture of Amphipolis—increased hopes among her - enemies.—Extraordinary personal glory, esteem, and influence - acquired by Brasidas.—Inaction and despondency of Athens after - the battle of Delium, especially in reference to arresting - the conquests of Brasidas in Thrace.—Loss of Amphipolis was - caused by the negligence of the Athenian commanders—Euklês, - and the historian Thucydidês.—The Athenians banish Thucydidês - on the proposition of Kleon.—Sentence of banishment passed on - Thucydidês by the Athenians—grounds of that sentence.—He justly - incurred their verdict of guilty.—Preparations of Brasidas - in Amphipolis for extended conquest—his operations against - the Aktê, or promontory of Athos.—He attacks Torônê in the - Sithonian peninsula—he is admitted into the town by an internal - party—surprises and takes it.—Some part of the population, with - the small Athenian garrison, retire to the separate citadel - called Lêkythus.—Conciliating address of Brasidas to the assembly - at Torônê.—He attacks Lêkythus and takes it by storm.—Personal - ability and conciliatory efficiency of Brasidas. 363-425 - - - CHAPTER LIV. - - TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF - AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS. - - Eighth year of the war—began with most favorable promise for - Athens—closed with great reverses to her.—Desire of Spartans to - make peace in order to regain the captives—they decline sending - reinforcements to Brasidas.—King Pleistoanax at Sparta—eager for - peace—his special reasons—his long banishment recently terminated - by recall.—Negotiations during the winter of 424-423 B.C. for - peace.—Truce for one year concluded, in March 423 B.C.—Conditions - of the truce.—Resolution to open negotiations for a definitive - treaty.—New events in Thrace—revolt of Skiônê from Athens to - Brasidas, two days after the truce was sworn.—Brasidas crosses - over to Skiônê—his judicious conduct—enthusiastic admiration - for him there.—Brasidas brings across reinforcements to - Skiônê—he conveys away the women and children into a place of - safety.—Commissioners from Sparta and Athens arrive in Thrace, to - announce to Brasidas the truce just concluded. Dispute respecting - Skiônê. The war continues in Thrace, but is suspended everywhere - else.—Revolt of Mendê from Athens—Brasidas receives the offers - of the Mendæans—engages to protect them and sends to them a - garrison against Athens. He departs upon an expedition against - Arrhibæus in the interior of Macedonia.—Nikias and Nikostratus - arrive with an Athenian armament in Pallênê. They attack Mendê. - The Lacedæmonian garrison under Polydamidas at first repulses - them.—Dissensions among the citizens of Mendê—mutiny of the Demos - against Polydamidas—the Athenians are admitted into the town.—The - Athenians besiege and blockade Skiônê. Nikias leaves a blockading - force there, and returns to Athens.—Expedition of Brasidas - along with Perdikkas into Macedonia against Arrhibæus.—Retreat - of Brasidas and Perdikkas before the Illyrians.—Address of - Brasidas to his soldiers before the retreat.—Contrast between - Grecian and barbaric military feeling.—Appeal of Brasidas to - the right of conquest or superior force.—The Illyrians attack - Brasidas in his retreat, but are repulsed.—Breach between - Brasidas and Perdikkas: the latter opens negotiations with the - Athenians.—Relations between Athens and the Peloponnesians—no - progress made towards definitive peace—Lacedæmonian reinforcement - on its way to Brasidas, prevented from passing through - Thessaly.—Incidents in Peloponnesus—the temple of Hêrê near Argos - accidentally burnt.—War in Arcadia—battle between Mantineia and - Tegea.—Bœotians at peace _de facto_, though not parties to the - truce.—Hard treatment of the Thespians by Thebes.—Expiration of - the truce for one year. Disposition of both Sparta and Athens - at that time towards peace; but peace impossible in consequence - of the relations of parties in Thrace.—No actual resumption - of hostilities, although the truce had expired, from the - month of March to the Pythian festival in August.—Alteration - in the language of statesmen at Athens—instances of Kleon - and his partisans to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the - war in Thrace.—Brasidas—an opponent of peace—his views and - motives.—Kleon—an opponent of peace—his views and motives - as stated by Thucydidês. Kleon had no personal interest in - war.—To prosecute the war vigorously in Thrace was at this - time the real political interest of Athens.—Question of peace - or war, as it stood between Nikias and Kleon, in March 422 - B.C., after the expiration of the truce for one year.—Kleon’s - advocacy of war at this moment perfectly defensible—unjust - account of his motive given by Thucydidês.—Kleon at this time - adhered more closely than any other Athenian public man to the - foreign policy of Periklês.—Dispositions of Nikias and the - peace-party in reference to the reconquest of Amphipolis.—Kleon - conducts an expedition against Amphipolis—he takes Torônê.—He - arrives at Eion—sends envoys to invite Macedonian and Thracian - auxiliaries.—Dissatisfaction of his own troops with his - inaction while waiting for these auxiliaries.—He is forced - by these murmurs to make a demonstration—he marches from - Eion along the walls of Amphipolis to reconnoitre the top - of the hill—apparent quiescence in Amphipolis.—Brasidas, at - first on Mount Kerdylium—presently moves into the town across - the bridge.—His exhortation to his soldiers.—Kleon tries to - effect his retreat.—Brasidas sallies out upon the army in - its retreat—the Athenians are completely routed—Brasidas and - Kleon both slain.—Profound sorrow in Thrace for the death of - Brasidas—funeral honors paid him in Amphipolis.—The Athenian - armament, much diminished by its loss in the battle, returns - home.—Remarks on the battle of Amphipolis—wherein consisted - the faults of Kleon.—Disgraceful conduct of the Athenian - hoplites—the defeat of Amphipolis arose partly from political - feeling hostile to Kleon.—Important effect of the death of - Brasidas, in reference to the prospects of the war—his admirable - character and efficiency.—Feelings of Thucydidês towards Brasidas - and Kleon.—Character of Kleon—his foreign policy. Internal - policy of Kleon as a citizen in constitutional life.—Picture - in the Knights of Aristophanês.—Unfairness of judging Kleon - upon such evidence.—Picture of Sokratês by Aristophanês is - noway resembling.—The vices imputed by Aristophanês to Kleon - are not reconcilable one with the other.—Kleon—a man of strong - and bitter opposition talents—frequent in accusation—often on - behalf of poor men suffering wrong.—Necessity for voluntary - accusers at Athens—general danger and obloquy attending the - function.—We have no evidence to decide in what proportion of - cases he accused wrongfully.—Private dispute between Kleon - and Aristophanês.—Negotiations for peace during the winter - following the battle of Amphipolis.—Peace called the Peace of - Nikias—concluded in March 421 B.C.—Conditions of peace.—The peace - is only partially accepted by the allies of Sparta.—The Bœotians, - Megarians, and Corinthians, all repudiate it. 426-494 - - - - -HISTORY OF GREECE. - - - - -PART II. - -CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE. - - - - -CHAPTER XLVII. - -FROM THE THIRTY YEARS’ TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN -WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE -PELOPONNESIAN WAR. - - -The judicial alterations effected at Athens by Periklês and -Ephialtês, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large -proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active -interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed; -the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical -sentiment during the past, and a cause of its farther development -during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for -personal exertion in all directions: military service on land or -sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance -in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service -especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought -about continual improvement in skill and efficiency, and the poorer -citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience -and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the -infantry or the cavalry were drawn.[1] The maritime multitude, in -addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious -training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every -year more and more above the rest of Greece: and the perfection of -this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire -was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns; the reverses -immediately preceding the thirty years truce having broken up -all Athenian land ascendency over Megara, Bœotia, and the other -continental territories adjoining to Attica. - - [1] Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 18. - -The maritime confederacy,—originally commenced at Delos, under -the headship of Athens, but with a common synod and deliberative -voice on the part of each member,—had now become transformed into a -confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as -foreign dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, -Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original -footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and -fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval -aid when required, but not of paying tribute: the discontinuance of -the deliberative synod, however, had deprived them of their original -security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated -generally the steps, we do not know them in detail, whereby this -important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent -revolution,—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos -to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the -change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted -on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact -almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the -eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness -and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must -recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was -contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by -the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every -individual member:[2] it was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, -and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these -objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the -confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the -cost of the remainder: so that when Naxos and other members actually -did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only did her -duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them. By every -such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for -money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the -power of Athens increased, until at length she found herself with an -irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed tributaries, none of whom -could escape from her constraining power,—and mistress of the sea, -the use of which was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even -if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at -the time when the treasure was removed to Athens,—probably about 460 -B.C., or shortly afterwards. - - [2] Thucyd. v. 30: about the Spartan confederacy,—εἰρημένον, - κύριον εἶναι, ὅ,τι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι - θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ. - -The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially -changed by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and -followed one upon the other without any preconcerted plan: she became -an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent -subjects, all without their own active concurrence, and in many -cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It -was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up -the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution -from each of the members: nor would it have been at all desirable -that they should do so: for while Greece generally would have been -a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would -have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have -been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phenician fleets. -But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole -alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as -subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political -incorporation or collective meeting and discussion,—without taking -any pains to maintain community of feeling with the idea of a joint -interest,—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, -over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might -have proved difficult to accomplish,—so powerful was the force of -geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and -the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every -Grecian community: but they do not appear to have ever made the -attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the -allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at -the exaltation as a matter of pride as well as profit:[3] nor did -even Periklês, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betray any -consciousness that an empire without the cement of some all-pervading -interest or attachment, must have a natural tendency to become more -and more burdensome and odious, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. -Such was the course of events which, if the judicious counsels of -Periklês had been followed, might have been postponed but could not -have been averted. - - [3] Thucyd. ii, 63. τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ - ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς - πόνους, ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν, etc. - -Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal -alliance, Periklês formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens -owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from -them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the -Persian enemy, and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters.[4] -This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had -undertaken; and, provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies -had no right to ask questions or institute control. That it was -faithfully discharged no one could deny: no ship of war except that -of Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and -western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was -kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, -and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as -for keeping the seaman in constant pay and training.[5] And such was -the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous -period preceding the thirty years’ truce, when Athens lost Megara and -Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous -maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt. - - [4] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12. - - [5] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. - -The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted -to one thousand, according to a verse of Aristophanês,[6] which -cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, -greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at -the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for the -years preceding it, is given by Thucydidês at about six hundred -talents; of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have -little or no information.[7] It was placed under the superintendence -of the Hellenotamiæ; originally officers of the confederacy, but -now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an -Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue,[8] -from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the -Peloponnesian war, is stated by Xenophon at one thousand talents: -customs, harbor, and market dues, receipts from the silver-mines at -Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, -a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, -etc., may have made up a larger sum than four hundred talents; which -sum, added to the six hundred talents from tribute, would make the -total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanês,[9] during the -ninth year of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 422, gives the general -total of that time as “nearly two thousand talents:” this is in all -probability much above the truth, though we may well imagine that -the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies may have been -augmented during the interval: I think that the alleged duplication -of the tribute by Alkibiadês, which Thucydidês nowhere notices, is -not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever -reached the sum of twelve hundred talents.[10] Whatever may have -been the actual magnitude of the Athenian budget, however, prior to -the Peloponnesian war, we know that during the larger part of the -administration of Periklês, the revenue, including tribute, was so -managed as to leave a large annual surplus; insomuch that a treasure -of coined money was accumulated in the acropolis during the years -preceding the Peloponnesian war,—which treasure, when at its maximum, -reached the great sum of nine thousand seven hundred talents (equal -to two million two hundred and thirty thousand pounds), and was still -at six thousand talents, after a serious drain for various purposes, -at the moment when that war began.[11] This system of public economy, -constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year,—in which -Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any -public reserve whatever,[12]—goes far of itself to vindicate Periklês -from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous -distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to -exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite -for living by the public purse which it is common to ascribe -to them. After the death of Kimon, no farther expeditions were -undertaken against the Persians, and even for some years before his -death, not much appears to have been done: so that the tribute-money -remained unexpended, though it was the duty of Athens to hold it in -reserve against future attack, which might at any time be renewed. - - [6] Aristophan. Vesp. 707. - - [7] The island of Kythêra was conquered by the Athenians from - Sparta in 425 B.C., and the annual tribute then imposed upon - it was four talents (Thucyd. iv, 57). In the Inscription No. - 143, ap. Boeckh, Corp. Inscr., we find some names enumerated of - tributary towns, with the amount of tribute opposite to each, - but the stone is too much damaged to give us much information. - Tyrodiza, in Thrace, paid one thousand drachms: some other towns, - or junctions of towns, not clearly discernible, are rated at one - thousand, two thousand, three thousand drachms, one talent, and - even ten talents. This inscription must be anterior to 415 B.C., - when the tribute was converted into a five per cent. duty upon - imports and exports: see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, and his - Notes upon the above-mentioned Inscription. - - It was the practice of Athens not always to rate each tributary - city separately, but sometimes to join several in one collective - rating; probably each responsible for the rest. This seems to - have provoked occasional remonstrances from the allies, in some - of which the rhetor, Antipho, was employed to furnish the speech - which the complainants pronounced before the dikastery: see - Antipho ap. Harpokration, v. Ἀπόταξις—Συντελεῖς. It is greatly - to be lamented that the orations composed by Antipho, for the - Samothrakians and Lindians,—the latter inhabiting one of the - three separate towns in the island of Rhodes,—have not been - preserved. - - [8] Xenophon, Anab. vii, 1, 27. οὐ μεῖον χιλίων ταλάντων: compare - Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, ch. 7, 15, 19. - - [9] Aristophan. Vesp. 660. τάλαντ᾽ ἐγγὺς δισχίλια. - - [10] Very excellent writers on Athenian antiquity (Boeckh, Public - Econ. of Athens, c. 15, 19, b. iii; Schömann, Antiq. J. P. Att. - sect. lxxiv; K. F. Hermann, Gr. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 157: - compare, however, a passage in Boeckh, ch. 17, p. 421, Eng. - transl., where he seems to be of an opposite opinion) accept - this statement, that the tribute levied by Athenians upon her - allies was doubled some years after the commencement of the - Peloponnesian war,—at which time it was six hundred talents,—and - that it came to amount to twelve hundred talents. Nevertheless, - I cannot follow them, upon the simple authority of Æschinês, and - the Pseudo-Andokidês (Æschin. De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 301; - Andokidês, De Pace, c. 1, and the same orator cont. Alkibiad. - c. 4). For we may state pretty confidently, that neither of the - two orations here ascribed to Andokidês is genuine: the oration - against Alkibiadês most decidedly not genuine. There remains, - therefore, as an original evidence, only the passage of Æschinês, - which has, apparently, been copied by the author of the Oration - De Pace, ascribed to Andokidês. Now the chapter of Æschinês, - which professes to furnish a general but brief sketch of Athenian - history for the century succeeding the Persian invasion, is so - full of historical and chronological inaccuracies, that we can - hardly accept it, when standing alone, as authority for any - matter of fact. In a note on the chapter immediately preceding, - I have already touched upon its extraordinary looseness of - statement,—pointed out by various commentators, among them - particularly by Mr. Fynes Clinton: see above, chap. xlv, note 2, - pp. 409-411, in the preceding volume. - - The assertion, therefore, that the tribute from the Athenian - allies was raised to the sum of twelve hundred talents annually, - comes to us only from the orator Æschinês as an original - witness: and in him it forms part of a tissue of statements - alike confused and incorrect. But against it we have a powerful - negative argument,—the perfect silence of Thucydidês. Is it - possible that that historian would have omitted all notice of - a step so very important in its effects, if Athens had really - adopted it? He mentions to us the commutation by Athens of the - tribute from her allies into a duty of five per cent. payable - by them on their exports and imports (vii, 28)—this was in the - nineteenth year of the war, 413 B.C. But anything like the - duplication of the tribute all at once, would have altered much - more materially the relations between Athens and her allies and - would have constituted in the minds of the latter a substantive - grievance, such as to aggravate the motive for revolt in a - manner which Thucydidês could hardly fail to notice. The orator - Æschinês refers the augmentation of the tribute, up to twelve - hundred talents, to the time succeeding the peace of Nikias: M. - Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, ch. 15-19, pp. 400-434) - supposes it to have taken place earlier than the representation - of the Vespæ of Aristophanês, that is, about three years before - that peace, or 423 B.C. But this would have been just before the - time of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace, and his success - in exciting revolt among the dependencies of Athens: if Athens - had doubled her tribute upon all the allies, just before that - expedition, Thucydidês could not have omitted to mention it, as - increasing the chances of success to Brasidas, and helping to - determine the resolutions of the Akanthians and others, which - were by no means adopted unanimously or without hesitation, to - revolt. - - In reference to the oration called that of Andokidês against - Alkibiadês, I made some remarks in the fourth volume of this - History (vol. iv, ch. xxxi, p. 151), tending to show it to be - spurious and of a time considerably later than that to which - it purports to belong. I will here add one other remark, which - appears to me decisive, tending to the same conclusion. - - The oration professes to be delivered in a contest of ostracism - between Nikias, Alkibiadês, and the speaker: one of the three, - he says, must necessarily be ostracized, and the question is, - to determine which of the three: accordingly, the speaker - dwells upon many topics calculated to raise a bad impression of - Alkibiadês, and a favorable impression of himself. - - Among the accusations against Alkibiadês, one is, that after - having recommended, in the assembly of the people, that the - inhabitants of Melos should be sold as slaves, he had himself - purchased a Melian woman among the captives, and had had a son by - her: it was criminal, argues the speaker, to beget offspring by - a woman whose relations he had contributed to cause to be put to - death, and whose city he had contributed to ruin (c. 8). - - Upon this argument I do not here touch, any farther than to bring - out the point of chronology. The speech, if delivered at all, - must have been delivered, at the earliest, nearly a year after - the capture of Melos by the Athenians: it may be of later date, - but it _cannot possibly be earlier_. - - Now Melos surrendered in the winter immediately preceding the - great expedition of the Athenians to Sicily in 415 B.C., which - expedition sailed about midsummer (Thucyd. v, 116; vi, 30). - Nikias and Alkibiadês both went as commanders of that expedition: - the latter was recalled to Athens for trial on the charge of - impiety about three months afterwards, but escaped in the way - home, was condemned and sentenced to banishment in his absence, - and did not return to Athens until 407 B.C., long after the death - of Nikias, who continued in command of the Athenian armament in - Sicily, enjoying the full esteem of his countrymen, until its - complete failure and ruin before Syracuse,—and perished himself - afterwards as a Syracusan prisoner. - - Taking these circumstances together, it will at once be seen that - there never can have been any time, ten months or more after the - capture of Melos, when Nikias and Alkibiadês _could_ have been - exposed to a vote of ostracism at Athens. The thing is absolutely - impossible: and the oration in which such historical and - chronological incompatibilities are embodied, must be spurious: - furthermore, it must have been composed long after the pretended - time of delivery, when the chronological series of events had - been forgotten. - - I may add that the story of this duplication of the tribute by - Alkibiadês is virtually contrary to the statement of Plutarch, - probably borrowed from Æschinês, who states that the demagogues - _gradually_ increased (κατὰ μικρὸν) the tribute to thirteen - hundred talents (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 24). - - [11] Thucyd. ii, 13. - - [12] Thucyd. i, 80. The foresight of the Athenian people, in - abstaining from immediate use of public money and laying it up - for future wants, would be still more conspicuously demonstrated, - if the statement of Æschinês, the orator, were true, that they - got together seven thousand talents between the peace of Nikias - and the Sicilian expedition. M. Boeckh believes this statement, - and says: “It is not impossible that one thousand talents might - have been laid by every year, as the amount of tribute received - was so considerable.” (Public Economy of Athens, ch. xx. p. 446, - Eng. Trans.) I do not believe the statement: but M. Boeckh and - others, who do admit it, ought in fairness to set it against the - many remarks which they pass in condemnation of the democratical - prodigality. - -Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of -Athenian revenue, however, we know that the tribute received from -the allies was by far the largest item in it.[13] And altogether the -exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian -life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy -at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, -with Attica for her territory: she was a capital or imperial city,—a -despot city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even -sometimes by her own citizens,[14]—with many dependencies attached -to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which -not merely Periklês and the other leading statesmen, but even the -humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens; and the -sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and -stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among -the dependent territories, was one important object in the eyes of -Periklês, and while he discountenanced all distant[15] and rash -enterprises, such as invasions of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out -many kleruchies and colonies of Athenian citizens, intermingled with -allies, on islands, and parts of the coast. He conducted one thousand -citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, five hundred to Naxos, and two -hundred and fifty to Andros. In the Chersonese, he farther repelled -the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook -the labor of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus, which -connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian -tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon,[16] had still -continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the -occupation of the elder Miltiadês, about eighty years before, there -had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently -intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired -both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it -does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. -The maritime expeditions of Periklês even extended into the Euxine -sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinôpê, then governed by -a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the -citizens were in active discontent. He left Lamachus with thirteen -Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven -into exile along with his friends and party: the properties of -these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of -six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and -residence with the Sinôpeans. We may presume that on this occasion -Sinôpê became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had -not been so before: but we do not know whether Kotyôra and Trapezus, -dependencies of Sinôpê, farther eastward, which the ten thousand -Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterwards, existed in the -time of Periklês or not. Moreover, the numerous and well-equipped -Athenian fleet, under the command of Periklês, produced an imposing -effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast,[17] -contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably -to the acquisition of new dependent allies. - - [13] Thucyd. i. 122-143; ii, 13. The πεντηκοστὴ, or duty of two - per cent. upon imports and exports at the Peiræus, produced to - the state a revenue of thirty-six talents in the year in which - it was farmed by Andokidês, somewhere about 400 B.C., after - the restoration of the democracy at Athens from its defeat and - subversion at the close of the Peloponnesian war (Andokidês de - Mysteriis, c. 23, p. 65). This was at a period of depression in - Athenian affairs, and when trade was doubtless not near so good - as it had been during the earlier part of the Peloponnesian war. - - It seems probable that this must have been the most considerable - permanent source of Athenian revenue next to the tribute; though - we do not know what rate of customs-duty was imposed at the - Peiræus during the Peloponnesian war. Comparing together the two - passages of Xenophon (Republ. Ath. 1, 17, and Aristophan. Vesp. - 657), we may suppose that the regular and usual rate of duty - was one per cent. or one ἑκατοστὴ,—while in case of need this - may have been doubled or tripled.—τὰς πολλὰς ἑκατοστάς, (see - Boeckh, b. iii, chs. 1-4, pp. 298-318, Eng. Trans.) The amount of - revenue derived even from this source, however, can have borne no - comparison to the tribute. - - [14] By Periklês, Thucyd. ii, 63. By Kleon, Thucyd. iii, 37. By - the envoys at Melos, v, 89. By Euphemus, vi, 85. By the hostile - Corinthians, i, 124 as a matter of course. - - [15] Plutarch, Periklês. c. 20. - - [16] Plutarch, Kimon. c. 14. - - [17] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19, 20. - -It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments -of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the -maritime empire of the city,—some rich, investing their property -in the islands as more secure—from the incontestable superiority -of Athens at sea—even than Attica, which, since the loss of -the Megarid, could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land -invasion,[18]—others poor, and hiring themselves out as laborers.[19] -The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory -of Estiæa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by -Athenian proprietors and citizens,—other places partially so -occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to -associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since -they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the -Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally -for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact, that -shortly before the Peloponnesian war, she excluded the Megarians -from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and -the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately -preceding the Peloponnesian war: nor were these relations confined to -the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western -regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this -period were Amphipolis in Thrace, and Thurii in Italy. - - [18] Xenophon, Rep. Ath. ii, 16. τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν ταῖς νήσοις - παρατίθενται, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ θάλασσαν· τὴν δὲ - Ἀττικὴν γῆν περιορῶσι τεμνομένην, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι εἰ αὐτὴν - ἐλεήσουσιν, ἑτέρων ἀγαθῶν μειζόνων στερήσονται. - - Compare also Xenophon (Memorabil. ii, 8, 1, and Symposion, iv, - 31). - - [19] See the case of the free laborer and the husbandman at - Naxos, Plato, Euthyphro, c. 3. - -Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, -under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated -near the river Strymon, in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the -spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging -from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement -of the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine Ways,—in a -situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over -the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold -and silver mines of the neighboring region,—and distant about three -English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of -the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments -at Ennea Hodoi have already been noticed,—first, that of Histiæus -the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 497-496 -B.C.), next, that of the Athenians about 465 B.C., under Leagrus -and others,—on both these occasions the intruding settlers had -been defeated and expelled by the native Thracian tribes, though -on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than -ten thousand.[20] So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a -long time from any repetition of the attempt: though it is highly -probable that individual citizens from Eion and from Thasus connected -themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this -manner actively engaged in mining, to their own great profit,—as -well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property -of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, -bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on Athenian -property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number -the historian Thucydidês himself; seemingly descended from Athenian -parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife -either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in -that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in -the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around.[21] -This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of -Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually. - - [20] Thucyd. i. 100. - - [21] Thucyd. iv, 105; Marcellinus, Vit. Thucyd. c. 19. See - Rotscher, Leben des Thukydides, ch. i, 4, p. 96, who gives a - genealogy of Thucydidês, as far as it can be made out with any - probability. The historian was connected by blood with Miltiadês - and Kimon, as well as with Olorus, king of one of the Thracian - tribes, whose daughter Hegesipylê was wife of Miltiadês, the - conqueror of Marathon. In this manner, therefore, he belonged to - one of the ancient heroic families of Athens, and even of Greece, - being an Ækid through Ajax and Philæus (Marcellin. c. 2). - -The colony under Agnon, despatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., -appears to have been both numerous and well sustained, inasmuch as -it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in -spite of those formidable Edonian neighbors who had baffled the two -preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of -Amphipolis,—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded -on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed -extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians: some were of -Chalkidic race, others came from Argilus, a Grecian city colonized -from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of -the Strymon, immediately opposite to Amphipolis,[22] and which was -included among the subject allies of Athens. Amphipolis, connected -with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most -important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and -Macedonia. - - [22] Thucyd. iv, 102; v, 6. - -The colony of Thurii on the coast of the gulf of Tarentum in -Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, -was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, -not long after the conclusion of the thirty years’ truce with -Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the -Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part -remained unappropriated: the descendants of the former inhabitants, -dispersed at Laus and in other portions of the territory, were not -strong enough to establish any new city; nor did it suit the views -of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more -than sixty years, however, during which one unsuccessful attempt -at occupation had been made by some Thessalian settlers, these -Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and -protect the recolonization; the proposition having been made in -vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet -and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Periklês with ten ships as -chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded under the auspices of -Athens. The settlers were collected from all parts of Greece, and -included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. -But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to -be treated as privileged citizens, and monopolized for themselves -the possession of political powers, as well as the most valuable -lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also -assumed an offensive preëminence over the other women of the city -in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and -monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the -ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or -to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded -under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely -to have any lasting success: and we find that after no very long -period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against -the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided -the entire territory of the city, upon equal principles, among the -colonists of every different race. This revolution enabled them to -make peace with the Krotoniates, who had probably been unfriendly -so long as their ancient enemies, the Sybarites, were masters of -the city, and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging -their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, -democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and -without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous -disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow -of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population -of Thurii was, we may judge from the denominations of the ten -tribes,—such was the number of tribes established, after the model -of Athens,—Arkas, Achaïs, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, -Athenaïs, Euboïs, Nesiôtis. From this mixture of race they could not -agree in recognizing or honoring an Athenian œkist, or indeed any -œkist except Apollo.[23] The Spartan general, Kleandridas, banished a -few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens -along with king Pleistoanax, removed to Thurii, and was appointed -general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war -was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of -Herakleia, half-way between the two,—in the fertile territory called -Siritis.[24] - - [23] Diodor. xii, 35. - - [24] Diodor. xii, 11, 12; Strabo. vi, 264: Plutarch, Periklês, c. - 22. - -The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is, that the -rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus, were both domiciliated -there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly -only by a feeble tie; nor was it numbered among the tributary subject -allies.[25] From the circumstance that so large a proportion of the -settlers at Thurii were not native Athenians, we may infer that -there were not many of the latter at that time who were willing to -put themselves so far out of connection with Athens,—even though -tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising -territory. And Periklês was probably anxious that those poor citizens -for whom emigration was desirable should become kleruchs in some -of the islands or ports of the Ægean, where they would serve—like -the colonies of Rome—as a sort of garrison for the insurance of the -Athenian empire.[26] - - [25] The Athenians pretended to no subject allies beyond the - Ionian gulf, Thucyd. vi, 14: compare vi, 45, 104; vii, 34. - Thucydidês does not even mention Thurii, in his catalogue of - the allies of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war - (Thucyd. ii, 15). - - [26] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. - -The fourteen years between the thirty years’ truce and the breaking -out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period of full maritime empire -on the part of Athens,—partially indeed resisted, but never with -success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to -her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, -from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in -architecture. Since the death of Kimon, Periklês had become more and -more the first citizen in the commonwealth: his qualities told for -more the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses -which preceded the thirty years’ truce had not overthrown him, -since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmidês into -Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence -of Periklês had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to -have become stronger and better organized than it had been before; -and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective -than Kimon,—Thucydidês, son of Melêsias. The new chief was a near -relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to -that of Periklês: a statesman and orator rather than a general, -though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every -leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydidês, the -political and parliamentary opposition against Periklês assumed -a constant character and an organization such as Kimon, with his -exclusively military aptitudes, had never been able to establish. -The aristocratical party in the commonwealth,—the “honorable and -respectable” citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their -own nomenclature,—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of -undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, -sitting together in a particular section, so as to be conspicuously -parted from the Demos. In this manner, their applause and dissent, -their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts -to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes -than it had been before, when these distinguished persons had been -intermingled with the mass of citizens.[27] Thucydidês himself was -eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Periklês,—perhaps hardly -inferior even to him. We are told that in reply to a question put to -him by Archidamus, whether Periklês or he were the better wrestler, -Thucydidês replied: “Even when I throw him, he denies that he has -fallen, gains his point, and talks over those who have actually seen -him fall.”[28] - - [27] Compare the speech of Nikias, in reference to the younger - citizens and partisans of Alkibiadês sitting together near the - latter in the assembly,—οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ - ~παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους~ φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις - ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, εἴ τῴ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, - etc. (Thucyd. vi, 13.) See also Aristophanês, Ekklesiaz. 298, - _seq._, about partisans sitting near together. - - [28] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8. Ὅταν ἐγὼ καταβάλω παλαίων, ἐκεῖνος - ἀντιλέγων ὡς οὐ πέπτωκε, νικᾷ, καὶ μεταπείθει τοὺς ὁρῶντας. - -Such an opposition made to Periklês, in all the full license which a -democratical constitution permitted, must have been both efficient -and embarrassing; but the pointed severance of the aristocratical -chiefs, which Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, introduced, contributed -probably at once to rally the democratical majority round Periklês, -and to exasperate the bitterness of party-conflict.[29] As far as -we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly -upon the pacific policy of Periklês towards the Persians, partly -upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydidês contended that -Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks, by having drawn the -confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretence -of greater security, and then employing it, not in prosecuting war -against the Persians,[30] but in beautifying Athens by new temples -and costly statues. To this Periklês replied, that Athens had -undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute-money, to -protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy,—that -she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and -retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for -the future;—that, under such circumstances, she owed no account to -her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty -to expend it for purposes useful and honorable to the city. In -this point of view it was an object of great public importance to -render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas -generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated ornaments, -sculptural and architectural,—and by religious festivals,—frequent, -splendid, musical, and poetical. - - [29] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. ἡ δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἅμιλλα καὶ φιλοτιμία - τῶν ἀνδρῶν βαθυτάτην τομὴν τεμοῦσα τῆς πόλεως, τὸ μὲν δῆμον, τὸ - δ᾽ ὀλίγους ἐποίησε καλεῖσθαι. - - [30] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12. διέβαλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις - βοῶντες, ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἀδοξεῖ καὶ κακῶς ἀκούει τὰ κοινὰ τῶν - Ἑλλήνων χρήματα πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐκ Δήλου μεταγαγών, ἣ δ᾽ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ - πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν προφάσεων, δείσαντα τοὺς - βαρβάρους ἐκεῖθεν ἀνελέσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν ἐν ὀχυρῷ τὰ κοινά, - ταύτην ἀνῄρηκε Περικλῆς, etc. - - Compare the speech of the Lesbians, and their complaints against - Athens, at the moment of their revolt in the fourth year of the - Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. iii, 10); where a similar accusation - is brought forward,—ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς (the Athenians) - τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν - ἐπαγομένους, etc. - -Such was the answer made by Periklês in defence of his policy -against the opposition headed by Thucydidês. And as far as we can -make out the ground taken by both parties, the answer was perfectly -satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Periklês -continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably -complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so -far as to encroach upon the exigences of defence. What Thucydidês and -his partisans appear to have urged, was, that this common fund should -still continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian -king, in Egypt and elsewhere,—conformably to the projects pursued -by Kimon during his life.[31] But Periklês was right in contending -that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either -to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant -defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. -The Persian force was already kept away, both from the waters of the -Ægean and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty -of Kallias, or—if that treaty be supposed apocryphal—by a conduct -practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The -_allies_, indeed, might have had some ground of complaint against -Periklês, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from -them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate -purposes of the confederacy, or for not having collected their -positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that -this was the argument adopted by Thucydidês and his party, nor was it -calculated to find favor either with aristocrats or democrats, in the -Athenian assembly. - - [31] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20. - -Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the -parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Periklês—in acting -as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the -active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies, we shall -find that the schemes of Periklês were at the same time eminently -Pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing -the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious -offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing -attraction,—he intended to exalt her into something greater than an -imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her -the centre of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, -and the type of strong democratical patriotism combined with full -liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely -to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the -admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbors, so -as to procure for Athens a moral ascendency much beyond the range -of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a -visible grandeur,[32] which made her appear even much stronger than -she really was,—and which had the farther effect of softening to the -minds of the subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it -served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of -energetic action even under full license of criticism,—of elegant -pursuits economically followed,—and of a love for knowledge without -enervation of character. Such were the views of Periklês in regard -to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian -war, as we find them recorded in his celebrated Funeral Oration, -pronounced in the first year of that war,—an exposition forever -memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as -conceived by its ablest president. - - [32] Thucyd. i, 10. - -So bitter, however, was the opposition made by Thucydidês and his -party to this projected expenditure,—so violent and pointed did -the scission of aristocrats and democrats become,—that the dispute -came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian -constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal -party-leaders,—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which -preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly -that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to -meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydidês, in -order to procure the banishment of Periklês, the more powerful person -of the two, and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The -challenge was accepted by Periklês and his friends, and the result -of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned -Thucydidês to ostracism.[33] And it seems that the majority must have -been very decisive, for the party of Thucydidês was completely broken -by it: and we hear of no other single individual equally formidable -as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of -Periklês. - - [33] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11-14. Τέλος δὲ πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην - ~εἰς ἀγῶνα~ περὶ τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστὰς ~καὶ διακινδυνεύσας~, - ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐξέβαλε, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἑταιρείαν. - See, in reference to the principle of the ostracism, a remarkable - incident at Magnesia, between two political rivals, Krêtinês and - Hermeias: also the just reflections of Montesquieu, Esprit des - Loix, xxvi, c. 17; xxix, c. 7. - -The ostracism of Thucydidês apparently took place about two years[34] -after the conclusion of the thirty years’ truce,—443-442 B.C.,—and -it is to the period immediately following that the great Periklêan -works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out -of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the -third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbor was the -proposition of Periklês, at what precise time we do not know. The -long walls originally completed—not long after the battle of Tanagra, -as has already been stated—were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, -another from Athens to Phalêrum: the space between them was broad, -and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus -would be interrupted. Accordingly, Periklês now induced the people -to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the -first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance[35]—seemingly -near one furlong—from it: so that the communication between the -city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even -assuming an enemy to have got within the Phaleric wall. It was -seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal -in Peiræus, alleged by Isokratês to have cost one thousand talents, -were constructed:[36] while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out -anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently, -this was something new in Greece,—the towns generally, and Athens -itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or -width, or continuity of streets:[37] and Hippodamus the Milesian, a -man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the -age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having -laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of -them at least, permanently bore his name,—the Hippodamian agora.[38] -At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius -in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the -structure of towns began to be regularized also: moreover, we are -told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went -as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to -straight and wide streets.[39] - - [34] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 16: the indication of time, however, - is vague. - - [35] Plato, Gorgias, p. 455, with Scholia; Plutarch, Periklês, c. - 13: Forchhammer, Topographie von Athen, in Kieler Philologische - Studien, pp. 279-282. - - [36] Isokratês, Orat. vii: Areopagit. p. 153. c. 27. - - [37] See Dikæarchus, Vit. Græciæ, Fragm. ed. Fuhr. p. 140: - compare the description of Platæa in Thucydidês, ii, 3. - - All the older towns now existing in the Grecian islands are put - together in this same manner,—narrow, muddy, crooked ways,—few - regular continuous lines of houses: see Ross, Reisen in den - Griechischen Inseln, Letter xxvii, vol. ii, p. 20. - - [38] Aristotle, Politic. ii, 5, 1; Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 4, 1; - Harpokration, v, Ἱπποδάμεια. - - [39] Diodor, xii, 9. - -The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out, was not without -its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. -But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real -glory of the Periklêan age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was -constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great -Panathenaic solemnity; next, the splendid temple of Athênê, called -the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture and -reliefs; lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of -the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the -solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that -the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 -B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which -latter year the Peloponnesian war began.[40] Progress was also made -in restoring or reconstructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of -Athênê Polias, the patron goddess of the city,—which had been burnt -in the invasion of Xerxes; but the breaking out of the Peloponnesian -war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of -the great temple of Dêmêter, at Eleusis, for the celebration of -the Eleusinian mysteries,—that of Athênê, at Sunium,—and that of -Nemesis, at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the -architecture: three statues of Athênê, all by the hand of Pheidias, -decorated the acropolis,—one colossal, forty-seven feet high, of -ivory, in the Parthenon,[41]—a second of bronze, called the Lemnian -Athênê,—a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athênê -Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible -from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea. - - [40] Leake, Topography of Athens, Append. ii and iii, pp. - 328-336, 2d edit. - - [41] See Leake, Topography of Athens, 2d ed. p. 111, Germ. - transl. O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 18) mentions no less than - eight celebrated statues of Athênê, by the hand of Pheidias,—four - in the acropolis of Athens. - -It is not, of course, to Periklês that the renown of these splendid -productions of art belongs: but the great sculptors and architects -by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same -period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy which called -forth a similar creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, -and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal -name,—Pheidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the -original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art -appear to have disengaged themselves from that hardness of execution -and adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts of his -predecessors.[42] He was the great director and superintendent of -all those decorative additions whereby Periklês imparted to Athens -a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city: -the architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—Iktînus, -Kallikratês, Korœbus, Mnesiklês, and others—worked under his -superintendence: and he had, besides, a school of pupils and -subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labors was confided. -With all the great additions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of -Athens, his last and greatest achievement was out of Athens,—the -colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in -the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. The effect -produced by this stupendous work, sixty feet high, in ivory and -gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions -of Grecian poetry and religion, upon the minds of all beholders for -many centuries successively,—was such as never has been, and probably -never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane. - - [42] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-15; O. Müller, De Phidiæ Vitâ, pp - 34-60, also his work, Archäologie der Kunst, sects. 108-113. - -Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only -as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are phenomena -of extraordinary importance. When we read the profound impression -which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may -judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw -them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been -ruined by the occupation of Xerxes: since that period, the Greeks -had seen, first, the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an -enlarged scale,—next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and -magazines,—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, -thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, -arms, ships, etc., in Greece,[43]—lastly, the rapid creation of so -many new miracles of art,—the sculptures of Pheidias as well as -the paintings of the Thasian painter, Polygnôtus, in the temple of -Theseus, and in the portico called Pœkilê. Plutarch observes[44] -that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most -remarkable circumstance connected with them; and so it probably -might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The -gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire -were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped -her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of -power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame -the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta.[45] The cost was doubtless -prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there -was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable -tribute annually coming in: if we may trust a computation which -seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less -than three thousand talents in the aggregate,—about six hundred and -ninety thousand pounds.[46] The expenditure of so large a sum was, -of course, the source of great private gain to the contractors, -tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, etc., -concerned in it: in one way or another, it distributed itself over a -large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials -employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly -description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the -gods: marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athênê, -and ivory employed in its place;[47] while the gold with which it -was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents.[48] A large -expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, -was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, -which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and -magnificence, and repaid by grateful deference the rich men who -indulged in it. Periklês knew well that the visible splendor of -the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great -real power to appear even greater than its reality, and would thus -procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps even -an ascendency—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain -that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak -of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of -involuntary deference. - - [43] Thucyd. i, 80. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, - πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις, καὶ - ὄχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστὶν, etc. - - [44] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13. - - [45] Thucyd. i, 10. - - [46] See Leake, Topography of Athens, Append. iii, p. 329, 2d ed. - Germ. transl. Colonel Leake, with much justice, contends that the - amount of two thousand and twelve talents, stated by Harpokration - out of Philochorus as the cost of the Propylæa alone, must be - greatly exaggerated. Mr. Wilkins (Atheniensia, p. 84) expresses - the same opinion; remarking that the transport of marble from - Pentelikus to Athens is easy and on a descending road. - - Demetrius Phalereus (ap. Cicer. de Officiis, ii, 17) blamed - Periklês for the large sum expended upon the Propylæa; nor is it - wonderful that he uttered this censure, if he had been led to - rate the cost of them at two thousand and twelve talents. - - [47] Valer. Maxim. i, 7, 2. - - [48] Thucyd. ii, 13. - -A step taken by Periklês, apparently not long after the commencement -of the thirty years’ truce, evinces how much this ascendency was -in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both -of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon -the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great -and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be -held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended -congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt -by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows, as on that -occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of -maritime commerce for all. Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round -to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens,—a Pan-Hellenic -congress for Pan-Hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to -Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the -jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies: of the rest -we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate -the whole scheme.[49] It is to be remarked that the dependent allies -of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities -perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens -was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that -such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new -possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed -fractions of the Greek name,—a comprehensive benefit, to which Sparta -was at once incompetent and indifferent, but which might, perhaps, -have been realized under Athens, and seems in this case to have been -sincerely aimed at by Periklês. The events of the Peloponnesian war, -however, extinguished all hopes of any such union. - - [49] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17. Plutarch gives no precise date, - and O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 9) places these steps for - convocation of a congress before the first war between Sparta and - Athens and the battle of Tanagra,—_i. e._, before 460 B.C. But - this date seems to me improbable: Thebes was not yet renovated - in power, nor had Bœotia as yet recovered from the fruits of her - alliance with the Persians; moreover, neither Athens nor Periklês - himself seem to have been at that time in a situation to conceive - so large a project; which suits in every respect much better for - the later period, after the thirty years’ truce, but before the - Peloponnesian war. - -The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the thirty -years’ truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one -of undisturbed peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period -occurred the formidable revolt of Samos. - -That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the -allies of Athens,[50]—more powerful even than Chios or Lesbos, and -standing on the same footing as the two latter; that is, paying -no tribute-money,—a privilege when compared with the body of the -allies,—but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, -subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchical -government, its fortifications, and its military force. Like most -of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion -of territory on the mainland, between which and the territory of -Milêtus, lay the small town of Priênê, one of the twelve original -members contributing to the Pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the -possession of this town of Priênê, a war broke out between the -Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the thirty years’ truce -(B.C. 440-439): whether the town had before been independent, we do -not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell -into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as -they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of -the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a -party in Samos itself opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. -The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter -before discussion and award at Athens, with which the Samians refused -to comply:[51] whereupon an armament of forty ships was despatched -from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratical -government; leaving in it a garrison, and carrying away to Lemnos -fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchical families, -to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number -retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with -Pissuthnês, the satrap of Sardis, to procure aid and restoration. -Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over -in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchical -party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian -garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnês. They were -farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their -own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt -against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, -that though, by such a proceeding, they would of course draw upon -themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was -to resume aggressive hostilities against Milêtus,[52] whither they -sailed with a powerful naval force of seventy ships, twenty of them -carrying troops aboard. - - [50] Thucyd. i, 115; viii, 76; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28. - - [51] Thucyd. i, 115; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 25. Most of the - statements which appear in this chapter of Plutarch—over and - above the concise narrative of Thucydidês—appear to be borrowed - from exaggerated party stories of the day. We need make no remark - upon the story, that Periklês was induced to take the side of - Milêtus against Samos, by the fact that Aspasia was a native - of Milêtus. Nor is it at all more credible that the satrap - Pissuthnês, from good-will towards Samos, offered Periklês ten - thousand golden staters as an inducement to spare Samos. It may - perhaps be true however, that the Samian oligarchy, and those - wealthy men whose children were likely to be taken as hostages, - tried the effect of large bribes upon the mind of Periklês, to - prevail upon him not to alter the government. - - [52] Thucyd. i, 114, 115. - -Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of -sixty triremes—probably all that were in complete readiness—was -despatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Periklês -himself and the poet Sophoklês,[53] both seemingly included among -the ten ordinary stratêgi of the year. But it was necessary to -employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from -Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophoklês went in person;[54] -partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of -the Phenician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that -Periklês had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet -he did not hesitate to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships -on its way back from Milêtus, near the island of Tragia, and was -victorious in the action. Presently, he was reinforced by forty -ships from Athens, and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so -as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian -land-force, and blocked up the harbor with a portion of his fleet, -surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile, -the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming -of the Phenician fleet, and the report of their approach became -again so prevalent that Periklês felt obliged to take sixty ships, -out of the total one hundred and twenty-five, to watch for them off -the coast of Kaunus and Karia, where he remained for about fourteen -days. The Phenician fleet[55] never came, though Diodorus affirms -that it was actually on its voyage. Pissuthnês certainly seems to -have promised, and the Samians to have expected it: but I incline -to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage -revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap, nevertheless, did not -choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the -Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian -promontory. The departure of Periklês, however, so much weakened the -Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of -their harbor in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under -the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher -Melissus,—surprised and ruined the blockading squadron, and gained -a victory over the remaining fleet, before the ships could be -fairly got out to sea.[56] For fourteen days they remained masters -of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper: nor -was it until the return of Periklês that they were again blocked -up. Reinforcements, however, were now multiplied to the blockading -squadron,—from Athens, forty ships, under Thucydidês,[57] Agnon, and -Phormion, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Antiklês, besides thirty -from Chios and Lesbos,—making altogether near two hundred sail. -Against this overwhelming force, Melissus and the Samians made an -unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked -up, and remained so for nearly nine months, until they could hold -out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to raze their -fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages -for future good conduct, and to make good by stated instalments the -whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached one thousand -talents. The Byzantines, too, made their submission at the same -time.[58] - - [53] Strabo, xiv, p. 638; Schol. Aristeidês, t. iii, p. 485, - Dindorf. - - [54] See the interesting particulars recounted respecting - Sophoklês by the Chian poet, Ion, who met and conversed with him - during the course of this expedition (Athenæus, xiii, p. 603). - He represents the poet as uncommonly pleasing and graceful in - society, but noway distinguished for active capacity. Sophoklês - was at this time in peculiar favor, from the success of his - tragedy, Antigonê, the year before. See the chronology of - these events discussed and elucidated in Boeckh’s preliminary - Dissertation to the Antigonê, c. 6-9. - - [55] Diodor. xi, 27. - - [56] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 26. Plutarch seems to have had - before him accounts respecting this Samian campaign, not only - from Ephorus, Stesimbrotus, and Duris, but also from Aristotle: - and the statements of the latter must have differed thus far - from Thucydidês, that he affirmed Melissus the Samian general to - have been victorious over Periklês himself, which is not to be - reconciled with the narrative of Thucydidês. - - The Samian historian, Duris, living about a century after this - siege, seems to have introduced many falsehoods respecting the - cruelties of Athens: see Plutarch, _l. c._ - - [57] It appears very improbable that this Thucydidês can be the - historian himself. If it be Thucydidês son of Melêsias, we must - suppose him to have been restored from ostracism before the - regular time,—a supposition indeed noway inadmissible in itself, - but which there is nothing else to countenance. The author of the - Life of Sophoklês, as well as most of the recent critics, adopt - this opinion. - - On the other hand, it may have been a third person named - Thucydidês; for the name seems to have been common, as we might - guess from the two words of which it is compounded. We find a - third Thucydidês mentioned viii, 92—a native of Pharsalus: and - the biographer, Marcellinus seems to have read of many persons so - called (Θουκύδιδαι πολλοὶ, p. xvi, ed. Arnold). The subsequent - history of Thucydidês son of Melêsias, is involved in complete - obscurity. We do not know the incident to which the remarkable - passage in Aristophanês (Acharn. 703) alludes,—compare Vespæ, - 946: nor can we confirm the statement which the Scholiast cites - from Idomeneus, to the effect that Thucydidês was banished and - fled to Artaxerxes: see Bergk. Reliq. Com. Att. p. 61. - - [58] Thucyd. i, 117; Diodor. xii, 27, 28; Isokratês, De Permutat. - Or. xv, sect. 118; Cornel. Nepos, Vit. Timoth. c. 1. - - The assertion of Ephorus (see Diodorus, xii, 28, and Ephori - Fragm. 117 ed. Marx, with the note of Marx) that Periklês - employed battering machines against the town, under the - management of the Klazomenian Artemon, was called in question - by Herakleidês Ponticus, on the ground that Artemon was a - contemporary of Anakreon, near a century before: and Thucydidês - represents Periklês to have captured the town altogether by - blockade. - -Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as -illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, -that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from -Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that even -Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left -unassailed. Now, it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies -near Byzantium, or anywhere else, availed themselves of so favorable -an opportunity to revolt also: a fact which seems plainly to imply -that there was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. -Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnês might have -realized his promise of bringing in the Phenician fleet, which would -have been a serious calamity for the Ægean Greeks, and was only kept -off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire. - -Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnês, -but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom, at a special -meeting, the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. -Notwithstanding the thirty years’ truce then subsisting, of which -only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by -Athens,—many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians: -what part Sparta herself took, we do not know,—but the Corinthians -were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only -contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the -Samian request, but also recognized the right of each confederacy to -punish its own recusant members, and this was the decision ultimately -adopted, for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit, in the -eyes of Athens, as the chief authors.[59] Certainly, if the contrary -policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great -danger, the Phenician fleet would probably have been brought in also, -and the future course of events might have been greatly altered. - - [59] Thucyd. i, 40, 41. - -Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a -matter of certainty, that the Athenians would renew the democratical -government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet, if -they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt -to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos -again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, towards the latter -division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B.C., and it then appears -with an established oligarchical government of geomori, or landed -proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising -during the course of that year.[60] As Samos remained, during the -interval between 439 B.C. and 412 B.C., unfortified, deprived of its -fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens,—and -as it, nevertheless, either retained or acquired its oligarchical -government; so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically -interfered to democratize by violence the subject-allies, in cases -where the natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The -condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt, hereafter to be -related, will be found to confirm this conclusion.[61] - - [60] Thucyd. viii, 21. - - [61] Compare Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, sect. 58, - vol. ii, p. 82. - -On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Periklês was -chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in -the war, to whom, according to custom, solemn and public obsequies -were celebrated in the suburb called Kerameikus. This custom -appears to have been introduced shortly after the Persian war,[62] -and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the patriotism of the -citizens, especially when the speaker elected to deliver it was of -the personal dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Periklês. -He was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citizens: -once after the Samian success, and a second time in the first year -of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on the first occasion has -not reached us,[63] but the second has been fortunately preserved, -in substance at least, by Thucydidês, who also briefly describes the -funeral ceremony,—doubtless the same on all occasions. The bones -of the deceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before -the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might have the -opportunity of bringing offerings: they were then placed in coffins -of cypress, and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at -the Kerameikus; one coffin for each of the ten tribes, and one empty -couch, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones -had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each -followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a numerous -procession both of citizens and strangers. So soon as the bones had -been consigned to the grave, some distinguished citizen, specially -chosen for the purpose, mounted an elevated stage, and addressed to -the multitude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect produced -by that of Periklês after the Samian expedition, that, when he had -concluded, the audience present testified their emotion in the -liveliest manner, and the women especially crowned him with garlands, -like a victorious athlete.[64] Only Elpinikê, sister of the deceased -Kimon, reminded him that the victories of her brother had been more -felicitous, as gained over Persians and Phenicians, and not over -Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, the friend of -Kimon, reported what he thought an unseemly boast of Periklês,—to the -effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, -while _he_ in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of -all the Ionic communities.[65] But if we possessed the actual speech -pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honor -of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their -achievement in favorable comparison with that of Agamemnon and his -host,—not himself with Agamemnon. - - [62] See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland - und Rom; Diodor. xi, 33; Dionys. Hal. A. R. v, 17. - - Periklês, in the funeral oration preserved by Thucydidês (ii, - 35-40), begins by saying—Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε εἰρηκότων ἤδη - ἐπαινοῦσι ~τὸν προσθέντα~ τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, etc. - - The Scholiast, and other commentators—K. F. Weber and Westermann - among the number—make various guesses as to _what_ celebrated man - is here designated as the introducer of the custom of a funeral - harangue. The Scholiast says, Solon: Weber fixes on Kimon: - Westermann, on Aristeidês: another commentator on Themistoklês. - But we may reasonably doubt whether _any one_ very celebrated man - is specially indicated by the words τὸν προσθέντα. To commend the - introducer of the practice, is nothing more than a phrase for - commending the practice itself. - - [63] Some fragments of it seem to have been preserved, in the - time of Aristotle: see his treatise De Rhetoricâ, i, 7; iii, 10, - 3. - - [64] Compare the enthusiastic demonstrations which welcomed - Brasidas at Skiônê (Thucyd. iv, 121). - - [65] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28; Thucyd. ii, 34. - -Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that -the result of the Samian war not only rescued the Athenian empire -from great peril,[66] but rendered it stronger than ever: while the -foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterwards, -strengthened it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few -years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, -until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The -feeling common among them towards Athens, seems to have been neither -attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence -in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really -existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but -from the general political instinct of the Greek mind,—desire of -separate autonomy for each city; which manifested itself in each, -through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by Athens, -and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from the Grecian -communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, -the condition of a subject-ally of Athens was treated as one of -degradation and servitude: and in proportion as fear and hatred of -Athens became more and more predominant among the allies of Sparta, -they gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so -as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject-allies of -the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and -every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, -Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated -to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, -which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to -encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such -encouragement a part of her policy. And had she even tried sincerely -to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest, and the -attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political -separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took -no such pains,—with the usual morality that grows up in the minds -of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled -to exact obedience as her right; and some of the Athenian speakers -in Thucydidês go so far as to disdain all pretence of legitimate -power, even such as might fairly be set up, resting the supremacy -of Athens on the naked plea of superior force.[67] As the allied -cities were mostly under democracies,—through the indirect influence -rather than the systematic dictation of Athens,—yet each having its -own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements -for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with -some few citizens apart: while the people, though sharing more or -less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their -own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always -backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither -Periklês nor Kleon, indeed, lay stress on the attachment of the -people as distinguished from that of the Few, in these dependent -cities; but the argument is strongly insisted on by Diodorus,[68] -in the discussion respecting Mitylênê after its surrender: and as -the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta -became more and more identified with the internal preponderance of -democracy or oligarchy in each.[69] We shall find that in most of -those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding -circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of -oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while -in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, -there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing -like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In -the case of Mitylênê,[70] in the fourth year of the war, it was the -aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon -as they obtained arms, actually declared in favor of Athens: and the -secession of Chios, the greatest of all the allies, in the twentieth -year of the Peloponnesian war, even after all the hardships which -the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the -ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse,—was -both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations -of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence, but -against the inclination, of their own people.[71] In like manner, -the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian -democracy been previously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and -his oligarchical confederates. So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in -Mendê, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested -from Athens by Brasidas, we find the latter secretly introduced by -a few conspirators, while the bulk of the citizens do not hail him -at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they -acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, -and his demeanor, just as well as conciliating, soon gains their -esteem: but neither in Akanthus nor in Amphipolis would he have -been admitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not -been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and -their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the walls.[72] -These particular examples warrant us in affirming, that though the -oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off -the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in following -them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make -sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Grecian desire -for separate autonomy,[73] felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous -pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the -change could be made with safety: but their condition was not one -of positive hardship, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of -such a change,—partly from the coercive hand of Athens, partly from -new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them, and not -least, from their own oligarchy. Of course, the different allied -cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more -averse to Athens than others. - - [66] A short fragment remaining from the comic poet Eupolis - (Κόλακες, Fr. xvi, p. 493, ed. Meineke), attests the anxiety at - Athens about the Samian war, and the great joy when the island - was reconquered: compare Aristophan. Vesp. 283. - - [67] Thucyd. iii, 37; ii, 63. See the conference, at the island - of Melos in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. - v, 89, _seq._), between the Athenian commissioners and the - Melians. I think, however, that this conference is less to be - trusted as based in reality, than the speeches in Thucydidês - generally,—of which more hereafter. - - [68] Thucyd. iii, 47. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς - πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστὶ, καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐὰν - βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθὺς, etc. - - [69] See the striking observations of Thucydidês, iii, 82, 83; - Aristotel. Politic. v, 6, 9. - - [70] Thucyd. iii, 27. - - [71] Thucyd. viii, 9-14. He observes, also, respecting the - Thasian oligarchy just set up in lieu of the previous democracy - by the Athenian oligarchical conspirators who were then - organizing the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens,—that - they immediately made preparations for revolting from - Athens,—ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ ἐβούλοντο, τὴν πόλιν τε - ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσθαι, καὶ ~τὸν ἐναντιωσόμενον δῆμον καταλελύσθαι~ - (viii, 64). - - [72] Thucyd. iv, 86, 88, 106, 123. - - [73] See the important passage, Thucyd. viii, 48. - -The particular modes in which Athenian supremacy was felt as a -grievance by the allies appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The -annual tribute. 2. The encroachments, exactions, or perhaps plunder, -committed by individual Athenians, who would often take advantage of -their superior position, either as serving in the naval armaments, as -invested with the function of inspectors as placed in garrison, or as -carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which -the allies were placed, of bringing a large proportion of their -judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens. - -As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount had been -but little raised from its first settlement down to the beginning -of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was six hundred talents -yearly:[74] it appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment -corrected, in every fifth year, at which period the collecting -officers may probably have been changed; but we shall afterwards -find it becoming larger and more burdensome. The same gradual -increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of -inconvenience,—vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, -chiefly officers of armaments, or powerful citizens.[75] Doubtless -this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when -the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs, but it was probably -not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the -Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more -apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering -ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire. - - [74] Xenophon. Repub. Athen. iii, 5. πλὴν αἱ τάξεις τοῦ φόρου· - τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δι᾽ ἔτους πέμπτου. - - [75] Xenophon. Repub. Athen. i, 14. Περὶ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων, οἱ - ἐκπλέοντες συκοφαντοῦσιν, ὡς δοκοῦσι, καὶ μισοῦσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς, - etc. - - Who are the persons designated by the expression οἱ ἐκπλέοντες, - appears to be specified more particularly a little farther on (i, - 18); it means the generals, the officers, the envoys, etc. sent - forth by Athens. - -But the third circumstance above noticed—the subjection of the allied -cities to the Athenian dikasteries—has been more dwelt upon as a -grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. -We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction -exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, -at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an -indispensable element of that confederacy, that the members should -forego their right of private war among each other, and submit their -differences to peaceable arbitration,—a covenant introduced even -into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely -essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against -Persia.[76] Of course, many causes of dispute, public as well as -private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and -seaports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of -fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod -of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board -of arbitration for such disputes, and a habit must thus have been -formed, of recognizing a sort of federal tribunal,—to decide -peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged its duties, -both towards the confederacy collectively, and towards other -allies with their individual citizens separately,—as well as to -enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to -the right which Sparta and her confederacy claimed and exercised -also.[77] Now from the beginning, the Athenians were the guiding -and enforcing presidents of this synod, and when it gradually died -away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its -functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over -the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became -changed into an Athenian empire,—the judicial functions of the synod -being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and -doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have -been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, -especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them. - - [76] See the expression in Thucydidês (v, 27) describing the - conditions required when Argos was about to extend her alliances - in Peloponnesus. The conditions were two. 1. That the city should - be autonomous. 2. Next, that it should be willing to submit its - quarrels to equitable arbitration,—ἥτις αὐτόνομός τέ ἐστι, καὶ - δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι. - - In the oration against the Athenians, delivered by the Syracusan - Hermokratês at Kamarina, Athens is accused of having enslaved her - allies partly on the ground that they neglected to perform their - military obligations, partly because they made war upon each - other (Thucyd. vi, 76), partly also on other specious pretences. - How far this charge against Athens is borne out by the fact, we - can hardly say; in all those particular examples which Thucydidês - mentions of subjugation of allies by Athens, there is a cause - perfectly definite and sufficient,—not a mere pretence devised by - Athenian ambition. - - [77] According to the principle laid down by the Corinthians - shortly before the Peloponnesian war,—τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους - αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν (Thucyd. i, 40-43). - - The Lacedæmonians, on preferring their accusation of treason - against Themistoklês, demanded that he should be tried at Sparta, - before the common Hellenic synod which held its sitting there, - and of which Athens was then a member: that is, the Spartan - confederacy, or alliance,—ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων - (Diodor. xi, 55). - -Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens,—taking this -numerical statement of Aristophanês, not in its exact meaning, but -simply as a great number,—if a small town, or one of its citizens, -had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except -the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could -have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not -to be supposed that all the private complaints and suits between -citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried -up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how the line -was drawn between matters carried up thither and matters tried at -home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the -power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after -previous trial and condemnation at Athens:[78] so that the latter -reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes,—or -what may be called “the higher justice” generally. And the political -accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject -city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, -etc., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial,—perhaps the most -important part of her jurisdiction. - - [78] Antipho, De Cæde Herôdis, c. 7, p. 135. ὃ οὐδὲ πόλει - ἔξεστιν, ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι. - -But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by -Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of -justice in each separate allied city: it went rather to regulate -the relations between city and city,—between citizens of different -cities,—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these -allied cities with which they had relations,—between each city -itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, -and the imperial head, Athens. All these were problems which imperial -Athens was called on to solve, and the best way of solving them would -have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies: -putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by -Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced -to think so, when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards -adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under -Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities -under the government of a dekadarchy or oligarchical council of -ten among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost, or -governor, having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found, -when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire, that these -arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and -extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem: -they served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion -of Sparta, without contributing to regulate the dealings between the -citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire -as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their -dependent cities, governors analogous to the harmosts, though they -did so occasionally under special need; but their fleets and their -officers were in frequent relation with these cities; and as the -principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so -the facility of complaint, constantly open to the Athenian popular -dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of -this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves -sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydidês: the chief -source from whence they had to apprehend evil was the Athenian -officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of -Athens for their own private purposes,—but they looked up to the -“Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbor -of refuge to themselves.”[79] If the popular dikasteries at Athens -had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much -more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their -individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony, -between the imperial city and the subject ally, was insured by Athens -through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost -of injustice and violence than by Sparta; for though oligarchical -partisans might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such -accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the -Spartan harmosts and dekadarchies, who put numbers to death without -any trial at all. - - [79] Thucyd. viii, 48. Τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους - οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς (that is, the subject-allies) νομίζειν σφίσι - πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν - κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ - ἐκείνοις εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν δὲ - δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. Καὶ ταῦτα - παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι, - ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσιν. This is introduced as the deliberate - judgment of the Athenian commander Phrynichus, whom Thucydidês - greatly commends for his sagacity, and with whom he seems in this - case to have concurred. - - Xenophon (Rep. Ath. i. 14, 15) affirms that the Athenian officers - on service passed many unjust sentences upon the oligarchical - party in the allied cities,—fines, sentences of banishment, - capital punishments; and that the Athenian people, though they - had a strong public interest in the prosperity of the allies, in - order that their tribute might be larger, nevertheless thought - it better that any individual citizen of Athens should pocket - what he could out of the plunder of the allies, and leave to the - latter nothing more than was absolutely necessary for them to - live and work, without any superfluity, such as might tempt them - to revolt. - - That the Athenian officers on service may have succeeded too - often in unjust peculation at the cost of the allies, is probable - enough: but that the Athenian people were pleased to see their - own individual citizens so enriching themselves is certainly not - true. The large jurisdiction of the dikasteries was intended, - among other effects, to open to the allies a legal redress - against such misconduct on the part of the Athenian officers: and - the passage above cited from Thucydidês proves that it really - produced such an effect. - -So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not -officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire -as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders; of course, therefore, disputes -would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as -well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties -did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan -imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, -since the action of the harmost or the dekadarchy was confined to -one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal -competence and public trial, afforded the only redress which the -contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved -by the historian Thucydidês, either as commander of the Athenian -fleet off the station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace, he -had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian -dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not -less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city, it -might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at -Athens, but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be -able to sue before those courts others whom else he could not have -reached. He had his share both of the benefit and of the hardship. -Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at -least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common -judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims -of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been -practicable, to the weaker at least, even in a state of general -independence. - -Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with -regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the -rule of a harmost, and a partisan oligarchy; and we read anecdotes -which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta, even for the -grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans -out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Bœotian named Skedasus, of -Leuktra in Bœotia, had been first violated and then slain by two -Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus, in Eubœa, had -been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodêmus:[80] in -both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before -the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear -was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by -Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal -exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can -be no doubt that both would have been severely punished: we shall -see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by -the Athenian general Pachês, at Mitylênê, cost him his life before -the Athenian dikasts.[81] Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided -representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, -that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice, at -Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and -would have paid court only to those individual Athenians—generals, -trierarchs, or envoys—who visited the islands on service; but under -the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens -either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity -of paying court to the bulk of the people also,—that is, to those -humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they -supplicated the dikasts in court for favor or lenient dealing.[82] -However true this may be, we must remark that it was a lighter lot -to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned -without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off -his condemnation by a bribe; and, moreover, that the dikastery was -open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied -cities, but also to entertain the complaints which they preferred -against others. - - [80] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20; Plutarch, Amator. Narrat. c. 3, - p. 773. - - [81] See _infra_, chap. 49. - - [82] Xenophon, Rep. Athen, i, 18. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ - ἐπὶ δίκας ᾔεσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτίμων ἂν - μόνους, τούς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν - δ᾽ ἠνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κολακεύειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν - συμμάχων, γιγνώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀφικόμενον Ἀθήναζε δίκην δοῦναι - καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι δὴ - νόμος Ἀθήνῃσι. Καὶ ἀντιβολῆσαι ἀναγκάζεται ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, - καὶ εἰσιόντος του, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρός. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ - σύμμαχοι δοῦλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθεστᾶσι μᾶλλον. - -Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as -tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they -were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his -own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city -was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. -Accordingly, we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before -the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city -on this ground for equal dealing with her subject-allies. “If our -power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would -presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards -us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement -rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at -disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have -appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves and under laws -equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by nothing -better than a love of litigation.”[83] “Our allies (he adds) would -complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard -to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon an -equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this, that they think -themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment -of their expectations.[84] They suffered worse hardships under -the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse -under you (the Spartans), if you were to succeed in conquering us -and making our empire yours.” History bears out the boast of the -Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the -empire of Athens.[85] And an Athenian citizen, indeed, might well -regard it, not as a hardship, but as a privilege, that subject-allies -should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend -themselves before the same tribunal, either in case of wrong done -to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of -Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more -would he find reason to eulogize the universal competence of these -dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of -the numerous distinct communities of the empire, one with another, -and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Ægean. That -complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies, is noway -surprising: for the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent -with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself -entitled,—and this was one of its prominent and constantly operative -institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the -subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm, that if empire -was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found -at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending -competence of the dikasteries,—a system not taking its rise in the -mere “love of litigation,” if, indeed, we are to reckon this a -real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another -opportunity of examining, much less in those petty collateral -interests indicated by Xenophon,[86] such as the increased customs -duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger -profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was -nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of -Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties -towards the whole,—a power inherited by Athens from that synod, and -enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end -it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself.[87] It may -be that the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian -citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and -the subject-allies,—and in so far the latter had good reason to -complain; but on the other hand, we have no ground for suspecting it -of deliberate or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than -such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whoever -might be the parties under trial. - - [83] Thucyd. i, 76, 77. Ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα - λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν· ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ - ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. Καὶ - ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις, - καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς - κρίσεις, φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν, etc. - - I construe ξυμβολαίαις δίκαις as connected in meaning with - ξυμβόλαια and not with ξύμβολα—following Duker and Bloomfield in - preference to Poppo and Göller: see the elaborate notes of the - two latter editors. Δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων indicated the arrangements - concluded by special convention between two different cities, by - consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies - between their respective citizens: they were something - essentially apart from the ordinary judicial arrangements of - either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon - is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says, that the allies - were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian - laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial - arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before - the Athenian dikasteries cannot, with propriety, be said to be - δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων; unless the act of original incorporation into - the confederacy of Delos is to be regarded as a ξύμβολον, or - agreement,—which in a large sense it might be, though not in the - proper sense in which δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων are commonly mentioned. - Moreover. I think that the passage of Antipho (De Cæde Herôdis, - p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places _not in - alliance with Athens_, who litigated with Athenians according to - δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων,—not the allies of Athens while they resided - in their own native cities; for I agree with the interpretation - which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner - and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii, ch. xvi, - p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778; - Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv, 2, pp. - 110-112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho - and Thucydidês). - - The passages in Demosthenês Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99; - and Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter - oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well - suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and - contents of ξύμβολα), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial - conventions, or ξύμβολα,—special and liable to differ in each - particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that - systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens - were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies - among or between the allied cities, as well as of political - accusations. - - M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the _autonomous_ - allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the - Peloponnesian war) and the _subject_-allies: “the former class - (he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas - the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the - courts of Athens.” Doubtless this distinction would prevail - to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly - say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one - of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an - individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the - Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose - that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute - with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent - court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose - a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting - revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or - Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of - power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, - must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just - as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. - We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but - I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial - arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was - less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that - the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies,—the - liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of - prosecuting for injuries received. - - There is one remark, however, which appears to me of importance - for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian - empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of - Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at - the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered - and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year - 377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to - acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to - resume her footing of something like an imperial city. But her - power over her allies, during this second period of empire, was - nothing like so great as it had been during the first, between - the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure - that what is true of the second is also true of the first. Now - I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians, - which represent the allies as carrying on δίκας ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων in - ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about - the second empire or alliance. Bekker Anecdota, p. 436. Ἀθηναῖοι - ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων ἐδίκαζον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux, - viii. 63. Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐδικάζοντο. - Also Hesychius, i, 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle - may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it - cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians - may really have had σύμβολα, or special conventions for judicial - business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making - Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as - they did during the first. It is to be remarked, however, that - Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of σύμβολα treats - them in a perfectly general way, as contentions for settlement - of judicial controversy between city and city, without any - particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter, - Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, iii, 1, 3, p. 91. - - [84] Thucyd. i. 77. Οἱ δὲ (the allies) ~εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ - τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν~, etc. - - [85] Compare Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyric. pp. 62-66, sects. - 116-138; and Or. xii, Panathenaic. pp. 247-254, sects. 72-111; - Or. viii, De Pace, p. 178, sect. 119, _seqq._; Plutarch, Lysand. - c. 13; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 2, 3. - - [86] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 17. - - [87] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 16. He states it as one of the - advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring - the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial—that - the prytaneia, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial, - became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the dikasts - throughout the year. - - But in another part of his treatise (iii, 2, 3), he represents - the Athenian dikasteries as overloaded with judicial business, - much more than they could possibly get through; insomuch that - there were long delays before causes could be brought on for - trial. It could hardly be any great object, therefore, to - multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the - dikasts. - -We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the -Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied -revolts, to which that war gave rise,—before the cruelties which -accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply -stained the character of Athens,—before that aggravated fierceness, -mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which -Thucydidês so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the -Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.[88] There had -been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, -from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos: all had -been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed -the same unrelenting rigor as we shall find hereafter manifested -towards Mitylênê, Skiônê, and Mêlos. The policy of Periklês, now in -the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, -averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased -burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have -entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the -Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers,—not without a -conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between -Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of -the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read -in Thucydidês the speech of the envoy from Mitylênê[89] at Olympia, -delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year -of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city -from Athens,—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest -case against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish,—we -shall be surprised how weak the case is, and how much the speaker is -conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances -and oppressions to urge against the imperial city,—he does not -dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian -officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other -sufferings of the subjects generally,—he has nothing to say except -that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens -held authority over them without and against their own consent: and -in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since -she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of -course, this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or -such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably -shake off whenever they had an opportunity:[90] but the negative -evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far -to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta -immediately before the war,—that, beyond the fact of such forced -dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city -like Mitylênê, moreover, would be strong enough to protect itself -and its own commerce without the help of Athens: but to the weaker -allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly -lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the -waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased -at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.[91] - - [88] See his well-known comments on the seditions at Korkyra, - iii, 82, 83. - - [89] Thucyd. iii, 11-14. - - [90] So the Athenian orator Diodotus puts it in his speech - deprecating the extreme punishment about to be inflicted on - Mitylênê—ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον ~εἰκότως πρὸς - αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα~, etc. (Thucyd. iii, 46.) - - [91] It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was - essentially _a government of dependencies_; Athens, as - an imperial state, exercising authority over subordinate - governments. To maintain beneficial relations between two - governments, one supreme, the other subordinate, and to make - the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one - as well as of the people in the other, has always been found a - problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume - of Mr. G. C. Lewis (Essay on the Government of Dependencies), - and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this - matter which are set forth therein, will be inclined to think - that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a - creditable figure. It will, most certainly, stand full comparison - with the government of England, over dependencies, in the last - century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal - laws against the Catholics; by the Declaration of Independence, - published in 1776, by the American colonies, setting forth the - grounds of their separation; and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke - against Warren Hastings. - - A statement and legal trial alluded to by Mr. Lewis (p. 367), - elucidates, farther, two points not unimportant on the present - occasion: 1. The illiberal and humiliating vein of sentiment - which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government - towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English - jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the - dependency against oppression by English officers. - - “An action was brought, in the court of Common Pleas, in 1773, - by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General - Mostyn, the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial - were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned - him, and transported him to Spain, without any form of trial, on - the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for - redress of grievances, in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr. - Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff’s - behavior was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was - about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether - he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a - redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff - was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict - for the plaintiff _with_ £3,000 _damages_. In the following term, - an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the - whole court. - - “The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn, - on this trial, contain a plain and _naïve_ statement of the - doctrine, _that a dependency is to be governed, not for its - own interest, but for that of the dominant state_. ‘Gentlemen - of the jury,’ said the counsel, ‘it will be time for me now - to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the - gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives - of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English, and to the - English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are - the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the - country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all - to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English, whom - they consider as their conquerors.—Of all the Minorquins in the - island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently - the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the - crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen, - _he is, or chooses to be called, the patriot of Minorca_. Now - patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe - much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but - little to value, and we should have but little of what we now - enjoy, were it not for our trade. _And for the sake of our - trade, it is not fit that we should encourage patriotism in - Minorca_; for it is there destructive of our trade, and there - is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there. - But _here it is very well_; for the body of the people in this - country will have it: they have demanded it,—and in consequence - of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will - transmit to their posterity,—and it is not in the power of this - government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all - our conquests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the - consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of - our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves - free in our plantations.’” - - The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury, shows the - strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against - the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the - dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as - strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against - misconduct of Athenian trierarchs, or inspectors. - - The feelings expressed in the speech above cited would also often - find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly; and it - would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which - these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be - the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to - escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise, - almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two - governments, one supreme and the other subordinate. They are not - the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the - Athenian democracy, as Mr. Mitford and so many others have sought - to prove. - -Nearly the whole of the Grecian world, putting aside Italian, -Sicilian, and African Greeks, was at this time included either in -the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce -of thirty years insured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. -Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by majority -of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt -against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical -international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies -should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain -or punish its own disobedient members.[92] Of this refusal, which -materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had -been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens -which prompted many of the allies to vote for war.[93] The position -of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other -allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times -maritime, commercial, and colonizing,—she had been indeed once the -first naval power in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had -not increased it at all during the last forty years, or, if she -had, her comparative naval importance had been entirely sunk by the -gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and -colonies,—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near -the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated -on the isthmus of Pallênê, in Thrace, and intimately connected with -them: and the interest of their commerce made them extremely averse -to any collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this -consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the -Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos: for though their -feelings, both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now -strong,[94] arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before -for the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance,—prudence -indicated that, in a war against the first naval power in Greece, -they were sure to be the greatest losers. So long as the policy -of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability -that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of -grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, -distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years -after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only -extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even -transformed her into the forward instigator of war. - - [92] See the important passage already adverted to in a prior - note. - - Thucyd. i, 40. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα - ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρὴ - αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, ~φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους - αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν~. - - [93] Thucyd. i. 33. - - [94] Thucyd. i. 42. - -Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of -Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony, -or supremacy.[95] What extent of real power and interference this -acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we -are not in a condition to say; but the Corinthians were popular, -and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the -colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, -however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception, having been -generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, -with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed -tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such relations -of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra, that a dispute -grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the -Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo,—a colony -founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf, -considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the -sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, -that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been -obliged to select the œkist, or founder-in-chief of Epidamnus, from -that city,—a citizen of Herakleid descent, named Phalius,—along -with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers: so that -Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognized -granddaughter, if the expression may be allowed, of Corinth, the -recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically -celebrated in honor of the œkist.[96] - - [95] Thucyd. i, 38. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι. - - [96] Thucyd. i, 24, 25. - -Founded on the isthmus of an outlaying peninsula on the sea-coast of -the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first very prosperous, and -acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. -But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have -now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses: internal sedition -between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from -the neighboring Illyrians, had crippled its power: and a recent -revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced -it still farther,—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a -force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city -grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such -straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid: their envoys sat -down as suppliants at the temple of Hêrê, cast themselves on the -mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators -with the exiled oligarchy and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. -Though the Korkyræans themselves, democratically governed, might -have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their -prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite: for it was the -Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, -from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family -burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found:[97] -while the demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, -may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate -had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. -Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed -condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying -to Corinth: but as this was a step of questionable propriety, their -envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. -His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to -Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as -their unavailing application at Korkyra,—tendering Epidamnus to -the Corinthians as to its œkists and chiefs, with the most urgent -entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin,—and not -omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was -found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus -as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not -only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defence, a resolution -much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily -organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, -partly of a protecting military force,—Corinthian, Leukadian, and -Ambrakiôtic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from -the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia, -and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.[98] - - [97] Thucyd. i, 26. ἦλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων - φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν ἣν προϊσχόμενοι - ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν. - - [98] Thucyd. i, 26. - -The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment, -but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans, -who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of -their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings -were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, -coming to the island with petition for succor, and appeals to the -tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They -were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards -strengthened by a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus -with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith -restored, and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention -being paid to these demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade -of the city with forty ships, and with an auxiliary land-force of -Illyrians,—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or -not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an -enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission -we do not know: but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news -that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians -immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition,—sufficient -not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance -which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty -triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited -aid both in ships and money from many of their allies: eight ships -fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palês, in the island -of Kephallênia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermionê, -ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia,—together with pecuniary -contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed -a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal -political rights to all; an option being allowed to anyone who wished -to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to insure -future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. -Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were -full of doubt and danger, such was the confidence entertained in the -metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to -join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for the liberty of future -junction. - -All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with -intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any -formal proposition, such as was customary among Grecian states,—a -harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred towards -Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that -island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the -Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware -of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth, and of the union -among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for -it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force -of one hundred and twenty triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. -They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing -upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to -Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers -recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all -right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony,—they at -the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for -arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the -Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two -cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged, and the decision to be -obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, -if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek -new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the -Corinthians answered, that they could entertain no proposition until -the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus: whereupon -the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided -the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the -same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or -the Korkyræans would acquiesce in this _statu quo_ on both sides, -until the arbiters should have decided.[99] - - [99] Thucyd. i, 28. - -Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the -first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at -Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians -had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, -to admit of listening to arbitration, and accordingly, so soon as -their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching -a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. As soon -as the armament, consisting of seventy triremes, under Aristeus, -Kallikratês, and Timanor, with two thousand five hundred hoplites, -under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium, at the -mouth of the Ambrakian gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in -a little boat forbidding all farther advance,—a summons of course -unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan -fleet. Out of the one hundred and twenty triremes which constituted -the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the -siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought -into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the -occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, -destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable -number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus -surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the -Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other -new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies -did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while -the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighboring sea. -Having erected a trophy on Leukimmê, the adjoining promontory of -their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of -Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners,—except the Corinthians, -who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for -purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those -allies of Corinth, who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: -they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burned Kyllênê, the seaport -of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were -compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to -Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. -The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but -no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both -armaments were disbanded.[100] - - [100] Thucyd. i, 29, 30. - -Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, -together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought -together; and though their original project was frustrated by the -loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge -against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves, for two -entire years after the battle, in building new ships and providing -an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent -round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands -under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the -best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned -Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the -battle: and the entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted -to not less than one hundred and fifty sail: twenty-seven triremes -from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from -Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had -officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleidês and four others -were commanders-in-chief.[101] - - [101] Thucyd. i, 31-46. - -But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to -the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which -that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout -Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to -brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves -among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon: it had always -been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, -which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar -position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they -had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered -both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their -island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands -in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to -maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. -But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to -the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of -forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no -longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, -wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being -out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with -Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic gulf; she -was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable -relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous -fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there -anything to forbid it: for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it -had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled -in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at -pleasure.[102] While the proposition of alliance was thus formally -open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances -under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies -to all parties; and the Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time -visited Athens, for the purpose of making it, came thither with -doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was -one of life or death. - - [102] Thucyd. i, 35-40. - -According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to -make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be -intrusted to the executive government apart from the representative -assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics -most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of -the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under -governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, -under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys, on -reaching that city, would first open their business to the stratêgi, -or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be -heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand -to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans -had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time -when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration: and -even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was -obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their -_proxeni_ at Athens, Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian -interests, public and private, in confidential correspondence with -that government,—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as -volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern -times, would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. -So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the -public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them -and to oppose the granting of their prayer. - -Thucydidês has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, -speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability -the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps -himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and -harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the -plainest and most business-like in his whole work, bringing before -us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and -difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of -the opposite sides. The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous -improvidence, which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until -the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the -friendship of Athens, on the strongest grounds of common interest -and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and want -of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon -them in an unjust quarrel, or by disgraceful conduct: they had -proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and -their application had been refused,—which showed where the right -of the case lay; moreover, they were now exposed single-handed, -not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a -formidable confederacy, organized under her auspices, including -choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting -their prayer, Athens would, in the first place, neutralize this -misemployment of her own mariners, and would, at the same time, -confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and -secure to herself a most important reinforcement. For, next to her -own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, -and this was now placed within her reach: if, by declining the -present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval -force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth -and the Peloponnesian alliance,—and such they would soon be openly -declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that -alliance and Athens could not long be postponed: and it was with a -view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to -seize Korkyra along with her naval force.[103] The policy of Athens, -therefore, imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, -by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the -terms of the thirty years’ truce: and although some might contend -that, in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was -tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would -falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself -that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. -She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, -but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and -Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending -reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.[104] - - [103] Thucyd. i, 33. Τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ - πολεμησείοντας, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς - καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν - ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτῶν μετ᾽ - ἀλλήλων στῶμεν, etc. - - [104] Thucyd. i, 32-36. - -To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the -Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and -iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of -Epidamnus, than in all former time,[105]—which was the real reason -why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, -she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth, -her mother-city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial -allegiance which Grecian morality recognized, and which the other -Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed.[106] Epidamnus was not a -Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony, and the Korkyræans, having -committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without -being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: -they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the -fact in such injustice. The provision of the thirty years’ truce -might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but -that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities -already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere,—still less -the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, -where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a -declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right -to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better -right than Korkyra: for the latter had never had any transactions -with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant -of amity with them, through the thirty years’ truce,—but had also -rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian -allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the -Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international -law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory -members: they now called upon Athens to respect this principle, -by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,[107] -especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon -Athens herself, with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an -impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a -contingency was as yet uncertain,—and might possibly never occur at -all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on -this critical occasion: but it would assuredly occur if she refused -such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would -be far greater than the promised naval coöperation of Korkyra would -compensate.[108] - - [105] The description given by Herodotus (vii, 168: compare - Diodor. xi. 15), of the duplicity of the Korkyræans when - solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of - Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavorable character of them, - given by the Corinthians, coincided with the general impression - throughout Greece. - - Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyræans, see - Aristotle apud Zenob. Proverb. iv, 49. - - [106] Thucyd. i, 38. ἄποικοι δὲ ὄντες ἀφεστᾶσί τε διὰ παντὸς - καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν - ἐκπεμφθείησαν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοί φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων - ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ - εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι· αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ - μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα. - - This is a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of - the metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as - to be comprised under the general word _hegemony_: superiority - and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of - reverence and obedience on the other,—limited in point of extent, - though we do not know where the limit was placed, and varying - probably in each individual case. The Corinthians sent annual - magistrates to Potidæa, called Epidemiurgi (Thucyd. i, 56). - - [107] Thucyd. i, 40. φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν ~τοὺς προσήκοντας - ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν~. - - [108] Thucyd. i, 37-43. - -Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending -envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate. -For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned -over to the morrow: so considerable was the number of speakers, and -probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily, Thucydidês -does not give us any of these Athenian discourses,—not even that -of Periklês, who determined the ultimate result. Epidamnus, with -its disputed question of metropolitan right, occupied little of the -attention of the Athenian assembly: but the Korkyræan naval force -was indeed an immense item, since the question was, whether it -should stand on their side or against them,—an item which nothing -could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. “Let -us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the -sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen -in the service of the Peloponnesian league.” “You will not really -avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others): the -generating causes of war are at work,—and it will infallibly come, -whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of -the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake -the war at great comparative disadvantage.” Of these two views, the -former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly;[109] but -they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformable to the -steady conviction of Periklês. It was, however, resolved to take a -sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, -to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent -Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by -adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians -under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if -required,—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. -Accordingly, nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes -strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case -they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this -resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius, son of -Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians -that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it -would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as -to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties,[110]—which -was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to -Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express; not to engage in -fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching -Korkyra, or some Korkyræan possession, with a view to attack: but in -that case to do his best on the defensive. - - [109] Thucyd. i, 44. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης - καὶ δὶς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν Κορινθίων - ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν, etc. - - Οὐχ ἧσσον, in the language of Thucydidês, usually has the - positive meaning of _more_. - - [110] Thucyd. i, 44. Plutarch (Periklês, c. 29) ascribes the - smallness of the squadron despatched under Lacedæmonius to a - petty spite of Periklês against that commander, as the son of his - old political antagonist, Kimon. From whomsoever he copied this - statement, the motive assigned seems quite unworthy of credit. - -The great Corinthian armament of one hundred and fifty sail soon -took its departure from the gulf, and reached a harbor on the -coast of Epirus, at the cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to -the southern extremity of Korkyra: they there established a naval -station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from -the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighborhood. The Korkyræan -fleet of one hundred and ten sail, under Meikiadês and two others, -together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the -adjoining islands called Sybota, while the land force and one -thousand Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape -Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on -board three days’ provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and -encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing towards -them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three -generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. -Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, -occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various -allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never -before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle; -but the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. -The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers -below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves: the -ships, on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct -impact, prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce -hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, -as if they were on land,—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon -the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those -improvements which had been introduced into the Athenian navy during -the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, -and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed -troops on deck: by strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and -sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the -Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not -against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of -his enemy,—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of -her crew the real weapon of attack, which was first to disable the -enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this -was done did the armed troops on deck begin their operations.[111] -Lacedæmonius, with his ten armed ships, though forbidden by his -instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by -taking station at the extremity of the line, and by making motions as -if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate -what they would despise as the lubberly handling of the ships on both -sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined; the ships -on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable, -orders could neither be heard nor obeyed, and the individual valor -of the hoplites and bowmen on deck was the decisive point on which -victory turned. - - [111] Πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν—to turn the naval battle into a - land-battle on shipboard, was a practice altogether repugnant - to Athenian feeling, as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv, 14: - compare also vii, 61. - - The Corinthian and Syracusan ships ultimately came to counteract - the Athenian manœuvring by constructing their prows with - increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel - to a direct shock, which its weaker prow was unable to bear - (Thucyd. vii, 36). - -On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans -was victorious; their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies -of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed -and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out -of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their -total number was inferior: for their right wing, opposed to the -best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. -Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat -as they could,—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other -wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline -in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten -Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. These Athenians, though at first -they obeyed the instructions from home, in abstaining from actual -blows, yet,—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the -Corinthians were pressing their victory,—could no longer keep aloof, -but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the -defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as -their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene -of action, which was covered with disabled and water-logged ships, -their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and -wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks, or keeping above -water as well as they could,—among them many of their own citizens -and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these -disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but -looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, -but putting the greater number to death: some even of their own -allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. They -then picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, and -transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; -after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume -the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got -together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the -small reserve which had remained in harbor, in order to prevent at -any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within -the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to coöperate with -full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: -but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted -for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; -presently they headed round, and sailed directly away to the Epirotic -coast. Nor did the Korkyræans comprehend the cause of this sudden -retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief -of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and -Andokidês, which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and -had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was -already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimmê, having -traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies;[112] and at -first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement -had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information -of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression -that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of -defence,—an impression more than verified by the reality. - - [112] Thucyd. i, 51. διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι - κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον. - -Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians -had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found -sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding -action, the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled,—the -Corinthians only thirty,—so that the superiority of numbers was -still on the side of the latter, who were, however, encumbered -with the care of one thousand prisoners, eight hundred of them -slaves, captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the -narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this -embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second -battle against thirty Athenian ships, in addition to the remaining -Korkyræan: and when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle -on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of -nothing but immediate retreat,—with serious alarm lest the Athenians -should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between -Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the -day before. Having ranged their fleet in line, not far from shore, -they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending -forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following -remonstrance,—the men carried no herald’s staff (_we_ should say, -no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection -against an enemy. “Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in -beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to -oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention -to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra, or anywhere else that -we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now -address you, and deal with us as enemies.” It was not the fault of -the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realized: for -such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians -by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far -from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: “We -neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have -come simply to aid these Korkyræans, our allies. If ye wish to sail -anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail -against Korkyra, or any of her possessions, we shall use our best -means to prevent you.” Both the answer, and the treatment of the men -in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be -unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could -get ready, staying, however, to erect a trophy at Sybota, on the -Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding -day. In their voyage homeward, they surprised Anaktorium, at the -mouth of the Ambrakiôtic gulf, which they had hitherto possessed -jointly with the Korkyræans; planting in it a reinforcement of -Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching -Corinth, the armament was disbanded, and the great majority of the -prisoners taken—eight hundred slaves—were sold; but the remainder, -two hundred and fifty in number, were detained and treated with -peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest -families of the island, and the Corinthians designed to gain them -over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in -the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their return will -appear in a future chapter. - -Thus relieved from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead -bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their -island, and even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, chiefly -in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, -they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of -the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to -them as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who -had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, -only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this -time forward they considered the thirty years’ truce as broken, and -conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so -that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in -sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity -was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their -enemy, through one of her wide-spread dependencies. - -On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pellênê, which -forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater peninsula -called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs, -was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary -allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth, and still -maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: -insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as -magistrates, under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the -neighboring coast, also, there were several small towns belonging to -the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list -of Athenian tributaries. The neighboring inland territory, Mygdonia -and Chalkidikê,[113] was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son -of that Alexander who had taken part, fifty years before, in the -expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have -extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace -by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the -territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had -been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were -other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip and Derdas, holding -independent principalities in the upper country,[114] apparently on -the higher course of the Axius near the Pæonian tribes, with whom -he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as -the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active -enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of -Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire -was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland -than over the islands:[115] for the former were always more or less -dependent on any powerful land-neighbor, sometimes more dependent -on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens -herself cultivating assiduously the favor of Sitalkês and other -strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the -seaports.[116] Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the -Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and the violent -enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians -by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same -projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order -to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to -Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration -of war against Athens.[117] And he farther prevailed on many of -the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns -on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, -which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as -the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas -farther assigned some territory near Lake Bolbê to contribute to the -temporary maintenance of the concentrated population. - - [113] See the geographical Commentary of Gatterer upon Thrace, - embodied in Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, ch. 29. - - The words τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης—τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία (Thucyd. ii, 29) - denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê,—places _in the - direction or in the skirts of_ Thrace, rather than parts of - Thrace itself. - - [114] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 100. - - [115] See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference, - Thucyd. iv, 120-122. - - [116] Thucyd. ii, 29-98. Isokratês has a remarkable passage on - this subject in the beginning of Or. v, ad Philippum, sects. - 5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony - on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate, and - the excellent site which had been chosen far Kyrênê, as being - near only to feeble tribes,—he goes so far as to say that - the possession of Amphipolis would be injurious rather than - beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon - Philip, from his power of annoying her colonists,—just as she - had been dependent before upon Mêdokus, the Thracian king, in - consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese,—ἀναγκασθησόμεθα - τὴν αὐτὴν εὔνοιαν ἔχειν τοῖς σοῖς πράγμασι διὰ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα (at - Amphipolis) κατοικοῦντας, οἵαν περ εἴχομεν Μηδόκῳ τῷ παλαιῷ διὰ - τοὺς ἐν Χεῤῥονήσῳ γεωργοῦντας. - - [117] Thucyd. i, 56, 57. - -The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and -of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth after the Korkyræan -sea-fight; immediately after which they sent to take precautions -against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down -their wall on the side of Pellênê, so as to leave the town open on -the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, -and fortified only towards the mainland,—requiring them farther both -to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came -to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and -one thousand hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched -to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic gulf, was directed at the -same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to -repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighboring Chalkidians. -Immediately on receiving these requisitions, the Potidæans sent -envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining -time,—and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to -determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa -being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained -a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the thirty years’ truce -still subsisting: at Athens they had no success, and they accordingly -openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer, 432 B.C.), at the same -time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and -Bottiæans revolted at the same time, at the express instigation of -Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.[118] -Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, found -them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself -to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough -to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to -Therma, in coöperation with the Macedonian troops from the upper -country, under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that -place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have -been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade -of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he -spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to -Potidæa a reinforcement of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred -light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians, hired -for the occasion,—under Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, a man of such -eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the -soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put -into a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt -reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to -attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth.—forty -triremes and two thousand Athenian hoplites, under Kallias, son of -Kalliades,[119] with four other commanders,—who, on reaching the -Thermaic gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After -prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves -obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could -with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations -against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first -crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic -gulf,—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa,—and -then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the -direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached -the seaport called Gigônus, near which they encamped.[120] - - [118] Thucyd. v, 30. - - [119] Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had - paid the large sum of one hundred minæ to Zeno of Elea, the - philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical - instruction (Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 31, p. 119). - - [120] Thucyd. i, 61. The statement of Thucydidês presents some - geographical difficulties which the critics have not adequately - estimated. Are we to assume as certain, that the _Berœa_ here - mentioned must be the Macedonian town of that name, afterwards - so well known, distant from the sea westward one hundred and - sixty stadia, or nearly twenty English miles (see Tafel, Historia - Thessalonicæ, p. 58), on a river which flows into the Haliakmon, - and upon one of the lower ridges of Mount Bermius? - - The words of Thucydidês here are—Ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι - καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν - ἡ Ποτίδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθὼς, ~ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς - Μακεδονίας~, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, - καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, ἐπορεύοντο - κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. - - “The natural route from Pydna to Potidæa (observes Dr. Arnold in - his note) lay along the coast; and Berœa was _quite out of the - way_, at some _distance to the westward_, near the fort of the - Bermian mountains. But the hope of surprising Berœa induced the - Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then, after - the failure of this treacherous attempt, they returned again to - the sea-coast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at - Gigônus.” - - I would remark upon this: 1. The words of Thucydidês imply that - Berœa was _not in_ Macedonia, but _out_ of it (see Poppo, Proleg. - ad Thucyd. vol. ii, pp. 408-418). 2. He uses no expression which - in the least implies that the attempt on Berœa on the part of the - Athenians was _treacherous_, that is, contrary to the convention - just concluded; though, had the fact been so, he would naturally - have been led to notice it, seeing that the deliberate breach of - the convention was the very first step which took place after - it was concluded. 3. What can have induced the Athenians to - leave their fleet and march near twenty miles inland to Mount - Bermius and Berœa, to attack a Macedonian town which they could - not possibly hold,—when they cannot even stay to continue the - attack on Pydna, a position maritime, useful, and tenable,—in - consequence of the pressing necessity of taking immediate - measures against Potidæa? 4. If they were compelled by this - latter necessity to patch up a peace on any terms with Perdikkas, - would they immediately endanger this peace by going out of their - way to attack one of his forts? Again, Thucydidês says, “that, - proceeding by slow land-marches, they reached Gigônus, and - encamped _on the third day_,”—κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι - ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The computation of - time must here be made either from Pydna or from Berœa; and - the reader who examines the map will see that neither from the - one nor the other—assuming the Berœa on Mount Bermius—would it - be possible for an army to arrive at Gigônus on the third day, - marching round the head of the gulf, with easy days’ marches; the - more so, as they would have to cross the rivers Lydias, Axius. - and Echeidôrus, all not far from their mouths,—or, if these - rivers could not be crossed, to get on board the fleet and reland - on the other side. - - This clear mark of time laid down by Thucydidês,—even apart - from the objections which I have just urged in reference to - Berœa on Mount Bermius,—made me doubt whether Dr. Arnold and - the other commentators have correctly conceived the operations - of the Athenian troops between Pydna and Gigônus. The _Berœa_ - which Thucydidês means cannot be more distant from Gigônus, at - any rate, than a third day’s easy march, and therefore cannot - be the Berœa on Mount Bermius. But there was another town named - Berœa, either in Thrace or in Emathia, though we do not know - its exact site (see Wassi ad Thucyd. i, 61; Steph. Byz. v, - Βέρης; Tafel, Thessalonica, Index). This other Berœa, situated - somewhere between Gigônus and Therma, and out of the limits of - that Macedonia which Perdikkas governed, may probably be the - place which Thucydidês here indicates. The Athenians, raising - the siege of Pydna, crossed the gulf _on shipboard_ to Berœa, - and after vainly trying to surprise that town, marched along _by - land_ to Gigônus. Whoever inspects the map will see that the - Athenians would naturally employ their large fleet to transport - the army by the short transit across the gulf from Pydna (see - Livy, xliv, 10), and thus avoid the fatiguing land-march round - the head of the gulf. Moreover, the language of Thucydidês - would seem to make the land-march _begin at Berœa_ and not at - Pydna,—~ἀπανίστανται~ ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ~ἀφικόμενοι ἐς - Βέροιαν~ κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ - χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, ~ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν~ πρὸς Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα - δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. Κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι - ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The change of tense - between ἀπανίστανται and ἐπορεύοντο,—and the connection of the - participle ἀφικόμενοι with the latter verb,—seems to divide the - whole proceeding into two distinct parts; first, departure from - Macedonia to Berœa, as it would seem, by sea,—next, a land-march - from Berœa to Gigônus, of three short days. - - This is the best account, as it strikes me, of a passage, the - real difficulties of which are imperfectly noticed by the - commentators. - - The site of Gigônus cannot be exactly determined, since all that - we know of the towns on the coast between Potidæa and Æneia, is - derived from their enumerated names in Herodotus (vii, 123); nor - can we be absolutely certain that he has enumerated them all in - the exact order in which they were placed. But I think that both - Col. Leake and Kiepert’s map place Gigônus too far from Potidæa; - for we see, from this passage of Thucydidês, that it formed the - camp from which the Athenian general went forth immediately to - give battle to an enemy posted between Olynthus and Potidæa; and - the Scholiast says of Gigônus,—οὐ πολὺ ἄπεχον Ποτιδαίας: and - Stephan. Byz. Γίγωνος, πόλις Θρᾴκης ~προσεχὴς τῇ Παλλήνῃ~. - - See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. - xxxi, p. 452. That excellent observer calculates the march, from - Berœa on Mount Bermius to Potidæa, as being one of four days, - about twenty miles each day. Judging by the map, this seems lower - than the reality; but admitting it to be correct, Thucydidês - would never describe such a march as ~κατ᾽ ὀλίγον~ δὲ προϊόντες - τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον: it would be a march rather rapid - and fatiguing, especially as it would include the passage of the - rivers. Nor is it likely, from the description of this battle - in Thucydidês (i, 62), that Gigônus could be anything like a - full day’s march from Potidæa. According to his description, - the Athenian army advanced by three very easy marches; then - arriving at Gigônus, they encamp, being now near the enemy, who - on their side are already encamped, expecting them,—προσδεχόμενοι - τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ~ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο~ πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ: the - imperfect tense indicates that they were already there at the - time when the Athenians took camp at Gigônus; which would hardly - be the case if the Athenians had come by three successive marches - from Berœa on Mount Bermius. - - I would add, that it is no more wonderful that there should be - one Berœa in Thrace and another in Macedonia, than that there - should be one Methônê in Thrace and another in Macedonia (Steph. - B. Μεθώνη). - -In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose -character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to -notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent two -hundred horse to join them, under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus -posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, -providing a market without the walls, in order that they might not -stray in quest of provisions: his position was on the side towards -Olynthus,—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in -a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of -the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, -upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when -they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve -his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; -while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus -and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, -Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him -were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and -pursuing for a considerable distance: but the remaining Potidæans -and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within -the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious -Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative -either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of -making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the -least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the -Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of -the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus, with a -mole running out at each end into the water: he effected this daring -enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable -difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus, -though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had -been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans -had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could -make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side -come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the -town immediately in their rear, lost only three hundred men, while -the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty, together with the general -Kallias.[121] - - [121] Thucyd. i, 62, 63. - -The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after -having erected their trophy, and given up the enemy’s dead for -burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus, -on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all -communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade -complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the -other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach -a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time -they were joined by Phormio with sixteen hundred fresh hoplites -from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis, in the peninsula of -Pallênê, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in -order to draw out the citizens to battle: but the challenge not -being accepted, he undertook, and finished without obstruction, the -blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now -completely inclosed, and the harbor watched by the Athenian fleet. -The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard -it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations -against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa -was now only a question of more or less time, and Aristeus, in order -that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to -choose a favorable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly -from the harbor, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, -and leaving only five hundred defenders behind: though he offered -himself to be among those left behind, he could not determine the -citizens to so bold an enterprise, and he therefore sallied forth -in the way proposed with a small detachment, in order to try and -procure relief from without,—especially some aid or diversion -from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond -some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians,[122] and a -successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did -nothing for the relief of the blockaded town: it had, however, been -so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years,—a period -full of important events elsewhere. - - [122] Thucyd. i, 65. - -From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly -at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprung those -important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be -recounted in the next chapter. - - - - -CHAPTER XLVIII. - -FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE -PELOPONNESIAN WAR. - - -Even before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had -been evident to reflecting Greeks that the continued observance of -the thirty years’ truce was very uncertain, and that the mingled -hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens inspired throughout -Greece, would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize -the first favorable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. -That such was the disposition of Sparta, was well understood among -the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence and general -slowness in resolving might postpone the moment of carrying it into -effect. Accordingly, not only the Samians when they revolted had -applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to -have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests -then animating the Corinthians,—but also the Lesbians had endeavored -to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though -the authorities—to whom alone the proposition could have been -communicated, since it remained secret and was never executed—had -given them no encouragement.[123] The affairs of Athens had been -administered under the ascendency of Periklês, without any view to -extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant -view to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city -in a condition to meet it: but even the splendid internal ornaments, -which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their -effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her -ultimate views. The only known incident, wherein Athens had been -brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy -prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was the decree passed in regard to -Megara,—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade -or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the -Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, -that the Megarians had harbored runaway slaves from Athens, and -had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon the border; -partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis,—partly a -strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore -left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent -inclosure.[124] In reference to this latter point, the Athenian -herald, Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but -had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was -imputed as a crime to the Megarians.[125] We may well suppose that -ever since the revolt of Megara, fourteen years before, which caused -to Athens an irreparable mischief, the feeling prevalent between the -two towns had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many -ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens -to a signal revenge.[126] Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in -her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, -was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at -Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the thirty years’ truce; -though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to -enforce,—and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of -foreigners by Sparta, with which Periklês compared it. - - [123] Thucyd. iii, 2-13. This proposition of the Lesbians at - Sparta must have been made before the collision between Athens - and Corinth at Korkyra. - - [124] Thucyd. i, 139. ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς - τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου, etc. Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30; - Schol. ad Aristophan. Pac. 609. - - I agree with Göller that two distinct violations of right are - here imputed to the Megarians: the one, that they had cultivated - land, the property of the goddesses at Eleusis,—the other, that - they had appropriated and cultivated the unsettled pasture land - on the border. Dr. Arnold’s note takes a different view, less - correct, in my opinion: “The land on the frontier was consecrated - to prevent it from being inclosed: in which case the boundaries - might have been a subject of perpetual dispute between the - two countries,” etc. Compare Thucyd. v, 42, about the border - territory round Panaktum. - - [125] Thucydidês (i, 139), in assigning the reasons of this - sentence of exclusion passed by Athens against the Megarians, - mentions only the two allegations here noticed,—wrongful - cultivation of territory, and reception of runaway slaves. He - does not allude to the herald, Anthemokritus: still less does - he notice that gossip of the day, which Aristophanês and other - comedians of this period turn to account in fastening the - Peloponnesian war upon the personal sympathies of Periklês, - namely, that first, some young men of Athens stole away the - courtezan, Simætha, from Megara: next, the Megarian youth - revenged themselves by stealing away from Athens “two engaging - courtezans,” one of whom was the mistress of Periklês; upon - which the latter was so enraged that he proposed the sentence - of exclusion against the Megarians (Aristoph. Acharn. 501-516; - Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30). - - Such stories are chiefly valuable as they make us acquainted with - the political scandal of the time. But the story of the herald, - Anthemokritus, and his death, cannot be altogether rejected. - Though Thucydidês, not mentioning the fact, did not believe that - the herald’s death had really been occasioned by the Megarians; - yet there probably was a popular belief at Athens to that effect, - under the influence of which the deceased herald received a - public burial near the Thriasian gate of Athens, leading to - Eleusis: see Philippi Epistol. ad Athen. ap. Demosthen. p. - 159, R.; Pausan. i, 36, 3; iii, 4, 2. The language of Plutarch - (Periklês, c. 30) is probably literally correct,—“the herald’s - death _appeared_ to have been caused by the Megarians,”—αἰτίᾳ τῶν - Μεγαρέων ἀποθανεῖν ἔδοξε. That neither Thucydidês, nor Periklês - himself, believed that the Megarians had really caused his - death, is pretty certain: otherwise, the fact would have been - urged when the Lacedæmonians sent to complain of the sentence of - exclusion,—being a deed so notoriously repugnant to all Grecian - feeling. - - [126] Thucyd. i, 67. Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα - διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ, λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων - ἀρχῇ, etc. - -These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra -and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the -Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the -highest degree: nor was it simply resentment for the past which -animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so -strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison -from capture. Accordingly, they lost no time in endeavoring to rouse -the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to -invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances -against that city. Not merely the Megarians but several other -confederates, appeared there as accusers; while the Æginetans, though -their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made -themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining -that Athens withheld from them that autonomy to which they were -entitled under the truce.[127] - - [127] Thucyd. i, 67. λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς - σπονδάς. O. Müller (Æginet. p. 180) and Göller in his note, think - that the _truce_ (or _covenant_ generally) here alluded to is, - not the thirty years’ truce, concluded fourteen years before - the period actually present, but the ancient alliance against - the Persians, solemnly ratified and continued after the victory - of Platæa. Dr. Arnold, on the contrary, thinks that the thirty - years’ truce is alluded to, which the Æginetans interpreted - (rightly or not) as entitling them to independence. - - The former opinion might seem to be countenanced by the allusion - to Ægina in the speech of the Thebans (iii, 64): but on the - other hand, if we consult i, 115, it will appear possible that - the wording of the thirty years’ truce may have been general, - as,—Ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Ἀθηναίους ὅσα ἔχουσι Πελοποννησίων: at any rate, - the Æginetans may have pretended that, by the same rule as Athens - gave up Nisæa, Pegæ, etc., she ought also to renounce Ægina. - - However, we must recollect that the one plea does not exclude - the other: the Æginetans may have taken advantage of _both_ in - enforcing their prayer for interference. This seems to have been - the idea of the Scholiast, when he says—κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῶν - σπονδῶν. - -According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that -the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide -whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens -against themselves or against Peloponnesus,—either in violation of -the thirty years’ truce, or in any other way. If the determination -of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even -be submitted to the vote of the allies; but if it were in the -affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their -opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with -the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then -pledged to the given line of policy,—if the majority was contrary, -the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates -as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right -of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as -a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as -leader,—and that the only question ever submitted to the allies -was, whether they would or would not go along with her previous -decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed: the -Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt -either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before -the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the -Athenians had broken the truce, and were going on in a course of -wrong towards Peloponnesus.[128] Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, -such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly -of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution -to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the -assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities -addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. -The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the -assembly had been previously inflamed by the previous speakers. - - [128] Thucyd. i, 67. κατεβόων ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδάς - τε λελυκότες εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. The change of - tense in these two verbs is to be noticed. - -Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of -Greece turned, Thucydidês has preserved an account unusually copious. -First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of -some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta -on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to -have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other -complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address -the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king -Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. -Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the ephor -Stheneläidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, -the composition of Thucydidês himself, contain substantially the -sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed: neither of them -is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents -the situation of affairs from a different point of view. - -The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to -address had been favorably prepared for them,—for the Lacedæmonian -authorities had already given an actual promise to them and to the -Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would -invade Attica. So great was the revolution in sentiment of the -Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more -powerful island of Lesbos, when it proposed to revolt,—a revolution -occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. -Nor were the Corinthians ignorant that their positive grounds of -complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the -existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute -about Potidæa nor about Korkyra, had Athens infringed the truce -or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both, she had come into -collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy: -she had a right, both according to the truce and according to the -received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the -Korkyræans at their own request,—she had a right also, according to -the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of -the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She -had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression: -indeed the aggression, both in the case of Potidæa and in that of -Korkyra, was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the -Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was -understood to be bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or -wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys; -and accordingly we find that, in their speech at Sparta, they touch -but lightly, and in vague terms, on positive or recent wrongs. Even -that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens -about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation -the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the -Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only -the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other -knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not -connected by any permanent bonds with Athens,—we should have supposed -that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon -an autonomous ally of Corinth,[129]—we should never have imagined -that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the -Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be -pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined -metropolitan relations with Potidæa: but at any rate, the incident -was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the -Athenians, either of outrage towards Corinth,[130] or of wrongful -aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy. - - [129] Thucyd. i, 68. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυράν τε ὑπολαβόντες βίᾳ ἡμῶν - εἶχον, καὶ Ποτίδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον - πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε - Πελοποννησίοις. - - [130] Thucyd. i, 68. ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ - καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ - δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι. - -To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have -suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the -thirty years’ truce expressly provided that recourse should be had -to amicable arbitration,—to which recourse he never once alludes. -He knew that, as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun -at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very -emphatic speech is, to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and -especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less -by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to -depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort -abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes -never dashed by failure,—of Athens; as contrasted with the cautious, -home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches -the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having -repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable -height,—especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after -the retreat of Xerxes, and afterwards to build the long walls from -the city to the sea.[131] The Spartans, he observes, stood alone -among all Greeks, in the notable system of keeping down an enemy -not by acting, but delaying to act,—not arresting his growth, but -putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely, indeed, had -they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality -merely slow:[132] in resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they -had always been behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends -to ruin,—while both these enemies had only failed of complete success -through their own mistakes. - - [131] Thucyd. i, 69. - - [132] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ - Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, - καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, διπλασιουμένην - δὲ, καταλύοντες. Καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος - τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει· τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον, etc. - -After half apologizing for the tartness of these reproofs,—which, -however, as the Spartans were now well-disposed to go to war -forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable,—the Corinthian -orator vindicates the necessity of plain-speaking by the urgent -peril of the emergency, and the formidable character of the enemy -who threatened them. “You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly -different the Athenians are from yourselves. _They_ are innovators -by nature; sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have -determined: _you_ are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in -determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute -necessity requires.[133] _They_ again dare beyond their means, -run risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes -even in desperate circumstances: _your_ peculiarity is, that your -performance comes short of your power,—you have no faith even in -what your judgment guarantees,—when in difficulties, you despair of -all escape. _They_ never hang back,—_you_ are habitual laggards: -they love foreign service,—you cannot stir from home: for they are -always under the belief that their movements will lead to some -farther gain, while you fancy that new projects will endanger what -you have already. When successful, they make the greatest forward -march; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover, they task -their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of -others,—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion -in her service.[134] When their plans for acquisition do not come -successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: -yet the acquisitions when realized appear like trifles compared with -what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, -new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with -them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost -simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they -have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all -their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment -in the continual thirst for increase,—knowing no other festival -recreation except the performance of active duty,—and deeming -inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak -the truth in two words: such is their inborn temper, that they will -neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.[135] - - [133] Thucyd. i, 70. Οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ, καὶ ἐπιχειρῆσαι - ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ὃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε - σώζειν, καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. - - The meaning of the word ὀξεῖς—_sharp_—when applied to the latter - half of the sentence, is in the nature of a sarcasm. But this is - suitable to the character of the speech. Göller supposes some - such word as ἱκανοὶ, instead of ὀξεῖς, to be understood: but we - should thereby both depart from the more obvious syntax, and - weaken the general meaning. - - [134] Thucyd. i, 70. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ - τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ - αὐτῆς. - - It is difficult to convey, in translation, the antithesis between - ἀλλοτριωτάτοις and οἰκειοτάτῃ—not without a certain conceit, - which Thucydidês is occasionally fond of. - - [135] Thucyd. _l. c._ καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων - δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν - ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι - ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι, ξυμφορὰν δὲ οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα - ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι - ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾷν, - ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι. - -“Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians,—yet ye -still hang back from action.... Your continual scruples and apathy -would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbors like yourselves in -character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated -and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements -which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged -institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act,—yet -multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty -of contrivance.[136] It is through these numerous trials that the -means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than -yours.” - - [136] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς - ἐστιν. Ἀνάγκη δ᾽, ὥσπερ τέχνης, ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν· καὶ - ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ - ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ. - -The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous -warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to -protect her allies against Athens,—if she delayed to perform her -promise made to the Potidæans, of immediately invading Attica,—they, -the Corinthians, would forthwith look for safety in some new -alliance, and they felt themselves fully justified in doing so. -They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward -Peloponnesus with undiminished dignity as it had been transmitted to -her from her predecessors.[137] - - [137] Thucyd. i, 71. - -Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as -exhibited by her fiercest enemy, before the public assembly at -Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal -to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of -unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens -during the past,—and by the certainty held out that the same system, -unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed -still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to -this point did the Athenian envoy—staying in Sparta about some -other negotiation, and now present in the assembly—address himself -in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the -magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the -younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances -under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for -them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.[138] - - [138] Thucyd. i, 72. - -He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city -against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the -existing truce: this was no part of his mission, nor did he recognize -Sparta as a competent judge in disputes between Athens and Corinth. -But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against -the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, -as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the -policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded -to show that the empire of Athens had been honorably earned and -amply deserved,—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed -upon her,—and that she could not abdicate it without emperiling her -own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the -circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed -to them with pride as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism -of that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run -down as an enemy.[139] He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending -the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and -the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect -from Sparta and the other Greeks,—the preponderance of her naval -force in the entire armament,—the directing genius of her general -Themistoklês, complimented even by Sparta herself,—and the title of -Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of -Greece. This alone ought to save her empire from reproach: but this -was not all,—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing -instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both -incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia.[140] -By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her -presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who -revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too -had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon -her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against -her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and -revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by -force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have -acted otherwise: no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have -acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground -of complaint to her subjects. Worse they _had_ suffered, while under -Persia; worse they _would_ suffer, if they came under Sparta, who -held her own allies under the thraldom of an oligarchical party in -each city; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects -always hated the _present_ dominion, whatever that might be.[141] - - [139] Thucyd. i, 73. ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἕνεκα ἢ - μαρτυρίου, καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἵαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις - ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται. - - [140] Thucyd. i, 75. Ἆρ᾽ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ - προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης συνέσεως, ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν - τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν - τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων - παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων - τῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι· ἐξ αὐτοῦ - δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, - μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας. - - [141] Thucyd. i, 77. - -Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian -empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, -without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, -before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which -exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could -foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, -but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the -amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin -war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to -witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken.[142] - - [142] Thucyd. i, 78. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ πω τοιαύτῃ ἁμαρτίᾳ - ὄντες, οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ οὔτε ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες, λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι - αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ - παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν - ξυνθήκην· ἢ θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι, πειρασόμεθα - ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἄρχοντας ταύτῃ ᾗ ἂν ὑφηγῆσθε. - -The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that -the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, of the origin -and character of the empire exercised by his city, though doubtless -the account of a partisan, is in substance correct and equitable; -the envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which -they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the coming -war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of -Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably -have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the -Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all “strangers,” -and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the -question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one -language,[143]—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and -urging the necessity of instant war. There was, however, one voice, -and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion: the -ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it. - - [143] Thucyd. i, 79. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι - ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε Ἀθηναίους ἤδη, καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει. - -The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, -setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, -looks at the question with a view to the interests and honor of -Sparta only,—not, however, omitting her imperial as well as her -separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant -against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating -it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force -of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic -city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of -Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to -excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the -subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric -upon the well-known valor and discipline of the city. To all these -arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience -of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the -assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, -and perils, of the war into which they were hurrying without -preparation.[144] He reminded them of the wealth, the population, -greater than that of any other Grecian city, the naval force, the -cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens,—and -then asked by what means they proposed to put her down?[145] Ships, -they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They -could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and -land-force: but the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to -enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great -navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose -that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring -the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings -would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real -strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps, for a whole -generation.[146] Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely -necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and -to multiply their allies, not merely among the Greeks, but among -foreigners also: while this was in process, envoys ought to be sent -to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of -the allies. If the Athenians granted this,—which they very probably -would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when -the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was held over -them _in terrorem_ without being actually consummated,—so much the -better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war -might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded -his countrymen that their allies would hold _them_ responsible for -the good or bad issue of what was now determined;[147] admonishing -them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that -cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, -despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their -valor. “We, Spartans, owe both our bravery and our prudence to our -admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense -of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valor is with -the sense of shame: it makes us prudent, because our training keeps -us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and -holds us under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them.[148] And -thus, not being overwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans -are not given to disparage our enemy’s strength in clever speech, -and then meet him with short-comings in reality: we think that the -capacity of neighboring states is much on a par, and that the chances -in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated -beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our -enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must -count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance -of their errors. Indeed, there is no great superiority in one man -as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the -severest trials. Let us, for our parts, not renounce this discipline, -which we have received from our fathers, and which we still continue, -to our very great profit: let us not hurry on, in one short hour, -a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so -many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to -consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. -Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Potidæa, and of the -other grievances alleged by our allies,—and that too, the rather -as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers -satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous -application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But, at the same -time, make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at -once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your -enemies.”[149] - - [144] Thucyd. i, 80. - - [145] Thucyd. i, 80. πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας, οἳ γῆν τε ἑκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ - προσέτι πολέμου ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα - ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις - καὶ ὅπλοις, καὶ ὄχλῳ, ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ - ἐστὶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς - χρὴ πρὸς τούτους ῥᾳδίως πόλεμον ἄρασθαι, καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας - ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι. - - [146] Thucyd. i, 81. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν - ὑπολίπωμεν, etc. - - [147] Thucyd. i, 82, 83. - - [148] Thucyd. i, 84. Πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον - γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν, ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, - αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία· εὔβουλοι δὲ, ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς - ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι, καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε - αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν· καὶ μὴ, τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες, τὰς - τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι, ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ - ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους - εἶναι, καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς. - - In the construction of the last sentence, I follow Haack and - Poppo, in preference to Göller and Dr. Arnold. - - The wording of this part of the speech of Archidamus is awkward - and obscure, though we make out pretty well the general sense. - It deserves peculiar attention, as coming from a king of Sparta, - personally, too, a man of superior judgment. The great points - of the Spartan character are all brought out. 1. A narrow, - strictly-defined, and uniform range of ideas. 2. Compression of - all other impulses and desires, but an increased sensibility to - their own public opinion. 3. Great habits of endurance as well as - of submission. - - The way in which the features of Spartan character are - deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which - Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range - of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship - of ignorance and narrow-mindedness is not only to be found - among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of - the Athenian democracy (see Aristophanês, Ran. 1070: compare - Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of Kleon - (Thucyd. iii, 37). - - [149] Thucyd. i, 84, 85. - -The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain -reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point -of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative -feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite -of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of -feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. -Stheneläidas—one of the five ephors, to whom it fell to put the -question for voting—closed the debate; and his few words mark at -once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the -simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for -which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen. - -“I don’t understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. -They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted -what is laid to their charge,—that they are guilty of wrong against -our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now, if in former days they -were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against -us, they deserve double punishment, as having become evil-doers -instead of good.[150] But _we_ are the same now as we were then: -we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering -wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid while they cannot adjourn -their sufferings.[151] Others have in abundance wealth, ships, -and horses,—but _we_ have good allies, whom we are not to abandon -to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to -arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. -We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Nor let any -one tell us that we can with honor deliberate when we are actually -suffering wrong,—it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, -to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, -in a manner worthy of Sparta: suffer not the Athenians to become -greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but -march, with the aid of the gods, against the wrong-doers.” - - [150] Compare a similar sentiment in the speech of the Thebans - against the Platæans (Thucyd. iii, 67). - - [151] Thucyd. i, 86. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμὲν, καὶ - τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους, οὐδὲ - μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν· οἱ δὲ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν. - - There is here a play upon the word μέλλειν, which it is not easy - to preserve in a translation. - -With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential -admonitions of Archidamus, Stheneläidas put the question for the -decision of the assembly,—which, at Sparta, was usually taken neither -by show of hands nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries -analogous to the Aye or No of the English House of Commons,—the -presiding ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On -this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger:[152] -yet Stheneläidas affected inability to determine which of the two -cries was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for -bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a -stronger apparent majority,—since a portion of the minority would -probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals -openly. He accordingly directed a division, like the Speaker of the -English House of Commons, when his decision in favor of aye or no -is questioned by any member: “Such of you as think that the truce -has been violated, and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to -_that_ side; such as think the contrary, to the other side.” The -assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the -warlike side of the question. - - [152] Thucyd. i, 87. βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους - τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμῆσαι, etc. - -The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important -decision was, to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it -would be beneficial to them to undertake the war: the answer brought -back (Thucydidês seems hardly certain that it was really given[153]) -was,—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that -the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same -time convened a general congress of their allies at Sparta, for the -purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all. - - [153] Thucyd. i, 118. ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς, ~ὡς λέγεται~, etc. - -To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the -decision of this congress was not less important than that which -the Spartans had just taken separately: and they sent round envoys -to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without -reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse -then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly -warlike: most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens, -and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to -speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated -to insure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to -shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians: this point had now -been carried, and they had to enforce, upon the allies generally, -the dishonor as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing -leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the inland -states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves -ultimately victims of the encroaching despot city: whatever efforts -were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was -only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honorable -peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and -that the war would not last long,—so decided was the superiority of -the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal -heart and obedience of all its members.[154] The naval superiority -of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen,—and the confederacy, -by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon -be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal -her equipment at sea: they would excite revolt among her allies, and -establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make -up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for -Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed, and -nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive -enslavement,—the very supposition of which was intolerable to -Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the -Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a -cause,—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious -effort. The Delphian god had promised them his coöperation; and the -whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of -the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be -the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken -it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. -Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian -population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks -whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was -becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it -would be when it came. “Be ye persuaded then, (concluded the orator), -that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, has -her position against all of us alike, some for present rule, others -for future conquest; let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell -securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are -now in slavery.”[155] - - [154] Thucyd. i, 120, 121. Κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, - πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προὔχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα - ~ὁμοίως~ πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας. - - I conceive that the word ~ὁμοίως~ here alludes to the equal - interest of all the confederates in the quarrel, as opposed to - the Athenian power, which was composed partly of constrained - subjects, partly of hired mercenaries: to both of which points, - as weaknesses in the enemy, the Corinthian orator goes on - to allude. The word ὁμοίως here designates the same fact as - Periklês, in his speech at Athens (i, 141), mentions under the - words πάντες ἰσόψηφοι: the Corinthian orator treats it as an - advantage to have all confederates equal and hearty in the cause: - Periklês, on the contrary, looking at the same fact from the - Athenian point of view, considers it as a disadvantage, since it - prevented unity of command and determination. - - Poppo’s view of this passage seems to me erroneous. - - The same idea is reproduced, c. 124. εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταὐτὰ - ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, etc. - - [155] Thucyd. i, 123, 124. - -If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition -to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein -even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, -the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and -small, indiscriminately and the majority decided for war.[156] This -important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the -beginning of January 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans -separately may have been taken about two months earlier, in the -preceding October or November 432 B.C. - - [156] Thucyd. i, 125. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. It seems - that the decision was not absolutely unanimous. - -Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this -momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive -grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. -She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the -thirty years’ truce: and for such of her acts as were alleged to be -such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which -the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were -manifestly the aggressors in the contest; and if Sparta, usually so -backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are -to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, -partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians. -Thucydidês, recognizing these two as the grand determining motives, -and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions -or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as -having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of -her allies.[157] That the extraordinary aggrandizement of Athens, -during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was -well calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is -indisputable: but if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it -deserves notice that she had neither made, nor, so far as we know, -tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen -years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the thirty years’ -truce;[158]— and, moreover, that that truce marked an epoch of -signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which -Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently -complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to -inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue -her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling -out of which war was likely to grow,—and we see that even before the -quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere -anticipated war as not far distant:[159] it was near breaking out -even on occasion of the revolt of Samos,[160] and peace was then -preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, -partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth -and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she -thought it her interest to do so,—and the junction of Korkyra with -Athens,—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandizement, -and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; -while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a -clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa,—fomented by Corinth, -and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade -Attica,—was, in point of fact, the first distinct violation of the -truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war: nor did -the Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, -serve any other purpose than to provide such formalities as were -requisite to insure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and -to clothe with imposing sanction a state of war already existing in -reality, though yet unproclaimed. The sentiment in Peloponnesus at -this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens,—and -the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence -was justified by plausible grounds: men might well think that the -Athenians would never endure the entire devastation of their highly -cultivated soil,—or at least that they would certainly come forth -to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians -desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendency and unshaken -resolution of Periklês, induced the Athenians to persevere in a -scheme of patient defence, and to trust to that naval superiority -which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious -Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover, the -confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by -the wide-spread sympathy in favor of their cause, proclaiming, as it -did, the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.[161] - - [157] Thucyd. i, 88. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς - λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, ~οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων - πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους~, μὴ ἐπὶ - μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια - ἤδη ὄντα: compare also c. 23 and 118. - - [158] Plutarch’s biography of Periklês is very misleading, from - its inattention to chronology, ascribing to an earlier time - feelings and tendencies which really belong to a later. Thus - he represents (c. 20) the desire for acquiring possession of - Sicily, and even of Carthage and the Tyrrhenian coast, as having - become very popular at Athens even before the revolt of Megara - and Eubœa, and before those other circumstances which preceded - the thirty years’ truce: and he gives much credit to Periklês - for having repressed such unmeasured aspirations. But ambitious - hopes directed towards Sicily could not have sprung up in the - Athenian mind until after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. - It was impossible that they could make any step in that direction - until they had established their alliance with Korkyra, and this - was only done in the year before the Peloponnesian war,—done - too, even then, in a qualified manner, and with much reserve. At - the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had - nothing but fears, while the Peloponnesians had large hopes of - aid, from the side of Sicily. While it is very true, therefore, - that Periklês was eminently useful in discouraging rash and - distant enterprises of ambition generally, we cannot give him the - credit of keeping down Athenian desires of acquisition in Sicily, - or towards Carthage,—if, indeed, this latter ever was included - in the catalogue of Athenian hopes,—for such desires were hardly - known until after his death, in spite of the assertion again - repeated by Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 17. - - [159] Thucyd. i, 33-36. - - [160] Thucyd. i, 40, 41. - - [161] Thucyd. ii, 8. - -To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a -very different aspect; holding out scarcely any hope of possible -gain, and the certainty of prodigious loss and privation,—even -granting, that, at this heavy cost, her independence and union at -home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Periklês, and by -the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war -was foreseen even before the Korkyræan dispute.[162] But Periklês -was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and -listened to, more than any one else by the body of the citizens, -but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech -and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens,—and -even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal -determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course -have been made known at Athens by those Athenian envoys, who had -entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No -steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect -until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory -vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any -formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, -not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of -providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the -contrary purpose,—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds -of quarrel.[163] Meanwhile, the deputies retiring home from the -congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general -resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made, with as -little delay as possible.[164] - - [162] Thucyd. i, 45; Plutarch, Periklês. c. 8. - - [163] Thucyd. i, 126. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς - Ἀθηναίους ~ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις - εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι ἐσακούωσι~. - - [164] Thucyd. i, 125. - -The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a -political manœuvre aimed at Periklês, their chief opponent in that -city. His mother, Agaristê, belonged to the great family of the -Alkmæônids, who were supposed to be under an inexpiable hereditary -taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor -Megaklês, nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the -Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.[165] -Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the -mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manœuvre: -about seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of -Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king -Kleomenês, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance -of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of -Kleisthenês, the founder of the democracy, and his chief partisans. -This demand, addressed by Kleomenês to the Athenians, at the instance -of Isagoras, the rival of Kleisthenês,[166] had been then obeyed, -and had served well the purposes of those who sent it; a similar -blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Periklês, the grand -nephew of Kleisthenês, and doubtless at the instance of his political -enemies: religion required, it was pretended, that “the abomination -of the goddess should be driven out.”[167] If the Athenians complied -with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical -moment, of their ablest leader; but the Lacedæmonians, not expecting -compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Periklês with -the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family -taint of impiety,[168]—and this impression would doubtless be loudly -proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly. - - [165] See the account of the Kylonian troubles, and the sacrilege - which followed, in vol. iii, of this History, ch. x, p. 110. - - [166] See Herodot. v, 70: compare vi, 131; Thucyd. i, 126; and - vol. iv, ch. xxxi, p. 163 of this History. - - [167] Thucyd. i, 126. ἐκέλευον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν - τῆς θεοῦ. - - [168] Thucyd. i, 127. - -The influence of Periklês with the Athenian public had become greater -and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. -But the bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along -with it; and not long before this period, he had been indirectly -assailed, through the medium of accusations against three different -persons, all more or less intimate with him,—his mistress Aspasia, -the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Pheidias. We cannot -make out either the exact date, or the exact facts, of either of -these accusations. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a native of -Milêtus, beautiful, well educated, and ambitious. She resided at -Athens, and is affirmed, though upon very doubtful evidence, to -have kept slave-girls to be let out as courtezans; whatever may -be the case with this report, which is most probably one of the -scandals engendered by political animosity against Periklês,[169] -it is certain that so remarkable were her own fascinations, her -accomplishments, and her powers, not merely of conversation, but even -of oratory and criticism,—that the most distinguished Athenians of -all ages and characters, Sokratês among the number, visited her, and -several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also. -The free citizen women of Athens lived in strict and almost oriental -recluseness, as well after being married as when single: everything -which concerned their lives, their happiness, or their rights, was -determined or managed for them by male relatives: and they seem -to have been destitute of all mental culture and accomplishments. -Their society presented no charm nor interest, which men accordingly -sought for in the company of the class of women called hetæræ, or -courtezans, literally female companions; who lived a free life, -managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers -of pleasing. These women were numerous, and were doubtless of every -variety of personal character: but the most distinguished and -superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodotê,[170] appear to -have been the only women in Greece, except the Spartan, who either -inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendency. - - [169] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 24. Respecting Aspasia, see Plato, - Menexenus, c. 3, 4; Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 6, 36; Harpokration, - v, Ἀσπασία. Aspasia was, doubtless, not an uncommon name among - Grecian women; we know of one Phokæan girl who bore it, the - mistress of Cyrus the younger (Plutarch, Artaxer. c. 26). The - story about Aspasia having kept slave-girls for hire, is stated - by both Plutarch and Athenæus (xiii, p. 570); but we may well - doubt whether there is any better evidence for it than that which - is actually cited by the latter, the passage in Aristophanês, - Acharn. 497-505:— - - Κἀθ᾽ οἱ Μεγαρῆς ὀδύναις πεφυσιγγωμένοι - Ἀντεξέκλεψαν Ἀσπασίας ~πόρνα δύο~ or ~πόρνας δύο~. - - Athenæus reads the latter, but the reading πόρνα δύο appears - in the received text of Aristophanês. Critics differ, whether - Ἀσπασίας is the genitive case singular of Ἀσπασία, or the - accusative plural of the adjective ἀσπάσιος. I believe that it is - the latter; but intended as a play on the word, capable of being - understood either as a substantive or as an adjective—ἀσπασίας - πόρνας δύο, or Ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο. There is a similar play on - the word, in a line of Kratinus, quoted by Plutarch, Periklês, c. - 24. - - At the time, if ever, when this theft of the Megarian youth took - place, Aspasia must have been the beloved mistress and companion - of Periklês; and it is inconceivable that she should have kept - slave-girls for hire _then_, whatever she may have done before. - - That reading and construction of the verse above cited, which - I think the least probable of the two, has been applied by the - commentators of Thucydidês to explain a line of his history, - and applied in a manner which I am persuaded is erroneous. When - the Lacedæmonians desired the Athenians to repeal the decree - excluding the Megarians from their ports, the Athenians refused, - alleging that the Megarians had appropriated some lands which - were disputed between the two countries, and some which were - even sacred property,—and also, that “_they had received runaway - slaves from Athens_,”—καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων - (i, 139). The Scholiast gives a perfectly just explanation of - these last words—ὡς ὅτι δούλους αὐτῶν ἀποφεύγοντας ἐδέχοντο. - But Wasse puts a note to the passage to this effect—“_Aspasiæ - servos_, v, Athenæum, p. 570; Aristoph. Acharn. 525, et Schol.” - This note of Wasse is adopted and transcribed by the three best - and most recent commentators on Thucydidês,—Poppo, Göller, and - Dr. Arnold. Yet, with all respect to their united authority, - the supposition is neither natural, as applied to the words, - nor admissible, as regards the matter of fact. Ἀνδράποδα - ἀφιστάμενα mean naturally (not _Aspasiæ servos_, or more properly - _servas_, for the very gender ought to have made Wasse suspect - the correctness of his interpretation,—but) the runaway slaves - of proprietors generally in Attica; of whom the Athenians lost - so prodigious a number after the Lacedæmonian garrison was - established at Dekeleia (Thucyd. vii, 28: compare i, 142; and - iv, 118, about the ἀυτόμολοι). Periklês might well set forth - the reception of such runaway slaves as a matter of complaint - against the Megarians, and the Athenian public assembly would - feel it so likewise: moreover, the Megarians are charged, not - with having _stolen away_ the slaves, but with _harboring_ them - (ὑποδοχὴν). But to suppose that Periklês, in defending the decree - of exclusion against the Megarians, would rest the defence on - the ground that some Megarian youth had run away with two girls - of the _cortège_ of Aspasia, argues a strange conception both of - him and of the people. If such an incident ever really happened, - or was even supposed to have happened, we may be sure that it - would be cited by his opponents, as a means of bringing contempt - upon the real accusation against the Megarians,—the purpose for - which Aristophanês produces it. This is one of the many errors - in respect to Grecian history, arising from the practice of - construing passages of comedy as if they were serious and literal - facts. - - [170] The visit of Sokratês with some of his friends to Theodotê, - his dialogue with her, and the description of her manner of - living, is among the most curious remnants of Grecian antiquity, - on a side very imperfectly known to us (Xenophon, Memorab. iii, - 11). - - Compare the citations from Eubulus and Antiphanês, the comic - writers, apud Athenæum, xiii, p. 571, illustrating the - differences of character and behavior between some of these - hetæræ and others,—and Athenæ. xiii, p. 589. - -Periklês had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family -considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and -had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two -sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage, having never been -comfortable, was afterwards dissolved by mutual consent, according -to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted; and -Periklês concurred with his wife’s male relations, who formed her -legal guardians, in giving her a way to another husband.[171] He -then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her, who bore -his name, and continued ever afterwards on terms of the greatest -intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations -which represent Aspasia as having communicated to Periklês his -distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations -for public delivery, we may well believe her to have been qualified -to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society -which frequented the house of Periklês, and which his unprincipled -son Xanthippus,—disgusted with his father’s regular expenditure, -as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant -establishment,—reported abroad with exaggerating calumnies and -turned into derision. It was from that worthless young man, who -died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Periklês, that -his political enemies and the comic writers of the day were mainly -furnished with scandalous anecdotes to assail the private habits -of this distinguished man.[172] The comic writers attacked him for -alleged intrigues with different women, but the name of Aspasia they -treated as public property, without any mercy or reserve: she was -the Omphalê, the Deianeira, or the Hêrê, to this great Hêraklês or -Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not -contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for -impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and -the opinions professed, in the society of Periklês, by Anaxagoras -and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment -is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thucydidês, -son of Melêsias, under a general resolution recently passed in the -public assembly, at the instance of Diopeithês. And such was the -sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterwards fatally -in the case of Sokratês, and embittered in this instance by all the -artifices of political faction, against philosophers whose opinions -conflicted with the received religious dogmas, that Periklês did -not dare to place Anaxagoras on his trial: the latter retired from -Athens, and the sentence of banishment was passed against him in his -absence.[173] But he himself defended Aspasia before the diakastery: -in fact, the indictment was as much against him as against her: -one thing alleged against her, and also against Pheidias, was, the -reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Periklês. -He defended her successfully, and procured a verdict of acquittal: -but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the -strongest personal emotions, and even by tears.[174] The dikasts were -accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to -extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons: but in Periklês, -so manifest an outburst of emotion stands out as something quite -unparalleled: for constant self-mastery was one of the most prominent -features in his character.[175] And we shall find him near the close -of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular -with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment -with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence,—bearing up against -their unmerited anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of -conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; -insomuch that the rhetor Dionysius, who criticizes the speech of -Periklês as if it were simply the composition of Thucydidês, censures -that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of -insolence where humility would have been becoming.[176] - - [171] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 24 Εἶτα τῆς συμβιώσεως οὐκ οὔσης - αὐτοῖς ἀρεστῆς, ἐκείνην μὲν ἑτέρῳ βουλομένην συνεξέδωκεν, αὐτὸς - δὲ Ἀσπασίαν λαβὼν ἔστερξε διαφερόντως. - - [172] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-36. - - [173] This seems the more probable story: but there are - differences of statement and uncertainties upon many points: - compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 16-32; Plutarch, Nikias, c. - 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 12, 13. See also Schaubach, Fragment. - Anaxagoræ, pp. 47-52. - - [174] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 32. - - [175] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 7, 36-39. - - [176] Thucyd. ii, 60, 61: compare also his striking expressions, - c. 65; Dionys. Halikarn. De Thucydid. Judic. c. 44, p. 924. - -It appears, also, as far as we can judge amidst very imperfect -data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged -embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue -of Athênê,[177] took place nearly at this period. That statue had -been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since -which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia, in his last and -great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On -his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or -432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him -by the political enemies of Periklês.[178] A slave of Pheidias, -named Menon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing -to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had -committed peculation. Motion was made to receive his depositions, -and to insure to his person the protection of the people; upon which -he revealed various statements impeaching the pecuniary probity of -Pheidias, and the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his -trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the -statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so -as to verify its accuracy, which Periklês dared the accusers to do. -Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances -which rendered Pheidias unpopular: it had been discovered that, in -the reliefs on the friese of the Parthenon, he had introduced the -portraits both of himself and of Periklês in conspicuous positions. -It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; -and some even said, that he had been poisoned by the enemies of -Periklês, in order that the suspicions against the latter, who was -the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that -Drakontidês proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, -that Periklês should be called on to give an account of the money -which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account -was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner -from the altar: this latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, -while proposing that the dikasts should be fifteen hundred in number, -retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary -custom.[179] - - [177] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31. Φειδίας—ἐργολάβος τοῦ ἀγάλματος. - - This tale, about protecting Pheidias under the charge of - embezzlement, was the story most widely in circulation against - Periklês—ἡ χειρίστη μὲν αἰτία πασῶν, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας - (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31). - - [178] See the Dissertation of O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, c. 17, - p. 35), who lays out the facts in the order in which I have given - them. - - [179] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-32. - -If Periklês was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt -that he was honorably acquitted: for the language of Thucydidês -respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could never have been -employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had ever -been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever -was tried: indeed, another accusation urged by his enemies, and -even by Aristophanês, in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, -implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Periklês, -in order to escape this danger, “blew up the Peloponnesian war,” and -involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own -aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her: especially that he -passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really -brought on.[180] We know enough, however, to be certain that such -a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Periklês -were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, -to have let him escape by such a stratagem: moreover, we learn from -the assurance of Thucydidês, that the war depended upon far deeper -causes,—that the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of -it,—that it was not Periklês, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it -on, by the blow struck at Potidæa. - - [180] Aristophan. Pac. 587-603: compare Acharn. 512; Ephorus, - ap. Diodor. xii, 38-40; and the Scholia on the two passages of - Aristophanês; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 32. - - Diodorus (as well as Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7) relates another - tale, that Alkibiadês once approached Periklês when he was in - evident low spirits and embarrassment, and asked him the reason: - Periklês told him that the time was near at hand for rendering - his accounts, and that he was considering how this could be done: - upon which Alkibiadês advised him to consider rather how he could - evade doing it. The result of this advice was that Periklês - plunged Athens into the Peloponnesian war: compare Aristophan. - Nub. 855, with the Scholia,—and Ephorus, Fragm. 118, 119, ed. - Marx, with the notes of Marx. - - It is probable enough that Ephorus copied the story, which - ascribes the Peloponnesian war to the accusations against - Pheidias and Periklês, from Aristophanês or other comic writers - of the time. But it deserves remark, that even Aristophanês is - not to be considered as certifying it. For if we consult the - passage above referred to in his comedy _Pax_, we shall find - that, first, Hermês tells the story about Pheidias, Periklês, and - the Peloponnesian war; upon which both Trygæus, and the Chorus, - remark that _they never heard a word of it before_: that it is - quite _new_ to them. - - Tryg. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ᾽γὼ ᾽πεπύσμην οὐδενὸς, - Οὐδ᾽ ὅπως αὐτῇ (Εἰρήνῃ) προσήκοι Φειδίας ἠκηκόη. - - Chorus. Οὐδ᾽ ἔγωγε πλήν γε νυνί. - - If Aristophanês had stated the story ever so plainly, his - authority could only have been taken as proving that it was a - part of the talk of the time: but the lines just cited make him - as much a contradicting as an affirming witness. - -All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is, -that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian -war, Periklês was hard pressed by the accusations of political -enemies,—perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons -of those who were most in his confidence and affection.[181] And it -was in this turn of his political position that the Lacedæmonians -sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition, that the ancient -Kylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, -that Periklês and his family might be banished. Doubtless, his -enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would -strenuously support this proposition: and the party of Lacedæmon -at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war: -to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honor -even by the greatest Athenian families.[182] On this occasion, -however, the manœuvre did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen -to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæônids. On -the contrary, they replied that the Spartans, too, had an account -of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of -Poseidon, at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants -to be put to death,—and the sanctuary of Athênê Chalkiœkus at Sparta, -in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To -require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege, -was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for -the banishment of Periklês.[183] Probably, the actual effect of -that demand was, to strengthen him in the public esteem:[184] very -different from the effect of the same manœuvre when practised before -by Kleomenês against Kleisthenês. - - [181] It would appear that not only Aspasia and Anaxagoras, but - also the musician and philosopher Damon, the personal friend and - instructor of Periklês, must have been banished at a time when - Periklês was old,—perhaps somewhere near about this time. The - passage in Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 30, p. 118, proves that Damon - was in Athens, and intimate with Periklês, when the latter was - of considerable age—καὶ νῦν ἔτι ~τηλικοῦτος~ ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν - αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα. - - Damon is said to have been ostracized,—perhaps he was tried and - condemned to banishment: for the two are sometimes confounded. - - [182] See Thucyd. v, 43; vi, 89. - - [183] Thucyd. i, 128, 135, 139. - - [184] Plutarch, Perikl. c. 33. - -Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived, with fresh demands. -The Athenians were now required: 1. To withdraw their troops from -Potidæa. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree -of exclusion against the Megarians. It was upon the latter that the -greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war -might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly, from -this proceeding, that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the -anti-Periklêan leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the -decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue -of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa: but on the other -hand, the party opposed to Periklês would have much better chance -of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the -Megarians: and this advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble -his influence generally. No concession was obtained, however, on -either of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree -of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of -opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved -upon war, and had sent these envoys in mere compliance with the -exigencies of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about -an accommodation—sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition, -which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without -disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians -the simple injunction: “The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; -and it _may_ stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous.” Upon -this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians -resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to -open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine, once -for all, on a peremptory answer.[185] - - [185] Thucyd. i, 39. It rather appears, from the words of - Thucydidês, that these various demands of the Lacedæmonians - were made by _one_ embassy, joined by new members arriving with - fresh instructions, but remaining during a month or six weeks, - between January and March 431 B.C., installed in the house of the - proxenus of Sparta at Athens: compare Xenophon Hellenic. v, 4, 22. - -The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went -to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian -empire,—combined with the character, alike wavering and insincere, -of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the -Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favor of -war,—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring -together this important assembly under the universal conviction that -war was inevitable. Such, however, was not the fact. The reluctance -to go to war was sincere amidst the large majority of the assembly; -while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, -that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians -had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were -the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among -the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this -decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war -about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Periklês for refusing to -concede such a trifle.[186] Against this opinion Periklês entered his -protest, in an harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of -Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydidês: the latter -historian may probably himself have heard the original speech. - - [186] Thucyd. i, 139; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31. - -“I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we -must not yield to the Peloponnesians,—though I know that men are -in one mood when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in -another when actually in the contest,—their judgments then depending -upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said -on former occasions,—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere -to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially -unfavorable: or else, not to take credit for wisdom in the event of -success.[187] For it is very possible that the contingencies of -events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels -of man: such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute -to fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their -hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. -While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable -satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we -possess,—they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but will -not receive it when tendered by us: they choose to settle complaints -by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the tone of -complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin -us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the -decree against the Megarians: nay, these last envoys are even come -to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now let -none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, -if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree,—which they chiefly put -forward, as if its repeal would avert the war,—let none of you take -blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. -For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial -of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other -greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on -one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it -clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of -equality.”[188] - - [187] Thucyd. i, 140. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων - οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· διόπερ - καὶ τὴν τύχην ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. I - could have wished, in the translation, to preserve the play - upon the words ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι, which Thucydidês introduces into - this sentence, and which seems to have been agreeable to his - taste. Ἀμαθῶς, when referred to ξυμφορὰς, is used in a passive - sense by no means common,—“in a manner which cannot be learned, - departing from all reasonable calculation.” Ἀμαθῶς, when referred - to διανοίας, bears its usual meaning,—“ignorant, deficient in - learning or in reason.” - - [188] Thucyd. i, 140. - -Periklês then examined the relative strength of parties and the -chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, -with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public; -they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war: -they were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to -contribute from their very narrow means:[189] in a border-war, or a -single land battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare -against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, -nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by -opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful attack. -They might, perhaps, establish a fortified post in Attica, but it -would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and -helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy -would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on -tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means -of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi:[190] for besides that the -mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even -by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance -afterwards,—Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case -of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own -walls steersmen and mariners better as well as more numerous than -all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was -vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island,—it was exposed -to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without -committing the imprudence of engaging a land battle to avert it: they -had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to -supply their wants, and they could in their turn, by means of their -navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no -subsidiary lands to recur to.[191] - - [189] Thucyd. i, 141. αὐτουργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι, καὶ - οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς· ἔπειτα χρονίων - πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἄπειροι, διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους - ὑπὸ πενίας ἐπιφέρειν. - - [190] Thucyd. i, 143. εἴτε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ - Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῷ μείζονι πειρῷντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς - ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων, ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν - τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων, δεινὸν ἂν ἦν· νῦν δὲ τόδε τε ὑπάρχει, καὶ, - ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν - πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς. - - This is in reply to those hopes which we know to have been - conceived by the Peloponnesian leaders, and upon which the - Corinthian speaker in the Peloponnesian congress had dwelt (i, - 121). Doubtless Periklês would be informed of the tenor of all - these public demonstrations at Sparta. - - [191] Thucyd. i, 141, 142, 143. - -“Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator): -reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but -men acquire them.[192] Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I -would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus -show to the Peloponnesians that, for them at least, ye will not -truckle. And I could exhibit many further grounds for confidently -anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at -increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take -upon yourselves new self-imposed risks; for I have ever been more -afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our enemy.[193] But -these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual -operations: for the present let us dismiss these envoys with the -answer: That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and -harbors, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their -(xenêlasy or) summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from -their own territory,—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent -either one or the other: that we will leave the Grecian cities -autonomous, if we _had_ them as autonomous at the time when the truce -was made,—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to _their_ -allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not -such as is convenient to Sparta: that while we are ready to give -satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will -repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and -suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds -that war is inevitable: the more cheerfully we accept it, the less -vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the -danger is greatest, there also is the final honor greatest, both for -a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they -bore up against the Persians,—having no such means as we possess -to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did -possess,—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our -actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by -a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall -short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave -an unimpaired power to our successors.”[194] - - [192] Thucyd. i, 143. τήν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς - ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων· οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ - ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται. - - [193] Thucyd. i, 144. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ - περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, - καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι - τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας. - - [194] Thucyd. i, 143, 144. - -These animating encouragements of Periklês carried with them the -majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such -as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was -announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or -war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of -complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable -arbitration,—but that they would do nothing under authoritative -demand.[195] With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an -end was put to negotiation. - - [195] Thucyd. i, 145. καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ - ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ᾽ ἕκαστά τε ὡς ἔφρασε, καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν οὐδὲν - κελευόμενοι ποιήσειν, δίκῃ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι - διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ. - -It seems evident, from the account of Thucydidês, that the Athenian -public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, -and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of -property in Attica: and that a considerable minority took opposition -on the Megarian decree,—the ground skilfully laid by Sparta for -breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party -opposed to Periklês. But we may also decidedly infer from the same -historian,—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta, -as he sets them forth,—that Athens could not have avoided the war -without such an abnegation, both of dignity and power as no nation -under any government will ever submit to, and as would have even -left her without decent security for her individual rights. To -accept the war tendered to her, was a matter not merely of prudence -but of necessity: the tone of exaction assumed by the Spartan -envoys would have rendered concession a mere evidence of weakness -and fear. As the account of Thucydidês bears out the judgment of -Periklês on this important point,[196] so it also shows us that -Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of -international dealing. It was not Athens, as the Spartans[197] -themselves afterwards came to feel, but her enemies, who broke the -provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa, and -by promising invasion of Attica: it was not Athens, but her enemies, -who, after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant -demands, in order to get up as good a case as possible for war.[198] -The case made out by Periklês, justifying the war on grounds both -of right and prudence, is in all its main points borne out by the -impartial voice of Thucydidês. And though it is perfectly true, -that the ambition of Athens had been great, and the increase of her -power marvellous, during the thirty-five years between the repulse -of Xerxes and the thirty years’ truce,—it is not less true that by -that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to -compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and -the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Periklês had not been one of -foreign aggrandizement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment -towards other Grecian powers: even the Korkyræan alliance was noway -courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to -the obligations of the existing truce: while the circumstances out -of which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the -part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself -the Korkyræan naval force. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian -war to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the -case. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on -the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens -desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her -stand as she was at the conclusion of the thirty years’ truce; it was -their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, -wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of -principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every -Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, -wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and -far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian. - - [196] In spite of the contrary view taken by Plutarch, Periklês, - c. 31: comparison of Perikl. and Fab. Max. c. 3. - - [197] Thucyd. iv, 21. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοσαῦτα εἶπον, - νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, - σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιουμένων κωλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένως - δέξεσθαί τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδώσειν. - - See also an important passage (vii, 18) about the feelings of the - Spartans. The Spartans thought, says Thucydidês, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ - πολέμῳ (the beginning of the Peloponnesian war) σφέτερον τὸ - παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι - ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ - ἐπιφέρειν ἢν δίκας θέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας - προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε - ἐνόμιζον, etc. - - [198] Thucyd. i, 126. ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ - πολεμεῖν. - -Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was -struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer -given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous -proceedings, and the preparations actually going on among the -Peloponnesian confederacy,—the truce could hardly be said to be still -in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few -weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse;[199] though -individuals who passed the borders did not think it necessary to -take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of -ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this -was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of -course great probability of success, before their preparations were -completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, -and the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear -in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her -neighbor. - - [199] Thucyd. i, 146. ἐπεμίγνυντο δ᾽ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ᾽ - ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων, ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δ᾽ οὔ· σπονδῶν γὰρ - ξύγχυσις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν, καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν. - -The little town of Platæa, still hallowed by the memorable victory -over the Persians, as well as by the tutelary consecration received -from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood -in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithæron; on the borders of Attica -on one side, and of the Theban territory on the other, from which it -was separated by the river Asôpus: the distance between Platæa and -Thebes being about seventy stadia, or a little more than eight miles. -Though Bœotian by descent, the Platæans were completely separated -from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance, as well as qualified -communion of civil rights, with the Athenians, who had protected -them against the bitter enmity of Thebes, for a period of time now -nearly three generations. But in spite of this long prescription, -the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves -wronged by the separation of Platæa: and an oligarchical faction -of wealthy Platæans espoused their cause,[200] with a view of -subverting the democratical government of the town, of destroying -its leaders, their political rivals, and of establishing an -oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. Naukleidês, and others -of this faction, entered into a secret conspiracy with Eurymachus -and the oligarchy of Thebes: to both it appeared a tempting prize, -since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous -interval, before watches had been placed, and the precautions of a -state of war commenced, and to surprise the town of Platæa in the -night: moreover, a period of religious festival was chosen, in order -that the population might be most completely off their guard.[201] -Accordingly, on a rainy night towards the close of March 431 -B.C.,[202] a body of rather more than three hundred Theban hoplites, -commanded by two of the Bœotarchs, Pythangelus, and Diemporus, and -including Eurymachus in the ranks, presented themselves at the gate -of Platæa during the first sleep of the citizens: Naukleidês and his -partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they -reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. -The best part of the Theban military force was intended to arrive at -Platæa by break of day, in order to support them.[203] - - [200] Thucyd. ii, 2. βουλόμενοι ἰδίας ἕνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε - τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπεναντίους διαφθεῖραι, καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς - Θηβαίοις προσποιῆσαι: also iii, 65. ἄνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι - καὶ γένει, etc. - - [201] Thucyd. iii, 56. - - [202] Thucyd. ii, 2. ἅμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ—seems to indicate a period - rather before than after the first of April: we may consider - the bisection of the Thucydidean year into θέρος and χείμων as - marked by the equinoxes. His summer and winter are each a half - of the year (Thucyd. v, 20), though Poppo erroneously treats the - Thucydidean winter as only four months (Poppo, Proleg. i, c. v, - p. 72, and ad Thucyd. ii, 2: see F. W. Ullrich, Beiträge zur - Erklärung des Thukydidês, p. 32, Hamburg, 1846). - - [203] Thucyd. ii, 2-5. ~θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ ὅπλα~ ... καὶ - ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ, εἴτις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν - ξυμμαχεῖν, ~τίθεσθαι παρ᾽ αὑτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα~. - - Dr. Arnold has a note upon this passage, explaining τίθεσθαι, or - θέσθαι τὰ ὅπλα, to mean, “piling the arms,” or getting rid of - their spears and shields by piling them all in one or more heaps. - He says: “The Thebans, therefore, as usual on a halt, proceeded - to pile their arms, and by inviting the Platæans to come and pile - theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from - their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their - spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up - together with theirs, whenever there should be occasion either to - march or to fight.” The same explanation of the phrase had before - been given by Wesseling and Larcher, ad Herodot. ix, 52; though - Bähr on the passage is more satisfactory. - - Both Poppo and Göller also sanction Dr. Arnold’s explanation: yet - I cannot but think that it is unsuitable to the passage before - us, as well as to several other passages in which τίθεσθαι τὰ - ὅπλα occurs: there may be other passages in which it will suit, - but as a general explanation it appears to me inadmissible. In - most cases, the words mean “_armati consistere_,”—to ground - arms,—to maintain rank, resting the spear and shield (see Xenoph. - Hellen. ii, 4, 12) upon the ground. In the incident now before - us, the Theban hoplites enter Platæa, a strange town, with the - population decidedly hostile, and likely to be provoked more - than ever by this surprise, add to which, that it is pitch dark, - and a rainy night. Is it likely, that the first thing which they - do will be to pile their arms? The darkness alone would render - it a slow and uncertain operation to resume the arms: so that - when the Platæans attacked them, as they did, quite suddenly - and unexpectedly, and while it was yet dark, the Thebans would - have been—upon Dr. Arnold’s supposition—altogether defenceless - and unarmed (see ii, 3. ~προσέβαλόν τε εὐθὺς~—οἱ Πλαταιῆς—καὶ ἐς - χεῖρας ᾔεσαν ~κατὰ τάχος~) which certainly they were not. Dr. - Arnold’s explanation may suit the case of the soldier in camp, - but certainly not that of the soldier in presence of an enemy, or - under circumstances of danger: the difference of the two will be - found illustrated in Xenophon, Hellenic. ii, 4, 5, 6. - - Nor do the passages referred to by Dr. Arnold himself bear - out his interpretation of the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα. That - interpretation is, moreover, not conveniently applicable either - to Thucyd. vii, 3, or viii, 25,—decidedly inapplicable to iv, - 68 (θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα), in the description of the night attack - on Megara, very analogous to this upon Platæa,—and not less - decidedly inapplicable to two passages of Xenophon’s Anabasis, i, - 5, 14; iv, 3, 7. - - Schneider, in the Lexicon appended to his edition of Xenophon’s - Anabasis, has a long but not very distinct article upon τίθεσθαι - τὰ ὅπλα. - -Naukleidês and his friends, following the instincts of political -antipathy, were eager to conduct the Thebans to the houses of their -opponents, the democratical leaders, in order that the latter might -be seized or despatched. But to this the Thebans would not consent: -believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a -large reinforcement at daylight, they thought they could overawe -the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their -terms, without any actual violence: they wished, moreover, rather -to soften and justify, than to aggravate, the gross public wrong -already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite, -by public proclamation, all Platæans who were willing to return to -their ancient sympathies of race, and to the Bœotian confederacy, -that they should come forth and take station as brethren in the -armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Platæans, suddenly roused from -sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of -the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants -was far greater than the reality: so that in spite of their strong -attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began -to open negotiations. But as they soon found out, in spite of the -darkness, as the discussion proceeded, that the real numbers of the -Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with,—they speedily took -courage and determined to attack them; establishing communication -with each other by breaking through the walls of their private -houses, in order that they might not be detected in moving about in -the streets or ways,[204]—and forming barricades with wagons across -such of these ways as were suitable. A little before daybreak, when -their preparations were fully completed, they sallied forth from -their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters -with the Thebans. The latter, still fancying themselves masters of -the town, and relying upon a satisfactory close to the discussions -when daylight should arrive, now found themselves surprised in their -turn, and under great disadvantages: for they had been out all night -under a heavy rain,—they were in a town which they did not know, -with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had -difficulty in finding even by daylight. Nevertheless, on finding -themselves suddenly assailed, they got as well as they could into -close order, and repelled the Platæans two or three times: but the -attack was still repeated, with loud shouts, while the women also -screamed, and howled, and threw tiles from the flat-roofed houses, -until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight -was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their -way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the -only one open, had been closed by a Platæan citizen, who thrust into -it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was -commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city, and pursued by men who -knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall, and -jumped down on the outside, most of them perished in the attempt,—a -few others escaped through an unguarded gate, by cutting through the -bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them,—while the greater -number of them ran into the open doors of a large barn or building -in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach -to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without the chance of -escape, and the Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the -building: but at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as -well as all the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at -discretion.[205] - - [204] Thucyd. ii, 3. ἐδόκει οὖν ἐπιχειρητέα εἶναι, καὶ - ξυνελέγοντο διορύσσοντες τοὺς κοινοὺς τοίχους παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ὅπως - μὴ διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν φανεροὶ ὦσιν ἰόντες, ἁμάξας δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ὑποζυγίων - ἐς τὰς ὁδοὺς καθίστασαν, ἵν᾽ ἀντὶ τείχους ᾖ, καὶ τἄλλα ἐξήρτυον, - etc. - - I may be permitted to illustrate this by a short extract from the - letter of M. Marrast, mayor of Paris, to the National Assembly, - written during the formidable insurrection of June 25, 1848, in - that city, and describing the proceedings of the insurgents: - “Dans la plupart des rues longues, étroites et couvertes de - barricades qui vont de l’Hôtel de Ville à la Rue St. Antoine, - la garde nationale mobile, et la troupe de ligne, ont dû faire - le siège de chaque maison; et ce qui rendait l’œuvre plus - périlleuse, c’est que les insurgés avaient établi, de chaque - maison à chaque maison, des communications intérieures qui - reliaient les maisons entre elles, en sorte qu’ils pouvaient se - rendre, comme par une allée couverte, d’un point éloigné jusqu’au - centre d’une suite de barricades qui les protégeaient.” (Lettre - publiée dans le journal, le National, June 26, 1848). - - [205] Thucyd. ii, 3, 4. - -Had the reinforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, -this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark -night retarded their whole march, while the river Asôpus was so -much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they -reached the gates of Platæa, their comrades within were either slain -or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thebans without could -not tell: but they immediately resolved to seize what they could -find, persons as well as property, in the Platæan territory,—no -precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils -of war by keeping within the walls,—in order that they might have -something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this -step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town -to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having so -flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to -do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting -farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to -them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A -convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the -Thebans retired without any active measures. Such at least was the -Theban account of what preceded their retirement: but the Platæans -gave a very different statement; denying that they had made any -categorical promise or sworn any oath,—and affirming that they had -engaged for nothing, except to suspend any decisive step with regard -to the prisoners until discussion had been entered into to see if a -satisfactory agreement could be concluded. - -As Thucydidês records both of these statements, without intimating -to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume -that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban -story is undoubtedly the most probable: but the Platæans appear to -have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction -of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the -Platæans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their -movable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners -forthwith; without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. -The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, -were one hundred and eighty in number.[206] - - [206] Thucyd. ii, 5, 6; Herodot. vii, 233. Demosthenês (cont. - Neæram, c. 25, p. 1379) agrees with Thucydidês in the statement - that the Platæans slew their prisoners. From whom Diodorus - borrowed his inadmissible story, that the Platæans gave up their - prisoners to the Thebans, I cannot tell (Diodor. xii, 41, 42). - - The passage in this oration against Neæra is also curious, - both as it agrees with Thucydidês on many points, and as it - differs from him on several others: in some sentences, even - the words agree with Thucydidês (ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμὸς μέγας - ἐῤῥύη, καὶ διαβῆναι οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἦν, etc.: compare Thucyd. ii, - 2); while on other points there is discrepancy. Demosthenês—or - the Pseudo-Demosthenês—states that Archidamus, king of Sparta, - planned the surprise of Platæa,—that the Platæans only - discovered, when morning dawned, the small real number of the - Thebans in the town,—that the larger body of Thebans, when they - at last did arrive near Platæa after the great delay in their - march, were forced to retire by the numerous force arriving from - Athens, and that the Platæans then destroyed their prisoners - in the town. Demosthenês mentions nothing about any convention - between the Platæans and the Thebans without the town, respecting - the Theban prisoners within. - - On every point on which the narrative of Thucydidês differs from - that of Demosthenês, that of the former stands out as the most - coherent and credible. - -On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger -had started from Platæa to carry the news to Athens: a second -messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the -prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. The Athenians sent back -a herald without delay, enjoining the Platæans to take no step -respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with -Athens. Periklês doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact: -for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. -Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the -received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be -denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thebans, when fortune was -in their favor, chose to designate it as such,[207]—but impartial -contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would -deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. For Thebes, the best -thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens -forthwith: but next to that, the least evil would be to hear that -they had been put to death. In the hands of the Athenians and -Platæans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much -more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of -Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for -imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance,—as -may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of -Korôneia, and by that of Sparta, hereafter to be recounted, after the -taking of Sphakteria. The Platæans, obeying the simple instinct of -wrath and vengeance, threw away this great political advantage, which -the more long-sighted Periklês would gladly have turned to account. - - [207] Thucyd. iii, 66. - -At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Platæa, they also -issued orders for seizing all Bœotians who might be found in Attica; -while they lost no time in sending forces to provision Platæa, and -placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens -the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint -or discussion, respecting the recent surprise, was thought of by -either party: it was evident to both that the war was now actually -begun,—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying -it on,—and that there could be no farther personal intercourse -except under the protection of heralds.[208] The incident at Platæa, -striking in all its points, wound up both parties to the full pitch -of warlike excitement. A spirit of resolution and enterprise was -abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet -unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce -but just broken had raised up; and the contagion of high-strung -feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of -Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, -and religious legends adapted to the moment:[209] a recent earthquake -at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical -phenomena, were construed as prognostics of the awful struggle -impending,—a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, -drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of -war.[210] - - [208] Thucyd. ii, 1-6. - - [209] Thucyd. ii. 7, 8. ἥ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ~πᾶσα μετέωρος ἦν~, - ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων. - - [210] Thucyd. i, 23. - -An aggression so unwarrantable as the assault on Platæa tended -doubtless to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to -silence the opponents of Periklês, and to lend additional weight -to those frequent exhortations,[211] whereby the great statesman -was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence -was sent round to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of -Athens, tributary as well as free: the latter, with the exception -of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were -all insular,—Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, and Zakynthians: to the -island of Kephallênia also they sent envoys, but it was not actually -acquired to their alliance until a few months afterwards.[212] With -the Akarnanians, too, their connection had only been commenced a -short time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising -out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphilochia. That -town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian gulf, was -originally occupied by a portion of the Amphilochi, a non-Hellenic -tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between -Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been -admitted as co-residents with the Amphilochian inhabitants of this -town, presently expelled them, and retained the town with its -territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, -fraternizing with their fellow tribes around as well as with the -Akarnanians, looked out for the means of restoration; and in order -to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly, the -Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes, under Phormio, who, -joining the Amphilochians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried -Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to -the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the -alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and -that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral, Phormio, -commenced.[213] - - [211] Thucyd. ii, 13. ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον, etc., ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα, - ~οἷάπερ εἰώθει~, Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ. - - [212] Thucyd. ii, 7, 22, 30. - - [213] Thucyd. ii, 68. The time at which this expedition of - Phormio and the capture of Argos happened, is not precisely - marked by Thucydidês. But his words seem to imply that it was - before the commencement of the war, as Poppo observes. Phormio - was sent to Chalkidikê about October or November 432 B.C. (i, - 64); and the expedition against Argos probably occurred between - that event and the naval conflict of Korkyræans and Athenians - against Corinthians with their allies, Ambrakiots included,—which - conflict had happened in the preceding spring. - -The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied -in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the -Ægean, including all the islands north of Krete, with the exception -of Melos and Thera.[214] Moreover, the elements of force collected -in Athens itself, were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great -an empire. Periklês could make a report to his countrymen of three -hundred triremes fit for active service; twelve hundred horsemen and -horse-bowmen; sixteen hundred bowmen; and the great force of all, -not less than twenty-nine thousand hoplites,—mostly citizens, but -in part also metics. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as -to age and as to equipment, were thirteen thousand in number; while -the remaining sixteen thousand, including the elder and younger -citizens and the metics, did garrison-duty on the walls of Athens -and Peiræus,—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both -with Peiræus and Phalêrum,—and in the various fortified posts both -in and out of Attica. In addition to these large military and naval -forces, the city possessed in the acropolis, an accumulated treasure -of coined silver amounting to not less than six thousand talents, -or about one million four hundred thousand pounds, derived from -annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other -revenues besides: the treasure had at one time been as large as nine -thousand seven hundred talents, or about two million two hundred -and thirty thousand pounds, but the cost of the recent religious -and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as at the siege of -Potidæa, had reduced it to six thousand. Moreover, the acropolis -and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, -deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions -and festivals, etc., to an amount estimated at more than five -hundred talents; while the great statue of the goddess recently -set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, -included a quantity of the latter metal not less than forty talents -in weight,—equal in value to more than four hundred talents of -silver,—and all of it go arranged that it could be taken off from the -statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the -resources of the state, Periklês spoke of them only as open to be so -applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them -during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had -proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus -actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting, -under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to six -hundred talents, equal to about one hundred and thirty-eight thousand -pounds; besides all other items,[215] making up a general total of at -least one thousand talents, or about two hundred and thirty thousand -pounds. - - [214] Thucyd. ii, 9. - - [215] Thucyd. ii, 13; Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 4. - -To this formidable catalogue of means for war were to be added other -items not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed -and numbered; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the -seamen,—the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, -of the general mass of citizens,—and the superior development -of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy -had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely -anything else,—few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of -combination or headship,—we may be satisfied that there were ample -materials for an orator like Periklês to draw an encouraging picture -of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under -siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts;[216] and -he could guarantee success[217] as the sure reward of persevering, -orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance -under a period of temporary but unavoidable suffering; and combined -too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper -to comply with,—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant -enterprise, while their force was required by the necessities of war -near home.[218] But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted -calculation, looking beyond immediate loss, and therefore likely to -take less hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen,—or at any rate, -to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. -Moreover, the best which Periklês could promise was a successful -resistance,—the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which -Athens had become accustomed; a policy purely conservative, without -any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition,—and not only -without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple -acquiescence on the part of most of her allies,—of strong hostility -everywhere else. - - [216] Thucyd. ii, 7. ὡς βεβαίως πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον - καταπολεμήσοντες. vi, 90. πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πολιορκοῦντες. - - [217] Thucyd. ii, 65. τοσοῦτον τῷ Περικλεῖ ἐπερίσσευσε τότε - ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν ῥᾳδίως περιγενέσθαι τῶν - Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ. - - [218] Thucyd. i, 144. ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα - πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι. - -On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance -was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of confederates had -never been got together,—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the -entire strength of Peloponnesus—except Argeians and Achæans, both -of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pellênê -joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently—was -brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phocians, -Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians, and Anaktorians. Among -these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellênê, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas, -furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phocians, and Lokrians -supplied cavalry. Many of these cities, however, supplied hoplites -besides; but the remainder of the confederates furnished hoplites -only. It was upon this latter force, not omitting the powerful -Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed; especially for -the first and most important operation of the war,—the devastation -of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active -antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and -confidence for this immediate forward march,—so gratifying at once -both to their hatred and to their love of plunder, by the hand of -destruction laid upon the richest country in Greece,—and presenting -a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the -Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come -out and fight. Certainty of immediate success, at the first outset, a -common purpose to be accomplished and a common enemy to be put down, -and favorable sympathies throughout Greece,—all these circumstances -filled the Peloponnesians with sanguine hopes at the beginning of the -war: and the general persuasion was, that Athens, even if not reduced -to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more -than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive -process.[219] Strongly did this confidence contrast with the proud -and resolute submission to necessity, not without desponding -anticipations of the result, which reigned among the auditors of -Periklês.[220] - - [219] Thucyd. vii, 28. ὅσον κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ μὲν - ἐνιαυτὸν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν, ~οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον - ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτοὺς~ (the Athenians), ~εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι - ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν~: compare v, 14. - - [220] Thucyd. vi, 11. διὰ τὸ ~παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβεῖσθε - τὸ πρῶτον, περιγεγενῆσθαι~, καταφρονήσαντες ἤδη καὶ τῆς Σικελίας - ἐφίεσθε. It is Nikias, who, in dissuading the expedition against - Syracuse, reminds the Athenians of their past despondency at the - beginning of the war. - -But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief of -carrying their point by simple land-campaign, they did not neglect -auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians -resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves -and their allies to an aggregate of five hundred triremes; chiefly -by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian -coast. Upon each of them a specific contribution was imposed, -together with a given contingent; orders being transmitted to them to -make such preparations silently without any immediate declaration of -hostility against Athens, and even without refusing for the present -to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbors.[221] Besides -this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the -Persian king, and to other barbaric powers,—a remarkable evidence of -melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom -the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, -was now invoked to bring the Phenician fleet again into the Ægean for -the purpose of crushing Athens. - - [221] Thucyd. ii, 7. Diodorus says that the Italian and Sicilian - allies were required to furnish two hundred triremes (xii, 41). - Nothing of the kind seems to have been actually furnished. - -The invasion of Attica, however, without delay, was the primary -object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued -circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise at Platæa. -Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, -yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took -upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two-thirds -of the hoplites of each confederate city,—apparently two-thirds of -a certain assumed rating, for which the city was held liable in -the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who -furnished cavalry were not constrained to send two-thirds of their -entire force of hoplites,—were summoned to be present on a certain -day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an -expedition of some length.[222] On the day named, the entire force -was found duly assembled, and the Spartan king Archidamus, on taking -the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from -each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. -His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine -over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the -magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse agitating all Greece, -and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy -so much hated,—he admonished them not to let their great superiority -of numbers and bravery seduce them into a spirit of rash disorder. -“We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in -every way, so that we may be very certain that they will come out -and fight,[223] even if they be not now actually on the march to -meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory -ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any -unusual indignity become incensed, and act more under passion than -under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes: much -more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and -to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so -treated.” - - [222] Thucyd. ii, 10-12. - - [223] Thucyd. ii, 11. ὥστε χρὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἰέναι - αὐτοὺς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὥρμηνται, ἐν ᾧ οὔπω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἐν - τῇ γῇ ὁρῶσιν ἡμᾶς δῃοῦντάς τε καὶ τἀκείνων φθείροντας. - - These reports of speeches are of great value as preserving a - record of the feelings and expectations of actors, apart from the - result of events. What Archidamus so confidently anticipated, did - _not_ come to pass. - -Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Melêsippus -as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in -hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been -already adopted, at the instance of Periklês, to receive neither -herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was -on its march: so that Melêsippus was sent back without even being -permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory -before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from -addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the -border, Melêsippus exclaimed,[224] with a solemnity but too -accurately justified by the event: “This day will be the beginning of -many calamities to the Greeks.” - - [224] Thucyd. ii, 12. - -Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known -to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica,—which -territory he entered by the road of Œnoê, the frontier Athenian -fortress of Attica towards Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought -it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Œnoê, which had -been put into so good a state of defence, that after all the various -modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful, had -been tried in vain,[225]—and after a delay of several days before the -place,—he was compelled to renounce the attempt. - - [225] Thucyd. ii, 18. πᾶσαν ἰδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν. - The situation of Œnoê is not exactly agreed upon by topographical - inquirers: it was near Eleutheræ, and on one of the roads from - Attica into Bœotia (Harpokration, v, Οἰνόη; Herodot. v, 74). - Archidamus marched, probably, from the isthmus over Geraneia, - and fell into this road in order to receive the junction of the - Bœotian contingent after it had crossed Kithæron. - -The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king,—his -multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and -lastly before Œnoê,—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the -army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the -calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta,[226]—that -the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a -hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be -more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was -nevertheless impending, and at their doors. In this point of view, -a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the -partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it -would enable them to prevail. Nor can we doubt that it was a moment -full of difficulty to Periklês at Athens. He had to proclaim to all -the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare -to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their -persons, families, and movable property, must be brought in for -safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory,—or -carried across to one of the neighboring islands. It would, indeed, -make a favorable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his -own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty -to the city: in case, therefore, the invaders, while ravaging Attica, -should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith -make them over to the state as public property: nor was such a case -unlikely to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, -at least from the deliberate manœuvre of the Spartans, who would -seek thus to set the Athenian public against Periklês, as they had -tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the sacrilegious -Alkmæônid race.[227] But though this declaration would doubtless -provoke a hearty cheer, the lesson which he had to inculcate, not -simply for admission as prudent policy, but for actual practice, -was one revolting alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and -the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, -without raising an arm to defend them,—to carry away their wives -and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, -as they had done during the Persian invasion,—all in the confidence -of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success,—were -recommendations which, probably, no one but Periklês could have -hoped to enforce. They were, moreover, the more painful to execute, -inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the -habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various -demes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their -festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, -handed down from the day when they had once been independent of -Athens.[228] It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, -and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored -from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch -of improvement than ever; yet the fruits of this labor, and the -scenes of these local affections, were now to be again deliberately -abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the utmost privation -and discomfort. Archidamus might well doubt whether the Athenians -would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary -for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and -whether they would not constrain Periklês against his will to make -propositions for peace. His delay on the border, and postponement of -actual devastation, gave the best chance for such propositions being -made; though as this calculation was not realized, the army raised -plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians -time to save so much of their property. - - [226] Thucyd. i, 82; ii, 18. - - [227] Thucyd. ii, 13: compare Tacitus, Histor. v, 23. “Cerealis, - insulam Batavorum hostiliter populatus, agros Civilis, _notâ arte - ducum_, intactos sinebat.” Also Livy, ii, 39. - - Justin affirms that the Lacedæmonian invaders actually did leave - the lands of Periklês uninjured, and that he made them over to - the people (iii, 7). Thucydidês does not say whether the case - really occurred: see also Polyænus, i, 36. - - [228] Thucyd. ii, 15, 16. - -From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious -walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the houseless, like -Salamis, forty-nine years before: entire families with all their -movable property, and even with the woodwork of their houses; the -sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining -islands.[229] Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or -reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp -in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the -numerous temples of the city,—always excepting the acropolis and -the eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane -occupants; but even the ground called _the Pelasgikon_, immediately -under the acropolis, which, by an ancient and ominous tradition, -was interdicted to human abode,[230] was made use of under the -present necessity. Many, too, placed their families in the towers -and recesses of the city walls,[231] or in sheds, cabins, tents, or -even tubs, disposed along the course of the long walls to Peiræus. -In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, -the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxes was -faithfully copied, and copied too under more honorable circumstances, -since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas, -the march of Archidamus might, perhaps, now have been arrested by -submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent -with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power. Such -submissions, if suggested as they probably may have been by the party -opposed to Periklês, found no echo among the suffering population. - - [229] Thucyd. ii, 14. - - [230] Thucyd. ii, 17. καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν - ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπάρατόν τε ἦν μὴ οἰκεῖν καί τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ - μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόνδε διεκώλυε, λέγον ὡς ~τὸ Πελασγικὸν - ἀργὸν ἄμεινον~, ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξῳκήθη. - - Thucydidês then proceeds to give an explanation of his own for - this ancient prophecy, intended to save its credit, as well as - to show that his countrymen had not, as some persons alleged, - violated any divine mandate by admitting residents into the - Pelasgikon. When the oracle said: “The Pelasgikon is better - unoccupied,” it did not mean to interdict the occupation of that - spot, but to foretell that it would never be occupied until a - time of severe calamity arrived. The necessity of occupying it - grew only out of national suffering. Such is the explanation - suggested by Thucydidês. - - [231] Aristophanês, Equites, 789. οἰκοῦντ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πιθάκναισι - κἀν γυπαρίοις καὶ πυργιδίοις. The philosopher Diogenês, in taking - up his abode in a tub, had thus examples in history to follow. - -After having spent several days before Œnoê without either taking -the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus -marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain,—about the middle -of June, eighty days after the surprise of Platæa. His army was of -irresistible force, not less than sixty thousand hoplites, according -to the statement of Plutarch,[232] or of one hundred thousand, -according to others: considering the number of constituent allies, -the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness -of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder, even the -largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take -it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed also: -but as Thucydidês, though comparatively full in his account of this -march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had -heard none upon which he could rely. As the Athenians had made no -movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come -forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which -was the first portion of territory that he sat down to ravage: but -no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of -cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called -Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, -Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from -Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, -but turned off to the westward, leaving that mountain on his right -hand until he came to Krôpeia, where he crossed a portion of the -line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ. He was here about seven miles from -Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches -westerly and northwesterly from Athens, and visible from the city -walls: and he here encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for -battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place -and its neighborhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of -all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than three thousand -hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, -vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning -from the forests of ilex on the neighboring hills: moreover, if -we are to believe Aristophanês, the Acharnian proprietors were -not merely sturdy “hearts of oak,” but peculiarly vehement and -irritable.[233] It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory -under invasion, when we find this great deme, which could not have -contained less than twelve thousand free inhabitants of both sexes -and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves, completely -deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw -his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their -wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and -they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors -especially, he thought, would be foremost in inflaming this temper, -and insisting upon protection to their own properties,—or, if the -remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, -after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented -and indifferent to the general weal.[234] - - [232] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33. - - [233] See the Acharneis of Aristophanês, represented in the sixth - year of the Peloponnesian war, v, 34, 180, 254, etc. - - πρεσβῦταί τινες - Ἀχαρνικοὶ, στιπτοὶ γέροντες, πρίνινοι, - ἀτεράμονες, Μαραθωνομάχαι, σφενδάμνινοι, etc. - - [234] Thucyd. ii, 20. - -Though his calculation was not realized, it was, nevertheless, -founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated -was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it, except -the personal ascendency of Periklês, strained to its very utmost. -So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, -the Athenians had some faint hope that it might—like Pleistoanax, -fourteen years before—advance no farther into the interior: but -when it came to Acharnæ, within sight of the city walls,—when the -ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and -crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian -eye except to those very old men who recollected the Persian -invasion,—the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose -to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all, next -the youthful citizens generally,—became madly clamorous for arming -and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, -but less correctly informed of the superior strength of the enemy, -they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of -citizens were everywhere gathered together,[235] angrily debating -the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of -excited feeling,—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of -them, doubtless, promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ,—were -eagerly caught up and circulated. - - [235] Thucyd. ii, 21. κατὰ ξυστάσεις δὲ γιγνόμενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι - ἦσαν: compare Euripidês, Herakleidæ, 416; and Andromachê, 1077. - -In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Periklês was naturally -the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the -cause of all the existing suffering: he was reviled as a coward for -not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general: -the rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only -practicable means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches -had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten.[236] This burst -of spontaneous discontent was, of course, fomented by the numerous -political enemies of Periklês, and particularly by Kleon,[237] now -rising into importance as an opposition-speaker; whose talent for -invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high -aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public. But no -manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgment -or the firmness of Periklês. He listened, unmoved, to all the -declarations made against him, and resolutely refused to convene -any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorized -character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens.[238] -It appears that he, as general, or rather the board of ten generals, -among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with -the power, not only of calling the ekklesia when they thought fit, -but also of preventing it from meeting,[239] and of postponing even -those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, -four times in the prytany. No assembly, accordingly, took place, -and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from -realizing itself in any rash public resolution. That Periklês should -have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many -honorable points in his political character; but it is far less -wonderful than the fact, that his refusal to call the ekklesia was -efficacious to prevent the ekklesia from being held. The entire body -of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused -to convoke the ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx, -without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a -juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect -which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms -of their democratical constitution—assisted doubtless by their -long-established esteem for Periklês, yet opposed to an excitement -alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, -in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion,—is -one of the most memorable incidents in their history. - - [236] Thucyd. ii, 21. παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸν - Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, καὶ ὧν παρῄνεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδὲν, - ἀλλ᾽ ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, αἴτιόν τε σφίσιν - ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον. - - [237] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33. - - [238] Thucyd. ii, 22. - - [239] See Schömann, De Comitiis, c. iv, p. 62. The prytanes (_i. - e._ the fifty senators belonging to that tribe whose turn it was - to preside at the time), as well as the stratêgi, had the right - of convoking the ekklesia: see Thucyd. iv, 118, in which passage, - however, they are represented as convoking it in conjunction with - the stratêgi: probably a discretion on the point came gradually - to be understood as vested in the latter. - -While Periklês thus decidedly forbade any general march out for -battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the -compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent out, -together with the Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose -of restraining the excursions of the enemy’s light troops, and -protecting the lands near the city from plunder.[240] At the same -time, he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to -ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica.[241] -Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of -Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not -hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a northwesterly direction -towards the demes between Mount Brilêssus and Mount Parnês, on the -road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these -districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted -Attica by the northwestern road near Orôpus, which brought them into -Bœotia. The Oropians were not Athenians, but dependent upon Athens, -and the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid -waste; after which, the army dispersed and retired back to their -respective homes.[242] It would seem that they quitted Attica towards -the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and -forty days. - - [240] Thucyd. ii, 22. The funeral monument of these slain - Thessalians, was among those seen by Pausanias near Athens, on - the side of the Academy (Pausan. i, 29, 5). - - [241] Diodorus (xii, 42) would have us believe, that the - expedition sent out by Periklês, ravaging the Peloponnesian - coast, induced the Lacedæmonians to hurry away their troops out - of Attica. Thucydidês gives no countenance to this,—nor is it at - all credible. - - [242] Thucyd. ii, 23. The reading Γραϊκὴν, belonging to Γραία, - seems preferable to Πειραϊκὴν. Poppo and Göller adopt the - former, Dr. Arnold the latter. Græa was a small maritime place - in the vicinity of Orôpus (Aristotel. ap. Stephan. Byz. v. - Τάναγρα),—known also now as an Attic deme belonging to the tribe - Pandionis: this has been discovered for the first time by an - inscription published in Professor Ross’s work (Ueber die Demen - von Attika, pp. 3-5). Orôpus was not an Attic deme; the Athenian - citizens residing in it were probably enrolled as Γραῆς. - -Meanwhile, the Athenian expedition under Karkinus, Prôteas, and -Sokratês, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships, and by some other -allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to -inflict damage, and among other places, at Methônê (Modon) on the -southwestern peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory.[243] The -place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried -with little difficulty, had not Brasidas the son of Tellis,—a -gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined -to great celebrity afterwards,—who happened to be on guard at a -neighboring post, thrown himself into it with one hundred men by -a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be -brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the -defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the -Athenians were forced to reëmbark,—an act of prowess which procured -for him the first public honors bestowed by the Spartans during this -war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, -the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of -the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for -two days, defeating both the troops in the neighborhood and three -hundred chosen men from the central Eleian territory. Strong winds -on a harborless coast now induced the captains to sail with most -of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbor of -Pheia on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, -marching by land across the promontory, attacked Pheia and carried -it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were reëmbarked,—the full -force of Elis being under march to attack them: they then sailed -northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, -until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast -of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to -the inhabitants of the neighboring Akarnanian town of Palærus,—as -well as Astakus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and -enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence -they passed over to Kephallênia, which they were fortunate enough -also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion,—with its -four distinct towns, or districts, Palês, Kranii, Samê, and Pionê. -These various operations took up near three months from about the -beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close -of September,[244]—the beginning of the winter half of the year, -according to the distribution of Thucydidês. - - [243] Thucyd. ii, 25; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 34; Justin, iii, 7, - 5. - - [244] Thucyd. ii, 25-30; Diodor. xii, 43, 44. - -Nor was this the only maritime expedition of the summer: thirty -more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to -the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some -disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium -and Alopê were sacked, and farther devastation inflicted: while a -permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the -uninhabited island of Atalanta, opposite to the Lokrian coast, in -order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Lokrian towns -in their excursions against Eubœa.[245] It was farther determined -to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the -island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent -by the important position of the island midway between Attica and -Peloponnesus; but a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger -motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy and revenge -against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the -war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans -with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed -in Peloponnesus,—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the -maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards -Argos: some of them, however, found shelter in other parts of Greece. -The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian kleruchs, or -citizen proprietors, sent thither by lot.[246] - - [245] Thucyd. ii, 26-32; Diodor. xii, 44. - - [246] Thucyd. ii, 27. - -To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find -still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the -Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon -none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared -the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, -that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two,—and were -thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. -Towards the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens -and metics, marched into the Megarid under Periklês, and laid waste -the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred -ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived -at Ægina on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in -the Megarid, instead of going straight home. The junction of the -two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen -together: there were ten thousand citizen hoplites, independent of -three thousand others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa, -and three thousand metic hoplites,—besides a large number of light -troops.[247] Against so large a force the Megarians could of course -make no head, and their territory was all laid waste, even to the -city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted -this destruction once, and often twice in the same year: a decree was -proposed in the Athenian ekklesia by Charinus, though perhaps not -carried, to the effect that the stratêgi every year should swear, as -a portion of their oath of office,[248] that they would twice invade -and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the -port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and -of the neighboring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the -Megarians became extreme and intolerable.[249] Not merely their corn -and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were -rooted up and destroyed, and their situation seems often to have been -that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of -Pausanias, so many centuries afterwards, the miseries of the town -during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being -assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had -never been completed.[250] - - [247] Thucyd. ii, 31; Diodor. xii, 44. - - [248] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30. - - [249] See the striking picture in the Acharneis of Aristophanês - (685-781) of the distressed Megarian selling his hungry children - into slavery with their own consent: also Aristoph. Pac. 432. - - The position of Megara, as the ally of Sparta and enemy of - Athens, was uncomfortable in the same manner,—though not to the - same intense pitch of suffering,—in the war which preceded the - battle of Leuktra, near fifty years after this (Demosthen. cont. - Neær., p. 1357, c. 12). - - [250] Pausan. i, 40, 3. - -To these various military operations of Athens during the course -of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added; -and Thucydidês also notices an eclipse of the sun which modern -astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this -eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the -entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have -been construed as an unfavorable omen, and caused the postponement of -the scheme. Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made -arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, -both by sea and land; what these arrangements were, we are not told -in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named -particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure -in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except -on the single contingency of a hostile naval force about to assail -the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further -enacted, that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate -put the question, in the public assembly, to make any different -application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. -Moreover, they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their -best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the -same special necessity.[251] It may be doubted whether this latter -provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed -with the same rigor, as that concerning the money, which latter was -not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the -disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the -revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians first -repealed the sentence of capital punishment against the proposer of -this forbidden change, and next appropriated the money to meet the -then imminent peril of the commonwealth.[252] - - [251] Thucyd. ii, 24. - - [252] Thucyd. viii, 15. - -The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous -sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mr. -Mitford to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of democratical -government.[253] But we must recollect, first, that the sentence -of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility -come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make -the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever -desired to make it, would first begin by proposing to repeal the -prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the -assembly decided in the affirmative or negative; and if he obtained -an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to -move the reappropriation of the fund. To speak the language of -English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension -or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was -forbidden,—next, he would move the proposition itself: in fact, such -was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be -done.[254] But though the capital sentence could hardly come into -effect, the proclamation of it _in terrorem_ had a very distinct -meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the -people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about -the reserve,—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, -of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose,—it surrounded -the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who -aimed at the reappropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition, -formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which -previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the -door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The -proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without -any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the -same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. -The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which -subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its -enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority -strongly felt upon the judgment of its successors, and to prevent -them from entertaining motions for repeal, except under necessity at -once urgent and obvious. Far from thinking that the law now passed -at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I -consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted -view of the future,—qualities the exact reverse of barbarism,—and -worthy of the general character of Periklês, who probably suggested -it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of -indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the -people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them -under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, -was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, -which Periklês, assuming him to be the proposer, named as the sole -condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered -as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense -was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose -it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Peiræus, was -a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution -to look forward to, and which it is truly wonderful that the people -generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to -this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible -emergency: and we shall find the actual employment of it incalculably -beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she -could hardly have protected herself without some such special -resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an -economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the -war that their available reserve was still much larger: but it will -be forever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, -that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and -afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure -for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther -abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible. - - [253] Mitford, Hist. of Greece, ch. xiv, sect. 1, vol. iii, p. - 100. “Another measure followed, which, taking place at the time - when Thucydidês wrote and Periklês spoke, and while Periklês - held the principal influence in the administration, strongly - marks both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of - democratical government. A decree of the people directed.... - But so little confidence was placed in a decree so important, - sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant, the - multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since the depression - of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained,—that the - denunciation of capital punishment was proposed against whosoever - should propose, and whosoever should _concur in_ (?) any decree - for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any - other circumstances.” - - [254] Thucyd. viii, 15. τὰ δὲ χίλια τάλαντα, ὧν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ - πολέμου ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἅψεσθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας - τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσαντι, ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ - ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν. - -To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging -parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens -during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that -the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of -Potidæa, which still remained under blockade,—and of the neighboring -Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course -of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these -towns, through the assistance of Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian -Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodôrus, a -citizen of Abdêra; who engaged to render him, and his son Sadokus, -allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens -at Abdêra, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodôrus -made this alliance, and promised, in the name of Sitalkês, that -a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the -reconquest of her revolted towns: the honor of Athenian citizenship -was at the same time conferred upon Sadokus.[255] Nymphodôrus farther -established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and -the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which -they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise -of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the -latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. -Moreover, the town of Astakus, in Akarnania, which the Athenians had -captured during the summer, in the course of their expedition round -Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot -Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and one thousand -hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made -some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of Akarnania and -upon the island of Kephallênia: in the latter, they were entrapped -into an ambuscade, and obliged to return home with considerable -loss.[256] - - [255] Thucyd. ii, 29. - - [256] Thucyd. ii, 33. - -It was towards the close of this autumn also that Periklês, chosen -by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at -the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the -campaign. The ceremonies of this public token of respect have already -been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of -Samos: but that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable -interest, was the discourse of the chosen statesman and orator; -probably heard by Thucydidês himself, and in substance reproduced. A -large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, -accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called -the outer Kerameikus, where Periklês, mounted upon a lofty stage -prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The -law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative -discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to -the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age: -a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we -have only the description and discourse belonging to this single -occasion.[257] - - [257] Thucyd. ii, 34-45. Sometimes, also, the allies of Athens, - who had fallen along with her citizens in battle, had a part in - the honors of the public burial (Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 13). - -The eleven chapters of Thucydidês which comprise this funeral speech -are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering -that under the language and arrangement of the historian,—always -impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship -of a powerful mind, misled by a bad or an unattainable model,—we -possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A -portion of it, of course, is and must be common-place, belonging to -all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true -only of a comparatively small portion: much of it is peculiar, and -every way worthy of Periklês,—comprehensive, rational, and full, -not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus -forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric -of other harangues, mostly[258] not composed for actual delivery; -and deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining -to us from Plato, and the Pseudo-Demosthenês, and even Lysias, the -honorable distinction which Thucydidês claims for his own history,—an -ever-living possession, and not a mere show-piece for the moment. - - [258] The critics, from Dionysius of Halikarnassus downward, - agree, for the most part, in pronouncing the feeble Λόγος - Ἐπιτάφιος, ascribed to Demosthenês, to be not really his. Of - those ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been - suspected, though upon far less grounds. The Menexenus, if it be - really the work of Plato, however, does not add to his fame: but - the harangue of Lysias, a very fine composition, may well be his, - and may, perhaps, have been really delivered,—though probably not - delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen. - - See the general instructions, in Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, - pp. 258-268, Reisk, on the contents and composition of a funeral - discourse,—Lysias is said to have composed several,—Plutarch, - Vit. x, Orator. p. 836. - - Compare, respecting the funeral discourse of Periklês, K. F. - Weber, Über die Stand-Rede des Periklês (Darmstadt, 1827); - Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom. - sects. 35, 63, 64; Kutzen, Perikles, als Staatsman, p. 158, sect. - 12 (Grimma, 1834). - - Dahlmann (Historische Forschungen, vol. i, p. 23) seems to - think that the original oration of Periklês contained a - large sprinkling of mythical allusions and stories out of - the antiquities of Athens, such as we now find in the other - funeral orations above alluded to; but that Thucydidês himself - deliberately left them out in his report. But there seems no - foundation for this suspicion. It is much more consonant to - the superior tone of dignity which reigns throughout all this - oration, to suppose that the mythical narratives, and even - the previous historical glories of Athens, never found any - special notice in the speech of Periklês,—nothing more than - a general recognition, with an intimation that he does not - dwell upon them at length because they were well known to his - audience,—μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω (ii, 36). - -In the outset of his speech, Periklês distinguishes himself from -those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, -by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to -bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues: he thinks that -the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations -of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more -emphatically in token of gratitude to the brave dead, when the -scene passes in silence, than when it is translated into the words -of a speaker, who may easily offend, either by incompetency or by -apparent feebleness, or perhaps even by unseasonable exaggeration. -Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as -he has been by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty -imposed upon him in the best manner he can.[259] - - [259] Thucyd. ii, 35. - -One of the remarkable features in this discourse is, its -business-like, impersonal character: it is Athens herself who -undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to -hearten up and admonish the living. - -After a few words on the magnitude of the empire, and on the glorious -efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they -had acquired it,—Periklês proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the -constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were -brought about.[260] - - [260] Thucyd. ii, 36. Ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ᾽ - αὐτὰ, καὶ μεθ᾽ οἵας πολιτείας, καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, - ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον εἶμι, etc. - - In the Demosthenic or pseudo-Demosthenic Orat. Funebris, c. 8, p. - 1397—χρηστῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων συνήθεια, τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας ὑπόθεσις, - etc. - -“We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of -our neighbors,—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere -imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends -towards the many and not towards the few: in regard to private -matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man: while -looking to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, -every man’s chance of advancement is determined, not by party-favor -but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own -particular department: nor does poverty, or obscure station, keep him -back,[261] if he really has the means of benefiting the city. And -our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, -but also in regard to intolerance of each other’s diversity of daily -pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbor for what he may -do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks,[262] -which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure -to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with -reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters -by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being, and of -our laws,—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection -of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, -are enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have -provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by -our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the -year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments,—the daily -charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude -of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, -so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and -assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for -war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several -material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we -apply no xenêlasy to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or -any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to -him; for we trust less to manœuvres and quackery than to our native -bravery, for warlike efficiency. Next, in regard to education, while -the Lacedæmonians, even from their earliest youth, subject themselves -to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we, with our -easy habits of life, are not less prepared than they, to encounter -all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, -that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but -with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, -overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own -territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our -entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy,—partly from -our dispersion in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when -they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they -pretend to have vanquished us all,—if defeated, they pretend to have -been vanquished by all. - - [261] Thucyd. ii, 37. οὐδ᾽ αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων δέ τι ἀγαθὸν - δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται: compare Plato, - Menexenus, c. 8. - - [262] Thucyd. ii, 37. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν - πολιτεύομεν, καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν - ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι᾽ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ᾽ ἡδονήν τι - δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μὲν, λυπηρὰς δὲ, τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας - προστιθέμενοι. Ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια - διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων - ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ - τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται, καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην - ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσι. - -“Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an -indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage -as much as under force of law,—we are gainers in the end, by not -vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still -appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil -without ceasing. - -“In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves -admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of -life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated:[263] we -employ wealth, not for talking and ostentation, but as a real -help in the proper season: nor is it disgraceful to any one who -is poor to confess his poverty, though he _may_ rather incur -reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The -magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic -duties also,—the private citizen, while engaged in professional -business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand -alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter, not -as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce -on public matters, when discussed by our leaders,—or perhaps strike -out for ourselves correct reasonings about them: far from accounting -discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are -not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. -For, in truth, we combine in the most remarkable manner these two -qualities,—extreme boldness in execution, with full debate beforehand -on that which we are going about: whereas, with others, ignorance -alone imparts boldness,—debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly, -those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, -knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of -peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril. - - [263] Thucyd. ii, 40. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ᾽ εὐτελείας, καὶ - φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας· πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου - κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ - μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον. - - The first strophe of the Chorus in Euripid. Medea, 824-841, may - be compared with the tenor of this discourse of Periklês: the - praises of Attica are there dwelt upon, as a country too good to - receive the guilty Medea. - -“In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the -schoolmistress of Greece;[264] while, viewed individually, we -enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself -in the greatest variety of ways, and with the most complete grace -and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine -reality: and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions -just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone, of all cities, -stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her -enemy, when he attacks her, will not have his pride wounded by -suffering defeat from feeble hands,—her subjects will not think -themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy -superior.[265] Having thus put forward our power, not uncertified, -but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less -by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need -either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for -the moment please, while the truth when known would confute their -intended meaning: we have compelled all land and sea to become -accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable -monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility. - - [264] Thucyd. ii, 41. ξυνελών τε λέγω, τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς - Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν - ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν - εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι. - - The abstract word παίδευσιν, in place of the concrete παιδευτρία, - seems to soften the arrogance of the affirmation. - - [265] Thucyd. ii, 41. μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πεῖραν - ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει - ὑφ᾽ οἵων κακοπαθεῖ, οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόῳ κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀξίων - ἄρχεται. - -“Such is the city on behalf of which these warriors have nobly died -in battle, vindicating her just title to unimpaired rights,[266]—and -on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. -It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the -city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for -equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like -excellence,—and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium -pronounced upon her.” - - [266] Thucyd. ii. 42. περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἵδε τε γενναίως - δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν - λειπομένων πάντα τινὰ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κάμνειν. - - I am not sure that I have rightly translated δικαιοῦντες μὴ - ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν,—but neither Poppo, nor Göller, nor Dr. Arnold, - say anything about these words, which yet are not at all clear. - -Periklês pursues at considerable additional length the same tenor -of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with -many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives -of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near -him. But the extract which I have already made is so long, that -no farther addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to -pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its -glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect -of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal -citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but -painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians,—is nowhere more -forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Periklês, -as well as in others afterwards: “Contemplating as you do daily -before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately -attached to it, when you conceive its full greatness, reflect that -it was all acquired by men of daring, acquainted with their duty, -and full of an honorable sense of shame in their actions,”[267]—such -is the association which he presents between the greatness of the -state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, -and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and -preserving causes: poor as well as rich being alike interested in the -partnership. - - [267] Thucyd. ii. 43. τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ - θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη - δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ - δέοντα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, - etc. - - Αἰσχυνόμενοι: compare Demosthen. Orat. Funebris, c. 7, p. 1396. - Αἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεῖαι δέος μὲν ἐνεργάζονται τοῖς - πολίταις, αἰσχύνην δ᾽ οὐ παριστᾶσιν. - -But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially -and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign -exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. -Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect -both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride -of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse,—an -unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, -coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one -individual and another, and an absence even of those “black looks” -which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity -of fact. This portion of the speech of Periklês deserves peculiar -attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too -indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern -societies,—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the -individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual -agency been left free to the proper extent. This is preëminently true -of Sparta: it is also true, in a great degree, of the ideal societies -depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the -Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of -the major part of the Grecian cities. - -I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the -great speculative philosophers: in the mean time I cannot pass over -this speech of Periklês without briefly noticing the inference which -it suggests, to negative the supposed exorbitant interference of the -state with individual liberty, as a general fact among the ancient -Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind -a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigor of Sparta, and -that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at -Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. -But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the -liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive -restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man -and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in -taste and pursuit,—deserves serious notice, and brings out one of -those points in the national character upon which the intellectual -development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was -indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulses: -the peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed -to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed -by external opinion, or trained into forced conformity with some -assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of -the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating -causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while -society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more -stimulating,—all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare -everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. -Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed at -Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even -eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark -as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbors or of the public. This -remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter -to explain the striking career of Sokratês, and it farther presents -to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors -of Athens denounced under the name of “democratical license.” The -liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive -to Xenophon,[268] Plato, and Aristotle,—attached either to the -monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, -though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to -impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty -of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, -but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Periklês depicts -in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no -select one or few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any -other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies: -nor can we dissemble the fact that none of the governments of modern -times, democratical, aristocratical, or monarchical, presents any -thing like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, -and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech -of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the intolerance of the -national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few -set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained -to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with -hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restraints either -of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort -of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of -individual impulse subject to those limits,—is an ideal, which, if -it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, -and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for in any -modern society. - - [268] Compare the sentiment of Xenophon, the precise reverse of - that which is here laid down by Periklês, extolling the rigid - discipline of Sparta, and denouncing the laxity of Athenian life - (Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 15; iii, 12, 5). It is curious that - the sentiment appears in this dialogue as put in the mouth of the - younger Periklês (illegitimate son of the great Periklês) in a - dialogue with Sokratês. - -Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, -was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, -which Periklês contrasts with the xenêlasy or jealous expulsion -practised at Sparta,—but also the many-sided activity, bodily and -mental, visible in the former, so opposite to that narrow range -of thought, exclusive discipline of the body and never-ending -preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His -assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta, even in her own solitary -excellence,—efficiency on the field of battle,—is doubtless -untenable; but not the less impressive is his sketch of that -multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated -and impelled the Athenian mind,—the strength of one not implying -the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of -art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, -coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as -endurance: abundance of recreative spectacles, yet noway abating the -cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic -duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered -danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it -beforehand: lastly, an anxious interest as well as a competence of -judgment in public discussion and public action, common to every -citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man’s own private -industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, -bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as -those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we -supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it -becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it -at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must -be taken, however, as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Periklês -and his contemporaries; nor would it have suited either the period of -the Persian war, fifty years before, or that of Demosthenês, seventy -years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and -the philosophy, were as yet backward, while even the active energy -and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked -up to the pitch which they afterwards reached: at the latter period, -although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full -or even increased vigor, we shall find the personal enterprise -and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the -circumstances, which I have already recounted, go far to explain the -previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, -containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to -explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to -commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which -it is surprising that she recovered at all,—but noway surprising -that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal -energy in the character of her citizens. - -And thus the season at which Periklês delivered his discourse lends -to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was delivered at a time -when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum for though her real -power was, doubtless, much diminished, compared with the period -before the thirty years’ truce, yet the great edifices and works -of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, in so -far as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either -citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It -was delivered at the commencement of the great struggle with the -Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which Periklês -never disguised either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though -he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already -invaded; it was no longer “the unwasted territory,” as Euripidês -had designated it in his tragedy Medea,[269] represented three or -four months before the march of Archidamus,—and a picture of Athens -in her social glory was well calculated both to rouse the pride -and nerve the courage of those individuals citizens, who had been -compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon -their country-residence and fields for a thin tent or confined hole -in the city.[270] Such calamities might, indeed, be foreseen: but -there was one still greater calamity, which, though actually then -impending, could not be foreseen: the terrific pestilence which will -be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colors, and tone -of cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Periklês, -appear the more striking from being in immediate antecedence to the -awful description of this distemper: a contrast to which Thucydidês -was, doubtless, not insensible, and which is another circumstance -enhancing the interest of the composition. - - [269] Euripidês, Medea, 824. ἱερᾶς χώρας ἀπορθήτου τ᾽, etc. - - [270] The remarks of Dionysius Halikarnassus, tending to show - that the number of dead buried on this occasion was so small, - and the actions in which they had been slain so insignificant, - as to be unworthy of so elaborate an harangue as this of - Periklês,—and finding fault with Thucydidês on that ground,—are - by no means well-founded or justifiable. He treats Thucydidês - like a dramatic writer putting a speech into the mouth of one of - his characters, and he considers that the occasion chosen for - this speech was unworthy. But though this assumption would be - correct with regard to many ancient historians, and to Dionysius - himself in his Roman history,—it is not correct with reference - to Thucydidês. The speech of Periklês was a real speech, heard, - reproduced, and doubtless dressed up, by Thucydidês: if therefore - more is said than the number of the dead or the magnitude of the - occasion warranted, this is the fault of Periklês, and not of - Thucydidês. Dionysius says that there were many other occasions - throughout the war much more worthy of an elaborate funeral - harangue,—especially the disastrous loss of the Sicilian army. - But Thucydidês could not have heard any of them, after his exile - in the eighth year of the war: and we may well presume that none - of them would bear any comparison with this of Periklês. Nor does - Dionysius at all appreciate the full circumstances of this first - year of the war,—which, when completely felt, will be found to - render the splendid and copious harangue of the great statesman - eminently seasonable. See Dionys. H. de Thucyd. Judic. pp. - 849-851. - - - - -CHAPTER XLIX. - -FROM THE BEGINNING OE THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE THIRD -YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. - - -At the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Platæa -by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an -unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had -been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, -or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus: in spite -of mutual damage inflicted,—doubtless, in the greatest measure -upon Attica,—no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of -those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. -Especially, the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief -of Potidæa—was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it -necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the -first year’s operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of -the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it -justified the anticipations both of Periklês and of Archidamus. - -A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement -of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that -territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle -with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March, or -beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force—two-thirds from -each confederate city, as before—was assembled under the command of -Archidamus, and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work -of systematic destruction, not merely over the Thriasian plain and -the plain immediately near to Athens, as before; but also to the -more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of -Laurium. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and the western -coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found -the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired -within the walls.[271] - - [271] Thucyd. ii, 47-55. - -In regard to this second invasion, Periklês recommended the same -defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and, apparently, -the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at -least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation -had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though -enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus -entered Attica, a pestilence, or epidemic sickness, broke out -unexpectedly at Athens. - -It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some -time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, -as was believed, in Æthiopia,—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, -and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian -government: about sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar -calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been -felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not -with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian -world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the -Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as -its appearance had been sudden; whilst the extraordinary accumulation -of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the -presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favorable -to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close -cabins and places of temporary shelter,[272]—throughout a city -constructed, like most of those in Greece, with little regard -to the conditions of salubrity,—and in a state of mental chagrin -from the forced abandonment and sacrifice of their properties in -the country, transmitted the disorder with fatal facility from one -to the other. Beginning as it did about the middle of April, the -increasing heat of summer farther aided the disorder, the symptoms of -which, alike violent and sudden, made themselves the more remarked -because the year was particularly exempt from maladies of every other -description.[273] - - [272] Thucyd. ii, 52; Diodor. xii, 45; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 34. - It is to be remarked, that the Athenians, though their persons - and movable property were crowded within the walls, had not - driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them - over to Eubœa and the neighboring islands (Thucyd. ii, 14). Hence - they escaped a serious aggravation of their epidemic: for in the - accounts of the epidemics which desolated Rome under similar - circumstances, we find the accumulation of great numbers of - cattle, along with human beings, specified as a terrible addition - to the calamity (see Livy, iii, 66; Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. x, 53: - compare Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. vol. ii, p. 90). - - [273] Thucyd. ii, 49. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ πάντων - μάλιστα δὴ ἐκεῖνο ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγχανεν ὄν. - Hippokratês, in his description of the epidemic fever at Thasos, - makes a similar remark on the absence of all other disorders at - the time (Epidem. i, 8, vol. ii, p. 640, ed. Littré). - -Of this plague,—or, more properly, eruptive typhoid fever,[274] -distinct from, yet analogous to, the smallpox,—a description no less -clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thucydidês, -himself not only a spectator but a sufferer. It is not one of the -least of his merits, that his notice of the symptoms, given at so -early a stage of medical science and observation, is such as to -instruct the medical reader of the present age, and to enable the -malady to be understood and identified. The observations, with which -that notice is ushered in, deserve particular attention. “In respect -to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say -what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably -have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently -powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself -had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will -state _what it actually was_, and will indicate, in addition, such -other matters, as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with -knowledge and the means of calculation beforehand, in case the same -misfortune should ever again occur.”[275] To record past facts, -as a basis for rational prevision in regard to the future,—the -same sentiment which Thucydidês mentions in his preface,[276] as -having animated him to the composition of his history,—was at that -time a duty so little understood, that we have reason to admire -not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the -distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. We may infer from -his language that speculation in his day was active respecting the -causes of this plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics -and scanty stock of ascertained facts, which was all that could then -be consulted. By resisting the itch of theorising from one of those -loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, -he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and -interest would be derivable at the time: but his simple and precise -summary of observed facts carries with it an imperishable value, and -even affords grounds for imagining, that he was no stranger to the -habits and training of his contemporary, Hippokratês, and the other -Asklepiads of Cos.[277] - - [274] “La description de Thucydide (observes M. Littré, in his - introduction to the works of Hippokratês, tom. i, p. 122), - est tellement bonne qu’elle suffit pleinement pour nous faire - comprendre ce que cette ancienne maladie a été: et il est fort à - regretter que des médecins tels qu’Hippocrate et Galien n’aient - rien écrit sur les grandes épidémies, dont ils ont été les - spectateurs. Hippocrate a été témoin de cette peste racontée par - Thucydide, et il ne nous en a pas laissé la description. Galien - vit également la fièvre éruptive qui désola le monde sous Marc - Aurèle, et qu’il appelle lui-même la longue peste. Cependant - excepté quelques mots épars dans ses volumineux ouvrages, excepté - quelques indications fugitives, il ne nous a rien transmis sur - un événement médical aussi important; à tel point que si nous - n’avions pas le récit de Thucydide, il nous seroit fort difficile - de nous faire une idée de celle qu’a vue Galien, et qui est - la même (comme M. Hecker s’est attaché à le démontrer) que la - maladie connue sous le nom de Peste d’Athènes. C’était une fièvre - éruptive différente de la variole, et éteinte aujourdhui. On a - cru en voir les traces dans les _charbons_ (ἄνθρακες) des livres - Hippocratiques.” - - Both Krauss (Disquisitio de naturâ morbi Atheniensium. Stuttgard, - 1831, p. 38) and Hæser (Historisch. Patholog. Untersuchungen. - Dresden 1839, p. 50) assimilate the pathological phenomena - specified by Thucydidês to different portions of the Ἐπιδημίαι of - Hippokratês. M. Littré thinks that the resemblance is not close - or precise, so as to admit of the one being identified with the - other. “Le tableau si frappant qu’en a tracé ce grand historien - ne se réproduit pas certainement avec une netteté suffisante dans - les brefs détails donnés par Hippocrate. La maladie d’Athènes - avoit un type si tranché, que tous ceux qui en ont parlé ont du - le réproduire dans ses parties essentielles.” (Argument aux 2me - Livre des Epidémies, Œuvres d’Hippocrate, tom. v. p. 64.) There - appears good reason to believe that the great epidemic which - prevailed in the Roman world under Marcus Aurelius—the Pestis - Antoniniana—was a renewal of what is called the Plague of Athens. - - [275] Thucyd. ii, 48. λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἕκαστος - γιγνώσκει, καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης, ἀφ᾽ ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι - αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἅστινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἱκανὰς - εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι σχεῖν· ἐγὼ δὲ οἷόν τε ἐγίγνετο - λέξω, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις ἐπιπέσοι, - μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω, αὐτός τε - νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας. - - Demokritus, among others, connected the generation of these - epidemics with his general system of atoms, atmospheric effluvia, - and εἴδωλα: see Plutarch, Symposiac. viii, 9, p. 733; Demokriti - Fragment., ed. Mullach, lib. iv, p. 409. - - The causes of the Athenian epidemic as given by Diodorus (xii, - 58)—unusual rains, watery quality of grain, absence of the - Etesian winds, etc., may perhaps be true of the revival of the - epidemic in the fifth year of the war, but can hardly be true - of its first appearance; since Thucydidês states that the year - in other respects was unusually healthy, and the epidemic was - evidently brought from foreign parts to Peiræus. - - [276] Thucyd. i, 22. - - [277] See the words of Thucydidês. ii, 49. καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς - πᾶσαι, ~ὅσαι ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν ὠνομασμέναι εἰσὶν~, ἐπῄεσαν,—which would - seem to indicate a familiarity with the medical terminology: - compare also his allusion to the speculations of the physicians, - cited in the previous note; and c. 51—~τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ - θεραπευόμενα~, etc. - - In proof how rare the conception was, in ancient times, of the - importance of collecting and registering particular medical - facts, I transcribe the following observations from M. Littré - (Œuvres d’Hippocrate, tom. iv, p. 646, Remarques Retrospectives). - - “Toutefois ce qu’il importe ici de constater, ce n’est pas - qu’Hippocrate a observé de telle ou telle manière, mais c’est - qu’il a eu l’idée de recueillir et de consigner des faits - particuliers. En effet, rien, dans l’antiquité, n’a été plus rare - que ce soin: outre Hippocrate, je ne connois qu’Erasistrate qui - se soit occupé de relater sous cette forme les résultats de son - expérience clinique. Ni Galien lui-même, ni Arétée, ni Soranus, - ni les autres qui sont arrivés jusqu’à nous, n’ont suivi un aussi - louable exemple. Les observations consignées dans la collection - Hippocratique constituent la plus grande partie, à beaucoup près, - de ce que l’antiquité a possédé en ce genre: et si, en commentant - le travail d’Hippocrate, on l’avait un peu imité, nous aurions - des matériaux à l’aide desquels nous prendrions une idée bien - plus précise de la pathologie de ces siècles reculés.... Mais - tout en exprimant ce regret et en reconnaissant cette utilité - relative à nous autres modernes et véritablement considérable, - il faut ajouter que l’antiquité avoit dans les faits et la - doctrine Hippocratiques un aliment qui lui a suffi—et qu’une - collection, même étendue, d’histoires particulières n’auroit pas - alors modifié la médecine, du moins la médecine scientifique, - essentiellement et au delà de la limite que comportoit la - physiologie. Je pourrai montrer ailleurs que la doctrine - d’Hippocrate et de l’école de Cos a été la seule solide, la seule - fondée sur un aperçu vrai de la nature organisée; et que les - sectes postérieures, méthodisme et pneumatisme, n’ont bâti leurs - théories que sur des hypothèses sans consistance. Mais ici je me - contente de remarquer, que la pathologie, en tant que science, - ne peut marcher qu’à la suite de la physiologie, dont elle n’est - qu’une des faces: et d’Hippocrate à Galien inclusivement, la - physiologie ne fit pas assez de progrès pour rendre insuffisante - la conception Hippocratique. Il en résulte, nécessairement, que - la pathologie, toujours considérée comme science, n’auroit pu, - par quelque procédé que ce fût, gagner que des corrections et des - augmentations de détail.” - -It is hardly within the province of an historian of Greece to repeat -after Thucydidês the painful enumeration of symptoms, violent in the -extreme, and pervading every portion of the bodily system, which -marked this fearful disorder. Beginning in Peiræus, it quickly passed -into the city, and both the one and the other was speedily filled -with sickness and suffering, the like of which had never before been -known. The seizures were perfectly sudden, and a large proportion -of the sufferers perished, after deplorable agonies, on the seventh -or on the ninth day: others, whose strength of constitution carried -them over this period, found themselves the victims of exhausting and -incurable diarrhœa afterwards: with others again, after traversing -both these stages, the distemper fixed itself in some particular -member, the eyes, the genitals, the hands, or the feet, which were -rendered permanently useless, or in some cases amputated, even -where the patient himself recovered. There were also some whose -recovery was attended with a total loss of memory, so that they -no more knew themselves or recognized their friends. No treatment -or remedy appearing, except in accidental cases, to produce any -beneficial effect, the physicians or surgeons whose aid was invoked -became completely at fault; while trying their accustomed means -without avail, they soon ended by catching the malady themselves -and perishing: nor were the charms and incantations[278] to which -the unhappy patient resorted, likely to be more efficacious. While -some asserted that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns of -water, others referred the visitation to the wrath of the gods, -and especially to Apollo, known by hearers of the Iliad as author -of pestilence in the Greek host before Troy. It was remembered -that this Delphian god had promised the Lacedæmonians, in reply to -their application immediately before the war, that he would assist -them whether invoked or uninvoked,—and the disorder now raging was -ascribed to the intervention of their irresistible ally: while the -elderly men farther called to mind an oracular verse sung in the time -of their youth: “The Dorian war will come, and pestilence along with -it.”[279] Under the distress which suggested, and was reciprocally -aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, prophets were consulted, and -supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to -appease the divine wrath. - - [278] Compare the story of Thalêtas appeasing an epidemic at - Sparta by his music and song (Plutarch, De Musicâ, p. 1146). - - Some of the ancient physicians were firm believers in the - efficacy of these charms and incantations. Alexander of Tralles - says, that having originally treated them with contempt, he had - convinced himself of their value by personal observation, and - altered his opinion (ix, 4)—ἔνιοι γοῦν οἴονται τοῖς τῶν γραῶν - μύθοις ἐοικέναι τὰς ἐπῳδὰς, ὥσπερ κἀγὼ μέχρι πολλοῦ· τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ - ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων ἐπείσθην εἶναι δύναμιν ἐν αὐταῖς. See - an interesting and valuable dissertation, Origines Contagii, by - Dr. C. F. Marx (Stuttgard, 1824, p. 129). - - The suffering Hêraklês, in his agony under the poisoned - tunic, invokes the ἀοιδὸς along with the χειροτέχνης ἰατοριάς - (Sophoklês, Trachin. 1005). - - [279] Thucyd. ii, 54. - - Φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ᾄδεσθαι— - Ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ. - - See also the first among the epistles ascribed to the orator - Æschinês, respecting a λοιμὸς in Delos. - - It appears that there was a debate whether, in this Hexameter - verse, λιμὸς (famine) or λοιμὸς (pestilence) was the correct - reading: and the probability is, that it had been originally - composed with the word λιμὸς,—for men might well fancy beforehand - that _famine_ would be a sequel of the Dorian war, but they - would not be likely to imagine _pestilence_ as accompanying it. - Yet, says Thucydidês, the reading λοιμὸς was held decidedly - preferable, as best fitting to the actual circumstances (οἱ γὰρ - ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο). And “if (he goes - on to say) there should ever hereafter come another Dorian war, - and famine along with it, the oracle will probably be reproduced - with the word λιμὸς as part of it.” - - This deserves notice, as illustrating the sort of admitted - license with which men twisted the oracles or prophecies, so as - to hit the feelings of the actual moment. - -When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could -retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the -Athenians abandoned themselves to utter despair, and the space within -the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked -with the malady at once lost his courage,—a state of depression, -itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down -and die, without the least attempt to seek for any preservatives. And -though, at first, friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the -sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number -of these attendants who perished, “like sheep,” from such contact, -that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most -generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their -duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers.[280] The patient was -thus left to die alone and unheeded: sometimes all the inmates of a -house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go -near it: desertion on one hand, attendance on the other, both tended -to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having -had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. -These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery -of the time,—for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and -when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Elate with their own -escape, they deemed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and -were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were -just beginning. It was from them, too, that the principal attention -to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state -of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the -sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. -Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea -of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read, in the words of -an eye-witness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed -crowd without the smallest decencies of attention,[281]—that the -dead and the dying lay piled one upon another, not merely in the -public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood -defilement of the sacred building,—that half-dead sufferers were -seen lying round all the springs, from insupportable thirst,—that -the numerous corpses thus unburied and exposed, were in such a -condition, that the dogs which meddled with them died in consequence, -while no vultures or other birds of the like habits ever came near. -Those bodies which escaped entire neglect, were burnt or buried[282] -without the customary mourning, and with unseemly carelessness. In -some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which -another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt -also;[283] or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not -yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, -and then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable -to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times. - - [280] Compare Diodor. xiv, 70, who mentions similar distresses - in the Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse, during the terrible - epidemic with which it was attacked in 395 B.C.; and Livy, xxv, - 26, respecting the epidemic at Syracuse when it was besieged by - Marcellus and the Romans. - - [281] Thucyd. ii, 52. Οἰκιῶν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν καλύβαις - πνιγηραῖς ὥρᾳ ἔτους διαιτωμένων, ὁ φθόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, - ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἀποθνήσκοντες ἔκειντο, καὶ ἐν ταῖς - ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἁπάσας ἡμιθνῆτες, τοῦ - ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. Τά τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο, νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, - αὐτοῦ ἐναποθνῃσκόντων· ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, - οὐκ ἔχοντες, ὅ,τι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ - ὁσίων ὁμοίως. - - [282] Thucyd. ii, 50: compare Livy, xli, 21, describing the - epidemic at Rome in 174 B.C. “Cadavera, intacta à canibus et - vulturibus, tabes absumebat: satisque constabat, nec illo, nec - priore anno in tantâ strage boum hominumque vulturium usquam - visum.” - - [283] Thucyd. ii, 52. From the language of Thucydidês, we see - that this was regarded at Athens as highly unbecoming. Yet a - passage of Plutarch seems to show that it was very common, in his - time, to burn several bodies on the same funeral pile (Plutarch, - Symposiac. iii, 4, p. 651). - -To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless -despair, was superadded another evil, which affected those who were -fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and -morality became relaxed, amidst such total uncertainty of every man -both for his own life, and that of others. Men cared not to abstain -from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely -to overtake them,—nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure -privations in obedience even to their strongest conviction, when -the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy -any future esteem. An interval short and sweet, before their doom -was realized—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery -which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the -virtuous and the profligate—was all they looked to enjoy; embracing -with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such -positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of -procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honor or of -long-sighted advantage. Life and property were alike ephemeral, nor -was there any hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before -the outstretched hand of destiny should fall upon its victims. - -The melancholy picture of society under the pressure of a murderous -epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and -demoralization, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, -but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than -by Thucydidês,[284] who had no predecessor, and nothing but the -reality to copy from. We may remark that, amidst all the melancholy -accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as -those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger -of the gods,—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary -authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers -of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.[285] Three years altogether -did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire -second and third years of the war,—after which, followed a period -of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then revived -again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. -The public loss, over and above the private misery, which this -unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of -twelve hundred horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, -three hundred died of the epidemic; besides four thousand and four -hundred hoplites out of the roll formerly kept, and a number of the -poorer population so great as to defy computation.[286] No efforts -of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or -to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the -distemper told the more in their favor, as it never spread at all -into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more -populous islands.[287] The Lacedæmonian army was withdrawn from -Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear -of taking the contagion.[288] - - [284] The description in the sixth book of Lucretius, translated - and expanded from Thucydidês,—that of the plague at Florence in - 1348, with which the Decameron of Boccacio opens,—and that of - Defoe, in his History of the Plague in London, are all well known. - - [285] “Carthaginienses, cum inter cetera mala etiam peste - laborarent, cruentâ sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio, - usi sunt: quippe homines ut victimas immolabant; pacem deorum - sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vitâ Dii rogari maximè - solent.” (Justin, xviii, 6.) - - For the facts respecting the plague of Milan and the Untori, - see the interesting novel of Manzoni, Promessi Sposi, and the - historical work of the same author, Storia della Colonna Infame. - - [286] Thucyd. iii, 87. τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὄχλου ἀνεξεύρετος ἀριθμός. - Diodorus makes them above 10,000 (xii, 58) freemen and slaves - together, which must be greatly beneath the reality. - - [287] Thucyd. ii, 54. τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα. He - does not specify what places these were: perhaps Chios, but - hardly Lesbos, otherwise the fact would have been noticed when - the revolt of that island occurs. - - [288] Thucyd. ii, 57. - -But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the -first freshness of the terrible malady, that Periklês equipped and -conducted from Peiræus an armament of one hundred triremes, and four -thousand hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus: three hundred -horsemen were also carried in some horse-transports, prepared for -the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated -in the city, was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those -who went aboard, might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an -infected home. But unhappily they carried the infection along with -them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled -all its efforts. Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and -Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, -ravaging the territory, and making an unavailing attempt upon the -city: next, they made like incursions on the more southerly portions -of the Argolic peninsula,—Trœzen, Halieis, and Hermionê; and lastly -attacked and captured Prasiæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On -returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted, -under Agnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the -blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On -arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines, -and by the other aggressive methods then practised; but nothing -whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became incompetent for -all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper -here assumed, communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens, even to -those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was -the mortality, that out of the four thousand hoplites under Agnon, -no less than ten hundred and fifty died in the short space of forty -days. The armament was brought back in this melancholy condition to -Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left, as before, to the -slow course of blockade.[289] - - [289] Thucyd. ii, 56-58. - -On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Periklês -found his countrymen almost distracted[290] with their manifold -sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemic, they had just gone -over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the -invaders throughout all the territory—except the Marathonian[291] -Tetrapolis and Dekeleia; districts spared, as we are told, through -indulgence founded on an ancient legendary sympathy—during their long -stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and -farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various demes, torn -down and ruined. Death,[292] sickness, loss of property, and despair -of the future, now rendered the Athenians angry and intractable to -the last degree; and they vented their feelings against Periklês, -as the cause, not merely of the war, but also of all that they were -now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys -to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a -deaf ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them -still more furious against Periklês, whose long-standing political -enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations -of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, -which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more -imperiously required, and never more effectively manifested. In his -capacity of stratêgus, or general, he convoked a formal assembly of -the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against -the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line -of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, -are not given by Thucydidês; but that of Periklês himself is set -down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It -strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the -impress of actual circumstances,—an impregnable mind, conscious not -only of right purposes, but of just and reasonable anticipations, -and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural -difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable -misfortune. He had foreseen,[293] while advising the war originally, -the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, -but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had -been exasperated into madness: and he now addressed them, not merely -with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also -in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change -of sentiment towards him,—seeking at the same time to combat that -uncontrolled despair which, for the moment, overlaid both their pride -and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present -sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their -esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the -continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something -belonging to him by acquired right. - - [290] Thucyd. ii, 59. ἠλλοίωντο τὰς γνώμας. - - [291] Diodor. xii, 45; Ister ap. Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Colon. - 689; Herodot. ix. - - [292] Thucyd. ii, 65. Ὁ μὲν δῆμος, ὅτι ἀπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων ὁρμώμενος, - ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων· οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ, καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν - οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες. - - [293] Thucyd. i, 140. - -His main object, throughout this discourse, is to fill the minds of -his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, -so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the -collective city flourishes, he argues, private misfortunes may at -least be borne: but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if -the collective city falls; a proposition literally true in ancient -times, and under the circumstances of ancient warfare, though less -true at present. “Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry -both with me, who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves, who -followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to -others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible -probity,[294]—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving -such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable, and there -would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the -same man, still unchanged,—but ye, in your misfortunes, cannot stand -to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and -unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you: yet, -inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions -suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost -pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have -often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual -success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than -before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus -to your present unnatural depression,—that your naval force makes you -masters, not only of your allies, but of the entire sea,[295]—one -half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so -vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory -is a mere trifle,—an ornamental accessory not worth considering; and -this, too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It -was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the -advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by -losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honor and -empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby -alone that honor is sustained: moreover, ye now fight, not merely -for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of -empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It -is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so; for -ye hold your empire like a despotism,—unjust perhaps in the original -acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not -angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the -enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them; still -less on account of this unforeseen distemper: I know that this makes -me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, -unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected -good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory -from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, -her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been -seen: and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence -of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of -permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: -display that courage which is essential to protect you against -disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honor for the -future. Send no farther embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes -without showing symptoms of distress.”[296] - - [294] Thucyd. ii, 60. καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς - οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι - ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων. - - [295] Thucyd. ii, 62. δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ - αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους πέρι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν, - οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις· οὐδ᾽ ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν - ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς - ἑώρων. Οἴεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων μόνον ἄρχειν—ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω - δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, τοῦ ἑτέρου - ὑμᾶς παντὸς κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε, καὶ ἢν - ἐπιπλέον βουληθῆτε. - - [296] Thucyd. ii, 60-64. I give a general summary of this - memorable speech, without setting forth its full contents, still - less the exact words. - -The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing -of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not -possible for Thucydidês to reproduce,—together with the age and -character of Periklês,—carried the assent of the assembled people; -who, when in the Pnyx, and engaged according to habit on public -matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in -considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens: possibly, -indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become -somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it -was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself -within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no farther -propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be -prosecuted with vigor. But though the public resolution thus adopted -showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Periklês, -the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of -anger against him, as the author of that system which had brought -them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleon, Simmias, -or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide -an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in -act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The -accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary -malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable -fine, the amount of which is differently reported,—fifteen, fifty, -or eighty talents, by different authors.[297] The accusing party -thus appeared to have carried their point, and to have disgraced, -as well as excluded from reëlection, the veteran statesman. But the -event disappointed their expectations: the imposition of the fine -not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but -even occasioned a serious reaction in his favor, and brought back as -strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It -was quickly found that those who had succeeded Periklês as generals, -neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree, the public -confidence, and he was accordingly soon reëlected, with as much power -and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.[298] - - [297] Thucyd. ii, 65: Plato, Gorgias, p. 515, c. 71: Plutarch, - Periklês, c. 35; Diodor. xii, c. 38-45. About Simmias, as the - vehement enemy of Periklês, see Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. - p. 805. - - Plutarch and Diodorus both state that Periklês was not only - fined, but also removed from his office of stratêgus. Thucydidês - mentions the fine, but not the removal: and his silence leads me - to doubt the reality of the latter event altogether. For with - such a man as Periklês, a vote of removal would have been a - penalty more marked and cutting than the fine; moreover, removal - from office, though capable of being pronounced by vote of the - public assembly, would hardly be inflicted as penalty by the - dikastery. - - I imagine the events to have passed as follows: The stratêgi, - with most other officers of the commonwealth, were changed or - reëlected at the beginning of Hekatombæon, the first month of - the Attic year; that is, somewhere about midsummer. Now the - Peloponnesian army, invading Attica about the end of March or - beginning of April, and remaining forty days, would leave the - country about the first week in May. Periklês returned from his - expedition against Peloponnesus shortly after they left Attica; - that is, about the middle of May (Thucyd. ii, 57): there still - remained, therefore, a month or six weeks before his office of - stratêgus naturally expired, and required renewal. It was during - this interval (which Thucydidês expresses by the words ἔτι δ᾽ - ἐστρατήγει, ii, 59) that he convoked the assembly and delivered - the harangue recently mentioned. - - But when the time for a new election of stratêgi arrived, the - enemies of Periklês opposed his reëlection, and brought a charge - against him, in that trial of accountability to which every - magistrate at Athens was exposed, after his period of office. - They alleged against him some official misconduct in reference - to the public money, and the dikastery visited him with a fine. - His reëlection was thus prevented, and with a man who had been - so often reëlected, this might be loosely called “taking away - the office of general:” so that the language of Plutarch and - Diodorus, as well as the silence of Thucydidês, would, on this - supposition, be justified. - - [298] Thucyd. ii, 65. - -But that life—long, honorable, and useful—had already been prolonged -considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many -circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as -well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Periklês -was preaching to his countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the -necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country, in -the midst of private suffering,—he was himself among the greatest of -sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing -his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons, -the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus, but also his sister, -several other relatives, and his best and most useful political -friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral -obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of -his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last -misfortune,—the death of his favorite son Paralus, which left his -house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family -and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove -to command himself as before, yet, at the obsequies of the young man, -when it became his duty to place a garland on the dead body, his -grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time of -his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.[299] - - [299] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 36. - -In the midst of these several personal trials he received the -intimation, through Alkibiadês and some other friends, of the -restored confidence of the people towards him, and of his re-election -to the office of stratêgus: nor was it without difficulty that -he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, -and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people -was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence,—perhaps, -indeed, the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it -permitted, saving the forms of law,[300]—in the present temper of -the city; which was farther displayed towards him by the grant of -a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. -He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, -whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both -of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction -several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother’s side, are -said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a -public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to -Periklês singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly -enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less -by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. -Without a legitimate heir, the house of Periklês, one branch of the -great Alkmæônid gens by his mother’s side, would be left deserted, -and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken,—a -misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated -to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous -displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to -Periklês to legitimize, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry -his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.[301] - - [300] See Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 27, about the manner of - bringing about such an evasion of a fine: compare also the letter - of M. Boeckh, in Meineke, Fragment. Comic. Græcor. ad Fragm. - Eupolid. ii, 527. - - [301] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 37. - -It was thus that Periklês was reinstated in his post of stratêgus, -as well as in his ascendency over the public counsels,—seemingly -about August or September, 430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, -and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health -permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he -fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to -a slow and wearing fever,[302] which underminded his strength as -well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in -this disease, Periklês replied by showing a charm or amulet which -his female relations had hung about his neck,—a proof how low he was -reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the -hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet -more interesting and equally illustrative of his character,—it was -during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and -insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review -the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected -at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, -though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them -by remarking: “What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good -fortune,—and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But -the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed,—no -Athenian has ever put on mourning on my account.”[303] - - [302] Plutarch (Perik. c. 38) treats the slow disorder under - which he suffered as one of the forms of the epidemic: but this - can hardly be correct, when we read the very marked character of - the latter, as described by Thucydidês. - - [303] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 38. - -Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to -recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted -calculation, aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy -of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a -career long, beyond all parallel, in the history of Athens,—since -he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive -personal ascendency, for between thirty and forty years. His -character has been presented in very different lights, by different -authors, both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking -the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and -long-continued ascendency, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are -facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends,—nay, even -more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, -who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every -leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in -setting forth both the one and the other:[304] Telekleidês, Kratinus, -Eupolis, Aristophanês, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him -like Olympian Zeus, hurling thunder and lightning,—like Hêraklês -and Achilles,—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat, and -who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the -philosopher,[305] who disapproved of his political working, and -of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless -extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendency: “his majestic -intelligence,”—in language not less decisive than Thucydidês. -There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the -testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amidst -the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Periklês towards -opponents was always mild and liberal.[306] The conscious self-esteem -and arrogance of manner with which the contemporary poet Ion -reproached him,[307] contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity -of his own patron Kimon,—though probably invidiously exaggerated, -is doubtless in substance well founded, and those who read the -last speech given above out of Thucydidês, will at once recognize -in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical -research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all -contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make -him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of -conciliating public favor. - - [304] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4, 8, 13, 16; Eupolis. Δῆμοι, - Fragm. vi. p. 459, ed. Meineke. Cicero (De Orator. iii, 34; - Brutus, 9-11) and Quintilian (ii, 16, 19; x, 1, 82) count only as - witnesses at second-hand. - - [305] Plato, Gorgias, c. 71, p. 516; Phædrus, c. 54. p. 270. - Περικλέα, τὸν οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα. Plato, Mens. p. 94, - B. - - [306] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10-39. - - [307] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 5. - -But admitting this latter reproach to be well founded, as it seems -to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political -crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent -well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his -own political power,—of corrupting the people by distributions of -the public money. “He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch’s -words[308]), and shaped his administration for their immediate -favor, by always providing at home some public spectacle, or -festival, or procession, thus nursing up the city in elegant -pleasures,—and by sending out every year sixty triremes, manned -by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and -acquired nautical skill.” Now the charge here made against Periklês, -and supported by allegations in themselves honorable rather than -otherwise,—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of -improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against -their permanent interests,—is precisely that which Thucydidês, in -the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts -Periklês with his successors in the express circumstances that -_they_ did so, while _he_ did not. The language of the contemporary -historian[309] well deserves to be cited: “Periklês, powerful from -dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above -the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, -and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not -being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with -any view to present favor, but had sufficient sense of dignity to -contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus, -whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he -shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down: -when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract -it, and restore them confidence: so that the government was in -name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first -citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being -more equal one with another, and each of them desiring preëminence -over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favor -of the people, and sacrificing to that object even important -state-interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might -be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian -expedition,” etc. - - [308] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. Διὸ καὶ τότε μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ τὰς - ἡνίας ἀνεὶς ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν—ἀεὶ μέν τινα θέαν - πανηγυρικὴν ἢ ἑστίασιν ἢ πομπὴν εἶναι μηχανώμενος ἐν ἄστει, καὶ - διαπαιδαγωγῶν οὐκ ἀμούσοις ἡδοναῖς τὴν πόλιν—ἑξήκοντα δὲ τριήρεις - καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκπέμπων, ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπλεον - ὀκτὼ μῆνας ἔμμισθοι, μελετῶντες ἅμα καὶ μανθάνοντες τὴν ναυτικὴν - ἐμπειρίαν. - - Compare c. 9, where Plutarch states that Periklês, having no - other means of contending against the abundant private largesses - of his rival, Kimon, resorted to the expedient of distributing - the public money among the citizens, in order to gain influence; - acting in this matter upon the advice of his friend, Demonidês, - according to the statement of Aristotle. - - [309] Thucyd. ii, 65. Ἐκεῖνος μὲν (Περικλῆς) δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ - ~τε ἀξιώματι~ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, ~χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος - γενόμενος, κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως~, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον - ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων - τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχων ἐπ᾽ ~ἀξιώσει~ καὶ - πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν. Ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ - καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ - δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. Ἐγίγνετο δὲ - λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. Οἱ δὲ - ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες, καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ - πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι, ἐτράποντο καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ - πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. Ἐξ ὧν, ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ - ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον - γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν, etc. Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 3. - - Ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωμα, as used by Thucydidês seem to differ in this - respect: Ἀξίωσις signifies, a man’s dignity, or pretensions to - esteem and influence as felt and measured by himself; _his sense - of dignity_; Ἀξίωμα means his _dignity_, properly so called; as - felt and appreciated by others. See i, 37, 41, 69. - -It will be seen that the judgment here quoted from Thucydidês -contradicts, in the most unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly -made against Periklês, of having corrupted the Athenian people -by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their -unwise caprices, for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his -own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes the -opposite qualities,—self-judgment, conscious dignity, indifference -to immediate popular applause or wrath, when set against what was -permanently right and useful,—as the special characteristic of that -great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch -professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later -part of his long political career: he began, so that biographer -says, by corrupting the people in order to acquire power, but having -acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, -so that the judgment of Thucydidês, true respecting the later part of -his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction -may be to a certain degree well founded, inasmuch as the power of -opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations -of the public mind, necessarily implies an established influence, -and can hardly ever be exercised even by the firmest politician -during his years of commencement: he is at that time necessarily -the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in -operation, and has to stand forward actively and assiduously before -he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we -admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us -in restricting the encomium of Thucydidês exclusively to the later -life of Periklês, or in representing the earlier life as something -in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the -historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of -Periklês. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, -Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect -of Periklês and his political ascendency,—such as the limitation -of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the -magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular -dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay -to those who attended the ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, -religious edifices and ornaments, the diobely (or distribution of two -oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order -that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), -taking it as it then stood, etc.,—did not appear to Thucydidês -mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them; or -else he did not particularly refer them to Periklês. - -Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political -changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dikasteries, took -place when Periklês was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed -to have yet acquired the immense personal ascendency which afterwards -belonged to him. Ephialtês in fact seems in those early days to have -been a greater man than Periklês, if we may judge by the fact that -he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination,—so -that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with -which Periklês was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. -But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydidês considered -these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian -character. All that he does say as to the working of Periklês on the -sentiment and actions of his countrymen, is eminently favorable. He -represents the presidency of that statesman as moderate, cautious, -conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping -back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend -their empire,—as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and -maintaining the naval, military, and financial forces of the state in -constant condition to stand it,—as calculating, with long-sighted -wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we -follow the elaborate funeral harangue of Periklês, which Thucydidês, -since he produces it at length, probably considered as faithfully -illustrating the political point of view of that statesman, we shall -discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational -than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of -the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active -obligation, either public or private,—and least of all, any idea of -dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general -revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Periklês, of Athens, “as the -schoolmistress of Greece,” implies a prominent development of private -industry and commerce, not less than of public citizenship and -soldiership,—of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste. - -Though Thucydidês does not directly canvass the constitutional -changes effected in Athens under Periklês, yet everything which he -does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that -statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian -character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. -And we may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our -best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the -charge against Periklês, of having corrupted the Athenian habits, -character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public -treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately -works for the city,—yet the sum which he left untouched, ready -for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to -appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public -safety, or military honor. It cannot be shown of Periklês that -he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less,—the permanent -and substantially valuable, to the transitory and showy,—assured -present possessions, to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain -conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which -brought on the defeat of the Athenian Tolmidês, at Korôneia in -Bœotia, would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have -maintained her ascendency over Megara and Bœotia, which would have -protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the -subsequent history. Periklês is not to be treated as the author of -the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive -characteristics and susceptibilities, among which, those which -he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of -expeditions against the Persians, which Kimon would have pushed -into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished -all which could be usefully aimed at: the ambition of Athens he -moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of -Athens he regularized, and worked out into judicial institutions, -which became one of the prominent features of Athenian life, and -worked, in my judgment, with a very large balance of benefit to -the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of -the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that -point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, -as Periklês found if, and as he left it, is, unquestionably, the -pacific and intellectual development,—rhetoric, poetry, arts, -philosophical research, and recreative variety. To which if we add, -great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil,—extension of -Athenian trade,—attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum -of maritime skill, attested by the battles of Phormio,—enlargement -of the area of complete security by construction of the Long -Walls,—lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by -ornaments, architectural and sculptural,—we shall make out a case of -genuine progress realized during the political life of Periklês, such -as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go -but a little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the -picture drawn by Periklês in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C. would -have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those -warriors who fell at Tanagra, twenty-seven years before! - -It has been remarked by M. Boeckh,[310] that Periklês sacrificed the -landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of -Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the -country during the Peloponnesian war; for down to the commencement -of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was -particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh, therefore, -depends upon the question, how far Periklês contributed to produce, -or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results -so fatal, not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now -here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydidês, we -shall see that in the judgment of that historian, not only Periklês -did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without -such concession as Athenian prudence, as well as Athenian patriotism -peremptorily forbade: moreover, we shall see, that the calculations -on which Periklês grounded his hopes of success if driven to war, -were, in the opinion of the historian, perfectly sound and safe. We -may even go farther, and affirm, that the administration of Periklês -during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a “moderation,” -to use the words of Thucydidês,[311] dictated especially by anxiety -to avoid raising causes of war; though in the months immediately -preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the -Corinthians at Potidæa, and the resolutions of the congress at -Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands -from Sparta,—demands essentially insincere, and in which partial -compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without insuring -peace. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, -even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of -them, must, if we follow Thucydidês, be looked upon at worst as -concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: -though modern authors, in speaking of Periklês, are but too apt to -use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well founded. - - [310] Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. iii, ch. xv. p. 399, - Eng. Trans. - - Kutzen, in the second Beylage to his treatise, Periklês als - Staatsmann (pp. 169-200), has collected and inserted a list of - various characters of Periklês, from twenty different authors, - English, French, and German. That of Wachsmuth is the best of the - collection,—though even he appears to think that Periklês is to - blame for having introduced a set of institutions which none but - himself could work well. - - [311] Thucyd. ii, 65. ~μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο~. i, 144. δίκας δὲ ὅτι - ἐθέλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξομεν, - ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνούμεθα. - -Seeing then that Periklês did not bring on and could not have averted -the Peloponnesian war,—that he steered his course in reference to -that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that -the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially -interwoven,—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of -sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These might, indeed, be -excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously; but the -impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit -their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman. - -The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, -it was beyond the power of Periklês seriously to amend, probably also -beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well -as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond, sustained -by effective federal authority between different cities, was rarely -entertained even by the best Greek minds.[312] We hear that he tried -to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, -the allies of Athens included;[313] but the scheme could not be -brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, noway surprising, -of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated -during his administration: and if, among the other bad consequences -of the prolonged war, they, as well as Athens, and all other Greeks -come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he -is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether -from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with -his powers of thought, speech, and action,—his competence, civil and -military, in the council as well as in the field,—his vigorous and -cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community -in pacific and many-sided development,—his incorruptible public -morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those -qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of -course much rarer,—we shall find him without a parallel throughout -the whole course of Grecian history. - - [312] Herodotus (1, 170) mentions that previous to the conquest - of the twelve Ionic cities in Asia by Crœsus, Thalês had - advised them to consolidate themselves all into one single city - government at Teos, and to reduce the existing cities to mere - demes or constituent, fractional municipalities,—τὰς δὲ ἄλλας - πόλιας οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζεσθαι κατάπερ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν. - It is remarkable to observe that Herodotus himself bestows his - unqualified commendation on this idea. - - [313] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17. - -Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, their -operations of war naturally languished; while the enemies also, -though more active, had but little success. A fleet of one hundred -triremes, with one thousand hoplites on board, was sent by the -Lacedæmonians under Knêmus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished -nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island, and then -returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of -September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilochian -town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the gulf of -Ambrakia: which town, as has been recounted in the preceding chapter, -had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians, under -Phormio, and restored to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. The -Ambrakiots, as colonists and allies of Corinth, were at the same time -animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, -and by desire to regain the lost town of Argos. Procuring aid from -the Chaonians, and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against -Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavored to take the -town by assault, but were repulsed, and obliged to retire.[314] This -expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity -of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that -in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to -occupy Naupaktus, now inhabited by the Messenians, as a permanent -naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian gulf.[315] -We shall find in the events of the succeeding year ample confirmation -of this necessity. - - [314] Thucyd. ii, 68. - - [315] Thucyd. ii, 69. - -Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to -undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, -especially the Megarian privateers from the harbor of Nisæa, were -active in injuring her commerce,[316]—and not merely the commerce -of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple -or discrimination. Several merchantmen and fishing-vessels, with -a considerable number of prisoners, were thus captured.[317] Such -prisoners as fell into the hands of the Lacedæmonians,—even neutral -Greeks as well as Athenians,—were all put to death, and their bodies -cast into clefts of the mountains. In regard to the neutrals, this -capture was piratical, and the slaughter unwarrantably cruel, judged -even by the received practice of the Greeks, deficient as that was -on the score of humanity: but to dismiss these neutral prisoners, or -to sell them as slaves, would have given publicity to a piratical -capture and provoked the neutral towns, so that the prisoners were -probably slain as the best way of getting rid of them and thus -suppressing evidence.[318] - - [316] Thucyd. iii, 51. - - [317] Thucyd. ii, 67-69; Herodot. vii, 137. Respecting the - Lacedæmonian privateering during the Peloponnesian war, compare - Thucyd. v, 115: compare also Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 29. - - [318] Thucyd. ii, 67. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὕπηρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους - οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον - πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. Πάντας γὰρ - δὴ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν - τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων - ξυμπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων. - - The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas slew all the prisoners taken on - board merchantmen off the coast of Ionia, in the ensuing year - (Thucyd. iii, 32). Even this was considered extremely rigorous, - and excited strong remonstrance; yet the mariners slain were not - neutrals, but belonged to the subject-allies of Athens: moreover, - Alkidas was in his flight, and obliged to make choice between - killing his prisoners or setting them free. - -Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the -southwestern coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, -and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phasêlis and Phenicia to -Athens; to protect which, the Athenians despatched, in the course -of the autumn, a squadron of six triremes under Melêsander. He -was farther directed to insure the collection of the ordinary -tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such -contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this -latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against -one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled -with loss, and he himself slain.[319] - - [319] Thucyd. ii, 69. - -An opportunity soon offered itself to the Athenians, of retaliating -on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In -execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the -Lacedæmonians sent Anêristus and two others as envoys to Persia, -for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money -and troops against Athens; the dissensions among the Greeks thus -gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendency in the -Ægean. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis, -without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian -Aristeus, accompanied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, -they travelled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont; and -Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, -prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkês, king of the -Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and -his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship: -yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the -Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against -the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa,—this being refused, -they lastly applied to him for a safe escort to the banks of the -Hellespont, in their way towards Persia. But Learchus and Ameiniadês, -then Athenian residents near the person of Sitalkês, had influence -enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to -induce Sadokus, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of -Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus -and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly, the -whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where -they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to -speak,—and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the -captured seamen slain by the Lacedæmonians.[320] - - [320] Thucyd. ii. 67. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. iii, - ch. 20, p. 129) says that “the envoys were sacrificed chiefly - to give a decent color to the baseness” of killing Aristeus, - from whom the Athenians feared subsequent evil, in consequence - of his ability and active spirit. I do not think this is fairly - contained in the words of Thucydidês. He puts in the foreground - of Athenian motive, doubtless, fear from the future energy of - Aristeus; but if that had been the only motive, the Athenians - would probably have slain him singly without the rest: they would - hardly think it necessary to provide themselves with “any decent - color,” in the way that Dr. Thirlwall suggests. Thucydidês names - the special feeling of the Athenians against Aristeus (in my - judgment), chiefly in order to explain the extreme haste of the - Athenian sentence of execution—αὐθήμερον—ἀκρίτους, etc.: they - were under the influence of combined motives,—fear, revenge, - retaliation. - - The envoys here slain were sons of Sperthiês and Bulis, former - Spartan heralds who had gone up to Xerxes at Susa to offer their - heads as atonement for the previous conduct of the Spartans in - killing the heralds of Darius. Xerxes dismissed them unhurt,—so - that the anger of Talthybius (the heroic progenitor of the - family of heralds at Sparta) remained still unsatisfied: it was - only satisfied by the death of their two sons, now slain by the - Athenians. The fact that the two persons now slain were sons of - those two (Sperthiês and Bulis) who had previously gone to Susa - to tender their lives,—is spoken of as a “romantic and tragical - coincidence.” But there surely is very little to wonder at. The - functions of herald at Sparta, were the privilege of a particular - gens, or family: every herald, therefore, was _ex officio_ the - son of a herald. Now when the Lacedæmonians, at the beginning - of this Peloponnesian war, were looking out for two members of - the heraldic gens to send up to Susa, upon whom would they so - naturally fix as upon the sons of those two men who had been to - Susa before? These sons had doubtless heard their fathers talk - a great deal about it,—probably with interest and satisfaction, - since they derived great glory from the unaccepted offer of their - lives in atonement. There was a particular reason why these two - men should be taken, in preference to any other heralds, to - fulfil this dangerous mission: and doubtless when they perished - in it, the religious imagination of the Lacedæmonians would - group all the series of events as consummation of the judgment - inflicted by Talthybius in his anger (Herodot. vii, 135—ὡς - λέγουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι). - - It appears that Anêristus, the herald here slain, had - distinguished himself personally in that capture of fishermen on - the coast of Peloponnesus by the Lacedæmonians, for which the - Athenians were now retaliating (Herodot. vii, 137). Though this - passage of Herodotus is not clear, yet the sense here put upon it - is the natural one,—and clearer (in my judgment) than that which - O. Müller would propose instead of it (Dorians, ii, p. 437). - -Such revenge against Aristeus, the instigator of the revolt of -Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy; and that -blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it -capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through -the extreme of suffering from famine, to such a degree that some -of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of -such intolerable distress, the Athenian generals, Xenophon son of -Euripidês and his two colleagues, admitted them to favorable terms -of capitulation,—permitting the whole population and the Corinthian -allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as -well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman,—so -that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the -neighborhood. These terms were singularly favorable, considering the -desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered -at discretion: but the hardships, even of the army without, in the -cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly -tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost -to Athens had been not less than two thousand talents; since the -assailant force had never been lower than three thousand hoplites, -during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the -time considerably greater,—each hoplite receiving two drachmas _per -diem_. The Athenians at home, when they learned the terms of the -capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence -shown,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the -city to surrender at discretion: in which case the expense would -have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves,—and -Athenian vengeance probably gratified by putting the warriors to -death.[321] A body of one thousand colonists were sent from Athens to -occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory.[322] - - [321] Thucyd. ii, 70; iii, 17. However, the displeasure of the - Athenians against the commanders cannot have been very serious, - since Xenophon was appointed to command against the Chalkidians - in the ensuing year. - - [322] Diodor. xii, 46. - -Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war, -by the attack of the Thebans on Platæa; yet the Peloponnesians had -accomplished nothing of what they expected. They had not rescued -Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by -the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought -Athens to any sufficient humiliation,—though perhaps the envoys -which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions -for peace, contrary to the advice of Periklês, may have produced an -impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time, the -Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since -the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have -been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops -gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece -had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so -that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at -least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third -spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into -Attica,—deterred, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemic -yet raging there,—but still more by the strong desire of the Thebans -to take their revenge on Platæa. - -To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith, at the head of -the confederate army. But no sooner had he entered and begun to lay -waste the territory, than the Platæan heralds came forth to arrest -his hand, and accosted him in the following terms: “Archidamus, and -ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong, and in a manner neither worthy of -yourselves nor of your fathers, in thus invading the territory of -Platæa. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias, son of Kleombrotus, after he -had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those -Greeks who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered -sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius, in the market-place of Platæa; and -there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Platæans their -own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should -invade them wrongfully, or with a view to enslave them: should such -invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand -forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made -to us this grant, in consideration of our valor and forwardness in -that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye -are come along with our worst enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. -And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who -sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, -not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Platæan territory, but -to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed.”[323] - - [323] Thucyd. ii, 71, 72. - -Whereunto Archidamus replied: “Ye speak fairly, men of Platæa, if -your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous -yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other -Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the -same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. -It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this -formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Pursuant to your -oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part -in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, -conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you; enjoy -your own territory, and remain neutral,—receiving both parties as -friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall -be satisfied.” - -The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance -which the historian had not before directly mentioned; that the -Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Platæans to renounce -their alliance with Athens and remain neutral: at what time this -took place,[324] we do not know, but it marks the peculiar sentiment -attaching to the town. But the Platæans did not comply with the -invitation thus twice repeated. The heralds, having returned for -instructions into the city, brought back for answer, that compliance -was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their -wives and families were now harbored at Athens: besides, if they -should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the -Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply -to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them: “Well, then, -hand over your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians: mark out the -boundaries of your territory: specify the number of your fruit-trees, -and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then -retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon -as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received,—in -the interim, we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, -and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants.”[325] - - [324] This previous summons is again alluded to afterwards, on - occasion of the slaughter of the Platæan prisoners (iii, 68): - διότι ~τόν τε ἄλλον χρόνον~ ἠξίουν δῆθεν, etc. - - [325] Thucyd. ii, 73, 74. - -The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general -body of the Platæans were at first inclined to accept it, provided -the Athenians would acquiesce; and they obtained from Archidamus a -truce long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After -communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to -Platæa, bearing the following answer: “Men of Platæa, the Athenians -say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the -alliance first began,—nor will they now betray you, but will help -you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths -which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the -alliance.” - -This message awakened in the bosoms of the Platæans the full force -of ancient and tenacious sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at -all cost, and even to the extreme of ruin, if necessity should -require it, their union with Athens. It was indeed impossible that -they could do otherwise, considering the position of their wives and -families, without the consent of the Athenians; and though we cannot -wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in -their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted -it. For the forces of Platæa counted for little as a portion of -the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly -protect it against the superior land-force of their enemies,—in fact, -so hopeless was the attempt that they never even tried, throughout -the whole course of the long subsequent blockade. - -The final refusal of the Platæans was proclaimed to Archidamus, by -word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send -out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, -he prepared for hostile operations,—apparently with very sincere -reluctance, attested in the following invocation, emphatically -pronounced:— - -“Ye gods and heroes, who hold the Platæan territory, be ye my -witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully—not -until these Platæans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of -us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians -after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitious for Greeks -to fight in,—nor shall we commit wrong in what we may do farther, for -we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success. -Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong -receive punishment for it,—may those who are aiming to inflict -penalty righteously, obtain their object.” - -It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under -the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who manned them, -endeavored to conciliate the gods and heroes of that town which he -was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary -debate,[326] so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydidês, -illustrates forcibly the respectful reluctance with which the -Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the -glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, that their direct -sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platæan people, but -only to the Platæan territory; it is purely local, though it becomes -partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by -secondary association. It was, however, nothing but the long-standing -antipathy[327] of the Thebans which induced Archidamus to undertake -the enterprise; for the conquest of Platæa was of no avail towards -the main objects of the war, though its exposed situation caused it -to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece. - - [326] Thucyd. ii, 71-75. - - [327] Thucyd. iii, 68. - -Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his -numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, -would soon capture a place of no great size, and probably not very -well fortified; yet defended by a resolute garrison of four hundred -native citizens, with eighty Athenians: there was no one else in -the town except one hundred and ten female slaves for cooking. The -fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed -to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to -block up the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of -timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a -mound up against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to -march up by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault. -Wood, stones, and earth, were piled up in a vast heap,—cross palings -of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right -angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of -materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights -did the army labor at this work, without any intermission, taking -turns for food and repose: and through such unremitting assiduity, -the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it -gradually mounted up, the Platæans were not idle on their side: they -constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the -top of their own town wall, so as to heighten the part over against -the enemy’s mound: sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which -the neighboring houses furnished materials: hides, raw as well as -dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect their -workmen against missiles, and the woodwork against fire-carrying -arrows.[328] And as the besiegers still continued heaping up -materials, to carry their mound up to the height even of this recent -addition, the Platæans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part -of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion -of the mound; which thus gave way at the top and left a vacant space -near the wall, until the besiegers filled it up by letting down -quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled reeds, which could -not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Platæans dug a -subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground -immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen the lower -earth belonging to the latter; so that the besiegers saw their -mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the -top,—yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless, it was plain that -these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Platæans -accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the -shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each -side of the mound: the besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit -from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; since when -they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town -wall to be carried in like manner. - - [328] Thucyd. ii, 75. - -Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther -brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and -endangered the additional height of wall built by the Platæans over -against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different -portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new -assailants, various means of defence were used: the defenders on -the walls threw down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching -engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either -upwards or sideways: or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the -wall, each attached to both ends by long iron chains to two poles -projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles -it was raised up and held aloft: so that at the proper moment, when -the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly -let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the -engine and broke off its projecting beak.[329] However rude these -defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against -the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months’ -unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town -in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine,—a -process alike tedious and costly.[330] - - [329] The various processes, such as those here described, - employed both for offence and defence in the ancient sieges, are - noticed and discussed in Æneas Poliorketic. c. 33, _seq._ - - [330] Thucyd. ii, 76. - -Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had -recourse to one farther stratagem,—that of trying to set the town -on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large -quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and -the newly-built crescent piece of wall,—partly, as far as they could -reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles -were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration -was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion -of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly -escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind -been rather more favorable: there was indeed a farther story, of a -most opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which -Thucydidês does not seem to credit.[331] In spite of much partial -damage, the town remained still defensible, and the spirit of the -inhabitants unsubdued. - - [331] Thucyd. ii, 77. - -There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of -circumvallation round Platæa, and trust to the slow process of -famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the -various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of -September, a little before the autumnal equinox.[332] Two distinct -walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all -covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall: there were, -moreover, two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had -been taken,—one on the inside towards Platæa, and the other on the -outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered -space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters -for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of -Peloponnesians.[333] - - [332] Thucyd. ii, 78. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ Ἀρκτούρου - ἐπιτολάς, etc. at the period of the year when the star Arcturus - rises immediately before sunrise,—that is, sometime between the - 12th and 17th of September: see Göller’s note on the passage. - Thucydidês does not often give any fixed marks to discriminate - the various periods of the year, as we find it here done. The - Greek months were all lunar months, or nominally so: the names - of months, as well as the practice of intercalation to rectify - the calendar, varied from city to city; so that if Thucydidês - had specified the day of the Attic month Boêdromion (instead - of specifying the rising of Arcturus) on which this work - was finished, many of his readers would not have distinctly - understood him. Hippokratês also, in indications of time for - medical purposes, employs the appearance of Arcturus and other - stars. - - [333] Thucyd. ii, 78; iii, 21. From this description of the - double wall and covered quarters provided for what was foreknown - as a long blockade, we may understand the sufferings of the - Athenian troops (who probably had no double wall), in the two - years’ blockade of Potidæa,—and their readiness to grant an easy - capitulation to the besieged: see a few pages above. - -At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Platæa, the -Athenians on their side despatched a force of two thousand hoplites -and two hundred horsemen, to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon -son of Euripidês (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so -recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless, -to convoy and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy -the deserted site of Potidæa: moreover, the general had acquired -some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, -and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. They first -invaded the territory belonging to the Bottiæan town of Spartôlus, -not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to them -by intelligences within: but this was prevented by the arrival -of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly -peltasts. These peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed -and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield), and short -spear, or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these -Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half -Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned -to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic -hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their -cavalry and their peltasts are very good: in the action which now -took place under the walls of Spartôlus, the Athenian hoplites -defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops -were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther -strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured -even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall -back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. -During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and -light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but -attacked them on all sides when on their march; and employed missiles -so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain -a steady order, but took to flight, and sought refuge at Potidæa. -Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, -together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, and the -expedition returned in dishonor to Athens.[334] - - [334] Thucyd. ii, 79. - -In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies -were more successful. The repulse of the Ambrakiots from the -Amphilochian Argos, during the preceding year, had only exasperated -them and induced them to conceive still larger plans of aggression -against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their -mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed -upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of -Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the -Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and put -each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence; so that all -of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together -with Kephallênia and Zakynthus, from the Athenian alliance. The -fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, -was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as -might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the -important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel -the Athenians completely from those parts. - -The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive -than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the -Ambrakiots, together with their neighbors and fellow-colonists the -Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city, while -their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian -coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knêmus, the -Lacedæmonian admiral, with one thousand Peloponnesian hoplites, who -found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance -of Phormio,—but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian -auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost -tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of -Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen from the regal gens. -Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, -acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and Atintânes, who -also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of -the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Paranæi, from -the banks of the river Aôus under their king Orœdus, together with -one thousand Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by -their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in -alliance with Athens, sent one thousand of his Macedonian subjects, -who, however, arrived too late to be of any use.[335] This large -and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian -history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves -the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city -of Ambrakia,—a city destined to become in later days the capital of -the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. - - [335] Thucyd. ii, 80. - -It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth -should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast -of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that -territory. But Knêmus finding the land-force united and ready, near -Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and -marched straight into Akarnania, through Limnæa, a frontier village -territory belonging to the Amphilochian Argos. He directed his march -upon Stratus,—an interior town, and the chief place in Akarnania,—the -capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of -the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence -of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders -on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, -so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was -Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition -to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the -large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such -circumstances, Knêmus and his army indulged the most confident hopes -of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three -divisions: the Epirots in the centre,—the Leukadians and Anaktorians -on the right,—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with -Knêmus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained -of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near -or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, -maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the look -out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order whatever; -especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted -the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit -and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would -not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks; -but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, -intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should -carry it at the first assault, before the Greeks came up, so that -the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited -by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and -suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the -gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the -troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The -Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed -with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little -resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their -Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were at -all aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued -by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then -joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained farther pursuit,—the -Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other -Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of -Knêmus, however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were -preëminently skilful; nor did Knêmus choose to persist in his attack -under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived, -so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to -the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well -aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian -forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the -arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from Œniadæ (the only town in -the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest), and -sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and -returned to their respective homes.[336] - - [336] Thucyd. ii, 82; Diodor. xii, 48. - -Meanwhile, the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been -destined to coöperate with Knêmus off the coast of Akarnania, had -found difficulties in its passage, alike unexpected and insuperable. -Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other -places, with a body of soldiers on board, and with accompanying -store-vessels,—it departed from the harbor of Corinth, and made -its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not -intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, -never for a moment imagined that he would venture to attack a -number so greatly superior: the triremes were, accordingly, fitted -out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to -naval combat,—and with little attention to the choice of skilful -rowers.[337] - - [337] Thucyd. ii, 83. οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον - παρεσκευασμένοι: compare the speech of Knêmus, c. 87. The - unskilfulness of the rowers is noticed (c. 84). - -Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the -Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime -efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached: -themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of -working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree -to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the -Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a -confirmed feeling of their own superiority,—but Phormio especially, -the ablest of all their captains, always familiarized his men with -the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever -so great, could possibly contend against them with success.[338] -Accordingly, the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues, -were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian -squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in -parallel line with them and watching their progress until they -should get out of the Corinthian gulf into the more open sea. Having -advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in -Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the northwest -in order to cross over towards the Ætolian coast, in their way to -Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was -bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river -Euenus, and they now discovered for the first time that he was going -to attack them. Disconcerted by this incident, and not inclined for -a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan -of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to -for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of -the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive -Phormio, and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast: -for, during the course of the night, they left their station, and -tried to get across the breadth of the gulf, where it was near the -strait, and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down -upon them: and if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take -night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across -to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the -wide sea: but he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all -night, and was thus enabled to attack them in mid-channel, even -during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of -morning.[339] On seeing his approach, the Corinthian admirals ranged -their triremes in a circle with the prows outward, like the spokes -of a wheel; the circle was made as large as it could be without -leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practise the -manœuvre of the diekplus,[340] and the interior space was sufficient, -not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen triremes, -who were kept as a reserve, to dart out when required through the -intervals between the outer triremes. - - [338] Thucyd. ii, 88. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ~ἀεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε~ - (Phormio) καὶ προπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος - νεῶν τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπιπλέῃ, ὅ,τι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον αὐτοῖς ἐστί· - καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην - εἰλήφεσαν, ~μηδένα ὄχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν - ὑποχωρεῖν~. - - This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking - persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval - superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate - communication between the Athenian captain and his seamen,—so - strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter. - Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokratês, - Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 30. - - [339] Thucyd. ii, 83. Ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἑώρων - αὐτοὺς (that is, when the Corinthians saw the Athenian ships) - παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαΐας πρὸς τὴν - ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον διαβαλλόντων ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς - Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας - σφίσι, ~καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὐφορμισάμενοι~, οὕτω δὴ - ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. - - There is considerable difficulty in clearly understanding what - was here done, especially what is meant by the words οὐκ ἔλαθον - νυκτὸς ὐφορμισάμενοι, which words the Scholiast construed as - if the nominative case to ἔλαθον were οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, whereas the - natural structure of the sentence, as well as the probabilities - of fact, lead the best commentators to consider οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι - as the nominative case to that verb. The remark of the Scholiast, - however, shows us, that the difficulty of understanding the - sentence dates from ancient times. - - Dr. Arnold—whose explanation is adopted by Poppo and Göller—says: - “The two fleets were moving parallel to one another along the - opposite shores of the Corinthian gulf. But even when they had - sailed out of the strait at Rhium, the opposite shores were still - so near, that the Peloponnesians hoped to cross over without - opposition, if they could so far deceive the Athenians, as to - the spot where they brought to for the night, as to induce them - either to stop too soon, or to advance too far, that they might - not be exactly opposite to them to intercept the passage. If they - could lead the Athenians to think that they meant to advance in - the night beyond Patræ, the Athenian fleet was likely to continue - its own course along the northern shore, to be ready to intercept - them when they should endeavor to run across to Acarnania. But - the Athenians, aware that they had stopped at Patræ, stopped - themselves at Chalkis, instead of proceeding further to the - westward; and thus were so nearly opposite to them, that the - Peloponnesians had not time to get more than half-way across, - before they found themselves encountered by their watchful enemy.” - - This explanation seems to me not satisfactory, nor does it take - account of all the facts of the case. The first belief of the - Peloponnesians was, that Phormio would not dare to attack them - at all: accordingly, having arrived at Patræ, they stretched - from thence across the gulf to the mouth of the Euenus,—the - natural way of proceeding according to ancient navigation,—going - in the direction of Akarnania (ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας). As they were - thus stretching across, they perceived Phormio bearing down upon - them from the Euenus: this was a surprise to them, and as they - wished to avoid a battle in the mid-channel, they desisted from - proceeding farther that day, in hopes to be able to deceive - Phormio in respect of their night-station. They made a feint of - taking night-station on the shore between Patræ and Rhium, near - the narrow part of the strait; but, in reality, they “slipped - anchor and put to sea during the night,” as Mr. Bloomfield says, - in hopes of getting across the shorter passage under favor of - darkness, before Phormio could come upon them. That they must - have done this is proved by the fact, that the subsequent battle - was fought on the morrow in the mid-channel _very little after - daybreak_ (we learn this from what Thucydidês says about the - gulf-breeze, for which Phormio waited before he would commence - his attack—ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει, καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ~ἐπι - τὴν ἕω~). If Phormio had returned to Chalkis, they would probably - have succeeded; but he must have kept the sea all night, which - would be the natural proceeding of a vigilant captain, determined - not to let the Peloponnesians get across without fighting: so - that he was upon them in the mid-channel immediately that day - broke. - - Putting all the statements of Thucydidês together, we may be - convinced that this is the way in which the facts occurred. But - of the precise sense of ὐφορμισάμενοι, I confess I do not feel - certain: Haack says, it means “clam appellere ad littus,” but - here, I think, that sense will not do: for the Peloponnesians did - not wish, and could indeed hardly hope, to conceal from Phormio - the spot where they brought to for the night, and to make him - suppose that they brought to at some point of the shore west of - Patræ, when in reality they passed the night in Patræ,—which - is what Dr. Arnold supposes. The shore west of Patræ makes a - bend to the southwest,—forming the gulf of Patras,—so that the - distance from the northern, or Ætolian and Akarnanian, side of - the gulf becomes for a considerable time longer and longer, and - the Peloponnesians would thus impose upon themselves a longer - crossing, increasing the difficulty of getting over without a - battle. But ὐφορμισάμενοι may reasonably be supposed to mean, - especially in conjunction with οὐκ ἔλαθον, “taking up a simulated - or imperfect night-station,” in which they did not really intend - to stay all night, and which could be quitted at short notice and - with ease. The preposition ὑπὸ, in composition, would thus have - the sense, not of _secrecy_ (_clam_) but of _sham-performance_, - or of mere going through the forms of an act for the purpose of - making a false impression (like ὑποφέρειν, Xenoph. Hell. iv, 72). - Mr. Bloomfield proposes conjecturally ἀφορμισάμενοι, meaning, - “that the Peloponnesians slipped their anchors in the night:” I - place no faith in the conjecture, but I believe him to be quite - right in supposing, that the Peloponnesians _did actually_ slip - their anchors in the night. - - Another point remains to be adverted to. The battle took - place κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. Now we need not understand this - expression to allude to the narrowest part of the sea, or the - strait, strictly and precisely; that is, the line of seven stadia - between Rhium and Antirrhium. But I think we must understand it - to mean a portion of sea not far westward of the strait, where - the breadth, though greater than that of the strait itself, - is yet not so great as it becomes in the line drawn northward - from Patræ. We cannot understand πορθμὸς (as Mr. Bloomfield and - Poppo do,—see the note of the latter on the Scholia) to mean - _trajectus_ simply, that is to say, the passage across even - the widest portion of the gulf of Patras: nor does the passage - cited out of c. 86 require us so to understand it. Πορθμὸς, in - Thucydidês, means a strait, or narrow crossing of sea, and Poppo - himself admits that Thucydidês always uses it so: nor would it be - reasonable to believe that he would call the line of sea across - the gulf, from Patræ to the mouth of the Euenus, a πορθμός. See - the note of Göller, on this point. - - [340] Thucyd. ii, 86. μὴ δíδοντες διέκπλουν. The great object of - the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was, to drive its beak against - some weak part of the adversary’s ship: the stern, the side, or - the oars,—not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as - well for defence as for offence. The Athenian, therefore, rowing - through the intervals of the adversary’s line, and thus getting - in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before - the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking - it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was - called the _diekplus_. The success of it, of course, depended - upon the extreme rapidity and precision of the movements of the - Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary, - not only in the better construction of the ship, but the - excellence of rowers and steersmen. - -In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak, -by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, -all admirable sailors, and his own ship leading; all being strictly -forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly -round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships -as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being -about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this -manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians,—partly from the -natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship -in its exact stationary position,—the order of the circle, both -within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long -before a new ally came to his aid, on which he fully calculated, -postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred. -The strong land-breeze out of the gulf of Corinth, always wont to -begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian -fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness -of their order was already somewhat giving way, and forced their -ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The -triremes began to run foul of each other, or become entangled with -the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men aboard were obliged -to keep pushing off their neighbors on each side with poles,—not -without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the -orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the -keleustês animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being -at all audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a -swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could -not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost all -command over their vessels.[341] The critical moment was now come, -and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and -disabled one of the admiral’s ships,—his comrades next assailed -others with equal success,—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and -terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order -and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to -Dymê, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who, with scarcely the -loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, took aboard and carried away -almost the entire crews, and sailed off with them to Molykreium, or -Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian -gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. -Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating -one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; -while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to -Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here -soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron -from Leukas.[342] - - [341] See Dr. Arnold’s note upon this passage of Thucydidês, - respecting the keleustês and his functions: to the passages - which he indicates as reference, I will add two more of Plautus, - Mercat. iv, 2, 5, and Asinaria, iii, 1, 15. - - When we conceive the structure of an ancient trireme, we shall - at once see, first, how essential the keleustês was, to keep the - rowers in harmonious action,—next, how immense the difference - must have been between practised and unpractised rowers. The - trireme had, in all, one hundred and seventy rowers, distributed - into three tiers. The upper tier, called thranitæ, were sixty-two - in number, or thirty-one on each side: the middle tier, or - zygitæ, as well as the lowest tier, or thalamitæ, were each - fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides - these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number, - seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (κῶπαι περινέω), - to be used by the epibatæ, or soldiers, serving on board, in - case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Each tier of - rowers was distributed along the whole length of the vessel, - from head to stern, or at least along the greater part of it; - but the seats of the higher tiers were not placed in the exact - perpendicular line above the lower. Of course, the oars of the - thranitæ, or uppermost tier, were the longest: those of the - thalamitæ, or lowest tier, the shortest: those of the zygitæ, of - a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The - thranitæ, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and - most highly paid. What the length of the oars was, belonging to - either tier, we do not know, but some of the supplementary oars - appear to have been about fifteen feet in length. - - What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained, - chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years - ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine,—and - from the most instructive commentary appended to these - inscriptions by M. Boeckh, Seewesen der Athener, ch. ix, pp. - 94, 104, 115. But there is a great deal still, respecting the - equipment of an ancient trireme, unascertained and disputed. - - Now there was nothing but the voice of the keleustês to keep - these one hundred and seventy rowers all to good time with their - strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this - must have been no easy matter, and apparently quite impossible, - unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference - between those who were so trained and those who were not, must - have been immense. We may imagine the difference between the - ships of Phormio and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of - the latter in contending with the swell of the sea,—when we read - this description of the ancient trireme. - - About two hundred men, that is to say, one hundred and seventy - rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly epibatæ or hoplites - serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship’s bow, - the keleustês, etc., probably some half dozen officers, formed - the crew of a trireme: compare Herodot. viii, 17; vii, 184, where - he calculates the thirty epibatæ over and above the two hundred. - Dr. Arnold thinks that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian - war, the epibatæ on board an Athenian trireme were no more than - ten: but this seems not quite made out: see his note on Thucyd. - iii, 95. - - The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by - about the same number of men. “Les galères Vénitiens du convoi de - Flandre devaient être montées par deux cent hommes libres, dont - 180 rameurs, et 12 archers. Les arcs ou balistes furent préscrits - en 1333 pour toutes les galères de commerce armées.” (Depping, - Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l’Europe, vol. i, p. 163.) - - [342] Thucyd. ii, 84. - -These two incidents, just recounted, with their details,—the -repulse of Knêmus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the -Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio,—afford ground for some interesting -remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the -Epirots to the Greeks,—and even to the less advanced portion of the -Greeks,—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power -of coöperation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them -is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the -commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek -divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to -omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority -of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out,—so in the -sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority -of the Athenians over their opponents; a superiority, indeed, noway -inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in -this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the -one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the -other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, -which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, -stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It -gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since -the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians, -under Peter the Great, learned the art of war from the Swedes, under -Charles the Twelfth,—while the Athenian triremes and their crews -seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible -disaster at Syracuse, and are irreparably deteriorated after that -misfortune. - -To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so -incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard, indeed, -of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not -understand what it meant: so they imputed the defeat to nothing -but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at -Kyllênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, -and repair the dishonor. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, -Timokratês, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their -advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from -the different allied cities: and by this means, under the general -resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of -seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus,—a harbor -of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium, and immediately within -the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place -ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet. Such preparations did -not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news -of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements -to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians -immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him: but they were -induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus -at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the -faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He -had made this promise as a private favor to the inhabitants of -Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he -was unable to fulfil it: nothing was effected except ravage of the -Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds -and weather from getting away.[343] This ill-advised diversion of -the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how -much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss -of Periklês, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly -afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and -projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his -countrymen,[344] was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous -consequences. - - [343] Thucyd. ii, 85. - - [344] Thucyd. i, 144. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ - περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, - καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι - τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας. - -Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio now found -himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to -the vastly increased forces of the enemy,—seventy-seven triremes, -with a large force on land to back them: the latter, no mean help in -ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, -or the Molykric Rhium, as it was called,—the opposite cape to the -Achaic Rhium: the line between them, seemingly about an English mile -in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. The Messenian -force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept -on the outside of the gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open -breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring: while his -adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, -from the corresponding reason,—feeling that to them the narrow sea -was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, -effacing all superiority of nautical skill.[345] If we revert back -to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of -space was at that time accounted the best of all protections for a -smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change -of feeling, occasioned by the system of manœuvring introduced since -that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea room is now -not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved -practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare. - - [345] Thucyd. ii, 86-89: compare vii, 36-49. - -For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out -against each other,—Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to -the outside of the gulf, while they on their side did what they could -to bring him within it.[346] To him, every day’s postponement was -gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: -for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to -accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for -forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such -was the discouragement and reluctance, prevailing among their seamen, -many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat,—that -Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations; insisting -on the favorable prospect before them,—pointing out that the late -battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which -would be for the future corrected,—and appealing to the inherent -bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that -while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due -honor, the laggards would assuredly be punished:[347] a topic rarely -touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of -battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of -the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to the fight again -chiefly by the ascendency and strenuous commands of Sparta. To this -reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations -which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of -their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, -were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them -of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at -sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy -conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance: and he called upon -them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of -orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect -silence during the actual battle,[348]—useful in all matters of -war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea -of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was -going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is -also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control -and military habits among these citizen-seamen. - - [346] Thucyd. ii, 86. - - [347] Thucyd. ii, 87. Τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν - ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδώσομεν πρόφασιν - οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι· ἢν δέ τις ἄρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ - πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμήσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἄθλοις - τῆς ἀρετῆς. - - [348] Thucyd. ii, 89. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ~κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν~ περὶ - πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὃ ἔς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν ξυμφέρει, καὶ - ναυμαχίᾳ οὐχ ἥκιστα, etc. - -The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was -within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it,—opposite to -Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the -opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing -occupied the north, or northeast side towards Naupaktus. Knêmus and -Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the gulf, as if -against that town, which was the main Athenian station; for they knew -that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence -of the place, and they hoped to pin him up and force him to action -close under the land, where Athenian manœuvring would be unavailing. -Accordingly, they commenced this movement early in the morning, -sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the -inner gulf; the right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokratês, -was in the van, according to its natural position,[349] and care had -been taken to place in it twenty of the best sailing ships, since -the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend -upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio the moment he -saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the -interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the -Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, -with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,[350] was -utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, -probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land -towards Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to -him. Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards -the same point, the Athenian close along shore, the Peloponnesians -somewhat farther off.[351] The latter had now got Phormio into the -position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no -room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole -Peloponnesian fleet facing to the left, changed from column into -line, and instead of continuing to sail along the coast, rowed -rapidly with their prows shore-ward to come to close quarters with -the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians occupying -the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of -cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; -and the best ships had been placed on the right for that important -object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action -completely succeeded; the Athenians were caught in a situation where -resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in -flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the -best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the -twenty, just found means to run by,[352] before the right wing of the -enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to -Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore -with serious damage,—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping -by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire -crew, and some others empty; but more than one of them was rescued by -the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy -panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the -decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually -made fast, and the process of dragging off had begun.[353] - - [349] Thucyd. ii, 90. ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς. Matthiæ - in his Grammar (sect. 584), states that ἐπὶ τεσσάρων means “four - deep,” and cites this passage of Thucydidês as an instance of it. - But the words certainly mean here _four abreast_; though it is to - be recollected that a column four abreast, when turned into line, - becomes four deep. - - [350] Thucyd. iii, 102. - - [351] Thucyd. ii, 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ - Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενὰ, βουλόμενοι - ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ - τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ~ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω~ ἐπὶ τοῦ - κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν· ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ - εἴκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ - τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ - παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι - ~ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως~, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται αἱ νῆες περικλῄσειαν. - - It will be seen that I have represented in the text the - movement of the Peloponnesian fleet as directed ostensibly - and to all appearance against Naupaktus: and I translate the - words in the fourth line of the above passage—ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν - γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου—as meaning “_against the station of the - Athenians up the gulf within_,” that is, against Naupaktus. Mr. - Bloomfield gives that meaning to the passage, though not to the - words; but the Scholiast, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller, all - construe it differently, and maintain that the words τὴν ἐαυτῶν - γῆν mean _the Peloponnesian shore_. To my view, this latter - interpretation renders the whole scheme of the battle confused - and unintelligible; while with the other meaning it is perfectly - clear, and all the circumstances fit in with each other. - - Dr. Arnold does not seem even to admit that τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν can - mean anything else but the coast of Peloponnesus. He says: “The - Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for παρά. It would be better - to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a - place and neighborhood to it: expressing that the Peloponnesians - sailed _towards_ their own land (_i. e._ towards Corinth, Sikyon, - and Pellênê, to which places the greater number of the ships - belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast, which - belonged to their enemies: and at the same time kept close _upon_ - their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case.” - - It appears to me that Dr. Arnold’s supposition of Corinth and - Sikyon as the meaning of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν is altogether far-fetched - and improbable. As a matter of fact, it would only be true of - part of the confederate fleet; while it would be false with - regard to ships from Elis, Leukas, etc. And if it had been - true with regard to all, yet the distance of Corinth from the - Peloponnesian station was so very great, that Thucydidês would - hardly mark _direction_ by referring to a city so very far off. - Then again, both the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold do great violence - to the meaning of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, - and cite no examples to justify it. What the sense of ἐπὶ is with - an accusative case signifying locality, is shown by Thucydidês - in this very passage.—εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ~ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον~ αὐτοὺς - πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων, etc. (again, c. 85. ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι; and - i. 29, ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, etc.—ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ of Perdikkas, i, - 57), that is, against, or to go thither with a hostile purpose. - So sensible does the Scholiast seem to be of this, that he - affirms ἐπὶ to be used instead of παρά. This is a most violent - supposition, for nothing can be more different than the two - phrases ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν and παρὰ τὴν γῆν. Dr. Arnold again assigns - to ἐπὶ with an accusative case another sense, which he himself - admits that it only has with a dative. - - I make these remarks with a view to show that the sense which - Dr. Arnold and others put upon the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον - ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν,—departs from the usual, and even from the - legitimate meaning of the words. But I have a stronger objection - still. If that sense be admitted, it will be found quite - inconsistent with the subsequent proceedings, as Thucydidês - describes; and any one who will look at the map in reading this - chapter, will see plainly that the fact is so. If, as Dr. Arnold - supposes, the Peloponnesian fleet kept close along the shore of - Peloponnesus, what was there in their movements to alarm Phormio - for the safety of Naupaktus, or to draw him so reluctantly into - the strait? Or if we even grant this, and suppose that Phormio - construed the movement along the coast of Achaia to indicate - designs against Naupaktus, and that he therefore came into the - gulf and sailed along his own shore to defend the town,—still the - Peloponnesians would be separated from him by the whole breadth - of the gulf at that point; and as soon as they altered their line - of direction for the purpose of crossing the gulf and attacking - him, he would have the whole breadth of the gulf in which to take - his measures for meeting them, so that instead of finding himself - jammed up against the land, he would have been able to go out - and fight them in the wide water, which he so much desired. The - whole description given by Thucydidês, of the sudden wheeling of - the Peloponnesian fleet, whereby Phormio’s ships were assailed, - and nine of them cut off, shows that the two fleets must have - been very close together when that movement was undertaken. If - they had not been close,—if the Peloponnesians had had to row - any considerable distance after wheeling,—all the Athenian ships - might have escaped along shore without any difficulty. In fact, - the words of Thucydidês imply that _both_ the two fleets, at the - time when the wheel of the Peloponnesians was made, _were sailing - in parallel directions along the northern coast in the direction - of Naupaktus_,—ὅπως εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν - ὁ Φορμίων ~καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν~ ταύτῃ παραπλέοι,—“if he _also_, - with a view to defend the place, should sail along that coast,” - (that is, if he, _as well as they_:) which seems to be the - distinct meaning of the particle καὶ in this place. - - Now if we suppose the Peloponnesian fleet to have sailed from - its original station towards Naupaktus, all the events which - follow become thoroughly perspicuous and coherent. I apprehend - that no one would ever have entertained any other idea, except - from the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ~ἑαυτῶν~ γῆν ἔσω - ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. Since the subject or nominative case of the verb - ἔπλεον is οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, it has been supposed that the word - ~ἑαυτῶν~ must necessarily refer to the Peloponnesians; and Mr. - Bloomfield, with whom I agree as to the signification of the - passage, proposes to alter ~ἑαυτῶν~ into ~αὐτῶν~. It appears - to me that this alteration is not necessary, and that ἑαυτῶν - may very well be construed so as to refer to the _Athenians_, - not to the Lacedæmonians. The reflective meaning of the pronoun - ἑαυτῶν is _not necessarily_ thrown back upon the subject of the - action _immediately_ preceding it, in a complicated sentence - where there is more than one subject and more than one action. - Thus, for instance, in this very passage of Thucydidês which I - have transcribed, we find the word ἑαυτῶν a second time used, - and used so that its meaning is thrown back, not upon the - subject immediately preceding, but upon a subject more distant - from it,—ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ (τῷ κέρατι) εἴκοσι ναῦς ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα - πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα..., μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν - σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως~, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται αἱ νῆες - περικλῄσειαν. Now here the words τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, allude to - the Peloponnesian fleet, not to the Athenians, which latter is - the subject immediately preceding. Poppo and Göller both admit - such to be the true meaning; and if this be admissible, there - appears to me no greater difficulty in construing the words ἐπὶ - τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν to mean, “the land of the _Athenians_,” _not_ - “the land of the _Peloponnesians_.” Ἑαυτῶν might have been more - unambiguously expressed by ἐκείνων αὑτῶν; for the reflective - signification embodied in αὑτῶν is here an important addition to - the meaning: “Since the Athenians did not sail into the interior - of the gulf and the narrow waters, the Peloponnesians, wishing to - bring them in even reluctantly, sailed _against the Athenians’ - own land_ in the interior.” - - Another passage may be produced from Thucydidês, in which the - two words ἑαυτοῦ and ἐκείνου are both used in the same sentence - and designate the same person, ii, 13. Περικλῆς, ὑποτοπήσας, - ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ - βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δῃώσῃ, - ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ~ἑαυτοῦ~ γένηται - τοῦτο, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγη ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἕνεκα ~ἐκείνου~· - προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ - ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δ᾽ - ἀγροὺς ~τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ~ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δῃώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι - ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι. Here ἑαυτοῦ - and ἐκείνου (compare an analogous passage, Xenophon, Hellen. i, - 1, 27) both refer to Periklês; and ἑαυτοῦ is twice used, so that - it reflects back not upon the subject of the action immediately - preceding it, but upon another subject farther behind. Again, iv, - 99. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν (οἱ - Ἀθηναῖοι), ἀπιόντας ~ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν~ ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα· εἰ δ᾽ - ἐν τῇ ~ἐκείνων~, αὐτοὺς γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον. Here the use of - ἑαυτῶν and ἐκείνων is remarkable. Ἑαυτῶν refers to the Bœotians, - though the Athenians are the subject of the action immediately - preceding; while ἐκείνων refers to the Athenians, in another case - where they are the subject of the action immediately preceding. - We should almost have expected to find the position of the two - words reversed. Again, in iv, 57, we have—Καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ - Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους - Κυθηρίους ~οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν~ φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν. - Here ἑαυτῶν refers to the subject of the action immediately - preceding—that is, to Κυθηρίους, not to Ἀθηναῖοι: but when we - turn to another chapter, iii, 78: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ - πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν, ἁθρόαις μέν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ - κατὰ μέσον ~ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις~ (ναυσὶ)—we find ἑαυτῶν - thrown back upon the subject, _not_ immediately preceding it. - The same, iv, 47—εἴ πού τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ; and ii, 95. - Ὁ γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν - ~ἑαυτὸν~ (_i. e._ Perdikkas), κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον, - etc. - - Compare also Homer, Odyss. xvii, 387. Πτωχὸν δ᾽ οὐκ ἄν τις - καλέοι, τρύξοντα ἓ αὐτόν; and Xenophon, Memorab. iv, 2, 28; i, 6, - 3; v, 2, 24; Anabas. vii. 2, 10; 6, 43; Hellen. v, 2, 39. - - It appears to me, that when we study the use of the pronoun - ἑαυτὸς, we shall see reason to be convinced that in the passage - of Thucydidês now before us, the phrase οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔπλεον - ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, need not necessarily be referred to the - _Peloponnesian_ land, but may in perfect conformity with analogy - be understood to mean the _Athenian_ land. I am sure that, in so - construing it, we shall not put so much violence upon the meaning - as the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold have put upon the preposition - ἐπὶ, when the Scholiast states that ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν means the - same thing as παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, and when Dr. Arnold admits - this opinion, only adding a new meaning which does not usually - belong to ἐπὶ with an accusative case. - - An objection to the meaning which I propose may possibly be - grounded on the word νομίσας, applied to Phormio. If the - Peloponnesian fleet was sailing directly towards Naupaktus, it - may be urged, Phormio would not be said to _think_ that they - were going thither, but _to see_ or _become aware_ of it. But - in reply to this we may observe, that the Peloponnesians never - really intended to attack Naupaktus, though they directed their - course towards it; they wished in reality to draw Phormio within - the strait, and there to attack him. The historian, therefore, - says with propriety, that Phormio would _believe_, and not that - he would _perceive_, them to be going thither, since his belief - would really be erroneous. - - [352] Thucyd. ii, 90. How narrow the escape was, is marked in - the words of the historian—τῶν δὲ ἕνδεκα μὲν αἵπερ ἡγοῦντο - ~ὑπεκφεύγουσι~ τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφήν, ἐς - τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν. - - The proceedings of the Syracusan fleet against that of the - Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, and the reflections of the - historian upon them, illustrate this attack of the Peloponnesians - upon the fleet of Phormio (Thucyd. vii. 36). - - [353] Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian - hoplites at Pylus (Thucyd. iv, 14). - -The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured, and while their -left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right -wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven -fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of -these got clear away into the harbor of Naupaktus, and there posted -themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, -before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, -somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral; who, on -board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in -hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie -moored a merchant vessel, at the entrance of the harbor of Naupaktus; -and the Athenian captain in his flight, observing that the Leukadian -pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold -and rapid manœuvre. He pulled swiftly round the merchant vessel, -directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove -his beak against her midships with an impact so violent as to disable -her at once; her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Timokratês, was -so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew -himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbor. The pursuing -vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, -that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; -while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the -coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbor -were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word -from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to -make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy: whose ships, -disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly -stopped, could not be speedily got again under way, and expected -nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the -twenty pursuing ships, on the right wing; next, they pursued their -advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the -right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely -routed, and fled across the gulf to their original station at -Panormus.[354] Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, -terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the -capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes,—but they also -rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and -taken in the early part of the action: moreover, the Peloponnesian -crews sustained a considerable loss, both in killed and in prisoners. - - [354] Thucyd. ii, 92. It is sufficiently evident that - the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty - Peloponnesian ships of the right or pursuing wing,—but also - the left and centre. Otherwise, they would not have been able - to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the - beginning of the battle. Thucydidês, indeed, does not expressly - mention the Peloponnesian left and centre as following the - right in their pursuit towards Naupaktus. But we may presume - that they partially did so, probably careless of much order, as - being at first under the impression that the victory was gained. - They were probably, therefore, thrown into confusion without - much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were beaten - and driven back upon them,—even though the victorious Athenian - triremes were no more than eleven in number. - -Thus, in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but -also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at -first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory, to -which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since -they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their -dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their -own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves -entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, -to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated -the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. -Yet they were so completely discomfited,—and farther, so much in -fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens,—that they took -advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the gulf to Corinth: -all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home. - -Nor was it long before the reinforcement actually arrived, after -that untoward detention which had wellnigh exposed Phormio and his -whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of -the gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians -had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian -influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn -an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian -inland country with four hundred Athenian hoplites and four hundred -Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were -attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into -exile, while the chief named Kynês, of Koronta, who seems to have -been hitherto in exile, was reëstablished in his native town. The -great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Œniadæ, -near the mouth of the Achelôus; a town at variance with the other -Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But the great spread -of the waters of the Achelôus rendered this siege impracticable -during the winter, and Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. -From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, -carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were -freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian -prisoners in the hands of Sparta.[355] - - [355] Thucyd. ii, 102, 103. - -After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to -Corinth, Knêmus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, -before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden -inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the -Athenians at sea, that, while they guarded amply the coasts of -Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of -an attack upon their own main harbor. Accordingly, Peiræus was not -only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute -even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of -the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were -immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next -to Megara,—each man carrying his sitting-cloth,[356] and his oar, -together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole -in the side, and thus prevented from slipping. There lay forty -triremes in Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, which, though old and out -of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen -immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. But such was -the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme -came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, -though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching -Peiræus: but it was pretended that the wind was adverse, and they -contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, -in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and -seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbor of -Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over -a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as -well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen -aggression, both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the -extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not -conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that -Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole -population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea -with all the triremes that were ready against the Peloponnesians; -but these latter, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste -to quit Salamis with their booty, and the three captured guard-ships. -The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus -was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, -down to the end of the war.[357] Forty years afterwards, however, -we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with -much more boldness and dexterity, by the Lacedæmonian captain -Teleutias.[358] - - [356] Thucyd. ii, 93. ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τὴν - κώπην, καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον, καὶ τὸν τροπωτῆρα, etc. On these words - there is an interesting letter of Dr. Bishop’s published in the - Appendix to Dr. Arnold’s Thucydidês, vol. i. His remarks upon - ὑπηρέσιον are more satisfactory than those upon τροπωτήρ. Whether - the fulcrum of the oar was formed by a thowell, or a notch, on - the gunwale, or by a perforation in the ship’s side, there must - in both cases have been required—since it seems to have had - nothing like what Dr. Bishop calls a _nut_—a thong to prevent it - from slipping down towards the water; especially with the oars of - the thranitæ, or upper tier of rowers, who pulled at so great an - elevation, comparatively speaking, above the water. Dr. Arnold’s - explanation of τροπωτὴρ is suited to the case of a boat, but not - to that of a trireme. Dr. Bishop shows that the explanation of - the purpose of the ὑπηρέσιον, given by the Scholiast, is not the - true one. - - [357] Thucyd. ii, 94. - - [358] Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 19. - -As during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down -a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, -in conjunction with the Peloponnesians,—so during the autumn, the -Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from a -still more powerful barbaric prince, Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian -Thracians. Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the -Ægean sea,—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though -each had a special name besides,—the Odrysians were at this time -the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Têrês, father of -Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue[359] and render -tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those -whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His -dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, -extended from Abdêra, or the mouth of the Nestus, in the Ægean sea, -to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this -must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, -especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. -Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian -tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axius and -the Strymon.[360] Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant -tribute, presents, and military force when required; and with the two -former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since -his nephew and successor Seuthes, under whom the revenue increased -and attained its maximum, received four hundred talents annually in -gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, -over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and -ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, -which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what -proportions we are not informed: even Grecian cities not in Thrace -sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the -produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or -tribes.[361] The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and -of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining -tribes, appears to have been about twelve days’ journey inland from -Byzantium,[362] in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south -of Mount Hæmus, and northeast of Rhodopê. The Odrysian chiefs were -connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the -subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes -north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithês[363] had married -the daughter of the Odrysian Têrês, the first who extended the -dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace. - - [359] Thucyd. ii, 29, 95, 96. - - [360] Thucyd. ii, 99. - - [361] See Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 3, 16; 4, 2. Diodorus (xii, 50) - gives the revenue of Sitalkês as more than one thousand talents - annually. This sum is not materially different from that which - Thucydidês states to be the annual receipt of Seuthes, successor - of Sitalkês,—revenue, properly so called, and presents, both - taken together. - - Traders from Parium, on the Asiatic coast of the Propontis, are - among those who come with presents to the Odrysian king, Mêdokus - (Xenophon _ut supra_). - - [362] Xenoph. Anabas. _l. c._ - - [363] Herodot. iv, 80. - -The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgment of -Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of disunion and -incapacity of political association; were such association possible, -he says, they would be strong enough to vanquish every other -nation,—though Thucydidês considers them as far inferior to the -Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the -period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development -which Thucydidês describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian -war, and which imparted to these tribes an union, partial indeed -and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or -afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince -Sitalkês, had taken for his wife, or rather for one of his wives, -the sister of Nymphodôrus, a Greek, of Abdêra; by whose mediation -he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of -Athens,—and had been induced to promise that he would reconquer the -Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians,[364]—his -ancient kinsmen, according to the mythe of Tereus as interpreted -by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, -had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving -him his sister in marriage,—a promise made as consideration for -the interference of Sitalkês and Nymphodôrus in procuring for him -peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil -dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling -in his own name, and seemingly independent of Perdikkas, over a -portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axius, -had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge -with Sitalkês: he was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas -received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The -Athenians had ambassadors resident with Sitalkês, and they sent -Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against -the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to -coöperate. In treating with Sitalkês, it was necessary to be liberal -in presents, both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who -held power dependent upon him: nothing could be accomplished among -the Thracians except by the aid of bribes,[365] and the Athenians -were more competent to supply this exigency than any other people -in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally -resolved. - - [364] Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 2, 31; Thucyd. ii, 29; Aristophan. - Aves, 366. Thucydidês goes out of his way to refute this current - belief,—a curious exemplification of ancient legend applied to - the convenience of present politics. - - [365] Thucyd. ii, 97. Φόρος δὲ ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβάρου καὶ τῶν - Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ὅσον προσῆξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ὕστερον Σιτάλκου - βασιλεύσας πλεῖστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων μάλιστα - δύναμις, ἃ χρυσὸς καὶ ἄργυρος εἴη· καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων - χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ὑφαντά τε - καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ - τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσι καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν· κατεστήσαντο - γὰρ τοὐναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὄντα μὲν καὶ - τοῖς ἄλλοις Θρᾳξὶ, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι, καὶ αἴσχιον ἦν - αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν· ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὸ - δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν μὴ - διδόντα δῶρα· ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἦλθεν ἰσχύος. - - This universal necessity of presents and bribes may be seen - illustrated in the dealings of Xenophon and the Cyreian army with - the Thracian prince Seuthes, described in the Anabasis, vii, - chapters 1 and 2. It appears that even at that time, B.C. 401, - the Odrysian dominion, though it had passed through disturbances - and had been practically enfeebled, still extended down to the - neighborhood of Byzantium. In commenting upon the venality of the - Thracians, the Scholiast has a curious comparison with his own - time—καὶ οὐκ ἦν τι πρᾶξαι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸν μὴ διδόντα χρήματα· - ~ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥωμαίοις~. The Scholiast here tells us that the - venality in his time as to public affairs, in the Roman empire, - was not less universal: of what century of the Roman empire he - speaks, we do not know: perhaps about 500-600 A.D. - - The contrast which Thucydidês here draws between the Thracians - and the Persians is also illustrated by what Xenophon says - respecting the habits of the younger Cyrus: (Anabas. i, 9, 22): - compare also the romance of the Cyropædia, viii, 14, 31, 32. - -But the forces of Sitalkês, collected from many different portions -of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes -under his dominion, between Hæmus, Rhodopê, and the two seas: -the Getæ, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the -Scythians, their neighbors on the other side of the river, with bow -and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes, -the Lææi, and the other Pæonian tribes subject to his dominion; -lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by -their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence -on the heights of Rhodopê, were tempted by the chance of plunder, -or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard. Altogether, his -army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to one hundred and fifty -thousand men, one third of it cavalry, who were for the most part -Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp -were the independent tribes of Rhodopê; but the whole host, alike -numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all -those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march. - -Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him -Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited -mountain called Kerkinê, which divided the Pæonians on the west from -the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Mædi on the east, until he -reached the Pæonian town or district called Dobêrus;[366] it was -here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making -up his full total. From Dobêrus, probably marching down along one -of the tributary streams of the Axius, he entered into that portion -of Upper Macedonia, which lies along the higher Axius, and which -had constituted the separate principality of Philip: the presence -in his army of Amyntos son of Philip, induced some of the fortified -places, Gortynia, Atalantê, and others, to open their gates without -resistance, while Eidomenê was taken by storm, and Eurôpus in vain -attacked. From hence, he passed still farther southward into Lower -Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas; ravaging the territory on both -sides of the Axius even to the neighborhood of the towns Pella and -Kyrrhus; and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river -and the head of the Thermaic gulf. Farther south than this he did not -go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of -the Axius and the head of the Strymonic gulf,—Mygdonia, Krestônia, -and Anthemus,—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the -territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiæans. The Macedonians under -Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so -overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small -number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry -from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well armed and excellent, made some -orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed -with javelins, short swords, and the pelta, or small shield,—but it -was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and -compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.[367] - - [366] See Gatterer (De Herodoti et Thucydidis Thraciâ), sects. - 44-57; Poppo (Prolegom. ad Thucydidem), vol. ii, ch. 31, about - the geography of this region, which is very imperfectly known, - even in modern times. We can hardly pretend to assign a locality - to these ancient names. - - Thucydidês, in his brief statements respecting this march of - Sitalkês, speaks like one who had good information about the - inland regions; as he was likely to have from his familiarity - with the coasts, and resident proprietorship in Thrace (Thucyd. - ii, 100; Herodot. v, 16). - - [367] Thucyd. ii, 100; Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 9, 2. - -Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made -until the beginning of winter, seemingly about November or December. -We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the -joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a -better time of the year: having probably waited to hear that his -army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair -of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to despatch -any force of their own to the spot.[368] Some envoys and presents -only were sent as compliments, instead of the coöperating armament; -and this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, -the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at -that season, induced Sitalkês soon to enter into negotiations with -Perdikkas; who, moreover, gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian -prince, by promising his sister Stratonikê in marriage, together -with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be -speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been -distributed for thirty days over Macedonia: during eight of those -days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval -had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around: such a -host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, -and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry -their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panæi, Odomantê, -Drôi, and Dersæi) in the plains on the northeast of the Strymon, and -near Mount Pangæus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel -alarm lest Sitalkês should take the opportunity of trying to conquer -them; on the other side, the Thessalians, Magnêtes, and other Greeks -north of Thermopylæ, anticipated that he would carry his invasion -farther south, and began to organize means for resisting him: even -the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this -new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against -them. All such alarms were dissipated, when Sitalkês, after remaining -thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable -avalanche was thus seen to melt away without falling on them. The -faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to -Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his -previous similar promise to Sitalkês.[369] - - [368] Thucyd. ii, 101. ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ παρῆσαν ταῖς ναυσὶν, - ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἥξειν, etc. - - [369] Thucyd. ii, 101. - - - - -CHAPTER L. - -FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR -DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA. - - -The second and third years of the war had both been years of great -suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, -which did not materially relax until the winter of the third -year (B.C. 429-428). It is no wonder that, under the pressure of -such a calamity, their military efforts were enfeebled, although -the victories of Phormio had placed their maritime reputation -at a higher point than ever. To their enemies, the destructive -effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder -itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—afforded -material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere; and the -Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated during this year -their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been intermitted -during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious -resistance: entering the country about the beginning of May, they -continued the process of devastation until their provisions were -exhausted.[370] To this damage the Athenians had probably now -accustomed themselves: but they speedily received, even while the -invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more -embarrassing and formidable,—the revolt of Mitylênê and of the -greater part of Lesbos. - - [370] Thucyd. iii, 1. - -This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly -unawares; but the idea of it was of longer standing than they -suspected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it before the -war, and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without -success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the -design, which was warmly promoted by the Bœotians, kinsmen of the -Lesbians in Æolic lineage and dialect. The Mitylenæan leaders appear -to have finally determined on revolt during the preceding autumn or -winter; but they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before -they declared themselves openly: and, moreover, they took measures -for constraining three other towns in Lesbos—Antissa, Eresus, -and Pyrrha—to share their fortunes, to merge their own separate -governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylênê. Methymna, -the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was -decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Mitylenæans -built new ships, put their walls in an improved state of defence, -carried out a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbor, -and render it capable of being closed with a chain, despatched -emissaries to hire Scythian bowmen and purchase corn in the Euxine, -and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective -resistance. Though the oligarchical character of their government -gave them much means of secrecy, and above all, dispensed with the -necessity of consulting the people beforehand,—still, measures of -such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. -Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylenæan citizens, -partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of _proxeni_ -(or _consuls_, to use a modern word which approaches to the meaning) -for Athens,—especially by a Mitylenæan named Doxander, incensed with -the government for having disappointed his two sons of a marriage -with two orphan heiresses.[371] Not less communicative were the -islanders of Tenedos, animated by ancient neighborly jealousy towards -Mitylênê; so that the Athenians were thus forewarned both of the -intrigues between Mitylênê and the Spartans and of her certain -impending revolt unless they immediately interfered.[372] - - [371] Aristotel. Politic. v, 2, 3. The fact respecting Doxander - here mentioned is stated by Aristotle, and there is no reason to - question its truth. But Aristotle states it in illustration of a - general position,—that the private quarrels of principal citizens - are often the cause of great misfortune to the commonwealth. He - represents Doxander and his private quarrel as having brought - upon Mitylênê the resentment of the Athenians and the war with - Athens—Δόξανδρος—ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως, καὶ παρώξυνε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, - πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως. - - Having the account of Thucydidês before us, we are enabled to - say that this is an incorrect conception, as far as concerns the - _cause_ of the war,—though the fact in itself may be quite true. - - [372] Thucyd. iii, 2. - -This news seems to have become certain about February or March -428 B.C.: but such was then the dispirited condition of the -Athenians,—arising from two years’ suffering under the epidemic, -and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of -Periklês,—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe -what they were so much afraid to find true. Lesbos, like Chios, -was their ally, upon an equal footing, still remaining under those -conditions which had been at first common to all the members of -the confederacy of Delos. Mitylênê paid no tribute to Athens: it -retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed -possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was -oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without the least -reference to Athens. Its obligations as an ally were, that, in -case of war, it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in -determinate number or not, we do not know: it would undoubtedly be -restrained from making war upon Tenedos, or any other subject-ally -of Athens: and its government or its citizens would probably be -held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of -any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenedos -or of any other ally of Athens,—these latter being themselves also -accountable before the same tribunals, under like complaints from -Mitylênê. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and -so extremely powerful that the Athenians in their actual state -of depression were fearful of coping with it, and therefore loth -to believe the alarming intelligence which reached them. They -sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylenæans -to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys -returned without success that they saw the necessity of stronger -measures. Ten Mitylenæan triremes, serving as contingent in the -Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard; -while Kleïppidês, then on the point of starting, along with two -colleagues, to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Peloponnesus, -was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to -Mitylênê.[373] It was expected that he would reach that town about -the time of the approaching festival of Apollo Maloeis, celebrated in -its neighborhood,—on which occasion the whole Mitylenæan population -was in the habit of going forth to the temple: so that the town, -while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the -fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleïppidês -was instructed to require that the Mitylenæans should surrender their -ships of war and raze their fortifications, and, in case of refusal, -to attack them immediately. - - [373] Thucyd. iii, 3. - -But the publicity of debate at Athens was far too great to allow -such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the -city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off -to communicate it at Mitylênê. Crossing over to Geræstus in Eubœa, -he got aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, and reached -Mitylênê with a favorable wind on the third day from Athens: so that -when Kleïppidês arrived shortly afterwards, he found the festival -adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition -which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæan fleet even came -forth from the harbor to assail him, but was beaten back with -little difficulty: upon which, the Mitylenæan leaders, finding -themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and -desiring still to gain time before they declared their revolt, -opened negotiations with Kleïppidês, and prevailed on him to suspend -hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens,—protesting -that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to -have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian -invasion of Attica. Kleïppidês was induced, not very prudently, to -admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was -insufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful; and he -remained moored off the harbor at the north of Mitylênê until the -envoys, among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mitylênê -who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed -his opinion, should return from Athens. Meanwhile the Mitylenæan -government, unknown to Kleïppidês, and well aware that the embassy -would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret -envoys to Sparta, imploring immediate aid: and on the arrival of -the Lacedæmonian Meleas and the Theban Hermæondas, who had been -despatched to Mitylênê earlier, but had only come in by stealth since -the arrival of Kleïppidês, a second trireme was sent along with them, -carrying additional envoys to reiterate the solicitation. These -arrivals and despatches were carried on without the knowledge of the -Athenian admiral, chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the -town, which had originally been placed upon a little islet divided -from Lesbos by a narrow channel, or _euripus_, and had subsequently -been extended across into the main island,—like Syracuse, and so -many other Grecian settlements. It had consequently two harbors, one -north, the other south of the town: Kleïppidês was anchored off the -former, but the latter remained unguarded.[374] - - [374] Thucyd. iii, 3, 4: compare Strabo, xiii, p. 617; and Plehn, - Lesbiaca, pp. 12-18. - - Thucydidês speaks of the spot at the mouth of the northern harbor - as being called Malea, which was also undoubtedly the name of the - southeastern promontory of Lesbos. We must therefore presume that - there were two places on the seaboard of Lesbos which bore that - name. - - The easternmost of the two southern promontories of Peloponnesus - was also called Cape Malea. - -During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, reinforcements -reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Imbros, and some other -allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna: so that when -the envoys returned, as they presently did, with an unfavorable -reply, war was resumed with increased vigor. The Mitylenæans, having -made a general sally with their full military force, gained some -advantage in the battle; yet, not feeling bold enough to maintain -the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of -their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression -unfavorable to the stability of the Athenian empire: but when it -was seen that their conduct was irresolute, and their achievements -disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took -place,—and the Chians and other allies came in with increased zeal -in obedience to the summons of Athens for reinforcements. Kleïppidês -soon found his armament large enough to establish two separate camps, -markets for provision, and naval stations, north and south of the -town, so as to watch and block up both the harbors at once.[375] But -he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to -invest the city by land; especially as the Mitylenæans had received -reinforcements from Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, the other towns of -Lesbos which acted with them. They were even sufficiently strong to -march against Methymna, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them -by a party within; but this expectation was not realized, nor could -they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the -Mitylenæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns; in such -manner that the Methymnæans, who soon afterwards attacked Antissa, -were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undecided condition -the island continued, until, somewhere about the month of August -B.C. 428, the Athenians sent Pachês to take the command, with a -reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, who rowed themselves thither -in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep -the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city -with a single wall of circumvallation, strengthened by separate forts -in suitable positions. By the beginning of October, Mitylênê was thus -completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.[376] - - [375] Thucyd. iii, 6. - - [376] Thucyd. iii, 18. - -Meanwhile, the Mitylenæan envoys, after a troublesome voyage, reached -Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of -June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, -where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would -naturally be present,—and there to set forth their requests, after -the festival was concluded, in presence of all.[377] Thucydidês has -given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherein this was -done,—a speech not a little remarkable. Pronounced as it was by men -who had just revolted from Athens, having the strongest interest to -raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves,—and -before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, -all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the bitterest -calumnies against her, we should have expected a confident sense of -righteous and well-grounded though perilous effort on the part of the -Mitylenæans, and a plausible collection of wrongs and oppressions -alleged against the common enemy. Instead of which, the speech is -apologetic and embarrassed: the speaker not only does not allege any -extortion or severe dealing from Athens towards the Mitylenæans, but -even admits the fact that they had been treated by her with marked -honor;[378] and that, too, during a long period of peace, during -which she stood less in awe of her allies generally, and would have -had much more facility in realizing any harsh purposes towards them, -than she could possibly enjoy now that the war had broken out, when -their discontents would be likely to find powerful protectors.[379] -According to his own showing, the Mitylenæans, while they had been -perfectly well treated by Athens during the past, had now acquired, -by the mere fact of war, increased security for continuance of the -like treatment during the future. It is upon this ground of security -for the future, nevertheless, that he rests the justification of the -revolt, not pretending to have any subject of positive complaint. -The Mitylenæans, he contends, could have no prospective security -against Athens: for she had successively and systematically brought -into slavery all her allies, except Lesbos and Chios, though all had -originally been upon an equal footing: and there was every reason -for fearing that she would take the first convenient opportunity of -reducing the two last remaining to the same level,—the rather as -their position was now one of privilege and exception, offensive -to her imperial pride and exaggerated ascendency. It had hitherto -suited the policy of Athens to leave these two exceptions, as a -proof that the other allies had justly incurred their fate, since -otherwise Lesbos and Chios, having equal votes, would not have -joined forces in reducing them:[380] but this policy was now no -longer necessary, and the Mitylenæans, feeling themselves free only -in name, were imperatively called upon by regard for their own -safety to seize the earliest opportunity for emancipating themselves -in reality. Nor was it merely regard for their own safety, but a -farther impulse of Pan-Hellenic patriotism; a desire to take rank -among the opponents, and not among the auxiliaries of Athens, in her -usurpation of sovereignty over so many free Grecian states.[381] The -Mitylenæans had, however, been compelled to revolt with preparations -only half-completed, and had therefore a double claim upon the succor -of Sparta,—the single hope and protectress of Grecian autonomy. And -Spartan aid—if now lent immediately and heartily, in a renewed attack -on Attica during this same year, by sea as well as by land—could -not fail to put down the common enemy, exhausted as she was by -pestilence as well as by the cost of three years’ war, and occupying -her whole maritime force, either in the siege of Mitylênê or round -Peloponnesus. The orator concluded by appealing not merely to the -Hellenic patriotism and sympathies of the Peloponnesians, but also to -the sacred name of the Olympic Zeus, in whose precinct the meeting -was held, that his pressing entreaty might not be disregarded.[382] - - [377] Thucyd. iii, 9. - - [378] Thucyd. iii, 10. μηδέ τῳ χείρους δόξωμεν εἶναι, εἰ ~ἐν τῇ - εἰρήνῃ τιμώμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν~ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφιστάμεθα. - - The language in which the Mitylenæan envoys describe the - treatment which their city had received from Athens, is - substantially as strong as that which Kleon uses afterwards - in his speech at Athens, when he reproaches them with their - ingratitude,—Kleon says (iii, 39), αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες, καὶ - ~τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν~, τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, etc. - - [379] Thucyd. iii, 12. οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ πολύ γ᾽ ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν - δυνηθῆναι (περιγίγνεσθαι), εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε κατέστη, - παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους. Τίς οὖν αὐτὴ ἡ - φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστὴ, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους - ὑπεδεχόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, - ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν. - - [380] Thucyd. iii, 11. Αὐτόνομοι δὲ ἐλείφθημεν οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ - ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπείᾳ τε λόγου, καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον - ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος, τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο καταληπτά. Ἅμα μὲν γὰρ - μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο, μὴ ἂν ~τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας~, εἰ μή τι - ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῄεσαν, ~ξυστρατεύειν~. - - [381] Thucyd. iii, 13. - - [382] Thucyd. iii, 13, 14. - -In following this speech of the orator, we see the plain confession -that the Mitylenæans had no reason whatever to complain of the -conduct of Athens towards themselves: she had respected alike their -dignity, their public force, and their private security. This -important fact helps us to explain, first, the indifference which the -Mitylenæan people will be found to manifest in the revolt; next, the -barbarous resolution taken by the Athenians after its suppression. -The reasons given for the revolt are mainly two. 1. The Mitylenæans -had no security that Athens would not degrade them into the condition -of subject-allies like the rest. 2. They did not choose to second -the ambition of Athens, and to become parties to a war, for the sake -of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Grecian political -instincts. In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch -the sore point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly -contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind,—the -right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs -apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognized -this autonomy in theory, by the general synod and equal voting of all -the members at Sparta, on important occasions; though it was quite -true,[383] as Periklês urged at Athens, that in practice nothing more -was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings,—and -though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of -her Arcadian allies, summoning their military contingents without -acquainting them whither they were destined to march. But Athens -proclaimed herself a despot, effacing the autonomy of her allies not -less in theory than in practice: far from being disposed to cultivate -in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not -even cheat them with those forms and fictions which so often appease -discontent in the absence of realities. Doubtless, the nature of -her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected, or -only partially connected, with kindred of race, rendered the forms -of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up; at the same time -that it gave to her as naval chief an ascendency much more despotic -than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful -whether she could have overcome—it is certain that she did not try -to overcome—these political difficulties; so that her empire stood -confessed as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the -Greek mind; and the revolts against it, like this of Mitylênê,—in -so far as they represented a genuine feeling, and were not merely -movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy,—were -revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of -actual oppression. The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they -had no security against being one day reduced to the common condition -of subject-allies like the rest; yet an Athenian speaker, had he -been here present, might have made no mean reply to this portion -of their reasoning;—he would have urged that, had Athens felt any -dispositions towards such a scheme, she would have taken advantage -of the fourteen years’ truce to execute it; and he would have shown -that the degradation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her -position from president to despot had been far less intentional and -systematic than the Mitylenæan orator affirmed. - - [383] Thucyd. i, 144. Καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι (the Lacedæmonians) ταῖς - αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι, μὴ ~σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως - αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται~. - - About the hostages detained by Sparta for the fidelity of her - allies, see Thucyd. v, 54, 61. - -To the Peloponnesian auditors, however, the speech of the latter -proved completely satisfactory; the Lesbians were declared members -of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was -decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned -contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving -with their own at the isthmus: they there began to prepare carriages -or trucks for dragging across the isthmus the triremes which had -fought against Phormio, from the harbor of Lechæum into the Saronic -gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining -allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied -with their harvest; and the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed -with this languor and disobedience, were still farther confounded -by the unexpected presence of one hundred Athenian triremes off the -coast of the isthmus. The Athenians, though their own presence at -the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned -more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there -respecting Mitylênê. Perceiving the general belief entertained of -their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to contradict -this by a great and instant effort, and accordingly manned forthwith -one hundred triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, -citizens as well as metics; and excepting only the two richest -classes of the Solonian census, _i. e._ the pentakosiomedimni, and -the hippeis, or horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a -demonstration along the isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and -landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. -At the same time, thirty other Athenian triremes, despatched sometime -previously to Akarnania, under Asôpius, son of Phormio, landed at -different openings in Laconia, for the same purpose; and this news -reached the Lacedæmonians at the isthmus while the other great -Athenian fleet was parading before their eyes.[384] Amazed at so -unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much -the Mitylenæans had misled them respecting the exhaustion of Athens, -and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of -their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and -land against Attica. They therefore returned home, resolving to send -an expedition of forty triremes, under Alkidas, to the relief of -Mitylênê itself; at the same time transmitting requisitions to their -various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.[385] - - [384] Thucyd. iii, 7-16. - - [385] Thucyd. iii, 15, 16. - -Meanwhile, Asôpius, with his thirty triremes, had arrived in -Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve were sent home. -He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormio, who appears -either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his -victories of the preceding year; and the Akarnanians had preferred -a special request that a son, or at least some relative of Phormio, -should be invested with the command of the squadron; so beloved was -his name and character among them. Asôpius, however, accomplished -nothing of importance, though he again undertook conjointly with the -Akarnanians a fruitless march against Œniadæ. Ultimately, he was -defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory -of Leukas.[386] - - [386] Thucyd. iii, 7. - -The sanguine announcement made by the Mitylenæans at Olympia, that -Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had indeed been -strikingly contradicted by her recent display; since, taking numbers -and equipment together, the maritime force which she had put forth -this summer, manned as it was by a higher class of seamen, surpassed -all former years; although, in point of number only, it was inferior -to the two hundred and fifty triremes which she had sent out during -the first summer of the war.[387] But the assertion that Athens was -impoverished in finances was not so destitute of foundation: for -the whole treasure in the acropolis, six thousand talents at the -commencement of the war, was now consumed, with the exception of -that reserve of one thousand talents which had been solemnly set -aside against the last exigences of defensive resistance. This is not -surprising, when we learn that every hoplite engaged for near two -years and a half in the blockade of Potidæa, received two drachmas -per day, one for himself and a second for an attendant: there were -during the whole time of the blockade three thousand hoplites engaged -there,—and for a considerable portion of the time, four thousand six -hundred; besides the fleet, all the seamen of which received one -drachma per day per man. Accordingly the Athenians were now for the -first time obliged to raise a direct contribution among themselves, -to the amount of two hundred talents, for the purpose of prosecuting -the siege of Mitylênê: and they at the same time despatched Lysiklês -with four colleagues, in command of twelve triremes, to collect -money. What relation these money-gathering ships bore to the regular -tribute paid by the subject-allies, or whether they were allowed to -visit these latter, we do not know: in the present case, Lysiklês -landed at Myus, near the mouth of the Mæander, and marched up the -country to levy contributions on the Karian villages in the plain of -that river: but he was surprised by the Karians, perhaps aided by the -active Samian exiles at Anæa in the neighborhood, and slain, with a -considerable number of his men.[388] - - [387] Thucyd. iii, 17. Καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὃν αἱ νῆες - ἔπλεον, ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται δὴ νῆες ἅμ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ κάλλει - ἐγένοντο, παραπλήσιαι δὲ καὶ ἔτι πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. - Τήν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὔβοιαν καὶ Σαλαμῖνα ἑκατὸν ἐφύλασσον, καὶ - περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἕτεραι ἑκατὸν ἦσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ Ποτίδαιαν - καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἅμα ἐγίγνοντο ἐν ἑνὶ - θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα. Καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα - ὑπανάλωσε μετὰ Ποτιδαίας, etc. - - I have endeavored to render as well as I can this obscure and - difficult passage; difficult both as to grammar and as to sense, - and not satisfactorily explained by any of the commentators,—if, - indeed, it can be held to stand now as Thucydidês wrote it. - In the preceding chapter, he had mentioned that this fleet of - one hundred sail was manned largely from the hoplite class of - citizens (iii, 16). Now we know from other passages in his - work (see v, 8; vi, 31) how much difference there was in the - appearance and efficiency of an armament, according to the class - of citizens who served on it. We may then refer the word κάλλος - to the excellence of outfit hence arising: I wish, indeed, that - any instance could be produced of κάλλος in this sense, but we - find the adjective κάλλιστος (Thucyd. v, 60) στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ - τοῦτο ~κάλλιστον~ Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνῆλθεν. In v, 8, - Thucydidês employs the word ἀξίωμα to denote the same meaning; - and in vi, 31, he says: παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὑτὴ πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μιᾶς - πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν - εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. It may be remarked that in that - chapter too, he contrasts the expedition against Sicily with two - other Athenian expeditions, equal to it in number, but inferior - in equipment: the same comparison which I believe he means to - take in this passage. - - [388] Thucyd. iii, 19. - -While the Athenians thus held Mitylênê under siege, their faithful -friends, the Platæans, had remained closely blockaded by the -Peloponnesians and Bœotians for more than a year, without any -possibility of relief. At length, provisions began to fail, and -the general, Eupompidês, backed by the prophet Theænetus,—these -prophets[389] were often among the bravest soldiers in the -army,—persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring but seemingly -desperate resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall, and -in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, -that at the moment of execution, one half of the garrison shrank from -it as equivalent to certain death: the other half, about two hundred -and twelve in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it have been -for the remainder had they even perished in the attempt, and thus -forestalled the more melancholy fate in store for them! - - [389] Thucyd. iii, 20. Compare Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 4, 19; - Herodot. ix, 37; Plutarch, Aratus, c. 25. - -It has been already stated, that the circumvallation of Platæa was -accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch, one ditch without -the encircling walls, another between them and the town; the two -walls being sixteen feet apart, joined together, and roofed all -round, so as to look like one thick wall, and to afford covered -quarters for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumference -were furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements -came a roofed tower, covering the whole breadth of the double -wall,—allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, -the entire circuit of the roofed wall was kept under watch night -and day: but on wet nights the besiegers had so far relaxed their -vigilance as to retire under cover of the towers, and leave the -intermediate spaces unguarded: and it was upon this omission that -the plan of escape was founded. The Platæans prepared ladders of a -proper height to scale the blockading double wall, ascertaining its -height by repeatedly counting the ranges of bricks, which were quite -near enough for them to discern, and not effectually covered with -whitewash. On a cold and dark December night, amidst rain, sleet, and -a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gates, lightly armed, -some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, -javelins, and bows and arrows: the right foot was naked, and the left -foot alone shod, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the -muddy ground.[390] Taking care to sally out with the wind in their -faces, and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any -clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot -of the wall without being discovered: the ladders, borne in the van, -were immediately planted, and Ammeas, son of Korœbus, followed by -eleven others, armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted -the wall: others, armed with spears, followed him, their shields -being carried and handed to them when on the top by comrades behind. -It was the duty of this first company to master and maintain the two -towers, right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for -passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers -being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers: -and many of the Platæans had already reached the top of the wall, -when the noise of a tile accidently knocked down by one of them, -betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general clamor was raised, -alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath -to the top of the wall, yet not knowing where the enemy was to be -found; a perplexity farther increased by the Platæans in the town, -who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite -side. Amidst such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment -could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at -their posts, except a reserve of three hundred men, kept constantly -in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled -the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. -At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at -Thebes,—but here again the Platæans in the town had foreseen and -prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith, -in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special -meaning.[391] - - [390] Thucyd. iii, 22. Dr. Arnold, in his note, construes this - passage as if the right or bare foot were the _least_ likely to - slip in the mud, and the left or shod foot the _most_ likely. - The Scholiast and Wasse maintain the opposite opinion, which is - certainly the more obvious sense of the text, though the sense - of Dr. Arnold would also be admissible. The naked foot is very - liable to slip in the mud, and might easily be rendered less - liable, by sandals, or covering particularly adapted to that - purpose. Besides, Wasse remarks justly, that the warrior who is - to use his _right_ arm requires to have his _left_ foot firmly - planted. - - [391] Thucyd. iii, 22. φρυκτοί τε ᾔροντο ἐς τὰς Θήβας πολέμιοι, - etc. It would seem by this statement that the blockaders must - have been often in the habit of transmitting intelligence to - Thebes by means of fire-signals; each particular combination of - lights having more or less of a special meaning. The Platæans - had observed this, and foresaw that the same means would be used - on the night of the outbreak, to bring assistance from Thebes - forthwith. If they had not observed it _before_, they could - not have prepared for the moment when the new signal would be - hoisted, so as to confound its meaning—ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα ᾖ.... - - Compare iii, 80. I agree with the general opinion stated in Dr. - Arnold’s note respecting these fire-signals, and even think that - it might have been sustained more strongly. - - “Non enim (observes Cicero, in the fifth oration against - Verres, c. 36), sicut erat nuper consuetudo, prædonum adventum - significabat _ignis è speculà sublatus aut tumulo_: sed flamma - ex ipso incendio navium et calamitatem acceptam et periculum - reliquum nuntiabat.” - -Meanwhile, the escaping Platæans, masters of the two adjoining -towers,—on the top of which some of them mounted, while others -held the doorway through, so as to repel with spears and darts -all approach of the blockaders,—prosecuted their flight without -interruption over the space between, shoving down the battlements in -order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. -In this manner they all successively got over and crossed the outer -ditch; every man, immediately after crossing, standing ready on the -outer bank, with bow and javelin, to repel assailants and maintain -safe passages for his comrades in the rear. At length, when all had -descended, there remained the last and greatest difficulty,—the -escape of those who occupied the two towers and kept the intermediate -portion of wall free: yet even this was accomplished successfully and -without loss. The outer ditch was, however, found embarrassing,—so -full of water from the rain as to be hardly fordable, yet with -thin ice on it also, from a previous frost: for the storm, which -in other respects was the main help to their escape, here retarded -their passage of the ditch by an unusual accumulation of water. It -was not, however, until all had crossed except the defenders of the -towers,—who were yet descending and scrambling through,—that the -Peloponnesian reserve of three hundred were seen approaching the spot -with torches. Their unshielded right side was turned towards the -ditch, and the Platæans, already across and standing on the bank, -immediately assailed them with arrows and javelins,—in which the -torches enabled them to take tolerable aim, while the Peloponnesians -on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and -had no previous knowledge of their position. They were thus held in -check until the rearmost Platæans had surmounted the difficulties -of the passage: after which the whole body stole off as speedily as -they could, taking at first the road towards Thebes, while their -pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite -direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryos-Kephalæ -to Athens: after having marched about three quarters of a mile on the -road to Thebes, leaving the chapel of the Hero Androkratês on their -right hand, the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward -towards Erythræ and Hysiæ, soon found themselves in safety among -the mountains which separate Bœotia from Attica at that point; from -whence they passed into the glad harbor and refuge of Athens.[392] - - [392] Thucyd. iii, 24. Diodorus (xii, 56) gives a brief summary - of these facts, without either novelty or liveliness. - -Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, -breaking loose from that impending fate which too soon overtook the -remainder, and preserving for future times the genuine breed and -honorable traditions of Platæa. One man alone was taken prisoner -at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled -themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned -in despair even from the foot of the inner wall; telling their -comrades within that the whole band had perished. Accordingly, at -daybreak, the Platæans within sent out a herald to solicit a truce -for burial of the dead bodies, and it was only by the answer made -to this request, that they learned the actual truth. The description -of this memorable outbreak exhibits not less daring in the execution -than skill and foresight in the design; and is the more interesting, -inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were -precisely the bravest men, who best deserved it. - -Meanwhile, Pachês and the Athenians kept Mitylênê closely blocked -up, the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were -already beginning to think of capitulation,—when their spirits were -raised by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian envoy Salæthus, who had -landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in -through a ravine which obstructed the continuity of the blockading -wall,—about February 427 B.C. He encouraged the Mitylenæans to hold -out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas was on -the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be -forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, -also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encouragement: -we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse by the -Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single -Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and -the Mitylenæans awaited with impatience the arrival of Alkidas, who -started from Peloponnesus at the beginning of April, with forty-two -triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded -Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. -Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and -destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer -because they awaited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But none -reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army -was obliged to break up.[393] - - [393] Thucyd. iii, 25, 26. - -The news, when it did arrive, proved very unsatisfactory. - -Salæthus and the Mitylenæans had held out until their provisions -were completely exhausted, but neither relief, nor tidings, reached -them from Peloponnesus. At length, even Salæthus became convinced -that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, -a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of blockade. -For this purpose, he distributed full panoplies among the mass of -the people, or commons, who had hitherto been without them, having -at best nothing more than bows or javelins.[394] But he had not -sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. -The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, -had no interest whatever in the present contest, which had been -undertaken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason -for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical -grievance from the Athenian alliance: and we shall find hereafter -that even among the subject-allies—to say nothing of a privileged -ally like Mitylênê—the bulk of the citizens were never forward, -sometimes positively reluctant, to revolt. The Mitylenæan oligarchy -had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because -they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for -its continuance: but this was a feeling to which the people were -naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own -town, and being kept dead and passive, as it was the interest of the -oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A -Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under -ordinary circumstances, but if ever it required energetic effort, -the genuine devotion under which alone such effort could be given, -was found wanting. Accordingly, the Mitylenæan demos, so soon as -they found themselves strengthened and ennobled by the possession of -heavy armor, refused obedience to the orders of Salæthus for marching -out and imperiling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were -under the belief—not unnatural under the secrecy of public affairs -habitually practised by an oligarchy, but which, assuredly, the -Athenian demos would have been too well informed to entertain—that -their governors were starving them, and had concealed stores of -provisions for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they -made of their arms was, to demand that these concealed stores should -be brought out and fairly apportioned to all, threatening, unless -their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations -with the Athenians, and surrender the city. The ruling Mitylenæans, -unable to prevent this, but foreseeing that it would be their -irretrievable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves -for a capitulation. It was agreed with Pachês, that the Athenian -armament should enter into possession of Mitylênê; that the fate of -its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and -that the Mitylenæans should send envoys to Athens to plead their -cause: until the return of these envoys, Pachês engaged that no one -should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold into slavery. -Nothing was said about Salæthus, who hid himself as well as he could -in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Pachês, so -great was the alarm of those Mitylenæans who had chiefly instigated -the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they -threw themselves as suppliants upon the altars for protection; but -being induced, by his assurances, to quit their sanctuary, were -placed in the island of Tenedos until answer should be received from -Athens.[395] - - [394] Thucyd. iii, 27. ὁ Σάλαιθος, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ προσδεχόμενος ἔτι - τὰς ναῦς, ὁπλίζει τὸν δῆμον, πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα, ὡς ἐπεξιὼν τοῖς - Ἀθηναίοις. - - [395] Thucyd. iii, 28. - -Having thus secured possession of Mitylênê, Pachês sent round some -triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured -Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns -of Pyrrha and Eresus, he received news which forced him to turn his -attention elsewhere. - -To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of -Alkidas was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there -much earlier, and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have -reached Mitylênê even before the surrender of the city. But the -Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters -and brave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impressions of -conscious weakness and timidity—especially since the victories of -Phormio in the preceding year—as that which beset land-troops who -marched up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.[396] Alkidas, -though unobstructed by the Athenians, who were not aware of his -departure,—though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian -exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian -exiles who had established themselves at Anæa,[397] on the Asiatic -continent, and acted as zealous enemies of Athens,—nevertheless, -instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near -Peloponnesus, next at the island of Delos, making capture of private -vessels with their crews; until at length, on reaching the islands of -Ikarus and Mykonus, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged -town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed -onward to Embaton, in the Erythræan territory on the coast of Asia -Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had -elapsed since the capitulation had been concluded, Teutiaplus, an -Eleian captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project -of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mitylênê by night in its -existing unsettled condition: no preparation would have been made for -receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might -be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenæans again armed, and the town -recovered. - - [396] Thucyd. iv, 34. τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους. - - [397] Thucyd. iv, 75. - -Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, -did not suit the temper of Alkidas. Nor could he be induced by the -solicitation of the exiles to fix and fortify himself either in any -port of Ionia, or in the Æolic town of Kymê, so as to afford support -and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were -disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of -them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Pissuthnês -of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. Having been sent for -the express purpose of relieving Mitylênê, Alkidas believed himself -interdicted from any other project, and determined to return to -Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of -Pachês and the Athenian fleet. From Embaton, accordingly, he started -on his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. -But the prisoners taken in his voyage were now an encumbrance to -his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the -merchant-vessels in his route had approached the fleet without -suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Peloponnesian fleet near -the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To -get rid of his prisoners, Alkidas stopped at Myonnêsus, near Teos, -and there put to death the greater number of them,—a barbarous -proceeding, which excited lively indignation among the neighboring -Ionic cities to which they belonged; insomuch that when he reached -Ephesus, the Samian exiles dwelling at Anæa, who had come forward so -actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him -that the slaughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor -even connected with Athens, except by constraint, was disgraceful -to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece,—and that, if he -persisted, he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies -into friends. So keenly did Alkidas feel this animadversion, that he -at once liberated the remainder of his prisoners, several of them -Chians; and then started from Ephesus, taking his course across sea -towards Krete and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of -Krete from stormy weather, which harassed and dispersed his fleet, he -at length reached in safety the harbor of Kyllênê in Elis, where his -scattered ships were ultimately reunited.[398] - - [398] Thucyd. iii, 32, 33-69. - -Thus inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian admiral -who dared to enter that _Mare clausum_ which passed for a portion -of the territory of Athens.[399] But though he achieved little, his -mere presence excited everywhere not less dismay than astonishment: -for the Ionic towns were all unfortified, and Alkidas might take and -sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold -it permanently. Pressing messages reached Pachês from Erythræ and -from several other places, while the Athenian triremes called Paralus -and Salaminia, the privileged vessels which usually carried public -and sacred deputations, had themselves seen the Peloponnesian fleet -anchored at Ikarus, and brought him the same intelligence. Pachês, -having his hands now free by the capture of Mitylênê, set forth -immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far the -island of Patmos. It was there ascertained that Alkidas had finally -disappeared from the eastern waters, and the Athenian admiral, though -he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open -sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in -some Asiatic harbor,—in which case it would have been necessary for -him to undertake a troublesome and tedious blockade,[400] besides all -the chances of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see -how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of -the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition -of Brasidas. - - [399] Thucyd. v, 56. Ἀργεῖοι δ᾽ ἐλθόντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκάλουν - ὅτι, γεγραμμένον ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ~διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν~ ἑκάστους μὴ - ἐᾶν πολεμίους διιέναι, ἐάσειαν ~κατὰ θάλασσαν~ (Λακεδαιμονίους) - παραπλεῦσαι. - - We see that the sea is here reckoned as a portion of the Athenian - territory; and even the portion of sea near to Peloponnesus,—much - more, that on the coast of Ionia. - - [400] Thucyd. iii, 33. - -On his return from Patmos to Mitylênê, Pachês was induced to stop at -Notium by the solicitations of some exiles. Notium was the port of -Kolophon, from which it was some little distance, as Peiræus was from -Athens.[401] - - [401] The dissensions between Notium and Kolophon are noticed by - Aristot. Politic. v, 3, 2. - -About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken -place in Kolophon, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of -the Persian Itamanes (seemingly one of the generals of the satrap -Pissuthnês), had placed him in possession of the town; whereupon the -opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately -and independently at Notium. But the Kolophonians who remained in -the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whereby they -were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of -Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pissuthnês. These Arcadians -formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a -separate citadel, or fortified space, while the town became again -attached as harbor to Kolophon. A considerable body of exiles, -however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Pachês to -reinstate them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reaching the place, -the Athenian general prevailed upon Hippias, the Arcadian captain, -to come forth to a parley, under the promise that, if nothing -mutually satisfactory could be settled, he would again replace -him, “safe and sound,” in the fortification. But no sooner had the -Arcadian come forth to this parley, than Pachês, causing him to be -detained under guard, but without fetters or ill-usage, immediately -attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the -armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians -and the Persians who were found within. Having got possession of -the fortification, he next brought Hippias again into it, “safe and -sound,” according to the terms of the convention, which was thus -literally performed, and then immediately afterwards caused him to -be shot with arrows and javelins. Of this species of fraud, founded -on literal performance and real violation of an agreement, there are -various examples in Grecian history; but nowhere do we read of a -more flagitious combination of deceit and cruelty than the behavior -of Pachês at Notium. How it was noticed at Athens, we do not know: -but we may remark, not without surprise, that Thucydidês recounts it -plainly and calmly without a single word of comment.[402] - - [402] Thucyd. iii, 34. - -Notium was separated from Kolophon, and placed in possession of -those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the -upper town. But as it had been down to this time a mere appendage of -Kolophon and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent -œkists and performed for it the ceremonies of colonization according -to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the -remaining exiles of Kolophon.[403] Whether any new settlers went from -Athens itself, we do not know: but the step was intended to confer a -sort of Hellenic citizenship, and recognized collective personality, -on the new-born town of Notium; without which, neither its theôry or -solemn deputation would have been admitted to offer public sacrifice, -nor its private citizens to contend for the prize, at Olympic and -other great festivals. - - [403] Thucyd. iii, 34; C. A. Pertz, Colophoniaca, p. 36. - (Göttingen, 1848.) - -Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the enemies of Athens, Pachês -returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, and -soon found himself so completely master both of Mitylênê and the -whole island, as to be able to send home the larger part of his -force; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylenæans who had -been deposited in Tenedos, as well as others, prominently implicated -in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a -thousand. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, being recently detected in his -place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted. - -Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce, -and they entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath -and vengeance. As to Salæthus, their resolution to put him to death -was unanimous and immediate, nor would they listen to his promises, -assuredly delusive, of terminating the blockade of Platæa, in case -his life were spared. What to do with Mitylênê and its inhabitants -was a point more doubtful, and was submitted to formal debate in the -public assembly. - -It is in this debate that Thucydidês first takes notice of Kleon, -who is, however, mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance -some few years earlier, during the lifetime of Periklês. Under the -great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiræus during -the last forty years, a new class of politicians seem to have grown -up, men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, -who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient families -of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to -that which took place in the cities of mediæval Europe, when the -merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete -with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the -supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient -family and station enjoyed at this time no political privilege, -and since the reforms of Ephialtês and Periklês, the political -constitution had become thoroughly democratical. But they still -continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian census -founded on property,—the pentakosiomedimni, and the hippeis, or -knights: new men enriched by trade doubtless got into these classes, -but probably only in minority, and imbibed the feeling of the class -as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an -individual Athenian of this class, though without any legal title -to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political -influence, continued to be decidedly preferred and welcomed by the -social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous -sympathies distinctions effaced from the political code.[404] -Besides this place ready prepared for him in the public sympathy, -especially advantageous at the outset of political life,—he found -himself farther borne up by the family connections, associations, -and political clubs, etc., which exercised very great influence both -on the politics and the judicature of Athens, and of which he became -a member as a matter of course. Such advantages were doubtless only -auxiliary, carrying a man up to a certain point of influence, but -leaving him to achieve the rest by his own personal qualities and -capacity. But their effect was nevertheless very real, and those who, -without possessing them, met and buffeted him in the public assembly, -contended against great disadvantages. A person of such low or -middling station obtained no favorable presumptions or indulgence on -the part of the public to meet him half-way,—nor had he established -connections to encourage first successes, or help him out of early -scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendency, and -well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win -his own way unaided, from the first step to the last, by qualities -personal to himself; by assiduity of attendance, by acquaintance with -business, by powers of striking speech, and withal by unflinching -audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that -opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born -politicians, and organized party clubs, as soon as he appeared to be -rising up into ascendency. - - [404] Thucyd. v, 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης—ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι τότε - νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος. Compare - Xenophon, Memorabil. i, 2, 25; iii, 6, 1. - -The free march of political and judicial affairs raised up several -such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding -the Peloponnesian war. Even during the lifetime of Periklês, they -appear to have arisen in greater or less numbers: but the personal -ascendency of that great man,—who combined an aristocratical position -with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged -intellect rarely found attached to either,—impressed a peculiar -character on Athenian politics. The Athenian world was divided into -his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were -individuals high-born and low-born,—though the aristocratical party, -properly so called, the majority of wealthy and high-born Athenians, -either opposed or disliked him. It is about two years after his death -that we begin to hear of a new class of politicians: Eukratês, the -rope-seller; Kleon, the leather-seller; Lysiklês, the sheep-seller; -Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker;[405] the two first of whom must have -been already well-known as speakers in the ekklesia, even during the -lifetime of Periklês. Among them all, the most distinguished was -Kleon, son of Kleænetus. - - [405] Aristophan. Equit. 130, _seqq._, and Scholia; Eupolis, - Demi, Fram. xv, p. 466, ed. Meineke. See the remarks in Ranck, - Commentat. de Vitâ Aristophanis, p. cccxxxiv, _seqq._ - -Kleon acquired his first importance among the speakers against -Periklês, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early -political career, the countenance of the numerous and aristocratical -anti-Perikleans. He is described by Thucydidês in general terms as -a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens,—as -being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective -and accusation.[406] Aristophanês, in his comedy of the Knights, -reproduces these features, with others new and distinct, as well -as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. -His comedy depicts Kleon in the point of view in which he would -appear to the knights of Athens,—a leather-dresser, smelling of the -tan-yard,—a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence -of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his -gestures,—moreover, as venal in his politics, threatening men with -accusations, and then receiving money to withdraw them; a robber of -the public treasury, persecuting merit as well as rank, and courting -the favor of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The -general attributes set forth by Thucydidês (apart from Aristophanês, -who does not profess to write history), we may well accept; the -powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest, together -with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of -the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus, who persevered in -addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in -it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, -were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Had they -not possessed this quality, they would never have surmounted the -opposition made to them: we may well believe that they had it to -a displeasing excess,—and even if they had not, the same measure -of self-assumption which in Alkibiadês would be tolerated from his -rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. -Unhappily, we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the -invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent -than that of Demosthenês and Æschinês, seventy years afterwards,—each -of those eminent orators imputing to the other the grossest -impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice, and revolting -audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed -in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably -short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree -Kleon’s denunciations of the veteran Periklês were fiercer than those -memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, -with which Lord Chatham’s political career opened. The talent for -invective possessed by Kleon, employed first against Periklês, would -be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious -statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens; but among -the numerous enemies of Periklês, it would be applauded as a burst -of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that -extraneous support at first which would sustain him until he acquired -his personal hold on the public assembly.[407] - - [406] Thucyd. iii, 36. Κλέων—ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν - πολιτῶν, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ παραπολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος. - - He also mentions Kleon a second time, two years afterwards, but - in terms which also seem to imply a first introduction,—μάλιστα - δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον - τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, iv, 21-28, also v, 16. - Κλέων—νομίζων καταφανέστερος ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος - διαβάλλων, etc. - - [407] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33. Ἐπεφύετο δὲ καὶ Κλέων, ἤδη διὰ - τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὀργῆς τῶν πολιτῶν πορευόμενος εἰς τὴν δημαγωγίαν. - - Periklês was δηχθεὶς αἴθωνι Κλέωνι—in the words of the comic - author Hermippus. - -By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually -increased, we do not know; but at the time when the question of -Mitylênê came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of -ascendency which Thucydidês describes by saying that Kleon was -“at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of -the people.” The fact of Kleon’s great power of speech, and his -capacity of handling public business in a popular manner, is better -attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon -two witnesses both hostile to him,—Thucydidês and Aristophanês. The -assembly and the dikastery were Kleon’s theatre and holding-ground: -for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting, -and the Athenian people taken individually, were not always the -same person and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in -the Pnyx, was a different man from Demos at home.[408] The lofty -combination of qualities possessed by Periklês exercised ascendency -over both one and the other; but the qualities of Kleon swayed -considerably the former without standing high in the esteem of the -latter. - - [408] Aristophan. Equit. 750. - -When the fate of Mitylênê and its inhabitants was submitted to the -Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never -was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and -power of fierce invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylênê -presented a revolt as inexcusable and aggravated as any revolt -could be: and we have only to read the grounds of it, as set forth -by the Mitylenæan speakers themselves before the Peloponnesians at -Olympia, to be satisfied that such a proceeding, when looked at from -the Athenian point of view, would be supposed to justify, and even -to require, the very highest pitch of indignation. The Mitylenæans -admit, not only that they have no ground of complaint against Athens, -but that they have been well and honorably treated by her, with -special privilege. But they fear that she may oppress them in future: -they hate the very principle of her empire, and eagerly instigate, -as well as aid, her enemies to subdue her: they select the precise -moment in which she has been worn down by a fearful pestilence, -invasion, and cost of war. Nothing more than this would be required -to kindle the most intense wrath in the bosom of an Athenian patriot: -but there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if -not more: the revolters had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian -fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim, both to Athens and -her allies, the precarious tenure of her empire.[409] The violent -Kleon would on this occasion find in the assembly an audience hardly -less violent than himself, and would easily be able to satisfy them -that anything like mercy to the Mitylenæans was treason to Athens. -He proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by -the custom of war in their harshest and fullest measure: to kill -the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, probably -about six thousand persons,—and to sell as slaves all the women and -children.[410] The proposition, though strongly opposed by Diodotus -and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trireme -was forthwith despatched to Mitylênê, enjoining Pachês to put it in -execution.[411] - - [409] Thucyd. iii, 36. προσξυνεβάλετο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὁρμῆς, - etc. - - [410] I infer this total number from the fact that the number - sent to Athens by Pachês, as foremost instigators, was rather - more than one thousand (Thucyd. iii, 50). The total of ἡβῶντες, - or males of military age, must have been (I imagine) six times - this number. - - [411] Thucyd. iii, 36. - -Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous -application of the received laws of war. Not merely the reconquered -rebel, but even the prisoner of war, apart from any special -convention, was at the mercy of his conqueror, to be slain, sold, -or admitted to ransom: and we shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying -out the maxim without the smallest abatement towards the Platæan -prisoners, in the course of a very short time. And doubtless the -Athenian people, so long as they remained in assembly, under that -absorbing temporary intensification of the common and predominant -sentiment which springs from the mere fact of multitude, and so -long as they were discussing the principle of the case, What had -Mitylênê deserved? thought only of this view. Less than the most -rigorous measure of war, they would conceive, would be inadequate -to the wrong done by the Mitylenæans. But when the assembly broke -up,—when the citizen, no longer wound up by sympathizing companions -and animated speakers in the Pnyx, subsided into the comparative -quiescence of individual life,—when the talk came to be, not about -the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details -of executing it, a sensible change and marked repentance became -presently visible. We must also recollect, and it is a principle of -no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical -people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many -resolutions passed and afterwards unexecuted, that the sentiment of -wrath against the Mitylenæans had been really in part discharged by -the mere _passing_ of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; -just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by -imprecations against others which he would himself shrink from -afterwards realizing. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane -people in Greece,—though humanity, according to our ideas, cannot be -predicated of any Greeks,—became sensible that they had sanctioned -a cruel and frightful decree, and the captain and seamen,[412] to -whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with mournful -repugnance. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens, who had probably -been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause, -together with those Athenians who had been proxeni and friends of -Mitylênê, and the minority generally of the previous assembly, soon -discerned, and did their best to foster, this repentance; which -became, during the course of the same evening, so powerful as well -as so wide-spread, that the stratêgi acceded to the prayer of the -envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider -the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and -exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment: but the change of -feeling among the people was so manifest as to overbear any such -scruples.[413] - - [412] Thucyd. iii, 36. Καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν - αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς, ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνῶσθαι, πόλιν - ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους. - - The feelings of the seamen, in the trireme appointed to carry - the order of execution, are a striking point of evidence in this - case: τῆς προτέρας νεὼς οὐ σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, - etc. (iii, 50). - - [413] Thucyd. iii, 36. As to the illegality, see Thucyd. vi, - 14, which I think is good evidence to prove that there was - illegality. I agree with Schömann on this point, in spite of the - doubts of Dr. Arnold. - -Though Thucydidês had given us only a short summary, without any -speeches, of what passed in the first assembly,—yet as to the second -assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and -Diodotus, the two principal orators of the first also. We may be -sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most -interesting and anxious of the whole war; and though we cannot -certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined -Thucydidês in his selection of speeches, yet this cause, as well -as the signal defeat of Kleon, whom he disliked, may probably be -presumed to have influenced him here. That orator came forward to -defend his proposition passed on the preceding day, and denounced -in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the -people, who could not bear to treat their subject-allies, according -to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon -the mischief and folly of reversing on one day what had been decided -on the day preceding,—upon the guilty ambition of orators, who -sacrificed the most valuable interests of the commonwealth either to -pecuniary gains, or to the personal credit of speaking with effect, -triumphing over rivals, and setting up their own fancies in place -of fact and reality. He deprecated the mistaken encouragement given -to such delusions by a public “wise beyond what was written,” who -came to the assembly, not to apply their good sense in judging of -public matters, but merely for the delight of hearing speeches.[414] -He restated the heinous and unprovoked wrong committed by the -Mitylenæans,—and the grounds for inflicting upon them that maximum -of punishment which “justice” enjoined. He called for “justice” -against them; nothing less, but nothing more: warning the assembly -that the imperial necessities of Athens essentially required the -constant maintenance of a sentiment of fear in the minds of unwilling -subjects, and that they must prepare to see their empire pass away -if they suffered themselves to be guided either by compassion for -those who, if victors, would have no compassion on them,[415]—or by -unseasonable moderation towards those who would neither feel nor -requite it,—or by the mere impression of seductive discourses. -Justice against the Mitylenæans, not less than the strong political -interests of Athens, required the infliction of the sentence decreed -on the day preceding.[416] - - [414] Thucyd. iii, 37. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι - βούλονται φαίνεσθαι, τῶν τε ἀεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν - περιγίγνεσθαι ... οἱ δ᾽ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐαυτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι - μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος - μέμψασθαι λόγον. - - Compare the language of Archidamus at Sparta in the congress, - where he takes credit to the Spartans for being ἀμαθέστερον τῶν - νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι, etc. (Thucyd. i, 84)—very - similar in spirit to the remarks of Kleon about the Athenians. - - [415] Thucyd. iii, 40. μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, - οἴκτῳ, καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων, καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἁμαρτάνειν. - - [416] Thucyd. iii, 40. πειθόμενοι δὲ ἐμοὶ τά τε δίκαια ἐς - Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε· ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς - μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε. - -The harangue of Kleon is in many respects remarkable. If we are -surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his -tongue, denouncing so severely the license and the undue influence of -speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the -advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of -the moment,—that he could, therefore, pass off the dictates of this -sentiment as plain, downright, honest sense and patriotism; while the -opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment, and therefore -driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of -manœuvre, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing -their talents in making the worse appear the better reason,—if not -actually bribed, at least unprincipled, and without any sincere moral -conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions both of -public concern and of private morality, not less common at present -than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war,—to seize upon some -strong and tolerably wide-spread sentiment among the public, to treat -the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious -right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of coming good -and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid -subtlety,—we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to -support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous. - -Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent -sentiment would not only not be in favor of Kleon, but would be -irresistibly in favor of his opponents. To put to death in cold -blood some six thousand persons, would so revolt modern feelings, -as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the -persons to be condemned. Nevertheless, the speech of Diodotus, who -followed and opposed Kleon, not only contains no appeal to any such -merciful predispositions, but even positively disclaims appealing -to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Kleon, the influence -of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compromise and -moderation.[417] He farther discards considerations of justice or -the analogies of criminal judicature,[418]—and rests his opposition -altogether upon reasons of public prudence, bearing upon the future -welfare and security of Athens. - - [417] Thucyd. iii. 48: compare the speech of Kleon. iii, 40. - ὑμεῖς δὲ γνόντες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶναι, καὶ μήτε οἴκτῳ πλέον - νείμαντες μήτε ἐπιεικείᾳ, ~οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι~, ἀπ᾽ - αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινουμένων, etc. - - Dr. Arnold distinguishes οἶκτος (or ἔλεος) from ἐπιεικεία, - by saying that “the former is a feeling, the latter a habit: - οἶκτος, pity or compassion, may occasionally touch those who are - generally very far from being ἐπιεικεῖς—mild or gentle. Ἐπιεικεία - relates to all persons,—οἶκτος, to particular individuals.” The - distinction here taken is certainly in itself just, and ἐπιεικὴς - sometimes has the meaning ascribed to it by Dr. Arnold: but in - this passage I believe it has a different meaning. The contrast - between οἶκτος and ἐπιεικεία—as Dr. Arnold explains them—would be - too feeble, and too little marked, to serve the purpose of Kleon - and Diodotus. Ἐπιεικεία here rather means the disposition to stop - short of your full rights; a spirit of fairness and adjustment; - an abatement on your part likely to be requited by abatement on - the part of your adversary: compare Thucyd. i, 76; iv, 19; v, 86; - viii, 93. - - [418] Thucyd. iii, 44. ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ - Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας - ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας ... - ~δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ (Κλέωνος) ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν - ὀργὴν ἐς Μυτιληναίους~, τάχα ἂν ἐπισπάσαιτο· ~ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ - δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν~, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα - περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν. - - So Mr. Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with America (Burke’s - Works, vol. iii. pp. 69-74), in discussing the proposition of - prosecuting the acts of the refractory colonies as criminal: “The - thing seems a great deal too big for my ideas of jurisprudence. - It should seem, to my way of conceiving such matters, that there - is a wide difference in reason and policy, between the mode of - proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or - even of bands of men who disturb order within the state,—and the - civil dissensions which may from time to time agitate the several - communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be - narrow and pedantic, to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal - justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method - of drawing up an indictment against a whole people,” etc.—“My - consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the - policy of the question.” - -He begins by vindicating[419] the necessity of reconsidering the -resolution just passed, and insists on the mischief of deciding so -important a question in haste or under strong passion; he enters -a protest against the unwarrantable insinuations of corruption or -self-conceit by which Kleon had sought to silence or discredit his -opponents;[420] and then, taking up the question on the ground of -public wisdom and prudence, he proceeds to show that the rigorous -sentence decreed on the preceding day was not to be defended. That -sentence would not prevent any other among the subject-allies from -revolting, if they saw, or fancied that they saw, a fair chance of -success: but it might perhaps drive them,[421] if once embarked in -revolt, to persist even to desperation, and bury themselves under -the ruins of their city. While every means ought to be employed to -prevent them from revolting, by precautions beforehand, it was a -mistaken reckoning to try to deter them by enormity of punishment, -inflicted afterwards upon such as were reconquered. In developing -this argument, the speaker gives some remarkable views on the -theory of punishment generally, and on the small addition obtained -in the way of preventive effect even by the greatest aggravation -of the suffering inflicted upon the condemned criminal,—views -which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the last -century.[422] And he farther supports his argument by emphatically -setting forth the impolicy of confounding the Mitylenæan Demos in -the same punishment with their oligarchy: the revolt had been the -act exclusively of the latter, and the former had not only taken -no part in it, but, as soon as they obtained possession of arms, -had surrendered the city spontaneously. In all the allied cities, -it was the commons who were well-affected to Athens, and upon whom -her hold chiefly depended against the doubtful fidelity of the -oligarchies:[423] but this feeling could not possibly continue, -if it were now seen that all the Mitylenæans indiscriminately -were confounded in one common destruction. Diodotus concludes by -recommending that those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent to Athens as -chiefs of the revolt, should be put upon their trial separately; but -that the remaining population should be spared.[424] - - [419] Thucyd. iii, 42. - - [420] Thucyd. iii, 43. - - [421] Thucyd. iii, 45, 46. - - [422] Compare this speech of Diodotus with the views of - punishment implied by Xenophon in his Anabasis, where he is - describing the government of Cyrus the younger:— - - “Nor can any man contend, that Cyrus suffered criminals and - wrong-doers to laugh at him: he punished them with the most - unmeasured severity (ἀφειδέστατα πάντων ἐτιμωρεῖτο). And you - might often see along the frequented roads men deprived of their - eyes, their hands, and their feet: so that in his government - either Greek or barbarian, if he had no criminal purpose, might - go fearlessly through and carry whatever he found convenient.” - (Anabasis, i, 9, 13.) - - The severity of the punishment is, in Xenophon’s mind, the - measure both of its effects in deterring criminals, and of the - character of the ruler inflicting it. - - [423] Thucyd. iii, 47. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς - πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστὶ, καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ - ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθὺς, καὶ τῆς - ἀντικαθισταμένης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξύμμαχον ἔχοντες ἐς πόλεμον - ἐπέρχεσθε. - - [424] Thucyd. iii, 48. - -This speech is that of a man who feels that he has the reigning -and avowed sentiment of the audience against him, and that he must -therefore win his way by appeals to their reason. The same appeals, -however, might have been made, and perhaps had been made, during the -preceding discussion, without success; but Diodotus knew that the -reigning sentiment, though still ostensibly predominant, had been -silently undermined during the last few hours, and that the reaction -towards pity and moderation, which had been growing up under it, -would work in favor of his arguments, though he might disclaim all -intention of invoking its aid. After several other discourses, both -for and against,—the assembly came to a vote, and the proposition of -Diodotus was adopted; but adopted by so small a majority, that the -decision seemed at first doubtful.[425] - - [425] Thucyd. iii, 49. ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, - ἐκράτησε δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου. - -But the trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, -and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mitylênê. A second -trireme was immediately put to sea, bearing the new decree; yet -nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the -condemned city before the terrific sentence now on its way might be -actually in course of execution. The Mitylenæan envoys stored the -vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew -if they arrived in time; and an intensity of effort was manifested, -without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship,—the oar -being never once relaxed between Athens and Mitylênê, and the rowers -merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment -of barley-meal steeped with wine and oil swallowed on their seats. -Luckily, there was no unfavorable wind to retard them: but the object -would have been defeated, if it had not happened that the crew of the -first trireme were as slow and averse in the transmission of their -rigorous mandate, as those of the second were eager for the delivery -of the reprieve in time. And, after all, it came no more than just -in time; the first trireme had arrived, the order for execution -was actually in the hands of Pachês, and his measures were already -preparing. So near was the Mitylenæan population to this wholesale -destruction:[426] so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of -an enormity which would have raised against her throughout Greece a -sentiment of exasperation more deadly than that which she afterwards -incurred even from the proceedings at Melos, Skiônê, and elsewhere. -Had the execution been realized, the person who would have suffered -most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer, -Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate -and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more -violent would it have been when they learned that the deed had been -irrevocably done, and when all its painful details were presented to -their imaginations: and Kleon would have been held responsible as the -author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the -case turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger; and -his proposition, to put to death those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had -sent home as the active revolting party, was afterwards adopted and -executed. It doubtless appeared so moderate after the previous decree -passed but rescinded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to -provoke no after-repentance: yet the men so slain were rather more -than one thousand in number.[427] - - [426] Thucyd. iii, 49. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου. - - [427] Thucyd. iii, 50. - -Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the -fortifications of Mitylênê, and took possession of all her ships of -war. In lieu of tribute, they farther established a new permanent -distribution of the land of the island; all except Methymna, which -had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into three -thousand lots, of which three hundred were reserved for consecration -to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian kleruchs, or -proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens; the Lesbian -proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and -paying to the Athenian kleruch an annual rent of two minæ, near four -pounds sterling, for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more -about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian -suffice to explain. It would seem that two thousand seven hundred -Athenian citizens, with their families must have gone to reside, -for the time at least, in Lesbos, as kleruchs; that is, without -abnegating their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being -exonerated either from Athenian taxation, or from personal military -service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long -to reside in Lesbos: and we may even suspect that the kleruchic -allotment of the island must have been subsequently abrogated. There -was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto -belonged to Mitylênê; this was now separated from that town, and -henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens.[428] - - [428] Thucyd. iii, 50; iv, 52. About the Lesbian kleruchs, - see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, B. iii, c. 18; Wachsmuth, - Hell. Alt. i. 2, p. 36. These kleruchs must originally have - gone thither as a garrison, as M. Boeckh remarks; and may - probably have come back, either all or a part, when needed for - military service at home, and when it was ascertained that the - island might be kept without them. Still, however, there is - much which is puzzling in this arrangement. It seems remarkable - that the Athenians, at a time when their accumulated treasure - had been exhausted, and when they were beginning to pay direct - contributions from their private property, should sacrifice - five thousand four hundred minæ (ninety talents) annual revenue - capable of being appropriated by the state, unless that sum were - required to maintain the kleruchs as resident garrison for the - maintenance of Lesbos. And as it turned out afterwards that their - residence was not necessary, we may doubt whether the state did - not convert the kleruchic grants into a public tribute, wholly or - partially. - - We may farther remark, that if the kleruch be supposed a citizen - resident at Athens, but receiving rent from his lot of land in - some other territory,—the analogy between him and the Roman - colonist fails. The Roman colonists, though retaining their - privileges as citizens, were sent out to reside on their grants - of land, and to constitute a sort of resident garrison over - the prior inhabitants, who had been despoiled of a portion of - territory to make room for them. - - See, on this subject and analogy, the excellent Dissertation of - Madwig: De jure et conditione coloniarum Populi Romani quæstio - historica,—Madwig, Opuscul. Copenhag. 1834. Diss. viii, p. 246. - - M. Boeckh and Dr. Arnold contend justly that at the time of the - expedition of Athens against Syracuse and afterwards (Thucyd. - vii, 57; viii, 23), there could have been but few, if any, - Athenian kleruchs resident in Lesbos. We might even push this - argument farther, and apply the same inference to an earlier - period, the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv, 75), when the - Mitylenæan exiles were so active in their aggressions upon - Antandrus and the other towns, originally Mitylenæan possessions, - on the opposite mainland. There was no force near at hand on the - part of Athens to deal with these exiles except the ἀργυρόλογαι - νῆες,—had there been kleruchs at Mitylênê, they would probably - have been able to defeat the exiles in their first attempts, and - would certainly have been among the most important forces to put - them down afterwards,—whereas Thucydidês makes no allusion to - them. - - Farther, the oration of Antipho (De Cæde Herod. c. 13) makes - no allusion to Athenian kleruchs, either as resident in the - island, or even as absentees receiving the annual rent mentioned - by Thucydidês. The Mitylenæan citizen, father of the speaker - of that oration, had been one of those implicated—as he says, - unwillingly—in the past revolt of the city against Athens: since - the deplorable termination of that revolt he had continued - possessor of his Lesbian property, and continued also to - discharge his obligations as well (choregic obligations—χορηγίας) - towards Mitylênê as (his obligations of pecuniary payment—τέλη) - towards Athens. If the arrangement mentioned by Thucydidês had - been persisted in, this Mitylenæan proprietor would have paid - nothing towards the city of Athens, but merely a rent of two - minæ to some Athenian kleruch, or citizen; which can hardly be - reconciled with the words of the speaker as we find them in - Antipho. - -To the misfortunes of Mitylênê belongs, as a suitable appendix, the -fate of Pachês, the Athenian commander, whose perfidy at Notium has -been recently recounted. It appears, that having contracted a passion -for two beautiful free women at Mitylênê, Hellânis and Lamaxis, he -slew their husbands, and got possession of them by force. Possibly, -they may have had private friends at Athens, which must of course -have been the case with many Mitylenæan families: at all events they -repaired thither, bent on obtaining redress for this outrage, and -brought their complaint against Pachês before the Athenian dikastery, -in that trial of accountability to which every officer was liable -at the close of his command. So profound was the sentiment which -their case excited, in this open and numerous assembly of Athenian -citizens, that the guilty commander, not waiting for sentence, slew -himself with his sword in open court.[429] - - [429] See the Epigram of Agathias, 57, p. 377. Agathias, ed. Bonn. - - Ἑλλανὶς τριμάκαιρα, καὶ ἁ χαρίεσσα Λάμαξις, - ἤστην μὲν πάτρας φέγγεα Λεσβιάδος. - Ὅκκα δ᾽ Ἀθηναίῃσι σὺν ὅλκασιν ἔνθαδε κέλσας - τὰν Μιτυληναίαν γᾶν ἀλάπαξε Πάχης, - Τᾶν κουρᾶν αδίκως ἡράσσατο, τὼς δὲ συνεύνως - ἔκτανεν, ὡς τήνας τῇδε βιησόμενος. - Ταὶ δὲ κατ᾽ Αἰγαίοιο ῥόου πλατὺ λαῖτμα φερέσθην, - καὶ ποτὶ τὰν κραναὰν Μοψοπίαν δραμέτην, - Δάμῳ δ᾽ ἀγγελέτην ἀλιτήμονος ἔργα Πάχητος - μέσφα μιν εἰς ὀλοὴν κῆρα συνηλασάτην. - Τοῖα μὲν, ὦ κούρα, πεπονήκατον· ἄψ δ᾽ ἐπὶ πάτραν - ἥκετον, ἐν δ᾽ αὐτᾷ κεῖσθον ἀποφθιμένα. - Εὖ δὲ πόνων ἀπόνασθον, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ σᾶμα συνεύνων - εὕδετον, ἐς κλεινᾶς μνᾶμα σαοφροσύνας· - Ὑμνεῦσιν δ᾽ ἔτι πάντες ὁμόφρονας ἡρωΐνας, - πάτρας καὶ ποσίων πήματα τισαμένας. - - Plutarch (Nikias, 6: compare Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 26) states - the fact of Pachês having slain himself before the dikastery - on occasion of his trial of accountability. Πάχητα τὸν ἕλοντα - Λέσβον, ὃς, εὐθύνας δίδους τῆς στρατηγίας, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ - σπασάμενος ξίφος ἀνεῖλεν ἑαυτὸν, etc. - - The statement in Plutarch, and that in the Epigram, hang together - so perfectly well, that each lends authority to the other, and - I think there is good reason for crediting the Epigram. The - suicide of Pachês, and that too before the dikasts, implies - circumstances very different from those usually brought in - accusation against a general on trial: it implies an intensity - of anger in the numerous dikasts greater than that which acts - of peculation would be likely to raise, and such as to strike a - guilty man with insupportable remorse and humiliation. The story - of Lamaxis and Hellânis would be just of a nature to produce - this vehement emotion among the Athenian dikasts. Moreover, the - words of the Epigram,—μέσφα μιν εἰς ὀλοὴν κῆρα συνηλασάτην,—are - precisely applicable to a self-inflicted death. It would seem by - the Epigram, moreover, that, even in the time of Agathias (A.D. - 550—the reign of Justinian), there must have been preserved at - Mitylênê a sepulchral monument commemorating this incident. - - Schneider (ad Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 2) erroneously identifies - this story with that of Doxander and the two ἐπίκληροι whom he - wished to obtain in marriage for his two sons. - -The surrender of Platæa to the Lacedæmonians took place not long -after that of Mitylênê to the Athenians,—somewhat later in the same -summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the -provisions last longer for the rest, still they had now come to be -exhausted, and the remaining defenders were enfeebled and on the -point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedæmonian commander of the -blockading force, knowing their defenceless condition, could easily -have taken the town by storm, had he not been forbidden by express -orders from Sparta. For the Spartan government, calculating that -peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual -cession of places acquired by war, wished to acquire Platæa, not by -force but by capitulation and voluntary surrender, which would serve -as an excuse for not giving it up: though such a distinction, between -capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern -diplomacy, was afterwards found to tell against the Lacedæmonians -quite as much as in their favor.[430] Acting upon these orders, the -Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Platæans to -surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians -as judges,—with a stipulation “that the wrong-doers[431] should -be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly.” To the -besieged, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were -nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a -few days’ interval, during which they received nourishment from the -blockading army, five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgment -upon their fate,—one, Aristomenidas, a Herakleid of the regal -family.[432] - - [430] Thucyd. v, 17. - - [431] Thucyd. iii, 52. προσπέμπει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἰ - βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ~ἑκόντες~ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, - καὶ δικασταῖς ἐκείνοις χρήσασθαι, τούς τε ἀδίκους κολάζειν, παρὰ - δίκην δὲ οὐδένα. - - [432] Pausan. iii, 9, 1. - -The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, doubtless -in full presence of the blockading army, and especially with the -Thebans, the great enemies of Platæa, by their side,—the prisoners -taken, two hundred Platæans and twenty-five Athenians, were brought -up for trial, or sentence. No accusation was preferred against -them by any one: but the simple question was put to them by the -judges: “Have you, during the present war, rendered any service to -the Lacedæmonians or to their allies?” The Platæans were confounded -at a question alike unexpected and preposterous: it admitted but -of one answer,—but before returning any categorical answer at all, -they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite -of the opposition of the Thebans,[433] their request was granted: -and Astymachus and Lakon, the latter proxenus of Sparta at Platæa, -were appointed to speak on behalf of the body. Possibly, both these -delegates may have spoken: if so, Thucydidês has blended the two -speeches into one. - - [433] Thucyd. iii, 60. ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις ~παρὰ γνώμην τὴν - αὑτῶν~ μακρότερος λόγος ἐδόθη τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα ἀποκρίσεως. - αὑτῶν here means _the Thebans_. - -A more desperate position cannot be imagined, for the interrogatory -was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding -the Peloponnesian war,—but the speakers, though fully conscious -how slight was their chance of success, disregarded the limits of -the question itself, and while upholding with unshaken courage the -dignity of their little city, neglected no topic which could touch -the sympathies of their judges. After remonstrating against the -mere mockery of trial and judgment to which they were submitted, -they appealed to the Hellenic sympathies, and lofty reputation for -commanding virtue, of the Lacedæmonians,—they adverted to the first -alliance of Platæa with Athens, concluded at the recommendation of -the Lacedæmonians themselves, who had then declined, though formally -solicited, to undertake the protection of the town against Theban -oppression. They next turned to the Persian war, wherein Platæan -patriotism towards Greece was not less conspicuous than Theban -treason,[434]—to the victory gained over the Persians on their soil, -whereby it had become hallowed under the promises of Pausanias, and -by solemn appeals to the local gods. From the Persian war, they -passed on to the flagitious attack made by the Thebans on Platæa, in -the midst of the truce,—nor did they omit to remind the judges of an -obligation personal to Sparta,—the aid which they had rendered, along -with the Athenians, to Sparta, when pressed by the revolt of the -Helots at Ithôme. This speech is as touching as any which we find in -Thucydidês, and the skill of it consists in the frequency with which -the hearers are brought back, time after time, and by well-managed -transitions, to these same topics.[435] And such was the impression -which it seemed to make on the five Lacedæmonian judges, that the -Thebans near at hand found themselves under the necessity of making -a reply to it: although we see plainly that the whole scheme of -proceeding—the formal and insulting question, as well as the sentence -destined to follow upon answer given—had been settled beforehand -between them and the Lacedæmonians. - - [434] See this point emphatically set forth in Orat. xiv, called - Λόγος Πλαταϊκὸς, of Isokratês, p. 308, sect. 62. - - The whole of that oration is interesting to be read in - illustration of the renewed sufferings of the Platæans near fifty - years after this capture. - - [435] Thucyd. iii, 54-59. Dionysius of Halikarnassus bestows - especial commendation on the speech of the Platæan orator (De - Thucyd. Hist. Judic. p. 921). Concurring with him as to its - merits, I do not concur in the opinion which he expresses that - it is less artistically put together than those other harangues - which he considers inferior. - - Mr. Mitford doubts whether these two orations are to be taken - as approximating to anything really delivered on the occasion. - But it seems to me that the means possessed by Thucydidês for - informing himself of what was actually said at this scene before - the captured Platæa must have been considerable and satisfactory: - I therefore place full confidence in them, as I do in most of the - other harangues in his work, so far as _the substance_ goes. - -The Theban speakers contended that the Platæans had deserved, -and brought upon themselves by their own fault, the enmity of -Thebes,—that they had stood forward earnestly against the Persians, -only because Athens had done so too, and that all the merit, whatever -it might be, which they had thereby acquired, was counterbalanced -and cancelled by their having allied themselves with Athens -afterwards for the oppression and enslavement of the Æginetans, and -of other Greeks equally conspicuous for zeal against Xerxes, and -equally entitled to protection under the promises of Pausanias. The -Thebans went on to vindicate their nocturnal surprise of Platæa, -by maintaining that they had been invited by the most respectable -citizens of the town,[436] who were anxious only to bring back Platæa -from its alliance with a stranger to its natural Bœotian home,—and -that they had abstained from anything like injurious treatment of the -inhabitants, until constrained to use force in their own defence. -They then reproached the Platæans, in their turn, with that breach of -faith whereby ultimately the Theban prisoners in the town had been -put to death. And while they excused their alliance with Xerxes, at -the time of the Persian invasion, by affirming that Thebes was then -under a dishonest party-oligarchy, who took this side for their own -factious purposes, and carried the people with them by force,—they at -the same time charged the Platæans with permanent treason against the -Bœotian customs and brotherhood.[437] All this was farther enforced -by setting forth the claims of Thebes to the gratitude of Lacedæmon, -both for having brought Bœotia into the Lacedæmonian alliance, at the -time of the battle of Korôneia, and for having furnished so large a -portion of the common force in the war then going on.[438] - - [436] Thucyd. iii, 65. - - [437] Thucyd. iii, 66. τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια—iii, 62. ἔξω τῶν - ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια. - - [438] Thucyd. iii, 61-68. It is probable that the slaughter of - the Theban prisoners taken in the town of Platæa was committed - by the Platæans in breach of a convention concluded with the - Thebans: and on this point, therefore, the Thebans had really - ground to complain. Respecting this convention, however, there - were two conflicting stories, between which Thucydidês does not - decide: see Thucyd. ii, 3, 4, and this History, above, chap. - xlviii. - -The discourse of the Thebans, inspired by bitter, and as yet -unsatisfied hatred against Platæa, proved effectual: or rather it was -superfluous,—the minds of the Lacedæmonians having before been made -up. After the proposition twice made by Archidamus to the Platæans, -inviting them to remain neutral, and even offering to guarantee -their neutrality,—after the solemn apologetic protest tendered by -him upon their refusal, to the gods, before he began the siege,—the -Lacedæmonians conceived themselves exonerated from all obligation to -respect the sanctity of the place;[439] looking upon the inhabitants -as having voluntarily renounced their inviolability and sealed their -own ruin. Hence the importance attached to that protest, and the -emphatic detail with which it is set forth in Thucydidês. The five -judges, as their only reply to the two harangues, again called the -Platæans before them, and repeated to every one of them individually, -the same question which had before been put: each one of them, as he -successively replied in the negative,[440] was taken away and killed, -together with the twenty-five Athenian prisoners. The women captured -were sold as slaves: and the town and territory of Platæa were -handed over to the Thebans, who at first established in them a few -oligarchical Platæan exiles, together with some Megarian exiles,—but -after a few months recalled this step, and blotted out Platæa,[441] -as a separate town and territory, from the muster-roll of Hellas. -They pulled down all the private buildings and employed the materials -to build a vast barrack all round the Heræum, or temple of Hêrê, two -hundred feet in every direction, with apartments of two stories above -and below; partly as accommodation for visitors to the temple, partly -as an abode for the tenant-farmers or graziers who were to occupy the -land. A new temple of one hundred feet in length, was also built in -honor of Hêrê, and ornamented with couches, prepared from the brass -and iron furniture found in the private houses of the Platæans.[442] -The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property -belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban cultivators. - - [439] Thucyd. iii, 68; ii, 74. To construe the former of these - passages (iii, 68) as it now stands, is very difficult, if not - impossible; we can only pretend to give what seems to be its - substantial meaning. - - [440] Diodorus (xii, 56) in his meagre abridgment of the siege - and fate of Platæa, somewhat amplifies the brevity and simplicity - of the question as given by Thucydidês. - - [441] Thucyd. iii, 57. ὑμᾶς δὲ (you Spartans) καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ - Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικησίᾳ διὰ Θηβαίους (Πλάταιαν) ~ἐξαλεῖψαι~. - - [442] Thucyd. iii, 69. - -Such was the melancholy fate of Platæa, after sustaining a blockade -of about two years.[443] Its identity and local traditions seemed -thus extinguished, and the sacrifices, in honor of the deceased -victors who had fought under Pausanias, suspended,—which the Platæan -speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be -tolerated,[444] and which perhaps the latter would hardly have -consented to under any other circumstances except from an anxious -desire of conciliating the Thebans in their prominent antipathy. -It is in this way that Thucydidês explains the conduct of Sparta, -which he pronounces to have been rigorous in the extreme.[445] And -in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of -the case, and apart from the number of victims, than even the first -unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans: for neither -Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretence for considering Platæa -as a revolted town, whereas Mitylênê was a city which had revolted -under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover, Sparta -promised trial and justice to the Platæans on their surrender: Pachês -promised nothing to the Mitylenæans, except that their fate should -be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little -city—interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and -tenacious attachments, and its unmerited suffering—now existed only -in the persons of its citizens harbored at Athens: we shall find it -hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored: -so checkered was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by -the contending politics of the greater neighbors. The slaughter of -the twenty-five Athenian prisoners, like that of Salæthus by the -Athenians, was not beyond the rigor admitted and tolerated, though -not always practised, on both sides, towards prisoners of war. - - [443] Demosthenês—or the Pseudo-Demosthenês—in the oration - against Neæra (p. 1380, c. 25), says that the blockade of Platæa - was continued for ten years before it surrendered,—ἐπολιόρκουν - αὐτοὺς διπλῷ τείχει περιτειχίσαντες δέκα ἔτη. That the real - duration of the blockade was only _two_ years, is most certain: - accordingly, several eminent critics—Palmerius, Wasse, Duker, - Taylor, Auger, etc., all with one accord confidently enjoin us - to correct the text of Demosthenês from δέκα to δύο. “Repone - _fidenter_ δύο,” says Duker. - - I have before protested against corrections of the text of - ancient authors grounded upon the reason which all these - critics think so obvious and so convincing; and I must again - renew the protest here. It shows how little the principles of - historical evidence have been reflected upon, when critics can - thus concur in forcing dissentient witnesses into harmony, and - in substituting a true statement of their own in place of an - erroneous statement which one of these witnesses gives them. And - in the present instance, the principle adopted by these critics - is the less defensible, because the Pseudo-Demosthenês introduces - a great many other errors and inaccuracies respecting Platæa, - besides his mistake about the duration of the siege. The ten - years’ siege of Troy was constantly present to the imaginations - of these literary Greeks. - - [444] Thucyd. iii, 59. - - [445] Thucyd. iii, 69. σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν - οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θηβαίων ἕνεκα, - νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους - εἶναι. - -We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating -the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mitylênê -and Platæa. We next pass to the west of Greece,—the island of -Korkyra,—where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more -revolting. - -It has been already mentioned,[446] that in the naval combats -between the Corinthians and Korkyræans during the year before the -Peloponnesian war, the former had captured two hundred and fifty -Korkyræan prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in -the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in -slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not -greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation: they -had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them -over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to -effect a revolution in the island,—to bring it into alliance with -Corinth,[447] and disconnect it from Athens. Such an opportunity -appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the -present year, while both Mitylênê and Platæa were under blockade; -probably about the time when Alkidas departed for Ionia, and when -it was hoped that not only Mitylênê would be relieved, but the -neighboring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole -attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly, the Korkyræan -prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy -ransom of eight hundred talents, for which those Korkyræan citizens -who acted as proxeni to Corinth made themselves responsible:[448] the -proxeni, lending themselves thus to the deception, were doubtless -participant in the entire design. - - [446] See above, chap. xlvii. - - [447] Thucyd. i, 55. - - [448] Thucyd. iii, 70: compare Diodor. xii, 57. - -But it was soon seen in what form the ransom was really to be paid. -The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed, after so long -a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most -active personal canvass, to bring about a complete rupture of all -alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to Athens of what was -going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat -these manœuvres; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from -Corinth to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence -of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of -the island: but still more conspicuous did this change become, when -a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided,—that -Korkyra would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the -limited terms of simple mutual defence originally stipulated;[449] -but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the -Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidamnian quarrel. But -the alliance between Athens and Korkyra had since become practically -more intimate, and the Korkyræan fleet had aided the Athenians in -the invasion of Peloponnesus:[450] accordingly, the resolution, now -adopted, abandoned the present to go back to the past,—and to a past -which could not be restored. - - [449] Thucyd. i, 44. - - [450] Thucyd. ii, 25. - -Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, -such a declaration was self-contradictory: nor, indeed, did the -oligarchical party intend it as anything else than a step to a more -complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up -by a political prosecution against Peithias, the citizen of greatest -personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as -proxenus to the Athenians. They accused him of practising to bring -Korkyra into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial institutions -of the island, under which he was tried, we do not know: but he was -acquitted of the charge; and he then revenged himself by accusing in -his turn five of the richest among his oligarchical prosecutors, of -the crime of sacrilege,—as having violated the sanctity of the sacred -grove of Zeus and Alkinous, by causing stakes, for their vine-props, -to be cut in it.[451] This was an act distinctly forbidden by law, -under penalty of a stater or four drachms for every stake so cut: -but it is no uncommon phenomenon, even in societies politically -better organized than Korkyra, to find laws existing and unrepealed, -yet habitually violated, sometimes even by every one, but still -oftener by men of wealth and power, whom most people would be afraid -to prosecute: moreover, in this case, no individual was injured by -the act, and any one who came forward to prosecute would incur the -odium of an informer,—which probably Peithias might not have chosen -to brave under ordinary circumstances, though he thought himself -justified in adopting this mode of retaliation against those who -had prosecuted him. The language of Thucydidês implies that the -fact was not denied: nor is there any difficulty in conceiving that -these rich men may have habitually resorted to the sacred property -for vine-stakes. On being found guilty and condemned, they cast -themselves as suppliants at the temples, and entreated the indulgence -of being allowed to pay the fine by instalments: but Peithias, then -a member of the (annual) senate, to whom the petition was referred, -opposed it, and caused its rejection, leaving the law to take its -course. It was moreover understood, that he was about to avail -himself of his character of senator,—and of his increased favor, -probably arising from the recent judicial acquittal,—to propose in -the public assembly a reversal of the resolution recently passed, -and a new resolution to recognize only the same friends and the same -enemies as Athens. - - [451] Thucyd. iii, 70. φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Διὸς - τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου· ζημία δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο - στατήρ. - - The present tense τέμνειν seems to indicate that they were - going on habitually making use of the trees in the grove for - this purpose. Probably it is this cutting and fixing of stakes - to support the vines, which is meant by the word χαρακισμὸς in - Pherekratês. Pers. ap. Athenæum, vi, p. 269. - - The Oration of Lysias (Or. vii), against Nikomachus, ὑπὲρ τοῦ - σηκοῦ ἀπολογία, will illustrate this charge made by Peithias at - Korkyra. There were certain ancient olive-trees near Athens, - consecrated and protected by law, so that the proprietors of - the ground on which they stood were forbidden to grub them up, - or to dig so near as to injure the roots. The speaker in that - oration defends himself against a charge of having grubbed up one - of these and sold the wood. It appears that there were public - visitors whose duty it was to watch over these old trees: see the - note of Markland on that oration, p. 270. - -Pressed by the ruinous fine upon the five persons condemned, -as well as by the fear that Peithias might carry his point and -thus completely defeat their project of Corinthian alliance, the -oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence -and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst -suddenly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew -Peithias with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private -individuals: some others of his friends escaped the same fate by -getting aboard the Attic trireme which had brought the envoys, and -which was still in the harbor, but now departed forthwith to Athens. -These assassins, under the fresh terror arising from their recent -act, convoked an assembly, affirmed that what they had done was -unavoidable to guard Korkyra against being made the slave of Athens, -and proposed a resolution of full neutrality, both towards Athens -and towards the Peloponnesians,—to receive no visit from either of -the belligerents, except of a pacific character, and with one single -ship at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained -to pass,—it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical -partisans were at hand in arms.[452] At the same time they sent -envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such coloring -as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of -Peithias from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as -might occasion a counter-revolution in the island.[453] With some of -the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of -compromising their own families, left behind, prevailed: but most -of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both -what had been done, and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical -envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to -adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, -and placed in detention at Ægina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian -triremes, under Eurymedon, was immediately fitted out to sail -for Korkyra,—for which there was the greater necessity, as the -Lacedæmonian fleet, under Alkidas, lately mustered at Kyllênê after -its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing -thither.[454] - - [452] Thucyd. iii, 71. ὡς δὲ εἶπον, καὶ ~ἐπικυρῶσαι ἠνάγκασαν τὴν - γνώμην~. - - [453] Thucyd. iii, 71. καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ καταπεφευγότας πείσοντας - μηδὲν ἀνεπιτήδειον πράσσειν, ὅπως μή τις ἐπιστροφὴ γένηται. - - [454] Thucyd. iii, 80. - -But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra knew better than to rely -on the chances of this mission to Athens, and proceeded in the -execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best -calculated to insure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian -trireme, which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also -brought news that the fleet of Alkidas would shortly appear,—they -organized their force, and attacked the people and the democratical -authorities. The Korkyræan Demos were at first vanquished and -dispersed; but during the night they collected together and fortified -themselves in the upper parts of the town near the acropolis, and -from thence down to the Hyllaic harbor, one of the two harbors which -the town possessed; while the other harbor and the chief arsenal, -facing the mainland of Epirus, was held by the oligarchical party, -together with the market-place near to it, in and around which the -wealthier Korkyræans chiefly resided. In this divided state the -town remained throughout the ensuing day, during which the Demos -sent emissaries round the territory soliciting aid from the working -slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward; while the -oligarchy also hired and procured eight hundred Epirotic mercenaries -from the mainland. Reinforced by the slaves, who flocked in at the -call received, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow, more -furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the -advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which -they fought communicated itself even to the women, who, braving -danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by -flinging tiles from the housetops. Towards the afternoon, the people -became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying -by assault the lower town, together with the neighboring arsenal, -both held by the oligarchy,—nor had the latter any other chance of -safety except the desperate resource of setting fire to that part of -the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, -their own among the rest. This proceeding drove back the assailants, -but destroyed much property belonging to merchants in the warehouses, -together with a large part of the town: indeed, had the wind been -favorable the entire town would have been consumed. The people being -thus victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the -Epirotic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the -victors were still farther strengthened on the ensuing morning by the -arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus, with twelve triremes -from Naupaktus,[455] and five hundred Messenian hoplites. - - [455] Thucyd. iii, 74, 75. - -Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, -and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. -Under his auspices, a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded -between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals -of the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders: -these men of course soon disappeared, so that there would have been -no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. -At the same time an alliance offensive and defensive was established -between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on -the point of departing, when the Korkyræan leaders entreated him to -leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little -fleet of twelve,—offering him five of their own triremes instead. -Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus -acceded to it, and the Korkyræans, preparing the five ships to be -sent along with him, began to enroll among the crews the names of -their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance -of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. -Under this impression they took refuge as suppliants in the temple -of the Dioskuri, where Nikostratus went to visit them and tried to -reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their -personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as -they persisted in refusing to serve, the Korkyræan Demos began to -suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the -recusants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, -if Nikostratus had not taken them under his protection. The principal -men of the defeated party, to the number of about four hundred, -now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Hêrê; and -the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position -they might still cause further insurrection in the city, opened a -negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the -little island immediately opposite to the Heræum; where they were -kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to -them, for four days.[456] - - [456] Thucyd. iii, 75, 76. - -At the end of these four days, while the uneasiness of the -popular leaders still continued, and Nikostratus still adjourned -his departure, a new phase opened in this melancholy drama. The -Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrived at the road of Sybota on -the opposite mainland,—fifty-three triremes in number, for the forty -triremes brought back from Ionia had been reinforced by thirteen -more from Leukas and Ambrakia, and the Lacedæmonians had sent down -Brasidas as advising companion,—himself worth more than the new -thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alkidas, instead -of bringing nothing but authority to advise.[457] Despising the -small squadron of Nikostratus, then at Naupaktus, they were only -anxious to deal with Korkyra before reinforcements should arrive from -Athens: but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkidas, after -their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When -the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break -of day, the confusion in Korkyra was unspeakable: the Demos and the -newly-emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible -combat and by fear of the invaders,—the oligarchical party, though -defeated, was still present and forming a considerable minority, and -the town was half burnt. Amidst such elements of trouble, there was -little authority to command, and still less confidence or willingness -to obey. Plenty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were -given to man sixty of them forthwith,—while Nikostratus, the only man -who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, -entreated the Korkyræan leaders to proceed with regularity, and to -wait till all were manned, so as to sail forth from the harbor in -a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go -forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet, until the -Korkyræan sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support -him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron; but the Korkyræans, -instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one and -without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to -the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting -among themselves; even those which actually joined battle came up by -single ships, without the least order or concert. - - [457] Thucyd. iii, 69-76. - -The Peloponnesians, soon seeing that they had little to fear from -such enemies, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships -against the Korkyræans, while with the remaining thirty-three they -moved forward to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratus, -having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical -superiority,—the more so, as two of his twelve triremes were -the picked vessels of the Athenian navy,—the Salaminia and the -Paralus.[458] He took care to avoid entangling himself with the -centre of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks; and as -he presently contrived to disable one of their ships, by a fortunate -blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead -of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into -a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first -combat with Phormio in the middle of the strait at Rhium. Nikostratus -(like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by -feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their -places or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening -for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining -twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding, and recollecting -with dismay the success of a similar manœuvre in the former battle, -had not quitted the Korkyræan ships, whose disorderly condition they -despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet of -fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to -attack Nikostratus, who retreated before them, but backing astern and -keeping the head of his ships towards the enemy. In this manner he -succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave to most -of the Korkyræan ships opportunity for getting back to the harbor; -while such was the superior manœuvring of the Athenian triremes, -that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force -him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no -greater triumph than their success against the Korkyræans, thirteen -of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.[459] - - [458] These two triremes had been with Pachês at Lesbos (Thucyd. - iii, 33), immediately on returning from thence, they must have - been sent round to join Nikostratus at Naupaktus. We see in what - constant service they were kept. - - [459] Thucyd. iii, 77, 78, 79. - -It was the expectation in Korkyra, that they would on the morrow make -a direct attack—which could hardly have failed of success—on the -town and harbor; and we may easily believe (what report afterwards -stated), that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. -And the Korkyræan leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed -their prisoners from the little island to the Heræum, and then tried -to come to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally, -for the purpose of organizing some effective and united defence. -Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, wherein some even of the -oligarchical Korkyræans were persuaded to form part of the crews. -But the slackness of Alkidas proved their best defence: instead of -coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in -the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimnê: -after ravaging the neighboring lands for some hours, he returned to -his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again -returned: for on the very same night the fire-signals of Leukas -telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from -Athens,—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of -the Peloponnesian fleet, which was in fact saved by this telegraphic -notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along -the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukas from the -mainland,—across which isthmus the ships were dragged by hand or -machinery, so that they might not fall in with or be descried by the -Athenian fleet in sailing round the Leukadian promontory. From hence -Alkidas made the best of his way home to Peloponnesus, leaving the -Korkyræan oligarchs to their fate.[460] - - [460] Thucyd. iii, 80. - -That fate was deplorable in the extreme. The arrival of Eurymedon -opens a third unexpected transition in this checkered narrative,—the -Korkyræan Demos passing, abruptly and unexpectedly, from intense -alarm and helplessness to elate and irresistible mastery. In the -bosom of Greeks, and in a population seemingly amongst the least -refined of all Greeks,—including too a great many slaves just -emancipated against the will of their masters, and of course the -fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island,—such -a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost -ungovernable, as the only compensation for foregone terror and -suffering. As soon as the Peloponnesian fleet was known to have -fled, and that of Eurymedon was seen approaching, the Korkyræan -leaders brought into the town the five hundred Messenian hoplites -who had hitherto been encamped without; thus providing a resource -against any last effort of despair on the part of their interior -enemies. Next, the thirty ships recently manned,—and held ready, in -the harbor facing the continent, to go out against the Peloponnesian -fleet, but now no longer needed, were ordered to sail round to the -other or Hyllaic harbor. Even while they were thus sailing round, -some obnoxious men of the defeated party, being seen in public, were -slain: but when the ships arrived at the Hyllaic harbor, and the -crews were disembarked, a more wholesale massacre was perpetrated, -by singling out those individuals of the oligarchical faction who -had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the -crews, and putting them to death.[461] Then came the fate of those -suppliants, about four hundred in number, who had been brought back -from the islet opposite, and were yet under sanctuary in the sacred -precinct of the Heræum. It was proposed to them to quit sanctuary and -stand their trial; and fifty of them having accepted the proposition, -were put on their trial,—all condemned, and all executed. Their -execution took place, as it seems, immediately on the spot, and -within actual view of the unhappy men still remaining in the sacred -ground;[462] who, seeing that their lot was desperate, preferred -dying by their own hands to starvation or the sword of their enemies. -Some hung themselves on branches of the trees surrounding the temple, -others helped their friends in the work of suicide, and, in one -way or another, the entire band thus perished: it was probably a -consolation to them to believe, that this desecration of the precinct -would bring down the anger of the gods upon their surviving enemies. - - [461] Thucyd. iii, 80, 81. καὶ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν, ὅσους ἔπεισαν - ἐσβῆναι, ἐκβιβάζοντες ἀπεχώρησαν. It is certain that the reading - ἀπεχώρησαν here must be wrong: no satisfactory sense can be made - out of it. The word substituted by Dr. Arnold is ἀνεχρῶντο; that - preferred by Göller is ἀπεχρῶντο; others recommend ἀπεχρήσαντο; - Hermann adopts ἀπεχώρισαν, and Dionysius, in his copy, read - ἀνεχώρησαν. I follow the meaning of the words proposed by - Dr. Arnold and Göller, which appear to be both equivalent to - ἐκτεῖνον. This meaning is at least plausible and consistent; - though I do not feel certain that we have the true sense of the - passage. - - [462] Thucyd. iii, 81. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ - ἐπείσθησαν, ~ὡς ἑώρων τὰ γιγνόμενα~, διέφθειραν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ - ἀλλήλους, etc. The meagre abridgment of Diodorus (xii, 57) in - reference to these events in Korkyra, is hardly worth notice. - -Eurymedon remained with his fleet for seven days, during all which -time the victorious Korkyræans carried on a sanguinary persecution -against the party who had been concerned in the late oligarchical -revolution. Five hundred of this party contrived to escape by flight -to the mainland; while those who did not, or could not flee, were -slain wherever they could be found. Some received their death-wounds -even on the altar itself,—others shared the same fate, after having -been dragged away from it by violence. In one case, a party of -murderers having pursued their victims to the temple of Dionysius, -refrained from shedding their blood, but built up the doorway and -left them to starve; as the Lacedæmonians had done on a former -occasion respecting Pausanias. Such was the ferocity of the time, -that in one case a father slew his own son. Nor was it merely the -oligarchical party who thus suffered: the floodgates of private feud -were also opened, and various individuals, under false charges of -having been concerned in the oligarchical movements, were slain by -personal enemies or debtors. This deplorable suspension of legal, as -well as moral restraints, continued during the week of Eurymedon’s -stay,—a period long enough to satiate the fierce sentiment out of -which it arose;[463] yet without any apparent effort on his part to -soften the victors or protect the vanquished. We shall see farther -reason hereafter to appreciate the baseness and want of humanity -in his character: but had Nikostratus remained in command, we may -fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of -the sedition, with very inferior force, that he would have set much -earlier limits to the Korkyræan butchery: unfortunately, Thucydidês -tells us nothing at all about Nikostratus, after the naval battle of -the preceding day.[464] - - [463] Thucyd. iii, 85. Οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι - ~τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις~ ἐς ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, etc. - - [464] In reading the account of the conduct of Nikostratus, as - well as that of Phormio, in the naval battles of the preceding - summer, we contract a personal interest respecting both of them. - Thucydidês does not seem to have anticipated that his account - would raise such a feeling in the minds of his readers, otherwise - he probably would have mentioned something to gratify it. - Respecting Phormio, his omission is the more remarkable; since we - are left to infer, from the request made by the Akarnanians to - have his son sent as commander, that he must have died or become - disabled: yet the historian does not distinctly say so (iii, 7). - - The Scholiast on Aristophanês (Pac. 347) has a story that Phormio - was asked for by the Akarnanians, but that he could not serve in - consequence of being at that moment under sentence for a heavy - fine, which he was unable to pay: accordingly, the Athenians - contrived a means of evading the fine, in order that he might - be enabled to serve. It is difficult to see how this can be - reconciled with the story of Thucydidês, who says that the son of - Phormio went instead of his father. - - Compare Meineke, Histor. Critic. Comicc. Græc. vol. i, p. 144, - and Fragment. Eupolid. vol. ii, p. 527. Phormio was introduced as - a chief character in the Ταξίαρχοι of Eupolis; as a brave, rough, - straightforward soldier something like Lamachus in the Acharneis - of Aristophanês. - -We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in -the way of restoration or healing, after this burst of murderous -fury, in which doubtless the newly-emancipated slaves were not -the most backward, and after the departure of Eurymedon. But here -again Thucydidês disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him, -that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were -strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the -territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos -and Mitylênê became more or less completely masters of the Peræa -or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent -envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hopes of procuring aid to accomplish -their restoration by force, but their request found no favor, and -they were reduced to their own resources. After harassing for some -time the Korkyræans in the island by predatory incursions, so as to -produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a -band of Epirotic mercenaries, passed over to the island, and there -established a fortified position on the mountain called Istônê, not -far from the city. They burned their vessels in order to cut off all -hopes of retreat, and maintained themselves for near two years on -a system of ravage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the -island.[465] This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders wore -out and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable. -The ultimate fate of these occupants of Istônê, which belongs to a -future chapter, will be found to constitute a close suitable to the -bloody drama yet unfinished in Korkyra. - - [465] Thucyd. iii, 85. - -Such a drama could not be acted, in an important city belonging to -the Greek name, without producing a deep and extensive impression -throughout all the other cities. And Thucydidês has taken advantage -of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during -the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, -aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens -and Sparta,—the former espousing the democratical party everywhere; -the latter, the oligarchical. The Korkyræan sedition was the -first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and -exasperation were seen acting with full united force, and where -the malignity of sentiment and demoralization flowing from such an -union was seen without disguise. The picture drawn by Thucydidês, -of moral and political feeling under these influences, will ever -remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher: he -has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit -of generalization which renders these two chapters hardly less -applicable to other political societies, far distant both in time and -place,—especially, under many points of view, to France between 1789 -and 1799,—than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian -era. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by -the accompanying dangers of foreign war and intervention of foreign -enemies,—the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks -that the other will forestall him in striking a mortal blow, and -where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either -as restraint or as protection,—the superior popularity of the man -who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down his enemies in -the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat -both prudence in action and candor in speech as if it were nothing -but treachery or cowardice,—the exclusive regard to party ends, with -the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or -violence as the most effectual means,—the loss of respect for legal -authority, as well as of confidence in private agreement, and the -surrender even of blood and friendship to the overruling ascendency -of party-ties,—the perversion of ordinary morality, bringing with -it altered signification of all the common words importing blame -or approbation,—the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and -contentious passions, overpowering in men’s minds all real public -objects, and equalizing for the time the better and the worse cause, -by taking hold of democracy on one side and aristocracy on the other -as mere pretences to sanctify personal triumph,—all these gloomy -social phenomena, here indicated by the historian, have their causes -deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases -of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and -firmly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time, -under diverse modifications, “so long as human nature shall be the -same as it is now,” to use the language of Thucydidês himself.[466] -He has described, with fidelity not inferior to his sketch of the -pestilence at Athens, the symptoms of a certain morbid political -condition, wherein the vehemence of intestine conflict, instead -of being kept within such limits as consists with the maintenance -of one society among the contending parties, becomes for the time -inflamed and poisoned with all the unscrupulous hostility of foreign -war, chiefly from actual alliance between parties within the state -and foreigners without. In following the impressive description of -the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners -in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, -as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which -has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we -have farther to recollect that if he had been describing the effects -of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among -his contemporary Greeks, he would have added to his list of horrors -mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder. - - [466] Thucyd. iii, 82. γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενα ἕως ἂν ἡ - αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι - διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται, - etc. - - The many obscurities and perplexities of construction which - pervade these memorable chapters, are familiar to all readers of - Thucydidês, ever since Dionysius of Halikarnassus, whose remarks - upon them are sufficiently severe (Judic. de Thucyd. p. 883). To - discuss difficulties which the best commentators are sometimes - unable satisfactorily to explain, is no part of the business of - this work: yet there is one sentence which I venture to notice as - erroneously construed by most of them, following the Scholiast. - - Τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφάλεια δὲ - (Dr. Arnold and others read ἀσφαλείᾳ in the dative) τὸ - ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. - - The Scholiast explains the latter half of this as follows: - τὸ ἐπιπολὺ βουλεύσασθαι δι᾽ ἀσφάλειαν πρόφασις ἀποτροπῆς - ἐνομίζετο,,—and this explanation is partly adopted by Poppo, - Göller, and Dr. Arnold, with differences about ἀσφάλεια and - ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, but all agreeing about the word ἀποτροπὴ so that - the sentence is made to mean, in the words of Dr. Arnold: “But - safely to concert measures against an enemy, was accounted but a - decent pretence for _declining the contest with him altogether_.” - - Now the signification here assigned to ἀποτροπὴ is one which does - not belong to it. Ἀποτροπὴ, in Thucydidês as well as elsewhere, - does not mean “tergiversation, or declining the contest:” it - has an active sense, and means, “the deterring, preventing, - or dissuading another person from something which he might be - disposed to do,—or the warding off of some threatening danger or - evil:” the remarkable adjective ἀποτροπαῖος is derived from it, - and προτροπὴ, in rhetoric, is its contrary term. In Thucydidês - it is used in this active sense (iii, 45): compare also Plato, - Legg. ix, c. 1, p. 853; Isokratês, Areopagatic. Or. vii, p. 143, - sect. 17; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphon. c. 68, p. 442: Æschyl. Pers. - 217; nor do the commentators produce any passage to sustain - the passive sense which they assign to it in the sentence here - under discussion, whereby they would make it equivalent to - ἀναχωρεῖν—ἀναχώρησις—or ἐξαναχωρεῖν (Thucyd. iv, 28; v, 65), “a - backing out.” - - Giving the meaning which they do to ἀποτροπὴ, the commentators - are farther unavoidably embarrassed how to construe ἀσφάλεια - δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, as may be seen by the notes of Poppo, - Göller, and Dr. Arnold. The Scholiast and Göller give to the word - ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι the very unusual meaning of “repeated and careful - deliberation,” instead of its common meaning of “laying snares - for another, concerting secret measures of hostility:” and Poppo - and Dr. Arnold alter ἀσφάλεια into the dative case ἀσφαλείᾳ, - which, if it were understood to be governed by προσετέθη, might - make a fair construction,—but which they construe along with τὸ - ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, though the position of the particle δὲ, upon - that supposition, appears to me singularly awkward. - - The great difficulty of construing the sentence arises from the - erroneous meaning attached to the word ἀποτροπὴ. But when we - interpret that word “deterrence, or prevention,” according to the - examples which I have cited, the whole meaning of the sentence - will become clear and consistent. Of the two modes of hurting a - party-enemy—1. violent and open attack; 2. secret manœuvre and - conspiracy—Thucydidês remarks first, what was thought of the one; - next, what was thought of the other, in the perverted state of - morality which he is discussing. - - Τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη—ἀσφάλεια δὲ τὸ - ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. - - “Sharp and reckless attack was counted among the necessities of - the manly character: secret conspiracy against an enemy was held - to be safe precaution,—a specious pretence of preventing him from - doing the like.” - - According to this construction, τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι is the - subject; ἀσφάλεια belongs to the predicate and the concluding - words, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος, are an epexegesis, or - explanatory comment, upon ἀσφάλεια. Probably we ought to consider - some such word as ἐνομίζετο to be understood,—just as the - Scholiast understands that word for his view of the sentence. - -The language of Thucydidês is to be taken rather as a generalization -and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different -communities, rather than as belonging altogether to any one of them. -Nor are we to believe—what a superficial reading of his opening words -might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the -earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors -spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history -suffice to show that though the same causes which worked upon this -unfortunate island became disseminated, and produced analogous -mischiefs throughout many other communities, yet the case of Korkyra, -as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in -point of intensity. Fortunately, the account of Thucydidês enables us -to understand it from beginning to end, and to appreciate the degree -of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do -with certainty; because when once the interchange of violence has -begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently -overpower in the minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, -as well as all scruples as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts -in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two, we are -often obliged to employ the emphatic language which Tacitus uses -respecting Otho and Vitellius: “Deteriorem fore, quisquis vicisset;” -of two bad men, all that the Roman world could foresee was, that the -victor, whichsoever he was, would prove the worst. - -But in regard to the Korkyræan revolution, we can arrive at a more -discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the -work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign -enemy, and the worst and most ancient enemy of the island,—aiming to -subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves, and -ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment -of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely -defensive and conservative, the oligarchical movers, having tried -fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which -latter they find retorted with greater effect against themselves. -They set the example of judicial prosecution against Peithias, -for the destruction of a political antagonist; in the use of this -same weapon, he proves more than a match for them, and employs it -to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the -senate-house, against him and his immediate fellow-leaders, and -to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy -generally. The Korkyræan Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive, -and instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense -anti-social sentiments,—fear, pugnacity, hatred, vengeance, obtain -unqualified possession of their bosoms; exaggerated too through -the fluctuations of victory and defeat successively brought by -Nikostratus, Alkidas, and Eurymedon. Their conduct as victors is such -as we should expect under such maddening circumstances, from coarse -men, mingled with liberated slaves: it is vindictive and murderous in -the extreme, not without faithless breach of assurances given. But -we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defence, -and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defence -successful. They are provoked by an aggression no less guilty in -the end than in the means,—an aggression, too, the more gratuitous, -because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the -oligarchical captives were restored from Corinth, there was no -pretence for affirming that it had suffered, or was suffering, any -loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with Athens. These -oligarchical insurgents find the island in a state of security and -tranquillity,—since the war imposed upon it little necessity for -effort,—they plunge it into a sea of blood, with enormities as well -as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete -extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder -us from appreciating the behavior whereby it was earned. - -In the course of a few years from this time, we shall have occasion -to recount two political movements in Athens, similar in principle -and general result to this Korkyræan revolution; exhibiting -oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative -democracy, with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards -put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between -Athens and Korkyra, under such circumstances, will be found highly -instructive, especially in regard to the Demos, both in the hours of -defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the -habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs,—of -open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions -by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote,—of having -constantly present, to the mind of every citizen, in his character of -dikast or ekklesiast, the conditions of a pacific society, and the -paramount authority of a constitutional majority,—how much all these -circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any -other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to soften -the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very -great provocation. - -But the case of Korkyra, as well as that of Athens, different in -so many respects, conspire to illustrate another truth, of much -importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how false and -impudent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the -various Grecian cities, to superior morality, superior intelligence, -and greater fitness for using honorably and beneficially the powers -of government, as compared with the mass of the citizens. Though -the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over fashion, -and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon -themselves the appellation of “the best men, the honorable and good, -the elegant, the superior,” etc., and attached to those without -their own circle epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral -attributes,—no such difference will be found borne out by the facts -of Grecian history.[467] Abundance of infirmity, with occasional bad -passions, was doubtless liable to work upon the people generally, -often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the -best apparently of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the -rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them -as a class, apart from honorable individual exceptions, by no means -the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices -which beset smaller and poorer men, they imbibed from that same -position an unmeasured self-importance, and an excess of personal -ambition as well as of personal appetite, peculiar to themselves, -not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much grander -scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age, -they were noway superior, considering them as a class; while their -animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among -the foremost causes of misfortune in Grecian commonwealth,—and indeed -many of the most exceptionable acts committed by the democracies, -consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one -aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-selfishness -which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into -the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous -oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle,[468] we shall find many -illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking -than this Korkyræan revolution. - - [467] See the valuable preliminary discourse, prefixed to - Welcker’s edition of Theognis, page xxi, sect. 9, _seq._ - - [468] Aristotel. Politic. v. 7, 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, - καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ,τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν. - - - - -CHAPTER LI. - -FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN -WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR. - - -About the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias, the -Athenian general, conducted an armament against the rocky island -of Minôa, which lay at the mouth of the harbor of Megara, and was -occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which -separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa, and formed the entrance -of the harbor, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa, -which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines -from his ships. He thus cut off Minôa from communication on that -side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where -it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with -a causeway. Minôa, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more -completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was -eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the -Megarian harbor, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the -opposite shore of Salamis.[469] - - [469] Thucyd. iii, 51. See the note of Dr. Arnold, and the plan - embodied in his work, for the topography of Minôa, which has now - ceased to be an island, and is a hill on the mainland near the - shore. - -Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous -in public life, and is said to have been more than once stratêgus -along with Periklês, this is the first occasion on which Thucydidês -introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the stratêgi, or -generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the -whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen -of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth -and in family he ranked among the first class of Athenians: in -political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydidês -son of Melêsias and Theramenês, above all other names in Athenian -history,—seemingly even above Periklês.[470] Such a criticism, from -Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before -us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the -position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal -person of what maybe called the oligarchical party, succeeding -Kimon and Thucydidês, and preceding Theramenês. In looking to the -conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall -see that, during the interval between Thucydidês (son of Melêsias) -and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed -ascendency, that it would not have suited the purpose of any -politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to -the Sicilian expedition, and the great embarrassment in the foreign -relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that -change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, -so that we shall find Theramenês among the chief conspirators in -the revolution of the Four Hundred: but Nikias represents the -oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, -accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the -form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a -remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, -that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared -as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have -remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in -the city. He was a man of a sort of even mediocrity, in intellect, -in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and -not only personally courageous in the field, but also competent as a -general under ordinary circumstances:[471] assiduous in the discharge -of all political duties at home, especially in the post of stratêgus, -or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently -chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his -predecessor Periklês, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in -the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all his -influence rested,—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs -to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes -in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible, as to pecuniary -gains,—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, -that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired -a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could -have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Periklêan view as to -the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for -Athens, and of avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous -risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of -analogy, there were at the same time material differences between -them, even in regard to foreign policy. Periklês was a conservative, -resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, -as well as refraining from aggrandizement: Nikias was in policy -faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, -and disposed, not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by -considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion -of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and -as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course -of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious -and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for -honest purposes,—his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily -recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be -followed. - - [470] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 2, 3. - - [471] Καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου (says Nikias, in - the Athenian assembly, Thucyd. vi, 9) ~καὶ ἧσσον ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ - ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀῤῥωδῶ~· νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι, ὃς - ἂν καὶ τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοῆται. - - The whole conduct of Nikias before Syracuse, under the most - trying circumstances, more than bears out this boast. - -Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with -Periklês, he was perfect in the use of those minor and collateral -modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had -taken little pains to practise. While Periklês attached himself -to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem, in the eyes -of the public, either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the -domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable -to the rules of Athenian decorum. Periklês was surrounded by -philosophers, Nikias by prophets,—whose advice was necessary both as -a consolation to his temperament, and as a guide to his intelligence -under difficulties; one of them was constantly in his service and -confidence, and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by -the difference of character between one prophet and another,[472] -just as the government of Louis the Fourteenth, and other Catholic -princes, has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life -thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable -to the Athenians—Nikias added the judicious employment of a large -fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies—or expensive -public duties undertaken by rich men each in his turn, throughout -other cities of Greece as well as in Athens—which fell to his lot -were performed with such splendor, munificence, and good taste, -as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his -predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these -liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state, -so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his -zeal for the honor of the gods at the same time that he laid up for -himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution -and timidity—not before an enemy, but in reference to his own -fellow-citizens—which marked his character, rendered him preëminently -scrupulous as to giving offence or making personal enemies. While -his demeanor towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and -conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain -friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear that -various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their -profit out of this susceptibility,—but most assuredly Nikias as a -public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, was -greatly assisted by the reputation which he thus acquired. - - [472] Thucyd. vii. 50; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 4, 5, 23. Τῷ μέντοι - Νικίᾳ συνηνέχθη τότε μηδὲ μάντιν ἔχειν ἔμπειρον· ὁ γὰρ συνήθης - αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθνήκει - μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν. This is suggested by Plutarch as an excuse for - mistakes on the part of Nikias. - -The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict -personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another -quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias, -though in this too he stood distinguished from Periklês. He was -a careful and diligent money-getter; a speculator in the silver -mines of Laurium, and proprietor of one thousand slaves, whom he -let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each: -the superintending slaves who managed the details of this business -were men of great ability and high pecuniary value.[473] Most of the -wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. -Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have -been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money: -for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, -the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom -Euripidês owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement -of the slave-letter Nikias. The degree to which the latter was thus -occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the -general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract -himself from public duty: but such unambitious reluctance, rare -among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more -anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of -the Pentakosiomedimni and the Hippeis, the two richest classes in -Athens, he was one of themselves,—and on the whole, the best man, as -being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose -to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers who often out-talked them in -the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon,—and did not -much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because -he happened to be poor,[474]—respected in Nikias the union of wealth -and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The -maritime and trading multitude esteemed him as a decorous, honest, -religious gentleman, who gave splendid choregies, treated the poorest -men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a -job for his own profit,—who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding -qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible -authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady -safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian -expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult -enterprise, but what he had done had been accomplished successfully; -so that he enjoyed the reputation of a fortunate as well as a -prudent commander.[475] He appears to have acted as proxenus to -the Lacedæmonians at Athens; probably by his own choice, and among -several others. - - [473] Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 5, 2; Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, iv, - 14. - - [474] Thucyd. v, 7; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 21. Ὁ γὰρ Λάμαχος ἦν - μὲν πολεμικὸς καὶ ἀνδρώδης, ἀξίωμα δ᾽ οὐ προσῆν οὐδ᾽ ὄγκος αὐτῷ - διὰ πενίαν; compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 15. - - [475] Thucyd. v, 16. Νικίας πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν - στρατηγίαις,—Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἠξιοῦτο, - διασώσασθαι ~τὴν εὐτυχίαν~, etc.—vi, 17. ἕως ἐγώ τε (Alkibiadês) - ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας ~εὐτυχὴς~ δοκεῖ εἶναι, etc. - -The first half of the political life of Nikias,—after the time -when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already -of mature age,—was spent in opposition to Kleon; the last half, -in opposition to Alkibiadês. To employ terms which are not fully -suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view -the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias -was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising and -always likely to exercise official functions,—Kleon was a man of -the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure -official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of -that sense which they are understood to carry in English political -life,—a standing parliamentary majority in favor of one party: Kleon -would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his -opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position,—who served -in the posts of stratêgus, ambassador, and other important offices -designated by the general vote, were obliged against their will -to execute. In attaining such offices they were assisted by the -political clubs, or established _conspiracies_ (to translate the -original literally), among the leading Athenians, to stand by each -other both for acquisition of office and for mutual insurance under -judicial trial. These clubs, or hetæries, must without doubt have -played a most important part in the practical working of Athenian -politics, and it is much to be regretted that we are possessed of no -details respecting them. We know that in Athens they were thoroughly -oligarchical in disposition,[476]—while equality, or something near -to it, in rank and position must have been essential to the social -harmony of the members: in some towns, it appears that such political -associations existed under the form of gymnasia,[477] for the mutual -exercise of the members, or of syssitia for joint banquets. At Athens -they were numerous, and doubtless not habitually in friendship with -each other, since the antipathies among different oligarchical men -were exceedingly strong, and the union brought about between them -at the time of the Four Hundred arose only out of common desire -to put down the democracy, and lasted but a little while. But the -designation of persons to serve in the capacity of stratêgus and -other principal offices greatly depended upon them,—as well as the -facility of passing through that trial of accountability to which -every man was liable after his year of office. Nikias, and men -generally of his rank and fortune, helped by these clubs, and lending -help in their turn, composed what may be called the ministers, or -executive individual functionaries of Athens: the men who acted, -gave orders to individual men as to specific acts, and saw to the -execution of that which the senate and the public assembly resolved. -Especially in regard to the military and naval force of the city, so -large and so actively employed at this time, the powers of detail -possessed by the stratêgi must have been very great and essential to -the safety of the state. - - [476] Thucyd. viii, 54. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, - αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, - ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν, καὶ παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ - βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τἆλλα παρασκευάσας, etc. - - After having thus organized the hetæries, and brought them - into coöperation for his revolutionary objects against the - democracy, Peisander departed from Athens to Samos: on his - return, he finds that these hetæries have been very actively - employed, and had made great progress towards the subversion of - the democracy: they had assassinated the demagogue Androklês and - various other political enemies,—οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον—ἦλθον - ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας,—καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις - προειργασμένα, etc. (viii, 65.) - - The political ἑταίρεια to which Alkibiadês belonged is mentioned - in Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 348, sect. 6. λέγοντες ὡς ὁ - πατὴρ ~συνάγοι τὴν ἑταίρειαν ἐπὶ νεωτέροις πράγμασι~. Allusions - to these ἑταιρεῖαι and to their well-known political and judicial - purposes (unfortunately they are only allusions), are found in - Plato, Theætet. c. 79, p. 173, σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς, - etc.: also Plato, Legg. ix, c. 3, p. 856; Plato, Republic, ii, - c. 8, p. 365, where they are mentioned in conjunction with - συνωμοσίαι—ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας - συνάξομεν—also in Pseudo-Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 2, p. - 112. Compare the general remarks of Thucydidês, iii, 82, and - Demosthenês cont. Stephan. ii, p. 1157. - - Two Dissertations, by Messrs. Vischer and Büttner, collect the - scanty indications respecting these hetæries, together with some - attempts to enlarge and speculate upon them, which are more - ingenious than trustworthy (Die Oligarchische Partei und die - Hetairien in Athen, von W. Vischer, Basel, 1836; Geschichte der - politischen Hetairien zu Athen, von Hermann Büttner, Leipsic, - 1840). - - [477] About the political workings of the Syssitia and Gymnasia, - see Plato Legg. i, p. 636; Polybius, xx, 6. - -While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function, -Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same, but -was confined to the inferior function of opposition: we shall see -in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly -by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice -and misjudgment of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of -Sphakteria. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to -denounce; his theatre of action was the senate, the public assembly, -the dikasteries; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he -must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two -gifts which had been united in Periklês—superior capacity for speech -as well as for action—were now severed, and had fallen, though both -in greatly inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As -an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely -formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in -the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important -positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what -is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the -public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential -person in the democracy: his powers of speech in fact, stood out the -more prominently, because they were found apart from that station, -and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but -essential to make a man a leader in political life. To understand the -political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to -take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that -though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was -the more guiding and influential leader; the points gained by Kleon -were all noisy and palpable, sometimes however, without doubt, of -considerable moment,—but the course of affairs was much more under -the direction of Nikias. - -It was during the summer of this year, the fifth of the war,—B.C. -427, that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; -probably contrary to the advice both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of -them seemingly favorable to these distant undertakings. I reserve, -however, the series of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterwards -became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a -department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring -them down to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when I reach -the date of that important event. - -During the autumn of the same year, the epidemic disorder, after -having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens, -and continued for one whole year longer, to the sad ruin both of -the strength and the comfort of the city. And it seems that this -autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent -atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes -were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Bœotia, especially near -Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea and unexampled tides were also -felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris, and the islands of Atalantê -and Peparêthus; the Athenian fort and one of the two guard-ships -at Atalantê were partially destroyed. The earthquakes produced one -effect favorable to Athens; they deterred the Lacedæmonians from -invading Attica. Agis, king of Sparta, had already reached the -isthmus for that purpose; but the repeated earthquakes were looked -upon as an unfavorable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.[478] - - [478] Thucyd. iii, 87, 89, 90. - -These earthquakes, however, were not considered as calculated to -deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new -colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of -a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the -war. The coast immediately north of the strait of Thermopylæ was -occupied by the three subdivisions of the Malians,—Paralii, Hierês, -and Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Œta on -its north side,—as well as the Dorians, the little tribe properly -so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians -generally, who joined the same mountain-range on the south,—were -both of them harassed and plundered by the predatory mountaineers, -probably Ætolians, on the high lands between them. At first, the -Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection -of Athens; but not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in -which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in -claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens, -possessing naval superiority only, and being inferior on land, could -have given them effective aid. The Lacedæmonians eagerly embraced -the opportunity, and determined to plant a strong colony in this -tempting situation: there was wood in the neighboring regions for -ship-building,[479] so that they might hope to acquire a naval -position for attacking the neighboring island of Eubœa, while the -passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace, -would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had -forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A -considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Periœki, -was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan œkists,—Leon, -Damagon, and Alkidas; the latter we are to presume, though Thucydidês -does not say so, was the same admiral who had met with such little -success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was farther made to -invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by -name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. -Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather -the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present -reasons; since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta. -A number of colonists, stated as not less than ten thousand, flocked -to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under -the powerful protection of Sparta; and a new town, of large circuit, -was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia;[480] not far -from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the -nearest point of the Maliac gulf, but about double that distance -from the strait of Thermopylæ. Near to the latter, and for the -purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port, with dock and -accommodation for shipping, was constructed. - - [479] Respecting this abundance of wood, as well as the site of - Herakleia generally, consult Livy, xxxvi, 22. - - [480] Diodor. xii, 59. Not merely was Hêraklês the mythical - progenitor of the Spartan kings, but the whole region near Œta - and Trachis was adorned by legends and heroic incidents connected - with him: see the drama of the Trachiniæ by Sophoklês. - -A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this -important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation -in every part of Greece: but the Lacedæmonian œkists were harsh and -unskilful in their management, and the Thessalians, to whom the -Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an -encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they -harassed it with hostilities from the first moment, while the Œtæan -assailants were not idle: and Herakleia, thus pressed from without, -and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and -promise, barely maintaining its existence.[481] We shall find it in -later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable -importance. - - [481] Thucyd. iii, 92, 93; Diodor xi, 49; xii, 59. - -The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty -triremes, under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island -of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from -Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to -be, members of the Athenian alliance, or subjects of the Athenian -empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in -the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort -to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command -over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable -plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the -protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing at all to -the cost of it: but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong -Lacedæmonian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in -the war, and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to -conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation -of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power -in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle -of maritime empire. Melos and Thera formed awkward corners, which -defaced the symmetry of a great proprietor’s field;[482] and the -former ultimately entailed upon Athens the heaviest of all losses,—a -deed of blood which deeply dishonored her annals. On this occasion, -Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning -the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking -a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Orôpus, on the northeast -frontier of Attica, bordering on Bœotia: the hoplites on board his -ships landed in the night, and marched into the interior of Bœotia, -to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal -raised, by a military force from Athens, which marched thither by -land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagræan territory, -gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, -Nikias reassembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of -Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting -anything farther.[483] - - [482] Horat. Sat. ii, 6, 8:— - - O! si angulus iste - Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum! - - [483] Thucyd. iii, 91. - -About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, -under Demosthenês and Proklês, had been sent round Peloponnesus -to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole -Akarnanian force, except the men of Œniade,—with fifteen triremes -from Korkyra, and some troops from Kephallênia and Zakynthus,—they -ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the -isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was -too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation -and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was -especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenês to undertake this -measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and -success was nearly certain. - -But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of -offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a -country of all others the most impracticable,—the interior of Ætolia. -The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations -of the neighboring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by -suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations,[484] more worthy of -the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas. -The various tribes of Ætolians,—rude, brave, active, predatory, and -unrivalled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of -their hands,—stretched across the country from between Parnassus -and Œta to the eastern bank of the Achelôus. The scheme suggested -by the Messenians was, that Demosthenês should attack the great -central Ætolian tribes,—the Apodôti, Ophioneis, and Eurytânes: if -they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the -Ambrakian gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into -the alliance of Athens,—the Akarnanians being already included in -it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force,[485] -Demosthenês contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head -of it on the west of Parnassus, through the territory of the Ozolian -Lokrians,—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian gulf, friendly to -Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in -their habits and in their fighting,—until he arrived at Kytinium, -in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephisus. -He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the -Phocians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favorable -opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to -do so. From Phocis, the scheme was to invade from the northward the -conterminous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens: which -might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same -time from Attica. Any Athenian general, who could have executed -this comprehensive scheme, would have acquired at home a high and -well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenês had been ill-informed, both -of the invincible barbarians and the pathless country comprehended -under the name of Ætolia: some of the tribes spoke a language -scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even eat their meat raw, while -the country has even down to the present time remained not only -unconquered, but untraversed, by an enemy in arms. - - [484] Thucyd. iii, 95. Δημοσθένης δ᾽ ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν - χρόνον τοῦτον ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς τοσαύτης - ξυνειλεγμένης, etc. - - [485] Thucyd. iii, 95. τὸ ἄλλο ἠπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτῃ. None of - the tribes properly called Epirots, would be comprised in this - expression: the name ἠπειρῶται is here a general name, not - a proper name, as Poppo and Dr. Arnold remark. Demosthenês - would calculate on getting under his orders the Akarnanians - and Ætolians, and some other tribes besides; but _what_ other - tribes, it is not easy to specify: perhaps the Agræi, east of - Amphilochia, among them. - -Demosthenês accordingly retired from Leukas, in spite of the -remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to -accompany him, but went home in visible disgust, He then sailed with -his other forces—Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians—to Œneon, -in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, a maritime township on the -Corinthian gulf, not far eastward of Naupaktus,—where his army was -disembarked, together with three hundred epibatæ (or marines) from -the triremes,—including on this occasion, what was not commonly the -case on shipboard,[486] some of the choice hoplites, selected all -from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having -passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Nemeus at Œneon, -memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been -slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the -Messenian Chromon, into Ætolia; on the first day he took Potidania, -on the second Krokyleium, on the third Teichium,—all of them -villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned -them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt -and wait the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to -invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his -success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare and similarity -of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance -without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be -separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be -gathered together: and Demosthenês was so encouraged by having as yet -encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægitium, which he also -found deserted, and captured without opposition. - - [486] Thucyd. iii, 98. The epibatæ, or soldiers serving on - shipboard (marines), were more usually taken from the thetes, - or the poorest class of citizens, furnished by the state with a - panoply for the occasion,—not from the regular hoplites on the - muster-roll. Maritime soldiery is, therefore, usually spoken - of as something inferior: the present triremes of Demosthenês - are noticed in the light of an exception (ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου - στρατιᾶς, Thucyd. vi, 21). - - So among the Romans, service in the legions was accounted higher - and more honorable than that of the classiarii milites (Tacit. - Histor. i, 87). - - The Athenian epibatæ, though not forming a corps permanently - distinct, correspond in function to the English marines, who - seem to have been first distinguished permanently from other - foot-soldiers about the year 1684. “It having been found - necessary on many occasions to embark a number of soldiers - on board our ships of war, and mere landsmen being at first - extremely unhealthy,—and at first, until they had been accustomed - to the sea, in a great measure unserviceable,—it was at length - judged expedient to appoint certain regiments for that service, - who were trained to the different modes of sea-fighting, and also - made useful in some of those manœuvres of a ship where a great - many hands were required. These, from the nature of their duty, - were distinguished by the appellation of _maritime soldiers_, or - marines.”—Grose’s Military Antiquities of the English Army, vol. - i, p. 186. (London, 1786.) - -Here however was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round -Ægitium were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, -but also by the entire force of Ætolia, collected even from the -distant tribes Bomiês and Kalliês, who bordered on the Maliac -gulf. The invasion of Demosthenês had become known beforehand to -the Ætolians, who not only forewarned all their tribes of the -approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to -ask for aid.[487] However, they showed themselves fully capable of -defending their own territory, without foreign aid: and Demosthenês -found himself assailed, in his position at Ægitium, on all sides -at once, by these active highlanders, armed with javelins, pouring -down from the neighboring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, -they retreated when the Athenians advanced forward to charge -them,—resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who -could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the -ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen -along with Demosthenês for some time kept their unshielded assailants -at bay; but the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain, -and the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still -worse, Chromon, the Messenian, the only man who knew the country, and -could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either -ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves -in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always -returned upon them, and in every successive onset thinned and -distressed them more and more. At length the force of Demosthenês -was completely broken, and compelled to take flight; but without -beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to -them, but impervious from continual mountain, rock, and forest. Many -of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in -rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country: some even -lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames -kindled around them by the Ætolians: and the fugitives were at -length reassembled at Œneon, near the sea, with the loss of Proklês, -the colleague of Demosthenês in command, as well as of one hundred -and twenty hoplites, among the best-armed and most vigorous in the -Athenian muster-roll.[488] The remaining force was soon transported -back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenês remained behind, being -too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at -such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to -incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against Ætolia, -alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been -conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected -favor of fortune could have counterbalanced. - - [487] Thucyd. iii, 100. Προπέμψαντες πρότερον ἔς τε Κόρινθον καὶ - ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις—πείθουσιν ὥστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ - Ναύπακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν ~Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν~. - - It is not here meant, I think—as Göller and Dr. Arnold - suppose—that the Ætolians sent envoys to Lacedæmon before there - was any talk or thought of the invasion of Ætolia, simply - in prosecution of the standing antipathy which they bore to - Naupaktus: but that they had sent envoys immediately when they - heard of the preparations for invading Ætolia,—yet before the - invasion actually took place. The words διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων - ἐπαγωγήν show that this is the meaning. - - The word ἐπαγωγὴ is rightly construed by Haack, against the - Scholiast: “Because the Naupaktians were bringing in the - Athenians to invade Ætolia.” - - [488] Thucyd. iii, 98. - -The force of the new enemy whom his unsuccessful attack had raised -into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys despatched -to Sparta and Corinth found it easy to obtain the promise of a -considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naupaktus: -and about the month of September, a body of three thousand -Peloponnesian hoplites, including five hundred from the newly-founded -colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of -Eurylochus, Makarius, and Menedemus. Their road of march to Naupaktus -lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed -either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian -township, and in the immediate neighborhood of Delphi, they had -little difficulty,—for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with -their neighbors on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that -the new armament might become the instrument of Phocian antipathy -against them. On the very first application they joined the Spartan -alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover, they -persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the Myoneis, -who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the -same. Eurylochus received from these various townships reinforcements -for his army, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he -deposited at Kytinium in Doris: and he was thus enabled to march -through all the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians without resistance; -except from Œneon and Eupalion, both which places he took by force. -Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, he was there joined -by the full force of the Ætolians; and their joint efforts, after -laying waste all the neighborhood, captured the Corinthian colony of -Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.[489] - - [489] Thucyd. iii, 101, 102. - -Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was -in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had -it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenês, who -had remained there ever since the unfortunate Ætolian expedition. -Apprized of the coming march of Eurylochus, he went personally to -the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the -defence of Naupaktus: for a long time they turned a deaf ear to his -solicitations, in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas, but -they were at length induced to consent. At the head of one thousand -Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenês threw himself into Naupaktus; -and Eurylochus, seeing that the town had thus been placed out of -the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it,—marching -farther westward to the neighboring territories of Ætolia, Kalydon, -Pleuron, and Proschium, near the Achelôus and the borders of -Akarnania. The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common -purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to -their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots, rejoiced to find so -considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighborhood, prevailed -upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphilochian Argos as well -as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of -bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the -Ambrakian and Corinthian gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon. -Having persuaded Eurylochus thus to keep his forces together and -ready, they themselves with three thousand Ambrakiot hoplites invaded -the territory of the Amphilochian Argos, and captured the fortified -hill of Olpæ immediately bordering on the Ambrakian gulf, about three -miles from Argos itself: this hill had been in former days employed -by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the -whole nation.[490] - - [490] Thucyd. iii, 102-105. - -This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochus, was the -signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians marched with -their whole force to the protection of Argos, and occupied a post -called Krênæ in the Amphilochian territory, hoping to be able to -prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots -at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenês -at Naupaktus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes -under Aristotelês and Hierophon, entreating their aid in the present -need, and inviting Demosthenês to act as their commander. They had -forgotten their displeasure against him arising out of his recent -refusal to blockade at Leukas,—for which they probably thought that -he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace in Ætolia; while -they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the accident -whereby he had been detained at Naupaktus, now worked fortunately for -them as well as for him: it secured to them a commander whom all of -them respected, obviating the jealousies among their own numerous -petty townships,—it procured for him the means of retrieving his -own reputation at Athens. Demosthenês, not backward in seizing this -golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian gulf with the -twenty Athenian triremes, conducting two hundred Messenian hoplites -and sixty Athenian bowmen. He found the whole Akarnanian force -concentrated at the Amphilochian Argos, and was named general along -with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole -direction of the operations. - -He found also the whole of the enemy’s force, both the three thousand -Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus, -already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For -Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprized that the Ambrakiots had -reached Olpæ, broke up forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia, -knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of -Akarnania consisted in celerity: the whole Akarnanian force, however, -had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through -that country. He crossed the Achelôus, marched westward of Stratus, -through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Medeon, and Limnæa, then -quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, -he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Thyamus, -in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. -From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and -passed unobserved under cover of the darkness between Argos itself, -and the Akarnanian force at Krênæ; so as to join in safety the three -thousand Ambrakiots at Olpæ; to their great joy,—for they had feared -that the enemy at Argos and Krênæ would have arrested his passage; -and feeling their force inadequate to contend alone, they had sent -pressing messages home to demand large reinforcements for themselves -and their own protection.[491] - - [491] Thucyd. iii, 105, 106, 107. - -Demosthenês thus found an united and formidable enemy, superior in -number to himself, at Olpæ, and conducted his troops from Argos and -Krênæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and -between the two armies lay a steep ravine which neither liked to -be the first to pass, so that they lay for five days inactive. If -Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed -this delay to unfavorable sacrifices (which may probably have been -the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting -the prophets on both sides; but the more positive and practical -genius of Thucydidês merely acquaints us, that on the sixth day -both armies put themselves in order of battle,—both probably tired -of waiting. The ground being favorable for ambuscade, Demosthenês -hid in a bushy dell four hundred hoplites and light-armed, so that -they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the -Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the -right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus -on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians, with the Amphilochian -akontists, or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot -hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were, however, intermixed in -the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained -a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle -accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was -proceeding to surround Demosthenês, when on a sudden the men in -ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, and -they made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: -they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself -with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early -slain. Demosthenês, having near him his best troops, pressed them -vigorously and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the -centre, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the -right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots, the most warlike -Greeks in the Epirotic regions, completely defeated the Akarnanians -opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. -So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenês over -the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in -fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without -severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, -the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating -order.[492] The loss in the army of Demosthenês was about three -hundred: that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not -specified. - - [492] Thucyd. iii, 107, 108: compare Polyænus, iii, 1. - -Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarius, had -been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by -sea and land,—the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. -It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, -especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot reinforcement coming -from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, -too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary -truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with -Demosthenês and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining -an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenês -(with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to -the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together -with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops,—that if they -chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their -comrades, no opposition would be offered: for he designed by this -means, not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of -Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries -who had come under Eurylochus, but also to obtain the more permanent -advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the -eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military -fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenês to grant a -separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with -Menedæus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it -with indignation: yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, -that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried -into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as a -specimen of separate treason in officers, to purchase safety for -themselves by abandoning those under their command. Had the officers -been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as an example of -the pretended faithlessness of democracy: but as it was the act of a -Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, -we can only remark upon it as a farther manifestation of that -intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation -towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably -prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case indeed -heightened by the fact that the men deserted were fellow-Dorians and -fellow-soldiers, who had just fought in the same ranks. - -As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, -Menedæus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret -convention, stole away slyly and in small bands under pretence of -collecting wood and vegetables: on getting to a little distance, -they quickened their pace and made off,—much to the dismay of the -Ambrakiots, who ran after them and tried to overtake them. The -Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in -explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. Nor was -it without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard, -from their own troops, that they at length caused the fugitive -Peloponnesians to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most -obnoxious of the two to Akarnanian feeling, were pursued without any -reserve, and two hundred of them were slain before they could escape -into the friendly territory of the Agræans.[493] To distinguish -Ambrakiots from Peloponnesians, similar in race and dialect, was, -however, no easy task, and much dispute arose in individual cases. - - [493] Thucyd. iii, 111. - -Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity -was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city, -which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started -in due course as soon as it could be got ready, and entered the -territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was -fought, but ignorant of that misfortune, and hoping to arrive soon -enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to -Demosthenês, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians; who, -at the same time, indicated to him the best way of surprising them -in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at -the two conspicuous peaks called Idomenê, immediately above a narrow -pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the -line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night -at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on -the next morning. On that same night, a detachment of Amphilochians, -under direction from Demosthenês, seized the higher of the two peaks; -while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, -started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. One of -these divisions, having the advantage of Amphilochian guides in their -own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to Idomenê; -the other, under Demosthenês himself, went directly through the pass -leading from Idomenê to Olpæ. After marching all night, they reached -the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak,—Demosthenês -himself with his Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete; -the Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even -the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle,—hearing themselves -accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenês -had placed in front for that express purpose, and not seeing very -clearly in the morning twilight, mistook them for some of their own -fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians -and Messenians thus fell among the Ambrakiots sleeping and unarmed, -and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them -were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions -among the neighboring mountains, none knowing the roads and the -country; it was the country of the Amphilochians, subjects of -Ambrakia, but subjects averse to their condition, and now making -use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to -inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Ambrakiots -became entangled in ravines,—others fell into ambuscades laid by the -Amphilochians. Others again, dreading most of all to fall into the -hands of the Amphilochians, barbaric in race as well as intensely -hostile in feeling, and seeing no other possibility of escaping -them, swam off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore. -There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to -Ambrakia.[494] - - [494] Thucyd. iii, 112. - -The complete victory of Idomenê, admirably prepared by Demosthenês, -was achieved with scarce any loss: and the Akarnanians, after -erecting their trophy, despoiled the enemy’s dead and carried off the -arms thus taken to Argos. - -On the morrow they were visited by a herald, coming from those -Ambrakiots who had fled into the Agræan territory, after the battle -of Olpæ, and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary -request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who -had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came, -knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomenê,—just -as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpæ; while, -on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were -full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomenê, supposed -that the message referred to the men slain in that engagement. The -numerous panoplies just acquired at Idomenê lay piled up in the -camp, and the herald, on seeing them, was struck with amazement at -the size of the heap, so much exceeding the number of those who were -missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason -of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been -slain,—meaning to refer to the slain at Idomenê. “About two hundred,” -the herald replied. “Yet these arms here show, not that number, but -more than a thousand men.” “Then they are not the arms of those who -fought with us.” “Nay, but they are; if ye were the persons who -fought yesterday at Idomenê.” “We fought with no one yesterday: it -was the day before yesterday, in the retreat.” “O, then ye have to -learn, that _we_ were engaged yesterday with these others, who were -on their march as reinforcement from the city of Ambrakia.” - -The unfortunate herald now learned for the first time that the large -reinforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his -feeling of mingled anguish and surprise, that he raised a loud cry of -woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word; not even -prosecuting his request about the burial of the dead bodies,—which -appears on this fatal occasion to have been neglected.[495] - - [495] Thucyd. iii, 113. - -His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity, -which Thucydidês considers to have been the greatest that afflicted -any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias; -so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learned the number -slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed,—a -scruple which we, his readers, have much reason to regret. It appears -that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was -destroyed, and Demosthenês was urgent with the Akarnanians to march -thither at once: had they consented, Thucydidês tells us positively -that the city would have surrendered without a blow.[496] But they -refused to undertake the enterprise, fearing, according to the -historian, that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome -neighbors to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was -operative, we need not doubt: but it can hardly have been either the -single, or even the chief, reason; for, had it been so, they would -have been equally afraid of Athenian coöperation in the blockade of -Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenês, and -had quarrelled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them -than Leukas, and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear: -but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenês -had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to -find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner. - - [496] Thucyd. iii, 113. πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μιᾷ πόλει Ἑλληνίδι - μέγιστον δὴ τῶν ~κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε~ ἐγένετο. Καὶ ἀριθμὸν - οὐκ ἔγραψα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἄπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται - ἀπολέσθαι, ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μέντοι - ~οἶδα~ ὅτι, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, Ἀθηναίοις - καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι, ἐξελεῖν, αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν εἷλον· νῦν δὲ - ἔδεισαν, μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι - ὦσι. - - We may remark that the expression κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε, when it - occurs in the first, second, third, or first half of the fourth - Book of Thucydidês, seems to allude to the first ten years of the - Peloponnesian war, which ended with the peace of Nikias. - - In a careful dissertation, by Franz Wolfgang Ullrich, analyzing - the structure of the history of Thucydidês, it is made to appear - that the first, second, and third Books, with the first half of - the fourth, were composed during the interval between the peace - of Nikias and the beginning of the last nine years of the war, - called the Dekeleian war; allowing for two passages in these - early books which must have been subsequently introduced. - - The later books seem to have been taken up by Thucydidês as a - separate work, continuing the former, and a sort of separate - preface is given for them (v, 26), γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς - Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἑξῆς, etc. It is in this later portion that - he first takes up the view peculiar to him, of reckoning the - whole twenty-seven years as one continued war only nominally - interrupted (Ullrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydidês, pp. - 85, 125, 138, etc. Hamburgh, 1846). - - Compare ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε (iii, 98), which in like manner means - the war prior to the peace of Nikias. - -In the distribution of the spoil, three hundred panoplies were -first set apart as the perquisite of Demosthenês: the remainder -were then distributed, one-third for the Athenians, the other -two-thirds among the Akarnanian townships. The immense reserve, -personally appropriated to Demosthenês, enables us to make some -vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakiots. The fraction of -one-third, assigned to the Athenian people, must have been, we may -imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion, -than the reserve of the general: for the latter was at that time -under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things -to regain their favor,—an object which would be frustrated rather -than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were not greatly -disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Reasoning upon -this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be eighteen -hundred, and the total of Ambrakiot slain, whose arms became public -property, would be five thousand four hundred. To which must be -added some Ambrakiots killed in their flight from Idomenê by the -Amphilochians, in dells, ravines, and by-places: probably those -Amphilochians, who slew them, would appropriate the arms privately, -without bringing them into the general stock. Upon this calculation, -the total number of Ambrakiot slain in both battles and both -pursuits, would be about six thousand: a number suitable to the grave -expressions of Thucydidês, as well as to his statements, that the -first detachment which marched to Olpæ was three thousand strong, and -that the message sent home invoked as reinforcement the total force -of the city. How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more -conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged -shortly afterwards to send by land a detachment of three hundred -hoplites for its defence.[497] - - [497] Thucyd. iii, 114. Diodorus (xii, 60) abridges the narrative - of Thucydidês. - -The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Naupaktus, -after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians -and Amphilochians on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and -Peloponnesians—who had fled after the battle of Olpæ into the -territory of Salynthius and the Agræi—on the other, insuring a safe -and unmolested egress to both of the latter.[498] With the Ambrakiots -a more permanent pacification was effected: the Akarnanians and -Amphilochians concluded with them a peace and alliance for one -hundred years, on condition that they should surrender all the -Amphilochian territory and hostages in their possession, and should -bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility -to the Akarnanians. Each party, however, maintained its separate -alliance,—the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the -Akarnanians with Athens: it was stipulated that the Akarnanians -should not be required to assist the Ambrakiots against Athens, nor -the Ambrakiots to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian -league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to -the other.[499] - - [498] Thucyd. iii, 114. Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, ἀπελθόντων - Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους, τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους - καταφυγοῦσιν Ἀμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀναχώρησιν - ἐσπείσαντο ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν, οἵπερ καὶ μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίον. - - This is a very difficult passage. Hermann has conjectured, and - Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold all approve, the reading παρὰ - Σαλυνθίου instead of the two last words of this sentence. The - passage might certainly be construed with this emendation, though - there would still be an awkwardness in the position of the - relative οἵπερ with regard to its antecedent, and in the position - of the particle καὶ, which ought then properly to come after - μετανέστησαν, and not before it. The sentence would then mean, - that “the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians, who had originally taken - refuge with Salynthius, had moved away from his territory to - Œniadæ,” from which place they were now to enjoy safe departure. - - I think, however, that the sentence would construe equally well, - or at least with no greater awkwardness, without any conjectural - alteration of the text, if we suppose Οἰνιαδῶν to be not merely - the name of the place, but the name of the inhabitants: and the - word seems to be used in this double sense (Thucyd. ii, 100). As - the word is already in the patronymic form, it would be difficult - to deduce from it a new _nomen gentile_. Several of the Attic - demes, which are in the patronymic form, present this same double - meaning. If this supposition be admitted, the sentence will mean, - that “safe retreat was granted to Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians - from the Œniade, who _also_—καὶ, that is, they as well as the - Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians—went up to the territory of - Salynthius.” These Œniadæ were enemies of the general body of - Akarnanians (ii, 100), and they may well have gone thither to - help in extricating the fugitive Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians. - - [499] Thucyd. iii, 114. - -To Demosthenês personally, the events on the coast of the Ambrakian -gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill -which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence -in the Ætolian expedition, and to reëstablish himself in the favor -of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens, during -the course of the winter, with his reserved present of three hundred -panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that -the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the -Athenian people, were captured at sea, and never reached Athens. -Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenês were the only trophy of -the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples, -where Thucydidês mentions them as still existing at the time when he -wrote.[500] - - [500] Thucyd. iii, 114. Τὰ δὲ ~νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς - ἱεροῖς~ Δημοσθένει ἐξῃρέθησαν, τριακόσιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἄγων - αὐτὰς κατέπλευσε. Καὶ ἐγένετο ἅμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας - ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεεστέρα ἡ κάθοδος. - -It was in the same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an -oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred -island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, -since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation -of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this -period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a -year, disappeared,—many of them probably ascribed this relief to the -effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island -were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed, and reinterred in -the neighboring island of Rheneia: and orders were given that for -the future no deaths and no births should take place in the sacred -island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival—once the common point -of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated -for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests -had subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia—was now renewed. -The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, -even the chariot-race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been -known in former times: and they appointed a similar festival to be -celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both -from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the -revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious -zeal and munificence of Nikias was strikingly displayed at Delos.[501] - - [501] Thucyd. iii, 104; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 3, 4; Diodor. xii, - 58. - - - - -CHAPTER LII. - -SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA. - - -The invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an -ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except -the third and sixth, and then omitted only from accidental causes; -though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the -commencement of the war. During the present spring, Agis king of -Sparta conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, seemingly -about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages. - -It seemed, however, as if Korkyra were about to become the principal -scene of the year’s military operations: for the exiles of the -oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified -themselves on Mount Istônê, carried on war with so much activity -against the Korkyræans in the city, that distress and even famine -reigned there; while sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither -to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how -hardly the Korkyræans in the city were pressed, orders were given to -an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under -Eurymedon and Sophoklês, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and -to lend whatever aid might be needed.[502] But during the course -of this voyage, an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen -nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to -the whole war,—illustrating forcibly the observations of Periklês -and Archidamus before its commencement, on the impossibility of -calculating what turn events might take.[503] - - [502] Thucyd. iv, 2, 3. - - [503] Thucyd. i, 140; ii, 11. - -So high did Demosthenês stand in the favor of his countrymen, after -his brilliant successes in the Ambrakian gulf, that they granted -him permission, at his own request, to go aboard and to employ the -fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of -Peloponnesus. The attachment of this active officer to the Messenians -at Naupaktus, inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment -of them on some well-chosen maritime post in the ancient Messenian -territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the -Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots,—the more so, -from their analogy of race and dialect. The Messenians, active in -privateering, and doubtless well acquainted with the points of this -coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had -probably indicated to him Pylus, on the southwestern shore. That -ancient and Homeric name was applied specially and properly to denote -the promontory which forms the northern termination of the modern -bay of Navarino, opposite to the island of Sphagia, or Sphakteria; -though in vague language the whole neighboring district seems also -to have been called Pylus. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Laconia, -Demosthenês requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot -long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay -afterwards and maintain it with a garrison. It was an uninhabited -promontory, about forty-five miles from Sparta; that is, as far -distant as any portion of her territory, presenting rugged cliffs, -and easy of defence both by sea and land: but its great additional -recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Athens, -consisted in its overhanging the spacious and secure basin now called -the bay of Navarino. That basin was fronted and protected by the -islet called Sphakteria, or Sphagia, untrodden, untenanted, and full -of wood, which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three -quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances: one at its northern end, -opposite to the position fixed on by Demosthenês, so confined as -to admit only two triremes abreast,—the other at the southern end, -about four times as broad; while the inner water approached by these -two channels was both roomy and protected. It was on the coast of -Peloponnesus, a little within the northern or narrowest of the two -channels, that Demosthenês proposed to plant his little fort,—the -ground being itself eminently favorable, and a spring of fresh -water[504] in the centre of the promontory.[505] - - [504] Thucyd. iv, 26. - - [505] Topography of Sphakteria and Pylus. The description given - by Thucydidês, of the memorable incidents in or near Pylus and - Sphakteria, is perfectly clear, intelligible, and consistent with - itself, as to topography. But when we consult the topography of - the scene as it stands now, we find various circumstances which - cannot possibly be reconciled with Thucydidês. Both Colonel - Leake (Travels in the Morea, vol. i, pp. 402-415) and Dr. Arnold - (Appendix to the second and third volume of his Thucydidês, p. - 444) have given plans of the coast, accompanied with valuable - remarks. - - The main discrepancy, between the statement of Thucydidês and the - present state of the coast, is to be found in the breadth of the - two channels between Sphakteria and the mainland. The southern - entrance into the bay of Navarino is now between thirteen hundred - and fourteen hundred yards, with a depth of water varying - from five, seven, twenty-eight, thirty-three fathoms; whereas - Thucydidês states it as being only a breadth adequate to admit - eight or nine triremes abreast. The northern entrance is about - one hundred and fifty yards in width, with a shoal or bar of - sand lying across it on which there are not more than eighteen - inches of water: Thucydidês tells us that it afforded room for no - more than two triremes, and his narrative implies a much greater - depth of water, so as to make the entrance for triremes perfectly - unobstructed. - - Colonel Leake supposes that Thucydidês was misinformed as to - the breadth of the southern passage; but Dr. Arnold has on this - point given a satisfactory reply,—that the narrowness of the - breadth is not merely affirmed in the numbers of Thucydidês, but - is indirectly implied in his narrative, where he tells us that - the Lacedæmonians intended to choke up both of them by triremes - closely packed. Obviously, this expedient could not be dreamt - of, except for a very narrow mouth. The same reply suffices - against the doubts which Bloomfield and Poppo (Comment. p. 10) - raise about the genuineness of the numerals ὀκτὼ or ἐννέα in - Thucydidês; a doubt which merely transfers the supposed error - from Thucydidês to the writer of the MS. - - Dr. Arnold has himself raised a still graver doubt; whether the - island now called Sphagia be really the same as Sphakteria, - and whether the bay of Navarino be the real harbor of Pylus. - He suspects that the Pale-Navarino which has been generally - understood to be Pylus, was in reality the ancient Sphakteria, - separated from the mainland in ancient times by a channel at the - north as well as by another at the southeast,—though now it is - not an island at all. He farther suspects that the lake or lagoon - called Lake of Osmyn Aga, north of the harbor of Navarino, and - immediately under that which he supposes to have been Sphakteria, - was the ancient harbor of Pylus, in which the sea-fight between - the Athenians and Lacedæmonians took place. He does not, indeed, - assert this as a positive opinion, but leans to it as the most - probable, admitting that there are difficulties either way. - - Dr. Arnold has stated some of the difficulties which beset this - hypothesis (p. 447), but there was one which he has not stated, - which appears to me the most formidable of all, and quite fatal - to the admissibility of his opinion. If the Paleokastro of - Navarino was the real ancient Sphakteria, it must have been a - second island situated to the northward of Sphagia. There must - therefore have been _two_ islands close together off the coast - and near the scene. Now if the reader will follow the account of - Thucydidês, he will see that there certainly was no more than - _one_ island,—Sphakteria, without any other near or adjoining to - it; see especially c. 13: the Athenian fleet under Eurymedon, - on first arriving, was obliged to go back some distance to the - island of Prôtê, because _the island_ of Sphakteria was full of - Lacedæmonian hoplites: if Dr. Arnold’s hypothesis were admitted, - there would have been nothing to hinder them from landing on - Sphagia itself,—the same inference may be deduced from c. 8. The - statement of Pliny (H. N. iv, 12) that there were _tres Sphagiæ_ - off Pylus, unless we suppose with Hardouin that two of them - were mere rocks, appears to me inconsistent with the account of - Thucydidês. - - I think that there is no alternative except to suppose that - a great alteration has taken place in the two passages which - separate Sphagia from the mainland, during the interval of two - thousand four hundred years which separates us from Thucydidês. - The mainland to the south of Navarino must have been much nearer - than it is now to the southern portion of Sphagia, while the - northern passage also must have been then both narrower and - clearer. To suppose a change in the configuration of the coast to - this extent, seems noway extravagant: any other hypothesis which - may be started will be found involved in much greater difficulty. - -But Eurymedon and Sophoklês decidedly rejected all proposition of -delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though -seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesian fleet had actually -reached Korkyra: they might well have remembered the mischief which -had ensued three years before from the delay of the reinforcement -sent to Phormio in some desultory operations on the coast of Krete. -The fleet accordingly passed by Pylus without stopping: but a -terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in -the very harbor which Demosthenês had fixed upon,—the only harbor -anywhere near. That officer took advantage of this accident to -renew his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders -chimerical: there were plenty of desert capes round Peloponnesus, -they said, if he chose to waste the resources of the city in -occupying them,[506]—nor were they at all moved by his reasons in -reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenês presumed upon -the undefined permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to -address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxiarchs, -or inferior officers, and to persuade them to second his project, -even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might -well have arisen from such clashing of authority: but it happened -that both the soldiers and the taxiarchs took the same view of -the case as their commanders, and refused compliance: nor can we -be surprised at such reluctance, when we reflect upon the seeming -improbability of being able to maintain such a post against the -great real, and still greater supposed, superiority of Lacedæmonian -land-force. It happened, however, that the fleet was detained there -for some days by stormy weather; so that the soldiers, having -nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of occupying -themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to execute -it with all the emulation of eager volunteers. Having contemplated -nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools -for cutting stone, nor hods for carrying mortar:[507] accordingly, -they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces -of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as each -happened to fit in: whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on -their backs bent inwards, with hands joined behind them to prevent -it from slipping away. Such deficiencies were made up, however, -partly by the unbounded ardor of the soldiers, partly by the natural -difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification -except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way -in six days, and Demosthenês was left in garrison with five ships, -while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Korkyra. The -crews of the five ships, two of which, however, were sent away to -warn Eurymedon afterwards, would amount to about one thousand in -all: but there presently arrived two armed Messenian privateers, -from which Demosthenês obtained a reinforcement of forty Messenian -hoplites, together with a supply of wicker shields, though more fit -for show than for use, wherewith to arm his rowers. Altogether, it -appears that he must have had about two hundred hoplites, besides the -half-armed seamen.[508] - - [506] Thucyd. iv, 3. The account, alike meagre and inaccurate, - given by Diodorus, of these interesting events in Pylus and - Sphakteria, will be found in Diodor. xii, 61-64. - - [507] Thucyd. iv, 4. - - [508] Thucyd. iv, 9. Demosthenês placed the _greater number_ - (τοὺς πολλοὺς) of his hoplites round the walls of his post, and - selected _sixty_ of them to march down to the shore. This implies - a total which can hardly be less than two hundred. - -Intelligence of this attempt to plant, even upon the Lacedæmonian -territory, the annoyance and insult of a hostile post, was soon -transmitted to Sparta,—yet no immediate measures were taken to -march to the spot; as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan -character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then going -on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the -expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression, however, -was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who -were at the same time suffering from want of provisions, the corn -not being yet ripe, and from an unusually cold spring: accordingly, -Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylus thus -produced the effect of abridging the invasion to the unusually short -period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection -of Korkyra: for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither, -or still on its way, received orders immediately to return for the -attack of Pylus. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting -the ships across the isthmus at Leukas, it reached Pylus about the -same time as the Lacedæmonian land-force from Sparta, composed of the -Spartans themselves and the neighboring Periœki: for the more distant -Periœki, as well as the Peloponnesian allies, being just returned -from Attica, were summoned to come as soon as they could, but did not -accompany this first march.[509] - - [509] Thucyd. iv, 8. - -At the last moment, before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and -occupied the harbor, Demosthenês detached two out of his five -triremes to warn Eurymedon and the main fleet, and to entreat -immediate succor: the remaining ships he hauled ashore under the -fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front, and -preparing to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having -posted the larger portion of his force,—some of them mere seamen -without arms, and many only half-armed,—round the assailable points -of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land-force, he -himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of -the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that -the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval -superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against -an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenês foresaw that the great -stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side, and his only chance -of safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing; a purpose, -seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility -of approach for ships, except on a narrow space immediately under the -fortification. It was here that he took post, on the water’s edge, -addressing a few words of encouragement to his men, and warning them -that it was useless now to display acuteness in summing up perils -which were but too obvious,—and that the only chance of escape lay -in boldly encountering the enemy before they could set foot ashore; -the difficulty of effecting a landing from ships in the face of -resistance being better known to Athenian mariners than to any one -else.[510] - - [510] Thucyd. iv, 10. - -With a fleet of forty-three triremes, under Thrasymelidas, and a -powerful land-force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians -had good hopes of storming at once a rock so hastily converted into -a military post. But as they foresaw that the first attack might -possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymedon would probably return, -they resolved to occupy forthwith the island of Sphakteria, the -natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the -purpose of assisting the garrison ashore. The neighboring coast on -the mainland of Peloponnesus was both harborless and hostile, so -that there was no other spot near, where they could take station. -And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to stop up, -as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbor, by -triremes lashed together, from the island to the mainland, with their -prows pointing outwards; so that they would be able at any rate, -occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the -Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenês closely blocked up[511] on -the rock of Pylus, where his provisions would quickly fail him. With -these views, they drafted off by lot some hoplites from each of the -Spartan lochi, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across -to Sphakteria; while their land-force and their fleet approached at -once to attack the fortification. - - [511] Thucyd. iv, 8. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔσπλους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρώροις - βύζην κλῄσειν ἔμελλον. - -Of the assault on the land-side, we hear little: the Lacedæmonians -were proverbially unskilful in the attack of anything like a -fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. -But the chief stress and vigor of the attack came on the sea-side, as -Demosthenês had foreseen. The landing-place, even where practicable, -was still rocky and difficult,—and so narrow in dimensions, that -the Lacedæmonian ships could only approach by small squadrons at a -time; while the Athenians maintained their ground firmly to prevent -a single man from setting foot on land. The assailing triremes rowed -up with loud shouts and exhortations to each other, striving to get -so placed as that the hoplites in the bow could effect a landing: -but such were the difficulties arising partly from the rocks and -partly from the defence, that squadron after squadron tried this -in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for -them any better success. That officer, commanding a trireme, and -observing that some of the pilots near him were cautious in driving -their ships close in shore for fear of breaking them against the -rocks, indignantly called to them not to spare the planks of their -vessels, when the enemy had insulted them by erecting a fort in the -country: Lacedæmonians, he exclaimed, ought to carry the landing by -force, even though their ships should be dashed to pieces,—nor ought -the Peloponnesian allies to be backward in sacrificing their ships -for Sparta, in return for the many services which she had rendered -to them.[512] Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, -Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and -advanced in person even on to the landing-steps for the purpose of -leaping first ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons -of the Athenian defenders, who beat him back and pierced him with so -many wounds, that he fainted away, and fell back into the bows, or -foremost part of the trireme, beyond the rowers; while his shield, -slipping away from the arm, dropped down and rolled overboard into -the sea. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without -having effected any landing: and all these successive attacks -from the sea, repeated for one whole day and a part of the next -were repulsed by Demosthenês and his little band with victorious -bravery. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary -relations,[513] that the Athenians, essentially maritime, should -be fighting on land—and that, too, Lacedæmonian land—against the -Lacedæmonians, the select land-warriors of Greece, now on shipboard, -and striving in vain to compass a landing on their own shore. The -Athenians, in honor of their success, erected a trophy, the chief -ornament of which was the shield of Brasidas, which had been cast -ashore by the water. - - [512] Thucyd. iv, 11, 12; Diodor. xii. Consult an excellent - note of Dr. Arnold on this passage, in which he contrasts - the looseness and exaggeration of Diodorus with the modest - distinctness of Thucydidês. - - [513] Thucyd. iv, 12. ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης ~ἐν τῷ τότε~, - τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ κρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ - θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον προέχειν. - -On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but -sent some of their vessels round to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, -for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to -employ against the wall of Demosthenês, on the side towards the -harbor, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without -machines, but where, at the same time, there was great facility -in landing,—for their previous attack had been made on the side -fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulties -of landing insuperable.[514] But before these ships came back, the -face of affairs was seriously changed by the unwelcome return of -the Athenian fleet from Zakynthus, under Eurymedon, reinforced by -four Chian ships, and some of the guard-ships at Naupaktus, so as -now to muster fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the enemy’s -fleet in possession of the harbor, and seeing both the island of -Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian -hoplites,[515]—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had -now arrived,—looked around in vain for a place to land, and could -find no other night-station except the uninhabited island of Prôtê, -not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to -Pylus, prepared for a naval engagement,—hoping that perhaps the -Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but -resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack -the fleet in the harbor; the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and -the mainland being sufficient to admit of nautical manœuvre.[516] -The Lacedæmonian admirals, seemingly confounded by the speed of the -Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of sailing out of the -harbor to fight, nor did they even realize their scheme of blocking -up the two entrances of the harbor with triremes closely lashed -together. Both entrances were left open, though they determined to -defend themselves within: but even here, so defective were their -precautions, that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the -rowers not fully aboard, when the Athenian admirals sailed in by both -entrances at once to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes, -afloat, and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain -time, but were at length vanquished, and driven back to the shore, -many of them with serious injury.[517] Five of them were captured -and towed off, one with all her crew aboard, and the Athenians, -vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge -on the shore, as well as those which were not manned at the moment -when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into -action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their -crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding -to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed -a new and strenuous resistance. Excited to the utmost pitch by -witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet, and aware of the -cruel consequences which turned upon it,—they marched all armed -into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged -off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to baffle the assailants: -we have already seen a similar act of bravery, two years before, -on the part of the Messenian hoplites accompanying the fleet of -Phormio near Naupaktus.[518] Extraordinary daring and valor was here -displayed on both sides, in the attack as well as in the defence, -and such was the clamor and confusion, that neither the land skill -of the Lacedæmonians, nor the sea skill of the Athenians, were of -much avail: the contest was one of personal valor and considerable -suffering on both sides. At length the Lacedæmonians carried their -point, and saved all the ships ashore; none being carried away except -those at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians -retired to the fortress at Pylus, where they were doubtless hailed -with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they erected a -trophy for their victory, giving up the enemy’s dead for burial, and -picking up the floating wrecks and pieces.[519] - - [514] Thucyd. iv, 13. ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος ὕψος - μὲν ἔχειν, ἀποβάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὔσης ἑλεῖν μηχαναῖς. See Poppo’s - note upon this passage. - - [515] Thucyd. iv, 14. - - [516] Thucyd. iv, 13. The Lacedæmonians παρεσκευάζοντο, ἢν ἐσπλέῃ - τις, ὡς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὄντι οὐ σμικρῷ ναυμαχήσοντες. - - The expression, “the harbor which was not small,” to designate - the spacious bay of Navarino, has excited much remark from Mr. - Bloomfield and Dr. Arnold, and was indeed one of the reasons - which induced the latter to suspect that the harbor meant by - Thucydidês was _not_ the bay of Navarino, but the neighboring - lake of Osmyn Aga. - - I have already discussed that supposition in a former note: but - in reference to the expression οὐ σμικρῷ, we may observe, first, - that the use of negative expressions to convey a positive idea - would be in the ordinary manner of Thucydidês. - - But farther, I have stated in a previous note that it is - indispensable, in my judgment, to suppose the island of - Sphakteria to have touched the mainland much more closely in the - time of Thucydidês than it does now. At that time, therefore, - very probably, the basin of Navarino was not so large as we now - find it. - - [517] Thucyd. iv, 14. ~ἔτρωσαν~ μὲν πολλὰς, πέντε δ᾽ ἔλαβον. We - cannot in English speak of _wounding_ a trireme,—though the Greek - word is both lively and accurate, to represent the blow inflicted - by the impinging beak of an enemy’s ship. - - [518] See above, in this History, chap. xlix. - - [519] Thucyd. iv, 13, 14. - -But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships -captured, nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylus. It -lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were -now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The -Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as -their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, -deeply distressed, but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for -advice. So grave was the emergency, that the ephors came in person -to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, -a greater number than the Athenians,—besides a large force on land, -and the whole command of the resources of the country,—while the -Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of -Pylus, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off -the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland -would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either -Demosthenês or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would -have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather steadfast and -unyielding than adventurous: and, moreover, the Athenian superiority -at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men’s minds, analogous -to that of the Spartans themselves on land; so that the ephors, on -reaching Pylus, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a -herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to -allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace. - -To this Eurymedon and Demosthenês assented, and an armistice was -concluded on the following terms: The Lacedæmonians agreed to -surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbor, but also all -the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also, -to abstain from all attack upon the fortress at Pylus, either by -land or sea, for such time as should be necessary for the mission of -envoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected -in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians -on their side engaged to desist from all hostilities during the -like interval; but it was agreed that they should keep strict and -unremitting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For -the subsistence of the detachment in the island, the Lacedæmonians -were permitted to send over every day two chœnikes of barley-meal in -cakes, ready baked, two kotylæ of wine,[520] and some meat, for each -hoplite,—together with half that quantity for each of the attendant -Helots; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the -Athenians, with peremptory obligation to send no secret additional -supplies. It was, moreover, expressly stipulated that if any one -provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole -should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, -on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in -the same condition as they received them. - - [520] Thucyd. iv, 16. The chœnix was equivalent to about two - pints, English dry measure: it was considered as the usual daily - sustenance for a slave. Each Lacedæmonian soldier had, therefore, - double of this daily allowance, besides meat, in weight and - quantity not specified: the fact that the quantity of meat is not - specified, seems to show that they did not fear abuse in this - item. - - The kotyla contained about half a pint, English wine measure: - each Lacedæmonian soldier had, therefore, a pint of wine daily. - It was always the practice in Greece to drink the wine with a - large admixture of water. - -Such terms sufficiently attest the humiliation and anxiety of the -Lacedæmonians; while the surrender of their entire naval force to -the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into -effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed -in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well aware that they were -themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the -Athenians desired peace, and that the latter had besides made -fruitless overtures while under the pressure of the epidemic, they -presumed that the same dispositions still prevailed at Athens, and -that their present pacific wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to -procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners in -Sphakteria.[521] - - [521] Thucyd. iv, 21: compare vii, 18. - -The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, -appeared before the public assembly to set forth their mission, -according to custom, prefacing their address with some apologies -for that brevity of speech which belonged to their country. Their -proposition was in substance a very simple one: “Give up to us the -men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this favor, peace, -with the alliance of Sparta.” They enforced their cause, by appeals, -well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but -still more to the prudential calculation of Athens; explicitly -admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was -now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior -position.[522] They, the Lacedæmonians, the first and greatest power -in Greece, were now smitten by adverse fortune of war,—and that too -without misconduct of their own, so that they were for the first -time obliged to solicit an enemy for peace; which Athens had the -precious opportunity of granting, not merely with honor to herself, -but also in such manner as to create in their minds an ineffaceable -friendship. And it became Athens to make use of her present good -fortune while she had it,—not to rely upon its permanence, nor to -abuse it by extravagant demands; her own imperial prudence, as well -as the present circumstances of the Spartans, might teach her how -unexpectedly the most disastrous casualties occurred. By granting -what was now asked, she might make a peace which would be far -more durable than if it were founded on the extorted compliances -of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honor and -gratitude; the greater the previous enmity, the stronger would be -such reactionary sentiment.[523] But if Athens should now refuse, -and if, in the farther prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria -should perish,—a new and inexpiable ground of quarrel,[524] peculiar -to Sparta herself, would be added to those already subsisting, -which rather concerned Sparta as the chief of the Peloponnesian -confederacy. Nor was it only the good-will and gratitude of the -Spartans which Athens would earn by accepting the proposition -tendered to her; she would farther acquire the grace and glory of -conferring peace on Greece, which all the Greeks would recognize as -her act. And when once the two preëminent powers, Athens and Sparta, -were established in cordial amity, the remaining Grecian states would -be too weak to resist what they two might prescribe.[525] - - [522] Thucyd. iv, 18. γνῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν ξυμφορὰς - ἀπιδόντες, etc. - - [523] Thucyd. iv, 19. - - [524] Thucyd. iv, 20. ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς, εἴπερ πότε, ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις - ἡ ξυναλλαγὴ, πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον διὰ μέσου γενόμενον ἡμᾶς - καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη ἀΐδιον ὑμῖν ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ ~κοινῇ καὶ - ἰδίαν~ ἔχειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι ὧν νῦν προκαλούμεθα. - - I understand these words κοινὴ and ἰδία agreeably to the - explanation of the Scholiast, from whom Dr. Arnold, as well - as Poppo and Göller, depart, in my judgment erroneously. The - whole war had been begun in consequence of the complaints of - the Peloponnesian allies, and of wrongs alleged to have been - done to _them_ by Athens: Sparta herself had no ground of - complaint,—nothing of which she desired redress. - - Dr. Arnold translates it: “We shall hate you not only - nationally, for the wound you have inflicted on Sparta; but also - individually, because so many of us will have lost our near - relations from your inflexibility.” “The Spartan aristocracy (he - adds) would feel it a personal wound to lose at once so many of - its members, connected by blood or marriage with its principal - families: compare Thucyd. v, 15.” - - We must recollect, however, that the Athenians could not possibly - know at this time that the hoplites inclosed in Sphakteria - belonged in great proportion to the first families in Sparta. And - the Spartan envoys would surely have the diplomatic prudence to - abstain from any facts or arguments which would reveal, or even - suggest, to them so important a secret. - - [525] Thucyd. iv, 20. ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ ὑμῶν ταὐτὰ λεγόντων τό γε ἄλλο - Ἑλληνικὸν ἴστε ὅτι ὑποδεέστερον ὂν τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει. - - Aristophanês, Pac. 1048. Ἐξὸν σπεισαμένοις κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος - ἄρχειν. - -Such was the language held by the Lacedæmonians in the assembly at -Athens. It was discreetly calculated for their purpose, though when -we turn back to the commencement of the war, and read the lofty -declarations of the Spartan ephors and assembly respecting the -wrongs of their allies and the necessity of extorting full indemnity -for them from Athens, the contrast is indeed striking. On this -occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from -consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from -their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as -little scruple as the Spartan general, Menedæus, during the preceding -year, when he abandoned his Ambrakiot confederates after the battle -of Olpæ, to conclude a separate capitulation with Demosthenês. - -The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the -proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, -the trireme which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the -first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events which -had rendered the Spartans in Sphakteria certain prisoners,—so it was -then conceived,—and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their -power; thus giving a totally new character of the war. The sudden -arrival of such prodigious intelligence,—the astounding presence of -Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing the olive-branch, and in an attitude of -humiliation,—must have produced in the susceptible public of Athens -emotions of the utmost intensity; an elation and confidence such as -had probably never been felt since the reconquest of Samos. It was -difficult at first to measure the full bearings of the new situation, -and even Periklês himself might have hesitated what to recommend: but -the immediate and dominant impression with the general public was, -that Athens might now ask her own terms, as consideration for the -prisoners in the island.[526] Of this reigning tendency Kleon[527] -made himself the emphatic organ, as he had done three years before -in the sentence passed on the Mitylenæans; a man who—like leading -journals, in modern times—often appeared to guide the public because -he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, -and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences. -On the present occasion, he doubtless spoke with the most genuine -conviction; for he was full of the sentiment of Athenian force and -Athenian imperial dignity, as well as disposed to a sanguine view of -future chances. Moreover, in a discussion like that now opened, where -there was much room for doubt, he came forward with a proposition -at once plain and decisive. Reminding the Athenians of the -dishonorable truce of thirty years to which they had been compelled -by the misfortunes of the time to accede, fourteen years before the -Peloponnesian war,—Kleon insisted that now was the time for Athens to -recover what she had then lost,—Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia. He -proposed that Sparta should be required to restore these to Athens, -in exchange for the soldiers now blocked up in Sphakteria; after -which a truce might be concluded for as long a time as might be -deemed expedient. - - [526] Thucyd. iv, 21. - - [527] Thucyd. iv, 21. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, - ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ - πιθανώτατος· καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, etc. - - This sentence reads like a first introduction of Kleon to the - notice of the reader. It would appear that Thucydidês had - forgotten that he had before introduced Kleon on occasion - of the Mitylenæan surrender, and that too in language very - much the same, iii, 36. καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου,—ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ - ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε - πιθανώτατος, etc. - -This decree, adopted by the assembly, was communicated as the answer -of Athens to the Lacedæmonian envoys, who had probably retired after -their first address, and were now sent for again into the assembly, -to hear it. On being informed of the resolution, they made no comment -on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, -who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms -for a pacification. Here, however, Kleon burst upon them with an -indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first, he said, that they -came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear,—nothing -else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart -from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to -make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this -the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come -with authority to make certain concessions, but to announce these -concessions forthwith would have rendered negotiation impossible, -besides dishonoring them in the face of their allies. Such dishonor -would be incurred, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians -should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly -before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally -unpractised in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, -such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the -Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the denunciation of a vehement -speaker like Kleon, required readiness of elocution, dexterity, and -self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They -remained silent,—abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper -of the assembly: their mission was thus terminated, and they were -reconveyed in the trireme to Pylus.[528] - - [528] Thucyd. iv, 22. - -It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an -effective reply to Kleon, and to defend their proposition against -his charge of fraudulent purpose, they would have been sustained -by Nikias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the -assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a -private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But -the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the -envoys should stand forward with some defence for themselves; which -Nikias might effectively second, but could not originate: and as -they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair broke down. -We shall hereafter find other examples, in which the incapacity -of Lacedæmonian envoys, to meet the open debate of Athenian -political life, is productive of mischievous results. In this case, -the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select -commissioners, was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the -only possibility—though doubtless not a certainty—of some ultimate -pacification: and the manœuvre whereby Kleon discredited it was -a grave abuse of publicity, not unknown in modern, though more -frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that -if commissioners were named, Nikias, Lachês, and other politicians -of the same rank and color, would be the persons selected; persons -whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them -over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens: and -it will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four -years afterwards, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded. - -Unfortunately Thucydidês, in describing the proceedings of this -assembly, so important in its consequences because it intercepted a -promising opening for peace, is brief as usual,—telling us only what -was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though -nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, -we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterwards -occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked -coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Sphakteria as upon his -peculiar measure.[529] - - [529] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 7; Philochorus, Fragm. 105, ed. Didot. - -It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys -on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democratical folly. But -over-estimation of the prospective chances arising out of success, -to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now -guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, -opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form,—an able -despot like the emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like -that of England,[530]—have found success to the full as misleading. -That Athens should desire to profit by this unexpected piece of -good fortune, was perfectly reasonable: that she should make use -of it to regain advantages which former misfortunes had compelled -herself to surrender, was a feeling not unnatural. And whether the -demand was excessive, or by how much, is a question always among -the most embarrassing for any government—kingly, oligarchical, or -democratical—to determine. - - [530] Let us read some remarks of Mr. Burke on the temper of - England during the American war. - - “You remember that in the beginning of this American war, - you were greatly divided: and a very strong body, if not the - strongest, opposed itself to the madness which every art and - every power were employed to render popular, in order that the - errors of the rulers might be lost in the general blindness of - the nation. This opposition continued until after our great, - but most unfortunate, victory at Long Island. Then all the - mounds and banks of our constancy were borne down at once; and - the frenzy of the American war broke in upon us like a deluge. - This victory, which seemed to put an immediate end to all - difficulties, perfected in us that spirit of domination which our - unparalleled prosperity had but too long nurtured. We had been - so very powerful, and so very prosperous, that even the humblest - of us were degraded into the devices and follies of kings. We - lost all measure between means and ends; and our headlong desires - became our politics and our morals. All men who wished for peace, - or retained any sentiments of moderation, were overborne or - silenced: and this city (Bristol) was led by every artifice (and - probably with the more management, because _I_ was one of your - members) to distinguish itself by its zeal for that fatal cause.” - Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol previous to the election - (Works, vol. iii, p. 365). - - Compare Mr. Burke’s Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, p. 174 of - the same volume. - -We may, however, remark that Kleon gave an impolitic turn to Athenian -feeling, by directing it towards the entire and literal reacquisition -of what had been lost twenty years before. Unless we are to consider -his quadruple demand as a flourish, to be modified by subsequent -negotiation, it seems to present some plausibility, but little of -long-sighted wisdom: for while, on the one hand, it called upon -Sparta to give up much which was not in her possession and must have -been extorted by force from allies,—on the other hand, the situation -of Athens was not the same as it had been when she concluded the -thirty years’ truce; nor does it seem that the restoration of Achaia -and Trœzen would have been of any material value to her. Nisæa and -Pegæ—which would have been tantamount to the entire Megarid, inasmuch -as Megara itself could hardly have been held with both its ports in -the possession of an enemy—would, indeed, have been highly valuable, -since she could then have protected her territory against invasion -from Peloponnesus, besides possessing a port in the Corinthian gulf. -And it would seem that if able commissioners had now been named for -private discussion with the Lacedæmonian envoys, under the present -urgent desire of Sparta, coupled with her disposition to abandon her -allies,—this important point might possibly have been pressed and -carried, in exchange for Sphakteria. Nay, even if such acquisition -had been found impracticable, still, the Athenians would have been -able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach, -and destroyed the confidence, between Sparta and her allies; a point -of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every -reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the -present temper of Sparta; and the step, by which Kleon abruptly broke -off such hopes, was decidedly mischievous. - -On the return of the envoys without success to Pylus,[531] twenty -days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately -terminated; and the Lacedæmonians redemanded the triremes which -they had surrendered. But Eurymedon refused compliance with this -demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had, during the truce, made -a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylus, and had violated -the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly -stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of -the least among its conditions, should cancel all obligation on both -sides. Thucydidês, without distinctly giving his opinion, seems -rather to imply, that there was no just ground for the refusal: -though if any accidental want of vigilance had presented to the -Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylus, they would be -likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would -thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and -render the continued blockade of Sphakteria impracticable. However -the truth may be, Eurymedon persisted in his refusal, in spite of -loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities -were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again -to attack the fortifications of Pylus, while the Athenian fleet -became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphakteria, in which they -were reinforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of -seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rowing round the -island in opposite directions, throughout the whole day; while at -night, the whole fleet were kept on watch, except on the sea-side of -the island in stormy weather.[532] - - [531] Thucyd. iv, 39. - - [532] Thucyd. iv, 23. - -The blockade, however, was soon found to be more full of privation -in reference to the besiegers themselves, and more difficult of -enforcement in respect to the island and its occupants, than had been -originally contemplated. The Athenians were much distressed for want -of water; they had only one really good spring in the fortification -of Pylus itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet: -many of them were obliged to scrape the shingle and drink such -brackish water as they could find; while ships as well as men were -perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only -by relays successively landing on the rock of Pylus, or even on the -edge of Sphakteria itself, with all the chance of being interrupted -by the enemy,—there being no other landing-place,[533] and the -ancient trireme affording no accommodation either for eating or -sleeping. At first, all this was patiently borne, in the hopes that -Sphakteria would speedily be starved out, and the Spartans forced -to renew the request for capitulation: but no such request came, -and the Athenians in the fleet gradually became sick in body as well -as impatient and angry in mind. In spite of all their vigilance, -clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, -under the temptation of large rewards offered by the Spartan -government. Able swimmers contrived to cross the strait, dragging -after them by ropes skins full of linseed and poppy-seed mixed with -honey; while merchant vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started -from various parts of the Laconian coast, selecting by preference -the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their -vessel with its cargo ashore on the sea-side of the island, at a time -when the Athenian guard-ships could not be on the lookout.[534] They -cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they -could get the cargo on shore; for ample compensation was insured to -them, together with emancipation to every Helot who succeeded in -reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians redoubled -their vigilance, and intercepted many of these daring smugglers, -still, there were others who eluded them: moreover, the rations -supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the -envoys in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Epitadas -the commander had been able to economize, and thus to make the stock -hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of -surrender, and the Athenians not only felt the present sufferings -of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own -supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant -and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of -thus indefinitely continuing the blockade against the contingencies -of such violent weather, as would probably ensue at the close of -summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active -Demosthenês began to organize a descent upon the island, with the -view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the -neighboring allies, Zakynthus and Naupaktus, but also transmitted an -urgent request to Athens that reinforcements might be furnished to -him for the purpose, making known explicitly both the uncomfortable -condition of the armament, and the unpromising chances of simple -blockade.[535] - - [533] Thucyd. iv, 25. τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχούσων ὅρμον. This does not - mean (as some of the commentators seem to suppose, see Poppo’s - note) that the Athenians had not plenty of sea-room in the - harbor: it means, that they had no station ashore, except the - narrow space of Pylus itself. - - [534] Thucyd. iv, 26. - - [535] Thucyd. iv, 27, 29, 30. - -The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the -Athenians at home. Having expected to hear, long before, that -Sphakteria had surrendered, they were now taught to consider even -the ultimate conquest as a matter of doubt: they were surprised that -the Lacedæmonians sent no fresh envoys to solicit peace, and began -to suspect that such silence was founded upon well-grounded hopes of -being able to hold out. But the person most of all discomposed was -Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting -repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him -as the author of it; while, on the contrary, his numerous political -enemies were rejoiced at the turn which events had taken, as it -opened a means of effecting his ruin. At first, Kleon contended -that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts; to which the -latter replied by entreating, that if their accuracy were mistrusted, -commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon -himself, along with Theogonês, was forthwith named for this function. - -But it did not suit Kleon’s purpose to go as commissioner to Pylus, -since his mistrust of the statement was a mere general suspicion, -not resting on any positive evidence: moreover, he saw that the -dispositions of the assembly tended to comply with the request of -Demosthenês, and to despatch a reinforcing armament. He accordingly -altered his tone at once: “If ye really believe the story (he -said), do not waste time in sending commissioners, but sail at once -to capture the men. It would be easy with a proper force, if our -generals were _men_ (here he pointed reproachfully to his enemy -Nikias, then stratêgus[536]), to sail and take the soldiers in the -island. That is what _I_ at least would do, if _I_ were general.” -His words instantly provoked a hostile murmur from a portion of the -assembly: “Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter -so easy?” while Nikias, taking up this murmur, and delighted to have -caught his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person, and -pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay; intimating the -willingness of himself and his colleagues to grant him any portion -of the military force of the city which he chose to ask for. Kleon -at first closed with this proposition, believing it to be a mere -stratagem of debate and not seriously intended: but so soon as he -saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and -observed to Nikias: “It is your place to sail: _you_ are general, -not I.”[537] Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, -renouncing formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon -the Athenians to recollect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold -him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the -louder and more unanimous did the cry of the assembly become that -Nikias should surrender it to him, and that _he_ should undertake -it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of receding, -Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce -his intention in a resolute address: “I am not at all afraid of -the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with -me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but -only the Lemnian and Imbrian hoplites who are now here (that is, -Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and -Imbros, and habitually resided there), together with some peltasts, -brought from Ænos, in Thrace, and four hundred bowmen. With this -force, added to what is already at Pylos, I engage in the space of -twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria hither -as prisoners, or to kill them in the island.” The Athenians—observes -Thucydidês—laughed somewhat at Kleon’s looseness of tongue; but -prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two -advantages was now certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, -which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most -desirable,—or, if mistaken on this point, the Lacedæmonians in the -island would be killed or taken.[538] The vote was accordingly passed -for the immediate departure of Kleon, who caused Demosthenês to be -named as his colleague in command, and sent intelligence to Pylus at -once that he was about to start with the reinforcement solicited. - - [536] Thucyd. iv, 27. Καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα - ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὢν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν—ῥᾴδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ - ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ· καὶ - αὐτός γ᾽ ἂν, εἰ ἦρχε, ποιῆσαι τοῦτο. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων - τι ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥᾴδιόν - γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται· καὶ ἅμα ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἥντινα - βούλεται δύναμιν λαβόντα τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι, ἐπιχειρεῖν. - - [537] Thucyd. iv, 28. ὁ δὲ (Κλέων) τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος - αὐτὸν (Νικίαν) λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι, ἑτοῖμος ἦν, γνοὺς δὲ τῷ - ὄντι παραδωσείοντα ἀνεχώρει, καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνον - στρατηγεῖν, δεδιὼς ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενός οἱ αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι - ὑποχωρῆσαι. Αὖθις δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκέλευε καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ - Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς, καὶ μάρτυρας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐποιεῖτο. Οἱ δὲ, ~οἷον - ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν~, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν πλοῦν καὶ - ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι - τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν. Ὥστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν - εἰρημένων ἔτι ἐξαπαλλαγῇ, ὑφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ παρελθὼν οὔτε - φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. - - [538] Thucyd. iv, 28. Τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μέν τι καὶ - γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ· ἀσμένοις δ᾽ ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς - σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου - τεύξεσθαι—ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ~ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι - γνώμης~ Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσασθαι. - -This curious scene, interesting as laying open the interior feeling -of the Athenian assembly, suggests, when properly considered, -reflections very different from those which have been usually -connected with it. It seems to be conceived by most historians as -a mere piece of levity or folly in the Athenian people, who are -supposed to have enjoyed the excellent joke of putting an incompetent -man against his own will at the head of this enterprise, in order -that they might amuse themselves with his blunders: Kleon is thus -contemptible, and the Athenian people ridiculous. Certainly, if that -people had been disposed to conduct their public business upon such -childish fancies as are here implied, they would have made a very -different figure from that which history actually presents to us. -The truth is, that in regard to Kleon’s alleged looseness of tongue, -which excited more or less of laughter among the persons present, -there was no one really ridiculous except the laughers themselves: -for the announcement which he made was so far from being extravagant, -that it was realized to the letter, and realized, too, let us add, -without any peculiar aid from unforeseen favorable accident. To show -how much this is the case, we have only to contrast the jesters -before the fact with the jesters after it. While the former deride -Kleon as a promiser of extravagant and impossible results, we find -Aristophanês, in his comedy of the Knights, about six months -afterwards,[539] laughing at him as having achieved nothing at -all,—as having cunningly put himself into the shoes of Demosthenês, -and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Sphakteria, -after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got -over, and “the cake ready baked,”—to use the phrase of the comic -poet. Both of the jests are exaggerations in opposite directions; but -the last in order of time, if it be good at all against Kleon, is a -galling sarcasm against those who derided Kleon as an extravagant -boaster. - - [539] Aristophanês, Equit. 54:— - - ... καὶ πρωήν γ᾽ ἐμοῦ - Μᾶζαν μεμαχότος ἐν Πύλῳ Λακωνικὴν, - Πανουργότατά πως περιδραμὼν ὑφαρπάσας - Αὐτὸς παρέθηκε τὴν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μεμαγμένην. - - It is Demosthenês who speaks in reference to Kleon,—termed in - that comedy the Paphlagonian slave of Demos. - - Compare v. 391, - - Κᾆτ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, τἀλλότριον ἀμὼν θέρος, etc., - - and 740-1197. - - So far from cunningly thrusting himself into the post as general, - Kleon did everything he possibly could to avoid the post, and - was only forced into it by the artifices of his enemies. It is - important to notice how little the jests of Aristophanês can be - taken as any evidence of historical reality. - -If we intend fairly to compare the behavior of Kleon with that of his -political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: -first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the -Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has -been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears -to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner: -his opponents, proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a -fair chance for honorable terms of peace, took a juster view of the -public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission -for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the -fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There -were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, -and for employing all the force requisite to insure the capture of -that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was -nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while -his political adversaries, Nikias among them, are deplorably timid, -ignorant, and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn -the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party opportunity for -ruining him. - -To grant the reinforcement asked for by Demosthenês was obviously -the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along -with him in proposing it: but he had at the same time good grounds -for reproaching Nikias, and the other stratêgi, whose duty it was -to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining -silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were -Kleon’s affair and not theirs. His taunt: “This is what _I_ would -have done, if _I_ were general,” was a mere phrase of the heat of -debate, such as must have been very often used, without any idea -on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the -speaker was bound to realize: nor was it any disgrace to Kleon to -decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his -incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the -post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, was not, as some -historians would have us believe, because the Athenian people loved -a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided -the assembly,—feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding -on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him -forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry, -and that he would thus be ruined: his friends, perceiving this -manœuvre, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing -his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more -vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer -by cheers of sincere encouragement. “Why do you not try your hand at -this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? You will soon find -that it is too much for you;” was the cry of his enemies: to which -his friends would reply: “Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon: by all means, -try: do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honorably out -of it, and we will stand by you.” Such cheer and counter-cheer is -precisely in the temper of an animated multitude, as Thucydidês[540] -states it, divided in feeling; and friends as well as enemies thus -concurred to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of -all the parties here concerned those whose conduct is the most -unpardonably disgraceful are Nikias and his oligarchical friends; -who force a political enemy into a supreme command against his own -strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail so as to compromise -the lives of many soldiers, and the destinies of the state on an -important emergency,—but satisfying themselves with the idea that -they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin. - - [540] Thucyd. iv, 28. οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν, etc. - -It is to be remarked, that Nikias and his fellow stratêgi were -backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of -the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death at Sphakteria, -such as that at Thermopylæ: in which case, though victory might -perhaps be won by a superior assailant force, it would not be won -without much bloodshed and peril, besides an inexpiable quarrel with -Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought -to have credit for it, as one “bene ausus vana contemnere.” And it -seems probable, that if he had not been thus forward in supporting -the request of Demosthenês for reinforcement,—or rather, if he had -not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward,—Nikias and -his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and reopened -negotiations for peace, under circumstances neither honorable nor -advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this manner one main author of -the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole -war. - -On joining Demosthenês with his reinforcement, Kleon found every -preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at -Pylus eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve -them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphakteria had become recently -more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of -the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Athenian seamen, while -landing at the skirt of the island, and cooking their food: under the -influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had thus -caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenês this was an accident -especially welcome; for the painful experience of his defeat in the -forest-covered hills of Ætolia had taught him how difficult it was -for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and -who knew all the good points of defence in the country.[541] The -island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey -the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack -on certain data. He now, too, for the first time, discovered that -he had underrated their real number, having before suspected that -the Lacedæmonians had sent in rations for a greater total than was -actually there. The island was occupied altogether by four hundred -and twenty Lacedæmonian hoplites, out of whom more than one hundred -and twenty were native Spartans, belonging to the first families -in the city. The commander, Epitadas, with the main body, occupied -the centre of the island, near the only spring of water which it -afforded:[542] an advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not -far from the sea-shore, in the end of the island farthest from -Pylus; while the end immediately fronting Pylus, peculiarly steep -and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones, of unknown -origin, which served as a sort of defence, was held as a post of -reserve.[543] - - [541] Thucyd. iv, 30. - - [542] Colonel Leake gives an interesting illustration of these - particulars in the topography of the island which may even now be - verified (Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 408). - - [543] Thucyd. iv, 31. - -Such was the prey which Kleon and Demosthenês were anxious to grasp. -On the very day of the arrival of the former, they sent a herald to -the Lacedæmonian generals on the mainland, inviting the surrender of -the hoplites on the island, on condition of being simply detained -under guard without any hardship, until a final pacification should -take place. Of course the summons was refused; after which, leaving -only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night -to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making show as if -they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, -so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The -entire body of Athenian hoplites, eight hundred in number, were thus -disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a -little before daybreak: the advanced guard of thirty Lacedæmonians, -completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep and all -slain.[544] At the point of day, the entire remaining force from -the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving on board -only the thalamii, or lowest tier of rowers, and reserving only a -sufficient number to man the walls of Pylus. Altogether, there could -not have been less than ten thousand troops employed in the attack of -the island,—men of all arms: eight hundred hoplites, eight hundred -peltasts, eight hundred bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, -and stones. Demosthenês kept his hoplites in one compact body, but -distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about two -hundred men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, -and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.[545] - - [544] Thucyd. iv, 32. - - [545] Thucyd. iv, 32. - -To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Epitadas had -only three hundred and sixty hoplites around him; for his advanced -guard of thirty men had been slain, and as many more must have been -held in reserve to guard the rocky station in his rear: of the Helots -who were with him, Thucydidês says nothing, during the whole course -of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his -enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to -encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. But the -Spartan march was habitually slow:[546] moreover, the ground was -rough and uneven, obstructed with stumps, and overlaid with dust and -ashes, from the recently burnt wood, so that a march at once rapid -and orderly was hardly possible: and he had to traverse the whole -intermediate space, since the Athenian hoplites remained immovable -in their position. No sooner had his march commenced, than he found -himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right -or unshielded flank, by the numerous companies of light-armed.[547] -Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men -were at first awe-stricken at finding themselves in actual contest -with Lacedæmonian hoplites:[548] still, they began the fight, poured -in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites -were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among -them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But -pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men -lightly clad and armed, who always retired, in whatever direction -the pursuit was commenced, had the advantage of difficult ground, -redoubled their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers as soon as -the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks, and always -took care to get round to the rear of the hoplites. - - [546] Thucyd. v, 71. - - [547] Thucyd. iv, 33. - - [548] Thucyd. iv, 33. ὥσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον ~τῇ γνώμῃ - δεδουλωμένοι~ ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. - -After some experience of the inefficacy of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the -light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them -nearer and more universally, with arrows, javelins, and stones, -raising shouts and clamor that rent the air, rendering the word of -command inaudible by the Lacedæmonian soldiers, who at the same time -were almost blinded by the thick clouds of dust, kicked up from the -recently spread wood-ashes.[549] Such method of fighting was one -for which the Lykurgean drill made no provision, and the longer it -continued the more painful did the embarrassment of the exposed -hoplites become: their repeated efforts to destroy or even to reach -nimble and ever-returning enemies, all proved abortive, whilst their -own numbers were incessantly diminished by wounds which they could -not return. Their only offensive arms consisted of the long spear and -short sword usual to the Grecian hoplite, without any missile weapons -whatever; nor could they even pick up and throw back the javelins -of their enemies, since the points of these javelins commonly broke -off and stuck in the shields, or sometimes even in the body which -they had wounded. Moreover, the bows of the archers, doubtless -carefully selected before starting from Athens, were powerfully -drawn, so that their arrows may sometimes have pierced and inflicted -wounds even through the shield or the helmet,—but at any rate, the -stuffed doublet, which formed the only defence of the hoplite on his -unshielded side, was a very inadequate protection against them.[550] -Under this trying distress did the Lacedæmonians continue for a -long time, poorly provided for defence, and altogether helpless for -aggression,—without being able to approach at all nearer to the -Athenian hoplites. At length the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that -his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to close the ranks -and retreat to the last redoubt in the rear: but this movement was -not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed assailants -became doubly clamorous and forward, and many wounded men, unable to -move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.[551] - - [549] Thucyd. iv, 34: compare with this the narrative of the - destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, by Iphikratês - and the Peltastæ (Xenophon. Hellen. iv, 5, 11). - - [550] Thucyd. iv, 34. Τό τε ἔργον ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς - Λακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατο· οὔτε γὰρ οἱ πῖλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, - δοράτιά τε ἐναποκέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἶχον δὲ οὐδὲν σφίσιν - αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι, ἀποκεκλῃμένοι μὲν τῇ ὄψει τοῦ προορᾷν, ὑπὸ δὲ - τῆς μείζονος βοῆς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ - ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου δὲ πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες - ἐλπίδα καθ᾽ ὅ,τι χρὴ ἀμυνομένους σωθῆναι. - - There has been doubt and difficulty in this passage, even from - the time of the Scholiasts. Some commentators have translated - πῖλοι _caps_ or _hats_,—others, _padded cuirasses_ of wool or - felt, round the breast and back: see the notes of Duker, Dr. - Arnold, Poppo, and Göller. That the word πῖλος is sometimes used - for the helmet, or head-piece, is unquestionable,—sometimes even - (with or without χαλκοὺς) for a brazen helmet (see Aristophan. - Lysis. 562; Antiphanês ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 503); but I cannot - think that on this occasion Thucydidês would specially indicate - the head of the Lacedæmonian hoplite as his chief vulnerable - part. Dr. Arnold, indeed, offers a reason to prove that he - might naturally do so; but in my judgment the reason is very - insufficient. - - Πῖλοι means stuffed clothing of wool or felt, whether employed - to protect head, body, or feet: and I conceive, with Poppo - and others, that it here indicates the body-clothing of the - Lacedæmonian hoplite; his body being the part most open to be - wounded on the side undefended by the shield, as well as in the - rear. That the word πῖλοι will bear this sense may be seen in - Pollux, vii, 171; Plato, Timæus, p. 74; and Symposion, p. 220, - c. 35: respecting πῖλος as applied to the foot-covering,—Bekker, - Chariklês, vol. ii, p. 376. - - [551] Thucyd. iv, 35. - -A diminished remnant, however, reached the last post in safety, and -they were here in comparative protection, since the ground was so -rocky and impracticable that their enemies could not attack them -either in flank or rear: though the position at any rate could not -have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of -water in the island was in the centre, which they had just been -compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, -Demosthenês and Kleon brought up their eight hundred Athenian -hoplites, who had not before been engaged; but the Lacedæmonians -were here at home[552] with their weapons, and enabled to display -their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially -as they had the advantage of higher ground against enemies charging -from beneath. Although the Athenians were double their own numbers -and withal yet unexhausted, they were repulsed in many successive -attacks. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all their -previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty -diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so -long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, -when the commander of the Messenians came to Kleon and Demosthenês, -and intimated that they were now laboring in vain; promising at -the same time that if they would confide to him a detachment of -light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher -cliffs, in the rear of the assailants.[553] He accordingly stole -away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, -and by an almost impracticable footing on the brink of the sea, -amidst approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never -imagining that they could be molested in that direction. He suddenly -appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them, so that -their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at -Thermopylæ, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their -enemies in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, -pressed forward with increased ardor, until at length the courage of -the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.[554] - - [552] Thucyd. iv, 33. τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρήσασθαι, etc. - - [553] Thucyd. iv, 36. - - [554] Thucyd. iv, 37. - -A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and -slain, when Kleon and Demosthenês, anxious to carry them as prisoners -to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald -an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their -arms and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, -incapable of farther effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, -signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving both -hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Styphon the -commander—originally only third in command, but now chief, since -Epitadas had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretês, -was lying disabled by wounds on the field—entered into conference -with Kleon and Demosthenês, and entreated permission to send across -for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athenian -commanders, though refusing this request, sent themselves and -invited Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whom -communications were exchanged twice or three times between Styphon -and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message -came: “The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, -but to do nothing disgraceful.”[555] Their counsel was speedily -taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms; two -hundred and ninety-two in number, the survivors of the original -total of four hundred and twenty. And out of these, no less than -one hundred and twenty were native Spartans, some of them belonging -to the first families in the city.[556] They were kept under guard -during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian -trierarchs to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was -granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore, in order that they might carry -across the dead bodies for burial. So careful had Epitadas been -in husbanding the provisions, that some food was yet found in the -island; though the garrison had subsisted for fifty-two days upon -casual supplies, aided by such economies as had been laid by during -the twenty days of the armistice, when food of a stipulated quantity -was regularly furnished. Seventy-two days had thus elapsed, from the -first imprisonment in the island to the hour of their surrender.[557] - - [555] Thucyd. iv. 38. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς - περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι, μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας. - - [556] Thucyd. iv, 38; v, 15. - - [557] Thucyd. iv, 39. - -The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor -occasion surprise, by surrendering, under circumstances in all -respects similar to this gallant remnant in Sphakteria. Yet in Greece -the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learned -that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners:[558] for -the terror inspired by their name, and the deep-struck impression of -Thermopylæ, had created a belief that they would endure any extremity -of famine, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile -force, rather than dream of giving up their arms and surviving as -captives. The events of Sphakteria, shocking as they did this -preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the -eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. Even -in Sparta itself, too, the same feeling prevailed,—partially revealed -in the answer transmitted to Styphon from the generals on shore, -who did not venture to forbid surrender, yet discountenanced it by -implication: and it is certain that the Spartans would have lost less -by their death than by their surrender. But we read with disgust -the spiteful taunt of one of the allies of Athens (not an Athenian) -engaged in the affair, addressed in the form of a question to one of -the prisoners: “Have your best men then been all slain?” The reply -conveyed an intimation of the standing contempt entertained by the -Lacedæmonians for the bow and its chance-strokes in the line: “That -would be a capital arrow which could single out the best man.” The -language which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, composed -in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, attests this same belief -in Spartan valor: “The Lacedæmonians die, but never surrender.”[559] -Such impression was from henceforward, not indeed effaced, but -sensibly enfeebled, and never again was it restored to its former -pitch. - - [558] Thucyd. iv, 40. παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν - πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο, etc. - - [559] To adopt a phrase, the counterpart of that which has been - ascribed to the Vieille Garde of the Emperor Napoleon’s army; - compare Herodot. vii, 104. - -But the general judgment of the Greeks respecting the capture -of Sphakteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less -surprising than that pronounced by Thucydidês himself. Kleon and -Demosthenês returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all -the prisoners, started from Sphakteria on the next day but one after -the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had -left it. Thus, “the promise of Kleon, _insane as it was_, came true,” -observes the historian.[560] - - [560] Thucyd. iv, 39. Καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος ~καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα ἡ - ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη~· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσιν ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, - ὥσπερ ὑπέστη. - - Mr. Mitford, in recounting these incidents, after having - said, respecting Kleon: “In a _very extraordinary train of - circumstances_ which followed, _his impudence and his fortune_ - (if, in the want of another, we may use that term) wonderfully - favored him,” goes on to observe, two pages farther:— - - “It however soon appeared, that though for a man like Cleon, - unversed in military command, the undertaking was rash and the - bragging promise abundantly ridiculous, yet the business was not - so desperate as it was in the moment generally imagined: and - in fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing such a - trust to such a man, far exceeded that of the man himself, whose - impudence seldom carried him beyond the control of his cunning. - He had received intelligence that Demosthenês had already formed - the plan and was preparing for the attempt, with the forces upon - the spot and in the neighborhood. Hence, his apparent moderation - in the demand for troops; which he judiciously accommodated to - the gratification of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require - any Athenians. He farther showed his judgment, when the decree - was to be passed which was finally to direct the expedition, by - a request which was readily granted, that Demosthenês might be - joined with him in the command.” (Mitford, Hist. of Greece, vol. - iii, ch. xv, sect. vii. pp. 250-253.) - - It appears as if no historian could write down the name of Kleon - without attaching to it some disparaging verb or adjective. We - are here told in the same sentence that Kleon was an _impudent - braggart_ for _promising the execution of the enterprise_,—and - yet that the enterprise itself was _perfectly feasible_. We - are told in one sentence that he was rash and ridiculous for - promising this, _unversed as he was in military command_: a few - words farther, we are informed that he expressly requested that - the most competent man to be found, Demosthenês, might be named - his colleague. We are told of the _cunning of Kleon_, and that - _Kleon had received intelligence from Demosthenês_,—as if this - were some private communication to himself. But Demosthenês had - sent no news to Kleon, nor did Kleon know anything which was not - equally known to every man in the assembly. _The folly of the - people in committing the trust to Kleon_ is denounced,—as if - Kleon had sought it himself, or as if his friends had been the - first to propose it for him. If the folly of the people was thus - great, what are we to say of the knavery of the oligarchical - party, with Nikias at their head, who impelled the people into - this folly, for the purpose of ruining a political antagonist, - and who forced Kleon into the post against his own most - unaffected reluctance? Against this manœuvre of the oligarchical - party, neither Mr. Mitford nor any other historian says a word. - When Kleon judges circumstances rightly, as Mr. Mitford allows - that he did in this case, he has credit for nothing better than - _cunning_. - - The truth is, that the people committed no folly in appointing - Kleon, for he justified the best expectations of his friends. But - Nikias and his friends committed great knavery in proposing it, - since they fully believed that he would fail. And, even upon Mr. - Mitford’s statement of the case, the opinion of Thucydidês which - stands at the beginning of this note is thoroughly unjustifiable; - not less unjustifiable than the language of the modern historian - about the “extraordinary circumstances,” and the way in which - Kleon was “favored by fortune.” Not a single incident can - be specified in the narrative to bear out these invidious - assertions. - -Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death -and imprisonment, and Grecian opinion was only mistaken in assuming -as a certainty that the Lacedæmonians would choose the former. But -Kleon had never promised to bring them home as prisoners: his promise -was disjunctive,—that they should be either so brought home, or -slain, within twenty days: and no sentence throughout the whole of -Thucydidês astonishes me so much as that in which he stigmatizes -such an expectation as “insane.” Here are four hundred and twenty -Lacedæmonian hoplites, without any other description of troops to -aid them,—without the possibility of being reinforced,—without -any regular fortification,—without any narrow pass, such as that -of Thermopylæ,—without either a sufficient or a certain supply -of food,—cooped up in a small open island less than two miles in -length. Against them are brought ten thousand troops of diverse arms, -including eight hundred fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshalled -by Demosthenês, a man alike enterprising and experienced: for the -talents as well as the presence and preparations of Demosthenês -are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence -of Kleon to command alone, is foreign to the calculation. Now if, -under such circumstances, Kleon engaged that this forlorn company of -brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he -be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but -even as overstepping the most cautious and mistrustful estimate of -probability? Even to doubt of this result, much more to pronounce -such an opinion as that of Thucydidês, implies an idea not only of -superhuman power in the Lacedæmonian hoplites, but of disgraceful -cowardice on the part of Demosthenês and the assailants. Nor was the -interval of twenty days, named by Kleon, at all extravagantly narrow, -considering the distance of Athens from Pylus: for the attack of this -petty island could not possibly occupy more than one or two days at -the utmost, though the blockade of it might by various accidents have -been prolonged, or might even, by some terrible storm, be altogether -broken off. If, then, we carefully consider this promise made by -Kleon in the assembly, we shall find that so far from deserving -the sentence pronounced upon it by Thucydidês, of being a mad boast -which came true by accident, it was a reasonable and even a modest -anticipation of the future:[561] reserving the only really doubtful -point in the case, whether the garrison of the island would be -ultimately slain or made prisoners. Demosthenês, had he been present -at Athens instead of being at Pylus, would willingly have set his -seal to the engagement taken by Kleon. - - [561] The jest of an unknown comic writer (probably Eupolis or - Aristophanês, in one of the many lost dramas) against Kleon: - “that he showed great powers of prophecy after the fact,” (Κλέων - Προμηθεύς ἐστι μετὰ τὰ πράγματα, Lucian, Prometheus, c. 2), may - probably have reference to his proceedings about Sphakteria: if - so, it is certainly undeserved. - - In the letter which he sent to announce the capture of Sphakteria - and the prisoners to the Athenians, it is affirmed that he began - with the words—Κλέων Ἀθηναίων τῇ Βουλῇ καὶ τῷ Δήμῳ χαίρειν. - This was derided by Eupolis, and is even considered as a piece - of insolence, though it is difficult to see why (Schol. ad - Aristophan. Plut. 322; Bergk, De Reliquiis Comœdiæ Antiquæ, p. - 362). - -I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement -made by one of the biographers of Thucydidês,[562] that Kleon was the -cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore -received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity -of historian. But though this sentiment is not probably without -influence in dictating the unaccountable judgment which I have just -been criticizing,—as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on -which I shall say more in a future chapter,—I nevertheless look upon -that judgment not as peculiar to Thucydidês, but as common to him -with Nikias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, -the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some -measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed -among that party at the present memorable crisis; so pointedly -contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute calculations, and the -judicious conduct in action, of Kleon, who, when forced against his -will into the post of general, did the very best which could be done -in his situation,—he selected Demosthenês as colleague and heartily -seconded his operations. Though the military attack of Sphakteria, -one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and -distinguished not less by the dextrous employment of different -descriptions of troops, than by care to spare the lives of the -assailants,—belongs altogether to Demosthenês, yet if Kleon had not -been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those -gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thucydidês, Demosthenês -would never have been reinforced nor placed in condition to land on -the island. The glory of the enterprise, therefore, belongs jointly -to both: and Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenês -(as Aristophanês represents, in his comedy of the Knights), was -really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same -time deservedly shared them. It has hitherto been the practice to -look at Kleon only from the point of view of his opponents, through -whose testimony we know him: but the real fact is, that this history -of the events of Sphakteria, when properly surveyed, is a standing -disgrace to those opponents and no inconsiderable honor to him; -exhibiting them as alike destitute of political foresight and of -straightforward patriotism,—as sacrificing the opportunities of war, -along with the lives of their fellow-citizens and soldiers, for the -purpose of ruining a political enemy. It was the duty of Nikias, as -stratêgus, to propose, and undertake in person if necessary, the -reduction of Sphakteria: if he thought the enterprise dangerous, -that was a good reason for assigning to it a larger military force, -as we shall find him afterwards reasoning about the Sicilian -expedition,—but not for letting it slip or throwing it off upon -others.[563] - - [562] Vit. Thucydidis, p. xv, ed. Bekker. - - [563] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 8; Thucyd. v, 7. - -The return of Kleon and Demosthenês to Athens, within the twenty -days promised, bringing with them near three hundred Lacedæmonian -prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating -event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. -It at once changed the prospects, position, and feelings of both -the contending parties. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, -especially one hundred and twenty Spartans, was a source of -almost stupefaction to the general body of Greeks, and a prize of -inestimable value to the captors. The return of Demosthenês in the -preceding year from the Ambrakian gulf, when he brought with him -three hundred Ambrakian panoplies, had probably been sufficiently -triumphant; but the entry into Peiræus on this occasion from -Sphakteria, with three hundred Lacedæmonian prisoners, must doubtless -have occasioned emotions transcending all former experience; and it -is much to be regretted that no description is preserved to us of -the scene, as well as of the elate manifestations of the people when -the prisoners were marched up from Peiræus to Athens. We should be -curious, also, to read some account of the first Athenian assembly -held after this event,—the overwhelming cheers heaped upon Kleon by -his joyful partisans, who had helped to invest him with the duties of -general, in confidence that he would discharge them well,—contrasted -with the silence or retraction of Nikias, and the other humiliated -political enemies. But all such details are unfortunately denied -to us, though they constitute the blood and animation of Grecian -history, now lying before us only in its skeleton. - -The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a -guarantee to their territory against invasion:[564] they resolved -to keep them securely guarded until the peace, but if, at any time -before that event, the Lacedæmonian army should enter Attica, to -bring forth the prisoners and put them to death in sight of the -invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the -prosecution of the war, and became farther confirmed in the hope, not -merely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering -much of what they had lost before the thirty years’ truce. Pylus was -placed in an improved state of defence, with the adjoining island of -Sphakteria, doubtless as a subsidiary occupation: the Messenians, -transferred thither from Naupaktus, and overjoyed to find themselves -once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestorial -territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Laconia, while -the Helots, shaken by the recent events, manifested inclination -to desert to them. The Lacedæmonian authorities, experiencing -evils before unfelt and unknown, became sensibly alarmed lest such -desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were -to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless -brought themselves, probably under the pressure of the friends and -relatives of the Sphakterian captives, to send to Athens several -missions for peace; but all proved abortive.[565] We are not told -what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which -the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge. - - [564] Thucyd. iv, 41. - - [565] Thucyd. iv, 41: compare Aristophan. Equit. 648 with Schol. - -We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent -history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain -with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding -the capture of Sphakteria, than it was ever open to them to make -afterwards; and they had reason to repent that they let slip the -opportunity. Perhaps also Periklês, had he been still alive, might -have taken the same prudent measure of the future, and might have had -ascendency enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide -of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again. But if -we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn -which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenês from Sphakteria, -we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was -continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens -in a far better position than she had occupied at a time when they -were only blocked up in Sphakteria, and when the Lacedæmonian envoys -first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to -command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she -chose to invite it,—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the -hardship of invasion. Next, and this was perhaps the most important -feature of the case, the apprehension of Lacedæmonian prowess was now -greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered -as prodigiously improved,[566] even in the estimation of impartial -Greeks; much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover, -the idea of a tide of good fortune, of the favor of the gods, now -begun and likely to continue, of future success as a corollary -from past, was one which powerfully affected Grecian calculations -generally. Why not push the present good fortune, and try to regain -the most important points lost before and by the thirty years’ -truce, especially in Megara and Bœotia,—points which Sparta could -not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? -Though these speculations failed, as we shall see in the coming -chapter, yet there was nothing unreasonable in undertaking them. -Probably, the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment -warlike,—and even Nikias, humiliated as he must have been by the -success in Sphakteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire -of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. -That Demosthenês, now in full measure of esteem, would be eager -to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory -were essentially associated, just as Thucydidês[567] observes about -Brasidas on the Lacedæmonian side, can admit of no doubt. The comedy -of Aristophanês, called the Acharnians, was acted about six months -before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look -forward to such an event,—the comedy of the Knights, about six months -after it.[568] Now, there is this remarkable difference between the -two,—that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, -and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, -although at that time Athens had an opportunity of coming even to a -decent accommodation,—the latter, running down Kleon with unmeasured -scorn and ridicule, talks in one or two places only of the hardships -of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which -peace had been dwelt upon in the Acharnians,—although coming out at a -time when peace was within the reach of the Athenians. - - [566] Thucyd. iv, 79. - - [567] Thucyd. v, 16. - - [568] The Acharneis was performed at the festival of the Lenæa, - at Athens, January, 425 B.C.: the Knights, at the same festival - in the ensuing year, 424 B.C. - - The capture of Sphakteria took place about July, B.C. 425: - between the two dates above. See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, - ad ann. - -To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we -must distinguish various occasions which are often confounded. -At the moment when Sphakteria was first blockaded, and when the -Lacedæmonians first sent to solicit peace, there was a considerable -party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer, and the ascendency -of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was rejected. But after -the captives were brought home from Sphakteria, the influence of -Kleon, though positively greater than it had been before, was no -longer required to procure the dismissal of Lacedæmonian pacific -offers and the continuance of the war: the general temper of Athens -was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for -an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances -of war turned out mostly unfavorable to Athens, so that by the end -of that year she had become much more disposed to peace.[569] The -truce for one year was then concluded,—but even after that truce was -expired, Kleon still continued eager, and on good grounds, as will -be shown hereafter, for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when -a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He -was one of the main causes of that resumption of warlike operations, -which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and -to Brasidas. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the -personal influence and sanguine character of Kleon seems to have been -of sensible moment in determining the Athenian public to war instead -of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached, that is, the -year immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, the Athenians -were all sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as -well as the rest. - - [569] Thucyd. iv, 117; v, 14. - -It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately -after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference -to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two -colleagues, against the Corinthian territory: he took with him eighty -triremes, two thousand Athenian hoplites, two hundred horsemen aboard -of some horse transports, and some additional hoplites from Milêtus, -Andros, and Karystus.[570] Starting from Peiræus in the evening, he -arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill -and village of Solygeia,[571] about seven miles from Corinth, and -two or three miles south of the isthmus. The Corinthian troops, -from all the territory of Corinth, within the isthmus, were already -assembled at the isthmus itself to repel him; for intelligence of -the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from -Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have -been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast -during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprized of the fact -by fire-signals from Solygeia. Not being able to hinder the landing, -they despatched forthwith half their forces, under Battus and -Lykophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left -at the harbor of Kenchreæ, on the northern side of Mount Oneion, to -guard the port of Krommyon, outside of the isthmus, in case it should -be attacked by sea. Battus with one lochus of hoplites threw himself -into the village of Solygeia, which was unfortified, while Lykophron -conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle -was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its -landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, -together with their Karystian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, -after a stout and warmly disputed hand-combat of spear and shield: -but the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, -returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochus, drove -the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the -latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage.[572] -The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians: -but here, after a contest of some length, the latter gained a more -decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry,—pursuing the -Corinthians, who fled in some disorder to a neighboring hill and -there took up a position.[573] The Athenians were thus victorious -throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, -while the Corinthians had lost two hundred and twelve, together with -the general Lykophron. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the -dead bodies, and buried their own dead. - - [570] Thucyd. iv, 42. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα ~εὐθὺς~, etc. - - [571] See the geographical illustrations of this descent in Dr. - Arnold’s plan and note appended to the second volume of his - Thucydidês,—and in Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, ch. xxviii, - p. 235; xxix, p. 309. - - [572] Thucyd. iv, 43. - - [573] Thucyd. iv, 44. ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα,—an expression which Dr. - Arnold explains, here as elsewhere, to mean “piling the arms:” - I do not think such an explanation is correct, even here: much - less in several other places to which he alludes. See a note on - the surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, immediately before the - Peloponnesian war. - -The Corinthian detachment left at Kenchreæ could not see the battle, -in consequence of the interposing ridge of Mount Oneium: but it -was at last made known to them by the dust of the fugitives, and -they forthwith hastened to help. Reinforcements also came both -from Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and as it seemed, too, from the -neighboring Peloponnesian cities, so that Nikias thought it prudent -to retire aboard his ships, and halt upon some neighboring islands. -It was here first discovered that two of the Athenians slain had not -been picked up for burial; upon which he immediately sent a herald -to solicit a truce, in order to procure these two missing bodies. We -have here a remarkable proof of the sanctity attached to that duty; -for the mere sending of the herald was tantamount to confession of -defeat.[574] - - [574] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 6. - -From hence Nikias sailed to Krommyon, where he ravaged the -neighborhood for a few hours and rested for the night. On the -next day he reëmbarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurus, upon -which he inflicted some damage in passing, and stopped at last -on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurus and Trœzen.[575] -On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a -fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the -Epidaurian peninsula. This was his last exploit, and he then sailed -home: but the post at Methana long remained as a centre for pillaging -the neighboring regions of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halieis. - - [575] Thucyd. iv, 45. - -While Nikias was engaged in this expedition, Eurymedon and Sophoklês -had sailed forward from Pylus with a considerable portion of that -fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphakteria, to the -island of Korkyra. It has been already stated that the democratical -government at Korkyra had been suffering severe pressure and -privation from the oligarchical fugitives, who had come back into -the island with a body of barbaric auxiliaries, and established -themselves upon Mount Istônê, not far from the city.[576] Eurymedon -and the Athenians joining the Korkyræans in the city, attacked and -stormed the post on Mount Istônê; while the vanquished, retiring -first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender -themselves on terms to the Athenians. They abandoned their mercenary -auxiliaries altogether, and only stipulated that they should -themselves be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the -Athenian people. Eurymedon, assenting to these terms, deposited the -disarmed prisoners in the neighboring islet of Ptychia, under the -distinct condition that, if a single man tried to escape, the whole -capitulation should be null and void.[577] - - [576] Thucyd. iv, 2-45. - - [577] Thucyd. iv, 46. - -Unfortunately for these prisoners, the orders given to Eurymedon -carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was irksome, therefore, to -him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey these men to -Athens,—while the honors of delivering them there would be reaped, -not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided: -and the Korkyræans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious -that the prisoners should not be sent to Athens; for their animosity -against them was bitter in the extreme, and they were afraid that the -Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against -the island might be again resumed. And thus a mean jealousy on the -part of Eurymedon, combined with revenge and insecurity on the part -of the victorious Korkyræans, brought about a cruel catastrophe, -paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with -the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island. - -The Korkyræan leaders, seemingly not without the privity of -Eurymedon, sent across to Ptychia fraudulent emissaries under the -guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries—assuring the -prisoners that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the convention -signed, were about to hand them over to the Korkyræan people for -destruction—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared -for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of -escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: -upon which Eurymedon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in -the island, who imprisoned them all together in one vast building, -under guard of hoplites. From this building they were drawn out -in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and -compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshalled on -each side of the road. Those who loitered in the march were hurried -on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies -on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them until -at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were -thus destroyed, ere the remaining prisoners in the interior, who -thought merely that their place of detention was about to be changed, -suspected what was passing: at length they found it out, and one -and all then refused either to quit the building or to permit any -one else to enter. They at the same time piteously implored the -intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them, and thus -preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The -latter abstained from attempts to force the door of the building, -but made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, -and poured showers of tiles, upon the prisoners within; who sought -at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves -to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of -destruction. Some of them pierced their throats with the arrows shot -down from the roof: others hung themselves, either with cords from -some bedding which happened to be in the building, or with strips -torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work -of destruction, both from above and within, was continued without -intermission, so that before morning all these wretched men perished, -either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daybreak, -the Korkyræans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on -carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are -not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than three hundred. -The women who had been taken at Istônê along with these prisoners, -were all sold as slaves.[578] - - [578] Thucyd. iv, 47, 48. - -Thus finished the bloody dissensions in this ill-fated island: for -the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was -victorious, and there were no farther violences throughout the whole -war.[579] It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with -the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Corinth, bringing along -with them projects both of treason and of revolution: they ended -with the annihilation of that party, in the manner above described; -the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and retaliation, -wherein of course the victors had most opportunity of gratifying -their vindictive passions. Eurymedon, after the termination of these -events, proceeded onward with the Athenian squadron to Sicily: -what he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to -Sicilian affairs exclusively. - - [579] Thucyd. iv, 48. - -The complete prostration of Ambrakia during the campaign of the -preceding year had left Anaktorium without any defence against the -Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Naupaktus. They besieged and -took it during the course of the present summer;[580] expelling the -Corinthian proprietors, and repeopling the town and its territory -with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country. - - [580] Thucyd. iv, 49. - -Throughout the maritime empire of Athens matters continued perfectly -tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course -of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having -recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with -the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt.[581] They -solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the -Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the -obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active -band of Mitylenæan exiles, who captured both Rhœteium and Antandrus -during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious -and vigilant on the subject of Chios.[582] - - [581] Thucyd. iv, 51. - - [582] Thucyd. iv, 52. - -The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron circulated among the -maritime subjects, and captured, during the course of the present -autumn, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a -Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Strymon, -in his way to Sparta with despatches from the Great King. He was -brought to Athens, and his despatches, which were at some length, -and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made -public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he -could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous -envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly -he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to -send some envoys with fresh and plain instructions to accompany -Artaphernes.[583] Such was the substance of the despatch, conveying a -remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government -in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting -Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with -half as much unsteadiness and stupidity, ample inferences would have -been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been -no motive generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which -included kingship in double measure,—two parallel lines of hereditary -kings: together with an entire exemption from everything like -popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management -of Sparta, revealed by the despatch of Artaphernes, seem traceable -partly to an habitual faithlessness often noted in the Lacedæmonian -character, partly to the annual change of ephors, so frequently -bringing into power men who strove to undo what had been done by -their predecessors, and still more to the absence of everything like -discussion or canvass of public measures among the citizens. We -shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, -of this disposition on the part of ephors, not merely to change the -policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn -and concluded by them: and such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan -public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor -discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the -expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not -trust the assurances of the Lacedæmonian executive without binding -them by the most solemn oaths.[584] - - [583] Thucyd. iv, 50. ἐν αἷς πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον - ἦν, πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅ,τι βούλονται· πολλῶν γὰρ - ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν· εἰ οὖν βούλονται σαφὲς - λέγειν, πέμψαι μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἄνδρας ὡς αὐτόν. - - [584] Thucyd. iv, 86. ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη - τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἦ μὴν, etc. - -The Athenians sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and -availed themselves of this opportunity for procuring access to the -Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that -they should accompany him up to Susa: but on reaching Asia, the news -had just arrived that King Artaxerxes had recently died. Under such -circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, -and the Athenians dropped their design.[585] - - [585] Thucyd. iv, 50; Diodor. xii, 64. The Athenians do not - appear to have ever before sent envoys or courted alliance with - the Great King; though the idea of doing so must have been - noway strange to them, as we may see by the humorous scene of - Pseudartabas in the Acharneis of Aristophanês, acted in the year - before this event. - -Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval -of fifty-four years since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece, we have -little information before us except the names of the successive -kings. In the year 465 B.C. Xerxes was assassinated by Artabanus and -Mithridates, through one of those plots of great household officers, -so frequent in oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two -sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and -Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been -the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to revenge his -father’s death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother -Darius: he next tried to assassinate Artaxerxes himself, and to -appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes however, apprized beforehand of -the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him -to be slain and then reigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes -Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now -arrived.[586] - - [586] Diodor. xi, 65; Aristotel. Polit. v, 8, 3; Justin, iii, - 1; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29, 30. It is evident that there were - contradictory stories current respecting the plot to which Xerxes - fell a victim: but we have no means of determining what the - details were. - -Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the -dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inanes, actively -aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt -was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian -general Megabyzus, with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. -After the peace of Kallias, erroneously called the Kimonian peace, -between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since -resumed. We read in Ktesias, amidst various anecdotes seemingly -collected at the court of Susa, romantic adventures ascribed -to Megabyzus, his wife Amytis, his mother Amestris, and a Greek -physician of Kos, named Apollonides. Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, after -the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to -Athens.[587] - - [587] Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-43; Herodot. iii, 80. - -At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family violences incident -to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxes -succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or -months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner -after a short interval.[588] Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under -the name of Darius Nothus), either abler or more fortunate, kept his -crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen, the -savage Parysatis, he was father to Artaxerxes Mnemon and Cyrus the -younger, both names of interest in reference to Grecian history, to -whom we shall hereafter recur. - - [588] Diodor. xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 44-46. - - - - -CHAPTER LIII. - -EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR. - - -The eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of -a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. -In reviewing the preceding years, we observe that though there -is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both -sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not -calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of -Sphakteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole -Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and imposing -in the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series -of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they -had yet conceived; directed, not merely against Sparta in her own -country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendency in Megara and -Bœotia which they had lost on or before the thirty years’ truce. On -the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the -revolted Chalkidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdikkas, king of -Macedonia, that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck -so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is -thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had -succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she -enjoyed before the thirty years’ truce: but it happened that Sparta, -or rather the Spartan Brasidas, was successful, gaining enough to -neutralize all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of -Sphakteria. - -The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the -spring was against the island of Kythêra, on the southern coast of -Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Periœki, and administered -by a governor, and garrison of hoplites, annually sent thither. It -was the usual point of landing for merchantmen from Libya and Egypt; -and as it lay very near to Cape Malea, immediately over against -the gulf of Gythium,—the only accessible portion of the generally -inhospitable coast of Laconia,—the chance that it might fall into -the hands of an enemy was considered as so menacing to Sparta, that -some politicians are said to have wished the island at the bottom of -the sea.[589] Nikias, in conjunction with Nikostratus and Autoklês, -conducted thither a fleet of sixty triremes, with two thousand -Athenian hoplites, some few horsemen, and a body of allies, mainly -Milesians. There were in the island two towns,—Kythêra and Skandeia: -the former having a lower town close to the sea, fronting Cape Malea, -and an upper town on the hill above; the latter, seemingly, on the -south or west coast. Both were attacked at the same time by order of -Nikias; ten triremes and a body of Milesian[590] hoplites disembarked -and captured Skandeia; while the Athenians landed at Kythêra, and -drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where -they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them had indeed -secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy -terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by -the Kytherians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as -prisoners to Athens: but the remainder were left undisturbed, and -enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four -talents per annum; an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythêra -for the protection of the island. From hence Nikias employed seven -days in descents and inroads upon the coast, near Helos, Asinê, -Aphrodisia, Kotyrta, and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonian force was -disseminated in petty garrisons, which remained each for the defence -of its own separate post, without uniting to repel the Athenians, so -that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which -the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy. - - [589] Thucyd. iv, 54; Herodot. vii, 235. The manner in which - Herodotus alludes to the dangers which would arise to Sparta from - the occupation of Kythêra by an enemy, furnishes one additional - probability tending to show that his history was composed before - the actual occupation of the island by Nikias, in the eighth year - of the Peloponnesian war. Had he been cognizant of this latter - event, he would naturally have made some allusion to it. - - The words of Thucydidês in respect to the island of Kythêra are, - the Lacedæmonians πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο· ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς - τῶν τε ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης ὁλκάδων προσβολὴ, καὶ λῃσταὶ ἅμα - τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἧσσον ἐλύπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ᾗπερ μόνον οἷον τ᾽ ἦν - κακουργεῖσθαι· ~πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει~ πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν - πέλαγος. - - I do not understand this passage, with Dr. Arnold and Göller, to - mean, that Laconia was unassailable by land, but very assailable - by sea. It rather means that the only portion of the coast of - Laconia where a maritime invader could do much damage, was in the - interior of the Laconic gulf, near Helos, Gythium, etc., which - is in fact the only plain portion of the coast of Laconia. The - two projecting promontories, which end, the one in Cape Malea, - the other in Cape Tænarus, are high, rocky, harborless, and - afford very little temptation to a disembarking enemy. “The whole - Laconian coast is _high projecting cliff_, where it fronts the - Sicilian and Kretan seas,”—~πᾶσα ἀνέχει~. The island of Kythêra - was particularly favorable for facilitating descents on the - territory near Helos and Gythium. The ἀλιμενότης of Laconia is - noticed in Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 8, 7, where he describes the - occupation of the island by Konon and Pharnabazus. - - See Colonel Leake’s description of this coast, and the high - cliffs between Cape Matapan—Tænarus—and Kalamata, which front the - Sicilian sea, as well as those eastward of Cape St. Angelo, or - Malea, which front the Kretan sea (Travels in Morea, vol. i, ch. - vii, p. 261: “tempestuous, rocky, unsheltered coast of Mesamani,” - ch. viii, p. 320; ch. vi, p. 205; Strabo, viii, p. 368; Pausan. - iii, c. xxvi, 2). - - [590] Thucyd. iv, 54. δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων ὁπλίταις. It seems - impossible to believe that there could have been so many as - two thousand _Milesian_ hoplites: but we cannot tell where the - mistake lies. - -In returning home from Kythêra, Nikias first ravaged the small strip -of cultivated land near Epidaurus Limêra, on the rocky eastern -coast of Laconia, and then attacked the Æginetan settlement at -Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town -and district had been made over by Sparta to the Æginetans, at the -time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens, in -the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town -too distant from the sea[591] for their maritime habits, were now -employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore; in which -work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tantalus, on guard in that -neighborhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both -Æginetans and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. -The former, with the commanding officer, Tantalus, occupied the -upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking -it tenable, refused to take part in the defence, and retired to -the neighboring mountains, in spite of urgent entreaty from the -Æginetans. The Athenians, immediately after landing, marched up to -the town of Thyrea, and carried it by storm, burning or destroying -everything within it: all the Æginetans were either killed or made -prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner -also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was -taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kytherians brought -home were distributed for safe custody among the dependent islands: -Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from Sphakteria; but -a harder fate was reserved for the Æginetans; they were all put to -death, victims to the long-standing apathy between Athens and Ægina. -This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted -customs of war in those days: had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, -there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal -rigor.[592] - - [591] Thucyd. iv, 56. He states that Thyrea was ten stadia, or - about a mile and one-fifth, distant from the sea. But Colonel - Leake (Travels in the Morea, vol. ii, ch. xxii, p. 492), who has - discovered quite sufficient ruins to identify the spot, affirms - “that it is at least three times that distance from the sea.” - - This explains to us the more clearly why the Æginetans thought it - necessary to build their new fort. - - [592] Thucyd. iv, 58; Diodor. xii, 65. - -The occupation of Kythêra, in addition to Pylus, by an Athenian -garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in -Sphakteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm -and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within -the course of a few short months their position had completely -changed from superiority and aggression abroad to insult and -insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant -foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of -internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots: nor -was it unknown to them, probably, that even Kythêra itself had been -lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphakteria had caused -peculiar sensations among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had -addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to -procure succor for their hoplites while blockaded in the island; and -if the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had abated the terrors -of Lacedæmonian prowess throughout all Greece, this effect had been -produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A -refuge at Pylus, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of -expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; -while the establishment of an Athenian garrison at Kythêra opened a -new channel of communication with the enemies of Sparta, so as to -tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward as liberators -of their enslaved race.[593] The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious -at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly -against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay, confining -themselves to measures strictly defensive, and organizing a force of -four hundred cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their -ordinary establishment. - - [593] Thucyd. iv, 41, 55, 56. - -But the precaution which they thought it necessary to take in regard -to the Helots, affords the best measure of their apprehensions -at the moment, and exhibits, indeed, a refinement of fraud and -cruelty rarely equalled in history. Wishing to single out from the -general body such as were most high-couraged and valiant, the ephors -made proclamation, that those Helots, who conceived themselves to -have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war, might -stand forward to claim it. A considerable number obeyed the call; -probably many who had undergone imminent hazards during the preceding -summer, in order to convey provisions to the blockaded soldiers -in Sphakteria.[594] They were examined by the government, and two -thousand of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation; which -was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial, with garlands, -visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. -The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently -every man among these newly-enfranchized Helots was made away -with, no one knew how.[595] A stratagem at once so perfidious in -the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in -the execution, stands without parallel in Grecian history,—we might -almost say, without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity -far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law -against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The ephors -must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for -the performance of this bloody deed; yet it appears that no certain -knowledge could be obtained of the details; a striking proof of the -mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that -of the Council of Ten at Venice, as well as of the utter absence of -public inquiry or discussion. - - [594] Thucyd. iv, 80. - - [595] Thucyd. iv, 80. Καὶ προκρίναντες ἐς δισχιλίους, οἱ μὲν - ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον ὡς ἠλευθερωμένοι· οἱ δὲ - οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ - ἕκαστος διεφθάρη: compare Diodor. xii, 67. - - Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiii, p. 244, - 2d edit. _note_) thinks that this assassination of Helots by the - Spartans took place at some other time unascertained, and not - at the time here indicated. I cannot concur in this opinion. It - appears to me, that there is the strongest probable reason for - referring the incident to the time immediately following the - disaster in Sphakteria, which Thucydidês so especially marks (iv, - 41) by the emphatic words: Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν - τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ λῃστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πολέμου, τῶν τε Εἱλώτων - αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι - νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἔφερον. This was just - after the Messenians were first established at Pylus, and began - their incursions over Laconia, with such temptations as they - could offer to the Helots to desert. And it was naturally just - then that the fear, entertained by the Spartans of their Helots, - became exaggerated to the maximum, leading to the perpetration - of the act mentioned in the text. Dr. Thirlwall observes, “that - the Spartan government would not order the massacre of the Helots - at a time when it could employ them on foreign service.” But - to this it may be replied, that the capture of Sphakteria took - place in July or August, while the expedition under Brasidas was - not organized until the following winter or spring. There was - therefore an interval of some months during which the government - had not yet formed the idea of employing the Helots on foreign - service. And this interval is quite sufficient to give a full and - distinct meaning to the expression καὶ τότε (Thucyd. iv, 80) on - which Dr. Thirlwall insists; without the necessity of going back - to any more remote point of antecedent time. - -It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness -at home, that envoys reached them from Perdikkas of Macedonia and -the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens; who -was considered likely, in her present tide of success, to resume -aggressive measures against them. There were, moreover, other -parties, in the neighboring cities[596] subject to Athens, who -secretly favored the application, engaging to stand forward in open -revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their -incurring the hazard. Perdikkas (who had on his hands a dispute with -his kinsman Arrhibæus, prince of the Lynkestæ-Macedonians, which he -was anxious to be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalkidians -offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well -as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to -them; and what was of still greater importance to the success of the -enterprise, they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested -with the command.[597] He had now recovered from his wounds received -at Pylus, and his reputation for adventurous valor, great as it was -from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because -not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His -other great qualities, apart from personal valor, had not yet been -shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned -with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the -envoys; although at this time it must have appeared so replete with -difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself -would have entered upon it with the smallest hopes of success. To -raise up embarrassments for Athens, in Thrace, was an object of great -consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of -sending away another large detachment of her dangerous Helots. Seven -hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the -orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any -of their own proper forces. With the sanction of the Spartan name, -with seven hundred Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he -could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the -Chalkidians, Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike -adventurous and important. - - [596] Thucyd. iv, 79. - - [597] Thucyd. iv, 80. προὐθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἄνδρα ἔν - τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα, etc. - -Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his design, they -could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they -knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perdikkas, nor did -they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of -her depression, much less an enterprise far bolder than any which -she had ever been known to undertake. They were now elate with hopes -of conquests to come on their own part, their affairs being so -prosperous and promising that parties favorable to their interests -began to revive, both in Megara and in Bœotia; while Hippokratês and -Demosthenês, the two chief stratêgi for the year, were men of energy, -well qualified both to project and execute military achievements. - -The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The -inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war -than any other persons in Greece: they had been the chief cause -of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians revenged -upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the -Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they laid waste the -Megarid, which bordered upon their own territory; and that too with -such destructive hands throughout its limited extent, that they -intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town, at the -same time keeping the harbor of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such -hard conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying -even the primary wants of life.[598] But their case had now, within -the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine -commotion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of -exiles, who seized and held possession of Pegæ, the Megarian port -in the gulf of Corinth. Probably imports from Pegæ had been their -chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them -from the side of Athens; so that it became scarcely possible to -sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pegæ not only deprived them -of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These -exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become -more or less democratical: but the privations in the city presently -reached such a height, that several citizens began to labor for a -compromise, whereby the exiles in Pegæ might be readmitted. It was -evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could -not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides, but it was -also their feeling that the exiles in Pegæ, their bitter political -rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of -these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent -this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with -Hippokratês and Demosthenês, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa -to the Athenians; though Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, about one mile -from the city, was a separate fortress occupied by a Peloponnesian -garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls, for the -purpose of holding Megara fast to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[599] - - [598] The picture drawn by Aristophanês (Acharn. 760) is a - caricature, but of suffering probably but too real. - - [599] Thucyd. iv, 66. Strabo (ix, p. 391) gives eighteen stadia - as the distance between Megara and Nisæa; Thucydidês only eight. - There appears sufficient reason to prefer the latter: see - Reinganum, Das alte Megaris, pp. 121-180. - -The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable, -in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter -to which many persons must have been privy, was kept secret, until -the instant of execution. A large Athenian force, four thousand -hoplites and six hundred cavalry, was appointed to march at night -by the high road through Eleusis to Megara: but Hippokratês and -Demosthenês themselves went on shipboard from Peiræus to the island -of Minôa, which was close against Nisæa, and had been for some time -under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokratês concealed -himself with six hundred hoplites, in a hollow space out of which -brick earth had been dug, on the mainland opposite to Minôa, and not -far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction -of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Nisæa; while -Demosthenês, with some light-armed Platæans and a detachment of -active young Athenians, called Peripoli, and serving as the movable -guard of Attica, in their first or second year of military service, -placed himself in ambush in the sacred precinct of Arês, still closer -to the same gate. - -To procure that the gate should be opened, was the task of the -conspirators within. Amidst the shifts to which the Megarians had -been reduced in order to obtain supplies, especially since the -blockade of Minôa, predatory exit by night was not omitted. Some of -these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with -Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sculler-boat by night -upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian -commander of Nisæa and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought -out, was carried down to the shore along the hollow of the dry -ditch which surrounded the wall of Nisæa, then put to sea for some -nightly enterprise, and was brought back again along the ditch before -daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let -it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get -to sea, since the Athenians at Minôa were complete masters of the -harbor. On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried -out and brought back at the usual hour. But the moment that the -gate in the Long Wall was opened to readmit it, Demosthenês and his -comrades sprang forward to force their way in; the Megarians along -with the boat at the same time setting upon and killing the guards, -in order to facilitate his entrance. This active and determined band -were successful in mastering the gate, and keeping it open until the -six hundred hoplites under Hippokratês came up, and got into the -interior space between the Long Walls. They immediately mounted the -walls on each side, every man as he came in, with little thought -of order, to drive off or destroy the Peloponnesian guards; who, -taken by surprise, and fancying that the Megarians generally were in -concert with the enemy against them,—confirmed, too, in such belief -by hearing the Athenian herald proclaim aloud that every Megarian who -chose might take his post in the line of Athenian hoplites,[600]—made -at first some resistance, but were soon discouraged, and fled into -Nisæa. By a little after daybreak, the Athenians found themselves -masters of all the line of the Long Walls, and under the very gates -of Megara,—reinforced by the larger force which, having marched by -land through Eleusis, arrived at the concerted moment. - - [600] Thucyd. iv, 68. Ξυνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα - ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύξαι, τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι Μεγαρέων μετὰ - Ἀθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα. - - Here we have the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα employed in a case where - Dr. Arnold’s explanation of it would be eminently unsuitable. - There could be no thought of _piling arms_ at a critical moment - of actual fighting, with result as yet doubtful. - -Meanwhile, the Megarians within the city were in the greatest tumult -and consternation. But the conspirators, prepared with their plan, -had resolved to propose that the gates should be thrown open, and -that the whole force of the city should be marched out to fight -the Athenians: when once the gates should be open, they themselves -intended to take part with the Athenians, and facilitate their -entrance,—and they had rubbed their bodies over with oil in order -to be visibly distinguished in the eyes of the latter. Their plan -was only frustrated the moment before it was about to be put in -execution, by the divulgation of one of their own comrades. Their -opponents in the city, apprized of what was in contemplation, -hastened to the gate, and intercepted the men rubbed with oil as -they were about to open it. Without betraying any knowledge of the -momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly -protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy -for whom they had never conceived themselves, even in moments of -greater strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting -only on the public mischiefs of the measure, they at the same time -planted themselves in arms against the gate, and declared that they -would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For this -obstinate resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they -were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed. - -The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would -be opened, soon perceived by the delay that their friends within -had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Nisæa, -which lay behind them; an acquisition important not less in itself, -than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about -the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Masons and -tools in abundance were forthwith sent for from Athens, and the army -distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Nisæa -in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls -themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication -with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both -the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to inclose Nisæa, -with its fortifications and ditch. The scattered houses which formed -a sort of ornamented suburb to Nisæa, furnished bricks for this -inclosing circle, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as -they stood, with the parapets on their roofs; while the trees were -cut down to supply material wherever palisades were suitable. In a -day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, -so that the Peloponnesians in Nisæa saw before them nothing but a -hopeless state of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they -not only fancied that the whole city of Megara had joined the -Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, -which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the -city. Despairing of any speedy relief from Peloponnesus, they -accepted easy terms of capitulation offered to them by the Athenian -generals.[601] After delivering up their arms, each man among them -was to be ransomed for a stipulated price; we are not told how much, -but doubtless a moderate sum. The Lacedæmonian commander, and such -other Lacedæmonians as might be in Nisæa, were, however, required -to surrender themselves as prisoners to the Athenians, to be held -at their disposal. On these terms Nisæa was surrendered to the -Athenians, who cut off its communication with Megara, by keeping -the intermediate space between the Long Walls effectively blocked -up,—walls, of which they had themselves, in former days, been the -original authors.[602] - - [601] Thucyd. iv, 69. - - [602] Thucyd. i, 103; iv, 69. Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ μακρὰ τείχη - ἀποῤῥήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν - παραλαβόντες, τἄλλα παρεσκευάζοντο. - - I cannot think, with Poppo and Göller, that the participle - ἀποῤῥήξαντες is to be explained as meaning that the Athenians - PULLED DOWN the portion of the Long Walls near Megara. This - may have been done, but it would be an operation of no great - importance; for to pull down a portion of the wall would not - bar the access from the city, which it was the object of the - Athenians to accomplish. “They broke off” the communication - along the road between the Long Walls from the city to Nisæa, by - building across or barricading the space between: similar to what - is said a little above,—~διοικοδομησάμενοι~ τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας, - etc. Diodorus (xii, 66) abridges Thucydidês. - -Such interruption of communication by the Long Walls indicated in -the minds of the Athenian generals a conviction that Megara was -now out of their reach. But the town in its present distracted -state, would certainly have fallen into their hands,[603] had it -not been snatched from them by the accidental neighborhood and -energetic intervention of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the -levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Corinth and -Sikyon, when he first learned the surprise and capture of the Long -Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these -Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got -together a body of two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, -six hundred Sikyonian and four hundred Phliasian, besides his own -small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiskus, in -the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pegæ, on the road over -Mount Geraneia; having first despatched a pressing summons to the -Bœotians to request that they would meet him at that point with -reinforcements. He trusted by a speedy movement to preserve Megara, -and perhaps even Nisæa; but on reaching Tripodiskus in the night, he -learned that the latter place had already surrendered. Alarmed for -the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without -delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of three hundred men, he -presented himself, without being expected, at the gates of the city; -entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for -the recovery of Nisæa. One of the two parties in Megara would have -been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case -the exiles in Pegæ would be brought back upon them, was prepared for -a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only -one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these -circumstances the two parties came to a compromise, and mutually -agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle -would take place between him and the Athenians, and each calculated -that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.[604] - - [603] Thucyd. iv, 73. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὤφθησαν ἐλθόντες (Brasidas - with his troops) οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν - ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως. - - [604] Thucyd. iv, 71. - -Returning back without success to Tripodiskus, Brasidas was joined -there early in the morning by two thousand Bœotian hoplites and six -hundred cavalry; for the Bœotians had been put in motion by the same -news as himself, and had even commenced their march, before his -messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached -Platæa.[605] The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to -six thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry, with whom he marched -straight to the neighborhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, -dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Bœotian -cavalry; but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a -sharp action with the assailants, wherein, after some loss on both -sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They -granted a truce for the burial of the Bœotian officer of cavalry, -who was slain with some others. After this indecisive cavalry -skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain, -between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian -hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array, hard by Nisæa and the -Long Walls. He thus offered them battle if they chose it; but each -party expected that the other would attack and each was unwilling -to begin the attack on his own side, Brasidas was well aware that, -if the Athenians refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from -falling into their hands,—which loss it was his main object to -prevent, and which had in fact been prevented only by his arrival. If -he attacked and was beaten, he would forfeit this advantage,—while, -if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian -generals on their side reflected, that they had already secured a -material acquisition in Nisæa, which cut off Megara from their sea; -that the army opposed to them was not only superior in number of -hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so -that no one city hazarded much in the action; while their own force -was all Athenian, and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which -would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city: nor did they -think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose -of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on -both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each -waiting for the other to attack: at length the Athenians, seeing that -no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the -first to retire into Nisæa. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas -retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened -without reserve to admit him.[606] - - [605] Thucyd. iv, 72. - - [606] Thucyd. iv, 73. - -The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was -collected, speedily dispersed,—he himself resuming his preparations -for Thrace; while the Athenians on their side also returned home, -leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisæa and -of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete -and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not -thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with -the Athenians,[607] the opposite party opened communication with -the exiles at Pegæ and readmitted them into the city; binding them -however, by the most solemn pledges, to observe absolute amnesty of -the past and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. -The new-comers only kept their pledge during the interval which -elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They -soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and -found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A -review and examination of arms, of the hoplites in the city, having -been ordered, the Megarian lochi were so marshalled and tutored as -to enable the leaders to single out such victims as they thought -expedient. They seized many of their most obnoxious enemies, some of -them suspected as accomplices in the recent conspiracy with Athens: -the men thus seized were subjected to the forms of a public trial, -before that which was called a public assembly; wherein each voter, -acting under military terror, was constrained to give his suffrage -openly. All were condemned to death and executed, to the number of -one hundred.[608] The constitution of Megara was then shaped into an -oligarchy of the closest possible kind, a few of the most violent men -taking complete possession of the government. But they must probably -have conducted it with vigor and prudence for their own purposes, -since Thucydidês remarks that it was rare to see a revolution -accomplished by so small a party, and yet so durable. How long it -lasted, he does not mention. A few months after these incidents, -the Megarians regained possession of their Long Walls, by capture -from the Athenians,[609] to whom indeed they could have been of no -material service, and levelled the whole line of them to the ground: -but the Athenians still retained Nisæa. We may remark, as explaining -in part the durability of this new government, that the truce -concluded at the beginning of the ensuing year must have greatly -lightened the difficulties of any government, whether oligarchical or -democratical, in Megara. - - [607] We find some of them afterwards in the service of Athens, - employed as light-armed troops in the Sicilian expedition - (Thucyd. vi, 43). - - [608] Thucyd. iv, 74. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ - ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους, ἐξελέξαντο - τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἵ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα ξυμπρᾶξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς - Ἀθηναίους, ἄνδρας ὡς ἑκατόν· καὶ ~τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν - δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν~, ὡς κατεγνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, - καὶ ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τὰ μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ πλεῖστον - δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ᾽ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετάστασις - ξυνέμεινεν. - - [609] Thucyd. iv, 109. - -The scheme for surprising Megara had been both laid and executed -with skill, and only miscarried through an accident to which such -schemes are always liable, as well as by the unexpected celerity -of Brasidas. It had, moreover, succeeded so far as to enable the -Athenians to carry Nisæa,—one of the posts which they had surrendered -by the thirty years’ truce, and of considerable positive value -to them: so that it counted on the whole as a victory, leaving -the generals with increased encouragement to turn their activity -elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought -back from the Megarid,[610] Hippokratês and Demosthenês concerted a -still more extensive plan for the invasion of Bœotia, in conjunction -with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break -down and democratize the oligarchical governments, and especially -through the agency of a Theban exile named Ptœodôrus. Demosthenês, -with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesus to Naupaktus, with -instructions to collect an Akarnanian force, to sail into the inmost -recess of the Corinthian or Krissæan gulf, and to occupy Siphæ, a -maritime town belonging to the Bœotian Thespiæ, where intelligences -had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, -Hippokratês engaged to enter Bœotia, with the main force of Athens, -at the southeastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to -fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo, on the coast of the Eubœan -strait: while at the same time it was concerted that some Bœotian -and Phocian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chæroneia -on the borders of Phocis. Bœotia would thus be assailed on three -sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be -distracted and unable to coöperate. Internal movements were farther -expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to -establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance -with the Athenians. - - [610] Thucyd. iv, 76. εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν, - etc. - -Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenês sailed from -Athens to Naupaktus, where he collected his Akarnanian allies,—now -stronger and more united than ever, since the refractory inhabitants -of Œniadæ had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian -brethren: moreover, the neighboring Agræans with their prince -Salynthius were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the -appointed day, seemingly about the beginning of October, he -sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Siphæ, in full -expectation that it would be betrayed to him.[611] But the execution -of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the -first place, there was a mistake as to the day understood between -Hippokratês and Demosthenês: in the next place, the entire plot was -discovered and betrayed by a Phocian of Phanoteus (bordering on -Chæroneia) named Nicomachus,—communicated first to the Lacedæmonians -and through them to the bœotarchs. Siphæ and Chæroneia were -immediately placed in a state of defence, and Demosthenês, on -arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it -favorable to him, but a formidable Bœotian force which rendered -attack unavailing: moreover, Hippokratês had not yet begun his march, -so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from -Siphæ.[612] Under these circumstances, not only was Demosthenês -obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself -with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyon,[613] but -all the expected internal movements in Bœotia were prevented from -breaking out. - - [611] Thucyd. iv, 77. - - [612] Thucyd. iv, 89. - - [613] Thucyd. iv, 101. - -It was not till after the Bœotian troops, having repelled the attack -by sea, had retired from Siphæ, that Hippokratês commenced his -march from Athens to invade the Bœotian territory near Tanagra. He -was probably encouraged by false promises from the Bœotian exiles, -otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in -executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of -the other part. It was, however, executed in a manner which implies -unusual alacrity and confidence. The whole military population of -Athens was marched into Bœotia, to the neighborhood of Delium, -the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the -Bœotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, -not merely citizens, but also metics or resident non-freemen, and -even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course -this statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards -left behind for the city: but besides the really effective force -of seven thousand hoplites, and several hundred horsemen, there -appear to have been not less than twenty-five thousand light-armed, -half-armed, or unarmed attendants accompanying the march.[614] The -number of hoplites is here prodigiously great; brought together by -general and indiscriminate proclamation, not selected by a special -choice of the stratêgi out of the names on the muster-roll, as was -usually the case for any distant expedition.[615] As to light-armed, -there was at this time no trained force of that description at -Athens, except a small body of archers. No pains had been taken to -organize either darters or slingers: the hoplites, the horsemen, -and the seamen, constituted the whole effective force of the -city. Indeed, it appears that the Bœotians also were hardly less -destitute than the Athenians of native darters and slingers, since -those which they employed in the subsequent siege of Delium were in -great part hired from the Malian gulf.[616] To employ at one and -the same time heavy-armed and light-armed, was not natural to any -Grecian community, but was a practice which grew up with experience -and necessity. The Athenian feeling, as manifested in the Persæ -of Æschylus a few years after the repulse of Xerxes, proclaims -exclusive pride in the spear and shield, with contempt for the bow: -and it was only during this very year, when alarmed by the Athenian -occupation of Pylus and Kythêra, that the Lacedæmonians, contrary -to their previous custom, had begun to organize a regiment of -archers.[617] The effective manner in which Demosthenês had employed -the light-armed in Sphakteria against the Lacedæmonian hoplites, was -well calculated to teach an instructive lesson as to the value of the -former description of troops. - - [614] Thucyd. iv, 93, 94. He states that the Bœotian ψιλοὶ were - above ten thousand, and that the Athenian ψιλοὶ were πολλαπλάσιοι - τῶν ἐναντίων. We can hardly take this number as less than - twenty-five thousand ψιλῶν καὶ σκευοφόρων (iv, 101). - - The hoplites, as well as the horsemen, had their baggage and - provision carried for them by attendants: see Thucyd. iii, 17; - vii, 75. - - [615] Thucyd. iv, 90. Ὁ δ᾽ Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους - πανδημεὶ, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν, etc.: - also πανστρατιᾶς (iv, 94). - - The meaning of the word πανδημεὶ is well illustrated by Nikias in - his exhortation to the Athenian army near Syracuse, immediately - antecedent to the first battle with the Syracusans,—levy - _en masse_, as opposed to hoplites specially selected (vi, - 66-68),—ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ - ἀπολέκτους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς—καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, etc. - - When a special selection took place, the names of the hoplites - chosen by the generals to take part in any particular service - were written on boards according to their tribes: each of these - boards was affixed publicly against the statue of the Heros - Eponymus of the tribe to which it referred: Aristophanês, - Equites, 1369; Pac. 1184, with Scholiast; Wachsmuth, Hellen. - Alterthumsk. ii, p. 312. - - [616] Thucyd. iv, 100. - - [617] Thucyd. iv, 55. - -The Bœotian Delium,[618] which Hippokratês now intended to occupy and -fortify, was a temple of Apollo, strongly situated and overhanging -the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and somewhat more than a -mile from the border territory of Orôpus,—a territory originally -Bœotian, but at this time dependent on Athens, and even partly -incorporated in the political community of Athens, under the name -of the Deme of Græa.[619] Orôpus itself was about a day’s march -from Athens, by the road which led through Dekeleia and Sphendalê, -between the mountains Parnês and Phelleus: so that as the distance to -be traversed was so inconsiderable, and the general feeling of the -time was that of confidence, it is probable that men of all ages, -arms, and dispositions crowded to join the march, in part from mere -curiosity and excitement. Hippokratês reached Delium on the day after -he had started from Athens: on the succeeding day he began his work -of fortification, which was completed, all hands aiding, and tools as -well as workmen having been brought along with the army from Athens, -in two days and a half. Having dug a ditch all round the sacred -ground, he threw up the earth in a bank alongside of the ditch, -planting stakes, throwing in fascines, and adding layers of stone -and brick, to keep the work together, and make it into a rampart of -tolerable height and firmness. The vines[620] round the temple, -together with the stakes which served as supports to them, were cut -to obtain wood; the houses adjoining furnished bricks and stone: the -outer temple-buildings themselves also, on some of the sides, served -as they stood to facilitate and strengthen the defence; but there was -one side on which the annexed building, once a portico, had fallen -down: and here the Athenians constructed some wooden towers as a -help to the defenders. By the middle of the fifth day after leaving -Athens, the work was so nearly completed, that the army quitted -Delium, and began its march homeward, out of Bœotia; halting, after -it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian -territory of Orôpus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the -coming of Hippokratês, who still remained at Delium, stationing the -garrison, and giving his final orders about future defence; while -the greater number of the light-armed and unarmed, separating from -the hoplites, and seemingly without any anticipation of the coming -danger, continued their return-march to Athens.[621] Their position -was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Orôpus, on -the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium.[622] - - [618] Thucyd. iv, 90; Livy, xxxv, 51. - - [619] Dikæarch. Βίος Ἑλλάδος. Fragm. ed. Fuhr, pp. 142-230; - Pausan. i, 34, 2; Aristotle ap. Stephan. Byz. v, Ὠρωπός. See - also Col. Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. - iv, p. 123; Mr. Finlay, Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38; Ross, Die - Demen von Attika, p. 6, where the Deme of Græa is verified by an - inscription, and explained for the first time. - - The road taken by the army of Hippokratês in the march to Delium, - was the same as that by which the Lacedæmonian army in their - first invasion of Attica had retired from Attica into Bœotia - (Thucyd. ii, 23). - - [620] Dikæarchus (Βίος Ἑλλάδος, p. 142, ed. Fuhr) is full of - encomiums on the excellence of the wine drunk at Tanagra, and of - the abundant olive-plantations on the road between Orôpus and - Tanagra. - - Since tools and masons were brought from Athens to fortify Nisæa - about three months before (Thucyd. iv, 69), we may be pretty sure - that similar apparatus was carried to Delium, though Thucydidês - does not state it. - - [621] Thucyd. iv, 90. That the vines round the temple had - supporting-stakes, which furnished the σταυροὺς used by the - Athenians, we may reasonably presume: the same as those χάρακες - which are spoken of in Korkyra, iii, 70: compare Pollux, i, 162. - - [622] “The plain of Oropus (observes Col. Leake) expands from - its upper angle at _Oropó_ towards the mouth of the Asopus, and - stretches about five miles along the shore, from the foot of the - hills of Markópulo on the east to the village of Khalkúki on - the west, where begin some heights extending westward towards - Dhilisi, the ancient Delium.”—“The plain of Oropus is separated - from the more inland plain of Tanagra by rocky gorges through - which the Asopus flows.” (Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, - vol. ii. sect. iv, p. 112.) - -During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Bœotia -had time to muster at Tanagra: and their number was just completed -as the Athenians were beginning their march homeward from Delium. -Contingents had arrived, not only from Thebes and its dependent -townships around, but also from Haliartus, Korôneia, Orchomenus, -Kôpæ, and Thespiæ: that of Tanagra joined on the spot. The government -of the Bœotian confederacy at this time was vested in eleven -bœotarchs,—two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportion -by the other cities, immediate members of the confederacy,—and in -four senates, or councils, the constitution of which is not known. -Though all the bœotarchs, now assembled at Tanagra, formed a sort -of council of war, yet the supreme command was vested in Pagondas -and Aranthidês, the bœotarchs from Thebes; either in Pagondas as the -senior of the two, or perhaps in both, alternating with each other -day by day.[623] As the Athenians were evidently in full retreat, -and had already passed the border, all the other bœotarchs, except -Pagondas, were unwilling to hazard a battle[624] on soil not Bœotian, -and were disposed to let them return home without obstruction. Such -reluctance is not surprising, when we reflect that the chances of -defeat were considerable, and that probably some of these bœotarchs -were afraid of the increased power which a victory would lend to -the oppressive tendencies of Thebes. But Pagondas strenuously -opposed this proposition, and carried the soldiers of the various -cities along with him, even in opposition to the sentiments of -their separate leaders, in favor of immediately fighting. He called -them apart and addressed them by separate divisions, in order that -all might not quit their arms at one and the same moment.[625] He -characterized the sentiment of the other bœotarchs as an unworthy -manifestation of weakness, which, when properly considered, had not -even the recommendation of superior prudence. For the Athenians -had just invaded the country, and built a fort for the purpose of -continuous devastation; nor were they less enemies on one side of the -border than on the other. Moreover, they were the most restless and -encroaching of all enemies; and the Bœotians, who had the misfortune -to be their neighbors, could only be secure against them by the most -resolute promptitude in defending themselves, as well as in returning -the blows first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and -their property against the condition of slavery under which their -neighbors in Eubœa had long suffered, as well as so many other -portions of Greece, their only chance was to march onward and beat -these invaders, following the glorious example of their fathers and -predecessors in the field of Korôneia. The sacrifices were favorable -to an advancing movement, and Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had -desecrated by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his -cordial aid to the Bœotian defence.[626] - - [623] Thucyd. iv, 93; v, 38. Akræphiæ may probably be considered - as either a dependency of Thebes, or included in the general - expression of Thucydidês, after the word Κωπαιῆς—οἱ περὶ τὴν - λίμνην. Anthêdon and Lebadeia, which are recognized as separate - autonomous townships in various Bœotian inscriptions, are not - here named in Thucydidês. But there is no certain evidence - respecting the number of immediate members of the Bœotian - confederacy: compare the various conjectures in Boeckh, ad Corp. - Inscript. tom. i, p. 727; O. Müller, Orchomenus, p. 402; Kruse, - Hellas, tom. ii, p. 548. - - [624] Thucyd. iv, 91. τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ ~εἰσιν ἕνδεκα~, οὐ - ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι, etc. - - The use of the present tense εἰσιν marks the number eleven as - that of _all the bœotarchs_; at this time, according to Boeckh’s - opinion, ad Corp. Inscript. i, vol. i, p. 729. The number, - however, appears to have been variable. - - [625] Thucyd. iv, 91. προσκαλῶν ἑκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ - ἁθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὅπλα, ἔπειθε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς - Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι. - - Here Dr. Arnold observes: “This confirms and illustrates what - has been said in the note on ii, 2, 5, as to the practice of the - Greek soldiers piling their arms the moment they halted in a - particular part of the camp, and always attending the speeches of - their general without them.” - - In the case here before us, it appears that the Bœotians did - come by separate lochi, pursuant to command, to hear the words - of Pagondas, and also that each lochus left its arms to do so; - though even here it is not absolutely certain that τὰ ὅπλα does - not mean _the military station_, as Dukas interprets it. But Dr. - Arnold generalizes too hastily from hence to a customary practice - as between soldiers and their general. The proceeding of the - Athenian general Hippokratês, on this very occasion, near Delium, - to be noticed a page or two forward, exhibits an arrangement - totally different. Moreover, the note on ii, 2, 5, to which Dr. - Arnold refers, has no sort of analogy to the passage here before - us, which does not include the words τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα; whereas - these words are the main matters in chapter ii, 2, 5. Whoever - attentively compares the two, will see that Dr. Arnold, followed - by Poppo and Göller, has stretched an explanation which suits - the passage here before us to other passages where it is no way - applicable. - - [626] Thucyd. iv, 92. - -Finding his exhortations favorably received, Pagondas conducted the -army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was -anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; -and, moreover, the day was nearly spent,—it was already late in the -afternoon. Having reached a spot where he was only separated from -the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the -other, he marshalled his troops in the array proper for fighting. -The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies, ranged in a depth -of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing: -the hoplites of Haliartus, Korôneia, Kôpæ, and its neighborhood, -were in the centre: those of Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, on -the left; for Orchomenus, being the second city in Bœotia next to -Thebes, obtained a second post of honor at the opposite extremity -of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshalling -the hoplites, and its own depth of files: on this point there was -no uniformity, a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissentient -custom in Greece, and how much each town, even among confederates, -stood apart as a separate unit.[627] Thucydidês specifies only the -prodigious depth of the Theban hoplites; respecting the rest, he -merely intimates that no common rule was followed. There is another -point also which he does not specify, but which, though we learn it -only on the inferior authority of Diodorus, appears both true and -important. The front ranks of the Theban heavy-armed were filled by -three hundred select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength, -valor, and discipline, who were accustomed to fight in pairs, each -man being attached to his neighbor by a peculiar tie of intimate -friendship. These pairs were termed the heniochi and parabatæ, -charioteers and companions; a denomination probably handed down -from the Homeric times, when the foremost heroes really combated in -chariots in front of the common soldiers, but now preserved after -it had outlived its appropriate meaning.[628] This band, composed -of the finest men in the various palæstræ of Thebes, and enjoying a -peculiar training for the defence of the kadmeia, or citadel, was -in after-days detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and -organized into a separate regiment under the name of the Sacred -Lochus, or Band: we shall see how much it contributed to the -short-lived military ascendency of Thebes. On both flanks of this -mass of Bœotian hoplites, about seven thousand in total number, were -distributed one thousand cavalry, five hundred peltasts, and ten -thousand light-armed or unarmed. The language of the historian seems -to imply that the light-armed on the Bœotian side were something more -effective than the mere multitude who followed the Athenians. - - [627] Thucyd. iv, 93. ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι - ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον. - - What is still more remarkable, in the battle of Mantincia, in 418 - B.C. between the Lacedæmonians on one side and the Athenians, - Argeians, Mantincians, etc., on the other, the different lochi or - divisions of the Lacedæmonian army were not all marshalled in the - same depth of files. Each lochage, or commander of the lochus, - directed the depth of his own division (Thucyd. v, 68). - - [628] Diodor. xii, 70. Προεμάχοντο δὲ πάντων οἱ παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις - Ἡνίοχοι καὶ Παραβάται καλούμενοι, ἄνδρες ἐπίλεκτοι τριακόσιοι.... - Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι διαφέροντες ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων ῥώμαις, etc. - - Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19. - -Such was the order in which Pagondas marched his army over the hill, -halting them for a moment in front and sight of the Athenians, to -see that the ranks were even, before he gave the word for actual -charge.[629] Hippokratês, on his side, apprized while still at -Delium, that the Bœotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders -to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently -arrived himself to command them; leaving three hundred cavalry at -Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting on -the rear of the Bœotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites -were ranged eight deep along the whole line,—with the cavalry, and -such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank. -Hippokratês, after arriving on the spot, and surveying the ground -occupied, marched along the front of the line briefly encouraging -his soldiers; who, as the battle was just on the Orôpian border, -might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they -were therefore exposed without necessity. He, too, in a strain -similar to that adopted by Pagondas, reminded the Athenians, that on -either side of the border they were alike fighting for the defence -of Attica, to keep the Bœotians out of it; since the Peloponnesians -would never dare to enter the country without the aid of the Bœotian -horse.[630] He farther called to their recollection the great name -of Athens, and the memorable victory of Myronidês, at Œnophyta, -whereby their fathers had acquired possession of all Bœotia. But -he had scarcely half-finished his progress along the line, when he -was forced to desist by the sound of the Bœotian pæan. Pagondas, -after a few additional sentences of encouragement, had given the -word: the Bœotian hoplites were seen charging down the hill; and the -Athenian hoplites, not less eager, advanced to meet them at a running -step.[631] - - [629] Thucyd. iv, 93. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ καλῶς αὐτοῖς εἶχεν, ὑπερεφάνησαν - (the Bœotians) τοῦ λόφου καὶ ~ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα~ τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ - ἔμελλον, etc. - - I transcribe this passage for the purpose of showing how - impossible it is to admit the explanation which Dr. Arnold, - Poppo, and Göller give of these words ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα (see Notes - ad Thucyd. ii, 2). They explain the words to mean, that the - soldiers “piled their arms into a heap,” disarmed themselves for - the time. But the Bœotians, in the situation here described, - cannot possibly have parted with their arms, they were just on - the point of charging the enemy: immediately afterwards, Pagondas - gives the word, the pæan for charging is sung, and the rush - commences. Pagondas had, doubtless, good reason for directing - a momentary halt, to see that his ranks were in perfectly good - condition before the charge began. But to command his troops to - “pile their arms” would be the last thing that he would think of. - - In the interpretation of τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, I agree with - the Scholiast, who understands μαχέσασθαι or μαχεῖσθαι after - ἔμελλον (compare Thucyd. v, 66), dissenting from Dr. Arnold and - Göller, who would understand τάσσεσθαι; which, as it seems to me, - makes a very awkward meaning, and is not sustained by the passage - produced as parallel (viii, 51). - - The infinitive verb, understood after ἔμελλον, need not - necessarily be a verb actually occurring before: it may be a verb - suggested by the general scope of the sentence: see ἐμέλλησαν, - iv, 123. - - [630] Thucyd. iv, 95. - - [631] Thucyd. iv, 95, 96. Καθεστώτων δ᾽ ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ - ἤδη μελλόντων ξυνιέναι, Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιπαριὼν τὸ - στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκελεύετό τε καὶ ἔλεγε τοιάδε.... - Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους παρακελευομένου, καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσου τοῦ - στρατοπέδου ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσαντος, οἱ Βοιωτοὶ, - παρακελευσαμένου καὶ σφίσιν ὡς διὰ ταχέων καὶ ἐνταῦθα Παγώνδου, - παιωνίσαντες ἐπῄεσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου, etc. - - This passage contradicts what is affirmed by Dr. Arnold, Poppo, - and Göller, to have been a _general practice_, that the soldiers - “piled their arms and _always_ attended the speeches of their - generals without them.” (See his note ad Thucyd. iv, 91.) - -At the extremity of the line on each side, the interposition -of ravines prevented the actual meeting of the two armies: but -throughout all the rest of the line, the clash was formidable and the -conduct of both sides resolute. Both armies, maintaining their ranks -compact and unbroken, came to the closest quarters; to the contact -and pushing of shields against each other.[632] On the left half -of the Bœotian line, consisting of hoplites from Thespiæ, Tanagra, -and Orchomenus, the Athenians were victorious. The Thespians, who -resisted longest, even after their comrades had given way, were -surrounded and sustained the most severe loss from the Athenians; -who in the ardor of success, while wheeling round to encircle the -enemy, became disordered and came into conflict even with their own -citizens, not recognizing them at the moment: some loss of life was -the consequence. - - [632] Thucyd. iv, 96. καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων - ξυνεστήκει, etc. Compare Xenophon, Cyropæd. vii, 1, 32. - -While the left of the Bœotian line was thus worsted and driven -back for protection to the right, the Thebans on that side gained -decided advantage. Though the resolution and discipline of the -Athenians was noway inferior, yet as soon as the action came to close -quarters and to propulsion with shield and spear, the prodigious -depth of the Theban column (more than triple of the depth of the -Athenians, twenty-five against eight) enabled them to bear down -their enemies by mere superiority of weight and mass. Moreover, the -Thebans appear to have been superior to the Athenians in gymnastic -training and acquired bodily force, as they were inferior both in -speech and in intelligence. The chosen Theban warriors in the front -rank were especially superior: but apart from such superiority, if -we assume simple equality of individual strength and resolution -on both sides,[633] it is plain that when the two opposing columns -came into conflict, shield against shield, the comparative force of -forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient -to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column, which -was increased by Epameinondas, half a century afterwards, at the -battle of Leuktra, from a depth of twenty-five men to the still more -astonishing depth of fifty: nor need we suspect the correctness -of the text, with some critics, or suppose, with others, that the -great depth of the Theban files arose from the circumstance that -the rear ranks were too poor to provide themselves with armor.[634] -Even in a depth of eight, which was that of the Athenian column in -the present engagement,[635] and seemingly the usual depth in a -battle, the spears of the four rear ranks could hardly have protruded -sufficiently beyond the first line to do any mischief. The great use -of all the ranks behind the first four, was partly to take the place -of such of the foremost lines as might be slain, partly, to push -forward the lines before them from behind. The greater the depth of -the files, the more irresistible did this propelling force become: -hence the Thebans at Delium, as well as at Leuktra, found their -account in deepening the column to so remarkable a degree, to which -we may fairly presume that their hoplites were trained beforehand. - - [633] The proverbial expression of Βοιωτίαν ὗν, “the Bœotian - sow,” was ancient even in the town of Pindar (Olymp. vi, 90, with - the Scholia and Boeckh’s note): compare also Ephorus, Fragment - 67, ed. Marx: Dikæarchus, Βίος Ἑλλάδος, p. 143, ed. Fuhr; Plato, - Legg. i, p. 636; and Symposion, p. 182, “pingues Thebani et - valentes,” Cicero de Fato, iv, 7. - - Xenophon (Memorab. iii, 5, 2, 15; iii, 12, 5: compare Xenoph. de - Athen. Republ. i, 13) maintains the natural bodily capacity of - Athenians to be equal to that of Bœotians, but deplores the want - of σωμασκία, or bodily training. - - [634] See the notes of Dr. Arnold and Poppo, ad Thucyd. iv, 96. - - [635] Compare Thucyd. v, 68; vi, 67. - -The Thebans on the right thus pushed back[636] the troops on the -left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly, and for a -short space, maintaining their order unbroken, so that the victory -of the Athenians on their own right would have restored the battle, -had not Pagondas detached from the rear two squadrons of cavalry; -who, wheeling unseen round the hill behind, suddenly appeared to -the relief of the Bœotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on -that side, already deranged in their ranks by the ardor of pursuit, -the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to reinforce the -Bœotians. And thus, even on the right, the victorious portion of -their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way; while on -the left, where they were worsted from the beginning, they found -themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thebans: so -that in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken, dispersed, and -fled. The garrison of Delium, reinforced by three hundred cavalry, -whom Hippokratês had left there to assail the rear of the Bœotians -during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or were repelled -by a Bœotian reserve stationed to watch them. Flight having become -general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took -different directions: the right sought refuge at Delium, the centre -fled to Orôpus, and the left took a direction towards the high lands -of Parnês. The pursuit of the Bœotians was vigorous and destructive: -they had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse -who had arrived even during the action: their peltasts also, and -their light-armed, would render valuable service against retreating -hoplites.[637] Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun -very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight: -this important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost -total destruction.[638] As it was, however, the general Hippokratês, -together with nearly one thousand hoplites, and a considerable number -of light-armed and attendants, were slain; while the loss of the -Bœotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under five -hundred hoplites. Some prisoners[639] seem to have been made, but we -hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Orôpus were -conveyed back by sea to Athens. - - [636] Thucyd. iv, 96. Τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν, ᾗ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τε - τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ~ὠσάμενοι~ κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπηκολούθουν. - - The word ὠσάμενοι (compare iv, 35; vi, 70), exactly expresses the - forward pushing of the mass of hoplites with shield and spear. - - [637] Thucyd. iv, 96; Athenæus, v, p. 215. Diodorus (xii, 70) - represents that the battle began with a combat of cavalry, in - which the Athenians had the advantage. This is quite inconsistent - with the narrative of Thucydidês. - - [638] Diodorus (xii, 70) dwells upon this circumstance. - - [639] Pyrilampês is spoken of as having been wounded and taken - prisoner in the retreat by the Thebans (Plutarch, De Genio - Socratis, c. 11, p. 581). See also Thucyd. v, 35, where allusion - is made to some prisoners. - -The victors retired to Tanagra, after erecting their trophy, -burying their own dead, and despoiling those of their enemies. An -abundant booty of arms from the stripped warriors, long remained -to decorate the temples of Thebes, and the spoil in other ways is -said to have been considerable. Pagondas also resolved to lay siege -to the newly-established fortress at Delium: but before commencing -operations,—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians -could always reinforce the garrison by sea,—he tried another means of -attaining the same object. He despatched to the Athenians a herald, -who, happening in his way to meet the Athenian herald, coming to ask -the ordinary permission for burial of the slain, warned him that no -such request would be entertained until the message of the Bœotian -general had first been communicated, and thus induced him to come -back to the Athenian commanders. The Bœotian herald was instructed -to remonstrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the -Athenians in seizing and fortifying the temple of Delium; wherein -their garrison was now dwelling, performing numerous functions -which religion forbade to be done in a sacred place, and using as -their common drink the water especially consecrated to sacrificial -purposes. The Bœotians therefore solemnly summoned them in the name -of Apollo, and the gods inmates along with him, to evacuate the -place, carrying away all that belonged to them: and the herald gave -it to be understood, that, unless this summons were complied with, no -permission would be granted to bury the dead. - -Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the -Bœotian commanders, to the following effect: “The Athenians did not -admit that they had hitherto been guilty of any wrong in reference -to the temple, and protested that they would persist in respecting -it for the future as much as possible. Their object in taking -possession of it had been no evil sentiment towards the holy place, -but the necessity of avenging the repeated invasions of Attica by -the Bœotians. Possession of the territory, according to the received -maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of -temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfil all customary -obligations to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. -It was upon this maxim that the Bœotians had themselves acted when -they took possession of their present territory, expelling the prior -occupants and appropriating the temples: it was upon the same maxim -that the Athenians would act in retaining so much of Bœotia as they -had now conquered, and in conquering more of it, if they could. -Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water—a necessity -not originating in the ambition of Athens, but in prior Bœotian -aggressions upon Attica,—a necessity which they trusted that the -gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection -to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without -constraint experienced their displeasure. The Bœotians were guilty -of far greater impiety in refusing to give back the dead, except -upon certain conditions connected with the holy ground, than the -Athenians, who merely refused to turn the duty of sepulture into an -unseemly bargain. Tell us unconditionally (concluded the Athenian -herald) that we may bury our dead under truce, pursuant to the maxims -of our forefathers. Do not tell us that we may do so on condition of -going out of Bœotia, for we are no longer in Bœotia; we are in our -own territory, won by the sword.” - -The Bœotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and -decisive: “If you are in Bœotia, you may take away all that belongs -to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If on the other -hand you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution -without asking us.”[640] - - [640] See the two difficult chapters, iv, 98, 99, in Thucydidês. - -In this debate, curious as an illustration of Grecian manners and -feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on -both sides. The final sentence of the Bœotians was good as a reply -to the incidental argument raised by the Athenian herald, who had -rested the defence of Athens in regard to the temple of Delium on the -allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Bœotian, Athenian -by conquest and by the right of the strongest, and had concluded by -affirming the same thing about Oropia, the district to which the -battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of actual -superior force, which the Bœotians retorted, when they said: “If -the territory to which your application refers is yours by right -of conquest (_i. e._ if you are _de facto_ masters of it, and are -strongest within it), you can of course do what you think best in -it: you need not ask any truce at our hands; you can bury your dead -without a truce.”[641] The Bœotians knew that at this moment the -field of battle was under guard by a detachment of their army,[642] -and that the Athenians could not obtain the dead bodies without -permission; but since the Athenian herald had asserted the reverse -as a matter of fact, we can hardly wonder that they resented the -production of such an argument; meeting it by a reply sufficiently -pertinent in mere diplomatic fencing. - - [641] See the notes of Poppo, Göller, Dr. Arnold, and other - commentators, on these chapters. - - Neither these notes, nor the Scholiast, seem to me in all parts - satisfactory; nor do they seize the spirit of the argument - between the Athenian herald and the Bœotian officers, which - will be found perfectly consistent as a piece of diplomatic - interchange. - - In particular, they do not take notice that it is the _Athenian_ - herald who first raises the question, what is Athenian territory - and what is Bœotian: and that he defines Athenian territory to - be that in which the force of Athens is superior. The retort of - the Bœotians refers to that definition; not to the question of - rightful claim to any territory, apart from actual superiority of - force. - - [642] Thucyd. iv, 97. - -But if the Athenian herald, instead of raising the incidental point -of territorial property, combined with an incautious definition of -that which constituted territorial property, as a defence against the -alleged desecration of the temple of Delium, had confined himself -to the main issue, he would have put the Bœotians completely in the -wrong. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the -victor, if solicited, was held bound to grant to the vanquished -a truce for burying his dead; to grant and permit it absolutely, -without annexing any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, -the Bœotians sinned against the most sacred international law of -Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium -as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian -dead. Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, we shall find that -they did grant it unconditionally; and we may doubt whether they -would have ever persisted in refusing it, if the Athenian herald had -pressed this one important principle separately and exclusively; and -if he had not, by an unskilful plea in vindication of the right -to occupy and live at Delium, both exasperated their feelings, and -furnished them with a collateral issue as a means of evading the main -demand.[643] - - [643] Thucydidês, in describing the state of mind of the - Bœotians, does not seem to imply that they thought this a good - and valid ground, upon which they could directly take their - stand; but merely that they considered it a fair diplomatic way - of meeting the alternative raised by the Athenian herald; for - εὐπρεπὲς means nothing more than this. - - Οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐσπένδοντο ~δῆθεν~ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων (Ἀθηναίων)· τὸ δὲ ἐκ - τῆς ἑαυτῶν (Βοιωτῶν) ~εὐπρεπὲς~ εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀπιόντας καὶ - ἀπολαβεῖν ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν. - - The adverb δῆθεν also marks the reference to the special - question, as laid out by the Athenian herald. - -To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we ought -to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying -Delium, that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as -a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly -rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. Nor does the -vindication offered by the Athenian herald meet the real charge -preferred. It is one thing for an enemy of superior force to overrun -a country, and to appropriate everything within it, sacred as well -as profane: it is another thing for a border enemy, not yet in -sufficient force for conquering the whole, to convert a temple of -convenient site into a regular garrisoned fortress, and make it -a base of operations against the neighboring population. On this -ground, the Bœotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of -Delium: though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian -international custom would have thought them warranted in attaching -it as a condition to their grant of the burial-truce when solicited. - -All negotiation being thus broken off, the Bœotian generals prepared -to lay siege to Delium, aided by two thousand Corinthian hoplites, -together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of -Nisæa, who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent -for darters and slingers, probably Œtæans and Ætolians, from the -Maliac gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled -by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, -in spite of the hasty and awkward defences by which alone the -fort was protected. At length they contrived a singular piece of -fire-mechanism, which enabled them to master the place. They first -sawed in twain a thick beam, pierced a channel through it long-ways -from end to end, coated most part of the channel with iron, and then -joined the two halves accurately together. From the farther end of -this hollowed beam they suspended by chains a boiler, full of pitch, -brimstone, and burning charcoal; lastly, an iron tube projected from -the end of the interior channel of the beam, in a direction so as to -come near to the boiler. Such was the machine, which, constructed at -some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, -near the palisading and the wooden towers. The Bœotians then applied -great bellows to their own end of the beam, blowing violently with -a close current of air through the interior channel, so as to raise -an intense fire in the boiler at the other end. The wooden portions -of the wall, soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders, -who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting farther -resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners and a few slain; -but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This recapture of -Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during -all which interval the Athenians slain had remained on the field -unburied. Presently, however, arrived the Athenian herald to make -fresh application for the burial-truce; which was now forthwith -granted, and granted unconditionally.[644] - - [644] Thucyd. iv, 100, 101. - -Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium, a fatal -discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had -previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss -which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in -the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokratês -is to be numbered. His bravery both in the battle and the retreat was -much extolled by his friends, and doubtless with good reason: he had -before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidæa, -and he served also at Amphipolis: his patience under hardship and -endurance of heat and cold being not less remarkable than his -personal bravery. He and his friend Lachês were among those hoplites, -who, in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their -arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their -firmness of countenance; insomuch that the pursuing cavalry found it -dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to an easier prey in the -disarmed fugitives. Alkibiadês also served at Delium in the cavalry, -and helped to protect Sokratês in the retreat. The latter was thus -exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanês -was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the Clouds, as a -dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.[645] - - [645] See Plato (Symposion, c. 36, p. 221; Lachês, p. 181; - Charmidês, p. 153; Apolog. Sokratis, p. 28), Strabo, ix, p. 403. - - Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 7. We find it mentioned among the - stories told about Sokratês in the retreat from Delium, that his - life was preserved by the inspiration of his familiar dæmon, or - genius, which instructed him on one doubtful occasion which of - two roads was the safe one to take (Cicero, de Divinat. i, 54; - Plutarch, de Genio Sokratis, c. 11, p. 581). - - The skepticism of Athenæus (v, p. 215) about the military service - of Sokratês is not to be defended, but it may probably be - explained by the exaggerations and falsehoods which he had read, - ascribing to the philosopher superhuman gallantry. - -Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, -their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or towards the close -of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have -already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a -Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, -under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, revolted subjects of -Athens, and with Perdikkas of Macedon. Having frustrated the Athenian -designs against Megara (as described above),[646] Brasidas completed -the levy of his division,—seventeen hundred hoplites, partly Helots, -partly Dorian Peloponnesians,—and conducted them, towards the close -of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the -Trachinian territory near the Maliac gulf. To reach Macedonia and -Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was -no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in -Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. -Moreover, the mass of the Thessalian population were decidedly -friendly to Athens, nor had he any sufficient means to force a -passage: while, should he wait to apply for formal permission, there -was much doubt whether it would be granted, and perfect certainty -of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their -guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, -yet the Thessalian governments, all oligarchical, sympathized with -Lacedæmon; and the federal authority or power of the tagus, which -bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was -of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perdikkas, as well as the -Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom -they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the -passage of the army.[647] - - [646] See above, page 378. - - [647] Thucyd. iv, 78. - -To these men Brasidas sent a message at Pharsalus, as soon as he -reached Herakleia; and Nikonidas, of Larissa, with other Thessalian -friends of Perdikkas, assembling at Melitæa, in Achaia Phthiôtis, -undertook to escort him through Thessaly. By their countenance -and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid -movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible -enterprise of running through the country, not only without the -consent but against the feeling of its inhabitants, simply by -such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achaia -Phthiôtis, a territory dependent on the Thessalians, Brasidas began -his march from Melitæa through Thessaly itself, along with his -powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and -celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers -from the neighborhood, offended at the proceeding, and unfriendly -to Nikonidas, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of -the river Enipeus. Reproaching him with wrongful violation of an -independent territory, by the introduction of armed forces without -permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed -farther. His only chance of making progress lay in disarming their -opposition by fair words. His guides excused themselves by saying -that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his -guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting -to ask for formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, -was the farthest thing from their thoughts and they would renounce -the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their -requisition. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas -himself. “He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship -for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against -the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly -relation subsisting between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, such -as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against -the prohibition of the parties now before him, he could not possibly -march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it -to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him.” Such -conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and -inducing them to disperse. But so afraid were his guides of renewed -opposition in other parts, that they hurried him forward still -more rapidly,[648] and he “passed through the country at a running -pace without halting.” Leaving Melitæa in the morning, he reached -Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus: thence -he proceeded on the next day to Phakium, and on the day afterwards -into Perrhæbia,[649] a territory adjoining to and dependent on -Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, -so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perrhæbians -conducted him over the pass of Olympus—the same over which the army -of Xerxes had marched—to Dium, in Macedonia, in the territory of -Perdikkas, on the northern edge of the mountain.[650] - - [648] Thucyd. iv, 78. Ὁ δὲ, κελευόντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρίν τι πλέον - ξυστῆναι τὸ κωλῦσον, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχὼν δρόμῳ. - - [649] The geography of Thessaly is not sufficiently known - to enable us to verify these positions with exactness. That - which Thucydidês calls the Apidanus, is the river formed by - the junction of the Apidanus and Enipeus. See Kiepert’s map of - ancient Thessaly (Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. - xlii, vol. iv, p. 470; and Dr. Arnold’s note on this chapter of - Thucydidês). - - We must suppose that Brasidas was detained a considerable time - in parleying with the opposing band of Thessalians. Otherwise, - it would seem that the space between Melitæa and Pharsalus would - not be a great distance to get over in an entire day’s march, - considering that the pace was as rapid as the troops could - sustain. The much greater distance between Larissa and Melitæa, - was traversed in one night by Philip king of Macedon, the son - of Demetrius, with an army carrying ladders and other aids for - attacking a town, etc. (Polyb. v, 97.) - - [650] Thucyd. iv, 78. - -The Athenians were soon apprized of this stolen passage, so ably -and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly -no other Lacedæmonian, would have conceived to be possible. Aware -of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions -in Thrace, they transmitted orders thither for greater vigilance, -and at the same time declared open war against Perdikkas;[651] but -unfortunately without sending any efficient force, at the moment when -timely defensive intervention was imperiously required. Perdikkas -immediately invited Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arrhibæus, -prince of the Macedonians, called Lynkestæ, or of Lynkus; a summons -which the Spartan could not decline, since Perdikkas provided half -of the pay and maintenance of the army,—but which he obeyed with -reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the -allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still farther strengthened by -envoys from the Chalkidians of Thrace, who, as zealous enemies of -Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts -to relieve Perdikkas from embarrassing enemies in the interior, -in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to -conciliate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined -Perdikkas, and marched along with the Macedonian army towards the -territory of the Lynkestæ, was not only averse to active military -operations, but even entertained with favor propositions from -Arrhibæus, wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally -of Lacedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perdikkas -to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating -these propositions to Perdikkas, Brasidas invited him to listen to -an equitable compromise, admitting Arrhibæus into the alliance of -Lacedæmon. But Perdikkas indignantly refused: “He had not called in -Brasidas as a judge, to decide disputes between him and his enemies, -but as an auxiliary, to put them down wherever he might point them -out: and he protested against the iniquity of Brasidas in entering -into terms with Arrhibæus, while the Lacedæmonian army was half -paid and maintained by him,” (Perdikkas.[652]) Notwithstanding such -remonstrances, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his -intended conference with Arrhibæus, and was so far satisfied with -the propositions made that he withdrew his troops without marching -over the pass into Lynkus. Too feeble to act alone, Perdikkas -loudly complained, and contracted his allowance for the future so -as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of -one-half. - - [651] Thucyd. iv, 82. - - [652] Thucyd. iv, 83. - -To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to -begin his march into Chalkidikê, and his operations jointly with the -Chalkidians, for seducing or subduing the subject-allies of Athens. -His first operation was against Akanthus, on the isthmus of the -peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before -the vintage, probably about the middle of September; when the grapes -were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to -ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force: so important was it -to Brasidas to have escaped the necessity of wasting another month -in conquering the Lynkestæ. There was within the town of Akanthus a -party in concert with the Chalkidians, anxious to admit him, and to -revolt openly from Athens. But the mass of the citizens were averse -to this step: and it was only by dwelling on the terrible loss from -exposure of the crop without, that the anti-Athenian party could -persuade them even to grant the request of Brasidas to be admitted -singly,[653] so as to explain his purposes formally before the -public assembly, which would take its own decision afterwards. “For -a Lacedæmonian (says Thucydidês) he was no mean speaker:” and if -he is to have credit for that which we find written in Thucydidês, -such an epithet would be less than his desert. Doubtless, however, -the substance of the speech is genuine: and it is one of the most -interesting in Grecian history; partly as a manifesto of professed -Lacedæmonian policy, partly because it had a great practical effect -in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude -which, though unfavorably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach -of argument. I give the chief points of the speech, without binding -myself to the words. - - [653] Thucyd. iv, 84. Οἱ δὲ ~περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ᾽ - ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον, οἵ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ξυνεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ - δῆμος~· ὅμως δὲ, ~διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος~, πεισθὲν - τὸ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαί τε αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ ἀκούσαντας - βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται, etc. - -“Myself and my soldiers have been sent, Akanthians, to realize the -purpose which we proclaimed on beginning the war; that we took arms -to liberate Greece from the Athenians. Let no man blame us for -having been long in coming, or for the mistake which we made at the -outset in supposing that we should quickly put down the Athenians by -operations against Attica, without exposing you to any risk. Enough, -that we are now here on the first opportunity, resolved to put them -down if you will lend us your aid. To find myself shut out of your -town, nay, to find that I am not heartily welcomed, astonishes me. -We, Lacedæmonians, undertook this long and perilous march, in the -belief that we were coming to friends eagerly expecting us; and -it would indeed be terrible if you should now disappoint us, and -stand out against your own freedom as well as that of other Greeks. -Your example, standing high as you do both for prudence and power, -will fatally keep back other Greeks, and make them suspect that I -am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in -honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was -one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to -fight near Nisæa; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force -hither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not -one of mischief, but of liberation, the Lacedæmonian authorities -having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths, that every -city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore -the best assurance both as to my purposes and as to my power; still -less need you apprehend that I am come with factious designs, to -serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your -established constitution to the disadvantage either of the many or -of the few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation, so that -we Lacedæmonians should be taking all this trouble to earn hatred -instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy traitors, -worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the -Athenians: we should at once violate our oaths and sin against our -strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say, that though you -wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to -stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my -propositions elsewhere, to those who can safely embrace them, but -not to thrust my alliance upon any people against their own will. -If this should be your language, I shall first call your local gods -and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of -good, and have employed persuasion in vain; I shall then proceed to -ravage your territory and extort your consent, thinking myself justly -entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may -not sustain actual damage from these good wishes which you profess -towards me without actually joining,—damage in the shape of that -tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks -generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only -on the ground of common good, that we Lacedæmonians can justify -ourselves for liberating any city against its own will; but as we -are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of others, -not acquisition of empire for ourselves, we should fail in our duty -if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now -carrying to all. Consider well my words, then: take to yourselves -the glory of beginning the era of emancipation for Greece, save your -own properties from damage, and attach an ever-honorable name to the -community of Akanthus.”[654] - - [654] Thucyd. iv, 85, 86, 87. - -Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of -Brasidas to the Akanthians, nor had they any means of detecting the -falsity of the assertion, which he afterwards repeated in other -places besides,[655] that he had braved the forces of Athens at Nisæa -with the same army as that now on the outside of the walls. Perhaps -the simplicity of his speech and manner may even have lent strength -to his assurances. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely -discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among -the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides: and the decision, -not called for until after a long debate, was determined partly by -the fair promises of Brasidas, partly by the certain loss which -the ruin of the vine-crop would entail. The votes of the citizens -present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to accede to the -propositions of Brasidas and revolt from Athens.[656] Exacting the -renewal of his pledge and that of the Lacedæmonian authorities, for -the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join -him, they received his army into the town. The neighboring city of -Stageirus, a colony of Andros, as Akanthus also was, soon followed -the example.[657] - - [655] Thucyd. iv, 108. - - [656] Thucyd. iv, 88. Οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον - ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διά τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν - Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ, ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι - Ἀθηναίων. - - [657] Thucyd. iv, 88; Diodor. xii, 67. - -There are few acts in history wherein Grecian political reason and -morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of -the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion; -the established respect to the vote of the majority; the care to -protect individual independence of judgment by secret suffrage; the -deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual -citizen, all these main laws and conditions of healthy political -action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians. -We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so -creditable or so harmonious. - -But there is another inference which the scene just described -irresistibly suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the -Akanthians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and -that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their -own choice, without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is -the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens: the party who -desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined -effect of severe impending loss, and of tempting assurances held out -by the worthiest representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which -induces them to revolt from Athens: nor even then is the resolution -taken without long opposition, and a large dissentient minority, in -a case where secret suffrage insured free and genuine expression -of preference from every individual. Now, it is impossible that -the scene in Akanthus at this critical moment could have been of -such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious -and burdensome to the subject-allies, as it is commonly depicted. -Had such been the fact; had the Akanthians felt that the imperial -ascendency of Athens oppressed them with hardship or humiliation, -from which their neighbors, the revolted Chalkidians in Olynthus and -elsewhere, were exempt, they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas -with that cordiality which he himself expected and was surprised -not to find. The sense of present grievance, always acute and often -excessive, would have stood out as their prominent impulse: nor would -they have needed either intimidation or cajolery to induce them to -throw open their gates to the liberator, who, in his speech within -the town, finds no actual suffering to appeal to, but is obliged to -gain over an audience evidently unwilling by alternate threats and -promises. - -As in Akanthus, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of -Athens, the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by -the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt -from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be -a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the majority -beforehand, but act in such a manner as to leave no free option to -the majority afterwards, whether they will ratify or reject: bring in -a foreign force to overawe them and compromise them without their own -consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events -of Akanthus so important as an evidence, is, that the majority is not -thus entrapped and compressed, but pronounces its judgment freely -after ample discussion: the grounds of that judgment are clearly set -forth to us, so as to show that hatred of Athens, if even it exists -at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling. Had there -existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in -the Chalkidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to -hinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Brasidas -by spontaneous majorities, as he himself, encouraged by the sanguine -promises of the Chalkidians, evidently expected that they would do. -But nothing of this kind happened. - -That which I before remarked in recounting the revolt of Mitylênê, -a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the revolt of -Akanthus, a tributary and subject-ally. The circumstances of both -prove that imperial Athens inspired no hatred, and occasioned no -painful grievance, to the population of her subject-cities generally: -the movements against her arose from party-minorities, of the -same character as that Platæan party which introduced the Theban -assailants into Platæa at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. -There are of course differences of sentiment between one town and -another; but the conduct of the towns generally demonstrates that -the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be a scheme of plunder -and oppression, as Mr. Mitford and others would have us believe. It -is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her -own feelings and interests, and that her hold was rather upon the -prudence than upon the affection of her allies, except in so far as -those among them who were democratically governed sympathized with -her democracy: it is also true that restrictions in any form on -the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political -instincts of the Greeks: moreover, Athens took less and less pains -to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one -resting simply on established fact and superior force. But this -is a different thing from the endurance of practical hardship and -oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong -positive hatred among the subject-allies, such as Brasidas expected -to find universal in Thrace, but did not really find, in spite of the -easy opening which his presence afforded. - -The acquisition of Akanthus and Stageirus enabled Brasidas in no very -long time to extend his conquests; to enter Argilus, and from thence -to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis. - -Argilus was situated between Stageirus and the river Strymon, along -the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the -eastern bank of the same river,—south of the lake which it forms -under the name of Kerkinitis, and north of the town of Eion at -its mouth, was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, -communicating with the lands of Argilus by the important bridge there -situated. The Argilians were colonists from Andros, like Akanthus -and Stageirus, and the adhesion of those two cities to Brasidas -gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligences in Argilus, wherein -there had existed a standing discontent against Athens, ever since -the foundation of the neighboring city of Amphipolis.[658] The -latter city had been established by the Athenian Agnon, at the head -of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the Edonian -Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine Ways, about five years prior -to the commencement of the war (B.C. 437), after two previous -attempts to colonize it,—one by Histiæus and Aristagoras, at the -period of the Ionic revolt, and a second by the Athenians about 465 -B.C., both of which lamentably failed. So valuable, however, was -the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near Mount -Pangæus and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command -of the Strymon, and for commerce with the interior of Thrace and -Macedonia, that the Athenians had sent a second expedition under -Agnon, who founded the city and gave it the name of Amphipolis. The -resident settlers there, however, were only in small proportion -Athenian citizens; the rest of mixed origin, some of them Argilian, -a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Euklês was -governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his -command. - - [658] Thucyd. iv, 103. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε - προσοικοῦντες καὶ ἀεί ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὕποπτοι καὶ - ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ (Amphipolis). - -Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organized to betray -the town to Brasidas, the inhabitants of Argilus as well as the -Chalkidians each of them tampering with those of the same race -who resided in Amphipolis; and the influence of Perdikkas, not -inconsiderable, in consequence of the commerce of the place with -Macedonia, was employed to increase the number of partisans. Of -all the instigators, however, the most strenuous as well as the -most useful were the inhabitants of Argilus. Amphipolis, together -with the Athenians as its founders, had been odious to them from -its commencement; and its foundation had doubtless abridged their -commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the -Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the -arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of -success. It was they who enabled him to accomplish the surprise, -deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they -could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis. - -Starting with his army from Arnê in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas -arrived in the afternoon at Aulon and Bromiskus, near the channel -whereby the lake Bolbê is connected with the sea: from hence, after -his men had supped, he began his night-march to Amphipolis, on a -cold and snowy night of November, or the beginning of December. He -reached Argilus in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once -admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid -and guidance, he then hastened forward without delay to the bridge -across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day.[659] It -was guarded only by a feeble piquet,—the town of Amphipolis itself -being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up the -river;[660] so that Brasidas, preceded by the Argilian conspirators, -surprised and overpowered the guard without difficulty. Thus master -of this important communication, he crossed with his army forthwith -into the territory of Amphipolis, where his arrival spread the utmost -dismay and terror. The governor Euklês, the magistrates, and the -citizens, were all found wholly unprepared: the lands belonging to -the city were occupied by residents, with their families and property -around them, calculating upon undisturbed security, as if there had -been no enemy within reach. Such of these as were close to the city -succeeded in running thither with their families, though leaving -their property exposed,—but the more distant became in person as -well as in property at the mercy of the invader. Even within the -town, filled with the friends and relatives of these victims without, -indescribable confusion reigned, of which the conspirators within -tried to avail themselves in order to get the gates thrown open. And -so complete was the disorganization, that if Brasidas had marched -up without delay to the gates and assaulted the town, many persons -supposed that he would have carried it at once. Such a risk, however, -was too great even for his boldness, the rather as repulse would -have been probably his ruin. Moreover, confiding in the assurances -of the conspirators that the gates would be thrown open, he thought -it safer to seize as many persons as he could from the out-citizens, -as a means of working upon the sentiments of those within the walls; -lastly, this process of seizure and plunder was probably more to the -taste of his own soldiers, and could not well be hindered. - - [659] Thucyd. iv, 104. Κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἕω ἐπὶ τὴν - γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ. - - Bekker’s reading of πρὸ ἕω appears to me preferable to πρόσω. The - latter word really adds nothing to the meaning; whereas the fact - that Brasidas got over the river before daylight is one both new - and material: it is not necessarily implied in the previous words - ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτί. - - [660] Thucyd. iv, 104. Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως, - καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν, φυλακὴ δέ τις βραχεῖα - καθειστήκει, etc. - - Dr. Arnold, with Dobree, Poppo, and most of the commentators, - translates these words: “The town (of Amphipolis) is farther - off (from Argilus) than the passage of the river.” But this - must be of course true, and conveys no new information, seeing - that Brasidas had to cross the river to reach the town. Smith - and Bloomfield are right, I think, in considering τῆς διαβάσεως - as governed by ἀπέχει and not by πλέον,—“the city is at some - distance from the crossing:” and the objection which Poppo makes - against them, that πλέον must necessarily imply a comparison - with something, cannot be sustained: for Thucydidês often uses - ἐκ πλείονος (iv, 103; viii, 83), as precisely identical with ἐκ - πολλοῦ (i, 68; iv, 67; v, 69); also περὶ πλείονος. - - In the following chapter, on occasion of the battle of - Amphipolis, some farther remarks will be found on the locality. - -But he waited in vain for the opening of the gates. The conspirators -in the city, in spite of the complete success of their surprise and -the universal dismay around them, found themselves unable to carry -the majority along with them. As in Akanthus, so in Amphipolis, -those who really hated Athens and wished to revolt were only a -party-minority; the greater number of citizens, at this critical -moment, stood by Euklês and the few native Athenians around him in -resolving upon defence, and in sending off an express to Thucydidês -(the historian) at Thasos, the colleague of Euklês, as general -in the region of Thrace, for immediate aid. This step, of course -immediately communicated to Brasidas from within, determined him to -make every effort for enticing the Amphipolitans to surrender before -the reinforcement should arrive; the rather, as he was apprized -that Thucydidês, being a large proprietor and worker of gold mines -in the neighboring region, possessed extensive personal influence -among the Thracian tribes, and would be able to bring them together -for the relief of the place, in conjunction with his own Athenian -squadron. He therefore sent in propositions for surrender on the most -favorable terms, guaranteeing to every citizen who chose to remain, -Amphipolitan or even Athenian, continued residence with undisturbed -property and equal political rights, and granting to every one who -chose to depart, five days for the purpose of carrying away his -property. - -Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced -presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens, proving -acceptable both to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different -grounds.[661] The properties of the citizens without, as well as many -of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas: no one counted -upon the speedy arrival of reinforcement; and even if it did arrive, -the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still -be either slain or made captive: a murderous battle would ensue, -and perhaps, after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, -might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing -themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well -pleased with his offer, as extricating them from a critical position -and procuring for them the means of escape, with comparatively little -loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, partakers in the same relief -from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which -preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and -merely severed them from Athens, towards which city they felt, not -hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and relatives of -the citizens exposed in the out-region were strenuous in urging on -the capitulation, so that the conspirators soon became bold enough -to proclaim themselves openly, insisting upon the moderation of -Brasidas and the prudence of admitting him. Euklês found that the -tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned -against him, nor could he prevent the acceptance of the terms, and -the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day. - - [661] Thucyd. iv, 106. Οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ~ἀλλοιότεροι~ - ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, etc. - - The word ἀλλοιότεροι seems to indicate both the change of view, - compared with what had been before, and new divergence introduced - among themselves. - -No such resolution would have been adopted, had the citizens been -aware how near at hand Thucydidês and his forces were. The message -despatched early in the morning from Amphipolis found him at Thasos -with seven triremes; with which he instantly put to sea, so as to -reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of -Amphipolis, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving -Amphipolis, but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He -arrived, indeed, only just in time to preserve Eion; for parties -in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of -Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next -morning. Thucydidês, putting the place in a condition of defence, -successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and -by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for -the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis.[662] - - [662] Thucyd. iv, 105, 106; Diodor. xii, 68. - -The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the -foreign possessions of Athens, and the opening of the bridge over the -Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by -land, occasioned prodigious emotion throughout all the Grecian world. -The dismay felt at Athens[663] was greater than had been ever before -experienced: hope and joy prevailed among her enemies, and excitement -and new aspirations became widely spread among her subject-allies. -The bloody defeat at Delium, and the unexpected conquests of -Brasidas, now again lowered the _prestige_ of Athenian success, -sixteen months after it had been so powerfully exalted by the capture -of Sphakteria. The loss of reputation which Sparta had then incurred, -was now compensated by a reaction against the unfounded terrors since -conceived about the probable career of her enemy. It was not merely -the loss of Amphipolis, serious as that was, which distressed the -Athenians, but also their insecurity respecting the maintenance of -their whole empire: they knew not which of their subject-allies might -next revolt, in contemplation of aid from Brasidas, facilitated by -the newly-acquired Strymonian bridge. And as the proceedings of that -general counted in part to the credit of his country, it was believed -that Sparta, now for the first time shaking off her languor,[664] had -taken to herself the rapidity and enterprise once regarded as the -exclusive characteristic of Athens. But besides all these chances -of evil to the Athenians, there was another yet more threatening, -the personal ascendency and position of Brasidas himself. It was not -merely the boldness, the fertility of aggressive resource, the quick -movements, the power of stimulating the minds of soldiers, which -lent efficiency to that general; but also his incorruptible probity, -his good faith, his moderation, his abstinence from party-cruelty or -jobbing, and from all intermeddling with the internal constitutions -of the different cities, in strict adherence to that manifesto -whereby Sparta had proclaimed herself the liberator of Greece. Such -talents and such official worth had never before been seen combined. -Set off as they were by the full brilliancy of successes such as -were deemed incredible before they actually occurred, they inspired -a degree of confidence and turned a tide of opinion towards this -eminent man which rendered him personally one of the first powers in -Greece. Numerous solicitations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis -from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present -temper of large hopes from him and diminished fear of the Athenians: -the anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of -the population less restrained by fear.[665] - - [663] Thucyd. iv, 108. Ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς - μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, etc. - - The prodigious importance of the site of Amphipolis, with its - adjoining bridge forming the communication between the regions - east and west of the Strymon, was felt not only by Philip of - Macedon, as will hereafter appear, but also by the Romans after - their conquest of Macedonia. Of the four regions into which the - Romans distributed Macedonia, “pars prima (says Livy, xlv, 30) - habet opportunitatem Amphipoleos; quæ objecta claudit omnes ab - oriente sole in Macedoniam aditus.” - - [664] Thucyd. iv, 108. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον - ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα, καὶ ὅτι ~τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὀργώντων - ἔμελλον πειρᾶσθαι~, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν (the - subject-allies of Athens). - - [665] Thucyd. iv, 108. - -Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to -learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little abated -in power: but her inaction during this important autumn had been such -as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated -that, on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with -the Chalkidians, and Perdikkas so close upon their dependent allies, -they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thrace, which, -if despatched at that time, would probably have obviated all the -subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time, -and perhaps even then, if Periklês had been alive. But the news -arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition -against Bœotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of -Delium. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the -stratêgus, Hippokratês, and one thousand citizens, the idea of a -fresh expedition to Thrace would probably have been intolerable to -Athenian hoplites: the hardships of a winter service in Thrace, as -experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would -probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we -must steadfastly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen -soldiers, not about professional soldiers; and that the temper of the -time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable -degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even -after the rapid successes of Brasidas, not merely at Akanthus and -Stageirus, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate -guards[666] to the points most threatened, thus leaving to their -enterprising enemy the whole remaining winter for his operations, -without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we -may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to -the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the -Athenian public: a feeling encouraged by Nikias and other leading -men of the same party, who were building upon it in order to get the -Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted. - - [666] Thucyd. iv, 108. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακὰς ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ - ἐν χειμῶνι, διέπεμπον ἐς τὰς πόλεις etc. - -But while we thus notice the short-comings of Athens, in not sending -timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit, that -the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained, that of -Amphipolis, was the fault of her officers more than her own. Euklês, -and the historian Thucydidês, the two joint Athenian commanders in -Thrace, to whom she had confided the defence of that important town, -had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, -if they had employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution -beforehand. That Thucydidês became an exile immediately after this -event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own -statement: and we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient -authority, that the Athenians condemned him, probably Euklês also, to -banishment, on the proposition of Kleon.[667] - - [667] Thucyd. v, 26. See the biography of Thucydidês by - Marcellinus, prefixed to all the editions, p. 19, ed. Arnold. - -In considering this sentence, historians[668] commonly treat -Thucydidês as an innocent man, and find nothing to condemn except the -calumnies of the demagogue along with the injustice of the people. -But this view of the case cannot be sustained, when we bring together -all the facts even as indicated by Thucydidês himself. At the moment -when Brasidas surprised Amphipolis, Thucydidês was at Thasos; and -the event is always discussed as if he was there by necessity or -duty; as if Thasos was his special mission. Now we know from his own -statement that his command was not special or confined to Thasos: he -was sent as joint commander along with Euklês generally to Thrace, -and especially to Amphipolis.[669] Both of them were jointly and -severally responsible for the proper defence of Amphipolis, with -the Athenian empire and interests in that quarter such nomination -of two or more officers, coördinate and jointly responsible, being -the usual habit of Athens, wherever the scale or the area of -military operations was considerable, instead of naming one supreme -responsible commander, with subordinate officers acting under him and -responsible to him. If, then, Thucydidês “was stationed at Thasos,” -to use the phrase of Dr. Thirlwall, this was because he chose to -station himself there, in the exercise of his own discretion. - - [668] I transcribe the main features from the account of Dr. - Thirlwall, whose judgment coincides on this occasion with what is - generally given (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxiii, vol. iii, p. 268). - - “On the evening of the same day Thucydidês, with seven galleys - which he happened to have with him at Thasos, when he received - the despatch from Euklês, sailed into the mouth of the Strymon, - and learning the fall of Amphipolis proceeded to put Eion in - a state of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which - Brasidas attacked the next morning, both from the river and the - land, without effect: and the refugees who retired by virtue - of the treaty from Amphipolis, found shelter at Eion, and - contributed to its security. _The historian rendered an important - service to his country: and it does not appear that human - prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under - the same circumstances._ Yet _his unavoidable failure_ proved - the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years of - his life in exile: and he was only restored to his country in - the season of her deepest humiliation by the public calamities. - So much only can be gathered with certainty from his language: - for he has not condescended to mention either the charge which - was brought against him, or the nature of the sentence, which - he may either have suffered, or avoided by a voluntary exile. - A statement, very probable in itself, though resting on slight - authority, attributes his banishment to Cleon’s calumnies: _that - the irritation produced by the loss of Amphipolis should have - been so directed against an innocent object, would perfectly - accord with the character of the people and of the demagogue_. - Posterity has gained by the injustice of his contemporaries,” etc. - - [669] Thucyd. iv, 104. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίοι τοῖς προδιδοῦσι (that is, - at Amphipolis) κρατοῦντες τῷ πλήθει ὥστε μὴ αὐτίκα τὰς πύλας - ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ Εὐκλέους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τῶν - Ἀθηναίων παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ~ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν - τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρου, ὃς τάδε ξυνέγραψεν, - ὄντα περὶ Θάσον~ (ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ νῆσος, Παρίων ἀποικία, ἀπέχουσα - τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡμισείας ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν) κελεύοντες σφίσι - βοηθεῖν. - - Here Thucydidês describes himself as “the other general along - with Euklês, of the region of or towards Thrace.” There cannot be - a clearer designation of the extensive range of his functions and - duties. - - I adopt here the reading τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, the genitive case of the - well-known Thucydidean phrase τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, in preference to τὸν - ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης; which would mean in substance the same thing, though - not so precisely, nor so suitably to the usual manner of the - historian. Bloomfield, Bekker, and Göller have all introduced τῶν - into the text, on the authority of various MSS.: Poppo and Dr. - Arnold also both express a preference for it, though they still - leave τὸν in the text. - - Moreover, the words of Thucydidês himself, in the passage where - he mentions his own long exile, plainly prove that he was sent - out as general, not to Thasos, but _to Amphipolis_: (v, 26) καὶ - ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι ~μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν - στρατηγίαν~, etc. - -Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether -Thucydidês did all that could be done, after he received the alarming -express at Thasos, which is the part of the case that _he_ sets -prominently before us, but whether he and Euklês jointly took the -best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in -Thrace; especially for Amphipolis, the first jewel of her empire. -They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel, and how? Had they a -difficult position to defend? Were they overwhelmed by a superior -force? Were they distracted by simultaneous revolts in different -places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unforeseen? Not one of -these grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was -of all others the most defensible: they had only to keep the bridge -over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded, or to retain the -Athenian squadron at Eion, and Amphipolis was safe. Either one or -the other of these precautions would have sufficed; both together -would have sufficed so amply, as probably to prevent the scheme of -attack from being formed. Next, the force under Brasidas was in noway -superior, not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place -Eion, when properly guarded, much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, -there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor unknown -enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defence. There was but -one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach; an -enemy of surpassing merit, indeed, and eminently dangerous to Athens, -but without any chance of success except from the omissions of the -Athenian officers. - -Now Thucydidês and Euklês both knew that Brasidas had prevailed -upon Akanthus and Stageirus to revolt, and that too in such a way -as to extend his own personal influence materially: they knew that -the population of Argilus was of Andrian origin,[670] like that of -Akanthus and Stageirus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted -by the example of those two towns. Lastly, they knew, and Thucydidês -himself tells us,[671] that this Argilian population—whose territory -bordered on the Strymon and the western foot of the bridge, and -who had many connections in Amphipolis—had been long disaffected -to Athens, and especially to the Athenian possession of that city. -Yet, having such foreknowledge, ample warning for the necessity of -a vigilant defence, Thucydidês and Euklês withdraw, or omit, both -the two precautions upon which the security of Amphipolis rested; -precautions both of them obvious, either of them sufficient. The -one leaves the bridge under a feeble guard,[672] and is caught -so unprepared everywhere, that one might suppose Athens to be in -profound peace; the other is found with his squadron, not at Eion, -but at Thasos; an island out of all possible danger, either from -Brasidas, who had no ships, or any other enemy. The arrival of -Brasidas comes on both of them like a clap of thunder. Nothing more -is required than this plain fact, under the circumstances, to prove -their improvidence as commanders. - - [670] Compare Thucyd. iv, 84, 88, 103. - - [671] Thucyd. iv, 103. ~μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε - προσοικοῦντες καὶ ἀεί ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὕποπτοι καὶ - ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ~ (Amphipolis), ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ - καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδας ἦλθεν, ἔπραξάν τε ~ἐκ πλείονος~ πρὸς τοὺς - ἐμπολιτεύοντας σφῶν ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἐνδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις, etc. - - [672] Thucyd. iv, 103. ~φυλακὴ δέ τις βραχεῖα καθειστήκει, ἣν - βιασάμενος ῥᾳδίως~ ὁ Βρασίδας, ἅμα μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὔσης, ἅμα - δὲ καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος καὶ ~ἀπροσδοκήτος προσπεσὼν~, διέβη τὴν - γέφυραν, etc. - -The presence of Thucydidês on the station of Thrace was important -to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family connections, -mining property, and commanding influence among the continental -population round Amphipolis.[673] This was one main reason why he was -named; the Athenian people confiding partly in his private influence, -over and above the public force under his command, and looking to -him, even more than to his colleague Euklês, for the continued -security of the town: instead of which they find that not even their -own squadron under him is at hand near the vulnerable point, at the -moment when the enemy comes. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of -Euklês admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of -Thucydidês. For it seems that Euklês had no paid force in Amphipolis; -only the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other lineage. -Doubtless, these men found it irksome to keep guard through the -winter on the Strymonian bridge: and Euklês might fancy that, by -enforcing a large perpetual guard, he ran the risk of making Athens -unpopular: moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, -when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force, is not -easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better -than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thucydidês; who had -with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it -at Eion as at Thasos. We may be sure that the absence of Thucydidês -with his fleet, at Thasos, was one essential condition in the plot -laid by Brasidas with the Argilians. - - [673] Thucyd. iv, 105. καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις - ~τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν~, etc. - - Rotscher, in his Life of Thucydidês (Leben des Thukydides, - Göttingen, 1842, sect. 4, pp. 97-99), admits it to be the - probable truth, that Thucydidês was selected for this command - expressly in consequence of his private influence in the region - around. Yet this biographer still repeats the view generally - taken, that Thucydidês did everything which an able commander - could do, and was most unjustly condemned. - -To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that “human prudence and activity -could not have accomplished more than Thucydidês did, _under the -same circumstances_,” is true as matter of fact, and creditable as -far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, -and meets only one part of the case. An officer in command is -responsible, not only for doing most “under the circumstances,” -but also for the circumstances themselves, in so far as they are -under his control; and nothing is more under his control than the -position which he chooses to occupy. If the emperor Napoleon, or -the duke of Wellington, had lost, by surprise of an enemy not very -numerous, a post of supreme importance which they thought adequately -protected, would they be satisfied to hear from a responsible -officer in command: “Having no idea that the enemy would attempt any -surprise, I thought that I might keep my force half a day’s journey -off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically -impossible for the enemy to reach; but, the moment I was informed -that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all -that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and -though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, -yet I beat him back from a second post which he was on the point of -mastering also?” Does any one imagine that these illustrious chiefs, -smarting under the loss of an inestimable position which alters -the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a -report, and would dismiss the officer with praises for his vigor -and bravery, “under the circumstances?” They would most assuredly -reply, that he had done right in coming back, that his conduct after -coming back had been that of a brave man, and that there was no -impeachment on his courage. But they would at the same time add, -that his want of judgment and foresight, in omitting to place the -valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard beforehand, -and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent -in another place which was out of danger, and his easy faith that -there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character -of the enemy’s officer, as well as the disaffection of the neighbors -(Argilus), plainly indicated that there _would_ be, if the least -opening were afforded, that these were defects meriting serious -reproof, and disqualifying him from any future command of trust -and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the -respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the -unhappy miscalculation of this officer, would go along with such -a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of -injustice, or of “directing the irritation produced by the loss -against an innocent object.” - -The vehement leather-seller in the Pnyx, at Athens, when he brought -forward what are called “his calumnies” against Thucydidês and -Euklês, as having caused, through culpable omission, a fatal and -irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps state his case with -greater loudness and acrimony; but it may be doubted whether he -would say anything more really galling than would be contained in -the dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general to a subordinate -officer under similar circumstances. In my judgment, not only the -accusation against these two officers—I assume Euklês to have been -included—was called for on the fairest _presumptive_ grounds, which -would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-sell Kleon, -but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. -Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case -warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its -own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of -punishment: penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet, -would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I -consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the -conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there was a single -Athenian, or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment -too severe. - -It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against -a man who, as an historian, has earned the lasting admiration of -posterity,—my own, among the first and warmest. But in criticizing -the conduct of Thucydidês the officer, we are bound in common -justice to forget Thucydidês the historian. He was not known in the -latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed: perhaps -he never would have been so known, like the Neapolitan historian -Colletta, if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and -hopes of a citizen. It may be doubted whether he ever went home -from Eion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly -felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either -with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty -years;[674] nor did he return to Athens until after the conclusion -of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile, much is said to have -been spent on his property in Thrace: yet he also visited most parts -of Greece, enemies of Athens as well as neutral states. However much -we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, mankind in general -have, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice at it. To -this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near -approach to completion, of his history: nor is it less certain that -the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting -neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that impartial, -comprehensive, Pan-Hellenic spirit, which reigns generally throughout -his immortal work. - - [674] Thucyd. v, 26. - -Meanwhile, Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning -of December, 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more -vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute -Amphipolis; a task wherein the Macedonian Perdikkas, whose intrigues -had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. -That city was going through a partial secession and renovation of -inhabitants, and was now moreover cut off from the port of Eion and -the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. -Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its -internal polity as for its external defence. Brasidas took measures -for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to -force the lower part of the river:[675] but his most important step -was to construct a palisade work,[676] connecting the walls of the -city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the -crossing of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself -had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication -with Argilus and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some -acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Pittakus, prince of -the neighboring Edonian-Thracian township of Myrkinus, had been -recently assassinated by his wife Brauro, and by some personal -enemies: he had probably been the ally of Athens, and his assassins -now sought to strengthen themselves by courting the alliance of the -new conqueror of Amphipolis. The Thasian continental colonies of -Galêpsus and Œsymê also declared their adhesion to him. - - [675] Thucyd. iv, 104-108. - - [676] This is the σταύρωμα, mentioned (v, 10) as existing a year - and a half afterwards, at the time of the battle of Amphipolis. - I shall say more respecting the topography of Amphipolis, when I - come to describe that battle. - -While he sent to Lacedæmon, communicating his excellent position as -well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the -answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could -get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Aktê,—the -narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighborhood of -Akanthus to the mighty headland called Mount Athos,—near thirty -miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in -breadth.[677] The long, rugged, woody ridge,—covering this peninsula -so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling or cultivation, or -feeding of cattle,—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty -communities, some of them divided in race and language. Sanê, a -colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf, called the -Singitic gulf, between Athos and the Sithonian peninsula, near -the Xerxeian canal: the rest of the Aktê was distributed among -Bisaltians, Krestônians, and Edonians, all fractions of the Thracian -name; Pelasgians, or Tyrrhenians, of the race which had once -occupied Lemnos and Imbros, and some Chalkidians. Some of these -little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thyssus, Kleône, -Olophyxus, and others, all submitted on the arrival of Brasidas; but -Sanê and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by -ravaging their territory. - - [677] See Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und Brura, vol. i, ch. - viii, p. 226. - -He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Torônê, -situated near the southern extremity of that peninsula, opposite -to Cape Kanastræum, the extreme headland of the peninsula of -Pallênê.[678] - - [678] Thucyd. iv, 109. - -Torônê was inhabited by a Chalkidic population, but had not partaken -in the revolt of the neighboring Chalkidians against Athens. A -small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the -recent dangers, and were now defending it, as well as repairing -the town-wall in various parts where it had been so neglected -as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct citadel -the outlying cape called Lêkythus, joining by a narrow isthmus -the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port wherein lay -two Athenian triremes as guard-ships. A small party in Torônê, -without privity[679] or even suspicion of the rest, entered into -correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the -means of entering and mastering the town. Accordingly, he advanced -by a night-march to the temple of the Dioskuri, Kastor and Pollux, -within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gates, which he reached -a little before daybreak, sending forward one hundred peltasts to -be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when -signal was made from within. His Torônæan partisans, some of whom -were already concealed on the spot, awaiting his arrival, made -their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town, -conducting with them seven determined men from his army, armed only -with daggers, and having Lysistratus of Olynthus as their chief: -twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger -appeared so extreme, that only seven of them were bold enough to go. -This forlorn hope, enabled to creep in, through a small aperture in -the wall towards the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost -watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the -guards, and set open a neighboring postern gate, looking towards Cape -Kanastræum, as well as the great gate leading towards the agora. -They then brought in the peltasts from without, who, impatient with -the delay, had gradually stolen closely under the walls: some of -these peltasts kept possession of the great gate, others were led -round to the postern at the top, while the fire-signal was forthwith -lighted to invite Brasidas himself. He and his men hastened forward -towards the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts, a -terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. -Admission was easy through the open gates, but some also clambered -up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close -to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the -assailants were thus active in every direction, Brasidas himself -conducted a portion of them, to assure himself of the high and -commanding parts of the city. - - [679] Thucyd. iv, 110. καὶ αὐτὸν ~ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπῆγον κρύφα~, - ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι, iv, 113. Τῶν δὲ Τορωναίων - γιγνομένης τῆς ἁλώσεως ~τὸ μὲν πολὺ, οὐδὲν εἰδὸς, ἐθορυβεῖτο~, - etc. - -So completely were the Torônæans surprised and thunderstruck, that -hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian -hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, -were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the -separately-garrisoned cape of Lêkythus, whither they were followed by -a portion of the Torônæan population; some from attachment to Athens, -others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brasidas addressed a -proclamation, inviting them to return, and promising them perfect -security, for person, property, and political rights; while at the -same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians -in Lêkythus, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the -Chalkidians, but permitting them to carry away their property. They -refused to evacuate the place, but solicited a truce of one day for -the purpose of burying their slain. Brasidas granted them two days, -which were employed both by them and by him in preparations for the -defence and attack of Lêkythus; each party fortifying the houses on -or near the connecting isthmus. - -In the mean time he convened a general assembly of the Torônæan -population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable -language as he had employed elsewhere. “He had not come to harm -either the city, or any individual citizen. Those who had let him -in, ought not to be regarded as bad men or traitors, for they had -acted with a view to the benefit and the liberation of their city, -not in order to enslave it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On -the other hand, he did not think the worse of those who had gone -over to Lêkythus, for their liking towards Athens: he wished them -to come back freely; and he was sure that the more they knew the -Lacedæmonians the better they would esteem them. He was prepared to -forgive and forget previous hostility, but while he invited all of -them to live for the future as cordial friends and fellow-citizens, -he should also for the future hold each man responsible for his -conduct, either as friend or as enemy.” - -On the expiration of the two days’ truce, Brasidas attacked the -Athenian garrison in Lêkythus, promising a recompense of thirty -minæ to the soldier who should first force his way into it. -Notwithstanding very poor means of defence, partly a wooden palisade, -partly houses with battlements on the roof, this garrison repelled -him for one whole day: on the next morning he brought up a machine, -for the same purpose as that which the Bœotians had employed at -Delium, to set fire to the woodwork. The Athenians on their side, -seeing this fire-machine approaching, put up, on a building in -front of their position, a wooden scaffolding, upon which many of -them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or -to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming -greater than the scaffolding could support, it broke down with a -prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled -down in confusion. Some of these men were hurt, yet the injury was -not in reality serious; had not the noise, the cries, and strangeness -of the incident alarmed those behind, who could not see precisely -what had occurred, to such a degree, that they believed the enemy -to have already forced the defences. Many of them accordingly took -to flight, and those who remained were insufficient to prolong -the resistance successfully; so that Brasidas, perceiving the -disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his -fire-machine, and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by -assault, which now fully succeeded. A considerable proportion of -the Athenians and others in the fort escaped across the narrow gulf -to the peninsula of Pallênê, by means of the two triremes and some -merchant-vessels at hand: but every man found in it was put to -death. Brasidas, thus master of the fort, and considering that he -owed his success to the sudden rupture of the Athenian scaffolding, -regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the -thirty minæ, which he had promised as a reward to the first man who -broke in, to the goddess Athênê, for her temple at Lêkythus. He -moreover consecrated to her the entire cape of Lêkythus; not only -demolishing the defences, but also dismantling the private residences -which it contained,[680] so that nothing remained except the temple, -with its ministers and appurtenances. - - [680] Thucyd. iv. 114, 115. νομίσας ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπείῳ - τὴν ἅλωσιν γενέσθαι. - -What proportion of the Torônæans who had taken refuge at Lêkythus -had been induced to return by the proclamation of Brasidas, alike -generous and politic, we are not informed. His language and conduct -were admirably calculated to set this little community again in -harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. -And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and -gratitude towards himself personally; a sentiment which gained -strength with every successive incident in which he was engaged, -and which enabled him to exercise a greater ascendency than could -ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had -ever been possessed by Athens. It is this remarkable development of -commanding individuality, animated throughout by straightforward -public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who -had few other feelings in common, which lends to the short career of -this eminent man a romantic and even an heroic interest. - -During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in -setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans -for farther conquests in the spring.[681] But the beginning of -spring—or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth -year of the war, as Thucydidês reckons—brought with it a new train of -events, which will be recounted in the following chapter. - - [681] Thucyd. iv, 119. - - - - -CHAPTER LIV. - -TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF -NIKIAS. - - -The eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened -with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta, -chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards -the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other -events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of -Athens, against Megara and against Bœotia; the former plan, partially -successful, the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with -a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace, following close -upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations -everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again -seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The -year thus closed amidst humiliations the more painful to Athens, as -contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun. - -It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom -she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his -supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever -she desired it.[682] Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she -had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the -past year; and this speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, -had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had -occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace. -Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their -captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they -considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly as a stepping-stone -towards that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make -peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis, -setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating -reinforcements, they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in -no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chief -men;[683] who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking -upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from -Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds -disposed to labor for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon -the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the -present fortune and realized conquests of Brasidas as a basis for -negotiation and recovery of the prisoners; without opening the chance -of ulterior enterprises, which though they might perhaps end in -results yet more triumphant, would unavoidably put in risk that which -was now secure.[684] The history of the Athenians during the past -year might, indeed, serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from -playing an adventurous game. - - [682] Thucyd. iv, 21. - - [683] Thucyd. iv, 108. Ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν - τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε.... Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ - φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, etc. - - [684] Thucyd. iv, 117. Τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο - κομίσασθαι, ὡς ἔτι Βρασίδας εὐτύχει· καὶ ἔμελλον, ἐπὶ μεῖζον - χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος, τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, - τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν καὶ κρατήσειν. - - This is a perplexing passage, and the sense put upon it by the - best commentators appears to me unsatisfactory. - - Dr. Arnold observes: “The sense required must be something - of this sort. If Brasidas were still more successful, the - consequence would be that they would lose their men taken at - Sphakteria, and after all would run the risk of not being - finally victorious.” To the same purpose, substantially Haack, - Poppo, Göller, etc. But surely this is a meaning which cannot - have been present to the mind of Thucydidês. For how could - the fact, of Brasidas being _more successful_, cause the - Lacedæmonians to lose the chance of regaining their prisoners? - The larger the acquisitions of Brasidas, the greater chance - did the Lacedæmonians stand of getting back their prisoners, - because they would have more to give up in exchange for them. - And the meaning proposed by the commentators, inadmissible under - all circumstances, is still more excluded by the very words - immediately preceding in Thucydidês: “The Lacedæmonians were - above all things anxious to get back their prisoners, while - Brasidas was yet in full success;” (for ὡς with ἔτι must mean - substantially the same as ἕως.) It is impossible immediately - after this, that he can go on to say: “Yet if Brasidas became - _still more successful_, they would _lose_ the chance of - getting the prisoners back.” Bauer and Poppo, who notice this - contradiction, profess to solve it by saying, “that if Brasidas - pushed his successes farther, the Athenians would be seized with - such violence of hatred and indignation, that they would put the - prisoners to death.” Poppo supports this by appealing to iv, 41, - which passage, however, will be found to carry no proof in the - case: and the hypothesis is in itself inadmissible, put up to - sustain an inadmissible meaning. - - Next, as to the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος (ἐπὶ μεῖζον - χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος); Göller translates - these: “Postquam Brasidas in majus profecisset, et _sua arma cum - potestate Atheniensium æquasset_.” To the same purpose also Haack - and Poppo. But if this were the meaning, it would seem to imply, - that Brasidas had, as yet, done nothing and gained nothing; - that his gains were all to be made during the future. Whereas - the fact is distinctly the reverse, as Thucydidês himself has - told us in the line preceding: Brasidas had already made immense - acquisitions,—so great and serious, that the principal anxiety of - the Lacedæmonians was to make use of what he had already gained - as a means of getting back their prisoners, before the tide of - fortune could turn against him. - - Again, the last part of the sentence is considered by Dr. Arnold - and other commentators as corrupt; nor is it agreed to what - previous subject τοῖς δὲ is intended to refer. - - So inadmissible, in my judgment, is the meaning assigned by the - commentators to the general passage, that, if no other meaning - could be found in the words, I should regard the whole sentence - as corrupt in some way or other. But I think another meaning may - be found. - - I admit that the words ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ _might_ - signify, “if he should arrive at greater success;” upon the - analogy of i, 17, and i, 118, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως—ἐπὶ - μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως. But they do not necessarily, nor even - naturally, bear this signification. Χωρεῖν ἐπὶ (with accus. - case) means to _march upon_, to _aim at_, to _go at_ or _go - for_ (adopting an English colloquial equivalent), ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ - τὴν ἀντικρὺς ἐλευθερίαν (Thucyd. viii, 64). The phrase might be - used, whether the person of whom it was affirmed succeeded in his - object or not. I conceive that in this place the words mean: “if - Brasidas should go at something greater;” if he should aim at, - “or march upon, greater objects;” without affirming the point, - one way or the other, whether he would attain or miss what he - aimed at. - - Next, the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος do not refer, in my - judgment, to the future gains of Brasidas, or to their magnitude - and comparative avail in negotiation. The words rather mean: “if - he should set out in open contest and hostility that which he - had already acquired,” (thus exposing it to the chance of being - lost), “if he should put himself and his already-acquired gains - in battle-front against the enemy.” The meaning would be then - substantially the same as καταστήσαντος ἑαυτὸν ἀντίπαλον. The two - words here discussed are essentially obscure and elliptical, and - every interpretation must proceed by bringing into light those - ideas which they imperfectly indicate. Now, the interpretation - which I suggest keeps quite as closely to the meaning of the two - words as that of Haack and Göller; while it brings out a general - sense, making the whole sentence, of which these two words form a - part, distinct and instructive. The substantive, which would be - understood along with ἀντίπαλα, would be τὰ πράγματα; or perhaps - τὰ εὐτυχήματα, borrowed from the verb εὐτύχει, which immediately - precedes. - - In the latter part of the sentence, I think that τοῖς δὲ refers - to the same subject as ἀντίπαλα: in fact, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι - is only a fuller expression of the same general idea as ἀντίπαλα. - - The whole sentence would then be construed thus: “For they were - most anxious to recover their captives while Brasidas was yet in - good fortune; while they were likely, if he should go at more, - and put himself as he now stood into hostile contention, to - remain deprived of their captives; and even in regard to their - successes, to take the chance of danger or victory in equal - conflict.” - - The sense here brought out is distinct and rational; and I think - it lies fairly in the words. Thucydidês does not intend to - represent the Lacedæmonians as feeling, that if Brasidas should - _really gain_ more than he had gained already, such further - acquisition would be a disadvantage to them, and prevent them - from recovering their captives. He represents them as preferring - _the certainty_ of those acquisitions which Brasidas had already - made, to _the chance and hazard_ of his aiming at greater; which - could not be done without endangering that which was now secure, - and not only secure, but sufficient, if properly managed, to - procure the restoration of the captives. - - Poppo refers τοῖς δὲ to the Athenians: Göller refers it to - the remaining Spartan military force, apart from the captives - who were detained at Athens. The latter reference seems to me - inadmissible, for τοῖς δὲ must signify some persons or things - which have been before specified or indicated; and that which - Göller supposes it to mean has not been before indicated. To - refer it to the Athenians, with Poppo and Haack, in his second - edition, we should have to look a great way back for the subject, - and there is, moreover, a difficulty in construing ἀμυνόμενοι - with the dative case. Otherwise, this reference would be - admissible; though I think it better to refer τοῖς δὲ to the same - subject as ἀντίπαλα. In the phrase κινδυνεύειν, or κινδυνεύσειν, - for there seems no sufficient reason why this old reading should - be altered, ~καὶ~ κρατήσειν, the particle ~καὶ~ has a disjunctive - sense, of which there are analogous examples; see Kühner, - Griechische Grammmatik, sect. 726, signifying, substantially, the - same as ἢ: and examples even in Thucydidês, in such phrases as - τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια (i, 22, 143), τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα - τούτων, v, 74; see Poppo’s note on i, 22. - -Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedæmonians had -been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace -and the recovery of the prisoners; their pacific dispositions -being especially instigated by king Pleistoanax, whose peculiar -circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a -close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the -commencement of the war, and a little before the thirty years’ -truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on -occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years, he lived -in banishment, close to the temple of Zeus Lykæus, in Arcadia; in -such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians, that his dwelling-house was -half within the consecrated ground.[685] But he never lost the hope -of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess -at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristoklês kept in their pay. To -every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated -the same imperative injunction: “They must bring back the seed of -(Hêraklês) the demi-god son of Zeus, from foreign land to their own: -if they did not, it would be their fate to plough with a silver -ploughshare.” The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated and -backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax -at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. -In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile -was recalled; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded -honors, received with the same sacrifices and choric shows as those -which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings, on the -first settlement of Sparta. - - [685] Thucyd. v, 17. ἥμισυ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ Διὸς - οἰκοῦντα φόβῳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. - - “The reason was, that he might be in sanctuary at an instant’s - notice, and yet might be able to perform some of the common - offices of life without profanation, which could not have been - the case had the whole dwelling been within the sacred precinct.” - (Dr. Arnold’s note.) - -As in the case of Kleomenês and Demaratus, however, it was not -long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at -least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of -Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive -public calamity which befell the state, the miscarriages of -Alkidas, the defeat of Eurylochus in Amphilochia, and above all, -the unprecedented humiliation in Sphakteria, were imputed to the -displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of -Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most -eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, -so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door -for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by -regaining the prisoners.[686] - - [686] Thucyd. v, 17, 18. - -After the battle of Delium,[687] the pacific dispositions of Nikias, -Lachês, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favor -at Athens;[688] while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick -upon each other, each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently -increasing his means of achieving more, tended to convert the -discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations -appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter: -and the continual hope that these might be brought to a close, -combined with the impolitic aversion of Nikias and his friends to -energetic military action, help to explain the unwonted apathy of -Athens, under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her -courage flag, towards the close of the winter, that she came to look -upon a truce as her only means[689] of preservation against the -victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Kleon now was, we -are not directly informed: he would probably still continue opposed -to the propositions of peace, at least indirectly, by insisting on -terms more favorable than could be obtained. On this point, his -political counsels would be wrong; but on another point, they would -be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias: -for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by -Athenian force against Brasidas in Thrace. At the present moment -this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether -she entertained or rejected the views of peace: and the policy of -Nikias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens by -encouraging them to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta, -was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will -hereafter show. - - [687] Thucyd. v, 15. σφαλέντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ ~παραχρῆμα~ - οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἂν ἐνδεξομένους, ποιοῦνται - τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχειρίαν, etc. - - [688] Thucyd. iv, 118; v, 43. - - [689] Thucyd. iv, 117. νομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν - Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσαποστῆσαι οὐδὲν πρὶν παρασκευάσαιντο καθ᾽ - ἡσυχίαν, etc. - -Attempts were made by the peace-party both at Athens and Sparta to -negotiate at first for a definitive peace: but the conditions of such -a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties, -and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas. -At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his -progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year, desiring -the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the -terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the -conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for -one year,[690] together with the first two articles ready prepared, -came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without -proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as -allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations -against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so -much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace, -as to insure some peace which would liberate her captives: and she -calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of -peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon -themselves the rigorous obligations of war.[691] - - [690] This appears from the form of the truce in Thucyd. iv, - 118; it is prepared at Sparta, in consequence of a previous - proposition from Athens; in sect. 6. οἱ δὲ ἰόντες, τέλος ἔχοντες - ἰόντων, ᾗπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε. - - [691] Thucyd. iv, 117. καὶ γενομένης ἀνακωχῆς κακῶν καὶ - ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους) αὐτοὺς - πειρασαμένους ξυναλλαγῆναι, etc. - -In the month of March, 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the -month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month -Gerastius at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, -between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, -and Megara, on the other.[692] The Spartans, instead of merely -despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired, -went a step farther: in concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they -drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in -such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the -Athenians. The general principle of the truce was _uti possidetis_, -and the conditions were in substance as follows:— - - [692] Thucyd. iv, 119. The fourteenth of Elaphebolion, and the - twelfth of Gerastius, designate the same day. The truce went - ready-prepared from Sparta to Athens, together with envoys - Spartan, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and Epidaurian. - The truce was accepted by the Athenian assembly, and sworn - to at once by all the envoys as well as by three Athenian - stratêgi (σπείσασθαι δὲ ~αὐτίκα μάλα~ τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ - τὰς παρούσας, iv, 118, 119); that day being fixed on as the - commencement. - - The lunar months in different cities were never in precise - agreement. - -1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the -right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to -the customs of his particular city. The main purpose of this -stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow -Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during -the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians[693] and -Phocians: the Delphian authorities also were in the interest of -Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation -to the Pythian games. But the Bœotians and Phocians were no parties -to the truce: accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the -article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not -pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Bœotians and -Phocians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amicable -representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this -moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have -fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.[694] - - [693] See Aristophan. Aves, 188. - - [694] Thucyd. v, 1-32. They might perhaps believe that the - occupation of Delium had given offence to Apollo. - -2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each -according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property -of the Delphian god.[695] This article also is prepared at Athens, -for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favor of Apollo and the -Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course. - - [695] Thucyd. iv, 118 Περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι - ὅπως ~τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας~ ἐξευρήσομεν, etc. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. - Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxiii, p. 273) thinks that this article has - reference to past appropriation of the Delphian treasure by - the Peloponnesian alliance, for warlike purposes. Had such a - reference been intended, we should probably have found the past - participle, τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας: whereas the present participle, as - it now stands, is perfectly general, designating acts future and - contingent. - -3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Kythêra, Nisæa, and Minôa, and -Methana in the neighborhood of Trœzen, are to remain as at present. -No communication to take place between Kythêra and any portion of -the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers -occupying Pylus shall confine themselves within the space between -Buphras and Tomeus; those in Nisæa and Minôa, within the road which -leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, -without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In -like manner, the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trœzen, -and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special -convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.[696] - - [696] Thucyd. iv, 118: see Poppo’s note. - -4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for -trading purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty -to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of -tonnage equal to five hundred talents. [All war-ships were generally -impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for -fighting. Merchant-vessels seem generally to have sailed, but were -sometimes rowed: the limitation of size is added, to insure that the -Lacedæmonians shall not, under color of merchantmen, get up a warlike -navy.] - -5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land -between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy with suitable -attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of -differences. - -6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free -or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens -had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies, Sparta the desertion of -Helots.] - -7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to -their established laws and customs. - -Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta, seemingly -in concert with Athenian envoys, and sent by the Spartans to Athens -for approval, with the following addition: “If there be any provision -which occurs to you, more honorable or just than these, come to -Lacedæmon and tell us: for neither the Spartans nor their allies will -resist any just suggestions. But let those who come, bring with them -full powers to conclude, in the same manner as you desire of us. The -truce shall be for one year.” - -By the resolution which Lachês proposed in the Athenian public -assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that -negotiations should be open for a definitive treaty, and directed -the stratêgi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and -principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment -when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce -to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to -cancel it altogether. Two days[697] after the important fourteenth -of Elaphebolion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, -Skiônê revolted from Athens to Brasidas. - - [697] Thucyd. iv, 122. - -Skiônê was a town calling itself Achæan, one of the numerous colonies -which, in the want of an acknowledged mother city, traced its origin -to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula -of Pallênê (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land -into which Chalkidikê branches out); conterminous with the Eretrian -colony Mendê. The Skiônæans, not without considerable dissent among -themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with -Brasidas. He immediately crossed the gulf into Pallênê, himself in a -little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that -she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel,—while any -Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme, -paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The -revolt of Skiônê was, from the position of the town, a more striking -defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus -connecting Pallênê with the mainland was occupied by the town of -Potidæa, a town assigned at the period of its capture seven years -before to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other -residents besides. Moreover, the isthmus was so narrow, that the -wall of Potidæa barred it across completely from sea to sea: Pallênê -was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land-force from -the continent, like the towns previously acquired by Brasidas. The -Skiônæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict -against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire -not merely over continental towns, but over islands. - -Even to Brasidas himself their revolt appeared a step of astonishing -boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public -assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had -employed at Akanthus and Torônê, disavowing all party preferences as -well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and -exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. -He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their -courage. “They, though exposed to all hazards of islanders, had -stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom,[698] without -waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force towards -what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any -measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens -should be averted, and he should assign to them the very first post -of honor among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon.” This generous, -straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation, appealing to the -strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete -city autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct -had hitherto been conformable to it, had proved highly efficacious in -all the previous towns. But in Skiônê it roused the population to the -highest pitch of enthusiasm:[699] it worked even upon the feelings -of the dissentient minority, bringing them round to partake heartily -in the movement: it produced a unanimous and exalted confidence -which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances -in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same -time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal -attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The -Skiônæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the -liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his head, the burst -of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the -Grecian bosom was capable. “They crowded round him individually, and -encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete,”[700] -says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I -observed before, that the achievements, the self-relying march, -the straightforward politics and probity of this illustrious man, -who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good -qualities of Athens predominant, inspired a personal emotion towards -him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The -sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete -was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was, -perhaps of all others, the most wide-spread and Pan-Hellenic. It was -connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation, -common to the whole nation, while politics tended rather to disunite -the separate cities: it was farther a sentiment at once familiar -and exclusively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout -Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason; -but Thucydidês cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and -unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skiônê, just after the -desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile. - - [698] Thucyd. iv, 120. ὄντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται, etc. - - [699] Thucyd. iv, 121. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπῄρθησάν τε τοῖς - λόγοις, καὶ θαρσήσαντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε - τὰ πρασσόμενα, etc. - - [700] Thucyd. iv, 121. Καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς - ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ τε ἐταινίουν τε καὶ προσήρχοντο - ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ. - - Compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28: compare also Krause (Olympia), - sect. 17, p. 162 (Wien, 1838). It was customary to place a fillet - of cloth or linen on the head of the victors at Olympia, before - putting on the olive wreath. - -The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution -of the Skiônæans was needed, and how speedily their insular position -would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly -brought across to Pallênê a considerable portion of his army, not -merely with a view to the defence of Skiônê, but also with the -intention of surprising both Mendê and Potidæa, in both which places -there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates. - -It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who -came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, -and to enforce its provisions: Athenæus from Sparta, one of the three -Spartans who had sworn to the treaty: Aristonymus, from Athens. -The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication; -much to the satisfaction of the newly acquired allies of Sparta in -Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith, but to the great chagrin -of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. But he could -not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred -from the peninsula of Pallênê to Torônê. - -The case of Skiônê, however, immediately raised an obstruction, -doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners who had come in -an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place, -and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallênê. But on -inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skiônæans had not -revolted until two days after the day fixed for the commencement -of the truce: accordingly, while sanctioning the truce for all the -other cities in Thrace, he refused to comprehend Skiônê in it, -sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly -against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skiônê, -which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and -even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, -by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day -named in the truce. Violent was the burst of indignation when the -news sent home by Aristonymus reached Athens: nor was it softened, -when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to -them by Brasidas and Athenæus, despatched an embassy hither to claim -protection for Skiônê, or at any rate to procure the adjustment of -the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of -the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to -relax from their rights in favor of the first revolting islanders. -They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest -of Skiônê; and farther, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death -all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should -have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition -to throw up the truce generally; and the state of feeling on both -sides tended to this result, that, while the war continued in Thrace, -it was suspended everywhere else.[701] - - [701] Thucyd. iv, 122, 123. - -Fresh intelligence soon arrived, carrying exasperation at Athens -yet farther, of the revolt of Mendê, the adjoining town to -Skiônê. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly -introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the -truce-commissioners; but they saw that he retained his hold on -Skiônê, in spite of the provisions of the truce, and they ascertained -that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though -he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the -surprise of the town. Being, moreover, only a small party, with the -sentiment of the population against them, they were afraid, if they -now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the -partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against -Skiônê. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous -course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, -constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them:[702] the government -seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means -to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. -Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook -to protect them, professing to think that he had a right to do so, -because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. -But the truce upon this point was clear, which he himself virtually -admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in -which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made -preparation for the defence both of Mendê and Skiônê against the -attack, which was now rendered more certain than before, conveying -the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic -Olynthus, and sending thither as garrison five hundred Peloponnesian -hoplites with three hundred Chalkidic peltasts; the commander of -which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his -own troops separately.[703] Brasidas then withdrew himself with the -greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition -into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkêstæ. On what ground, -after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became -his active enemy, we are left to conjecture: probably his relations -with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were -such that this step was forced upon him against his will, or he may -really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate -to the defence of Mendê and Skiônê; an idea which the unaccountable -backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well -foster. Had he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved -them, considering the situation of Pallênê and the superiority of -Athens at sea; but his absence made their ruin certain.[704] - - [702] Thucyd. iv, 123. Διὸ καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τήν - τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἑτοίμην, καὶ ἅμα τῶν ~πρασσόντων - σφίσιν ὀλίγων τε ὄντων~, καὶ ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, - ἀλλὰ ~καταβιασαμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλούς~, iv, 130. ὁ δῆμος - εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιοργὴς ἐχώρει ἐπί τε Πελοποννησίους - ~καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πράξαντας~, etc. - - The Athenians, after the conquest of the place, desire the - Mendæans πολιτεύειν ὥσπερ εἰωθέσαν. - - Mendê is another case in which the bulk of the citizens were - averse to revolt from Athens, in spite of neighboring example. - - [703] Thucyd. iv, 130. - - [704] Thucyd. iv, 123, 124. - -While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian -armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa: fifty -triremes, ten of them Chian; one thousand hoplites and six hundred -bowmen from Athens; one thousand mercenary Thracians, with some -peltasts from Methônê and other towns in the neighborhood. From -Potidæa, they proceeded by sea to Cape Poseidonium, near which -they landed for the purpose of attacking Mendê. Polydamidas, the -Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of -seven hundred hoplites, including three hundred Skiônæans, upon -an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: upon -which the Athenian generals divided their forces; Nikias, with -sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, one hundred and twenty Methonean -peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side -path and thus turn the position; while Nikostratus with the main -army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of -the ground that both were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and -the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly -escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendæans, however, evacuated the -position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athenians, -sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skiônê, -ravaged the neighboring lands; and Nikias on the ensuing day carried -his devastations still farther, even to the border of the Skiônæan -territory. - -But dissensions had already commenced within the walls, and the -Skiônæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took -advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mendê had been -brought about against the will of the citizens by the intrigues and -for the benefit of an oligarchical faction: moreover, it does not -appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited -Skiônê and the other revolted towns: had he come, his personal -influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and -create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished, -after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his animating -words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops whom he had -sent to Mendê, were mere instruments to sustain the newly erected -oligarchy and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens -generally towards them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikostratus -with half of the Athenian force was planted before that gate of Mendê -which opened towards Potidæa: in the neighborhood of that gate, -within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of -the Peloponnesians and of the citizens; and Polydamidas, intending -to make a sally forth, was marshalling both of them in battle order, -when one of the Mendæan Demos, manifesting with angry vehemence -a sentiment common to most of them, told him, “that he would not -sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest.” -Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of -the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush -upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, -sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into -the acropolis; the rather, as they saw some of the Mendæans open -the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a -preconcerted betrayal. No such concert, however, existed, though the -besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened, -soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it -impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from -plundering the town; and they had even some difficulty in saving the -lives of the citizens.[705] - - [705] Thucyd. iv, 130; Diodor. xii, 72. - -Mendê being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of -the citizens to resume their former government, leaving it to them -to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use -was made of this permission, we are not told; but probably most -of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with -Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation round the -acropolis, joining the sea at both ends, and left a force to guard -it, the Athenians moved away to begin the siege of Skiônê, where they -found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a -strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround -the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked -it at once, and were more fortunate than they had been before Mendê; -for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take -refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced -the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison -who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mendê, got into Skiônê at -night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading -wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias -from prosecuting his operations, so that Skiônê was in no long time -completely inclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of -circumvallation.[706] - - [706] Thucyd. iv, 131. - -Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from -the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mendê or to relieve -Skiônê, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torônê. -Nikias, however, without attacking Torônê, returned soon afterwards -with his armament to Athens, leaving Skiônê under blockade. - -The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every -way, and nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from -utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of -three thousand Grecian hoplites, Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and -Chalkidian, with one thousand Macedonian and Chalkidian horse, and -a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they -had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lynkêstæ, -they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that -prince was completely worsted. They halted here for a few days, -awaiting—before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the -territory of Arrhibæus—the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, -with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain.[707] At length Perdikkas -became impatient to advance without them; while Brasidas, on the -contrary, apprehensive for the fate of Mendê during his absence, -was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming -aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments -at some distance from each other, when both received unexpected -intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. -The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, -and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number -of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, and such was their -reputation for ferocity as well as for valor, that the Macedonian -army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night -and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, -and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had -been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found -Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him, while the Macedonians -were already far advanced in their journey homeward. - - [707] Thucyd. iv, 124. - -The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia, general as -well as soldiers, was never more strikingly exhibited than on this -critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as -well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline: -the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full -authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square, or -oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the centre, for the -retreating march: youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer -ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the -assailing enemy; while Brasidas himself, with three hundred chosen -men, formed the rear-guard.[708] - - [708] Thucyd. iv, 125. - -The short harangue which, according to a custom universal with -Grecian generals, he addressed to his troops immediately before -the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable. Though some -were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all -by the honorable title of “Peloponnesians.” Reassuring them against -the desertion of their allies, as well as against the superior -numbers of the advancing enemy, he invokes their native, homebred -courage.[709] “_Ye_ do not require the presence of allies to inspire -you with bravery, nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy; for -ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger -number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule -subjects more numerous than themselves, having acquired their power -by no other means than by superiority in battle.” Next, Brasidas -tried to dissipate the _prestige_ of the Illyrian name; his army -had already vanquished the Lynkêstæ, and these other barbarians -were noway better. A nearer acquaintance would soon show that they -were only formidable from the noise, the gestures, the clashing of -arms, and the accompaniments of their onset; and that they were -incapable of sustaining the reality of close combat, hand to hand. -“They have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with -shame for deserting their post: flight and attack are with them -in equally honorable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the -really courageous man: their battle, wherein every man fights as he -chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretence -for running away.” “Repel ye their onset whenever it comes; and so -soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye -will soon arrive in a place of safety; and ye will be convinced that -such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep -aloof with empty menace and a parade of courage which never strikes; -while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold -in running after him where there is no danger.”[710] - - [709] Thucyd. iv, 126. Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ - πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ οἰκείαν - ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων, οἵ γε (μηδὲ) ἀπὸ - πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, - ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· ~οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν - δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν~. - - [710] Thucyd. iv, 126. Οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν - λιπεῖν τινα χώραν βιαζόμενοι· ἥ τε φυγὴ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος - ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει· - αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί (se - sauver) τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε. - - Σαφῶς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε, ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ - ὂν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατάσπερχον. Ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον, - καὶ ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ - ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίξεσθε, καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι - ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ~ἄποθεν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ - ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν~, οἳ δ᾽ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ - πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐπιδείκνυνται. - - The word μέλλησις which occurs twice in this chapter in regard to - the Illyrians, is very expressive and at the same time difficult - to translate into any other language,—“what they seem on the - point of doing, but never realize.” See also i, 69. - - The speech of the Roman consul Manlius, in describing the Gauls, - deserves to be compared: “Procera corpora, promissæ et rutilatæ - comæ, vasta scuta, prælongi gladii: ad hoc cantus ineuntium - prælium, et ululatus et tripudia, et quatientium scuta in patrium - quendam morem horrendus armorum crepitus: _omnia de industriâ - composita ad terrorem_” (Livy, xxxviii, 17.) - -The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly -numbers, even with equal undivided courage, is now a truth so -familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves -back into the fifth century before the Christian era, when this -truth was recognized only among the Hellenic communities; when the -practice of all their neighbors—Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, -Epirots, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of -it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military -habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed, having been -pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian -town of Stratus, in the second year of the war.[711] Both Epirots and -Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either -Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now -about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more -forcibly. Nor is it merely the contrast between two modes of fighting -which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers: he -gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which -that contrast is founded,—a theory of large range and going to the -basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The -sentiment in each individual man’s bosom, of a certain place which he -has to fill and duties which he has to perform, combined with fear of -the displeasure of his neighbors as well as of his own self-reproach -if he shrinks back, but at the same time essentially bound up -and reciprocating with the feeling that his neighbors are under -corresponding obligations towards him,—this sentiment, which Brasidas -invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, -was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace -as citizens of the same community. Simple as this principle may seem, -it would have found no response in the army of Xerxes, or of the -Thracian Sitalkês, or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes -to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip -which the Great King commands to be administered to him: the Illyrian -or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of -his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty, -but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied -or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself -bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble,[712]—who -obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but -a common and imperative sentiment of obligation,—whose honor or shame -is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor -overstepped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the -minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be -farther illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the -Ten Thousand: at present, I merely indicate them as forming a part -of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as -military, wherein the Greeks stood exalted above the nations who -surrounded them. - - [711] Thucyd. ii, 81. See above, chap. xlviii, of this History. - - [712] See the memorable remarks of Hippokratês and Aristotle - on the difference in respect of courage between Europeans - and Asiatics, as well as between Hellens and non-Hellens - (Hippokratês, De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 24, ed. Littré, sect. - 116, _seq._, ed. Petersen; Aristotel. Politic. vii, 6, 1-5), and - the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii, 103, - 104). - -But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves -notice. He tells his soldiers: “Courage is your homebred property; -for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs -the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves -and conquest by their ancestors.” First, it is remarkable that -a large proportion of the Peloponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas -thus addresses, consisted of Helots, the conquered race, not the -conquerors: yet so easily does the military or regimental pride -supplant the sympathies of race, that these men would feel flattered -by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race -which had enslaved their ancestors. Next, we here see the right of -the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power, and as -an honorable and ennobling recollection, by an officer of Dorian -race, oligarchical politics, unperverted intellect, and estimable -character: and we shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a -similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at -Melos, to disallow the explanation of those who treat it merely as -a theory invented by demagogues and sophists, upon one or other of -whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in -Grecian politics or morality. - -Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat. As -soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the -confidence and shouts of pursuers against a flying enemy, believing -that they should completely destroy his army. But wherever they -approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the -purpose, turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while -Brasidas himself, with his rear-guard of three hundred, was present -everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lynkêstæ and Illyrians -attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed -its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely -handled, and with such unwonted vigor,—for they probably had had no -previous experience of Grecian troops,—that after a few trials they -desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. -They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians -under Perdikkas, who had fled before, partly to occupy the narrow -pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into -Lynkêstis, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter -approached this narrow pass, he saw the barbarians masters of it; -several of them were already on the summits, and more were ascending -to reinforce them; while a portion of them were moving down upon his -rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen three hundred, -to charge up the most assailable of the two hills, with their best -speed, before it became more numerously occupied, not staying to -preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous movement -disconcerted the barbarians, who fled, abandoning the eminence to the -Greeks, and leaving their own men in the pass exposed on one of their -flanks.[713] The retreating army, thus master of one of the side -hills, was enabled to force its way through the middle pass, and to -drive away the Lynkêstian and Illyrian occupants. Having got through -this narrow outlet, Brasidas found himself on the higher ground, nor -did his enemies dare to attack him farther: so that he was enabled -to reach, even in that day’s march, the first town or village in the -kingdom of Perdikkas, called Arnissa. So incensed were his soldiers -with the Macedonian subjects of Perdikkas, who had fled on the first -news of danger without giving them any notice, that they seized and -appropriated all the articles of baggage, not inconsiderable in -number, which happened to have been dropped in the disorder of a -nocturnal flight; and they even unharnessed and slew the oxen out of -the baggage carts.[714] - - [713] Thucyd. iv, 128. It is not possible clearly to understand - this passage without some knowledge of the ground to which it - refers. I presume that the regular road through the defile, along - which the main army of Brasidas passed, was long and winding, - making the ascent to the top very gradual, but at the same time - exposed on both sides from the heights above. The detachment of - three hundred scaled the steep heights on one side, and drove - away the enemy, thus making it impossible for him to remain - any longer even in the main road. But I do not suppose, with - Dr. Arnold, that the main army of Brasidas followed the three - hundred, and “broke out of the valley by scaling one of its - sides:” they pursued the main road, as soon as it was cleared for - them. - - [714] Thucyd. iv, 127, 128. - -Perdikkas keenly resented this behavior of the troops of Brasidas, -following as it did immediately upon his own quarrel with that -general, and upon the mortification of his repulse from Lynkêstis. -From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesians, -and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the -wall of blockade round Skiônê. Such was the general faithlessness -of this prince, however, that Nikias required as a condition of the -alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions; -and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable -importance.[715] - - [715] Thucyd. iv, 128-132. Some lines of the comic poet Hermippus - are preserved (in the Φορμοφόροι, Meineke, Fragm. p. 407) - respecting Sitalkês and Perdikkas. Among the presents brought - home by Dionysus in his voyage, there is numbered “the itch from - Sitalkês, intended for the Lacedæmonians, and many shiploads - of lies from Perdikkas.” Καὶ παρὰ Περδίκκου ψεύδη ναυσὶν πάνυ - πολλαῖς. - -The relations between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion -of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious -combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding, -and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed. -The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for -discussions preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely -frustrated; nor does the decree of the Athenian people, which stands -included in their vote sanctioning the truce, for sending and -receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, ever seem to have been -executed. - -Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable -reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own -request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament -now under Nikias in Pallênê. But Ischagoras, the commander of the -reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther -progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. -For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been -enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests -to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and -was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an -essential service to the Athenians.[716] Ischagoras, however, with -a few companions, but without his army, made his way to Brasidas, -having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and -report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions -a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as -harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas: this was -among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of -the ancient Spartan custom, that none except elderly men, above the -military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed, Brasidas himself -was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of -these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any -but Spartans to such posts, for there were no Spartans in the army -of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of -Amphipolis; another, Pasitelidas, of Torônê.[717] It is probable that -these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the -activity of Brasidas: and the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, -together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops -intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one -exploit performed by him at this time, and that too more than six -months after the retreat from Macedonia, about January or February -422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the -town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring -up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant -his scaling ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying -and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a -short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to -pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another -throughout the night), when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took -advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach -the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the -assailants were compelled to retreat.[718] - - [716] Thucyd. iv, 132. - - [717] Thucyd. iv, 132. Καὶ ~τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν~ παρανόμως ἄνδρας - ἐξῆγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἄρχοντας καθιστάναι καὶ μὴ - ~τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν~ ἐπιτρέπειν. - - Most of the commentators translate ἡβώντων, “_young men_,” which - is not the usual meaning of the word: it signifies, “_men of - military age_,” which includes both young and middle-aged. If we - compare iv, 132 with iii, 36, v, 32, and v, 116, we shall see - that ἡβῶντες really has this larger meaning: compare also μέχρι - ἥβης (ii, 46), which means, “until the age of military service - commenced.” - - It is not therefore necessary to suppose that the men taken out - by Ischagoras were very young, for example that they were below - the age of thirty, as Manso, O. Müller, and Göller would have us - believe. It is enough that they were within the limits of the - military age, both ways. - - Considering the extraordinary reverence paid to old age at - Sparta, it is by no means wonderful that old men should have been - thought exclusively fitted for such commands, in the ancient - customs and constitution. - - The extensive operations, however, in which Sparta became - involved through the Peloponnesian war, would render it - impossible to maintain such a maxim in practice: but at this - moment, the step was still recognized as a departure from a - received maxim, and is characterized as such by Thucydidês under - the term παρανόμως. - - I explain τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν to refer to the case of men _not - Spartans_ being named to these posts: see in reference to this - point, the stress which Brasidas lays on the fact that Klearidas - was a Spartan, Thucyd. v, 9. - - [718] Thucyd. iv, 135. - -In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near -Peloponnesus, during the course of this summer, Thucydidês mentions -to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there -been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Hêrê, -between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times -more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the -latter, Mykenæ itself having been subjected and almost depopulated -by the Argeians), enjoyed an ancient Pan-Hellenic reputation; the -catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of -each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real -and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate -nominees. Chrysis, an old woman, who had been priestess there for -fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning -lamp near to her head: the fillet encircling her head took fire, and -though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient, -and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of -the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it -necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athênê -Alea, at Tegea: Phaeinis was appointed priestess in her place.[719] -The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Eupolemus, of Argos, -continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of -the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude: Pausanias, the -traveller, who describes this temple as a visitor, near six hundred -years afterwards, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had -been burned. - - [719] Thucyd. ii, 5; iv, 133; Pausan. ii, 17, 7; iii, 5, 6. - Hellanikus (a contemporary of Thucydidês, but somewhat older, - coming in point of age between him and Herodotus) had framed a - chronological series of these priestesses of Hêrê, with a history - of past events belonging to the supposed times of each. And such - was the Pan-Hellenic importance of the temple at this time, - that Thucydidês, when he describes accurately the beginning of - the Peloponnesian war, tells us, as one of his indications of - time, that Chrysis had then been forty-eight years priestess at - the Heræum. To employ the series of Olympic prize-runners and - Olympiads as a continuous distribution of time, was a practice - which had not yet got footing. - - The catalogue of these priestesses of Hêrê, beginning with - mythical and descending to historical names, is illustrated by - the inscription belonging to the temple of Halikarnassus in - Boeckh, Corpus Inscr. No. 2655: see Boeckh’s Commentary, and - Preller, Hellanici Fragmenta, pp. 34, 46. - -We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities -of Mantineia and Tegea, each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly -free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, -the victory was disputed: each party erected a trophy, each sent -spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak -farther of these Arcadian dissensions. - -The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta -and Athens in the preceding month of March; but they seem to have -followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities _de -facto_: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of -Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and -sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual -incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one -which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendency of the -Thebans over the inferior Bœotian cities.[720] The Thebans destroyed -the walls of Thespiæ, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, -on the charge of _atticizing_ tendencies. How far this suspicion was -well founded we have no means of judging: but the Thespians, far from -being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless, having -lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, -where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very -helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against -Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce -the rigorous sentence above mentioned.[721] - - [720] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 6. - - [721] Thucyd. iv, 133. - -But the month of March, or the Attic Elaphebolion, 422 B.C., the time -prescribed for expiration of the one year’s truce, had now arrived. -It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more -than partially observed: Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from -the beginning, and both the contracting powers had tacitly acquiesced -in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace -elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking -the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we -plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among -both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. Nor was -there anything except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted -subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive -the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to -maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties, always -excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover, the Athenians were to a certain -degree soothed by their success at Mendê and Skiônê, and by their -acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of -423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties -was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or -to conclude any new agreement, though neither were disposed to depart -from that which had been already concluded. - -The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical -difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had -expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually -did renew them. To the Athenians, there was this additional motive -for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great -Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the -beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy -spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the -conclusion of the one year’s truce, their pious feelings seem now to -have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and -festivals connected with it. Though the truce, therefore, had really -ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were -over.[722] - - [722] This seems to me the most reasonable sense to put upon the - much-debated passage of Thucyd. v, 1. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους - αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι τῶν Πυθίων· καὶ ἐν τῇ - ~ἐκεχειρίᾳ~ Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου; again, v, 2. - Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ - τὴν ~ἐκεχειρίαν~, etc. - - Thucydidês says here, that “the truce was dissolved:” the - bond imposed upon both parties was untied, and both resumed - their natural liberty. But he does not say that “_hostilities - recommenced_” before the Pythia, as Göller and other critics - affirm that he says. The interval between the 14th of the month - Elaphebolion and the Pythian festival was one in which there - was no binding truce any longer in force, and yet no actual - hostilities: it was an ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος, to use the words of - Thucydidês, when he describes the relations between Corinth and - Athens in the ensuing year (v, 32). - - The word ἐκεχειρία here means, in my judgment, the truce - proclaimed at the season of the Pythian festival,—quite distinct - from the truce for one year which had expired a little while - before. The change of the word in the course of one line from - σπονδαὶ to ἐκεχειρία marks this distinction. - - I agree with Dr. Arnold, dissenting both from M. Boeckh and - from Mr. Clinton, in his conception of the events of this year. - Kleon sailed on his expedition to Thrace after the Pythian holy - truce, in the beginning of August: between that date and the end - of September, happened the capture of Torônê and the battle of - Amphipolis. But the way in which Dr. Arnold defends his opinion - is not at all satisfactory. In the Dissertation appended to his - second volume of Thucydidês (p. 458), he says: “The words in - Thucydidês αἱ ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων, mean, - as I understand them, ‘that the truce for a year had _lasted - on_ till the Pythian games, and then ended:’ that is, instead - of expiring on the 14th of Elaphebolion, it had been _tacitly - continued_ nearly four months longer, till after midsummer: and - it was not till the middle of Hekatombæon that Cleon was sent out - to recover Amphipolis.” - - Such a construction of the word διελέλυντο appears to me - inadmissible, nor is Dr. Arnold’s defence of it, p. 454, of much - value: σπονδὰς διαλύειν is an expression well known to Thucydidês - (iv, 23; v, 36), “to dissolve the truce.” I go along with Boeckh - and Mr. Clinton in construing the words, except that I strike - out what they introduce from their own imagination. They say: - “The truce was ended, and _the war again renewed_, up to the - time of the Pythian games.” Thucydidês only says “that the truce - was dissolved;” he does not say “_that the war was renewed_.” It - is not at all necessary to Dr. Arnold’s conception of the facts - that the words should be translated as he proposes. His remarks - also (p. 460) upon the relation of the Athenians to the Pythian - games, appear to me just: but he does not advert to the fact, - which would have strengthened materially what he there says, that - the Athenians had been excluded from Delphi and from the Pythian - festival between the commencement of the war and the one year’s - truce. I conceive that the Pythian games were celebrated about - July or August. In an earlier part of this History (ch. xxviii, - vol. iv, p. 67), I said that they were celebrated in _autumn_; - it ought rather to be “towards the end of summer.” - -But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at -Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters renewed their -instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed -them with great additional strength of argument; the question being -now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding -obligation. - -“At this time (observes Thucydidês)[723] the great enemies of peace -were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, -because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war; -the latter, because he thought that if peace were concluded, he -should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily -credited in his criminations of others.” As to Brasidas, the remark -of the historian is indisputable: it would be wonderful, indeed, -if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the -war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian -towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from -Lacedæmon,—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were -not in his view the paramount object. In truth, his position in -Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady -peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon. - - [723] Thucyd. v, 16. Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν - μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν, διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ - τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ, γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος - νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, etc. - -But the coloring which Thucydidês gives to Kleon’s support of the -war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the -question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war,—whether his -personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by -it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations, -which tended infallibly to place ascendency in the hands of others, -and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on -dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of -his political ascendency; while matter of crimination against others, -assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood, could hardly be -wanting either in war or peace; and if the war brought forward -unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw -up successful generals who would certainly outshine him, and would -probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of -Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one -of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens, of character -analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon, expressed his surprise -on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new -war: “Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them; though -I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you; -if there be peace, you will have command over me.”[724] This is -surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the -comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than -that which Thucydidês pronounces in reference to the interests of -Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of -Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, -and the aristocrat Hermokratês far more warlike:[725] the former is -afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence -energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We -may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike: he commenced -his political career as an opponent of Periklês, when the latter was -strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the -Peloponnesian war.[726] - - [724] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. - - [725] See the speeches of Athenagoras and Hermokratês, Thucyd. - vi, 33-36. - - [726] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33-35. - -But farther, if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate -party-interest in promoting the war, it will still remain to be -considered, whether, at this particular crisis, the employment of -energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and -prudent policy for Athens. Taking Periklês as the best judge of -that policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating -emphatically two important points: 1. To stand vigorously upon the -defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, “keeping -their subject-allies well in hand,” submitting patiently even to see -Attica ravaged. 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire -or to make new conquests during the war.[727] Consistently with this -well-defined plan of action, Periklês, had he lived, would have taken -care to interfere vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from -making his conquests: had such interference been either impossible -or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too -great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of -the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which -the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible -to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely -than his rival Nikias to the policy of Periklês. It was to Nikias, -more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not -interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be -imputed: it was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost -any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it, who -encouraged his countrymen, at a moment of great public depression -of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the -chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The -peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, -with the promise and for the express purpose of checking the farther -conquests of Brasidas; also with the farther promise of maturing that -truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the -restoration of Amphipolis. - - [727] Thucyd. i, 142, 143, 144; ii, 13. καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν - ᾗπερ ἰσχύουσιν ἐξαρτύεσθαι, ~τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς - ἔχειν~—λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς - προσόδου, etc. - -Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace -and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out -might perhaps appear plausible in March 422 B.C., at the moment when -the truce for one year was concluded. But the subsequent events had -frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the -best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly -be realized while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For -the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce -on the basis of _uti possidetis_, and desiring to extend it to Thrace -as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it -upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions, -so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in -that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch -of her armament to Skiônê and Mendê had she maintained herself in -possession even of Pallênê. Now what was the lesson to be derived -from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their -future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of -all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace, -especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, -continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing -to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens; -and his connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her -professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and -doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent -experience: “If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of -Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of -finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their -prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will -never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who -are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that -after all, you will give them back their prisoners on the faith of an -equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened -during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of -Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not -even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and -to desist from farther conquest: much less will he obey them when -they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all, -if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition -and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you -desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic -employment of force, as has happened with Skiônê and Mendê: and you -ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while -the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting -until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby -losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon.” - -Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent -history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound -themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or -could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the -death of Brasidas: much less could they have done so during his life, -when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and -hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them. -Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so -that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing -him to read the lesson open before his eyes. - -Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the -expiration of the one year’s truce, may be thus shown to be not only -more conformable to the genius of Periklês, but also founded on a -juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy -of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without -refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his -own narrative, nay, without even indicating their existence, merely -tells us that “Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloke -dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination?” We -cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such -words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydidês, that -it is harsh and unfair towards Kleon, and careless in regard to truth -and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit -of honorable impartiality which pervades his general history: it is -an interpolation by the officer whose improvidence had occasioned to -his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, retaliating upon the -citizen who justly accused him: it is conceived in the same tone as -his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sphakteria. - -Rejecting on this occasion the judgment of Thucydidês, we may -confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging -his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis. -Demagogue and leather-seller though he was, he stands here honorably -distinguished, as well from the tameness and inaction of Nikias, -who grasped at peace with hasty credulity through sickness of the -efforts of war, as from the restless movement and novelties, not -merely unprofitable but ruinous, which we shall presently find -springing up under the auspices of Alkibiadês. Periklês had said to -his countrymen, at a time when they were enduring all the miseries -of pestilence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than -that which prevailed in B.C. 422: “You hold your empire and your -proud position, by the condition of being willing to encounter cost, -fatigue, and danger: abstain from all views of enlarging the empire, -but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired. To lose what -we have once got is more disgraceful than to fail in attempts at -acquisition.”[728] The very same language was probably held by Kleon -when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest -of Amphipolis. But when uttered by him, it would have a very -different effect from that which it had formerly produced when held -by Periklês, and different also from that which it would now have -produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it -when it came from Kleon; partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly -from a conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition -against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful service to all -concerned in it, general as well as soldiers; partly also from a -persuasion, sincerely entertained at the time, though afterwards -proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be -got back through peace with the Lacedæmonians. - - [728] Thucyd. ii, 63. Τῆς δὲ πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ - τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς - πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν, etc. c. 62, αἴσχιον δὲ, ἔχοντας - ἀφαιρεθῆναι ἢ κτωμένους ἀτυχῆσαι. Contrast the tenor of the two - speeches of Periklês (Thucyd. i, 140-144; ii, 60-64) with the - description which Thucydidês gives of the simple “avoidance of - risk,” (τὸ ἀκίνδυνον), which characterized Nikias (v. 16). - -If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself -as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible -ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is -understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, -we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, -arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was -the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at -Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, -it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself -some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair -at Sphakteria, the eighth year of the war: a season of most active -warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out -of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he -obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period we -may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive -personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did -not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which -he had manifested in that affair, reluctance to engage in military -expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well -as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in -proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to -take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable, -that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the stratêgi to take -the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias, doubtless, -opposed the expedition as much as he could: when it was determined -by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily -decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force -it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under -his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less -glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service than to see -his rival entangled in it; and he would have before him the same -alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much -satisfaction in the affair of Sphakteria: either the expedition would -succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken, or it would fail, -and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two -was really the more probable at Amphipolis, as Nikias had erroneously -imagined it to be at Sphakteria. - -It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these -circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the -public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens -unfavorable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, -Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army, and -the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest -officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in -putting on his armor. From all these circumstances united, political -as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites -whom he took out with him went with much reluctance.[729] An -ignorant general, with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically -disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from -Brasidas: but had Nikias or the stratêgi done their duty, and carried -the entire force of the city under competent command to the same -object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and -loss; certainly very different as to dishonor. - - [729] Thucyd. v, 7. καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον. - -Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently towards the beginning of -August, with twelve hundred Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites, -and three hundred horsemen, troops of excellent quality and -condition: besides an auxiliary force of allies, number not exactly -known, and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all -equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, -besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of -the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and -Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first -halted in his voyage near Skiônê, from which place he took away such -of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed -across the gulf from Pallênê to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place -called the Harbor of the Kolophonians, near Torônê.[730] Having -here learned that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable -Peloponnesian garrison were present in Torônê, he landed his forces -and marched to attack the town, sending ten triremes at the same time -round a promontory which separated the harbor of the Kolophonians -from Torônê, to assail the latter place from seaward. It happened -that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torônê, -had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials -in building a new and larger wall inclosing the proasteion, or -suburb: this new wall appears to have been still incomplete and -in an imperfect state of defence. Pasitelidas, the Peloponnesian -commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; -but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian -triremes sailing into the harbor, which was hardly guarded at all. -Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to repel these -new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered -from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered -aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles’ distance -from the city when he learned the capture, and was obliged to retire -unsuccessfully. Pasitelidas the commander, with the Peloponnesian -garrison and the Torônæan male population, were despatched as -prisoners to Athens; while the Torônæan women and children, by a fate -but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.[731] - - [730] The town of Torônê was situated near the extremity of the - Sithonian peninsula, on the side looking towards Pallênê. But the - territory belonging to the town comprehended all the extremity - of the peninsula on both sides, including the terminating point - Cape Ampelos,—Ἄμπελον τὴν Τορωναίην ἄκρην (Herodot. vii, 122). - Herodotus calls the Singitic gulf θάλασσαν τὴν ἄντιον Τορώνης - (vii, 122). - - The ruins of Torônê, bearing the ancient name, and Kufo, a - land-locked harbor near it, are still to be seen (Leake, Travels - in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 119). - - [731] Thucyd. v, 3. - -After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory -of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of -Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent -envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of -Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces; and to -Pollês the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come -with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians, -the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas: -and the local influence of the banished Thucydidês would no longer be -at the service of Athens, much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting -the expected reinforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an -attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic gulf, which was repulsed; next -upon Galêpsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which -was successful. But the reinforcements did not at once arrive, and -being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to -remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement -out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant -watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from -his station on the hill of Kerdylion, on the western bank of the -river-communication with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed -in such inaction on both sides; but the Athenian hoplites, becoming -impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those -feelings of dislike which they had brought out from Athens against -their general, “whose ignorance and cowardice (says the historian) -they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent.”[732] -Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely -to refrain from manifesting it; and Kleon was presently made aware -of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against -his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be -anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground -all round the city, and a demonstration to escape the appearance of -doing nothing, being aware that it was impossible to attack the place -with any effect before his reinforcements arrived. - - [732] Thucyd. v, 7. Ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα δὲ - ~ἠναγκάσθη~ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο. Τῶν γὰρ - στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν - ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν, πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μεθ᾽ οἵας - ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο, καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες - αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ - τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγε. - -To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary -to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can -understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was -placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around -which the river makes a bend, first in a southwesterly direction, -then, after a short course to the southward, back in a southeasterly -direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification -one long wall, which began near the point northeast of the town, -where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through -the lake Kerkinitis, ascended along the eastern side of the hill, -crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus, and then -descended so as to touch the river again at another point south -of the town; thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent -bow formed by the river. On three sides therefore, north, west, -and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon, and was thus -visible without any intervening wall to spectators from the side -of the sea (south), as well as from the side of the continent (or -west and north).[733] At some little distance below the point where -the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge,[734] -a communication of great importance for the whole country, which -connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Argilus. On the -western or right bank of the river, bordering it, and forming an -outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount -Kerdylium: in fact, the course of the Strymon is here determined by -these two steep eminences, Kerdylium on the west, and the hill of -Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when -Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected -with the long city wall; but during the intervening eighteen months, -he had erected a palisade work—probably an earthen bank topped with -a palisade—connecting the two. By means of this palisade, the bridge -was thus at the time of Kleon’s expedition comprehended within the -fortifications of the city; and Brasidas, while keeping watch on -Mount Kerdylium, could pass over whenever he chose into the city, -without any fear of impediment.[735] - - [733] Thucyd. iv, 102. Ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἣν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἅγνων - ὠνόμασεν, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα περιῤῥέοντος τοῦ Στρύμονος, διὰ τὸ - περιέχειν αὐτὴν, τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν, - περιφανῆ ἐς θάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἤπειρον ᾤκισεν. - - Ὁ καλλιγέφυρος ποταμὸς Στρύμων, Euripid. Rhesus, 346. - - I annex a plan which will convey some idea of the hill of - Amphipolis and the circumjacent territory: compare the plan in - Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxv, p. - 191, and that from Mr. Hawkins, which is annexed to the third - volume of Dr. Arnold’s Thucydidês, combined with a Dissertation - which appears in the second volume of the same work, p. 450. - See also the remarks in Kutzen, De Atheniensium imperio circa - Strymonem, ch. ii, pp. 18-21; Weissenborn, Beiträge zur genaueren - Erforschung der alt-griechischen Geschichte, pp. 152-156; - Cousinéry, Voyage dans la Macédoine, vol. i, ch. iv, p. 124, - _seq._ - - Colonel Leake supposes the ancient bridge to have been at the - same point of the river as the modern bridge; that is, north of - Amphipolis, and a little westward of the corner of the lake. - On this point I differ from him, and have placed it, with Dr. - Arnold, near the southeastern end of the reach of the Strymon, - which flows round Amphipolis. But there is another circumstance, - in which Col. Leake’s narrative corrects a material error in - Dr. Arnold’s Dissertation. Colonel Leake particularly notices - the high ridge which connects the hill of Amphipolis with Mount - Pangæus to the eastward (pp. 182, 183, 191-194), whereas Dr. - Arnold represents them as separated by a deep ravine (p. 451): - upon which latter supposition the whole account of Kleon’s march - and survey appears to me unintelligible. - - The epithet which Thucydidês gives to Amphipolis, “conspicuous - both towards the sea and towards the land,” which occasions some - perplexity to the commentators, appears to me one of obvious - propriety. Amphipolis was indeed situated on a hill; so were many - other towns: but its peculiarity was, that on three sides it had - no wall to interrupt the eye of the spectator: one of those sides - was towards the sea. - - Kutzen and Cousinéry make the long wall to be the segment of a - curve highly bent, touching the river at both ends. But I agree - with Weissenborn that this is inadmissible; and that the words - “long wall” imply something near a straight direction. - - [734] Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως: see a note a few - pages ago upon these words. This does not necessarily imply that - the bridge was at any considerable distance from the extreme - point where the long wall touched the river to the south: but - this latter point was a good way off from the town properly so - called, which occupied the higher slope of the hill. We are not - to suppose that the _whole_ space between the long wall and the - river was covered by buildings. - - [735] Thucyd. v. 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν (Brasidas) κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ - σταύρωμα πύλας, καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος - ἐξελθὼν, ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν, etc. - - The explanation which I have here given to the word σταύρωμα is - not given by any one else; but it appears to me the only one - calculated to impart clearness and consistency to the whole - narrative. - - When Brasidas surprised Amphipolis first, the bridge was - completely unconnected with the Long Wall, and at a certain - distance from it. But when Thucydidês wrote his history, there - were a pair of _connecting walls_ between the bridge and the - fortifications of the city as they then stood—οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη - ὥσπερ νῦν (iv, 103): the whole fortifications of the city had - been altered during the intermediate period. - - Now the question is, was the Long Wall of Amphipolis connected - or unconnected with the bridge, at the time of the conflict - between Brasidas and Kleon? Whoever reads the narrative of - Thucydidês attentively will see, I think, that they must have - been connected, though Thucydidês does not in express terms - specify the fact. For if the bridge had been detached from the - wall, as it was when Brasidas surprised the place first, the hill - of Kerdylium on the opposite side of the river would have been - an unsafe position for him to occupy. He might have been cut off - from Amphipolis by an enemy attacking the bridge. But we shall - find him remaining quietly on the hill of Kerdylium with the - perfect certainty of entering Amphipolis at any moment that he - chose. If it be urged that the bridge, though unconnected with - the Long Wall, might still be under a strong separate guard, - I reply, that on that supposition an enemy from Eion would - naturally attack the bridge first. To have to defend a bridge - completely detached from the city, simply by means of a large - constant guard, would materially aggravate the difficulties of - Brasidas. If it had been possible to attack the bridge separately - from the city, something must have been said about it in - describing the operations of Kleon, who is represented as finding - nothing to meddle with except the fortifications of the town. - - Assuming, then, that there was such a line of connection between - the bridge and the Long Wall, added by Brasidas since the first - capture of the place, I know no meaning so natural to give to - the word σταύρωμα. No other distinct meaning is proposed by any - one. There was, of course, a gate, or more than one, in the Long - Wall, leading into the space inclosed by the palisade; through - this gate Brasidas would enter the town when he crossed from - Kerdylium. This gate is called by Thucydidês αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα - πύλαι. There must have been also a gate, or more than one, in - the palisade itself, leading into the space without: so that - passengers or cattle traversing the bridge from the westward and - going to Myrkinus (_e. g._) would not necessarily be obliged to - turn out of their way and enter the town of Amphipolis. - - On the plan which I have here given, the line running nearly from - north to south represents the Long Wall of Agnon, touching the - river at both ends, and bounding as well as fortifying the town - of Amphipolis on its eastern side. - - The shorter line, which cuts off the southern extremity of this - Long Wall, and joins the river immediately below the bridge, - represents the σταύρωμα, or palisade: probably it was an earthen - mound and ditch, with a strong palisade at the top. - - By means of this palisade, the bridge was included in the - fortifications of Amphipolis, and Brasidas could pass over from - Mount Kerdylium into the city whenever he pleased. - -In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the -ridge which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to -Mount Pangæus, in order to survey the city and its adjoining ground -on the northern and northeastern side which he had not yet seen; -that is, the side towards the lake, and towards Thrace,[736] which -was not visible from the lower ground near Eion. The road which he -was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city -long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the -bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march, the -rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible -on Mount Kerdylium: moreover, the gates of Amphipolis were all shut, -not a man was on the wall, nor were any symptoms of movement to be -detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack, -he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly -array.[737] Having reached the top of the ridge, and posted his army -on the strong eminence fronting the highest portion of the Long Wall, -he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city -which lay towards Thrace, or towards Myrkinus, Drabêskus, etc., thus -viewing all the descending portion of the Long Wall northward towards -the Strymon. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and -even astonished him: it seemed altogether undefended, and he almost -fancied that, if he had brought battering-engines, he could have -taken it forthwith.[738] Impressed with the belief that there was no -enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while -his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim, -some even advancing close up to the walls and gates. - - [736] Thucyd. v, 7; compare Colonel Leake, _l. c._ p. 182; αὐτὸς - ἐθεᾶτο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρύμονος, καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ - Θρᾴκῃ, ὡς ἔχοι. - - [737] Thucyd. v, 7. Κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ - χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, - ἢν ἀναγκάζηται, περισχήσων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων - τὴν πόλιν. - - The words οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, etc. do not refer to μείζω - παρασκευὴν, as the Scholiast, with whom Dr. Arnold agrees, - considers them, but to the general purpose and dispositions of - Kleon. “He marched up, not like one who is abundantly provided - with means of safety, in case of being put on his defence; but - like one who is going to surround the city and take it at once.” - - Nor do these last words represent any real design conceived in - the mind of Kleon (for Amphipolis from its locality _could not - be really surrounded_), but are merely given as illustrating the - careless confidence of his march from Eion up to the ridge: in - the same manner as Herodotus describes the forward rush of the - Persians before the battle of Platæa, to overtake the Greeks whom - they supposed to be running away—Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ - ἐπήισαν, ὡς ~ἀναρπασόμενοι~ τοὺς Ἕλληνας (ix, 59): compare viii, - 28. - - [738] Thucyd. v, 7. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ κατῆλθεν ἔχων, - ἁμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει· ἑλεῖν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρῆμον. - - I apprehend that the verb κατῆλθεν refers to the coming of the - armament to Eion: analogous to what is said v, 2, ~κατέπλευσεν~ - ἐς τὸν Τορωναίων λιμένα: compare i, 51; iii, 4, etc. The march - from Eion up to the ridge could not well be expressed by - the word κατῆλθεν: but the arrival of the expedition at the - Strymon, the place of its destination, might be so described. - Battering-engines would be brought from nowhere else but from - Athens. - - Dr. Arnold interprets the word κατῆλθεν to mean that Kleon had - first marched up to a higher point, and then descended from this - point upon Amphipolis. But I contest the correctness of this - assumption, as a matter of topography: it does not appear to me - that Kleon ever reached any point higher than the summit of the - hill and wall of Amphipolis. Besides, even if he had reached a - higher point of the mountain, he could not well talk of “bringing - down battering-machines _from that point_.” - -But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas -knew that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium -of absolute inaction, and he calculated that by affecting extreme -backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce Kleon into some -incautious movement of which advantage might be taken. His station -on Mount Kerdylium enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian -army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside -of the Long Wall of Amphipolis,[739] he immediately crossed the -river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his -intention to march out and offer them open battle; for his army, -though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and -equipment;[740] in which points the Athenian force now present was -so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves -a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. -He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed -surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling -of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their -enemy. - - [739] Thucyd. v, 6. Βρασίδας δὲ—ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ - Κερδυλίῳ· ἔστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο Ἀργιλίων, πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, οὐ - πολὺ ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ ~κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε - οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτόθεν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ~, etc. - - [740] Thucyd. v, 8. - -Having offered the battle sacrifice at the temple of Athênê, Brasidas -called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements -prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his -Peloponnesians, accustomed to triumph over Ionians, he explained -to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with -comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not -prepared for it,[741] when their courage was not wound up to battle -pitch, and when, after carelessly mounting the hill to survey the -ground, they were thinking only of quietly returning to quarters. He -himself at the proper moment would rush out from one gate, and be -foremost in conflict with the enemy: Klearidas, with that bravery -which became him as a Spartan, would follow the example by sallying -out from another gate: and the enemy, taken thus unawares, would -probably make little resistance. For the Amphipolitans, this day and -their own behavior would determine whether they were to be allies of -Lacedæmon, or slaves of Athens, perhaps sold into captivity or even -put to death as a punishment for their recent revolt. - - [741] Thucyd. v, 9. Τοὺς γὰρ ἐναντίους εἰκάζω καταφρονήσει - τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντας ὡς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἐς - μάχην, ἀναβῆναί τε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον, καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θέαν - τετραμμένους ὀλιγωρεῖν.... Ἕως οὖν ἔτι ~ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσοῦσι~, - καὶ τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, - τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ~ἐν τῷ ἀνειμένῳ αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης, καὶ πρὶν - ξυνταχθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν~, ἐγὼ μὲν, etc. - - The words τὸ ἀνειμένον τῆς γνώμης are full of significance in - regard to ancient military affairs. The Grecian hoplites, even - the best of them, required to be peculiarly _wound up_ for a - battle; hence the necessity of the harangue from the general - which always preceded. Compare Xenophon’s eulogy of the manœuvres - of Epameinondas before the battle of Mantineia, whereby he made - the enemy fancy that he was not going to fight, and took down the - preparation in the minds of their soldiers for battle: ἔλυσε μὲν - τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευὴν, - etc. (Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.) - -These preparations, however, could not be completed in secrecy; for -Brasidas and his army were perfectly visible while descending the -hill of Kerdylium, crossing the bridge and entering Amphipolis, -to the Athenian scouts without: moreover, so conspicuous was the -interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of -Athênê, and Brasidas with its ministers around him, performing the -ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognized. The fact was made -known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, -while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported -that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen -under them, as if preparing for a sally.[742] He himself went close -to the gate, and satisfied himself of this circumstance: we must -recollect that there was no defender on the walls, and no danger from -missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his -reinforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat, -which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within -could be fully organized; for he imagined that a considerable number -of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before -the attack was actually begun, not dreaming that the sally would be -instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been -proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left -flank towards Eion, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill -with the right wing, waited only to see his left and centre actually -in march on the road to Eion, and then directed his right also to -wheel to the left and follow them. - - [742] Thucyd. v, 10. Τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ - ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιφανεῖ οὔσῃ - ἔξωθεν περὶ τὸ ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς θυομένου καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος, - ἀγγέλλεται (προὐκεχωρήκει γὰρ τότε κατὰ τὴν θέαν) ὅτι ἥ τε - στρατιὰ ἅπασα φανερὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν τῇ πόλει, etc. - - Kleon did not himself _see_ Brasidas sacrificing, or see the - enemy’s army within the city; others on the lower ground were - better situated for seeing what was going on in Amphipolis, - than he was while on the high ridge. Others saw it, and gave - intimation to him. - -The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a -direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with -their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy, when Brasidas, -looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall with his small -detachment ready marshalled near him, burst out into contemptuous -exclamations on the disorder of their array.[743] “These men will -not stand us; I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their -heads. Men who reel about in that way, never stand an assailing -enemy. Open the gates for me instantly, and let us sally out with -confidence.” - - [743] Thucyd. v, 10. Οἱ ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μένουσι (q. μενοῦσι?)· - δῆλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν· οἷς γὰρ ἂν - τοῦτο γίγνηται, οὐκ εἰώθασι μένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας. - - This is a remarkable illustration of the regular movement of - heads and spears, which characterized a well-ordered body of - Grecian hoplites. - -With that, both the gate of the Long Wall nearest to the palisade, -and the adjoining gate of the palisade itself, were suddenly thrown -open, and Brasidas with his one hundred and fifty chosen soldiers -issued out through them to attack the retreating Athenians. Running -rapidly down the straight road which joined laterally the road -towards Eion along which the Athenians were marching, he charged -their central division on the right flank:[744] their left wing had -already got beyond him on the road towards Eion. Taken completely -unprepared, conscious of their own disorderly array, and astounded at -the boldness of their enemy, the Athenians of the centre were seized -with panic, made not the least resistance, and presently fled. Even -the Athenian left, though not attacked at all, instead of halting -to lend assistance, shared the panic and fled in disorder. Having -thus disorganized this part of the army, Brasidas passed along the -line to press his attack on the Athenian right: but in this movement -he was mortally wounded and carried off the field, unobserved by -his enemies. Meanwhile Klearidas, sallying forth from the Thracian -gate, had attacked the Athenian right on the ridge opposite to him, -immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the -Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas -against the other division, and though astonished at the sudden -danger, had thus a moment’s warning, before they were themselves -assailed, to halt and take close rank on the hill. Klearidas here -found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon; -who, more astonished than any man in his army by a catastrophe so -unlooked for, lost his presence of mind and fled at once; but was -overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinus and slain. His soldiers -on the right wing, however, repelled two or three attacks in front -from Klearidas, and maintained their ground, until at length the -Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinus, having come forth -out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear so as -to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was thus put to -flight; the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing -and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangæus in their rear. -Their sufferings and loss in the flight, from the hands of the -pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe: and when they at -last again mustered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but six -hundred Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found -missing.[745] - - [744] Thucyd. v, 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν, κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας, - καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν, ἔθει δρόμῳ - τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου - ἰόντι τὸ τροπαῖον ἕστηκε. - - Brasidas and his men sallied forth by two different gates at - the same time. One was the first gate in the Long Wall, which - would be the first gate in order, to a person coming from the - southward. The other was the _gate upon the palisade_ (αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ - σταύρωμα πύλαι), that is, the gate in the Long Wall which opened - _from the town upon the palisade_. The persons who sallied out by - this gate would get out to attack the enemy by the gate in the - palisade itself. - - The gate in the Long Wall which opened from the town upon the - palisade, would be that by which Brasidas himself with his army - entered Amphipolis from Mount Kerdylium. It probably stood open - at this moment when he directed the sally forth: that which - had to be opened at the moment, was the gate in the palisade, - together with the first gate in the Long Wall. - - The last words cited in Thucydidês—ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον - τοῦ χωρίου ἰόντι τὸ τροπαῖον ἕστηκε—are not intelligible without - better knowledge of the topography than we possess. What - Thucydidês means by “the strongest point in the place,” we cannot - tell. We only understand that the trophy was erected in the road - by which a person went up to that point. We must recollect that - the expressions of Thucydidês here refer to the ground as it - stood sometime afterwards, not as it stood at the time of the - battle between Kleon and Brasidas. - - [745] It is almost painful to read the account given by Diodorus - (xii, 73, 74) of the battle of Amphipolis, when one’s mind is - full of the distinct and admirable narrative of Thucydidês, only - defective by being too brief. It is difficult to believe that - Diodorus is describing the same event; so totally different are - all the circumstances, except that the Lacedæmonians at last - gain the victory. To say, with Wesseling in his note, “Hæc _non - usquequaque_ conveniunt Thucydideis,” is prodigiously below the - truth. - -So admirably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its -success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. -But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who being -carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete -victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the -sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thrace, especially among -the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished -honor of interment within their city, the universal habit being to -inter even the most eminent deceased persons in a suburb without -the walls. All the allies attended his funeral in arms and with -military honors: his tomb was encircled by a railing, and the space -immediately fronting it was consecrated as the great agora of the -city, which was remodelled accordingly. He was also proclaimed œkist, -or founder, of Amphipolis, and as such, received heroic worship -with annual games and sacrifices to his honor.[746] The Athenian -Agnon, the real founder and originally recognized œkist of the city, -was stripped of all his commemorative honors and expunged from the -remembrance of the people: his tomb and the buildings connected -with it, together with every visible memento of his name, being -destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were towards -Athens,—and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which -they had just sustained of their saviour and protector,—they felt -repugnance to the idea of rendering farther worship to an Athenian -œkist. Nor was it convenient to keep up such a religious link with -Athens, now that they were forced to look anxiously to Lacedæmon -for assistance. Klearidas, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended -those numerous alterations in the city which this important change -required, together with the erection of the trophy, just at the spot -where Brasidas had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining -armament of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their -dead, returned home without farther operations. - - [746] Thucyd. v, 11. Aristotle, a native of Stageirus near - to Amphipolis, cites the sacrifices rendered to Brasidas as - an instance of institutions established by special and local - enactment (Ethic. Nikomach. v, 7). - - In reference to the aversion now entertained by the Amphipolitans - to the continued worship of Agnon as their œkist, compare the - discourse addressed by the Platæans to the Lacedæmonians, - pleading for mercy. The Thebans, if they became possessors of - the Platæid, would not continue the sacrifices to the gods who - had granted victory at the great battle of Platæa, nor funereal - mementos to the slain (Thucyd. iii, 58). - -There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and -contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest,—consummate -skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the -other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be -but one verdict of unqualified admiration: but the criticism passed -by Thucydidês on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without -reserves. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up -to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident -spirit with which he had embarked on the enterprise against Pylus, in -the blind confidence that no one would resist him.[747] Now I have -already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the -anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from -being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and -judicious, realized to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from -fortune. Nor are the remarks, here made by Thucydidês on that affair, -more reasonable than the judgment on it in his former chapter; for it -is not true, as he here implies, that Kleon expected no resistance in -Sphakteria: he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force -sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as -that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This -charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself -wished to make no aggressive movement until his reinforcements should -arrive, and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to -abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by -the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance -and backwardness, the latter quality being the reverse of that with -which he is branded by Thucydidês. - - [747] Thucyd. v, 7. Καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον - εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν· ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἤλπισέν οἱ - ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, - καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, etc. - -When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the -top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground, was -not in itself unreasonable, and might have been accomplished in -perfect safety, if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared -for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be completely -out-generalled and overreached by that simulated consciousness of -impotence and unwillingness to fight, which Brasidas took care to -present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been -the most frequently practised with success against inexperienced -generals, who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect -precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous -than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order -of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man -to keep steadily present to his mind liabilities even real and -serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their -approach; much more when there _is_ positive evidence, artfully laid -out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault -substantially the same had been committed by Thucydidês himself and -his colleague Euklês a year and a half before, when they suffered -Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis: not even -taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the -fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous, -but ignorant and unpractised, in a military sense; incapable of -keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly -knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching -explosion. - -This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid -for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the -danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within -were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving -instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away -before the enemy’s attack could be brought to bear.[748] An abler -officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the -hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper -array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind -up their courage to the fighting-point: for up to that moment they -had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian -hoplites, taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder -visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the -usual preliminaries of battle, was but too apt to prove deficient. -To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy, was unavoidable -from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable -to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done, or for causing -his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as -Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in -not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight -during their retreat. Let us add, however, and the remark, if it -serves to explain Kleon’s idea of being able to get away before he -was actually assailed, counts as a double compliment to the judgment -as well as boldness of Brasidas, that no other Lacedæmonian general -of that day perhaps, not even Demosthenês, the most enterprising -general of Athens, would have ventured upon an attack with so very -small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his -sudden movement. - - [748] Thucyd. v, 10. Οἰόμενος φθήσεσθαι ἀπελθὼν, etc. - -But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the -worst of Kleon’s faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the -moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of -that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. -A commander who has been out-generalled is under a double force of -obligation to exert and expose himself, to the uttermost, in order to -retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least -preserve his own personal honor, whatever censure he may deserve on -the score of deficient knowledge and judgment.[749] - - [749] Contrast the brave death of the Lacedæmonian general - Anaxibius, when he found himself out-generalled and surprised by - the Athenian Iphikratês (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 38). - -What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself, must be -applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian -hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of -the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems -to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when -we read in Thucydidês, that the men who thus disgraced themselves -were among the best, and the best-armed hoplites in Athens; that they -came out unwillingly under Kleon; that they began their scornful -murmurs against him before he had committed any fault, despising -him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt -anything serious, and was only manifesting a reasonable prudence in -waiting the arrival of expected reinforcements; when we read this, -we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with -former manœuvres respecting the attack of Sphakteria, and to discern -other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of -the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens -the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. -The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to their -wishes: they could not prevent it, but their opposition enfeebled it -from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned -to it, and was one main reason which frustrated its success. - -Had Periklês been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been -lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to -defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and -recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been, with -the full force and the best generals that Athens could furnish. -With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all -impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that -time it had no defence on three sides except the Strymon, and might -thus be approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The -armament of Kleon,[750] even if his reinforcements had arrived, was -hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Periklês would have been able -to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being -paralyzed by the contentions of political party: he would have seen -as clearly as Kleon, that the place could only be recovered by force, -and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens -could devote her energies. - - [750] Amphipolis was actually thus attacked by the Athenians - eight years afterwards, by ships on the Strymon, Thucyd. vii, - 9. Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ᾽ - Ἀμφίπολιν Θρᾳξὶ πολλοῖς, τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἷλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν - Στρύμονα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει, - ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἱμεραίου. (In the eighteenth year of the war.) But - the fortifications of the place seem to have been materially - altered during the interval. Instead of one long wall, with three - sides open to the river, it seems to have acquired a curved wall, - only open to the river on a comparatively narrow space near to - the lake; while this curved wall joined the bridge southerly by - means of a parallel pair of long walls with road between. - -It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue, -partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous -defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas -converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained -no Spartan either like or second to that eminent man, either as a -soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him -in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace; -none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens -on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable. -The fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the -future, disappeared alike with him. The Athenian generals, Phormio -and Demosthenês, had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an -influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from -their country: but the career of Brasidas, exhibited an extent of -personal ascendency and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, -such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain -in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable -historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles.[751] All the -achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more -than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from -his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in -which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development -of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely -estranged from all experience of party or political discussion, we -are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power -of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his -felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite -political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired. -The combination “of every sort of practical excellence,” valor, -intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing, which his character -presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens, -and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favorable -presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize.[752] -At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was -unquestionably the first man in Greece; and though it is not given to -us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure -that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified; -perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might have had -sufficient occupation at home to keep her from the disastrous -enterprise in Sicily. - - [751] Plato, Symp. c. 36, p. 221. - - [752] Thuc. iv, 81. δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς, etc. - -Thucydidês seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant -exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methônê to the last at -Amphipolis, not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in -different senses, the causes of his banishment. He never mentions -the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as -unwise or discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty -of empire thought itself entitled to practise in ancient times -against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reach their maximum -in the propositions against Mitylênê and Skiônê: both of them are -ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the -slaughter of the Melians, equally barbarous, and worse in respect to -grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects -of Athens, we find Thucydidês mentioning the deed without naming the -proposer.[753] - - [753] Thucyd. v, 116. - -Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated -will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that -of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydidês -has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticizing this personal -enemy; that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main -and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest -advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in -regard to his judgment as advocating the prosecution of war, three -different times must be distinguished: 1. After the first blockade -of the hoplites in Sphakteria; 2. After the capture of the island; -3. After the expiration of the one year truce. On the earliest of -those three occasions he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the -door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing -with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and -plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned -out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and -Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On -the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the -political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklêan, -much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the -coming chapters how those opponents managed the affairs of the state -after his death; how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the -enforcement of the conditions of peace; how Nikias and Alkibiadês -together shipwrecked the power of their country on the shores of -Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this comparison, -we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydidês is reserved and -even indulgent towards the errors and vices of other statesmen, harsh -only towards those of his accuser. - -As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician -in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy -evidence. There exists, indeed, a portrait of him, drawn in colors -broad and glaring, most impressive to the imagination, and hardly -effaceable from the memory; the portrait in the “Knights” of -Aristophanês. It is through this representation that Kleon has been -transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself -to have had a personal grudge against him, just as he has been -commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had -proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanês, so replete with -comic genius throughout, the “Knights” is the most consummate and -irresistible; the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and -purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in -reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest -possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it -obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit -combined with malice can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule, -contempt, and odium. Dean Swift would have desired nothing worse, -even for Ditton and Winston. The old man, Demos of Pnyx, introduced -on the stage as personifying the Athenian people,—Kleon, brought -on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who by coaxing, lying, -impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master’s -ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches -himself,—the Knights, or chief members of what we may call the -Athenian aristocracy, forming the Chorus of the piece as Kleon’s -pronounced enemies,—the sausage-seller from the market-place, who, -instigated by Nikias find Demosthenês along with these Knights, -overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the -favor of Demos; all this, exhibited with inimitable vivacity of -expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of libellous comedy. -The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was -represented at the Lenæan festival, January B.C. 424, about six -months after the capture of Sphakteria, with Kleon himself and most -of the real Knights present, must have been intense beyond what we -can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after -this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigor -and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence, at -least not permanently; for not only do we see him the most effective -opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for -believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his -tone towards this powerful enemy. - -So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are -satisfied with Aristophanês as a witness against him: though no other -public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such -evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or -Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them: -no man will take measure of a political Englishman from Punch, or of -a Frenchman from the Charivari. The unrivalled comic merit of the -“Knights” of Aristophanês is only one reason the more for distrusting -the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon. We have means too -of testing the candor and accuracy of Aristophanês by his delineation -of Sokratês, whom he introduced in the comedy of “Clouds” in the year -after that of the “Knights.” As a comedy, the “Clouds” stands second -only to the “Knights”: as a picture of Sokratês, it is little better -than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different -person. We may indeed perceive single features of resemblance; the -bare feet, and the argumentative subtlety, belong to both; but the -entire portrait is such, that if it bore a different name, no one -would think of comparing it with Sokratês, whom we know well from -other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we -know generally of the portraits of Periklês by these authors, we are -not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except -on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add, that -some of the hits against him, where we can accidentally test their -pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact; as, for example, where -the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately and cunningly robbed -Demosthenês of his laurels in the enterprise against Sphakteria.[754] - - [754] Aristophan. Equit. 55, 391, 740, etc. In one passage of - the play, Kleon is reproached with pretending to be engaged at - Argos in measures for winning the alliance of that city, but in - reality, under cover of this proceeding, carrying on clandestine - negotiations with the Lacedæmonians (464). In two other passages, - he is denounced as being the person who obstructs the conclusion - of peace with the Lacedæmonians (790, 1390). - -In the prose of Thucydidês, we find Kleon described as a dishonest -politician, a wrongful accuser of others, the most violent of all -the citizens:[755] throughout the verse of Aristophanês, these -same charges are set forth with his characteristic emphasis, but -others are also superadded; Kleon practises the basest artifices and -deceptions to gain favor with the people, steals the public money, -receives bribes, and extorts compositions from private persons by -wholesale, and thus enriches himself under pretence of zeal for the -public treasury. In the comedy of the Acharnians, represented one -year earlier than the Knights, the poet alludes with great delight to -a sum of five talents, which Kleon had been compelled “to disgorge”: -a present tendered to him by the insular subjects of Athens, if we -may believe Theopompus, for the purpose of procuring a remission of -their tribute, and which the Knights, whose evasions of military -service he had exposed, compelled him to relinquish.[756] - - [755] Thucyd. v, 17; iii, 45. καταφανέστερος μὲν εἶναι κακουργῶν, - καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων—βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν. - - [756] Aristophan. Acharn. 8, with the Scholiast, who quotes from - Theopompus. Theopompus, Fragment, 99, 100, 101, ed. Didot. - -But when we put together the different heads of indictment -accumulated by Aristophanês, it will be found that they are not -easily reconcilable one with the other; for an Athenian, whose temper -led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price -of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it -peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on peculation for -his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he -would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking -at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous -as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side -of the indictment which is indicated in Thucydidês; not Kleon, as -truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit -(which is certainly not the character implied in his speech about -the Mitylenæans, as given to us by the historian),[757] but Kleon -as a man of violent temper and fierce political antipathies, a -bitter speaker, and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against -adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free -debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was -thus that the elder Cato, “the universal biter, whom Persephonê was -afraid even to admit into Hades after his death,” was characterized -at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and -in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him, -as Thucydidês was to Kleon.[758] In Cato, such a temper was not -inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts -an anecdote respecting Kleon, that, on first beginning his political -career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy -with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him -from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.[759] - - [757] The public speaking of Kleon was characterized by Aristotle - and Theopompus (see Schol. ad Lucian. Timon, c. 30), not as - wheedling, but as full of arrogance; in this latter point too - like that of the elder Cato at Rome (Plutarch, Cato, c. 14). The - derisory tone of Cato in his public speaking, too, is said to - have been impertinent and disgusting (Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. - Præcept. p. 803, c. 7). - - [758] An epigram which Plutarch (Cato, c. 1) gives us from a poet - contemporary of Cato the Censor, describes him:— - - Πυῤῥὸν, ~πανδακέτην~, γλαυκόμματον, οὐδὲ θανόντα - Πόρκιον εἰς Ἀΐδην Περσεφόνη δέχεται. - - Livy says, in an eloquent encomium on Cato (xxxix, 40): - “Simultates nimio plures et exercuerunt eum, et ipse exercuit - eas: nec facile dixeris utrum magis presserit eum nobilitas, an - ille agitaverit nobilitatem. Asperi procul dubio animi, et linguæ - acerbæ et immodice liberæ fuit: sed invicti a cupiditatibus - animi et rigidæ innocentiæ: contemptor gratiæ, divitiarum.... - Hunc sicut omni vitâ, tum censuram petentem premebat nobilitas; - coierantque candidati omnes ad dejiciendum honore eum; non - solum ut ipsi potius adipiscerentur, nec quia indignabantur - novum hominem censorem videre; sed etiam quod tristem censuram, - periculosamque multorum famæ, et _ab læso a plerisque et lædendi - cupido_, expectabant.” - - See also Plutarch (Cato, c. 15, 16: his comparison between - Aristeidês and Cato, c. 2) about the prodigious number of - accusations in which Cato was engaged, either as prosecutor or - as party prosecuted. His bitter feud with the _nobilitas_ is - analogous to that of Kleon against the Hippeis. - - I need hardly say that the comparison of Cato with Kleon applies - only to domestic politics: in the military courage and energy for - which Cato was distinguished, Kleon is utterly wanting, nor are - we entitled to ascribe to him anything like the superiority of - knowledge and general intelligence which we find recorded of Cato. - - The expression of Cicero respecting Kleon: “turbulentum quidem - civem, sed tamen eloquentem,” (Cicero, Brutus, 7) appears to be - a translation of the epithets of Thucydidês—βιαιότατος—τῷ δήμῳ - πιθανώτατος (iii, 45). - - The remarks made too by Latin critics on the style and temper - of Cato’s speeches, might almost seem to be a translation of - the words of Thucydidês about Kleon. Fronto said about Cato: - “Concionatur Cato _infeste_, Gracchus turbulente, Tullius - copiose. Jam in judiciis _sævit_ idem Cato, triumphat Cicero, - tumultuatur Gracchus.” See Dübner’s edition of Meyer’s Oratorum - Romanorum Fragmenta, p. 117 (Paris, 1837). - - [759] Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 806. Compare two other - passages in the same treatise, p. 805, where Plutarch speaks of - the ἀπόνοια καὶ δεινότης of Kleon; and p. 812, where he says, - with truth, that Kleon was not at all qualified to act as general - in a campaign. - -Moreover, the reputation of Kleon as a frequent and unmeasured -accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy -Aristophanês: a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just -representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the “Frogs”) -represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and -five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive -for misrepresentations against either. In the “Frogs,” the scene -is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes, in the attire of -Hêraklês and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of -bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripidês. Among the -incidents, Xanthias, in the attire which his master had worn, is -represented as acting with violence and insult towards two hostesses -of eating-houses; consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing -to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a -drawn sword. Upon which the women, having no other redress left, -announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector -Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the -offender to justice before the dikastery.[760] This passage shows us, -if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible, that -Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping -poor persons who had been wronged to obtain justice before the -dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might apply to Antipho -or some other rhetor for paid advice and aid as to the conduct of his -complaint; but a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to -obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, -of Kleon or Hyperbolus; who would thus extend their own popularity, -by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in -Rome.[761] - - [760] Aristophan. Ran. 566-576. - - [761] Here again we find Cato the elder represented as constantly - in the forum at Rome, lending aid of this kind, and espousing - the cause of others who had grounds of complaint (Plutarch, - Cato, c. 3), πρωῒ μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν βαδίζει καὶ παρίσταται - τοῖς δεομένοις—τοὺς μὲν θαυμαστὰς καὶ φίλους ἐκτᾶτο διὰ τῶν - ξυνηγοριῶν, etc. - -But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also -a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or -alleged. That some one should undertake this duty was indispensable -for the protection of the city; otherwise, the responsibility to -which official persons were subjected after their term of office -would have been merely nominal: and we have proof enough that -the general public morality of these official persons, acting -individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same -time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, -while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the -most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure -a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the -numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand -drachms. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a -formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and -the political club, of the accused party, extremely menacing to his -own future security and comfort, in a community like Athens. There -was therefore little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, -the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at -Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals, -but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing -it frequently or by inclination, and the orators constantly do so -guard themselves in those speeches which yet remain. - -It is this reputation which Thucydidês fastens upon Kleon, and which, -like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited; from native -acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective and from -his position, both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights, or -aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in -what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious, -the real question upon which a candid judgment turns, we have no -means of deciding, either in his case or that of Cato. “To lash the -wicked (observes Aristophanês himself[762]) is not only no blame, -but is even a matter of honor to the good.” It has not been common -to allow to Kleon the benefit of this observation, though he is -much more entitled to it than Aristophanês. For the attacks of a -poetical libeller admit neither of defence nor retaliation; whereas a -prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply -or even to retort, and was obliged to specify his charge, as well -as to furnish proof of it; so that there was a fair chance for the -innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty. - - [762] Aristophan. Equit. 1271:— - - Λοιδορῆσαι τοὺς πονηροὺς, οὐδέν ἐστ᾽ ἐπίφθονον, - Ἀλλὰ τιμὴ τοῖσι χρηστοῖς, ὅστις εὖ λογίζεται. - -The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanês is said to have arisen out -of an accusation which he brought against that poet[763] in the -Senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the -“Babylonians,” exhibited B.C. 426, at the festival of the urban -Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were -present at Athens, and especially many visitors and deputies from -the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute: and -as the “Babylonians,” (now lost), like so many other productions -of Aristophanês, was full of slashing ridicule, not only against -individual citizens but against the functionaries and institutions -of the city,[764] Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the -senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public security before -strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens was then -in the midst of an embarrassing war; that the fidelity of her -subject-allies was much doubted; that Lesbos, the greatest of her -allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a -revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such -circumstances, Kleon had good reason for thinking that a political -comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the -city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous -when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains[765] -that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and -calumny: but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor, -indeed, had the senate competence to find him guilty or punish him -except to the extent of a small fine: they could only bring him to -trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done. -He himself, however, seems to have felt the justice of the warning: -for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before -the Peace of Nikias,—the Acharnians, the Knights, and the Wasps,—were -represented at the Lenæan festival,[766] in the month of January, a -season when no strangers nor allies were present. Kleon was doubtless -much incensed with the play of the Knights, and seems to have annoyed -the poet either by bringing an indictment against him for exercising -freemen’s rights without being duly qualified, since none but -citizens were allowed to appear and act in the dramatic exhibitions, -or by some other means which are not clearly explained. Nor can we -make out in what way the poet met him, though it appears that finding -less public sympathy than he thought himself entitled to, he made an -apology without intending to be bound by it.[767] Certain it is, that -his remaining plays subsequent to the Knights, though containing some -few bitter jests against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate set -against him. - - [763] It appears that the complaint was made ostensibly - against Kalistratus, in whose name the poet brought out the - “Babylonians,” (Schol. ad Arist. Vesp. 1284), and who was - of course the responsible party, though the real author was - doubtless perfectly well known. The Knights was the first play - brought out by the poet in his own name. - - [764] See Acharn. 377, with the Scholia, and the anonymous - biography of Aristophanês. - - Both Meineke (Aristoph. Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii, p. 966) and - Ranke (Commentat. de Aristoph. Vitâ, p. cccxxx) try to divine the - plot of the “Babylonians;” but there is no sufficient information - to assist them. - - [765] Aristoph. Acharn. 355-475. - - [766] See the Arguments prefixed to these three plays; and - Acharn. 475, Equit. 881. - - It is not known whether the first comedy, entitled _The Clouds_ - (represented in the earlier part of B.C. 423, a year after the - Knights, and a year before the Wasps), appeared at the Lenæan - festival of January, or at the urban Dionysia in March. It was - unsuccessful, and the poet partially altered it with the view - to a second representation. If it be true that this second - representation took place during the year immediately following - (B.C. 422: see Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 422), it - must have been at the urban Dionysia in March, just at the time - when the truce for one year was coming to a close; for the Wasps - was represented in that year at the Lenæan festival, and the same - poet would hardly be likely to bring out two plays. The inference - which Ranke draws from Nubes 310, that it was represented at the - Dionysia, is not, however, very conclusive (Ranke, Commentat. de - Aristoph. Vitâ, p. ccxxi, prefixed to his edition of the Plutus). - - [767] See the obscure passage, Vespæ, 1285, _seqq._; Aristoph. - Vita Anonymi, p. xiii, ed. Bekker; Demosthen. cont. Meid. p. 532. - - It appears that Aristophanês was of Æginetan parentage (Acharn. - 629); so that the γραφὴ ξενίας (indictment for undue assumption - of the rights of an Athenian citizen) was founded upon a real - fact. Between the time of the conquest of Ægina by Athens, and - the expulsion of the native inhabitants in the first year of the - Peloponnesian war (an interval of about twenty years), probably - no inconsiderable number of Æginetans became intermingled or - intermarried with Athenian citizens. Especially men of poetical - talent in the subject-cities would find it their interest to - repair to Athens: Ion came from Chios, and Achæus from Eretria; - both tragic composers. - - The comic author Eupolis seems also to have directed some taunts - against the foreign origin of Aristophanês, if Meineke is correct - in his interpretation of a passage (Historia Comicor. Græc. i, p. - 111). - -The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced -individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens too was -more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the -number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city -with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing -Athenian soldiership. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias -and Lachês, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, -as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to -resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. -King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their -side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all -the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of -Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and -winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities -on either side. At first, the pretensions advanced were found very -conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed -to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been -acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration -of Platæa; but the Thebans replied that Platæa was theirs neither by -force nor by treason, but by voluntary capitulation and surrender -of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat -remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less -the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in -the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing -their demand of Platæa, were enabled to retain Nisæa, which they had -acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Sollium,[768] which -they had taken from Corinth. To insure accommodating temper on the -part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica -in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the -territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, -enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had -now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were -probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent -form. - - [768] Thucyd. v, 17-30. The statement in cap. 30 seems to show - that this was the ground on which the Athenians were allowed to - retain Sollium and Anaktorium. For if their retention of these - two places had been distinctly and in terms at variance with the - treaty, the Corinthians would doubtless have chosen this fact as - the ostensible ground of their complaint: whereas they preferred - to have recourse to a πρόσχημα, or sham plea. - -At the beginning of spring, about the end of March, 421 B.C., -shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens, the important treaty -was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its -principal conditions:— - -1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of -Greece, for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle, -or public sacred mission. Every man shall be undisturbed both in -going and coming. [The value of this article will be felt, when we -recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to -visit the Olympic or Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.] - -2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their -temple and their territory. [This article was intended to exclude -the ancient claim of the Phocian confederacy to the management of the -temple; a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the -thirty years’ truce: but they had now little interest in the matter, -since the Phocians were in the ranks of their enemies.] - -3. There shall be peace for fifty years, between Athens and Sparta -with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief, either -overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea. - -4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory -of the other, not by any artifice or under any pretence. - -Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by -equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be -hereafter agreed on. - -5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the -Athenians. - -They shall farther _relinquish_ to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, -Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. But these cities shall -remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according -to the assessment of Aristeidês. Any of their citizens who may choose -to quit them shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry away his -property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies -of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them by amicable -persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if -she can. - -The inhabitants of Mekyberna, Sanê, and Singê, shall dwell -independently in their respective cities, just as much as the -Olynthians and Akanthians. [These were towns which adhered to Athens, -and were still numbered as her allies; though they were near enough -to be molested by Olynthus[769] and Akanthus, against which this -clause was intended to insure them.] - - [769] Compare v, 39 with v, 18, which seems to me to refute the - explanation suggested by Dr. Arnold, and adopted by Poppo. - - The use of the word ἀποδόντων in regard to the restoration of - Amphipolis to Athens, and of the word παρέδοσαν in regard to the - _relinquishment_ of the other cities, deserves notice. Those - who drew up the treaty, which is worded in a very confused way, - seem to have intended that the word παρέδοσαν should apply both - to Amphipolis and the other cities, but that the word ἀποδόντων - should apply exclusively to Amphipolis. The word παρέδοσαν is - of course applicable to the restoration of Amphipolis, for that - which is _restored_ is of course _delivered up_. But it is - remarkable that this word παρέδοσαν does not properly apply to - the other cities: for they were not _delivered up_ to Athens, - they were only _relinquished_, as the clauses immediately - following farther explain. Perhaps there is a little Athenian - pride in the use of the word, first to intimate indirectly that - the Lacedæmonians were to _deliver up_ various cities to Athens, - then to add words afterwards, which show that the cities were - only to be _relinquished_, not surrendered to Athens. - - The provision, for guaranteeing liberty of retirement and - carrying away of property, was of course intended chiefly for the - Amphipolitans, who would naturally desire to emigrate, if the - town had been actually restored to Athens. - -The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore Panaktum to the -Athenians. - -6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythêra, -Methônê, Pteleum, Atalantê, with all the captives in their hands from -Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or -allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skiônê. - -7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore all the -captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies. - -8. Respecting Skiônê, Torônê, Sermylus, or any other town in the -possession of Athens, the Athenians may take their own measures. - -9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties, -according to the solemnities held most binding in each city -respectively, and in the following words: “I will adhere to this -convention and truce sincerely and without fraud.” The oaths shall -be annually renewed, and the terms of peace shall be inscribed on -columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and -Athens. - -10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, -the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding -and consent, without being held to violate their oaths. - -These oaths were accordingly exchanged: they were taken by seventeen -principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their -respective countries, on the 26th day of the month Artemisius at -Sparta, and on the 24th day of Elaphebolion at Athens, immediately -after the urban Dionysia; Pleistolas being ephor eponymus at Sparta, -and Alkæus archon eponymus at Athens. Among the Lacedæmonians -swearing, are included the two kings Agis and Pleistoanax, the ephor -Pleistolas, and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know, and -Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn, are -comprised Nikias, Lachês, Agnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenês.[770] - - [770] Thucyd. v, 19. - -Such was the peace—commonly known by the name of the Peace of -Nikias—concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the -war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions were -put to the vote at Sparta, in the assembly of deputies from the -Lacedæmonian allies, the majority of whom accepted them: which, -according to the condition adopted and sworn to by every member of -the confederacy,[771] made it binding upon all. There was, indeed, a -special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious -scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or -heroes, but, saving this reserve, the peace had been formally acceded -to by the decision of the confederates. But it soon appeared how -little the vote of the majority was worth, even when enforced by the -strong pressure of Lacedæmon herself, when the more powerful members -were among the dissentient minority. The Bœotians, Megarians, and -Corinthians, all refused to accept it; nor does it seem that any -deputies from the allies took the oath along with the Lacedæmonian -envoys; though the truce for a year, two years before,[772] had -been sworn to by Lacedæmonian, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and -Epidaurian envoys. - - [771] Thucyd. v, 17-30. παραβήσεσθαί τε ἔφασαν (the Lacedæmonians - said) αὐτοὺς (the Corinthians) τοὺς ὅρκους, καὶ ἤδη ἀδικεῖν ὅτι - οὐ δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς, εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι ὅτι ἂν - τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ. - - [772] Compare Thucyd. iv, 119; v, 19. Though the words of the - peace stand ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις (v, 18), yet it seems that this - oath was not _actually_ taken by any of the allied cities; only - by the Lacedæmonians themselves, upon the vote of the majority of - the confederates (v, 17: compare v, 23). - -The Corinthians were displeased because they did not recover Sollium -and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the -Bœotians, because they were required to surrender Panaktum. In spite -of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these -powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted -against it in the general assembly of allies, but refused to accept -it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective -cities for instructions.[773] - - [773] Thucyd. v, 22. - -Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, -of the Peace of Nikias, which terminated, or professed to terminate, -the great Peloponnesian war, after a duration of ten years. -Its consequences and fruits, in many respects such as were not -anticipated by either of the concluding parties, will be seen in my -next volume. - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, v. 6 (of 12), by George Grote - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, V. 6 (OF 12) *** - -***** This file should be named 54936-0.txt or 54936-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/9/3/54936/ - -Produced by Henry Flower, Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares -Box, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/American -Libraries.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |