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diff --git a/old/54917-0.txt b/old/54917-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 46107c5..0000000 --- a/old/54917-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28761 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Volume V, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume V - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: Various - -Release Date: June 16, 2017 [EBook #54917] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NUREMBERG TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOL 5 *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US. - - - - - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 - - [Illustration] - - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - [Illustration: Nuremberg Seal] - - Editor’s Note - - In spite of the meticulous care given to this edition certain - inexactitudes may slip in, some originating with the speakers - themselves. In order to give a faithful rendering of the Record - we are avoiding alterations, but corrective notes will be - printed in the final volume. - - The General Secretary’s Office would be grateful if the reader - would draw to his attention any errors or omissions, so that - they may also be included in the list of corrections. - - _S. Paul A. Joosten_ - Deputy General Secretary. - -Address: -Lawrence Deems Egbert, Editor -International Military Tribunal Record -APO 696 A, United States Army. - - - - - VOLUME V - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - - 9 January 1946 — 21 January 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - Thirtieth Day, Wednesday, 9 January 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 31 - - Thirty-first Day, Thursday, 10 January 1946, - Morning Session 65 - Afternoon Session 100 - - Thirty-second Day, Friday, 11 January 1946, - Morning Session 131 - Afternoon Session 159 - - Thirty-third Day, Monday, 14 January 1946, - Morning Session 197 - - Thirty-fourth Day, Tuesday, 15 January 1946, - Morning Session 230 - Afternoon Session 260 - - Thirty-fifth Day, Wednesday, 16 January 1946, - Morning Session 296 - Afternoon Session 329 - - Thirty-sixth Day, Thursday, 17 January 1946, - Morning Session 368 - Afternoon Session 399 - - Thirty-seventh Day, Friday, 18 January 1946, - Morning Session 434 - Afternoon Session 459 - - Thirty-eighth Day, Saturday, 19 January 1946, - Morning Session 489 - - Thirty-ninth Day, Monday, 21 January 1946, - Morning Session 520 - Afternoon Session 547 - - - - - THIRTIETH DAY - Wednesday, 9 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -If the Tribunal please, when the Tribunal adjourned I had just dealt -with the last of the two Norway documents, which I how put in as -Exhibits GB-140 and GB-141. Their numbers are 004-PS and D-629. - -My Lord, for convenience the first document, to which I shall refer in a -few minutes, will be Document Number 1871-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I have that here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before I come to that, I just want to -say one word about the aggression against the Low Countries—Belgium, -the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. - -The facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the -period when this defendant was Foreign Minister, were stated in full by -my friend Mr. Roberts, and I think if I give the Tribunal the reference -to the transcript at Pages 1100 to 1125 (Volume III, Pages 289 to 307), -I do not need to detain the Tribunal on that part of the case. I only -remind the Tribunal that the action of this defendant as Foreign -Minister to which attention may be called is the making of a statement -on the 10th of May 1940 to representatives of the foreign press with -regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the Low Countries; and -these reasons were, in my respectful submission, demonstrated to be -false by the evidence called by Mr. Roberts, which appears in that part -of the transcript. - -My Lord, I then proceed to the aggression in southeastern Europe against -Greece and Yugoslavia, and the first moment of time in that regard is -the meeting at Salzburg in August 1939, at which the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop participated, when Hitler announced that the Axis had decided -to liquidate certain neutrals. That is Document 1871-PS, which I now put -in as Exhibit GB-142, and the passage to which I should like to refer -the Tribunal is on Page 2 of the English version, two-thirds down the -page in the middle of the fifth paragraph, six lines from the top. Your -Lordship will find the words “Generally speaking.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I desire to quote from there: - - “Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the - pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done - if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, as the - latter finishes off one of the uncertain neutrals. Italy may - consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of - Prince Regent Paul he (the Führer) suggested, particularly with - regard to Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude - towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer - connection with the Axis and the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from - the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. - Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance - from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that - happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable - during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the - aims of the Western Democracies. Afterwards it was learned that - he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the - Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria, - which is, in a sense, a natural ally of Italy and Germany.” - -Then missing a sentence: - - “At the moment of a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, - however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping - thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the - Axis.” - -That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals. - -Then, as early as September 1940 this defendant reviewed the war -situation with Mussolini. This defendant emphasized the heavy revenge -bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in -ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests -were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia and that Italy could count on -German support. - -Then Von Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish -plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein and -that he was expecting to sign the protocol with Spain, bringing the -latter country into the war, on his return to Berlin. - -This is Document 1842-PS, which is the next document in the book to the -one at which the Tribunal has just been looking, and the passage with -regard to Greece and Yugoslavia occurs in the middle of the first -page—if I might just read a very short extract: - - “With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia the Foreign Minister - stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian - interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone - and in which Italy would be certain of Germany’s sympathetic - assistance.” - -I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, member for the United States): I think -you had better read the next paragraph. - - SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “But it seemed to us to be better not to - touch on these problems for the time being, but instead to - concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces. - Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern - German districts (Norway, _et cetera_), and this was - acknowledged by the Duce.” - -I am very grateful to you, Your Honor. That I put in as Exhibit GB-143. - -A month or two later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and -Mussolini, in which this defendant participated, the Greek operation was -discussed. Hitler had stated that the German troops in Romania were for -use in the planned campaign against Greece. That document is C-134, -which was put in as Exhibit GB-119, and therefore I do not propose to -give it again but to give the Tribunal the reference to the points which -are mentioned at the foot of Page 3 of the English text. - -With regard to that meeting there is a cross-reference in Count Ciano’s -diary, Count Ciano having attended as Italian Foreign Minister, and he -recalls his impression of that meeting in the diary for the 20th and -21st of January by saying: - - “The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am - less pleased. Above all, because Ribbentrop, who had always been - so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how - long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its - ending before 1942.” - -Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, a short time -later, 3 weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the -Japanese, this defendant took a more optimistic line. - -On the 13th of February 1941 he saw Ambassador Oshima, the Japanese -Ambassador, and that conversation appears in Document 1834-PS, which is -Exhibit USA-129. That was read previously, and again I simply give the -reference on Page 3 of the English version. - -The second from the last paragraph dealt with the optimistic account of -the military position and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey. I do not -think I need read it further, but I will give the Tribunal the -reference. - -Then after that, in March, this defendant put forth his efforts to get -Yugoslavia to join the Axis, and on the 25th of March the defendant, in -a note to the Prime Minister Cvetković—and this is Document 2450-PS, -which is Exhibit GB-123—gave the assurance: - - “The Axis-Power Governments, during this war, will not direct a - demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of - troops through the Yugoslav state or territory.” - -After that, it is only fair to point out that there was the _coup -d’état_ in Yugoslavia. General Simovic took over the government; and two -days after the assurance which I just read, at the meeting of the 27th -of March 1941, at which this defendant was present, Hitler outlined the -military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of -Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force. That -is contained in Document 1746-PS, which is Exhibit GB-120; and that was -read by my friend, Colonel Phillimore at an earlier stage so I do not -need to read it again. - -The final action of this defendant with regard to Yugoslavia was that -after the invasion of Yugoslavia Von Ribbentrop was one of the persons -directed by Hitler to draw up the boundaries for the partition and -division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that is Document -1195-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-144. - -We now come to the aggression against the Soviet Union, and the -first. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Has that been read, 1195? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it has not. I am much obliged, Your -Lordship. I will now read the relevant sentence with regard to this. - -On Page 2, Section 2, Your Lordship will see the words “the drawing up -of boundaries.” And in Paragraph 1 it says: - - “Insofar as the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down - in the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme - Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign - Office,”—that is this defendant—“the Delegate for the Four - Year Plan,”—the Defendant Göring—“and the Reich Minister of - the Interior.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is the Reich Minister of the Interior? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the Defendant Frick. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it is. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am grateful to Your Lordship. I had -forgotten that had not been read before. - -Now then, as I say, we come to the aggression against the Soviet Union; -and the first document which has not been put in so far, which I now put -in as Exhibit GB-145, is TC-25, the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. - -On 23 August 1939 this defendant had signed the German-Soviet -Non-aggression Pact. Now the first point at which this defendant seems -to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet -Union was just after the 20th of April 1941, when the Defendant -Rosenberg and this defendant met or communicated to consider the -problems which were expected to arise in Occupied Eastern Territory. -This defendant appointed his Counselor, Grosskopf, to be his liaison man -with Rosenberg and also assigned a consul general called Bräutigam, who -had many years experience in the U.S.S.R., as collaborator with -Rosenberg. That is shown in Document 1039-PS, which is already Exhibit -USA-146. I did not propose to read it again, as it had been read. But -the passage to which I have referred is the first paragraph on the top -of Page 2, beginning, “After notification to the Reich Foreign -Minister.” It is that paragraph which I have just mentioned. - -That was in April 1941. The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German -Foreign Office prepared a declaration setting forth operational zones in -the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic and the Black Seas, to be used by the -German Navy and the Air Force in the coming invasion of the Soviet -Union. That is the next document, C-77, which I now put in as Exhibit -GB-146, and it is very short. Therefore I think I should quote it; it -has not been read before: - - “The Foreign Office has prepared for the use in ‘Barbarossa’ the - attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The - Foreign Office, however, has reserved the decision as to the - date when the declaration will be issued as well as the - discussion of particulars.” - -These last two documents show quite clearly that this defendant was -again implicated in the preparation for this act of aggression. Then, on -the 22d of June 1941, this defendant announced to the world that the -German armies were invading the U.S.S.R., as was seen by the Tribunal in -the film shown on the 11th of December. And how untrue were the reasons -given is shown by the report of his own Ambassador in Moscow who said -that everything was being done to avoid a conflict. The Tribunal will -find the reference to that in the speech of my learned friend, the -Attorney General, the transcript at Page 888 (Volume III, Page 143). - -We now come to the aggression which involved Japan and was directed -against the United States of America. And there the initial document is -2508-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-147. That shows that on the -25th of November 1936, as a result of negotiations of this defendant as -Ambassador-at-large, Germany and Japan had signed the Anticomintern -Pact. I do not think that has been read, but if I might just read the -introduction, the recital that gives the purposes of the agreement: - - “The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese - Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist - International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and - subdue existing states by all the means at its command, - convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist - International in the internal affairs of the nations not only - endangers their internal peace and social well-being but is also - a menace to the peace of the world, desirous of co-operating in - the defense against Communist subversive activities, have agreed - as follows. . . .” - -And then there follow the effective terms of the agreement under which -they will act together for 5 years. It is signed by this defendant. - -On the 27th of September 1940 this defendant, as Foreign Minister, -signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about -a full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a “New -Order” in Europe and East Asia. That is 2643-PS, Exhibit USA-149, and -has been read. - -Then, on the 13th of February of 1941—that is a month or two -later—this defendant was urging the Japanese to attack British -possessions in the Far East. And that is shown in Document 1834-PS, -which is Exhibit USA-129 and which has already been read by my friend, -Mr. Alderman. That was February. - -Then, in April of 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka, -representing Japan, at which this defendant was present, Hitler promised -that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war -occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese -aggression in the Pacific. That is shown in Document 1881-PS, Exhibit -USA-33, which has already been read and which I did not intend to read -again. - -Then the next document which reinforces that point is 1882-PS, which is -Exhibit USA-153. If I might trouble the Tribunal with just two short -paragraphs of that; it is interesting, showing the psychological -development of this defendant and his views at that time. They are the -first two paragraphs that are quoted, under the heading “Pages 2 and 3,” -where it begins “Matsuoka”; it is on the first page of the document: - - “Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, - referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the - workers during his recent visit to the Borsig works. He - expressed his regret that developments in Japan were not yet as - far advanced as in Germany and that in his country the - intellectuals still exercised considerable influence. - - “The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which - had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of - intellectuals, some of whom are parasites, anyway.” - -THE PRESIDENT: It is “most,” according to my document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, “most”; I beg Your Lordship’s pardon, it is -completely my fault, it should be “most,” “most of whom are parasites, -anyway.” - - “A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun - must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany - they had already started their pernicious activities when - National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely - be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected - with certainty.” - -Then it continues on the usual lines. That last document was on the 5th -of April. - -Then, the next stage: Within a month after the German Armies invaded the -Soviet Union, the 22d of June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging his Ambassador -in Tokyo to do his utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the -Soviet in Siberia; and that is proved by two documents which have -already been put in—2896-PS, which is Exhibit USA-155, a telegram to -the German Ambassador, in Tokyo, one Ott; and 2897-PS, USA-156, which is -the reply from Ambassador Ott. Both of these were read by my friend, Mr. -Alderman, and I won’t trouble the Tribunal again. - -But the next document, which is D-656, is a new document which I put in -as GB-148. That was captured from the Japanese, and it is a -message—intercepted—which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in -Berlin just before the attack on the United States. If I might just read -one short extract from this defendant’s speech; on the 29th of November -1941, that is roughly a week before Pearl Harbor, this defendant was -saying—it is in Paragraph 1, and I will read it all because it is new: - - “Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had - received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States - negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word. - - “Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in - East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been - and probably never will be a time when closer co-operation under - the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this - time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New - Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States - will be concentrated against Japan. - - “‘As Führer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences - in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the - United States. We have received advice to the effect that there - is practically no hope of the Japanese-United States - negotiations being concluded successfully because of the fact - that the United States is putting up a stiff front. - - “‘If this is indeed the fact of the case and if Japan reaches a - decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident - that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan - jointly but would bring about favorable results for Japan - herself.’” - -Then the Ambassador replied: - - “‘I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any - concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that - a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and - the United States?’” - -The Defendant Ribbentrop: - - “‘Roosevelt’s a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he - would do.’” - -Then: - - “Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has - said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to - avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler’s - recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop’s, I feel that the - German attitude toward the United States is being considerably - stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would - not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.” - -Then the next part, Section 2, is an extremely optimistic prognosis of -the war against the Soviet Union. I do not think, in view of the date in -which we are reading it, that I need trouble the Tribunal with that. - -There are then a few remarks about the intended landing operations -against England, which is also _vieux jeu_ at this time. - -If the Tribunal would go to Part 3, there again we get the international -attitude of mind of this defendant—at the foot of Page 2, Part 3; and I -am quoting: - - “‘In any event Germany has absolutely no intention of entering - into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all - British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this - war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international - affairs. The island empire of Britain may remain, but all of her - other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided - three ways by Germany, the United States and Japan. In Africa, - Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were - formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share - of the African colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to - control European Russia.’” - -And after hearing this defendant, the Ambassador said; and I quote: - - “‘I am fully aware of the fact that Germany’s war campaign is - progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose - that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only - Great Britain as an actual enemy but also all of those areas in - which Britain has influence, and those countries which have been - aiding Britain as actual enemies, as well. Under such - circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, - of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under - such an eventuality?’” - -The Defendant Ribbentrop: - - “‘We would like to end this war during next year.’”—that is, - 1942—“‘However, under certain circumstances it is possible that - it will have to be continued into the following year. - - “‘Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United - States. . .’” - -THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I am sorry. I will go -back to the paragraph I have just finished. - -The Defendant Ribbentrop—and I am still quoting: - - “‘We would like to end this war during next year. However, under - certain circumstances it is possible that it will have to be - continued into the following year. - - “‘Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United - States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. - There is absolutely no possibility of Germany’s entering into a - separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. - The Führer is determined on that point.’” - -That document associates this defendant with the aggression by Japan -against the United States in the closest possible way. - -Another new document, which is also an intercepted Japanese diplomatic -message, is the next one, D-657, which I put in as Exhibit GB-149; and -if I might read the first two sentences that show what it is—and I -quote—the Japanese Ambassador says: - - “At 1:00 p. m. today”—the 8th of December—“I called on Foreign - Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany - and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. - Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a - conference at general headquarters, discussing how the - formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make - a good impression on the German people, and that he would - transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he could to - have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me - that on the morning of the 8th”—that is before the declaration - of war—“Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to - attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet - them. - - “It goes without saying that this is only for your secret - information.” - -Then, as a matter of fact, as the Tribunal are aware, on the 11th of -December 1941 this Defendant Ribbentrop, in the name of the German -Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United -States. - -The next stage concerns his attempt to get Japan to attack the Soviet -Union. - -In Ribbentrop’s conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in -July 1942 and in March and April 1943, he continued to urge Japanese -participation and aggression against the Soviet Union. This is shown in -Document 2911-PS, which has been put in as Exhibit USA-157 and already -read, and Document 2954-PS, which I now put in as GB-150. That is a new -document; and if I might just indicate the effect of it by a very short -quotation—it is a discussion between the Defendant Ribbentrop and -Ambassador Oshima. It begins: - - “Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from - Tokyo; and he is to report, by order of his Government, to the - Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: - - “The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was - the object of a common conference between the Japanese - Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the - question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The - outcome is the following: The Japanese Government thoroughly - recognize the danger which threatens from Russia and completely - understand the desire of their German ally that Japan on her - part also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not - possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present - war situation, to enter the war. They are rather of the - conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start - the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese - Government will never lose sight of the Russian question.” - -And then, in the middle of the next paragraph, this defendant returns to -the attack. The third sentence—it begins on the fourth line—says: - - “However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the - Three Power Pact, would combine their forces to strike together - at not only England and America, but also Russia. It is not good - if one part must fight alone.” - -Then the pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown again in the next -document, 2929-PS, which was put in as Exhibit USA-159. And, if I might -just close this part of the case, if I might read that—it is very -short: - - “The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that - without any doubt this year presented the most favorable - opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had - sufficient antitank weapons at her disposal to attack Russia, - which certainly would never again be as weak as at the - moment”—the moment being 18 April 1943. - -If the Tribunal please, that concludes my evidence on the second -allegation dealing with aggressive war; and I submit that that -allegation in the Indictment is more than amply proved. - -The third allegation is that the Defendant Ribbentrop authorized, -directed, and participated in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. - -Of course, I am considering this from the point of view of planning -these crimes only. The execution of the crimes will be dealt with by my -friends and Soviet colleagues, but it is relevant to show how this -defendant participated in the planning of such crimes. I deal, first, -with the killing of Allied aviators; secondly, with the destruction of -peoples in Europe; and thirdly, with the persecution of the Jews. - -First, the killing of Allied aviators: - -With the increasing air raids on German cities in 1944 by Allied Air -Forces, the German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter -Anglo-American fliers from further raids on the Reich cities. In a -report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be established, -there is stated what was the point of view that this Defendant -Ribbentrop had been urging. That is in Document 735-PS, which I now put -in as Exhibit GB-151. That is a discussion of a meeting at the Führer’s -headquarters on the 6th of June 1944. If I might read the first -paragraph: - - “Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of - Operations Staff”—WFSt—“in Klessheim on the afternoon of the - 6th of June that a conference on this question had been held - shortly before by the Reich Marshal”—the Defendant Göring—“the - Reich Foreign Minister”—the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—“and the - Reichsführer SS.”—Himmler—“Contrary to the original suggestion - made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every - type of terror attack on the German civilian population, - including bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above - conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft - armament aimed directly at the civilian population and their - property should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a - criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the - rule, there was no mention of trial by court-martial or handing - over to the police.” - -That is, this defendant was pressing that even where there was an attack -on a German city, the airmen should be handed over to be lynched by the -crowd. The others were saying that that should be restricted to cases -where there were attacks by machine guns, and the like, on the civilian -population. - -I do not think we need trouble with Paragraph (a) of the statement of -the Deputy Chief of WFSt. The importance of (a) goes because -Kaltenbrunner says that there were no such cases as were mentioned. - -If you look at (b): - - “The Deputy Chief of the WFSt pointed out that, besides the - lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating such - enemy aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind - by sending them to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel - and, if the suspicion was confirmed, handing them over to the SD - for special treatment.” - -As I understand that, it is that if they were not lynched under the -first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of -war, where they would, of course, be subject to the protecting power’s -intervention. And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed -over to the SD to be killed. - -Then in Paragraph 3 we have what was decided to justify the lynch law. -Paragraph 3 says: - - “At a conference with Colonel Von Brauchitsch (Colonel of the - Air Force) on the 6th of June, it was settled that the following - actions are to be regarded as terror actions justifying lynch - law: - - “Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian - population, single persons as well as crowds. - - “Shooting in the air our own (German) men who had bailed out. - - “Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the - public service. - - “Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, - hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with - the red cross.” - -These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as this defendant had -suggested, a case where there was the bombing of a city. - -Then on the next page, the last page of this document, we have a -somewhat curious comment from the Defendant Keitel: - - “Remarks by the Chief of the OKW on the agenda dated 6 June - 1944.” - -The number is that of the document at which the Tribunal has just been -looking. - - “Most secret; Staff officers only. - - “If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is - difficult to enforce rules. - - “Ministerial Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator - on the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn’t work - out.”—Signed—“Keitel.” - -Then the Defendant Jodl’s comment appears: - - “This conference is insufficient. The following points must be - decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office: - - “1. What do we consider as murder? Is the Foreign Office in - agreement with point 3b? - - “2. How should the procedure be carried out? a. By the people? - b. By the authorities? - - “3. How can we guarantee that the procedure will not be also - carried out against other enemy aviators? - - “4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or - not?”—Signed—“Jodl.” - -It is important, I respectfully submit, to note that this defendant and -the Foreign Office were fully in on these breaches of the laws and -usages of war, and indeed the clarity with which the Foreign Office -perceives that there were breaches of the laws and usages of war, is -shown by the next document, which is 728-PS, which I now put in as -GB-152. That is a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by the -Defendant Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials called -Ritter; and the fact that it is approved by this defendant is -specifically stated in the next Document 740-PS, which I put in as -GB-153. I do not think this Document 728-PS has been read before, and -therefore, again, I would like to read just one or two passages in it. -It begins: - - “In spite of the obvious objections, based on international law - and foreign policy, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement - with the proposed measures. - - “In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must - be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special - treatment by the SD. - - “I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the - facts involving punishment, according to points 1 through 4 of - the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the - German authorities are not directly responsible, since the death - will have occurred before a German official becomes concerned - with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will - be such, that it will not be difficult to represent the case in - an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of - lynching it will be of primary importance correctly to handle - the individual case upon publication. - - “II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the SD, - including subsequent publication, would be feasible only if - Germany would at the same time openly repudiate the commitments - of international law, at present in force and still recognized - by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by - the Police and is delivered to the reception camp for aviators - at Oberursel, he has acquired by this very fact the legal status - of a prisoner of war. - - “The Prisoner-of-War Agreement of 27 July 1929 established - definite rules for the prosecution and sentencing of prisoners - of war and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in - Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only 3 months - after the Protecting Power has been notified of the sentence. In - Article 63: A prisoner of war will be tried only by the same - courts and under the same procedure as members of the German - Armed Forces. These rules are so specific that it would be - futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever - wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the - other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion - a formal repudiation of the Prisoner-of-War Agreement. - - “An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected enemy - fliers from ever attaining a legal prisoner-of-war status, that - is, that immediately upon capture they be told that they are not - considered prisoners of war but criminals, that they would not - be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over - prisoners of war, hence not go to a prisoner-of-war camp, but - that they be delivered to the authorities in charge of the - prosecution of criminal acts, and that they be tried in summary - proceedings. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the - special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the - fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of - prisoner of war by transfer to the reception camp for aviators - at Oberursel. - - “Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility - of Germany’s being accused of violation of existing treaties or - even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At - any rate this solution would enable us to follow a clearly - defined course, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly - having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of - having to use excuses which no one would believe, upon the - publication of each individual case.” - -I do not want to take this in detail, but I ask the Tribunal to look at -the first sentence of Section III: - - “It follows from the above that the main weight of the action - will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be - carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit: the - deterrence of enemy aviators, is actually achieved, which goal - is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by - enemy fliers directing the fire of their weapons upon the - civilian population must be stressed in a completely different - propagandist manner than heretofore.” - -I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal, but that shows quite clearly -the defendant’s point of view. If the Tribunal would look at the next -document, it is stated at the beginning of the second paragraph: - - “Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that - the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft. . . .” - -That is the position as to the treatment of aviators, where there is, in -my suggestion, a completely cold-blooded and deliberate adoption of a -procedure evading international law. - -The second section is the destruction of the peoples in Europe. With -regard to Poland, again I want scrupulously to avoid going into details; -but I remind the Tribunal of the evidence of the Witness Lahousen, which -appears in the transcript, Pages 618 and 619 (Volume II, Pages 448-449) -on the 30th of November of last year, and on Pages 713 to 716 (Volume -III, Pages 20-25), when he was cross-examined on the 1st of December. - -Secondly, Bohemia and Moravia: On the 16th of March 1939 there was -promulgated the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, signed by -Ribbentrop, concerning the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. That is -already in as Exhibit GB-8, Document TC-51. The effect of that was to -place the Reich Protector in a remarkable position of supremacy under -the Führer. The only part which I would like the Tribunal to have in -mind is Article 5 and Subarticle 2: - - “2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Führer and - Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich - Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance - of the political principles laid down by the Führer and - Chancellor of the Reich. - - “3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate shall be - confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be - withdrawn. - - “4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all - measures taken by the Government of the Protectorate and to give - advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich - and, in cases of danger, issue ordinances required for the - common interest. - - “5. The promulgation of laws, decrees, and other legal - provisions and the execution of administrative measures and - legal judgments shall be suspended if the Reich Protector enters - an objection.” - -As a result of this law, the two Reich Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia -and their various deputies were appointed; and then there were committed -the various crimes which will be detailed by my Soviet colleague. - -Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands on the 18th of May 1940, a -decree of the Führer was signed by Ribbentrop concerning the exercise of -governmental authority in the Netherlands, and that—Document 639-PS, -which I put in as Exhibit GB-154, Section 1—says: - - “The Occupied Netherlands Territories shall be administered by - the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories - . . . the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the - Reich and vested with supreme civil authority. - - “Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner - for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.” - -On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner—the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart—promulgated such orders as that of the 4th of July 1940, -dealing with the confiscation of property of those who had, or might -have, furthered activities hostile to the German Reich; and tentative -arrangements were made for the resettlement of the Dutch population. But -all this will also be dealt with fully by my French colleagues. - -I simply for the moment put in as a matter of reference the general -order of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, which is GB-155, the document -being 2921-PS. I do not intend to read it. I have summarized the effect -of it and it will be dealt with more fully by my French colleagues. - -I want the Tribunal to appreciate, with regard to these two matters, -Bohemia and the Netherlands, that the charge against this defendant is -laying the basis and procuring the governmental structure under which -the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity were directed. - -I should also put in formally Exhibit GB-156, the discussion on the -question of the Dutch population, which is contained in Document -1520-PS. Again I have explained it generally and I do not want to occupy -time by reading it in full now. - -Then coming to the Jews: In December 1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop, in a -conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France, -expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United -States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department. The report of -Mr. Kennedy is Document L-205, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-157. If -I might read to the Tribunal the second paragraph, which concerns this -point: - - “During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger’s office - in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been - raised by Bonnet in his conversation with Von Ribbentrop. The - result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to - Bonnet that the Jews in Germany, without exception, were - pickpockets, murderers, and thieves. The property they possessed - had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore - decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the - population. The property which they had acquired illegally would - be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts - frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police - observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report - to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German - Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped - to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was - not, however, willing for them to take the property which had - resulted from illegal operations with them. There was in fact - nothing that it could or would do.” - -That succinct statement of this defendant’s views on Jews is elaborated -in a long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office, which is -numbered 3358-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-158. I do not want to -read the whole of that document because it is excessively dreary; it is -also an excessively clear indication of the defendant’s views on the -treatment of Jews. But if the Tribunal would look at, first of all, Page -3—it is headed, “The Jewish Question as a Factor in German Foreign -Policy in the Year 1938”; after the four divisions the document goes on -to say: - - “It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has - brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question - simultaneously with the realization of the ‘idea of Greater - Germany,’ since the Jewish policy was both the basis and - consequence of the events of the year 1938.” - -That is elaborated. If the Tribunal will turn over to Page 4 at the -beginning of the second paragraph, they will see the first sentence: - - “The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all - the Jews living in Reich territory.” - -Then that is developed at great length through a large number of pages. -The conclusion which is—if the Tribunal would turn to the foot of Page -7 and examine it—it goes on this way: - - “These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if - desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the - expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews - from German Lebensraum, which were misunderstood in many - countries for lack of evidence, would be only temporary and - would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw - with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to - them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant - Jew is to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country - will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest - of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be - a future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated - not by false compassion for the ‘United Religious Jewish - Minority’ but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the - danger which it represents to the racial composition of the - nations.” - -The Tribunal will appreciate that this document was circulated by the -defendant’s ministry, widely circulated to all senior Reich authorities -and to numerous people before the war, on the 25th of January 1939, just -after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently the anti-Semitism of the -defendant went from—I was going to say from strength to strength, if -that is the correct term, or at any rate from exaggeration to -exaggeration, for in June 1944 the Defendant Rosenberg made arrangements -for an international anti-Jewish congress to be held in Kraków on the -11th of July 1944. The honorary members were to be Von Ribbentrop, -Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank—I think the Defendant Frank. The Foreign -Office was to take over the mission of inviting prominent foreigners -from Italy, France, Hungary, Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway, et cetera, -in order to give an international aspect to the congress. However, the -military events of June 1944 prompted Hitler to call off the congress -which had lost its significance by virtue of the landings in Normandy. - -That is contained in Document 1752-PS, GB-159. At the foot of Page 1 the -Tribunal will see the following had been entered as honorary members: -Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. So that there is no doubt -that this defendant was behind the program against the Jews which -resulted in the placing of them in concentration camps with anyone else -who opposed the Nazi way of life; and it is submitted that he must, as a -minister in special touch with the head of the government, have known -what was going on in the country and in the camps. One who preached this -doctrine and was in a position of authority cannot, I submit to anyone -who has had any ministerial experience, suggest that he was ignorant of -how the policy was carried out. - -That is the evidence on the third allegation and it is submitted that by -the evidence which I have recapitulated to the Tribunal the three -allegations are proved. - -With regard to the second, Hitler’s own words were: - - “In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, Von - Ribbentrop, was of great help to me by virtue of his accurate - and audacious judgment and admirably clever treatment of all - problems of foreign policy.” - -During the course of the war this defendant was in close liaison with -the other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them, -in his embassies and legations abroad, information which was required -and at times participated, as I have shown, in the planning of War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. - -It is submitted that all the allegations which I read from Appendix A of -the Indictment are completely proved against this defendant. I want, if -the Tribunal will allow me, to add only one fact on behalf of the -British Delegation. In the preparation of these briefs we have received -great assistance from certain of our American colleagues; and I should -like to thank once, but nonetheless heartily, on behalf of us all, Dr. -Kempner’s staff: Captains Auchincloss, Claggett, and Stoll, Lieutenants -Felton and Heller, and Mr. Lachmann for the great help they have been to -us. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendant Frank): May it please the -Tribunal, I have a motion to make. - -THE PRESIDENT: On behalf of whom? - -DR. SEIDL: I want to make a motion which concerns the indictment of -Frank. - -The Charter of the Tribunal contains, in Part IV, regulations for a fair -trial, and Article 16 prescribes that for the purpose of safeguarding -the right of the defendants the following procedure shall be followed. -“The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the -charges against the defendant. A copy of the Indictment, and of all the -documents lodged with the Indictment, translated into a language which -he understands, shall be furnished to the defendant at a reasonable time -before the Trial.” - -At the beginning of the Trial the Defendant Frank was handed a copy of -the Indictment. This is the Indictment which was read on the first day. -This is, if I may say so, a general indictment. All actions are listed -therein which, according to the opinion of the Signatories of the London -Agreement, are regarded as Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes -against Humanity. The Indictment does not contain in detail the criminal -actions of each defendant. I am now thinking about positive actions or -concrete actions or omissions. - -This morning I received a document. It has the title, “The Individual -Responsibility of the Defendant Hans Frank for Crimes against Peace, War -Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity”—or in German “Die persönliche -Verantwortlichkeit des Angeklagten Frank für Verbrechen gegen den -Frieden, für Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit.” This -document is without any table of contents. It consists of 30 typewritten -pages. In addition to this document, or indictment, as I should like to -call it, another document book has been given to me, namely, “Document -Book Hans Frank.” The first document, as well as the second document is -not in German but in English. This first document is in reality what I -should call the indictment against Frank, because here in this document -of 30 pages for the first time those individual activities of Frank are -listed which are to be regarded as criminal actions. At least one ought -to say that this document is an essential part of the Indictment. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Forgive me for interrupting you. The Tribunal has already -expressed its desire that a motion such as this should be made in -writing. The Tribunal considers that a motion of the sort which you are -now making orally is a waste of the Tribunal’s time and it therefore -desires you to put your motion in writing. It will then be considered. - -DR. SEIDL: I regret myself that I must make this motion now, but I was -not able to make this motion in writing before receiving this document -only two and a half hours ago. My motion is that the Prosecution should -submit these two documents to the Defendant Frank in the German -language. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not got the documents to which you are -referring. It is quite impossible for us to understand the motion you -are making unless you make it in writing and attach the documents or in -some other way describe or explain to us what the documents are. We have -not got the documents that you are referring to. - -DR. SEIDL: Then I shall make my motion in writing. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, can you explain to me what the counsel who -has just spoken is complaining about? - -MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): I gather he -was complaining that the trial brief and the document book which had -been served on his client, Frank, were in English and not in German. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is dealing with the case against Frank? - -MR. ROBERTS: It is being dealt with by the United States. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps I had better ask Colonel Storey then. - -COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United -States): If the Tribunal please, I think what counsel is referring to is -the practice we have made of delivering in advance a copy of the -document book and a copy of the trial brief. In this particular instance -I happen to know that what counsel refers to is the trial address, which -is to be read over the microphone, and as a courtesy to counsel they -have been delivered in advance of the presentation, just like all the -other document books and briefs against the other individual defendants. -That’s what it is, as I understand it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The documents which will be presented against the -Defendant Frank will be all translated? - -COL. STOREY: I am sure they are; yes, Sir. I don’t know about the -individual case, but the instructions are that the documents will have -two photostats, each one in German, plus the English translation, for -counsel, and that is what has been delivered, plus the trial address, if -Your Honor pleases. We handed that to him in advance—what the attorney -will read over the microphone. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I thought the Tribunal ordered, after -consulting the prosecutors as to the feasibility of the scheme, that -sufficient translators should be supplied to the defendants’ counsel so -that such documents as trial briefs, if in the English language, might -be translated to defendants’ counsel. You will remember it was suggested -that at least four translators, I think, should be supplied to the -defendants’ counsel. - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal will recall, I think this is what was -finally determined; that document books and briefs could be submitted in -English and the photostatic copies submitted to defendants’ counsel and -that if they wanted additional copies of the German, then they should -request them and they would be furnished. I think that is what the final -order was. - -THE PRESIDENT: There was, at any rate, a suggestion that translators -should be ordered to translate such documents as trial briefs. - -COL. STOREY: That is correct; yes, Sir, and whenever counsel wanted more -copies, then they would request them and they would be available for -them. The translators or translations or photostats would be available -if they requested them. - -Were there any other questions, Your Honor? - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that translators have not been supplied to -defendants’ counsel? - -COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, as I understand, the defendants’ -Information Center is now under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and my -information is—I would like to check it—that when they want extra -copies all they have to do is ask for them and they may obtain them and -sufficient translators are available to provide the extra copies if they -want them. That is my information. I have not checked it in the last few -days, but sufficient copies in English are furnished for all the -counsel; and these briefs and document books are furnished to them in -advance. In this case I am told that the document book and the briefs -were furnished. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendants Funk and Von Schirach): Your -Honor, you may be assured that we Defense Counsel do not like to take up -the time of the Tribunal for such discussions which we ourselves would -rather avoid. But the question just raised by a colleague of mine is -really very unpleasant for us Defense Counsel and makes our work -extremely difficult for us. - -You see, it does not help us if agreements are made or regulations are -issued and in actual practice it is entirely different. - -Last night, for example, we received a big volume of documents all of -which were in English. Now, in the evening in the prison we are supposed -to spend hours discussing with our clients the results of the -proceedings, a task which has now been rendered still more difficult by -the installation of wire screens in the consultation room. In addition -we are also required to talk over whole volumes of documents written in -English, and that is practically impossible. Time and again these -documents are not received until the evening before the day of the -proceedings; and it is not possible, even for one who knows English -well, to make the necessary preparation. - -The same thing is true of the individual trial briefs; and I do not know -whether the actual trial briefs, such as we receive for each defendant, -have also been submitted to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Nearly every document which has been referred to in this -branch of the case, which has been presented by Mr. Albrecht and by Sir -David Maxwell-Fyfe, are documents which have been referred to previously -in the Trial and which must have been before the defendants’ counsel for -many days—for weeks—and therefore there can be no lack of familiarity -with those documents. The documents which have been referred to, which -are fresh documents, are very few indeed and the passages in them which -are now being put in evidence are all read over the microphone and, -therefore, are heard by defendants’ counsel in German and can be studied -by German counsel tomorrow morning in the transcript of the shorthand -notes; and I do not see, therefore, what hardship is being imposed upon -German counsel by the method which is being adopted. - -You see, the Counsel for the Prosecution, out of courtesy to Counsel for -the Defense, have been giving them their trial briefs in English -beforehand. But there is no strict obligation to do that; and insofar as -the actual evidence is concerned, all of which is contained in -documents, as I have already pointed out to you, the vast majority of -those documents have already been put in many days ago and have been in -the hands of German counsel ever since, in the German language—and also -the documents which are now put in. - -DR. SAUTER: No, this is not true, Your Honor. This is the complaint -which we of the Defense Counsel, because we dislike to approach the -Tribunal with such complaints, have been discussing among ourselves—the -complaint that we do not receive German documents. You may be assured, -Mr. President, that if things were as you believe, none of us would -complain but we would all be very grateful; but in reality it is -different. - -THE PRESIDENT: But Dr. Sauter, surely when you have a reference to a -German document, that German document is available to you in the -Information Center; and as these documents have been put in evidence, -some of them as long ago as the 20th of November or shortly thereafter, -surely there must have been adequate time for defendants’ counsel to -study them. - -DR. SAUTER: Suppose, for instance, I receive this morning a volume on -Funk. I know, for instance, when Funk’s case comes on—perhaps tomorrow. -It is quite impossible for me to study this volume of English documents -upon my return from the prison at 10 o’clock in the evening. That simply -overtaxes the physical strength of a Defense Counsel. I could go through -it if it were in German, but even so, it is impossible for me after -finishing my visit to the prison at 9 or 10 o’clock in the evening to go -through such a volume. We absolutely cannot do it. - -THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Sauter, it is not as though you had to -cross-examine witnesses immediately after the evidence is given. The -documents are put in and it is not for you then to get up and argue upon -the interpretation of those documents. You have, I regret to say, a -considerable time before you will have to get up and call your own -evidence and ultimately to argue upon the documents which are now being -put in. Therefore, it is not a question of hours, it is a question of -days and weeks before you will have to deal with these documents which -are now being put in. And I really do not see that there is any hardship -upon defendants’ counsel in the system which is being adopted. - -And you will not forget that the rule, which, in a sense, penalizes the -Prosecution, is that every document which is put in evidence and every -part of the document which is put in evidence, has to be read in open -court, in order that it should be translated over the earphones and then -shall get into the shorthand notes. I am told that the shorthand notes -are not available in German the next morning but are available only some -days afterwards. But they are ultimately available in German. And -therefore every defendant’s counsel must have a complete copy of the -shorthand notes, at any rate up to the recess; and that contains all the -evidence given against the defendants, and it contains it in German. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President, what we are most anxious to have done -and what we have been asking for many weeks is that the documents, or at -least those parts of the document which come into question, should be -given to us in German translation. It is very difficult for us, even if -we know English, to translate the documents in the time which is at our -disposal. It is practically impossible for any of us to do this. It is -for this reason that we regret that our wish to get the documents in -German is not being taken into consideration. We are conscious of the -difficulties and we are very grateful for any assistance given. We -assure you we are very sorry to have to make such requests, but the -conditions are really very difficult for us. The last word I wish to say -is that the conditions are really very difficult for us. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I am most anxious and the other members of -the Tribunal are most anxious that every reasonable facility should be -afforded to the defendants and their counsel. But, as I have pointed out -to you, it is not necessary for you, for any of you, at the present -moment, to get up and argue upon these documents which are now being put -in. By the time that you have to get up and argue upon the documents -which are now being put in, you will have had ample time in which to -consider them in German. - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Sir. - -HERR GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for the SA): I have repeatedly asked to -receive copies of everything presented in English. The accusation -against the SA was presented on the 19th or 18th of December, and at the -same time a document book was presented. Today I received a few -photostats, but I have not received the greater part of the photostats -or other pertinent translations. This shows that we do not receive the -German translations immediately after the presentation. Nor are we ever -able to read the transcript of the proceedings on the next day or on the -day after that. The minutes of the session. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: We are not dealing with the SA or the organizations at -the present moment. If you have any motion to make, you will kindly make -it in writing, and we will now proceed with the part of the Trial with -which we are dealing. - -HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, will you permit me one more remark? The -minutes of December 17 and 18, 1945 I have received today. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean the transcript of it? - -HERR BOEHM: I received today the German transcript for the 18th and 19th -of December 1945. You see, it is not a fact that we receive the -transcript the day after or a few days after the session. I received it -weeks later, after I asked for it repeatedly. I have asked the -appropriate offices repeatedly to give me a copy of the document book in -German, and I have still not received it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will inquire into that. One moment. - -[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will the last counsel who was speaking stand up? - -I am told that the reason for the delay in the case you have mentioned -was that there had been an error in the paging and therefore the -transcripts of those shorthand notes had to be recopied. I understand -that the delay ordinarily is not anything like so long as that delay. - -HERR BOEHM: But I hardly believe that in the case of the translation of -the document book the delay is due to those reasons. But even if the -delay in this particular case should be justified, it means that week -after week I am hampered in my defense. I do not know the day before -what is going to be presented, and I do not know until weeks afterwards -what has been presented. I am therefore not in a position to study the -evidence from the standpoint of a Defense Counsel. I do not even know -what is contained in the document book. I am thus obviously handicapped -in my defense in every way. The Prosecution keeps saying that it will -furnish the documents on time. This is apparently not the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will kindly make your complaint in writing -and give the particulars of it. Do you understand that? - -HERR BOEHM: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present the -evidence against Keitel and also against the Defendant Jodl and I would -ask the Tribunal for permission, if it is thought right, that those two -cases should be presented together in the interest of saving time, a -matter which I know we all have at heart. - -The story with regard to Keitel and Jodl runs on parallel lines. For the -years in question they marched down the same road together. Most of the -documents affect them both, and in those circumstances, I submit, it -might result in a substantial saving of time if I were permitted to -present the cases against both of them together. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Then I shall proceed, if I may, on that basis. - -My Lords, may I say that I fully recognize that the activities of both -these defendants have been referred to in detail many times and quite -recently by Colonel Telford Taylor, and my earnest desire is to avoid -repetition as far as I possibly can. And may I say I welcome any -suggestions, as I travel the road, which the Tribunal have to make, to -make my presentation still shorter. - -There is a substantial document book, Document Book Number 7, which is a -joint document book dealing with both the defendants. Practically all -the documents in that book have already been referred to. They nearly -all, of course, have a German origin. I propose to read passages from -only nine new documents and those nine documents, I think, are shown in -Your Lordship’s bundle and in the bundles of your colleagues. - -May I commence by referring, as shortly as may be, to the part of the -Indictment which deals with the two defendants. That will be found on -Page 33 (Volume I, Page 77) of the English translation. It begins with -“Keitel” in the middle of the page, and it says, “The Defendant Keitel -between 1938 and 1945” was the holder of various offices. I only want to -point out there that although the commencing date is 1938 the -Prosecution rely on certain activities of the Defendant Keitel before -1938, and we submit that we are entitled so to do because of the general -words appearing on Page 28 of the Indictment (Volume I, Page 68) at the -head of the appendix: - - “The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each - individual defendant constitute matters upon which the - Prosecution will rely _inter alia_ as establishing the - individual responsibility. . . .” - -And then the Tribunal will see: - - “. . . Keitel used the foregoing positions, his personal - influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a - manner that: He promoted the military preparations for war set - forth in Count One. . . .” - -If I may read it shortly—he participated in the planning and -preparation for wars of aggression and in violation of treaties, he -executed the plans for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -treaties, and he authorized and participated in War Crimes and Crimes -against Humanity. - -Then, “The Defendant Jodl between 1932 and 1945 was” the holder of -various positions. He “used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his close connection with the Führer in such a -manner”—and this is not to be found in the text relating to -Keitel—“that: He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi -conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Germany. . . .” - -May I say, My Lords, here, that I know of no evidence at the moment to -support that allegation that he promoted the Nazi rise to power before -1933. There is plenty of evidence that he was a devoted, almost a -fanatical admirer of the Führer, but that, I apprehend, would not be -enough. - -And then it is alleged against Jodl that he promoted the preparations -for war, that he participated in the planning and preparation of the -war, and that he authorized and participated in War Crimes and Crimes -against Humanity. - -My Lords, with regard to the position of the Defendant Keitel, it is -well-known that in February of 1938 he became Chief of the OKW, Supreme -Commander of all the Armed Forces, and that Jodl became Chief of the -Operations Staff; and that is copiously proved in the shorthand notes -and in the documents. Perhaps I ought to refer to his position in 1935, -at the time when the reoccupation of the Rhineland was first envisaged. -Keitel was head of the Wehrmachtsamt in the Reich War Ministry, and that -is proved by a Document 3019-PS, which is to be found in _Das Archiv_; -and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that. It is not in the -bundle. - -Jodl’s positions have been proved by his own statement, Document -2865-PS, which is also Exhibit USA-16; and in 1935 he held the rank of -lieutenant colonel, Chief of the Operations Department of the -Landesverteidigung. - -May I just refer to the pre-1938 period—that is, the pre-OKW period—to -two documents, one of which is new. The first document I desire to -mention without reading is EC-177. I do not want to read it. It is -Exhibit USA-390. My Lords, those are the minutes, shortly after the Nazi -rise to power, of the working committee of the Delegates for Reich -Defense. The date is the 22d of May 1933. Keitel presided at that -meeting. The minutes have been read. There is a long discussion as to -the preliminary steps for putting Germany on a war footing. Keitel -regarded the task as most urgent, as so little had been done in previous -years; and perhaps the Tribunal will remember the most striking passage -where Keitel impressed the need for secrecy: Documents must not be lost; -oral statements can be denied at Geneva. - -And I submit, if I may be allowed to make this short comment, it is -interesting to see in those very early days of 1933 that the heads of -the Armed Forces of Germany contemplated using lying as a weapon. - -My Lord, the next document I desire to refer to is a new one, and it is -EC-405, Exhibit GB-160. I desire to refer to this shortly because, in my -submission, it fixes Jodl with knowledge of, and complicity in, the plan -to reoccupy the Rhineland country, contrary to the Versailles Treaty. -The Tribunal will see that these are the minutes of the working -committee of the Reich Defense Council, dated the 26th of June 1935. - -The Court will see that, a quarter of the way down the page, -Subparagraph F, Lieutenant Colonel Jodl gives a dissertation on -mobilization preparation; and it is only the fourth and fifth paragraphs -on that same page, the last paragraph but one from the bottom, that I -desire to read: - - “The demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his - speech of the 21st of May and other utterances, the Führer has - stated that the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the - Locarno Pact regarding the demilitarized zone are being - observed. To the _aide-mémoire_ of the French _chargé - d’affaires_ on recruiting offices in the demilitarized zone, the - Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting - authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have - been entrusted with mobilization tasks, such as the raising, - equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of - war or in preparation therefor. - - “Since political complications abroad must be avoided at - present”—I stress the “at present”—“under all circumstances, - only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may - be carried out. The existence of such preparations or the - intention of making such preparations must be kept in strictest - secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich.” - -My Lord, I need not read more. I submit that fixes Jodl clearly with -knowledge of the forthcoming breach of Versailles. - -My Lord, the day before the Rhineland was reoccupied on the 7th of March -1936, the Defendant Keitel issued the directive which has been read -before, Document C-194, Exhibit USA-55, ordering an air reconnaissance -and certain U-boat movements in case any other nation attempted to -interfere with that reoccupation. - -My Lords, I pass now to the 4th of February 1938, when the OKW was -formed. My Lords, shortly after its formation there was issued a -handbook, which is a new exhibit, from which I want to read short -passages. The number of the exhibit is L-211. It is Document GB-161. -Now, this is dated 19 April 1938; “top secret; Direction of War as a -Problem of Organization.” I read only from the appendix which is -entitled, “What is the War of the Future?”; and if the Court will kindly -turn over to the second page, I am going to read, 12 lines from the -bottom of the page, the line beginning “Surprise”: - - “Surprise as the requisite for quick initial success will often - require hostilities to begin before mobilization has been - completed or the armies are fully in position. - - “A declaration of war is no longer necessarily the first step at - the start of a war. - - “According to whether the application of the rules of warfare - create greater advantages or disadvantages for the warring - nations, will the latter consider themselves at war or not at - war with the neutral states.” - -It may, of course, be said that those were only theoretical words and -they might apply to any other nation which might be minded to make war -on Germany. The Court can use its judicial notice of the conditions of -things in Europe in 1938 and ask itself whether Germany had any -potential aggressor against her. - -But, My Lord, I emphasize that passage because I submit it so clearly -envisages exactly the way in which Germany did make war in 1939 and in -the subsequent years. - -My Lord, I now start to tread the road which has been trodden so many -times and which will be trodden so many times again, the road from 1938 -to 1941: the final act of aggression. My Lord, I believe that I can -treat this, so far as Keitel and Jodl are concerned, in a very few -sentences, because I submit that the documents which are already in, -which have been read and reread into the record, demonstrate quite -clearly that Keitel, as would only be expected, he being Chief of the -Supreme Command of all the Armed Forces, and Jodl, as only would be -expected also, he being Chief of the Operations Staff, were vitally and -intimately concerned with every single act of aggression which took -place successively against the various victims of Nazi aggression. - -My Lord, Your Lordship has in front of you the document book and perhaps -the trial brief in which those documents are set out under the heading. -If I might take first the aggression against Austria, Your Lordship will -remember, in Jodl’s diary on the 12th of February 1938, how Keitel, who -was something more than a mere soldier, put heavy pressure upon -Schuschnigg—that is Document 1780-PS, Jodl’s diary—how on the -following day Keitel writes to Hitler—Document 1775-PS, Exhibit -USA-75—suggesting the shamming of military action and the spreading of -false but quite credible news. - -Then the actual operation orders for “Operation Otto,” Exhibits USA-74, -75, and 77, all of the 11th of March 1938, are OKW orders for which -Keitel is responsible. - -THE PRESIDENT: What are the numbers of them? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Documents C-102, C-103, and C-182. One of them is -actually signed or initialed by Keitel, and two are initialed by Jodl. -Those are the operation orders for the advance into Austria, the -injunction, if the Tribunal remembers, to treat Czech soldiers as -hostile and to treat the Italians as friends. - -My Lord, that is the first milestone on the road, the occupation of -Austria. My Lord, the second is, is it not. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps if you are going to pass on to another, we -had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, I had got to the commencement -of the alleged aggression against Czechoslovakia; and the Tribunal will -remember that the leading exhibit on that matter is the file 388-PS, -Exhibit Number USA-26, the “Fall Grün” file. My Lords, that file, in my -submission, contains copious evidence against both Keitel and Jodl, -showing that they were taking the natural part of the Chief of the -Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the head of the Operations -Staff. - -May I remind the Tribunal of Item 2. I do not want to read any of these. -I might just refer to the notes of a meeting on the 21st of April 1938. -The important thing to notice is that Keitel and the Führer met alone, -showing the intimate connection between Keitel and the Führer. And it -was at that meeting that preliminary plans were discussed, including the -possibility of an incident, namely, the murder of the German Ambassador -at Prague. - -Item 5 in that file, dated the 20th of May 1938, shows the plans for the -political and the military campaign against Czechoslovakia, issued by -Keitel. - -Item 11, dated the 30th of May 1938, is the directive signed by Keitel -for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, with the date given as the 1st of -October 1938. - -There are many items which are initialed by Jodl—Item 14 and Item 17, -to mention only two. - -Perhaps, for the purpose of the note, I should mention the others: Items -24, 36, and 37. - -There is the directive, Items 31 and 32, dated the 27th of September -1938, signed by Keitel, enclosing orders for secret mobilization. - -Jodl’s diary, Document 1780-PS, contains many references to the -forthcoming aggression, particularly the 13th of May and the 8th of -September; and there is a very revealing entry on the 11th of September -in Jodl’s diary, 1780-PS, in which he says. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the date? - -MR. ROBERTS: I beg Your Lordship’s pardon; 11th of September 1938. - - “In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke, - from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, on the - imminent common tasks. The joint preparations for refutation of - our own violations of international law and the exploitation of - its violations by the enemy were considered particularly - important.” - -I emphasize those words, “our own violations of international law.” - -My Lords, as a result of that conference the Document C-2, which was -referred to by my learned leader, Sir David, was prepared, which the -Tribunal will remember has in parallel columns the possible breach of -international law and the excuse which is then going to be given for it. -It was referred to so recently that I need not refer to it again. - -My Lords, I respectfully submit on that branch of the case that there is -an overwhelming case that Keitel and Jodl played an important, indeed a -vital part, in the aggression against Czechoslovakia which led up to the -Pact of Munich. - -My Lords, after the Pact of Munich was signed, as has been pointed out -many times, the Nazi conspirators at once set about preparations for -annexing the remainder of Czechoslovakia. - -My Lords, at this point Jodl disappears from the scene for a time, -because he goes to do some regimental soldiering as artillery general in -Austria—artillery general of the 44th Division—and so it cannot be -said that there is any evidence against him from the Munich Pact until -the 23rd of August 1939, when he is recalled on the eve of the Polish -invasion to take up his duties once more as chief of the operational -staff of OKW. - -So far as Keitel is concerned, on the 21st of October 1938, less than a -month after the Munich Pact, he countersigned Hitler’s order to -liquidate the rest of Czechoslovakia and to occupy Memel—Document -C-136, Exhibit Number USA-104. - -On the 24th of November 1938, Document C-137, Exhibit Number GB-33, -Keitel issues a memorandum about the surprise occupation of Danzig. - -On the 17th of December 1938, Document C-138, Exhibit Number USA-105, he -signs an order to the lower formations: “Prepare for the liquidation of -the rest of Czechoslovakia.” Those preparations were made. - -On the 15th of March 1939 Keitel, who—I again repeat—was more than a -mere soldier, was present at the midnight conference between the Führer -and Hacha, President of Czechoslovakia, when, under a threat of bombing -Prague, Hacha surrendered the rest of his country to the Germans. I -refrain from referring to the contents of the minutes, which have been -read many times already. - -My Lords, so that milestone is past. And again I submit, in all that -aggression it is clear that Keitel was playing a vital part as Hitler’s -right-hand man, commanding all the armed forces under him. - -I now pass to the Polish aggression. Keitel was present at the meeting -at the chancellery on the 23rd of May 1939, Document L-79, Exhibit -Number USA-27, when it was said—just a few words so familiar: Danzig -was not the subject of the dispute; Poland was to be attacked at the -first suitable opportunity; Dutch and Belgian air bases must be -occupied; declarations of neutrality were to be ignored. - -The directive for “Fall Weiss”, the invasion of Poland, is Document -C-120(a), Exhibit GB-41. The date is the 3rd of April 1939. The Tribunal -will remember the plans were to be submitted to OKW by the 1st of May, -and the forces were to be ready for invasion by the 1st of September. -And that directive is signed by Keitel. - -Document C-126, Exhibit GB-45, is a follow-up of that previous -directive. It is dated the 22d of June 1939. The need for camouflage is -emphasized; and it is stated, “Do not disquiet the population.” That is -signed by Keitel. - -On the 17th of August 1939, Document 795-PS, Exhibit GB-54, Keitel has a -conference with Admiral Canaris about the supplying of Polish uniforms -to Heydrich; and it will be noticed in the last paragraph of the note -that Admiral Canaris is against the war, and Keitel argues in favor of -it. And Keitel made the prophecy that Great Britain would not enter the -war. - -I submit that Keitel’s vital part, again, in the preparation for the -aggression against Poland is clearly established beyond possibility of -dispute. - -Jodl, as I have said to the Tribunal, was recalled on the 23rd of -August, as seen in his diary entry, Document 1780-PS, where he says that -he is recalled to take charge of the Operations Staff. He says: - - “Received order from armed forces high command to proceed to - Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive - Office.”—And then—“1100 hours to 1330 hours—discussion with - Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X-Day has been announced for - the 26th of August. Y-Time has been announced for 0430 hours.” - -And I submit that the Tribunal can infer the importance of Jodl to this -conspiracy from the fact that on the eve of the war he is recalled to -Berlin to take his place at the head of the operational staff of the -Supreme Command. - -So Poland was invaded, and before I pass to the next aggression may I -just point out that, according to the evidence of General Lahousen, if -the Tribunal accepts it on this point, Keitel and Jodl were in the field -with Hitler on the 10th of September 1939. That is in the shorthand -notes, Pages 617 and 618 (Volume II, Pages 447 and 448). I don’t suppose -there will be any dispute that the head of the High Command and the -Chief of his Operational Staff were in the field. - -My Lord, I pass now to Norway and Denmark. So far as both are concerned -we see from Document C-64, Exhibit GB-86, that on the 12th of December -1939 Keitel and Jodl were both present at Hitler’s conference with -Raeder when the invasion of Norway was discussed; and Keitel’s direct -responsibility to those operations is shown in my submission by Document -C-63, Exhibit GB-87, in which Keitel says that the operations against -Norway will be “under my direct and personal guidance.” And he sets up a -planning staff of OKW for the carrying out of those operations. - -Jodl’s knowledge and complicity, in my submission, are clearly shown -also from the entries in his own diary—Document 1809-PS. That is the -second part of his diary. And the Tribunal will remember the entry of -the 13th of March 1940, in which he records that the Führer was still -looking for an excuse for the “Weser” operations. That is the 13th of -March, My Lord, 1809-PS: - - “The Führer does not give the order yet for Weser. He is still - looking for an excuse.” - -And then, on the 14th of March, “Führer has not yet decided what reason -to give for Weser Exercise,” which, in my submission, if I may be -allowed to make a short comment, shows up in a lurid light the code of -honor of the military leaders of Germany—still looking for an excuse. - -My Lord, then, as we know, Norway was attacked unawares; and then -subsequently lying excuses were given. - -My Lord, the invasion of the Low Countries and Luxembourg equally, in my -submission, is clearly shown by the documents to have been controlled -and directed by Keitel with Jodl’s assistance. The Tribunal already have -a note of the conference in May of the lands to be occupied—Document -L-79. Document C-62, Exhibit GB-106, is a directive, signed “Hitler,” on -the 9th of October 1939 and another directive, signed “Keitel,” on the -15th of October. C-62 comprises two documents, the 9th of October and -15th of October—two directives, one signed “Hitler” and one signed -“Keitel”—both giving orders for the occupation of Holland and Belgium. - -My Lord, Document C-10, Exhibit GB-108, dated the 8th of November, is -Keitel’s operation orders for the 7th Parachute Division to make an -airborne landing in the middle of Holland. - -Document 440-PS, Exhibit GB-107, dated the 20th of November 1939, signed -“Keitel,” is a further directive for the invasion of Holland and -Belgium. - -Document C-72, Exhibit GB-109, 7th of November 1939, the 10th of May -1940, 18 letters—11 signed by Keitel, 7 signed by Jodl: “The Führer is -postponing A-Day because of the weather.” - -My Lord, Jodl’s diary is also eloquent on that subject. That is Document -1809-PS. Several entries—perhaps I need not refer to them -again—relating to these forthcoming operations, culminating with the -one on the 8th of May, which perhaps the Tribunal will remember, when -Jodl says, “Alarming information from Holland,” and he expresses -righteous indignation that the wicked Dutchmen should erect roadblocks -and make mobilization preparations. - -My Lord, and so those three neutral countries were invaded, and I submit -there is copious and overwhelming evidence that these men were in charge -of the military organizations which made those invasions possible. - -My Lord, I pass now to the planning for the aggression against Greece -and Yugoslavia. Document PS-1541, Exhibit GB-117, dated 13th of December -1940, Hitler’s order for “Marita,” the operation against Greece, signed -by Hitler, and a copy to Keitel, namely, OKW. - -Document 448-PS, Exhibit GB-118, 11th of January 1941: Keitel initialed -a Hitler order for the Greek operation. - -Document C-134, Exhibit GB-119, 20th of January 1941: Both Keitel and -Jodl are present at the conference with Hitler, Mussolini, and others -when the operations against Greece and Yugoslavia are discussed. - -Document C-59, Exhibit GB-121, 19th of February 1941: The dates of the -operations against Marita are filled in by Keitel. - -Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, 27th of March 1941: A conference with -Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl present; the decision to attack and destroy -Yugoslavia is announced, and the Führer said: “I am determined to -destroy Yugoslavia. I shall use unmerciful harshness to frighten other -neutrals”—and these two soldiers were present when that was said. - -My Lord, I submit that on that the complicity of these two men for that -aggression is amply proved. - -My Lord, I pass to Barbarossa—Document 446-PS, Exhibit USA-131, dated -18th of December 1940—Hitler’s order for the Barbarossa operation, -initialed by Keitel and Jodl. Hitler says, the Tribunal will remember, -that he intends to overthrow Russia in a single rapid campaign. - -Document 872-PS, Exhibit USA-134, 3rd of February 1941: A discussion -with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl re: Barbarossa and “Sonnenblume”—North -African suggestions. Hitler said, “When Barbarossa commences, the world -will hold its breath and make no comments.” - -Then, Document 447-PS, Exhibit USA-135, dated 13th of March 1941: That -is an operation order signed by Keitel re: the administration of the -areas which were to be occupied; showing again that Keitel was more than -a mere soldier; this is civil administration. - -Document C-39, Exhibit USA-138, 6th of June 1941: Timetable for -Barbarossa, signed by Keitel, and Jodl gets a sixth copy. - -Document C-78, Exhibit USA-139, 9th of June 1941, is Hitler’s order to -Keitel and Jodl to attend the pre-Barbarossa conference on the 14th of -June 1941, 8 days before the operation. - -My Lord, on those facts and documents on the position of these two -defendants, again I respectfully submit their participation in this -aggression is overwhelmingly proved. - -My Lord, the last aggression is with regard to the provoked persuasion -of Japan to commit an aggression against the United States of America. -My Lord, there are two key documents; and both Keitel and Jodl are -implicated by both of them. My Lord, the first is Document C-75, Exhibit -USA-151, dated 5th of March 1941. It is an OKW order signed by Keitel, -copy to Jodl. “Japan must be induced to take positive action as soon as -possible” is a quotation from it. - -Document C-152, Exhibit GB-122, 18th of March 1941: The meeting between -Hitler, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl—Japan to seize Singapore. That is the -relevant extract on that. - -My Lord, on those acts of aggression and those preparations for -aggression, I submit that the case against these two men is -overwhelming. It is clear, in my submission, that there could be no -defense open to them except that they were obeying the orders of a -superior. That defense is not open to them under this Charter. No doubt -all these wicked schemes germinated in the wicked brain of Hitler, but -he could not carry them out alone. He wanted men nearly as wicked and -nearly as unscrupulous as himself. - -My Lord, I now pass very rapidly to the question of War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity. My Lord, it has already been proved that Keitel -signed the “Nacht und Nebel” decrees, committing persons to -incarceration in Germany where all trace of them was lost. That is -Document L-90, Exhibit USA-503. - -There is one fresh document that I desire to put in. Colonel Telford -Taylor put in Document C-50, Keitel’s order as to ruthless action in the -Barbarossa campaign. There is one complementary document to that, -Document C-51, which is Exhibit GB-162, Keitel’s order dated the 27th of -July 1941: - - “In accordance with the regulations concerning classified - material the following offices will destroy all copies of the - Führer’s decree of 13 May 1941”—that is C-50, the Barbarossa - decree—“in the communication mentioned above: - - “a) All offices up to the rank of ‘general commands’ - inclusive;”—My Lord, that means that corps commanders and - downwards should destroy copies—“b) group commands of the - armored troops”—that again means offices of the armed corps - below the rank of corps commanders should destroy the - copies—“c) army commands and offices of equal rank, if there is - an inevitable danger that they might fall into the hands of - unauthorized persons.” - -That is to say that even higher generals, if the war approaches closely -to them, should destroy these documents rather than risking any chance -of their being captured. - - “The validity of the decree is not affected by the destruction - of the copies. In accordance with Paragraph III, it remains the - personal responsibility of the commanding officers to see to it - that the offices and legal advisers are instructed in time and - that only these sentences are confirmed which correspond to the - political intentions of the Supreme Command.” - -That was with regard to German soldiers not being tried by court-martial -for offenses against Soviet troops: “This order will be destroyed -together with the copies of the Führer’s decree.” - -My Lord, I submit that the anxiety on the part of the OKW, presided over -by Keitel, to destroy that—I suggest an illegal order; a barbarous -order—is significant. - -My Lord, I desire now to put in another document which is almost the -last document in the bundle, UK-20. Your Lordship will find it flagged -at the end of the bundle. It is from the Führer’s headquarters, 26th of -May 1943. It says: - - “Re: Treatment of supporters of De Gaulle who fight for the - Russians. - - “French airmen serving in the Soviet forces have been shot down - on the Eastern Front for the first time. The Führer has ordered - that employment of French troops in the Soviet forces is to be - counteracted by the strongest means. - - “It is therefore ordered: - - “1) Supporters of De Gaulle who are taken prisoner on the - Eastern Front will be handed over to the French Government for - proceedings in accordance with OKW order. . . .” - -And then I read Paragraph 3: - - “Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases - against relatives of Frenchmen who fight for the Russians, if - these relatives are resident in the occupied area of France. If - the investigation reveals that relatives have given assistance - to facilitate escape from France, then severe measures are to be - taken.” - -My Lord, I offer that as Exhibit GB-163. - -My Lord, there is a document which I feel I should put in, which is the -next document in the bundle. It is Document UK-57, Exhibit GB-164. This -is the last document, I think, in the bundle. My Lord, it is from the -Ausland Abwehr—I believe it is from the intelligence foreign -department. It is to the OKW and it is signed the 4th of January 1944. -My Lord, the heading is “Re: Counteraction to Kharkov ‘trial.’” -Paragraph 2 is all that I read: - - “The documents concerning ‘commandos’ have been asked for and - thoroughly investigated by the Reich Security Main Office. In - five cases members of the British Armed Forces were arrested as - participants. Thereupon they were shot in compliance with the - order from the Führer. It would be possible to attribute to them - breaches of international law and to have them posthumously - sentenced to death by a Tribunal. Up to the present no breaches - of international law could be proved against commando - participants.” - -My Lord, I read no more, and I submit that that is clearly an admission -of murder, not warfare at all. - -My Lord, Keitel’s comments are to be found in the top left-hand corner -of that document: - - “We want documents on the basis of which we can institute - similar proceedings. They are reprisals which have no connection - with battle actions. Legal justifications are superfluous.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that not at the top signed by Keitel? - -MR. ROBERTS: It is typewritten in the office copy which is the original. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is no actual signature? - -MR. ROBERTS: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How does it connect with Keitel then? - -MR. ROBERTS: “Vermerk Chef OKW”—that is “note of the Chief of OKW.” - -Now, that is the first minute. My Lord, the second minute is on the same -subject, and it is dated the 6th of January 1944; and there is a large -red Keitel “K” initialed on the top of this letter, showing that he got -it. My Lord, the first paragraph deals with two officers who were then -at Eichstätt Camp in Bavaria. My Lord, there is no importance in that -paragraph, because those two officers are still alive. - -The second paragraph: - - “Attempted attacks on the battleship _Tirpitz_. - - “At the end of October ’42 a British commando that had come to - Norway in a cutter had orders to carry out an attack on the - battleship _Tirpitz_ in Drontheim Fjord by means of a two-man - torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes which were - attached to the cutter were lost in the stormy sea. From the - crew consisting of six Englishmen and four Norwegians, a party - of three Englishmen and two Norwegians were challenged on the - Swedish border. However, only the British seaman Robert Paul - Evans, born 14 January ’22 at London, could be arrested . . . - the others escaped into Sweden. - - “Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession such as are used to - carry weapons under the armpit and also a knuckle-duster. - Violence, representing a breach of international law, could not - be proved. He has made extensive statements about the operation. - In accordance with the Führer’s order he was shot on 19 January - ’43.” - -Again I submit, that is murder. Violence representing a breach of -international law could not be proved. - -My Lord, then the third paragraph: - - “Blowing up of the Glomfjord power station. - - “On 16 September ’42, 10 Englishmen and two Norwegians landed on - the Norwegian coast dressed in the uniform of the British - Mountain Rifle Regiment, heavily armed and equipped with - explosives of every description. After negotiating difficult - mountain country they blew up important installations in the - power station Glomfjord on 21 September ’42. The German sentry - was shot dead on that occasion. Norwegian workmen were - threatened that they would be chloroformed should they resist. - For this purpose the Englishmen were equipped with morphia - syringes. Several of the participants have been arrested while - the others escaped into Sweden. - - “Those arrested are: Captain Graeme Black, born 9 May ’11 in - Dresden; Captain Joseph Houghton, born 13 June ’11 at - Bromborough; Sergeant-major Miller Smith, born 2 November ’15 at - Middlesborough; Corporal William Chudley, born 10 May ’22 at - Exeter; Rifleman Reginald Makeham, born 28 January ’14 at - Ipswich; Rifleman Cyril Abram, born 20 August ’22 in London; - Rifleman Eric Curtis, born 24 October ’21 in London. They were - shot on 30 October ’42.” - -Again there is no suggestion that there was any breach of international -law. They were British seamen and they were in uniform. - -Then Paragraph 4: - - “The sabotage attack against German ships off Bordeaux. - - “On 12 December ’42, a number of German ships off Bordeaux were - seriously damaged by explosives below water-level. The adhesive - mines had been fixed by five English sabotage gangs working from - canoes. Of the 10 participants the following were arrested after - a few days. . . .” - -Then there followed six names, six British names—one an Irishman; a -lieutenant, a petty officer, a sergeant, and three marines. - - “A seventh soldier named Moffett was found drowned; the - remainder apparently escaped into Spain. - - “The participants proceeded in pairs from a submarine in canoes - upstream into the mouth of the River Gironde. They were wearing - olive grey special uniforms. After effecting the explosions they - sank the boats, and attempted to escape into Spain in civilian - clothes, with the assistance of the French civilian population. - No special criminal actions during the flight have been - discovered. All the arrested, in accordance with orders, were - shot on 23 March 1943.” - -Keitel initialed that document. That document, read by my learned leader -Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe not so long ago, is Document Number 735-PS, -quoting Keitel as saying, “I am against legal procedure. It does not -work out.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the Page 5 which follows that? - -MR. ROBERTS: If it will please the Tribunal, that is what I shall do. -Page 5: - - “The Führer’s headquarters, 9 January 1944. The Chief of OKW has - handed the Deputy Chief”—that ought to be WFSt, that is - Jodl—“the enclosed letter with the following account: - - “It is of no importance to establish documentary proof of - breaches of international law. What is important, however, is - the collection of material suitable for a propaganda - presentation of a display trial. A display trial as such is - therefore not meant actually to take place but merely to be a - propaganda presentation of cases of breaches of international - law by enemy soldiers, who will be mentioned by name and who - have already either been punished with death or are awaiting the - death penalty. The Chief of the OKW asks the Chief of the - Foreign Department to bring with him pertinent documents for his - next visit to the Führer’s headquarters.” - -As the Tribunal heard from my learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, -when he read Document 735-PS earlier today, Keitel said, “I am against -legal procedure. It does not work out.” - -One can agree with Keitel after having read that record of what, in my -submission, is cold-blooded murder of brave men, brave soldiers and -sailors who were fighting for their country; and although this Trial has -a record of the death of brave men, of the murder of brave men, there -are few cases which are more poignant than those shown in the documents -to which I have just referred. - -I have finished my presentation of the case against Keitel and against -Jodl. So far as Jodl’s part in the War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity is concerned, he figures much less than Keitel. Of course, he -had no power of giving orders or directives, but we see that he at any -rate signed and circulated an infamous order of the Führer saying that -commandos ought to be shot and are not to be treated as prisoners of war -at all. - -In my submission the evidence against these two men is overwhelming and -their conviction is demanded by the civilized world. - -Your Lordships, Mr. Walter W. Brudno of the American Delegation will -present the case against Alfred Rosenberg. - -MR. WALTER W. BRUDNO (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): -May it please the Tribunal, in connection with the case against the -Defendant Rosenberg, I wish to offer the document book designated as -United States Exhibit EE. This book contains the English translation of -all the documents which I will offer into evidence, as well as the -English translation of those documents previously offered to which I -will refer. The documents are arranged by series in the order of C, L, -R, PS, and EC, and they are arranged numerically within each series. - -Your Honors will note that on the first four pages of the document book -there appears a descriptive list of documents. This list is a tabulation -of all the documents directly implicating Rosenberg, including those -previously offered, and those which I will offer into evidence. Those -previously offered are keyed to the transcript page of the Record, and -to their exhibit numbers. The list is included in the document books. -The list is included in the document books made available to the -Defense. This list will gather together in one place all references to -the Defendant Rosenberg which are in the Record up to this point. In -order to avoid repetition, I will not refer to a great many of the -documents previously introduced. - -The Indictment at Page 29 (Volume I, Page 70) charges the Defendant -Rosenberg under all four Counts of the Indictment. In the presentation -which follows, I will show that as charged in Count One, Section IV, -Subparagraph D, Rosenberg played a particularly prominent role in -developing and promoting the doctrinal techniques of the conspiracy, in -developing and promoting beliefs and practices incompatible with -Christian teaching, in subverting the influence of the churches over the -German people, in pursuing the program of relentless persecution of the -Jews, and in reshaping the educational system in order to make the -German people amenable to the will of the conspirators and to prepare -the people psychologically for waging an aggressive war. - -I will also show that Rosenberg played an important role in preparing -Germany for the waging of aggressive war through the direction of -foreign trade, as charged in Count One, Subparagraph E, of the -Indictment, and that his activities in the field of foreign policy -contributed materially toward the preparation for the aggression charged -in Subparagraph F in the Indictment and the Crimes against Peace, as -charged in Count Two. - -Finally I will show that Rosenberg participated in the planning and -direction of the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as specified in -Paragraph G of Count One of the Indictment. Particularly, he -participated in the planning and direction of the spoliation of art -treasures in the western countries and in the numerous crimes committed -in that part of the eastern countries formerly occupied by the U.S.S.R. - -The political career of the Defendant Rosenberg embraced the entire -history of National Socialism and permeated nearly every phase of the -conspiracy with which we are concerned. In order to obtain a full -conception of his influence upon and participation in the conspiracy, it -is necessary to review briefly his political history, and to consider -each of his political activities in their relation to the thread of the -conspiracy which stretches from the inception of the Party in 1919 to -the defeat of Germany in 1945. - -It is both interesting and revealing to note that for Rosenberg the 30th -of November 1918 marked the “beginning of political activities with a -lecture about the ‘Jewish Problem.’” That statement is found at Line 2 -of the translation of Document 2886-PS, which is an excerpt from a book -entitled, _The Work of Alfred Rosenberg_, a biography, and I offer this -book as Exhibit Number USA-591. - -From the Document 3557-PS, which has excerpts from an official pamphlet -entitled _Dates in the History of the NSDAP_, and which I offer as -Exhibit Number USA-592, we learn that Rosenberg was a member of the -German Labor Party, afterwards the National Socialist German Workers -Party, in January 1919 and that Hitler joined forces with Rosenberg and -his colleagues in October of the same year. Thus, Rosenberg was a member -of the National Socialist movement even before Hitler himself. - -Now I wish to offer Document 3530-PS, which is an extract from _Das -Deutsche Führer Lexikon_, the year of 1934-35, and I offer it as Exhibit -Number USA-593. In this document we obtain additional biographical data -on Rosenberg as follows: - - “From 1921 until the present he was editor of the _Völkische - Beobachter_; editor of the _N. S. Monatshefte_; in 1930, he - became member of the Reichstag and representative of the foreign - policies for the Party . . . since April 1933 he was leader of - the foreign political office of the NSDAP, then designated - Reichsleiter; in January 1934, deputized by the Führer for the - supervision of the ideological education of the NSDAP, the - German labor front, and all related organizations.” - -The Document 2886-PS, which I have just referred to, offered as Exhibit -Number USA-591, adds that in July 1941 Rosenberg was appointed Reich -Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. - -With this general background information in mind the first phase of -proof will deal with Rosenberg as official National Socialist -ideologist. The proof which I will present will show the nature and -scope of the ideological tenets he expounded, and the influence he -exerted upon the unification of German thought, a unification which was -an essential part of the conspirators’ program for the seizure of power -and preparation for aggressive war. - -Rosenberg wrote extensively on, and actively participated in, virtually -every aspect of the National Socialist program. His first publication -was the _Nature, Basic Principles, and Aims of the NSDAP_. This -publication appeared in 1922. Rosenberg spoke of this book in a speech -which we have seen and heard delivered in the motion picture previously -introduced as Exhibit Number USA-167. On Page 2, Part 1, of the -transcription of the speech, which is our Document Number 3054-PS, -Rosenberg stated as follows: - - “During this time”—that is, during the early phase of the - Party—“I wrote a short thesis which nevertheless is significant - in the history of the NSDAP.”—This is Rosenberg speaking.—“It - was always being asked what points of program the NSDAP had and - how they were to be interpreted. Therefore I wrote the _Nature, - Basic Principles, and Aims of the NSDAP_, and this writing made - the first permanent connection for Munich and local - organizations being created and friends within the Reich.” - -We thus see that the original draftsman of, and spokesman on, the Party -program was the Defendant Rosenberg. Without attempting to survey the -entire ideological program advanced by the Defendant Rosenberg in his -various writings and speeches, which are very numerous, I wish to offer -into evidence certain of his statements as an indication of the nature -and broad scope of the ideological program which he championed. It will -be seen that there was not a single basic tenet of the Nazi philosophy -which was not given authoritative expression by Rosenberg. Rosenberg -wrote the book entitled _Myth of the Twentieth Century_, published in -1930. This book has already been offered as Exhibit USA-352. At Page -479, which Your Honor will find on the second page of Document 3553-PS, -Rosenberg wrote on the race question as follows: - - “The essence of the contemporary world revolution lies in the - awakening of the racial type; not in Europe alone but on the - whole planet. This awakening is the organic counter movement - against the last chaotic remnants of the liberal economic - imperialism, whose objects of exploitation out of desperation - have fallen into the snare of Bolshevik Marxism, in order to - complete what democracy had begun, the extirpation of the racial - and national consciousness.” - -Rosenberg expounded the Lebensraum idea, which idea was the chief -motivation, the dynamic impulse behind Germany’s waging of aggressive -war. In his journal, the _National Socialist Monatshefte_, for May 1932, -which I wish to offer as Exhibit Number USA-594, our Document Number -2777-PS, he wrote at Page 199: - - “The understanding that the German nation, if it is not to - perish in the truest sense of the word, needs ground and soil - for itself and its future generations; and the second sober - perception that this soil can no more be conquered in Africa, - but in Europe and first of all in the East—these organically - determine the German foreign policy for centuries.” - -Rosenberg expressed his theory as to the place of religion in the -National Socialist State in his _Myth of the Twentieth Century_, -additional excerpts from which are cited in Document 2891-PS. At Page -215 of the “Myth” he wrote as follows: - - “We now realize that the central supreme values of the Roman and - the Protestant Churches being a negative Christianity do not - respond to our soul, that they hinder the organic powers of the - people designated as a Nordic race, that they must give way to - them, that they have to be remodelled to conform to a Germanic - Christianity. Therein lies the meaning of the present religious - search.” - -In the place of traditional Christianity, Rosenberg sought to implant -the neo-pagan myth of the blood. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to break off here for a recess? - -MR. BRUDNO: Yes, Your Honor. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make to the defendants’ -counsel. In view of the applications which were made to the Tribunal -this morning, I immediately ordered on behalf of the Tribunal that an -investigation should be made of the complaints made by defendants’ -counsel about the delay in the delivery of the transcript of the -shorthand notes and such delay will be remedied at once. The -investigation shows that transcripts of the sessions up to and including -the 20th of December can be completed by this afternoon. The transcripts -for the sessions held since the resumption of the Trial will be -distributed, up to and including the 8th of January, by tomorrow -evening. Hereafter, the German transcripts will be regularly distributed -to the Defense Counsel within a period of 48 hours after the session. - -MR. BRUDNO: If Your Honors please, when the Court rose I had just read a -quotation of Rosenberg, in which he expressed his views on Christianity. - -In the place of traditional Christianity, Rosenberg sought to implant -the neo-pagan myth of the blood. At Page 114 in the _Myth of the -Twentieth Century_ he stated as follows: - - “Today, a new faith is awakening; the myth of the blood, the - belief that the divine being of mankind generally is to be - defended with the blood. The faith embodied by the fullest - realization that the Nordic blood constitutes that mystery which - has supplanted and overwhelmed the old sacraments.” - -Rosenberg’s attitudes on religion were accepted as the only philosophy -compatible with National Socialism. In 1940 the Defendant Bormann wrote -to Rosenberg in Document 098-PS, which has been previously introduced as -Exhibit Number USA-350; and I quote: - - “The churches cannot be conquered by a compromise between - National Socialism and Christian teachings but only through a - new ideology, whose coming you, yourself, have announced in your - writings.” - -Rosenberg actively participated in the program for elimination of church -influence. The Defendant Bormann frequently wrote Rosenberg in this -regard, furnishing him information as to proposed action to be -instituted against the churches; and, when necessary, requesting that -action be taken by Rosenberg’s department. I refer to documents -introduced in connection with the case against the Leadership Corps, -such documents as 070-PS, Exhibit Number USA-349, which deals with -abolition of religious services in the schools; Document 072-PS, Exhibit -Number USA-357, dealing with confiscation of religious property; -Document 064-PS, Exhibit Number USA-359, which deals with the inadequacy -of anti-religious material being circulated to the soldiers; Document -089-PS, Exhibit Number USA-360, dealing with curtailment of the -publication of Protestant periodicals; and Document 122-PS, which is -Exhibit Number USA-362, dealing with the closing of theological -faculties. - -Rosenberg was particularly avid in his pursuit of what he called the -“Jewish question.” On the 28th of March 1941, on the occasion of the -opening of the Institute for the Exploration of the Jewish Question, he -set the keynote for its activities and indicated the direction which the -exploration was to take. I would like to quote from Document 2889-PS, -which I offer as Exhibit Number USA-595. This is an excerpt from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_, 29th of March 1941. This is a statement made by -Rosenberg on the occasion of the opening of the institute. - - “For Germany the Jewish question is only then solved when the - last Jew has left the Greater German space. - - “Since Germany with its blood and its folkdom has now broken for - always this Jewish dictatorship for all Europe and has seen to - it that Europe as a whole will become free from the Jewish - parasitism once more, we may, I believe, also say for all - Europeans: For Europe the Jewish question is only then solved - when the last Jew has left the European continent.” - -It has already been seen that Rosenberg did not overlook any opportunity -to put these anti-Semitic beliefs into practice. Your Honors will recall -that in Document 001-PS, which was introduced as Exhibit Number USA-282 -in connection with the case on persecution of the Jews, Rosenberg -recommended that instead of executing 100 Frenchmen as retaliation for -attempts on lives of members of the Wehrmacht, there be executed 100 -Jewish bankers, lawyers, et cetera. The recommendation was made with the -avowed purpose of awakening the anti-Jewish sentiment. - -Document 752-PS, which was introduced this morning by Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe as Exhibit GB-159, discloses that Rosenberg had called an -anti-Semitic congress in June 1944, although this congress was cancelled -due to military events. - -In the realm of foreign policy, in addition to demanding Lebensraum, -Rosenberg called for elimination of the Versailles Treaty and cast aside -any thought of revision of that treaty. In his book _The Nature, Basic -Principles, and Aims of the NSDAP_, written by Rosenberg in 1922, he -expressed his opinions regarding the Treaty of Versailles. Excerpts from -this book are translated in Document 2433-PS, and I offer the book as -Exhibit Number USA-596. He stated as follows: - - “The National Socialists reject the popular phrase of the - ‘Revision of the Peace of Versailles’ as such a revision might - perhaps bring a few numerical reductions in the so-called - ‘obligations’; but the entire German people would still be, just - as before, the slave of other nations.” - -Then he goes on to expound the second point of the Party: - - “We demand equality for the German people with other nations, - the cancellation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. - Germain.” - -Rosenberg conceived of the spread of National Socialism throughout the -world and, as will be subsequently shown, took an active part in -promoting the infection of other nations with his creed. In the _Nature, -Basic Principles, and Aims of the NSDAP_ he states: - - “But National Socialism still believes that its principles and - ideology—though in individual methods of fight according to - various racial conditions—will be directives far beyond the - borders of Germany for the inevitable fights for power in other - countries of Europe and America. There too a clear line of - thought must be drawn, and the racial-nationalistic fight - against the everywhere-similar loan-capitalistic and - Marxist-internationalism must be taken up. National Socialism - believes that once the great world battle is concluded, after - the defeat of the present epoch, there will be a time when the - swastika will be woven into the different banners of the - Germanic peoples as the Aryan symbol of rejuvenation.” - -This statement was made in 1922. It is thus seen that the Defendant -Rosenberg gave authoritative expression to the basic tenets upon which -National Socialism was founded and through the exploitation of which the -conspiracy was crystallized in action. - -Rosenberg’s value to the conspiratorial program found official -recognition with his appointment in 1934 as the Führer’s delegate for -the entire spiritual and philosophical education and supervision of the -NSDAP. His activities in this capacity were vast and varied. - -I now offer in evidence the _National Socialist Year Book_ for the year -1938 as Exhibit Number USA-597. At Page 180 of this book, which is our -Document Number 3531-PS, the functions of Rosenberg’s office as the -Führer’s delegate are described as follows: - - “The sphere of activity of the Führer’s delegate for the entire - spiritual and ideological instruction and education of the - movement, its organizations, including the ‘Strength through - Joy,’ extends to the uniform execution of all the educational - work of the Party and of the affiliated organizations. The - office set up by Reichsleiter Rosenberg has the task of - preparing the ideological education material, of carrying out - the teaching program, and is responsible for the education of - those teachers suited to this educational and instructional - work.” - -As the Führer’s delegate, Rosenberg thus supervised all ideological -education and training within the Party. - -It was Rosenberg’s personal belief that upon the performance of his new -functions as ideological delegate depended the future of National -Socialism. I offer Document 3532-PS as Exhibit Number USA-598. This is -an excerpt from an article by Rosenberg appearing in the March 1934 -issue of _The Educational Letter_. At Page 9 of this publication -Rosenberg states: - - “The focus of all our educational work from now on is the - service for this ideology; and it depends on the result of these - efforts, whether National Socialism will die with our fighting - generation or whether, as we believe, it really represents the - beginning of a new era.” - -In his capacity as the Führer’s delegate for the spiritual and -ideological training, Rosenberg assisted in the preparation of the -curriculum for the Adolf Hitler schools. These schools, it will be -recalled, selected the most suitable candidates from the Hitler Jugend -and trained them for leadership within the Party. They were the elite -schools of National Socialism. The next document, entitled “Documents of -German Politics” is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-365. -Translations of excerpts from this document are found in 3529-PS, Page -389, and read as follows: - - “As stated by Dr. Ley, Reich Organization Leader, on 23 November - 1937 at Ordensburg Sonthofen, these Adolf Hitler Schools, as the - first step of the principle of selecting a special elite, form - an important branch in the educational system of the National - Socialist training of future leaders. . . . - - “‘The curriculum has been laid down by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, - together with the Reich Organization Leader and the Reich Youth - Leader.’” - -Rosenberg exercised further influence in the education of Party members -in the establishment of community schools for all organizations of the -Party. Document 3528-PS is a translation of Page 297 of the 1934 edition -of _Das Dritte Reich_, which I offer as Exhibit Number USA-599. It reads -as follows: - - “We support the request of the Führer’s delegate for the - supervision of the entire spiritual and ideological education - and instruction of the NSDAP, Party member Alfred Rosenberg, to - organize community schools of all organizations of the NSDAP - twice a year, in order to show by this common effort the - ideological and political unity of the NSDAP and the - steadfastness of the National Socialist will.” - -This program was endorsed by the Defendant Schirach as well as by -Himmler, Ley, and others. - -THE PRESIDENT: Aren’t you dealing with this rather in a cumulative way? -Isn’t it possible to summarize this evidence against Rosenberg more than -you are doing? - -MR. BRUDNO: I will try to, Your Honor. However, although the Indictment -charges, and there is already substantial proof to show that the -defendant conspirators used ideological training as an implement in -achieving their rise to power and in consolidating their control, there -seems to be little evidence as to Rosenberg’s position; and I am -introducing this evidence in order to show that he played a dominant -role in this connection. However, I will try to summarize these -documents if I can. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I’ve taken down about 20 documents that you have -alluded to, all of which deal with Rosenberg’s ideological theories. - -MR. BRUDNO: Yes, Your Honor. I was merely trying to show the scope of -his activities. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. BRUDNO: Your Honors will recall that it was in his capacity as -Führer’s delegate that Rosenberg established the Institute for the -Exploration of the Jewish Question in Frankfurt. This institute, -commonly known as the “Hohe Schule,” has been referred to in connection -with the exposition of art plunders. Into its library there flowed -books, documents, and manuscripts which were looted from virtually every -country of occupied Europe. Further evidence on this score will be -introduced by the prosecutor of the Republic of France. - -Your Honors will also recall, and the Record shows at Pages 1671 to 1687 -(Volume IV, Pages 81 to 92), that it was as ideological delegate that -Rosenberg conducted the fabulous art looting activities of the -Einsatzstab Rosenberg, activities which extended to virtually every -country occupied by the Germans. I will not attempt to summarize the -extent of the plunder and merely refer the Tribunal to Document -1015(b)-PS, which has already been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-385, -and Document L-188, which has been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-386. -Document 1015(b)-PS details the looting of 21,000 objects of art; -Document L-188, the looting of the contents of over 71,000 Jewish homes -in the West. This subject, too, will be further developed by the French -Prosecutor. - -The importance of Rosenberg’s activities as official ideologist of the -Nazi Party was not overlooked. In Document 3559-PS, which I wish to -introduce as Exhibit Number USA-600—this document, incidentally, is the -Hart biography of Rosenberg, entitled _Alfred Rosenberg, The Man and His -Work_—it is stated that Rosenberg won the German National Prize in -1937. The creation of this prize, Your Honors will recall, was the -Nazis’ petulant reply to the award of the Nobel Prize to Karl von -Ossietzki, an inmate of a German concentration camp. The citation which -accompanied the award to Rosenberg reads as follows: - - “Alfred Rosenberg has helped with his publications to lay the - scientific and intuitive foundation and to strengthen the - ideology of National Socialism in the most excellent way. . . . - The National Socialist movement, and beyond that, the entire - German people will be deeply gratified that the Führer has - distinguished Alfred Rosenberg as one of his oldest and most - faithful fighting comrades by awarding him the German National - Prize.” - -The contribution which Rosenberg’s book, the _Myth of the Twentieth -Century_, the foundation of all his ideological propaganda, made in the -development of National Socialism, was appraised in a publication Bücher -Kunde in 1942. This publication is our Document Number 3554-PS, dated -November 1942. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-601. The first page sets -forth an appraisal of the _Myth of the Twentieth Century_. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brudno, you referred us to the _Myth of the Twentieth -Century_ on several occasions. - -MR. BRUDNO: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: We really don’t want to hear any more about it. - -MR. BRUDNO: I wish to show that this book is regarded as being one of -the pillars of the movement and I wish to show also, Sir, that it had a -circulation of over a million copies. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think it is absolutely clear from the evidence -which has already been given that Rosenberg was enunciating doctrines of -the ideology of the Nazi Party; and I don’t think that it is necessary -to go any further into details about it. - -MR. BRUDNO: Very well. If the Tribunal is satisfied that Rosenberg’s -ideas formed the foundation for the National Socialist ideological -movement, I will pass on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have already brought out the fact that he was -appointed the Führer’s deputy for that purpose; wasn’t he? - -MR. BRUDNO: Yes, Your Honor. I shall pass on from that point. I would -merely like to make reference, however, to Document 789-PS, which has -already been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-23. This document records -a meeting between Hitler and his supreme commanders, on which occasion -Hitler said, “The building up of our Armed Forces was possible only in -connection with the ideological education of the German people by the -Party.” - -We submit that the contribution which Rosenberg made through formulation -and dissemination of National Socialist ideology was fundamental to the -conspiracy. As the apostle of neo-paganism, the exponent of the drive -for Lebensraum, and the glorifier of the myth of Nordic superiority and -as one of the oldest and most energetic Nazi proponents of -anti-Semitism, he contributed materially to the unification of the -German people behind the swastika. He provided the impetus and the -inspiration for the National Socialist movement. His doctrines were -responsible for the sublimation of morality and the crystallization of -the Nordic dream in the minds of the German people, thereby making them -useful tools in the hands of the conspirators and willing collaborators -in the prosecution of their criminal plan. - -I now pass to the second phase of Rosenberg’s criminal activities—his -active contribution toward the preparation for aggressive war through -the international activities of the APA, the Foreign Policy Office of -the Party. - -As previously indicated in my quotation from _Das Führer Lexikon_, which -is Exhibit Number USA-593, Rosenberg became a Reichsleiter, the highest -level of rank in the Leadership Corps, and was made chief of the foreign -policy office of the Party in April 1933. The organization manual of the -Party, Document 2319-PS, which I offer as Exhibit Number USA-602, -describes the functions of the APA as including the influencing of -public opinion abroad so as to convince foreign nations that Germany -desired peace. The far-flung activities of the APA are indicated at Page -14 of the translation of this document and are stated as follows: - - “1. The APA is divided into three main offices: - - “A. Office for Foreign Areas with its main sections: a) England - and Far East; b) Near East; c) southeast; d) north; e) old - Orient; f) controls, personnel questions, _et cetera_. - - “B. Office of the German Academic Exchange Service. . . . - - “C. Office of Foreign Commerce. - - “2. Moreover, there is in the APA a main office for the press - service and an educational office.” - -The press activities of the APA were designed to influence world opinion -in such a manner as to conceal the conspirators’ true purposes and thus -facilitate the preparation for waging aggressive war. The activities -were carried on, on an ambitious scale. I offer into evidence Document -003-PS, which is entitled _A Short Report on the Activities of the APA -of the NSDAP_. It is Exhibit Number USA-603. The last paragraph on Page -5 of the translation describes the press activities as follows: - - “The Press Division of the APA is staffed by persons conversant - with all languages to be considered. They examine approximately - 300 newspapers daily and deliver to the Führer, the Führer’s - deputy, and all other interested offices the condensations of - the important trends of the entire world press. . . . The Press - Division furthermore maintains an exact record on the prestige - of the most important papers and journalists of the world. Many - embarrassments during conferences in Germany could have been - avoided had one consulted these archives. . . . Further, the - Press Division was able to arrange a host of interviews with me - as well as conducting a great number of unobjectionable foreign - journalists to the various official representatives of Germany.” - -And then: - - “Hearst then personally asked me to write often about the - position of German foreign policy in his papers. This year five - detailed articles have appeared under my name in Hearst papers - all over the world. Since these articles, as Hearst personally - let me know, presented well-founded arguments, he asked me to - write further articles for his paper.” - -Thus, Rosenberg used his foreign policy office to influence world -opinion on behalf of National Socialism. - -It is interesting to note in passing that Rosenberg states, at Page 4 of -this document, that the Romanian anti-Semitic leader, Cuza, followed his -suggestions as—in Rosenberg’s words—“he had recognized in me an -unyielding anti-Semite.” We will hear more of this affair shortly. - -The nature and extent of the activities of the APA are amply disclosed -in a single document. This is the principal document to which I will -refer in this phase of the case against Rosenberg. This document bears -our Number 007-PS and is entitled, “Report on the Activities of the -Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party from 1933 to 1943.” It is signed by -Rosenberg. Portions of Annex 1, attached to the report, have already -been read into evidence as Exhibit GB-84. The body of the report and -Annex 2 have not been referred to heretofore. As will be seen the -document contains a recital of widespread activities in foreign -countries. These activities range from the promotion of economic -penetration to fomentation of anti-Semitism; from cultural and political -infiltration to the instigation of treason. Activities were carried on -throughout the world and extended to such widely separated points as the -Middle East and Brazil. - -Many of the APA’s achievements were brought about through the subtle -exploitation of personal relationships. Reading from the middle of the -first paragraph on Page 2 of the translation, which refers to activities -in Hungary, we learn that: - - “The first foreign state visit after the seizure of power took - place through the mediation of the foreign policy office. Julius - Gömbös, who in former years had himself pursued anti-Semitic and - racial tendencies and with whom the office maintained a personal - connection, had reached the Hungarian Premier’s chair. . . .” - -The APA endeavored to strengthen the war economy by shifting the source -of food imports to the Balkans, as stated in Paragraph 3 on Page 2 of -the translation: - - “Motivated by reasons of war economy, the office advocated the - transfer of raw material purchases from overseas to the areas - accessible by overland traffic routes.” - -Then he goes on to point out that they had successfully shifted the -source of food imports, particularly fruit and vegetable imports, to the -Balkans as a result of the activities of the offices. - -Activities in Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg were confined, according -to the report, to “observation of existing conditions”—a phrase which -may have broad connotations—and “to the establishment of relations, -especially of a commercial nature.” - -In Iran the APA achieved a high degree of economic penetration, in -addition to promoting cultural relations. I quote from the middle of the -third paragraph on Page 3: - - “The office’s initiative in developing, with the help of - commercial circles, entirely new methods for the economic - penetration of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily - favorable way, in reciprocal trade relations. Naturally, in - Germany, too, this initiative encountered a completely negative - attitude and resistance on the part of the competent State - authorities, an attitude that at first had to be overcome. In - the course of a few years, the volume of trade with Iran was - multiplied five-fold and in 1939 Iran’s trade turnover with - Germany had attained first place.” - -In the last sentence on Page 3. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, now, Mr. Brudno, will you kindly explain to the -Tribunal how the paragraph that you just read bears upon the guilt of -Rosenberg in this Trial? - -MR. BRUDNO: If Your Honor pleases, we submit that the conspirators used, -as one of the tools of conspiracy, the economic penetration of those -countries which they deemed strategically necessary to have within the -Axis orbit. The activities of Rosenberg in the field of foreign trade -contributed materially, we submit, to the advancement of the conspiracy, -as charged in the Indictment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting that it is a crime to try and -stimulate trade in foreign countries? - -MR. BRUDNO: If Your Honor pleases, the expression of ideological -opinions or the advancement of foreign trade do not, in themselves, -constitute a crime, we agree. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing here about ideological considerations. -It is simply a question of trade. - -MR. BRUDNO: Further on, Your Honor, he mentions the cultural activities. - -THE PRESIDENT: I was confining myself, in order to try to get on, to the -particular paragraph that you had just cited. - -MR. BRUDNO: I see, Your Honor; we are merely trying to show, Sir, that -the Germans used the foreign trade weapon as a material part of the -conspiratorial program. - -THE PRESIDENT: As I have said before, it is not possible for me or for -any member of this Tribunal to conduct the case of the Prosecution for -them. We can only tell them when we think they are being irrelevant and -cumulative and ask them to try to cut down their presentation. It is for -you to cut it down. - -MR. BRUDNO: Rosenberg goes on to state, if Your Honor please, at Page 3 -of the translation, that “Afghanistan’s neutral position today is -largely due to the office’s activity.” - -In connection with Arabia, he says: - - “The Arab question, too, became part of the work of the office. - In spite of England’s tutelage of Iraq, the office established a - series of connections to a number of leading personalities of - the Arab world, smoothing the way for strong bonds to Germany. - In this connection, the growing influence of the Reich in Iran - and Afghanistan did not fail to have repercussions in Arabia.” - -Rosenberg concluded his report with the statement that, with the -outbreak of war, he was entitled to consider his task as terminated, and -then he says, “The exploitation of the many personal connections in many -lands can be resumed under a different guise.” - -I now turn to Annex 2 of the report, which is found at Page 9 of the -translation. This annex deals with activities in Romania. Here the APA’s -intrigue was more insidious, its interference in the internal affairs of -a foreign nation more pronounced. After describing the failure of what -Rosenberg terms a “basically sound anti-Semitic tendency,” due to -dynastic squabbles and Party fights, Rosenberg describes the APA’s -influence in the unification of conflicting elements. I quote, beginning -with the ninth line of the translation: - - “What was lacking was the guiding leadership of a political - personality. After manifold groping trials the office believed - such a personality to have been found in the former Minister and - poet, Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet, - pervaded by instinctive inspiration, that a greater Romania, - though it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be - maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to - create in him the desire to link the fate of Romania with the - future of the National Socialist German Reich in good time. By - bringing continuing influence to bear, the office succeeded in - inducing Octavian Goga as well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate - the parties under their leadership on an anti-Semitic basis. - Thus they could carry on with united strength the struggle for - Romania’s renascence internally and her Anschluss with Germany - externally. Through the office’s initiative both parties, which - had heretofore been known by distinct names, were merged as the - National Christian Party, under Goga’s leadership and with Cuza - as Honorary President.” - -Rosenberg’s man, Goga, was supported by two splinter parties, which had -not joined the anti-Semitic trend, and Rosenberg states: “Through -intermediaries, the office maintained constant contact with both -tendencies.” - -Goga, the man supported by Rosenberg, was appointed Prime Minister by -the King in December 1937. The pernicious influence of Rosenberg’s -ideology had achieved a major triumph, for he states: - - “Thus a second government on racial and anti-Semitic foundations - had appeared in Europe, in a country in which such an event had - been considered completely impossible.” - -I will not deal at any length with the details of the political turmoil -that plagued Romania during the ensuing period. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brudno, I think the Tribunal are satisfied that -Rosenberg—I mean satisfied, subject to what Rosenberg himself or his -counsel may say—that Rosenberg tried to spread his ideology abroad, and -we don’t require any further detailed proof of that, and we are also -satisfied that we have heard enough of the activities of the APA. - -MR. BRUDNO: Certainly, Your Honor. We feel that if the Tribunal is -satisfied, we can pass on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Subject, as I said, to anything that Rosenberg may prove. - -MR. BRUDNO: Surely. I would merely like to conclude with the statement -that the activities of the APA were, as indicated in this Document -007-PS, primarily responsible for Romania’s joining the Axis. It was a -vital link in Germany’s chain of military strategy. - -I would further like to call to Your Honor’s attention the evidence -which has already been submitted on the activities of the APA in Norway, -activities which led to the treason of Quisling and Hagelin, for which -they have been condemned. - -I come now to the final phase of the case against the Defendant -Rosenberg. We have seen how he aided the Nazi rise to power and directed -the psychological preparation of the German people for waging of -aggressive war. I will now offer proof of his responsibility for the -planning and execution of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity -committed in the vast areas of the occupied East, which he administered -for over 3 years. These areas included the Baltic States, White -Ruthenia, the Ukraine, and the eastern portion of Poland. - -I will not endeavor here to chronicle again the tale of mass murder, -spoliation, and brutality. We feel that that has already been -sufficiently evidenced, and further evidence on this point will be -presented by the Prosecution for the U.S.S.R. and for the Republic of -France. - -We anticipate, however, that Rosenberg will contend that some of these -crimes were committed against his wishes, and, indeed, there is some -evidence that he protested on occasion—not out of humanitarian reasons -but on grounds of political expediency. - -We also anticipate that Rosenberg will attempt to place the blame for -these crimes on other agencies and on other defendants. The evidence -will prove, however, that he himself formulated the harsh policies, in -the execution of which the crimes were committed; that the crimes were -committed for the most part by persons and agencies within his -jurisdiction and control; that any other agencies which participated in -the commission of these crimes were invited by Rosenberg to co-operate -in the administration of the East, although the brutal methods -customarily employed by them were common knowledge; and, finally, his -Ministry lent full co-operation to their activities, despite the -criminal methods that were employed. - -Rosenberg was actively participating in the affairs of the East as early -as 20 April 1941, 2 months prior to the German attack upon the Soviet -Union. On that date he was designated by Hitler as commissioner for the -central control of questions connected with the East European region. - -The Hitler order by virtue of which he received this appointment has -been read into the record in its entirety as Exhibit Number USA-143, our -Document Number 865-PS. - -The initial preparations undertaken by Rosenberg for fulfillment of his -task indicated the extent to which he co-operated in promoting the -military plans for aggression. They also show that he understood his -task at the inception as requiring the assistance of a multitude of -Reich agencies and that he invited their co-operation. - -Shortly after his appointment by Hitler, Rosenberg conducted a series of -conferences with representatives of various Reich agencies, conferences -which are summarized in Document 1039-PS, previously offered as Exhibit -Number USA-146. This document indicated the co-operation of the -following agencies. It indicated that the co-operation of these agencies -was both contemplated and solicited by Rosenberg. The agencies are as -follows: OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of Economics, Commissioner for the Four -Year Plan, the Ministry of the Interior, Reich Youth Leadership, the -German Labor Front, Ministry of Labor, the SS, the SA, and several -others. - -These arrangements, it should be noted, were made by Rosenberg in his -capacity as commissioner on Eastern questions, before the attack on the -Soviet Union, before he was appointed as Reich Minister for the occupied -East, in fact, before there was any occupied East for Germany to -administer. - -I would like to refer briefly to some of Rosenberg’s basic attitudes -regarding his new task and the directives which he knew he would be -expected to follow. - -Your Honor will recall that on 29 April 1941, in Document 1024-PS, -previously introduced as Exhibit Number USA-278, Rosenberg stated that: - - “A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for - which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced - labor for the Jews, creation of ghettos, _et cetera_).” - -On May 8, 1941 he prepared instructions for all Reich commissioners in -the Occupied Eastern Territories. These instructions are found in -Document 1030-PS, previously introduced as Exhibit Number USA-144. The -last paragraph, which has not been called to Your Honors’ attention, -reads as follows: - - “From the point of view of cultural policy, the German Reich is - in a position to promote and direct national culture and science - in many fields. It will be necessary that in some territories an - uprooting and resettlement of various racial stocks will have to - be effected.” - -In Document 1029-PS, which has been introduced as Exhibit Number -USA-145, Rosenberg directs that the Ostland be transformed into a part -of the Greater German Reich by germanizing racially possible elements, -colonizing Germanic races, and banishing undesirable elements. - -In a speech which Rosenberg made on 20 June 1941, Your Honors will -recall, he stated the job of feeding Germans was the top of Germany’s -claim on the East; that there was no obligation to feed the Russian -peoples; that this was a harsh necessity bare of any feelings; that a -very extensive evacuation will be necessary; and that the future will -hold many hard years in store for the Russians. This speech, Your -Honors, is in the record as Document 1058-PS, Exhibit Number USA-147. - -On July 4, 1941, still prior to Rosenberg’s appointment as Reich -Minister for the occupied East, a representative of Rosenberg’s office -attended a conference on the subject of utilization of labor, and -especially of the labor of Soviet prisoners of war. Document 1199-PS is -a memorandum of this conference, and I offer it into evidence as Exhibit -Number USA-604. It states that the participants were, among others, -representatives of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, of the Reich -Labor Ministry, of the Reich Food Ministry, and of the Rosenberg office. -The first sentence states, and I quote: - - “After an introduction by Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Krull, - Lieutenant Colonel Breyer of the PW Department explained that - actually there was a prohibition in effect by the Führer against - bringing Russian PW’s into the Reich for employment, but that - one might count on this prohibition being relaxed a little.” - -The last paragraph records that, and I quote: - - “The chairman summarized the results of the discussion as - indicating that all the bureaus concerned unqualifiedly - advocated and supported the demand for utilization of PW’s - because of manpower needs in the Reich.” - -On 16 July 1941, the day before Rosenberg’s appointment as Minister of -the occupied East, he attended a conference at the Führer’s -headquarters, the minutes of which have been introduced as Document -L-221, Exhibit Number USA-317. At that time Hitler stated, “The Crimea -has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by Germans -alone.” - -He further stated that Germany’s objectives in the East were three-fold: -first, to dominate it; second, to administer it; third, to exploit it. - -Thus, the character of the administration which was contemplated for the -occupied East was well established before Rosenberg took office as -Minister. He knew of these plans and was in accord with them. -Persecution of the Jews, forced labor of prisoners of war, Germanization -and exploitation, were all basic points of policy which Rosenberg knew -of at the time he assumed office. - -On July 17, 1941, Rosenberg was appointed Reich Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories. The decree by which he was appointed is in -evidence as Document 1997-PS, Exhibit Number USA-319. - -I would like now to examine the organizational structure and the chain -of responsibility which existed within the Ministry for the occupied -East. - -The organizational structure of the East was such as we will show that -Rosenberg was not merely a straw man. He was the supreme authority with -full control. - -Document 1056-PS is a mimeographed treatise entitled, “The Organization -of the Administration of the Occupied Eastern Territories.” It is -undated and unsigned, but we can obtain further information regarding it -by reference to EC-347, which is Göring’s Green Folder, already in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-320. - -It is noted that Part II, Subsection A, of Document EC-347 is entitled, -and I quote: “Excerpts from the Directives of the Reich Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories and for the Civil Administration,” and then -in parenthesis, “Brown Folder, Part I, Pages 25 to 30.” - -The two paragraphs which follow are identical to two paragraphs found at -the top of Page 9 of the translation of Document 1056-PS. Thus Document -1056-PS is identified as being a mimeograph of Part I of the Brown -Folder which was mentioned in the Green Folder, and was issued by the -Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. - -I now offer Document 1056-PS as Exhibit Number USA-605. I offer this -document for the purpose of proving, from the directives issued by the -Rosenberg Ministry itself, the extent of Rosenberg’s authority; that he -was the supreme civilian authority in the Eastern territories. The -document will show that there was a continuous chain of command from -Rosenberg down to the regional administrative officials, a chain of -command which extended even to the local prison warden. - -The document also will show the relationship which existed between the -Rosenberg Ministry and other German agencies, a relationship which -varied from full control by Rosenberg to full co-operation with them, -made mandatory by his directives and by Hitler’s orders. - -Finally, the document will show that the various subdivisions of the -Ministry were required to submit periodic reports of the situation -within their jurisdiction, so that the numerous reports of unspeakable -brutality which Rosenberg received, and which are already in the record, -were submitted to him pursuant to his orders. - -The first paragraph of this significant document states as follows: - - “The newly occupied Eastern territories are subordinated to the - Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. By - direction of the Führer he establishes a civil administration - there, upon withdrawal of the military administration. He heads - and supervises the entire administration of this area and - represents the sovereignty of the Reich in the Occupied Eastern - Territories.” - -At the top of Page 2 of the translation is stated, and I quote: - - “To the Reich Ministry is assigned a deputy of the Reich Leader - SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the - Interior.” - -Roman numeral III on Page 2 of the translation defines the -responsibility of the Reich commissioners as, and I quote: - - “In the Reich commissariats, Reich commissioners are responsible - for the entire civil administration under the supreme authority - of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. - According to the instructions of the Reich Minister for the - Occupied Eastern Territories, the Reich Commissioner, as a - functionary of the Reich, heads and supervises, within his - precincts, the entire civil administration. Within the scope of - these instructions he acts on his own responsibility.” - -And then the chain of command is outlined: Subordinate offices, general -commissariats, main commissariats, district commissariats, _et cetera_. - -In the second last paragraph on Page 3 of the translation it is stated -again: - - “The Higher SS and Police Leader is directly subordinated to the - Reich Commissioner. However, the Chief of Staff has the general - right to secure information from him also. . . . - - “Great stress is to be placed on close co-operation between him, - the Chief of Staff, and the other main department heads of the - office of the Reich Commissioner, particularly with the one for - policies.” - -To digress from this document a moment, I ask that the Court take -judicial notice of the decree signed by Rosenberg, dated July 17, 1941, -and found in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of the Reich Minister for the -occupied East, 1942, Number 2, Pages 7 and 8. - -This decree provides for the creation of summary courts for decisions on -crimes committed by non-Germans in the East. The courts are to be -presided over by a police officer or an SS leader, who have authority to -order the death sentence or confiscation of property, and those -decisions are not subject to appeal. The general commissar is given the -right to reject a decision. Thus, the determination of the SS, of these -summary courts, is made subordinate to the authority of a representative -of the Rosenberg Ministry. - -At Page 4 of the translation of Document 1056-PS, the position of the -Commissioner General is defined. It is stated here that: “The -Commissioner General forms the administrative office of intermediate -appeal.” - -Three paragraphs down it is stated, and I quote: - - “The SS and Police Leader assigned to the Commissioner General - is directly subordinated to him. However, the Chief of Staff has - the general right of requiring information from him.” - -The document goes on to describe the function of the various -subdivisions of the Ministry, concluding with regional commissioners who -preside over the local administrative districts. They, too, have police -units assigned to them and directly subordinated to them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Brudno, surely that could have been stated in a -sentence without referring us to all these passages in this document. I -mean, Rosenberg was the Minister for the Eastern Territories. He had -under him Reich commissioners and SS units, who had the full -administration—civil administration—of the Eastern Territories. If you -had stated that, surely that would have been sufficient. - -MR. BRUDNO: Very well, Your Honor. - -I will proceed from that point, then, merely to point out that the -economic exploitation of the territory was undertaken in the fullest -co-operation with the Commissioner of the Four Year Plan, as shown by -Paragraph 2 of Page 7 of the translation. It is stated there that the -economic inspectorates of the Commissioner of the Four Year Plan will be -substantially absorbed in the agencies of the civil administration after -the establishment of the civil administration. - -I also wish to call Your Honors’ attention to the first paragraph on -Page 6, which reads as follows: - - The various commissioners, it says, “are, aside from the - military agencies, the only Reich authorities in the Occupied - Eastern Territories. Other Reich authorities may not be - established alongside them. They handle all questions of - administration of the area which is subordinate to their - sovereignty and all affairs which concern the organization and - activity of the administration, including those of the police, - in the supervision of the autonomous agencies and organizations - and of the population.” - -I now turn briefly to the second section of the document which is -entitled, “Working Directives for the Civil Administration.” The first -two paragraphs on Page 9 have been read into the record as part of -Document EC-347, Exhibit Number USA-320. I call particular attention to -the statement that the “Hague Rules of Land Warfare, which deal with the -administration of a country occupied by a foreign armed power, are not -valid.” - -I continue quoting at the last paragraph on Page 9: - - “The handling of cases of sabotage is a concern of the Higher SS - and Police Leader, of the SS and Police Leader, or of the Police - leaders of the lower echelon. Insofar as collective measures - against the population appear appropriate, the decision about - them rests with the competent commissar. - - “To inflict penalties in cash or kind, as well as to order the - seizure of hostages and the shooting of inhabitants of the - territory in which the acts of sabotage have taken place, rests - only with the Commissioner General, unless the Reich - Commissioner himself intervenes.” - -I conclude with this document by quoting the first sentence at the top -of Page 13: - - “The district commissioners are responsible for the supervision - of all prisons, unless the Reich commissioners intervene.” - -I will not take the time of the Tribunal, nor burden the Record, with a -detailed account of the manner in which Rosenberg’s plenary authority -and power were wielded. There is evidence in the Record, and there will -be additional evidence presented by the Soviet prosecutor, as to the -magnitude of the War Crimes and the Crimes against Humanity perpetrated -against the peoples of the occupied East. - -However, merely to illustrate the manner in which Rosenberg participated -in the criminal activities conducted within his jurisdiction, I would -like to refer briefly to a few examples. - -I call your attention to the document numbered R-135, which was -previously introduced as Exhibit Number USA-289. In this document the -prison warden of Minsk reports that 516 German and Russian Jews had been -killed, and called attention to the fact that valuable gold had been -lost due to the failure to knock out the fillings of the victims’ teeth -before they were done away with. - -These activities took place in the prison at Minsk, a prison which, Your -Honors will recall from Document 1056-PS, was directly under the -supervision of the Ministry for the occupied East. - -For my next illustration I wish to offer Document 018-PS. This document -has already been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-186. I would like to -read to the Tribunal the first paragraph of Document 018-PS, which has -not yet been read into the Record. The document reveals that Rosenberg -wrote Sauckel on 21 November 1942, in the following terms: - - “I thank you very much for your report on the execution of the - great task given to you; and I am glad to hear that in carrying - out your mission you have always found the necessary support, - even on the part of the civilian authorities in the Occupied - Eastern Territories. For myself and the officials under my - command, this collaboration was and is self-evident, especially - since both you and I have, with regard to the solution of the - labor problem in the East, represented the same points of view - from the beginning.” - -As late as 11 July 1944 the Rosenberg Ministry was actively concerned -with the continuation of the forced labor program, in spite of the -retreat from the East. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): After making this generality, Rosenberg goes -on to object, at the last here, to the methods used. You haven’t -mentioned that. - -MR. BRUDNO: Quite right, Your Honor. Those objections are already in the -record, Sir, and I was merely referring to this document to show that -Rosenberg favored recruitment from the East, that his civilian -administrators co-operated with the recruitment in spite of the methods -used, the methods which were known to Rosenberg as he reports in the -letter himself. - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): High Tribunal, in -this connection I must protest that the Prosecutor did not finish -reading this Paragraph 1 he has just quoted. For then comes the sentence -in which he states that an agreement existed between Sauckel and -Rosenberg regarding. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you can have heard that the United States -Member of the Tribunal has just made this very point, which you are now -making to Counsel for the United States, and has pointed out to him that -he ought to have read there, or drawn attention at any rate, to the -other paragraphs in this document which showed that Rosenberg was -objecting to the methods used. - -DR. THOMA: High Tribunal, I would like to point out that the prosecutor -quoted just the first two sentences of a specific paragraph. The same -paragraph ends, however, where it is stated that “there was an agreement -between Sauckel and me according to which workers were to be treated -well in Germany, and for this purpose welfare organizations were to be -created”. The presentation of the prosecutor creates the impression that -the Defendants Sauckel and Rosenberg had agreed only on the use of -forced labor without restraint and on the deportation of the workers -from the East. - -THE PRESIDENT: As Counsel for the United States pointed out, the other -passages in the document have already been read. And, naturally, the -whole document will be treated as being in evidence. - -The Tribunal fully realizes the point you are making, that it is not -fair to read one passage of a document when there are other passages in -the document which show that the passage read is not a full or proper -statement of the document. - -MR. BRUDNO: If Your Honor pleases, I was not attempting to delude the -Tribunal; it was merely in the interest of time that I did not read the -balance. The rest is in the Record. - -THE PRESIDENT: I realize that. - -We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-FIRST DAY - Thursday, 10 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. BRUDNO: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose yesterday -I had finished the submission of proof as to Rosenberg’s responsibility -and authority in the Occupied Eastern Territories and was about to -conclude my presentation with four brief examples as to the manner in -which his authority was exercised. I was in the middle of the third -example, which, Your Honors will recall, dealt with Rosenberg’s -participation in the forced labor program. I wish to conclude that -illustration with reference to Document 199-PS, which we offer as -Exhibit Number USA-606. This document is a letter from Alfred Meyer, -Rosenberg’s deputy, and is addressed to Sauckel, dated July 11, 1944. -This time, Your Honors will note, it is Rosenberg’s Ministry that is -urging action. I wish to quote Item Number 1 of this letter, which reads -as follows: - - “The War Effort Task Force Command formerly stationed in Minsk - must continue, under all circumstances, the calling up of young - White Ruthenian and Russian men for military employment in the - Reich. In addition the Command has the mission of bringing young - boys of 10-14 years of age into the Reich.” - -My third illustration deals with Rosenberg’s exercise of his legislative -powers, and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the decree signed -by Lohse, who was Reich Commissar for Ostland. This decree is published -in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of the Reich Commissar for Ostland, 1942, -Number 38, Pages 158 and 159. It provides for the seizure of the entire -property of the Jewish population in the Ostland, including the claims -of Jews against third parties. The seizure is made retroactive to the -day of occupation of the territory by German troops. This sweeping -decree was issued and published by Rosenberg’s immediate subordinate, -and it must be assumed that Rosenberg knew of it and acquiesced in it. - -I now come to my final illustration. This illustration is derived from -Document 327-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-338. - -It is a copy of a secret letter from Rosenberg to Bormann dated 17 -October 1944. It furnishes a graphic account of Rosenberg’s activities -in the economic exploitation of the occupied East. I wish to quote from -the first paragraph on Page 1, which has not been read into the Record. -I quote: - - “In order not to delay the liquidation of companies under my - supervision, I beg to point out that the companies concerned are - not private firms but business enterprises of the Reich, so that - directives with regard to them, just as with regard to - Government offices, are reserved to the highest authorities of - the Reich. I supervise the following companies. . . .” - -There follows a list of nine companies: A trading company, an -agricultural development company, a supply company, a pharmaceutical -company, and five banking concerns. On Page 3 of the translation at Item -1 (a) the mission of the trading company is stated to be, and I quote: - - “Seizure of all agricultural products as well as commercial - marketing and transportation thereof. (Delivery to Armed Forces - and the Reich).” - -I now call your attention to Item 5 of the same page. It describes the -activities of the companies as follows: - - “During this period, the Z.O.”—that is, the Central Trading - Corporation East—“together with its subsidiaries has seized: - - “Grain 9,200,000 tons, meat and meat products 622,000 tons, - linseed 950,000 tons, butter 208,000 tons, sugar 400,000 tons, - fodder 2,500,000 tons, potatoes 3,200,000 tons, seeds 141,000 - tons, other agricultural products 1,200,000 tons, and - 1,075,000,000 eggs. - - “The following was required for transportation: 1,418,000 - freight cars and 472,000 tons shipping space.” - -In conclusion we submit that the evidence has shown that the Defendant -Rosenberg played a leading role in the Nazi Party’s rise to power by -moulding German thought so as to promote the conspirators’ ambitions; -that he played a leading role in spreading propaganda and intrigue, and -in instigating treason in foreign countries, so as to pave the way for -the waging of wars of aggression; and that he bears full responsibility -for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity which were perpetrated in -the Occupied Eastern Territories and which will be further developed by -the prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. - -This completes the presentation of the case against the Defendant -Rosenberg. The next presentation will be that of the case against the -Defendant Frank, which will be presented by Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin. - -LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM H. BALDWIN (Assistant Trial Counsel for the -United States): May it please the Tribunal, we wish now to deal with the -individual responsibility of the Defendant Frank. In accordance with the -expressed desire of the Tribunal, this presentation has been strictly -limited; and, of course, I should welcome any direction from the -Tribunal as to length or method as I proceed. - -First, I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Miss Harriet Zetterberg, of -our legal staff, and to Dr. Pietrowski, of the Polish Delegation, for -their invaluable work—Dr. Pietrowski and the Polish Delegation, -naturally, having a special interest in the Defendant Frank. - -Aspects of the criminal complicity of the Defendant Hans Frank under -Count One of the Indictment have been placed before this Tribunal on -several occasions. There remain, however, certain matters for -discussion—either novel in presentation or in development—concerning -this defendant as an individual, before the United States’ portion of -the Prosecution’s case against him is completed. Our Soviet colleagues -will carry further the heavy complaint against the Defendant Frank in -their treatment of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the East. -We wish here merely to touch upon that evidence which, we believe, -irrefutably discloses Frank to have been a tremendously important cog in -the machine which conceived, promoted, and executed the Nazi Common Plan -or Conspiracy. Documents relating to this point have been assembled in a -document book bearing the letters “FF.” I am informed that these books, -as well as explanatory briefs, have been distributed for the use of the -members of the Tribunal. - -Reference will be made in the course of this argument to the so-called -Frank diary, portions of which have already been brought to the -attention of the Tribunal. It seems appropriate that brief mention -should here be made of the content and source of this diary. It is a set -of some 38 volumes, most of which are on the table at the front of the -courtroom, detailing the activities of the Defendant Frank from 1939 to -the end of the war in his capacity as Governor General of Occupied -Poland. It is a record, in short, of each day’s business, hour by hour, -appointment by appointment, conference by conference, speech by speech, -and—in truth we believe—crime by crime. Each volume, excepting the -last few, is now handsomely bound; and in those volumes, which deal with -the conferences of Frank and his underlings in the Government General, -the name of each person attending the meeting is inscribed in his own -handwriting on a page preceding the minutes of the conference itself. It -is incredibly shocking to the normal conscience that such a neat history -of murder, starvation, and extermination should have been maintained by -the individual responsible for such deeds, but by now the Tribunal is -well aware that the Nazi leaders were sentimentally fond of elaborately -documenting their exploits, as witness the Rosenberg volumes displaying -the looted art treasures and the album reporting on the extermination of -Jews in the Warsaw ghetto. The complete set of the Frank diary was found -in Bavaria, at Neuhaus, near Schliersee, on 18 May 1945, by the 7th -American Army. It was taken to the 7th Army document center at -Heidelberg and on or about 20 September 1945 the collection was sent to -the Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel here at Nuremberg. It is here in -court in its entirety; and now its tones, we submit, are those of -accusation rather than boastful narration. - -That the Defendant Frank held a position of leadership in the Nazi Party -and in the German Government is undeniable. Even, presumably, it would -be unfair to the Defendant Frank to underestimate his importance in the -Nazi hierarchy and the Third Reich. Like the other defendants in this -case, he was a man of far-reaching influence and position; and his -office-holding record is already before this Court. It is an affidavit -signed by the Defendant Frank and identified as Exhibit Number USA-7. -This document contains a listing of 11 important positions held by Frank -in the Party and in the Government and supports the assertion of -influence and position which I have just made, especially since this -Tribunal has been fully apprised of the criminal activities of the Nazi -organizations and formations. - -The machinations of Frank divide themselves logically into two periods. -In the one, from 1920 to 1939, he was by his own admission the leading -Nazi jurist, although parenthetically the word “jurist” loses its -reputable content when modified by the word “Nazi”. In the other period, -extending from 10 October 1939 until the end of the war, he was Governor -General of occupied Poland. While he is most notorious for his -persecutions and carrying out of the conspiracy in the latter capacity, -it is the opinion of the United States Prosecution that the Defendant -Frank’s contributions to the Nazi rise to power as the leading Nazi -jurist should not pass without mention. It is with this aspect that I -shall first deal—the Defendant Frank’s furtherance of the realization -of the conspirators’ program in the field of law, his knowledge of the -criminal purpose of the program, and his active participation therein. - -The Defendant Frank, himself, described his role in the Nazi struggle -for power in the following words, which were remarks he ordered his -secretary to place in the Frank diary on 28 August 1942. The remarks -appear in the diary and are translated in our Document 2233(x)-PS, -which, if the Court please, is at Page 54 in the document book before -it. - -The numbers of the pages of the document book will be found in the upper -right-hand corner in colored pencil, either red or blue. The original of -this document I now offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-607. In the -German text these extracts appear in Part 3 of the 1942 diary volume on -Pages 968, 969, and 983. Frank says: - - “I have since 1920 continually dedicated my work to the NSDAP. - As a National Socialist I was a participant in the events of - November 1923, for which I received the Order of the Blood. - After the resurrection of the movement in the year 1925, my - really greater activity in the movement began, which made me, - first gradually, later almost exclusively, the legal adviser of - the Führer and of the Reich Party Directorate of the NSDAP. I - was thus the representative of the legal interests of the - growing Third Reich in a legal-ideological as well as in a - practical way.” - -He goes on to say: - - “The culmination of this work I see in the Leipzig army trial, - in which I succeeded in having the Führer admitted to the famous - oath of legality, a circumstance which gave the Movement legal - grounds to expand on a large scale. The Führer, indeed, - recognized this achievement and in 1926 made me leader of the - National Socialist Lawyers’ League; in 1929, Reichsleiter of the - Reich Legal Office of the NSDAP; in March 1933, Bavarian - Minister of Justice; in the same year, Reich Commissioner for - Justice; in 1934, President of the Academy of German Law, - founded by me; and in December 1934, Reich Minister without - Portfolio. And in 1939, I was finally appointed Governor General - for the occupied Polish territories. - - “So I was, am, and will remain the representative jurist of the - struggle period of National Socialism. . . . - - “I profess myself now and always, as a National Socialist and a - faithful follower of the Führer, Adolf Hitler, whom I have now - served since 1919. . . .” - -It is indeed significant and worth mentioning to the Court. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this an extract from his diary? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: Yes, Sir; it is. - -THE PRESIDENT: And are the words “Present: Dr. Hans Frank and others” -written by him in his diary? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: Yes, Sir; they are. Before each of these excerpts, if -Your Honor pleases, if it was in conference it was indicated which -members of the Government General were present or who made the address. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: It is indeed significant and worth mentioning to the -Court that the Defendant Frank assumes responsibility for the so-called -oath of legality at the Leipzig army trial. At that trial, in 1930, -three army officers were accused of—curiously enough—conspiracy to -high treason. The charge was that the defendants in that trial, in their -capacity as members of the German Army, tried to form National Socialist -cells in the German Army and to influence the German Army to such an -extent that, in the case of a Putsch by the National Socialists, the -army would not fire at the National Socialists, but would stand at ease -instead. All three of the officers were found guilty and sentenced to 18 -months’ confinement. At that trial, however, Hitler was a witness; and -during the course of the trial, testified under oath that the term -“revolution,” used by him, meant only spiritual revolution in Germany -and that the expression “heads would roll in the sand” meant only that -they would do so as a result of legal procedure through state tribunals, -if the National Socialists came to power. This, if the Court please, was -the so-called oath of legality, the lie that the Defendant Frank -provided his Führer as a facade for the conspiracy and which he, at -least in 1942, considered the culmination of his efforts. - -As the “representative jurist of the struggle period of National -Socialism” and in various juridical capacities listed in his affidavit -of positions held, Defendant Frank was, between 1933 and 1939, the most -prominent policy-maker in the field of German legal theory. For example, -Defendant Frank founded the Academy of German Law in 1934 and he was -president of this once potent body until 1942. The statute defining the -functions of this Academy conferred upon it wide power to initiate and -co-ordinate juridical policies. - -This statute appears in the translation at Page 5 in the document book -as our Document 1391-PS and appears in the 1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_ at -Page 605. We ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. I now quote -briefly from the decree: - - “It is the task of the Academy for German Law to further the - reorganization of legal procedure in Germany. Closely connected - with the agencies competent for legislation, it shall further - the realization of the National Socialist program in the realm - of the law. This task shall be carried out by approved - scientific methods. - - “The Academy’s task shall cover primarily: - - “1. The formulation, initiation, judging, and preparing of - drafts of law; 2. collaboration in rejuvenating and unifying the - training in jurisprudence and political science; 3. the editing - and supporting of scientific publications; 4. financial - assistance for work and research in specific fields of law and - political economy.” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you have to read all this? We will take -judicial notice of it. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: Among the early tasks which Defendant Frank set for -himself, as policy-maker in the field of law, were the unification of -the German State, the promotion of racial legislation, and the -elimination of political organizations other than the Nazi Party. In a -radio address given on 20 March 1934 he announced success in these -matters. Our partial English translation of this speech appears as -Document 2536-PS, at Page 64 in the document book. The official text of -this speech appears in _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume II -(first edition), Pages 294-298. In the German text the extracts which I -shall quote appear at Pages 296 and 298, and I will ask the Court to -take judicial notice of these passages: - - “The first task was that of uniting all Germans into one State. - It was an outstanding historical and legislative accomplishment - on the part of our Führer that by boldly grasping historical - development he eliminated the sovereignty of the various German - states. At last we have now, after 1,000 years, again a unified - German State in every respect. It is no longer possible for the - world, based on the spirit of resistance inherent in small - states, which are set up on an egoistical scale and solely with - a view to their individual interest, to make calculations to the - detriment of the German people. That is a thing of the past for - all times to come.” - -I pass on now to the second excerpt: - - “The second fundamental law of the Hitler Reich is racial - legislation. The National Socialists were the first in the - entire history of human law to elevate the concept of race to - the status of a legal term. The German Nation, unified racially - and nationally, will in the future be legally protected against - any further disintegration of the German race stock.” - -I pass now to the mention of the sixth law: - - “The sixth fundamental law was the legal elimination of those - political organizations which within the State, during the - period of the regeneration of the people and the reconstruction - of the Reich, were once able to place their selfish aims ahead - of the common good of the nation. This elimination has taken - place entirely legally. It is not the coming to the fore of - despotic tendencies, but it was the necessary legal consequence - of a clear political result of the 14 years’ struggle of the - NSDAP. - - “In accordance with these unified legal aims”—Frank - continues—“in all spheres, particular efforts have for months - now been made regarding the work of the great reform of the - entire field of German law. - - “As the leader of the German jurists, I am convinced that, - together with all strata of the German people, we shall be able - to construct the legal state of Adolf Hitler in every respect - and to such an extent that no one in the world will at any time - be able to dare to attack this constitutional state as regards - its laws.” - -In his speech on the occasion of the day of the Reich University -Professors of the National Socialist Lawyers’ League on 3 October 1936, -the Defendant Frank explained to the gathering of professors the -elimination of Jews from the legal field, in accordance with the Nazi -plan. Our partial translation of this speech appears as Document -2536-PS, at Page 62 of the document book. The official text appears -likewise in _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, in Volume IV, Pages 225 -to 230. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this. It deals, to -summarize. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need it because we have already had -documents of the same sort. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: As the leading Nazi jurist, the Defendant Frank -accepted, condoned, and promoted the system of concentration camps and -of arrest without warrant. He apparently had no hesitancy in subverting -his professional ethics, if any he had, while subverting the legal -framework of the German State to Nazi ends. He explains the outrageous -departure from civilization that were concentration camps in an article -on “Legislation and Judiciary in the Third Reich,” published in 1936 in -the official journal of the Academy of German Law, of which, of course, -he was the editor. The partial translation of this article appears as -our Document 2533-PS, at Page 61 of the document book. The official -German text of the extract appears in _Zeitschrift der Akademie für -Deutsches Recht_, 1936, at Page 141, and I will ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of this. Since the extract is short, I will ask -permission to read it. Frank says: - - “Before the world we are blamed again and again because of the - concentration camps. We are asked: Why do you arrest without a - warrant of arrest? I say: Put yourselves into the position of - our nation. Don’t forget that the very great and still untouched - world of Bolshevism cannot forget that here on our German soil - we have made final victory for them impossible in Europe.” - -It can be seen, therefore, that just as other defendants mobilized the -military, economic, and diplomatic resources for aggressive war, the -Defendant Frank, in the field of legal policy, geared the German -juridical machine for a war of aggression, which war of aggression, as -he explained in 1942 to the NSDAP political leaders of Galicia at a mass -meeting in Lvov—and I now quote from the Frank diary, our Document -2233(s)-PS, at Page 50 in the document book, the original of which I -offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-607—had for its purpose, and I -quote: “. . . to expand the living space for our people in a natural -manner.” - -The distortions and warpings of German law, which Defendant Frank -engineered for the Party, gave him, if not the world, vast satisfaction. -He reported this to the powerful Academy for German Law in November -1939, 1 month after becoming Governor General of occupied Poland. This -speech is partially translated in our Document 3445-PS, at Page 73 in -the document book. The official text of the speech appears in _Deutsches -Recht_, 1939, Volume 2, the week of 23-30 December 1939, beginning at -Page 2121; and we ask the Court to take judicial notice of this, but -would ask permission to read the excerpt, as it is very short. Frank -stated: - - “Today we are proud of having formulated our legal principles - from the very beginning in such a way that they need not be - changed in the case of war. For the maxim—that which serves the - Nation is right, and that which harms it is wrong, which stood - at the beginning of our legal work and which established this - idea of the community of the people as the only standard of the - law—this maxim shines out also in the social order of these - times.” - -If this sentiment has a familiar ring to it, it is because it is a -restatement of a Party commandment tailored and furnished by the Party -lawyer to fit the Party’s concept of law. I allude, of course, to the -Party commandment, commented upon at Page 1608 (Volume IV, Page 38) of -the official English transcript of these proceedings in the treatment of -the Leadership Corps, which commandment stated and I quote, “Right is -that which serves the Movement and thus Germany.” - -It follows, I think, that the Prosecution conceives the Defendant Frank -to be jointly responsible for all those cruel and discriminatory -enabling acts and decrees through which the Nazis crushed minorities in -Germany and consolidated their control over the German State and -prepared it for its early entry upon aggression. It matters not, in our -view, that the signature of this lawyer does not appear at the foot of -every decree. Enough has been shown, in our submission, to indicate -culpability in this regard. There is sufficient, we believe, now in this -Record—and I refer to decrees cited by Major Walsh in his treatment of -the persecution of the Jews and by Colonel Storey in his treatment of -the Reich Cabinet—to demonstrate that type of enactment and the -consequences thereof, for which we hold the Defendant Frank liable. In -following this theory, may it please the Tribunal, we are only arriving -at conclusions already arrived at for us by the Defendant Frank himself. - -I now pass to that second and well-known phase of the Defendant Frank’s -official life, wherein he for 5 years, as chief Party and Government -agent, was bent upon the elimination of a whole people. He was appointed -Governor General of the occupied Polish territory by a decree signed by -his then Führer on 12 October 1939. The decree defined the scope of -Frank’s executive power and is contained in our Document 2537-PS, at -Page 66 in the document book. I shall ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of this, since it appears in _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1939, Part I, -Page 2077. - -It merely states that Dr. Frank is appointed as Governor General of the -occupied Polish territory; that Dr. Seyss-Inquart is appointed as Deputy -Governor General, and that “the Governor General shall be directly -responsible to me”—meaning Hitler, he having signed the decree. - -While some of the outside world was prone in earlier days to wonder at -the apparent efficiency of Nazi administration, we now know that it was -often riddled with the petty jealousies of small men in positions of -some authority and with jurisdictional fractiousness. No such difficulty -existed with the Defendant Frank, however, for though he was not without -the threat of divided authority, he insisted upon, and was granted, the -favor of supreme command within the territorial confines of the -Government General. Only two references from his diary, one in 1940 and -one in 1942, are necessary to show the all-inclusiveness of his -direction and authority. - -At a meeting of department heads of the Government General on 8 March -1940 in the Bergakademie, the Defendant Frank clarified his status as -Governor General; and these remarks appear in the diary and in our -Document 2233(m)-PS, at Page 42 in the document book, the original of -which I offer into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-173. - -In the German text, the extracts appear in the meetings of department -heads, Volume 2 for 1939-1940, at Pages 5, 6, 7, and 8. Frank says: - - “One thing is certain. The authority of the Governor General as - the representative of the will of the Führer and the will of the - Reich in this territory is certainly strong, and I have always - emphasized that I would not tolerate misuse of this authority. I - have made this known anew at every office in Berlin, especially - after Herr Field Marshal Göring on 12. 2. 1940, from Karin Hall, - had forbidden all administrative offices of the Reich, including - the Police and even the Wehrmacht, to interfere in - administrative matters of the Government General. . . .” - -He goes on to say: - - “There is no authority here in the Government General which is - higher as to rank, stronger in influence, and of greater - authority than that of the Governor General. Even the Wehrmacht - has no governmental or official functions here of any kind; it - has only security functions and general military duties—it has - no political power whatsoever. The same applies to the Police - and the SS. There is here no state within a state, but we are - representatives of the Führer and of the Reich.” - -Later, in 1942, at a conference of the district political leaders of the -NSDAP in Kraków on 18 March, Defendant Frank further explained the -relationship between the administration and the Reichsführer SS Himmler. -These remarks appear in the diary and in our Document 2233(r)-PS and at -Page 48 of the document book, the original of which I offer into -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-608. In the German text, the extract to -be quoted appears at Pages 185 and 186 of diary Volume 18, 1942, Part I. -I quote: - - “As you know”—says Frank—“I am a fanatic as to unity in - administration. . . . It is therefore clear that the Higher SS - and Police Leader is subordinated to me, that the Police is a - component of the Government, that the SS and Police Leader in - the district is subordinated to the Governor, and that the - district chief has the authority of command over the gendarmerie - in his district. This the Reichsführer SS has recognized; in the - written agreement all these points are mentioned word for word - and signed. It is also self-evident that we cannot establish a - closed shop here which can be treated in the traditional manner - of small states.” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you think all this has to be read? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: It is considered important, Sir, by the United States -Prosecution, in view of the fact that this is the later extract from the -diary and indicates that 2 years later even Frank considered himself to -be the supreme authority in the Government General. This is a point -which we conceive to be of importance, Sir. May I proceed? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - LT. COL. BALDWIN: “It would, for instance, be ridiculous if we - would build up here a security policy of our own against our - Poles in the country, while knowing that the Poles in West - Prussia, in Posen, in Warthegau, and in Silesia have one and the - same movement of resistance. So the Reichsführer SS and Chief of - the German Police must be able to carry out, with his agencies, - his police measures concerning the interests of the Reich as a - whole. This, however, will be done in such a way that the - measures to be adopted will first be submitted to me and carried - out only when I give my consent. In the Government General the - Police are the armed forces. Consequently the leader of the - Police will be called by me into the Government of the - Government General; he is subordinate to me, or to my deputy, as - a state secretary for security.” - -At this juncture, it is appropriate to mention that the man who filled -the position of State Secretary for Security in the Government General -was Frank’s Higher SS and Police Leader, Krüger. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the next page? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: May it please the Tribunal; I shall come to that -excerpt later. - -THE PRESIDENT: In the same document? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: Yes, Sir. It seems more appropriate at another point. - -The Tribunal may recall that the reports of the extermination of Jews in -the Warsaw ghetto were made in the spring of 1943 by SS Leader Stroop, -who immediately supervised the operation, to this same Krüger, who was -still at that time one of the two most influential members of Frank’s -Cabinet, as State Secretary for Security. - -It was inevitable that the grand conspiracy or common plan should have -as its component parts a host of small plans each dealing with a -particular sphere of activity. These plans, differing from the master -plan only in size, are the blueprints for a specific action drawn from -the broad policies. Occupied Poland was no exception to this rule. The -plan for the administration of Poland was contained in a top secret -memorandum of a conference between Hitler and the Chief of the OKW, -Defendant Keitel, entitled “Regarding Future Relations of Poland to -Germany” and dated 20 October 1939. This report was initialed by General -Warlimont. It is our Document 864-PS and may be found at Page 3 of the -document book, and I shall offer it into evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-609. - -I shall quote, if the Court please, only from Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, and 6: - - “1) The Armed Forces will welcome it if they can dispose of - administrative questions in Poland. On principle, there cannot - be two administrations. . . . - - “3) It is not the task of the administration to make Poland into - a model province or a model state of the German order or to put - her economically or financially on a sound basis. - - “The Polish intelligentsia must be prevented from forming a - ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain - low; we want only to draw labor forces from there. Poles are - also to be used for the administration of the country. However, - the forming of national political groups may not be allowed. - - “4) The administration has to work on its own responsibility and - must not be dependent on Berlin. We do not want to do there what - we do in the Reich. The responsibility does not rest with the - Berlin Ministries since there is no German administration unit - concerned. - - “The accomplishment of this task will involve a hard racial - struggle which will not allow any legal restrictions. The - methods will be incompatible with the principles otherwise - adhered to by us. - - “The Governor General is to give the Polish nation only bare - living conditions and is to maintain the basis for military - security. . . . - - “6). . . . Any tendencies towards the consolidation of - conditions in Poland are to be suppressed. The ‘Polish muddle’ - must be allowed to develop. The Government of the territory must - make it possible for us to purify the Reich territory from Jews - and Poles too. Collaboration with new Reich provinces (Posen and - West Prussia) only for resettlements (compare Himmler mission). - - “Purpose: Shrewdness and severity must be the maxims in this - racial struggle in order to spare us from going to battle on - account of this country again.” - -The Defendant Frank was the chosen executor of this program. He knew its -aims, approved of them, and actively carried out the scheme. The -Tribunal’s attention has already been invited to Exhibit Number USA-297 -wherein—this may be found at Page 1512 of the English text of the -official transcript—(Volume III, Pages 576, 577) the Defendant Frank -expounded the mission which his Führer assigned to him and according to -which he intended to administer in Poland. It contemplated, in brief, -ruthless exploitation, deportation of all supplies and workers, -reduction of the entire Polish economy to an absolute minimum necessary -for bare existence of the population, and the closing of all schools. No -more callous statement exists than the one Frank made in this report, -wherein he said, “Poland shall be treated as a colony; the Poles shall -be the slaves of the Greater German world empire.” - -In December 1940 Frank submitted to his department heads that the task -of administering Poland did truly involve a hard racial struggle which -would not allow any legal restrictions. I refer to our Document -2233(o)-PS, which may be found at Page 45 in the document book. It is -taken from the Frank diary, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-173. In the German text the extract to be quoted appears in the -volume of the diary entitled, “Department Heads Meetings 1939-1940,” on -Pages 12 and 13. I now quote: - - “In this country the force of a determined leadership must rule. - The Pole must feel here that we are not building him a legal - state, but that for him there is only one duty, namely, to work - and to behave himself. It is clear that this leads sometimes to - difficulties; but you must, in your own interest, see that all - measures are ruthlessly carried out in order to become master of - the situation. You can rely on me absolutely in this.” - -As for the Poles and Ukrainians, Defendant Frank’s attitude was clear. -They were to be permitted to slave for the German economy as long as the -war emergency continued. Once the war was won, even this cynical -interest would cease. I refer to a speech before German political -leaders at Kraków on 12 January 1944. It appears in the Frank diary and -as our Document 2233(bb)-PS at Page 60 in the document book. It is the -first passage on that page. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-295. In the diary, the German text will be found in the loose-leaf -volume covering the period from 1 January to 28 February 1944, at the -entry for 14 January 1944, at Page 24. “Once the war is won” Frank tells -these leaders—and here we have, may it please the Court, the classic -example of the completely brutal statement: - - “Once the war is won, then, for all I care, mincemeat can be - made of the Poles and the Ukrainians and all the others who run - around here; it doesn’t matter what happens.” - -In accordance with the racial program of the Nazi conspirators, the -Defendant Frank makes it quite clear in his diary that the complete -annihilation of Jews was one of his cherished objectives. In Exhibit -Number USA-271, Frank stated in late 1940 in his diary that he could not -eliminate all lice and Jews in a year’s time. In Exhibit Number USA-281, -he notes in his diary in the year 1942 that a program of starvation -rations sentencing, in effect, 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger, should -be noted only marginally. In Exhibit Number USA-295, he confided to a -secret press conference that in the year 1944—and this, too, is from -the diary—there were still in the Government General perhaps 100,000 -Jews. - -These facts, if the Tribunal please, are from the diary of the man -himself. We do no more here than to tabulate the results. The supreme -authority within a certain geographic area admits that in a period of 4 -years’ time up to 3,400,000 persons from that area have been annihilated -pursuant to an official policy and for no crime, but only because of -having been born a Jew. No words could possibly reveal the inferences of -death and suffering which must needs be drawn from these stark facts. - -It was a Nazi policy that the population of occupied countries should -endure terror, oppression, impoverishment, and starvation. The Defendant -Frank succeeded so well in this regard that he was forced to report to -his Führer in 1943 that, in effect, Poles did not regard the Government -General with affection. This report to Hitler was a summarization of the -first 3½ years of the Defendant Frank’s administration. It, better than -anything else, can show the conditions as they then existed as a result -of the conspiratorial efforts of the defendants. - -The report is contained in our Document 437-PS, at Page 2 of the -document book, and I now offer the original in evidence as Exhibit -Number USA-610. In the German text, the extract to be quoted appears at -Pages 10 and 11 of this report by Frank to Hitler dated 19 June 1943, -regarding the situation in Poland. I now quote. Frank says: - - “In the course of time, a series of measures, or of consequences - of the German rule, have led to a substantial deterioration of - the attitude of the entire Polish people to the Government - General. These measures have affected either individual - professions or the entire population and frequently also—often - with crushing severity—the fate of individuals.” - -He goes on: - - “Among these are in particular: - - “1. The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, - mainly of the working classes in the cities, the majority of - which are working for German interests. - - “Until the war of 1939 their food supplies, though not varied, - were sufficient and were generally assured owing to the agrarian - surplus of the former Polish State and in spite of the - negligence on the part of their former political leadership. - - “2. The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates, - expropriation without compensation, and evacuation of Polish - peasants from maneuver areas and from German settlements. - - “3. Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in - commerce and trade, and in the field of other private property. - - “4. Mass arrests and shootings by the German Police who applied - the system of collective responsibility. - - “5. The rigorous methods of recruiting workers. - - “6. The extensive paralyzing of cultural life. - - “7. The closing of high schools, colleges, and universities. - - “8. The limitation, indeed the complete elimination, of Polish - influence from all spheres of State administration. - - “9. Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, - limiting its extensive influence—an undoubtedly necessary - move—and, in addition, until quite recently, often at the - shortest notice, the closing and confiscation of monasteries, - schools, and charitable institutions.” - -Indeed, the Nazi plan for Poland succeeded all too well. - -THE PRESIDENT: This is only an extract here. Was he saying that these -measures were inevitable or that he justified them, or what was he -saying in the report? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: He was saying, Sir, that the Polish people’s attitude -to the Government General had substantially deteriorated. The reasons -for that deterioration are the listings I gave to the Court. In other -words. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that all he said? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: No, Sir; that is just taken from Pages 10 and 11 of -the report. The report is an extremely long one. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I suppose you know what the general tenor of the -report was. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: The general tenor of the report, Sir, was in the -nature of a complaint to Hitler, that he, Frank, was having an extremely -difficult time in the Government General because of these measures and -because of these happenings in the Government General. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: In order to illustrate how completely the Defendant -Frank is identified with the policies. . . - -DR. SEIDL: [_Interposing._] As the Tribunal has already asked the -Prosecution what the purpose of this document is, I would like to point -out here that it concerns a document of 40 typewritten pages addressed -to Hitler and that Frank condemns the conditions which the Prosecution -has brought forward and that in this document he makes far-reaching -proposals to remedy the situation which he severely criticizes. - -I shall, when my turn comes, read the whole document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Exactly. You will have full opportunity, when it is your -turn, to explain this document; but it is not your turn at the moment. - -DR. SEIDL: I only mention it now because the Tribunal itself drew my -attention to this point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin, I asked you what was the -whole content of the document from which you were reading this -paragraph. According to counsel for Frank, the document, which is a very -long document, shows that Frank was suggesting remedies for the -difficulties which he here sets out. Is that so? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: That is so, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the. . . - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: May it please the Tribunal, I did not cite this -portion of that document, as I will later demonstrate, to show that -Frank did or did not suggest remedies for these conditions; but only to -explain that these conditions existed as of a certain period. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, when you cite a small part of the document, you -should make sure that what you cite is not misleading as compared to the -rest of the document. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: I see, Your Honor. I had not considered it to be such, -in view of the purpose for which I introduced it, which, as I suggested, -was only to indicate a set of conditions which existed at a certain -time. I naturally assumed that the Defense, as Dr. Seidl has indicated, -will carry on with the rest of the document as a matter of defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course, that is all very well, but the Defendant -Frank’s counsel will speak at some remote date; and it is not a complete -answer to say that he will have an opportunity of explaining the -document at some future date. It is for Counsel for the Prosecution to -make sure that no extracts which they read can reasonably make a -misleading impression upon the mind of the Tribunal. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: I shall now state, then, that the extract which was -just read was read solely for the purpose of indicating that at a -certain period, namely, June 1943, those conditions existed in Poland, -as the result of statements by the Governor General of Poland. - -Would that be satisfactory to the Tribunal? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, what is not satisfactory to the -Tribunal is that you did not give us the real purport of the document. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: Well, Sir, I don’t have the complete document before -me now. Therefore, I can’t read all of it. - -THE PRESIDENT: What we would like, would be, if possible, that when an -extract is made from a document, counsel who are presenting that extract -should instruct themselves as to the general purport of the document so -as to make certain that the part that is read is not misleading. - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: Yes, Sir. - -In order to illustrate how completely the Defendant Frank is identified -with the policies, the execution of which is reported in this document, -and how thoroughly they were his own policies; and this, if the Tribunal -please, regardless of what remedies he may have had in 1943, it is -proposed in this last section to take passages from Frank’s own diary in -proof of his early espousal and execution of these self-same policies. - -As to the insufficient nourishment of the Polish population, there was -no need for the Defendant Frank to have waited until June 1943 to have -reported this fact to Hitler. In September 1941 Defendant Frank’s own -chief medical officer reported to him the appalling Polish health -conditions. This appears in Frank’s diary and in our Document -2233(p)-PS, at Page 46 in the document book, which I now offer in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-611. The German text is to be found in -the 1941 diary volume at Page 830. I quote: - - “Chief Medical Adviser Dr. Walbaum expresses his opinion of the - health condition of the Polish population. Investigations which - were carried out by his department proved that the majority of - Poles had only about 600 calories allotted to them, whereas the - normal requirement for a human being was 2,200 calories. The - Polish population was weakened to such an extent that it would - fall an easy prey to spotted fever.”—Parenthetically, I think - we know that as typhus. - - “The number of diseased Poles has amounted to date to 40 - percent. During the last week alone, 1,000 new spotted fever - cases were officially recorded. That is so far the highest - figure. This health situation represents a serious danger for - the Reich and for the soldiers coming into the Government - General. A spreading of that pestilence into the Reich is very - possible. The increase in tuberculosis, too, is causing anxiety. - If the food rations were to be diminished again, an enormous - increase of the number of illnesses could be predicted.” - -While it was crystal-clear from this report that in September 1941 -disease affected 40 percent of the Polish population, nevertheless the -Defendant Frank approved, in August 1942, a new plan which called for a -much larger contribution of foodstuffs to Germany at the expense of the -non-German population of the Government General. Methods of meeting the -new quotas out of the grossly inadequate rations of the Government -General and the impact of the new quotas on the economy of the country -were discussed at a cabinet meeting of the Government General on 24 -August 1942 in terms which leave no possible doubt that not only was the -proposed requisition beyond the resources of the country, but its force -was to be distributed on a grossly discriminatory basis. This appears -from Frank’s diary and in our Document 2233(e)-PS, which is at Page 30 -in the document book, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-283. The German text appears in the 1942 conference volume at the -conference entry for 24 August 1942. I quote the following extract: - - “Before the German people”—said Frank—“suffer starvation, the - occupied territories and their people shall be exposed to - starvation. In this moment, therefore, we here in the Government - General must have the iron determination to help the great - German people, that is our fatherland. - - “The Government General, therefore, must do the following: The - Government General has undertaken to send 500,000 tons of bread - grain to the fatherland in addition to the foodstuffs already - being delivered for the relief of Germany or consumed here by - troops of the Armed Forces, Police, or SS. If you compare this - with our contributions of last year you can see that this means - a six-fold increase over that of last year’s contribution by the - Government General. - - “The new demand will be fulfilled exclusively at the expense of - the foreign population. It must be done cold-bloodedly and - without pity.” - -Defendant Frank was not only responsible for reducing the Government -General to starvation level, but was proud of the contribution he -thereby made to the Reich. I refer to a statement made to the political -leaders of the NSDAP on 14 December 1942 at Kraków. It is contained in -the Frank diary and is our Document 2233(z)-PS, at Page 57 in the -document book; and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-612. -In the German text the extract appears in the 1942 diary volume, Part -IV, at Page 1331. Defendant Frank is speaking: - - “I will endeavor to get out of the reservoir of this territory - everything that is yet to be had out of it.” - -He continues: - - “When you consider that it was possible for me to deliver to the - Reich 600,000 tons of bread grain and in addition 180,000 tons - to the Armed Forces stationed here; further, an abundance - amounting to many thousands of tons of other commodities, such - as seed, fats, vegetables, besides the delivery to the Reich of - 300 million eggs, _et cetera_, you can estimate how important - the work in this territory is for the Reich. In order to make - clear to you the significance of the consignment from the - Government General of 600,000 tons of bread grain, you are - referred to the fact that the Government General, by this - achievement alone, covers the raising of the bread ration in the - Greater German Reich by two-thirds for the present rationing - period. This enormous achievement can rightfully be claimed by - us.” - -Now, as to the resettlement of Polish peasants which Defendant Frank -mentions secondly in the report to Hitler—although Himmler was given -general authority in connection with the conspirators’ project to -resettle various districts in the conquered Eastern territories with -racial Germans, the projects relating to resettling districts in the -Government General were submitted to and approved by the Defendant -Frank. The plan to resettle Zamosc and Lublin, for example, was reported -to him at a meeting to discuss special problems of the district Lublin -by his infamous State Secretary for Security, Higher SS and Police -Leader, Krüger, on 4 August 1942. It is contained in Frank’s diary and -in our Document 2233(t)-PS, at Page 51 in the document book, which I now -offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-607. The German text appears in -the 1942 volume of the diary, Part III, Pages 830, 831, and 832. - -I now quote from the report of the conference: - - “State Secretary Krüger then continues, saying that the - Reichsführer’s next immediate plan until the end of the - following year would be to settle the following German racial - groups in the two districts”—Zamosc and Lublin—“1,000 peasant - homes (1 homestead per family of about 6) for Bosnian Germans; - 1,200 other kinds of homes; 1,000 homesteads for Bessarabian - Germans; 200 for Serbian Germans; 2,000 for Leningrad Germans; - 4,000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Wolhynia Germans; and 200 - homes for Flemish, Danish, and Dutch Germans; in all 10,000 - homes for 50,000 to 60,000 persons.” - -Upon hearing this, the Defendant Frank directed that—and I quote: - - “. . . the resettlement plan is to be discussed co-operatively - by the competent authorities and he declares his willingness to - approve the final plan by the end of September after - satisfactory arrangements had been made concerning all the - questions appertaining thereto—in particular the guaranteeing - of peace and order—so that by the middle of November, as the - most favorable time, the resettlement can begin.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: May it please the Tribunal, the way in which the -resettlement at Zamosc was carried out was described to Defendant Frank -by Krüger at a meeting at Warsaw on January 25, 1943. The report is -contained in the Frank diary and is our Document 2233(aa)-PS, and -appears at Page 58 in the document book. I offer the original of it in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-613. The German text appears in the labor -conference volume for 1943, at Pages 16, 17, and 19. Krüger in this -excerpt reports that they had settled the first 4,000 in the Kreis -Zamosc shortly before Christmas; that, understandably, friends were not -made of the Poles in the resettlement program; and that the Poles had to -be chased out. He then stated to Frank, and I quote: - - “We are removing those who constitute a burden in this new - colonization territory. Actually, they are the asocial and - inferior elements. They are being deported; first brought to a - concentration camp and then sent as labor to the Reich. From a - Polish propaganda standpoint, this entire first action has an - unfavorable effect. For the Poles say: ‘After the Jews have been - destroyed, then they will employ the same methods to get the - Poles out of this territory and liquidate them just like the - Jews.’” - -Krüger went on to mention that there was a great deal of unrest in the -territory as a result; and Frank informed him, that is, Krüger, that -each individual case of resettlement would be discussed in the future -exactly as that one of Zamosc had been. - -Although the illegality of this dispossession of Poles to make room for -Germans was evident and although the fact that the Poles who were not -only being dispossessed but sent off to concentration camps became -increasingly difficult to handle, the resettlement projects continued in -the Government General. - -The third item mentioned by Frank—the encroachments and confiscations -of industry and private property—was again an early Frank policy. He -explained this to his department heads in December 1939. The report is -from his diary and is our Document 2233(k)-PS, and it appears at Page 40 -in the document book. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-173. The German text appears in the department heads conference -volume for 1939-40 at the entry for 2 December 1939 at Pages 2 and 3. -Dr. Frank states: - - “Principally it can be said regarding the administration of the - Government General: This territory in its entirety is booty for - the German Reich, and thus it will not do for this territory to - be exploited in separate individual parts; but the territory in - its entirety shall be economically used and its entire economic - worth redound to the benefit of the German people.” - -Reference is made to Exhibit Number USA-297, if any further support of -an early policy of ruthless exploitation is deemed necessary by the -Tribunal. In addition, the decree permitting sequestration in the -Government General heretofore pointed out to the Tribunal -(_Verordnungsblatt für das Generalgouvernement_, Number 6, 27 January -1940, Page 23), which decree was signed by the Defendant Frank, -permitted and empowered the Nazi officials to engage in wholesale -seizure of property. This was made the easier by the undefined criteria -of the decree. The looting of the Government General under this and -other decrees has already been presented to the Tribunal on 14 December -1945, under the subject heading, “Germanization and spoliation of -occupied territories,” and the Tribunal is respectfully referred to that -portion of the record and in particular to that segment dealing with the -Government General. - -The Defendant Frank mentioned mass arrests and mass shooting and the -application of collective responsibility as the fourth reason for the -apparent deterioration of the attitude of the entire Polish people. In -this, too, he is to blame, for it was no part of Defendant Frank’s -policy that reprisal should be commensurate with the gravity of the -offense. He was, on the contrary, an advocate of the most drastic -measures. At a conference of district political leaders at Kraków, on 18 -March 1942, Frank stated his policy. This extract is from the diary and -is our Document 2233(r)-PS and will be found at Page 49 in the document -book. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-608. The German text -may be found in the diary volume for 1942, Part I, Pages 195 and 196. I -quote Frank’s statement: - - “Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will - be pursued cold-bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work. - You see that we do not hesitate at anything, and stand dozens of - people up against the wall. This is necessary because a simple - reflection tells me that it cannot be our task at this period, - when the best German blood is being sacrificed, to show regard - for the blood of another race; for out of this, one of the - greatest dangers may arise. One already hears today in Germany - that prisoners of war, for instance, in Bavaria or Thuringia, - are administering large estates entirely independently, while - all the men in a village fit for service are at the front. If - this state of affairs continues, then a gradual retrogression of - Germanism will result. One should not underestimate this danger. - Therefore, everything revealing itself as a Polish power of - leadership must be destroyed again and again with ruthless - energy. This does not have to be shouted abroad; it will happen - silently.” - -And on 15 January 1944 Defendant Frank assured the political leaders of -the NSDAP that reprisals would be made for German deaths. These remarks -are to be found in the Frank diary, in our Document 2233(bb)-PS at Page -60 in the document book, the second quote on that page, the original of -which I offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-295. The German text -appears in the loose-leaf volume of the diary covering the period from 1 -January 1944 to 28 February 1944, and appears at Page 13. Frank says -quite simply—“I have not hesitated to declare that when a German is -shot, up to 100 Poles shall be shot too.” - -The whole tragic history of slave-labor and recruitment of workers has -been placed before this Tribunal in great detail. When the Defendant -Frank refers to these methods as his fifth reason for disaffection in -Poland in his report to Hitler, he once more cites policies which he -executed. Force, violence, and economic duress were all supported by him -as means for recruiting laborers for deportation to slavery in Germany. -This was an announced policy, and I have already alluded to Exhibit -Number USA-297, which contains verification of this fact. - -While in the very beginning recruitment of laborers in the Government -General may have been voluntary, these methods soon proved inadequate. -In the spring of 1940 the question of utilizing force came up and the -matter was discussed at an official meeting at which the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart was also present. I refer to the Frank diary and our -Document 2233(n)-PS, which the Tribunal will find at Page 43 in the -document book. I offer the original in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-614. The German text appears in the diary volume for 1940, Part II, -at Page 333. I quote the conference report: - - “The Governor General stated that all means in the form of - proclamations, _et cetera_, not having succeeded, one is led to - the conclusion that the Poles, out of malevolence and with the - intention of harming Germany by not putting themselves at its - disposal, refuse to enlist for labor service. Therefore, he asks - Dr. Frauendorfer if there are any other measures not as yet - employed to win the Poles on a voluntary basis. - - “Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered the question in - the negative. - - “The Governor General emphasized the fact that he will now be - asked to take a definite attitude towards this question. - Therefore, the question will arise whether any form of coercive - measures should now be employed. - - “The question put by the Governor General to SS Lieutenant - General Krüger as to whether he sees possibilities of calling - Polish workers by coercive means, is answered in the affirmative - by SS Lieutenant General Krüger.” - -In May 1940, at an official conference—and this record is already -before the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USA-173—Defendant Frank stated -that compulsion in recruitment of labor could be exercised, that Poles -could be snatched from the streets and that the best method would be -organized raids. - -As in the case of persecution of the Jews, the forced labor program in -the Government General is almost beyond belief. I refer to the Frank -diary and to our Document 2233(w)-PS, which will be found at Page 53 in -the document book, the original of which I offer into evidence as -Exhibit Number USA-607. This excerpt is a record, if the Court please, -of a discussion between the Defendant Sauckel and the Defendant Frank at -Kraków on 18 August 1942; and it appears in the diary volume for 1942, -Part III, at Pages 918 and 920. Dr. Frank speaks: - - “I am pleased to report to you officially, Party Comrade - Sauckel, that we have up to now supplied 800,000 workers for the - Reich. . . .” - -He continues: - - “Recently you have requested us to supply a further 140,000. I - have pleasure in informing you officially that in accordance - with our agreement of yesterday, 60 percent of the newly - requested workers will be supplied to the Reich by the end of - October and the balance of 40 percent by the end of the year.” - -Dr. Frank continues: - - “Beyond the present figure of 140,000 you can, however, next - year reckon upon a higher number of workers from the Government - General, for we shall employ the Police to conscript them.” - -How this recruitment was carried out—by wild and ruthless manhunts—is -clearly shown in Exhibit Number USA-178, which is in evidence before the -Tribunal. Starvation, violence, and death, which characterized the -entire slave-labor program of the conspirators, was thus faithfully -reflected in the administration of the Defendant Frank. - -There were, of course, other grounds for uneasiness in occupied Poland -which the Defendant Frank did not mention in his report to Hitler. He -does not mention the concentration camps, perhaps because as a -representative jurist of National Socialism, the Defendant Frank had -himself defended the system in Germany. As Governor General the -Defendant Frank, we feel, must be held responsible for all concentration -camps within the boundaries of the Government General. These include, -among others, the notorious camp at Maidanek and the one at Lublin and -at Treblinka outside of Warsaw. As indicated previously, the Defendant -Frank knew and approved that Poles were taken to concentration camps in -connection with resettlement projects. He had certain jurisdiction as -well in relation to the extermination camp Auschwitz, to which Poles -from the Government General were committed by his administration. In -February 1944 Embassy Counsellor Dr. Schumberg suggested a possible -amnesty of Poles who had been taken to Auschwitz for trivial offenses -and kept there for several months. This conference, if the Court please, -is reported in the Frank diary and is contained in our Document -2233(bb)-PS, at Page 60 in the document book. It is the third quote on -that page. I offer the original in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-295. - -THE PRESIDENT: You go too fast. Did you say Page 70? - -LT. COL. BALDWIN: Page 60, Sir. The German text appears in the -loose-leaf volume covering the period 1 January 1944 to 28 February -1944, at the conference on 8 February 1944, on Page 7. I quote: - - “The Governor General will take under consideration an amnesty - probably for 1 May of this year. Nevertheless, one must not lose - sight of the fact that the German leadership of the Government - General must not now show any sign of weakness.” - -This, then, was and is the conspirator Hans Frank. The evidence is by no -means exhausted, but it is our belief that sufficient proof has been -given to this Tribunal to establish his liability under Count One of the -Indictment. - -As legal adviser of Hitler and the Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, -Defendant Frank promoted the conspirators’ rise to power. In his various -juridical capacities, both in the NSDAP and in the German Government, -Defendant Frank certainly advocated and promoted the political monopoly -of the NSDAP, the racial program of the conspirators, and the terror -system of the concentration camps and of arrest without warrant. His -role, early in the Common Plan, was to realize “the National Socialist -program in the realm of the law” and to give the outward form of -legality to this program of terror, persecution, and oppression which -had as its ultimate purpose mobilization for aggressive war. - -As a loyal adherent of Hitler and the NSDAP, Defendant Frank was -appointed Governor General in 1939 of that area of Poland known as the -Government General. Defendant Frank had defined justice as that which -benefited the German nation. His 5 years’ administration of the -Government General illustrates the most extreme extension of that -principle. - -It has been shown that Defendant Frank took the office of Governor -General under a program which constituted in itself a criminal plan or -conspiracy, as Defendant Frank well knew and approved, to exploit the -territory ruthlessly for the benefit of Nazi Germany, to conscript its -nationals for labor in Germany, to close its schools and colleges, to -prevent the rise of a Polish intelligentsia, and to administer the -territory as a colonial possession of the Third Reich in total disregard -of the duties of an occupying power towards the inhabitants of occupied -territory. - -Under Defendant Frank’s administration this criminal plan was -consummated, but the execution went even beyond the plan. Food -contributions to Germany increased to the point where the bare -subsistence reserved for the Government General under the plan was -reduced to a level of mass starvation. The savage program of -exterminating Jews was relentlessly executed. Resettlement projects were -carried out with reckless disregard of the rights of the local -population and the terror of the concentration camp followed in the wake -of the Nazi invaders. - -This statement of evidence has been compiled in large part from -statements by the Defendant Frank himself, from the admission found in -his diary, official reports, reports of conferences with his colleagues -and subordinates, and his speeches. It is therefore appropriate that a -passage from his diary should be quoted in conclusion. It is our -Document 2233(aa)-PS. It appears at Page 59 in the document book. I -offer the original in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-613. The German -text appears in the 1943 volume of labor conference meetings at the 25 -January 1943 entry on Page 53. In his address Defendant Frank, -prophetically enough, told his colleagues in the Government General that -their task would grow more difficult. “Hitler”, he said, “could help -them only as a kind of ‘administrative pill box.’” They must depend on -themselves. - - “We are now duty bound to hold together”—and I quote Frank—“We - must remember that we who are gathered together here figure on - Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the honor of being - Number One. We have, so to speak, become accomplices in the - world historic sense.” - -This concludes the presentation on the Defendant Frank. - -May it please the Tribunal, Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones of the -British Delegation will now deal with the individual responsibility of -the Defendant Streicher. - -LIEUTENANT COLONEL M. C. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United -Kingdom): If the Tribunal please, it is my duty to present the case -against the Defendant Julius Streicher. - -Appendix A of the Indictment, that paragraph of the Appendix relating to -Streicher, sets out the positions which he held and which I shall prove. -It then goes on to allege that he used those positions and his personal -influence and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner that -he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany, as set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; that he authorized, directed, and participated in the -Crimes against Humanity, set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including particularly the incitement of the persecution of the Jews, -set forth in Count One and Count Four of the Indictment. - -My Lord, the case against this defendant can be, perhaps, described by -the unofficial title that he assumed for himself as “Jew-baiter Number -One.” It is the Prosecution’s case that for the course of some 25 years -this man educated the whole of the German people in hatred and that he -incited them to the persecution and to the extermination of the Jewish -race. He was an accessory to murder, perhaps on a scale never attained -before. - -With the Tribunal’s permission I propose to prove quite shortly the -position and influence that he held and then to refer the Tribunal to -several short extracts from his newspapers and from his speeches and -then to outline the part that he played in the particular persecutions -that occurred against the Jews between the years 1933 and 1945. - -My Lord, perhaps before I start, I might say that the document book -before the members of the Tribunal is arranged in the order in which I -intend to refer to the documents. They are paged and there is an index -at the beginning of the book and if the Tribunal have got what is called -the trial brief, it is in effect a note of the evidence to which I shall -refer and again in the order in which I shall refer to it, which may be -of some assistance. - -My Lord, this defendant was born in 1885. He became a school teacher in -Nuremberg and formed a party of his own, which he called the German -Socialist Party. The chief policy of that party, again, was -anti-Semitism. In 1922 he handed over his party to Hitler; and there is -a glowing account of his generosity which appears in Hitler’s _Mein -Kampf_, which I do not think it worth occupying the time of the Tribunal -in reading. It appears as Document M-3, and is the first document in the -Tribunal’s document book. The copy of _Mein Kampf_ is already before the -Tribunal as Exhibit GB-128. - -The appointments that he held in the Party and State were few. From 1921 -until 1945 he was a member of the Nazi Party. In 1925 he was appointed -Gauleiter of Franconia, and he remained as such until about February of -1940; and from the time that the Nazi Government came into power in 1933 -until 1945, he was a member of the Reichstag. In addition to that he -held the title of Obergruppenführer in the SA. All that information -appears in Document 2975-PS, which is already exhibited as Exhibit -Number USA-9, and is the affidavit that he made himself. - -The propaganda that he carried out throughout those years was chiefly -done through the medium of his newspapers. He was the editor and -publisher of the paper called Der Stürmer, which was a weekly journal, -from 1922 until 1933; and thereafter the publisher and owner of the -paper. - -In 1933 he also founded and thereafter, I think, published—certainly -was responsible for—the daily newspaper called the _Fränkische -Tageszeitung_. - -There were, in addition to that and particularly later, several others, -mostly local journals, that he published from Nuremberg. - -Those are the positions that he held; and now if I may, I shall quite -briefly trace the course of his incitement and propaganda more or less -in chronological order by referring the Tribunal to the short extracts. -I would say this: These extracts are really selected at random. They are -selected with a view to showing the Tribunal the various methods that he -employed to incite the people against the Jewish race; but his -newspapers are crowded with them, week after week, day after day. It is -impossible to pick up any copy without finding the same kind of stuff in -the headlines and in the articles. - -If I might quote from four speeches and articles showing his early -activities from 1922 until 1933—at Page 3 of the Tribunal’s document -book, Document M-11—that is an extract from a speech that he made in -1922 in Nuremberg, and—after abusing the Jews in the first paragraph—I -refer only to the last two lines: “We know that Germany will be free -when the Jew has been excluded from the life of the German people.” - -I pass to the next document, which is M-12, on Page 4. The first -document was Exhibit GB-165. That is the book, I understand, that is -being given that number, so that the next document, which is taken from -the same book, will be the same. Perhaps I might be allowed to read that -short extract. It is an extract from a speech: - - “I beg you and particularly those of you who carry the cross - throughout the land, to become somewhat more serious when I - speak of the enemy of the German people, namely, the Jew. Not - out of irresponsibility or for fun do I fight against the Jewish - enemy, but because I bear within me the knowledge that the whole - misfortune was brought to Germany by the Jews alone. - - “. . . I ask you once more, what is at stake today? The Jew - seeks domination not only among the German people but among all - peoples. The Communists pave the way for him. . . . Do you not - know that the God of the Old Testament ordered the Jews to - devour and enslave the peoples of the earth? . . . - - “The Government allows the Jew to do as he pleases. The people - expect action to be taken. . . . You may think about Adolf - Hitler as you please, but one thing you must admit. He possessed - the courage to attempt to free the German people from the Jew by - a national revolution. That was a great deed.” - -The next short extract appearing on the next page is taken from a speech -in April of 1925: - - “You must realize that the Jew wants our people to perish. . . . - That is why you must join us and leave those who have brought - you nothing but war and inflation and discord. For thousands of - years the Jew has been destroying the nations.” - -I ask the Tribunal to note now these last few words: - - “Let us start today, so that we can annihilate the Jews.” - -My Lord, so far as I have been able to find, that is the earliest -expression of annihilation of the Jewish race. Perhaps it gave birth to -what was 14 years later to become the official policy of the Nazi -Government. - -And one further passage from this period. This is in April 1932, -Document M-14, taken from the same book. He starts by saying, “For 13 -years I have fought against Jewry.” I quote the last paragraph only: - - “We know that the Jew, whether he is baptized as a Protestant or - as a Catholic, remains a Jew. Why can you not realize this, you - Protestant clergymen, you Catholic priests! You are blinded and - serve the God of the Jews who is not the God of love but the God - of hate. Why do you not listen to Christ, who said to the Jews, - ‘You are the children of the Devil.’” - -That, then, was the kind of performance he was putting up during those -early years. When the Nazi Party came to power, they officially started -their campaign against the Jews by the boycott of 1 April 1933. Now, of -that boycott the Tribunal have already had evidence; and I would do no -more now than to remind the Tribunal in a word what happened. - -The boycott was agreed on and approved of by the whole Government, as -was shown in a document which is already before you, Document 2409-PS, -Exhibit Number USA-262, which was Goebbels’ diary. - -Streicher was appointed the chairman of the central committee for the -organization of that boycott, which appears in Document 2156-PS, Exhibit -Number USA-263. It was then said that he started his work on Wednesday, -the 29th. - -On that same day the central committee issued a proclamation in which -they said that the boycott would start on Saturday at 10:00 a. m. sharp. -“Jewry will realize whom it has challenged.” That short quotation -appears in Document 3389-PS, which is USA-566, which is a volume—in -actual fact, it is a copy of _Der Stürmer_ which is already before the -Court. - -I would refer the Tribunal to one short passage from an article in the -_Nationalsozialistische Partei Korrespondenz_ which the defendant wrote -on the 30th of March, before the boycott was due to start. It is -Document 2153-PS and appears on Page 12 of the Tribunal’s book, which -becomes Exhibit GB-166. There he writes, under the title, “Defeat the -enemy of the world!—by Julius Streicher, official leader of the central -committee to combat the Jewish atrocity and boycott campaign.”: - - “Jewry wanted this battle. It shall have it until it realizes - that the Germany of the brown battalions is not a country of - cowardice and surrender. Jewry will have to fight until we have - won victory. - - “National Socialists! Defeat the enemy of the world. Even if the - world is full of devils, we shall succeed in the end.” - -As head of the central committee for that boycott, Streicher outlined in -detail the organization of the boycott in orders which the committee -published on the 31st of March 1933, which is the next document in the -book, Document 2154-PS, Exhibit GB-167. I can summarize those. - -The committee stressed that no violence is to be employed against the -Jews on the occasion of that boycott, but not perhaps for humane -reasons; it is because, if there is no violence employed, then Jewish -employers will have no grounds for discharging their employees without -notice; and they will have no ground for refusing to pay them any wages. - -The Jews were also reported apparently to be transferring businesses to -German figureheads in order to alleviate the results of this -persecution, and the committee laid it down that any property to be -transferred was to be considered as Jewish for the purpose of the -boycott. - -I do not think I need go into that any further. It does show that at -that date he was taking a leading part, and a leading part as appointed -by the Government, in the persecution of the Jews. - -I would now refer the Court again to a few further extracts to show the -form that this propaganda developed as the years went on. At Page 18 of -the document book, Document M-20, we have an article in the New Year’s -issue of a new paper that he had just founded. It was a semi-medical -paper called _German People’s Health Through Blood and Soil_, edited by -himself; and it is an example of the really remarkable lengths to which -he went in putting over this propaganda against the Jews. I quote: - - “For the initiated it is established for all time: ‘alien - albumen’ is the sperm of a man of alien race. The male sperm in - cohabitation is partially or completely absorbed by the female, - and thus enters her bloodstream. One single cohabitation of a - Jew with an Aryan woman is sufficient to poison her blood - forever. Together with the ‘alien albumen’ she has absorbed the - alien soul. Never again will she be able to bear purely Aryan - children, even when married to an Aryan. They will all be - bastards, with a dual soul and a body of a mixed breed. Their - children, too, will be crossbreeds; that means, ugly people of - unsteady character and with a tendency to illnesses. . . . - - “Now we know why the Jew uses every artifice of seduction in - order to ravish German girls at as early an age as possible; why - the Jewish doctor rapes his female patients while they are under - anaesthesia. . . . He wants the German girl and the German woman - to absorb the alien sperm of the Jew. She is never again to bear - German children! - - “But the blood products of all animal organisms right down to - bacteria, thus serum, lymph, extracts from internal organs, _et - cetera_, are also ‘alien albumen.’ They have a poisonous effect - if directly introduced into the bloodstream either by - vaccination or by injection. - - “The worst is that by these products of sick animals the blood - is defiled, the Aryan is impregnated with an alien species. - - “The author and abettor of such action is the Jew. He has been - aware of the secrets of the race question for centuries, and - therefore plans systematically the annihilation of the nations - which are superior to him. Science and ‘authorities’ are his - instruments for the enforcing of pseudoscience and the - concealment of truth.” - -That becomes, My Lord, Exhibit GB-168. - -The next document, also at the beginning of 1935, an extract from his -own paper _Der Stürmer_, is entitled “The Chosen People of the -Criminals”: - - “And all the same, or let us say, just because of this, the - history book of the Jews, which is usually called the Holy - Scriptures, impresses us as a horrible criminal romance, which - makes the 150 shilling-shockers of the British Jew, Edgar - Wallace, grow pale with envy. This ‘holy’ book abounds in - murder, incest, fraud, theft, and indecency.” - -On the 4th of October 1935—and the Tribunal will remember that that was -the month after the Nuremberg Decrees had been made—he made a speech -which is reported in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ and is entitled in that -newspaper, “Safeguard of German Blood and German Honor.” I read the -report in that article: “Gauleiter Streicher speaks at a German Labor -Front mass demonstration for the Nuremberg laws.” Then the first line of -the actual article says that he spoke for the second time within a few -weeks. I quote only the last two lines of that first large paragraph: -“. . . we have therefore to unmask the Jew, and that is what I have been -doing for the past 15 years.” That remark apparently was met with -tempestuous applause. That document, M-34, becomes Exhibit GB-169. - -And, My Lord, I think it unnecessary to quote from the next document in -the Tribunal’s book. It is very much the same type of thing. On Page 22 -of the document book, Document M-6, there is a leading article by -Streicher in his _Der Stürmer_ of which I would refer only to the last -half of the last paragraph where again he emphasizes the part that he -himself has taken in this campaign. - - “The _Stürmer’s_ 15 years of work of enlightenment has already - led an army of initiated—millions strong—to National - Socialism. The continued work of _Der Stürmer_ will help to - ensure that every German down to the last man will, with heart - and hand, join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush the - head of the serpent Pan-Juda beneath their heels. He who helps - to bring this about helps to eliminate the devil, and this devil - is the Jew.” - -That document becomes Exhibit GB-170. - -The next document—I include it in the document book again only to show -the extraordinary length to which he went in his propaganda; and it -consists of a photograph of the burning hull of the airship _Hindenburg_ -when it went on fire in June 1937 in America. Underneath it the caption -includes the comment: - - “The first radio picture from the United States of America shows - quite clearly that a Jew stands behind the explosion of our - airship _Hindenburg_. Nature has depicted quite clearly and - quite correctly that devil in human guise.” - -And although it is not at all clear from that photograph, I think the -meaning of that comment is that the cloud of smoke in the air is in the -shape of a Jewish face. - -On the next page Document M-4 is a speech he made in September 1937 at -the opening of a bridge in Nuremberg. I will quote only the last -paragraph on Page 24. The bridge in question is called the Wilhelm -Gustloff bridge, and he says: - - “The man who murdered Wilhelm Gustloff must have come from the - Jewish people, because the Jewish textbooks teach that every Jew - has the right to kill a non-Jew; and indeed, that it is pleasing - to the Jewish God to kill as many non-Jews as possible. - - “Look at the road the Jewish people have been following for - thousands of years past; everywhere murder, everywhere mass - murder! Neither must we forget that behind present-day wars - there stands the Jewish financier who pursues his aims and - interests. The Jew always lives on the blood of other nations; - he needs such murder and such victims. For us who know, the - murder of Wilhelm Gustloff is the same as ritual murder.” - -And then on the next page: - - “It is our duty to tell the children at school and the bigger - ones what this memorial means. . . .” - -I go to the next paragraph: - - “The Jew no longer shows himself among us openly as he used to. - But it would be wrong to say that victory is ours. Full and - final victory will have been achieved only when the whole world - is rid of Jews.” - -That becomes Exhibit GB-171. - -Now the next two documents in your document books are simply extracts -from the correspondence columns of his _Der Stürmer_, showing again one -of the methods he employed in this propaganda. I do not need to read -them. The correspondence columns of all his issues are full of letters -coming in from Germans saying that some German has been buying her shoes -from a Jewish shop and so on, and in that way assisting in the general -boycott of the Jews. In other words, they really are a weekly column of -libels against the Jews all over Germany. - -I pass then to another and particular form of propaganda that he -employed and which he called “ritual murder.” The Tribunal may well -remember that some years ago—I think it started in 1934—this _Der -Stürmer_ began publishing accounts of Jewish ritual murder which -horrified the whole world to such an extent that even the Archbishop of -Canterbury eventually wrote to the _Times_ protesting, as indeed did -people from every country in the world, protesting that any Government -should allow matter like this to be published in their national -newspapers. - -He takes his ritual murder, I understand, from a medieval belief that -during their Eastertide celebrations the Jews were in the habit of -murdering Christian children; and he enlarges upon this and -misrepresents this belief, this medieval belief, to show that not only -did they do it in the Middle Ages, but that they are still doing it and -still want to do it. And if I might just quote one or two passages from -his newspapers and show one or two pictures which he published in -connection with his campaign of ritual murder, it will illustrate to the -Court the type of teaching and propaganda that he was putting up. On -Page 29 of the Tribunal’s document book, I will quote from the third but -last paragraph: - - “This the French front-line soldier should take with him to - France: The German people have taken a new lease on life. They - want peace, but if anybody should attack them, if anyone should - try to torture them again, to throw them back into the past, - then the world would witness another heroic epic; then may - Heaven decide where righteousness lies—here with us, or where - the Jew has the whiphand and where he instigates massacres, one - could almost say the biggest ritual murders of all times. If the - German people are to be slaughtered according to the Jewish - rites, the whole world will be thus slaughtered at the same - time.” - -And the last paragraph: - - “Just as you have drummed morning and evening prayers into your - children’s heads, so now drum this into their heads, so that the - German people may gain the spiritual power to convince the rest - of the world which the Jews desire to lead against us.” - -That Document is M-2, Exhibit GB-172. - -And on the following page of the document book there is a reproduction -of a photograph taken from _Der Stürmer_ of April 1937 which illustrates -three Jews ritually murdering a girl by cutting her throat and shows the -blood pouring out into a bucket on the ground. The caption underneath -that photograph is as follows: - - “Ritual Murder at Polna. Ritual murder of Agnes Hruza by the - Jews Hilsner, Erdmann, and Wassermann (taken from a contemporary - postcard.)” - -That is Exhibit Number USA-258. It is already in a copy of _Der -Stürmer_, which has been put in. - -There appears on the next page of the document book an extract from that -same _Der Stürmer_, April 1937. I will not read it now, because it has -been put in and has all been read to the Court. It describes what -happens when ritual murder takes place, and the blood is mixed with the -bread and drunk by the Jews having their feast. The Tribunal will -remember that during the feast the head of the family exclaims, “May all -gentiles perish—as the child whose blood is contained in the bread and -wine.” - -That is already Exhibit Number USA-258, and it has been read in the -transcript at Page 1437 (Volume III, Pages 522, 523). - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If My Lordship pleases. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, if I might just -refer to two further copies of _Der Stürmer_ on the subject of “ritual -murder,” the first of which appears on Page 32 of the document book, -2700-PS. It is the copy in Exhibit USA-260. It is an article in _Der -Stürmer_ for July 1938: - - “Whoever has had the occasion to be an eyewitness to the - ritualistic slaughtering of animals or at least to see a - truthful film on this method of slaughtering will never forget - this gruesome experience. It is horrifying. And instinctively he - is reminded of the crimes which the Jews have committed for - centuries on human beings. He will be reminded of the ritual - murder. History offers hundreds of cases in which non-Jewish - children were tortured to death by Jews. They, too, received the - same gash in the throat as is found on ritualistically - slaughtered animals. They, too, were slowly bled to death while - fully conscious.” - -My Lord, on special occasions, or when he had some particular subject -matter to put before the world, he was in the habit of issuing special -editions of his newspaper _Der Stürmer_. Ritual murder was such a -special subject that he issued one of these special editions dealing -solely with it. The Tribunal will have a photostatic copy of the -complete issue for May 1939. - -Now I have not attempted to have translated all, or indeed any, of the -articles which appear in that edition. It is perhaps sufficient to look -at the pictures, the illustrations, and for me to read the captions -which appear underneath the photographs; and I regret the translations -of the captions have not been attached to the Tribunal’s copy but -perhaps I may be permitted to refer to the pictures and read the -captions for the Tribunal. - -The pages are marked in red pencil on the right-hand corner. On Page 1 I -see a picture of a child having knives stuck into its side, blood -spurting from it, and below the pedestal on which it stands are five -presumably dead children lying on the ground. The caption to that -picture is as follows: - - “In the year 1476 the Jews in Regensburg murdered six boys. They - drew their blood and tortured them to death. In an underground - vault which belonged to the Jew Josfol, the judges found the - bodies of the murdered boys. A bloodstained earthen bowl stood - on an altar.” - -On the next page there are two pictures, and the captions explain them. -The one at the top left-hand corner: - - “For the Jewish New Year celebrations in 1913, World Jewry - published this picture as a postcard. On the Jewish New Year and - on the Day of Atonement the Jews slaughter a so-called ‘kapores - cock,’ that is to say, dead cock, whose blood and death is - intended to purify the Jews. In 1913 the ‘kapores cock’ had the - head of the Russian Czar Nicholas II. By publishing this - postcard the Jews intended to say that Nicholas II would be - their next political purifying sacrifice. On the 16th of July - 1918 the Czar was murdered by the Jews Jurovsky and - Goloschtschekin.” - -The picture at the bottom of the page, again, has a Jew holding a -similar bird: - - “The ‘kapores cock’ has the head of the Führer. The Hebrew - script says that one day Jews will ‘kill all Hitlerites.’ Then - they, the Jews, will be delivered from all misfortunes. But in - due course the Jews will realize that they have reckoned without - an Adolf Hitler.” - -The next page of the newspaper contains reproductions of a lot of -previous articles on ritual murder, with a picture of the Defendant -Julius Streicher at the top. - -On the fourth page, a picture at the bottom of the right-hand corner has -the caption: - - “Jew at the Passover Meal. The wine and matzoth,”—unleavened - bread—“contain non-Jewish blood. The Jew ‘prays’ before the - meal. He ‘prays’ for death to all non-Jews.” - -On the fifth page are reproductions from some of the European and -American newspaper articles and letters which had been received by those -newspapers during the course of the last years in protest to this -propaganda on the subject of ritual murder, and in the center of it you -will see the letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury written to the -editor of the _Times_ in protest. - -On the next page, Page 6, is another ghastly picture of a man having his -throat cut—again the usual spurt of blood falling into a basin on the -floor—and the caption to that is as follows: - - “The Ritual Murder of the Boy Heinrich. In the year 1345 the - Jews in Munich slaughtered a non-Jewish boy. The martyr was - beatified by the Church.” - -On Page 7 appears a picture representing three ritual murders. On Page 8 -there is another photo-picture: - - “St. Gabriel. This boy was crucified and tortured to death by - the Jews in the year 1690. The blood was drawn from him.” - -I think we can pass Page 9 and Page 10. - -On Page 11 there is shown a piece of sculpture which appears on the wall -of the Wallfahrts Chapel in Wesel and it represents the ritual murder of -a boy, Werner. It is a somewhat disgusting picture of the boy strung up -by his feet and being murdered by two Jews. - -Page 12 reproduces another picture taken from the same place. The -caption is: - - “The Embalmed Body of ‘Simon of Trent’ Who Was Tortured to Death - by the Jews.” - -Page 13 has another picture—somebody else having a knife stuck into -him, more blood coming out into a basin. - -On Page 14 are two pictures. The one at the top is said to be the ritual -murder of the boy Andreas, and the one at the bottom is the picture of a -tombstone, the caption of which reads as follows: - - “The Tombstone of Hilsner. This is the memorial to a Jewish - ritual murderer, Leopold Hilsner. He was found guilty of two - ritual murders and was condemned in two trials to death by - hanging. The emperor was bribed and pardoned him. Masaryk, the - friend of the Jews, liberated him from penal servitude in 1918. - Even on his tombstone lying Jewry calls this two-fold murderer - an innocent victim.” - -The next page again reproduces the picture of a woman being murdered by -having her throat cut in the same way; and perhaps I might refer to Page -17, which reproduces a picture of the Archbishop of Canterbury and a -picture of an old Jewish man, and the caption says: - - “Dr. Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Highest Dignitary - of the English Church. His ally, a typical example of the Jewish - race.” - -The last page, Page 18, reproduces a picture called, “St. Simon of -Trent, Who Was Tortured to Death.” - -My Lord, it is my submission that that document is nothing but an -incitement to the people of Germany who read it, an incitement to -murder. It is filled with pictures of murder, murder alleged to be -against the German people, and is an encouragement to all who read it to -revenge themselves, and to revenge themselves in the same way. That -document, M-10, becomes Exhibit GB-173. - -DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): The Defendant Julius -Streicher has just called my attention to the fact that he has not been -given the opportunity to prove from where these pictures, which the -Prosecution referred to just now, were taken. It is, in the opinion of -the Defense, necessary that the origin of these pictures should be made -clear to the Tribunal; otherwise one might think that these pictures had -been especially borrowed for _Der Stürmer_ from some obscure source. The -Defendant Streicher, however, points out that these pictures came from -recognized historical sources. I should therefore like to suggest that -the Prosecution make this material also available. I think that the -articles of _Der Stürmer_ which have been referred to must show what the -sources are from which Streicher was supplied. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do the articles show the sources? Do the articles -themselves indicate the sources? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I should have said so. There wasn’t any -intention to misrepresent the matter, that these pictures are taken from -original pictures. These were not invented by the newspaper, and in some -cases the sources are shown in the caption. This is a collection of -medieval pictures and frescoes dealing with this matter. In actual fact -the papers show in almost all cases where they come from. - -DR. MARX: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already given us the dates of them, which -indicated they were medieval. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is so. My Lord, in January 1938—and it -will be remembered that in 1938 the persecution of the Jews became more -and more severe—in January 1938, for some reason or other, another -special issue of _Der Stürmer_ was published. If the Tribunal would look -at Page 34 of their document book I will quote a short passage from the -leading article in that paper—an article written by the defendant: - - “The supreme aim and highest task of the State is therefore to - preserve People, Blood, and Race. But if this is the supreme - task, any crime against this law must be punished with the - supreme penalty. _Der Stürmer_ takes therefore the view that - there are only two punishments for the crime of polluting the - race: 1. Long-term penal servitude for attempted race pollution. - 2. Death for the completed crime.” - -And again, indeed if it is now still necessary to show the type of paper -this was, if the Tribunal will turn over to the next page they will see -the headlines set out for some of the articles that are contained in -that edition: - - “Jewish Race Polluters at Work.” - - “Fifteen-Year-Old Non-Jewess Violated.” - - “A Dangerous Race Polluter. He regards German women as fair game - for himself.” - - “The Jewish Sanatorium. A Jewish institution for the cultivation - of race pollution.” - - “Rape of a Feeble-Minded Girl.” - - “The Jewish Butler. He steals from his Jewish masters and - commits race pollution.” - -The copy of that paper is already in as Exhibit USA-260. - -On the next page of the document book I will quote only the last two -lines. It is an article appearing in _Der Stürmer_; and it is true that -it is not an article actually written by the Defendant Streicher but by -his then editor, Karl Holz: - - “Revenge will break loose one day and will exterminate Jewry - from the face of the earth.” - -And again on Page 37, in September 1938, _Der Stürmer_ has written an -article in which the last two lines read as follows: - - “. . . a parasite, a mischief maker, an evil-doer, a - disseminator of disease, who must be destroyed in the interest - of mankind.” - -It is my submission to the Tribunal that this is no longer propaganda -for the persecution of the Jews; this is propaganda for the -extermination of Jews, for the murder not of one man but of millions. - -The next document in the document book, on Page 38, has already been put -in evidence and read to the Tribunal. It is Exhibit USA-260. It appears -in the document book and was read into the transcript at Page 1438 -(Volume III, Page 523). This is a short article appearing in December -1938, Number 50 of _Der Stürmer_. - -I would draw the Tribunal’s attention to the next document which is a -picture taken from that same copy. It shows the upper part of a girl’s -body being strangled by the arms of a man with his hands around her neck -and the shadow of the man’s face is shown against the background, quite -obviously with Jewish features. The caption under that picture is as -follows: - - “Castration for Race Polluters. Only heavy penalties will - preserve our womenfolk from a tighter grip from the loathsome - Jewish claws. The Jews are our misfortune.” - -I pause for the moment from _Der Stürmer_ to a particular incident that -occurred, in which the Defendant Streicher took a leading part. It will -be remembered that the organized demonstrations against the Jews took -place the 9th and 10th of November 1938. All this propaganda, as I say, -was becoming fiercer and more ferocious. In the autumn of that year the -Defendant Streicher organized the breaking up of the Nuremberg -synagogues on the occasion of a meeting of press representatives in -Nuremberg. That incident has in fact been referred to previously in this -case and the documents in connection with it are 1724-PS, which were put -in as Exhibit USA-266 and were referred to and read in the transcript at -Page 1443 (Volume III, Page 526). - -Gauleiter Julius Streicher was personally to set the crane in motion -with which the Jewish symbols were to be torn down from the synagogue. -From another document which also was put in, 2711-PS, which became -USA-267, and also was read in the transcript at Page 1443 (Volume III, -Page 526), I quote two lines: - - “. . . the Synagogue is demolished! Julius Streicher himself - inaugurates the work by a speech lasting an hour and a half. By - his order then—so to speak as a prelude of the demolition—the - tremendous Star of David came off the cupola.” - -The defendant, of course, took active part in the November -demonstrations of that year. I do not suggest that he was responsible -for the idea of them. The evidence against him is confined only to the -part that he took in his Gau in Franconia. - -On Page 43 of the document book, Document M-42 is an account of the -Nuremberg demonstrations as they were reported in the _Fränkische -Tageszeitung_, which of course was his paper, on the 11th of November. I -quote: - - “In Nuremberg and Fürth there were demonstrations by the crowd - against the Jewish murderers. These lasted until the early hours - of the morning. Long enough had one watched the doings of the - Jews in Germany.” - -And then I go to the last three lines of that paragraph: - - “After midnight the excitement of the populace reached its peak - and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nuremberg and - Fürth and burned these two Jewish buildings where the murder of - Germans had been preached. - - “The fire brigades, which had been notified immediately, saw to - it that the fire was confined to the original outbreak. The - windows of the Jewish shopkeepers, who still had not given up - hope of selling their rubbish to the stupid Gojim, were smashed. - Thanks to the disciplined behaviour of the SA-men and the - police, who rushed to the scene, there was no plundering.” - -That becomes Exhibit GB-174. - -The following document in the document book is the report of Streicher’s -speech on the 10th of November, the day of the demonstration. I will -quote from two paragraphs on that page—or rather, starting in the -middle of the first paragraph: - - “From the cradle the Jew is not taught, as we are, such texts as - ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ or ‘Whosoever shall - smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.’ No, - he is told ‘With the non-Jew you can do whatever you like.’ He - is even taught that the slaughtering of a non-Jew is an act - pleasing to God. For 20 years we have been writing about this in - _Der Stürmer_; for 20 years we have been preaching it throughout - the world, and we have made millions recognize the truth.” - -I go to the last paragraph: - - “The Jew slaughtered in one night 75,000 Persians; when he - emigrated from Egypt he killed all the first-born, that is, a - whole future generation of Egyptians. What would have happened - if the Jew had succeeded in driving the nations into war against - us, and if we had lost the war? The Jew, protected by foreign - bayonets, would have fallen on us and would have slaughtered and - murdered us. Never forget what history teaches.” - -My Lord, after the November demonstrations irregularities occurred in -the Gau of Franconia in connection with the organized Aryanization of -Jewish property. Aryanization of Jewish property was, of course, -regulated by the State; and under a decree it had been laid down that -the proceeds, or any proceeds that there might be, from taking over -Jewish properties and giving them to Aryans—all such proceeds were to -go to the State. What apparently happened in Franconia was that a good -deal of the proceeds never found their way as far as the State, and as a -result Göring set up a commission to investigate what had taken place. -We have the report of that commission, and I would refer the Tribunal to -certain short passages in it. On Page 45, we see from that report -exactly what had been taking place in this Defendant Streicher’s Gau. I -quote from the paragraph, opposite where it says “Page 13”. . . - -DR. MARX: As proof of the irregularities which occurred in connection -with the Aryanization in Nuremberg after the 9th of November, the -prosecutor intends to quote a report which the Deputy Gauleiter Holz -made when he was interrogated before the examining commission. I wish to -protest against making use of this report. Between Streicher and the -Deputy Gauleiter Holz there existed real tension if not enmity. The -Deputy Gauleiter Holz was the very person responsible for the measures -of Aryanization. It is not at all proved that Streicher had agreed to -these measures being undertaken. It is rather to be assumed that Holz, -in order to cover himself, made statements here which he himself could -not answer for if he were to appear here as witness today. Therefore, in -this report of Holz it is a question of statements made by a man who was -deeply involved in this matter, a man who participated in these deeds, -and a man who was an enemy of the Defendant Streicher. Holz incriminated -Streicher because Streicher did not protect him in front of the -commission and from the then Minister President Göring. Therefore I do -not think that this report should be used. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you said what you wished to say? - -DR. MARX: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that this document, being an -official document, is admissible under Article 21 and that the -objections which you have made to it are not objections which go to its -admissibility as evidence but go to its weight; and as to that, you will -have an opportunity to develop your objections at a later stage when you -come to speak. The Tribunal rules that the document is admissible. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I read from the center of that Page 45 -of the document book: - - “After the November demonstrations the Deputy Gauleiter Holz - took up the Jewish question. His reasons can be given here in - detail on the basis of his statement of 25th March 1939: - - “The 9th and 10th of November 1938. During the night of the 9th - to the 10th of November and on the 10th of November 1938, events - took place throughout Germany which I”—and I emphasize that - that is Holz speaking—“considered to be the signal for a - completely different treatment of the Jewish question in - Germany. Synagogues and Jewish schools were burnt down and - Jewish property was smashed both in shops and in private houses. - Besides this, a large number of prominent Jews were taken to - concentration camps by the police. Towards midday we discussed - these events in the Gauleiter’s house. All of us were of the - opinion that we now faced a completely new state of affairs on - the Jewish question. By the great action against the Jews - carried out in the night and morning of the 10th of November all - precedents and all laws on this subject had been made - meaningless. We were of the opinion (particularly I myself) that - we should now act on our own initiative in this respect. I - proposed to the Gauleiter that in view of the great existing - lack of housing the best thing would be to put the Jews into a - kind of internment camp. Then the houses would become free at - once; and the housing shortage would be relieved, at least in - part. Besides that, we should have the Jews under control and - supervision! I added ‘The same thing happened to our prisoners - of war and war internees.’ - - “The Gauleiter said that this suggestion was for the time being - unfeasible. Thereupon I made a new proposal to him. I said to - him that I considered it unthinkable that, after the Jews had - had their property smashed, they should still be able to own - houses and land. I proposed that these houses and this land - ought to be taken away from them, and declared myself ready to - carry through such an action. I declared that by the - Aryanization of Jewish land and houses a large sum could accrue - to the Gau out of the proceeds. I named some millions of marks. - I stated that, in my opinion, this Aryanization could be carried - out as legally as the Aryanization of shops. The Gauleiter’s - answer was something to this effect: ‘If you think you can carry - this out, do so. The sum gained will then be used to build a Gau - school.’” - -I go down now to where it says “Page 18”: - - “The Aryanization was accomplished by the alienation of - properties, the surrender of claims, especially mortgage claims, - and reductions in buying price. - - “The payment allowed the Jews was basically 10 percent of the - nominal value or nominal sum of the claim. As a justification - for these low prices, Holz claimed, at the Berlin meeting of the - 6th of February 1939, that the Jews had mostly bought their - property during the inflation period for less than a tenth of - its value. As has been shown by investigating a large number of - individual cases selected at random, this claim is not true.” - -My Lord, I would turn to Page 48 of the document book, which appears in -the second part of this report, and that part of the report is really -the part containing the findings of the commission. I quote from the top -of the page, Page 48 of the document book . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this still part of the report? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This is still part of the report. It is, in -fact, as I say, the findings of the commission. - - “Gauleiter Streicher likes to beat people with a riding whip but - only if he is in the company of several persons assisting him. - In most cases the beatings are carried out with sadistic - brutality. - - “The best known case is that of Steinruck, whom he beat in the - prison cell until the blood came, together with Deputy Gauleiter - Holz and SA Oberführer König. After returning from this scene to - the Deutscher Hof he said, ‘Now I am relieved. I needed that - again!’ Later he also stated several times that he needed - another Steinruck case in order to ‘relieve’ himself. - - “In August 1938 he beat the editor Burker at the Gauhaus - together with District Office Leader Schöller and his adjutant, - König.” - -To show the authority and power that he held in his Gau, I refer to the -last paragraph on that page: - - “According to reports of reliable witnesses, Gauleiter Streicher - is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions - that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For - instance, at a meeting in the Colosseum in Nuremberg in 1935 he - said that nobody could remove him from office. In a meeting at - Herkules Hall, where he described how he had beaten Professor - Steinruck, he emphasized that he would not let himself be beaten - by anybody, not even by an Adolf Hitler. . . . - - “For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts - first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to - approve.” - -My Lord, both of those volumes of that report, Document 1757-PS, will -become Exhibit GB-175. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal isn’t altogether satisfied that that has any -bearing on the case against Streicher. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, it is the object of that document to -show the kind of treatment and persecution which the Jews were receiving -in the district or Gau over which this defendant ruled and, secondly, to -show the absolute authority with which this defendant acted in his -district. That is the purpose of that document. - -As a result either of that investigation or of some other matter the -defendant was relieved of his position as Gauleiter in February 1940, -but he did not cease from his propaganda or from the control of his -newspaper. I would only quote one further short extract from _Der -Stürmer_. An article written by him on the 4th of November 1943, which -appears in the document book on Page 53, is Document 1965-PS and becomes -Exhibit GB-176; and it is an extract of importance: - - “It is actually true that the Jews have so to speak disappeared - from Europe and that the Jewish ‘Reservoir of the East,’ from - which the Jewish pestilence has for centuries beset the peoples - of Europe, has ceased to exist. But the Führer of the German - people at the beginning of the war prophesied what has now come - to pass.” - -My Lord, that article was signed by Streicher, and it is my submission -that it shows that he had knowledge of what was going on in the East, of -which this Court has had such evidence. That was written November 1943. -In April ’43, the Tribunal will remember, the Warsaw ghetto was -destroyed. Between April 1942 and April 1944, 1,700,000-odd Jews were -killed in Auschwitz and Dachau—I quote now from the transcript—and -throughout the whole of that period millions of Jews were to die. It is -my submission that that article appearing on the 4th of November and -signed by him shows that he knew what was happening, perhaps not the -details, but that he knew that the Jews were being exterminated. - -I leave _Der Stürmer_ and I would draw the attention of the Tribunal -quite shortly to a matter which is perhaps as evil as any other aspect -of this man’s activity, and that is the particular attention that he -paid to the instruction—if you can call it that—or the perversion of -the children and the youth of Germany. He was not content with inciting -the German population. He seized the children as early as he could at -their schools, and he started to poison their minds at the earliest -possible date. Already in some of the extracts to which I have referred, -the Tribunal will remember that there are mentions of children and the -need for teaching them anti-Semitism. I refer now to Page 54 of the -document book, and I would quote four or five lines from the last -paragraph, starting in the middle of the last paragraph. It is a report -of a speech by Streicher as early as June 1925, when he says: - - “I repeat, we demand the transformation of the school into an - ethno-German institution of education. If German children are - taught by German teachers, then we shall have laid the - foundations for the ethno-German school. This ethno-German - school must teach racial doctrine.” - -I now go to the last line of the first paragraph on the following page: - - “We demand, therefore, the introduction of racial doctrine into - the school.” - -That is in a copy of _Der Stürmer_ which has already been put in. It is -Exhibit GB-165 (Document M-30). - -The following Document, M-43, is an extract from the _Fränkische -Tageszeitung_ of the 19th of March 1934, when he addressed the pupils at -a girls’ school at Preisslerstrasse after their finishing their -vocational course. He was continually holding children’s meetings and -attending children’s schools. I quote the third paragraph: - - “Then Julius Streicher spoke about his life and told them about - a girl who had at one time been a pupil of his and who had - fallen a victim to a Jew and was finished for the rest of her - life.” - -I need not read the rest. It is all in the same tone. That becomes -Exhibit GB-177. - -Every summer they celebrated in Nuremberg what they called their -solstice celebration, some pagan rite where the youth of Nuremberg -rallied—organized or at least encouraged by the Defendant Streicher. - -On Page 58 of the document book is a report taken from his paper, -_Fränkische Tageszeitung_, of his speech to the Hitler Youth on what -they called the “Holy Mountain” near Nuremberg, on the 22d of June 1935. - - “Boys and girls, look back a little more than 10 years ago. A - great war—the World War—had raged over the peoples of the - earth and had left in the end a heap of ruins. Only one people - remained victorious in that dreadful war, a people of whom - Christ said that its father is the Devil. That people had ruined - the German Nation in body and soul. At that time Adolf Hitler, - an unknown man, arose from among the people and became a voice - which proclaimed a holy war and struggle. He cried to the people - to take courage again and to rise and join in liberating the - German people from the Devil, so that mankind might again be - free from that race which has roamed the globe for centuries and - millennia, marked with the brand of Cain. - - “Boys and girls, even if it is said that the Jews were once the - chosen people do not believe it, but believe us when we say that - the Jews are not a chosen people. Because it cannot be that a - chosen people should act among the peoples as the Jews do - today.” - -And so on, with similar kind of propaganda. That Document, M-1, will be -Exhibit GB-178. - -The next Document, M-44, from which I will not read now, becomes Exhibit -GB-179. The Tribunal will see that it was a report of Streicher’s -address to 2,000 children at Nuremberg at Christmastime 1936. Underlined -it says: - - “‘_Do you know who the Devil is?_’ he asked his breathlessly - listening audience. ‘The Jew, the Jew,’ resounded from a - thousand children’s voices.” - -But he wasn’t content only with writing and talking. He actually issued -a book for teachers, a book which he published from his _Der Stürmer_ -offices, called _The Jewish Question and School Instruction_. - -I have not had the whole of that book translated. It is addressed to -school teachers. It is intended for their benefit, and it emphasizes the -necessity of anti-Semitic teaching in schools, and it suggests ways in -which the subject can be introduced and handled. - -On Page 60 of the document book, M-46, the Tribunal will see a few -extracts which have been taken from that book. The preface part of it is -as follows: - - “The National Socialist State has brought fundamental changes - into all spheres of life of the German people. - - “It has also presented the German teacher with new duties. The - National Socialist State demands that its teachers instruct - German children on racial questions. As far as the German people - is concerned the racial question is a Jewish question. Those who - want to teach the child about the Jew must themselves have a - thorough knowledge of the subject.” - -I will quote from the paragraph opposite “Page 5” in the margin. The -whole of the rest of the extracts are really suggestions for teachers as -to how to introduce the Jewish subject into their teaching, and at Page -5 of the introduction: - - “Racial and Jewish questions are the fundamental problems of the - National Socialist ideology. The solution of these problems will - secure the existence of National Socialism and with this the - existence of our nation for all time. The enormous significance - of the racial question is recognized almost without exception - today by all the German people. In order to come to this - realization, our people had to travel through a long road of - suffering.” - -DR. MARX: I should like to point out the following: The prosecutor -omitted in his presentation to state that the book he referred to was -not written by the Defendant Streicher but by the school inspector Fink. -If the prosecutor had read the next sentence, the Tribunal would have -known about this fact. My client has called my attention to this point. -I noticed it myself also because the next sentence reads as follows: - - “Schulrat Fritz Fink desires to help German teachers on the road - to information and knowledge with his book: _The Jewish Question - in the Schools_.” - -There can thus be no doubt that this School Inspector Fink is the author -of the book. It is, after all, an essential thing to know that Fink and -not Streicher was the author of this book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished what you wish to say? - -DR. MARX: Yes; that is what I wanted to say. - -THE PRESIDENT: I would point out to you that although the book does -appear to have been written by Fritz Fink, which is stated in the -paragraph at the top, it has a preface by Streicher, so we may presume -that Streicher authorized it; and it was published and printed by _Der -Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: That is correct. I just wanted to point out to the Tribunal -that it did not appear to be understood, that just that particular -sentence was not read. One might have thought that an original work of -Streicher’s was concerned, in which case the question of whether -Streicher agreed with that work would appear of minor importance. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you see, Dr. Marx, counsel was reading actually from -the preface by Streicher. The last passage that he read, or almost the -last, was the preface by Streicher. The last passage I have got marked -is the passage on Page 60, which is headed “Preface” and is signed by -Julius Streicher, which says in terms that the book was written by -School Inspector Fritz Fink. - -Let us not take any further time about it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I think I have reached. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the last words of that preface on Page 60 -there: “Those who take to heart . . .”? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If Your Lordship pleases, I read towards the -end of the paragraph—the first paragraph of the preface: - - “Those who take to heart all that has been written with such - feeling by Fritz Fink, who for many years has been greatly - concerned about the German people, will be grateful to the - creator of this outwardly insignificant publication.”—Then it - is signed—“Julius Streicher, City of the Reich Party rallies, - Nuremberg, in the year 1937.” - -I omitted that last part only in the interest of time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That book is Exhibit GB-180. I would just read -the last two lines, which I was not able to read before Dr. Marx -interposed. The last three lines of the paragraph under “Introduction”: - - “No one should be allowed to grow up in the midst of our people - without this knowledge of the frightfulness and dangerousness of - the Jew.” - -I will not occupy the time of the Tribunal by reading further from that -book. The nature of the book I hope is clear. I would only refer to the -last three lines on the next page in the document book, taking another -extract from it: - - “One who has reached this stage of understanding will inevitably - remain an enemy of the Jews all his life and will instill this - hatred into his own children.” - -_Der Stürmer_ also published some children’s books, although I make it -quite clear that I am not alleging that the defendant himself wrote the -books. But they were published from his publishing business; and they -are, of course, on the same line as everything else that was published -and issued from that business. - -The first of them to which I would call attention was entitled in -English—or the English translation is—as follows: Don’t Trust the Fox -in the Green Meadow Nor the Jew on His Oath. It is a picture book for -children. There are pictures, all of them offensive pictures depicting -Jews, of which a variety of selections appears in the Tribunal’s book. -And opposite each picture there is a little story. - -On Page 62 of the document book the Tribunal will see the kind of thing -which appears opposite each picture. Opposite the picture in the -Tribunal’s document book appears the following: - - “Jesus Christ says, ‘The Jew is a murderer through and through.’ - And when Christ had to die the Lord didn’t know of any other - people that would torture him to death, so he chose the Jews. - That is why the Jews pride themselves on being the chosen - people.” - -The writing opposite the first picture, which depicts a very unpleasant -looking Jewish butcher cutting up meat, is as follows: - - “The Jewish butcher: He sells half-refuse instead of meat. A - piece of meat lies on the floor, the cat claws another. This - doesn’t worry the Jewish butcher since the meat increases in - weight. Besides, one mustn’t forget, he won’t have to eat it - himself.” - -Again in the interest of time, it is not worth quoting the contents of -that book any further. The Tribunal can see the type of book it is, the -type of teaching it was instilling into the minds of the children. The -pictures speak for themselves. - -The second picture is a rather beastly picture of a girl being led away -by a Jew. On the next page we see the defendant smiling benignly at a -children’s party, greeting the little children. The next picture depicts -copies of _Der Stürmer_ posted on a wall with children looking at them. - -The next picture perhaps requires a little explanation. It is a picture -of Jewish children being taken away from an Aryan school, led away by an -unpleasant looking father; and all the Aryan children shouting and -dancing and enjoying the fun very much. - -That book, Document M-32, becomes Exhibit GB-181. - -THE PRESIDENT: You won’t be able, will you, to finish in a short time? -Perhaps we’d better adjourn now. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have about another 20 minutes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes; we will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I had finished describing that one -children’s book. There is a similar book called _The Poisonous Fungus_, -which has, in fact, been put in evidence already as Exhibit USA-257, but -it was not read to the Tribunal; and I would like to read one of the -short stories from that book because it shows, perhaps more strikingly, -I think, than any other extract to which we have referred, the revolting -way in which this man poisoned the minds of his listeners and readers. - -It is a book of pictures again with short stories, and Page 69 of the -document book shows one of the pictures, a girl sitting in a Jewish -doctor’s waiting room. - -My Lord, it is not a very pleasant story, but he is not a very pleasant -man; and it is only by reading these things that it becomes possible to -believe the kind of education that the German children have been -receiving during these years, led by this man. - -I quote from the story: - - “Inge”—that is the girl—“Inge sits in the reception room of - the Jew doctor. She has to wait a long time. She looks through - the journals which are on the table. But she is much too nervous - to read even a few sentences. Again and again she remembers the - talk with her mother. And again and again her mind reflects on - the warnings of her leader of the League of German Girls. A - German must not consult a Jew doctor. And particularly not a - German girl. Many a girl that went to a Jew doctor to be cured - met with disease and disgrace. - - “When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an - extraordinary incident. From the doctor’s consulting room she - could hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young - girl, ‘Doctor, doctor, leave me alone.’ - - “Then she heard the scornful laughter of a man. And then, all of - a sudden it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened - breathlessly. - - “‘What can be the meaning of all this?’ she asked herself, and - her heart was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of - her leader in the League of German Girls. - - “Inge had already been waiting for an hour. Again she takes the - journals in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks - up. The Jew appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. - Horrified she jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the - Jewish doctor. And this face is the face of the Devil. In the - middle of this devil’s face is a huge crooked nose. Behind the - spectacles gleam two criminal eyes. Around the thick lips plays - a grin, a grin that means, ‘Now I have you at last, you little - German girl!’ - - “And then the Jew approaches her. His fat fingers snatch at her. - But now Inge has got hold of herself. Before the Jew can grab - hold of her, she smacks the fat face of the Jew doctor with her - hand. One jump to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the - stairs. Breathlessly she escapes from the Jew house.” - -Comment is almost unnecessary on a story like that, read by children of -the age of those who are going to read the books you have seen. - -Another picture which I have included in the book is a picture, of -course of the defendant, and the script opposite that picture, which -appears on Page 70 of the document book, includes the words—and I quote -from the last but one paragraph: “Without a solution of the Jewish -question there will be no salvation for mankind.” - -The page itself contains an account of how some boys attended one of his -speeches: - - “That is what he shouted to us. We all understood him. And when, - at the end, he shouted, ‘Sieg-Heil for the Führer,’ we all - acclaimed him with tremendous enthusiasm. Streicher spoke for - two hours that time. To us it seemed to have been but a few - minutes.” - -One can begin to see the effect that all this was having from the -columns of _Der Stürmer_ itself. In April 1936 there appears only one -letter—many others appear in other copies from children of all ages—I -quote the third paragraph of this letter, the letter signed by the boys -and girls of the National Socialist Youth Hostel at Gross-Möllem: - - “Today we saw a play on how the Devil persuades the Jew to shoot - a conscientious National Socialist. In the course of the play - the Jew did it, too. We all heard the shot. We would have all - liked to jump up and arrest the Jew. But then the policeman came - and after a short struggle took the Jew along. You can imagine, - dear _Stürmer_, that we heartily cheered the policeman. In the - whole play not one name was mentioned, but we all knew that this - play represented the murder by the Jew Frankfurter. We were very - sad when we went to bed that night. None felt like talking to - the others. This play made it clear to us how the Jew sets to - work.” - -My Lord, that book is already in evidence as I have stated. It is -Exhibit GB-170 (Document M-25). - -To conclude, I would draw the attention of the Tribunal again only to -his authority as a Gauleiter. It appears in the _Organization Book of -the NSDAP_ for 1938—which is already in as Exhibit USA-430—in the -description of the duties and authority of Gauleiter: The Gauleiter -bears over-all responsibility to the Führer for the sector of -sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties, and jurisdiction of -the Gauleiter result primarily from the mission assigned by the Führer -and, apart from that, from detailed direction. - -His association with the Führer and with the other defendants—or some -of the other defendants—can be seen from the newspapers. On the -occasion of his 50th birthday Hitler paid a visit to Nuremberg to -congratulate him. That was on the 13th of February 1935. The account of -that meeting is published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of that date, -and I quote as follows: - - “Adolf Hitler spoke to his old comrade in arms and the latter’s - followers in words which went straight to their hearts. By way - of introduction he remarked that it was a special pleasure for - him to spend, on this day of honor to Julius Streicher, a short - while in Nuremberg, the town of battle-steeled National - Socialist solidarity, within the circle of the veteran - standard-bearers of the National Socialist idea. - - “Just as they all, during the years of misery, had unshakeably - believed in the victory of the Movement, so his friend and - comrade in arms, Streicher, had stood faithfully at his side at - all times. It had been this unshakeable belief that had moved - mountains. - - “For Streicher it would surely be an inspiring thought that this - 50th anniversary meant to him not only the turn of a half - century, but also of a thousand years of German history. He had - in Streicher a comrade of whom he could say that here in - Nuremberg was a man who would never waver for a single second - and who would unflinchingly stand behind him in every - situation.” - -That is Document M-8 and becomes Exhibit GB-182. - -The next document (M-22) is a letter from Himmler published in _Der -Stürmer_ of April 1937. That edition is already Exhibit USA-258. - - “When in future years the history of the reawakening of the - German people is written and the next generation is already - unable to understand that the German people were once friendly - to the Jews, it will be recognized that Julius Streicher and his - weekly paper _Der Stürmer_ contributed a great deal toward the - enlightenment regarding the enemy of mankind.”—Signed—“The - Reichsführer SS, H. Himmler.” - -That is Exhibit USA-258. A number of these documents are already in -evidence in the bound volumes. - -Lastly, we have a letter from Baldur von Schirach, the Reich Youth -Leader, published in _Der Stürmer_ of March 1938 (Document M-45, Exhibit -USA-260): - - “It is the historical merit of _Der Stürmer_ to have enlightened - the broad masses of our people in a popular way as to the Jewish - world danger. _Der Stürmer_ is right in not carrying out its - task in a purely aesthetic manner, for Jewry has shown no regard - for the German people. We have, therefore, no reason for being - considerate toward our worst enemy. What we fail to do today, - the youth of tomorrow will have to suffer for bitterly.” - -My Lord, it may be that this defendant is less directly involved in the -physical commission of the crimes against Jews, of which this Tribunal -have heard, than some of his co-conspirators. The submission of the -Prosecution is that his crime is no less the worse for that reason. No -government in the world, before the Nazis came to power, could have -embarked upon and put into effect a policy of mass extermination in the -way in which they did, without having a people who would back them and -support them and without having a large number of people, men and women, -who were prepared to put their hands to their bloody murder. And not -even, perhaps, the German people of previous generations would have lent -themselves to the crimes about which this Tribunal has heard, the -killing of millions and millions of men and women. - -It was to the task of educating the people, of producing murderers, -educating and poisoning them with hate, that Streicher set himself; and -for 25 years he has continued unrelentingly the education—if you can -call it so—or the perversion of the people and of the youth of Germany. -And he has gone on and on as he saw the results of his work bearing -fruit. - -In the early days he was preaching persecution. As persecutions took -place he preached extermination and annihilation; and, as we have seen -in the ghettos of the East, as millions of Jews were being exterminated -and annihilated, he cried out for more and more. - -That is the crime that he has committed. It is the submission of the -Prosecution that he made these things possible—made these crimes -possible—which could never have happened had it not been for him and -for those like him. He led the propaganda and the education of the -German people in those ways. Without him the Kaltenbrunners, the -Himmlers, the General Stroops would have had nobody to carry out their -orders. And, as we have seen, he has concentrated upon the youth and the -childhood of Germany. In its extent his crime is probably greater and -more far-reaching than that of any of the other defendants. The misery -that they caused finished with their incarceration. The effects of this -man’s crime, of the poison that he has injected into the minds of -millions and millions of young boys and girls and young men and women -lives on. He leaves behind him a legacy of almost a whole people -poisoned with hate, sadism, and murder, and perverted by him. That -German people remains a problem and perhaps a menace to the rest of -civilization for generations to come. - -My Lord, I submit that the Prosecution’s case against this man as set -out in the Indictment is proved. - -My Lord, Lieutenant Brady Bryson, of the United States Delegation, will -present to the Court the case against Schacht. - -LIEUTENANT BRADY O. BRYSON (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, a document book has been prepared -and filed and the appropriate number of copies has been delivered to the -defendants. - -We ask the Tribunal’s permission to file within the next few days a -trial brief which now is in the process of preparation. - -Our proof against the Defendant Schacht is confined to planning and -preparation of aggressive war. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was it you said about the trial brief? - -LT. BRYSON: We ask permission to file a trial brief within the next few -days, as our brief is not yet ready. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -LT. BRYSON: Our proof against the Defendant Schacht is limited to -planning and preparation for aggressive war and to membership in a -conspiracy for aggressive war. - -The extent of Schacht’s criminal responsibility as a matter of law, -under the Charter of the Tribunal, will be developed in our brief. Only -a few of our 50-odd documents have been previously submitted in -evidence. We have taken special pains to avoid repetition and cumulative -proof; but for the sake of continuity we would like, in several -instances, simply to draw the Tribunal’s attention to evidence -previously received, with an appropriate reference to the transcript of -the Record. - -Before commencing our proof, we wish to state our understanding that the -Defendant Schacht’s control over the German economy was on the wane -after November 1937, and that by the time of the aggression on Poland -his official status had been reduced to that of Minister without -Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler. We know too that he is -sometimes credited with opposition to certain of the more radical -elements of the Nazi Party; and I further understand that at the time of -capture by United States forces he was under German detention in a -prison camp, having been arrested by the Gestapo in July 1944. - -Be this as it may, our proof will show that at least up until the end of -1937 Schacht was the dominant figure in the rearming of Germany and in -the economic planning and preparation for war, that without his work the -Nazis would not have been able to wring from their depressed economy the -tremendous material requirements of armed aggression, and that Schacht -contributed his efforts with full knowledge of the aggressive purposes -which he was serving. - -The details of this proof will be presented in four parts: - -First, we will very briefly show that Schacht accepted the Nazi -philosophy prior to 1933 and supported Hitler’s rise to power. - -Second, proof of the contribution of Schacht to German rearmament and -preparation for war will be submitted. This evidence will also be brief, -since the facts in this respect are well-known and have already been -touched upon by Mr. Dodd in his presentation of the case on economic -preparation for war. - -Third, we will show that Schacht assisted the Nazi conspiracy purposely -and willingly with knowledge of, and sympathy for, its illegal ends. - -And last, we will prove that Schacht’s loss of power in the German -Government did not in any sense imply disagreement with the policy of -aggressive war. - -We turn now to our proof that Schacht helped Hitler to power. - -Schacht met Göring for the first time in December 1930, and Hitler early -in January 1931 at Göring’s house. His impression of Hitler was -favorable. I offer in evidence Exhibit USA-615 (Document 3725-PS), -consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht under -date of 20 July 1945, and quote two questions and answers related to -this meeting, near the middle of the first page of the interrogation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to give us the Exhibit number? You haven’t -given us the other number? - -LT. BRYSON: This is an interrogation, Sir, and it will not have two. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got a number for it? - -LT. BRYSON: You will find it in your document book in the back, labeled -“Schacht Interrogation of 20 July 1945.” I quote from the middle of the -first page: - - “Q: ‘What did he’”—that is, Hitler—“‘say?’ - - “A: ‘Oh, ideas he expressed before, but it was full of will and - spirit.’” - -And near the bottom of the page: - - “Q: ‘What was your impression at the end of that evening?’ - - “A: ‘I thought that Hitler was a man with whom one could - co-operate.’” - -After this meeting Schacht allied himself with Hitler; and at a crucial -political moment in November 1932, he lent the prestige of his name, -which was widely known in banking, financial, and business circles -throughout the world, to Hitler’s cause. I offer in evidence Exhibit -USA-616 (Document 3729-PS) consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial -interrogation of Schacht on 17 October 1945. I wish to quote, beginning -at the top of Page 36 of this interrogation. This is the interrogation -of 17 October 1945, at Page 36. I may say that when I refer to the page -numbers, I speak of the page of the document book: - - “Q: ‘Yes, and at that time’”—referring to January 1931—“‘you - became a supporter, I take it, of. . .’ - - “A: ‘In the course. . .’ - - “Q: ‘Of Hitler’s coming to power?’ - - “A: ‘Especially in the course of the years 1931 and 1932.’” - -And I quote further from the lower half of Page 37 of the same -interrogation: - - “Q: ‘But what I mean—to make it very brief—did you lend the - prestige of your name to help Hitler come to power?’ - - “A: ‘I have publicly stated that I expected Hitler to come to - power; for the first time, if I remember, in November ’32.’ - - “Q: ‘And you know, or perhaps you don’t, that Goebbels in his - diary records with great affection. . .’ - - “A: ‘Yes.’ - - “Q: ‘. . . the help that you gave him at the time?’ - - “A: ‘Yes, I know that.’ - - “Q: ‘November 1932?’ - - “A: ‘From the Kaiserhof to the Chancellery and back.’ - - “Q: ‘That’s right. You have read that?’ - - “A: ‘Yes.’ - - “Q: ‘And you don’t deny that Goebbels was right?’ - - “A: ‘I think his impression was that that was correct at that - time.’” - -I now refer the Tribunal to this statement of Goebbels, set forth in -2409(a)-PS. The entire diary of Goebbels is in evidence as Exhibit -Number USA-262. The entry I wish to read, which appears in 2409(a)-PS, -was made on 21 November 1932: - - “In a conversation with Dr. Schacht I assured myself that he - absolutely shares our point of view. He is one of the few who - stand immovable behind the Führer.” - -It is believed that Schacht joined the Party only in the sense that he -allied himself with the cause. Dr. Franz Reuter, whose biography of -Schacht was officially published in Germany in 1937, has stated that -Schacht refrained from formal membership in order to be of greater -assistance to the Party. I offer in evidence Document Number EC-460, -Exhibit Number USA-617, consisting of an excerpt from Reuter’s -biography, and I quote the last sentence of the excerpt: - - “By not doing so, he was able eventually to help more toward the - final victory than if he had become an enrolled Party member.” - -It was Schacht who organized the financial means for the decisive March -1933 election, at a meeting of Hitler with a group of German -industrialists in Berlin. Schacht acted as the sponsor or host of this -meeting, and a campaign fund of several million marks was collected. -Without reading therefrom, I offer in evidence Document Number EC-439, -Exhibit Number USA-618, an affidavit of Von Schnitzler under date of 10 -November 1945, and refer the Tribunal to the transcript for 23 November, -Pages 282-283 (Volume II, Pages 223, 224), where the text of the -affidavit already appears in the Record. - -Further evidence on this point is also contained in the excerpt from the -interrogation of Schacht on 20 July 1945, from which I read a part a -moment ago. Schacht lent his support to Hitler not only because he was -an opportunist, but also because he shared Hitler’s ideological -principles. Apart from the entry in Goebbels’ diary, this may be seen -from Schacht’s own letter to Hitler, under date of 29 August 1932, -pledging continued support to Hitler after the latter’s poor showing in -the July 1932 elections. I offer this letter in evidence as Document -Number EC-457, Exhibit Number USA-619, and quote from the middle of the -first paragraph and further from the next to the last paragraph: - - “But what you could perhaps do with in these days is a kind - word. Your movement is carried internally by so strong a truth - and necessity that victory in one form or another cannot elude - you for long.” - -And further down—and keep in mind that neither Hitler nor Schacht was -then in the German Government—Schacht says: - - “Wherever my work may take me in the near future, even if you - should see me one day behind stone walls, you can always count - on me as your reliable assistant.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What do those words mean at the top: “The President of -the Reichsbank in Retirement”? Are they on the letter? - -LT. BRYSON: Yes, they are, Sir. Dr. Schacht had previously been a -president of the Reichsbank. At this time he was in retirement. You will -remember, this is prior to Hitler’s accession to power. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. - -LT. BRYSON: And then Hitler reinstated Dr. Schacht as President of the -Reichsbank after the Nazis had taken over. - -THE PRESIDENT: And he put that at the top of his letter, did he? - -LT. BRYSON: That I cannot say. - -I will also point out that Schacht signed this letter, “With a vigorous -Heil.” - -We turn now to the second part of our proof, relating to Schacht’s -contribution to preparation for war. - -The detailed chronology of Schacht’s official career in the Nazi -Government, as set forth in Document 3021-PS, has already been submitted -in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-11. However, it may be helpful at the -outset to remind the Tribunal that Schacht was recalled to the -Presidency of the Reichsbank by Hitler on 17 March 1933, which office he -continuously held until 20 January 1939; that he was Acting Minister and -then Minister of Economics from August 1934 until November 1937; and -that he was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in May -1935. He resigned as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General -for War Economy in November 1937, when he accepted appointment as -Minister without Portfolio, which post he held until January 1943. His -position as virtual economic dictator of Germany in the 4 crucial years -from early 1933 to the end of 1936 is practically a matter of common -knowledge. - -Schacht was the guiding genius behind the Nazi expansion of the German -credit system for rearmament purposes. From the outset he recognized -that the plan for the German military supremacy required huge quantities -of public credit. To that end a series of measures was adopted which -subverted all credit institutions in Germany to the over-all aim of -supplying funds for the military machine. I will briefly mention some of -these measures. - -By Cabinet decree of 27 October 1933 the statutory reserve of 40 percent -in gold and foreign exchange required against circulating Reichsbank -notes was permanently abandoned. By the Credit Act of 1934 the -Government assumed jurisdiction of all credit institutions, and control -over the entire banking system was centralized in Schacht as Chairman of -the Supervisory Board for the Credit System and President of the -Reichsbank. This act not only enabled Schacht to control the quantity of -credit but also its use. On 29 March 1934 a system of forced corporate -lending to the Reich was imposed on German business. And on 19 February -1935 the Treasury was authorized to borrow funds in any amounts approved -by the Reich Chancellor, that is, by Hitler. - -On these points I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1933, Part II, Page 827; _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1934, -Part I, Page 1203; _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1934, Part I, Page 295; and -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, Part I, Page 198. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are they found here in the document book? - -LT. BRYSON: They’re not in the document book, Sir. - -I asked only that judicial notice be taken of them as published laws of -Germany. - -These measures enabled Schacht to embark upon what he himself has termed -a “daring credit policy,” including the secret financing of a vast -amount of armaments through the so-called ‘mefo’ bill, a description of -which appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 295 (Volume II, -Page 232). I offer in evidence Document Number EC-436, Exhibit Number -USA-620, consisting of a statement, dated 2 November 1945, by Emil Puhl, -a director of the Reichsbank during Schacht’s presidency, and quote the -second paragraph thereof as follows: - - “In the early part of 1935 the need for financing an accelerated - rearmament program arose. Dr. Schacht, President of the - Reichsbank, after considering various techniques of financing, - proposed the use of mefo bills to provide a substantial portion - of the funds needed for the rearmament program. This method had - as one of its primary advantages the fact that secrecy would be - possible during the first years of the rearmament program; and - figures indicating the extent of rearmament, that would have - become public through the use of other methods, could be kept - secret through the use of mefo bills.” - -The extent of the credit expansion and the importance of mefo financing -may be seen from Document Number EC-419, which I now offer as Exhibit -Number USA-621 and which consists of a letter from Finance Minister Von -Krosigk to Hitler, under date of 1 September 1938. I quote the following -figures from the middle of the first page: - - “The Reich debt accumulated as follows: - - “As of 31 December 1932: Funded debt, 10,400 millions of - Reichsmark; short-term debt, 2,100 millions of Reichsmark; debt - not published in the budget (trade and mefo bills of exchange), - 0. - - “As of 30 June 1938: Funded debt, 19,000 million Reichsmark; - short-term debt, 3,500 million Reichsmark; and debt not - published in the budget (trade and mefo bills of exchange), - 13,300 million Reichsmark. - - “Total: as of 31 December 1932, 12,500 million Reichsmark; as of - 30 June 1938, 35,800 million Reichsmark.” - -The Reich debt thus tripled. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the next section, beginning with the words -“Provisions were made to cover. . .”? - -LT. BRYSON: “Provisions were made to cover the armament expenditures for -the year 1938 (the same amount as in 1937) as follows: - - “Five thousand millions from the budget, that is, taxes; 4,000 - millions from loans; 2,000 millions from 6-month treasury notes, - which means postponement of payment until 1939; total: 11,000 - millions.” - -The Reich debt thus tripled under Schacht’s management. More than -one-third of the total was financed secretly and through the -instrumentality of the Reichsbank by mefo and trade bills. It is clear -that this amount of financing outside the normal public issues -represented armament debt. I read further from Document EC-436, at the -beginning of the last long paragraph: - - “These mefo bills were used exclusively for financing - rearmament; and when in March 1938 a new finance program - discontinuing the use of mefo bills was announced by Dr. - Schacht, there was a total volume outstanding of 12,000 million - marks of mefo bills which had been issued to finance - rearmament.” - -The character of Schacht’s credit policy and the fact that it was -ruthlessly dedicated to the creation of armaments plainly appear from -his own speech delivered on 29 November 1938. - -I offer it in evidence as Document Number EC-611, Exhibit Number -USA-622; and I quote from Page 6 at the beginning of the last paragraph: - - “It is possible that no bank of issue in peacetime carried on - such a daring credit policy as the Reichsbank since the seizure - of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this credit - policy, however, Germany created an armament second to none; and - this armament in turn made possible the results of our policy.” - -Beyond the field of finance Schacht assumed totalitarian control over -the German economy generally in order to marshal it behind the -rearmament program. - -He acquired great power over industry as a result of the Nazi -reorganization of German industry along military lines and in accordance -with the so-called Leadership Principle. On this point I refer the -Tribunal to the transcript for 23 November at Pages 287-290 (Volume II, -Pages 227-228); and to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1934, Part I, Page 1194, -of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice. - -Schacht also exercised broad powers as a member of the Reich Defense -Council, which was secretly established on 4 April 1933 and the function -of which was preparation for war. The Tribunal is referred to the -transcript for 23 November, Page 290 (Volume II, Pages 228-229). I also -offer in evidence as Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623, a -report under date of 30 September 1934, showing the functions of the -Ministry of Economics in this respect. The report reveals concentration -upon all the familiar wartime economic problems, including stockpiling, -production of scarce goods, removal of industry to secure areas, fuel -and power supply for war production, machine tools, control of wartime -priorities, rationing, price control, civilian supply, and so on. I wish -to read into the Record merely an excerpt showing the jurisdiction of -the Ministry of Economics, beginning near the top of Page 2 of Document -Number EC-128: - - “With the establishment of the Reich Defense Council and its - permanent committee the Reich Ministry of Economics has been - given the task of making economic preparation for war. There - should really be no need to explain the tremendous importance of - this task. Everyone remembers vividly how terribly the lack of - any economic preparation for war hit us during the World War.” - -Finally, in 1934, Schacht acquired sweeping powers under legislation -which authorized him, as Minister of Economics, to take any measure -deemed necessary for the development of the German economy. In this -connection reference is made to the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Part I, -Page 565, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice. - -The so-called “New Plan” devised by Schacht was announced in the fall of -1934 shortly after he became Minister of Economics. In this connection -the Tribunal is referred to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part I, Page -816 and the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1935, Part I, Page 105, with the -request that judicial notice be taken thereof. The New Plan was -Schacht’s basic program for obtaining the necessary foreign-produced raw -materials and foreign exchange required to sustain the rearmament -program. - -With respect to the details of the New Plan, I offer in evidence -Document Number EC-437, Exhibit Number USA-624, consisting of an -affidavit of Emil Puhl, dated 7 November 1945. The entire text is -pertinent. Therefore, permission is requested to submit the affidavit -without reading therefrom, on condition that French and Russian -translations be prepared and filed. - -THE PRESIDENT: And German ones supplied, too. - -LT. BRYSON: We will supply copies. I wish to say that the original is in -English, but the affidavit has already been translated into German. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. BRYSON: This affidavit by a co-worker of Schacht describes in detail -the many ingenious and often ruthless devices he used, including -negotiating “stand-still” agreements, forcing payment in Reichsmark of -interest and amortization on debts incurred in foreign currency, using -scrip and funding bonds for the same purpose, suspending service on -foreign-held debts, blocking foreign-held marks, freezing foreign claims -in Germany, eliminating unessential foreign expenditures, requisitioning -German-held foreign exchange, subsidizing exports, issuing restricted -marks, bartering under clearing agreements, licensing imports, and -controlling all foreign exchange transactions to the end of favoring raw -materials for armaments. - -The Tribunal is also asked to take judicial notice of -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Page 997; _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, Part I, -Page 349; and _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1937, Part I, Page 600, relating to -the clearing bank, the conversion bank, and the maturity of foreign -loans, all of which decrees are mentioned in the affidavit. - -Schacht even went so far as to invest foreign-held Reichsmark on deposit -in German banks in rearmament notes, thus, as he put it, financing -rearmament with the assets of his political opponents. Without reading -therefrom, I refer your Honors to Document Number 1168-PS, Exhibit -USA-37, being a memorandum from Schacht to Hitler, dated 3 May 1935, -which already appears in the transcript on Pages 412 and 413 (Volume II, -Pages 312, 313). Moreover, Schacht even resorted to capital punishment -to prevent the loss of foreign exchange when frightened capital began to -flee from the country. In this connection reference is made to the Law -against Economic Sabotage, found in 1936 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -Page 999, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice. - -Schacht took particular pride in the results which were accomplished -under the stringent controls which he instituted under his New Plan. I -refer the Tribunal to Document Number EC-611, in evidence as Exhibit -Number USA-622, consisting of Schacht’s speech in Berlin on 29 November -1938. I wish to read into the Record an excerpt from the top of Page 10: - - “If there is anything remarkable about the New Plan, it is again - only the fact that German organization under National Socialist - leadership succeeded in conjuring up in a very short time the - whole apparatus of supervision of imports, direction of exports, - and promotion of exports. The success of the New Plan can be - proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to - quantity, the import of finished products was cut down by 63 - percent between 1934 and 1937. On the other hand, the import of - ores was increased by 132 percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain - by 102, and of rubber by 71 percent.” - -While President of the Reichsbank and Minister of Economics, Schacht -acquired still another key position, that of Plenipotentiary General for -War Economy. - -He received this appointment from Hitler pursuant to the unpublished -Reich Defense Law secretly enacted on 21 May 1935. This law is in -evidence as Document Number 2261-PS, Exhibit Number USA-24, consisting -of a letter from Von Blomberg dated 24 June 1935 to the chiefs of the -Army, Navy and Air Forces, together with copies of the Reich Defense Law -and the Cabinet’s memorandum relating thereto. Pertinent comments on and -excerpts from this document appear in the transcript for 23 November, at -Pages 278 and 292 (Volume II, Pages 220-229). I will simply state -therefore that by virtue of this appointment Schacht was put in complete -charge of economic planning and preparation for war in peacetime, except -for certain direct armament production under control of the War -Ministry. Upon the outbreak of war he was to be the economic czar of -Germany with complete control over the activities of a number of key -Reich ministries. - -Schacht appointed Wohlthat as his deputy and organized a staff to carry -out his directives. In this connection I offer in evidence excerpts from -a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht under date 17 October 1945. This -document is Exhibit Number USA-616 (Document 3729-PS). I wish to read -into the Record a question and answer found at the bottom of Page 40 of -the document book: - - “Q: ‘Let me ask you a general question then: Do you take the - responsibility as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy for - the writings that were made and the actions that were done by - Wohlthat and his assistants?’ - - “A: ‘I have to.’” - -I also offer in evidence Document Number EC-258, Exhibit Number USA-625, -consisting of a status report issued in December 1937 under the -signature of Schacht’s deputy, Wohlthat. The report is entitled, “The -Preparation of the Economic Mobilization by the Plenipotentiary General -for War Economy.” Schacht had withdrawn from office immediately prior to -the preparation of this report, and it plainly is a recapitulation of -his accomplishments while in office. Since the entire text is relevant, -we ask permission to submit the document without reading therefrom on -condition that translations into French and Russian be later filed with -the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is consistent with the rule laid down -by the Tribunal, which was that the translations in the French and -Russian languages should be submitted at the same time. You are now -suggesting that you can submit translations at a later stage. - -LT. BRYSON: Well, if Your Honor pleases, in any event I did not plan to -read from the document at this time and Defense Counsel do have the -German original. - -THE PRESIDENT: I was not speaking of the Defense Counsel so much as of -the members of the Tribunal. - -LT. BRYSON: We have the Russian translation in process now and it was -delayed and we were unable to get it here at this time, but the delay -will be very short and the document is of critical importance to our -case. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long will it be before it is ready? - -LT. BRYSON: I wouldn’t like to say precisely, Sir, but perhaps within 4 -or 5 days. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you propose to do now, because it is a very -complicated and long document, is it not? - -LT. BRYSON: It is and it shows. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Were you proposing to summarize it? - -LT. BRYSON: I was proposing to summarize it, Sir, now. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would summarize it now -and only be permitted to put it in at the stage when you have the -translation ready, you may summarize it now. - -LT. BRYSON: I will summarize it now, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will it take long to summarize? - -LT. BRYSON: Not very long, Sir; no. - -THE PRESIDENT: You see, it is 5 o’clock. - -LT. BRYSON: I think there will be time to summarize it, and then we will -stop. - -This document discloses that before his resignation Schacht had worked -out in amazing detail his plans and preparations for the management of -the economy in the forthcoming war. For example, 180,000 industrial -plants in 300 industries had been surveyed with respect to usefulness -for war purposes; economic plans for the production of 200 basic -materials had been worked out; a system for the letting of war contracts -had been devised; allocations of coal, motor fuel, and power had been -determined; 248 million Reichsmark had been spent on storage facilities -alone; evacuation plans for war materials and skilled workers from -military zones had been worked out; 80 million wartime ration cards had -already been printed and distributed to local areas; and a card index on -the skills of some 22 million workers had been prepared. - -That concludes the summary, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-SECOND DAY - Friday, 11 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, before picking up our line of proof -against the Defendant Schacht, I would like to supply a point of -information. - -Yesterday the President of the Tribunal inquired with respect to -Document Number EC-457, Exhibit Number USA-619. The question raised by -the Tribunal was with respect to the words “in retirement” in the -letterhead used by Schacht in writing to Hitler in 1932. This is the -letter in which Schacht expressed his belief in the truth of the Nazi -movement and in which he said that Hitler could always count upon him as -a reliable assistant. - -The letterhead has printed upon it “The President of the Reichsbank” and -after that phrase there is typed the letters “a. D.”, and I understand -that those letters are an abbreviation for a German phrase meaning “in -retirement” and that it is customary, or it was customary, in Germany -for retired officials to continue to use their titles with the letters -“a. D.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -LT. BRYSON: Yesterday we had just about completed our proof with respect -to the contribution of the Defendant Schacht to the preparation for war, -and I wish to submit one more document on this point. This is Document -Number EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626. It consists of a statement by -George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to -1934. I will quote therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the -fourth paragraph: - - “It was his”—Schacht’s—“financial ability that enabled the - Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for - the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to - carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this - is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was - shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi - regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to - establish its control over Germany, much less to create the - enormous war machine which was necessary for its objectives in - Europe and later throughout the world. - - “The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to - rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary, while - at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht’s - resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his - absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish - the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably, without this - complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and - all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler - and the Nazis to develop an armed force sufficient to permit - Germany to launch an aggressive war.” - -We turn now. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Lieutenant Bryson, I am not sure that that gives a -full or quite fair interpretation of the document. Don’t you think -perhaps you ought to read the paragraph before? - -LT. BRYSON: The preceding paragraph, Sir? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - LT. BRYSON: “Dr. Schacht always attempted to play both sides of - the fence. He told me, and I know he told both other American - representatives in Berlin and various British representatives, - that he disapproved of practically everything that the Nazis - were doing. I recall on several occasions his saying, after the - Nazi Party came into power, that if the Nazis were not stopped, - they were going to ruin Germany and the rest of the world with - it. I recall distinctly that he emphasized to me that the Nazis - were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war.” - -If the Court please, I would like to read also from the last paragraph: - - “In my opinion Schacht was in no sense a captive of the Nazis. - He was not compelled to devote his time and his capacities to - their interest. His situation was such that he would most likely - have been able either to work on much less restrained scale or - to abstain from activity entirely. He continued to lend his - services to the Nazi Government out of opportunism.” - -We turn now to the third part of our case against Schacht. The evidence -is clear that he willingly contributed his efforts to the Nazi -conspiracy, knowing full well its aggressive designs. The Tribunal will -recall our proof that Schacht was converted to the Nazi philosophy in -1931 and helped Hitler come to power in 1933. We will now prove, first, -that Schacht personally favored aggression and, second, that in any -event he knew Hitler’s aggressive intentions. - -There is ample evidence to justify the conclusion that Schacht rearmed -Germany in order to see fulfilled his strong belief in aggressive -expansion as an instrument of German national policy. Schacht had long -been a German nationalist and expansionist. He spoke against the Treaty -of Versailles at Stuttgart as early as 1927. I offer in evidence -Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of -excerpts from speeches by Schacht. I quote from the top of Page 2: “The -Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its -economic but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong.” - -It is common knowledge that he strongly favored acquisition of colonial -territory by Germany. However, he also favored acquisition of contiguous -territory in Europe. On 16 April 1929 at the Paris conference in -connection with reparations, he said. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a -later stage? - -LT. BRYSON: At a later stage, if you please, Sir, in connection with -another point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on. - -LT. BRYSON: On 16 April 1929, at the Paris conference in connection with -reparations, he said: - - “Germany can as a whole pay only if the Corridor and Upper - Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession - and if, besides, somewhere on the earth, colonial territory will - be made available to Germany.” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you quoting from? - -LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-628 (Document -3726-PS), consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of -Schacht on 24 August 1945. You will find it in the document book at the -back, labelled “Interrogation of 24 August”. At the top of the first -page of the interrogation this statement was quoted to Schacht, and his -reply contains an admission of having made the statement. In his reply -he said: - - “That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the - statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to - pay after this war will be proved in the future.” - -I wish to point out that this is the very territory which was the -subject of the armed aggression in September 1939. - -In 1935 Schacht stated flatly that Germany would, if necessary, acquire -colonies by force. I offer in evidence Document EC-450, designated as -Exhibit Number USA-629. This document consists of an affidavit of S. R. -Fuller, Jr., together with a transcript of his conversation with Schacht -at the American Embassy in Berlin on 23 September 1935. I wish to read -from Page 6 of the document where there appears a statement by Schacht -in the lower half of the page. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the conversation? - -LT. BRYSON: The conversation occurred on 23 September 1935. The page -number of this document is at the bottom, and I quote from Page 6: - - “Schacht: ‘Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them - through negotiation, if possible; but if not, we shall take - them.’” - -In July 1936, when the rearmament program was well under way, Schacht -again publicly spoke of the Versailles Treaty. This time his language -contained an explicit threat of war. I refer the Tribunal again to -Document EC-415, which I have previously introduced in evidence as -Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of speeches by -Schacht. I wish to read from the paragraph beginning in the middle of -the first page: - - “But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the peoples’ - mind. That is because, deeper than material wounds, moral wounds - are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. - Material loss can be made up through labor, but the moral wrong - which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples in the peace - dictates, leaves a burning scar on the peoples’ conscience. The - spirit of Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war; and there - will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the - world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire - of pronouncing this warning.” - -Later in the same year Schacht publicly advocated the doctrine of -Lebensraum for the German people. I quote again from Document EC-415, -Exhibit Number USA-627, being an excerpt from Schacht’s speech at -Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, on the second page, the last paragraph: - - “Germany has too little living space for her population. She has - made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other - nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is - necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite - of all these efforts, the space does not suffice.” - -In January 1937 Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies, at -least by inference threatened a breach of the peace in demanding a -colonial cession. I offer in evidence Document L-111, being Exhibit -Number USA-630, and consisting of excerpts from a report under date of -20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State. I wish -to read therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the second -paragraph: - - “He”—meaning Schacht—“stated the following: - - “That the present condition of the German people was - intolerable, desperate, and unendurable; that he had been - authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and - England which would: (1) Guarantee European peace, (2) secure - present European international boundaries, (3) reduce armaments, - (4) establish a new form of a workable league of nations, and - (5) abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint - administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would - provide for Germany an outlet for population, a source for - foodstuffs, fats, and raw materials.” - -In December 1937 Ambassador Dodd noted in his diary that Schacht would -be willing to risk war for the sake of new territory in Europe. I refer -the Tribunal to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador -Dodd’s diary. - -THE PRESIDENT: The proposal contained in Document L-111 was for cession -of colonies, was it not? - -LT. BRYSON: It was, Sir. - -I turn now to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador -Dodd’s diary. The entire diary has previously been received in evidence -as Exhibit Number USA-58. I quote some notes on a conversation with -Schacht on 21 December 1937, beginning near the bottom of the second -page of Document EC-461, in the last paragraph: - - “Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they - invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks; that - is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, - especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler’s - dictatorship, he, like most other eminent Germans, wishes - annexation without war if possible; with war if the United - States will keep hands off.” - -THE PRESIDENT: There is another passage in that book, that diary. I am -not sure; it probably is not the same date, but it is on the first page -of the exhibit, I think—the third paragraph. - -LT. BRYSON: The third paragraph. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it at a different time? - -LT. BRYSON: It is a different time, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: September the 19th of what year? - -LT. BRYSON: We will check that in the complete volume here, and I think -in a minute I will be able to supply the date. In the meantime would you -like me to read it, Sir? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you had better read it. - - LT. BRYSON: “He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is - absolutely committed to war; and the people, too, are ready and - willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the - dangers and are opposed. He concluded, ‘But we shall postpone it - 10 years. Then it may be we can avoid war.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you should read the next paragraph, too. - - LT. BRYSON: “I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some 2 - weeks ago and said, ‘I agree with you about commercial and - financial matters in the main. But why do you not, when you - speak before the public, tell the German people they must - abandon a war attitude?’ He replied, ‘I dare not say that. I can - speak only on my special subjects.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: And the next one. - -LT. BRYSON: And the next one: - - “How, then, can German people ever learn the real dangers of - war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once - more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used - his influence with Hitler—‘a very great man’, he - interjected—to prevent war. I said, ‘The German papers printed - what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our - countries, but not a word about the terrible effects and - barbarism of war.’ He acknowledged that and talked very - disapprovingly of the Propaganda Ministry which suppresses - everything it dislikes. He added, as I was leaving ‘You know a - party comes into office by propaganda and then cannot disavow it - or stop it.’” - -The date of his conversation was in September 1934. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that those years are not stated in the -document. It is rather misleading as it is. - -LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, the exhibit which is in evidence will -show the dates. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not blaming you; but it is misleading, because -it looks like September the 19th and December the 21st, and as there -were 3 years’ interval between, it makes a difference. That is right, -isn’t it? - -LT. BRYSON: Yes, that is right. I am sorry the excerpt simply shows the -page numbers from the exhibit, and not the dates. - -Schacht admittedly strained all the resources of Germany to build up a -Wehrmacht which would provide Hitler with an instrument of realization -of his desire for Lebensraum. In this connection I offer in evidence -Document Number EC-369, Exhibit Number USA-631, consisting of a -memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate, signed by Schacht, to -Hitler, dated 7 January 1939. I wish to read the last paragraph of the -first page: - - “From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact - that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the - reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It—the - Reichsbank—therefore assumed to a very great extent the - responsibility of financing the rearmament in spite of the - inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was - the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the - background, to carry through the armament at once, out of - nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a - respect-commanding foreign policy possible.” - -It is clear that the “successful foreign policy” which Schacht thus -attributed to rearmament included the Austrian and Czechoslovakian -acquisitions. I offer in evidence Document EC-297(a), Exhibit Number -USA-632, being a speech of Schacht’s in Vienna after the Anschluss in -March 1938. I quote from the third page and the second full paragraph: - - “Thank God, these things could not after all hinder the great - German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a - communion of German will and German thought. He bolstered it - with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and finally gave the - external form to the internal union between Germany and - Austria.” - -With respect to the Sudetenland I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-611, -already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-622, being a speech by -Schacht; EC-611—but I will not read it, Sir—being a speech by Schacht -on 29 November 1938, shortly after the Munich settlement. I have earlier -read the pertinent remark attributing Hitler’s success at that -conference to the rearmament made possible by Schacht’s financial and -economic measures. - -This line of proof shows that Schacht entertained an aggressive -philosophy with respect to territorial expansion and justifies the -conclusion that he allied himself with Hitler because of their common -viewpoint. - -We turn now to prove that, whether or not Schacht wanted war, he at -least knew Hitler planned military aggression for which he was creating -the means. He had numerous discussions with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. He -knew that Hitler was intent upon expansion to the east, which would mean -war, and that Hitler felt he must present the German people with a -military victory. I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-633 (Document -3727-PS), consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of -Schacht on 13 October 1945, and I read from the second page at the end -of the second question: - - “Q: ‘What was there in what he’”—meaning Hitler—“‘said that - led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?’ - - “A: ‘That is in _Mein Kampf_. He never spoke to me about that, - but it was in _Mein Kampf_.’ - - “Q: ‘In other words, as a man who read it, you understood that - Hitler’s expansion policy was directed to the east?’ - - “A: ‘To the east.’ - - “Q: ‘And you thought that it would be better to try to divert - Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial - policy instead?’ - - “A: ‘Quite.’” - -I also offer in evidence Document EC-458, Exhibit Number USA-634, -consisting of an affidavit of Major Edmund Tilley under date of 21 -November 1945, with respect to an interview of Schacht on 9 July 1945. I -read the second paragraph: - - “During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that - he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. Schacht - stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that - in order to make his hold and government secure, the Führer felt - that he must present the German people with a military victory.” - -As early as 1934, Schacht stated his belief that the Nazis would bring -war to Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-451, which I have -already submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-626, consisting of -an affidavit under date of 15 November 1945 by Messersmith, American -Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I wish to read from the first -page, third paragraph, last sentence. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have read it already. - -LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, there is a little more there which we -have not read, which I should like to read. - -THE PRESIDENT: You read the whole paragraph. At our invitation you read -from the third paragraph down to the bottom of the page. - -LT. BRYSON: I should like to read the first sentence of the fourth -paragraph on Page 1. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - - LT. BRYSON: “While making these protestations he nevertheless - showed by his acts that he was thoroughly an instrument of the - whole Nazi program and ambitions and that he was lending all his - extraordinary knowledge and resourcefulness toward the - accomplishment of that program.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, speaking for myself and for some other -members of the Tribunal, we think it is a far better way to deal with a -document, to deal with it, if possible, once and for all, and not to be -coming back to it. It not only wastes time by the fact that the Tribunal -have got to turn back and forth, back and forth, to the document; but -you get a much fairer idea of the document if it is dealt with once and -for all, although it may cover more than one subject. I say that -although it may be impossible for you to do that now in consonance with -the preparations that you have made; but those who follow you may be -able to alter their course. If it is possible, when you get a document -with a variety or a number of paragraphs in it which you want to quote, -you should quote them all at the same time. Do you follow what I mean? - -LT. BRYSON: I follow you, Your Honor. We have so organized our materials -that we have directed our evidence to specific points, and since the -points are separated, we had to separate our quotations. - -THE PRESIDENT: I realize that it may be difficult for you. - -LT. BRYSON: In September of 1934 Ambassador Dodd made a record in his -diary of a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in -Berlin. If the Court please, I will pass over this document, because in -response to a question from the Tribunal, I read an excerpt from the -document which covers the same point that I was about to direct myself -toward. - -I had just pointed out that Schacht has acknowledged to Ambassador Dodd -in September 1934 his knowledge of the war purposes of the Nazi Party; -and we had already shown that in 1935 Schacht had stated that Germany -would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. He must then have known -to what length Hitler was prepared to go. - -After attending a meeting of the Reich ministers on 27 May 1936 in -Berlin, Schacht must have known that Hitler was contemplating war. Your -Honors may recall, as has been earlier shown, that at this meeting the -Defendant Göring, who was very close to Hitler, stated that all measures -are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war and -that waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. I refer the -Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, from which I will not read, as the -quotation is already in evidence in Exhibit Number USA-123. - -On 31 August 1936 the War Minister, Von Blomberg, sent to Schacht a copy -of Von Blomberg’s letter to the Defendant Göring. I refer the Tribunal -again to 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-123, and read from the middle of Page 19 of the document. The page -numbers, if the Court please, on this document are found in the upper -lefthand corner: - - “According to an order of the Führer the setting up of all Air - Force units is to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore - considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936, which at the - time when the budget for 1936 was made were planned for later - years only.” - -This intensification of the air force program certainly revealed to -Schacht the closeness to war which Hitler must have felt. - -I also offer in evidence Document EC-416, Exhibit USA-635, consisting of -minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936 which Schacht -attended. I read the statement by Göring found at the top of Page 2 of -this document: - - “The Führer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the - Colonel General and the Reich War Minister which represents a - general instruction for the execution of this task. - - “It starts from the basic thought that the show-down with Russia - is inevitable.” - -Schacht thus knew that Hitler expected war with Russia. He also knew of -Hitler’s ambitions towards the east. It must have been plain to him, -therefore, that such a war would result from Russian opposition to -German military expansion in that direction; that is, Schacht must have -known that it would be a war of German aggression. - -In January 1937, the Tribunal will recall, Schacht stated to Ambassador -Davies in Berlin that he had “been authorized by his government” to -submit certain proposals to France and England which, in fact, amounted -to a bid for colonies under threat of war. If Schacht was acting under -instructions from Hitler, he was necessarily familiar with Hitler’s -aggressive intentions at that time. - -In November of 1937 Schacht knew Hitler was determined to acquire -Austria and at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia and that Hitler -also had designs on the Polish Corridor. I refer the Tribunal to -Document L-151, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-70, this being -a letter containing a memorandum of a conversation between Schacht and -Ambassador Bullitt, dated 23 November 1937. I quote the last paragraph -on Page 2: - - “Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to - Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of - Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned - about the Polish Corridor, and in his”—Schacht’s—“opinion it - might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were - permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a - bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and - East Prussia with Germany.” - -To digress for just a moment, Schacht here was really speaking for -himself as well as for Hitler. We have seen from his speech of 29 March -1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was -even working hard for its achievement. In this connection I refer the -Tribunal to Pages 506 and 507 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 373) -for evidence of Schacht’s having subsidized the Nazis’ preliminary -agitation in Austria. - -In addition to the foregoing direct evidence, the Tribunal is asked to -take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the -events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler’s intention. Schacht was a -close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the Cabinet during the -period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of -conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the -Republican Government in Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and -the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this -period the Reich’s debt tripled under the stress of mounting armaments, -the expenditures from 750,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1932 to 11,000,000,000 -Reichsmarks in 1937, and 14,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1938. During the -entire period 35,000,000,000 Reichsmarks were spent on armaments. It was -a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the -satisfaction of Germany’s repeated demands for additional territory. -Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in -foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in -preparation for war. - -Certainly, in this setting Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the -fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road toward -armed aggression. - -We turn now to our last line of proof with respect to Schacht’s loss of -power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937, Schacht resigned his -offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War -Economy. At that time he accepted appointment as Minister without -Portfolio and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank. - -Our evidence will show: (a) This change in position was no more than a -clash between two power-seeking personalities, Göring and Schacht, in -which Göring, being closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy -differences were concerned only with the method of rearming; and (c) -Schacht’s loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist -armed aggression. - -There was an issue of policy between Göring and Schacht, but it was -concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war -preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of -rearmament material during the transitory period until Germany should be -ready to strike. Göring was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. -Hitler supported Göring; and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly -resenting Göring’s intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out. - -I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, previously submitted in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, containing notes of a conversation -between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page -21 of the document, from which I quote: - - “President Schacht called me to him at 1300 hours today and - requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War: - Schacht returned from the Führer with the greatest anxiety, - since he could not agree to the economic program planned by the - Führer. - - “The Führer wants to speak at the Party convention about - economic policy and wants to emphasize there that we now want to - get free from foreign countries with all our energy by - production in Germany. - - “Schacht requests urgently that the Reich Minister of War warn - the Führer from this step.” - -And three paragraphs farther down: - - “If we now shout out abroad our decision to make ourselves - economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because - we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period.” - -Nevertheless, Hitler announced the Four Year Plan of self-sufficiency a -few days later in Nuremberg, and against Schacht’s wishes Göring was -named Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. - -At this point I refer the Tribunal again to the interrogation of Schacht -on 16 October 1945, being Exhibit Number USA-636; and I wish to read -beginning near the bottom of Page 9 of the document: - - “Q: ‘And the Four Year Plan came in when?’ - - “A: ‘It was announced in September ’36, on the Party Day.’ - - “Q: ‘Do you say that from the time that the Four Year Plan came - in in September 1936, you were ready to rid yourself of your - economic duty?’ - - “A: ‘No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my - position even against Göring.’ - - “Q: ‘Yes, in what sense?’ - - “A: ‘That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to - manage in my ministry.’ - - “Q: ‘As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor - by you?’ - - “A: ‘I would not have ever appointed a man like Göring who - didn’t understand a bit about all these things.’” - -Schacht and Göring immediately became embroiled in a conflict of -jurisdiction. On 26 November 1936 Göring issued a directive regarding -raw and synthetic material production. I offer in evidence Document -EC-243, Exhibit Number USA-637, consisting of a copy of this directive. -It shows that Göring’s Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials pre-empted -control over large economic areas previously in the hands of Schacht. As -an example, I will quote from Paragraph V of the directive on Page 4 of -the document: - - “The planning and determination of objectives, as well as the - control over the execution of the tasks which must be - accomplished within the framework of the Four Year Plan, are the - responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic - Materials, which supersedes the authorities which have - heretofore been in charge of these tasks.” - -On 11 December 1936 Schacht found it necessary to order all supervisory -offices in the Ministry of Economics to accept instructions from him -alone. I offer in evidence Document EC-376, Exhibit Number USA-638, -consisting of a circular letter from Schacht to all supervisory offices -under date of 11 December 1936, and I quote from the second paragraph: - - “The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from - me alone. They must answer all official inquiries for any - information of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials - in order to give any information at any time to the fullest - extent.” - -And a little further down: - - “. . . I herewith authorize the supervisory offices to take the - necessary measures for themselves. In case doubts should result - from requests of the above offices and these doubts cannot be - cleared by oral negotiations with the experts of these offices, - I should be informed immediately. I will then order in each case - the necessary steps to be taken.” - -The military sided with Schacht, who had rearmed them so well. I offer -in evidence Document EC-420, Exhibit Number USA-639, consisting of a -draft of a memorandum by the Military Economic Staff, dated 19 December -1936. I wish to read from Paragraph 1: - - “(1) The direction of war economy in the civilian sector in case - of war can be handled only by the person who in peacetime has - borne the sole responsibility for the preparations for war. - - “Upon recognizing this fact a year and a half ago Reichsbank - President Dr. Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for - War Economy and an operations staff was attached to his office.” - -And then Paragraph Number 2: - - “(2) The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with - the principle laid down in Number 1, Paragraph 1, if the - Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the - Minister President General Göring’s command.” - -In January 1937 the _Military Weekly Gazette_ published an article -warmly praising Schacht’s achievements in rearmament. Without reading it -I offer in evidence Document EC-383, Exhibit Number USA-640, containing -this article, a pertinent quotation from which already appears in the -transcript for 23 November at Page 296 (Volume II, Page 233). - -Shortly thereafter Schacht attempted to force a show-down with Göring by -temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. I offer -in evidence Document EC-244, Exhibit Number 641, consisting of a letter -from Von Blomberg, the Minister of War, to Hitler under date of February -22, 1937. I read the second paragraph of this letter as follows: - - “The President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, has notified me - that he is not acting in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the - time being, since in his opinion there exist discrepancies - regarding the powers conferred upon him and those of Colonel - General Göring. Because of this the preparatory mobilization - steps in the economic field are delayed.” - -Schacht obviously was using his importance to the war preparations as a -lever. - -THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, does the Defendant Schacht admit in -his interrogation that the reason for his giving up his office was the -difference of opinion between him and the Defendant Göring? - -LT. BRYSON: He does, Sir, and the Defendant Göring so states in his -interrogation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into the details of their quarrel? - -LT. BRYSON: If the Court will be satisfied that this was the cause of -Schacht’s resignation. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: If they both say so. . . - -LT. BRYSON: . . . and that the cause was not his unwillingness to go -along with the aggressive intentions of the Nazis at that time, I shall -be perfectly satisfied to confine our evidence to the interrogations of -Schacht and Göring. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does he suggest that in his interrogation?—that that -might have been the reason? - -LT. BRYSON: I will find out, Sir, but our case against Schacht is -premised upon conspiracy. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Schacht wants to set up such a case as -that, you could apply to be heard in rebuttal. - -LT. BRYSON: Well, we shall be satisfied then to eliminate a number of -our items of evidence, including the controversy between Göring and -Schacht, and satisfy ourselves with the interrogations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, we are almost at the time of the break. -Perhaps during the break we can arrange our evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): We agree -that the question of the disagreement between the Defendants Göring and -Schacht need not be discussed further at this time. But we shall come -back to and deal in detail with the question as to how far these -disagreements had any bearing on the plan for an aggressive war. - -LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, we have eliminated part of our -proof. I would simply like to put in a letter from Göring and an -interrogation of Schacht which will finish up the question of the -disagreement. - -Under date of 5 August 1937 Schacht wrote a critical letter to Göring, -who replied with a 24-page letter on 22 August 1937. Göring’s letter -reviews their many differences in detail. I offer it as Document EC-493, -Exhibit Number USA-642, and I wish to read simply one statement found in -the middle of Page 13: - - “In conclusion I should like to refer to remarks which you made - in a paragraph of your letter entitled ‘The Four Year Plan’ - about your general attitude toward my work in regard to the - economic policy. I know and I am pleased that at the beginning - of the Four Year Plan you promised me your most loyal support - and co-operation and that you repeatedly renewed this promise - even after the first differences of opinion had occurred and had - been removed in exhaustive discussions. I deplore all the more - having the impression recently, which is confirmed by your - letter, that you are increasingly antagonistic toward my work in - the Four Year Plan. This explains the fact that our - collaboration has gradually become less close. . . .” - -Schacht and Göring were reconciled by written agreement on 7 July 1937 -but subsequently again fell into disagreement, and Hitler finally -accepted Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November -1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister without Portfolio, and -later Schacht’s resignation was extended to his position as -Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Without reading it, I offer in evidence -Document EC-494, Exhibit Number USA-643, as proof of this fact. - -Now, finally, I wish to refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of -Schacht, under date of 16 October 1945, Document 3728-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-636, and I wish to read from Page 12 of the document near the -bottom: - - “A: ‘It may amuse you if I tell you that the last - conversation’”—this is Schacht speaking—“‘that I had with - Göring on these topics was in November 1937, when Luther for 2 - months had endeavored to unite Göring and myself and to induce - me to co-operate further with Göring and maintain my position as - Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Göring; and - at the end of this talk Göring said, “But I must have the right - to give orders to you.” Then I said, “Not to me, but to my - successor.” I have never taken orders from Göring; and I would - never have done it because he was a fool in economics, and I - knew something about it, at least.’ - - “Q: ‘Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive personal - business between you and Göring. That seems perfectly obvious.’ - - “A: ‘Certainly.’” - -In all this abundant and consistent evidence there is not the slightest -suggestion that Schacht’s withdrawal from these two posts represented a -break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. -Indeed, Hitler was gratified that Schacht would still be active in the -Government as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister without -Portfolio. I offer in evidence Document L-104, Exhibit Number USA-644, -consisting of a letter to the United States Secretary of State from -Ambassador Dodd, under date of 29 November 1937, enclosing a translation -of Hitler’s letter of 26 November 1937 to Schacht. I quote the last two -sentences of Hitler’s letter, found on Page 2 of the document: - - “If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest - gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy - consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorate - you will make available for the German people and me for many - years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your - untiring energy. Delighted at the fact that in the future, also, - you are willing to be my personal adviser, I appoint you as of - today a Reich Minister.” - -Schacht did continue, obviously still in full agreement with Hitler’s -aggressive purpose. He was still President of the Reichsbank at the time -of the taking of Austria in March 1938. In fact, the Reichsbank took -over the Austrian National Bank. On this point I refer the Tribunal to -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, Page 254, and ask that judicial notice -be taken thereof. Further, Schacht even participated in the planning of -the absorption of Austria. In this connection I introduce into evidence -Document EC-421, Exhibit Number USA-645, consisting of excerpts from -minutes of a meeting of the staff of General Thomas on 11 March 1938 at -1500 hours. I quote therefrom as follows: - - “Lieutenant Colonel Hünerm reads directive of the Führer of 11 - March concerning the ‘Action Otto’ and informs us that ‘The - Economy War Service Law’ has been put in force. He then reads - Directives 1 and 2 and gives special orders to troops for - crossing the Austrian borders. According to that, at Schacht’s - suggestion, no requisitions should be made but everything ought - to be paid for at the rate of 2 schillings to 1 Reichsmark.” - -On the conversion of the Austrian schilling the Tribunal is asked also -to take judicial notice of _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, Page 405. - -The Tribunal, of course, is already familiar with the public approval by -Schacht of the Anschluss in his Vienna speech of 21 March 1938, and Your -Honors will also recall Schacht’s pride in Hitler’s use of the rearmed -Wehrmacht at Munich, as expressed in his speech of 29 November 1938. -Both speeches were subsequent to his resignation in November 1937. - -We come now to the removal of Schacht from the presidency of the -Reichsbank in January 1939. The reason for this development is quite -clear. Schacht lost confidence in the credit capacity of the Reich and -was paralyzed, with the fear of a financial collapse. He felt that the -maximum level of production had been reached, so that an increase in -banknote circulation would only cheapen money and bring on inflation. In -this attitude he ceased to be useful to Hitler, who was about to strike -and wished to tap every ounce of available Government credit for -military purposes. - -I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-369, which I have previously -submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-631. This document is a -memorandum from the Reichsbank directorate to Hitler, under date of 7 -January 1939, in which Schacht reviews in detail his fears of inflation. -The seriousness of the situation may be seen generally from the entire -text. I wish to quote several of the more crucial statements, one from -the last paragraph on Page 3, the second sentence: - - “We are, however, faced with the fact that approximately 3 - billion Reichsmark of such drafts cannot now be paid, though - they will be due in 1939.” - -I quote from the upper half of Page 4: - - “Exclusive of the Reichsbank there are approximately 6 billion - Reichsmark mefo drafts which can be discounted against cash - payment at any time at the Reichsbank, which fact represents a - continuous danger to the currency.” - -And I quote finally from the concluding paragraph of the memorandum: - - “We are convinced that the effects on the currency caused by the - policy of the last 10 months can be mended and that the danger - of inflation again can be eliminated by strict maintenance of a - balanced budget. The Führer and Reich Chancellor himself has - publicly rejected, again and again, an inflation as foolish and - fruitless. - - “We therefore ask for the following measures: - - “(1) The Reich as well as all the other public offices must not - incur expenditures or assume guaranties and obligations that - cannot be covered by taxes or by those funds which can be raised - through loans without disturbing the long-term investment - market. - - “(2) In order to carry out these measures effectively, full - financial control over all public expenditures must be restored - to the Reich Minister of Finance. - - “(3) The price and wage control must be rendered effective. The - existing mismanagement must be eliminated. - - “(4) The use of the money and investment market must be at the - sole discretion of the Reichsbank.” - -It is clear that Schacht’s fear was genuine and is a complete -explanation for his departure from the scene. He had good reason to be -afraid. In fact, the Finance Minister had already recognized the -situation in September 1938. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-419, -Exhibit Number USA-621, which I have already submitted in evidence and -which consists of a letter under date of 1 September 1938 from Krosigk -to Hitler, in which Krosigk warns of an impending financial crisis. I -quote from the bottom of Page 2. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that not really cumulative of what you have already -read? - -LT. BRYSON: We will be glad to skip it, Sir. It is cumulative. - -Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis, but he was afraid -that he personally would be held responsible for it. I offer in evidence -an affidavit of Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank and co-worker of -Schacht, dated 8 November 1945, designated as Document EC-438, Exhibit -Number USA-646, and I read therefrom, beginning at the bottom of the -second page: - - “When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had - sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more eager to - get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a - long time the ‘Leitmotiv’ of Schacht’s conversation with the - directors of the bank.” - -In the end Schacht escaped by deliberately stimulating his dismissal -from the Presidency of the Reichsbank. I offer in evidence Document -3731-PS, Exhibit Number USA-647, consisting of excerpts from an -interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945, and I wish -to read several statements beginning at the very bottom of the second -page: - - “I asked Mr. Schacht to finance for the Reich for the ultimo of - the month the sum of 100 or 200 millions. It was this quite - customary procedure which we had used for years, and we used to - give back this money after a couple of days. Schacht this time - refused and said that he was not willing to finance a penny - because he wanted, as he said, that it should be made clear to - Hitler that the Reich was bankrupt. I tried to explain that this - was not the proper ground to discuss the whole question of - financing because the question of financing very small sums for - a few days during ultimo never would bring Hitler to the - conviction that the whole financing was impossible. As far as I - remember now, it was Funk who told Hitler something about this - conversation; then Hitler asked Schacht to call upon him. I do - not know what they said but the result certainly was the - dismissal of Schacht.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Just give me the reference again to that document that -you were reading from. - -LT. BRYSON: This is the interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 -September 1945. I wish to read further, continuing on Page 3: - - “Q: ‘Now did Schacht ever say anything to you to the effect that - he wanted to resign because he was in opposition to the - continuance of the rearmament program?’ - - “A: ‘No, he never said it in this specific form, but in some - conversations he certainly spoke about it several times in his - own way when he had encounters with Göring . . . therefore I did - not take these things very seriously.’ - - “Q: ‘Well, let me put it this way, and please think carefully - about this. Did Schacht ever say that he wanted to resign - because he realized that the extent of the rearmament program - was such as to lead him to the conclusion that it was in - preparation for war rather than for defense?’ - - “A: ‘No, he never did.’ - - “Q: ‘Was Schacht ever quoted to you to this effect by any of - your colleagues or by anybody else?’ - - “A: ‘No.’ - - “Q: ‘Now, after Keitel took over the position of Chief of the - Wehrmacht were there still meetings between Schacht and yourself - with Keitel in place of Blomberg?’ - - “A: ‘Yes.’ - - “Q: ‘Did Schacht ever say anything at these meetings to indicate - that except for the technical question of the financing through - the Reichsbank directly he was opposed to a further program of - rearmament or opposed to the budget of the Wehrmacht?’ - - “A: ‘No, I do not think he ever did.’” - -The Defendant Göring has also confirmed this testimony. I refer the -Tribunal to the interrogation of Göring under date of 17 October 1945, -this being Document 3730-PS, Exhibit Number USA-648. I read from the -interrogation of Göring on 17 October 1945, from the lower half of the -third page: - - “Q: ‘I want to ask you this specifically. Was Schacht dismissed - from the Reichsbank by Hitler for refusing to participate any - further in the rearmament program?' - - “A: ‘No, because of his utterly impossible attitude in this - matter regarding this advance, which had no connection with the - rearmament program.’” - -Hitler dismissed Schacht from the Reichsbank on 20 January 1939. Without -reading, I offer in evidence Document EC-398, Exhibit Number USA-649, -consisting merely of a brief note from Hitler to Schacht announcing his -dismissal. - -From all of the foregoing it is clear that Schacht’s dismissal in no -sense reflected a parting of the ways with Hitler on account of proposed -aggression. This fact may also be seen from Document EC-397, Exhibit -Number USA-650, consisting of Hitler’s letter to Schacht under date of -19 January 1939, the text of which I wish to read: - - “At the occasion of your recall from office as President of the - Reichsbank Directorate I take the opportunity of expressing to - you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which - you have rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in - this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above - all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the - national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of - your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as - Reich Minister.” - -In fact, Schacht continued as Minister without Portfolio until January -1943. - -I wish to conclude by saying that the evidence shows: First, Schacht’s -work was indispensable to Hitler’s rise to power and to the rearmament -of Germany; second, Schacht personally was favorably disposed towards -aggression and knew Hitler intended to and would break the peace; and, -third, Schacht retired from the scene for reasons wholly unrelated to -the imminence of illegal aggression. - -As long as he remained in power, Schacht was working as eagerly for the -preparation of aggressive war as any of his colleagues. He was beyond -any doubt most effective and valuable in this connection. His assistance -in the earlier phase of the conspiracy made their later crimes possible. -His withdrawal from the scene reflected no moral feeling against the use -of aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy. He personally -struggled to retain his position. By the time he lost it he had already -completed his task in the conspiracy, namely, to provide Hitler and his -colleagues with the physical means and economic planning necessary to -launch and maintain the aggression. We do not believe that, having -prepared the Wehrmacht for assault upon the world, he should now be -permitted to find refuge in his loss of power before the blow was -struck. - -This concludes our case against the Defendant Schacht, and Lieutenant -Meltzer follows me with the presentation of the American case against -the Defendant Funk. - -LIEUTENANT (j. g.) BERNHARD D. MELTZER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the -United States): May it please the Tribunal, the documents bearing upon -Defendant Funk’s responsibility have been assembled in a document book -marked “HH,” which has been filed with the Tribunal and has also been -made available to Defense Counsel. The same is true of the brief. The -documents have been arranged in the book in the order of their -presentation. Moreover, to facilitate reference, the pages of the -document book have been numbered consecutively in red. I wish to -acknowledge the invaluable collaboration of Mr. Sidney Jacoby, who sits -to my right, in the selection and analysis of these documents. - -We propose to submit evidence concerning five phases of Defendant Funk’s -participation in the conspiracy: - -First, his contribution to the Nazi seizure of power; second, his role -in the Propaganda Ministry and in the related agencies and his -responsibility for the activities of that ministry; third, his -responsibility for the unrelenting elimination of Jews, first from the -so-called cultural professions and then from the entire German economy; -fourth, his collaboration in the paramount Nazi task to which all other -tasks were subordinated—preparation for aggressive war; and finally, we -propose to mention briefly the evidence concerning his active -participation in the waging of aggressive war. - -We turn now to the evidence showing that Defendant Funk actively -promoted the conspirators’ accession to power and their consolidation of -control over Germany. Soon after he joined the Nazi Party in 1931 -Defendant Funk began to hold important positions, first within the Party -itself and then within the Nazi Government. Funk’s positions have, in -the main, been listed in Document Number 3533-PS, which is a statement -signed by both Defendant Funk and his counsel. This document has been -made available in the four working languages of these proceedings, and a -copy in the appropriate language should be available in each of Your -Honors’ document books. It is accordingly requested that this document, -which is Exhibit Number USA-651, be received into evidence without the -necessity of its being read in its entirety. - -Your Honors will observe that there are some deletions and reservations -after some of the items listed in Document Number 3533-PS. These were -inserted by Defendant Funk. The words which he wished deleted are -enclosed in parentheses. His comments are underscored and followed by -asterisks. - -We wished to avoid troubling the Tribunal with a detailed discussion of -all these contested points. Accordingly, we collected in Document -3563-PS relevant excerpts from certain German publications. This -document has also been made available in the four working languages. -Moreover, we submit that the Tribunal can properly take judicial notice -of the publications referred to in the document. However, in order to -facilitate reference, we request that it be received in evidence as -Exhibit Number USA-652. - -In connection with Item “b” on the top of Page 1 of Document Number -3533-PS—Your Honors will find that on Page 1 of the document—Your -Honors will observe that Defendant Funk has in effect denied that he was -Hitler’s personal economic adviser in the 1930’s. However, the excerpts -from the four German publications set forth on Pages 1 and 2 of Document -Number 3563-PS directly contradict this denial. - -We submit that it will be clear from the documents just referred to that -Defendant Funk, soon after he joined the Party, began to operate as one -of the Nazi inner circle. Moreover, as a Party economic theorist during -its critical days in 1932, he made a significant contribution to its -drive for mass support by drafting its economic slogans. In this -connection I would refer to Document 3505-PS, which is a biography -entitled, in the English translation, _Walter Funk—A Life for Economy_. -This biography was written by one Oestreich in German and published by -the Central Publishing House of the Nazi Party. I offer this document in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-653. I wish to quote now from Page 1 of -the translation of this document, the center of the page. The -corresponding page of the German document is Page 81: - - “In 1931 he”—that is, Funk—“became a member of the Reichstag. - A document of his activity at the time is the ‘Economic - Construction Program of the NSDAP’ which was formulated by him - in the second half of the year 1932. It received the approval of - Adolf Hitler and was declared binding for all Gau leaders, - speakers on the subject, and Gau advisers on the subject and - others of the Party.” - -Thus Defendant Funk’s slogans became the economic gospel for the Party -organizers and spellbinders. - -Defendant Funk, however, was much more than one of the Nazi Party’s -economic theorists; he was also involved in the highly practical work of -soliciting campaign contributions for the Party. As liaison man between -the Party and the large German industrialists he helped place the -industrialists’ financial and political support behind Hitler. Defendant -Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June 1945, admitted that he -helped finance the highly critical campaign of 1932. I offer in evidence -Document Number 2828-PS as Exhibit Number USA-654, and I quote from the -bottom of Page 43. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Meltzer, isn’t this really all cumulative and -detailed evidence to support what the Defendant Funk has already agreed -with reference to his office? On Page 1 you have there the admission -that he was a member of the Nazi Party, chief of the division of the -Central Nazi Party, chairman of the committee of the Nazi Party on -economic policy, and then it goes on from A to U with views of the -various offices which he held and which he admits, he held. But surely -to go into the details of those positions is unnecessary. - -LT. MELTZER: If Your Honor pleases, the admission of the various -positions listed do not, in our judgment, indicate in any way Defendant -Funk’s participation in the fund-raising for the Nazi Party. - -THE PRESIDENT: The fund-raising? - -LT. MELTZER: The fund-raising. Now, it is a possible inference from -those positions that he did engage in the solicitation of campaign -contributions. However, it did seem to us relevant to mention most -briefly direct evidence of that aspect of his activity. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you say there is nothing in these offices -which covered the matter you are going to deal with; well and good. - -LT. MELTZER: Defendant Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June -1945, admitted, as I said a minute ago, that he helped to finance this -highly critical campaign. - -THE PRESIDENT: You see, Lieutenant Meltzer, the heading that you have so -conveniently given to us is that he contributed to the seizure of power. -Well now, nearly every one of the headings A to U on Page 1, which he -admits, is evidence that he contributed to seizure of power. Is it your -object to propose that he also helped to raise funds? The contribution -to the seizure of power is not in itself a crime; it is only a step. - -LT. MELTZER: Very well, Your Honor. There is one aspect, however, of his -activity in that regard which I should like to mention; that is, in -connection with his fund-raising activities, he was present at a meeting -in Berlin early in 1933. - -I am referring to the document which records what went on in that -meeting in order to point out that in the course of the meeting Hitler -and Göring submitted an exposition of certain basic elements of the Nazi -program. The reference to this meeting is found in Document 2828-PS, -which Your Honors will find on Page 28 of the document book. I wish to -quote the following question and answer: - - “Q: ‘About 1933, we have been informed, certain industrialists - attended a meeting in the home of Göring before the election in - March. Do you know anything about this?’ - - “A: ‘I was at the meeting. Money was not demanded by Göring but - by Schacht. Hitler left the room, then Schacht made a speech - asking for money for the election. I was there as an impartial - observer, since I was friendly with the industrialists.’” - -The character and importance of Funk’s work with the large -industrialists is emphasized in the biography of Funk, which I referred -to earlier, and I will simply invite Your Honors’ attention to the -relevant pages of that book, which are 83 and 84. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t understand why you read that passage. If you -wanted to show that he was at the meeting, it would be merely sufficient -to say that he was at the meeting. I don’t think those two sentences -that you read help us in the very least. - -LT. MELTZER: If the Tribunal please, those two sentences do not refer to -the meeting. Those two sentences refer to the biography which sums up -the Defendant Funk’s general contribution to the Nazi accession to power -and I thought it might be of interest to the Tribunal to see the -attitude of a German writer on this aspect of the defendant’s career. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me you referred to the meeting. - -LT. MELTZER: I was referring Your Honors to Pages 32 and 33 of the -document book, and to clarify this point may I read briefly from the -biography: - - “No less important than Funk’s accomplishments in the - programmatic field in the years 1931 and 1932 was his activity - at that time as the Führer’s liaison man to the leading men of - the German industry, trade, commerce, and finance. On the basis - of his past work his personal relations to the German economic - leaders were broad and far-reaching. He was now able to enlist - them in the service of Adolf Hitler and not only to answer their - questions authoritatively but to convince them and win their - backing for the Party. At that time that was terribly important - work; every success achieved meant a moral, political, and - economic strengthening of the vitality of the Party and - contributed toward destroying the prejudice that National - Socialism is merely a party of class hatred and class struggle.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Again, I don’t see that that has helped the Tribunal in -the least. - -LT. MELTZER: After Funk had helped Hitler become Chancellor, as Press -Chief of the German Government, he participated in the early Cabinet -meetings, in the course of which the conspirators planned the strategy -by which they would secure the passage of the Presidential Emergency -Decree, which was passed on 24 March 1933. Funk’s presence at these -meetings is revealed by Document 2962-PS which has already been received -in evidence and by Document Number 2963-PS, offered as Exhibit Number -USA-656. Your Honors will recall that this decree marked the real -seizure of political power in Germany. - -Soon after this the Defendant Funk assumed an important role in the -Ministry of Propaganda. The record shows that the Ministry became one of -the most important and vicious of Nazi institutions and that propaganda -was fundamental to the achievement of the Nazi program within Germany -and outside of Germany. We do not propose to review those matters to you -but rather to present evidence showing, as we have said, that the -Defendant Funk took a significant part in the propaganda operations. - -The Ministry was established on 13 March 1933, with Goebbels as Chief -and Defendant Funk as undersecretary, second in command. - -As undersecretary Defendant Funk was not only Goebbels’ chief aide but -was also the organizer of the large and complex propaganda machine. I -wish to offer in evidence Document Number 3501-PS, which will be found -on Page 47 of your document book as Exhibit Number USA-657. This -document is an affidavit signed on 19 December 1945 by Max Amann, who -held the position of Reich Leader of the Press and President of the -Reich Press Chamber. I should like to read the second sentence of the -first paragraph and the entire second paragraph: - - “In carrying out my duties and responsibilities I became - familiar with the operation and the organization of the Reich - Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment. Funk was the soul of - the Ministry, and without him Goebbels could not have built it - up. Goebbels once stated to me that Funk was his ‘most efficient - man.’ Funk exercised comprehensive control over all of the media - of expression in Germany; over the press, the theater, radio, - and music. As Press Chief of the Government and later as - undersecretary of the Ministry, Funk held daily meetings with - the Führer and a daily press conference in the course of which - he issued the directives governing the materials to be published - by the German press.” - -In addition to his position as undersecretary, Funk had many other -important jobs in the Propaganda Ministry and in its subordinate -agencies. These positions have already been listed in Document 3533-PS. -I wish, however, to refer in particular to Funk’s position as -vice-president of the Reich Chamber of Culture. This position was, of -course, related to his functions in the Propaganda Ministry. - -In his dual capacity he directly promoted two vital and related Nazi -policies. The first was the regimentation of all creative activities in -the interests of Nazi political and military objectives. The second was -the complete elimination of Jews and dissidents from the so-called -cultural professions. A full discussion of the methods by which these -policies were effectuated has been included in the brief which was -submitted as part of Document Book E. Accordingly, we will not go into -that matter now unless the Tribunal wishes us. - -In view of the Defendant Funk’s major role in the Propaganda Ministry, -it is natural to find Nazi writers stressing his responsibility for the -Nazi perversion of culture. In this connection, I will simply invite the -Tribunal’s attention to Pages 94 and 95 of Oestreich’s biography, which -has already been referred to. - -After Defendant Funk left the Ministry of Propaganda and became Minister -of Economics in 1938, he continued to advance the anti-Jewish program. -For example, on 14 June 1938 he signed a decree providing for the -registration of Jewish enterprises. This decree, which became the -foundation for the ruthless economic persecution which followed, is -found in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Page 627. It is -requested that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this reference to -the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and all subsequent references. May I add that -the brief on Defendant Funk gives the document numbers of translations -of decrees and other German publications of which the Tribunal will be -requested to take judicial notice. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? - -LT. MELTZER: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Before we do so, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I see that one -of the counsel, Colonel Phillimore, I think, is proposing to call -certain witnesses. The Tribunal would like to know who those witnesses -are and what subject their evidence is going to deal with. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would the Tribunal like to know now? I would -like to let them know, if it is convenient. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you could, it would be convenient now. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The first witness is Korvettenkapitän -Moehle, who was a captain on Defendant Dönitz’ staff; and he will prove -the passing on the Dönitz order of 17 September 1942. I think that is -the main point that he deals with. I think he deals also with the -destruction of some rescue ships, but that is the main point. - -The second witness is Lieutenant Heisig. He will deal primarily with -lectures of the Defendant Dönitz in which he advocated the destruction -of the crews of merchant ships. That is the general effect of the -evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Meltzer, are you intending to call any -witnesses this afternoon? - -LT. MELTZER: No, Sir. There is another member of the Prosecution, Sir, -who I believe is intending to call a witness—Mr. Dodd. - -THE PRESIDENT: In connection with the case against Funk? - -LT. MELTZER: No, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Or in connection with the case against somebody else? - -LT. MELTZER: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is it in connection with, Raeder? - -LT. MELTZER: I believe Mr. Dodd might offer. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Raeder, is it? - -LT. MELTZER: No, Sir. Mr. Dodd might offer a better explanation than I -on the purpose of calling the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd? - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Yes, -Sir. Your Honor, the witness is offered in connection with the -Defendants Rosenberg, Funk, Frick, Sauckel, and Kaltenbrunner. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. The evidence relates to concentration camps, does -it? - -MR. DODD: It does, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -MR. DODD: This witness would have been called at the time that we -presented the other proof, except for the fact that he was before the -military court at Dachau at that time and was not available. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see; thank you. - -LT. MELTZER: May it please the Tribunal, before we adjourned we were -dealing with Defendant Funk’s role in the economic persecution of the -Jews. As Your Honors will recall, in November of 1938 the death of Vom -Rath in Paris was exploited by the Nazis as a pretext for intensifying -the persecution of the Jews. The new policy was directed at the complete -elimination of the Jews from the economic life of Germany. The evidence -we will offer will show that Defendant Funk took a significant part in -both the formulation and execution of that policy. In this connection I -would refer the Tribunal to Document Number 1816-PS which is already in -the Record. This document is a report of the meeting on the Jewish -question. It will be found, Your Honor, on Page 52 of the document book. -This meeting was held under Göring’s chairmanship on 12 November 1938. -In opening the meeting, Defendant Göring stated—and I quote now from -Page 1, Paragraph 1, of the translation; the corresponding page of the -German document is also Page 1: - - “. . . today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received - a letter written by the chief of staff of the Führer’s Deputy, - Bormann, on the Führer’s orders directing that the Jewish - question be now, once and for all, co-ordinated and solved one - way or another.” - -Defendant Funk came to this meeting well prepared. He had a law already -drafted which he submitted with the following explanation—I quote again -from Document 1816-PS, Page 15: - - “I have prepared a law for this case which provides that as from - 1 January 1939 Jews shall be prohibited from operating retail - stores and mail-order establishments as well as independent - workshops. They shall be further prohibited from hiring - employees for that purpose or offering any goods on the market. - Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, it is to be closed by the - police. From 1 January 1939 a Jew can no longer operate a - business in the sense of the law for the regulation of national - labor of 20 January 1934.” - -I believe we may omit the rest. It is all in the same tenor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. MELTZER: The substance of Defendant Funk’s draft law promptly found -its way into the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. On 12 November 1938 Defendant -Göring signed a decree entitled, and I quote, “. . . for the Elimination -of Jews from German Economic Life,” and in Section 4 he authorized -Defendant Funk to implement the provisions of the decree by issuing the -necessary rules and regulations. An examination of the provisions of -this decree, which is set forth in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, -Page 1580, will reveal how well it deserved its title “. . . for the -Elimination of the Jews from German Economic Life.” - -Soon after the passage of the decree of 12 November, Defendant Funk -delivered a speech on the Jewish question. He made it clear that the -program of economic persecution was part of the larger program of -extermination and he boasted of the fact that the new program insured -the complete elimination of Jews from the German economy. I offer into -evidence Document Number 3545-PS as Exhibit USA-659. This document, -which is found on Page 76 of the document book, is a certified -photostatic copy of Page 2 of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of 17 November -1938. I quote a very brief portion of that speech: - - “State and economy constitute a single unit. They must be - directed according to the same principles. The best proof of - this is given by the most recent development of the Jewish - problem in Germany. One cannot exclude the Jews from political - life and yet let them live and work in the economic sphere.” - -I shall omit the rest, with the request that the Tribunal take judicial -notice of this reprint from the German newspaper, the _Frankfurter -Zeitung_. - -I wish, however, to refer to only one more decree, signed by Defendant -Funk himself. On the 3rd of December 1938 he signed a decree which -imposed additional and drastic economic disabilities upon the Jews and -subjected their property to confiscation and forced liquidation. This -decree is set forth in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, Page 1709. -Defendant Funk himself has admitted and deplored his responsibility for -the economic persecution of the Jews. I offer into evidence Document -Number 3544-PS, as Exhibit USA-660. This document, which is the last -document in connection with this phase of the case, is an interrogation -of Defendant Funk dated 22 October 1945. Your Honors will find it on -Pages 102 and 103 of the document book. I wish to quote from Pages 26 to -27 of the interrogation. The corresponding page of the German -translation is Page 21. Although I propose to quote enough to place -Defendant Funk’s statements in their proper context, I do not, of -course, intend to give any credence to his attempts at -self-justification: - - “Q: ‘All the decrees excluding the Jews from industry were - yours, were they not?’” - -Now, omitting the first nine lines of the reply: - - “A: ‘As far as my participation in this Jewish affair is - concerned, that was my responsibility, and I regretted later on - that I ever participated. The Party had always brought pressure - to bear on me to make me agree to the confiscation of Jewish - property, and I refused repeatedly. But later on, when the - anti-Jewish measures and the brutality against Jews were being - carried out with full force, something legal had to be done to - prevent the looting and confiscation of the whole of Jewish - property.’ - - “Q: ‘You knew that the looting and all that was done at the - instigation of the Party, didn’t you?’ - - “Here Defendant Funk wept and answered: - - “‘That is when I should have resigned, in 1938. I am guilty. I - am guilty. I admit that I am a guilty party here.’” - -In the Propaganda Ministry, Defendant Funk, as we have seen, helped -solidify the German people in favor of war. When he moved on to his -position as Minister of Economics, and to other positions which will -appear, he used his talents even more directly for the conspirators’ -main task: preparation for war. Immediately before Defendant Funk took -over the Ministry of Economics from Defendant Schacht in 1938, there was -a major reorganization of that ministry’s functions which integrated it -with the Four Year Plan as the supreme command of the German military -economy. This reorganization was effected by a decree, dated 4 February -1938, signed by Göring as Commissioner of the Four Year Plan. This -decree is set forth in an official monthly bulletin issued by Göring and -entitled, in the English translation, _The Four Year Plan_, Volume II, -1938, Page 105. It is requested that the Tribunal take judicial notice -of this publication. - -At this point I would simply note that that decree makes it clear that -Defendant Funk assumed a critical role in the task of economic -mobilization during a decisive period. Indeed, in 1938 he was directly -charged with the task of preparing the German economy for war. By a -secret decree he was made Plenipotentiary General for Economics and -assumed the duties which once had been discharged by Defendant Schacht. -In this connection I refer to Document 2194-PS, which has already been -placed in evidence. This document, which is found on Page 111 of Your -Honors’ document books, consists of a letter dated 6 September 1939, and -that letter transmitted a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 September -1938. It is this enclosure that we wish to deal with now. I wish to -quote from Page 4 of the translation, Paragraphs 2 to 4: - - “It is the task of the GBW”—that is the Plenipotentiary General - for Economics—“to put all economic forces into the service of - the Reich defense and to safeguard economically the life of the - German nation. To him are subordinated: the Reich Minister of - Economics, the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, the Reich - Minister of Labor. . .” and so on.—“He is furthermore - responsible for directing the financing of the Reich defense - within the realm of the Reich Finance Ministry and the - Reichsbank.” - -To quote one more paragraph: - - “The GBW must fulfill the demands of the OKW which are of - essential importance for the Armed Forces and must ensure the - economic conditions necessary for the production of the armament - industry directly managed by the OKW, according to the - requirements of the latter.” - -This law, in essence, re-enacted the provisions previously passed in the -Reich Defense Law of 1935, and I will not trouble the Tribunal with -further reading. I do wish to note, however, that the law was, at the -specific direction of Hitler, kept secret and that it was signed by -Defendant Funk, among others, as Plenipotentiary General for Economics. -Your Honors will find Defendant Funk’s signature on the next to the last -page of the document, and I invite your attention to the names of his -co-signers. - -Defendant Funk, in a speech which he delivered on 14 October 1939, -explained how, as Plenipotentiary General for Economics, he had for a -year and a half prior to the launching of the aggression against Poland, -advanced Germany’s economic preparations for war. I offer into evidence -Document Number 3324-PS as Exhibit USA-661. This document is a German -book by Berndt and Von Wedel entitled, in the English translation, -_Germany in the Fight_. That book reprints the defendant’s speech. I -quote now from Page 2 of the translation of Document Number 3324-PS, -which is found on Page 116 of the document book. The translation of this -speech is somewhat awkward, and with the Tribunal’s permission I would -rephrase it somewhat without changing its substance in the slightest. - - “Although all economic and financial departments were harnessed - to the task of the Four Year Plan under the leadership of - General Field Marshal Göring, Germany’s economic preparation for - war was also secretly advanced in another sector for well over a - year, namely, through the formation of a national guiding - apparatus for special war economy tasks which would have to be - accomplished the moment that war became a fact. For this work - all economic departments were combined into one administrative - authority, the Plenipotentiary General for Economics, to which - position the Führer appointed me one and a half years ago.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that? - -LT. MELTZER: The date of that speech, Sir, is 14 October 1939. - -In his dual capacity as Plenipotentiary General for Economics and -Minister of Economics, Defendant Funk was naturally advised of the -requirements which the conspirators’ program of aggression imposed on -the German economy. In this connection I would invite the Tribunal’s -attention to Document Number 1301-PS, which is already in evidence. As -Your Honors will recall, this document is a top secret report of the -conference held in Defendant Göring’s office on 14 October 1938. Your -Honors will find it on Page 142 of the document book. I shall simply -summarize the relevant portions of this document. - -During the conference Göring referred to the world situation and to -Hitler’s directive to organize a gigantic armament program. He thereupon -directed the Ministry of Economics to increase exports in order to -obtain the foreign exchange necessary for stepping up armament. He -added, as Your Honors will recall, that the Luftwaffe must be increased -five-fold, that the Navy should arm more quickly, and that the Army -should accelerate the production of weapons for attack. Defendant -Göring’s words directed at Funk, among others, were the words of a man -already at war; and his emphasis on quintupling the Air Force and on -weapons for attack was that of a man waging aggressive war. - -After Schacht’s departure Funk was a key figure in the preparation of -plans to finance the war. This was natural, since Defendant Funk after -1939 occupied three positions crucial to war finance. Two we have -already named: Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for -Economics. In addition, he was President of the Reichsbank. - -Funk’s role in war financing is illustrated by Document Number 3562-PS, -which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-662. This document was -found in the captured files of the Reich Ministry of Economics. It -consists, in part, of a letter from the Plenipotentiary General for -Economics, signed on his behalf by Dr. Posse. The letter is dated 1 June -1939 and encloses the minutes of a conference concerning the financing -of the war which was held under the chairmanship of Funk’s -undersecretary in the Ministry of Economics, Dr. Landfried. A copy of -the document which I have offered into evidence bears a marginal note on -Page 1 in the bottom lefthand corner, dated 5 June, stating, and I -quote: “To be shown to the Minister,”—that is, Funk—“for his -information.” - -During the course of the meeting, which was attended by 12 officials, -five of whom were directly responsible to Defendant Funk in his various -capacities, the conferees discussed a memorandum regarding war finance -which had been prepared by the Plenipotentiary General for Economics on -May 9, 1939. I wish to quote briefly from Page 2 of the English -translation, which is found on Page 153 of Your Honors’ document book: - - “Then a report was made of the contents of the ‘Notes on the - question of Internal Financing of War’ of 9 May of this year, in - which the figures given to me by the Reich Minister of Finance - were also discussed. It was pointed out that the Plenipotentiary - General for Economics is primarily interested in introducing - into the legislation for war finance the idea of financing war - expenditures by future revenues to be expected after the war.” - -And, if I may quote another brief excerpt from this important -memorandum, which is found on Page 2 of the English translation, Page -153 of your document books: - - “State Secretary Neumann first submitted for discussion the - question of whether, in case of war, production would be able to - meet, to the extent supposed, the demands of the Armed Forces, - especially if the demands of the Armed Forces, as stated in the - above report, should increase to approximately 14,000 millions - in the first 3 months of war. He stated that if the production - potential of the present Reich territory is taken as a basis he - doubts the possibility of such an increase.” - -It is plain then that Defendant Funk exercised comprehensive authority -over large areas of the German economy whose proper organization and -direction were critical to effective war preparation. The once powerful -military machine which rested on the foundation of thorough economic -preparation was a tribute to the contribution which Defendant Funk had -made to Nazi aggression. - -And Funk made this contribution with full knowledge of the plans for -military aggression. A compelling inference of such knowledge would -arise from the combination of several factors: From Funk’s long and -intimate association with the Nazi inner circle; from the very nature of -his official functions; from the war-dominated setting of Nazi Germany; -from the fact that force and the threat of force had become the primary -and the open instruments of German foreign policy. And the final element -in weighing the question of Defendant Funk’s knowledge is, of course, -the fact that, at the same time that Defendant Funk was making economic -preparation, specific plans for aggression were being formulated—plans -which were carried out and plans which could be effectively carried out -only if they were synchronized with the complementary economic measures. - -The conclusion concerning Defendant Funk’s knowledge is reinforced -beyond any question by considering, in the light of the factors -described above, the more specific and direct evidence which has already -been placed into the Record. We have seen from Document 1760-PS that -Defendant Funk had told Mr. Messersmith that the absorption of Austria -by Germany was a political and economic necessity, and that it would be -achieved by whatever means were necessary. We have already referred to -Document Number 1301-PS, in which Defendant Göring laid down directives -which could be understood only as directives to prepare the economic -basis for aggression. And Document Number 3562-PS has revealed that -Defendant Funk was making detailed plans for financing the war, that is, -of course, a particular war, the war against Poland. In this connection -I wish to refer to another vital piece of evidence which has already -been introduced in the Record. It is the letter dated 25 August 1939 -which Defendant Funk wrote to Hitler. In that letter, as Your Honors -will recall, Defendant Funk expressed his gratitude at being able to -experience those world-shaking times and to contribute to those -tremendous events. And he thanked Hitler for approving his proposals -designed to prepare the German economy for the war. - -Moreover, the Record contains evidence showing that Defendant Funk, both -personally and through his representatives, participated in the economic -planning which preceded the military aggression against the Soviet -Union. I would refer the Tribunal to Document 1039-PS, which revealed -that in April of 1941 Defendant Rosenberg, who had been appointed deputy -for the centralized treatment of problems related to the occupation of -the Eastern territories, that is, the Soviet Union, discussed with -Defendant Funk the economic problems which would arise when the plans -for aggression in the East matured. And Document 1039-PS also reveals -that Defendant Funk appointed one Dr. Schlotterer as his deputy to -collaborate with Rosenberg in connection with the exploitation of the -Eastern territories and that Schlotterer met with Defendant Rosenberg -almost daily. - -It is clear, then, that Defendant Funk participated in every phase of -the conspirators’ program, from their seizure of power to their final -defeat. Throughout he worked effectively, if sometimes more quietly than -others, on behalf of the Nazi program, a program which from the very -beginning he knew contemplated the use of ruthless terror and force -within Germany and, if necessary, outside of Germany. He bears, we -submit, a special, a direct, and a heavy responsibility for the -commission of Crimes against Humanity, Crimes against Peace, and War -Crimes. The Record makes it clear, if we may summarize the evidence, -that by virtue of his activities in the Ministry of Propaganda and in -the Ministry of Economics he is responsible for stimulating and engaging -in the unrelenting persecution of the Jews and other minorities, for -psychologically mobilizing the German people for aggressive war, and for -weakening the willingness and capacity of the conspirators’ intended -victims to resist aggression. It is also clear, we submit, that -Defendant Funk, with full knowledge of the conspirators’ purposes, in -his capacity as Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and -Plenipotentiary General for Economics, actively participated in the -mobilization of the German economy for aggression. In these capacities -and as a member of the Ministerial Council for Defense and the Central -Planning Board he also participated in the waging of aggressive war. -Moreover, by virtue of his membership in the Central Planning Board, -which, as Your Honors will recall from Mr. Dodd’s presentation, -formulated and directed the program for the enslavement, the -exploitation, and degradation of millions of foreign workers, Defendant -Funk also shares special responsibility for the Nazi slave-labor -program. - -The French Prosecution, I am informed, will deal with this matter in -greater detail. Moreover, the French and Soviet Prosecution will submit -evidence showing that Defendant Funk actively participated in the -program for the criminal looting of the resources of occupied -territories. - -MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we would like to call at this time -the witness, Dr. Franz Blaha. - -[_The witness, Blaha, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT [_To the witness_]: Is your name Franz Blaha? - -DR. FRANZ BLAHA (Witness) [_In Czech._]: Dr. Franz Blaha. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty -and Omniscient—that I will speak the truth, the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you wish. - -MR. DODD: You are Dr. Franz Blaha, a native and a citizen of -Czechoslovakia, are you not? - -BLAHA: [_In Czech._] Yes. - -MR. DODD: I understand that you are able to speak German, and for -technical reasons I suggest that we conduct this examination in German, -although I know your native tongue is Czech; is that right? - -BLAHA: [_In Czech._] In the interest of the case I am willing to testify -in German for the following reasons: 1. For the past 7 years, which are -the subject of my testimony, I have lived exclusively in German -surroundings; 2. A large number of special and technical expressions -relating to life in and about the concentration camps are purely German -inventions, and no appropriate equivalent for them in any other language -can be found. - -MR. DODD: Dr. Blaha, by education and training and profession you are a -doctor of medicine? - -BLAHA: [_In German._] Yes. - -MR. DODD: And in 1939 you were the head of a hospital in Czechoslovakia? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You were arrested, were you not, by the Germans in 1939 after -they occupied Czechoslovakia? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And were you confined in various prisons between 1939 and -1941? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -MR. DODD: From 1941 to April of 1945 you were confined at Dachau -Concentration Camp? - -BLAHA: Yes, until the end. - -MR. DODD: When that camp was liberated by the Allied Forces? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You executed an affidavit in Nuremberg on the 9th day of -January of this year, did you not? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -MR. DODD: This affidavit, if it please the Tribunal, bears the Document -Number 3249-PS, and I wish to offer it at this time. It is Exhibit -USA-663. I feel that we can reduce the extent of this interrogation by -approximately three-fourths through the submission of this affidavit and -I should like to read it. It will take much less time to read this -affidavit than it would to go through it in question and answer form and -it covers a large part of what we expect to elicit from this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: I wouldn’t have read it if we had had time to have a Russian -and French translation, but unfortunately that wasn’t possible in the -few days we had. - - “I, Franz Blaha, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: - - “1. I studied medicine in Prague, Vienna, Strasbourg, and Paris - and received my diploma in 1920. From 1920 to 1926 I was a - clinical assistant. In 1926 I became chief physician of the - Iglau Hospital in Moravia, Czechoslovakia. I held this position - until 1939 when the Germans entered Czechoslovakia and I was - seized as a hostage and held a prisoner for co-operating with - the Czech Government. I was sent as a prisoner to the Dachau - Concentration Camp in April 1941 and remained there until the - liberation of the camp in April 1945. Until July 1941 I worked - in a punishment company. After that I was sent to the hospital - and subjected to the experiments in typhoid being conducted by - Dr. Muermelstadt. After that I was to be made the subject of an - experimental operation and succeeded in avoiding this only by - admitting that I was a physician. If this had been known before, - I would have suffered, because intellectuals were treated very - harshly in the punishment company. In October 1941 I was sent to - work in the herb plantation and later in the laboratory for - processing herbs. In June 1942 I was taken into the hospital as - a surgeon. Shortly afterwards I was directed to perform a - stomach operation on 20 healthy prisoners. Because I would not - do this I was transferred to the autopsy room where I stayed - until April 1945. While there I performed approximately 7,000 - autopsies. In all, 12,000 autopsies were performed under my - direction. - - “2. From the middle of 1941 to the end of 1942 some 500 - operations on healthy prisoners were performed. These were for - the instructions of the SS medical students and doctors and - included operations on the stomach, gall bladder, and throat. - These were performed by students and doctors of only 2 years’ - training, although they were very dangerous and difficult. - Ordinarily they would not have been done except by surgeons with - at least 4 years’ surgical practice. Many prisoners died on the - operating table and many others from later complications. I - performed autopsies on all of these bodies. The doctors who - supervised these operations were Lang, Muermelstadt, Wolter, - Ramsauer, and Kahr. Standartenführer Dr. Lolling frequently - witnessed these operations. - - “3. During my time at Dachau I was familiar with many kinds of - medical experiments carried on there on human victims. These - persons were never volunteers but were forced to submit to such - acts. Malaria experiments on about 1,200 people were conducted - by Dr. Klaus Schilling between 1941 and 1945. Schilling was - personally ordered by Himmler to conduct these experiments. The - victims were either bitten by mosquitoes or given injections of - malaria sporozoites taken from mosquitoes. Different kinds of - treatment were applied including quinine, pyrifer, neosalvarsan, - antipyrin, pyramidon, and a drug called 2516 Behring. I - performed autopsies on the bodies of people who died from these - malaria experiments. Thirty to 40 died from the malaria itself. - Three hundred to four hundred died later from diseases which - were fatal because of the physical condition resulting from the - malaria attacks. In addition there were deaths resulting from - poisoning due to overdoses of neosalvarsan and pyramidon. Dr. - Schilling was present at my autopsies on the bodies of his - patients. - - “4. In 1942 and 1943 experiments on human beings were conducted - by Dr. Sigmund Rascher to determine the effects of changing air - pressure. As many as 25 persons were put at one time into a - specially constructed van in which pressure could be increased - or decreased as required. The purpose was to find out the - effects on human beings of high altitude and of rapid descents - by parachute. Through a window in the van I have seen the people - lying on the floor of the van. Most of the prisoners used died - from these experiments, from internal hemorrhage of the lungs or - brain. The survivors coughed blood when taken out. It was my job - to take the bodies out and as soon as they were found to be dead - to send the internal organs to Munich for study. About 400 to - 500 prisoners were experimented on. The survivors were sent to - invalid blocks and liquidated shortly afterwards. Only a few - escaped. - - “5. Rascher also conducted experiments on the effect of cold - water on human beings. This was done to find a way for reviving - airmen who had fallen into the ocean. The subject was placed in - ice-cold water and kept there until he was unconscious. Blood - was taken from his neck and tested each time his body - temperature dropped one degree. This drop was determined by a - rectal thermometer. Urine was also periodically tested. Some men - stood it as long as 24 to 36 hours. The lowest body temperature - reached was 19 degrees centigrade, but most men died at 25 or 26 - degrees. When the men were removed from the ice water attempts - were made to revive them by artificial sunshine, with hot water, - by electro-therapy, or by animal warmth. For this last - experiment prostitutes were used and the body of the unconscious - man was placed between the bodies of two women. Himmler was - present at one such experiment. I could see him from one of the - windows in the street between the blocks. I have personally been - present at some of these cold water experiments when Rascher was - absent, and I have seen notes and diagrams on them in Rascher’s - laboratory. About 300 persons were used in these experiments. - The majority died. Of those who survived, many became mentally - deranged. Those who did not die were sent to invalid blocks and - were killed just as were the victims of the air pressure - experiments. I know only two who survived, a Yugoslav and a - Pole, both of whom are mental cases. - - “6. Liver puncture experiments were performed by Dr. Brachtl on - healthy people and on people who had diseases of the stomach and - gall bladder. For this purpose a needle was jabbed into the - liver of a person and a small piece of the liver was extracted. - No anaesthetic was used. The experiment is very painful and - often had serious results, as the stomach or large blood vessels - were often punctured, resulting in hemorrhage. Many persons died - of these tests for which Polish, Russian, Czech, and German - prisoners were employed. Altogether about 175 people were - subjected to these experiments. - - “7. Phlegmone experiments were conducted by Dr. Schütz, Dr. - Babor, Dr. Kieselwetter and Professor Lauer. Forty healthy men - were used at a time, of which twenty were given intramuscular - and twenty intravenous injections of pus from diseased persons. - All treatment was forbidden for 3 days, by which time serious - inflammation and in many cases general blood poisoning had - occurred. Then each group was divided again into groups of 10. - Half were given chemical treatment with liquid and special pills - every 10 minutes for 24 hours. The remainder were treated with - sulfanamide and surgery. In some cases all the limbs were - amputated. My autopsy also showed that the chemical treatment - had been harmful and had even caused perforations of the stomach - wall. For these experiments Polish, Czech, and Dutch priests - were ordinarily used. Pain was intense in such experiments. Most - of the 600 to 800 persons who were used finally died. Most of - the others became permanent invalids and were later killed. - - “8. In the fall of 1944 there were 60 to 80 persons who were - subjected to salt water experiments. They were locked in a room - and for 5 days were given nothing for food but salt water. - During this time their urine, blood, and excrement were tested. - None of these prisoners died, possibly because they received - smuggled food from other prisoners. Hungarians and Gypsies were - used for these experiments. - - “9. It was common practice to remove the skin from dead - prisoners. I was commanded to do this on many occasions. Dr. - Rascher and Dr. Wolter in particular asked for this human skin - from human backs and chests. It was chemically treated and - placed in the sun to dry. After that it was cut into various - sizes for use as saddles, riding breeches, gloves, house - slippers, and ladies’ handbags. Tattooed skin was especially - valued by SS men. Russians, Poles, and other inmates were used - in this way, but it was forbidden to cut out the skin of a - German. This skin had to be from healthy prisoners and free from - defects. Sometimes we did not have enough bodies with good skin - and Rascher would say, ‘All right, you will get the bodies.’ The - next day we would receive 20 or 30 bodies of young people. They - would have been shot in the neck or struck on the head so that - the skin would be uninjured. Also we frequently got requests for - the skulls or skeletons of prisoners. In those cases we boiled - the skull or the body. Then the soft parts were removed and the - bones were bleached and dried and reassembled. In the case of - skulls it was important to have a good set of teeth. When we got - an order for skulls from Oranienburg the SS men would say, ‘We - will try to get you some with good teeth.’ So it was dangerous - to have good skin or good teeth. - - “10. Transports arrived frequently in Dachau from Struthof, - Belsen, Auschwitz, Mauthausen and other camps. Many of these - were 10 to 14 days on the way without water or food. On one - transport which arrived in November 1942 I found evidence of - cannibalism. The living persons had eaten the flesh from the - dead bodies. Another transport arrived from Compiègne in France. - Professor Limousin of Clermont-Ferrand who was later my - assistant told me that there had been 2,000 persons on this - transport when it started. There was food available but no - water. Eight hundred died on the way and were thrown out. When - it arrived after 12 days, more than 500 persons were dead on the - train. Of the remainder most died shortly after arrival. I - investigated this transport because the International Red Cross - complained, and the SS men wanted a report that the deaths had - been caused by fighting and rioting on the way. I dissected a - number of bodies and found that they had died from suffocation - and lack of water. It was mid-summer and 120 people had been - packed into each car. - - “11. In 1941 and 1942 we had in the camp what we called invalid - transports. These were made up of people who were sick or for - some reason incapable of working. We called them ‘Himmelfahrt - Commandos.’ About 100 or 120 were ordered each week to go to the - shower baths. There four people gave injections of phenol, - evipan, or benzine, which soon caused death. After 1943 these - invalids were sent to other camps for liquidation. I know that - they were killed, because I saw the records and they were marked - with a cross and the date that they left, which was the way that - deaths were ordinarily recorded. This was shown on both the card - index of the Camp Dachau and the records in the registry office - of Dachau. One thousand to two thousand went away every 3 - months, so there were about five thousand sent to death in this - way in 1943, and the same in 1944. In April 1945 a Jewish - transport was loaded at Dachau and was left standing on the - railroad siding. The station was destroyed by bombing, and they - could not leave. So they were just left there to die of - starvation. They were not allowed to get off. When the camp was - liberated they were all dead. - - “12. Many executions by gas or shooting or injections took place - right in the camp. The gas chamber was completed in 1944, and I - was called by Dr. Rascher to examine the first victims. Of the - eight or nine persons in the chamber there were three still - alive, and the remainder appeared to be dead. Their eyes were - red, and their faces were swollen. Many prisoners were later - killed in this way. Afterwards they were removed to the - crematorium where I had to examine their teeth for gold. Teeth - containing gold were extracted. Many prisoners who were sick - were killed by injections while in the hospital. Some prisoners - killed in the hospital came through to the autopsy room with no - name or number on the tag which was usually tied to their big - toe. Instead the tag said ‘Do not dissect’. I performed - autopsies on some of these and found that they were perfectly - healthy but had died from injections. Sometimes prisoners were - killed only because they had dysentery or vomited and gave the - nurses too much trouble. Mental patients were liquidated by - being led to the gas chamber and injected there or shot. - Shooting was a common method of execution. Prisoners could be - shot just outside the crematorium and carried in. I have seen - people pushed into the ovens while they were still breathing and - making sounds, although if they were too much alive they were - usually hit on the head first. - - “13. The principal executions about which I know from having - examined the victims or supervised such examinations are as - follows: - - “In 1942 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Russians held in a separate - camp inside Dachau. They were taken on foot to the military - rifle range near the camp in groups of 500 or 600 and shot. Such - groups left the camp about three times a week. At night we used - to go out to bring the bodies back in carts and then examine - them. In February 1944 about 40 Russian students arrived from - Moosburg. I knew a few of the boys in the hospital. I examined - their bodies after they were shot outside the crematory. In - September 1944 a group of 94 high-ranking Russian officers were - shot, including two military doctors who had been working with - me in the hospital. I examined their bodies. In April 1945, a - number of prominent people were shot who had been kept in the - bunker. They included two French generals, whose names I cannot - remember; but I recognized them from their uniform. I examined - them after they were shot. In 1944 and 1945 a number of women - were killed by hanging, shooting, and injections. I examined - them and found that in many cases they were pregnant. In 1945, - just before the camp was liberated, all ‘Nacht und Nebel’ - prisoners were executed. These were prisoners who were forbidden - to have any contact with the outside world. They were kept in a - special enclosure and were not allowed to send or receive any - mail. There were 30 or 40, many of whom were sick. These were - carried to the crematory on stretchers. I examined them and - found they had all been shot in the neck. - - “14. From 1941 on the camp was more and more overcrowded. In - 1943 the hospital for prisoners was already overcrowded. In 1944 - and in 1945 it was impossible to maintain any sort of sanitary - conditions. Rooms which held 300 or 400 persons in 1942 were - filled with 1,000 in 1943, and in the first quarter of 1945 with - 2,000 or more. The rooms could not be cleaned because they were - too crowded and there was no cleaning material. Baths were - available only once a month. Latrine facilities were completely - inadequate. Medicine was almost nonexistent. But I found after - the camp was liberated that there was plenty of medicine in the - SS hospital for all the camp, if it had been given to us for - use. New arrivals at the camp were lined up out of doors for - hours at a time. Sometimes they stood there from morning until - night. It did not matter whether this was in the winter or in - the summer. This occurred all through 1943, 1944, and the first - quarter of 1945. I could see these formations from the window of - the autopsy room. Many of the people who had to stand in the - cold in this way became ill with pneumonia and died. I had - several acquaintances who were killed in this manner during 1944 - and 1945. - - “In October 1944 a transport of Hungarians brought spotted fever - into the camp, and an epidemic began. I examined many of the - corpses from this transport and reported the situation to Dr. - Hintermayer but was forbidden, on penalty of being shot, to - mention that there was an epidemic in the camp. He said that it - was sabotage, and that I was trying to have the camp quarantined - so that the prisoners would not have to work in the armaments - industry. No preventive measures were taken at all. New healthy - arrivals were put into blocks where an epidemic was already - present. Also infected persons were put into these blocks. The - 30th block, for instance, died out completely three times. Only - at Christmas, when the epidemic spread into the SS camp, was a - quarantine established. Nevertheless, transports continued to - arrive. We had 200 to 300 new typhus cases a day and about 100 - deaths from typhus daily. In all we had 28,000 cases and 15,000 - deaths. Apart from those that died from the disease my autopsies - showed that many deaths were caused solely by malnutrition. Such - deaths occurred in all the years from 1941 to 1945. They were - mostly Italians, Russians, and Frenchmen. These people were just - starved to death. At the time of death they weighed 50 to 60 - pounds. Autopsies showed their internal organs had often shrunk - to one-third of their normal size. - - “The facts stated above are true. This declaration is made by me - voluntarily and without compulsion. After reading over the - statement I have signed and executed the same at Nuremberg, - Germany, this 9th day of January 1946.”[1] - - —Signed—“Dr. Franz Blaha. - - “Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of January 1946 - at Nuremberg, Germany. 2d Lieutenant Daniel F. Margolies.” - -MR. DODD: [_Continuing the interrogation._] Dr. Blaha, will you state -whether or not visitors came to the camp of Dachau while you were there? - -BLAHA: Very many visitors came to our camp so that it sometimes seemed -to us that we were not confined in a camp but in an exhibition or a zoo. -At times there was a visit or an excursion almost every day from -schools, from different military, medical, and other institutions, and -also many members of the Police, the SS, and the Armed Forces; also. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you pause so as to give the interpreter’s words time -to come through; do you understand? - -BLAHA: Yes. Also some State personalities came to the camp. Regular -inspections were made month by month by the Inspector General of -Concentration Camps, Obergruppenführer Pohl; also by SS Reichsführer -Professor Grawitz, Inspector of Experimental Stations; Standartenführer -Dr. Lolling; and other personalities. - -MR. DODD: The presiding Justice has suggested that you pause, and it -would be helpful if you paused in the making of your answers so that the -interpreters can complete their interpretation. - -BLAHA: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Are you able to state how long these visits lasted on an -average? - -BLAHA: That depended on the sort of visits being made. Some were inside -for half an hour to an hour, some for 3 or 4 hours. - -MR. DODD: Were there prominent Government people who visited the camp at -any time while you were there? - -BLAHA: While I was there many personalities came to our camp: -Reichsführer Himmler came to Dachau several times and also was present -at the experiments. I was present myself on these occasions. Other -personalities also were there. I myself have seen three ministers of -state, and from political prisoners who were Germans and therefore knew -these people I heard that several other personages visited the camp. I -also twice saw high-ranking Italian officers and once a Japanese -officer. - -MR. DODD: Do you remember the names of any of these prominent Government -people, or do you remember more particularly who any of them were? - -BLAHA: Besides Himmler there was Bormann; also Gauleiter Wagner; -Gauleiter Giesler; State Ministers Frick, Rosenberg, Funk, Sauckel; also -the General of Police Daluege; and others. - -MR. DODD: Did these people whom you have just named take tours around -the camp while you were there? - -BLAHA: Generally the tour through the camp was so arranged that the -visitors were first taken to the kitchen, then to the laundry, then to -the hospital, that is, usually to the surgical station, then to the -malaria station of Professor Schilling and the experimental station of -Dr. Rascher. Then they proceeded to a few “blocks,” particularly those -of the German prisoners and sometimes they also visited the chapel, -which, however, had been fitted up inside for German clergy only. -Sometimes, too, various personalities were presented and introduced to -the visitors. It was so arranged that always, first of all, a “green” -professional criminal was selected and introduced as a murderer; then -the Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Schmitz, was usually presented as the second -one; then a high-ranking Czech officer; then a homosexual; a Gypsy; a -Catholic bishop or other Polish priest of high rank; then a university -professor, in this order, so that the visitors always found it -entertaining. - -MR. DODD: Now did I understand you to name Kaltenbrunner as one of those -visitors there or not? - -BLAHA: Yes, Kaltenbrunner was also present. He was there together with -General Daluege. That was, I believe, in the year 1943. I was also -interested in General Daluege because it was he who, after Heydrich’s -death, had become Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, and I wanted to see -him. - -MR. DODD: Did you see Kaltenbrunner there yourself? - -BLAHA: Yes. He was pointed out to me. I had not seen him previously. - -MR. DODD: Did I understand you mentioned the name Frick as one of those -whom you saw there? - -BLAHA: Yes, it was in the year of 1944, the first half of 1944. - -MR. DODD: Where did you see him? Where in the camp did you see him? - -BLAHA: I saw him from the hospital window as he was entering with his -staff, with several people. - -MR. DODD: Do you see the man whom you saw there that day, by the name of -Frick, in this courtroom now? - -BLAHA: Yes, the fourth man from the right in the first row. - -MR. DODD: I understand you also named the name Rosenberg as one of those -whom you saw there? - -BLAHA: I can recall that it was shortly after my arrival in the -concentration camp at Dachau that there was a visit and it was then that -my German comrades pointed Rosenberg out to me. - -MR. DODD: Do you see that man in this courtroom now? - -BLAHA: Yes. He is the second farther to the left in the first row. - -MR. DODD: I also understood you to name Sauckel as one of those who were -present in the camp. - -BLAHA: Yes, but I did not see him personally; I merely heard that he had -also visited certain factories and armament plants; and that was in -1943, I believe. - -MR. DODD: Was it general knowledge in the camp at that time that a man -named Sauckel visited the camp, and particularly the munition plant? - -BLAHA: Yes, that was general knowledge in the camp. - -MR. DODD: I also understood you to name one of those who visited this -camp as Funk. - -BLAHA: Yes. He was also present at a visit, and I can remember that it -was on the occasion of a state conference of the Axis Powers in Salzburg -or Reichenhall. It was the custom on such occasions, when there was a -Party convention or a celebration in Munich, Berchtesgaden, or Salzburg, -for several personalities to come from the celebrations to Dachau for a -visit. That was also the case with Funk. - -MR. DODD: Did you personally see Funk there? - -BLAHA: No, I did not see Funk personally; I merely heard that he was -there. - -MR. DODD: Was that general knowledge in the camp at that time? - -BLAHA: Yes. We knew beforehand that he was to come. - -MR. DODD: Were there any visits after the end of the year 1944, or in -the months of 1945? - -BLAHA: There were some visits still, but very few, because there was a -typhus epidemic in the camp at that time and quarantine was imposed. - -MR. DODD: Doctor, you are now director of a hospital in Prague, are you -not? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -MR. DODD: I have no further questions to ask of the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other counsel for the Prosecution wish to ask any -questions? Colonel Pokrovsky? [_Colonel Pokrovsky indicated assent._] We -will adjourn for a 10-minute recess. - ------ - -[1] The last paragraph of this affidavit appears in the English -translation signed by Dr. Blaha but not in the original German version. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I -would like permission to ask this witness several questions. - -[_Turning to the witness_]: Tell us, witness, do you know what was the -particular purpose of the concentration camp at Dachau; was it really, -so to speak, a concentration camp of extermination? - -BLAHA: Until the year 1943 it was really an extermination camp. After -1943 a good many factories and munition plants were established, also -inside the camp, particularly after the bombardments started, and then -it became more of a work camp. But as far as the results are concerned -there was no difference, because the prisoners had to work so hard while -going hungry that they died from hunger and exhaustion instead of from -beatings. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Must I understand you this way, that, in fact, both -before 1943 and after 1943 Dachau was a camp of extermination and that -there were different ways of extermination? - -BLAHA: That is so. - -COL. POKROVSKY: How many, according to your own observations, went -through this camp of extermination, Dachau; how many internees came -originally from the U.S.S.R., how many passed through the camp? - -BLAHA: I cannot state that exactly, only approximately. First, after -November 1941, there were exclusively Russian prisoners of war in -uniform. They had separate camps and were liquidated within a few -months. In the summer of 1942, those who remained of these—I believe -there were 12,000 prisoners of war—were transported to Mauthausen; and, -as I learned from the people who came from Mauthausen to Dachau, they -were liquidated in gas chambers. - -Then, after the Russian prisoners of war, Russian children were brought -to Dachau. There were, I believe, 2,000 boys, 6 to 17 years old. They -were kept in one or two special blocks. They were assigned to -particularly brutal people, the “greens,” who beat them at every step. -These young boys also. . . - -COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean when you refer to the “greens”? - -BLAHA: Those were the so-called professional criminals. They beat these -young boys and gave them the hardest work. They worked particularly in -the plantations where they had to pull ploughs, sowing machines, and -street rollers instead of horses and motors being used. Also in all -transport Kommandos Russian children were used exclusively. At least 70 -percent of them died of tuberculosis, I believe, and those who remained -were then sent to a special camp in the Tyrol in 1943 or the beginning -of 1944. - -Then after the children, several thousand so-called Eastern Workers were -killed. These were civilians who were removed from the Eastern -territories to Germany and then because of so-called work-sabotage were -put into concentration camps. In addition there were many Russian -officers and intellectuals. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I would like to ask you to be more exact in your answers -in regard to those people whom you call “greens.” Did I correctly -understand you when you said that those criminals had the task of -supervising those internees arriving at the camp? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And these professional criminals were given complete -charge of the children, and they beat and ill-treated these children of -Soviet citizens and put them to work far beyond their strength, so that -they became tubercular? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: What do you know about the executions of the citizens of -the U.S.S.R. which were carried out in this camp? - -BLAHA: I believe I am not far from the truth when I say that of all -those executed, at least 75 percent were Russians, and that women as -well as men were brought to Dachau from outside to be executed. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Can you give us more details in regard to the execution -of 94 high field and staff officers of the Red Army, which you already -spoke about in reply to the question of my colleague? Who were these -officers, and what rank did they hold? What were the reasons for their -execution? Do you know anything at all about it? - -BLAHA: In the summer or late spring of 1944 high-ranking Russian -officers—generals, colonels, and majors—were sent to Dachau. During -the following weeks they were examined by the political department; that -is to say, after each interrogation they were brought to the camp -hospital in a completely battered condition. I myself saw and knew well -some who for weeks had to lie on their bellies, and we had to remove by -surgical operation parts of their skin and muscles which had become -mortified. Many succumbed to these methods of investigation. The others, -94 people in number, were then brought to the crematory in the beginning -of September 1944 on orders from the RSHA in Berlin and there, while on -their knees, shot through the neck. - -In addition, in the winter and spring of 1945 several Russian officers -were brought from solitary confinement to the crematory and there either -hanged or shot. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I would like to ask you the same kind of question about -the execution of the 40 Russian students. It is possible for you to give -us a few details about the execution? - -BLAHA: Yes, those Russian students and intellectuals—I can recall that -a doctor was also among them—were brought from the Moosburg Camp to -Dachau, and after 1 month they were all executed. That was in March of -1944. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Do you happen to know what the reason was for their -execution? - -BLAHA: The order for it came from Berlin. We did not get to know the -reason, because I saw the bodies only after the execution and the reason -was read aloud before the execution took place. - -COL. POKROVSKY: This execution produced the impression that it was one -of the stages of the general plan for extermination of the people who -entered Dachau? - -BLAHA: Yes. It was easy to see that these executions, these transports -of invalids, and the way epidemics were dealt with, were all part of the -general plan for extermination; and particularly, and this I must -emphasize, it was the Russian prisoners who were always treated the -worst of all. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Would you be so kind as to say what is known to you in -regard to those internees who were in the “Nacht und Nebel” (night and -fog) category? Were there many of these internees? Do you know the -reason why they were sent to the concentration camp? - -BLAHA: Many so-called Nacht und Nebel prisoners came to the -concentration camp. The people so designated were mostly from the -western countries of Europe, particularly Frenchmen, Belgians, and -Dutchmen. The Russian people—and this was also the case with the Czechs -and also in my own case—frequently had the designation “return -undesirable.” This actually meant the same. Shortly before the -liberation many of these people were executed on the order of the camp -commander, that is, shot in front of the crematory. Many of these -people, particularly the French and Russians, were serious cases of -typhus and with a temperature of 40 degrees were carried on stretchers -to the rifle range. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you mentioned something about a -considerable number of prisoners who died of starvation. Could you tell -me how large that number was—the number of people who died of -starvation? - -BLAHA: I believe that two-thirds of the entire population of the camp -suffered from severe malnutrition and that at least 25 percent of the -dead had literally died of starvation. It was called in German -“Hungertyphus.” Apart from that, tuberculosis was the most widespread -disease in the camp and it spread also because of malnutrition. Most of -its victims were Russians. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you said, answering the question of -my colleague, that the majority of those who died of starvation and -exhaustion were French, Russians, and Italians. How do you account for -the fact that in just these categories of internees more people died -than in other categories? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: How do you explain that especially Russians, French, and -Italians made up the largest number of those people who died from -starvation? Was there any difference in the feeding of internees of the -different nationalities, or was there some other reason? - -BLAHA: It was like this: The others, the Germans, Poles, and Czechs, who -had already been in the camp for some time, had had time, if I may say -so, to adjust themselves to camp conditions, physically I mean. The -Russian deteriorated rapidly. The same was true of the French and the -Italians. Moreover, these nationals for the most part arrived from other -camps suffering from malnutrition so that they then soon fell easy prey -to the other epidemics and diseases. Also, the Germans, Poles, and many -others who worked in the armaments industry had since the year 1943 been -able to get parcels from home. That, of course, was not the case with -citizens of Soviet Russia, France, or Italy. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Can you answer the question about what Rosenberg, -Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, or Funk saw when they were in the Dachau -Concentration Camp? Do you know what they saw and what was shown them? - -BLAHA: I had no opportunity of seeing what happened during these visits. -Only on very rare occasions did one have the opportunity of seeing these -visitors from the window and observing where they went. I seldom had the -opportunity to be present as I was in the case of Himmler’s visits and -those of Obergruppenführer Pohl and once on the occasion of Gauleiter -Giesler’s visit, when they were shown the experiments or the patients in -the hospital. As to the others I do not know what they individually saw -and did in the camp. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you had an opportunity of observing the length -of the visit of those people in the camp, whether the visit was -short—just for a few moments—or whether they stayed there a long time. -I have in mind Rosenberg, Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, and Funk. - -BLAHA: That varied. Many visitors were there for half an hour, many, as -I said before, spent as many as 3 hours there. We were always able to -observe that quite well because at those times no work could be done, -nor was food distributed. We did not carry on our work in the hospital -and had to wait until the signal was given to us that the visitors had -left the camp. Apart from that I had no means of knowing how long these -visits in the camp lasted in the individual cases. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Can you recall the visit of Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, -Funk, and Sauckel? On the basis of what you said just now could you -state whether they were brief visits or whether those people stayed -there for several hours? Did you understand my question or not? - -BLAHA: Unfortunately, I cannot make a statement on that because, as I -said, the visits took place so frequently that I have difficulty, after -all these years, in recalling whether they lasted for a short or longer -time. Many visits, for instance, from schools—from the military and -police schools—lasted a whole day. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. I have no further questions of this witness -at this stage of the sitting. - -M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): You -alluded to a convoy of deported French people who came from Compiègne, -of whom only 1,200 survivors arrived. Were there any other convoys? - -BLAHA: Yes. There were transports, particularly from Bordeaux, Lyon, and -Compiègne, all in the first half of 1944. - -M. DUBOST: Were all the transports carried out under the same -conditions? - -BLAHA: The conditions under which these transports were made were, if -not the same, at any rate very similar. - -M. DUBOST: Each time you were able to see on arrival that there were -numerous victims? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: What were the causes of death? - -BLAHA: The deaths were caused by the fact that too many people were -packed into the cars, which were then locked, and that they did not get -anything to eat or drink for several days. Usually they starved or -suffocated. Many of those who survived were brought to the camp -hospital, and of these a large number died from various complications -and diseases. - -M. DUBOST: Did you make autopsies on the people who died while en route? - -BLAHA: Yes, particularly for the transport from Compiègne my services -were demanded because the rumor was spread that the French Maquis and -Fascists had attacked and killed each other in the cars. I had to -inspect these corpses, but in no case did I find any signs of violence. -Moreover, I took 10 corpses as a test, dissected them thoroughly and -sent special reports on them to Berlin. All these people had died of -suffocation. I was also able to note during the autopsy that these were -prominent people of France. I could tell from their identity papers and -uniforms that they were high-ranking French officers, priests, deputies, -and well-nourished people who had been taken direct from civilian life -to the cars and sent to Dachau. - -M. DUBOST: After the reports which you sent to Berlin did the conditions -under which the transports were made remain the same? - -BLAHA: Nothing happened, as usual. Always long reports were written but -conditions did not improve at all. - -M. DUBOST: You indicated that some French generals had been put to death -shortly before the liberation of the camp. Do you know the names of -these generals? - -BLAHA: Unfortunately I have forgotten these names. I can remember only -what I was told by the prisoners who were kept in the bunkers with -them—that they were the prominent personalities from Germany and other -countries: Pastor Niemöller was there, also a French prince, Schuschnigg -was there too, and members of the French Government and many others. I -was told that one of the generals who had been shot was a close relative -of General De Gaulle. Unfortunately I have forgotten his name. - -M. DUBOST: If I understood you correctly, these generals were prisoners -of war who had been transported to this concentration camp? - -BLAHA: These two generals were not in the concentration camp. They were -kept, along with the other prominent personalities, in the so-called -“Kommandantur-Arrest,” that is, in the bunker separated from the camp. -On various occasions when they needed medical attention I came into -contact with them, but that was very seldom. Otherwise they did not come -into contact with the other prisoners at all. - -M. DUBOST: Did they belong to the category of deported people whose -“return was undesirable” or were they in the Nacht und Nebel category? - -BLAHA: I do not know. It was 2 days previously that all the others who -were kept in the bunker were sent by special transport to the Tyrol. -That was, I believe, a week or 8 days before the liberation. - -M. DUBOST: You indicated that numerous visitors, German military men, -students, political men, often toured the camp. Can you say if any -ordinary people, like workers or farmers, knew what was going on in this -camp? - -BLAHA: In my opinion, the people who lived in the neighborhood of Munich -must have known of all these things, because the prisoners went every -day to various factories in Munich and the neighborhood; and at work -they frequently came into contact with the civilian workers. Moreover, -the various suppliers and consumers often entered the fields and the -factories of the German armament works and they saw what was done to the -prisoners and what they looked like. - -M. DUBOST: Can you say in what way the French were treated? - -BLAHA: Well, if I said that the Russians were treated worst of all, the -French were the second in order. Of course, there were differences in -the treatment of individual persons. The Nacht und Nebel prisoners were -treated quite differently; likewise the prominent political -personalities and the intellectuals. That was so for all nationalities. -And the workers and peasants also were treated differently. - -M. DUBOST: If I understood correctly, the treatment reserved for the -French intellectuals was particularly rigorous. Do you remember the -treatment inflicted on some French intellectuals and can you tell us -their names? - -BLAHA: I had many comrades among the physicians and university -professors who worked with me in the hospital. Unfortunately a large -number of them died of typhus. Most of the French, in fact, died of -typhus. I remember best of all Professor Limousin. He arrived in very -poor condition with the transport from Compiègne. I took him into my -department as assistant pathologist. Then I also knew the Bishop of -Clermont-Ferrand. There were other physicians and university professors -whom I knew. I remember Professor Roche, Dr. Lemartin, and many -others—I have forgotten their names. - -M. DUBOST: In the course of the conversations which you had with Dr. -Rascher were you informed of the purpose of these experiments? - -BLAHA: I didn’t understand the question, excuse me please. . . - -M. DUBOST: Were you informed of the purpose of the medical and -biological experiments made by Dr. Rascher in the camp? - -BLAHA: Well, Dr. Rascher made exclusively so-called Air Force -experiments in the camp. He was a major in the Air Force and was -assigned to investigate the conditions to which parachutists were -subjected and, secondly, the conditions of those people who had to make -an emergency landing on the sea or had fallen into the sea. According to -scientific standards, insofar as I can judge, this was all to no -purpose. Like all the other experiments, it was simply useless murder; -and it is amazing that learned university professors and physicians, -particularly, were capable of carrying out these experiments according -to plan. These experiments were much worse than all the liquidations and -executions, because all the victims of these experiments simply had -their suffering prolonged, as various medicines such as vitamins, -hormones, tonics, and injections, which were not available for the -ordinary patients, were provided for these patients so that the -experiments might last longer and give those people more time to observe -their victims. - -M. DUBOST: I am speaking now of the experiments of Dr. Rascher only. Had -he received the order to make these experiments or did he make them on -his own initiative? - -BLAHA: These experiments were made on Himmler’s direct orders; also, Dr. -Rascher had close relations with Himmler and was like a relative of his. -He visited Himmler very often and Himmler visited Dr. Rascher several -times. - -M. DUBOST: Have you any information as to the kind of physicians who -were making these experiments? Were they always SS men or were they -members of medical faculties of universities who, however, did not -belong to the SS? - -BLAHA: That varied. For example, the malaria station was under the -direction of Professor Klaus Schilling of the Koch Institute in Berlin. -The Phlegmone station also had several university professors. The -surgical station was manned solely by SS doctors. In the Air Force -station there were exclusively SS and military doctors. It differed. Dr. -Bleibeck from Vienna conducted the experiments with sea water. - -M. DUBOST: Were the experiments for the Luftwaffe made on the order of -Himmler only? - -BLAHA: Himmler. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know—this is the last question—how many Frenchmen -passed through this camp? - -BLAHA: I believe at least eight or ten thousand people arrived at the -camp. Furthermore, I know very well that, particularly during the last -period, several thousand French prisoners marched on foot from the -western camps, especially from Natzweiler, Struthof, _et cetera_, and -that only very small remnants of these ever reached Dachau. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us to what branches of the German service -those who were employed at the camp belonged? - -BLAHA: If I understood you correctly, the highest authority on -everything going on in the camp was the so-called Security Main Office -in Berlin. All demands and directives came from Berlin; also the -experimental stations received a definite quota of subjects for the -experiments and the numbers were fixed by Berlin. If the doctors making -the experiments needed a larger number, new requests had to be sent to -Berlin. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to know is to what branch of the -service the men belonged who were employed in the camp. - -BLAHA: They were all SS men and most of them from the SD. During the -last days, at the very end, a few members of the Armed Forces were there -as guards but the men in charge were entirely SS men. - -THE PRESIDENT: Were there any of the Gestapo there? - -BLAHA: Yes, that was the so-called political department, which was -directed by the chief of the Munich Gestapo. It had control of all the -interrogations and regulations, and it proposed the executions, -transports, and transports of invalids. Also, all the people who were -provided for the experiments had to be approved by the political -department. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to cross-examine -the witness? - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you told us that at one time the Defendant Funk -also was at Dachau, and you informed us, if I understood you correctly, -that this happened on the occasion of some celebration or state -conference between the Axis Powers. Please think back a little and tell -us when that was approximately. Perhaps—just a moment—perhaps you -could tell us the year, maybe also the season, and perhaps you could -also state which political celebration it was. - -BLAHA: As far as Funk is concerned, I can remember that it was, I -believe, a conference of finance ministers. The papers had announced -that it would take place and we were informed beforehand that some of -the ministers would come to Dachau. Such a visit was actually made a few -days afterwards, and it was said that Minister Funk was among the -visitors. It was, I believe, during the first half of the year 1944. I -cannot say that with absolute certainty. - -DR. SAUTER: You mean to say: during the first half of 1944, on the -occasion of a conference of finance ministers? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Where did that conference take place? - -BLAHA: If I remember correctly—I didn’t write that down, of -course—that was either in Salzburg or Reichenhall or Berchtesgaden, -somewhere in the neighborhood of Munich, I believe. - -DR. SAUTER: From whom did you learn at that time that on the next day, -or the day after, high-ranking visitors would arrive? - -BLAHA: We always received an order to prepare for such a visit. -Elaborate preparations were always made; everything was cleaned up; -everything had to be in order, as you will understand; and those people -whose presence might be undesirable or those who, in a certain sense, -might be dangerous, had to disappear. Thus, whenever such high-ranking -visitors were announced we always received an order from the camp -headquarters 1 or 2 days beforehand; and, also these visitors were -always accompanied by the camp commander. - -DR. SAUTER: By the camp commander? Now, if you know that the Defendant -Funk was there and people talked about it, then I think they would have -mentioned also what other persons were present at this visit made by the -Defendant Funk. - -BLAHA: I cannot remember. There were always several important persons. - -DR. SAUTER: The rest do not interest me. I am interested only in knowing -whether or not at that particular visit, which was said to have been -made by Funk, word was passed around the camp that such and such -personalities were with him? - -BLAHA: I cannot remember that now. - -DR. SAUTER: You cannot remember. Can you remember afterwards, perhaps on -the next day or the day after, something was said perhaps by people who -had seen the visitors? - -BLAHA: Yes, we always discussed that, but now I can no longer remember -which personalities were mentioned. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I am not interested in any other visit, but in this -specific visit, as long as I do not say anything to the contrary. In -this case I should like to know whether or not anything at all was said -later on about the persons who were there with Funk. - -BLAHA: That I do not know; there were so many visits. For instance, -after one visit, the very next day already another visit would be -announced. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, you do also remember the visit that Funk made. Well, if -other finance ministers were there, one would think that you would -recall these other persons also. - -BLAHA: I cannot remember that. It may be that the people with whom I -talked did not know who these other persons were. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know why, or to put it differently, which departments -of the camp were visited on the occasion when Funk was supposed to have -made this visit. At any rate he did not come to you. - -BLAHA: No; he did not come to the pathological department. - -DR. SAUTER: He did not. But you were also prepared? - -BLAHA: Yes. All departments had always to be prepared, even if no -visitors came. It also happened at times that a visit was announced, and -then, for one reason or another, nothing came of it. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, as regards these observations of yours that you -have related to us today, have you been interrogated in regard to them -many times already? - -BLAHA: I was interrogated on these matters for the first time before the -military court at Dachau. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you also at that time say that Funk had been there? I -repeat, did you before the military court at Dachau say anything to the -effect that Funk had been present? - -BLAHA: Yes, I said the same thing before the court at Dachau. - -DR. SAUTER: About Funk? - -BLAHA: Also about Funk. - -DR. SAUTER: But is it true, Witness? I ask again whether it is really -true, because you are here as a witness under oath. - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You were interrogated also the day before yesterday? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you, at that time, also make these statements about -Funk? - -BLAHA: I said the same thing at the interrogation conducted by the -Prosecution. - -DR. SAUTER: Is that also in the record which I believe you signed? - -BLAHA: I signed no record. - -DR. SAUTER: You signed no record? - -BLAHA: No; I simply signed what was read by the Prosecution. - -DR. SAUTER: Well, that is a record. - -BLAHA: Yes, but in that record there is no mention of these visits. - -DR. SAUTER: Why then didn’t you mention these visits the day before -yesterday? - -BLAHA: I was asked about it orally, and the prosecutor told me that -these matters would be taken up orally in the courtroom. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you then also told where the defendants sit in the -courtroom? - -BLAHA: No. Before the military court I was shown all the pictures. . . - -DR. SAUTER: Aha! - -BLAHA: And I was asked to identify to the court the various people. I -identified the three of whom I said today that I had seen them in -person. Funk and others I did not name. - -DR. SAUTER: You did not name Funk? - -BLAHA: I did not say that I had personally seen him or that I could -identify him. - -DR. SAUTER: But when the pictures were shown to you did you see the -defendants in the pictures? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, if I understand you correctly, you knew today where, -for instance, Funk or Frick or anyone else was sitting? - -BLAHA: Funk I do not know personally, because I did not see him at that -time. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you not told when the pictures were shown to you at -Dachau, “This is Funk; look at him; do you know him”? - -BLAHA: No; that was done quite differently. - -DR. SAUTER: How? - -BLAHA: All the pictures were shown to me and I was asked to say which of -these individuals I had seen at the Dachau camp. Of these people I named -these three. There was no further discussion whatsoever in regard to the -other pictures. - -DR. SAUTER: Well, Dr. Blaha, when your hearing started and you were -questioned by the President or by the prosecutor, you made a statement, -I believe, in the Czech language. - -BLAHA: No. - -DR. SAUTER: What then? - -BLAHA: In the German language. - -DR. SAUTER: No; everyone heard that that was not German, but it was -obviously Czech. - -BLAHA: The first sentence only. - -DR. SAUTER: The first sentences? Well, now, as it will in any case come -into the court transcript for practical purposes, I ask you to state and -to repeat quite literally, giving the true sense, that which you said -then, because we are interested in that from the point of view of the -Defense. - -BLAHA: I believe that it was included in the transcript because an -English translation was added to my statement. - -DR. SAUTER: No, I do not believe that Czech is being translated. But -anyhow please repeat it. We did not hear it. - -BLAHA: Yes. I said that I was ready, since it is technically impossible -to use my native Czech tongue in the hearing, to give my testimony in -German, because I have lived in German surroundings through all these -events which occurred during the last 7 years and which are now the -subject of this Trial. Moreover, the special and new expressions -referring to life in the camp can be found only in German, and in no -other dictionary can one find such suitable and expressive terms as in -the German language. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, Mr. President, I have no further questions. Thank you. - -DR. THOMA: Witness, were the inmates of the Concentration Camp Dachau -bound to secrecy? - -BLAHA: No. Of course, if someone was discharged from the camp by the -Gestapo—those cases were few and far between, particularly in the case -of the Germans, who were then drafted—one had to sign a so-called -pledge of secrecy. - -DR. THOMA: Could the inmates of the camp, those inside the camp, who -worked on farms, _et cetera_, talk to the other workers about conditions -in the camp? - -BLAHA: Yes, there were opportunities, because the people worked in the -same rooms and factories with other workers—civilian workers. That was -the case in the German armament industry, in the fields, and in all -factories in Munich and the surroundings. - -DR. THOMA: If I understood you correctly, you said previously that -visitors, people who delivered things, and customers, also had an -opportunity of observing these conditions in the camp without -difficulty. - -BLAHA: Yes. Many of these people had access everywhere, in the fields as -well as in the various factories, and could observe what life was like -in these places. - -DR. THOMA: And what did they see there in the way of atrocities and -ill-treatment, and so forth? - -BLAHA: I believe they saw how the people worked, what they looked like -and what was produced there. For instance, I can remember one example of -what they saw quite well. At that time I was working in the fields. We -were pulling a heavy street roller, 16 men, and a group of girls passed -who were on an excursion. When they passed, their leader said very -loudly, so that we all could hear it, “Look, those people are so lazy -that rather than harness up a team of horses they pull it themselves.” -That was supposed to be a joke. - -DR. THOMA: Witness, when did you first have occasion, after your -liberation from the concentration camp, to tell outside people about -those horrible atrocities which you related to us today? - -BLAHA: I did not understand that; please repeat. - -DR. THOMA: When did you first have an opportunity, after your discharge -or liberation from the concentration camp, of telling an outsider about -these horrible atrocities? - -BLAHA: Immediately after the liberation. I was at that time, as chief -physician of the concentration camp, interrogated by the American -investigating corps; and it was to this corps that I told this story for -the first time, and I also gave them various proofs—diagrams, and the -medical records which I had saved from being burnt. - -DR. THOMA: That prosecutor believed the information you gave without -further ado? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. THOMA: Witness, you said that the Defendant Rosenberg was pointed -out to you in the Concentration Camp Dachau shortly after you arrived -there. - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. THOMA: When was that? - -BLAHA: In the year 1941; first half of 1941. - -DR. THOMA: First half? - -BLAHA: I believe so, yes. - -DR. THOMA: Can you perhaps remember the month? - -BLAHA: I cannot remember. I arrived in April; I believe it was between -April and July or something like that. - -DR. THOMA: From April to July 1941? - -BLAHA: I believe so. - -DR. THOMA: Was Rosenberg at that time in uniform? - -BLAHA: He was in uniform. - -DR. THOMA: In what uniform? - -BLAHA: I believe it was an SS uniform. - -DR. THOMA: SS uniform? - -BLAHA: It was a—I cannot say that very precisely—but he was in -uniform. - -DR. THOMA: All right, you remember _prima facie_ that it was an SS -uniform, that is, a black uniform? - -BLAHA: No, at that time the SS no longer wore the black uniform, because -after the beginning of the war they wore field uniforms and other -similar uniforms. - -DR. THOMA: Then, you assume it was a gray uniform? - -BLAHA: Something like that; whether it was gray or yellow or brown I -don’t remember any more. - -DR. THOMA: That is just the point: whether it was gray, brown, or -yellow. Was it a field uniform? - -BLAHA: I do not know because from 1939 I was in the concentration camp, -and I am not at all familiar with the various German uniforms, ranks, -and branches of the Army, and so forth. - -DR. THOMA: But you just said that during the war they changed the -uniform. - -BLAHA: Yes, the men in the Gestapo also changed theirs. When I was -arrested in 1939, all Gestapo personnel wore this black uniform. Then, -after the war broke out most of them wore either green or gray uniforms. - -DR. THOMA: May I ask you again: Did Rosenberg wear a wartime uniform or -a peacetime uniform? - -BLAHA: I believe it was a wartime uniform. - -DR. THOMA: Wartime uniform? The Defendant Rosenberg was pointed out to -you by another comrade, wasn’t he? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. THOMA: At what distance? - -BLAHA: Well, he was just going down the camp street. That was perhaps 30 -or 40 degrees. - -DR. THOMA: Thirty or forty metres you mean? - -BLAHA: Well, 30 metres; 30 paces I wanted to say, 30 or 40 paces. - -DR. THOMA: And had you previously seen photographs of Rosenberg? Did you -already have an idea of what Rosenberg looked like? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. THOMA: And when this comrade showed you Rosenberg, was it then -necessary for him to say, “This is Rosenberg”? Didn’t you recognize him -already from having seen him in the photographs which you had -previously. . . - -BLAHA: I cannot remember that. But when he showed him to me I remembered -that I knew him already from the various pictures in the newspapers. - -DR. THOMA: May I ask you to describe the incident precisely? How it -happened; where you were standing; where Rosenberg came from; and who -was in his company. - -BLAHA: Who was in his company? I knew only the camp commander. - -DR. THOMA: Who was the camp commander at that time? - -BLAHA: Pierkowski was camp commander, Sturmbannführer Pierkowski. - -DR. THOMA: Do you know whether he is still alive? - -BLAHA: No, I don’t. - -DR. THOMA: The camp commander? - -BLAHA: Pierkowski. Then the Lagerführer Ziel and Hoffmann, I knew them. - -DR. THOMA: Now were you in your room and looking out of the window? - -BLAHA: No, we were in one of the so-called “block” streets. This led -into another street along which the visitors passed. - -DR. THOMA: And what was said to you? - -BLAHA: “Look, there goes Rosenberg.” - -DR. THOMA: Was Rosenberg alone? - -BLAHA: No, he was with the other persons. - -DR. THOMA: That is to say, only with the camp commander? - -BLAHA: No, there were many other people with him. - -DR. THOMA: That is to say, he had an escort, a staff? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -DR. THOMA: Members of Rosenberg’s staff? - -BLAHA: I don’t know whether that was Rosenberg’s staff, but there were a -number of persons. - -DR. THOMA: A number of persons? Witness, the Defendant Rosenberg assures -me most definitely that he has never been to the concentration camp at -Dachau. Is it possible that there has been a mistake? - -BLAHA: I believe I am not mistaken. Besides the German in question knew -Rosenberg very well, I believe. - -DR. THOMA: How do you know that? - -BLAHA: Because he told me so definitely. Otherwise, I have no way of -knowing that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma. - -DR. THOMA: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You will forgive me if I point out to you that this is -intended to be an expeditious trial and that it is not right to take up -too much time upon small points like this. - -DR. THOMA: My Lord, I ask your permission to remark that the question of -whether or not Rosenberg was in the concentration camp is of decisive -importance. I thank you. - -DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): The Defendant Frick -states that he has never been in Dachau Camp. Therefore, in order to -clarify the facts I should like to ask the following questions: - -Witness, at what distance do you believe you saw Frick? - -BLAHA: I saw him from the window as he passed with a number of people. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you know Frick before? - -BLAHA: Yes, from pictures. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: From pictures? Did you recognize him yourself or did -some friend tell you that it was Frick? - -BLAHA: A number of us saw him and I looked at him particularly, because -at that time he was already Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. For that -reason I had a personal interest in recognizing him. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Did Frick wear a uniform? - -BLAHA: I do not believe so. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize anybody who was with him, anyone -from his staff or from the camp command? - -BLAHA: I did not know his staff. From the camp command there was Camp -Commander Weiter. Camp Commander Weiter, and his adjutant, Otto. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Could you name anyone of your comrades who also -recognized him? - -BLAHA: There were many comrades of mine who at that time were standing -at the window. Unfortunately, I cannot say who they were, because, as -you will understand, life in the concentration camp was so full of -incidents that one could not record these things accurately in one’s -memory. One remembers only the more important events. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize him at once of your own accord when -he passed by, or had it been mentioned previously that Frick was -expected? - -BLAHA: No, it was not mentioned then. We simply heard that a -high-ranking visitor was expected, and we were waiting for this -high-ranking visitor. We were not told beforehand who it would be. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize Frick immediately when you came into -the courtroom, or did you know beforehand that he was sitting in the -fourth seat here? - -BLAHA: No, I recognized him easily, because I have already seen him many -times in various pictures, and because he is a well-known person in -Bohemia and Moravia. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: You believe then that there can be no question of any -error. - -BLAHA: I don’t think so. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: May I then ask the Court whether Frick himself may -take the stand to testify that he has never seen Dachau Camp? I want to -make this motion now so that, if necessary, the witness might be -confronted with Frick. - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the defendants will understand that they will -have the opportunity, when it comes to their time to present their -cases, to call all the defendants, but they will not have an opportunity -of calling them now. They will have to wait until the case for the -Prosecution is over and they will then have an opportunity, each of -them, to call the defendant for whom they appear, if they wish to. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I simply thought, that as the witness is available -now. . . - -[_Dr. Kubuschok approached the lectern._] - -THE PRESIDENT: It is now 5:00 o’clock and unless you are going to be -very short . . . are you going to be very short? - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Yes, Sir. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you said that when prominent -visitors came to the camp, for instance, Reich ministers, extensive -preparations were made beforehand. You also said that undesirable -persons were removed. Maybe you could supplement that statement. I am -interested to know what the purpose of these preparations was. - -BLAHA: I meant that everything had to be in order. In our infirmary all -the patients had to lie in bed quietly, everything was washed and -prepared; the instruments were polished, as is usually the case for -high-ranking visitors. We were not allowed to do anything—no -operations; no bandages nor food were given out before the visit had -terminated. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Could you perhaps tell me which undesirable persons were -to be removed, as you said before? - -BLAHA: Well, the Russians especially were always kept strictly in their -blocks. It was said that they were afraid of possible demonstrations, -assassinations, _et cetera_. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were prisoners kept out of sight because they showed -outward signs of ill-treatment? - -BLAHA: It goes without saying that before the visitors nobody was -struck, beaten, hanged, or executed. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: To sum up, the purpose of these preparations was to -prevent the guests from seeing the concentration camp as it really was. - -BLAHA: From seeing the cruelties. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court will not sit in open session tomorrow, -Saturday, and will only sit in the morning on Monday, because there is -work to be done in the closed session tomorrow and on Monday afternoon. -I thought it would be convenient for counsel to know that. - -The Court will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-THIRD DAY - Monday, 14 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you have the witness brought in? I think one of the -defendants’ counsel was about to cross-examine him. - -[_The witness, Blaha, took the stand._] - -HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for the SS and SD): I would like to put to -the witness a few practical questions which I think necessary both for a -better understanding of the earlier testimony of the witness and for my -own information. - -The witness was in the concentration camp from 1941 to 1945 and should -be well informed on conditions as they were. His memory, as is evident -from his previous statements, seems to be excellent. - -[_Turning to the witness._] - -Do you know how the proportion of political and criminal inmates changed -during the various periods? What were the approximate figures of -political and criminal inmates in Dachau? - -BLAHA: In Dachau it varied. There were political prisoners, professional -criminals, and the so-called black or asocial elements. I am, of course, -speaking only of the German prisoners; the inmates of other nations were -all political prisoners. Only the German inmates were divided into red, -green, and black prisoners. The great majority of Germans were political -prisoners. - -HERR BABEL: Can you indicate the approximate proportion? A quarter, a -half, or three-quarters? - -BLAHA: I am sorry, I didn’t hear you. - -HERR BABEL: Can you give figures? How many were political -prisoners—half, three-quarters, or how many? Can you give an -approximate number? - -BLAHA: I would say that of 5,000 German prisoners, 3,000 were political -and 2,000 were green and black prisoners. - -HERR BABEL: Was that the proportion during the whole 4- or 5-year -period? - -BLAHA: It changed; because many died, some Germans left, many were -drafted, and there were many new arrivals. In the last years there were -more and more political prisoners, because many of the green prisoners -were drafted to the front. - -HERR BABEL: What approximately was the total number in 1941, 1943, and -1945? - -BLAHA: Do you mean the total number of prisoners? - -HERR BABEL: Yes, the total number. - -BLAHA: We had 8,000 to 9,000 in 1941; in 1943 there were 15,000 to -20,000; and between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 we had -more than 70,000 or 80,000. - -HERR BABEL: Another question: You mentioned that at first you worked in -the plantations. What did you mean by plantations? - -BLAHA: The plantations were a large estate of the SS, in which spices, -medical herbs, and things of that sort were raised. - -HERR BABEL: Was this plantation inside the camp? - -BLAHA: No, it was in the near vicinity of the camp, not a part of it. - -HERR BABEL: You also mentioned work in armament factories. I gathered -from your testimony that these armament factories were partially within -and partially outside the camp. Is that correct? - -BLAHA: Yes, at first these so-called German armament works were only -outside the camp. Then, as a result of the bombings, some sections were -moved into the interior of the concentration camp. - -HERR BABEL: What was the number of camp guards in 1941? - -BLAHA: For actual guard duty usually three SS companies were in the -camp, but at Dachau there were in addition a large garrison of SS and a -Kommandantur. Guards were taken from other SS formations from time to -time, when it was necessary. It varied and depended on how many guards -were needed. For regular duty there were usually three companies. - -HERR BABEL: Were the prisoners in the armament factories guarded during -working hours? - -BLAHA: Yes. Every labor detachment had a commander selected from the -guard companies and, in addition, these so-called guards, who went with -the detachment to their place of work and then brought the prisoners -back to the camp. - -HERR BABEL: While you were at the camp, did you witness any -ill-treatment on the part of these guards in the course of their daily -activities? - -BLAHA: Yes; a great deal. - -HERR BABEL: Often? - -BLAHA: Yes. - -HERR BABEL: For what reasons? - -BLAHA: The reasons varied, depending on the nature of the guards or the -commanders. - -HERR BABEL: But you said you were occupied, indeed according to your -statements, very much occupied. - -BLAHA: Yes. - -HERR BABEL: How then did you have an opportunity of observing such -ill-treatment? - -BLAHA: I performed many autopsies on people either shot or beaten to -death at their work, and made official reports on the cause of death. - -HERR BABEL: You said they were shot. Did you see such incidents -yourself? - -BLAHA: No. - -HERR BABEL: Then, how do you know that? - -BLAHA: The bodies were brought to me from the place of work, and it was -my duty to ascertain the cause of death; that the men had been beaten to -death, for example, that the skull or ribs had been fractured, that the -man had died of internal hemorrhage, or that he had been shot; I had to -make an official report on the cause of death. Sometimes, but this was -rare, when an investigation was conducted, I was called in as witness. - -HERR BABEL: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you wish to re-examine the witness? - -MR. DODD: I have no further questions to ask the witness at this time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the prosecuting staff want to -re-examine? Colonel Pokrovsky? - -COLONEL POKROVSKY: At this stage of the Trial I have no further -questions to ask the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can go. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -MR. DODD: I should like to ask the Tribunal at this time to take -judicial notice of the findings and the sentences imposed by the -Military Court at Dachau, Germany, on the 13th day of December 1945. The -findings were dated the 12th and the sentences on the 13th. I have here -a certified copy of the findings and the sentences, Document Number -3590-PS, which I should like to offer as Exhibit Number USA-664. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have copies of this been given to the defendants? - -MR. DODD: Yes. They have been sent to the defendants’ counsel -information room. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: I have one other matter that I should like to take up very -briefly before the Tribunal this morning. It is concerned with a matter -that arose after I had left the courtroom to return to the United -States. - -On the 13th of December we offered in evidence Document Number 3421-PS, -and Exhibit Numbers USA-252 and 254. They were, respectively, the Court -will recall, sections of human skin taken from human bodies and -preserved; and a human head, the head of a human being, which had been -preserved. On the 14th day of December, according to the Record, counsel -for the Defendant Kaltenbrunner addressed the Tribunal and complained -that the affidavit, which was offered, of one Pfaffenberger, failed to -state that the camp commandant at Buchenwald, one Koch, along with his -wife, was condemned to death for having committed precisely these -atrocities, this business of tanning the skin and preserving the head. -And in the course of the discussion before the Tribunal the Record -reveals that counsel for the Defendant Bormann, in addressing the -Tribunal, stated that it was highly probable that the Prosecution knew -that the German authorities had objected to this camp commandant Koch -and, in fact, knew that he had been tried and sentenced for doing -precisely these things. And there was some intimation, we feel, that the -Prosecution, having this knowledge, withheld it from the Tribunal. Now, -I wish to say that we had no knowledge at all about this man Koch at the -time that we offered the proof; didn’t know anything about him except -that he had been the commandant, according to the affidavit. But, -subsequent to this objection we had an investigation made, and we have -found that he was tried in 1944, indeed, by an SS court, but not for -having tanned human skin nor having preserved a human head but for -having embezzled some money, for what—as the judge who tried him tells -us—was a charge of general corruption and for having murdered someone -with whom he had some personal difficulties. Indeed, the judge, a Dr. -Morgen, tells us that he saw the tattooed human skin and he saw a human -head in Commandant Koch’s office and that he saw a lampshade there made -out of human skin. But there were no charges at the time that he was -tried for having done these things. - -I would also point out to the Tribunal that, we say, the testimony of -Dr. Blaha sheds further light on whether or not these exhibits, Numbers -USA-252 and 254, were isolated instances of that atrocious kind of -conduct. We have not been able to locate the affiant. We have made an -effort to do so, but we have not been able to locate him thus far. - -THE PRESIDENT: Locate whom? - -MR. DODD: The affiant Pfaffenberger, the one whose affidavit was -offered. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd. - -DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): The statement -just made is undoubtedly significant, but it would be of importance to -have the documents which served to convict the commandant and his wife -at the time. Kaltenbrunner told me that it was known in the whole SS -that the commandant Koch and his wife had been taken to account also—I -emphasize “also”—on account of these things and that it was known in -the SS that one of the factors determining the severity of the sentences -imposed had been this proved inhuman behavior. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. As you were the counsel who made the -allegation that the commandant Koch had been put to death for his -inhuman treatment, it would seem that you are the party to produce the -judgment. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: I never had the verdict in my hand. I depended on the -information which Kaltenbrunner gave me personally and orally. - -THE PRESIDENT: It was you who made the assertion. I don’t care where you -got it from. You made the assertion; therefore it is for you to produce -the document. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. - -COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE: (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May -it please the Tribunal: Briefs and document books have been handed in. -The documents in the document book are in the order in which I shall -refer to them, and the references to them in the briefs are also in that -order. On the first page of the brief is set out the extract from -Appendix A of the Indictment, which deals with the criminality of this -defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing first of all with Raeder or with Dönitz? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: With Dönitz. My learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, will -deal with Raeder immediately after. Reading at Page 1 of the brief. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, may I proceed? - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Briefs and document books have been handed in. The -documents are in the document book in the order in which I shall refer -to them, and the references in the brief to the documents are in that -same order. On the first page of the brief is set out the extract from -the Indictment as Appendix A, which deals with the allegations against -this defendant. It sets out the positions he held and charges him, -first, with promoting the preparations for war, set forth in Count One; -second, with participating in the military planning and preparation for -wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, -agreements, and assurances, set forth in Count One and Two of the -Indictment; and thirdly, with authorizing, directing, and participating -in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, including -particularly the crimes against persons and property on the High Seas. - -Now, if at any place I appear to trespass on Count Three, it is with the -consent and courtesy of the Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic. - -My Lord, on the second page of the brief are set out first the positions -held by the Defendant Dönitz; and the document in question is the first -document in the document book, 2887-PS, which has already been put in as -Exhibit Number USA-12. The Tribunal will see that after his appointment -in 1935 as Commander of the Weddigen U-boat Flotilla—that was, in fact, -the first flotilla to be formed after the end of the World War in -1918—the defendant, who was in effect then Commander of U-boats, rose -steadily in rank as the U-boat arm expanded, until he became an admiral. -And then on the 30th of January 1943, he was appointed Grossadmiral and -succeeded the Defendant Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, -retaining his command of the U-boat arm. Then on the 1st of May 1945, he -succeeded Hitler as head of Germany. - -My Lord, as appears from a number of documents which I shall put in -evidence, the defendant was awarded the following decorations: On the -18th of September 1939 the Cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for -the U-boat successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This -award was followed on the 21st of April 1940 by the high award of the -Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross, while on the 7th of April 1943 he -received personally from Hitler the Oak Leaf to the Knight’s Cross of -the Iron Cross, as the 223rd recipient, for his services in building up -the German Navy and, in particular, his services for the offensive -U-boat arm for the coming war, which were outstanding. And now I put in -the next document in the document book, D-436, which becomes Exhibit -GB-183. That is an extract from the official publication _Das Archiv_ on -the defendant’s promotion to vice admiral. It is dated the 27th of -September 1940, and I read the last two sentences: - - “In 4 years of untiring and, in the fullest sense of the word, - uninterrupted work of training, he succeeds in developing the - young U-boat armed personnel and material till it is a weapon of - a striking power unexpected even by the experts. More than 3 - million gross tons of enemy shipping sunk in only 1 year, - achieved with only a few boats, speak better than words of the - merits of this man.” - -The next document in the document book, 1463-PS, which I put in as -Exhibit GB-184, is an extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 -edition, and it serves to emphasize the contents of that last document. -My Lord, I won’t read from it. The relevant passage is on Page 2, and if -I might summarize that, it describes in detail the defendant’s work in -building up the U-boat arm, his ceaseless work in training night and day -to close the gap of 17 years during which no training had taken place, -his responsibility for new improvements, and for devising the “pack” -tactics which were later to become so famous. And then his position is -summarized further at the top of Page 3. If I might read the last two -sentences of the first paragraph on that page: - - “In spite of the fact that his duties took on immeasurable - proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction - program, the chief was what he always was and always will be: - leader and inspiration to all the forces under him.” - -And then the last sentence of that paragraph: - - “In spite of all his duties, he never lost touch with his men; - and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to - the changing fortunes of war.” - -It was not, however, only his ability as a naval officer which won the -defendant these high honors: his promotion to succeed the Defendant -Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the personal position he -acquired as one of Hitler’s principal advisers, and finally, earlier -candidates, such as Göring, having betrayed Hitler’s trust or finding -the position less attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful -honor of becoming Hitler’s successor. These he owed to his fanatical -adherence to Hitler and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology -with which he sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and -to his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing -fortunes of war, referred to in the diary and which the Tribunal may -think, when I have referred them to the document, may be regarded as -synonymous with the capacity for utter ruthlessness. His attitude to the -Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his public utterances. - -I turn to the next document in the document book, D-443, which I put in -to become Exhibit GB-185. It is an extract from a speech made by the -defendant at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on the 17th -of December 1943. It was subsequently circulated by the defendant as a -top secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers -only. My Lord, if I might read: - - “I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For - what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for - the soldier. But the full value, the whole weight of duty done, - is only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a - voice in the matter. Doing his duty is then quite different from - what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, - obediently, and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the - soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his - mental, all his spiritual energy; and for this his conviction, - his ideology are indispensable. It is therefore necessary for us - to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he may be - adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every - dissension in this connection, or every divergence or - unpreparedness imply a weakness in all circumstances. He in whom - this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then - indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction - comes into play. It is also nonsense to say that the soldier or - the officer must have no politics. The soldier embodies the - state in which he lives, he is the representative, the - articulate exponent of his state. He must therefore stand with - his whole weight behind this state. - - “We must travel this road out of our deepest conviction. The - Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this - war if we take part in it, with holy zeal, with all our - fanaticism. . . . - - “I alone cannot do this, but it can be done only with the aid of - the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand—with - Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the - Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It - does not matter to me who builds them.” - -My Lord, that last sentence is of importance in connection with a later -document. The Tribunal will see when I come to it that the defendant was -not above employing concentration camp labor for this purpose. - -I put in the next document in the document book, D-640, which becomes -Exhibit GB-186. It is an extract from a speech on the same subject by -the defendant as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Commanders on the -15th of February 1944. My Lord, it is cumulative except that I think the -last two sentences add, if I might read them: - - “From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so - indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the - National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the - exponent of the State, the idle chatter that the officer is - non-political is sheer nonsense.” - -Now, the next document is 2878-PS, which I put in to become Exhibit -GB-187. It consists of three extracts from speeches. The first is from a -speech made by the defendant to the German Navy and the German people on -Heroes’ Day, the 12th of March 1944. - - “German men and women! - - “. . . What would have become of our country today, if the - Führer had not united us under National Socialism! Split into - parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable - to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising - ideology, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens of - this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our - adversaries. . . .” - -My Lord, the next extract is from a speech to the Navy on the 21st of -July 1944. It again shows the defendant’s fanaticism. It is perhaps -worth reading the first sentence: - - “Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts - because of the criminal attempt which was to have cost the life - of our beloved Führer. Providence wished it otherwise, watched - over and protected our Führer, and did not abandon our German - fatherland in the fight for its destiny.” - -And then he goes on to deal with the fate which should be meted out to -these traitors. - -The third extract deals with the introduction of the German salute into -the Armed Forces. I don’t think I need read it, but as the members of -the Tribunal will see, it was the Defendant Keitel and this defendant -who were responsible for the alteration of the salute in the German -forces and the adoption of the Nazi salute—together with Göring. . . -Pardon, I should have said: the Defendants Göring, Keitel, and Dönitz. - -The next document is a monitored report of the speech made on the German -wireless by this defendant, announcing the death of Hitler and his own -succession. It is Document D-444. I put it in to become Exhibit GB-188, -and I read a portion of it. The time is 2226—marked on the document. I -read therefrom: - - “It has been reported from the Führer’s headquarters that our - Führer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle - headquarters at the Reich Chancellery, fallen for Germany, - fighting to the last breath against Bolshevism. - - “On the 30th of April the Führer nominated Grossadmiral Dönitz - to be his successor. The Grossadmiral and Führer’s successor - will speak to the German nation.” - -And then, the first paragraph of the speech: - - “German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our - Führer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest - sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger - of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against - it. His fight having ended, he died a hero’s death in the - capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably - straight and steady life.” - -Then, that document also contains an order of the day issued by the -defendant, which is very much to the same effect. - -Apart from his services in building up the U-boat arm, there is ample -evidence that the defendant as officer commanding U-boats took part in -the planning and execution of aggressive war against Poland, Norway, and -Denmark. The next document in the document book, C-126(c), has already -been put in as Exhibit GB-45. It is a memorandum by the Defendant -Raeder, dated the 16th of May 1939, and I will call the attention of the -Tribunal to the distribution. The sixth copy went to the Führer der -Unterseeboote, that is to say, to the Defendant Dönitz. The document is -a directive for the invasion of Poland, Fall Weiss, and I won’t read it. -It has already been read. - -The next document, C-126(e), on the second page of that same document, -has also been put in as Exhibit GB-45. It again is a memorandum from the -Defendant Raeder’s headquarters, dated the 2d of August 1939. It is -addressed to the fleet, and then Flag Officer U-boats—that is, of -course, the defendant . . . and it is merely a covering letter for -operational directions for the employment of U-boats which are to be -sent out into the Atlantic by way of precaution in the event the -intention of carrying out Fall Weiss should remain unchanged. The second -sentence is important: - - “Flag Officer U-boats is handing in his operation orders to - SKL”—that is the Seekriegsleitung, the German Admiralty—“by 12 - August. A decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic - will probably be made in the middle of August.” - -The next document, C-172, I put in as Exhibit GB-189. It consists of the -defendant’s own operational instructions to his U-boats for the -operation Fall Weiss. It is signed by him. It is not dated, but it is -clear from the subject matter that its date must be before the 16th of -July 1939. I don’t think the substance of the document adds. It is -purely an operational instruction, giving effect to the document already -put in, C-126(c), the directive by Raeder. - -My Lord, the next document, C-122, has already been put in as Exhibit -GB-82. It is an extract from the War Diary of the naval war staff of the -German Admiralty, dated the 3rd of October 1939, and records the fact -that the chief of the naval war staff has called for views on the -possibility of taking operational bases in Norway. It has already been -read and I would merely call the Tribunal’s attention to the passage in -brackets, in the paragraph marked “d”: - - “Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors extremely - useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats to - call at temporarily.” - -The next document, C-5, has already been put in as Exhibit GB-83. This -is from the defendant, as Flag Officer U-boats, addressed to the Supreme -Command of the Navy, the naval war staff. It is dated the 9th of October -1939, and it sets out the defendant’s view on the advantages of -Trondheim and Narvik as bases. The document proposes the establishment -of a base at Trondheim with Narvik as an alternative. - -Now the next document, C-151, has already been put in as Exhibit GB-91. -It is the defendant’s operation order to his U-boats for the occupation -of Denmark and Norway, and the operation order, which is top secret, -dated the 30th of March 1940, is termed “Hartmut.” The members of the -Tribunal will remember that the document, in the last paragraph, said: - - “The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British - flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.” - -The preparations for war against England are perhaps best shown by the -disposition of the U-boats under his command on the 3rd of September -1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western Allies. The -locations of the sinkings in the following week, including that of the -_Athenia_ which will be dealt with by my learned friend, Major Elwyn -Jones, provide corroboration. On that, I would put in two charts; I put -them in as Document D-652, and they become Exhibit GB-190. - -My Lord, I have copies here for the members of the Tribunal. They have -been prepared by the Admiralty. There are two charts. The first sets out -the disposition of the submarines on the 3rd of September 1939. There is -a certification attached to the chart, in the top left-hand corner, -which I should read: - - “This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders - issued by Dönitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939 and - subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate - disposition of submarines ordered for the 3rd of September 1939 - but it cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail as the - files of captured orders are clearly not complete and also some - of the submarines shown apparently had received orders at sea on - or about 3 September to move to new operational areas. The - documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the - British Admiralty in London.” - -My Lord, there are two points I would make on that first chart. First, -it will be apparent to members of the Tribunal that U-boats which were -in those positions on the 3rd of September 1939 had left Kiel some -considerable time before. The other point which I would make is -important in connection with my learned friend Major Elwyn Jones’ case -against the Defendant Raeder, and that is the location of the U-boat -U-30. The members of the Tribunal may care to bear it in mind while -looking at the charts now. - -The second chart sets out the sinkings during the first week of the war, -and the location of the sinking of the _Athenia_ will be noted. There is -a short certification in the left-hand corner of the Tribunal’s copies: - - “This chart has been constructed from the official records of - the British Admiralty in London. It shows the positions of the - sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in - the 7 days commencing the 3rd of September 1939.” - -My Lord, I turn to the defendant’s participation in War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity. - -The course of the war waged against neutral and Allied merchant shipping -by the U-boats followed under the defendant’s direction a course of -consistently increasing ruthlessness. The defendant displayed his -masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of -war. From the very early days, merchant ships, both Allied and neutral, -were sunk without warning; and when operational danger zones had been -announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to take -place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in the -early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the crews -or passengers of sunk merchant ships, and the announcement claiming a -total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm the -established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted -without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the -requirements of humanity. - -The course of the war at sea during the first 18 months is summarized by -two official British reports made at a time when those who compiled them -were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which have since come -to hand. - -My Lord, I turn to the next document in the document book. It is -Document D-641(a), which I put in to become Exhibit GB-191. It is an -extract from an official report of the British Foreign Office concerning -German attacks on merchant shipping during the period 3 September 1939 -to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of the war, and it was -made shortly after September 1940. - -My Lord, if I might quote from the second paragraph on the first page: - - “During the first 12 months of the war, 2,081,062 tons of Allied - shipping comprising 508 ships have been lost by enemy action. In - addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping, comprising 253 - ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these merchant ships have - been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft, or surface craft, and - the great majority of them were sunk while engaged on their - lawful trading voyages. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen have lost - their lives in these ships. . . . - - “In the last war the practice of the central powers was so - remote from the recognized procedure that it was thought - necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in - particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty - of London, 1930; and in 1936 Germany acceded to the rules. The - rules laid down: - - “(1) In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must - conform to the rules of international law to which surface - vessels are subjected. - - “(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to - stop on being summoned or of active resistance to visit and - search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not - sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without - having first placed passengers, crew, and ships’ papers in a - place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not - regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the - passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather - conditions by the proximity of land or the presence of another - vessel which is in a position to take them on board.” - -Then, the next paragraph: - - “At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a prize - ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare and the guidance of - her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the - submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however, - provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it - seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into port, and Article - 73 (i) and (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral - vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for - forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy. - These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the - traditional British view but the important point is that, even - in these cases, the prize ordinance envisages the capture of the - merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the - Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own prize - ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with - them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the - broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event, - however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of - the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war - with steadily increasing disregard for international law, and - for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the - protection of human life and property from arbitrary and - ruthless attacks.” - -I pass to the third paragraph on the next page which sets out two -instances: - - “On the 30th of September 1939 came the first sinking of a - neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of - life. This was the Danish ship _Vendia_ bound for the Clyde in - ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after - torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had - already signaled that he would submit to the submarine’s orders - and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By - November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels - without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the - Norwegian _Arne Kjode_ was torpedoed in the North Sea without - any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral - port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their - lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open - boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the - nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an - increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew.” - -And then dealing with attacks on Allied merchant vessels, certain -figures are given: Ships sunk 241, recorded attacks 221, illegal attacks -112. At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then they were not illegally sunk, however? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, Sir. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): According to this document, the Germans have -been given the benefit of the doubt. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, I should have read that sentence; I am obliged -to Your Honor. - -I pass to the second report, Document D-641(b). It is part of the same -document and is put in as Exhibit GB-191. It is a report covering the -next 6 months from September 1, 1940. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you not reading Page 3? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases, I have read a great deal of -the report and there are passages that I had not considered important. - -THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t myself read it, but I think. . . - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If I might read the first two paragraphs on Page 3: - - “By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant - vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet 4 - months later the Germans were still officially claiming that - they were acting in accordance with their prize ordinance. Their - own semi-official commentators, however, had made the position - clear. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in - February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily - or under compulsion bound for an enemy port—including - contraband control harbors—thereby loses its neutrality and - must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was - let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which - obtained a navicert from a British consul in order to avoid - putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be - sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral - port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of - November 1939 a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of - British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had - been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines, - and after the date some 15 more unarmed Allied vessels were - torpedoed without warning. It is clear therefore that not only - was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure but also - that neither before nor after this German threat did the German - submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed vessels.” - -The last paragraph is merely a summing-up; it does not add. - -Turning to D-641(b), which is a similar report covering the next 6 -months, if I might read the first five paragraphs of Page 1: - - “On the 30th January 1941 Hitler proclaimed: ‘Every ship, with - or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is - going to be torpedoed. On the face of it, this announcement - appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification - provided by the context is that the threats immediately - preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the - American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently - tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring - only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the - German ‘total blockade’ is alleged to be in force. - - “From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly - was Hitler’s meaning, since the only conclusion that can be - reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant - shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by - the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but - solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any - given time.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, isn’t this document you are now -reading really legal argument? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, some of it is. The difficulty is to leave -those parts and take in the facts. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: The third paragraph, if I might leave the rest of the -second, is as follows: - - “The effect of the German ‘total blockade’ is to prohibit - neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round - Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, - and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), - upon pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their - crews killed. As a matter of fact, at least 32 neutral ships, - exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by - enemy action since the declaration of the ‘total blockade.’” - -The last sentence in the following paragraph about the sinking of ships -without warning: - - “Yet though information is lacking in very many cases, details - are available to prove that, during the period under review, at - least 38 Allied merchant ships exclusive of those in convoys - have been torpedoed without warning in or near the ‘total - blockade’ area. - - “That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the - area is proved by the fact that of the 38 ships referred to at - least 16 were torpedoed outside the limits of the war zone.” - -My Lord, the next page deals with a specific case illustrating the -matter set out above. It is in the first paragraph of that page, the -third sentence: - - “The sinking of the _City of Benares_ on the 17th September 1940 - is a good example of this. The _City of Benares_ was an - 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly - 100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the - ‘war zone,’ with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. - It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very - rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p. m. In the - darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at - least four of the 12 boats lowered were capsized. Others were - swamped and many people were washed right off. In one boat alone - 16 people, including 11 children, died from exposure; in another - 22 died, including 15 children; in a third 21 died. The point to - be emphasized is not the unusual brutality of this attack but - rather that such results are inevitable when a belligerent - disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans have done and - are doing.” - -I think the rest of that paragraph is not important. - -I turn to the next document, 641(c), which is part of Exhibit GB-191. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is clear, I suppose, from that statement of facts that -there was no warning whatever given? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: We think that you should read the next paragraph too. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases. - - “There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for - days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water - clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by - one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their - boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to - pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know - that such things are the inevitable result of the type of - warfare he has chosen to employ.” - -My Lord, the rest is very much to the same general effect. - -The document, 641(c), is merely a certificate giving the total sinkings -by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) as 2,775 British, Allied, and -neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross registered tons. - -My Lord, it is perhaps worth considering one example not quoted in the -above reports of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by the -defendant’s U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German -versions of the sinkings are available. I turn to the next document, -“The sinking of S. S. _Sheaf Mead_.” That is Document D-644, which I put -in as Exhibit GB-192. If I might read the opening paragraph: - - “The British S. S. _Sheaf Mead_ was torpedoed without warning on - 27 May 1940. . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: This is the German account, is it not? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: This is actually in the form of a British report. It -includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the -log. - -THE PRESIDENT: It bears the words, “top secret”? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, this was at the time a top secret -document. That was some while ago. - - “The British S. S. _Sheaf Mead_ was torpedoed without warning on - 27 May 1940, with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of - the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an - exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to - upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man - was Kapitänleutnant Öhrn of _U-37_: The following extract from - his log for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks - for itself as to his behaviour.” - -Again turning to the relevant extract from the log, on the second page, -the time is marked on the document as 1554. - - “Surface. Stern is underwater.”—referring to the ship which has - been torpedoed—“Stern is underwater. Bows rise higher. The - boats are now on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of - complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up - quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of - the ship. They leap and rush with great bounds along the deck - down the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a - boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs - outstretched. Bursting and crushing. Then all is over. A large - heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. - The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and capsized boats. - We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He - says, hardly turning his head, ‘Nix Name.’ A young boy in the - water calls, ‘Help, help, please!’ The others are very composed. - They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred - is on their faces. On to the old course. After washing the paint - off the buoy, the name comes to light: Greatafield, Glasgow, - 5,006 gross registered tons.” - -“On to the old course” means merely that the U-boat makes off. - -Then the next page of that document contains an extract from the report -of the chief engineer of the _Sheaf Mead_. The relevant paragraphs are -the first and the last: - - “When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side, - that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about 5 yards - away. The submarine captain asked the steward the name of the - ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our - lifebuoys, but this had the name Greatafield on it, as this was - the name of our ship before it was changed to _Sheaf Mead_ last - January.” - -In the last paragraph: - - “She had cut-away bows, but I did notice a net-cutter. Two men - stood at the side with boat-hooks to keep us off. - - “They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us - in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing. - Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any - assistance whatever.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any suggestion in the German report that any -warning was given? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord. It is quite clear, indeed, that it was -not. - -Under the time 1414 there is a description of the sighting of the ship -and the difficulty in identifying; and then at the top of the page: - - “The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in - quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern - yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also - prepared. On the ship’s side a yellow cross in a small, square, - dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope - a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an A/A gun or something - similar. Fire! It cannot miss. . .”—and then the sinking. - -Now that it is possible to examine some of the actual documents by which -the defendant and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in -disregard of international law, you may think the compilers of the above -reports understated the case. These orders cover not only the period -referred to in the reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. -It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the defendants -progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of -international law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including -neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of -being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show -that the question of whether ships were defensively armed or outside the -declared operational areas was in practice immaterial. - -I go to the next document in the document book, C-191, which I put in as -Exhibit GB-193. That is a memorandum by the German naval war staff, -dated 22 September 1939. It sets out: - - “Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to - sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights.” - -Reading from the third sentence: - - “In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as - the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way - that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political - situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, - U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters - where French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be - situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English - units are to be expected, the measures desired by Flag Officer - U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not - to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken - approval of the Naval Operations Staff. - - “U-boat commanders should be informed by word of mouth, and the - sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as - due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary - cruiser. In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have - received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without - lights.” - -Now I go to the next document, C-21, which I put in as Exhibit GB-194. -My Lord, this document consists of a series of extracts from the War -Diary of the German naval war staff of the German Admiralty. The second -extract, at Page 5, relates a conference with the head of the naval war -staff, report of the 2 January 1940, and then reading: - - “1) Report by Ia”—that is the Staff Officer Operations on the - naval war staff. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn’t you read above that, Paragraph 1/b? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases. It is important. The -others are much to the same effect. If I might read it: - - “Report by Ia.”—This is one report by Ia on the directive of - Armed Forces High Command of 30 December. - - “According to this, the Führer, on report of Commander-in-Chief - of the Navy, has decided: (a) Greek merchant vessels are to be - treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and - Britain; (b) in the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked - without warning. For external consumption these attacks should - be given out as hits by mines. Both measures may be taken with - immediate effect.” - -The next extract, a report by Ia, that is, the Staff Officer Operations -on the naval war staff on the directive of Armed Forces High Command, -dated 30 December: - - “Referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in - connection with ‘Fall Gelb’. - - “In consequence of this directive, the Navy is authorized, - simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, to - sink by U-boats, without any warning, all ships in those waters - near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this - case, for external consumption, pretence should be made that - mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, - U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.” - -And then the third extract, dated 6 January 1940: - - “. . . pursuant to the Führer’s consent on principle (see - minutes of report of Commander-in-Chief Navy of 30 December) to - authorize firing without warning while maintaining the pretence - of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockade - zone. . . .” - -Well, then the order is given to Flag Officer U-boats carrying out that -decision. - -The next extract, dated the 18th of January 1940, adds to some extent, -and if I may read it: - - “The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following - directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order - concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen. - - “The Navy is authorized, with immediate effect, to sink by - U-boats without warning all ships in those waters near the enemy - coasts in which the use of mines is possible.”—My Lord, that is - an extension of the area.—“U-boats must adapt their behavior - and employment of weapons to the pretence, which is to be - maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. - Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan, and Russia are - exempted from these attacks.” - -Well, then there is a note emphasizing the point about maintaining the -pretense of mine hits and the last extract is, I think, purely -cumulative. - -The next document, C-118, I put in as Exhibit GB-195. This is an extract -from the B.d.U. War Diary, that is to say the defendant’s war diary. It -is dated the 18th of July 1941, and it consists of a further extension -of that order by the cutting down of the protected categories. - - “Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being, - attacks on U.S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational - area of the North Atlantic, the Führer has ordered the - following: - - “1. Attacks on U.S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U.S. - convoys, or independently are authorized in the original - operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.S. - blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U.S. to - Iceland.” - -As the members of the Tribunal will have seen from these orders, at one -date the ships of a particular neutral under certain conditions could be -sunk while those of another could not. It would be easy to put before -the Tribunal a mass of orders and instances to show that the attitude to -be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals changed at various times. -The point is that the defendant conducted the U-boat war against -neutrals with complete cynicism and opportunism. It all depended on the -political relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a -particular time whether her ships were sunk or not. - -My Lord, I turn to the next document in the document book, D-642, which -I put in as Exhibit GB-196. My Lord, this is a series of orders; the -first, I should say, of a series of orders leading up to the issue of an -order which enjoined the U-boat commanders not merely to abstain from -rescuing crews, which is the purpose of this order, not merely to give -them no assistance but deliberately to annihilate them. - -My Lord, in the course of my proof of this matter, I shall call two -witnesses. The first witness will give the Court an account of a speech -made by the defendant at the time that he issued the order describing -the policy, or his policy toward the recovery of Allied troops: that it -must be stopped at all costs. - -The second witness is the officer who actually briefed crews on the -order. - -My Lord, this document is an extract from the standing orders of the -U-boat command, an extract from Standing Order Number 154, and it is -signed by the defendant: - - “Paragraph e) Do not pick up men or take them with you. Do not - worry about the merchant ship’s boats. Weather conditions and - distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own - ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as - possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war - in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that order, the copy we have, is not dated, -but a later order, Number 173, which was issued concurrently with an -operational order, is dated the 2d of May 1940. The Tribunal may take -it, it is earlier than the 2d of May 1940. My Lord, that is a secret -order. - -THE PRESIDENT: Earlier than May 1940? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Earlier than May 1940. - -It was, however, in 1942, when the United States entered the war with -its enormous shipbuilding capacity, that the change thus brought about -necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-boats -and of the defendant; and the defendant was guilty of an order which -intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the -abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination. - -My Lord, the next document in the document book shows the course of -events, Document D-423, and I put it in as Exhibit GB-197. It is a -record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador -Oshima, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop, on the 3 of January -1942. - - “The Führer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador - the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, - emphasizing that what he considers his most important task is to - get the U-boat warfare going in full swing. The U-boats are - being re-organized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-boats - operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now - be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off - Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown.” - -And then, after further details: - - “After having given further explanations on the map, the Führer - pointed out that, however many ships the United States built, - one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For - that reason even merchant ships would be sunk without warning - with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. - Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the - sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in - enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes - a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our - attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason - he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be - taken prisoner, which is in most cases not possible on the sea, - U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the - lifeboats. - - “Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Führer’s comments, - and said that the Japanese, too, are forced to follow these - methods.” - -My Lord, the next document, D-446, I put in as Exhibit GB-198. I do not -propose to read it. It is an extract from B. d. U. War Diary of the 16th -of September 1942; and it is part of the story in the sense that it was -on the following day that the order I complain of was issued, and the -Defense will, no doubt, wish to rely on it. It records an attack on a -U-boat which was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of -the Allied liner _Laconia_, when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft. - -My Lord, the next document, D-630, I put in as Exhibit GB-199. It -contains four documents. The first is a top secret order, sent to all -commanding officers of U-boats from the defendant’s headquarters, dated -17th of September 1942: - - “1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of - ships sunk; and this includes picking up persons in the water - and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and - handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the - rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy - ships and crews. - - “2. Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still - apply. - - “3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of - importance to your boat. - - “4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of - women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.” - -Now, My Lord, that is, of course, a very carefully worded order. Its -intentions are made very clear by the next document on that same page, -which is an extract from the defendant’s war diary; and I should say -there, as appears from the copy handed in to the Court, the war diary is -personally signed by the Defendant Dönitz. It is the war diary entry for -the 17th of September 1942: - - “The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn”—and I - would draw the Tribunal’s attention to the word “again”—“to the - fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships - which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for - the conduct of warfare for annihilating enemy ships and their - crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the captains and - chief engineers still stand.” - -The last two documents on that page consist of a telegram from the -commander of the U-boat _Schacht_ to the defendant’s headquarters and -the reply. _Schacht_ had been taking part in the rescue of survivors -from the _Laconia_. The telegram from _Schacht_, dated the 17th of -September 1942, reads: - - “163 Italians handed over to _Annamite_. Navigating officer of - _Laconia_ and another English officer on board.” - -And then it goes on setting out the position of English and Polish -survivors in boats. - -The reply sent on the 20th: - - “Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was - wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for - the rescue of English and Poles.” - -It is a small point, but of course “detailed” means before the bombing -incident had ever occurred. - -And then as for the next document, D-663, that was issued later and may -not yet have been inserted in the Tribunal’s Document Book; D-663 I put -in as Exhibit GB-200. My Lord, this is an extract from an operation -order, “Operation Order Atlantic Number 56,” dated the 7th of October -1943, and the copy put in is part of sailing orders to a U-boat. As I -shall prove through the second witness, although the date of this order -is the 7th of October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an -order issued very much earlier, in the autumn of 1942. - - “Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to - every convoy, a special ship of up to 3,000 gross registered - tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after - U-boat attacks. These ships are for the most part equipped with - a shipborne aircraft and large motorboats, are strongly armed - with depth charge throwers, and are very maneuverable, so that - they are often taken for U-boat traps by the commander.” - -And then, the last sentence: - - “In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their - sinking is of great value.” - -If I might just sum up those documents, it would appear from the War -Diary entry of the 17th of September that orders on the lines discussed -between Hitler and Oshima were, in fact, issued, but we have not -captured them. It may be they were issued orally and that the defendant -awaited a suitable opportunity before confirming them. The incident of -the bombing of the U-boats detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from -the _Laconia_ afforded the opportunity and the order to all commanders -was issued. Its intent is very clear when you consider it in the light -of the War Diary entry. The wording is, of course, extremely careful but -to any officer of experience its intention was obvious and he would know -that deliberate action to annihilate survivors would be approved under -that order. - -You will be told that this order, although perhaps unfortunately -phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his -ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous, as -a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and -that the notorious action of the U-boat Commander Eck in sinking the -Greek steamer _Peleus_ and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts -in the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a -copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as he -himself swore, on his own initiative. - -I would make the point to the Tribunal that if the intention of this -order was to stop the rescue attempts in the interests of the -preservation of the U-boat, first of all it would have been done by -calling attention to Standing Order 154. - -Second, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the order. -Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced staff -officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible capture -by the enemy. - -Third, if it was necessary to avoid the risks attendant on standing by -or surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there would have -been no question of taking any prisoners at all except possibly in -circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be -apprehended. - -Fourth, the final sentence of the first paragraph would have read very -differently. - -And fifth, if, in fact—and the Prosecution do not for one moment accept -it—the defendant did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was so worded -that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to such a -document. - -My Lord, I would call my first witness, Peter Heisig. - -[_The witness, Peter Josef Heisig, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -PETER JOSEF HEISIG (Witness): My name is Peter Josef Heisig. - -THE PRESIDENT: Say this: “I swear by God—the Almighty and -Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold nothing -and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Peter Josef Heisig, are you an Oberleutnant zur See in -Germany? - -HEISIG: I am Oberleutnant zur See in the German Navy. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And were you captured on the 27th of December 1944, and -now held as a prisoner of war? - -HEISIG: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you swear an affidavit on the 27th of November -1945? - -HEISIG: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And is that your signature? [_Document D-566 was -submitted to the witness._] - -My Lord, that is the Document D-566. - -HEISIG: That is the document I signed. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I put that in as Exhibit GB-201. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Will you take your mind back to the autumn -of 1942? What rank did you hold at that time? - -HEISIG: I was senior midshipman at the 2d U-boat Training Division. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Were you attending a course there? - -HEISIG: I took part in the training course for U-boat officers of the -watch. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember the last day of the course? - -HEISIG: On the last day of the course, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was then -Commander-in-Chief of the U-boats, reviewed the 2d U-boat Training -Division. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And what happened at the end of this tour? - -HEISIG: At the end of his visit—not at the end but rather during his -visit—Grossadmiral Dönitz made a speech before the officers of the 2d -U-boat Training Division. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you fix the date of his visit? - -HEISIG: I remember the approximate date; it must have been at the end of -September or the beginning of October 1942. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, will you give the Tribunal—speaking slowly—an -account of what Admiral Dönitz said in his speech? - -HEISIG: Grossadmiral Dönitz said in his speech that the successes of the -U-boats had declined. The strength of enemy air control was responsible -for that decline. New antiaircraft guns had been developed which would -in future make it possible for the U-boats to fight off enemy aircraft. -Hitler had personally given him the assurance that U-boats would be -equipped with these antiaircraft guns before all other branches of the -Armed Forces. It could be expected therefore that the successes of -former times would be reached again within a few months. After speaking -about his good relations with Hitler, Grossadmiral Dönitz discussed the -German armament program. - -A question by an officer regarding a newspaper article which stated that -the Allied countries were building more than a million tons of merchant -shipping every month, Admiral Dönitz answered by saying that he doubted -the credibility of this estimate and said it was based on an -announcement by President Roosevelt. He then spoke briefly about -President Roosevelt, about the American production program and armament -potential, and added that the Allies had great difficulty in manning -their ships. Allied seamen considered the route across the Atlantic -dangerous, because German U-boats were sinking Allied ships in great -numbers. Many of the Allied seamen had been torpedoed more than once; -these facts spread and make the seamen reluctant to go to sea again. -Some of them were even trying to shirk a crossing of the Atlantic, so -that the Allied authorities were compelled, if it became necessary, to -retain the men aboard by force of law. Such indications were favorable -to the Germans. From the facts that, firstly, the Allies were building -very many new merchant ships and, secondly, that the Allies were having -considerable difficulties in manning these newly built ships, Admiral -Dönitz concluded that the question of personnel was a very grave matter -for the Allies. The losses in men affected the Allies especially -seriously, because they had few reserves and also because. . . - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t want to interrupt you, but did he say anything -about rescues at all? You have told us about the Allied losses and how -serious they were. - -HEISIG: Yes, he mentioned rescues, but I would like to speak about that -later. - -Grossadmiral Dönitz said that the losses of the Allies affected them -very seriously, because they had no reserves and also because the -training of new seamen required a very long time. He could not, -therefore, understand it, if submarines were still. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, just a moment. I don’t think we want -to hear the whole of Admiral Dönitz’ speech. We want to hear the -material part of it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE [_to the witness._]: Now, you have dealt with the -question of losses. Will you come to the crucial part of the speech, at -the end, and deal with that? What did the Grand Admiral go on to say? - -DR. THOMA: The testimony of the witness does not concern me directly, -but I have an objection to raise. According to German law and according -to the German Code of Criminal Procedure, the witness must say -everything he knows about a matter. If he is asked about a speech of -Grossadmiral Dönitz, he must not, at least according to German law, -relate only those parts which, in the opinion of the Prosecution, are -unfavorable to the defendant. I believe this principle should also apply -in these proceedings, whenever a witness is questioned. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is not bound by German law. I have already -said that the Tribunal does not desire to hear from this witness all of -Admiral Dönitz’ speech. - -It will be open to any of the counsel for the defendants to -cross-examine this witness. Your intervention is therefore entirely -unnecessary. - -COL. PHILLIMORE [_to the witness._]: Now, will you deal with the crucial -parts of the Grand Admiral’s speech? - -HEISIG: Grossadmiral Dönitz continued, saying approximately that under -the circumstances he could not understand how German U-boats could still -rescue the crews of the merchant ships they had sunk, thereby -endangering their own ships. By doing that, they were working for the -enemy, since these rescued crews would sail again on new ships. - -The stage had now been reached in which total war had to be waged also -at sea. The crews of ships, like the ships themselves, were a target for -the U-boats; thus it would be impossible for the Allies to man their -newly-built ships; and moreover it could then be expected that in -America and the other Allied countries a strike would break out, for -already a part of the seamen did not want to go back to sea. - -These results could be expected if our tactics would render the war at -sea more vigorous. If any of us consider this war or these tactics harsh -we should also remember that our wives and our families at home are -being bombed. - -That, in its main points, was the speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, about how many officers were present and heard -that speech? - -HEISIG: I have no experience in fixing the number of people present at -large indoor gatherings. I can only give you a rough estimate: -approximately 120 officers. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the witness is available for -cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States prosecutor wish to ask any -question? - -[_There was no response._] - -The Soviet prosecutor? - -[_There was no response._] - -The French prosecutor? - -[_There was no response._] - -Now, any of the defendants’ counsel may cross-examine the witness. - -FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I -represent Grossadmiral Dönitz. - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel will understand that what I said to Dr. Thoma was -not intended to interfere with your cross-examination; it was only -intended to save time. The Tribunal did not desire to hear unimportant -passages in the Defendant Dönitz’ speech. Therefore, they did not want -to hear them from this witness. However, you are at liberty to ask any -questions that you please. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Oberleutnant Heisig, did you yourself take -part in an action against the enemy? - -HEISIG: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On which boat were you, and who was your -commander? - -HEISIG: I was on U-877, under Kapitänleutnant Finkeisen. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please repeat your answer. - -HEISIG: I served on U-877 in an action against the enemy, and the -commander was Kapitänleutnant Finkeisen. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you successful in action against enemy -ships? - -HEISIG: The boat was sunk on its way to the area of operations. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before you were able to sink an enemy ship? - -HEISIG: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How was the boat sunk? - -HEISIG: By depth charges. Two Canadian frigates sighted the U-boat and -destroyed it through depth charges. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your testimony today differs in an essential -point from the statement you made on the 27th of November. How did you -come to make this statement of the 27th of November? - -HEISIG: I made the statement in defense of my comrades who were put -before a military court in Hamburg and sentenced to death for the murder -of shipwrecked sailors. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your statement begins by saying that you had -received reports that German sailors were being accused of murder and -that you therefore considered it your duty to depose the following -affidavit. - -What reports had you received, and when? - -HEISIG: At the beginning of the Hamburg proceedings against -Kapitänleutnant Eck and his officers I was a prisoner of war in Great -Britain; there I heard on the radio and read in newspapers that these -officers were to be tried. Since I knew one of the accused officers, -Leutnant August Hoffmann, very well and had spoken with him on this -subject on two or three occasions, I considered it to be my duty to come -to his assistance and to his defense. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you not told in your interrogation on -the 27th of November that the death sentence against Eck and Hoffmann -had already been confirmed? - -HEISIG: That—I don’t remember whether it was on the 27th of November, I -only remember that I was told here that the death sentence had been -carried out. I no longer remember the date, as I was interrogated -several times. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since you have knowledge of the -circumstances, do you maintain that the speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz -mentioned in any way that fire should be opened on shipwrecked sailors? - -HEISIG: No; we gathered that from his words; and from his reference to -the bombing war, we gathered that total war had now to be waged against -ships and crews. That is what we understood, and I talked about it to my -comrades on the way back to the Hansa. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Speak slowly, please. - -HEISIG: We were convinced that Admiral Dönitz meant that. He did not -express it clearly. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you speak about this point with any of -your superiors at the school? - -HEISIG: I left the school on the same day. But I can remember that one -of my superiors, whose name to my regret I do not recall—nor do I -recall the occasion—once spoke to us about this subject and advised us -that, if possible, only officers should be on the bridge ready to -annihilate shipwrecked sailors, should the possibility arise, or should -it be necessary. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One of your superiors told you that? - -HEISIG: Yes, but I cannot remember in which connection and where. I -received a lot of advice from my superiors on many things. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it at the school? - -HEISIG: No; I left the U-boat Training Division on the same day. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you instructed at the school in the -standing orders of war? - -HEISIG: Yes; we were instructed in the standing orders of war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did these standing orders mention anywhere -that shipwrecked sailors were to be fired on or their rescue apparatus -destroyed? - -HEISIG: The standing orders did not mention that. But—I think one can -assume this from an innuendo of Captain Rollmann, who was then officers’ -company commander—a short time before that, some teletype message had -arrived containing an order prohibiting rescue measures and demanding -that sea warfare should be fought with more radical, more drastic means. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you think that the prohibition of rescue -measures is identical with the shooting of shipwrecked sailors? - -HEISIG: We came to this. . . - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please, answer my question. Do you think -these two things are identical? - -HEISIG: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I am afraid the Tribunal will have to adjourn -now; and I have an announcement to make. You may cross-examine tomorrow. - -DR. THOMA: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: As I have already said, the Tribunal will not sit in open -session this afternoon. - -The announcement that I have to make is in connection with the -organizations which are alleged to be criminal under Article 9 of the -Charter, and this is the announcement: - -The Tribunal has been giving careful consideration to the duty imposed -upon it by Article 9 of the Charter. - -It is difficult to determine the manner in which the representatives of -the named organizations shall be permitted to appear in accordance with -Article 9, without considering the exact nature of the case presented -for the Prosecution. - -For this reason, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that, at this -stage of the Trial, with many thousands of applications being made, the -case for the Prosecution should be defined with more precision than -appears in the Indictment. - -In these circumstances, therefore, it is the intention of the Tribunal -to invite argument from the Counsel for the Prosecution and for the -Defense, at the conclusion of the case by all prosecutors, in regard to -the questions hereinafter set forth. - -The questions which need further consideration are as follows: - -1. The Charter does not define a criminal organization, and it is -therefore necessary to examine the tests of criminality which must be -applied and to decide the nature of the evidence to be admitted. - -Many of the applicants who have made requests to be heard assert that -they were conscripted into the organization, or that they were ignorant -of the criminal purposes of the organization, or that they were innocent -of any unlawful acts. - -It will be necessary to decide whether such evidence ought to be -received to rebut the charge of the criminal character of the -organization, or whether such evidence ought more properly to be -received at the subsequent trials under Article 10 of the Charter, when -the organizations have been declared criminal, if the Tribunal so -decides. - -2. The question of the precise time within which the named organization -is said to have been criminal is vital to the decision of the Tribunal. - -The Tribunal desires to know from the Prosecution at this stage whether -it is intended to adhere to the limits of time set out in the -Indictment. - -3. The Tribunal desires to know whether, in the light of the evidence, -any class of persons included within the named organizations should be -excluded from the scope of the declaration, and which, if any. - -In the indictment of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the -Prosecution have reserved the right to request that Politische Leiter of -subordinate grades or ranks, or of other types or classes, be exempted -from further proceedings without prejudice to other proceedings or -actions against them. - -Is it the intention of the Prosecution to make any such request? If so, -it should be done now. - -4. The Tribunal would be glad if the Prosecution would also: - -(a) Summarize in respect of each named organization the elements which -in their opinion justify the charge of being a criminal organization. - -(b) Indicate what acts on the part of individual defendants, indicted in -this Trial—in the sense used in Article 9 of the Charter—justify -declaring the groups or organizations of which they are members to be -criminal organizations. - -(c) Submit in writing a summary of proposed findings of fact as to each -organization, with respect to which a finding of criminality is asked. - -The Tribunal hopes it is not necessary to say to the Prosecution that it -is not seeking to interfere with the undoubted right of the Prosecution -to present its case in its own way, in the light of the full knowledge -of all the documents and facts which it possesses, but the duty of the -Tribunal under Article 9 of the Charter makes it essential at this time -to have the case clearly and precisely defined. - -This announcement will be communicated to the Chief Prosecutors and to -Defense Counsel in writing. - -The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-FOURTH DAY - Tuesday, 15 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Counsel for the Defense wish to -cross-examine this witness? [_Referring to Peter Josef Heisig, -interrogated the previous day._] - -[_There was no response._] - -Then, Colonel Phillimore, do you wish to re-examine? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord; I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can go. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Before I call my second witness, Karl Heinz Moehle, an -affidavit by him is the next document in the document book. - -[_Karl Heinz Moehle took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -KARL HEINZ MOEHLE (Witness): Karl Heinz Moehle. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty -and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and -add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down, if you wish. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Karl Heinz Moehle, you held the rank of -Korvettenkapitän in the German Navy? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You served in the German Navy since 1930? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what decorations you hold? - -MOEHLE: I received the Submarine War Medal; the Iron Cross, Second -Class; the Iron Cross, First Class; the Knight’s Cross; the War Service -Cross, First and Second Class; and the German Cross in Silver. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you swear to an affidavit covering a statement you -have made on the 21st of July 1945? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I made such a statement. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you that document and ask you to say whether -that is your affidavit. - -[_Document 382-PS was submitted to the witness._] - -MOEHLE: Yes, this is my affidavit. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I put that document in, which is 382-PS, and it becomes -Exhibit GB-202. - -[_Turning to the witness._] In the autumn of 1942 were you head of the -5th U-boat Flotilla? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Were you stationed at Kiel? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: How long did you hold that appointment altogether? - -MOEHLE: For 4 years. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that from June 1941 until the capitulation? - -MOEHLE: That is correct. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What were your duties as commander of that flotilla? - -MOEHLE: My main duties as Flotilla Commander consisted of the fitting -out of U-boats which were to be sent to the front from home bases, and -giving them the orders of the U-boat command. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any special responsibility to U-boat commanders -in respect of the orders? - -MOEHLE? Yes, Sir; it was my responsibility to see that outgoing U-boats -were provided with the new orders of the U-boat command. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any responsibility in explaining the orders? - -MOEHLE: The orders of the U-boat command were always very clear and -unambiguous. If there were any ambiguities I used to have these -ambiguities cleared up myself at the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of -U-boats. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you personally see commanders before they went out -on patrol? - -MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before leaving for an operational cruise -went through a so-called commander’s briefing. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will go back, if I may, for two or three questions. -Did you personally see commanders before they went out on patrol? - -MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before sailing on a mission went through a -briefing session at my office. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And what did that briefing session consist of? Were -there any questions on the orders? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir, all experiences of previous patrols and any questions -of the ship’s equipment were discussed with the commander at that -session. Also, the commanders had an opportunity at the briefing to -clarify any uncertainties, which might have existed in their minds, by -asking questions. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Apart from your briefing sessions, did commanders also -go to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters for briefing? - -MOEHLE: As far as that was possible it was done, especially from the -moment when the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats had transferred his office -from Paris to Berlin. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order in the autumn of 1942 dealing -with lifeboats? - -MOEHLE: Yes. In September 1942 I received a wireless message addressed -to all commanders at sea, and it dealt with that question. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you this document. - -My Lord, that is the exhibit I have already put in as GB-199. - -THE PRESIDENT: What other number has it? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It is Document D-630. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Is that the order you are referring to? - -MOEHLE: Yes, that is the order. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: From the time when you were captured until last Friday -had you seen that order? - -MOEHLE: No, Sir. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It follows, I think, that the account of the order in -your statement was given from recollection? - -MOEHLE: Yes, only from recollection. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, after you got that order did you go to Admiral -Dönitz’ headquarters? - -MOEHLE: Yes, at my first visit to headquarters after receipt of the -order, I personally discussed it with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch who -was a specialist on the staff of the U-boat command. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what was said at that -meeting? - -MOEHLE: At that meeting I asked Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch how the -ambiguity contained in that order—or I might say, lack of -clarity—should be understood. He explained the order by two -illustrations. - -The first example was that of a U-boat in the outer Bay of Biscay. It -was sailing on patrol when it sighted a rubber dinghy carrying survivors -of a British plane. The fact that it was on an outgoing mission, that -is, being fully equipped, made it impossible to take the crew of the -plane on board, although, especially at that time, it appeared -especially desirable to bring back specialists in navigation from -shot-down aircraft crews to get useful information from them. The -commander of the U-boat made a wide circle around this rubber boat and -continued on his mission. When he returned from his mission he reported -this case to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats. The staff -officers reproached him, saying that, if he were unable to bring these -navigation specialists back with him, the right thing to do would have -been to attack that crew, for it was to be expected that, in less than -24 hours at the latest, the dinghy would be rescued by British -reconnaissance forces, and they. . . - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t quite get what you said would have been the -correct action to take. You were saying the correct thing to do would -have been. . . - -MOEHLE: The right thing to do would have been to attack the air crew as -it was not possible to bring back the crew or these specialists, for it -could be expected that that crew would be found and rescued within a -short time by British reconnaissance forces, and in given circumstances -might again destroy one or two German U-boats. - -The second example. . . - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did he give you any second example? - -MOEHLE: Yes, the second example I am going to recount now. - -Example 2. During the first month of the U-boat warfare against the -United States a great quantity of tonnage—I do not recollect the exact -figure—had been sunk in the shallow waters off the American coast. In -these sinkings the greater part of the crews were rescued, because of -the close proximity of land. That was exceedingly regrettable, as to -merchant shipping not only tonnage but also crews belong, and in the -meantime these crews were again able to man newly-built ships. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You have told us about the ambiguity of the order. Are -you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz worded his orders? - -MOEHLE: I do not quite understand the question. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz normally -worded his orders? - -MOEHLE: Yes. In my opinion, the order need only have read like this: It -is pointed out anew that rescue measures have to be discontinued for -reasons of safety for the submarines. This is how, I think, the order -should have been worded—if only rescue measures had been forbidden. -All. . . - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that if it had been intended only to -prohibit rescue measures it would have been sufficient to refer to the -previous order? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; that would have been enough. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that previous order also marked “top secret”? - -MOEHLE: I do not remember that exactly. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the propaganda at the time with regard to -crews? - -MOEHLE: The propaganda at that time was to the effect that the enemy was -having great difficulty in finding sufficient crews for his merchant -marine and. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The question as to the propaganda at that time is too -general a question for him to answer. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Honor pleases, I don’t press it. - -[_Turning to the witness._] From your knowledge of the way orders were -worded, can you tell the Tribunal what you understood this order to -mean? - -MOEHLE: The order meant, in my own opinion, that although rescue -measures remained prohibited, on the other hand it was desirable in the -case of sinkings of merchantmen that there should be no survivors. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And was it because you understood this to be the -meaning that you went to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters? - -MOEHLE: I did not go to the headquarters of the U-boat command on -account of this order alone; these visits took place at frequent -intervals in order to discuss other questions also and to have the -opportunity of keeping constantly in touch with the views and opinions -of the U-boat command, as I had to transmit them to the commanders. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: How did you brief commanders on this order? - -MOEHLE: At these briefing sessions I read the wording of the wireless -message to the commanders without making any comment. In a very few -instances some commanders asked me about the meaning of the order. In -such cases I gave them the two examples that headquarters had given to -me. However, I added, “U-boat command cannot give you such an order -officially; everybody has to handle this according to his own -conscience.” - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order about rescue ships? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you say what the date of that order was? - -MOEHLE: I do not remember the exact date, but I think it must have been -about the same as the order of September 1942. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: May the witness see the Document D-663 which I put in -yesterday? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It is the German copy of the document that I am showing -him; the original is being held. - -[_Document D-663 was submitted to the witness._] - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I recognize that order. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You will note that the date on that document is the 7th -of October 1943. - -MOEHLE: Yes, this order is laid down there in the general Operational -Order Atlantic Number 56. According to my recollection, this order was -already contained in the previous effective Operational Order Number 54, -that is in a wireless message containing practical experiences and -instructions. I cannot remember exactly. The date is October 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, is that order in the index here? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, that is the Document D-663, which I put -in yesterday as Exhibit GB-200. If it is omitted from the index, Your -Lordship will remember it is the document which, as I explained -yesterday, we just received. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where does it come in? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It comes in after D-630. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes. Thank you. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Your Lordship will remember the order; it deals with -rescue ships attached to convoys, and it was on the last sentence that I -relied. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I only wanted to get the words of it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, Sir. My Lord, also I have the original here now -and if it is thought necessary the witness can see it, but he has seen a -copy. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you remember an order about entries in -logs? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. At the time, the exact date I do not remember, it had -been ordered that sinkings and other acts which were in contradiction to -international conventions should not be entered in the log but should be -reported orally after return to the home port. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you care to say why it is that you are giving -evidence in this case? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; because when I was taken prisoner it was claimed that -I was the author of these orders, and I do not want to have this charge -connected with my name. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the witness is available for examination by my -colleagues and for cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any counsel for any defendant wish to ask the -witness any questions? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Lieutenant Commander Moehle, since when have -you been in the U-boat arm? - -MOEHLE: Since the end of 1936. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know Grossadmiral Dönitz personally? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since when? - -MOEHLE: Since October 1937. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you see him here in this room? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where? - -MOEHLE: To the left in the rear. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know Grossadmiral Dönitz as an -admiral to whom none of his flotilla chiefs and commanders could speak? - -MOEHLE: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Or was the opposite the case? - -MOEHLE: He could be approached by everybody at any time. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Have you yourself been a commander of a -U-boat? - -MOEHLE: Yes, on nine operations. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For how long? - -MOEHLE: From the beginning of the war until April 1941. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many ships did you sink? - -MOEHLE: Twenty ships. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After sinking ships, did you destroy the -rescue equipment or fire at the survivors? - -MOEHLE: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have an order to do that? - -MOEHLE: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had the danger passed for a U-boat after the -attack on a merchantman? - -MOEHLE: No; the danger to the U-boat does not end when the attack is -over. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why not? - -MOEHLE: Because in most instances when a ship is sunk, the ship is in a -position to send SOS messages and give its position, and thus bring -striking forces to attack the U-boat at the last minute. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is there a maxim in the U-boat arm that -fighting comes before rescuing? - -MOEHLE: I never heard of that rule put in that way. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Prior to the order of September 1942 did you -know of any other orders by which rescue work was prohibited if it -entailed danger to the U-boat? - -MOEHLE: Yes, but I do not know when and where this order was laid down. -It had been ordered that, as a matter of principle, the safety of one’s -own boat takes precedence. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this ordered only once, or in several -instances? - -MOEHLE: That I cannot say. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that the order of September 1942 -was given in consequence of an incident in which German U-boats, -contrary to orders, had undertaken rescue measures? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And the U-boats were then attacked by Allied -aircraft? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A minute ago you classified the order of -September 1942 as ambiguous, did you not? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You interpreted it to the commanders in the -sense that the order should include the destruction of rescue facilities -and of the shipwrecked crew? - -MOEHLE: No, not quite; I gave the two examples to the commanders only if -they made an inquiry and I passed them on in the same way as I had -received them from the Commander-in-Chief Submarine Fleet and they -themselves could draw that conclusion from these two examples. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In which sentence of the order do you see a -hidden invitation to kill survivors or to destroy the rescue facilities? - -MOEHLE: In the sentence. . . - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just a second, I shall read to you each -sentence of the order separately. - -MOEHLE: Very well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I read from the Document D-630: - - “1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of - ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water - and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and - handing over food and water. These are absolutely forbidden.” - -Do you see it in this sentence? - -MOEHLE: No. - - FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Rescue measures contradict the most - primitive demands of warfare that crews and ships should be - destroyed.” - -Do you see that in this sentence? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does that sentence contain anything as to -the destruction of shipwrecked persons? - -MOEHLE: No, of crews. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of the order is the phrase “Be -harsh.” Did you hear that phrase there for the first time? - -MOEHLE: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this phrase used by Commander-in-Chief -of U-boats to get the commanders to be severe themselves and to their -crews? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you discuss the order with Lieutenant -Commander Kuppisch? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that exactly? - -MOEHLE: As far as I can rely upon my recollection after such a long -time. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where did that conversation take place? - -MOEHLE: At the staff headquarters of the U-boat command, probably in -Paris. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What position did Lieutenant Commander -Kuppisch occupy at the time? - -MOEHLE: As far as I can remember, he was the man in charge of the Enemy -Convoys Department, but I could not say that with any certainty. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the superior officer of Lieutenant -Commander Kuppisch, Commander Hessler? - -MOEHLE: Superior officer? I would not say so, because Commander Hessler -was on the same level as Kuppisch, a departmental chief. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch’s superior -Admiral Goth? - -MOEHLE: Yes, in his capacity of Chief of Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you speak to Commander Hessler or -Admiral Goth or with the Grossadmiral himself with regard to the -interpretation to be given to the order of September? - -MOEHLE: Whether I spoke to Commander Hessler, I do not remember, but in -any case not to Admiral Goth or the Grossadmiral himself. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch had -told you about the opinion which was prevalent in the staff of the -U-boat command. - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With regard to the attitude towards the -aviators in the Bay of Biscay, did he tell you that it was the opinion -of the Grossadmiral himself? - -MOEHLE: I do not remember that. It is too far back. When explanations -were given at staff meetings of the U-boat command and an opinion was -expressed by a responsible departmental chief, we flotilla leaders -naturally took this to be the official opinion of the Commander-in-Chief -of the U-boat arm. Admiral Goth personally or the Commander-in-Chief of -the U-boat arm was only approached in cases where the departmental -chiefs refused to commit themselves definitely or to assume the -responsibility for an answer. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you not get to know that the story of -the airmen who had been shot down in the Bay of Biscay was in actual -fact just the opposite. . . - -MOEHLE: I do not understand. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I continue: That the commander was -reprimanded because he did not bring home these flyers even if it meant -breaking off his operation. - -MOEHLE: No, I do not know that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch tell you -in connection with that second example you mentioned, that the -shipwrecked or their rescue equipment off the American coast should have -been destroyed? - -MOEHLE: No; he only said it was regrettable that the crews had been -rescued. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And you concluded from that that it was -desired to have the shipwrecked killed? - -MOEHLE: I did not draw any conclusions at all from that for I passed on -these examples without any commentary. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know the standing orders of the -U-boat command? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do they contain the guiding principles of -U-boat warfare? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is there any order in the standing orders -directing or advising the killing of shipwrecked persons or the -destruction of rescue facilities? - -MOEHLE: As far as I know, no. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What grade of secrecy was attached to these -standing orders? - -MOEHLE: As far as I remember, top secret. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that in Standing Order 511 -the following was ordered. . . - -Mr. President, I read from an order which I shall submit in evidence -later on. I cannot do it now because I have not yet the original. - - “Standing Order of the U-boat Command Number 511; 20 May 1943; - taking on board of officers of sunken ships. - - “1. As far as accommodation facilities on board permit, captains - and chief engineers of sunken ships are to be brought in. The - enemy tries to thwart this intention and has issued the - following order: (a) masters are not allowed to identify - themselves when questioned, but should if possible use sailors - selected especially for this purpose; (b) crew has to state that - masters and chief engineers remained on board. - - “If in spite of energetic questioning it is not possible to find - the masters or the chief engineers, then other ships’ officers - should be taken aboard. - - “2. Masters and officers of neutral ships, which, according to - Standing Order Number 101, can be sunk (for instance, Swedish - ships outside Göteborg traffic), are not to be brought in - because internment of these officers would violate international - law. - - “3. In case ship officers cannot be taken prisoner, other white - members of the crew should be taken along as far as - accommodation facilities and further operations of the craft - permit, for the purpose of interrogation for military and - propaganda purposes. - - “4. In case of the sinking of a single cruising destroyer, - corvette, or escort vessel, try at all costs to take prisoners, - if that can be done without endangering the boat. Interrogation - of the prisoners at transit camps . . . can produce valuable - hints as to antisubmarine tactics, devices, and weapons used by - the enemy; the same applies to air crews of shot-down planes.” - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know that order? - -MOEHLE: Yes. The order seems familiar to me. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know the order 513? - - “Standing Order of U-boat Command; 1 June 1944; taking along of - prisoners. - - “1. Statements of prisoners are the safest and best source of - information regarding enemy tactics, weapons, location - appliances and methods. Prisoners from planes and destroyers may - be of the greatest importance to us; therefore, as far as - possible and without endangering the boat, the utmost is to be - done to take such prisoners. - - “2. As prisoners are extremely willing to talk when captured, - interrogate them at once on board. It is of special interest to - know the manner of locating U-boats by aircraft, whether by - radar or by passive location methods; for instance, by - ascertaining, through electricity or heat, the location of the - boat. Report prisoners taken as soon as possible in order to - hand them over to returning boats.” - -Do you know that order? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you not notice and try to clarify a -contradiction between these orders concerning the rescue of air crews in -every case and the story you passed on about the destruction of air -crews? - -MOEHLE: No; because in the order of September 1942 it also says that the -order about the bringing in of ships’ captains and chief engineers -remains in force. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you hear of any instance where a U-boat -brought in captains and chief engineers but shot the rest of the crew? - -MOEHLE: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that such -an order can be given—that is, that part of the crew should be rescued -and the rest of the crew should be killed? - -MOEHLE: No, Sir. One cannot make such an order. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever hear of any case where a U-boat -commander, on the basis of your briefings, destroyed rescue equipment or -killed shipwrecked persons? - -MOEHLE: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it permitted to attack neutral vessels -outside the fixed blockade zones? - -MOEHLE: Only in cases where they were not marked as neutrals according -to regulations. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Commander of the U-boat fleet -particularly severe in enforcing this order for the protection of -neutral ships? - -MOEHLE: As I know of no such cases, I cannot say anything on that -subject. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that the commanders were -threatened with court-martial if they did not obey the orders given for -the protection of neutrals? - -MOEHLE: Yes; I remember one case which happened in the Caribbean Sea. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember an order of 1944 directing -that neutral ships be stopped and searched? - -MOEHLE: Yes, it was ordered, but I do not remember the date, that -particular Spanish and Portuguese ships in the North Atlantic should be -stopped and searched. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you pass on that order to the -commanders? - -MOEHLE: As far as I recollect, this order was given in writing and was -contained in one of the official sets of orders. I passed on orders to -commanders only when they were not contained in a set of orders. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In passing that order on, did you make an -addition as to whether that order should be executed or not? - -MOEHLE: Yes, I remember that I said—when that order came by radio and -the commanders did not know of it yet—that they should be exceedingly -careful, when stopping neutrals, as there was always the danger that -also a neutral ship might disclose the position of the U-boat by radio. -Owing to the air superiority of the enemy in the North Atlantic, it -would always be safer or better not to be compelled to stop these ships. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had you orders from the Commander of the -U-boat fleet to make this additional remark? - -MOEHLE: As far as I remember, one of the departmental chiefs in the -U-boat command—I assume it was Commander Hessler—told me or took -particular care to point out that any stopping of ships, even neutrals, -involved considerable danger to the U-boat. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Because of the air patrol? - -MOEHLE: Because of the air patrol. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your attention has been called to the order -concerning the so-called rescue ships. - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that? - -MOEHLE: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these “rescue ships” recognized under -international law as hospital ships, with appropriate markings? - -MOEHLE: As far as I know, they were not. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What orders existed that hospital ships -should be protected? - -MOEHLE: Where these orders were laid down—whether in writing I do not -remember—I only know that the Commander of the U-boats fleet frequently -reminded the commanders of the absolute inviolability of hospital ships. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of any case in which a hospital -ship was attacked by a U-boat? - -MOEHLE: No; I don’t know of such a case. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the Commander of the U-boat fleet had -been interested in destroying helpless human beings in violation of -international law, the destruction of hospital ships would have been an -excellent means, don’t you think? - -MOEHLE: Without any doubt. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine this -witness? - -[_No response._] - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever save any of the survivors of the -vessels that you torpedoed? - -MOEHLE: I have not been in a position to do that due to the military -situation. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean to say it was dangerous to your boat -to do it? - -MOEHLE: Not only that. A great number of the ships which I sunk were in -a convoy or else there was a rough sea, so that it was impossible to -undertake any rescue measures owing to navigation conditions. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, do you want to re-examine? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have about three questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: [_Turning to the witness._] When you were a U-boat -commander yourself, what was the order with regard to rescue? - -MOEHLE: At the beginning of the war we had been told that the safety of -one’s own boat was the decisive thing, and that the boat should not be -endangered by rescue measures. Whether these orders already existed in -writing at the outbreak of the war I do not remember. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: When you got this order of the 17th of September 1942, -did you take it merely as prohibiting rescue or as going further? - -MOEHLE: When I received that order I noticed that it was not entirely -clear, as orders of the B. d. U. normally were. One could see an -ambiguity in it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You have not answered my question. Did you take the -order to mean that a U-boat commander should merely abstain from rescue -measures, or as something further? - -MOEHLE: I took the order to mean that something further was implied, -only it was not actually ordered but was considered desirable. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: The instance you were given about the Bay of Biscay, -had you any knowledge of the facts of that incident? - -MOEHLE: No, the circumstances of that case are not known to me. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What were the actual words you used when you passed -that order on to commanders? - -MOEHLE: I told the commanders in so many words: We are now approaching a -very delicate and difficult chapter; it is the question of the treatment -of lifeboats. The Commander of the U-boat fleet issued the following -radio message in September 1942—I then read the radio message of -September 1942 in full. For most of those present the chapter was -closed; no commander had any questions to ask. Explanations were not -given unless questions were asked. In some few instances the commanders -asked, “How should this order be interpreted?” Then as a means of -interpretation I gave the two examples which had been related to me at -the U-boat command and added, “Officially such a thing cannot be -ordered; everybody has to reconcile that with his own conscience.” - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember any comment being made by commanding -officers after you had read the order? - -MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. Several commanders, following the reading of this -radio message said, without making any further comment, “That is very -clear, but damned hard.” - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I would now put before the Tribunal two cases -where that order of the 17th of September 1942 was apparently put into -effect. The first case is set out at the next document in the document -book, which is D-645. My Lord, I put that document in and it becomes -Exhibit GB-203. It is a report of the sinking of a steam trawler, a -fishing trawler, the _Noreen Mary_, which was sunk by _U-247_ on the 5th -of July 1944. The first page of the document contains an extract from -the log of the U-boat. The time reference 1943 on the document is -followed by an account of the firing of two torpedoes which missed, and -then, at 2055 hours, the log reads: - - “Surfaced. Fishing Vessels. . . .”—bearings given of three - ships—“Engaged the nearest. She stops after 3 minutes.” - -Then there is an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and -then, the final entry: - - “Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern.” - -The Tribunal will notice there is no mention in the log of any action -against the torpedoed or the shipwrecked seamen. - -THE PRESIDENT: Why is it entered as 5. 7. 1943? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a typing error. I should have pointed it out. - -My Lord, the next page of the document is a comment on the action by the -U-boat command, and the last line reads: - - “Recognized success: Fishing vessel _Noreen Mary_ sunk by flak.” - -And then there is an affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deckhand -on board the _Noreen Mary_ at the time of the sinking. My Lord, reading -the last paragraph on the first page of the affidavit. He has dealt -earlier with having seen the torpedo tracks, which missed the trawler. -The last paragraph reads: - - “At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine - surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast - of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the - ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, - on a northwesterly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine - and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with - light airs.” - -My Lord, then there is an account of the firing in the next, paragraph, -and then, if I might read from the second paragraph, on Page 2. - -THE PRESIDENT: Why not read the first? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases: - - “When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the - conning tower. The skipper thought at first the submarine was - British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the - brake to take the weight off gear”—that is, the trawl—“and - increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine - chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds - killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck - and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started - using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from - which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and - stopping the ship. - - “By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but - four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round - ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both - guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the - time but did not catch fire. - - “The mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was - aft, but the mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the - attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the - waterline, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more port, - until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the - only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do - not know where the other three men had taken cover during this - time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the - water. - - “I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our - lifeboat which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top - of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately - steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired - directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their - intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained - there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after - which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine - had been firing her guns for a full hour.” - -My Lord, then the affidavit goes on to describe the deponent and others -attempting to rescue themselves and to help each other, and then they -were picked up by another trawler. - -The last paragraph on that page: - - “Whilst on board the _Lady Madeleine_ the second engineer and I - had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the second engineer - had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½ inches - long embedded in his body.” - -And there is a sentence on which I don’t rely, and the last sentence: - - “I had 14 shrapnel wounds.” - -My Lord, and then the last two paragraphs of the affidavit: - - “This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the - whalers _Sylvester_ (mined) and _New Seville_ (torpedoed), and - the trawler _Ocean Tide_, which ran ashore. - - “As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six - killed . . . two missing . . . two injured. . . .” - -My Lord, the next document, D-647, I put in as Exhibit GB-204. My Lord, -this is an extract from a statement given by the second officer of the -ship _Antonico_, torpedoed, set afire, and sunk, on the 28th of -September 1942, on the coast of French Guiana. The Tribunal will observe -that the date of the incident is some 11 days after the issue of the -order. My Lord, I would read from the words “that the witness saw the -dead,” slightly more than halfway down on the first page. An account has -been given of the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire: - - “. . . that the witness saw the dead on the deck of the - _Antonico_ as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; - that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and - that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from - the side of the _Antonico_ in order to avoid being dragged down - by the same _Antonico_ and also because she was the aggressor’s - target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to - see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the _Antonico_ lit - up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the - enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the - enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in - Number 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and - killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded - three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company - to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the - bullets: in so doing, they were protected and out of sight - behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even - so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the - witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from - the submarine. . . .” - -My Lord, I haven’t got the U-boat’s log in that case, but you may think -that, in view of the order with regard to entries in logs, namely that -anything compromising should not be put in, it would be no more helpful -than in the case of the previous incident. - -My Lord, the next Document, D-646(a), I put in as Exhibit GB-205. It is -a monitored account of a talk by a German naval war reporter on the long -wave propaganda service from Friesland. The broadcast was in English, -and the date is the 11th of March 1943. It is, if I may quote: - - “Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for - romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these - waters—dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the - colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a - U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. - Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of - the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a - decoy ship, the submarine steamed close, within 20 yards, when - hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the - Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There - remained only wreckage, lifeboats packed with men, and sailors - swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in - expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain - and America.” - -My Lord, the next page of the document I don’t propose to read. It is an -extract from the log of the U-boat believed to have sunk this ship. It -was, in fact, the _C. S. Flight_. - -My Lord, I read that because, in my submission, it shows that it was the -policy of the enemy at the start to seek to terrorize crews, and it is a -part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on -the destruction of seamen. - -If I might say so, in view of the cross-examination, the Prosecution do -not complain of rescue ships being attacked. They are not entitled to -protection. The point of the order was that they were to be given -priority in attack, and the order, therefore, is closely allied with the -order of the 17th of September 1942. In view of the Allied building -program, it had become imperative to prevent the ships being manned. - -My Lord, I pass to the period after the defendant had succeeded the -Defendant Raeder. My Lord, the next document is 2098-PS. It has been -referred to but not, I think, put in. I put it in formally as Exhibit -GB-206. My Lord, I won’t read it. It merely sets out that the Defendant -Raeder should have the equivalent rank of a minister of the Reich, and I -ask the Tribunal to infer that on succeeding Raeder the Defendant Dönitz -would presumably have succeeded to that right. - -THE PRESIDENT: This is from 1938 onward? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: From 1938 onward. - -The next document, D-648, I put in as Exhibit GB-207. It is an affidavit -by an official, or rather it is an official report certified by an -official of the British Admiralty. The certificate is on the last page, -and it sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings and -those present, on the occasion of meetings between the Defendant Dönitz -or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder -until the end. The certificate states: - - “. . . I have compiled from them”—that is, from captured - documents—“the attached list of occasions on which Admiral - Dönitz attended conferences at Hitler’s headquarters. The list - of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is - added when this information was contained in the captured - documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract - from the collective documents which I have examined, and which - are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London.” - -My Lord, I won’t go through the list. I would merely call the Tribunal’s -attention to the fact that either Admiral Dönitz or his deputy, -Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of these meetings; and that -amongst those who were also constantly there were the Defendants Speer, -Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, and Göring, and also Himmler or his -lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. - -My Lord, the inference which I ask the Tribunal to draw from the -document is that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, this defendant -was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all -decisions, major decisions of policy. - -My Lord, I pass to the next document, C-178. That has already been put -in as Exhibit Number USA-544. It is an internal memorandum of the naval -war staff, written by the division dealing with international law to -another division, and the subject is the order with regard to the -shooting of Commandos, of the 18th of October 1942, with which the -Tribunal are, I think, familiar. - -The point of the document is that some doubt appeared to have arisen in -some quarters with regard to the understanding of the order, and in the -last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested: - - “As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether - or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference - with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments - concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the - treatment of members of Commando units.” - -My Lord, whether that conference took place or not I do not know. The -document is dated some 11 days after this defendant had taken over from -the Defendant Raeder. - -But the next document in the book, D-649, which I put in as Exhibit -GB-208, is an instance of the Navy in July of that year—July -1943—handing over to the SD for shooting Norwegian and British naval -personnel whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order. My -Lord, it is an affidavit by a British barrister-at-law who served as -judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the -order. - -Paragraph 1 sets out that the deponent was judge advocate at the trial -of 10 members of the SD by a military court held at the law courts, -Oslo, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29 November 1945, and concluded its -sitting on Tuesday, 4 December 1945. - -My Lord, the next paragraph sets out who convened the court and the -names of the prosecuting and defending counsel, and the third paragraph -states: - - “The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that - they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in - violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the - killing of. . .” - -Then there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, -including one officer, and one leading telegraphist of the Royal Navy, -prisoners of war. I might read from Paragraph 4: - - “There was evidence before the court which was not challenged by - the Defense that Motor Torpedo Boat Number 345 set out from - Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of - making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian - coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The - persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the torpedo - boat.” - -Paragraph 5: - - “The Defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was - wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant - evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that - they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.” - -Paragraph 6: - - “On 27th July 1943, the torpedo boat reached the island of Aspo - off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day - the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a - German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral Von - Schrader, the admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to - the Bergenhus where they had arrived by 11 p. m. on 28th July. - The crew were there interrogated by Lieutenant H. P. K. W. - Fanger, a naval lieutenant of the Reserve, on the orders of - Korvettenkapitän Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval - Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon - the orders of the staff of the admiral of the west coast. - Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of the - intelligence branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the - members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of - war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in - writing to the Sea Commander Bergen, and in writing to the - admiral of the west coast. - - “7. The interrogation by the naval intelligence branch was - concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost - immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the - immediate orders of the Sea Commander Bergen, to - Obersturmbannführer of the SD Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at - that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This - followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral Von Schrader, at - which a copy of the Führer Order of 18 October 1942 was shown to - Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were - to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and - were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured - were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral Von Schrader told - Blomberg that the crew of this torpedo boat were to be handed - over, in accordance with the Führer Order, to the SD. - - “9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: You can summarize the rest, can’t you? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -My Lord, Paragraph 9 described the interrogation by officials of the SD, -and that these officials took the same views as the naval intelligence -officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; -that despite this they were taken out and shot by an execution squad -composed of members of the SD. Then there is a description of the -disposal of the bodies. - -My Lord, the last paragraph is perhaps important in connection with the -case against the Defendant Keitel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it. - - COL. PHILLIMORE: “11. It appeared from the evidence that in - March or April, 1945, an order from the Führer headquarters, - signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in - Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew - of Commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that - date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order - referred specifically to the Führer Order referred to above.” - -The member of the Tribunal will of course have noted the date; it was -time to put their affairs in order. - -My Lord, the next document, C-158, I put in as Exhibit GB-209. It -consists of two extracts from minutes of conferences on the 19th and -20th of February 1945, conferences between the Defendant Dönitz and -Hitler. If I might read the first and last sentence from the first -paragraph of the first extract: - - “The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should - renounce the Geneva Convention.” - -That is of course the 1929 prisoners-of-war convention. And the last -sentence: - - “The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to - consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion - as soon as possible.” - -Then the second extract—the Defendant Dönitz states his opinion in the -presence of the Defendant Jodl and the representative of the Defendant -Ribbentrop. It is the last two sentences on which I rely: - - “. . . On the contrary, the disadvantages”—that is, the - disadvantages of renouncing the convention—“outweigh the - advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the - Commander-in-Chief that this measure would bring no advantage. - It would be better to carry out the measures considered - necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with - the outer world.” - -My Lord, it is no small matter, that document, when one reflects that it -was to that convention that we owe the fact that upwards of 165,000 -British and 65,000 to 70,000 American prisoners of war were duly -recovered at the end of the war. And to advocate breaching that -convention, preferably without saying so, is not a matter to be treated -lightly. - -My Lord, the next document, C-171; I put in as Exhibit GB-210. It is -another extract from the minutes of a meeting between the Defendant -Dönitz and Hitler, on the 1st of July 1944. The extract is signed by the -defendant: - - “Regarding the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says - that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. - Court-martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the - names of such men are on everybody’s lips, whereas there is - silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their - lives in similar circumstances without court-martial - proceedings.” - -My Lord, the next document, C-195, I put in as Exhibit GB-211. It is a -memorandum signed by the defendant, dated late in 1944. There is no -specific date on the document, but it is late in 1944—in December, I -think, of 1944. The distribution on the third page includes Hitler, -Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force. - -My Lord, if I might read the second paragraph. He is dealing with the -review of German shipping losses: - - “Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties - by prisoners from the concentration camps, and as a special - measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, - especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert - coppersmiths from the reduced construction of locomotives to - shipbuilding.” - -Then he goes on to deal with sabotage, and the last two paragraphs on -that page are: - - “Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against - whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have - proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in - France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for - the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you need to read any more than that? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, no. The last sentence of the document in the -next page is Item 2 of the summing-up: - - “12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the - shipyards as additional labor (Security Service agrees to - this)”—that is the SD. - -My Lord, this man was one of the rulers of Germany, and in my -submission, that document alone is sufficient to condemn him. It was not -for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his lieutenants, Fegelein -and Kaltenbrunner, were present. - -My Lord, they were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of -battleships. It is clear, in my submission, from this document that this -defendant knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp -labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share -of that responsibility. - -My Lord, I pass to the last document, D-650, which I put in as Exhibit -GB-212. - -My Lord, this contains the orders issued by the defendant in April. The -document, in my submission, shows the defendant’s fanatical adherence to -the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a -hopeless war at the expense of human life and with the certainty of -increased destruction and misery to the men, women, and children of his -country. I read the last paragraph on the second page: - - “I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: - . . . that they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of - military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they - stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men - which endanger the following of this path.” - -Then he refers to an order. - - “I demand from senior commanders that they should take just as - ruthless action against any commander who does not do his - military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral - strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he - must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier - in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not - burdened with any task as a leader.” - -And then the last paragraph on that page, from a further order of 19th -of April, he gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be -promoted. - - “An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser - _Cormoran_, in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior - officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among - the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a - way that the guards did not notice this. This petty officer is - sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. - After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has - shown that he is fitted to be a leader.” - -My Lord, of course the point is not whether the facts were true or not, -but the type of order that he was issuing. My Lord, if I might just sum -up, the defendant was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service -officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day; he -was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the -German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he -who was chosen to succeed Hitler; not Göring, not Ribbentrop, not -Goebbels, not Himmler. He played a big part in fashioning the U-boat -fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to -plan and execute aggressive war, and we cannot doubt that he knew well -that these wars were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready -to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out: -Breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, where he might hope -to maintain that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and -did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action -only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally. - -My Lord, there can be few countries where widows or parents do not mourn -for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the callous -brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did -their work. - -My Lord, my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, now deals with the -Defendant Raeder. - -MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it -please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present to the Tribunal the -evidence against the creator of the Nazi Navy, the Defendant Raeder. The -allegations against him are set out in Appendix A of the Indictment at -Pages 33 and 34 (Volume I, Page 78), and the Tribunal will see that the -Defendant Raeder is charged with promoting and participating in the -planning of the Nazi wars of aggression; with executing those plans; and -with authorizing, directing, and participating in Nazi War Crimes, -particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare. - -At the outset the Tribunal may find it convenient to look at Document -2888-PS, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USA-13, -which the Tribunal will find at Page 96 of the document book. That is a -document which sets out the offices and positions held by the Defendant -Raeder. The Tribunal will see that he was born in 1876 and joined the -German Navy in 1894. By 1918 he had become commander of the cruiser -_Köln_. In 1928 he became an admiral, chief of naval command, and head -of the German Navy. In 1935 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In -1936, on Hitler’s 47th birthday, he became general admiral, a creation -of Hitler’s. In 1937 he received the high Nazi honor of the Golden Badge -of Honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the Secret -Cabinet Council. And in 1939 he reached the empyrean of Grossadmiral, a -rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal’s baton. In -1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which, as the -Tribunal will shortly see, was a kind of retirement into oblivion, -because from January 1943 on, as the Tribunal has heard, Dönitz was the -effective commander of the German Navy. - -In these eventful years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy from 1928 -to 1943 he played a vital role. I would like in the first instance to -draw the Tribunal’s attention to Raeder’s part in building up the German -Navy as an instrument of war to implement the Nazis’ general plan of -aggression. - -The Tribunal is by now familiar with the steps by which the small navy -permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously -expanded under the guidance of Raeder. I will do no more than to remind -the Tribunal of some of the milestones upon Raeder’s road to Nazi -mastery of the seas, which mercifully he was unable to attain. - -With regard to the story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of -the Treaty of Versailles, I would refer the Court to the Document C-156, -which is already before the Court as Exhibit Number USA-41 and which the -Tribunal will find at Page 26 of the document book. That document, as -the Tribunal will remember, was _A History of the Fight of the German -Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935_, which was published secretly by -the German Admiralty in 1937. The Tribunal will remember that that -history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty -was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own -legislature and at one stage its own Government. Their secret measures -of rearmament ranged from experimental U-boat and S-boat building to the -creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. I only -propose to trouble the Tribunal with a reference to the last paragraph -at Page 33 of the document book, which refers to the role of Raeder in -this development. It is an extract from Page 75 of this Document C-156, -and it reads: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral . . . Raeder, had - received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and - development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the - previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in - consideration of the Versailles Treaty.” - -As an illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament, I would remind -the Tribunal of the Document C-141, Exhibit Number USA-47, which is at -Page 22 of the document book. In that document Raeder states that: - - “In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the disarmament - conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat - half-flotilla—which in a few months will comprise new S-boats - of the same type—from appearing openly as a formation of - torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these - S-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed - us.” - -The next document, C-135, which will be Exhibit Number GB-213, and which -is at Page 20 of the document book, is of unusual interest because it -suggests that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was -already current in German military circles. This document is an extract -from the history of war organization and of the scheme for mobilization. -The German text of this document is headed “850/38,” which suggests that -the document was written in the year 1938. The extracts read: - - “Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for - mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a - very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a - theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time - . . . an ‘Assembling Order,’ and ‘Instructions for Assembling,’ - the forerunners of the present-day scheme for mobilization, also - an assembling organization and adaptable instructions for - assembling which were drawn up for each ‘A-year’ (cover-name for - mobilization year). - - “As stated, the ‘Assembling Organization’ at that time was to be - judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in - the form of men and materials. They provided nevertheless a - valuable foundation for the establishment of a war organization - as our ultimate aim.” - -Paragraph 2: - - “The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming - increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical - preparation for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a - purely German-Polish conflict. - - “The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of - Gdynia was made a basis; and the fleet on active service was to - be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be - indispensable to attain this strategic end; and the essential - coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and - Swinemünde, were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the - Reinforcement Plan was evolved.” - -If the Tribunal turns over the page to Paragraph 3, to the second -paragraph: - - “Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him - in 5 years, that is to say, by the 1st of April 1938, armed - forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of - political power.” - -Now that entry is a pointer to the fact that the Nazi seizure of power -in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. The -detailed story of this development has already been told by my American -colleague, Mr. Alderman; and I would simply refer the Court in the first -place to the Document C-189, Exhibit Number USA-44, which is at Page 66 -of the document book. In that document Raeder tells Hitler, in June -1934, that the German Fleet must be developed to oppose England and that -therefore from 1936 on the big ships must be armed with big guns to -match the British _King George_ class of battleship. It further, in the -last paragraph, refers to Hitler’s demand that the construction of -U-boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar -plebiscite. In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on -the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him -that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120 to 150 million -from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. The reference to that -is the Document C-190, Exhibit Number USA-45, at Page 67 of the document -book. The Tribunal may think that that proposed fraud upon the German -working people was a characteristic Nazi manifestation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? - -MAJOR JONES: If Your Lordship pleases. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the next document which I -desire to draw to the Tribunal’s attention is the Document C-23, Exhibit -Number USA-49, at Page 3 of the document book, which states that the -true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by 20 percent -the displacement reported to the British. That, I submit, is typical of -Raeder’s use of deceit. - -The next document to which I wish to refer briefly is C-166, Exhibit -Number USA-48, Page 36 of the document book. It is another such -deceitful document, which orders that auxiliary cruisers, which were -being secretly constructed, should be referred to as “transport ships.” - -Then there is the Document C-29, Exhibit Number USA-46, at Page 8 of the -document book, which is signed by Raeder and deals with the support -given by the German Navy to the German armament industry, and, I submit, -is an illustration of Raeder’s concern with the broader aspects of Nazi -policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German service -chiefs, and German armament manufacturers. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has that been put in before? - -MAJOR JONES: That has been put in before, My Lord, as Exhibit Number -USA-46. - -A final commentary on the post-1939 naval rearmament is the Document -C-155, at Page 24 of the document book, which is a new document and will -be Exhibit GB-214 and is a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated -11 June 1940. The original, which is now submitted to the Tribunal, -shows the very wide distribution of this letter. There is provision in -the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder’s is a -letter both of self-justification and of apology. The extracts read: - - “The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in - the Officers Corps are, for the time being, the torpedo - positions and the problem whether the naval building program, up - to autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war - as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been - laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats. . . . - - “If the opinion is voiced in the Officers Corps that the entire - naval building program has been wrongly directed and if, from - the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon - and after its consolidation on the large ships, I must emphasize - the following matters: - - “The building up of the fleet was directed according to the - political demands, which were decided by the Führer. The Führer - hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the - threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time - the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat - superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength - in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for - warfare on the High Seas. - - “The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the - expectation even of the Führer, into a war which it had to - accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The - result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis - should have been laid from the start on the building of the - U-boat arm appear to be right. I leave undiscussed how far this - development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, - training, and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in - any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German - Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and - necessary creation of an effective air force slowed down the - desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I - indicate, however, with pride, the admirable and, in spite of - the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic, - far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the - immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards - equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the - assumption of power. . . .” - -There is here, the Tribunal sees, no trace of reluctance in co-operating -with the Nazi program. On the contrary, the evidence points to the fact -that Raeder welcomed and became one of the pillars of Nazi power. And it -will now be my purpose to develop the relationship between Raeder, the -Navy, and the Nazi Party. - -The Prosecution’s submission is that Raeder, more than anyone else, was -responsible for securing the unquestioned allegiance of the German Navy -to the Nazi movement, an allegiance which Dönitz was to make even more -firm and fanatical. - -Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on the 2d of -August 1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when he and all the men -under him swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this -time to Adolf Hitler and no longer to the fatherland. The oath is found -in the Document D-481 at Page 101 of the document book. That will be -Exhibit GB-215, and it may be of interest to the Court to see what the -new oath was. The last paragraph reads: - - “The service oath of the soldiers of the armed forces: - - “‘I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the - Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme - Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I - will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.’” - -The Tribunal will see that for his fatherland Raeder substituted a -Führer. - -I am not proposing to take the Tribunal’s time with reiterating the -steps by which the German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest -alliance with the Nazi Party. I would remind the Court of facts of -history, like the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign under -which the German Fleet sailed and the wearing of the swastika on the -uniform of naval officers and men, which are facts which speak for -themselves. - -The Nazis for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder’s obeisance and -collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navy were widely -recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his 66th -birthday, the chief Party organ, the _Völkischer Beobachter_, published -a special article about him, to which I desire to draw the Tribunal’s -attention. It is at Page 100 of the document book; it is Document D-448, -Exhibit GB-216. It is a valuable summing-up of Raeder’s contribution to -Nazi development: - - “It was to Raeder’s credit”—writes the _Völkischer - Beobachter_—“to have already built up by that time a powerful - striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the - fetters of Versailles. - - “With the assumption of power, National Socialism began the most - fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German fleet. - - “The Führer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s - faithful services and unstinted co-operation, by appointing him - Grossadmiral on the 20th of April 1936.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it necessary to read the entire document? - -MAJOR JONES: I was going to turn to the last paragraph but one, My Lord, -which I think is helpful. - - “As a soldier and a seaman, the Grossadmiral has proved himself - to be the Führer’s first and foremost naval collaborator.” - -This, in my submission, is a summing-up of his status and position in -Nazi Germany. - -I now propose to deal with Raeder’s personal part in the Nazi -conspiracy. The evidence indicates that Raeder, from the time of the -Nazi seizure of power, became increasingly involved in responsibility -for the general policies of the Nazi State. - -Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a -member of the very secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was -founded on the 4th of April 1933. And thus, at an early date, he was -involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. The -relevant document upon that is Document EC-177, Exhibit Number USA-390, -at Page 68 of the document book, which I would remind the Tribunal -contains the classic Nazi directive: “Matters communicated orally cannot -be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva.” - -On the 4th of February 1938 Raeder was appointed to be a member of a -newly-formed secret advisory council for foreign affairs; and the -authority for that statement is Document 2031-PS at Page 88 of the -document book, which will be Exhibit GB-217. - -Three weeks after this a decree of Hitler’s stated that, as well as -being equal in rank with a cabinet minister, Raeder was also to take -part in the sessions of the Cabinet. That has already been established -in Document 2098-PS, which was submitted as Exhibit GB-206. - -In my submission, therefore, it is thus clear that Raeder’s -responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was -steadily developed from 1933 to 1938 and that in the course of time he -had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was, -indeed, very much a member of the inner councils of the conspirators -and, I submit, must carry with them the responsibility for the acts that -led to the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of war. - -As an illustration, I would remind the Tribunal that Raeder was present -at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention -of attacking neighboring countries. I refer the Tribunal to Document -386-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-25 and is found at Page 81 of the -document book, which the Tribunal will remember is the record of -Hitler’s conference at the Reich Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937 -about matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the -larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The document, which Mr. Alderman -submitted, establishes conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their -Crimes against Peace. - -Then there was the other conference of Hitler’s on the 23rd of May 1939, -the minutes of which are found in the Document L-79, Exhibit Number -USA-27, at Page 74 of the document book. That, the Tribunal will -remember, was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to -make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well -knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe. - -Now, those two were key conferences. At many, many others Raeder was -also present to place his knowledge and his professional skill at the -service of the Nazi war machine. - -His active promotion of the military planning and preparation for the -Polish campaign is by now well-known to the Tribunal, and I am not -proposing to reiterate that evidence again. Once the war did start, -however, the Defendant Raeder showed himself to be a master of the most -typical of the conspirators’ techniques, namely that of deceit on a -grand scale. There are few better examples of this allegation than that -of his handling of the case of the _Athenia_. - -The _Athenia_, as the Tribunal will be aware, was a passenger liner -which was sunk in the evening of the 3rd of September 1939, when she was -outward bound to America, about a hundred lives being lost. - -On the 23rd of October 1939 the Nazi Party paper, the _Völkischer -Beobachter_, published in screaming headlines the story, “Churchill Sank -the _Athenia_.” I would refer the Court to Document 3260-PS, at Page 97 -of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-218. And I would like the -Tribunal to look for a moment at the copy of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ -here, and see the scale with which this deliberate lie was perpetrated. -I have a photostat of the relevant page of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ -for that day. That is the third page and the Tribunal will see on this -front page, with the big red underlining, there are the words, “Now We -Indict Churchill.” - -The extract from the _Völkischer Beobachter_, which is at Page 97 of the -document book, reads as follows: - - “Churchill Sank the _Athenia_. The above picture”—and the - Tribunal will see it is a fine picture of this fine ship—“shows - the proud _Athenia_, the ocean giant, which was sunk by - Churchill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment - on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. - Why was the _Athenia_ silent? Because her captain was not - allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained - from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink - the ship through the explosion of a time bomb. He knew it well, - but he had to keep silent. Nearly 1,500 people would have lost - their lives if Churchill’s original plan had resulted as the - criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the 100 Americans - on board the ship would find death in the waves so that the - anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should - be directed against Germany, as the presumed author of the deed. - It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for - them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded - passengers. They were rescued by the freighter _City of Flint_, - and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard - boat _Gibb_ for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken - accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the - shades of those who lost their lives call him before the - tribunal of the world and ask the British people, ‘How long will - the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Great - Britain’s history, be held by a murderer?’” - -Now, in view of the maliciousness of this _Völkischer Beobachter_ -announcement and in fairness to the men of the British Merchant Navy, I -think it is proper that I should say, that contrary to the allegation in -this Nazi sheet, the _Athenia_ of course made repeated wireless distress -signals which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty’s -ship _Electra_, in escort, as well as by the Norwegian steamship _Knut -Nelson_ and the yacht _Southern Cross_. - -I shall submit evidence to the Tribunal to establish that, in fact, the -_Athenia_ was sunk by the German U-boat _U-30_. So unjustifiable was the -torpedoing of the _Athenia_, however, that the German Navy embarked upon -a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest -measures, in the hope of hiding this guilty secret. And for their part, -as the Tribunal has seen, the Nazi propagandists indulged in their -favorite falsehood of seeking to shift the responsibility to the -British. - -The captain of the _U-30_, Oberleutnant Lemp, was later killed in -action; but some of the original crew of the _U-30_ have survived to -tell the tale, and they are now prisoners of war. And so that the truth -of this episode may be placed beyond a peradventure, I submit to the -Tribunal an affidavit by a member of the crew of the _U-30_, as to the -sinking of the _Athenia_ and as to one aspect of the attempt to conceal -the true facts. - -I refer to Document C-654, Exhibit GB-219, at Page 106 of the document -book. The affidavit reads: - - “I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T, of the German - Navy and former member of the crew of the _U-30_, do solemnly - declare that: - - “1. I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta. - - “2. That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of - approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the - evening by the _U-30_. - - “3. That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, - approximately half an hour after the explosion, the commandant - called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship. - - “4. That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do - not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on - account of the position of the moon. - - “5. That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go - to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship. - - “6. That apart from myself, Oberleutnant Hinsch was in the tower - when I saw the steamer after the attack. - - “7. That I observed that the ship was listing. - - “8. That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was - launched. - - “9. That I myself observed much commotion on board the torpedoed - ship. - - “10. That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack. - - “11. That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes - were fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the - explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer. - - “12. That Oberleutnant Lemp waited until darkness before - surfacing. - - “13. That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939. - - “14. That Oberleutnant Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in - Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the - petty officers’ quarters where I was lying severely wounded. - - “15. That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the petty officers’ - quarters cleared in order to be alone with me. - - “16. That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under - oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing - concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the - _U-30_. - - “17. That this declaration under oath had approximately the - following wording: - - “‘I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in - secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the _U-30_, - regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my - memory all happenings of this day.’ - - “18. That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was - drawn up by the commandant in his own handwriting, with my left - hand very illegibly. - - “19. That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of - the _Athenia_ the idea came into my mind that the _U-30_ on the - 3 September 1939 might have sunk the _Athenia_, especially since - the captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration. - - “20. That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning - these events. - - “21. That due to the termination of the war I consider myself - freed from my oath.” - -Dönitz’ part in the _Athenia_ episode is described in an affidavit which -he has sworn, which is Document D-638, Exhibit GB-220, at Page 102 of -the document book. The affidavit was sworn in English, and I invite the -Tribunal to look at it and observe the addition in Dönitz’ handwriting -of four words at the end of the affidavit, the significance of which -will be seen in a moment. - -The Defendant Dönitz states: - - “_U-30_ returned to harbor about mid-September. I met the - captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as - the boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak - to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very - unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was - responsible for the sinking of the _Athenia_ in the North - Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions he had - been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant - cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had - torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the _Athenia_ from - wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed - merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my - instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant - cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I dispatched Lemp at - once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I - ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later in the - same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal - order from Kapitän zur See Fricke”—who was head of the - operations division of the naval war staff—“that: - - “Firstly, the affair was to be kept a total secret. - - “Secondly, the OKM considered that a court-martial was not - necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in - good faith. - - “Thirdly, political explanations would be handled by the OKM. - - “I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which - the Führer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the _Athenia_. - - “After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I - interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the - impression that, although he had taken reasonable care, he had - still not taken sufficient precaution to establish fully the - identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given - very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were - to be treated according to naval prize law before the occurrence - of this incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest, - as I felt certain that a court-martial would only acquit him and - would entail unnecessary publicity”—and then Dönitz had added - the words “and loss of time.” - -It is right, I think, that I should add the Dönitz’ suggestion that the -captain of the _U-30_ sank the _Athenia_ in mistake for a merchant -cruiser must be considered in the light of a document which Colonel -Phillimore submitted—the Document C-191, Exhibit GB-193, dated the 22 -of September 1939—in this period, which contained Dönitz’ order that -“the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as -due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.” - -Now, the _U-30_ returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. I submit -another fraudulent naval document, Document D-659, Page 110 of the -document book, which will be Exhibit GB-221, which is an extract from -the War Diary of the chief of U-boats, and it is an extract for the 27th -of September 1939. The Tribunal will see that it reads: - - “_U-30_ comes in. She had sunk: S. S. _Blairlogies_; S. S. - _Fanad Head_.” - -There is no reference at all, of course, to the sinking of the -_Athenia_. - -But perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode -was the forgery of the log book of the _U-30_, which was responsible for -sinking the _Athenia_; and I now submit that original log book to the -Tribunal as Document D-662, which will be Exhibit GB-222, and an extract -from the first and relevant page of it is found at Page 111 of the -document book. I would like the Tribunal to examine the original, if you -will be good enough to do so, because the Prosecution’s submission is -that the first page of that log book is a forgery, but a forgery which -shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. The Tribunal will -see that the first page of the text is a clear substitute for pages that -have been removed. The dates in the first column of that page are in -Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic looking page, and -throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. - -The Tribunal will also see that all reference to the action of the -sinking of the _Athenia_ on the 3rd of September is omitted. The entries -are translated on Page 111 of the document book for the Court’s -assistance. - -The log book shows that the position at 1400 hours, of the _U-30_ on the -3rd of September, is given as AL 0278, which the Tribunal will notice is -one of the very few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which -was, in fact, some 200 miles west of the position where the _Athenia_ -was sunk. The course due south, which is recorded in the log book, and -the speed of 10 knots—those entries are obviously designed to suggest -that the _U-30_ was well clear of the _Athenia’s_ position on the 3rd of -September. - -Finally, and most curiously, the Tribunal will observe that Lemp’s own -signature upon the page dealing with the 3rd of September differs from -the other signatures in the text. Page 1 shows Lemp’s signature with a -Roman “p” as the final letter of his name. On the other signatures, -there is a script “p,” and the inference I submit is that either the -signature is a forgery or it was made up by Lemp at some other, and -probably considerably later date. - -Now, in my submission, the whole of this _Athenia_ story establishes -that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even -before receiving Lemp’s reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly -denied the possibility that a German U-boat could be in the area -concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the -position of sinking of the _Athenia_, which Colonel Phillimore -introduced, have shown the utter dishonesty of these announcements; and -my submission upon this matter is this: Raeder, as head of the German -Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi -Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have -been party to the falsification published in the _Völkischer -Beobachter_, which was a wholly dishonorable attempt by the Nazi -conspirators to save their faces with their own people and to uphold the -myth of an infallible Führer backed by an impeccable war machine. - -The Tribunal has seen that truth mattered little in Nazi propaganda, and -it would appear that Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting -his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking -Norway and Denmark. With regard to that last matter—the invasion of -Norway and Denmark—I think it is hardly necessary that I should remind -the Tribunal of Raeder’s leading part in that perfidious Nazi assault, -the evidence as to which has already been presented. I think I need only -add Raeder’s proud comment upon those brutal invasions, which is -contained in his letter in Document C-155 at Page 25 of the document -book, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit GB-214. That -document, which is a letter of Raeder’s to the Navy, part of which I -have already read, states: “The operations of the Navy in the occupation -of Norway will for all time remain the grand contribution of the Navy to -this war.” - -Now, with the occupation of Norway and of much of Western Europe safely -completed, the Tribunal has seen that Hitler turned his eyes towards -Russia. Now, in fairness to Raeder, it is right that I should say that -Raeder himself was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to -dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. The documents show, however, -that Raeder approached the problem with complete cynicism. He did not -object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its -immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to it was its -untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further -afield. - -The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against -Russia is told in the Document C-170, at Page 37 of the document book, -which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-136. That -document consists of extracts from a German compilation of official -naval notes by the German naval war staff. - -The first entry, at Page 47 of the document book, which bore the date of -26 September 1940, which is at Page 11 of Document C-170, showed that -Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy in -which, of course, the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a -continental land policy. The entry reads: - - “Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme - Commander presents his opinion about the situation: The Suez - Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez, - advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. - The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. - Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is - questionable whether action against Russia from the north will - then be still necessary.” - -The next entry at Page 48 of the document book, for the 14th of -November: - - “Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Führer is ‘still - inclined’ to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme - Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the - victory over England, since there is heavy strain on German - forces and the end of warfare is not in sight.” - -Then there is the entry on Page 50 for 27 December 1940: - - “Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme - Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our - entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most - urgent need of the hour. On the one hand, England has gained - strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the - eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On - the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a - strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking - effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force - construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must - work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for the - Navy and Air Force, every dispersion of strength prolongs the - war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander - voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the - defeat of England.” - -At Page 52 of the document book, on the 18th of February 1941, there is -the entry: - - “Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of - Malta even before Barbarossa.” - -On the next page, on the 23rd of February, there is this interesting -entry: - - “Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that - seizure of Malta ‘is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the - execution of Barbarossa’”—which the Tribunal may think is a - sublime example of wishful thinking. - -The next entry, for the 19th of March 1941, which is at Page 54 of the -document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had begun to consider -what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. -There is the entry: - - “In case of Barbarossa, Supreme Naval Commander describes the - occupation of Murmansk as an urgent request of the Navy; Chief - of Supreme Command Armed Forces considers compliance very - difficult. . . .” - -In the meantime, the entries in this document show that Mussolini, the -flunky of Nazism, was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean -policy. I refer the Court to Page 57 of the document book, the entry for -the 30th of May. The word “Duce” is omitted from the first line, and the -entry should read: - - “Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall - 1941; 12 divisions needed for that. ‘This stroke would be more - deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’; Chief, - Naval Operations, agrees completely. . . .” - -And then, finally, the entry for the 6th of June, indicating strategic -views of Raeder and the German Navy at this stage, reads as follows. It -is at Page 58 of the document book: - - “Supreme Naval Commander with the Führer. Memorandum of the - Chief, Naval Operations: ‘Observation of the strategic situation - in the eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the - occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.’” - -A few sentences below: - - “The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive - aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved - into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area and - the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the - present favorable situation must take place with the greatest - acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened - her position in the Near East with help from the United States - of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that - the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly; but - demands, however, that the undertaking Barbarossa ‘which, - because of the magnitude of its aims, naturally stands in the - foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces - leadership,’ must under no circumstances ‘lead to an - abandonment, diminishing, or delay of the conduct of the war in - the eastern Mediterranean.’” - -So that Raeder was, throughout, seeking an active role for his Navy in -the Nazi war plans. - -Now, once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for -his Navy in the campaign against Russia; and the first naval operational -plan against Russia was a particularly perfidious one. I refer the -Tribunal to the Document C-170 which I have just been reading from, at -Page 59 of the document book. There the Tribunal will see an entry for -the 15th of June 1941: - - “On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations . . . use of arms - against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of the - Öland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless - destruction is to be aimed at.” - -The Defendant Keitel provided a characteristically dishonest pretext for -this action in his letter, the Document C-38, which is at Page 11 of the -document book and which will be Exhibit GB-223. The Tribunal sees that -Keitel’s letter is dated the 15th of June 1941: - - “Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the - Baltic Sea. - - “To: High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL). - - “Offensive action against submarines south of the line - Memel-southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot be - definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German - naval forces. - - “The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces - believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.” - -Now, that was on the 15th of June 1941, and the Tribunal will remember -that the Nazi attack on Russia did not take place until the 22d of June -of 1941. In the meantime Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as the 18th -of March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan -to seize Singapore. The relevant document is C-152, Exhibit GB-122, at -Page 23 of the document book. There is just one paragraph which I would -like to be permitted to read. The document describes the audience of -Raeder with Hitler on the 18th of March and the entries in it, in fact, -represent Raeder’s own views: - - “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, - since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole - English fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war - against Japan; inferiority of U.S. fleet _vis-à-vis_ the - Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, - but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she - will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England. - Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring - Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East - Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby - solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies). - - “Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She - can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as - possible.” - -The Japanese, of course, as events proved, had different ideas from -that. - -By the 20th of April 1941, the evidence is that Hitler had agreed with -this proposition of Raeder’s of inducing the Japanese to take offensive -action against Singapore. I refer the Tribunal again to the Document -C-170 and to an entry at Page 56 of the document book, for the 20th of -April 1941. A few sentences from that read: - - “Naval Supreme Commander with Führer. Navy Supreme Commander - asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit and evaluation of - Japanese-Russian pact. . . . Führer has informed Matsuoka ‘that - Russia will not be touched if she behaves in a friendly manner - according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for - himself.’ Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with - Germany and is to prevent Japan from advancing against - Vladivostok and to cause her to attack Singapore.” - -Now an interesting commentary upon this document is found in the -Document C-66, at Page 13 of the document book. The Document C-66 has -already been exhibited as GB-81. I would refer the Court to Paragraph 3 -at Page 13 of the document book. At that time the Führer was firmly -resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the -Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was -frequently changing; and there follows this interesting sentence: “The -communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure -and to ensure surprise.” - -The Axis partners were not even honest with each other, and this, I -submit, is typical of the kind of jungle diplomacy with which Raeder -associated himself. - -I now, with the Tribunal’s permission, turn from the field of diplomacy -to the final aspect of the case against Raeder, namely, to crimes at -sea. - -The Prosecution’s submission is that Raeder throughout his career showed -a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which -conflicted in the slightest with his intention of carrying through the -Nazi program of conquest. I propose to submit to the Tribunal only a few -examples of Raeder’s flouting of the laws and customs of civilized -states. - -Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in the most admirable fashion -in the Document UK-65, which the Tribunal will find at Page 98 of the -document book, and which will be Exhibit GB-224. Now that Document UK-65 -is a very long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German naval war -staff on the 15th of October 1939—that is to say, only a few weeks -after the war started. And it is a memorandum on the subject of the -intensification of the war at sea, and I desire to draw the Tribunal’s -attention to the bottom paragraph at Page 98 of the document book. It is -headed, “Possibilities of Future Naval Warfare”: - - “I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against - Great Britain: - - “Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means - at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success - can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea - communications wherever they are accessible to us, with the - greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut - off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to - consider the interests of neutrals in so far as this is possible - without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to - base all military measures taken on existing international law; - however, measures which are considered necessary from a military - point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from - them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered - by existing international law. In principle, therefore, any - means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance - should be based on some legal conception”—the nature of which - is not specified—“even if that entails the creation of a new - code of naval warfare. - - “The supreme war council . . . will have to decide what measures - of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been - decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, - in fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is to be - adhered to under all circumstances. Under no circumstances may - such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, - once it has been made, be dropped or released under political - pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World - War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must - be turned down. Even threats of further countries, particularly - of the United States, coming into the war, which can be expected - with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to - a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. - The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will - it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The - economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy - must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate - reorientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the - respective agreements with neutral states; for”—these are the - final words—“for this, strong political and economic pressure - must be employed if necessary.” - -I submit that those comments are most revealing; and the general -submission of the Prosecution is that as an active member of the inner -council of the Nazi State right up to 1943, Raeder, holding such ideas -as these, must share responsibility for the many War Crimes committed by -his confederates and their underlings in the course of the war. - -But quite apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder, there are -certain crimes which the Prosecution submits were essentially initiated -and passed down the naval chain of command by Raeder himself. - -I refer to the Document C-27, at Page 7 of the document book, which will -be Exhibit GB-225. Those are minutes of a meeting between Hitler and -Raeder on the 30th of December 1939. I will read with the Court’s -approval the second paragraph beginning: - - “The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff requests that full - power be given to the Naval Operations Staff in making any - intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war. - The Führer agrees in principle to the sinking without warning of - Greek ships in the American prohibited area and of neutral ships - in those sections of the American prohibited area in which the - fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol - Channel.” - -At this time, of course, as the Tribunal knows, Greek ships were also -neutral and I submit that this is yet another demonstration of the fact -that Raeder was a man without principle. - -This incitement to crime was, in my submission, a typical group effort, -because in the Document C-12, which is at Page 1 of the document book, -the Tribunal will see that a directive to the effect of those naval -views was issued on the 30th of December 1939 by the OKW, being signed -by the Defendant Jodl. And that Document C-12 will be Exhibit GB-226. It -is an interesting document. It is dated the 30th of December 1939, and -it reads: - - “On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of the - Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Führer and Supreme Commander - of the Armed Forces decided that: - - “1) Greek merchant ships in the area declared by England and the - U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels. - - “2) In the Bristol Channel all shipping may be attacked without - warning—where the impression of a mining incident can be - created. - - “Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.” - -Another example of the callous attitude of the German Navy, when it was -under Raeder’s command, towards neutral shipping, is found in an entry -in Jodl’s diary. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you should read the pencil note, oughtn’t -you? - -MAJOR JONES: The pencil note on the Document C-12 reads: - - “Add to 1): Attack must be carried out without being seen. The - denial of the sinking of these steamships, in case the expected - protests are made, must be possible.” - -As I was saying, My Lord, another example of the callous attitude of -Raeder’s Navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s -diary for the 16th of June 1942, at Page 112 of the document book, which -is Document 1807-PS, and will be Exhibit GB-227. This extract from -Jodl’s Diary is dated the 16th of June 1942 and it reads: - - “The Operational Staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May - for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The - SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian warships - and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture because defense - measures are still incomplete, because there is the possibility - of achieving surprise, and because Brazil is actually fighting - Germany at sea.” - -This, the Tribunal will see, was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl -Harbor” because the Tribunal will recollect that war did not in effect -break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22d of August 1942. - -Raeder himself also caused the Navy to participate in War Crimes ordered -by other conspirators, and I shall give one example only of that. - -On the 28th of October 1942, as the Document C-179, Exhibit USA-543, at -Page 63 of the document book shows, the head of the operations division -of the naval war staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler’s notorious -order of the 18th of October 1942 with regard to the shooting of -Commandos which in my submission amounted to denying the protection of -the Geneva Convention to captured Commandos. - -The Tribunal will remember the document is dated the 28th of October -1942, and it reads: - - “Enclosed please find a Führer order regarding annihilation of - terror and sabotage units. - - “This order must not be distributed in writing to officers below - the rank of a flotilla leader or a section commander. After - verbal notification to subordinate sections such officers must - hand this order over to the next higher section which is - responsible for its withdrawal and destruction.” - -What clearer indication could there be than the nature of these -instructions as to the naval command’s appreciation of the wrongfulness -of the murders Hitler ordered? - -THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MAJOR JONES: I have drawn the Tribunal’s attention to the circulation of -Hitler’s order to shoot Commandos. I now draw the Tribunal’s attention -to an example of the execution of that order by the German Navy during -the period when Raeder was its commander. - -My learned friend Mr. Roberts has already given the Tribunal an account -of a Commando operation of December 1942, which had as its objective an -attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The Tribunal will recollect that -the Wehrmacht account he quoted, Document UK-57, Exhibit GB-164, stated -that six of the 10 participants in that commando raid were arrested and -that all were shot on the 23 March 1943. In connection with that episode -the Prosecution has a further document throwing more light on this -Bordeaux incident and showing how much more expeditiously the Navy under -Raeder had implemented Hitler’s order on this particular occasion. I -draw the Court’s attention to Document C-176, at Page 61 of the document -book, Exhibit GB-228. - -That document consists of extracts from the war diary of Admiral -Bachmann, who was the German flag officer in charge of western France. -The first entry, at Page 61, is dated 10 December 1942 and reads: - - “About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the - Commander of the SD in Paris, SS Obersturmführer Dr. Schmidt, to - flag lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as - interrogation had not been concluded. . . . - - “After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff, the SD - had been directed to get approval direct from headquarters. - - “1820. SD, Bordeaux, requested Superior SD Office at Führer’s - headquarters to postpone the shooting for 3 days. Interrogations - continued for the time being.” - -The next day, 11 December 1942: - - “Shooting of two English prisoners was carried out by a unit - (strength 1/16 men) attached to the harbor command, Bordeaux, in - the presence of an officer of the SD on order of the Führer.” - -Then there is a note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry -which reads: - - “SD should have done this. Phone flag officer in charge in - future cases.” - -The Tribunal will therefore see from this Document C-176, that the first -two gallant men to be shot as a result of the Bordeaux operation were -actually put to death by a naval firing party on the 11th of December -1942. They were Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart, who had the -misfortune to be captured on the 8th of December in the preliminary -stages of the operation. - -Of interest is the comment of the naval war staff upon this shooting, -which is found in Document D-658. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do the last two lines in Document C-176 about the -operation being “particularly favored” mean? - -MAJOR JONES: “The operation was particularly favored by the weather -conditions and the dark night”—that presumably, My Lord, is a reference -to the operation of the marine Commandos in successfully blowing up a -number of German ships in Bordeaux harbor. Alternately, I am advised by -the naval officer who is assisting me, that it probably is a reference -to the conditions prevailing at the time of the shooting of the two men. - -THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought so. - -MAJOR JONES: I stand corrected by the representative of the British Navy -upon my interpretation of the matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Doesn’t it indicate that naval men had done it? - -MAJOR JONES: The shooting was in fact, as the entry of 11 December -shows, carried out by a naval party—by units belonging to the naval -officer in charge of Bordeaux. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MAJOR JONES: I was seeking to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the -comment of the naval war staff upon that shooting, which is in Document -D-658, at Page 109, Exhibit GB-229. It reads: - - “The Naval Commander, west France, reports that during the - course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping - material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial - photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage - material, and food and water for several days were found. - Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval - Commander west France has ordered that both soldiers be shot - immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation, - which has begun, confirms what has so far been discovered; their - execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more - information. - - “According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have meanwhile - been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Führer’s - special order but is nevertheless something new in international - law, since the soldiers were in uniform.” - -I submit that that last sentence shows very clearly that the Naval High -Command under Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as of -greater importance than any question of moral principle or of -professional honor and integrity. This operation of the shooting of -those two Commandos was, as I submit, not an act of war, but a murder of -two gallant men; and it is upon this somber note that it is my duty to -summarize this part of the Prosecution’s case against the Defendant -Raeder. - -The Prosecution’s submission is that he was not just a military puppet -carrying out political orders. The Tribunal has seen that, before the -Nazis came, he had worked actively to rebuild the German Navy behind the -back of the Reichstag. When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly -joined forces with them. He was the prime mover in transferring the -loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He was as much a member of -the inner councils of the Nazis as possibly any other defendant. And he -was a member of their main political advisory bodies. - -He was well aware of their aggressive designs and I submit he assisted -in their realization not only as a military technician, but also as a -mendacious politician. And he furthered, as I have submitted, their -brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all these conspirators Raeder was -one of the first to fall from his high position. It is in fact true that -the extension of war beyond the boundaries of Poland came as a -disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi armada mastering the -Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of -strategy. - -I would draw the Tribunal’s attention to Document C-161, at Page 35 of -the document book, which is an extract, Exhibit GB-230, from a -memorandum of Raeder, dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement, -entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for Conducting the -War by the Powers Signatory to the Three Power Pact.” The material entry -reads: - - “. . . it was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist - Reich to give the German Navy by 1944-45 such a strength that it - would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the - Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power, and range. - - “In 1939, the war having begun 5 years earlier, the construction - of these forces was still in its initial stages. . . .” - -The Tribunal will see from that document how completely Raeder was -cheated in his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high -seas fleet would be required. The Tribunal has seen that Raeder made a -great effort to recover some of his lost glory with his attack on an -inoffensive Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, -both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the -sea. But his further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow -conspirators, and in January 1943, Raeder retired, and thereafter he was -a leader in name only. - -I invite the Court’s attention to the Document D-655, at Page 108 of the -document book, Exhibit GB-231, which is a record in Raeder’s handwriting -of his interview with Hitler on the 6th of January 1943, which led to -Raeder’s retirement. I am only proposing to read the fifth paragraph, in -which Raeder records: - - “. . . if the Führer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting - was of the friendliest character and wished that the name Raeder - should continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly - abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to - the Inspector General, giving appropriate publicity in the - press, _et cetera_. But a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The - position of Inspector General, or whatever it was decided to - call it, must be purely nominal. - - “The Führer”—the record reads—“accepted this suggestion with - alacrity. The Inspector General could perhaps carry out special - tasks for him, make tours of inspection, _et cetera_. The name - of Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had repeated his request, the - Führer definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date. He - would like to think over the details.” - -This was Raeder’s twilight, and indeed a very different occasion from -the period of his ascendancy in 1939, when on the 12th of March Raeder -spoke on the occasion of the German Heroes’ Day. I now refer the Court -to the final document on Raeder, an account of that speech in March -1939, which is at Page 103 of the document book, in the Document D-653, -Exhibit GB-232. The first paragraph reads: - - “Throughout Germany celebrations took place on the occasion of - Hero Commemoration Day. . . . These celebrations were combined - for the first time with the celebration of the freedom to - rearm. . . . The day’s chief event was the traditional ceremony - held in the Berlin State Opera House in Unter den Linden.” - -In the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party and Armed -Forces, General-Admiral Raeder made a speech, extracts from which are -given below. - -I turn to Page 2 of the record, Page 104 of the document book, to about -the 15th line: - - “National Socialism”—says Raeder—“which originates from the - spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the - German people as its ideology. The German people follow the - symbols of its regeneration with as much great love as fanatical - passion. The German people has had practical experience of - National Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many - helpless critics abroad believe. The Führer has shown his people - that in the National Socialist solidarity of the people lies the - great and invincible source of strength, whose dynamic power - ensures not only peace at home but also enables us to release - all the Nation’s creative powers.” - -There follow eulogies of Hitler, and a few sentences below: - - “This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight - Bolshevism and international Jewry, the nation-destroying - activities of which our own people have sufficiently suffered. - Therefore, the alliance with all like-minded nations who, like - Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to - construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien - ideologies and by parasites of a foreign race.” - -Then a few sentences on: - - “If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, - this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught - National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part - of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a - demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if - we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the - Party and its organizations. . . .” - -The next sentence: - - “The Armed Forces and the Party thus became more and more united - in attitude and spirit.” - -And then just two sentences on the next page: - - “Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our - frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that.” - -That refers, of course, to the bombardment of the Spanish town of -Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on the 31 May 1937 -during the course of the Spanish Civil War. - -There are further references to the Führer and his leadership, and then -a final sentence of the first paragraph of Page 3: - - “They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition - of death for a holy cause, knowing that with their blood they - will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams.” - -My submission is that that speech of Raeder’s is the final proof of his -deep personal involvement in the Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture -of heroics and fatalism that led millions of Germans to slaughter. There -are boasts of violence used on the people of Almeria. There is the lip -service to peace by a man who planned conquest. “Armed Forces and the -Party have become more and more united in attitude and spirit”—there is -the authentic Nazi voice. There is the assertion of racialism. Finally, -there is the anti-Semitic gesture, Raeder’s contribution to the outlook -that produced Belsen. Imbued with these ideas he became an active -participant on both the political and military level in the Nazi -conspiracy to wage wars of aggression and to wage them ruthlessly. - -MR. RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): -May it please the Tribunal, the United States will continue with the -presentation, showing the individual responsibility of the Defendant Von -Schirach. It will be made by Captain Sprecher. - -CAPTAIN DREXEL A. SPRECHER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, it is my responsibility to present -the individual responsibility of the Defendant Schirach for Crimes -against the Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity as they -concern directly the Common Plan or Conspiracy. - -The Prosecution contends that the Defendant Schirach is guilty of having -exercised a leading part in the Nazi conspiracy from 1925 until the Nazi -downfall. - -The conspiratorial acts and the criminality of the Defendant Schirach -may be grouped for purposes of convenience into three principal phases: -(1) His early support of the conspirators over the period 1925-1929; (2) -his leadership and direction of German youth over the period 1929-1945; -(3) his leadership of the Reichsgau Vienna as chief representative of -the Nazi Party and the Nazi State in Vienna for the period July 1940 to -1945. The presentation will take up each of these principal phases after -a brief listing of all the principal positions which Schirach held. - -In presenting first a listing of the positions held by Schirach, it is -not intended immediately to describe the functions of each of these -positions. Insofar as a description of the functions of any particular -position is still felt necessary at this stage of the Trial, it will be -given later during the discussion of Schirach’s conspiratorial acts as -Nazi Youth Leader and as Nazi official in Vienna. - -For the consideration of the Tribunal, we have submitted a brief on this -subject. The document book contains English translations of 29 -documents. Although we feel that we have reduced the number of documents -to the minimum, the document book is still large. But Schirach’s -subversion of German youth is a large subject, even apart from any of -his other acts. Most of these documents are from German publications, of -which the Tribunal can take judicial notice. Therefore, in most cases, -it is intended only to paraphrase these documents, unless the Tribunal -in particular instances will indicate that they like fuller treatment. - -Before passing to the proof I want to express my appreciation, -particularly to Major Hartley Murray, Lieutenant Fred Niebergall at my -right, and Mr. Norbert Heilpern for their assistance in research, -analysis, translation, and organization of these materials. - -Schirach agrees he held the following positions. They are found in two -affidavits, an affidavit of certificate and one affidavit of report -dated December 1945, which is Document 3302-PS, document book, Page 110. - -I want to offer that affidavit as Exhibit Number USA-665. The -certificate, which I will rely on for only one point, is Document -2973-PS. It is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-14. - -Turning first to Document 3302-PS: This affidavit shows that Schirach -was a member of the Party from 1925 to 1945; that he was a leader of the -National Socialist Student League from 1929 to 1931; that he was leader -of the Hitler Youth Organization from 1931 to 1940. In 1931 and 1932 -Schirach was Reich Youth Leader on the staff of the SA Supreme Command, -where at that time all Nazi youth organizations were centralized. Also, -Schirach was Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP from 1931 to 1940. - -In 1932 Schirach became an independent Reich Leader (Reichsleiter), in -the Party. Upon acquiring this relatively independent position, he no -longer remained on the staff of the SA Supreme Command, since Nazi youth -affairs thereafter, with the creation of the Reich Youth Leadership, -were directly subordinate to Hitler with Schirach at the helm. We had -that kind of condition existing in the Party where, under the Leadership -Principle, at the pinnacle you had one man, Schirach, and you no longer -had the youth affairs underneath the SA. However, within the SA, -Schirach retained the rank and the title of a Gruppenführer throughout -the period from 1931 to 1941, and in that year, 1941, he was elevated to -the rank of an SA Obergruppenführer, a rank which Schirach continued to -hold in the SA until the collapse. - -Schirach was Reich Leader of Youth Education in the NSDAP from 1932 -until the collapse. In other words, from before the Nazis came to state -power until the final downfall, this defendant held the high position of -a Reichsleiter, a Reich Leader, inside the Party. - -Now, in addition to these positions in the Party, Schirach held the -following positions in the Nazi State: - -Reich Youth Leader, 1933 to 1940; Reich governor (Reichsstatthalter) of -the Reichsgau Vienna, 1940 to 1945; Reich Defense Commissioner of -Vienna, 1940 to 1945. - -Now, although Schirach gave up some of his positions with respect to the -leadership of German youth in 1940 when he accepted these positions in -Vienna, he still continued to hold after that time the Party position of -Reich Leader for Youth Education in the NSDAP. Moreover, he was given a -very special position: Deputy to the Führer for the Inspection of the -Hitler Youth, the organization which he, of course, had led until 1940. -He continued in these last two positions until the downfall. - -The certificate, Document 2973-PS, the only thing I rely on there in -this particular presentation, is to show that Schirach was a member of -the Reichstag from 1932 to 1945. - -We next take up acts showing that Schirach actively promoted the NSDAP -and its affiliated youth organizations before the Nazis seized power. -Schirach was an intimate and a servile follower of Hitler from the year -1925. In that year, when he was only 18 years old, Schirach joined the -Nazi conspirators by becoming a member of the Party. Upon special -request of Hitler, he went to Munich to study Party affairs. He became -active in converting students to National Socialism. I am paraphrasing -there, Your Honors, from Paragraph 2 of Schirach’s own affidavit, -Document 3302-PS, Exhibit Number USA-665, found at Page 110 of the -document book. - -Now, this was the start of conspiratorial activities which Schirach -thereafter continued for two decades in a spirit of unbending loyalty to -Hitler and to the principles of National Socialism. Hitler’s early -personal attentions to this defendant bore fruit for the conspirators, -and we find Schirach’s stature in the Party circles rapidly growing -through these early years. - -In 1929 Schirach was made national leader of the entire National -Socialist German Students League. He retained this position for 2 years -until 1931. Document 3464-PS, document book, Page 121, is an extract -from the 1936 edition of the Party manual, Exhibit Number USA-666, which -I would like to offer in evidence. This makes it clear that the purpose -of the Nazi Students League was the ideological and political conversion -of students in universities and technical schools to National Socialism. - -After 1931 Schirach devoted his full time to Party work. Schirach was -elected a Nazi member of the Reichstag in 1932, and therefore he played -his part in the unparliamentary conduct of the Nazi Reichstag members -during the last months of the existence of the Reichstag as an -independent instrument of government. - -Some of the best evidence concerning Schirach’s support of the -conspiracy in its early stages comes from Schirach’s own words in his -book _The Hitler Youth_. Excerpts from this book are found in Document -Number 1458-PS, document book, Page 1. It is offered in evidence as -Exhibit Number USA-667. Now, since this book, Your Honors, covers many -years and many topics, I shall be required to refer to it occasionally -later on. - -An example of Schirach’s servile loyalty to Hitler during the early -years is found at Page 17 of this book, Page 12 of your document book. -There he writes of his early years of Party activity as follows: - - “We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail. - We simply believed. And when Hitler’s book _Mein Kampf_ was - published, it was our bible, which we almost learned by heart in - order to answer the questions of the doubters and superior - critics. Almost everyone who today is leading youth in a - responsible position joined us in those years.” - -Before 1933 Schirach moved throughout Germany, leading demonstrations, -summoning German youth to membership in the Hitler Youth. When the -Hitler Youth and the wearing of its uniform were forbidden by law, -Schirach continued his activities by illegal means. Of this period he -himself writes, at Page 26 of his book on _The Hitler Youth_, Pages 16 -and 17 of your document book, as follows: - - “At this time the HJ (the Hitler Jugend) gained its best human - material. Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy or - girl, risked everything. . . . With pistols in our pockets we - drove through the Ruhr district while stones came flying after - us. We jumped every time we heard a bell ring, because we lived - in constant fear of arrests and expected our houses to be - searched.” - -At Page 27 of the same book, Page 18 of Your Honors’ document book, -Schirach indicates that in the early intra-Party fight between Hitler -and Strasser, Schirach clung steadfastly to the Hitler clique, and then, -in discussing Strasser, he exchanged his confidence only with Hitler and -the Defendant Streicher. It is hardly necessary to argue that such an -intimate of the Führer, himself, was advised from the beginning of the -general purposes, plans, and methods of the conspiracy. - -As an interesting sidelight, I believe a number of those conferences, -you will note, took place in Schirach’s apartment in Munich, and that -Hitler used to come there occasionally. - -Schirach was the leading Nazi conspirator in destroying all independent -youth organizations and in building the Nazi youth movement. In -connection with this point, the attention of the Tribunal is invited to -the brief of the United States Chief of Counsel entitled “The Reshaping -of Education, Training of Youth,” which was written for the United -States Chief of Counsel by Major Hartley Murray, and to the documents -cited therein under the section headed “b.” “The Nazi conspirators -supplemented the school system by training youth through the Hitler -Jugend.” These documents were offered in evidence in Document Book D in -the earlier phase of this Trial. The attention of the Tribunal is also -called to the motion picture _The Nazi Plan_, which was shown before the -Tribunal on the 11th of December, insofar as that film involved the -Defendant Schirach and his Hitler Youth organization. Occasions when -Schirach’s activities are shown in this film are noted in Document -Number 3054-PS, the index and the guide to this film, which is already -in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-167. - -It was the task of Schirach to perpetuate the Nazi regime through -generations by poisoning the minds of youth with Nazi ideology and -preparing youth for aggressive war. This poisoning will long outlive the -defendant. Indeed, one of the principal purposes of this exposure must -be to bring to those German youths who survived the Nazi-created -catastrophe a true picture of this man whom Nazi propaganda presented as -a great youth hero; a man against whom the living breath of free -criticism and the truth itself could make no answer before German youth -or before the German people, for more than 10 years. - -Again, from Schirach’s own hand in his book, _The Hitler Youth_, we have -crystal-clear evidence concerning the methods and the tactics employed -by this defendant in his destruction of independent youth organizations -and their incorporation into the Hitler Youth. At Page 32, Pages 19 and -20 of Your Honors’ document book, Schirach states that in 1933 the new -Cabinet ministers were too overburdened to solve the youth question by -their own initiative; that therefore he, Schirach, then leader of the -Hitler Youth, commissioned one of his confederates to lead 50 members of -the Berlin Hitler Youth in a surprise raid on the Reich Committee of -German Youth Organizations. This raid resulted in destroying the Reich -Committee and its absorption within the Hitler Youth. This raid was -closely followed by a second surprise raid of like success upon the -Youth Hostels Organization, Page 33, _The Hitler Youth_, found at Pages -20 and 21 of the document book. - -Now, after these successful showings of force and terror, Schirach’s -star climbed higher. He was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich -in June 1931 in a solemn ceremony before Hitler. Concerning his next -steps, Schirach writes at Pages 35 and 36 of his book, Page 22 of the -document book, as follows: - - “The first thing I did was to dissolve the Greater German - League. Since I headed all German youth organizations and I had - the right to decide on their leadership, I did not hesitate for - a moment to take this step which was for the Hitler Youth the - elimination of an unbearable state of affairs.” - -Schirach accomplished the dissolution and destruction of most youth -organizations by orders which he issued and signed as Youth Leader of -the German Reich. This is shown by the order contained in Document -Number 2229-PS, your document book, Page 65, which is offered in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-668. - -By this one order of Schirach nine youth organizations were dissolved, -including the Boy Scout movement. - -The Protestant and Catholic youth organizations were the last to be -destroyed and absorbed by the Hitler Youth. Schirach accomplished the -absorption of the Protestant youth organization by agreement with the -Hitler-appointed Reich Bishop Ludwig Müller, Page 38 of _The Hitler -Youth_, Page 24 of the document book. Schirach’s objective in forcing -all German youth into the Hitler Youth was finally accomplished in -December 1936 by the basic law on the Hitler Youth. Document Number -1392-PS is a decree, 1936, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 993, of -which, of course, the Tribunal may take judicial notice. This law -declared in part, and Your Honors, I read from this because it shows so -clearly the nature of what was to happen and what was already happening -to German youth under Schirach. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it set out in the document book? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: What page? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: It is Document Number 1392-PS. It is at Page 6 of your -document book: - - “The future of the German nation depends on its youth, and - German youth will have to be prepared for its future - duties. . . . All of the German youth in the Reich is organized - within the Hitler Youth. . . . The German youth, besides being - reared within the family and school, shall be educated - physically, intellectually, and morally in the spirit of - National Socialism to serve the people and the community through - the Hitler Youth. . . . The task of educating the German youth - through the Hitler Youth is being entrusted to the Reich Leader - of German Youth in the NSDAP. . . .” - -The first executive order on this basic law concerning the Hitler Youth -was issued on the 25th of March 1939. If you refer to Page 40 of your -document book, this decree, 1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 709, -among other points confirms the exclusive nature of Schirach’s -responsibility concerning German youth. I will quote only one sentence: - - “The Youth Leader of the German Reich is solely competent for - all missions of the physical, ideological, and moral education - of the entire German youth outside home and school.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Captain Sprecher, I think you have told us enough now to -satisfy us that Von Schirach was in charge, of the ideological education -of German youth and completely in charge of it. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: And we don’t desire to hear any more of it. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: I understand. - -In exercising his far-reaching control over German youth, Schirach -naturally relied on the common techniques of the Nazi conspirators, -including the Leadership Principle, the nature of which has already been -established before this Tribunal. The Tribunal will find a galling -glorification and explanation of the Leadership Principle as it was -applied to German youth, in Schirach’s book, _The Hitler Youth_, at Page -68, translated at Page 32 of the document book. I won’t read from that. - -In his affidavit, Document Number 3302-PS, Paragraph 5, Schirach states, -“It was my task to educate the youth in the aims, ideology, and -directives of the NSDAP, and beyond this to direct and to shape them.” - -Naturally, Schirach established and directed an elaborate propaganda -apparatus to accomplish a thorough-going poisoning of the minds of -German youth. Document Number 3349-PS, your document book Page 114, is -offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-666. - -This is an excerpt from Pages 452 and 453 of the 1936 edition of the -Party manual. This document will show that the Reich Youth Leadership -(Reichsjugendführung) of the NSDAP prepared and published numerous -periodicals ranging from a daily press service to monthly magazines. -This document also shows that the propaganda office of the Hitler Youth -maintained, through liaison agents, a political and ideological -connection with the propaganda office of the NSDAP and with the -Propaganda Ministry, both of which, of course, were headed by the -conspirator Goebbels. - -Schirach shares with the conspirator Dr. Robert Ley, Reich -Organizationsleiter of the NSDAP, the responsibility for the -establishment and general administration of the Adolf Hitler Schools. -This is shown by a joint statement of Ley and Schirach in the year 1937, -which is found in the document book at Page 100. It is our Document -2653-PS, offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-669. This document -shows that these Adolf Hitler Schools were open free of charge to -outstanding and proved members of the Young Folk, the junior section of -the Hitler Youth organization. It further shows that the object of these -schools was the building of youthful leadership for the Nazi Party and -the Nazi State apparatus. - -Schirach extended his education of German Youth into the field of law -and the legal profession even though these fields were principally under -the control of the Defendant Frank. Proof is found in Document Number -3459-PS, Page 120 of the document book. This is a one-page extract from -an account of the Congress of German Law in 1939. It is offered as -Exhibit Number USA-670. This document shows that beyond purely technical -education in law it was considered by the conspirators to be the task of -the Party to exercise influence upon the ideological conceptions of the -Young Law Guardians League. This league was a junior organization of the -National Socialist Law Guardians League, a Nazi-controlled organization -of lawyers. - -Now, at this Congress to which the document refers, an official of the -youth law guardians declared that ignorance of the simplest legal -principles could best be fought within the Hitler Youth and that, -therefore, the legal education program of the Hitler Youth was to -receive the broadest support. - -Obergebietsführer Arthur Axmann, the subordinate of Schirach at that -time and who in 1940 was to succeed him as leader of the Hitler Youth, -was at that time, namely, May 1939, appointed the chairman of a youth -legal committee for the establishment of the Youth Law. He was appointed -by the Defendant Frank. - -THE PRESIDENT: Captain Sprecher, I don’t think I made it quite clear -that the Tribunal is not really interested in these details by which the -Defendant Von Schirach acquired his power over the German Youth. You -have told us sufficient to establish in our minds, so far at any rate, -that he managed to get absolute command over the German youth. The only -thing that seems to me to be material, at the present stage, is whether -or not you can show us any direct evidence that the Defendant Schirach -was a party to the aggressive aims of the Reich leaders, or to any War -Crimes or to any Crimes against Humanity. Unless you can show us that, -your address to us is really not useful to us at this stage. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: I plan to take up directly, Your Honor, the question of -the militarization of youth. I did want to make one reference at this -point to the relation of the Hitler Youth to the League for Germans -Abroad, if that is satisfactory to Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that may bear on the aggressive aims of the Reich -leaders. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Schirach extended the influence of the Hitler Youth -beyond the borders of Germany by means of co-operation between the -Hitler Youth and the League for Germans Abroad, the VDA. This is proved -by an agreement made in 1933 between Schirach and leaders of the VDA -which is contained in Document L-360(h), document book Page 3. This is -offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-671. - -Now, Schirach discusses in his book, _The Hitler Youth_, under the -chapter heading, “Work Abroad”—that is Chapter 4 of the book, Pages 34 -to 38 of the document book—some of the connections of the Hitler Youth -with such Nazi ideas as Lebensraum, colonial policy as an ideological -weapon. - -I won’t read from that, since it also covers to a certain extent. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Did it talk about Lebensraum? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: It actually used the word Lebensraum. At Page 36 of the -document book there is reference made to the Ostraum, space in the -East. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought the document you were dealing with was L-360 on -Page 3. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: I am sorry. I had gone on from there, to speak about -Schirach’s book, Document 1458-PS, and I had mentioned that at Pages 34 -to 38 of the document book there were references concerning the Nazi -ideas of colonial policy and Lebensraum, and that this book by Schirach -indicated that the Hitler Youth was charged with spreading those ideas. - -He uses the word “Ostraum” in speaking of space in the East, and he -discusses German youth organizations abroad and the German schools in -these countries. And then I wish particularly to point out on Page 37 -the following sentence: - - “It will be taken into consideration concerning this schooling - that the guiding line of German population policy which aims at - the utilization of the space in the East will not be violated.” - -Now, the conspirators devoted a great deal of energy to the perpetuation -of their scheme of things by selecting and training successors for Nazi -leadership, selecting and training and acquiring active Nazis for the -rank and file of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations, including -the SA and the SS which are alleged here to be criminal organizations. - -A number of orders issued by the Party Chancellery under the heading, -“Successor Problems,” show the dominant part assumed by Schirach and his -Hitler Youth in this field. Our Document Number 3348-PS, “Selections -from Volume I of the Decrees, Regulations, and Announcements of the -Party Chancellery,” already marked in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-410, contains some of these orders, which I won’t take the time to -read. But they are all contained on one page, Page 113, of your document -book. - -Only Hitler Youth members who distinguished themselves were to be -admitted to the Party. Nazi leaders were directed to absorb full-time -Hitler Youth leaders into their staffs so as to offer them practical -experience and thus secure necessary successors for the Leadership Corps -which is also alleged as a criminal organization. This pivotal and -central function of the Hitler Youth in the domination of German life by -the Party is also shown at Pages 80 and 81 of the 1938 Party manual, -Exhibit Number USA-430, found at Page 74 of the document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: That last page, Page 113, does that refer to any of the -matters to which I drew your attention? It is simply the organization of -the youth; it has nothing to do with any criminal aims. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Your Honor, it certainly is the contention of the -Prosecution that any man who took an active part in furnishing for these -criminal organizations young members committed a crime. - -THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that, and that is why I told you that -we were satisfied that so far you had shown that he had acquired -absolute control over and was the leader of the German youth. The only -thing we want to hear about at this stage is whether he was a party to -the schemes for aggressive war, to War Crimes, or to Crimes against -Humanity. That is what we want to hear, and we don’t want to hear -anything else. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Your Honors, may I pass, then, to the connection of -Hitler Youth to the SS. Document 2396-PS, which is found at Page 69 of -the document book and which is offered as Exhibit Number USA-673, has a -quotation in it concerning the Streifendienst of the Hitler Youth; the -Streifendienst being the patrol service, a type of self-police -organization of the Hitler Youth. The quotation which I intend to read -will indicate how this organization became the principal supplier of the -SS. - -Are Your Honors interested in having me read that quotation concerning -the Hitler Youth as the main source of the SS? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, perhaps; I haven’t read it. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: This document is an agreement between Schirach and -Himmler. It was concluded in October 1938. It bears, I think, partial -quoting: - - “Organization of the Streifendienst. - - “1. Since the Streifendienst in the Hitler Youth has to perform - tasks similar to those which the SS perform for the whole - movement, it is organized as a special unit for the purpose of - securing recruits for the General SS. However, as much as - possible, recruits for the SS Special Troops, for the SS Death’s - Head Units, and for the officer-candidate schools, should also - be taken from these formations.” - -I am skipping down now to 4a, which is underlined in red in your book: - - “The selection of Streifendienst members is made according to - the principles of racial selection of the Schutzstaffel. The - competent officials of the SS, primarily unit leaders, race - authorities, and SS physicians, will be consulted for the - admission tests.” - -Skipping to 5: - - “To insure from the beginning a good understanding between Reich - Youth Leadership and Reich SS leadership, a liaison officer will - be ordered from the Reich Youth Leadership to the SS Main Office - starting 1 October 1938. The appointment of other leaders to the - higher SS sections is a subject for a future agreement.” - -Then, going down to what I think is the most striking quotation, Your -Honor, 6: - - “After the organization is completed, the SS takes its - replacement primarily from these Streifendienst members. - Admission of youths of German blood who are not members of the - Hitler Youth is then possible only after information and advice - of the competent Bannführer.” - -Now, the Bannführer referred to there was the local leader of the Hitler -Jugend; and without his consent no one could go into the SS in the -future after that agreement was made, which was in October 1938. - -Now, the second agreement which Schirach made with Himmler was made in -December 1938. It is found in our document book, Number 2567-PS, Page -98. It is offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-674. It states that -the Farm Service of the Hitler Youth “is, according to education and -aim, particularly well suited as a recruiting agency for the SS, General -SS, and the armed section of the SS, SS Special Troops, and SS Death’s -Head battalions.” - -The agreement concludes by stating that Farm Service members of the -Hitler Youth who pass the SS admission tests will be taken over by the -SS immediately after leaving the Hitler Youth Farm Service. - -I might point out to Your Honors that this meant that after that time -any Hitler Youth member who was in the Farm Service was obliged to go -into the SS. - -And now, to come directly to the point you have been inquiring about, -Your Honor: - -Throughout the 6 years of Nazi political control over Germany before the -launching of aggressive war, Schirach was actively engaged in -militarizing German youth. From the beginning, the Hitler Youth was set -up along military lines with uniforms, ranks and titles. It was -regimented and led in military fashion under the Leadership Principle. - -If Your Honors will take any edition whatsoever of the _Organization -Book_, the Party manual, and turn to the tables, beginning with Table -54, and leaf through the book, you will see the very striking insignia -of the Hitler Youth and how much it compares to what the normal military -insignia were. You will further notice that one of the most prominent -insignia is an “S” of the same type that the Nazis used with respect to -the SS. You will notice that part of the uniform was a long knife. - -THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t that all a part of what they are pleased to call -the Nazi ideology? I mean, the Führer Principle, military training? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: There is a relation between all of these things, -perhaps, and the Leadership Principle, because the Leadership Principle -dominated absolutely every aspect of German life. However, Your Honors, -I suggest that showing to you, in this graphic means, the similarity -between the uniform of the Hitler Youth and military uniforms has some -bearing upon the preparation for aggressive wars, about which I am -further to speak in just a moment. - -Now, Document 2654-PS, found at Page 102 of your document book, is a -whole book given over to just this question of the organization and the -insignia of the Hitler Youth. - -The Tribunal will see how the Hitler Youth was divided into branches or -divisions which were very similar to military divisions. - -That document is offered as Exhibit Number USA-675. I will refer no -further to it. - -Now, in a speech in February 1938, when the conspirators had already -dropped some of the camouflage which surrounded their earlier military -preparations for the wars which we have recently suffered, Hitler -discussed the military training of the Hitler Youth in the _Völkischer -Beobachter_ of the 21st of February 1938. This is our Document 2454-PS, -found at Page 97 of the document book. It is offered as Exhibit Number -USA-676. - -Hitler there said that thousands of German boys had received specialized -training through the Hitler Youth in naval, aviation, and motorized -groups and that over 7,000 instructors had trained more than 1 million -Hitler Youth members in rifle shooting. That was February 1938, shortly -before the Anschluss. Note the progress of military training within the -Hitler Youth between then and August 1939, just 1 month before the -invasion of Poland. - -At that time the Defendant Schirach and the Defendant Keitel, as Chief -of the High Command, entered into another one of those informative -agreements, which many of these defendants liked to make among -themselves. It is Document Number 2398-PS, your document book Page 72. -It is offered as Exhibit Number USA-677. It is taken from _Das Archiv_ -which, in introducing the actual agreement, declared that this agreement -was “the result of close co-operation” between Schirach and Keitel. The -agreement itself states, in part: - - “While it is exclusively the task of the Hitler Youth to attend - to the training of their units in this direction, it is - suitable, in the sense of a uniformed training corresponding to - the demands of the Wehrmacht, to support the leadership of the - Hitler Youth for their responsible task as trainers and - educators in all fields of training for defense by special - courses.” - -And then, skipping down towards the end, you will note this quotation -within the agreement: “A great number of courses are in progress.” - -Your Honor, if I may take about 5 minutes, I can finish this one section -on the aggressive war phase. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Whereas Hitler, in February 1938, mentioned that 7,000 -Hitler Youth leaders were engaged in training German youngsters in rifle -shooting, Schirach and Keitel, in their agreement of August 1939, note -the following: - - “. . . 30,000 Hitler Youth leaders are already being trained - annually in field service. The agreement with the Wehrmacht - gives the possibility of roughly doubling that number. The - billeting and messing of the Hitler Youth leaders is done, - according to the regulations for execution already published, in - the barracks, drill grounds, _et cetera_, of the Wehrmacht, at a - daily cost of 25 Pfennig.” - -Just as Schirach dealt with the head of the SS in obtaining zealous -recruits for organized banditry and the commission of atrocities, so -also he dealt with the head of the Wehrmacht in furnishing young men as -human grist for the mill of aggressive war. - -The training of German youths runs through the Nazi conspiracy as an -important central thread. It is one of the manifestations of Nazism -which has shocked the entire civilized world. The principal -responsibility for the planning and execution of the Nazi Youth policy -falls upon this defendant. - -I wish to take merely one sentence from his own affidavit, Paragraph 5, -Document Number 3302-PS, so that there can be no doubt before this -Tribunal or before the world, indeed, as to this defendant’s own feeling -of responsibility: “I feel myself responsible for the policy of the -youth movement in the Party and later within the Reich.” I underline the -phrase “_I feel myself responsible_.” - -Your Honor, that is a convenient breaking point before coming to a -discussion of Schirach’s connection to War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 16 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-FIFTH DAY - Wednesday, 16 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -CAPT. SPRECHER: May it please the Tribunal, I now pass to activities -which involve Schirach in the commission of Crimes against Humanity as -they bear directly on Count One. The presentation of all specific acts -will deal with the Reichsgau Vienna; but first allow me to refer back to -two important points in the previous proof, which will show that -Schirach bears responsibility for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity -which bring in the whole of Europe. Through his agreements with Himmler -he provided, through the Hitler Youth, many if not most of the SS men -who administered, in the main, the concentration camps and whose War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity throughout Europe generally are -notorious. - -Nor should we pass to further specific acts of Schirach without -mentioning one more thing: that he cannot escape responsibility for -implanting in youth the Nazi ideology generally, with its tenets of a -master race, sub-human peoples, and Lebensraum and world domination. For -such notions were the psychological prerequisites for the instigation -and for the tolerance of the atrocities which zealous Nazis committed -throughout Germany and the occupied countries. - -To present Schirach’s responsibilities for crimes committed within the -Reichsgau Vienna, where Schirach was Gau leader and Reich governor from -July 1940 until the downfall, the general basic functions of these two -offices must be held in mind. - -The first document I refer to is Document Number 1893-PS. This is an -extract from the Party manual of 1943 and therefore catches Schirach in -midstream in his activities in the Reichsgau Vienna. That is Page 42 of -the document book, and Pages 70, 71, 75, 98, 136, and 140b of the Party -manual, extracts from each of those pages appearing in your document -book. - -The following highlights concerning the Gau leader’s functions will -appear, and I propose only to paraphrase. Since Your Honor may take -judicial notice of the Party manual, you may check at your leisure -unless you wish me to read from any one of these specific orders. These -orders make it appear that the Gau leader was the highest representative -of Hitler in his Gau, that he was the bearer of sovereignty—the top -Hoheitsträger—and that he had sovereign political rights. Beyond that, -he was responsible for the entire political situation in his Gau. He -could call—and we believe this is important—he could call upon SA and -SS leaders as “needed in the execution of a political mission.” Beyond -that he was obliged to meet at least once a month with the leaders of -the affiliated Party organizations within his Gau, and this, of course, -included the SS. - -Now, the position of the Reich Governor in Vienna is somewhat special. -After the Anschluss the State of Austria was abolished, and Austria was -divided into seven Reich Gaue. The most important of these Gaue was the -Reichsgau Vienna, of which Schirach was Governor. Reference to any -statistical manual of the Reich at this time will establish that at that -time Vienna had a population of over 2 million people. Therefore it was -certainly one of the principal cities of the Reich. The Tribunal is -asked to take judicial notice of the decree, 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -Part I, Page 777, our Document Number 3301-PS, found at Page 107 of the -document book. This is the basic law on the administrative -reorganization of Austria. It was enacted in April 1939, a little more -than a year before Schirach became Governor. This law shows that -Schirach, as Governor, was the lieutenant of the head of the German -State, Hitler; that he could issue decrees and orders within the -limitations set by the supreme Reich authorities; that he was especially -under the administrative supervision of the Defendant Frick, Reich -Minister of the Interior; and that he was also the first mayor of the -city of Vienna. For the same period that Schirach was Gau leader and -Reich Governor of Vienna, he was also Reich Defense Commissioner of -Vienna; and after 1940, of course, the Reich was engaged in war. - -Because of his far-reaching responsibilities and authority in these -positions, the Prosecution contends that Schirach must be held guilty, -specifically, of all the crimes of the Nazi conspirators in the -Reichsgau Vienna, on the ground that he either initiated, approved, -executed, or abetted these crimes. Specific examples follow which, in -fact, demonstrate that Schirach was actively and personally engaged in -Nazi crimes, and that, when he became boastful—a characteristic never -lacking in most of these defendants—he himself admitted his own -involvement in acts which are crimes within the competence of this -Tribunal. - -I come first to slave-labor. - -The slave-labor program naturally played its part in staffing the -industries of as large and important a city as Vienna. The general -nature of this program and the crimes flowing therefrom have been in -part set before you by Mr. Dodd. The Soviet prosecutors will present -further acts later on. Our Document Number 3352-PS, found at Page 116 of -your document book, which I would like to offer as Exhibit USA-206, -gives extracts from a number of orders of the Party chancellery. Each of -these orders from which the extracts have been taken bear on the Gau -leader’s responsibility for manpower placement and utilization. They -prove quite simply and in unmistakable language that the Gau leaders -under the direction of the experienced old Gau leader Sauckel, who was -plenipotentiary for manpower, became the supreme integrating and -co-ordinating agents of the Nazi conspirators in the entire manpower -program. At Page 116 of your document book—Page 508 of the original -volume of orders—the Defendant Göring is shown to have agreed, as -leader of the Four Year Plan, to Sauckel’s suggestion that the Gau -leaders be utilized to assure the highest efficiency in manpower. At -Page 117 of your document book—Page 511 of the orders of the Party -chancellery—Sauckel in July 1942 makes the Gau leaders his special -plenipotentiaries for manpower within their Gaue, with the duty of -establishing a harmonious co-operation of all interests concerned. In -effect the Gau leader became the supreme arbitrator for all the -conflicting interests that exist during wartime with respect to claims -upon manpower. Under this same order the regional labor offices and -their staffs were “directed to be at the disposal of the Gau leaders for -information and advice and to fulfill the suggestions and demands of the -Gau leader for the purpose of improvements in manpower. . . .” At Pages -118 and 119 of your document book—Page 567 of the Party chancellery -orders—the Defendant Sauckel ordered that his special -plenipotentiaries, the Gau leaders, familiarize themselves with the -general regulations on Eastern Workers. He stated that his immediate -objective was “to prevent politically inept factory heads giving too -much consideration to the care of Eastern Workers and thereby cause -justified annoyance among the German workers.” - -We submit to the Tribunal that if Schirach as Gau leader was required to -concern himself in such manpower details as concern over the alleged -annoyance of German workers for the consideration given Eastern Workers, -it is unnecessary to press further into the detailed workings of the -manpower program to establish Schirach’s connection with, and -responsibility for, the slave-labor program in the Reichsgau Vienna. - -I now pass to the persecution of the churches. - -The elimination of the religious youth organizations while Schirach was -chief Nazi youth leader has already been noted. In March 1941 two -letters, one from the Defendant Bormann, the other from the conspirator -Hans Lammers. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Captain Sprecher, have you any other evidence which -connects Von Schirach with the problem of manpower? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: I had planned on presenting nothing further, Your Honor. -I felt that in view of the fact that our Soviet colleagues are going -further with the details of the manpower program, particularly in the -East, the main objective under Count One should merely be to show the -general responsibility of the Defendant Schirach for the slave-labor -program, and the question of specific acts will have to be taken from -the other proof in the Record, which will come, into the Record later. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: There is just one further point: When I come to the -treatment of the Jews in a few minutes, there will be one or two -specific examples. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are now going to deal with the persecution of -churches, is that right? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Yes, Sir. - -Now, the Tribunal is referred to Document R-146, at Page 5 of the -document book. This is offered as Exhibit USA-678. - -I am a little in doubt, Your Honors, as to whether I should read all -this document, in view of our common anxiousness to pass rapidly on; but -perhaps I may paraphrase it, and if you are not satisfied I will read -it. - -These documents establish clearly that during a visit by Hitler to -Vienna, Schirach and two other officials brought a complaint before the -Führer that the confiscations of Church property in Austria, made on -various pretexts, should be made in favor of the Gaue rather than of the -Reich. Later the Führer decided the issue in favor of the position which -had been taken by Schirach, namely, in favor of the Gau. I use this -merely to connect Schirach with the persecution of the churches, -concerning which there has been a great deal of evidence before this -time. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): None of it is in evidence yet. You have not -put anything in evidence. We cannot take judicial notice of something -unless you ask us to. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Your ruling is that this would not be in evidence unless -I read it? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not making any ruling; I was merely -pointing out to you that we have nothing in evidence on the last -document. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: I think, under the circumstances, I had better read this -document: - - “Munich, 20 March 1941, Brown House, Personal-Secret. - - “To: All Gau leaders. Subject: Sequestration of Church - properties (Monastery property, _et cetera_). - - “Recently, valuable church properties have had to be sequestered - on a large scale, especially in Austria; according to reports of - the Gauleiter to the Führer, these sequestrations were often - because of violations of ordinances relating to war economy (for - example, hoarding of foodstuffs of various kinds, textiles, - leather goods, _et cetera_). In other cases they were for - violations of the law relating to subversive acts against the - State and in some cases because of illegal possession of arms. - Obviously no compensation is to be paid to the churches for - sequestrations made for the above-mentioned reasons. - - “With regard to further sequestrations, several Austrian Gau - leaders, on the occasion of the Führer’s last visit to Vienna, - attempted to clarify the question of who should acquire such - sequestered properties. Please take note of the Führer’s - decision, as contained in the letter written by Reich Minister - Dr. Lammers to the Reich Minister of the Interior, dated 14 - March 1941. I enclose copy of extracts of the - same.”—Signed—“M. Bormann.” - -I had offered that document as Exhibit USA-678. Do you still wish me to -read the enclosure that went with it? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I don’t wish you to read anything; I was -simply pointing out that, as you had not read it, it was not in -evidence. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: In that event I will continue, Your Honor. The copy -reads as follows: - - “Berlin, 14 March 1941; The Reich Minister and Chief of the - Reich Chancellery. - - “To the Reich Minister of the Interior. Subject: Draft of an - ordinance supplementing the provisions on confiscation of - property of enemies of the People and State. - - “The Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Von Schirach, Dr. Jury and - Eigruber complained recently to the Führer that the Reich - Minister of Finance still maintains the point of view that - confiscation of property of enemies of the People and State - should be made in favor of the Reich and not in favor of the - Reich Gaue. Consequently the Führer has informed me that he - desires the confiscation of such properties to be effected in - favor of the Reich Gau in whose area the confiscated property is - situated, and not in favor of the Reich. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: You need not read any more of it. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: I pass over now to the Jewish persecution. - -The Prosecution submits, finally, that Schirach authorized, directed, -and participated in anti-Semitic measures. Of course, the whole ideology -and teaching of the Hitler Youth was predicated upon the Nazi racial -myth. Before the war, Schirach addressed a meeting of the National -Socialist German Students’ League, the organization he headed from 1929 -to 1931. Document 2441-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-679, an affidavit by -Gregor Ziemer. I wish to read merely from the bottom of Page 95 of the -document book to the end of the first paragraph at the top of Page 96 of -the document book. The deponent Ziemer is referring to a meeting at -Heidelberg, Germany, which he personally attended some time before the -war, at which Baldur von Schirach addressed the Students’ League, which -he himself had at one time led. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: What is this document? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: It is an affidavit of Gregor Ziemer: - - “He”—meaning Schirach—“declared that the most important phase - of German university life in the Third Reich was the program of - the NSDSTB. He extolled various activities of the League. He - reminded the boys of the service they had rendered during the - Jewish purge. Dramatically he pointed across the river to the - old university town of Heidelberg where several burnt-out - synagogues were mute witnesses of the efficiency of Heidelberg - students. These skeleton buildings would remain there for - centuries as inspiration for future students, as warning to - enemies of the State.” - -To attempt to visualize the true extent of the fiendish treatment of -Jews under Schirach, we must look to his activities in the Reichsgau -Vienna and to the activities of his assistants, the SS and the Gestapo, -in Vienna. - -Document Number 1948, Page 63 of your document book, is offered as -Exhibit USA-680. You will note it is on the stationery of the last -Governor of Vienna. - -THE PRESIDENT: Captain Sprecher, I have been reading on in this Document -2441-PS, on Page 96 of the document book. It seems to me you ought to -read the next three paragraphs on Page 96 from the place where you left -off. - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: The second, third, and fourth paragraphs. - - CAPT. SPRECHER: “Even as old Heidelberg Castle was evidence that - Old Germany had been too weak to resist the invading Frenchmen - who destroyed it, so the black remains of the synagogues would - be a perpetual monument reminding coming generations of the - strength of New Germany. - - “He reminded the students that there were still countries which - squandered their time and energy with books and wasteful - discussions about abstract topics of philosophy and metaphysics. - Those days were over. New Germany was a land of action. The - other countries were sound asleep. - - “But he was in favor of letting them sleep. The more soundly - they slumbered, the better opportunity for the men of the Third - Reich to prepare for more action. The day would come when German - students of Heidelberg would take their places side by side with - legions of other students to conquer the world for the ideology - of Nazism.” - -I was about to refer, Your Honors, to Document Number 1948-PS, which is -found at Page 63 of your document book, and which I offer as Exhibit -USA-680. This, you will note, is on the stationery of the Reich Governor -of Vienna, the Reichsstatthalter in Vienna. - - “. . . 7 November 1940. - - “Subject: Compulsory labor of able-bodied Jews. - - “1. Notice: On 5 November 1940 telephone conversation with - Colonel”—Standartenführer—“Huber of the Gestapo. The Gestapo - has received secret directions from the Reich Security Main - Office (RSHA) as to how able-bodied Jews should be drafted for - compulsory labor service. Investigations are being made at - present by the Gestapo to find out how many able-bodied Jews are - still available, in order to make plans for the contemplated - mass projects. It is assumed that there are not many more Jews - available. If some should still be available, however, the - Gestapo has no scruples to use the Jews even for clearing away - the destroyed synagogues. - - “SS Standartenführer Huber will make a report personally to the - Regierungspräsident in this matter. - - “I have reported to the Regierungspräsident accordingly. The - matter should be kept further in mind.” - -The signature is by Dr. Fischer. - -I want to call the Court’s attention to the significance of the title -Regierungspräsident. The SS Colonel, you will note, was to report to the -Regierungspräsident. If you will refer back again to the decree which -set up the Reichsgau Vienna, 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 777 -(Document 3301-PS), you will find that the Regierungspräsident was -Schirach’s personal representative within the governmental -administration of Vienna. - -Now, it seems to us that this Document Number 1948-PS, which was signed -by Fischer, concerning compulsory labor of able-bodied Jews, answers the -argument that persons of the rank of Gauleiter were ignorant of the -atrocities of the Gestapo and the SS in their own locality. It shows -further that even the assistants of the Gau leaders were informed of the -details of the persecution projects which were afoot at the time. - -Schirach also had concern for, and knowledge of, the housing shortage in -Vienna, which was alleviated for some members of the alleged master race -who succeeded to the houses of the luckless Jews who were moved into -oblivion in Poland. - -On December 3, 1940, the conspirator Lammers wrote a letter to Schirach. -It is our Document 1950-PS, Page 64 of your document book, and it is -offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-681. The letter is very short: - - December 1940. . .” - -the stationery of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, -and it is marked “secret”: - - “To the Reich Governor in Vienna, Gauleiter Von Schirach: - - “As Reichsleiter Bormann informs me, the Führer has decided, - after receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 - Jews still residing in the Reichsgau Vienna will be deported - most rapidly”—that is, still during the war—“to the Government - General, because of the housing shortage prevalent in Vienna. I - have informed the Governor General in Kraków, as well as the - Reichsführer SS, about this decision of the Führer, and I - request you also to take cognizance of it.”—Signed—“Lammers.” - -As a last piece of illustrative evidence against this youngest member of -the defendants in the dock, I take something from his own lips, which -was published for all Vienna and, indeed, for all Germany and the world -to know, even at that time. It appears in the Vienna edition of the -_Völkischer Beobachter_, on the 15th of September 1942, Document -3048-PS, your document book, Page 106. It is already in evidence as -Exhibit USA-274. - -I would like to point out that these words were uttered before the -so-called European Youth League in Vienna in 1942. The Tribunal will -recall that Schirach was still Reich Leader for Youth Education in the -NSDAP at that time: - - “Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to - European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven - from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry, - tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto - of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply, ‘I see in this an - action contributing to European culture.’” - -Although Schirach’s principal assistance to the conspiracy was made in -his commission of the German youth to the conspirators’ objectives, he -also stands guilty of heinous Crimes against Humanity as a Party and -governmental administrator of high standing, after the conspiracy had -reached its inevitable involvement in wars of aggression. - -This completes, Your Honors, the presentation on the individual -responsibility of the Defendant Schirach. - -The Prosecution will next take up the responsibility of the Defendant -Martin Bormann, and the presentation will be made by Lieutenant Lambert. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, as to the various errors made in the case -against Schirach, I shall state my position when the Defense has its -turn. But I should like to take the opportunity now of pointing out an -error in translation in one of the documents. It is in Document 3352-PS. - -It is an order of the Reich Chancellery to the subordinate offices, and -this order mentions that the labor offices had to be at the disposal of -the Gauleiter under certain circumstances. In the German original of -this order it reads as follows: “Anregungen und Wünsche.” Now -“Anregungen und Wünsche,” that is. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page of the document is it? - -DR. SAUTER: I think, Page 512 of Document 3352-PS, on Page 117 of the -document book. - -This German expression “Anregungen und Wünsche” has been translated by -“suggestions” (for “Anregungen”) and “demands” (for “Wünsche”). - -The first translation, the translation for “Anregungen,” we consider to -be correct; but the second translation, namely, “demands” for “Wünsche,” -we consider false, because, so far as we know, this word is “Befehle” or -“Forderungen” in German. We should consider it correct if the English -translation “demands” could be translated by another word, “wishes,” -which is an exact translation of the word “Wünsche.” I do not know -whether I have pronounced the word correctly in English. That is all I -have to say for the time being. Thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT (to Captain Sprecher): Do you wish to say anything about -that? - -CAPT. SPRECHER: I think that Dr. Sauter has made a very good point. I -have checked with the translator beside me, Your Honor, and the German -word “Wünsche” has been translated too strongly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -LIEUTENANT THOMAS F. LAMBERT, JR. (Assistant Trial Counsel for the -United States): May it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution comes now to -deal with the Defendant Bormann and to present the proofs establishing -his responsibility for the crimes set forth in the Indictment. And, if -the Tribunal will allow, we should like to observe on the threshold that -because of the absence of the Defendant Bormann from the dock we believe -that we should make an extra effort to make a solid record in the case -against Bormann, out of fairness to Defense Counsel and for the -convenience of the Tribunal. - -I offer the document book supporting this trial address as U.S. Exhibit -JJ, together with the trial brief against the Defendant Bormann. - -The Defendant Bormann bears a major responsibility for promoting the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators, the consolidation of their -total power over Germany, and the preparation for aggressive war set -forth in Count One of the Indictment. - -Upon the Record of this Trial the Nazi Party and its Leadership Corps -were the main vehicles of the conspiracy and the fountainhead of the -conspiracy. - -Now, following the flight of the Defendant Hess to Scotland in May 1941, -Bormann became executive chief of the Nazi Party. His official title was -Chief of the Party Chancellery. Before that date Bormann was chief of -staff to the Defendant Hess, the Deputy to the Führer. - -By virtue of these two powerful positions—Chief of the Party -Chancellery and Chief of Staff to the Deputy to the Führer—Bormann -stands revealed as a principal architect of the conspiracy. Subject -only—and we stress—subject only to the supreme authority of Hitler, -Bormann engineered and employed the vast powers of the Party, its -agencies, and formations, in furtherance of the Nazi conspiracy; and he -employed the Party to impose the will of the conspirators upon the -German people; and he then directed the powers of the Party in the drive -to dominate Europe. - -Accordingly, the Defendant Bormann is blameworthy for the multiple -crimes of the conspiracy, for the multiple crimes committed by the -Party, its agencies, and the German people, in furthering the -conspiracy. - -It might be helpful to give a very brief sketch of the career in -conspiracy of the Defendant Bormann. - -Bormann began his conspiratorial activities more than 20 years ago. In -1922, only 22 years of age, he joined the Organization Rossbach, one of -the illegal groups which continued the militaristic traditions of the -German Army and employed terror against the small struggling pacifist -minority in Germany. While he was district leader for this organization -in Mecklenburg, he was arrested and tried for his part in a political -assassination, which, we suggest, indicates his disposition to use -illegal methods to carry out purposes satisfactory to himself. On 15 May -1924 he was found guilty by the State Tribunal for the Protection of the -Republic and sentenced to 1 year in prison. - -Upon his release from prison in 1925 Bormann resumed his subversive -activities. He joined the militarist organization “Frontbann,” and in -the same year he joined the Nazi Party and began his ascent to a -prominent position in the conspiracy. In 1927 he became press chief for -the Party Gau of Thuringia. In other words, relating back to the case -against the Leadership Corps, he became an important staff officer of a -Gauleiter. On 1 April 1928 he was made District Leader (Bezirksleiter) -in Thuringia and business manager for the entire Gau. - -We come now to a particularly important point involving Bormann’s tie-up -with the SA. - -From 15 November 1928 to August 1930 he was on the staff of the Supreme -Command of the SA. - -Now the Tribunal has heard the demonstration of the criminality of the -SA and knows full well that this was a semi-military organization of -young men whose main mission was to get control of the streets and to -impose terror on oppositional elements of the conspiracy. - -Our submission at this stage is that, by virtue of Bormann’s position on -the staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, he shares responsibility for -the illegal activities of the SA in furtherance of the conspiracy. - -In August 1930 Bormann organized the Aid Fund (Hilfskasse) of the Nazi -Party, of which he became head. Through this fund he collected large -sums for the alleged purpose of aiding the families of Party members who -had been killed or injured while fighting for the Party. - -As the Tribunal knows, on 30 January 1933 the conspirators and their -Party took over the Government of Germany. Shortly thereafter, in July -1933, Bormann was given the number three position in the Party, that of -chief of staff to the Defendant Hess, the Deputy to the Führer. At the -same time he was made a Reichsleiter; and as the Tribunal knows, that -makes him a member of the top level of the alleged illegal organization, -the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. - -In November 1933 he was made a member of the Reichstag. - -I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the authoritative -German publication _The Greater German Reichstag_, edition of 1943. The -facts which I have recited in the foregoing sketch of Defendant -Bormann’s career are set forth on Page 167 of that publication, the -English translation of which appears in Document 2981-PS of the document -book now before the Tribunal. - -With respect to Bormann’s conviction for political murder, I offer in -evidence Document 3355-PS, Exhibit USA-682, which is the affidavit of -Dr. Robert M. W. Kempner, and I quote therefrom briefly as follows: - - “I, Robert M. W. Kempner, an expert consultant of the War - Department, appeared before the undersigned attesting officer - and, having been duly sworn, stated as follows: - - “In my capacity as Superior Government Counsellor and Chief - Legal Advisor of the pre-Hitler Prussian Police Administration, - I became officially acquainted with the criminal record of - Martin Bormann, identical with the Defendant Martin Bormann now - under indictment before the International Military Tribunal in - Nuremberg, Germany. - - “The official criminal record of Martin Bormann contained the - following entry: - - “Bormann, Martin, sentenced on May 15, 1924, by the State - Tribunal for the Protection of the Republic, in Leipzig, - Germany, to 1 year in prison, for having been an accomplice in - the commission of a political murder.”—Signed—“Robert M. W. - Kempner.”—End of quotation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Lambert, I don’t think it is necessary for -you, when dealing with a document of that sort, to read the formal -parts. If you state the nature of the document and read the material -part, you needn’t deal with the formal parts, for instance, “I, Robert -Kempner, an expert consultant,” and all that. Do you understand me? - -LT. LAMBERT: Thank you very much, Sir, for a very helpful suggestion. - -As Defendant Hess’ chief of staff, Bormann was responsible for receiving -and channelling up to the Defendant Hess the demands of the Party in all -fields of State action. These demands were then secured by the Defendant -Hess by virtue of his participation in the legislative process, his -power with respect to the appointment and promotion of government -officials, and by virtue of his position in the Reich Cabinet. - -I come now, as it seems to us, to an important point, which ties up the -Defendant Bormann with the SD and the Gestapo. As chief of staff of the -Defendant Hess, Bormann took measures to reinforce the grip of the -Gestapo and the SD over the German civil population. I request the -Tribunal to notice judicially a Bormann order of 14 February 1935, set -forth in the official publication _Decrees of the Deputy of the Führer_, -Edition 1937, Page 257. I quote merely the pertinent portions of that -decree, the English version of which is set forth in our Document -3237-PS, which reads as follows. That is our Document 3237-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: If it is a document of which we can take judicial notice, -it is sufficient for you to summarize it without reading it. - -LT. LAMBERT: I appreciate that, Sir. This quotation is so succinct and -so brief that we perhaps could avoid summarization. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on. - - LT. LAMBERT: “The Deputy to the Führer expects that Party - offices will now abandon all distrust of the SD and will support - it wholeheartedly in the performance of the difficult tasks with - which it has been entrusted for the protection of the Movement - and our people. - - “Because the work of the SD is primarily to the benefit of the - work of the Party, it is inadmissable that its development be - upset by uncalled-for attacks when individuals fall short of - expectations. On the contrary, it must be wholeheartedly - assisted.”—Signed—“Bormann, Chief of Staff to the Deputy to - the Führer.” - -That is with respect to Bormann’s support of the SD. I deal now with -Bormann’s effort to support the work of the Gestapo. - -THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Lambert, wouldn’t it be sufficient to say that -document indicates the support Bormann promised to the SD? - -LT. LAMBERT: I was anxious merely on one point, Sir, that a document was -not in evidence unless it had been quoted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you began by asking us to take judicial notice of -it. If we can take judicial notice of it, it need not be quoted. - -LT. LAMBERT: Then, with respect to Bormann’s efforts to reinforce the -grip of the Gestapo, I request the Tribunal to notice judicially a -Bormann order of 3 September 1935, calling on Party agencies to report -to the Gestapo all persons who criticize Nazi institutions or the Nazi -Party. This decree appears in the official Party publication _Decrees of -the Deputy of the Führer_, 1937, at Page 190. The English translation is -set forth in our Document 3239-PS. I shall summarize the effect of this -document shortly. In its first paragraph it refers to a law of 20 -December 1934. As the Tribunal will recall, this law gave the same -protection to Party institutions and Party uniforms as enjoyed by the -State; and in the first and second paragraphs of this decree it is -indicated that whenever a case came up involving malicious or slanderous -attack on Party members or the Nazi Party or its institutions, the Reich -Minister of Justice would consult with the Deputy of the Führer in order -to take joint action against the offenders. Then, in the third -paragraph, Bormann gives his orders to all Party agencies with respect -to reporting to the Gestapo individuals who criticized the Nazi Party or -its institutions. I quote merely the last paragraph. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I took down what you said in your first sentence, -which was that the document showed that he was ordering that a report -should be made to the Gestapo on anyone criticizing the Party. Well, -that is sufficient, it seems to me, and all that you said after is -cumulative. - -LT. LAMBERT: There is, however, one brief point, if I may be permitted, -which I should like to emphasize, about the last paragraph, because I -think it is helpful to the Prosecution’s case against the Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party. - -The Tribunal will recall that it asked certain very material questions -with respect to whether the Prosecution’s evidence involved the rank and -file of the Leadership Corps. In the last paragraph of this decree -Bormann instructs the Ortsgruppenleiter—now that is way down in the -Leadership Corps hierarchy under Kreisleiter and Gauleiter—to report to -the Gestapo persons who criticize Nazi Party institutions. - -Now, an important point with respect to the tie-up between Bormann and -the SS. The Tribunal has already received the evidence establishing the -criminality of the SS. In this connection, I respectfully request the -Tribunal to notice judicially the July 1940 issue of _Das Archiv_, our -Document 3234-PS. On Page 399 of that publication, under date 21 July -1940, it is stated that the Führer promoted Defendant Bormann from major -general to lieutenant general in the SS. Accordingly, we respectfully -submit that Bormann is chargeable and jointly responsible for the -criminal activities of the SS. - -After the flight of the Defendant Hess to Scotland in May 1941, the -Defendant Bormann succeeded him as head of the Nazi Party under Hitler, -with the title Chief of the Party Chancellery. I request the Tribunal to -take judicial notice of a decree of 24 January 1942, 1942 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 35. In our conception this is an -extremely important decree, because by virtue of it the participation of -the Party in all legislation and in government appointments and -promotions had to be undertaken exclusively by Bormann. He was to take -part in the preparation—and we emphasize that—as well as the enactment -and promulgation of all Reich laws and enactments; and further, he had -to give his assent to all enactments of the Reich Länder—that is, the -states—as well as all decrees of the Reich governors. All -communications between state and Party officials had to pass through his -hands. And, as a result of this law, we respectfully submit, Bormann is -chargeable for every enactment issued in Germany after 24 January 1942 -which facilitates and furthers the conspiracy. - -It will be helpful, I believe, to point out and to request the Court to -take judicial notice of a decree of 29 May 1941, 1941 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 295 (Document 2099-PS); in this decree -Hitler ordered that Bormann should take over all powers and all offices -formerly held by the Defendant Hess. I request the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of another very important decree, that of the -Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich, 16 November 1942 . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Are these documents set out in the document book? - -LT. LAMBERT: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: You haven’t given us the reference. - -LT. LAMBERT: That is true, Sir. I recall from memory, although I do not -have it in my manuscript, that document, that important decree of 24 -January 1942, is our Document, I believe, 2100-PS. - -I now request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the important -decree of the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich, dated 16 -November 1942, 1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 649 (Document -JN-5). Under this decree all Gauleiter, who were under Bormann by virtue -of his position as Chief of the Party Chancellery, were appointed Reich -defense commissars and charged with the co-ordination, supervision, and -management of the aggressive Nazi war effort. - -From then on the Party, under Bormann, became the decisive force in -planning and conducting the aggressive Nazi war economy. - -On 12 April 1943, as is shown in the publication _The Greater German -Reichstag_, 1943 edition, Page 167, our Document 2981-PS, Bormann was -appointed Secretary of the Führer, and we submit that this fact -testifies to the intimacy and influence of the Defendant Bormann with -the Führer and enlarges his role in, and responsibility for, the -conspiracy. - -We now come to the important point of Bormann’s executive responsibility -for the acts of the Volkssturm. I request the Tribunal to notice -judicially a Führer order of 18 October 1944, which was published in the -official _Völkischer Beobachter_, 20 October 1944 edition, in which -Hitler appointed Bormann political and organizational leader of the -Volkssturm. This is set forth in our Document 3018-PS. In this decree -Himmler is made the military leader of the Volkssturm, but the -organizational and political leadership is entrusted to Bormann. The -Tribunal will know that the Volkssturm was an organization consisting of -all German males between 16 and 60. By virtue of his leadership of the -Volkssturm Bormann was instrumental in needlessly prolonging the war, -with a consequential destruction of the German and the European economy -and a loss of life and destruction of property. - -We come now to deal with the responsibility of the Defendant Bormann -with respect to persecution of the Church. The Defendant Bormann -authorized, directed, and participated in measures involving the -persecution of the Christian Church. The Tribunal, of course, has heard -much in this proceeding concerning the acts of the conspiracy involving -the persecution of the Church. We have no desire now to rehash that -evidence. We are interested in one thing alone, and that is nailing on -the Defendant Bormann his responsibility, his personal, individual -responsibility, for the persecution of the Church. - -I shall now present the proofs showing the responsibility of Bormann -with respect to such persecution of the Christian churches. - -Bormann was among the most relentless enemies of the Christian Church -and Christian clergy in Germany and in German-occupied Europe. I refer -the Tribunal, without quoting therefrom, to Document D-75, previously -introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-348, which contains a copy -of the secret Bormann decree of 6 June 1941 entitled “The Relationship -of National Socialism to Christianity.” In this decree, as the Tribunal -will well recall, Bormann bluntly declared that National Socialism and -Christianity were incompatible, and he indicated that the ultimate aim -of the conspirators was to assure the elimination of Christianity -itself. - -I next refer the Tribunal, without quotation, to Document 098-PS, -previously put in as Exhibit Number USA-350. This is a letter from the -Defendant Bormann to the Defendant Rosenberg, dated 22 February 1940, in -which Bormann reaffirms the incompatibility of Christianity and National -Socialism. - -Now, in furtherance of the conspirators’ aim to undermine the Christian -churches, Bormann took measures to eliminate the influence of the -Christian Church from within the Nazi Party and its formations. I now -offer in evidence Document 113-PS, as Exhibit USA-683. This is an order -of the Defendant Bormann, dated 27 July 1938, issued as chief of staff -to the Deputy of the Führer, Hess, which prohibits clergymen from -holding Party offices. I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to -spread this quotation upon the Record. The point of it is, as indicated, -that Bormann issued an order forbidding the appointment of clergymen to -Party positions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off for 10 -minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -LT. LAMBERT: May it please the Tribunal, we are dealing with the efforts -of the Defendant Bormann to expel and exorcise from the Party all church -and religious influence. - -I offer in evidence Document 838-PS, as Exhibit USA-684. I shall not -burden the Record with extensive quotation from this exhibit, but merely -point out that this is a copy of a Bormann decree dated 3 June 1939, -which laid it down that followers of Christian Science should be -excluded from the Party. - -The attention of the Tribunal is next invited to Document 840-PS, -previously introduced in evidence as Exhibit USA-355. The Tribunal will -recall that this was a Bormann decree of 14 July 1939, referring with -approval to an earlier Bormann decree of 9 February 1937 in which the -Defendant Bormann ruled that in the future all Party members who entered -the clergy or who undertook the study of theology were to be expelled -from the Party. - -I next offer in evidence Document 107-PS, Exhibit USA-351. This is a -circular directive of the Defendant Bormann, dated 17 June 1938, -addressed to all Reichsleiter and Gauleiter—top leaders of the -Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party—transmitting a copy of directions -relating to the non-participation of the Reich Labor Service in -religious celebrations. The Reich Labor Service, the Tribunal will -recall, compulsorily incorporated all Germans within its organization. - -DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): The member of the -Prosecution has just submitted a number of documents, in which he proves -that, on the suggestion of Bormann, members of the Christian religion -were to be excluded from the Party or from certain organizations. I beg -the High Tribunal to allow the member of the Prosecution to explain to -me how and why this activity, that is, the exclusion of Christians from -the Party, can be a War Crime. I cannot gather this evidence from the -trial brief. The Party is described as criminal—as a conspiracy. Is it -a crime to exclude certain people from membership in a criminal -conspiracy? Is that considered a crime? How and why is the exclusion of -certain members from the Party a crime? - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel will answer you. - -LT. LAMBERT: If the Tribunal will willingly accommodate argument at this -stage, we find that the question. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Only short argument. - -LT. LAMBERT: Yes, Sir. . . . admits of a short, and, as it seems to us, -an easy answer. - -The point we are now trying to prove—and evidence is abounding on -it—is that Bormann had a hatred and an enmity and took oppositional -measures towards the Christian Church. The Party was the repository of -political power in Germany. To have power one had to be in the Party or -subject to its favor. By his efforts, concerted, continuing, and -consistent, to exclude clergymen, theological students, or any persons -sympathetic to the Christian religion, Bormann could not have chosen a -clearer method of showing and demonstrating his hatred and his distrust -of the Christian religion and those who supported it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Bormann can present his argument upon this -subject at a later stage. The documents appear to the Tribunal to be -relevant. - -LT. LAMBERT: With the Tribunal’s permission, I had just put in Document -107-PS and pointed out that it transmitted directions relating to the -non-participation of the Reich Labor Service in religious celebrations. -I quote merely the fourth and fifth paragraphs of Page 1 of the English -translation of Document 107-PS, which reads as follows: - - “All religious discussion is forbidden in the Reich Labor - Service because it disturbs the comrade-like union of all - working men and women. - - “For this reason also any participation of the Reich Labor - Service in church, that is, confessional, services and - celebrations is impossible.” - -The attention of the Tribunal is next invited to Document 070-PS, -previously put in as Exhibit USA-349. The Tribunal will recall that this -was a letter from Bormann’s office to the Defendant Rosenberg, dated 25 -April 1941, in which Bormann declared that he had achieved progressive -success in reducing and abolishing religious services in schools and in -replacing Christian prayers with National Socialist mottoes and rituals. -In this letter Bormann also proposed a Nazified morning service in the -schools in place of the existing confession and morning service. - -In his concerted efforts to undermine and subvert the Christian -churches, Bormann authorized, directed, and participated in measures -leading to the closing, reduction, and suppression of theological -schools, faculties, and institutions. The attention of the Tribunal is -invited to Document 116-PS, Exhibit Number USA-685, which I offer in -evidence. This is a letter from the Defendant Bormann to the Defendant -Rosenberg, dated 24 January 1939, enclosing for Rosenberg’s cognizance a -copy of Bormann’s letter to the Reich Minister for Science, Education, -and Popular Culture. In the enclosed letter Bormann informs the Minister -as to the Party’s position in favor of restricting and suppressing -theological faculties. Bormann states that, owing to war conditions, it -had become necessary to reorganize the German high schools and, in view -of this situation, he requested the Minister to restrict and suppress -certain theological faculties. - -I now quote from the first paragraph on Page 3 of the English -translation of Document 116-PS, which reads as follows: - - “I therefore should like to see you put the theological - faculties under substantial limitations, where, for the above - reasons, they cannot be entirely eliminated. This will apply not - only to the theological faculties at universities but also to - the various state institutions which, as seminaries having no - affiliation with any university, still exist in many places. - - “I request that no express explanations be given to churches or - other institutions and that public announcement of these - measures be avoided. Complaints and the like are to be answered - if at all, with the explanation that these measures are carried - out in the course of planned economy and that the same is - happening to other faculties. - - “I would be glad if the professorial chairs thus made vacant - could then be turned over especially to those fields of research - newly created in recent years, such as racial research, - archeology, _et cetera_, Martin Bormann.” - -In our submission, what this document comes to is a request from Bormann -to this effect: Please close down the religious faculties and substitute -in their place Nazi faculties and university chairs with the mission of -investigating racism, cultism, Nazi archeology. This sort of thing was -done in the Hohe Schule, as was so clearly demonstrated in the -Prosecution’s case against the plundering activities of the Einsatzstab -Rosenberg. - -The attention of the Tribunal is next invited to Document 122-PS, -previously put in as Exhibit Number USA-362. The Tribunal will recall -that 122-PS is a letter from the Defendant Bormann to the Defendant -Rosenberg, dated 17 April 1939, transmitting to Rosenberg a photostatic -copy of the plan of the Reich Minister of Science, Education, and -Popular Culture for the combining and dissolving of certain specified -theological faculties. In his letter of transmittal Bormann requested -Rosenberg to take “cognizance and prompt action” with respect to the -proposed suppression of religious institutions. - -I next offer in evidence Document 123-PS, Exhibit USA-686. This is a -confidential letter from the Defendant Bormann to the Minister of -Education, dated 23 June 1939, in which Bormann sets forth the Party’s -decision to order the suppression of numerous theological faculties and -religious institutions. The Tribunal will note that the letter lists 19 -separate religious institutions with respect to which Bormann ordered -dissolution or restriction. - -After directing the action to be taken by the Minister in connection -with the various theological faculties, Bormann stated as follows—and I -quote from the next to last paragraph of Page 3 of the English -translation of Document 123-PS: - - “In the above I have informed you of the Party’s wishes, after - thorough investigation of the matter with all Party offices. I - should be grateful if you would initiate the necessary measures - as quickly as possible. With regard to the great political - significance which every single case of such a consolidation - will have for the Gau concerned, I ask you to take these - measures and particularly to fix dates for them always in - agreement with me.” - -I next offer in evidence, without quotation, Document 131-PS as Exhibit -USA-687. In summary, without quotation therefrom, this is a letter from -the Defendant Bormann to the Defendant Rosenberg, dated 12 December -1939, relating to the suppression of seven professorships in the near-by -University of Munich. - -Now I deal briefly with the responsibility of Bormann for the -confiscation of religious property and cultural property. Bormann used -his paramount power and position to cause the confiscation of religious -property and to subject the Christian churches and clergy to a -discriminatory legal regime. - -I offer in evidence Document 099-PS, Exhibit USA-688. This is a copy of -a letter from Bormann to the Reich Minister for Finance, dated 19 -January 1940, in which Bormann demanded a great increase in the special -war tax imposed on the churches. I quote from the first two paragraphs -of Page 2 of the English translation of Document 099-PS, which read as -follows: - - “As it has been reported to me, the war contribution of the - churches for the 3-month period beginning 1 November 1939 has - been tentatively set at RM 1,800,000 per month, of which RM 1 - million are to be paid by the Protestant Church, and RM 800,000 - by the Catholic Church. - - “The fixing of such a low amount has surprised me. I see from - numerous reports that political communities are obliged to raise - such a large war contribution that the performance of their - tasks—some of them very important; for example, in the field of - public welfare—is endangered. In view of this, a higher quota - also from the churches appears to me to be absolutely - justified.” - -The question may arise: Of what criminal effect is it to demand larger -taxes from church institutions? As to this demand of Bormann’s taken by -itself, the Prosecution would not suggest that it had criminal effect, -but when viewed within the larger frame of Bormann’s demonstrated -hostility to the Christian Church and his efforts not merely to -circumscribe but to eliminate it, we suggest that this document has -probative value in showing Bormann’s hostility and his concrete measures -to effectuate that hostility against the Christian churches and clergy. - -I next refer the Tribunal to Document 089-PS, previously put in as -Exhibit Number USA-360. The Tribunal will recall that this was a letter -from Bormann to Reichsleiter Amann, dated 8 March 1940, in which Bormann -instructed Amann, Reichsleiter of the Press, to make a sharper -restriction in paper distribution against religious writings in favor of -publications more acceptable to the Nazi ideology. - -I next offer in evidence Document 066-PS, as Exhibit USA-689. This is a -letter from the Defendant Bormann to the Defendant Rosenberg, dated 24 -June 1940, transmitting a draft of a proposed discriminatory church law -for Danzig and West Prussia. This decree is a direct abridgment of -religious freedom, for in Paragraph 1—I do not quote, but briefly and -rapidly summarize—the approval of the Reich deputy for Danzig and West -Prussia is required as a condition for the legal competence of all -religious organizations. - -Paragraph 3 of the decree suspended all claims of religious -organizations and congregations to state or municipal subsidies and -prohibited religious organizations from exercising their right of -collecting dues without the approval of the Reich deputy. - -In Paragraph 5 of the decree the acquisition of property by religious -organizations was made subject to the approval of the Reich deputy. All -credit rights acquired by religious organizations prior to 1 January -1940 were required to be ratified by the Reich Deputy in order to become -actionable. - -I now offer in evidence Document 1600-PS, Exhibit USA-690. This -comprises correspondence of Bormann during 1940 and 1941 relating to the -confiscation of religious art treasures. I quote the text of the second -letter set forth on Page 1 of the English translation of Document -1600-PS, which is a letter from the Defendant Bormann to Dr. Posse of -the State Picture Gallery in Dresden, dated 16 January 1941, which reads -as follows, and I quote: - - “Dear Dr. Posse: - - “Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar - from the convent in Hohenfurth near Krumau. The convent and its - entire property will be confiscated in the immediate future - because of the subversive attitude of its inmates toward the - State. - - “It would be up to you to decide whether the pictures are to - remain in the convent at Hohenfurth or are to be transferred to - the museum at Linz after its completion. - - “I shall await your opinion in the matter. Bormann.” - -The Tribunal may know that, in what is described as Hitler’s last will -and testament, he makes a bequest of all the art treasures he had in the -museum at Linz, and from a legal point of view he uses the euphemism -“art treasures which I have bought.” This document, on its face, -suggests how at least certain of the properties, the art treasures in -the museum at Linz, were acquired. - -Finally, as the war drew increasing numbers of German youth into the -Armed Forces, the Defendant Bormann took measures to exclude and -exorcise all religious influence from the troops. The attention of the -Tribunal is invited to Document 101-PS, previously put in as Exhibit -Number USA-361. The Tribunal will recall that this is a letter from the -Defendant Bormann, dated 17 January 1940, in which Bormann pronounced -the Party’s opposition to the circulation of religious literature to the -members of the German Armed Forces. In this letter Bormann stated that -if the influence of the church upon the troops was to be effectively -fought, this could only be done by producing, in the shortest possible -time, a large amount of Nazi pamphlets and publications. - -I now offer in evidence Document 100-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-691. This -is a letter from the Defendant Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 18 January -1940, in which Bormann declares that the publication of Nazi literature -for army recruits as a counter measure to the circulation of religious -writings was the “most essential demand of the hour.” - -I forbear quoting from that document. Its substance is indicated. - -I now request the Tribunal to notice judicially the authoritative Nazi -publication entitled _Decrees of the Deputy of the Führer_, edition of -1937; and I quote from Page 235 of this volume the pertinent and -important decree issued by the Defendant Bormann to the Commissioner of -the Party Directorate, dated 7 January 1936, the English version of -which is set forth in the English translation of our Document 3246-PS. -In this one sentence Bormann aims and directs the terror of the Gestapo -against dissident church members who crossed the conspirators, and I -quote: - - “If parish priests or other subordinate Roman Catholic leaders - adopt an attitude of hostility toward the State or Party, it - shall be reported to the Secret State Police”—Gestapo—“through - official channels.”—Signed—“Bormann.” - -By leave of the Tribunal, I come now to deal with the responsibility of -the Defendant Bormann for the persecution of the Jews. - -Again, the Prosecution seeks not to rehash the copious evidence in the -Record on the persecution of the Jews but rather to limit itself to -evidence fastening on the Defendant Bormann his individual -responsibility for the persecution of the Jews. Bormann shares the deep -guilt of the Nazi conspirators for their odious program in the -persecution of the Jews. It was the Defendant Bormann, we would note, -who was charged by Hitler with the transmission and implementation of -the Führer’s orders for the liquidation of the so-called Jewish problem. - -Following the Party-planned and Party-directed program of 8 and 9 -November 1938, in the course of which a large number of Jews were killed -and harmed, Jewish shops pillaged and wrecked, and synagogues set ablaze -all over the Reich, the Defendant Bormann, on orders from Hitler, -instructed the Defendant Göring to proceed to the “final settlement of -the Jewish question” in Germany. - -The attention of the Tribunal is invited to Document 1816-PS, previously -put in as Exhibit USA-261. The Tribunal is well acquainted with this -document. It has frequently been referred to. The Tribunal knows that -Document 1816-PS is the minutes of a conference on the Jewish question, -held under the direction of Göring on the 12th of November 1938. 1 quote -only the first sentence of Document 1816-PS, which fastens the -responsibility upon Bormann and which reads as follows: - - “Göring: ‘Gentlemen, today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I - have received a letter written on the Führer’s orders by the - Chief of Staff of the Führer’s Deputy, Bormann, requesting that - the Jewish question be now, once and for all, co-ordinated and - solved in one way or another.’” - -The Tribunal is well aware of the proposals, the discussions, and the -actions taken in this conference that constituted the so-called -“settlement of the Jewish question.” - -As a result of this conference a series of anti-Jewish decrees and -measures were issued and adopted by the Nazi conspirators. I offer in -evidence Document 069-PS, Exhibit USA-589. This is a decree of Bormann, -dated 17 January 1939, in which Bormann demands compliance with the new -anti-Jewish regulations stemming and flowing from the Göring conference -just referred to, under which Jews were denied access to housing, -travel, and other facilities of ordinary life. I quote the Bormann -order, which appears at Page 1 of the English translation of Document -069-PS, which reads as follows: - - “According to a report of General Field Marshal Göring, the - Führer has made some basic decisions regarding the Jewish - question. The decisions are brought to your attention in the - enclosure. Strict compliance with these directives is - requested.”—Signed—“Bormann.” - -In the interests of expediting the proceedings, I shall resist the -temptation to quote extensively from the enclosed order in Bormann’s -letter of transmittal. In effect, the crux of it is that Jews are denied -sleeping compartments in trains, the right to give their trade to -certain hotels in Berlin, Munich, Nuremberg, Augsburg, and the like. -They are banned and excluded from swimming pools, certain public -squares, resort towns, mineral baths, and the like. The stigma, the -degradation, and the inconvenience in the ordinary affairs of life -promoted by this decree are plain. - -I next request the Tribunal to notice judicially the decree of 12 -November 1938, 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1580 (Document -JN-6), quite familiar to this Tribunal, for it was the decree which -excluded Jews from economic life. This decree forbade Jews to operate -retail shops, and it was a decree which went far to eliminate Jews from -economic life. - -Now Bormann also acted through other state agencies to wipe out the -economic existence of large sections of the Jewish population. In that -respect I request the Tribunal to notice judicially the authoritative -Nazi publication entitled _Decrees of the Deputy of the Führer_, edition -of 1937, our Document 3240-PS. At Page 383 of this publication there -appears a decree of the Defendant Bormann, dated 8 January 1937, -reproducing an order of the Defendant Frick, issued at Bormann’s -instigation, denying financial assistance to government employees who -employed the services of Jewish doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, -morticians, and other professional classes. I shall forbear from quoting -the text of that decree. Its substance is as given. - -If it please the Tribunal, for the benefit of the translators I shall -continue reading from Page 25 of the manuscript. - -After the outbreak of war the anti-Jewish measures increased in -intensity and brutality. Thus, the Defendant Bormann participated in the -arrangements for the deportation to Poland of 60,000 Jewish inhabitants -of Vienna, in co-operation with the SS and the Gestapo. I have no doubt -that the Tribunal received this document in connection with the case -against Von Schirach; it is our Document 1950-PS, and on its face it -points out, and Lammers says: Bormann has informed Von Schirach of your -proposal to bring about the deportations. I limit myself to pointing out -that single, solitary fact. - -When Bormann succeeded the Defendant Hess as Chief of the Party -Chancellery, he used his vast powers in such a way that he was a prime -mover in the program of starvation, degradation, spoliation, and -extermination of the Jews—and we use those terms advisedly—subject to -the Draconian rule of the conspirators. - -I request the Tribunal to notice judicially the decree of 31 May 1941, -1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 297, which was signed by the -Defendant Bormann and which extends the discriminatory Nuremberg laws -into the annexed Eastern territories. I request the Tribunal to notice -judicially the 11th ordinance under the Reich citizenship law of 25 -November 1941, 1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 722, signed by -Defendant Bormann, which ordered the confiscation of the property of all -Jews who had left Germany or who had been deported. - -I request the Tribunal to notice judicially an order of Bormann’s dated -23 October 1941. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You have not given us the PS numbers of either the decree -of 31 of May 1941 or the one after that. - -LT. LAMBERT: I confess dereliction of duty there. These decrees, in -translated form, are all in the document book. I do not have, in my -manuscript, their PS citation. However, in the brief now filed with or -soon to be delivered to the Tribunal, these decrees are given with their -PS numbers opposite. - -THE PRESIDENT: 3354-PS and 3241-PS. - -LT. LAMBERT: That is very good of you, Sir. Thank you. - -I request the Tribunal to notice judicially an order of the Defendant -Bormann, dated 23 October 1942, Volume II of the publication _Decrees, -Regulations, Announcements_, Page 147. This is our document, I rejoice -to be able to say, 3243-PS, which announces a Ministry of Food decree, -issued at Bormann’s instigation, which deprived Jews of many essential -food items, all special sickness and pregnancy rations for expectant -mothers and ordered confiscation of food parcels sent to the beleaguered -Jews from the sympathetic outside world. - -I now request the Tribunal to notice judicially the 13th ordinance under -the Reich citizenship law of 1 July 1943, 1943 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part -I, Page 372, signed by the Defendant Bormann, under which all Jews were -completely withdrawn from the protection of the ordinary courts and -handed over to the exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler’s police. This is -our Document 1422-PS. - -With leave of the Tribunal, we respectfully request the opportunity to -underline the significance of that decree. In a society which desires to -live under the rule of law, men are judged only after appearance before, -and adjudication by, a court of law. The effect of this decree was to -remove all alleged Jewish offenders from the jurisdiction of the courts -of law and to turn them over to the police. The police were to have -jurisdiction over alleged Jewish offenders, not the tribunal of law. - -The result of this law was soon forthcoming, a result for which the -Defendant Bormann shares the responsibility. On July 3, 1943, Himmler -issued a decree, our Document 3085-PS, 1943 _Ministry of Interior -Gazette_, Page 1085. I respectfully request the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of this decree, which charged the Himmler police and -Gestapo with the execution of the foregoing ordinance closing the courts -to the Jews and entrusting them to Himmler’s police. - -Finally, with respect to Bormann’s responsibility for the persecution of -the Jews, I request the Tribunal to notice judicially a decree of -Bormann’s, dated 9 October 1942, Volume II, _Decrees, Regulations, -Announcements_, Pages 131, 132. It declared that the problem of -eliminating forever millions of Jews from Greater German territory could -no longer be solved by emigration merely, but only by the application of -ruthless force in special camps in the East. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you referring to there? - -LT. LAMBERT: That, Sir, is Document 3244-PS. - -We had desired at the outset, Sir, to quote this decree in full as an -irrefutable answer to a question put by Defense Counsel some days ago in -cross-examination, as to whether or not anti-Semitic policies of the -conspirators were the policies merely of certain demented or deviational -members of the conspiracy and not the concerted, settled policy of the -conspiracy itself. Time does not permit the full quotation of this -decree, but with the indulgence of the Tribunal, if I may offer the -essence of this decree in a brief sentence or two. - -Bormann starts out in this decree by saying: Recently rumors have been -stimulated throughout the Reich as to “‘violent things’ we are doing -with respect to the Jews.” These rumors are being brought back to the -Reich by our returning soldiers who have eye-witnessed them in the East. -If we are to combat the effect of these rumors, then our attitude, as I -now outline it to you officially, must be communicated to the German -civil population. Bormann then reviews what he terms “the -two-thousand-year-old struggle against Judaism,” and he divides the -Party’s program into two spheres: the first, the effort of the Party and -the conspirators to excommunicate and expel the Jews from the economic -and social life of Germany. Then he adds: When we started rolling with -our war, this measure by itself was not enough; we had to resort to -forced emigration and set up our camps in the East. He then goes on to -say that: As our armies have advanced in the East, we have overrun the -lands to which we have sent the Jews, and now these emigration measures, -our second proposal, are no longer sufficient. - -Then he comes to the proposal, the considered proposal of himself and -the Party Chancellery: We must transport these Jews eastward and farther -eastward and place them in special camps for forced labor. I quote now -merely the last sentence of Bormann’s decree: - - “It lies in the very nature of the matter that these problems, - which in part are very difficult, can be solved only with - ruthless severity in the interest of the final security of our - people.”—Bormann. - -With leave of the Tribunal, I come now to deal. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it signed by Bormann? It does not appear to be. I -thought you said, “Bormann.” - -LT. LAMBERT: That is what I said, true, Sir. - -If the Tribunal will refer, as it has, to Document 3244-PS, it is clear -that this is a Bormann decree, issued from the Office of the Deputy to -the Führer. It is true in this translation of the decree, Sir, Bormann’s -name is not affixed; but in the original volume it is very clear that -this is a decree of Bormann’s, issued from the Party Chancellery. The -Prosecution so assures the Tribunal and accepts responsibility for that -submission. - -With leave of the Tribunal, I now come to deal with the responsibility -of the Defendant Bormann for overt acts, for the commission and planning -of a wide variety of crimes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The -Tribunal knows the vast powers that Bormann possessed; that has already -been put in evidence. Our point is that he used these vast powers, -buttressed by his position as secretary to the Führer attending all the -conferences at the Führer’s headquarters, in the planning, the -authorization, and the participation in overt acts denominated War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. - -The attention of the Tribunal is invited to Document L-221, previously -put in as Exhibit USA-317. The Tribunal knows that this document is a -comprehensive report, dated 16 July 1941, made by the Defendant Bormann -just 3 weeks after the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by -Germany. It is a report of a 20-hour conference at Hitler’s field -headquarters with the Defendants Göring, Rosenberg, Keitel, and with -Reich Minister Lammers. This conference resulted in the adoption of -detailed plans and directives for the enslavement, depopulation, -Germanization, and annexation of extensive territories in the Soviet -Union and other countries of eastern Europe. - -In his report on this conference, set forth in Document L-221, Bormann -included numerous proposals of his own for the execution of these plans. - -Later the Defendant Bormann took a prominent part in implementing the -conspiratorial program. The attention of the Tribunal is invited to -Document 072-PS, previously put in as Exhibit USA-357. The Tribunal will -recall that this is a letter from the Defendant Bormann to the Defendant -Rosenberg, dated 19 April 1941, dealing with the confiscation of -cultural property in the East. I quote merely the last two paragraphs of -the English translation of Document 072-PS, which reads as follows: - - “The Führer emphasized that in the Balkans the use of your - experts”—I parenthetically insert that that is the experts of - the Einsatzstab Rosenberg organization, the plundering - organization—“the use of your experts would not be necessary, - since there were no art objects to be confiscated. In Belgrade, - only the collection of Prince Paul existed, which would be - returned to him completely. The remaining material of the - lodges, _et cetera_, would be seized by the men of SS - Gruppenführer Heydrich. - - “The libraries and art objects of the monasteries confiscated in - the Reich were to remain for the time being in these - monasteries, insofar as the Gauleiter had not determined - otherwise. After the war, a careful examination of the stock - could be undertaken. Under no circumstances, however, should a - centralization of all the libraries be undertaken - . . . .”—Signed—“Bormann.” - -I now offer in evidence Document 061-PS, Exhibit USA-692. This is a -secret letter from Bormann, dated 11 January 1944, in which Bormann -discloses—and we stress this, very important as it seems to us—the -existence of large-scale operations to drain off commodities from -German-occupied Europe for delivery to the bombed-out population in -Germany. The Tribunal knows that the Hague Regulations and the laws of -war permit the requisitioning of goods and services only for the use of -the Army of Occupation and for the needs of the administration of the -area. This proposal and this action represent the requisitioning of -materials in occupied areas for the use of the folk at home—of the home -front. - -I now quote the first two paragraphs of the English -translation—Bormann’s letter of 11 January 1944, set forth in the -English translation of our Document 061-PS, which reads as follows: - - “Since the supply of textiles and household goods for the bombed - population is becoming increasingly difficult, the proposition - was made repeatedly to effect purchases in the occupied - territories in greater proportions. Various Gauleiter proposed - to let these purchases be handled by suitable private merchants - who know these districts and have corresponding connections. - - “I have brought these proposals to the attention of the Reich - Minister of Economics and am quoting his reply of 16 December - 1943 on account of its fundamental importance: - - “‘I consider it an especially important task to make use of the - economic power of the occupied territories for the Reich. You - are aware of the fact that, since the occupation of the Western - territories, the buying out of these countries has been effected - to the greatest extent possible. Raw materials, semi-finished - products, and stocks in finished goods have been rolling into - Germany for months; valuable machines were sent to our armaments - industry. Everything was done at that time to increase our - armament potentialities. Later on, the shipments of these - important economic goods were replaced by the so-called transfer - of orders from industry to industry.’” - -I shall end the quotation there. The rest is not material to the point. - -In the course of the war—and this is of utmost importance in the view -of the Prosecution. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it clear that that was confiscation? - -LT. LAMBERT: It was not suggested, Sir, that this was confiscation. Our -point was that the Hague regulations allow requisitions in return for -payment only for the needs of the army of occupation and for the needs -of administration of the occupied area. This represents, as it seems to -us, a requisitioning program for the needs of the home front. It is on -that point that we offer it. - -We come now to what the Prosecution considers a most important point -against the Defendant Bormann. In the course of the war Bormann issued a -series of orders establishing Party jurisdiction over the treatment of -prisoners of war, especially when employed as forced labor. - -The Tribunal knows that, under the Geneva Convention of 1929 relating to -prisoners of war, prisoners of war are the captives, not of the troops -who take them or even of the army which captures them, but of the -capturing power; and it is the capturing power which has jurisdiction -over and responsibility for them. - -By the series of decrees now to be put in, Bormann asserts and -establishes Nazi Party jurisdiction over Allied prisoners of war. In the -exercise of that Party jurisdiction he called for excessively harsh and -brutal treatment of Allied prisoners of war. - -I now offer in evidence Document 232-PS as Exhibit USA-693. This is a -decree of the Defendant Bormann, dated 13 September 1944, -addressed—will the Tribunal please note—to all Reichsleiter, -Gauleiter, and Kreisleiter, and leaders of the Nazi affiliated -organizations—numerous levels, that is, of the Leadership Corps of the -Nazi Party—a decree establishing Nazi Party jurisdiction over the use -of prisoners of war for forced labor. - -I quote the first three paragraphs of Bormann’s order, set forth on Page -1 of the English translation of Document 232-PS, which reads as follows: - - “The regulations valid until now on the treatment of prisoners - of war and the tasks of the guard units are no longer justified - in view of the demands of the total war effort.” - -The Prosecution would intrude to ask the question: Since when do the -exigencies of the war effort repeal or modify the provisions of -international law? - - “Therefore, the OKW, on my suggestion issued the regulation, a - copy of which is enclosed. - - “The following observations are made on its contents: - - “1. The understanding exists between the Chief of the Supreme - Command of the Armed Forces and myself that the co-operation of - the Party in the commitment of prisoners of war is inevitable. - Therefore, the officers assigned to the prisoner-of-war - organization have been instructed to co-operate most closely - with the Hoheitsträger. The commandants of the prisoner-of-war - camps have immediately to detail liaison officers to the - Kreisleiter. - - “Thus the opportunity will be afforded the Hoheitsträger to - alleviate existing difficulties locally, to exercise influence - on the behavior of guards units”—and this is the point we - underline—“and better to assimilate the commitment of prisoners - of war to the political and economic demands.” - -Will the Tribunal permit me to observe that on the face of this order, -addressed to Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, and Kreisleiter, and so to the -officials of the Leadership Corps, in the terms of the order itself -Hoheitsträger are referred to as co-operating media in this scheme. - -The Tribunal has graciously given me an opportunity to observe that this -decree is addressed to Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, and to the -leaders of the affiliated and controlled Nazi organizations. As the -Tribunal knows, within the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party the -Kreisleiter is a pretty low level. That is a county leader. On the face -of the decree itself the co-operation of the Hoheitsträger is -directed—and the Tribunal knows, under the evidence presented against -the Leadership Corps, that Hoheitsträger range all the way from the -Reichsleiter on the top—down to and including the 500,000 or so -Blockleiter implicated. - -I next offer in evidence Document D-163 as Exhibit USA-694. This is a -letter of the Defendant Bormann, dated 5 November 1941, addressed—the -Tribunal will please note—to all Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, and -Kreisleiter (the last just mere county leaders), transmitting to these -officials of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party the instructions of -the Reich Minister of the Interior prohibiting decent burials with -religious ceremonies for Russian prisoners of war. I quote the pertinent -portions of these instructions, beginning with the next to the last -sentence of Page 1 of the English translation of D-163, which reads as -follows: - - “To save costs, service departments of the Army will generally - be contacted regarding transport of corpses (furnishing of - vehicles) whenever possible. No coffins will be indented for the - transfer and burial. The body will be completely enveloped with - strong paper (if possible, oil, tar, asphalt paper) or other - suitable material. Transfer and burial is to be carried out - unobtrusively. If a number of corpses have to be disposed of, - the burial will be carried out in a communal grave. In this - case, the bodies will be buried side by side (not on top of each - other) and in accordance with the local custom regarding depth - of graves. Where a graveyard is the place of burial a distant - part will be chosen. - - “No”—we repeat—“No burial ceremony or decoration of graves - will be allowed.” - -I now offer in evidence Document 228-PS, Exhibit USA-695. This is a -Bormann circular, dated 25 November 1943, issued from the headquarters -of the Führer, demanding harsher treatment of prisoners of war and the -increased exploitation of their manpower. I now quote the Bormann -circular which is set forth on Page 1 of the English translation of -Document 228-PS, which reads as follows: - - “Individual Gau administrations often refer in reports to a too - indulgent treatment of prisoners of war on the part of the guard - personnel. In many places, according to these reports, the - guarding authorities have even developed into protectors and - caretakers of the prisoners of war. - - “I informed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of these - reports, with the comment that the productive German working - population absolutely cannot understand it if, in a time when - the German people is fighting for existence or nonexistence, - prisoners of war—hence our enemies—are leading a better life - than the German working man and that it is an urgent duty of - every German who has to do with prisoners of war, to bring about - a complete utilization of their manpower. - - “The chief of prisoner-of-war affairs in the Supreme Command of - the Armed Forces has now given the unequivocal order, attached - hereto in copy form, to the commanders of prisoners of war in - the military districts. I request that this order be brought - orally to the attention of all Party office holders in the - appropriate manner. - - “In case that in the future, complaints about unsuitable - treatment of prisoners of war still come to light, they are to - be immediately communicated to the commanders of the prisoners - of war with a reference to the attached order.” - -The Tribunal will note, of course, that on the face of the decree -Bormann instructs that these orders be communicated orally to all Party -officials and that surely must include the members of the Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party. - -THE PRESIDENT: Speaking for myself, I don’t see anything particularly -wrong in that communication. - -LT. LAMBERT: On that point, Sir, we submit that if you take a document -which says, “We wish to utilize all the labor power of prisoners of war -in our control possible and to get this result by suitable means,” -probably it tends to appear unexceptional. But viewing this document in -relation to the other evidence in, and to be presented, which show a -concerted and settled policy by Bormann and his co-conspirators to. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, it isn’t necessary to argue it. - -LT. LAMBERT: Yes, Sir. Thank you, Sir. - -The attention of the Tribunal is invited to Document 656-PS, previously -put in as Exhibit USA-339. The Tribunal will recall that this is a -secret Bormann circular transmitting instructions of the Nazi High -Command of 29 January 1943, providing for the enforcement of labor -demands on Allied prisoners of war through the use of weapons and -corporal punishment. I quote a brief excerpt from these instructions, -beginning with the third sentence of the third numbered paragraph of -Page 2 of the English translation of Document 656-PS, which reads as -follows; and I quote: - - “Should the prisoner of war not fulfill his order, then he - has”—that is the guard unit, the guard personnel—“then he has, - in the case of very exceptional need and extreme danger, the - right to force obedience with weapons, if he has no other means. - He may use the weapon insofar as this is necessary to attain his - goal. If the assistant guard is not armed, then he is authorized - in forcing obedience by other appropriate means.” - -The Tribunal knows that, under the Geneva Prisoners-of-War Convention of -1929, when prisoners of war prove derelict and refuse to carry out -proper orders of the captive power or its forces, such prisoners of war -are subject to court-martial and military proceedings as if they were -serving under their own forces. Here is a decree which, on its face, -authorizes or attempts to authorize guard personnel to use the rifle or -other suitable means of violence; and of course Your Lordship will -understand it was this type of document we had in mind when we suggested -that the decree of Bormann should be considered in the light of his -other orders relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -LT. LAMBERT: The Tribunal will recall that at the close of the morning -session I had been putting in a series of decrees of the Defendant -Bormann in which he called for increasingly harsh and severe treatment -of Allied prisoners of war. These instructions issued by the Defendant -Bormann culminated in his decree of 30 September 1944. The attention of -the Tribunal is invited to Document 058-PS, previously put in as Exhibit -Number USA-456. The Tribunal will recall that this decree of the -Defendant Bormann removed jurisdiction over all prisoners of war from -the Nazi High Command and transferred it to Himmler. The decree also -provided that all PW camp commanders should be under the orders of the -local SS commanders. By virtue of this order of the Defendant Bormann, -Hitler was enabled to proceed with his program of inhuman treatment and -even extermination of Allied prisoners of war. - -We now proceed to put in what the Prosecution conceive to be extremely -important and extremely incriminating evidence against Bormann and the -co-conspirators, that is, the responsibility of the Defendant Bormann -for the organized lynching of Allied airmen. I offer in evidence -Document 062-PS, Exhibit Number USA-696; and I very respectfully request -the Tribunal to turn to this document. On its face it is an order dated -13 March 1940 from the Defendant Hess addressed to Reichsleiter, -Gauleiter, and other Nazi officials and organizations. In this order -these Party officials are instructed by the Defendant Hess to instruct -the German civil population to arrest or liquidate all bailed-out Allied -fliers. I call the attention of the Tribunal to the third paragraph on -the first page of the English translation of Document 062-PS. In the -third paragraph Hess directs that these instructions, which I shall soon -read, are to be passed out only orally to all—will the Tribunal please -mark that—district leaders or Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, cell -leaders, and even the block leaders; that is to say, this order must be -passed out by all the officials of the Leadership Corps to the -Hoheitsträger, ranging from Reichsleiter down to, and including, the -Blockleiter. - -Now turn to Document 062-PS, and the Tribunal will find the instructions -which Hess demanded be disseminated by the Leadership Corps orally: The -lynching of Allied fliers. These directions are headed: “About behavior -in case of landings of enemy planes or parachutists.” The first three -instructions I omit as not material to the basic point now being made. -Instruction 4 reads, and I quote: “Likewise enemy parachutists are -immediately to be arrested or liquidated.” - -It speaks for itself and requires no further comment from the -Prosecution. - -Now, in order to insure the success of this scheme ordered by the -Defendant Hess, Bormann issued a secret letter, dated 30 May 1944, to -the officials, if the Tribunal will please mark, of the Leadership Corps -of the Nazi Party, prohibiting any police measures or criminal -proceedings against German civilians who had lynched or murdered Allied -airmen. This document, our 057-PS, has been previously put in and -received by the Tribunal in connection with the Prosecution’s case -against the alleged criminal organization, the Leadership Corps of the -Nazi Party. - -Now, may it please the Tribunal, that such lynchings, organized, -authorized, and consented to by Defendant Bormann, actually took place -has since been fully and indisputably demonstrated by trials by American -military commissions which have resulted in the conviction of German -civilians for the murder of Allied fliers. I request the Tribunal to -take judicial notice of Military Commission Order Number 2, Headquarters -15th U. S. Army, dated 23 June 1945. This order is our Document 2559-PS. -This order imposed the sentence of death upon a German civilian for -violation of the laws and usages of war in murdering an American airman -who had bailed out and landed without any means of defense. - -The Tribunal will note from that order of the American Military -Commission the 15th of August 1944 as date of crime; Bormann’s order was -dated May 1944. - -I request the Tribunal to notice judicially Military Commission Order -Number 5, Headquarters 3rd U. S. Army and Eastern Military District, -dated 18 October 1945. This order is set forth in Document 2560-PS. This -order imposed a sentence of death upon a German national for violating -the laws and usages of war by murdering, on or about 12 December 1944, -an American airman who landed in German territory. - -We could cite further orders of American and other Allied military -commissions sentencing German civilians to death for the lynching and -murdering of Allied airmen who had bailed out and landed without means -of defense on German territory. We think our point is made by taking the -time of the Tribunal to cite those two orders. - -As previously mentioned in the trial address, on 20 October 1944, when -Nazi defeat in the war had become certain, Bormann assumed political and -organizational command of the newly-formed Volkssturm, the people’s -army. By virtue of ordering the continued resistance by the Volkssturm, -Bormann bears some responsibility for the resistance which prolonged the -aggressive war for months. - -I come now, if it please the Tribunal, to present the proofs showing -that Bormann authorized, directed, and participated in a wide variety of -Crimes against Humanity in aid of the conspiracy. Bormann played an -important role in the administration of the forced labor program. I -offer in evidence Document D-226, Exhibit Number USA-697. This is a -Speer circular, a circular of the Defendant Speer of 10 November 1944, -transmitting Himmler’s instructions that the Party and the Gestapo -should co-operate in securing a larger productivity from the millions of -impressed foreign workers in Germany. I quote the second numbered -paragraph of Page 2 of the English translation of Document D-226, which -reads as follows. I quote: - - “All men and women of the NSDAP, its subsidiaries and affiliated - bodies in the works”—meaning of course factories—“will, in - accordance with instructions from their Kreisleiter, be warned - by their local group leaders”—we intrude to say that means - Ortsgruppenleiter—“and be put under obligation to play their - part in keeping foreigners under the most careful observation. - They will report the least suspicion to the works foreman, which - he will pass on to the defense deputy or, where such a deputy - has not been appointed, to the police department concerned, - while at the same time reporting to the works manager and the - local group leader”—the Ortsgruppenleiter—“to exert untiringly - and continuously their influence on foreigners, both in word and - deed, in regard to the certainty of German victory and the - German will to resist, thus producing a further increase of - output in the works. - - “Party members, both men and women, and members of Party - organizations and affiliated bodies must be expected more than - ever before to conduct themselves in an exemplary manner.” - -Now, in a word, the significance of that decree: It is true it is a -circular of Speer’s reciting an arrangement between himself and Himmler, -but the effect of the arrangement is to impose the onus and the -continuous task of supplying foreign workers on Party members, a Party -which, as the Tribunal knows, Bormann headed as executive chief. - -Under the decree of 24 January 1942 no such directive could have been -issued without the participation of Bormann, both in its preparation and -its enactment. - -I now offer in evidence Document 025-PS as Exhibit Number USA-698. This -is a conference report dated 4 September 1942 which states that the -recruitment, importation, mobilization, and processing of 500,000 female -domestic workers from the east would be handled exclusively by the -Defendant Sauckel, Himmler, and the Defendant Bormann. I quote the first -two sentences of the third paragraph of the English translation of -Document 025-PS, which reads as follows: - - “The Führer has ordered the immediate importation of 400,000 to - 500,000 female domestic eastern workers from the Ukraine between - the ages of 15 and 35 and has charged the Plenipotentiary for - Allocation of Labor with the execution of this action which is - to end in about 3 months. In connection with this—this is also - approved by Reichsleiter Bormann—the illegal bringing of female - housekeepers into the Reich by members of the Armed Forces, or - various other agencies is to be allowed subsequently and, - furthermore, irrespective of the official recruiting, is not to - be prevented.” - -And I now quote from the first sentence of the last paragraph on Page 4 -of the English translation of Document Number 025-PS, and this is the -part that hooks in the Defendant Bormann with the scheme: - - “Generally one gathered from this conference that the questions - concerning the recruitment and mobilization, as well as the - treatment of female domestic workers from the east, are being - handled by the Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor, the - Reichsführer SS, and the Chief of the German Police and the - Party Chancellery, and that the Reich Ministry for the Occupied - Eastern Territories is in these questions considered as having - no, or only limited, competence.” - -The Party Chancellery is here mentioned in terms, and Bormann was the -leader of the Party Chancellery, as the Tribunal knows. - -Now the defendant imposed his will on the administration of the -German-occupied areas and insisted on the ruthless exploitation of the -inhabitants of the occupied East. The attention of the Tribunal is -respectfully invited to Document R-36, previously put in as Exhibit -Number USA-344. The Tribunal is well acquainted with this document, for -it has been referred to several times in these proceedings, and knows -that this is an official memorandum of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern -Territories, dated 19 August 1942, which states that the repressive -views of the Defendant Bormann with respect to the inhabitants of the -Eastern areas actually determined German occupational policies in the -East. The Tribunal recalls the now almost notorious quotation from this -Document R-36, which purports to paraphrase and constitute the essence -of Bormann’s views with respect to German occupational policy in the -East. So often has it been quoted that I shall resist the temptation to -repeat it, but in essence it comes to this. Bormann in effect says: - - “The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don’t need them, - they may die. They should not receive the benefits of the German - public health system. We do not care about their fertility. They - may practice abortion and use contraceptives; the more the - better. We don’t want them educated; it is enough if they can - count up to 100. Such stooges will be the more useful to us. - Religion we leave to them as a diversion. As to food, they will - not get any more than is absolutely necessary. We are the - masters; we come first.” - -We respectfully submit this as an accurate paraphrase and summary of the -text of that document, Document R-36. - -The attention of the Tribunal is next respectfully invited to Document -654-PS, previously put in as Exhibit Number USA-218. The Tribunal will -recall that this is a conference report, dated 18 November 1942, -embodying an agreement between the Minister of Justice and Himmler -entered into by Bormann’s suggestion under which all inhabitants of the -Eastern occupied areas are subjected to a brutal police regime in the -place of an ordinary judicial system. And the agreement refers all -disputes between the Party, Reich Minister for Justice, and Himmler to -Bormann for settlement. - -Now, because Bormann issued these and related orders, we submit that he -bears a large share of the responsibility for the discriminatory -treatment and the extermination of great numbers of persons in -German-occupied areas of the East. - -With the indulgence of the Tribunal, I put the substance of what I have -been privileged to present in a few words. We have shown that Bormann, -only 45 years old at the time of Germany’s defeat, contributed his -entire adult life to the furtherance of the conspiracy. His crucial -contribution to the conspiracy lay in his direction of the vast powers -of the Nazi Party in advancing the multiple objectives of the -conspiracy. First, as Chief of Staff to the Defendant Hess and then, as -leader, in his own name, of the Party Chancellery, subject only to -Hitler’s supreme authority, he applied and directed the total power of -the Party and its agencies to carry into execution the plans of the -conspirators. He used his great powers to persecute the Christian Church -and clergy and was an unrepentant foe of the fundamentals of the -Christianity with which he warred. - -He actively authorized and participated in measures designed to -persecute the Jews, and his was a strong hand in pressing down the crown -of thorns of misery on the brow of the Jewish people, both in Germany -and in German-occupied Europe. - -As Chief of the Party Chancellery and secretary to the Führer, Bormann -authorized, directed, and participated in a wide variety of War Crimes -and Crimes against Humanity, including, without limitation, the lynching -of Allied airmen, the enslavement and inhuman treatment of the -inhabitants of German-occupied Europe, the cruelty of impressed labor, -the breaking up of homes contrary to the clear provisions of the Hague -regulations, and the planned persecution and extermination of the civil -population of Eastern Europe. - -May it please this Tribunal, every schoolboy knows that Hitler was an -evil man. The point we respectfully emphasize is that without chieftains -like Bormann, Hitler would never have been able to seize and consolidate -total power in Germany, but he would have been left to walk the -wilderness alone. - -He was, in truth, an evil archangel to the Lucifer of Hitler; and, -although he may remain a fugitive from the justice of this Tribunal, -with an empty chair in the dock, Bormann cannot escape responsibility -for his illegal conduct. - -And we close with what seems to us an extremely important point. Bormann -may not be here, but under the last sentence of Article VI of the -Charter every defendant in this dock shown in our evidence to have been -a leader, an organizer, an inciter, and an accomplice of this conspiracy -is responsible for the acts of all persons in furtherance of the general -scope of the conspiracy. And resting squarely on this proposition we -submit, even though Bormann is not here, that every man in the dock -shares responsibility for his criminal acts. And with this we close. The -name of Bormann is not “written in water,” but will be remembered as -long as the Record of Your Honors’ Tribunal is preserved. - -I now have the privilege of introducing Lieutenant Henry Atherton, who -will present the case for the Prosecution against the individual -Defendant Seyss-Inquart. - -LIEUTENANT HENRY K. ATHERTON (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution has prepared a -trial brief for the convenience of the Tribunal showing the individual -responsibility of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. Copies of this brief are -now being handed to the Tribunal. At the same time the document books -which bear the letters “KK” and which contain translations of the -evidence referred to in the brief, or to be introduced in evidence at -this time, are also being handed to the Tribunal. At the outset I wish -to make clear my intention to deal at this time only with the individual -responsibility of Seyss-Inquart for the crimes charged in Counts One and -Two of the Indictment. Evidence to show his guilt as charged under -Counts Three and Four of the Indictment, that is, evidence specifically -directed thereunto, is to be introduced later by the prosecutors of the -French Republic and the Soviet Union. - -Seyss-Inquart has agreed that he held the following positions in State -and Party, and I am referring now to Document 2910-PS, which is Exhibit -Number USA-17. He was State Councillor of Austria from May 1937 to 12 -February 1938. He was Minister of [the] Interior and Security of Austria -from 16 February 1938 to 11 March 1938; Chancellor of Austria from 11 -March to 15 March 1938; Reich Governor of Austria from 15 March 1938 to -1 May 1939; Reich Minister without Portfolio from 1 May 1939 until -September of that year; member of the Reich Cabinet from 1 May 1939 -until the end of the war; Chief of the Civil Administration of South -Poland from the early part of September 1939 until 12 October 1939; -Deputy Governor General of Poland under the Defendant Frank from 12 -October 1939 until May 1940; and, finally, Reich Commissioner of the -Occupied Territories of the Netherlands from 29 May 1940 until the end -of the war. He has also agreed that he became a member of the National -Socialist Party on 13 March 1938 and that he was appointed a general in -the SS 2 days later. - -Now this list of positions which Seyss-Inquart has agreed that he held, -if the Tribunal please, shows the place which he held in the Nazi Common -Plan or Conspiracy. It shows his steady rise to greater influence and -power, and especially it emphasizes his particular talent, his skill in -effecting the enslavement of the smaller nations surrounding Germany for -the benefit of what he called the Greater German Reich. - -Now the Defendant Seyss-Inquart first became a member of the Nazi -conspiracy in connection with the Nazi assault on Austria. Mr. Alderman -has shown how the Nazis implemented their diplomatic and military -preparations for this event by intensive political preparations within -Austria. - -The ultimate purpose of these preparations was to secure the appointment -of Nazis, or persons known to be sympathetic to them, to key positions -in the Austrian Government, particularly that of Minister of the -Interior and Security, which controlled the police, thus permitting -quick suppression of all opposition to the Nazis when the time came. - -For this purpose Seyss-Inquart was a most effective tool, the first of -the so-called Quislings or traitors used by the Nazis to further their -aggressions and to fasten their hold on their victims. Seyss-Inquart has -admitted his membership in the Party only from 13 March 1938, but I want -to show that he was closely affiliated with them at a much earlier time. -For this purpose I now offer in evidence Document 3271-PS as Exhibit -Number USA-700. - -Reading from Page 9 of the translation, he says in this letter, which is -a letter to Himmler, dated 19 August 1939: - - “As far as my membership in the Party is concerned, I state that - I was never asked to join the Party but had asked Dr. Kier in - December 1931 to clarify my relationship with the Party, since I - regarded the Party as the basis for the solution of the Austrian - problem . . . I paid my membership fees and, as I believe, - directly to the Gau Vienna. These contributions also took place - after the period of suppression. Later on I had direct contact - with the Ortsgruppe in Dornbach. My wife paid these fees, but - the Blockwart”—and I believe that is another word for - Blockleiter—“was never in doubt, considering that this amount, - 40 shillings per month, was a share for my wife and myself, and - I was in every respect treated as a Party member.” - -Seyss-Inquart, in the last sentence of the paragraph says: - - “In every way, therefore, I felt as a Party member, considered - myself a Party member, thus, as stated, as far back as December - 1931.” - -Now, if the Tribunal please, and before I leave this letter, I want just -to refer to one or two sentences which the Tribunal will find in the -third paragraph on Page 7 of the translation. Referring to a meeting -which he had had with Hitler, Seyss-Inquart says: - - “I left this discussion a very upright man with the unspeakably - happy feeling of being permitted to be a tool of the Führer.” - -The truth of the matter is that Seyss-Inquart was an active supporter of -the Nazis at all times after 1931. But after the Nazi Party in Austria -was declared illegal in July 1934, he avoided too notorious a connection -with the Nazi organization, in order to safeguard what the Nazis called -his good legal position. By this device he was better able to use his -connections with Catholics and others in his work of infiltration for -his Nazi superiors. - -The Tribunal will remember, as Document 2219-PS, Exhibit Number USA-62, -a letter from Seyss-Inquart to Göring of 14 July 1939, in which -Seyss-Inquart makes this clear. It was in this letter also that he said: - - “Yet, I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the - goal in which I believe; that is Greater Germany and the - Führer.” - -The evidence which Mr. Alderman introduced told in detail the manner in -which the Nazi conspirators carried out their assault on Austria. I do -not intend to attempt to review any part of this evidence. I merely wish -to refer the Tribunal to two documents which are particularly important -in showing the part played by this defendant. I refer to the Rainer -report to Gauleiter Bürckel, dated 6 July 1939, which relates the part -played by the Austrian Nazi Party, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and -others between July 1934 and March 1938; and the astonishing record of -telephone calls between the Defendant Göring or his agents in Berlin and -Seyss-Inquart and others in Vienna on 11 March 1938. The Rainer report -is Document 812-PS, Exhibit Number USA-61, and was read into the Record -beginning at Page 502 (Volume II, Page 370) of the English version and -continuing for a number of pages thereafter. The transcript of the -telephone calls is Document 2949-PS, Exhibit Number USA-76, and was -introduced first at Page 566 (Volume II, Page 414) of the English -Record. - -Now, in order to supplement this and further to show that part played by -Seyss-Inquart, I wish now to introduce in evidence the voluntary -statement which Seyss-Inquart signed with advice of his counsel on 10 -December 1945. This is Document 3425-PS, and I offer it as Exhibit -Number USA-701. - -In this statement Seyss-Inquart explains, from his point of view, his -part in bringing about the Anschluss. I want to read first just a few -sentences from the second paragraph on the first page. It states, and I -quote: - - “In 1918 I became interested in the Anschluss of Austria with - Germany. From that year on I worked, planned, and collaborated - with others of a like mind to bring about a union of Austria - with Germany. It was my desire to effect this union of the two - countries in an evolutionary manner, and by legal means.” - -Skipping just a sentence or two: - - “I supported also the National Socialist Party as long as it was - legal, because it declared itself with particular determination - in favor of the Anschluss. From 1932 onwards I made financial - contributions to this Party, but I discontinued financial - support when it was declared illegal in 1934.” - -Then skipping down another couple of sentences: - - “From July 1936 onwards I endeavored to help the National - Socialists to regain their legal status and, finally, to - participate in the Austrian Government. During this time, - particularly after the Party was forbidden in July 1934, I knew - that the radical element of the Party was engaged in terroristic - activities, such as attacks on railroads, bridges, telephone - communications, et cetera. I knew that the governments of both - Chancellors, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, although they held in - principle the same total German viewpoint were opposed to the - Anschluss then because of the National Socialist regime in the - Reich. I was sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian - Nazi Party to gain political power and corresponding influence, - because they were in favor of the Anschluss.” - -Now, briefly summarizing, the Tribunal will note that the defendant -tells how his appointment as State Councillor, in May 1937, was the -result of an agreement between Austria and Germany in July 1936, and -that was the agreement which Rainer agreed Seyss-Inquart had helped to -bring about; that his appointment as Minister of the Interior and -Security was one of the results of the agreement between Schuschnigg and -Hitler at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938. And he admits that after the -appointment and the agreement the Austrian National Socialists engaged -in more and more widespread demonstrations. He tells how immediately -after this appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security he went -directly to Berlin and talked with Himmler and Hitler; and then, -finally, he describes the events of that day, of the 11th of March 1938, -when with the full support of German military power he became -Chancellor. - -I don’t want to quote at length from that description, because the -Tribunal knows already what happened. Reading from the middle of Page 3, -he says: - - “At 10 o’clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I went to the - office of the Bundeskanzler and conferred for about 2 hours with - Dr. Schuschnigg. We frankly told him all that we knew, - particularly about the possibility of disturbances and of - preparations by the Reich. - - “The Chancellor said that he would give his decision by 1400 - hours. While I was with Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg, I - was repeatedly called to the telephone to speak to Göring.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Has this been read already? - -LT. ATHERTON: No, Sir; this document has not been in before. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - - LT. ATHERTON: “He informed . . . me that the agreement of 12 - February had been cancelled and demanded Dr. Schuschnigg’s - resignation and my appointment as Chancellor.” - -The Tribunal has heard the other side of that story, the actual -telephone conversations. And then, finally, the next two paragraphs, he -tells how Keppler repeatedly urged him to send a telegram calling on -Germany to send troops, and that at first he refused but finally -acquiesced, and I now read from the next to the last paragraph: - - “As I am able to gather from the records available, I was - requested about 10 p. m. to give my sanction to another somewhat - altered telegram about which I informed President Miklas and Dr. - Schuschnigg. Finally President Miklas appointed me Chancellor, - and a little while later he approved my list of proposed - ministers.” - -If the Tribunal will recall, the telegram in question called on Hitler, -on behalf of the Provisional Austrian Government, to send German troops -as soon as possible in order to support it in its task and help it to -prevent bloodshed. The text of the telegram, as printed in Volume 6 of -the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, appears as Document 2463-PS of -the document book. It is interesting to note that the text of this -telegram is substantially identical with that dictated by Göring over -the phone to Keppler on the evening of the 11th of March, which appears -on Page 575 (Volume II, Page 420) of the Record. - -Now, on the next morning, again referring to the statement of the -defendant, he admits that he telephoned Hitler. . . - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Are you reading? - -LT. ATHERTON: No, Sir; I am summarizing. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): If you don’t read it it is not in evidence. - -LT. ATHERTON: In that event I will read a little further. I read now the -last paragraph on Page 3: - - “During the morning of the 12th of March I had a telephone - conversation with Hitler in which I suggested that, while German - troops were entering Austria, Austrian troops, as a symbol, - should march into the Reich. Hitler agreed to this suggestion - and we agreed to meet in Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same - day. I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in Vienna - from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall - and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain was now - inoperative.” - -I have referred to the slavish manner in which, as the evidence has -shown, Seyss-Inquart carried out orders conveyed to him by telephone -from Göring on 11 March 1938 in his negotiations with Chancellor -Schuschnigg and President Miklas. This relationship had in fact existed -for some time. Early in January 1938, Seyss-Inquart, although he then -held an important position in the Austrian Government, had already -considered himself as holding a mandate from the Nazi conspirators in -Berlin in his negotiations with his own Government. As evidence of the -way in which this happened, I offer Document 3473-PS as Exhibit Number -USA-581. This is a letter from Keppler to Göring, dated 6 January 1938, -in which he states, and I quote: - - “My dear Colonel General: - - “Councillor of State, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, has sent a courier to - me with the report that his negotiations with the Federal - Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, have run aground, so that he feels - compelled to return the mandate entrusted to him. Dr. - Seyss-Inquart desires to have a discussion with me regarding - this before he acts accordingly. - - “May I ask your advice, whether at this moment such a step, - entailing automatically also the resignation of the Federal - Minister Glaise von Horstenau, appears indicated or whether I - should put forth efforts to postpone such an action.” - -The letter is signed by Keppler. On top of the original is a brief note -apparently attached by the secretary of the Defendant Göring and dated -Karinhall, 6 January 1938, reading as follows: - - “Keppler should be told by telephone: - - “1) He should do everything to avoid the resignation of - Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart and State Minister Glaise - von Horstenau. If some difficulties should arise, Seyss-Inquart - should come to him first of all.” - -Now as a result of this directive, apparently telephoned to Keppler, -Keppler, on the 8th of January 1938, wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart. I -now offer this letter, which is Document Number 3397-PS, in evidence as -Exhibit Number USA-702. Keppler writes, and the Tribunal will remember -that Keppler was, at that time, Secretary of State in charge of Austrian -affairs of the German Government: - - “Dear State Councillor: - - “The other day I had a visit from Mr. Pl. who gave us a report - of the state of affairs, and informed us that you are seriously - considering the question of whether or not you are forced to - hand back the mandate entrusted to you. - - “I informed General Göring of the situation in writing, and G. - just had me informed that I should try my utmost to prevent you, - or any one else, from taking this step. This is also in the same - vein as G.’s conversation with Dr. J. before Christmas; at any - rate, G. requests you to undertake nothing of this nature under - any circumstances before he himself has the opportunity of - speaking with you once more. - - “I can also inform you that G. is, furthermore, making an effort - to speak to Ll., in order that certain improper conditions be - eliminated by him.” - -Then the letter is signed by Keppler. - -The two letters together, if the Tribunal please, show clearly enough -the extent to which this defendant was a tool, the extent to which he -was being used at that time by the conspirators in their planning for -their assault on Austria. Now, once German troops were in Austria and -Seyss-Inquart had become Chancellor, he lost no time carrying out the -plan of his Nazi fellow conspirators. - -I next offer in evidence Document 3254-PS, which is a memorandum written -by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart entitled, “The Austrian Question.” It is -Exhibit Number USA-704. I offer it only because of the description which -he gives of the manner in which he secured the passage of an Austrian -act in annexing Austria to Germany. He said that on March 13 German -officials brought him a proposal for inviting Austria into Germany. They -reported that. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you quoting? - -LT. ATHERTON: I now quote from the middle of Page 20 of the English -text: - - “I called a meeting of the Council of Ministers, after having - been told by Dr. Wolf that the Bundespräsident would make no - difficulties in regard to that realization; he would return to - his home in the meantime and would await me there. On my - proposal the Council of Ministers assembled in the meantime - adopted the draft bill to which my law section had made some - formal modifications. The vote on the 20th of April had been - planned already in the first draft. According to the provisions - of the Constitution of 1 May 1934, any fundamental modification - of the Constitution could be decided by the Council of Ministers - with the approbation of the Bundespräsident. A vote or a - confirmation by the nation was in no way provided for. In the - event that the Bundespräsident should, for any reason, either - resign his functions or be for some time unable to fulfill them, - his prerogatives were to go over to the Bundeskanzler. I went to - the Bundespräsident with Dr. Wolf. The President told me that he - did not know whether this development would be of benefit to the - Austrian nation but that he did not wish to interfere and - preferred to resign his functions, so that all constitutional - rights would come into my hands.” - -And then, skipping two or three sentences to the top of Page 21: - - “Thereafter I returned to Linz by car, where I arrived about - midnight and reported to the Führer the accomplishment of the - Anschluss law.” - -The same day Germany formally incorporated Austria into the Reich by a -decree and declared it to be a province of the German Reich, in -violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles. I ask the Court to -take judicial notice of Document Number 2307-PS, which is the decree to -this effect, published in 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 237. - -If the Defendant Seyss-Inquart seems unduly modest as to the part which -he played in undermining the Government to which he owed allegiance, his -fellow conspirators were quick to recognize the importance of his -contributions. In a speech on the 26th of March 1938, the Defendant -Göring said—and I am reading now from Document 3270-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-703, which is an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, -Volume 6, Page 183: - - “A complete unanimity between the Führer and the National - Socialist confidants inside of Austria existed. . . . If the - National Socialists’ rising succeeded so quickly and thoroughly - and without bloodshed, it is first of all due to the calm, firm, - prudent, and decisive attitude of the present Reichsstatthalter - Seyss-Inquart and his confidants.” - -I want, before leaving the matter of the Anschluss, to stress this once -more, because this was a time of great importance, and it was -Seyss-Inquart who held the key position in this first open attack on -another country. Had it not been for his part, as has been shown, things -might have gone very differently, and if there were no other place where -he was connected with the conspirators’ plans for aggression, this would -be sufficient to rank him with the foremost of the conspirators. - -Now, passing on, Mr. Alderman has shown the way in which Seyss-Inquart -co-operated with the conspirators in integrating Austria as fully as -possible into the Reich, making its resources available to the -Reich—its resources of wealth and its resources of manpower. - -In furtherance of the conspirators’ plan, Reichsstatthalter -Seyss-Inquart for the first time demonstrated his talent for the -persecution of Jewish citizens. In an address in Vienna on the 26th of -March 1938, which will be found at Page 2326 (Volume IV, Page 552) of -the Record, he recalls that Göring expressly commissioned this -defendant, as Reichsstatthalter, to institute anti-Semitic measures. - -And the Tribunal will remember from previous evidence the kind of -wholesale larceny which this involved. So successfully did Seyss-Inquart -perform his task that at the meeting of the Air Ministry under the -chairmanship of the Defendant Göring on the 12th of November 1938, -Fischböck, a member of Seyss-Inquart’s official family, was able to -relate the efficiency with which the civil administration in Austria -dealt with the so-called “Jewish question.” I refer to Document Number -1816-PS, Exhibit Number USA-261, and I am reading first from Page 14 of -the English translation. The Tribunal will note that this is the third -full paragraph from the bottom of Page 14: - - “Your Excellency: In this matter we have already a very complete - plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisans and 5,000 - Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the seizure of power we - had already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total - of 17,000 stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans about - 10,000 were to be closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept - open; 4,000 of the 5,000 retail stores should be closed and - 1,000 should be kept open, that is, Aryanized. According to this - plan, between 3,000 and 3,500 of the total of 17,000 stores - would be kept open, all others closed. This was decided - following investigations in every single branch and according to - local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, and is - ready for publication as soon as we receive the law which we - requested in September. This law shall empower us to withdraw - licenses from artisans quite independent of the Jewish - question.” - -Göring said: - - “I shall have this decree issued today.” - -Then, if the Tribunal please, I just wish to read one more sentence from -the middle of the next page, in which Fischböck says: - - “Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be closed and the - remainder Aryanized or handed over to the Bureau of Trustees - which is operated by the State.” - -And Göring replies: - - “I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way the whole - affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals, - so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year.” - -The Defendant Funk then says: - - “We can do the same thing over here.” - -In other words, Seyss-Inquart’s so-called solution was so highly -regarded that it was considered a model for the rest of the Reich. - -The task of integrating Austria into the Reich being substantially -complete, the Nazi conspirators were able to use Seyss-Inquart’s expert -services for the subjugation of other peoples. As an illustration I -refer the Tribunal to Document D-571, Exhibit Number USA-112, which has -already been read in evidence. The Tribunal will recall that from this -document it appeared that on the 21st of March 1939 an official of the -British Government reported from Prague to Viscount Halifax that a -little earlier, on the 11th of March 1939, Seyss-Inquart, Bürckel, and -five German generals attended a meeting of the Cabinet of the Slovak -Government and told them that they should proclaim the independence of -Slovakia, that Hitler had decided to settle the question of -Czechoslovakia definitely (this has been read in court today) and that, -unless they did as they were told, Hitler would disinterest himself in -their fate. It just gives an indication of the manner in which this man -continued to be busy in the aggressive plans of these Nazi conspirators. - -Now early in September 1939, after the opening of the attack against -Poland, Seyss-Inquart became Chief of the Civil Administration of south -Poland. A few weeks later, on 12 October 1939, Hitler promulgated a -decree providing that territories occupied by German troops, except -those incorporated within the German Reich, should be subject to the -authority of the Governor General of the occupied Polish territories and -he appointed the Defendant Frank as Governor General and the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart as Deputy Governor General. This decree will be found in -the 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 2077, and I ask the Tribunal -to take judicial notice of it. Shortly thereafter, on 26 October 1939, -Frank promulgated a decree establishing the administration of the -occupied Polish territories, of which he was Governor. This decree is -published in the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_ and appears in the -document book as 3468-PS. I am informed that this book, Volume 7, has -also received the Exhibit Number 705 and I offer it as such. - -Article 3 of the decree provided that the Chief of the Office of the -Governor General and the Higher SS and Police Leader are directly -subordinate to the Governor General and his Deputy. The Deputy, of -course, was the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. - -The significance of that provision is obvious in the light of the -evidence which the Tribunal has heard and will hear. I ask the Tribunal -to take judicial notice of it. - -As Deputy Governor General of the Polish occupied territories, -Seyss-Inquart seems to have had the job of setting up a German -administration throughout this territory; that is, he worked under the -Defendant Frank but did much of the work of interviewing the various -local leaders, telling them what they should do. As an illustration I -offer in evidence a report of a trip which Seyss-Inquart and his -consultants took between the 17th and 22d of February 1939. This is our -Document Number 2278-PS, and I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-706. If -the Tribunal please, I have misstated that date or period. It was the -17th to the 22d of November 1939, in other words, shortly after the -administration was set up. On the first page of the English -translation—and I now quote from the second full paragraph—the -following appears: - - “At 3:00 p. m. Reich Minister, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, addressed the - department heads of the district chief and stated among other - things that the chief guiding rule for carrying out German - administration in the Government General must be solely the - interests of the German Reich. A stern and inflexible - administration must make the area of use to German economy; and, - so that excessive clemency may be guarded against, the results - of the intrusion of the Polish race into German territory must - be brought to mind.” - -This report is too long, if the Tribunal please, to quote from at too -great length; but if the Tribunal will turn over to Page 7, I would like -to read in some extracts of what occurred while the defendant was in -Lublin. From the report it appears that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart -after meeting the various local German administrative officers “then -expounded the principles,” and I am now quoting from the top of Page 7, -“in accordance with which the administration in the ‘Government’ must be -conducted.” Then, skipping a sentence: - - “The resources and inhabitants of this country would have to be - made of service to the Reich, and only within these limits could - they prosper. Independent political thought should no longer be - allowed to develop. The Vistula area might perhaps be still more - important to German destiny than the Rhine. The Minister then - gave as a guiding theme to the district leaders: ‘We will - further everything which is of service to the Reich and will put - an end to everything which may harm the Reich.’ Dr. - Seyss-Inquart then added that the Governor General wished that - those men who were fulfilling a task for the Reich here should - receive a post with material benefits in keeping with their - responsibility and achievements.” - -Then, if the Tribunal will turn over two more pages, the reporter is -describing a sightseeing tour which was made to the village of Wlodawa, -Cycow, and I quote: - - “Cycow is a German village. . .”—skipping down a couple of - sentences—“Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart made a speech in - which he pointed out that the fidelity of these Germans to their - nationality now found its justification and reward through the - strength of Adolf Hitler.” - -And then the next sentence, apparently thrown in by the reporter: - - “This district with its very marshy character could, according - to District Chief Schmidt’s deliberations, serve as a - reservation for the Jews, a measure which might possibly lead to - heavy mortality among the Jews.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We might break off here for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -LT. ATHERTON: If the Tribunal please, at the time the Tribunal rose, I -was in the process of considering the functions of the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart, his place as Deputy Governor General of Poland, between -1939 and 1940. - -Now the Tribunal has already heard evidence of the atrocities which were -perpetrated by the administration which Seyss-Inquart thus helped to -create. The prosecutors for the Soviet Union will present to the -Tribunal more evidence of such atrocities. For our present purposes, to -show the importance of the work which this man did to further the Nazi -plan for the Government General of Poland, it is enough to quote a few -words from the diary of the Defendant Frank. - -On the occasion of what was apparently a farewell lunch to -Seyss-Inquart, when he became Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands, -Frank said—and I now quote from Document 3465-PS, Pages 510 and 511 of -Volume 2, the 1940 volume of the diary, which is Exhibit Number USA-614: - - “I am extremely glad, Mr. Reich Commissioner and Reich Minister, - to assure you, in this hour of your departure, that the months - of our collaboration with you belong to the most precious - memories of my life and that your work in the Government General - will be remembered forever in the building of the coming world - empire of the German nation.” - -Skipping down a little, if the Tribunal please, Frank went on to say: - - “In the construction of the Government General your name will - forever take a place of honor as an originator of this - organization and this state system. . . . I express our thanks, - Mr. Reich Minister, for your collaboration and for your creative - energy.” - -Then reading the last two or three sentences: - - “During the hard times common work united us here in the East, - but it is at the same time the beginning point for a gigantic - power development of the German Reich. Its perfection will show - the development of the greatest energy unit which there ever was - in the history of the world. In this work you were placed by the - Führer, very effectively, in the most important position.” - -And to these remarks the Defendant Seyss-Inquart replied and I now quote -from the second page of the translation: - - “I learned here a lot, many things which I did not understand - before at all, and mainly on account of the initiative and firm - leadership as I saw them in my friend Dr. Frank.” - -Then, skipping a sentence: - - “I will now go to the West, and I want to be quite open with - you. With my whole heart I am present, because my whole attitude - is one directed toward the East. In the East we have a National - Socialist mission; over there, in the West, we have a function; - that may be the difference.” - -I submit, if the Tribunal please, that the sentences which I have just -read show clearly enough the conscious participation of the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart in the Polish phase of the conspiracy. - -Thus equipped with experience gained in Poland under the Defendant -Frank, Seyss-Inquart was ready to undertake his last and most ambitious -task, the enslavement of the Netherlands. The ruthless manner in which -he performed it marks his position in the Nazi Common Plan or -Conspiracy. - -I ask the Tribunal first to take judicial notice of a decree of Hitler -of 18 May 1940, which is found in 1940 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page -778. The translation will be found in the book as Document 1376-PS. By -Section 1 of this decree it is provided that: - - “The Reich Commissioner is protector of the interests of the - Reich and will represent the supreme power of the Government - within the civil sphere. He will be directly subordinated to me - and will receive directives and orders from me.” - -Section 3 provides that: - - “The Reich Commissioner may use German Police forces to carry - out his orders. The German Police forces are at the disposal of - the German military commander in the Netherlands insofar as - military necessities require this and if the missions of the - Reich Commissioner permit it.” - -Then by Paragraph or Section 5 of the law it is provided that the Reich -Commissioner may promulgate laws by decree, such orders to be published -in the _Verordnungsblatt_ for the occupied territory of the Netherlands, -a publication which I shall hereafter refer to merely as the -_Verordnungsblatt_. - -On the 29th of May 1940, acting within these powers, the defendant -promulgated an order covering the exercise of governmental authority in -the Netherlands and this appears as Document 3588-PS in the document -book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents. - -That will contain two decrees. I am now referring to the first one. - -By Section 1 of this decree the defendant modestly purports to assume, -to the extent required for the fulfillment of his duties, “all powers, -privileges, and rights heretofore vested in the King and the Government, -in accordance with the constitution and the laws of the Netherlands.” -That is a direct quotation. - -And then Section 5 of the order entrusts the maintenance of public -peace, safety, and order to the Netherlands Police force unless the -Reich Commissioner calls on German SS or Police forces for the -enforcement of his orders. It further provides that the investigation -and combatting of all activities hostile to the Reich and Germanism -shall be the concern of the German Police force. - -On June 3, 1940, a further decree was promulgated concerning the -organization and establishment of the Office of the Reich Commissioner. -This decree is found in the _Verordnungsblatt_ for 1940, Issue 1, at -Page 11, and is the second decree under Document 3588-PS. This decree -provided for general commissioners on the staff of the Reich -Commissioner to head four enumerated sections, one of which, the -Superior SS and Police Chief, was to head the section for public safety. -It was provided by Section 5 of this decree that: - - “This official should command the units of the military SS and - German Police forces transferred to the occupied Netherlands - territories, supervise the Netherlands central and municipal - police forces and issue to them necessary orders.” - -Section 11 provided that the Reich Commissioner alone. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Atherton, don’t you think that we can assume -that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who had been appointed to administer -the occupied territory of the Netherlands, had all these powers and that -you can turn your attention to what he did under those powers? - -LT. ATHERTON: Yes, Sir; I will do that but I wanted to make plain to the -Tribunal, because of the peculiar set-up of this German Police force, -the fact that he was granted the power to give orders to them, and not -only that, but that he customarily did. If that point is made clear, as -I believe it is, in these two decrees, I will pass on to the next -matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has no doubt that an officer under -the Reich who had got the powers of the administrator of an occupied -territory could make use of the police forces. - -LT. ATHERTON: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is really a matter that we should be prepared to -assume until it is proved to the contrary. - -LT. ATHERTON: I agree, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: We would wish you to turn attention to show what he did, -under those powers, which constitute crimes. - -LT. ATHERTON: Yes, Sir. It is not our intention at this time to go into -the crimes against persons and property which the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart is responsible for in the Netherlands in any detail, -because evidence of Nazi barbarity in this country is to be presented by -our associates, the prosecutors for the French Republic. It is only our -purpose to show a few illustrations and to give some idea of the scope -of this defendant’s activities and his responsibilities as evidence of -his part in the execution of the Nazis’ Common Plan or Conspiracy, which -it is our part to prove. - -Now, in the first place, there will be much evidence to show that the -defendant was responsible for widespread spoliation of property. Merely -as an illustration of the way in which he was implicated in the smallest -parts of this, I offer in evidence Document 176-PS, as Exhibit Number -USA-707. - -This document is a report on the activities of the “Task Force -Netherlands,” a part of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, on which the Tribunal -has already heard evidence. Quoting from the first page of this report, -the first sentence: - - “The Task Force Netherlands of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter - Rosenberg began its work in agreement with the competent - representative of the Reich Commissioner during the first days - of September 1940.” - -The report then proceeds to detail the property taken from Masonic -lodges and similar institutions to a considerable extent. Reading -from—I believe it is Page 3 of this report, the very bottom: - - “An extremely precious library, containing invaluable works on - Sanskrit, was confiscated, when the ‘Theosophic Society’ in - Amsterdam was dissolved, and packed into 96 cases. - - “A number of smaller libraries belonging to the Spiritists, the - Esperanto movement, the Bellamy movement, the International - Bible Students, and various other minor international - organizations were packed into seven cases; texts belonging to - various minor Jewish organizations were packed into four cases; - and a library of the ‘Anthroposophic Society’ in Amsterdam into - three. - - “It is safe to say that the stocks of books confiscated, packed, - and so far sent to Germany by the task force are of - extraordinary scientific value and will contribute an integral - part of the library of the ‘Hohe Schule.’ - - “The money value of these libraries . . . can only be estimated - but must surely amount to from 30 million to 40 million - Reichsmark.” - -Then, quoting from the very end of the report: - - “The task force, in executing the aforementioned tasks, is bound - strictly to the pace set by the Reich Commissioner for the - handling of the Jewish questions and those of the international - organizations.” - -As Reich Commissioner it was one of the functions of the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart to supervise the execution of the conspirators’ program -for deportation of Dutch citizens to Germany for slave-labor. The -Tribunal will recall that Mr. Dodd read into evidence at Page 1372 -(Volume III, Page 477) a portion of a transcript of an interrogation of -the Defendant Sauckel, on 5 October 1945, in which it appeared that the -quotas for the workers for Holland were agreed upon and then the numbers -given to the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart to fulfill; and after the -quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his mission to fulfill it with -the aid of Sauckel’s representative. And then the Tribunal will recall -that at Page 1310 (Volume III, Page 433) of the Record Mr. Dodd, having -shown the Defendant Seyss-Inquart’s part in recruitment for slave-labor -in this fashion and his responsibility for it, read into the Record, -Page 1310 (Volume III, Page 433), some portions from Document 1726-PS, -Exhibit Number USA-195, which showed the numbers of Netherlands citizens -deported to the Reich at various times. Since that is all a matter of -record, I will not go into it again. - -In the Netherlands, as in Austria and elsewhere, Seyss-Inquart was -relentless in his treatment of Jewish Netherlanders. To illustrate his -attitude, I offer in evidence Document 3430-PS, which consists of -extracts from the defendant’s book _Four Years in the Netherlands_ -(Collected Speeches). It becomes Exhibit Number USA-708. In a speech in -Amsterdam on 13 March 1941—and I am now quoting from Page 57 of the -original book, the last extract on the translation, Seyss-Inquart said: - - “The Jews, for us, are not Dutch. They are those enemies with - whom we can come to neither an armistice nor to peace. This - applies here, if you wish, for the duration of the occupation. - Do not expect an order from me which stipulates this, except - regulations concerning police matters. We will beat the Jews - wherever we meet them, and those who join them must bear the - consequences. The Führer declared that the Jews have played - their final act in Europe, and therefore they have played their - final act.” - -Now, as promised, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart proceeded to promulgate -the long series of decrees which first threatened to deprive the Jewish -people in the Netherlands of their property, of their rights, and -degraded them to something lower than the lowest, which eventually -resulted in their deportation to Poland. These decrees, all signed by -Seyss-Inquart, are collected in our brief, Page 65. I ask the Court to -take judicial notice of them. By way of illustration, the first to which -I wish to refer appears in the document book as 3333-PS, and it is a -decree of 26 October 1940, requiring the registration of businesses -belonging to Jews as defined in the decree, including partnerships or -corporations in which Jews owned a substantial interest. You have seen -that this type of law was the inevitable prelude to mass confiscation of -the property of Jews under the Nazi administration. In a law found in -_Verordnungsblatt_, Volume Number 6, Page 99, 11 February 1941, Document -3325-PS, Dutch universities and colleges were limited in the -registration of Jewish students. This of itself does not seem important, -but it is a part of the program to take away from these people their -rights and degrade them. Document Number 3328-PS is a decree published -in _Verordnungsblatt_ Number 44 at Page 841, of 22 October 1941. This -prevented the Jews from exercising any profession or trade without -authorization from administrative authorities and permitted such -authorities to order the termination of any employment contract -concerning Jews. - -As a final illustration I refer in passing to Document 3336-PS, a decree -published in the _Verordnungsblatt_, Issue 13, Page 289, and dated 21 -May 1942. This decree required all Jews to make written declaration of -claims of any kind, under which they might be beneficiaries, at a -banking firm known as Lippmann-Rosenthal and Company, which was actually -an agency of the Reich at Amsterdam. The decree gave the bank, this -named bank, all rights to dispose of the claim and provided that payment -to the bank should be released in full. This type of Nazi decree was, of -course, a forerunner of ultimate deportation to the East and allowed the -Nazis to snatch the insurance. - -Evidence of the success of this defendant’s efforts to annihilate all -Jews in the Netherlands has already been read into the Record. The court -will find that Major Walsh—again reading from the report of the -Netherlands Government, Exhibit Number USA-195, at Page 1497 (Volume -III, Page 565)—showed that out of 140,000 Jewish Netherlanders, 117,000 -were deported, over 115,000 of them to Poland, over 80 percent. The -evidence has shown what was the probable fate of most of these people, -and I shan’t dwell on it further. - -Finally, I want to say a few words about the responsibility of this -defendant for the systematic terror practiced against the inhabitants of -the occupied territory by the Nazis throughout the occupation. Referring -again to the collected speeches in Document 3430-PS, on 29 January 1943, -the defendant left little doubt of his point of view. He said, and I -quote: - - “It is also clear, now more than ever, that every resistance - which is directed against this fight for existence must be - suppressed. Some time ago the representatives of the churches - had written to the Wehrmacht commander and to me, and they - presented their ideas in regard to the execution of death - sentences which the Wehrmacht commander announced in the - meantime. To this I can say only the following: At the moment in - which our men, fathers, and sons with iron determination look - towards their fate in the East and unflinchingly and steadfastly - perform their highest pledge, it is unbearable to tolerate - conspiracies whose goal is to weaken the rear of this eastern - front. Whoever dares this must be annihilated. We must be severe - and become even more severe against our opponents. This is the - command of a relentless sequence of events and for us, perhaps, - inhumanly hard but our holy duty. We remain human because we do - not torture our opponents. We must remain hard in annihilating - them.” - -I do not offer any evidence of the commission of these crimes, because -that is to be done by prosecutors of the French Republic. But the -position of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissioner, the -control which he exercised, which has been shown, particularly over the -SS and Police, and the attitude of the man himself will make clear his -authorization and participation in the crimes to be proved and are a -further indication of his part in the common plan. - -Seyss-Inquart supported the Nazi Party as early as 1931. He was a -traitor to the government to which he owed allegiance and in which he -held high office. With full knowledge of the ultimate purposes of the -conspirators he bent every effort to integrate Austria into the Reich -and to make its resources and manpower, as well as its strategic -position, available for the Nazi war machine. He performed these tasks -with such ruthless efficiency that he was chosen thereafter for key -positions in the enslavement of Poland and the Netherlands—the -positions which he filled with such satisfaction to his superiors, that -ultimately he came to be one of the foremost and most detested leaders -in this common plan. As such, under Article 6 of the Charter, he is -responsible for all acts performed by any persons in the execution of -that plan. As such, he is guilty of the crimes charged to him under -Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -I wish to introduce to the Tribunal at this time Dr. Robert M. W. -Kempner, who will represent the Prosecution in the next phase of the -case dealing with the Defendant Frick. - -DR. ROBERT M. W. KEMPNER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal: There have been distributed to the -Tribunal and to all Defense Counsel, trial brief and documents relating -to the Defendant Frick. The trial brief prepared by my colleague, Karl -Lachmann, sets forth, in great detail, evidence, in the form of both -documents and decrees, against the Defendant Wilhelm Frick. English -translations of the evidentiary material referred to in the trial brief -are included in the document book prepared by my colleague Lieutenant -Felton. This book has been marked “LL.” - -Defendant Frick’s great contribution to the Nazi conspiracy was in the -field of governmental administration. He was the administrative brain -who devised the machinery of state for Nazism, who geared that machinery -for aggressive war. - -In the course of his active participation in the Nazi conspiracy, from -1923 to 1945, the Defendant Frick occupied a number of important -positions. Document 2978-PS, which has previously been introduced as -Exhibit Number USA-8, lists the positions in detail. The original was -signed by the Defendant Frick on 14 November 1945. I do not repeat these -positions; they are known to the Court. Frick’s past activity on behalf -of the Nazi conspirators was his participation in promoting their rise -to power. Frick betrayed, in his capacity as law enforcement official of -the Bavarian Government, his own Bavarian Government by participating in -the Munich Beer Hall Putsch of November 8, 1923. Frick was tried and -sentenced together with Hitler on a charge of complicity in treason. His -position in the Putsch is described in a record of the proceeding called -_The Hitler Trial before the People’s Court in Munich_, published in -Munich in 1924. - -I will ask this Tribunal to take judicial notice of this record of these -proceedings. Hitler’s appreciation of Frick’s assistance is evidenced by -the fact that he honored Frick by mentioning his name in _Mein Kampf_. -Only two other Defendants in this proceeding share this honor, namely, -Hess and Streicher. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the -favorable mentioning of Defendant Frick in _Mein Kampf_, German edition, -1933, Page 403. - -During the period after the Putsch, Frick made further contributions to -the Nazi conspiracy. I should like to refer briefly to Document 2513-PS, -an excerpt of Pages 36 and 38 from a report entitled, “The National -Socialist Workers Party as an Association Hostile to the State and to -the Republican Form of Government and Guilty of Treasonable Activity.” -This report has been previously introduced as Document 2513-PS, Exhibit -Number USA-235. It is an official report of the criminal activities of -Hitler, Frick, and other Nazis prepared by the Prussian Ministry of the -Interior in 1930. It states that Frick, next to Hitler, can be regarded -as the most influential representative of the Nazi Party at that time. -This document reported that at the 1927 Party Congress in Nuremberg -Frick said that the Reichstag would first be misused by the Nazi Party, -would then be abolished, and that its abolition would open the way for -racial dictatorship. The document also reported that Frick stated in a -speech in 1929 at Pyritz that this fateful struggle will first be taken -up with the ballot, but this cannot continue indefinitely, for history -has taught us that in battle blood must be shed and iron broken. - -Back in 1927 Frick’s prominent role in helping to bring the Nazis to -power was recognized when, on 23 January 1930, he was appointed Minister -of the Interior and Education in the State of Thuringia. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now? I thought you -were reading from 2513. - -DR. KEMPNER: No, this is an introduction of the next document. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see, Dr. Kempner. - -DR. KEMPNER: I just started to refer to the fact that Adolf Hitler at -this time, when Frick was Minister of the Interior in the State of -Thuringia, was an undesirable alien, not a German citizen. In his -capacity as Minister of Thuringia the Defendant Frick began his -manipulations to provide Adolf Hitler, the undesirable alien, with -German citizenship, an essential step toward the realization of the Nazi -conspiracy. - -This lack of German citizenship was highly detrimental to the cause of -the Nazi Party because, as an alien, Hitler could not become candidate -for the Reich Presidency in Germany. - -It was the Defendant Frick who solved this problem by an administrative -maneuver. We now introduce in evidence Document 3564-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-709. This document is an affidavit by Otto Meissner of 27 December -1945. Meissner was former state secretary and chief of Hitler’s -Presidential Chancellery. The last two sentences of this affidavit read -as follows: - - “Frick also, in collaboration with Klagges, Minister of - Brunswick, succeeded in naturalizing Hitler as a German citizen - in 1932 by having him appointed a Brunswick government official - Regierungsrat. This was done in order to make it possible for - Hitler to run as a candidate for the office of President in the - Reich.” - -When Hitler came to power on 30 January 1933, Frick was duly awarded a -prominent post in the new regime as Reich Minister of the Interior. In -this capacity he became responsible for the establishment of -totalitarian control over Germany, an indispensable prerequisite for the -preparation of aggressive warfare. Frick assumed responsibility for the -realization of a large part of the Nazi Conspirators’ program both -through administration and legislation. - -I must explain very briefly the significance of the Ministry of the -Interior in the Nazi State to show the contribution made by Frick to the -conspiracy. I offer, as evidence of Frick’s extensive jurisdiction as -Minister of the Interior, Document 3475-PS, Exhibit Number USA-710, -which is part of the official German manual for administrative -officials, dated 1943. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -Frick’s jurisdiction mentioned in this document. The names of the men -who, according to this document, worked under Frick’s supervision, and I -stress this point “worked under Frick’s supervision,” are symbolic. They -are listed on Page 1 of the English translation. Here we find among the -subordinates of Frick: Reich Health Leader, Dr. Conti; Reichsführer SS -and Chief of the German Police, Heinrich Himmler; and Reich Labor -Service leader, Hierl. This document shows Frick as supreme commander of -three important pillars of the Nazi State: the Nazi health service, the -Nazi police system, and the Nazi labor service. - -The wide variety of Frick’s activities as Reich Minister of the Interior -can be judged from the following catalogue of his functions, enumerated -on the following pages of the manual. He had final authority over -constitutional questions, drafted legislation, had jurisdiction over -governmental administration and civil defense, and was final arbiter in -all questions concerning race and citizenship. The manual also lists -sections of the Ministry concerned with administrative problems for the -occupied territories and annexed territories, the “New Order” in the -Southeast, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the “New Order” -in the East. He also had full jurisdiction in the field of civil -service, including such matters as appointment, tenure, promotion, and -dismissal. - -The Defendant Frick used his wide powers as Reich Minister of the -Interior to advance the cause of the Nazi conspiracy. To accomplish this -purpose, he drafted and signed the laws and decrees which abolished the -autonomous state governments, the autonomous local governments, and the -political parties in Germany other than the Nazi Party. - -In 1933 and 1934, the first 2 years of the Nazi regime, Frick signed -about 235 laws or decrees, all of which are published in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_. I should like to refer briefly to a few of the more -important laws and decrees, such as the law of 14 July 1933 outlawing -all political parties other than the Nazi Party, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -1933, Part I, Page 479, Document 1388(a)-PS; then the law of 1 December -1933 securing the unity of Party and State, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, -Part I, Page 1016, Document 1395-PS; the law of 30 January 1934 -transferring the sovereignty of the German states to the Reich, -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part I, Page 75, Document 3068-PS; the German -Municipality Act of 30 January 1935, which gave Frick’s Ministry of the -Interior final authority to appoint and dismiss all mayors of -municipalities throughout Germany, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1935, Part I, -Page 49, Document 2008-PS; and, finally, the Nazi Civil Service Act of 7 -April 1933 which provided that all civil servants must be trustworthy as -defined by Nazi standards and also must meet the Nazi racial -requirements, published in _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, Part I, Page 175, -Document 1397-PS. - -One category of Frick’s activities, however, deserves special notice; -that is, the crushing of opposition by legally camouflaged police -terror. This is shown by the book _Dr. Wilhelm Frick and His Ministry_, -our Document 3119-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-711, -written by Frick’s undersecretary and co-conspirator, Hans Pfundtner, -apparently written to establish Frick’s eternal contribution to the -creation of the Nazis’ thousand-year Reich. It states, and I quote -briefly from Page 4, paragraph 4, of the English translation: - - “While Marxism in Prussia was crushed by the hard fist of the - Prussian Prime Minister Hermann Göring and a gigantic wave of - propaganda was initiated for the Reichstag elections of 5 March - 1933, Dr. Frick prepared the complete seizure of power in all - states of the Reich. All at once the political opposition - disappeared. All at once the Main”—River—“line was eliminated; - from this time on only one will and one leadership reigned in - the German Reich.” - -How was this done? On February 28, 1933, the day after the Reichstag -fire, civil rights in Germany were abolished. This decree was published -in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, Page 83; and an English translation of -it appears in the document book as 1390-PS. I refer to this decree at -this time because it carries the signature of the Reich Minister of the -Interior Frick. And now something important. It is stated at the -beginning of the decree, which was published on the morning after the -Reichstag fire, that the suspension of civil rights is decreed as a -defense measure against Communist acts of violence endangering the -State. At the time of publication of this decree, the Nazi Government -announced that a thorough investigation had proven that the Communists -had set fire to the Reichstag building. I do not intend to go into the -controversial issue of who set fire to the Reichstag, but I should like -to offer proof that the official Nazi statement that the Communists were -responsible for the fire was issued without any investigation and that -the preamble of the decree which had Frick’s signature was a mere -subterfuge. - -I offer in evidence a very short excerpt of an interrogation of -Defendant Göring, dated October 13, 1945, our Document 3593-PS, Exhibit -Number USA-712, and I should like to read the following brief portion, -beginning on Page 4: - - “My question to Göring: ‘How could you tell your press agent, 1 - hour after the Reichstag caught fire, that the Communists did - it, without investigation?’ - - “Göring’s answer: ‘Did the public relations officer say that at - that time?’ - - “My answer: ‘Yes. He said you said it.’ - - “Göring: ‘It is possible when I came to the Reichstag the Führer - and his gentlemen were there. I was doubtful at that time, but - it was their opinion that the Communists had started the fire.’ - - “My question: ‘But you were the highest law enforcement official - in a certain sense. Daluege was your subordinate. Looking back - at it now, and not in the excitement that was there once, wasn’t - it too early to say without any investigation that the - Communists had started the fire?’ - - “Göring: ‘Yes, that is possible, but the Führer wanted it this - way.’ - - “Question: ‘Why did the Führer want to issue at once a statement - that the Communists had started the fire?’ - - “Answer: ‘He was convinced of it.’ - - “Question: ‘It is right when I say he was convinced without - having any evidence or any proof of that at this moment?’ - - “Göring: ‘That is right, but you must take into account that at - that time the Communist activity was extremely strong, that our - new government as such was not very secure.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kempner, what has that got to do with Frick? - -DR. KEMPNER: He signed the decree, as I said before, abolishing civil -liberties on the morning after, pointing out that there was a Communist -danger. On the other side, this Communist danger was a mere subterfuge -and was one of the things which finally led to the second World War. - -The Defendant Frick not only abolished civil liberties within Germany, -but he also became the organizer of the huge police network of the Nazi -Reich. - -Parenthetically, I may state that before this time there was no unified -Reich police system; the individual German states had police forces of -their own. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the decree of June 17, -1936, signed by Frick and published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1936, -Page 487. An English translation of this decree is in the document book -under Document Number 2073-PS. - -Section 1 of this Frick decree reads as follows: - - “For the unification of police duties in the Reich, a Chief of - German Police is appointed in the Reich Ministry of the - Interior, to whom is assigned the direction and conduct of all - police affairs. . . .” - -And from Section 2 we learn that it was the Defendant Frick and Hitler, -the signers of the decree, who appointed Himmler as Chief of the German -Police. - -Paragraph 2 of Section 2 of the decree states that Himmler was, and I -quote, “subordinated individually and directly to the Reich and Prussian -Minister of the Interior.” And of course that is Frick. - -The official chart of the German Police system, Document 1852-PS, which -has already been introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-449, -clearly shows the position of the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, -as the supreme commander of the entire German Police system, including -the notorious RSHA, of which the Defendant Kaltenbrunner became chief, -under Frick, in January 1943. - -The Defendant Frick used his authority over the newly centralized police -system for the promotion of the Nazi conspiracy. The Tribunal may take -judicial notice of Frick’s decree of September 20, 1936, published in -the _Ministerial Gazette of the Reich_ (_Ministerialblatt des -Reichs- und Preussischen Ministeriums des Innern_), 1936, Page 1343, -Document 2245-PS. - -In this decree Frick reserved for himself the authority to appoint -inspectors of the security police, subordinated them to his district -governors, the Oberpräsidenten, and ordered them to have a close -co-operation with the Party and the Armed Forces. - -Another example of the use of his activities in the police sphere is in -his ordinance of March 18, 1938, concerning the Austrian Anschluss, in -which Frick authorized the Reichsführer of the SS and Police, Himmler, -to take security measures in Austria without regard to previous legal -limitations. This decree is published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, -Page 262, and appears in the document book as Document Number 1437-PS. - -I shall not here repeat the evidence concerning the criminal activities -of the German police, over which the Defendant Frick had supreme -authority. I should simply like to refer the Tribunal to the -presentations already made on the subject of concentration camps and the -Gestapo, two of the police institutions under Frick’s jurisdiction. But -I should like to show that not only Himmler’s subordinate machine but -also Frick’s ministry itself was familiar with these institutions. -Therefore, I now offer into evidence Document 1643-PS, as Exhibit Number -USA-713. - -This document is a synopsis of correspondence between the Reich Ministry -of the Interior and its field offices, from November 1942 through August -1943, on the subject of the legal aspects of the confiscation of -property by the SS for the enlargement of the concentration camp at -Auschwitz. At the bottom of Page 1 and the top of Page 2 of the English -translation there appears a synopsis of the minutes of a meeting held on -December 17 and 18, 1942, concerning the confiscation of this property. -These minutes indicate that a further discussion was to be held on the -subject on 21 December 1942, between the representatives of the Reich -Minister of the Interior and the Reichsführer SS. On Page 2 there -appears also a summary of a teletype letter dated January 22, 1943 from -Dr. Hoffmann, representing the Reich Minister of the Interior, to the -District Governor in Katowice. - -The summary begins as follows, and I quote: - - “The territory of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp will be - changed into an independent estate”—which means an - administrative territory of itself. - -The fact that the Defendant Frick demonstrated personal interest in a -concentration camp became known through the testimony of Dr. Blaha, to -which I should like to refer the Tribunal, in which he testified that -Frick visited the Dachau Camp in 1943. - -The next aspect of the participation of the Defendant Frick in the Nazi -conspiracy concerns his promotion of racial persecution and racism, -involving the wiping out of the Jews. - -In addition to the many other responsibilities of Frick, this vast -administrative empire covered the entire area of the enactment and -administration of racial legislation. - -I refer again to Document 3475-PS, _The Manual for German Administrative -Officials_, previously introduced, and I refer to Pages 2 and 4, showing -that Frick was administrative and legislative guardian and protector of -the German race. - -In order to avoid any repetition, I shall not quote the various acts -drafted by Frick’s ministry against the Jews. The presentation -concerning persecution of the Jews made by Major Walsh before the -Christmas recess listed a number of decrees signed by Frick, including -the infamous Nuremberg Laws and the laws depriving Jews of their -property, their rights of citizenship and stigmatizing them with the -Yellow Star. - -But the activities of Frick’s ministry were not restricted to the -commission of such crimes, camouflaged in the form of legislation. The -police field offices, subordinate to Frick, participated in the -organization of such terroristic activities as the pogrom of November 9, -1938. - -I refer to a series of Heydrich’s orders and reports concerning the -organization of these pogroms or, as they were termed by Heydrich, -“spontaneous riots,” Documents 3051-PS and 3058-PS, which are already in -evidence as Exhibit Numbers USA-240 and 508. - -Three days after this pogrom of 9 November 1938 Frick, his -undersecretary Stuckart, and his subordinates, Heydrich and Daluege, -participated in a conference on the Jewish question under the -chairmanship of the Defendant Göring. At this meeting were discussed the -various measures which the individual governmental departments should -initiate against the Jews. A stenographic record of this meeting, -Document 1816-PS, is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-261. May -I briefly refer to the bottom of Page 23 of the English translation, -where we find Göring’s concluding remarks: - - “Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have to - think over what measures have to be taken.” - -This remark shows that Göring regarded it as Frick’s duty to follow-up -by administrative devices the pogrom, organized by Frick’s own -subordinates. - -In the foregoing presentation we have shown that the Defendant Frick, as -a member of the conspiracy, devised the machinery of the State for -Nazism. In the following presentation we will show that Frick actively -supported the preparation of the Nazi State for war. - -May we begin this portion by showing that Frick was in sympathy with the -flagrant violations by Germany of her treaties of non-aggression. This -is clearly shown by the affidavit of Ambassador Messersmith, Document -2385-PS, previously introduced as Exhibit Number USA-68. I shall quote -only one sentence from this affidavit, Page 4, line 10. It reads as -follows: - - “High-ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official - contact, particularly men such as Göring, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, - Frank, Darré, and others repeatedly scoffed at my position as to - the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that - Germany would observe her international undertakings only so - long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so.” - -In May 1935, by his appointment as Plenipotentiary General for the -administration of the Reich, Frick became one of the big three in charge -of preparing Germany for war. The other two members of the triumvirate -were the Chief of the OKW and the Plenipotentiary General for War -Economy, at that time the Defendant Schacht. Frick has admitted that he -held the position of Plenipotentiary General since 21 May 1935, the date -of the original secret Reich Defense Law. I refer to his statement of -positions, Document 2978-PS, Exhibit Number USA-8. - -His functions as Plenipotentiary General are outlined in the Reich -Defense Law of 4 September 1938, which was classified top military -secret and appears in our document book as 2194-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-36. Under this law of 1938, Paragraph 3, tremendous power was -concentrated in the hands of Frick as Plenipotentiary General for -Administration. In addition to the offices under his supervision as -Minister of the Interior, the law made the following offices subordinate -to Frick for the purpose of carrying out the directives of the law: -Reich Minister of Justice, Reich Minister of Education, Reich Minister -for Religious Matters, and the Reich Minister for Planning. - -Frick admitted the significant part he played in the preparations for -war as a member of the triumvirate in a speech made on 7 March 1940 at -the University of Freiburg. Excerpts appear in the document book as -Document Number 2608-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-714. I think it would be helpful if the Tribunal would allow me to -read two short paragraphs, beginning at the top of Page 1 of the English -translation: - - “The organization of the non-military national defense fits - organically into the entire structure of the National Socialist - Government and administration. This state of affairs is not - exceptional, but a necessary and planned part of the National - Socialist order. Thus, the conversion of our administration and - economy to wartime conditions has been accomplished very quickly - and without any friction—avoiding the otherwise very dangerous - change of the entire structure of the State. - - “The planned preparation of the administration for the - possibility of a war has already been carried out during - peacetime. For this purpose the Führer appointed a - Plenipotentiary General for the Reich Administration and a - Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.” - -Many of Frick’s contributions to the preparation of the German State for -war are outlined in detail in the book _Dr. Wilhelm Frick and His -Ministry_, which is already in evidence as Document 3119-PS. May I quote -two short sentences from the top of Page 3 of the English translation: - - “Besides, the leading co-operation of the Reich Minister of the - Interior in the important field of ‘military legislation,’ and - thus in the establishment of our Armed Forces, has to be - particularly emphasized. After all, the Reich Minister of the - Interior is the civilian minister of the defense of the country, - who in this capacity, together with the Reich War Minister, not - only signed the military law of 21 May 1935 but, in his capacity - as Supreme Chief of the General and Inner Administration as well - as of the Police, has also received from the Führer and Reich - Chancellor important powers in the fields of the recruitment - system and of military supervision.” - -I have previously mentioned that as Minister of the Interior Frick was -responsible for the administrative policy in occupied and annexed -territories. It was his ministry which introduced the new German order -throughout the vast territory of Europe occupied by the German Armed -Forces, and the Defendant Frick exercised these powers. I request that -the Tribunal take judicial notice of three decrees signed by Frick, -introducing German law into Austria, the Sudetenland, and the Government -General of Poland respectively: - -Decree of 13 March 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Page 237, -Article 8, Document 2307-PS; decree of 1 October 1938, -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Page 1331, Paragraph 8, Document -3073-PS; decree of 12 October 1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1939, Part I, -Page 2077, Paragraph 8 (1), Document 3079-PS. - -Frick’s ministry also arranged the selection and assignment of hundreds -of occupation officials for the Soviet territory even before the -invasion. This fact appears in a report by the Defendant Rosenberg of -April 1941 on preparations for the administration of occupied territory -in the East. May I refer to Page 2, Paragraph 2, of Document 1039-PS, -which has previously been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-146. - -One category of Frick’s contribution to the planning of, and preparation -for, aggressive war deserves special notice. This is the systematic -killing of persons regarded as useless to the German war machine, such -as the insane, the crippled, and aged, and foreign laborers who were no -longer able to work. These killings were carried out in nursing homes, -hospitals, and asylums. The Tribunal will recall that the Defendant -Frick, in his capacity as Reich Minister of the Interior, had -jurisdiction over public health and all institutions. May I refer again -briefly to the _Manual for German Administrative Officials_, Document -3475-PS, this time to Pages 3, 4, and 7 of the English partial -translation. There the following are mentioned as Frick’s jurisdictional -areas: “Health Administration,” “Social Hygiene,” “Racial Improvement -and Eugenics,” “Reich Plenipotentiary for Sanatoria and Nursing Homes.” - -As proof that Frick’s jurisdiction covered the death cases in these -institutions, I now offer in evidence Document 621-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-715. This is a letter of 2 October 1940 from the Chief of the Reich -Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, to the Reich Minister of Justice, informing -the latter that material concerning the death of inmates of nursing -homes had been transmitted to the Reich Minister of the Interior for -further action. In fact, the Defendant Frick not only had jurisdiction -of these establishments, but he was one of the originators of a secret -law organizing the murdering. - -I now offer Document 1556-PS, Exhibit Number USA-716. This is an -official report, dated December 1941, of the Czechoslovak War Crimes -Commission entitled, “Detailed Statement on the Murdering of Ill and -Aged People in Germany.” I should like to quote very brief excerpts from -this report. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 read as follows: - - “1) The murdering can be traced back to a secret law which was - released some time in the summer of 1940. - - “2) Besides the Chief Physician of the Reich, Dr. L. Conti, the - Reichsführer SS Himmler, the Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. - Frick, as well as other men, the following participated in the - introduction of this secret law:. . .”—Other names listed. - - “3) As I have already stated, there were—after careful - calculation—at least 200,000, mainly mentally deficient, - imbeciles, besides neurological cases and medically unfit - people—these were not only incurable cases—and at least 75,000 - aged people.” - -The most striking example of the continued killings in these -institutions, which were under Frick’s jurisdiction and operated under -the order of which Frick was a co-author, is the famous Hadamar case. - -Your Honor, may I ask you whether I may have 10 more minutes to end this -presentation, because the Chief Prosecutors agreed, as I understood, to -start tomorrow morning the case of the French, and I have just 10 more -minutes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. - -DR. KEMPNER: Thank you, Your Lordship. - -I refer to the Hadamar case. I now offer in evidence Document Number -615-PS, Exhibit Number USA-717. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What is this last report that you spoke -about? Whose is it? - -DR. KEMPNER: The Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission report. After I have -shown the general scheme, of which Frick was a co-author, I would like -to show that Frick’s ministry was acquainted with the things that were -going on under his organizational authorship; and therefore I am quoting -now a letter to the fact that he was acquainted with these killings and -that these killings had even become public knowledge. For this reason I -offer in evidence Document 615-PS, Exhibit number USA-717. This document -is a letter from the Bishop of Limburg of 13 August 1941 to the Reich -Minister of Justice. Copies were sent to the Reich Minister of the -Interior—this means Frick—and to the Reich Minister for Church -Affairs. I quote: - - “About 8 kilometers from Limburg, in the little town of Hadamar, - on a hill overlooking the town, there is an institution which - had formerly served various purposes and of late had been used - as a nursing home; this institution was renovated and furnished - as a place in which, by consensus of opinion, the - above-mentioned euthanasia has been systematically practiced for - months, approximately since February 1941. The fact has become - known beyond the administrative district of Wiesbaden, because - death certificates from a Registry Hadamar-Moenchberg are sent - to the home communities. . . .” - -And I quote further: - - “Several times a week buses arrive in Hadamar with a - considerable number of such victims. School children of the - vicinity know this vehicle and say, ‘There comes the murder-box - again.’ After the arrival of the vehicle, the citizens of - Hadamar watch the smoke rise out of the chimney and are tortured - with the ever-present thought of the miserable victims, - especially when repulsive odors annoy them, depending on the - direction of the wind. - - “The effect of the principles at work here, are: Children call - each other names and say, ‘You’re crazy; you’ll be sent to the - baking oven in Hadamar.’ Those who do not want to marry or find - no opportunity say, ‘Marry, never! Bring children into the world - so they can be put into the bottling machine!’ You hear old - folks say, ‘Don’t send me to a state hospital! After the - feeble-minded have been finished off, the next useless eaters - whose turn will come are the old people.’ - - “. . . The population cannot grasp that systematic actions are - carried out which, in accordance with Paragraph 211 of the - German criminal code, are punishable with, death! . . . - - “Officials of the Secret State Police, it is said, are trying to - suppress discussion of the Hadamar occurrences by means of - severe threats. In the interest of public peace this may be well - intended. But the knowledge and the conviction and the - indignation of the population cannot be changed by it; the - conviction will be increased with the bitter realization that - discussion is prohibited with threats but that the actions - themselves are not prosecuted under penal law.” - -I quote the last paragraph of the letter, the postscript: - - “I am submitting copies of this letter to the Reich Minister for - Church Affairs.” Initialed by above. - -Nevertheless, the killings carried out in these institutions under the -secret law created by Defendants Frick, Himmler, and others continued -year after year. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was any answer made to that letter? - -DR. KEMPNER: No answer has been found. I have other letters which I am -not able to quote here today which have the remark, “Please don’t -answer.” - -THE PRESIDENT: “Please don’t answer”? - -DR. KEMPNER: That it should be unanswered. - -Nevertheless, the killings carried out in these institutions under the -secret law created by Defendants Frick, Himmler, and others continued -year after year. I offer in evidence Document 3592-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-718, which is a certified copy of the charge, specifications, -findings, and sentence of the U.S. Military Commission at Wiesbaden, -against the individuals who operated the Hadamar Sanatorium, where many -Russians and Poles were murdered. In this particular proceeding seven -defendants were charged with the murder in 1944 of 400 persons of Polish -and Russian nationality, and three of the defendants were sentenced to -be hanged; the other four were sentenced to confinement at hard labor. - -Now I come to the last page of my presentation, the final case of -Frick’s responsibility, which arises under his position as Reich -Protector of Bohemia and Moravia for the period from August 20, 1943, -until the end of the war. I think it is not necessary to say anything -about the functions of the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; these broad -powers are known to the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from 3592-PS, is it clear that that trial -relates to the killing of Polish and Russian nationals in nursing homes -or institutions of that sort? - -DR. KEMPNER: It is absolutely clear in this document, the sentence of -the Military Commission of Hadamar for Wiesbaden. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you show me where that is? - -DR. KEMPNER: Document Number 3592-PS. I quote: - - “Specification: In that Alfons Klein, Adolf Wahlmann, Heinrich - Ruoff, Karl Willig, Adolf Merkle, Irmgard Huber, and Philipp - Blum, acting jointly and in pursuance of a common intent and - acting for and on behalf of the then German Reich, did, from or - about July 1, 1944, until about April 1, 1945, at Hadamar, - Germany, wilfully, deliberately, and wrongfully aid, abet, and - participate in the killing of human beings of Polish and Russian - nationality; their exact names and number being unknown, but - aggregating in excess of 400, and who were then and there - confined by the German Reich as an exercise of belligerent - control.” - -THE PRESIDENT: It doesn’t show that it came within the jurisdiction of -the Ministry of the Interior. - -DR. KEMPNER: Some time ago I referred to the manual of the German -administrative officials. This manual points out very clearly that -nursing homes, sanitaria, and similar establishments are under the -supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. - -THE PRESIDENT: I follow that, but this document does not refer to -nursing homes. That is what I was asking you. - -DR. KEMPNER: Yes, it says only Hadamar. It is, in fact, the Hadamar -Nursing Home. This portion wasn’t given by the Judge Advocate General, -but I am willing to give later a more extended document that Hadamar is -a common name for the so-called Hadamar killing mill, which is a nursing -home. - -Now I come to the last paragraph of my presentation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Kempner. Counsel for the Defense -wishes to speak. There is a gentleman standing by your side. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: From Document 3592-PS, which was just read, I cannot -find that the Defendant Frick is connected with the document in any way. - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely it is not necessary for you to get up and repeat -what I have just said. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I would like to add something else. - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I would like to add that the Defendant Frick since -August 1943 was not Minister of the Interior, and for that reason this -document cannot be used against him. - -THE PRESIDENT: And it does not give the date of the death of these -people. At any rate, until Dr. Kempner produces something to show that -this was a nursing home and in a time during which the Defendant Frick -was Minister of the Interior, the Tribunal will not treat it as being -evidence which implicates Frick. - -DR. KEMPNER: I quoted this killing in Hadamar for two reasons: First, -because the Ministry of the Interior has become acquainted, as I said -before, with the letter of the Bishop of Limburg, in 1941, when Frick -was Minister of the Interior and knew about these facts; and I quoted -the military decision for this reason, that these killings were still -going on in 1944 and 1945 under a law of which the Defendant Frick was -the co-author. - -The final phase of Frick’s responsibility arises under his position as -Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia for the period from 20 August -1943 until the end of the war. I have not to prove his function but I -shall mention one example, and I offer in evidence Document Number -3589-PS, Exhibit Number USA-720, which is a supplement to an official -Czechoslovak report on German crimes against Czechoslovakia. I would -like to quote only the following brief passage from this report: - - “During the tenure of office of Defendant Wilhelm Frick as Reich - Protector of Bohemia and Moravia from August 1943 until the - liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 many thousands of - Czechoslovak Jews were transported from the Terezin ghetto in - Czechoslovakia to the concentration camp at Oswieczim - (Auschwitz) in Poland and were there killed in the gas - chambers.” - -Brought from the territory over which Frick was Protector to the gas -chamber. - -Thus, we submit, it has been shown that the Defendant Frick was a key -conspirator from 1923 until the Allied armies crushed the resistance of -the Nazi Armed Forces. Frick’s guilt rests on his own record and on the -record of his co-defendants, for whom he is co-responsible under our -Charter. - -I would like to express my appreciation for the assistance rendered in -connection with the preparation of this case by my colleagues Mr. Karl -Lachmann, Lieutenant Frederick Felton, and Captain Seymour Krieger. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-SIXTH DAY - Thursday, 17 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I call upon the Counsel for France. - -M. FRANCOIS DE MENTHON (Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): The -conscience of the peoples, who only yesterday were enslaved and tortured -both in soul and body, calls upon you to judge and to condemn the most -monstrous attempt at domination and barbarism of all times, both in the -persons of some of those who bear the chief responsibility and in the -collective groups and organizations which were the essential instruments -of their crimes. - -France, invaded twice in 30 years in the course of wars, both of which -were launched by German imperialism, bore almost alone in May and June -1940 the weight of armaments accumulated by Nazi Germany over a period -of years in a spirit of aggression. Although temporarily crushed by -superiority in numbers, material, and preparation, my country never gave -up the battle for freedom and was at no time absent from the field. The -engagements undertaken and the will for national independence would have -sufficed to keep France behind General De Gaulle in the camp of the -democratic nations. If, however, our fight for freedom slowly took the -shape of a popular uprising, at the call of the men of the Resistance, -belonging to all social classes, to all creeds and to all political -parties, it was because, while our soil and our souls were crushed by -the Nazi invader, our people refused not only to submit to wretchedness -and slavery, but even more they refused to accept the Hitlerian dogmas -which were in absolute contradiction to their traditions, their -aspirations, and their human calling. - -France, which was systematically plundered and ruined; France, so many -of whose sons were tortured and murdered in the jails of the Gestapo or -in concentration camps; France, which was subjected to the still more -horrible grip of demoralization and return to barbarism diabolically -imposed by Nazi Germany, asks you, above all in the name of the heroic -martyrs of the Resistance, who are among the greatest heroes of our -national legend, that justice be done. - -France, so often in history the spokesman and the champion of human -liberty, of human values, of human progress, through my voice today also -becomes the interpreter of the martyred peoples of western Europe, -Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, peoples more than -all others devoted to peace, peoples who are among the noblest of -humanity by their aspirations and their worship of the values of -civilization, peoples who have shared our sufferings and have refused, -like us, to give up liberty and to sacrifice their souls before the -assault of Nazi barbarism. France here becomes their interpreter to -demand that real justice be done. - -The craving for justice of the tortured peoples is the basic foundation -of France’s appearance before Your High Tribunal. It is not the only -one, nor perhaps the most important one. More than toward the past, our -eyes are turned toward the future. - -We believe that there can be no lasting peace and no certain progress -for humanity, which still today is torn asunder, suffering, and -anguished, except through the co-operation of all peoples and through -the progressive establishment of a real international society. - -Technical procedures and diplomatic arrangements will not suffice. There -can be no well balanced and enduring nation without a common consent in -the essential rules of social living, without a general standard of -behavior before the claims of conscience, without the adherence of all -citizens to identical concepts of good and of evil. There is no domestic -law which, in defining and punishing criminal violations, is not founded -on criteria of a moral order which is accepted by all—in a word, -without a common morality. There can be no society of nations tomorrow -without an international morality, without a certain community of -spiritual civilization, without an identical hierarchy of values; -international law will be called upon to recognize and guarantee the -punishment of the gravest violations of the universally accepted moral -laws. This morality and this international criminal law, indispensable -for the final establishment of peaceful co-operation and of progress on -lasting foundations, are inconceivable to us today after the experience -of past centuries and more especially of these last years, after the -incredible and awesome sacrifices and the sufferings of men of all races -and of all nationalities, except as built on the respect of the human -person, of every human person whosoever he may be, as well as on the -limitation of the sovereignty of states. - -But in order that we may have the hope of founding progressively an -international society, through the free co-operation of all peoples, -founded on this morality and on this international law, it is necessary -that, after having premeditated, prepared, and launched a war of -aggression which has caused the death of millions of men and the ruin of -a great number of nations, after having thereupon piled up the most -odious crimes in the course of the war years, Nazi Germany shall be -declared guilty and her rulers and those chiefly responsible punished as -such. Without this sentence and without this punishment the people would -no longer have any faith in justice. When you have declared that crime -is always a crime, whether committed by one national entity against -another or by one individual against another, you will thereby have -affirmed that there is only one standard of morality, which applies to -international relations as well as to individual relations, and that on -this morality are built prescriptions of law recognized by the -international community; you will then have truly begun to establish an -international justice. - -This work of justice is equally indispensable for the future of the -German people. These people have been for many years intoxicated by -Nazism; certain of their eternal and deep seated aspirations, under this -regime, have found a monstrous expression; their entire responsibility -is involved, not only by their general acceptance but by the effective -participation of a great number of them in the crimes committed. Their -re-education is indispensable. This represents a difficult enterprise -and one of long duration. The efforts which the free peoples will have -to make in order to reintegrate Germany into an international community -cannot succeed in the end if this re-education is not carried out -effectively. The initial condemnation of Nazi Germany by your High -Tribunal will be a first lesson for these people and will constitute the -best starting point for the work of the revision of values and of -re-education which must be its great concern during the coming years. - -This is why France sees fit to ask the Tribunal to qualify juridically -as crimes, both the war of aggression itself and those acts in violation -of the morality and of the laws of all civilized countries which have -been committed by Germany in the conduct of the war, to condemn those -who are chiefly responsible, and to declare criminal the members of the -various groups and organizations which were the principal perpetrators -of the crimes of Nazi Germany. - -Your High Tribunal, established by the four nations signatory to the -agreement of 8 August 1945, acting in the interests of all the United -Nations, is qualified to mete out to Nazi Germany the justice of the -free peoples, the justice of liberated humanity. - -The establishment by our four governments of a Tribunal competent to -judge the crimes committed by those principally responsible in Nazi -Germany is based solidly on the principles and usage of international -law. As an eminent British jurist has recently reminded us: The practice -and the doctrine of international law have always given to belligerent -states the right to punish enemy war criminals who fall into their -power. It is an immutable rule of international law which no author has -ever contested. It is not a new doctrine. It was born with the birth of -international law. Francisco de Vittoria and Grotius laid its -foundations. The German authors of the 17th and 18th century developed -the doctrine. - -Thus Johann Jacob Moser, a positivist writer of the 18th century said: - - “Enemy soldiers who act in violation of international law, - should they fall into the hands of their adversaries, are not to - be treated as prisoners of war. They can suffer the same fate as - thieves or murderers.” - -The prosecutions which the United States, Great Britain, the Union of -Soviet Socialist Republics, and France are today carrying out against -the men and the organizations appearing before Your High Tribunal under -the Indictment read in Berlin on 18 October 1945, therefore have an -unimpeachable juridical foundation: The right, universally recognized by -international doctrine, of bringing war criminals before a punitive -jurisdiction. - -This right is strengthened by legal considerations that are perhaps even -more irrefutable. - -The principle of the territorial application of penal laws gives to -every state the right to punish crimes committed on its territory. The -application of the territorial principle covers the violations of -international law in territory subject to military occupation; these -violations are the chief source of war crimes. But the crimes committed -by the defendants were not directed against any given state, in any -given occupied territory. The National Socialist conspirators, against -whom we ask that justice be done, directed the policy of the Third -Reich. All the states which were occupied and temporarily enslaved by -their armed forces have been equally victims both of the illicit war -which they launched and of the methods used by them in the conduct of -this war. - -There is therefore no single state which could legitimately claim the -privilege of trying these criminals. Only an International Tribunal, -emanating from the combined United Nations, which were yesterday at war -with Germany, can rightly claim this privilege. This is why the -declaration on enemy atrocities made at the end of the Moscow Conference -in October 1943 had provided that the leaders of Nazi Germany would, -after the joint victory of the Allies, be brought before an -international jurisdiction. There is, therefore, nothing new from a -juridical point of view in the principle of justice which you are called -upon to render. Far from being merely an affirmation of power on the -part of the victors, your competence is founded on the recognition by -international law of the territorial jurisdiction of sovereign states. - -The transfer by these states of their juridical power to an -international court constitutes a notable progress in the setting up of -an inter-state punitive procedure. It does not constitute any innovation -in the legal foundation of the justice which you are called upon to -render. - -The penal qualification of the facts may seem more open to juridical -objections. This horrible accumulation and maze of Crimes against -Humanity both include and go beyond the two more precise juridical -notions of Crimes against Peace and War Crimes. But I think—and I will -revert later separately to Crimes against Peace and War Crimes—that -this body of Crimes against Humanity constitutes, in the last analysis, -nothing less than the perpetration for political ends and in a -systematic manner, of common law crimes such as theft, looting, ill -treatment, enslavement, murders, and assassinations, crimes that are -provided for and punishable under the penal laws of all civilized -states. - -No general objection of a juridical nature, therefore, appears to hamper -your task of justice. - -Moreover, the Nazis accused would have no ground to argue on alleged -lack of written texts to justify the penal qualification that you will -apply to their crimes. - -Has not the juridical doctrine of National Socialism admitted that in -domestic criminal law even the judge can and must supplement the law? -The written law no longer constituted the Magna Charta of the -delinquent. The judge could punish when, in the absence of a provision -for punishment, the National Socialist sense of justice was gravely -offended. - -How could a judge under the Nazi regime supplement the law? - -In his search for a semi-legal solution he acted in the manner of a -legislator. Proceeding from the firm basis of the National Socialist -program, he sought the rule which he would have proclaimed had he been a -legislator. The Defendant Frank, in his speech at the Juristentag in -1936, declared: - - “Say to yourself at each decision you have to make: How would - the Führer decide in my place? For every decision which you have - to make, ask yourself: Is this decision in accordance with the - National Socialist conscience of the German people? Thus you - will have a firm basis of conscience which will also bear for - all time, in your own sphere of decisions, the authority of the - Third Reich, based on the popular National Socialist unity and - on the recognition of the will of the Führer Adolf Hitler.” - -To those who tomorrow will render justice in the name of human -conscience, the Defendant Frank and his accomplices would be ill advised -to protest against a lack of written texts with appropriate sanctions, -especially since, in addition to various international conventions, -these texts, though they be not codified in an inter-state penal code, -exist in the penal code of every civilized country. - -Mr. Justice Jackson has given you the details of the various phases and -aspects of the National Socialist plot, its planning and its -development, from the first days of the conspiracy of Hitler and his -companions to rise to power, until the unleashing of innumerable crimes -in a Europe almost entirely at their mercy. - -Sir Hartley Shawcross then enumerated the various breaches of treaties, -of agreements, of promises which were the prelude to the many wars of -aggression of which Germany was guilty. - -I propose today to prove to you that all this organized and vast -criminality springs from what I may be allowed to call a crime against -the spirit, I mean a doctrine which, denying all spiritual, rational, or -moral values by which the nations have tried, for thousands of years, to -improve human conditions, aims to plunge humanity back into barbarism, -no longer the natural and spontaneous barbarism of primitive nations, -but into a diabolical barbarism, conscious of itself and utilizing for -its ends all material means put at the disposal of mankind by -contemporary science. This sin against the spirit is the original sin of -National Socialism from which all crimes spring. - -This monstrous doctrine is that of racialism: The German race, composed -in theory of Aryans, would be a fundamental and natural concept. Germans -as individuals do not exist and cannot justify their existence, except -insofar as they belong to the race or Volkstum, to the popular mass -which represents and amalgamates all Germans. Race is the matrix of the -German people; proceeding therefrom this people lives and develops as an -organism. The German may consider himself only as a healthy and vigorous -member of this body, fulfilling within the collectivity a definite -technical function; his activity and his usefulness are the exact gauge -and justification of his liberty. This national body must be “moulded” -to prepare it for a permanent struggle. - -The ideas and the bodily symbols of racialism form an integral part of -its political system. This is what is called authoritative or -dictatorial biology. - -The expression “blood” which appears so often in the writings of the -Nazi theorists denotes this stream of real life, of red sap which flows -through the circulatory system of every race and of all genuine culture -as it flows through the human body. To be Aryan is to feel this current -passing through oneself, this current which galvanizes and vivifies the -whole nation. Blood is this region of spontaneous and unconscious life -which reveals to each individual the tendencies of the race. The -intellectual life must never, in extolling itself, separate us from this -elemental basis of the sacred community. Let the individual go into -himself and he will receive by direct revelation “the commandments of -the blood.” Dreams, rites, and myths can lead to this revelation. In -other words the modern German can and must bear in himself the call of -the old Germany and find again its purity and its youthful -primitiveness. - -The body and soul unity (Leib Seele Einheit) of the individual must not -be disputed. One reads in the _Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte_ of -September 1938 that the body belongs to the State and the soul to the -Church and to God. It is no longer so. The whole of the individual, body -and soul, belongs to the Germanic nation and to the Germanic State. -National Socialism affirms, indeed, that the moral conscience is the -result of ortho-genetic evolution, the consequence of the most simple -physiological functions which characterize the individuality of the -body. Therefore, the moral conscience is also subject to heredity and -consequently subject to the postulate and to the demands of the race. - -True, this pseudo-religion does not repudiate the means of reason and of -technical activity, but subordinates them rigorously, brings them -infallibly to the racial myth. - -The individual has no value in himself and is important only as an -element of the race. This affirmation is logical if one admits that not -only physical and psychological characteristics, but also opinions and -tendencies are bound, not to the individual but to the nation. Anyone -whose opinions differ from the official doctrine is asocial or -unhealthy. He is unhealthy because in the Nazi doctrine the nation is -equivalent to the race. Now, the characteristics of the race are fixed. -An exception in the formation from the spiritual or moral point of view -constitutes a malformation in the same way as does a clubfoot or a -harelip. - -That is the totalitarian doctrine which reduces the individual to -nonexistence save by the race and for the race, without freedom of -action or any definite aim; totalitarian doctrine which excludes every -other concept, every other aspiration or requirement save those -connected with the race, totalitarian doctrine which eliminates from the -individual every other thought save that of the interest of the race. - -National Socialism ends in the absorption of the personality of the -citizen into that of the state and in the denial of any intrinsic value -of the human person. - -We are brought back, as can be seen, to the most primitive ideas of the -savage tribe. All the values of civilization accumulated in the course -of centuries are rejected, all traditional ideas of morality, justice, -and law give way to the primacy of race, its instincts, its needs and -interests. The individual, his liberty, his rights and aspirations, no -longer have any real existence of their own. - -In this conception of race it is easy to realize the gulf that separates -members of the German community from other men. The diversity of the -races becomes irreducible, and irreducible, too, the hierarchy which -sets apart the superior and the inferior races. The Hitler regime has -created a veritable chasm between the German nation, the sole keeper of -the racial treasure, and other nations. - -Between the Germanic community and the degenerate population of an -inferior variety of men there is no longer any common measure. Human -brotherhood is rejected, even more than all the other traditional moral -values. - -How can one explain how Germany, fertilized through the centuries by -classic antiquity and Christianity, by the ideals of liberty, equality, -and social justice, by the common heritage of western humanism to which -she had brought such noble and precious contributions, could have come -to this astonishing return to primitive barbarism? - -In order to understand it and to try to eradicate forever from the -Germany of tomorrow the evil by which our entire civilization came so -near to perishing, it must be recalled that National Socialism has deep -and remote origins. - -The mysticism of racial community was born of the spiritual and moral -crises which Germany underwent in the 19th century and which abruptly -broke out again in its economic and social structure through a -particularly rapid industrialization. National Socialism is in reality -one of the peaks of the moral and spiritual crisis of modern humanity, -convulsed by industrialization and technical progress. Germany -experienced this metamorphosis of economic and social life not only with -an extraordinary brutality but at a time when she did not yet possess -the political equilibrium and the cultural unity which the other -countries of western Europe had achieved. - -While the inner and spiritual life was weakening, a cruel uncertainty -dominated human minds, an uncertainty admirably defined by the term -“Ratlosigkeit,” which cannot be translated into French but which -corresponds to our popular expression, “One no longer knows in what -saint to believe.” This is the spiritual cruelty of the 19th century -which so many Germans have described with a tragic evocative power. A -gaping void opens before the human soul, disoriented by the search for -new values. - -The natural sciences and the sciences of the mind give birth to absolute -relativism; to a deep scepticism regarding the lasting quality of values -on which Western humanism has been nurtured for centuries. A vulgar -Darwinism prevails, bewilders, and befuddles the brain. The Germans -cease to see in human groups and races anything but isolated nuclei in -perpetual struggle with one another. - -It is in the name of decadence that the German spirit condemns humanism. -It sees in the value of humanism and in the elements that derive from it -only “maladies,” which it attributes to an excess of intellectualism and -abstraction of everything that restrains men’s passions by subjecting -them to common norms. From this point on, classic antiquity is no longer -considered in its aspects of ordered reason or of radiant beauty. In it -one sees only civilizations violently enamored of struggles and -rivalries, linked especially to Germany through their so-called Germanic -origin. - -Sacerdotal Judaism and Christianity in all its forms are condemned as -religions of honor and brotherhood, calculated to kill the virtues of -brutal force in man. - -A cry is raised against the democratic idealism of the modern era, and -then against all the internationals. - -Over a people in this state of spiritual crisis and of negations of -traditional values the culminating philosophy of Nietzsche was to -exercise a dominant influence. In taking the will to power as a point of -departure, Nietzsche preached, certainly not inhumanity but -superhumanity. If there is no final cause in the universe, man, whose -body is matter which is at once feeling and thinking, may mould the -world to his desire, choosing as his guide a militant biology. If the -supreme end of humanity is a feeling of victorious fullness which is -both material and spiritual, all that remains is to insure the selection -of physical specimens, who become the new aristocracy of masters. - -For Nietzsche the industrial evolution necessarily entails the rule of -the masses, the automatism and the shaping of the working multitudes. -The state endures only by virtue of an elite of vigorous personalities -who, by the methods so admirably defined by Machiavelli, which alone are -in accord with the laws of life, will lead men by force and by ruse -simultaneously, for men are and remain wicked and perverse. - -We see the modern barbarian arise. Superior by his intelligence and his -wilful energy, freed of all conventional ethics, he can enforce upon the -masses obedience and loyalty by making them believe in the dignity and -beauty of labor and by providing them with that mediocre well-being with -which they are so easily content. An identical force will, therefore, be -manifest in the leaders, by the harmony between their elementary -passions and the lucidity of their organizing reason, and in the masses, -whose dark or violent instincts will be balanced by a reasoned activity -imposed with implacable discipline. - -Without doubt, the late philosophy of Nietzsche cannot be identified -with the brutal simplicity of National Socialism. Nevertheless, National -Socialism was wont to glorify Nietzsche as one of its ancestors. And -justly so, for he was the first to formulate in a coherent manner -criticism of the traditional values of humanism; and also, because his -conception of the government of the masses by masters knowing no -restraint is a preview of the Nazi regime. Besides, Nietzsche believed -in the sovereign race and attributed primacy to Germany, whom he -considered endowed with a youthful soul and unquenchable resources. - -The myth of racial community which had arisen from the depths of the -German soul, unbalanced by the moral and spiritual crises endured by -modern humanity, allied itself with the traditional theses of -Pan-Germanism. - -Already Fichte’s speeches to the German nation exalting Germanism -clearly reveal one of the main ideas of Pan-Germanism, namely, that -Germany visualizes and organizes the world as it should be visualized -and organized. - -The apology for war is equally ancient. It dates back to Fichte and -Hegel, who had affirmed that war, through its classifying of peoples, -alone establishes justice among nations. For Hegel, in _Grundlinien der -Philosophie des Rechtes_, Page 433, states: “The moral health of nations -is maintained thanks to war, just as the passing breeze saves the sea -from stagnation.” - -The living space theory appears right at the beginning of the 19th -century. It is a well-known geographical and historical demonstration -which such people as Ratzel, Arthur Dix, and Lamprecht will take up -later on, comparing conflicts between peoples to a savage fight between -conceptions and realizations of space and declaring that all history is -moving towards German hegemony. - -State totalitarianism also has ancient roots in Germany. The absorption -of individuals by the State was hoped for by Hegel, who wrote: - - “Individuals disappear in the presence of the universal - substance”—that is the people or state idea—“and this - substance itself shapes the individuals in accordance with its - own ends.” - -Therefore, National Socialism appears in present-day Germany neither as -a spontaneous formation which might be due to the consequence of the -defeat in 1918, nor as a mere invention of a group of men determined -upon seizing power. National Socialism is the ultimate result of a long -evolution of doctrines; the exploitation by a group of men of one of the -most profound and most tragic aspects of the German soul. But the crime -committed by Hitler and his companions will be precisely that of -unleashing and exploiting to its extreme limit the latent force of -barbarity, which existed before him in the German people. - -The dictatorial regime instituted by Hitler and his companions carries -with it for all Germans the “soldier-life,” that is to say, a kind and a -system of life entirely different from that of the bourgeois West and -the proletarian East. It amounted to a permanent and complete -mobilization of individual and collective energies. This integral -militarization presupposed complete uniformity of thoughts and actions. -It is a militarization which conforms to the Prussian tradition of -discipline. - -Propaganda instils into the masses faith, drive, and a thirst for the -greatness of the community. Those consenting masses find an artificial -derivative for their moral anguish and their material cares in theories -of race and in a mystical exaltation held in common. Souls which -yesterday were wounded and rent asunder once more find themselves united -in a common mould. - -The Nazi educational system moulds new generations which show no trace -of traditional moral teachings, those being replaced by the cult of race -and of strength. - -The race myth tends to become a real national religion. Many writers -dream of substituting for the duality of religious confessions a -world-wide dogma of German conception, which would amount to being the -religion of the German race as a race. - -In the middle of the 20th century Germany goes back, of her own free -will, beyond Christianity and civilization to the primitive barbarity of -ancient Germany. She makes a deliberate break with all universal -conceptions of modern nations. The National Socialist doctrine, which -raised inhumanity to the level of a principle, constitutes, in fact, a -doctrine of disintegration of modern society. - -This doctrine necessarily brought Germany to a war of aggression and to -the systematic use of criminality in the waging of war. - -The absolute primacy of the German race, the negation of any -international law whatsoever, the cult of strength, the exacerbation of -community mysticism made Germany consider recourse to war, in the -interests of the German race, logical and justified. - -This race would have the incontestable right to grow at the expense of -nations considered decadent. Germany is about to resume even in the -middle of the 20th century the great invasions of the barbarians. -Moreover, most naturally and logically, she will wage her war in -barbarous fashion, not only because National Socialist ethics are -indifferent to the choice of means, but also because war must be total -in its means and in its ends. - -Whether we consider a Crime against Peace or War Crimes, we are -therefore not faced by an accidental or an occasional criminality which -events could explain without justifying it. We are, in fact, faced by -systematic criminality, which derives directly and of necessity from a -monstrous doctrine put into practice with deliberate intent by the -masters of Nazi Germany. - -From the National Socialist doctrine there arises directly the -immediately pursued perpetration of Crimes against Peace. As early as -February 1920, in the first program of the National Socialist Party, -Adolf Hitler had already outlined the future basis of German foreign -policy. But it was in 1924 in his Landsberg prison, while writing _Mein -Kampf_, that he gave a fuller development to his views. - -According to _Mein Kampf_ the foreign policy of the Reich must have as -its first objective to give back to Germany her “independence and her -effective sovereignty” which is clearly an allusion to the articles of -the Treaty of Versailles, referring to disarmament and the -demilitarization of the Rhineland. It would then endeavor to reconquer -the territories lost in 1919, and 15 years before the outbreak of the -second World War the question of Alsace and Lorraine is clearly raised. -It would also have to seek to extend German territories in Europe, the -frontiers of 1914 being “insufficient” and it would be indispensable to -extend them by including “all Germans” in the Reich, beginning with the -Germans of Austria. - -After having reconstituted Greater Germany, National Socialism will do -everything necessary to “insure the means of existence” on this planet -to the race forming the state, by means, of establishing a “healthy -relation” between the size of the population and the extent of the -territory. By “healthy relation” is meant a situation such that the -subsistence of the people will be assured by the resources of its own -territory. “A sufficient living space on this earth will alone insure to -a people its liberty of existence.” - -But so far that is but a stage. - - “When a people sees its subsistence guaranteed by the extent of - its territory, it is nevertheless necessary to think of insuring - the security of that territory”—because the power of a state - “arises directly out of the military value of its geographical - situation.” - -Those ends, Hitler adds, cannot be reached without war. It will be -impossible to obtain the re-establishment of the frontiers of 1914 -“without bloodshed.” How much more impossible it would be to acquire -living space if one did not prepare for a “clash of arms.” - - “It is in Eastern Europe, at the expense of Russia and the - neighboring countries that Germany must seek new territories. We - are stopping the eternal march of the Germans towards the South - and the West of Europe and are casting our eyes towards the - East.” - -But before anything, declares Hitler, it is necessary to crush France’s -tendency towards hegemony, and to have a “final settlement” with this -“mortal enemy.” “The annihilation of France will enable Germany to -acquire afterwards territories in the East.” The “settlement of -accounts” in the West is but a prelude. “It can be explained only as the -securing of our rear defenses in order to extend our living space in -Europe.” - -Henceforth, also, Germany will have to prevent the existence near her -territory of a “military power” which might become her rival and to -oppose “by all means” the formation of a state which possibly might -acquire sufficient strength to do so; and if that state exists already, -to “destroy” it is, for Germans, not only a right but a duty. “Never -permit”—recommends Hitler to his compatriots, in a passage which he -calls his political testament—“the formation in Europe of two -continental powers. In every attempt to set up a second military power -on Germany’s borders, even if it were in the shape of a state which -might possibly acquire that power, you must see an attack on Germany.” - -War to reconquer the territories lost in 1919, war to annihilate the -power of France, war to acquire living space in eastern Europe, war, -finally, against any state which would be or which might become a -counter-weight to the hegemony of the Reich, that is the plan of _Mein -Kampf_. - -In this way, from the inception of National Socialism, he does not -recoil from any of the certainties of war entailed by the application of -his doctrines. - -In fact, from the moment of his accession to power, Hitler and his -companions devoted themselves to the military and diplomatic preparation -of the wars of aggression which they had resolved to wage. - -It is true that, even before the accession to power of the National -Socialists, Germany had shown her determination to reconstruct her armed -forces, notably in 1932 when, on the occasion of the Disarmament -Conference, she demanded “equality of rights” as regards armament; and -Germany had already secretly violated the articles of the Treaty of -Versailles regarding disarmament. But after the arrival of Hitler to -power, German rearmament was to be carried out at a vastly different -rate. - -On 14 October 1933 the Reich left the Disarmament Conference and made -known 5 days later its decision to withdraw from the League of Nations -under the pretext that it was not granted equality of rights in the -matter of armament. France had, however, expressed her readiness to -accept equality of rights if Germany would first consent to an -international control which would enable the actual level of existing -armaments to be determined. Germany very obviously did not wish to agree -to this condition, for an international control would have revealed the -extent of the rearmament already carried out in secret by the Reich in -violation of the treaties. As a matter of fact, at a cabinet meeting -which took place on 13 October 1933, the minutes of which have been -found, Hitler had declared that he wished to “torpedo” the Disarmament -Conference. Under these conditions it is not surprising that the -attempts made to resume negotiations with Germany after her withdrawal -ended in failure. - -When 18 months later Hitler’s government decided to re-establish -conscription and to create immediately an army which would, on a peace -establishment, comprise 36 divisions, as well as to create a military -air force, it was breaking the engagements which Germany had undertaken -by the Treaty of Versailles. However, on 3 February 1935, France and -Great Britain had suggested to the Reich that it resume its place in the -League of Nations and prepare a general disarmament convention which -would have been substituted for the military Articles of the Treaty. At -the moment when Hitler was on the point of obtaining, by means of free -negotiation, the abolition of the “unilateral burden” which, as he said, -the Treaty of Versailles laid on Germany, he preferred to escape any -voluntary limitation and any control of armaments by a deliberate -violation of a treaty. - -When it decided on 7 March 1936 to denounce the Treaty of Locarno and to -reoccupy at once the demilitarized Rhineland area, thereby violating -Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the German government -alleged that in so doing it was replying to the pact concluded and -signed on 2 May 1935, between France and the U.S.S.R., and ratified on -27 February 1936 by the French Chamber of Deputies. It alleged that this -pact was contrary to the Treaty of Locarno. This was a mere pretext -which was taken seriously by nobody. The Nazi leaders wanted to start -building the Siegfried Line as soon as possible in the demilitarized -Rhineland area, in order to thwart a military intervention which France -might attempt in order to assist her Eastern allies. The decision of 7 -March 1936 was the prelude to the aggressions directed against Austria, -Czechoslovakia, and Poland. - -Internally, rearmament was achieved thanks to a plan of economic and -financial measures which affected every aspect of national life. The -entire economic system was directed towards the preparation of war. The -members of the government proclaimed priority of armaments manufacture -over all other branches of production. Policy took precedence over -economics. The Führer declared: - - “The people must be resigned for some time to having its butter, - fats, and meat rationed in order that rearmament may proceed at - the desired rate.” - -The German people did not protest against this order. The state -intervened to increase the production of substitute goods which would -help to relieve the insufficiency of raw materials and would enable the -Reich, in the event of war, to maintain the level of production -necessary for the Army and Air Force, even if imports were to become -difficult or impossible. The Defendant Göring, in September 1936, -inspired the drawing up and directed the application of the Four Year -Plan which put Germany’s economic system on a war footing. The expenses -entailed by this rearmament were assured thanks to the new system of -work treaties. The Defendant Schacht during the 3½ years he was at the -head of the Reich Ministry of Economics brought into being this -financial machinery and thereby played an outstanding role in military -preparations as he himself recalled, after he left the Ministry, in a -speech that he made in November 1938 at the Economic Council of the -German Academy. - -Germany thus succeeded in 3 years’ time in recreating a great army and -in creating on the technical plane an organization entirely devoted to -future war. On 5 November 1937, when expounding his plan for home policy -to his collaborators, Hitler stated that rearmament was practically -completed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? We will -adjourn, then, for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DE MENTHON: While Hitler’s government was giving to the Reich the -economic and financial means for a war of aggression he was carrying on -simultaneously the diplomatic preparation of that war by endeavoring to -reassure the threatened nations during the period which was -indispensable to him for rearmament and by endeavoring also to keep -apart his eventual adversaries one from the other. - -In a speech on 17 May 1933, Hitler, while asking for a revision of the -Treaty of Versailles, declared that he had no intention of obtaining it -by force. He stated that he admitted “the legitimate exigencies of all -peoples” and asserted that he did not want to “germanize those who are -not Germans.” He wished to “respect the rights of other nationalities.” - -The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, concluded on 26 January 1934, -which was to reassure for a time the Warsaw government and to lull it -into a state of false security, was principally intended to bar French -policy from any action. In a work published in 1939 entitled -_Deutschlands Aussenpolitik 1933-39_, an official writer, Professor Von -Freytagh-Loringhoven, wrote that the essential purpose of this pact was -to paralyze the action of the Franco-Polish alliance and to “overthrow -the entire French system.” - -On 26 May 1935, 10 days after denouncing the military clauses of the -Treaty of Versailles, Germany started negotiations with Great Britain -which were to result in the Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935, -negotiations which were intended to reassure British public opinion by -showing it that, while the Reich was desirous of becoming once more a -great military power, it was not thinking of reconstituting a powerful -fleet. - -Immediately following the plebiscite of 13 January 1935 which decided -the return of the Saar territory to the Reich, Hitler formally declared -“that he would make no further territorial demands whatsoever on -France.” - -He was to use the same tactics towards France until the end of 1938. On -6 December 1938 Ribbentrop came to Paris to sign the Franco-German -Declaration which recognized “the frontiers as definite” between the two -countries, and which stated that the two governments were resolved: - - “. . . under reservation of their particular relations with - third powers, to engage in mutual consultation in the event of - questions of common interests which might show a risk of leading - to international difficulties. . . .” - -He was then still hoping, to quote the French Ambassador in Berlin, to -“stabilize peace in the West in order to have a free hand in the East.” - -Did not Hitler make the same promises to Austria and Czechoslovakia? He -signed, on 11 July 1936, an agreement with the Viennese government -recognizing the independence of Austria, an independence which he was to -destroy 20 months later. By means of the Munich Agreement on 29 -September 1938, he promised subsequently to guarantee the integrity of -the Czech territory which he invaded less than 6 months later. - -Nevertheless, as early as 5 November 1937, in a secret conference held -at the Reich Chancellery, Hitler had made known to his collaborators -that the hour had come to resolve by force the problem of the living -space required by Germany. The diplomatic situation was favorable to -Germany. She had acquired superiority of armaments which ran the risk of -being only temporary. Action should be taken without further delay. - -Thereupon started the series of aggressions which have already been -detailed before this Court. It has also been shown to you that these -various aggressions have been made in violation of international -treaties and of the principles of international law. As a matter of -fact, German propaganda did not challenge this at the time. It merely -stated that those treaties and those principles “had lost any reality -whatever with the passage of time.” In other words, it simply denied the -value of the word once pledged and asserted that the principles which -formed the basis of international law had become obsolete. This is a -reasoning which is in line with the National Socialist doctrines which, -as we have seen, do not recognize any international law and state that -any means is justifiable if it is of a nature to serve the interests of -the German race. - -However, it is worth while examining the various arguments which German -propaganda made use of to justify the long-planned aggression. - -Germany set forth, first of all, her vital interests. Can she not be -excused for neglecting the rules of international law when she was -engaged in a struggle for the existence of her people? She needed -economic expansion. She had the right and the duty to protect the German -minorities abroad. She was obliged to ward off the encirclement which -the Western powers were directing against the Reich. - -Economic expansion was one of the reasons which Hitler put forward, even -to his direct associates, in the secret conferences he held in 1937 and -1939 in the Reich Chancellery. “Economic needs,” he said “are the basis -of the policy of expansion of Italy and of Japan. They also guide -Germany.” - -But would not Hitler’s Germany have been able to seek to satisfy these -needs by peaceful means? Did she think of obtaining new possibilities -for her foreign commerce through commercial negotiations? Hitler did not -stop at such solutions. To solve the German economic problems, he saw -only one way—the acquisition of agricultural territories—undoubtedly -because he was incapable of conceiving of these problems under any other -form than that of “war economy.” If he affirmed the necessity of -obtaining this “agricultural space”—to use his own words—it was -because he saw therein the means of obtaining for the German population -the food resources which would protect it against the consequences of a -blockade. - -The duty of protecting “the German minorities abroad” was the favorite -theme which Germany’s diplomacy made use of from 1937 to 1939. It could -obviously not serve as an excuse for the destruction of the -Czechoslovakian State or for the establishment of the “German -Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.” The fate of the “Sudeten Germans,” -that of the “Danzig Germans” was the Leitmotiv of the German press, of -the Führer’s speeches, and of the publications of Ribbentrop’s -propaganda. Thus, is it necessary to recall that in the secret -conference of 5 November 1937, in which Hitler draws up for his -associates the plan of action to be carried out against the -Czechoslovakian State, he does not say one word about the “Sudeten -Germans” and to recall that in the conference of 23 May 1939 he declares -that Danzig is not the “principal point” of the German-Polish -controversy? The “right of nationalities” was, therefore, in his mind -only a propaganda method intended to mask the real design, which was the -conquest of “living space.” - -The encirclement directed by the Western Powers against the Reich is the -argument which Hitler used when, on 28 April 1939, he denounced the -Naval Agreement which he had concluded in 1935 with Great Britain. This -thesis of encirclement occupied a great deal of space in the German -_White Book of 1939_, relative to the origins of the war; but is it -possible to speak of encirclement when Germany had, in May 1939, -obtained the alliance with Italy and when, on 23 August 1939, she -concluded the German-Russian Pact, and can we forget that the diplomatic -efforts of France and of Great Britain in respect to Greece, Romania, -Turkey, Poland, are subsequent both to the destruction of the -Czechoslovakian State and to the beginning of the German-Polish -diplomatic conflict. Had not the British Prime Minister declared on 23 -March 1939 before the House of Commons that British policy had only two -aims: To prevent Germany from dominating Europe and “to oppose a method -which, by the threat of force, obliged the weak states to renounce their -independence”? What Hitler Germany called “encirclement” was simply a -fence, belatedly built in an attempt to check measureless ambitions. - -But German propaganda did not limit itself to this. Did we not see one -of its spokesmen point to the contrast between the passivity of France -and Great Britain in September 1938 and the resistance which they showed -in 1939 to the Hitler policy, wherefrom it was concluded that the peace -would have been maintained if the Western Powers had exercised pressure -on Poland to bring it to accept the German demands, as they had -exercised pressure the previous year on Czechoslovakia? A strange -argument, which is equivalent to saying that Germany would have been -willing not to make war if all the Powers had yielded to her will! Is it -an excuse for the perpetrators of these violations that France and Great -Britain had for a long time opposed the violations of international law -by Germany merely by platonic protests? - -Public opinion in France and Great Britain, deceived by Hitler’s -declarations, may have believed that the designs of National Socialism -contemplated only settling the fate of German minorities; it may have -hoped that there was a limit to German ambitions; and, ignorant as they -were of the secret plans of which we have proof today, France and Great -Britain allowed Germany to rearm and reoccupy the Rhineland at the very -moment when, according to the testimony of Ribbentrop himself, a -military reaction on their part would, in March 1936, have placed the -Reich in a critical situation. They permitted the aggression of March -and September 1938, and it required the destruction of the -Czechoslovakian State to make the scope of the German plans clear to the -Allies. How can one be astonished that their attitude then changed and -they decided to resist the German plans? How could one still claim that -the peace could have been “bought” in August 1939 by concessions, since -the German secret documents prove that Hitler was determined to attack -Poland as early as May 1939, and that he would have been “deeply -disappointed” if she had yielded, and that he wished a general war? - -In reality, the war was implied by the coming to power of the National -Socialists. Their doctrine inevitably led to it. - -As Sir Hartley Shawcross forcefully brought out before Your High -Tribunal, a war of aggression is self-evidently a violation of -international law and, more particularly, a violation of the General -Treaty for the Renouncement of War of 27 August 1928, under the name of -the Paris Pact, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, of which Germany is one of -the signatories. This pact continues to constitute a part of -international law. - -May I reread Article I of this Treaty? - - “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the name of - their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for - the solution of international controversies and renounce it as - an instrument of national policy in their reciprocal relations.” - -War of aggression thus ceased to be lawful in 1928. - -Sir Hartley Shawcross told you, with eloquence, that the Paris Pact, a -new law of civilized nations, was the foundation of a better European -order. The Paris Pact, which remains the fundamental charter of the law -of war, indeed marks an essential step in the evolution of the relations -between states. The Hague Conventions had regulated the “law of the -conduct of war.” They had instituted the obligation of recourse to -arbitration as a preliminary to any conflict. They had, essentially, -established a distinction between acts of war to which international law -and custom allow recourse and those which it prohibits. The Hague -Convention did not even touch upon the principle of war which remained -outside the legal sphere. This is, in fact, what is brought into being -by the Paris Pact, which regulates “the right of declaration of war.” -Since 1928 the international law of war has emerged from its framework -of regulations. It has gone beyond the empiricism of the Hague -Convention to qualify the legal foundation of recourse to force. Every -war of aggression is illegal, and the men who bear the responsibility -for bringing it about place themselves by their own will beyond the law. - -What does this mean, if not that all acts committed as a consequence of -this aggression for the carrying on of the struggle thus undertaken will -cease to have the juridical character of acts of war? - -May I quote this well-known passage from Pascal? - - “Why do you kill me? Don’t you live on the other side of the - water? My friend, if you lived on this side, I would be an - assassin, and it would be unjust to kill you as I am doing, but - since you live on the other side, I am an honorable man, and - this is just.” - -Acts committed in the execution of a war are assaults on persons and -goods which are themselves prohibited but are sanctioned in all -legislations. The state of war could make them legitimate only if the -war itself was legitimate. Inasmuch as this is no longer the case, since -the Kellogg-Briand Pact, these acts become purely and simply common law -crimes. As Mr. Justice Jackson has already argued before you with -irrefutable logic, any recourse to war is a recourse to means which are -in themselves criminal. - -This is the whole spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It was intended to -deprive the states which accepted it of the right of having recourse, in -their national interests, to a series of acts directed against the -physical persons or against the properties of nationals of a foreign -power. Given this formal commitment, those who have ignored it have -given the order to commit acts prohibited by the common law of civilized -states, and there is here involved no special rule of international law -like that which existed previously and which left the said acts of war -untouched by any criminal qualifications. - -A war perpetrated in violation of international law no longer really -possesses the juridical character of a war. It is truly an act of -gangsterism, a systematically criminal undertaking. - -This war, or this would-be-war, is in itself not only a violation of -international law, but indeed a crime, since it signifies the launching -of this systematically criminal enterprise. - -Inasmuch as they could not legally have recourse to force, those who -dictated it, and who were the very organs of the state bound by -treaties, must be considered as the very source of the numerous assaults -upon life and property that are severely punished by all penal law. - -One cannot, of course, deduce from the preceding the individual -responsibility of all the perpetrators of acts of violence. It is -obvious that, in an organized modern state, responsibility is limited to -those who act directly for the state, they alone being in a position to -estimate the lawfulness of the orders given. They alone can be -prosecuted and they must be prosecuted. International law is -sufficiently powerful that the prestige of the sovereignty of states -cannot reduce it to impotence. It is not possible to maintain that -crimes against international law must escape repressive action because, -on the one hand, the state is an entity to which one cannot impute -criminal intention and upon which one cannot inflict punishment and, on -the other, no individual can be held responsible for the acts of the -state. - -On the other hand, it cannot be objected that, despite the illegality of -the principle of recourse to force by Germany, other states have -admitted that war existed and speak of the application of international -law in time of war. It must, in fact, be noted that, even in the case of -civil war, the parties have often invoked these rules which, to a -certain extent, canalize the use of force. This in no wise implies -acquiescence in the principle of its use. Moreover, when Great Britain -and France communicated to the League of Nations the fact that a state -of war existed between them and Germany as of 3 September 1939, they -also declared that in committing an act of aggression against Poland, -Germany had violated its obligations, assumed not only with regard to -Poland but also with regard to the other signatories of the Paris Pact. -From that moment on, Great Britain and France took cognizance, in some -way, of the launching of an illegal war by Germany. - -Recourse to war implies preparation and decision; it would be futile to -prohibit it, if one intended to inflict no chastisement upon those who -knowingly had recourse to it, though they had the power of choosing a -different path. They must, indeed, be considered the direct instigators -of the acts qualified as crimes. - -It seems to us that it is evident from all this that the Charter of 8 -August only established a jurisdiction to judge what was already an -international crime, not only before the conscience of humanity but also -according to international law, even before the Tribunal was -established. - -If it is not contested that a crime has really been committed, is it -possible to contest the competence of the International Tribunal to -judge it? - -There can, indeed, be no doubt that the states bound by the treaty of -1928 had assumed international responsibilities towards the -co-signatories, should they act contrary to the agreements undertaken. - -International responsibility normally involves the collective state, as -such, without in principle exposing the individuals who have been the -perpetrators of an illegal act. It is within the framework of the state, -with which an international responsibility rests, that as a general rule -the conduct of the men who are responsible for this violation of -international law may be appraised. They are subject, as the case may -be, to political responsibility or to penal responsibility before the -assemblies or the competent jurisdictions. - -The reason for this is that normally the framework of the state -comprises the nationals: The order of the state assumes the exercise of -justice over a given territory and with regard to the individuals whom -it includes, and the failure of the state in the exercise of this -essential mission is followed by the reaction and the protests of third -powers, notably when their own nationals are involved. - -But in the present situation there is no German State. - -Since the Surrender Declaration of 5 May 1945 and until the day when a -government shall have been established by the agreement of the four -occupying Powers, there will be no organ representing the German State. -Under these conditions, it cannot be considered that a German State -juridical order exists, which is capable of bringing the consequences -arising from a recognition of the responsibility of the Reich for the -violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to bear upon those individuals who -are, in fact, the perpetrators of this violation in their capacity as -organs of the Reich. - -Today supreme authority is being exercised over the whole German -territory, in regard to the entire German population, by the Four Powers -acting jointly. It must, therefore, be allowed that the states which -exercise supreme authority over the territory and population of Germany -can submit this guilt to a Court’s jurisdiction. Otherwise, the -proclamation that Germany has violated the solemn covenant which it has -undertaken, becomes meaningless. - -There is also involved a penal responsibility incurred for a series of -acts, qualified as crimes, which were committed against nationals of the -United Nations. These acts, which are not juridically acts of war but -which have been committed as such upon the instigation of those who bear -the responsibility for the launching of the so-called war, who have -committed aggression upon the lives and the property of nationals of the -United Nations, may, by virtue of the territorial principle as we have -shown above, be brought before a jurisdiction constituted for this -purpose by the United Nations, even as war crimes, properly speaking, -are now being brought before the tribunals of each country whose -nationals have been victims hereof. - -Crimes committed by the Nazis in the course of the war, like the war of -aggression itself, will be, as Mr. Justice Jackson has demonstrated to -you, the manifestation of a concerted and methodically executed plan. - -These crimes flow directly, like the war itself, from the National -Socialist doctrine. This doctrine is indifferent to the moral choice of -means to attain a final success, and for this doctrine the aim of war is -pillage, destruction, and extermination. - -Total war, totalitarian war in its methods and its aims, is dictated by -the primacy of the German race and the negation of any other value. The -Nazi conception maintains selection as a natural principle. The man who -does not belong to the superior race counts for nothing. Human life and -even less liberty, personality, the dignity of man, have no importance -when an adversary of the German community is involved. It is truly “the -return to barbarism” with all its consequences. Logically consistent, -National Socialism goes to the length of assuming the right, either to -exterminate totally races judged hostile or decadent, or to subjugate or -put to use individuals and groups capable of resistance, in the nations. -Does not the idea of totalitarian war imply the annihilation of any -eventual resistance? All those who, in any way, may be capable of -opposing the New Order and the German hegemony will be liquidated. It -will thus become possible to assure an absolute domination over a -neighboring people that has been reduced to impotence and to utilize, -for the benefit of the Reich, the resources and the human material of -those people reduced to slavery. - -All the moral conceptions which tended to make war more humane are -obviously outdated, and the more so, all international conventions which -had undertaken to bring some extenuation of the evils of war. - -The conquered peoples must concur, willingly or by force, in the German -victory by their material resources, as well as by their labor -potential. Means will be found to subject them. - -The treatment to which the occupied countries will be subjected is -likewise related to this war aim. One could read in _Deutsche -Volkskraft_ of 13 June 1935 that the totalitarian war will end in a -totalitarian victory. “Totalitarian” signifies the entire destruction of -the conquered nation and its complete and final disappearance from the -historic scene. - -Among the conquered peoples distinctions can be made according to -whether or not the National Socialists consider them as belonging to the -Master Race. For the former, an effort is made to integrate them into -the German Reich against their will. For the latter, there is applied a -policy of weakening them and bringing about their extinction by every -means, from that of appropriation of their property to that of -extermination of their persons. In regard to both groups, the Nazi -rulers assault not only the property and physical persons, but also the -spirits and souls. They seek to align the populations according to the -Nazi dogma and behavior, when they wish to integrate them in the German -community; they apply themselves at least to rooting out whatever -conceptions are irreconcilable with the Nazi universe; they aim to -reduce to a mentality and status of slaves, those men whose nationality -they wish to eradicate for the benefit of the German race. - -Inspired by these general conceptions as to the conduct to be observed -in occupied countries, the defendants gave special orders or general -directives or deliberately identified themselves with such. Their -responsibility is that of perpetrators, co-perpetrators, or accomplices -in the War Crimes systematically committed between 1 September 1939 and -8 May 1945 by Germany at war. They deliberately willed, premeditated, -and ordered these crimes, or knowingly associated themselves with this -policy of organized criminality. - -We shall expose the various aspects of this policy of criminality as it -was pursued in the occupied countries of Western Europe, by dealing -successively with Forced Labor, Economic Looting, Crimes against -Persons, and Crimes against Mankind. - -The conception of total war, which gave rise to all the crimes which -were to be perpetrated by the Nazi Germans in the occupied countries, -was the basis for the forced labor service. Through this institution, -Germany proposed to utilize to the maximum the labor potential of the -enslaved populations in order to maintain the German war production at -the necessary level. Moreover, there can be no doubt that this -institution was linked with the German plan of “extermination through -labor” of the populations adjoining Germany which she regarded as -dangerous or inferior. - -A document of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Germany, dated -1 October 1938, provided for the forced employment of prisoners and -civilians for war labor. Hitler in his speech of 9 November 1941 “did -not doubt for a moment that, in the occupied territories which we -control at present, we shall make the last man work for us.” From 1942 -on, it is under the admitted responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel, -acting together with the Defendant Speer, under the control of the -Defendant Göring, General Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan, that -obligatory foreign labor, for the benefit of the war conducted by -Germany, was developed to the full. - -The most various methods of constraint were utilized simultaneously or -successively: - -First: Requisition of services under conditions incompatible with -Article 52 of the Hague Convention. - -Second: So-called voluntary labor, which consisted of bringing a worker -under pressure to sign a contract to work in Germany. - -Third: Conscription for obligatory labor. - -Fourth: The forcing of war prisoners to work for the German war -production and their transformation in certain cases into so-called free -workers. - -Fifth: The enrolling of certain foreign workers, notably French (from -Alsace or Lorraine) and Luxembourgers in the German Labor Front. - -All these procedures constitute crimes contrary to international law and -in violation of Article 52 of the Hague Convention. - -These service requisitions were made under threat of death. Voluntary -labor recruiting was accompanied by individual measures of constraint, -obliging the workers of occupied territories to sign contracts. The -duration of these pseudo-contracts was subsequently prolonged -unilaterally and illegally by the German authorities. - -The failure of these measures of requisition or the voluntary -recruitment of labor led the German authorities everywhere to have -recourse to conscription. Hitler declared on 19 August 1942 in a -conference on the Four Year Plan, which was reported by the Defendant -Speer, that Germany “had to proceed to forced recruiting if sufficient -labor was not obtained on a voluntary basis.” On 7 November 1943 the -Defendant Jodl declared in the course of a speech given in Munich before -the Gauleiter: - - “In my opinion the time has come to take vigorous, resolute, and - hard measures in Denmark, in Holland, in France, and in Belgium - in order to force thousands of idle men to carry out this most - important work of fortification.” - -Having accepted the principle of force, the Germans made use of two -complementary methods: Legal constraint, consisting of promulgating laws -regulating obligatory labor; and restraint in fact, consisting of taking -necessary measures to oblige workers under penalty of grave sanctions to -conform to the issued legislation. - -The basis of the legislation on forced labor is the decree of 22 August -1942 of the Defendant Sauckel, who formulated the charter of forced -recruiting in all the occupied countries. - -In France, Sauckel got the so-called Government of Vichy to publish the -law of 4 September 1942. This law effected the freezing of all manpower -in industries and anticipated the possibility of a requisition of all -Frenchmen who might be employed in any work useful to the enemy. All -Frenchmen from 18 to 50 years of age, who did not have a job which -occupied them more than 30 hours a week, had to prove that they were -usefully employed to meet the needs of the country. A decree of 19 -September 1942 and an enabling directive of 24 September regulated the -various provisions of this announcement. The law of 4 September 1942 had -been published by the so-called Government of Vichy, following strong -pressure exercised by the occupation authorities. Specifically, Dr. -Michel, Chief of the Administrative Staff of the German Military Command -in France, wrote on 26 August 1942 a threatening letter to the Delegate -General for Franco-German Economic Relations, requesting him that the -law be published. - -In 1943, Sauckel obtained from the _de facto_ authority a directive -under date of 2 February, stipulating a census of all male Frenchmen -born between 1 January 1912 and 31 December 1921. He also obtained the -passing of the law of 16 February, establishing the Bureau of Compulsory -Labor for all young men from 20 to 22 years of age. On 9 April 1943, -Gauleiter Sauckel requested the deportation of 120,000 workers for the -month of May and another 100,000 for the month of June. To accomplish -this, the so-called Government of Vichy proceeded to mobilize the entire -military conscription class of 1942. On 15 January 1944 Sauckel -requested the _de facto_ French authorities to deliver 1 million men for -the first 6 months of the year; and he caused the adoption of the -regulation designated as the law of 1 February 1944, which extended the -possibility of impressing all men from 16 to 60 years of age and women -from the age of 18 to 45 for forced labor. - -Similar measures were taken in all occupied countries. - -In Norway, the German authorities imposed on the so-called Government of -Quisling the publication of a law dated 3 February 1943, which -established the compulsory registration of Norwegian citizens and -prescribed their forced enrollment. In Belgium and in Holland, the -Bureau of Compulsory Labor was organized directly by ordinances of the -occupying power. In Belgium the ordinances were promulgated by the -military command, and in Holland by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who was -Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherland territories. In both of -these countries the development of a compulsory labor policy followed -the same pattern. Compulsory labor was at first required only within the -occupied territories. It was soon extended in order to permit the -deportation of workers to Germany. This was achieved, in the case of -Holland, by the ordinance of 28 February 1941 and in Belgium by the -ordinance of 6 March 1942 which established the principle of forced -labor. The principle of deportation was formulated in Belgium by means -of the ordinance of 6 October 1942, and in Holland by the ordinance of -23 March 1942. - -In order to ensure the efficiency of these legal provisions, brutal -compulsion was exercised in all countries; numerous round-ups in all -large cities. For example, 50,000 persons were arrested in Rotterdam on -10 and 11 November 1944. - -Even more serious than the forced labor of civilian population was the -incorporation of laborers from occupied countries in the labor service -of the Reich. This incorporation was not merely the conscription of -laborers but the application of German legislation to the nationals of -occupied countries. - -In the face of the patriotic resistance of the workers of the different -occupied countries, the important results which the German Labor Office -had anticipated were far from being fulfilled. However, a large number -of workers from the occupied countries were forced to work for the -German war effort. - -With regard to the Todt Organization, the laborers who were employed in -the West in the construction of the Atlantic Wall totalled 248,000 at -the end of March 1943. In the year 1942, 3,300,000 workers from occupied -countries worked for Germany in their own country; among others, 300,000 -of these were in Norway, 249,000 in Holland, 650,000 in France. The -number of workers deported to Germany and coming from the occupied -territories in the West increased in 1942 to the figure of 131,000 -Belgians, 135,000 Frenchmen, 154,000 Hollanders. On 30 April 1943, -1,293,000 workmen, of whom 269,000 were women, from the occupied -territories in the West were working for the German War Economy. - -On 7 July 1944, Sauckel stated that the number of workers deported to -Germany during these first 6 months of 1944 reached a total of 537,000, -of which 33,000 were Frenchmen. On the 1st of March 1944 he -acknowledged, during a conference held by the Central Office of the Four -Year Plan, that there were in Germany 5 million foreign workers, of whom -200,000 were actually volunteers. - -The report of the French Ministry for prisoners, deportees, and -refugees, gives the figure of 715,000 for the total number of men and -women who had been deported. - -It should be added that, contrary to international law, the workers who -were transported to Germany had to work under labor conditions and -living conditions that were incompatible with the most rudimentary -regard for human dignity. The Defendant Sauckel has himself stated that -foreign workers, who could achieve substantial production, should be fed -so that they could be exploited as completely as possible with the -minimum of expense, adding that they should receive less food the moment -their production began to decrease and that no concern should be given -to the fate of those whose production capacity no longer presented any -interest. Special reprisal camps were organized for those who sought to -avoid the compulsion imposed on them. An order of 21 December 1942 -stipulated that unwilling workers should be sent, without trial, to such -camps. In 1943 Sauckel, during an inter-ministerial conference, stated -that the co-operation of the SS was essential to him in order to fulfill -the task with which he had been entrusted. Thus, the crime of forced -labor and of deportation gave rise to a whole series of additional -crimes against persons. - -The work required of war prisoners did not remain within the legal -limits authorized by international law any more than did that of the -civilian laborers. National Socialist Germany obliged prisoners of war -to work for the German war production, in violation of Articles 31 and -32 of the Geneva Convention. - -National Socialist Germany, while exploiting to the fullest extent for -the war effort prisoners as well as workers from occupied territories -against all international conventions, was at the same time seizing, by -every possible means, the wealth of these countries. German authorities -applied systematic pillage in these countries. By economic pillage we -mean both the taking away of goods of every type and the exploitation, -on the spot, of the national resources for the benefit of Germany’s war. - -This pillage was methodically organized. - -The Germans began by making sure that they had in their possession, in -all countries, the necessary means for payment. Thus, they insured that -they could seize, with the appearance of legality, the wealth which they -coveted. After freezing the existing purchasing power, they required -enormous payments under the pretext of indemnity for the maintenance of -occupation troops. - -It should be recalled that, according to the terms of the Hague -Convention, occupied countries may be obliged to assume the burden of -the expenses caused by the maintenance of an army of occupation. But the -amounts that were exacted under this by the Germans were only remotely -related to the actual costs of occupation. - -Moreover, they forced the occupied countries to accept a clearing system -which operated practically for the exclusive profit of Germany. Imports -from Germany were almost nonexistent; the goods exported to Germany by -the occupied countries were subject to no regulation. - -In order to maintain for the purchasing balance thus created a -considerable purchasing power, the Germans endeavored everywhere to -achieve the stabilization of prices and imposed a severe rationing -system. This rationing system, which left the population with a quantity -of inferior goods which was less than the minimum indispensable for -their existence, afforded the additional advantage of preserving for the -benefit of the Germans the greatest possible portion of the production. - -Thus, the Germans seized a considerable part of the stocks and of the -production as a result of operations which had the appearance of -legality (requisitions, purchases made with German priority coupons, -individual purchase). These transactions were completed by other -operations of a clandestine character, which were carried out in -violation of the official regulations imposed, frequently by the Germans -themselves. Thus, the Germans had created a whole organization for black -market purchases. For example, one may read in a report of the German -Foreign Ministry of 4 September 1942 that the Defendant Göring had -ordered that purchases on the black market should henceforth extend to -goods which until then had not been included, such as household goods; -and he prescribed further that all goods which could be useful to -Germany should be collected, even if as a result certain signs of -inflation appeared in the occupied countries. - -While they were transporting to Germany the maximum quantity of goods of -every description, after requisitioning without payment or by paying -with bills which they had irregularly obtained by a simple entry in the -clearing account, the Nazi leaders were at the same time endeavoring to -impose the resumption of activity in industry for the benefit of -Germany’s war. - -German industrialists had received instructions ordering them to divide -among themselves the enterprises in the occupied areas which had engaged -in a production similar to their own. While having to carry out these -orders, these industrialists were required to place such industries in -occupied countries firmly under their control by means of different -types of financial combinations. - -The appearance of monetary legality or contractual legality could in no -way hide the fact that economic looting was systematically organized, -contrary to the stipulations of the International Convention of The -Hague. If, according to the stipulations of this Convention, Germany had -the right to seize whatever was indispensable for the maintenance of the -troops necessary for the occupation, all seizures in excess of these -requirements undoubtedly constitute a war crime, which brought about the -economic ruin of the occupied countries, a long-range weakening of their -economic potential and of their means of subsistence, as well as the -general undernourishment of the populations. - -Exact estimates of German transactions in the economic field cannot be -formulated at this time. It would be necessary for this purpose to study -in detail the activities of several countries over a period of more than -4 years. - -Nevertheless it has been possible to bring out precisely certain facts -and to give minimum estimates of German spoliations with respect to the -different occupied countries. - -In Denmark, which was the first country in western Europe to be invaded, -the value of German seizures was nearly 8,000 million crowns. In Norway, -Germany’s spoliations exceed a total value of 20,000 million crowns. - -In the Netherlands, German pillage was effected to such an extent that -although Holland is one of the richest countries in the world in -relation to its population, it is today almost completely ruined and the -financial charges imposed by the occupant exceed 20,000 million -guilders. - -In Belgium, through various schemes, notably the system of occupation -indemnity and clearing, the Germans seized far more than 130,000 million -Belgian francs of payment balances. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg also -suffered important losses as a result of the action of the occupying -power. - -Finally in France the levying of taxes on means of payments reached a -total of 745,000 million francs. In this sum we have not included the -74,000 million francs, which represents the maximum figure which Germany -could legally demand for the maintenance of her army of occupation. -(Moreover, the seizure of 9,500 million in gold was calculated according -to the rate of 1939.) - -In addition to the goods settled for in the occupied countries by -Germany, by means of payment extorted from these countries, enormous -quantities of goods of every character were purely and simply -requisitioned without any indemnity, seized without any explanation, or -else stolen. The occupying authorities not only took all raw materials -and manufactured goods which could be useful to their war efforts, but -they extended their seizures to everything that might help to procure -them a credit balance in neutral countries, such as movables, jewels, -luxury goods, and objects of all kinds. Finally, the art treasures of -the countries of western Europe were likewise looted in the most -shameful manner. - -The considerable sums which Germany was able to obtain by abusing her -power, contrary to all the principles of international law, without -providing any compensation, enabled her to carry out with the appearance -of legality, the economic looting of France and of the other countries -of western Europe. The consequence for these countries, from the -economic viewpoint, is a loss of their strength which will take long to -repair. - -But the most serious consequence of these practices affected the -population itself. For more than 4 years the people of the occupied -countries were exposed to a regime of slow starvation, which resulted in -an increase in the death rate, a breaking down of the physical stamina -of the population and, above all, an alarming deficiency in the growth -of children and adolescents. - -Such practices perpetrated and consummated systematically by the German -leaders, contrary to international law and specifically contrary to the -Hague Convention, as well as contrary to the general principles of -criminal law in force in all civilized nations, constitute War Crimes -for which they must answer before Your High Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -M. DE MENTHON: Crimes against the physical person—arbitrary -imprisonment, ill-treatment, deportations, murder committed by the -Germans in the occupied countries—reached proportions beyond -imagination, even in the course of a world conflict, and took the most -odious forms. - -These crimes spring directly from the Nazi doctrine and testify to the -Reich leaders’ absolute disregard for the human individual, to the -abolition of any sense of justice or even of pity, to a total -subordination of any and all human consideration on the part of the -German community. - -All these crimes are linked to a policy of terrorism. Such a policy -permits the subjugation of occupied countries without involving a large -deployment of troops and their submission to anything that might be -demanded of them. Many of these crimes are moreover tied up with the -will to exterminate. - -We shall examine in succession executions of hostages, police crimes, -deportations, crimes involving prisoners of war, terroristic activities -against the Resistance, and the massacre of civilian populations. - -A. The execution of hostages constitutes in all countries the first act -of terrorism on the part of German occupation troops. From 1940 on, the -German command, notably in France, carried out numerous executions as -reprisals for any crime against the German Army. - -These practices, contrary to Article 50 of the Hague Convention which -forbids collective sanctions, awaken everywhere a feeling of horror and -frequently produce a result contrary to the one sought, by arousing the -populations against the occupant. - -The occupying authorities then endeavored to legalize such criminal -practices, thus seeking to have them recognized by the populations as -“the right” of the occupying power. Veritable “codes for hostages” were -promulgated by the German military authorities. - -Following the general order issued by the Defendant Keitel on 16 -September 1941, Stülpnagel published in France his ordinance of 30 -September 1941. According to the terms of this ordinance, all Frenchmen -held by German authorities for any reason whatsoever were to be -considered as hostages, as well as all Frenchmen who were in the custody -of the French authorities on behalf of German organizations. The -ordinance of Stülpnagel specifies: - - “At the time of the burial of the bodies, burial in a common - grave of a rather large number of persons in a particular - cemetery must be avoided, since this would create a shrine for - pilgrims which now or later might become a center for the - stimulation of anti-German propaganda.” - -In carrying out this ordinance the most infamous executions of hostages -were committed. - -Following the murder of two German officers, one in Nantes on 2 October -1941 and the other at Bordeaux a few days thereafter, the German -authorities had 27 hostages shot at Châteaubriant and 21 at Nantes. - -On 15 August 1942, 96 hostages were shot at Mon-Valérien. - -In September 1942 an assault had been committed against German soldiers -in the Rex motion picture house in Paris. One hundred sixteen hostages -were shot. - -Forty-six hostages were taken from the hostage depot of the Fortress at -Romainville and 70 from Bordeaux. - -In reprisal for the murder of a German official of the labor front 50 -hostages were shot in Paris at the end of September 1943. - -Threats of reprisals on the families of the patriots of the Resistance -are related to the same odious policy of hostages. The Kommandantur -published the following notice in the _Pariser Zeitung_ of 16 July 1942: - - “Near male relatives, brothers-in-law, and cousins of the - ‘agitators’ above the age of 18 years will be shot. - - “All female family members of the same degree of relationship - shall be condemned to forced labor. - - “Children less than 18 years of age of all above-mentioned - persons shall be sent to a house of correction.” - -The executions of hostages continued everywhere until the liberation, -but in the last period they were no more than one additional feature in -the methods of German terrorism, then grown more sweeping. - -B. Among the crimes against persons of which the civilian populations of -the occupied countries of the West were victims, those committed by the -Nazi police organizations are the most revolting. The intervention of -the German police who, in spite of certain appearances, did not belong -to the armies of occupation, is in itself contrary to international law. -Their crimes, particularly hateful in the complete disregard for human -dignity that they imply, were multiplied during 4 years throughout all -the territories of the West occupied by the German forces. - -True, no definite order, no detailed directive emanating directly from -one of the defendants or from one of their immediate subordinates and -valid for all the German police or for the police of the occupied -territories of the West, has been found. But these crimes were committed -by a police that was a direct expression of the National Socialist -ideology and the undeniable instrument of National Socialist policy for -which all the defendants carry the full and entire responsibility. - -Before the considerable mass of acts, their similarity, their -simultaneousness, their generalization in time and place, no one would -be able to deny that these acts are not only the individual -responsibility of those who committed them here or there, but constitute -as well the execution of orders from above. - -The arrests took place without any of the elementary guarantees -recognized in all civilized countries. On a simple, unverified -denunciation, without previous investigation, and often on charges -brought by persons not qualified to bring them, masses of arbitrary -arrests took place in every occupied country. - -During the first period of the occupation, the Germans nevertheless -simulated a scrupulous respect for “legality” in the matter of arrests. -This legality was that introduced by Nazism in the interior of Germany -and did not respect any of the traditional guarantees to which the -individuals in civilized countries are entitled. But, rapidly, even this -pseudo-legality itself was abandoned and the arrests became absolutely -arbitrary. - -The worst treatments were applied to arrested persons even before the -guilt of the accused had been examined. The use of torture in the -interrogations was almost a general rule. The tortures usually applied -were beating, whipping, chaining for several days without a moment of -rest for nourishment or hygienic care, immersion in ice water, drowning -in a bathtub, charging the bathwater with electricity, electrification -of the most sensitive parts of the body, burns at certain places on the -body, and the pulling out of fingernails. But, in addition, those who -carried out these measures had every latitude for unleashing their -instinct of cruelty and of sadism towards their victims. All those -facts, which were of public knowledge in the occupied countries, never -led to any punishment whatsoever of their authors on the part of the -responsible authorities. It even seems that the torture was more severe -when an officer was present. - -It is undeniable that the actions of the German police towards the -prisoners were part and parcel of a long premeditated system of -criminality, ordered by the chiefs of the regime and executed by the -most faithful members of the National Socialist organizations. - -Aside from the general use of torture on prisoners, the German police -perpetrated a considerable number of murders. It is impossible to know -the conditions under which many of these murders were carried out. -Nevertheless, we have enough information to permit us to discover in -them a new expression of the general policy of the National Socialists -in the occupied countries. Often the deaths were only the result of the -tortures inflicted on the prisoners, but often the murder was -deliberately desired and carried out. - -C. The crime which will undoubtedly be remembered as the most horrible -among those committed by the Germans against the civilian populations of -the occupied countries was that of deportation and internment in the -concentration camps of Germany. - -These deportations had a double aim: To secure additional labor for the -benefit of the German war machine; to eliminate from the occupied -countries and progressively exterminate the elements most opposed to -Germanism. They served likewise to empty prisons overcrowded with -patriots and to remove the latter for all time. - -The deportations and the methods employed in the concentration camps -were a stupefying revelation for the civilized world. Nevertheless, they -also are only a natural consequence of the National Socialist doctrine, -according to which man, of himself, has no value except when he is of -service to the German race. - -It is not possible to give exact figures. It is probable that one would -make an understatement when speaking of 250,000 for France; 6,000 for -Luxembourg; 5,200 for Denmark; 5,400 for Norway; 120,000 for Holland; -and 37,000 for Belgium. - -The arrests are founded, now under a pretext of a political nature, now -on a pretext of a racial nature. In the beginning they were individual; -subsequently they took on a collective character, particularly in France -since the end of 1941. Sometimes the deportation did not come until -after long months of prison, but more often the arrest was made directly -with a view to deportation under the system of “protective custody.” -Everywhere imprisonment in the country of origin was accompanied by -brutality, often by tortures. Before being sent to Germany, the -deportees were, in general, concentrated in an assembly camp. The -formation of a convoy was often the first stage of extermination. The -deportees travelled in cattle cars, 80 to 120 per car, no matter what -the season. There were few convoys where no deaths occurred. In certain -transports the proportion of deaths was more than 25 percent. - -The deportees were sent to Germany, almost always to concentration -camps, but sometimes also to prisons. - -Admitted to the prisons were those deportees who had been condemned or -were awaiting trial. The prisoners there were crowded together under -inhumane conditions. Nevertheless, the prison regime was generally less -severe than conditions in the camps. The work there was less out of -proportion to the strength of the prisoners, and the prison wardens were -more humane than the SS in the concentration camps. - -It appears to have been the plan, followed by the Nazis in the -concentration camps, gradually to do away with the prisoners; but only -after their working strength had been used to the advantage of the -German war effort. - -The Tribunal has been told of the almost inconceivable treatment -inflicted by the SS on the prisoners. We shall take the liberty of going -into still further detail during the course of the statement of the -French Prosecution, for it must be fully known to what extent of horrors -the Germans, inspired by National Socialist doctrine, could stoop. - -The most terrible aspect was perhaps the desire to create moral -degradation and debasement in the prisoner until he lost, if possible, -all semblance of a human individual. - -The usual living conditions imposed on the deportees in the camps were -sufficient to ensure slow extermination through inadequate feeding, bad -sanitation, cruelty of the guards, severity of discipline, strain of -work out of proportion to the strength of the prisoner, and haphazard -medical service. Moreover, you already know that many did not die a -natural death, but were put to death by injections, gas chambers, or -inoculations of fatal diseases. But more speedy extermination was often -the case; it was often brought about by ill-treatment: communal ice-cold -showers in winter in the open air, prisoners left naked in the snow, -cudgelling, dog bites, hanging by the wrists. - -Some figures will illustrate the result of these various methods of -extermination. At Buchenwald, during the first 3 months of 1945, there -were 13,000 deaths out of 40,000 internees. At Dachau, 13,000 to 15,000 -died in the 3 months preceding the liberation. At Auschwitz, a camp of -systematic extermination, the number of murdered persons came to several -millions. - -As to the total number of those deported from France, the official -figure is as follows: Of 250,000 deported only 35,000 returned. - -The deportees served as guinea pigs for numerous medical, surgical, or -other experiments which generally led to their death. At Auschwitz, at -Struthof, in the prison at Cologne, at Ravensbrück, at Neuengamme, -numerous men, women, and children were sterilized. At Auschwitz the most -beautiful women were set apart, artificially fertilized, and then -gassed. At Struthof a special barrack, isolated from the others by -barbed wire, was used to inoculate men in groups of 40 with fatal -illnesses. In the same camp women were gassed while German doctors -observed their reactions through a peephole arranged for this purpose. -Extermination was often directly effected by means of individual or -collective executions. These were carried out by shooting, by hanging, -by injections, by gas vans, or gas chamber. - -I should not wish to stress further the facts, already so numerous, -submitted to Your High Tribunal during the preceding days by the -American Prosecution, but the representative of France, so many of his -people having died in these camps after horrible sufferings, could not -pass in silence over this tragic example of complete inhumanity. This -would have been inconceivable in the 20th century, if a doctrine of -return to barbarism had not been established in the very heart of -Europe. - -D. Crimes committed against prisoners of war, although less known, bear -ample testimony to the degree of inhumanity which Nazi Germany had -attained. - -To begin with, the violations of international conventions committed -against prisoners of war are numerous. Many were forced to travel on -foot, almost without food, for very long distances. Many camps had no -respect for even the most elementary rules of hygiene. Food was very -often insufficient; thus a report from the WFSt of the OKW dated 11 -April 1945 and annotated by the Defendant Keitel, shows that 82,000 -prisoners of war interned in Norway received the food strictly -indispensable to the maintenance of life on the assumption that they -were not working, whereas 30,000 of them were really employed on heavy -work. - -In agreement with the Defendant Keitel, acting at the request of the -Defendant Göring, camps for prisoners belonging to the British and -American Air Forces were established in towns which were exposed to air -raids. - -In violation of the text of the Geneva Convention, it was decided, at a -conference held at the Führer’s headquarters on 27 January 1945, in the -presence of the Defendant Göring, to punish by death all attempts to -escape made by prisoners of war when in convoy. - -Besides all these violations of the Geneva Convention, numerous crimes -were committed by the German authorities against prisoners of war: -Execution of captured allied airmen, murder of commando troops, -collective extermination of certain prisoners of war for no reason -whatsoever—for example the matter of 120 American soldiers at Malmédy -on 27 January 1945. Parallel with “Nacht und Nebel,” an expression for -the inhumane treatment inflicted on civilians, can be put down the -“Sonderbehandlung,” a “special treatment” of prisoners of war, in which -these disappeared in great numbers. - -E. The same barbarism is found in the terroristic activity carried out -by the German Army and Police against the Resistance. - -The order of the Defendant Keitel of 16 September 1941, which may be -considered as a basic document, certainly has as a purpose the fight -against the Communist movements; but it anticipates that resistance to -the army of occupation can come from other than Communist sources and -decides that every case of resistance is to be interpreted as having a -Communist origin. - -As a matter of fact, in carrying out this general order to annihilate -the Resistance by every possible means, the Germans arrested, tortured, -and massacred men of all ranks and all classes. To be sure, the members -of the Resistance rarely complied with the conditions laid down by the -Hague Conventions, which would qualify them to be considered as regular -combat forces; they could be sentenced to death as _francs-tireurs_ and -executed. But they were assassinated without trial in most cases, often -after having been terribly tortured. - -After the liberation, numerous charnel-houses were discovered and the -bodies examined by doctors: They bore obvious traces of extreme brutal -treatment, cranial tissue was pulled out, the spinal column had been -dislocated, the ribs had been so badly fractured that the chest had been -entirely crushed and the lungs perforated, hair and nails had been -pulled out. It is impossible to determine the total number of the -victims of German atrocities in the fight against the Resistance. It is -certainly very high. In the department of the Rhône alone, for example, -the bodies of 713 victims were discovered after the liberation. - -An order of 3 February 1944 of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in -the West, signed “By order General Sperrle,” laid down for the fight -against the terrorists immediate reply by fire-arms and the immediate -burning down of all houses from which shots had come: - - “It is of little importance”—the text adds—“that innocent - people should suffer. It will be the fault of the terrorists. - All commanders of troops who show weakness in repressing the - terrorists will be severely punished. On the other hand, those - who go beyond the orders received and are too severe will incur - no penalty.” - -The war diary of Von Brodowski, commanding Liaison Headquarters Number -588, at Clermont-Ferrand, gives irrefutable examples of the barbarous -forms which the Germans gave to the struggle against the Resistance. The -resisters caught were almost all shot on the spot. Others were turned -over to the SD or the Gestapo to be subjected first to torture. The -diary of Brodowski mentions “the cleaning up of a hospital” or -“liquidation of an infirmary.” - -The struggle against the Resistance had the same atrocious character in -all the occupied territories of the West. - -F. The last months of the German occupation were characterized in France -by a strengthening of the policy of terrorism which multiplied the -crimes against the civilian population. The crimes which we are going to -consider were not isolated acts committed from time to time in this or -that locality, but were acts perpetrated in the course of extensive -operations, the high number of which can be explained only by general -orders. - -The perpetrators of these crimes were frequently members of the SS, but -the military command shares responsibility for them. In a directive -entitled “Fight against the Partisan Bands,” dated 6 May 1944, the -Defendant Jodl states that: - - “. . . the collective measures to be taken against the - inhabitants of entire villages (including the burning down of - these villages) are to be ordered exclusively by the division - commanders or the heads of the SS and of the police.” - -The war diary of Von Brodowski mentions the following: “It is understood -that the leadership of the Sipo and of the SD shall be subordinate to -me.” - -These operations are supposedly measures of reprisal which were caused -by the action of the Resistance. But the necessities of war have never -justified the plundering and heedless burning down of towns and villages -nor the blind massacres of innocent people. The Germans killed, -plundered, burned down, very often without any reason whatsoever, -whether in Ain, in Savoie, Lot, or Tarn-and-Garonne, in Vercors, -Corréze, in Dordogne. Entire villages were burned down at a time when -the nearest armed groups of the Resistance were tens of kilometers away -and the population of these villages had not made a single hostile -gesture towards the German troops. - -The two most typical examples are those of Maillé (in Indre-et-Loire) -where on 25 August 1944, 52 buildings out of 60 were destroyed and 124 -people were killed; and that of Oradour-sur-Glane (in the Haute-Vienne). -The war diary of Von Brodowski makes mention of the latter act in the -following manner: - - “All the male population of Oradour was shot. The women and - children took refuge in the church. The church caught fire. - Explosives were stored in the church. (This assertion has been - shown to be false.) Also women and children perished.” - -In the scale of criminal undertakings, perpetrated in the course of the -war by the leaders of National Socialist Germany, we finally meet a -category which we have called crimes against human status (_la condition -humaine_). - -First of all it is important that I should define clearly for the -Tribunal the meaning of this term. This classical French expression -belongs both to the technical vocabulary of law and to the language of -philosophy. It signifies all those faculties, the exercising and -developing of which rightly constitute the meaning of human life. Each -of these faculties finds its corresponding expression in the order of -man’s existence in society. His belonging to at least two social -groups—the nearest and the most extensive—is translated by the right -to family life and to nationality. His relations with the powers -constitute a system of obligations and guarantees. His material life, as -producer and consumer of goods, is expressed by the right to work in the -widest meaning of this term. Its spiritual aspect implies a combination -of possibilities to give out and to receive the expressions of thought, -whether in assemblies or associations, in religious practice, in -teachings given or received, by the many means which progress has put at -the disposal for the dissemination of intellectual value: Books, press, -radio, cinema. This is the right of spiritual liberty. - -Against this human status, against the status of public and civil rights -of the human beings in occupied territories, the German Nazis directed a -systematic policy of corruption and demoralization. We shall treat this -question last because it is this undertaking which presents a character -of the utmost gravity and which has assumed the most widespread -prevalence. Man is more attached to his physical integrity and to life -than to his property. But in all high conceptions of life, man is even -less attached to life than to that which makes for his dignity and -quality, according to the great Latin maxim, “_Et propter vitam, vivendi -perdere causas_.” On the other hand, if, in the territories occupied by -them, the Germans did not, in spite of the importance and extent of -their crimes, plunder all the property and goods and if they did not -kill all the people, there remains not a single man whose essential -rights they did not change or abolish and whose condition as a human -being they did not violate in some way. - -We can even say that in the entire world and as regards all people, even -those to whom they reserved the privileges belonging to the superior -race and even as regards themselves, their agents, and accomplices, the -Nazi leaders committed a major offense against the conscience which -mankind has today evolved from his status as a human being. The -execution of the enterprise was preceded by its plan. This is manifest -in the entire Nazi doctrine and we shall content ourselves by recalling -a few of its dominant features. The human status expresses itself, we -say, in major statutes, every one of which comprises a complex apparatus -of very different provisions. But these statutes are inspired in the -laws of civilized countries by a conception essential to the nature of -man. This conception is defined in two complementary ideas: The dignity -of the human being considered in each and every person individually, on -the one hand; and on the other hand, the permanence of the human being -considered within the whole of humanity. Every juridical organization of -the human being in a state of civilization proceeds from this essential, -two-fold conception of the individual, in each and in all, the -individual and the universal. - -Without doubt, to Occidentals this conception usually appears connected -with the Christian doctrine; but, if it is exact that Christianity is -bound up with its affirmation and diffusion, it would be a mistake to -see in it only the teachings of one or even of certain religions. It is -a general conception which imposes itself quite naturally on the spirit; -It was professed since ancient pre-Christian times; and, in more recent -times, the great German philosopher Kant expressed it in one of his most -forceful formulas, by saying that a human being should always be -considered as an end and never a means. - -The role, as we have already exposed, of the zealots of the Hitlerian -myth was to protest against the spontaneous affirmation of the genius of -mankind and to pretend to break at this point the continuous progress of -moral intelligence. The Tribunal is already acquainted with the abundant -literature of this sect. Without a doubt, nobody expressed himself more -clearly than the Defendant Rosenberg when he declared in the _Myth of -the 20th Century_, Page 539: - - “Peoples whose health is dependent on their blood do not know - individualism as a criterion of values any more than they - recognize universalism. Individualism and universalism in the - absolute sense and historically speaking, are the ideological - concepts of decadence.” - -Nazism professes, moreover, that: - - “The distance between the lowest human being still worthy of - this name, and our higher races, is greater than that between - the lowest type of mankind and the best educated monkey.” (_Die - Reden Hitlers_, Reichsparteitag 1933, Page 33). - -Thus, it is not only a question of abolishing the truly divine -conception which religion sets forth as regards man, but even of setting -aside all purely human conceptions and substituting for it an -animalistic conception. - -As a consequence of such a doctrine, the upsetting of the human status -appears not only to be a means to which one has recourse in the presence -of temporary opportunities, such as those arising from war, but also as -an aim both necessary and desirable. The Nazis propose to classify -mankind in three main categories: That of their adversaries, or persons -whom they consider inadaptable to their peculiar constructions—this -category can be bullied in all sorts of ways and even destroyed; that of -superior men which they claim is distinguishable by their blood or by -some arbitrary means; that of inferior men, who do not deserve -destruction and whose vital power should be used in a regime of slavery -for the well-being of the “overlords.” - -The Nazi leaders proposed to apply this conception everywhere they could -in territories more and more extended, to populations ever more -numerous; and in addition they demonstrated the frightful ambition to -succeed in imposing it on intelligent people, to convince their victims -and to demand from them, in addition to so many sacrifices, an act of -faith. The Nazi war is a war of fanatic religion in which one can -exterminate infidels and equally as well impose conversion upon them. It -should further be noted that the Nazis aggravated the excesses of those -horrible times, for in a religious war converted adversaries were -received like brothers, whereas the Nazis never gave their pitiable -victims the chance of saving themselves, even by the most complete -recantation. - -It is by virtue of these conceptions that the Germans undertook the -Germanization of occupied territories and had, without doubt, the -intention of undertaking to germanize the whole world. This -Germanization can be distinguished from the ancient theories of -Pan-Germanism insofar as it is both a Nazification and an actual return -to barbarism. - -Racialism classifies occupied nations into two main categories; -Germanization means for some a National Socialist assimilation, and for -others disappearance or slavery. For human beings of the so-called -“higher race,” the favored condition assigned to them comprises the -falling-in with the new concepts of the Germanic community. For human -beings of the so-called “inferior race” it was proposed either to -abolish all rights while waiting or preparing their physical -destruction, or to assign them to servitude. For both, racialism means -acceptance of the Nazi myths. - -This two-fold program of absolute Germanization was not carried out in -its entirety nor in all the occupied countries. The Germans had -conceived it as a lengthy piece of work which they intended to carry out -gradually, by a series of successive measures. This progressive approach -is always characteristic of the Nazi method. It fits in, apparently, -with the variety of obstacles encountered, with the hypocritical desire -of sparing public opinion, and with a horrid lust for experimenting and -scientific ostentation. - -When the countries were liberated, the state of the Germanization varied -a great deal according to the different countries, and in each country -according to such and such category of the population. At times the -method was driven on to its extreme consequences; elsewhere, one only -discovers signs of preparatory arrangements. But it is easy to note -everywhere the trend of the same evil, interrupted at different moments -in its development, but everywhere directed by the same inexorable -movement. - -As regards national status, the Germans proceeded to an annexation, pure -and simple, in Luxembourg, in the Belgian cantons of Eupen and of -Malmédy, and in the French departments of Alsace and of Lorraine. Here -the criminal undertaking consisted both in the abolition of the -sovereignty of the state, natural protector of its nationals, and in the -abolition for those nationals of the status they had as citizens of this -state, a status recognized by domestic and international law. - -The inhabitants of these territories thereby lost their original -nationality, ceasing to be Luxembourgers, Belgians, or French. They did -not acquire, however, full German nationality; they were admitted only -gradually to this singular favor, on the further condition that they -furnish certain justifications therefor. - -The Germans sought to efface in them even the memory of their former -country. In Alsace and in Moselle the French language was banned; names -of places and of people were germanized. - -New citizens or mere subjects were equally subjected to the obligations -relating to the Nazi regime: To forced labor, as a matter of course, and -soon to military conscription. In case of resistance to these unjust and -abominable orders, since it was a matter of arming the French against -their allies and in reality against their own country, sanctions were -brought to bear, not only against the parties concerned, but even -against the members of their families, following the theses of Nazi law, -which brush aside the fundamental principles of law against repression. - -Persons who appeared recalcitrant to Nazification, or even those who -seemed of little use to Nazi enterprises, became victims of large-scale -expulsions, driven from their homes in a few short hours with their most -scanty baggage, and despoiled of their property. - -Yet this inhuman evacuation of entire populations, which will remain one -of the horrors of our century, appears as favorable treatment when -compared to the deportations which were to fill the concentration camps, -in particular the Struthof Camp in Alsace. - -At the same time that they oppressed the population by force and in -contravention of all law, the Nazis undertook, according to their -method, to convince the people of the excellence of their regime. The -young people especially were to be educated in the spirit of National -Socialism. - -The Germans did not proceed to the annexation, properly speaking, of -other areas than those we have named. It is beyond doubt, however, and -confirmed by numerous indications, that they proposed to annex -territories much more important by applying to them the same regime, if -the war had ended in a German victory. But everywhere they prepared for -the abolition or the weakening of the national status by debarring or -damaging the sovereignty of the state involved and by forcing the -destruction of patriotic feelings. - -In all the occupied countries, whether or not there existed an apparent -governmental authority, the Germans systematically disregarded the laws -of occupation. They legislated, regulated, administered. Besides the -territories annexed outright, the other occupied territories also were -in a state that might be defined as a state of pre-annexation. - -This leads to a second aspect which is the attack on spiritual security. -Everywhere, although with variation in time and space, the Germans -applied themselves to abolishing the public freedoms, notably the -freedom of association, the freedom of the press; and they endeavored to -trammel the essential freedoms of the spirit. - -The German authorities subordinated the press to the strictest -censorship, even in matters devoid of military character; a press, many -of whose representatives, moreover, were inspired by them. Manifold -restrictions were imposed on industry and on the moving picture -business. Numerous works altogether without political character were -banned, even textbooks. Religious authorities themselves saw their -clerical realm invaded and words of truth could not be heard. After -having curtailed freedom of expression even beyond the degree that a -state of war and occupation justified, the Germans developed their -National Socialist propaganda systematically through the press, radio, -films, meetings, books, and posters. All these efforts achieved so -little result that one might attempt today to minimize their importance. -Nevertheless, the propaganda conducted by means most contrary to the -respect due human intelligence and on behalf of a criminal doctrine, -must go down in history as one of the disgraces of the National -Socialist regime. - -No less did the Germanization program compromise human rights in the -other broad aspects that we have defined: Right of the family, right of -professional and economic activity, juridical guarantees. These rights -were attacked; these guarantees were curtailed. The forced labor and the -deportations infringed the rights of the family, as well as the rights -of labor. The arbitrary arrests suppressed the most elementary legal -guarantees. In addition, the Germans tried to impose their own methods -on the administrative authorities of the occupied countries and -sometimes unfortunately succeeded in their attempts. - -It is also known that racial discriminations were provoked against -citizens of the occupied countries who were catalogued as Jews, measures -particularly hateful, damaging to their personal rights and to their -human dignity. - -All these criminal acts were committed in violation of the rules of -international law, and in particular the Hague Convention, which limits -the rights of armies occupying a territory. - -The fight of the Nazis against the human status completes the tragic and -monstrous totality of war criminality of Nazi Germany, by placing her -under the banner of the abasement of man, deliberately brought about by -the National Socialist doctrine. This gives it its true character of a -systematic undertaking of a return to barbarism. - -Such are the crimes which National Socialist Germany committed while -waging the war of aggression that she launched. The martyred peoples -appeal to the justice of civilized nations and request Your High -Tribunal to condemn the National Socialist Reich in the person of its -surviving chiefs. - -Let the defendants not be astonished at the charges brought against them -and let them not dispute at all this principle of retroactivity, the -permanence of which was guaranteed, against their wishes, by democratic -legislation. War Crimes are defined by international law and by the -national law of all modern civilizations. The defendants knew that acts -of violence against the persons and property and human status of enemy -nationals were crimes for which they would have to answer before -international justice. - -The Governments of the United Nations have addressed many a warning to -them since the beginning of the hostilities. - -On 25 October 1941 Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States of -America, and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, -announced that the war criminals would not escape just punishment: - - “The massacres of France”—said Churchill—“are an example of - what Hitler’s Nazis are doing in many other countries under - their yoke. The atrocities committed in Poland, Yugoslavia, - Norway, Holland, Belgium, and particularly behind the German - front in Russia, exceed anything that has been known since the - darkest and most bestial ages of humanity. The punishment of - these crimes should now be counted among the major goals of the - war.” - -During autumn 1941 the representatives of the governments of the -occupied countries met in London upon the initiative of the Polish and -Czech Governments. They worked out an inter-Allied declaration which was -signed on 13 January 1942. May I remind the Tribunal of its terms: - - “The undersigned, representing the Governments of Belgium, of - Czechoslovakia, the National Committee of Free France, the - Governments of Greece, of Luxembourg, of the Netherlands, of - Poland, and of Yugoslavia, - - “Whereas Germany, from the beginning of the present conflict, - which was provoked by her policy of aggression, set up in the - occupied countries a regime of terror characterized, among other - things, by imprisonment, mass expulsions, massacres, and - execution of hostages; - - “Whereas these acts of violence are committed equally by the - allies and associates of the Reich, and in certain countries by - citizens collaborating with the occupying power; - - “Whereas international solidarity is necessary in order to - prevent these deeds of violence from giving rise to acts of - individual or collective violence, and finally in order to - satisfy the spirit of justice in the civilized world; - - “Recalling to mind that international law and, in particular, - the Hague Convention signed in 1907, concerning the laws and - customs of land warfare, do not permit belligerents to commit - acts of violence against civilians in occupied countries, or to - violate laws which are in force or to overthrow national - institutions; - - “1. Affirming that acts of violence thus committed against - civilian populations have nothing in common with the conceptions - of an act of war or a political crime as this is understood by - civilized nations; - - “2. Taking note of the declarations made in this respect on 25 - October 1941, by the President of the United States of America - and the British Prime Minister; - - “3. Placing among their chief war aims, the punishment by means - of organized justice of those guilty of, or responsible for, - these crimes, whether they ordered, perpetrated, or shared in - them; - - “4. Having decided to see to it in a spirit of international - solidarity that: a) Those guilty or responsible, whatever their - responsibility, shall be sought out, brought to justice, and be - judged; b) that the sentences pronounced shall be executed. - - “In faith whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized, to - this effect have signed this declaration.” - -The leaders of National Socialist Germany received other warnings. I -refer to the speech of General De Gaulle of 13 January 1942; that of -Churchill of 8 September 1942; the note of Molotov, Commissar of the -People for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, of 14 October 1942; and -the second inter-Allied declaration of 17 December 1942. The latter was -made simultaneously in London, Moscow, and Washington after receipt of -information according to which the German authorities were engaged in -exterminating the Jewish minorities in Europe. In this declaration, the -Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the -Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United States of America, the United -Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the French National Committee -which represented the continuation of France, solemnly reaffirmed their -will to punish the war criminals who are responsible for this -extermination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off for 10 -minutes? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DE MENTHON: The premises for a just punishment are thus fulfilled. -The defendants, at the time when they committed their crimes, knew the -will of the United Nations to bring about their punishment. The warnings -which were given to them contain a definition which precedes the -punishment. - -The defendants, moreover, could not be ignorant of the criminal nature -of their activities. The warnings of these Allied governments in effect -translated in a political form the fundamental principles of -international and of national law which permit the punishment of war -criminals to be established on positive precedents and positive rules. - -The founders of international law had a presentiment of the concept of -war crime, particularly Grotius who elucidated the criminal character of -needless acts of war. The Hague Conventions, after the lapse of several -centuries, established the first generally binding standards for laws of -war. They regulated the conduct of hostilities and occupation -procedures; they formulated positive rules in order to limit recourse to -force and to bring the necessities of war into agreement with the -requirements of human conscience. War Crimes thus received the first -definition under which they may be considered; they became a violation -of laws and customs of war as codified by the Hague Convention. - -Then came the war of 1914. Imperial Germany waged the first World War -with a brutality perhaps less systematic and frenzied than that of the -National Socialist Reich, but just as deliberate. The deportation of -workers, looting of public and private property, the taking and killing -of hostages, the demoralization of the occupied territories constituted, -in 1914 as in 1939, the political methods of German warfare. - -The Treaty of Versailles was based on the Hague Convention in order to -establish the suppression of War Crimes. Under the title “Sanctions” -Chapter VII of the Treaty of Versailles discusses criminal -responsibility incurred in the launching and waging of the conflict -which was then the Great War. Article 227 accused William of -Hohenzollern, previously Emperor of Germany, of a supreme offense -against international morality and against the sacred character of -treaties. Article 228 acknowledged the right of the Allied and -Associated Powers to bring persons guilty of acts contrary to the laws -and customs of war before military tribunals. Article 229 provided that -criminals whose acts were not of precise geographical location were to -be referred to inter-Allied jurisdiction. - -The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were repeated in the -conventions which were signed in 1919 and 1920 with the powers allied -with Germany, in particular in the Treaty of Saint-Germain and in that -of Neuilly. That is how the idea of war crime was affirmed in -international law. The peace treaties of 1919 not only defined the -concept of infraction, they formulated the terms of its repression. The -defendants were aware of this, just as they were aware of the warnings -of the governments of the United Nations. They no doubt hoped that the -repetition of the factual circumstances, which hampered the punishment -of the criminals in 1914, would permit them to escape their just -punishment. Their presence before this Tribunal is the symbol of the -constant progress which international law is making in spite of all -obstacles. - -International law had given a still more precise definition of the term -“war crime.” This definition was formulated by the commission which the -preliminary peace conference appointed on 25 January 1919 to disentangle -the various responsibilities incurred in the course of the war. The -report of the Commission of Fifteen of 29 March 1919 constitutes the -historical basis of Articles 227 and following of the Treaty of -Versailles. The Commission of Fifteen based its investigation of -criminal responsibilities on an analysis of the crimes liable to involve -them. A material element enters into the juridical settlement of any -infraction. Its definition is, therefore, the more precise as it -includes an enumeration of the facts which it encompasses. That is why -the Commission of Fifteen set up a list of War Crimes. This list -includes 32 infractions. These are particularly: - -1. Murders, massacres, systematic terrorism; 2. killing of hostages; 3. -torture of civilians; 8. confinement of civilians in inhuman conditions; -9. forced labor of civilians in connection with military operations of -the enemy; 10. usurpation of sovereignty during the occupation of -occupied territories; 11. forced conscription of soldiers among the -inhabitants of the occupied territories; 12. attempts to denationalize -the inhabitants of occupied territories; 13. looting; 14. confiscation -of property; 17. imposition of collective fines; 18. wilful devastation -and destruction of property; 25. violation of other rules concerning the -Red Cross; 29. ill-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war; and 30. -use of prisoners of war for unauthorized work. - -This list, which already includes the grievances against the defendants -enumerated in the Indictment and from which we have just quoted a few -facts, is significant because the War Crimes which it encompasses all -present a composite character. They are crimes against both -international law and national law. Some of these crimes constitute -attacks on the fundamental liberties and constitutional rights of -peoples and of individuals; they consist in the violation of public -guarantees which are recognized by the constitutional Charter of the -Nations whose territories were occupied; violation of the principles of -liberty, equality, and fraternity which France proclaimed in 1789 and -which the civilized states guarantee in perpetuity. These War Crimes are -violations of public international law, since they represent a -systematic refusal of acknowledgment of all respective rights of both -occupying and occupied power; but they also may be analyzed as -violations of public national law, since they mean forcibly transforming -the constitutional institutions of the occupied territories and the -juridical statute of their inhabitants. - -More numerous are crimes which constitute attacks on the integrity of -the physical person and of property. They are allied with war law -regulations and include violations of international law and customs. - -But the international conventions, it should be noticed, determine the -elements constituting an infraction more than they actually establish -that infraction itself. The latter existed before in all national -legislatures; it was to some extent a part of the juridical inheritance -common to all nations; governments agreed to affirm its international -character and to define its contents. International penal law is thus -superimposed on national law, which preserves its repressive basis -because the war crime remains, after all, a crime of common law. -National penal law gives the definition of this. All the acts referred -to in Article 6 of the Charter of 8 August 1945, all the facts -encompassed by the third Count of the Indictment of 18 October 1945 -correspond to the infractions of common law provided for and punished by -national penal legislation. The killing of prisoners of war, of -hostages, and of inhabitants of occupied territories falls, in French -law, under Articles 295 and following of the Penal Code, which define -murder and assassination. The mistreatment to which the Indictment -refers would come under the heading of bodily injuries caused -intentionally or through negligence which are defined by Articles 309 -and following. Deportation is analyzed, independently of the murders -which accompany it, as arbitrary sequestration, which is defined by -Articles 341 and 344. Pillage of public and private property and -imposition of collective fines are penalized by Articles 221 and the -following of our Military Code of Justice. Article 434 of the Penal Code -punishes voluntary destruction, and the deportation of civilian workers -may be compared with the forced conscription provided for by Article 92. -The oath of allegiance is equivalent to the exaction of a false oath in -Article 366, and the Germanization of occupied territories may be -applied to a number of crimes, the most obvious of which is forced -incorporation in the Wehrmacht in violation of Article 92. The same -equivalents can be found in all modern legislative systems and -particularly in German law. - -The crimes against persons and property of which the defendants are -guilty are provided for by all national laws. They present an -international character because they were committed in several different -countries; from this there arises a problem of jurisdiction, which the -Charter of 8 August 1945 has solved, as we have previously explained; -but this leaves intact the rule of definition. - -A crime of common law, the war crime is, nevertheless, not an ordinary -infraction. It has a character peculiarly intrinsic—it is a crime -committed on the occasion or under the pretext of war. It must be -punished because, even in time of war, attacks on the integrity of the -physical person and or property are crimes if they are not justified by -the laws and customs of war. The soldier who on the battlefield kills an -enemy combatant commits a crime, but this crime is justified by the law -of war. International law therefore intervenes in the definition of a -war crime, not in order to give it essential qualification but in order -to fix its outer limits. In other words, every infraction committed on -the occasion or under the pretext of hostilities is criminal unless -justified by the laws and customs of war. International law here applies -the national theory of legitimate defense which is common to all codes -of criminal law. The combatant is engaged in legitimate defense on the -battlefield; his homicidal action is therefore covered by a justifying -fact. But if this justifying fact is taken away the infraction, whether -ordinary crime or war crime, remains in its entirety. To establish the -justifying fact, the criminal action must be necessary and proportional -to the threat to which it responds. The defendants, against whom justice -is demanded of you, can plead no such justification. - -Nor can they escape their responsibility by arguing that they were not -the physical authors of the crimes. The war crime involves two -responsibilities, distinct and complementary: that of the physical -author and that of the instigator. There is nothing heterodox in this -conception. It is the faithful representation of the criminal theory of -complicity through instructions. The responsibility of the accomplice, -whether independent or complementary to that of the principal author, is -incontestable. The defendants bear the entire responsibility for the -crimes which were committed upon their instructions or under their -control. - -Finally, these crimes cannot be justified by the pretext that an order -from above was given by Hitler to the defendants. The theory of the -justifying fact of an order from above has, in national law, definite -fixed limits; it does not cover the execution of orders whose illegality -is manifest. German law, moreover, assigns only a limited rule to the -concept of justification by orders from above. Article 47 of the German -Military Code of Justice of 1940, although maintaining in principle that -a criminal order from a superior removes the responsibility of the -agent, punishes the latter as an accomplice, when he exceeded the orders -received or when he acted with knowledge of the criminal character of -the act which had been ordered. Goebbels once made this juridical -concept the theme of his propaganda. On 28 May 1944 he wrote in an -article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, which was submitted to you by -the American Prosecution, an article intended to justify the murder of -Allied pilots by German mobs: - - “The pilots cannot validly claim that as soldiers they obeyed - orders. No law of war provides that a soldier will remain - unpunished for a hateful crime by referring to the orders of his - superiors, if their orders are in striking opposition to all - human ethics, to all international customs in the conduct of - war.” - -Orders from a superior do not exonerate the agent of a manifest crime -from responsibility. Any other solution would, moreover, be -unacceptable, for it would testify to the impotence of all repressive -policy. - -All the more reason why orders from above cannot be the justifying fact -for the crimes of the defendants. Sir Hartley Shawcross told you with -eloquence that the accused cannot claim that the Crimes against Peace -were the doing of Hitler alone and that they limited themselves to -transmitting the general directives. War Crimes may be compared to the -will for aggression; they are the common work of the defendants; the -defendants bear a joint responsibility for the criminal policy which -resulted from the National Socialist doctrine. - -The responsibility, for German war criminality, because it constituted a -systematic policy, planned and prepared before the opening of -hostilities, and perpetrated without interruption from 1940 to 1945, -rests with all the defendants, political or military leaders, high -officials of National Socialist Germany, and leaders of the Nazi Party. - -Nevertheless, some among them appear more directly responsible for the -acts taken as a whole, particularly those facts connected with the -French charges, that is to say, crimes committed in the Western occupied -territories or against the nationals of those countries. We shall cite: - -The Defendant Göring as Director of the Four Year Plan and President of -the Cabinet of Ministers for Reich Defense; the Defendant Ribbentrop in -his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of the -administration of occupied countries; the Defendant Frick in his -capacity as Director of the Central Office for occupied territories; the -Defendant Funk in his capacity as Minister of Reich Economy; the -Defendant Keitel, inasmuch as he had command over the occupation armies; -the Defendant Jodl, associated in all the responsibilities of the -preceding defendant; the Defendant Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as -Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territory from 13 May 1940 to -the end of the hostilities. - -We will examine more particularly among these defendants, or among -others, those responsible for each category of acts, it being understood -that this enumeration is in no wise restrictive. - -The Defendant Sauckel bears the chief responsibility for compulsory -labor in its various forms. As Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor, -he carried out the intensive recruiting of workers by every possible -means. He is in particular the signer of the decree of 22 August 1942, -which constitutes the charter for compulsory labor in all occupied -countries. He worked in liaison with the Defendant Speer, Chief of the -Todt Organization and Plenipotentiary General for Armament in the office -of the Four Year Plan; as well as with the Defendant Funk, Minister of -Reich Economy; and with the Defendant Göring, Chief of the Four Year -Plan. - -The Defendant Göring participated directly in economic looting in the -same capacity. He appears often to have sought and derived a personal -profit from it. - -The Defendant Ribbentrop in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs -was no stranger to these acts. - -The Defendant Rosenberg, organizer and Chief of the Einsatzstab -Rosenberg, is particularly guilty of the looting of works of art in the -occupied countries. - -The chief responsibility for the murders of hostages lies with the -Defendant Keitel, the drafter notably of the general order of 16 -September 1941, with his assistant, the Defendant Jodl, and with the -Defendant Göring who agreed to the order in question. - -The Defendant Kaltenbrunner, Himmler’s direct associate and chief of all -the foreign police and security offices, is directly responsible for the -monstrous devices to which the Gestapo had recourse in all occupied -countries, devices which are only the continuation of the methods -originated in the Gestapo by its founder, in Prussia, the Defendant -Göring. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner is likewise directly responsible for -the crimes committed in deportation camps. Moreover, he visited these -camps of deportation, as will be proved by the French Delegation in the -case of the Mauthausen Camp. The Defendant Göring knew of and gave his -approval to the medical experiments made on prisoners. The Defendant -Sauckel forced prisoners by every possible means to work under -conditions, which were often inhuman, for the German war production. - -The Defendant Keitel and his assistant, the Defendant Jodl, are -responsible for treatment contrary to the laws of war inflicted upon war -prisoners, for murders and killings to which they were subjected, as -well as for handing over great numbers of them to the Gestapo. The -Defendant Göring shares their responsibility for the execution of Allied -aviators and soldiers belonging to the commando groups. The Defendant -Sauckel directed the work of war prisoners for the German war production -in violation of international law. - -The Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Kaltenbrunner both bear the chief -responsibility for the terrorist actions carried out jointly by the -German Army and the police forces in the various occupied countries and -notably in France against the Resistance, as well as for the -devastations and massacres carried out against the civilian population -of several French departments. The Defendant Jodl shares in this -responsibility, most particularly through his initial order, “Fight -against Partisan Bands,” dated 6 May 1944, which provides for -“collective measures against the inhabitants of entire villages.” These -blows against mankind are the result of racial theories of which the -Defendant Hess, the Defendant Rosenberg, and the Defendant Streicher are -among the instigators or propagandists. The Defendant Hess participated -notably in the elaboration of this subject, which is found in _Mein -Kampf_. - -The Defendant Rosenberg, one of the principal theorists of racial -doctrine, exercised the function of special delegate for the spiritual -and ideological training of the Nazi Party. The Defendant Streicher -showed himself to be one of the most violent anti-Semitic agitators. In -the execution of the policy of Germanization and Nazification -responsibility is shared between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that -is to say, the Defendant Ribbentrop; the General Staff, that is, the -Defendants Keitel and Jodl; the Central Office for all the occupied -territories, that is, the Defendant Frick. - -The major National Socialist culprits had their orders carried out in -the divers Nazi organizations, which we ask you to declare criminal, in -order that each of their members may be then apprehended and punished. - -The Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the General -Staff, the High Command of the German Armed Forces represent only a -small number of persons whose guilt and punishment must ultimately -result from the evidence, since they participated personally and -directly in the decisions, or ensured their execution through some -eminent person in the political or military hierarchy, and without being -able to ignore their criminal nature. - -The leaders of the Nazi Party are unquestionably in the forefront of -those who participated in the criminal enterprise, and around the -Defendants Keitel and Jodl the military High Command directed the Army -to the execution of hostages, to pillage, to wanton destruction, and to -massacres. - -But perhaps it will seem to you that the punishment of hundreds of -thousands of men who belonged to the SS, to the SD, to the Gestapo, to -the SA, will give rise to some objection. I should like to try, should -this be the case, to do away with that objection by showing you the -dreadful responsibilities of these men. Without the existence of these -organizations, without the spirit which animated them, one could not -understand how so many atrocities could have been perpetrated. The -systematic War Crimes could not have been carried out by Nazi Germany -without these organizations, without the men who composed them. It is -they who not only executed but willed this body of crimes on behalf of -Germany. - -It may have seemed impossible to you that the monstrous barbarity of the -National Socialist doctrine could have been imposed upon the German -people, the heir, as are our people, of the highest values of -civilization. The education by the Nazi Party of the young men who -formed the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo, explains the hold Nazism -exercised over all Germany. They incarnated National Socialism, and -permitted it to accomplish, thanks to the guilty passiveness of the -whole German population, a part of its purpose. This youth, those who -carried out the tenets of the regime, were trained in a veritable -doctrine of immoralism, which results from the ideology that inspired -the regime. The myth of the race removed from war in the eyes of these -disciples of Nazism its criminal character. - -If it is proved that a superior race is to annihilate races and peoples -that are considered inferior and decadent, incapable of living a life as -it should be lived, before what means of extermination will they recoil? -This is the ethics of immorality, the result of the most authentic -Nietzscheism, which considers that the destruction of all conventional -ethics is the supreme duty of man. The crime against race is punished -without pity. The crime on behalf of race is exalted without limit. The -regime truly creates a logic of crime which obeys its own laws, which -has no connection whatsoever with what we consider ethical. With such a -point of view, all horrors could have been justified and authorized. So -many acts which appear incomprehensible to us, so greatly do they clash -with our customary notions, were explained, were formulated in advance -in the name of the racial community. - -Add that these atrocities and these cruelties were perpetrated within -the rigid framework created by the “esprit de corps,” by the soldierly -solidarity which bound individuals and insured the legitimacy of the -crime an unlimited field of action. The individuals who committed them -would not only be covered by the regime itself, but spurred on by the -discipline and the “camaraderie” of these corps, imbued with Nazi -criminality. - -The Nazi youth was invited to go through an extraordinary adventure. -Having unlimited power at its disposal, thanks to the Party and its -massive grip, it was first of all called upon to implement the grandiose -dreams of National Socialist Pan-Germanism. - -The Party exercised a rigid selection of its youth, and neglected no -incentive. It solicited from its youth the desire to distinguish itself, -to accomplish exploits beyond the common order and beyond nature. The -young Nazis in the Gestapo and the SS knew that their acts, no matter -how cruel or how inhumane they might be, would always be judged -legitimate by the regime, in the name of the racial community, of its -needs, and of its triumphs. The Nazi Party, thanks to the young men of -the SS, of the SD, and of the Gestapo, had thus become capable of -accomplishing in the field of criminality what no other person or nation -could have committed. - -The members of these organizations became voluntarily the authors of -these innumerable crimes of all kinds, often executed with disconcerting -cynicism and with artful sadism in the concentration camps of Germany as -well as in the various occupied countries, and especially in those of -Western Europe. - -The crimes are monstrous. The crimes and the responsibility for them -have definitely been established. There is no possible doubt. -Nevertheless throughout these tranquil sessions of this Trial, -extraordinary in the history of the world, in view of the exceptional -nature of the justice which your High Tribunal is called upon to render -before the United Nations and the German people and before all mankind a -few objections may arise in our minds. - -It is our duty to discuss this exhaustively, even if it is only -sub-conscious in us, for soon a pseudo-patriotic propaganda may take -hold of Germany, and even may echo in some of our countries. - -“Who can say: I have a clean conscience, I am without fault? To use -different weights and measures is abhorred by God.” This text from the -Holy Scriptures (Proverbs XX, 9-10) has already been mentioned here and -there; it will serve tomorrow as a theme of propaganda, but above all, -it is profoundly written in our souls. Rising in the name of our -martyred people as accusers of Nazi Germany, we have never for a moment -repressed it as a distasteful reminder. - -Yes, no nation is without reproach in its history, just as no individual -is faultless in his life. Yes, every war in itself brings forth -iniquitous evils and entails almost necessarily individual and -collective crimes, because it easily unleashes in man the evil passions -which always slumber there. - -But we can examine our conscience fearlessly in the face of the Nazi -culprits; we find no common measure between them and ourselves. - -If this criminality had been accidental; if Germany had been forced into -war, if crimes had been committed only in the excitement of combat, we -might question ourselves in the light of the Scriptures. But the war was -prepared and deliberated upon long in advance, and upon the very last -day it would have been easy to avoid it without sacrificing any of the -legitimate interests of the German people. And the atrocities were -perpetrated during the war, not under the influence of a mad passion nor -of a war-like anger nor of an avenging resentment, but as a result of -cold calculation, of perfectly conscious methods, of a pre-existing -doctrine. - -The truly diabolical enterprise of Hitler and of his companions was to -assemble in a body of dogmas formed around the concept of race, all the -instincts of barbarism, repressed by centuries of civilization, but -always present in men’s innermost nature, all the negations of the -traditional values of humanity, on which nations, as well as -individuals, question their conscience in the troubled hours of their -development and of their life; to construct and to propagate a doctrine -which organizes, regulates, and aspires to command crime. - -The diabolical enterprise of Hitler and of his companions was also to -appeal to the forces of evil in order to establish his domination over -the German people and subsequently the domination of Germany over Europe -and perhaps over the world. It planned to incorporate organized -criminality into a system of government, into a system of international -relations, and into a system of warfare, by unleashing within a whole -nation the most savage passions. - -Nationalism and serving their people and their country will perhaps be -their explanation. Far from constituting an excuse, if any excuse were -possible in view of the enormity of their crime, these explanations -would make it still more serious. They have profaned the sacred idea of -the fatherland by linking it to a willed return to barbarism. In its -name they obtained—half by force, half by persuasion—the adherence of -a whole country, formerly among the greatest in the order of spiritual -values, and have lowered it to the lowest level. The moral confusion, -the economic difficulties, the obsession with the defeat of 1918 and -with the loss of might and the Pan-Germanic tradition are the basis of -the empire of Hitler and of his companions over a people thrown off its -balance; to abandon oneself to force, to renounce moral concern, to -satisfy a love of collectivity, to revel in lack of restraint are the -natural temptations strongly implanted in the German, which the Nazi -leaders exploited with cynicism. The intoxication of success and the -madness of greatness completed the picture and put practically all -Germans, some without doubt unconsciously, in the service of the -National Socialist doctrine by associating them with the diabolical -enterprise of their Führer and his companions. - -Opposing this enterprise men of various countries and different classes -rose, all of them animated by the common bond of their human lot. France -and Great Britain entered the war only to remain faithful to their given -word. The peoples of the occupied countries, tortured in body and soul, -never renounced their liberty nor their cultural values, and it was a -magnificent epic of clandestine opposition and of Resistance which -through a splendid heroism testifies to the spontaneous refusal of the -populations to accept the Nazi myths. Millions and millions of men of -the Soviet Union fell to defend not only the soil and independence of -their country, but also their humanitarian universalism. The millions of -British and American soldiers who landed on our unhappy continent -carried in their hearts the ideal of freeing from Nazi oppression both -the occupied countries and the peoples who willingly or by force had -become the satellites of the Axis and the German people. - -They were all of them together, whether in uniform or not, fighters for -the great hope which throughout the centuries has been nourished by the -suffering of the peoples, the great hope for a better future for -mankind. - -Sometimes this great hope expresses itself with difficulty or loses its -way or deceives itself or knows the dread return to barbarism, but it -persists always and finally constitutes the powerful lever which brings -about the progress of humanity despite everything. These aspirations -always reborn, these concerns constantly awakened, this anguish -unceasingly present, this perpetual combat against evil form in a -definitive manner the sublime grandeur of man. National Socialism only -yesterday imperiled all of this. - -After that gigantic struggle where two ideologies, two conceptions of -life were at grips, in the name of the people whom we represent here and -in the name of the great human hope for which they have so greatly -suffered, so greatly fought, we can without fear and with a clean -conscience rise as accusers of the leaders of Nazi Germany. - -As Mr. Justice Jackson said so eloquently at the opening of this Trial, -“Civilization could not survive if these crimes were to be committed -again,” and he added, “The true plaintiff in this Court is -civilization.” - -Civilization requires from you after this unleashing of barbarism a -verdict which will also be a sort of supreme warning at the hour when -humanity appears still at times to enter the path of the organization of -peace only with apprehension and hesitation. - -If we wish that on the morrow of the cataclysm of war the sufferings of -martyred countries, the sacrifices of victorious nations, and also the -expiation of guilty people will engender a better humanity, justice must -strike those guilty of the enterprise of barbarism from which we have -just escaped. The reign of justice is the most exact expression of the -great human hope. Your decision can mark a decisive stage in its -difficult pursuit. - -Undoubtedly even today, this justice and this punishment have become -possible only because, as a first condition, free peoples emerged -victorious from the conflict. This is actually the link between the -force of the victors and the guilt of the vanquished leaders who appear -before Your High Tribunal. - -But this link signifies nothing else but the revelation of the wisdom of -nations that justice, in order to impose itself effectively and -constantly upon individuals and upon nations, must have force at its -disposal. The common will to put force in the service of justice -inspires our nations and commands our whole civilization. - -This resolution is brilliantly confirmed today in a judicial case where -the facts are examined scrupulously in all their aspects, the penal -nature of the offense rigorously established, the competency of the -Tribunal incontestable, the rights of the defense intact, total -publicity insured. - -Your judgment pronounced under these conditions can serve as a -foundation for the moral uplift of the German people, first stage in its -integration into the community of free countries. Without your judgment, -history might incur the risk of repeating itself, crime would become -epic, and the National Socialist enterprise a last Wagnerian tragedy; -and new Pan-Germanists would soon say to the Germans: - - “Hitler and his companions were wrong because they finally - failed, but we must begin again some day, on other foundations, - the extraordinary adventure of Germanism.” - -After your judgment, if only we know how to enlighten this people and -watch over their first steps on the road to liberty, National Socialism -will be inscribed permanently in their history as the crime of crimes -which could lead it only to material and moral perdition, as the -doctrine which they should forever avoid with horror and scorn in order -to remain faithful or rather become once more faithful to the great -norms of common civilization. - -The eminent international jurist and noble European, Politis, in his -posthumous book entitled _International Ethics_ reminds us that, like -all ethical rules, those which should govern international relations -will never be definitely established unless all peoples succeed in -convincing themselves that there is definitely a greater profit to be -gained by observing them than by transgressing them. That is why your -judgment can contribute to the enlightenment of the German people and of -all peoples. - -Your judgment must be inscribed as a decisive act in the history of -international law in order to prepare the establishment of a true -international society excluding recourse to war and enlisting force -permanently in the service of the justice of nations; it will be one of -the foundations of this peaceful order to which nations aspire on the -morrow of this frightful torment. The need for justice of the martyred -peoples will be satisfied, and their sufferings will not have been -useless to the progress of mankind. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. De Menthon, would you prefer to continue the case on -behalf of France this afternoon, or would you prefer to adjourn? - -M. DE MENTHON: We are at the disposal of the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then, if that is so, then I think we better go on -until 5 o’clock. - -M. DE MENTHON: It might be preferable to adjourn, because M. Faure’s -brief which is going to be presented will last at least an hour. Perhaps -it is better to adjourn until tomorrow morning. However, we will remain -at the disposal of the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: When you said that the proof which will now be presented -would take an hour, do you mean by that that it is an introductory -statement or is it a part of the main case which you are presenting? - -M. DE MENTHON: Your Honor, it is part of the general case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would it not be possible then to go on until 5 o’clock? - -M. DE MENTHON: Yes, quite so. - -M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. -President and Your Honor, I propose to submit to the Tribunal an -introduction dealing with the first and the second part of the French -case. - -The first part relates to forced labor; the second part to economic -looting. These two over-all questions are complementary to each other -and form a whole. Manpower on the one hand and material property on the -other constitute the two aspects of the riches of a country and the -living conditions in that country. Measures taken with regard to the one -necessarily react on the other, and it is understandable that in the -occupied countries German policy with regard to manpower and economic -property was inspired from the very beginning by common directing -principles. - -For this reason the French Prosecution has deemed it logical to submit -successively to the Tribunal those two briefs corresponding to the -letters “H” and “E” of the third Count of the Indictment. My present -purpose is to define these initial directives covering the German -procedure in regard to manpower and to material in the occupied -territories. - -When the Germans occupied the territories of Denmark, Norway, Holland, -Belgium, Luxembourg, and part of continental France, they thereby -assumed a material power of constraint with regard to the inhabitants -and a material power of acquisition with regard to its property. They -thus had in fact the possibility of utilizing these dual resources on -behalf of the war effort. - -On the other hand, legally they were confronted with precise rules of -international law relating to the occupation of territories by the -military forces of a belligerent state. These rules very strictly limit -the rights of the occupant, who may requisition property and services -solely for the needs of the army of occupation. I here allude to the -regulation annexed to the Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of -War signed at The Hague on 18 October 1907, Section III, and in -particular to the Articles 46, 47, 49, 52, and 53. If it please the -Tribunal, I shall merely cite the paragraph of Article 52 which defines -in a perfectly exact manner the lawful conditions of requisition of -persons and property: - - “Requisitions in kind and of services may be demanded of - communities or of inhabitants only for the needs of the army of - occupation. They will be proportionate to the resources of the - country and of such a nature that they do not imply for the - population the obligation of taking part in war operations - against their native country.” - -These various articles must, moreover, be considered in the general -spirit defined in the preamble of the Convention, from which I take the -liberty of reading the last paragraph to the Tribunal: - - “Until such time as a more complete code of the laws of war can - be enacted, the High Contracting Parties deem it opportune to - state that in cases not included in the regulations adopted by - them, populations and belligerents remain under the safeguard - and direction of the principles of the law of nations derived - from the established usages among civilized nations, the laws of - humanity, and the requirements of public conscience.” - -From this point of view it is very evident that the total exploitation -of the resources of occupied countries for the benefit of the enemy’s -war economy is absolutely contrary to the law of nations and to the -requirements of public conscience. - -Germany signed the Hague Convention and it must be pointed out that she -made no reservations at that time except with regard to Article 44, -which relates to the supply of information to the belligerents. She made -no reservation with regard to the articles which we have cited nor with -regard to the preamble. These articles and the preamble, moreover, -reiterate the corresponding text of the previous Hague Convention of 28 -July 1899. - -German official ratifications of the Conventions were given on 4 -September 1900 and 27 November 1909. I have purposely recalled these -well-known facts in order to emphasize that the Germans could not fail -to recognize the constant principles of international law to which they -subscribed on two occasions, long before their defeat in 1918 and -consequently outside the alleged pressure to which they referred in -regard to the Treaty of Versailles. - -While on this subject of juridical theory, may I point out that in the -arrangement signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919 in connection with the -military occupation of the territories of the Rhine, reference is made -in Article 6 to the Hague Convention in the following terms: - - “The right of requisition in kind and in services as formulated - by the Hague Convention of 1907 will be exercised by the allied - and associate armies of occupation.” - -Thus, the governing principles of the rights of requisition by the -occupiers is confirmed by a third international agreement subscribed to -by Germany, who in regard to the occupation of her own territory is here -the beneficiary of this limitation. - -What, then, will the conduct of the Germans be like, in view of this -factual situation, which involves power and temptation, and in view of -this legal situation which involves a limitation? - -The Tribunal is already aware, by virtue of the general presentation of -the American Prosecution, that the conduct of the Germans was to profit -by the fact and to ignore the law. - -The Germans systematically violated international rules and the law of -nations, as far as we are concerned, both by forced labor and by -spoliation. Detailed illustrations of these acts in the Western -countries will be laid before you in the briefs which will follow my -own. For my part I propose to concentrate for a moment on the actual -concepts which the Germans had from the outset. In this connection I -shall submit to the Tribunal three complementary propositions. - -First Proposition: From the very beginning of the occupation, the -Germans decided, in the interests of their war effort, to seize in any -way possible all the resources, both material and human, of the occupied -countries. Their plan was not to take any account of legal limitations. -It is not under the spur of occasional necessity that they subsequently -perpetrated their illicit acts, but in pursuance of a deliberate -intention. - -Second Proposition: However, the Germans took pains to mask their real -intentions; they did not make known that they rejected international -juridical rules. On the contrary, they gave assurance that they would -respect them. The reasons for this camouflage are easy to understand. -The Germans were anxious from the beginning to spare public opinion in -the occupied territory. Brutal proceedings would have aroused immediate -resistance which would have hampered their actions. They also wished to -deceive world opinion, and more particularly American public opinion, -since the United States of America had at that time not yet entered the -war. - -The third proposition which I lay before the Tribunal results from the -first two. As the Germans contemplated achieving their aims and masking -their intentions, they were of necessity bound to organize a system of -irregular means, while maintaining an appearance of legality. The -complexity and the technical character of the proceedings they used -enabled them easily to conceal the real state of affairs from the -uninitiated or the merely uninformed. These disguised means proved, in -fact, just as efficient and perhaps even more so than would have been -brutal seizure. They moreover enabled the Germans to have recourse to -such brutal action the day they deemed that this would yield them more -advantages than inconvenience. - -We are of the opinion that this analysis of the German intentions is of -interest to the Tribunal for, on the one hand, it demonstrates that the -illicit acts were premeditated and that their authors were aware of -their reprehensible character; and on the other hand, it enables one to -understand the scope and extent of these acts, despite the precautions -taken to mask them. - -The evidence which the Prosecution will submit to the Tribunal refers -chiefly to the second and third propositions, for as regards the first, -that is to say, the criminal intention and premeditation, it is -demonstrated by the discrepancy between the facade and reality. - -I say in the first place that the Germans at the time of the occupation -made a pretense of observing the rules of international law. Here is, by -way of example, a proclamation to the French population, signed by the -Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. This is a public document which -is reproduced in the _Official Journal_, containing the decrees issued -by the military governor for French occupied territories, Number 1 dated -4 July 1940. I submit to the Tribunal this document, which will bear -Number RF-1 of the French documentation; and from it I cite merely the -following sentence: - - “The troops have received the order to treat the population with - regard and to respect private property provided the population - remains calm.” - -The Germans proceeded in identical manner in all the occupied countries. -I also submit to the Tribunal the text of the same proclamation, dated -10 May 1940, which was published in the _Official Journal_ of the -Commander-in-Chief in Belgium and in the north of France, Number 1, Page -1, under the title “Proclamation to the Population of Belgium.” The -German text, as well as the Flemish text, bear the more complete title, -“Proclamation to the Population of Holland and Belgium.” In view of the -identical nature of these texts, this copy may be considered as Document -Number RF-1 (bis) of the French documentation. - -I now submit another proclamation entitled, “To the Inhabitants of -Occupied Countries!” dated 10 May 1940, and signed “The -Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group.” This is likewise published in the -_Official Journal_ of German ordinances. This will be Document Number -RF-2 of the French documentation. I will cite the first two paragraphs: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the German Army has given me - authority to announce the following: - - “I. The German Army guarantees the inhabitants full personal - security and the safeguard of their property. Those who behave - peacefully and quietly have nothing to fear.” - -I also quote passages from Paragraphs V, VI, and VII: - - “V. The administrative authorities of the state, communities, - the police, and schools shall continue their activities. They - therefore remain at the service of their own population. . . . - - “VI. All enterprises, businesses, and banks will continue their - work in the interest of the population. . . . - - “VII. Producers of goods of prime necessity, as well as - merchants, shall continue their activities and place their goods - at the disposal of the public.” - -The passages which I have just quoted are not the literal reproduction -of international conventions, but they reflect their spirit. Repetition -of the terms, “at the service of the population,” “in the interest of -the population,” “at the disposal of the public” must necessarily be -construed as an especially firm assurance that the resources of the -country and its manpower will be preserved for that country and not -diverted in favor of the German war effort. - -We pass now Document under Number RF-2 (bis) to the next of the same -proclamations signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group and -published in the _Official Journal_ of the Commander-in-Chief in -Belgium, numbered as above, Page 3. - -Finally, on 22 June 1940, an armistice convention was signed between the -representatives of the German Government and the representatives of the -_de facto_ authority which was at that time assuming the Government of -France. This convention is likewise a public document. It will be -submitted to the Tribunal at a later stage as the first document of the -economic case. At this stage I merely wish to cite a sentence of -Paragraph 3, which reads as follows: “In the occupied districts of -France the German Reich exercises all the rights of an occupying power.” - -This constitutes then a very definite reference to international law. -Moreover, the German plenipotentiaries gave in this respect -complementary oral assurances. On this matter I submit to the Tribunal, -in the form of French Exhibit Number RF-3 (Document RF-3), an extract -from the deposition made by Ambassador Leon Noel in the course of -proceedings before the French High Court of Justice. This extract is -reproduced from a book entitled _Transcript in extenso of the Sessions -of the Trial of Marshal Pétain_, printed in Paris in 1945 at the -printing office of the official journals and constitutes a document -admissible as evidence in accordance with the Charter of the Tribunal, -Article 21. This is the statement of M. Leon Noel, which I desire to -cite to the Tribunal. M. Leon Noel was a member of the French Armistice -Delegation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to present this document to us? - -M. FAURE: This document is presented to the Tribunal. We have given to -the Tribunal the transcript of the proceedings, and in the book of -documents the Tribunal will find the excerpt I am now quoting. - -THE PRESIDENT: We are not in possession of it at present. I do not know -where it is. - -M. FAURE: I think that possibly this document was handed to the -Secretariat of the Tribunal rather late, but it will be here -immediately. May it please the Tribunal, I merely intend to read a short -extract from this document today. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will have it tomorrow, I hope? - -M. FAURE: Certainly, Mr. President. - - [_Quoting._] “I have also obtained a certain number of replies - from German generals which I believe could have been - subsequently used—from General Jodl, who in the month of May - last signed at Reims the unconditional surrender of Germany and - from General (subsequently Marshal) Keitel, who a few weeks - later was to sign in Berlin the ratification of this surrender. - In this way I led them to declare in the most categorical manner - that in no event would they interfere with administration, that - the rights which they claimed for themselves under the - convention were purely and simply those which in similar - circumstances international law and international usage concede - to occupation armies, that is to say, those indispensable for - the maintenance of security, transportation, and the food supply - needs of these armies.” - -These assertions and promises on the part of the Germans were therefore -formal. Now, even at that time, they were not sincere. Indeed, not only -did the Germans subsequently violate them, but from the very beginning -they organized a system whereby they were enabled to accomplish these -violations in the most efficacious manner and at the same time in a -manner which enabled them to some extent to mask them. - -As far as economy and labor are concerned, this German system comes from -a very simple idea. It consisted in supervising production at its -beginning and its end. On the one hand, the Germans embarked immediately -upon the general requisitioning of all raw materials and all goods in -the occupied countries. Thenceforth, it would depend upon them to -supply, or not to supply, raw material to the national industry. They -were thus in a position to develop one branch of production rather than -another, to favor certain undertakings, and, inversely, to oblige other -undertakings to close down. As events and opportunities demanded, they -organized this appropriation of raw materials, principally with a view -to facilitating their distribution in their own interest but the -principle was continuously maintained. They thus held, as it were, the -key of entrance to production. On the other hand, they also held the -exit key, that is to say, of finance. By securing the financial means in -the form of the money of an occupied country, the Germans were able to -purchase products and to acquire, under the pretense of legality, the -output of the economic activity of the country. In point of fact, the -Germans obtained for themselves from the outset such considerable -financial means that they were easily able to absorb the entire -productive capacity of each country. - -If the Tribunal finds it suitable, I will interrupt at this point. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY - Friday, 18 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, Your Honors. At yesterday’s session I explained -to the Tribunal the principles of the provisions made by the Germans to -ensure the seizure of raw materials and the control of finance in the -occupied countries. - -These provisions will be demonstrated by numerous documents which will -be presented to the Tribunal in the course of the presentation of the -case on economic spoliation and forced labor. I shall not quote these -documents at this moment since, as I pointed out yesterday, the purpose -of my introduction is limited to the initial concepts of the Germans in -these matters. I shall cite only one document, which reveals the true -intentions of the Germans in the very first period. This document bears -our Document Number RF-3 (bis), and I offer it in evidence to the -Tribunal. - -It relates particularly to Norway. It consists of a photostatic copy, -certified, of a transcript of a conference held in Oslo, 21 November -1940, under the presidency of the Reich Commissioner. I would point out -to the Tribunal that we submit this document as being particularly -significant, because Norway is a country which was occupied at a very -early date by the Germans. The date of 21 November 1940, which you see, -refers to the very earliest period of the German occupation, and -moreover, in the text of the conference, allusion is made to the -situation of the 7 months preceding. - -You will find there the exact psychology of the occupation as it existed -in this period of April 1940 to November 1940, that is to say, at the -time, or even before, when the Germans, while invading other countries, -made the reassuring proclamations which I read to the Tribunal -yesterday. - -There were 40 personages present at the conference, of whom State -Secretary Dr. Landfried represented the Reich Ministry of Economics. -This is how the Reich Commissioner expresses himself: - - “Today’s conference is the continuation of a conference which - was held in Berlin. On this occasion I should like, first of - all, to stress and establish definitely that the collaboration - between the Wehrmacht and the Reich Commissioner is exemplary. I - must protest against the idea that the Wehrmacht carried out its - financial task here in a muddled and irresponsible manner. We - must also take into account the particular circumstances which - then prevailed in Norway and which still partially prevail. - - “Certain tasks were fixed by the Führer which were to be carried - out within a given time. - - “At the conference in Berlin the following points were settled, - which we can take as a basis of today’s conference. There is no - doubt that the country of Norway was utilized for the execution - of the tasks of the Wehrmacht during the last 7 months in such a - way that a further drain on the country without some - compensation is no longer possible in view of the future tasks - of the Wehrmacht. - - “I considered it from the beginning my obvious duty in my - capacity as Reich Commissioner to devote my activities to - mobilizing all the economic and material forces of the country - for the purposes of the Wehrmacht and not to call on the - resources of the Reich as long as I am in a position to organize - such resources in the country.” - -I will stop quoting the words of the Reich Commissioner at this point, -and now I shall cite the terms of the reply of Dr. Landfried, which you -will find a little lower down in the document: - - “I am very glad to be able to state that we have succeeded here - in Norway . . . in mobilizing the economic forces of Norway for - German needs to an extent which it has not been possible to - attain in all the other occupied countries. I must thank you - especially in the name of the Minister of Economics for having - succeeded in inducing the Norwegians to achieve the greatest - possible results.” - -I think the Tribunal will have observed the series of expressions which -are used in this document and which are quite characteristic. The Reich -Commissioner says that from the very beginning, his duty was to mobilize -all the economic and material forces of the country for the purposes of -the Wehrmacht, and Dr. Landfried answers that they succeeded in -mobilizing the economic forces to an extent which it has not been -possible to attain in all the other occupied territories. - -Thus we see that Dr. Landfried does not say that the Germans had, in -Norway, a particular concept of occupation and that in the other -countries they used a different procedure; he says that it was not -possible to do as well in the other countries. The only limitation he -recognizes is a limit of fact and opportunity, which will soon be -overcome, but in no wise a limitation of law. The idea of a legal -limitation never enters his mind, any more than it comes to the mind of -any of the 40 personages present. - -It is not here a question of an opinion or initiative of a regional -administrative authority, but rather of the official doctrine of the -Reich Cabinet and the High Command, since 40 high officials were present -at this conference, and especially the representative of the Minister -for Economy. - -I should like to stress at this point that this German doctrine and -these German methods for the mobilization of the resources of the -occupied countries necessarily extend to the labor of the inhabitants. - -I said yesterday that the Germans ensured for themselves from the very -beginning the two keys of production. By that very fact they had within -their power the working capital and the manpower. It depended on their -decision whether labor worked or did not work, whether there should or -should not be unemployment. This explains in a general way why the -Germans took such brutal measures as the displacement and the -mobilization of workers only after a certain time. - -In the first period, that is to say, as long as there existed in the -occupied countries stocks and raw materials, it was more in the -interests of the Germans to utilize labor locally, at least to a great -extent. This labor permitted them to produce for their benefit, with the -wealth of these countries, finished products which they seized. Thus, -besides the moral advantage of safeguarding appearances, they avoided -the initial transportation of raw materials. The consideration of -transport difficulties was always very important in the German war -economy. - -But when after a time, which was more or less long, the occupied -countries were impoverished in their raw materials and really ruined, -then the Germans no longer had any interest in permitting labor to work -on the spot. They would, indeed, have had to furnish the raw materials -themselves, and consequently that would involve double -transportation—that of raw material in one direction and that of the -finished products in the other direction. At that moment it became more -advantageous for them to export workmen. This consideration coincided, -moreover, with the needs resulting from the economic situation of -Germany at that time and with political considerations. - -On this question of the use of labor, I shall read to the Tribunal a few -sentences of a document which I offer under Document Number RF-4. It is -therefore the document following that from which I have just read. The -note which you will find in the document book reproduces the sentences -from an article which appeared in the newspaper _Pariser Zeitung_ on 17 -July 1942. - -I offer at the same time to the Tribunal a certified photostatic copy of -the page of the newspaper, which is from the collection of the -Bibliothèque Nationale. This article is signed by Dr. Michel, who was -the Chief of the Economic Administration in France. Its title is “Two -Years of Controlled Economy in France.” It is then an article written -for the purpose of German propaganda since it appeared in a German -newspaper which published one page in French in Paris. Naturally I wish -to point out to the Tribunal that we in no way accept all the ideas -which are presented in this article, but we should like to point out -several sentences of Dr. Michel’s as revealing the same sort of -procedure about which I was speaking just now, which consisted of -utilizing labor, first on the spot, as long as there was raw material, -and then deporting that labor to Germany: - - “In order to utilize the productive forces of French industry, - the Reich began by transferring to France its orders for - industrial articles for the war effort. - - “One single figure is sufficient to show the success of this - transfer of German orders: The value of the transactions to date - is expressed in a figure surpassing hundreds of thousands of - millions of francs. New blood is circulating in the veins of - French economy, which is working to the utmost of its - capacity. . . .” - -Some sentences in the original are omitted here, as they are of no -interest, and I would like to read the following sentence: - - “As the stocks of raw materials tended to diminish on account of - the length of the war, the recruitment of available French labor - began.” - -Dr. Michel uses here elegant ways of expressing himself, which cover the -reality, that is to say, the beginning of the transfer of workmen at the -moment when raw materials, which the Germans had appropriated from the -beginning, had begun to be exhausted. - -The conclusion which I would now like to give to my statement is the -following: That the Germans have always considered labor, human labor, -as a factor for their use. This attitude existed even before the -official institution of compulsory labor, of which we will speak to you -presently. - -For Germans the work of others has always been compulsory and for their -profit, and it was meant to remain so even after the end of the war. - -It is this last point that I should like to emphasize, for it shows the -extent and the gravity of the German conception and of the German -projects. I shall quote in relation to this a document which will bear -the Number RF-5 in our document book. Here is the document, which I -submit to the Tribunal. It is a work published in French in Berlin in -1943, by Dr. Friedrich Didier, entitled _Workers for Europe_. It was -issued by the central publishing house of the National Socialist Party. -It begins with a preface by the Defendant Sauckel, whose facsimile -signature is printed. - -I shall quote to the Tribunal a paragraph from this work, which is the -last page in my document book. It is Document Number RF-5 and this -sentence is found on Page 23. I quote: - - “A great percentage of foreign workers will remain, even after - victory, in our territory, in order to complete then—having - been trained in construction work—what the outbreak of war had - prevented, and to carry out those planned projects which up to - now had remained unrealized.” - -Thus, in a work of propaganda, consequently written with great prudence -and with intent to seduce, we nevertheless find this main admission by -the Germans, that they intended to keep, even after the war, the workers -of other countries in order to insure the greatness of Germany without -any limitation of aim or time. Hence it is a matter of a policy of -perpetual exploitation. - -If it please the Tribunal, my introduction having come to an end, M. -Herzog will present the brief relating to forced labor in France. - -M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. -President and Your Honors. - -The National Socialist doctrine, by the pre-eminence which it gives to -the idea of the State, by the contempt in which it holds individuals and -personal rights, contains a conception of work which agrees with the -principles of its general philosophy. - -For it, work is not one of the forms of the manifestation of individual -personalities; it is a duty imposed by the community on its members. - -“The relationship of labor, according to National Socialist ideas,” a -German writer has said, “is not a simple judicial relationship between -the worker and his employer; it is a living phenomenon in which the -worker becomes a cog in the National Socialist machine for collective -production.” The conception of compulsory labor is thus, for National -Socialism, necessarily complementary to the conception of work itself. - -Compulsory labor service was first of all imposed on the German people. -German labor service was instituted by a law of 26 June 1935 which bears -Hitler’s signature and that of the Defendant Frick, Minister of the -Interior. This law was published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -Page 769. I submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-6 (Document -Number 1389-PS). - -From 1939 the mobilization of workers was added to the compulsory labor -service. Decrees were promulgated to that effect by the Defendant Göring -in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I do not stress this -point; it arises from the conspiracy entered into by the accused to -commit their Crimes against Peace, and which my American colleagues have -already brought to the attention of the Tribunal. I merely point out -that the mobilization of workers was applicable to foreigners resident -in German territory, because I find in this fact the proof that the -principle of compulsory recruitment of foreign workers existed prior to -the war. Far from being the spontaneous result of the needs of German -war industry, the compulsory recruitment of foreign workers is the -putting into practice of a concerted policy. I lay before the Tribunal a -document which proves this. It is Document C-2 of the French -classification, which I offer as Exhibit Number RF-7. This is a -memorandum of the High Command of the German Armed Forces of 1 October -1938. This memorandum, drawn up in anticipation of the invasion of -Czechoslovakia, contains a classification of violations possible under -international law. In connection with each violation appears the -explanation which the High Command of the Armed Forces thinks it -possible to give. The document appears in the form of a list in four -columns. In the first is a statement of the violations of international -law; the second gives a concrete example; the third contains the point -of view of international law on the one hand and, on the other hand, the -conclusions which can be drawn from it; the fourth column is reserved -for the explanation of the Propaganda Ministry. - -I read the passage which deals with the forced labor of civilians and -prisoners of war, which is found on Page 6 of the German original, Page -7 of the French translation: - - “Use of prisoners of war and civilians for war work, - (construction of roads, digging trenches, making munitions, - employment in transport, _et cetera_).” - -Second column: - - “Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are ordered to - construct roads or to load munitions.” - -The third column: - - “Article 31 of an agreement signed 27 July 1939 concerning the - treatment of prisoners of war forbids their use in tasks - directly related to war measures. Compulsion to do such work is - in every case contrary to international law. The use of - prisoners of war as well as civilians is allowed for road - construction but forbidden for the manufacture of munitions.” - -Last column: - - “The use of these measures may be based on war needs or on the - declaration that the enemy has acted in the same way first.” - -The compulsory recruitment of foreign workers is thus in accordance with -National Socialist doctrine, one of the elements of the policy of German -domination. Hitler himself recognized this on several occasions. I quote -in this connection his speech of 9 November 1941 which was printed in -the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 10 November 1941, Number 314, Page 4, -which I submit to the Tribunal under Document Number RF-8. I read the -extract of this discourse, Columns 1 and 2, and the first paragraph -below, in the German original: - - “The territory which now works for us contains more than 250 - million men, but the territory in Europe which works indirectly - for this battle includes now more than 350 million. - - “As far as German territory is concerned, the territory occupied - by us and that which we have taken under our administration, - there is no doubt that we shall succeed in harnessing every man - for this work.” - -The recruitment of foreign workers thus proceeds in a systematic manner. -It constitutes the putting into practice of the political principles as -applied to the territories occupied by Germany. These principles, the -concrete development of which in other departments of German criminal -activity will be pointed out to you by my colleagues, are essentially of -two kinds: employment of all active forces of the occupied or dominated -territories; extermination of all their non-productive forces. - -These are the two reasons which the defendants gave in justification for -the establishment of the recruitment of foreign workers. There are many -documents to this effect; I confine myself to the most explicit. - -The justification for the recruitment of foreign workers, because of the -necessity of including the peoples of the enslaved states in the German -war effort, is primarily a result of the explanatory statement of the -decree of 21 March 1942, appointing the Defendant Sauckel as -Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor. The decree was published in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1942, Part I, Page 179. I submit it and will read -its complete text to the Tribunal, as Document Number RF-9. - - “The decree of the Führer concerning the creation of a - Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor, dated 21 March 1942. - - “The assurance of the required manpower for the whole war - economy, and in particular for the armament industry, - necessitates a uniform direction, meeting the needs of the war - economy, of all available labor, including hired foreigners and - prisoners of war, as well as the mobilization of all unused - labor still in the Greater German Reich, including the - Protectorate as well as the Government General and the occupied - territories. - - “This mission will be accomplished by Reichsstatthalter and - Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel in the capacity of Plenipotentiary - General for Allocation of Labor. In this capacity he is directly - responsible to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.” - -I would like to point out here that the Defendant Sauckel developed the -same theme at the Congress of Gauleiter and Reichsleiter held 5 and 6 -February 1943 at Posen. He expressed himself in plain terms: He -justified compulsory recruitment on the basis of National Socialist -philosophy and on the basis of the necessity of drawing all the European -peoples into the struggle carried on by Germany. His speech constitutes -Document 1739-PS. I submit it under Exhibit Number RF-10, and I request -the Court to take judicial notice of it and to accept the following -passages in evidence against the Defendant Sauckel. First, Page 5 of the -German text, fourth paragraph—this is found on the first page of the -French translation: - - “The remarkable violence of the war forces me to mobilize, in - the name of the Führer, many millions of foreigners for labor - for the entire German war economy and to urge them to effect the - maximum production. The purpose of this utilization is to assure - in the field of labor the war material necessary in the struggle - for the preservation of the life and liberty, in the first - place, of our own people, and also for the preservation of our - Western culture for those peoples who, in contrast to the - parasitical Jews and plutocrats, possess the honest will and - strength to shape their life by their own work and effort. - - “This is the vast difference between the work which was exacted - through the Treaty of Versailles and the Dawes and Young Plans - at one time—which took the form of slavery and tribute to the - might and supremacy of Jewry—and the use of labor which I, as a - National Socialist, have the honor to prepare and to carry out - as a contribution by Germany in the fight for her liberty and - for that of her allies.” - -The compulsory recruitment of foreign workers did not have as its only -object the maintenance of the level of German industrial production. -There was also the conscious desire to weaken the human potential of the -occupied countries. - -The idea of extermination by work was familiar to the theorists of -National Socialism and to the leaders of Germany. It constituted one of -the bases of the policy of domination of the invaded territories. I lay -before the Court the proof that the National Socialist conspirators -envisaged the destruction by work of whole ethnical groups. A discussion -which took place on 14 September 1942 between Goebbels and Thierack is -significant. It constitutes Document 682-PS, which I submit to the -Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-11, from which I take the following -passage: - - “Concerning the extermination of asocial elements, Doctor - Goebbels is of the opinion that the following groups must be - exterminated: All Jews and gypsies; Poles who have to serve 3 or - 4 years penal servitude; Czechoslovakians and Germans who have - been condemned to death or hard labor for life or placed in - protective custody. The idea of extermination by work is best.” - -The idea of extermination by work was not applied to ethnical groups -alone, the disappearance of which was desired by the defendants; it also -led to the employment of foreign labor in the German war industry up to -the extreme limit of each man’s strength. I will revert to this aspect -of the policy of forced labor when I lay before the Tribunal the -treatment of foreign workers in Germany: The cruelty to which they were -submitted sprang from this main conception of National Socialism, that -the human forces of the occupied countries must be employed with no -other limitation than that of their extermination, which is the final -goal. - -The defendants have not only admitted the principle of compulsory -recruitment of foreign workers; they have followed a consistent policy -of putting their principle into practice, applying it in the same -concrete manner in the various occupied territories. To do this they -resorted to identical methods of recruitment; they set up everywhere the -same recruitment organizations to which they gave the same orders. - -In the first place, it was a question of inducing foreign workers to -work in their own countries for the army of occupation and the services -connected with it. The German military and civil authorities organized -yards and workshops in order to carry out on the spot work useful to -their war policy. The yards and workshops of the Todt Organization, -which were under the direction of the Defendant Speer after the death of -their founder, and those of the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, and -the NSKK organization, employed numerous foreign workers in all areas of -Western Europe. - -But the essential undertaking of the German labor offices was the -deportation of foreign workers to the munition factories of the Reich. -The most varied means were used to this end. They were built up into a -recruiting policy which can be analyzed as follows: - -In the beginning, this policy took on the cloak of legality. The use of -labor took the form of requisition as under the terms of Article 52 of -the appendix to the fourth Hague Convention; it was also effected by -means of the voluntary recruitment of workers, to whom the German -recruiting offices offered labor contracts. - -I shall provide the Tribunal with proof that the requisitions of labor -effected by the National Socialist authorities were a deliberate -misinterpretation of the letter and spirit of the international -convention by virtue of which they were carried out. I shall show that -the voluntary character of the recruitment of certain foreign workers -was entirely fictitious; in reality their work contracts were made under -the pressure which the occupation authorities brought to bear on their -will. - -The defendants lost no time in flinging aside their mask of legality. -They compelled prisoners of war to do work forbidden by international -conventions. I shall show how the work of prisoners of war was -incorporated in the general plan for the Allocation of Labor from the -occupied areas. - -After all, it is through force that the defendants brought their -recruitment plans to fruition. They did not hesitate to resort to -violent methods. Thus they established compulsory labor service in the -areas which they occupied. Sometimes they directly promulgated orders -bearing the signature of military commanders or Reich commissioners; -this is the case with Belgium and Holland. Sometimes they forced the -actual authorities to take legislative measures themselves; this is -particularly the case with France and Norway. Sometimes they simply took -direct action, that is, they transferred foreign workers to factories in -Germany without issuing regulations providing for such action; this -happened in Denmark. Finally in certain occupied areas where they had -carried out Germanization, the defendants incorporated the inhabitants -of those territories in the labor service of the Reich. It happened thus -in the French provinces of Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, Moselle, and in -Luxembourg. - -The policy of compulsory labor was asserted and systematized from the -day when the Defendant Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for -Allocation of Labor. - -Member of the National Socialist Party since its formation, member of -the Diet of Thuringia, and member of the Reichstag, Obergruppenführer of -the criminal organizations SS and SA, the Defendant Sauckel was -Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia. On 21 March 1942 he was -appointed Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor by a decree of -the Führer. This decree is countersigned by Lammers in his capacity as -Reichsminister and Chief of the Chancellery and by the Defendant Keitel; -the responsibility of these latter is confirmed by this countersigning. -The Defendant Keitel has associated himself with the policy of -compulsory labor through the appointment of Sauckel, the principles and -methods of whom he approved. - -I have already read this decree to the Tribunal. I would remind you that -it placed Sauckel, in his capacity as Plenipotentiary General for -Allocation of Labour, under the immediate orders of the Delegate for the -Four Year Plan, the Defendant Göring. The latter bears a direct -responsibility in pursuing the plan of recruitment of compulsory labor. -I shall produce numerous proofs of this. I ask the Tribunal to authorize -me to produce as first proof the decree signed by the Defendant Göring -the day after the appointment of the Defendant Sauckel. This decree, -dated 27 March 1942, was published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1942, -Part I, Page 180. I submit it to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-12 -(Document Number 1902-PS). Göring by this decree did away with all the -administrative offices of the Four Year Plan which had been charged with -the recruitment of labor; he transmitted their powers to Sauckel’s -department, thus confirming his appointment. - -The powers of Sauckel between 1942 and 1944 were considerably -strengthened by decrees of Hitler and Göring. These decrees gave full -significance to the Defendant Sauckel’s title of Plenipotentiary. They -gave him administrative autonomy and even legislative competency such as -he could not have aspired to had he confined himself to executive tasks. -The importance of the political part which he played during the last 2 -years of the war increases to this extent the weight of the -responsibility devolving upon him. - -I draw the attention of the Tribunal very especially to the decrees of -the Führer of 30 September 1942 and of 4 March 1943 and to the decree of -the Defendant Göring of 25 May 1942. I will not read these decrees, -which have been commented on by my American colleague, Mr. Dodd. I -submit them in support of my argument. - -I will first refer to the decree of the Defendant Göring of 25 May 1942. -It was published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1942, Part I, Page 347. He -delegated to Sauckel part of the powers relating to labor held by the -Minister of Labor. I submit it to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number -RF-13 (Document Number 1905-PS). - -Hitler’s decree of 30 September 1942 gave Sauckel considerable power -over the civil and military authorities of the territories occupied by -the German Armed Forces. It made it possible for the defendant to -introduce into the staffs of the occupying authorities personal -representatives to whom he gave his orders direct. The decree is -countersigned by Lammers and by the Defendant Keitel and appears in the -_Collection of the Decrees, Directives, and Notices of 1942_, second -volume, Page 510. I submit it under Exhibit Number RF-14 (Document -1903-PS). - -In the carrying out of this decree representatives of Sauckel’s -department were in fact introduced into the headquarters staffs of the -military commands. The interrogation of General Von Falkenhausen, -Military Governor of Belgium and Northern France, gives in this -connection a proof which I would ask the Tribunal to be good enough to -remember. General Von Falkenhausen was interrogated on 27 November 1945 -by the head of the Investigation Section of the French Delegation. I -submit his evidence to the Tribunal under Document Number RF-15. I read -the following extract—Page 3, the first paragraph, of the French text, -and Page 2, the fifth paragraph, of the German translation: - - “Q: ‘Can the witness tell us what was the line of demarcation - between his own powers and the powers of the Arbeitseinsatz?’ - - “A: ‘Up to a certain moment there existed in my department a - labor service which was engaged in the hiring of voluntary - workers. I no longer remember the exact date—perhaps autumn - 1942—when this labor service was placed under the order of - Sauckel, and the only thing I had to do was to carry out the - orders which came through this way. I don’t remember, but - Reeder, who is also in prison’”—Reeder was a civilian official - on the staff of General Von Falkenhausen—“‘is very well - informed about the dates and can undoubtedly give them better - than I can.’ - - “Q: ‘Before the question of labor was entirely entrusted to - Sauckel’s organization, did there exist in the General Staff or - in its services an officer who was in charge of this question? - Afterwards was there a delegate from Sauckel’s service in this - department?’ - - “A: ‘Until Sauckel came into power there was, in my service, - Reeder, who directed the Bureau of Labor in my office. This - labor office functioned as an employment office in Germany, that - is to say, it concerned itself with demands for labor which - would naturally be voluntary.’ - - “Q: ‘What took place when the change happened?’ - - “A: ‘After the change the office continued to exist, but the - orders were given directly by Sauckel to the Arbeitseinsatz and - passed through my office.’” - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. HERZOG: I have just reminded the Tribunal of the legislative -framework through which the activity of the Defendant Sauckel was -exercised. This framework was strengthened by the varied decrees of the -defendant. The first document shows that Sauckel deliberately assumed -the responsibility of the general policy for the recruitment of foreign -workers. It is his decree of the 22d of August 1942, which appeared in -the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_, 1942, Part I, Page 382. This decree lays down -the principle of forced recruitment and makes the necessary provisions -for the whole human potential of the occupied territories to be placed -at the service of the German war machine. - -Sauckel forced the inhabitants of the invaded countries to participate -in the war of Germany against their own fatherland. It is not only a -violation of international law, it is a crime against the law of -nations. I submit the decree to the Tribunal under Document Number RF-17 -and I shall read it: - - “Decree Number 10 of the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation - of Labor, concerning the employment of labor in the occupied - territories, under date of 22 August 1942. - - “In order to mobilize the labor force of the occupied - territories under the new organization for the Allocation of - Labor within the European area, this force must be subjected to - a rigid and uniform control. The maximum production, as well as - the useful and rational distribution of this force, must be - assured in order to satisfy the labor requirements of the Reich - and the occupied territories. By virtue of the full powers which - are conferred upon me, I order: - - “1) By virtue of the decree of the Führer, under date of 21 - March 1942, concerning the Plenipotentiary General for - Allocation of Labor and by virtue of the ordinance of the - Delegate for the Four Year Plan, under date of 27 March 1942, - concerning the application of this decree, I likewise am - competent to employ, as may be necessary, the labor of occupied - territories, as well as to take all the measures necessary to - augment its efficiency. Those German offices competent for the - tasks of the Arbeitseinsatz and for the policy of wages, or my - commissioners, will carry out this Allocation of Labor and take - all measures necessary to increase efficiency, according to my - instructions. - - “2) This decree extends to all the territories occupied during - the war by the Wehrmacht, as far as they are under German - administration. - - “3) The labor available in the occupied territories must be - utilized in the first place to satisfy the primary war needs of - Germany herself. - - “This labor must be utilized in the occupied territories in the - following order: - - “a) For the needs of the army, the occupation services, and the - civilian services; b) for the needs of German armament; c) for - the tasks of food supply and agriculture; d) for industrial - needs other than those of armament, in which Germany is - interested; e) for the industrial needs concerning the - population of the territory in question.” - -A second document demonstrates the willingness of the Defendant Sauckel -to take the responsibility for the treatment of foreign workers. It is -an agreement concluded on 2 June 1943 with the Chief of the German Labor -Front. I shall not read this document to the Tribunal; it has been -discussed by Mr. Dodd. I point out that it was published in the -_Reichsarbeitsblatt_, 1943, Part I, Page 588. I submit it in support of -my statement under Exhibit Number RF-18 (Document Number 1913-PS). - -Designated by Hitler and by the Defendants Keitel and Göring in order to -pursue, under the control of the latter, the policy of recruitment of -compulsory labor, the Defendant Sauckel carried out his task by virtue -of the responsibilities which he had assumed. I request that the -Tribunal bear this in mind. - -I request the Tribunal, likewise, to note that the policy of recruitment -of foreign workers involves the responsibility of all German ministers -responsible for the economic and social life of the Reich. An -inter-ministerial office, or at any rate an inter-administrative office, -the Central Office for the Four Year Plan, proceeded to formulate the -program for the recruitment of foreign workers. - -All departments interested in the labor problem were represented at the -meetings of the Central Office. General Milch presided at the meetings, -in the name of the Defendant Göring. The Defendant Sauckel and the -Defendant Speer took part, in person, and I shall submit to the Tribunal -certain statements made by them. The Defendant Funk also took part; he -therefore knew of, and approved, the program for the deportation of -workers. He even collaborated in its formulation. As proof thereof I -produce two documents inculpating Funk. - -The first is a letter of 9 February 1944, in which Funk is summoned to a -meeting of the Central Office of the Plan. It is Document F-674 which I -submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-19. I read: - - “Sir: In the name of the Central Office of the Plan, I invite - you to a meeting concerning the question of the Allocation of - Labor, to take place on Wednesday, 16 February 1944, at 10 - o’clock in the committee room of the Secretary of State at the - Ministry of Aviation, Leipziger Strasse, in Berlin. - - “In the enclosure I transmit to you some statistics on the - subject of the development of the Allocation of Labor. These - statistics will serve as a basis for discussion at the meeting.” - -Funk was unable personally to attend the meeting but he arranged to be -represented by Undersecretary of State Hayler. He received the minutes -of the meeting, and on 7 March 1944 he wrote to General Milch to excuse -himself for his frequent absences from the meetings of the Office. I -submit this document to the Tribunal. It is Document F-675, which I -submit under Exhibit Number RF-20. It is the account of the 53rd meeting -of the Central Office of the Plan. The Tribunal may see on Page 2 of the -French translation that Minister Funk received an account of this -meeting. He is mentioned on the second line of the distribution -list—Reich Minister Speer first and on the second line Reich Minister -Funk. - -I now produce under Exhibit Number RF-21 (Document Number F-676) the -letter by which Funk excuses himself to Marshal Milch because of his -inability to be present at the meetings: - - “Very honored and dear Field Marshal: - - “Unfortunately the meetings of the Central Office of the Plan - are always set for dates when I am already engaged by other - important meetings. So it is to my great regret that I shall be - unable to be present Saturday at the meeting of the Central - Office of the Plan, inasmuch as I have to speak on that day in - Vienna in the course of a great demonstration commemorating the - anniversary of the day of the Anschluss. - - “State Secretary Dr. Hayler will also be in Vienna on Friday and - Saturday, where at the same time there will be an important - southeast European conference, in which foreign delegates will - participate and at which I must likewise speak. - - “Under these circumstances I beg you to allow Ministerial - Director and General of Police, SS Brigadeführer Ohlendorf, who - is the permanent deputy of State Secretary Hayler, to - participate as my representative. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Does this document tell us anything more than that the -Defendant Funk was unable to be present? - -M. HERZOG: This document, Mr. President, was given to me by my American -colleagues, who asked me to use it in the matter of compulsory labor, -because they have not had the necessary time to include it in their -charge against Funk. It is presented to the Tribunal to prove that Funk -followed the meetings of the Central Office of the Plan and that he had -permanent representatives there. He was represented at all meetings, and -by the minutes he received he was kept in touch with the work of the -Central Office of the Plan. That is why we present to the Tribunal this -document on Defendant Funk. - -I shall continue to quote: - - “Under these circumstances, I beg you to allow Ministerial - Director and General of Police, SS Brigadeführer Ohlendorf, who - is the permanent deputy of State Secretary Hayler, to - participate as my representative. Mr. Ohlendorf will have - Ministerial Director Dr. Koelfen as a consultant for questions - concerning goods for consumption and Counsellor of State Dr. - Janke, for questions concerning foreign trade.” - -The policy of the Central Office pursued by the Defendant Sauckel is -shown by the mass deportation of workers. The principle of this -deportation is a criminal one, but the manner of its execution was even -more criminal. I shall submit proof of this to the Tribunal and explain -in succession, the methods of compulsory recruitment, its results, and -the conditions of deportation. - -I wish here to thank the members of the French Delegation and of the -foreign delegations who have come to my aid in the preparation of my -work, in particular, my colleague M. Pierre Portal, attorney at the bar -of Lyons. - -The statement which I have the honor of presenting to the Tribunal will -be limited to the account of the recruiting of foreign labor in the -occupied territories of Western Europe, since the deportation of workers -coming from Eastern Europe will be dealt with by my Soviet colleagues. - -During the whole duration of the occupation the local field commanders -imposed conscription of labor on the populations of the occupied -territories. Fortification works considered necessary for the -furtherance of military operations and guard duties made necessary by -the need of maintaining the security of the occupation troops were -carried out by the inhabitants of the occupied areas. The labor -requisitions affected not only isolated individuals but entire groups. - -In France, for instance, they affected, in turn, groups of Indo-Chinese -workers, workers from North Africa, foreign workers, and _Chantiers de -Jeunesse_ (youth workyards). I produce in evidence an extract from the -report on forced labor and the deportation of workers drawn up by the -Institute of Statistics of the French Government. This report bears the -Document Number F-515 and I submit it to the Tribunal under Exhibit -Number RF-22. This document, because of its importance, has been taken -out of the document book. I quote first of all Page 17 of the French -text and 17, likewise, of the German translation, second paragraph -before the end: - - “Paragraph 6: The forced labor recruitment of constituted - groups: - - “Finally, a last procedure employed by the Germans on a number - of occasions during the whole course of the occupation, for - direct forced labor as well as for indirect forced labor: the - ‘requisition’ of constituted groups already trained and - disciplined and consequently an excellent contribution. - - “(a) Indo-Chinese labor (M.O.I.): This formation of colonial - workers had been intended from the beginning of hostilities to - satisfy the needs of French industry in unskilled labor. Under - the control of officers and noncommissioned officers of the - French Army, who became civilian officials after the month of - July 1940, Indo-Chinese labor was, from 1945 on, compelled to do - partial forced labor, directly as well as indirectly.” - -I skip the table on Page 18 and I read: - - “(b) North African labor: Between 17 August and 6 November 1942 - the home country received two contingents of workers from North - Africa; one composed of 5,560 Algerians, the other of 1,825 - Moroccans. These workers were immediately compelled to do direct - forced labor, which brought the number of North African workers - enrolled in the Todt Organization to 17,582. - - “(c) Foreign labor: The law of 11 July 1938, concerning the - organization of the nation in time of war, provided for the - cases of foreigners living in France, obliging them to render - service. Under French officers and noncommissioned officers who - by the law of 9 October 1940 had assumed the status of civil - servants, foreign labor was progressively subjected by the - Germans to direct forced labor.” - -I skip the table and I read: - - “(d) Youth workyards: On 29 January 1943 the labor staff of the - German Armistice Commission in Paris made known that the - Commander-in-Chief ‘West’ was examining whether and in what ways - the formations of French labor might be called upon for the - accomplishment of tasks important for both countries. There - followed partial recruiting and demands for young people from - the workyards for direct labor.” - -Similar requisitions took place in all the other territories of Western -Europe. These requisitions were illegal. They were carried out by virtue -of Article 52 of the Appendix to the fourth Hague Convention. In reality -they systematically violated the letter and the spirit of the text of -this international law. - -What does Article 52 of the Appendix to the fourth Hague Convention say? -It is worded as follows: - - “Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from - municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army - of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of - the country and be of such a nature that they do not imply for - the populations the obligation to take part in war operations - against their country. Such requisitions and services shall be - demanded only on the authority of the commander of the area - occupied.” - -The terms in which Article 52 authorizes the requisition of services by -an army of occupation are expressly formulated. These terms are four in -number: - -1. The rendering of services can be demanded only for the needs of the -army of occupation. All requisitions made for the general economic needs -of the occupying power are thus forbidden. - -2. Services demanded by way of requisition must not entail an obligation -to take part in military operations against the country of those -rendering them. The rendering of any service exacted in the interests of -the war economy of the occupying power, all guard duties, or exercise of -military control are forbidden. - -3. Services rendered in a given area must be in proportion to its -economic resources, the development of which must not be hampered. It -follows that any requisitioning of labor is contrary to international -law if it results in the impeding or prevention of the normal -utilization of the riches of the occupied country. - -4. Finally, labor requisitions must, under the provisions of the second -paragraph of Article 52, be carried out in the area of the locality -under the administration of the occupation authority who has signed the -requisition order. The transfer of conscripted workers from one part of -the occupied area to another and, even more, their deportation to the -country of the occupied power, are prohibited. - -Labor requisitions exacted by German civilian and military authorities -in the occupied areas did not honor the spirit of Article 52. They were -carried out to satisfy either the needs of German economy or even the -needs of the military strategy of the enemy forces. They deliberately -refused to acknowledge the need of ensuring facilities for a reasonable -utilization of local resources. They finally took the form of migration -of workers. The case of those workers who were conscripted from all -countries of Western Europe and formed an integral part of the Todt -Organization, to help in building the system of fortifications known -under the name of the “Atlantic Wall,” may be taken as a typical -example. - -This violation of international agreements is a flagrant one; it called -forth repeated protests from General Doyen, Delegate of the French -authorities at the German Armistice Commission. I ask the Tribunal to -accept as evidence the letter of General Doyen, dated 25 May 1941. This -letter constitutes Document F-283 and it is placed before the Tribunal -as Exhibit Number RF-23, I read: - - “Wiesbaden, 25 May 1941. Général de Corps d’Armée Doyen, - President of the French Delegation at the German Armistice - Commission, to General of Artillery Vogl, President of the - German Armistice Commission. - - “On several occasions, and notably in my letters Numbers - 14,263/A E and 14,887/A E of 26 February and 8 March, I - protested to you against the use made of French labor within the - Todt Organization in the execution of military work on the coast - of Brittany. - - “I have today the duty of calling your attention to other cases - in which the occupation authorities have had recourse to - recruiting French civilians to carry out services of a strictly - military character, cases which are even more grave than those - which I have already called to your attention. - - “If, indeed, as concerns the workers engaged by the Todt - Organization, it may be argued that certain ones among them - accepted voluntarily an employment for which they are being - remunerated (although in practice most often they were not given - the possibility of refusing this employment), this argument can - by no means be invoked when the prefects themselves are obliged - at the expense of the departments and the communities, to set up - guard services at important points, such as bridges, tunnels, - works of art, telephone lines, munitions depots, and areas - surrounding aviation fields. - - “The accompanying note furnishes some examples of the guard - services which have thus been imposed upon Frenchmen, services - which before this were assumed by the German Army and which - normally fall to the latter, since it is a question of - participating in watches or of preserving the German Army from - risks arising from the state of war existing between Germany and - Great Britain.” - -The occupying authorities, in the face of the resistance which they -encountered, were anxious that their orders regarding the requisition of -labor should be obeyed. The measures which they took to this end are -just as illegal as the measures taken for the requisition itself. The -National Socialist authorities in occupied France proceeded by way of -legislation. They promulgated ordinances by which sentence of death -could be pronounced against persons disobeying requisition orders. - -I submit two of these ordinances to the Tribunal as evidence. The first -was given in the early months of the occupation, 10 October 1940. It was -published in the _Verordnungsblatt_ for the occupied territory of France -on 17 October 1940, Page 108. I submit it to the Tribunal under Document -Number RF-24, and I read it: - - “Ordinance concerning protection against acts of sabotage, 10 - October 1940. - - “By virtue of the powers which have been conferred upon me by - the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, I decree - the following: - - “I. Whoever intentionally does not fulfill or fulfills - inadequately the tasks of surveillance which are imposed upon - him by the Chief of the Military Administration in France, or by - an authority designated by the latter, shall be condemned to - death.” - -I skip Paragraph 2 and read Paragraph 3: - - “In less serious cases concerning infractions of Paragraphs 1 - and 2 of the present ordinance, and in case of negligence, - punishment by solitary confinement with hard labor or - imprisonment may be imposed.” - -The second ordinance of the Military Commander in France to which I -refer is dated 31 January 1942. It was published in the -_Verordnungsblatt_ of France of 3 February 1942, Page 338. I submit it -to the Tribunal under Document Number RF-25 and I read: - - “Ordinance of 31 January 1942 concerning the requisition of - service and goods. - - “By virtue of the plenary powers which have been conferred on me - by the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, I - decree the following: - - “1. Whoever fails to comply with these requisitions of service - or goods which are imposed upon him by the Military Commander in - France, or an authority designated by him, or who performs them - in such a manner as to imperil or make fail the purpose of the - services or requisitions, shall be punished by penal servitude, - imprisonment, or fine. A fine may be imposed in addition to - penal servitude or imprisonment. - - “2. In serious cases the penalty of death may be inflicted.” - -These ordinances were protested against by the French authorities. -General Doyen protested on several occasions against the first of these -without his protest having any effect. - -I refer again to his letter of 25 May 1941, which I have just submitted -to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-23 (Document Number F-283), and -I read on Page 3 of the French text, Page 4 of the German translation: - - “I am instructed to lodge a formal protest with you against such - practices and to beg you to intervene so that an immediate end - may be put to this. - - “On 16 November, in letter Number 7,843/AE, I already protested - against the ordinance that was decreed on 10 October 1940, by - the Chief of the Military Administration in France, which - provided the death penalty for any person failing to carry out - or carrying out inadequately the tasks of surveillance imposed - by the occupation authorities. I protested then that this - demand, as well as the penalty, was contrary to the spirit of - the Armistice Convention, the object of which was to relieve the - French population from any participation in the hostilities. - - “I had limited myself to this protest in principle because at - the time no concrete case in which such a task of surveillance - might have been imposed had been called to my attention. But it - was not possible to accept as justification of the ordinance in - question the arguments which you gave me in your letter Number - 1361 of 6 March. - - “You did indeed point out there that Article 43 of the Hague - Convention gave the occupying power the authority to legislate, - but the power to which you refer in the said article is subject - to two qualifications: There can be legislation only to - establish and secure public order and life as far as it is - possible. On the other hand, the ordinances decreed must. . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t it enough to show that General Doyen protested? It -is not necessary to read all the argument which was put forward on the -one side or the other. - -M. HERZOG: I shall then stop this quotation, Mr. President. - -The German ordinances which I have just read to the Tribunal thus -contained formal violations of the general principles of international -criminal legislation; they were decreed in contradiction to Article 52 -of the Annex to the fourth convention of The Hague and also in -contradiction to Article 43, on which they were supposed to be based. -They were, therefore, illegal and they were criminal, since they -provided death sentences which no international law or domestic law -justifies. - -The system of the requisition of service furnishes the first example of -the criminal character of the methods pursued by the defendants in the -execution of their plan of recruitment of foreign labor. - -The National Socialist authorities then had recourse to a second -procedure to give an appearance of legality to the recruiting of foreign -workers. They called upon workers who were so-called volunteers. From -1940 on, the occupation authorities opened recruiting offices in all the -large cities of the occupied territories. These offices were placed -under the control of a special service instituted for this purpose -within the general staff of the commanders-in-chief of occupation zones. - -The Tribunal knows that these services from 1940 to 1942 functioned -under the control of the generals. From 1942 on, and more precisely, -from the day when the Defendant Sauckel became the Plenipotentiary for -Allocation of Labor, they received their orders directly from the -latter. General Von Falkenhausen, Commander-in-Chief in Belgium and in -the north of France, declared in the testimony which I have just read to -the Tribunal that from the summer of 1942 he had become the simple -intermediary charged with transmitting the instructions given by Sauckel -to the Arbeitseinsatz. - -Thus, the policy of the German employment offices set up in the occupied -areas was carried out from 1942 under the sole responsibility of the -Defendant Sauckel and his direct chief, the Delegate for the Four Year -Plan, the Defendant Göring. I ask the Tribunal to take note of this. - -The task of the employment offices was to organize the recruiting of -workers for the factories and workshops set up in Europe by the Todt -Organization and by the Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, and other -German organizations. It was also their task to procure for the German -munition factories the amount of foreign labor needed. Workers recruited -in this way signed a labor contract; thus they had, theoretically, the -status of free workers and were apparently volunteers. - -The occupation authorities always made a point of the voluntary nature -of the recruiting carried out by the employment offices, but the line -followed by their propaganda systematically ignored what they were -actually doing. In fact, the voluntary character of this recruiting was -entirely fictitious; the workers of the occupied areas who agreed to -sign German labor contracts were subject to physical and moral pressure. -This pressure took several forms. It was sometimes collective and -sometimes individual. In all its forms it was heavy enough to deprive -the workers, who were its victims, of their freedom of choice. - -The nullity of contracts entered into under the sway of violence is a -fundamental principle of law common to all civilized nations. It is -found just as expressly stated in German law as in the laws of the -powers represented in the Court, or the states occupied by Germany. The -German employment offices forced on the foreign workers labor contracts -which had no legal significance because they were obtained with -violence. I assert this and I will try to provide the Court with proof -of my assertion. - -First of all, I will show proof of premeditation by the Germans. The -pressure under which the foreign workers suffered was not the result of -sporadic action on the part of subordinate authorities. It came from the -deliberate intent which the National Socialist leaders of Germany -formulated into precise instructions. - -I submit to the Tribunal Document 1183-PS, which is Exhibit Number -RF-26. This is a circular dated 29 January 1942, dealing with the -recruitment of foreign workers. This directive comes from a section of -the Arbeitseinsatz of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. It bears the -signature of the section chief, Dr. Mansfeld, but it places the -executive responsibility directly on the Defendant Göring, Delegate for -the Four Year Plan. I read this circular: - - “Berlin (SW 11), 29 January 1942, Saarlandstrasse 96. - - “Subject: Increased mobilization of labor for the German Reich - from the occupied territories and preparations for mobilization - by force. - - “The labor shortage, aggravated on the one hand by drafts for - the Wehrmacht and on the other hand by the increased amount of - work for armaments in the Reich, renders it necessary for labor - for service in the Reich to be recruited from the occupied - territories to a much greater extent than heretofore, in order - to relieve the shortage. - - “Therefore, any and all methods must be adopted which make it - possible to transport, without exception and at once, for - employment in the Reich, manpower in the occupied territories - which is unemployed or which can be released . . . for use in - Germany after most careful screening.” - -I read further on Page 2 of the German text: - - “In the first place, this mobilization shall be carried out on a - voluntary basis as hitherto. For this reason recruitment for - employment in the German Reich must be intensified considerably. - If, however, satisfactory results are to be obtained, the German - authorities who are operating in the occupied territories must - be able to exert any pressure necessary to support the voluntary - recruitment of labor for employment in Germany. - - “Accordingly, as far as may be necessary, the regulations in - force in the occupied territories with regard to changing the - place of employment or . . . those refusing work, must be - tightened. Supplementary regulations concerning distribution of - labor must, above all, insure that older persons who are exempt - will be used to replace younger persons so that the latter may - be made available for the Reich. A far-reaching reduction in the - amount of relief granted by public welfare must also be effected - in order to induce laborers to accept employment in the Reich. - Unemployment relief must be set so low that the amount, in - comparison with the average wages in the Reich and the - possibilities there for sending remittances home, may serve as - an inducement to the workers to accept employment in Germany. - When refusal to accept work in the Reich is not justified, - relief must be reduced to an amount barely sufficient for - subsistence or even cancelled. In this case partial withdrawal - of ration cards and an assignment to particularly heavy - compulsory work may be considered.” - -I here end the quotation and I call to the Tribunal’s attention that -this circular is addressed to all the services responsible for labor in -the occupied areas. Its distribution in Western Europe was: The Reich -Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, the Reich -Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories, the Chief of the -Military Administration of Belgium and Northern France, the Chief of the -Military Administration of France, the Chief of the Civil Administration -of Luxembourg, the Chief of the Civil Administration at Metz, and the -Chief of the Civil Administration at Strasbourg. - -It is thus proved that a general common plan existed with a view to -compelling the workers of the occupied territories to work for Germany. - -I have now to show how this plan was put into practice in the different -occupation zones. The machinery of pressure which the National Socialist -authorities exerted on the foreign workers can be analyzed in the -following manner: German labor offices organized intense propaganda in -favor of the recruitment of foreign workers. This propaganda was -intended to deceive the workers of the occupied areas with regard to the -material advantages offered them by the German employment offices. It -was carried out by the press, the radio, and by every possible means of -publicity. This propaganda was also carried on as a side-line to -official administrative duties by secret organizations which had been -given the task of enticing foreign workers and subjecting them to a -veritable impressment. - -These measures proved to be insufficient. The occupation authorities -then intervened in the social life of the occupied countries. They -strove to produce artificial unemployment there and at the same time -they devoted their energies to making living conditions worse for the -workers and the unemployed. - -In spite of unemployment and the poverty with which they were -threatened, the foreign workers showed themselves unmoved by German -propaganda. This is why the German authorities finally resorted to -direct methods of pressure. They exercised pressure on the political -authorities of the occupied countries to make them give support to the -recruiting campaign. They compelled employers, especially the -organizational committees in France, to induce their workers to accept -the labor contracts of the German employment offices. Finally, they took -action by way of direct pressure on the workers and gradually passed -from so-called voluntary recruitment to conscription by force. - -The fiction of voluntary enrollment was dispelled by the sight of the -individual arrests and collective raids of which the workers of the -occupied areas rapidly became the victims. There are innumerable -documents providing proof of the facts which I relate. I shall submit -the most important of these to the Tribunal. - -The documents which show proof of the publicity campaigns made in France -by the German administration will be submitted to the Tribunal by M. -Edgar Faure in the course of his brief concerning Germanization and -Nazification. By way of example I wish to make use of a document which -in the French classification bears the Document Number F-516, which I -submit under Exhibit Number RF-27. - -This is a report of the Prefect of the Department of the North to the -Delegate of the Minister of the Interior in the General Delegation of -the French Government in the Occupied Territories. This report points -out that a German publicity car circulated through the community of -Lille in order to induce French workers to go to Germany. I quote the -report: - - “Lille, 25 March 1942. Prefect of the Region of the North, - Prefect of the Lille Region, to the Prefect, Delegate of the - Minister of the Interior with the General Delegation of the - French Government in the Occupied Territories. - - “Subject: German publicity car. - - “I have the honor to inform you that for some days a publicity - car covered with posters inviting French workers to enroll for - work in Germany has been circulating in the vicinity of Lille, - while a loud-speaker plays a whole repertoire of records of - French music, among which are featured the ‘Marche Lorraine’ and - the hymn ‘Maréchal, Here We Are.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, Your Honors. I showed you this morning what -the official propaganda was which was conducted by the German offices in -France to persuade workers to enroll for work in Germany. The effect of -this official propaganda was reinforced by the clandestine recruitment -bureaus. Real dens for clandestine recruiting were organized by the -occupation authorities apart from the administrative services whose -activities they completed. These recruitment bureaus were directed by -German agents who often succeeded in securing local accomplices. In -France these bureaus extended their ramifications to the non-occupied -zone as well as the occupied zone. Several documents prove their -existence. The first among them is a report transmitted on 7 March 1942 -by the Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the _de facto_ -Government of Vichy, to the Delegate General for Franco-German Economic -Relations. It is Document F-654 of the French archives. - -This report is drawn up under the seal of Vice President of the Council, -Darlan. It bears the signature of an officer of the latter’s General -Staff, Commander Fontaine. I submit this report under Exhibit Number -RF-28 (Document F-654) and I read it: - - “Vichy, 7 March 1942. Your Honor, the Delegate General, I have - the honor of transmitting to you in this letter, for your - information, a report on the organization of recruitment in - France of workers for German industry.” - -I now go to Page 2. - - “26 of February 1942. Secret. Note on the organization of the - recruitment in France of workers for German industry. Source: - excellent. - - “I. Organization of the recruitment of workers in France. - - “One of the main organizations for the recruitment of workers in - France for Germany is to be Société de Mécanique de la Seine, - whose head office is in Puteaux, Seine, at 8 Quai National, and - which is also known as A. M. S. - - “This society is to operate under the secret control of the - Kommandantur, and of three engineers, one of which is to have - the rank of chief engineer and the other two are to be M. Meyer - and M. Schronner. - - “In addition to the work which it has to carry out, this society - is particularly entrusted with the re-education of workers - recruited in France and sent to Germany at the request of German - industrial firms on payment of premiums. - - “The A. M. S. is assisted in these operations in the Occupied - Zone by three centers of recruiting which operate in Paris and - are the Porte de Vincennes Center, the Courbevoie Center (200 - Boulevard St. Denis), and the Avenue des Tournelles Center. - These centers are also charged with co-ordinating the operations - of recruitment in the non-occupied zone. For this zone, the two - principal centers are in Marseilles and Toulouse. A third center - is to be at Tarbes. - - “a) The center at Marseilles is in charge of the recruitment in - the Mediterranean zone, under the direction of Mr. Meyer who is - mentioned above. The address of this engineer is not known, but - one can obtain information about him at 24 Avenue Kléber, Paris, - at the Military Commander’s. - - “In Marseilles the A. M. S. office is situated at 83 Rue de - Sylvabelle. In his task Mr. Meyer is assisted by M. Ringo, who - lives in Madrague-Ville, 5 bis Boulevard Bernabo, near the - slaughter house.” - -I stop this quotation here to submit to the Tribunal the correspondence -exchanged between the months of December 1941 and January 1942, between -the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes and the authorities of the Vichy -Government. This is Document F-518 which I submit to the Tribunal as -Exhibit Number RF-29. This correspondence emphasizes the activity of the -German agents in clandestine recruiting, and particularly that of Mr. -Meyer, to whom the report of Commander Fontaine, which I have just read, -applies. I quote first the letter of 10 December 1941, in which the -Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes confirmed the reports which he had -previously made on this question. It is the letter which is on the sixth -page of the French text and the seventh page of the German text: - - “Nice, 10 December 1941. The State Counsellor, Prefect of the - Alpes-Maritimes, to His Honor, the State Secretary of the - Interior, Secretariat General of the Police, Directorate for - Home and Foreign Police. - - “Subject: The activity of foreign agents, aimed at enticing away - skilled workers. - - “Reference: Your telegrams 12,402 and 12,426 of 28 November - 1941; my reports 955 and 986 of 24 November 1941 and 6 December - 1941. - - “In my reports referred to I pointed out to you the activity of - recruiting agents who attempted to entice skilled workers on - behalf of Germany. - - “I have the honor of giving you below some additional - information gathered on this subject. - - “The German engineer Meyer and the French subject Bentz stopped - on 1 December 1941 at the Hotel Splendid in Nice, coming from - Marseilles.” - -Now, I go on to the third paragraph before the end: - - “I permit myself to draw your attention particularly to the fact - that in Paris they enrolled French workers for Germany.” - -Here I end the quotation. - -These documents attest to the activity which the clandestine recruiting -offices developed. But I am not satisfied merely to point out their -existence; I wish to show that these offices operated under the -initiative of official administrations and of the German office for -labor. - -The proof is furnished by a statement which the Defendant Sauckel made -on 1 March 1944, during the 54th conference of the Central Office for -the Four Year Plan. The stenographic report of these conferences has -been found. It forms Document R-124, to which my American colleagues -have already referred. I submit it again to the Tribunal under Exhibit -Number RF-30 and I shall read from an extract of the minutes of the -session of 1 March 1944. This is in Exhibit Number RF-30, in the French -text, Page 2, second paragraph; in the German text, Pages 1770 and 1771. -I quote the page numbers which are at the bottom and on the right of the -German original. I read the declaration made by the Defendant Sauckel: - - “The most abominable point against which I have to fight is the - claim that there is no organization in these districts properly - to recruit Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch - them to work. So I have even proceeded to employ and train a - whole staff of French and Italian agents of both sexes who for - good pay, just as was done in olden times for ‘shanghaiing,’ go - hunting for men and dupe them, using liquor as well as - persuasion. . .” - -The propaganda of the official services and that of the clandestine -recruiting offices proved to be inefficacious. The National Socialist -authorities then had to resort to methods of economic pressure. They -tried to give to the workers who were to go to Germany the hope of -material advantages. I cite in respect to this an ordinance of the -Military Commander in Belgium and the North of France, which I submit to -the Tribunal. It is an ordinance of 20 July 1942 which appeared in the -_Verordnungsblatt_ of Belgium. It exempts from tax Belgian workers who -work in German factories. I submit it to the Tribunal under Document -Number RF-31. - -On the other hand, the occupation authorities sought to lower the living -standard of workers who remained in the occupied territories. I said -that they had made poverty a factor in their recruiting policy. I am -going to prove it by showing how they went about creating artificial -unemployment in the occupied zones and aggravating the material -situation of the unemployed. - -I remark as a reminder that the German authorities also practiced for -this purpose a policy of freezing salaries. This measure aided the -recruiting campaign for labor for Germany and had also an economic -bearing, and I would like to refer the Tribunal to the explanations -which will be given on this point by M. Gerthoffer. - -Unemployment was produced by two complementary measures: The first is -the regulating of the legal working hours; the second, the concentration -and, if need be, the closing of industrial enterprises. - -From 1940 the local field commandants were concerned with increasing the -duration of work in their administrative zones. In France steps taken by -the local authorities brought about reactions. The problem became -general and was solved on a national scale. Long negotiations were -imposed on the representatives of the pseudo-government of Vichy. - -Finally an ordinance of 22 April 1942, from the Military Command in -France, reserved for the occupation authorities the right of fixing the -duration of work in industrial enterprises. This ordinance appeared in -their _Verordnungsblatt Frankreich_, 1942. I submit it to the Tribunal -under Document Number RF-32 and I quote the first paragraph: - - “Paragraph I: For establishments and enterprises of all kinds a - minimum of working hours may be imposed. This minimum of working - hours will be decreed for an entire economic region, for - specified economic branches, or for individual enterprises.” - -In Belgium working hours were fixed by a decree and by an implementing -order of 6 October 1942, which appeared in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of -Belgium. I submit this ordinance to the Tribunal under Document Number -RF-33. - -The regulating of working hours did not release a sufficient number of -workers for the German factories; that is why the National Socialist -authorities used a second method. Under the pretext of rationalizing -production they brought about a concentration of industrial and -commercial enterprises, certain of which were closed at their -instigation. I cite in this relation the provisions which were made or -imposed by the Germans in France, in Belgium, and in Holland. - -In France I would like to refer to two texts. The first is the ordinance -of the Vichy Government of 17 December 1941, published in the _Journal -Officiel de L’État Français_, which I submit to the Tribunal under -Document Number RF-34. The second text to which I wish to draw the -attention of the Tribunal is the ordinance of 25 February 1942, issued -by the Military Commandant in France. This ordinance appeared in the -_Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich_. I shall read -it to the Tribunal because it seems particularly important, as the -principle for the compulsory closing of certain French enterprises is -laid down by a decree by the occupying power. I shall read the first and -second paragraphs of Document Number RF-35: - - “Paragraph I: If the economic situation, especially as regards - the use of raw materials and industrial appliances, requires it, - establishments and economic enterprises may be partly or - completely closed. - - “Paragraph II: The closing of these enterprises will be - announced by field headquarters by means of a written - notification addressed to the establishment or to the industrial - enterprise.” - -In Belgium I refer to the ordinances of the Military Commandant, 30 -March and 3 October 1942, which appeared in the _Verordnungsblatt_ in -Belgium. I submit to the Tribunal the ordinance of 30 March under -Document Number RF-36. - -In Holland the regulating provisions of the occupying authorities were -more stringent than elsewhere. I present an ordinance of the Reich -Commissioner for the territory of occupied Holland, 15 March 1943. I -submit it to the Tribunal under Document Number RF-37. - -This ordinance presents a double interest. First, it offers precise -information which emphasizes the method with which the German services -executed their recruiting plan. It constitutes, on the other hand, the -first document I shall submit to the Tribunal accusing the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart. The policy of Sauckel was carried out in Holland with the -collaboration of Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart. The ordinances -regarding compulsory labor in Holland were all issued on the -responsibility of Seyss-Inquart, whether they bear his actual signature -or not. I ask the Tribunal to note this. - -The increase of the legal working hours and the closing of industrial -enterprises deprived thousands of workers of their jobs. The defendants -did not hesitate to use material constraint to incite the unemployed to -work for Germany. They threatened the unemployed that they would do away -with their unemployment compensation. This threat was made on several -occasions by the local field commandants in occupied France. I find -proof in the protest made by the French authorities to the German -Armistice Commission. The French document is F-282, which I submit to -the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-38. I read the first page, third -paragraph of the letter: - - “Moreover, the occupation authorities stipulate that the workers - who refuse the work offered to them will forfeit their right to - unemployment compensation and may be prosecuted by the war - tribunal for sabotage of Franco-German collaboration.” - -Far from disavowing the initiative of their local authorities, the -Central Office for Labor gave them instructions to continue this policy. -The proof is furnished by the circular of Dr. Mansfeld, dated 29 January -1942, which I have just submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number -RF-26 (Document Number 1183-PS) in which instructions were given that -the stopping of unemployment compensation should be utilized as a means -of pressure on workers from foreign countries. The circular of Dr. -Mansfeld shows that the blackmail of the National Socialist leaders was -practiced not only in the granting of unemployment compensation, but -also in the issuing of ration cards. - -Moreover, the defendants tried to force the inhabitants of the occupied -territories to leave for Germany by increasing their food difficulties. -The proof of this intention is given in the report of the session of 1 -March 1944 of the Conference of the Four Year Plan. This document I -referred to a short time ago as Exhibit Number RF-30 (Document R-124). -This is a passage which has not yet been read, which the Tribunal will -please permit me to read. It is on Page 5 of the French translation, -Pages 1814 and 1815 of the German text. The page numbers are at the -bottom and on the right. I read on the top of Page 5 of the French text: - - “Milch: ‘Wouldn’t the following method be better than . . . to - protect the “S” factories, German administration should take - over the feeding of the Italians and say to them, “No one shall - receive food unless he works in a protected factory (S-Betrieb) - or leaves for Germany?’” - - “Sauckel: ‘It is true that the French workman in France is - better fed than the German workman in Germany. The Italian - workman, even if he does not work at all, is better fed in the - part of Italy which we occupy than if he worked in Germany.’” - -I have shown the Tribunal the economic and social measures which the -National Socialist authorities took to force workers in the occupied -territories to accept labor contracts offered by the German authorities. -This indirect coercion was reinforced by direct pressure which was -simultaneously put on the local governments, the employers, and on the -workers themselves. - -The National Socialist leaders knew that their recruiting policy could -be facilitated by the local authorities. That is why they tried to make -the pseudo-governments of the occupied territories guarantee or indorse -the fiction of voluntary enrollment. I submit to the Tribunal an example -of the pressure which the German services placed on the Vichy Government -to that purpose. They first arranged that the State Secretariat of Labor -should issue a circular to all prefects on 29 March 1941. The German -authorities were not satisfied with this circular. They were conscious -of the illegality of their recruiting methods and they wished to justify -them by an agreement with the _de facto_ government of France. - -They required that this agreement be made known by public statement. -Negotiations were carried out for this purpose in 1941 and 1942. The -violence of the German pressure is substantiated by the letters -addressed by Dr. Michel, chief of the administrative staff, to the -Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations. - -I refer especially to his letters of 3 March 1942 and 15 May 1942, which -constitute Exhibits Numbers RF-39 and 40 (Documents Numbers F-526 and -F-525). I read first to the Tribunal the letter of 15 May, which is -under Exhibit Number RF-39 (Document Number F-526): - - “Paris, 15 May 1942. - - “Subject: The Recruiting of French Labor for Germany. - - “As the result of the conversations of 24 January 1942, and - after repeated appeals, the first draft of the declaration of - the French Government concerning recruiting was presented 27 - February. On the German side it was accepted with slight - modifications and in written form on 3 March, on the condition - that at the time of its transmission to the organizational - committees, attention should be directed to the fact that the - French Government expressly approved of the acceptance of work - in Germany. - - “On 19 March attention was drawn to the fact that a draft for a - memorandum to the organizational committees should be submitted, - whereupon the draft was submitted on 27 March. On 30 March a - proposal for modification was delivered to M. Terray, who was to - take it up with M. Bichelonne.” - -I skip the two following paragraphs, and I will read the last paragraph: - - “Although no reason appears for the unusual and incomprehensible - delay, the draft has not been presented up to now. As more than - 2 months have passed since the first request for the submission - of the memorandum, it is requested that the new draft be - submitted by 19 May. - - “For the Military Commandant; for Chief of the Administrative - Staff. Signed, Dr. Michel.” - -The Tribunal undoubtedly has observed that Dr. Michel demanded not only -the circulation of a public declaration, but also insisted that the text -of this statement be officially transmitted to the organizational -committees. The pressure which occupation authorities put upon French -industrial enterprises to stimulate them to encourage the departure of -their workers to Germany was brought about, in fact, through the medium -of the organizational committees. The German offices for labor -collaborated directly with the organizational committees. They ordered -conferences in the course of which they dictated their will to the -leaders of these committees. They also insisted that the organizational -committees should be informed of all the measures which the French -authorities had to take. - -The committees could then be associated with these measures in the -interests of German policy. The correspondence of Dr. Michel offers -numerous examples of the constant efforts of the German authorities to -act upon the organizational committees. - -I have just offered an example of this to the Tribunal in the document -which I have read. I now offer another. - -In 1941 the Germans demanded that the circulars, especially the -directive of 29 March 1941 addressed to the prefects regarding the -recruiting of laborers for Germany, should be officially transmitted to -the organizational committees. The occupation authorities obtained -satisfaction through a circular of 25 April, which I submit to the -Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-41 (Document Number F-521). But the -terms of this circular did not receive the approval of the German -authorities, and on 28 May 1941 Dr. Michel protested in violent terms to -the Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations. This protest -constitutes our Document F-522. I submit it to the Tribunal under -Exhibit Number RF-42, and read it: - - “Paris, 28 May 1941. - - “Subject: Recruiting of Workers for Germany. - - “Reference: Your letter Number 192 of 29 April 1941. - - “From your explanations I gather that even before my letter of - 23 April was received a circular for the organizational - committees had been drafted and sent on 25 April. - - “This circular, nevertheless, does not seem to me adequate to - support in an efficacious manner the recruiting of workers - carried out by Germany. That is why I consider that it is - necessary that, in a further directive, attention may be drawn - to the points which were particularly mentioned by me on 23 - April and I request you to submit to me as soon as possible the - appropriate draft. - - “On the German side an impressive contribution toward the - creating of a favorable atmosphere has been made by means of the - intended release of an additional large number of prisoners of - war, which was considered by you at the time of our conversation - of 24 March as a primary condition for the success of a - reinforced recruiting of workers for Germany. I am therefore - probably not wrong in expecting that you will send to the - economic organizations a communication so designed that the - attitude of expectation, maintained by French economy up until - now, will develop also in the field of the release of labor into - a constructive co-operation. I therefore expect that you will - submit to me your proposals with all possible speed.” - -And, finally, the German services placed direct pressure upon the -workers themselves. - -First, moral pressure. The _opération de la relève_ (prisoner exchange -plan) tried in France in the spring of 1942 is characteristic. The -occupation authorities promised to compensate for the sending of French -workers to Germany by liberating prisoners of war. The return of a -prisoner was to take place upon the departure of a worker. This promise -was fallacious, and reality was quite different. - -I quote in this connection the report on compulsory labor and the -deportation of workers, which I submitted this morning to the Tribunal -under Exhibit Number RF-22 (Document Number F-515). - -I quote Page 51, both in the French original and in the German -translation. In the French original it is the third paragraph of Page 51 -and in the German translation the first paragraph: - - “If the press, inspired by the occupying power, pretends in its - commentaries to applaud the replacement plan of one prisoner for - one worker, it is undoubtedly done to order and based on - calculation; and also it seems because until 20 June 1942, 2 - days before the speech cited before”—it was a speech of the - chief of the _de facto_ government of France—“it was, indeed, - this proportion which the Germans Michel and Ritter had - pretended to accept in their reports to the French - administrative services. - - “The proportion, in fact, of one to five, appears to have been a - last-minute surprise of which the press had never breathed a - word.” - -The pressure of which foreign workers were the victims was also a -material pressure. I said that the fiction of voluntary enrollment could -not be maintained in view of the arrests. I wish to submit a document to -the Tribunal which furnishes a characteristic example of the German -mentality and of the methods utilized by the National Socialist -administrations. This is a document which in the French archives is -Number 527, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-43. -This is a letter from the delegate of the Reich Labor Minister in the -French department of Pas de Calais. This official enjoins a young French -workman to depart for Germany as a free worker under threat of -unfavorable consequences. This is in Exhibit Number RF-43 (Document -Number F-527), third page: - - “Sir: - - “The 26th of March last, in Marquise, I ordered you to go to - work in Germany in your profession. You were to leave with the - convoy of the 1st of April for Germany. You paid no attention to - this summons. I warn you that you must present yourself, with - your baggage, next Monday, 28 April, before 19 hours, at 51 Rue - de la Pomme d’Or in Calais. I call your attention to the fact - that you leave for Germany as a free worker, that you will work - there under the same conditions, and earn the same wages as the - German workers. - - “In case you do not present yourself, I must tell you that - unfavorable consequences may very well follow. - - “Delegate for the Labor Ministry of the - Reich”—signed—“Hanneran.” - -The proof of the constraint which the German authorities exercised on -the workers of the occupied territories to bring about their allegedly -voluntary enrollment may be continued. The National Socialist -authorities did not merely impose labor contracts tainted with violence -on foreign workers, they themselves deliberately failed to honor these -contracts. - -I find proof of this in the fact that they unilaterally prolonged the -duration of the contracts signed by foreign workers. This proof is based -on several documents. Some ordinances were issued by the Defendant -Göring in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan; others by the -Defendant Sauckel. - -I now call the attention of the Tribunal to an order of Sauckel’s, dated -29 March 1943, which I submit to the Tribunal under Document Number -RF-44. It is an extract from _Verfügungen, Anordnungen, -Bekanntmachungen_, Volume 5, Page 203: - - “Extension of work contracts, fixed for a period of time, of - foreign workers, who during the time of their contract have, - absented themselves from their work without proper excuse. - - “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor decrees: - - “The regular carrying out of the clauses of a contract for a - fixed period of time concluded by a foreign worker necessitates - that the worker should devote all his energy to the enterprise - for the whole duration of the contract. Nevertheless, it happens - that foreign workers as a result of idleness, delays in their - return to work from visits to their homes,”—I draw the - Tribunal’s attention to the following words—“serving terms of - prison, internment in a camp of correction, or for other - reasons, remain absent from their work . . . without just cause, - for a longer or shorter period of time. In such cases foreign - workers cannot be authorized to return to their country when the - period of time has elapsed for which they agreed to work - voluntarily in Germany. - - “Such procedure is not in keeping with the spirit of a work - contract for a fixed period of time, whose object is not only - the presence of the foreign worker, but also the work - accomplished by him.” - -Kept by force in the German factories which they had entered under -compulsion, the foreign workers were neither voluntary workers nor free -workers. The exposé of the methods of German recruiting will suffice to -show the Tribunal the fictitious character of the voluntary enrollment -on which it was supposed to be based. The foreign workers who agreed to -work in the factories of the National Socialist war industry did not act -through free will. Their number, however, remained limited. The workers -of the occupied territories had the physical and moral courage to resist -German pressure. This is proved in an admission by the Defendant -Sauckel, which I take from the minutes of the meeting of 3 March 1944 of -the Conference of the Four Year Plan. - -This is from an extract which has already been read by my American -colleague, Mr. Dodd, so I will not read it again to the Tribunal. I -merely wish to recall that the Defendant Sauckel admitted that out of 5 -million foreign workers who came to Germany, there were not even 200,000 -who came voluntarily. The resistance of the foreign workers surprised -the Defendant Sauckel as much as it irritated him. One day he expressed -his surprise to a German general who replied, “The difficulty comes from -the fact that you address yourself to patriots who do not share your -ideal.” - -Indeed, only force could constrain the patriots of the occupied -territories to work in behalf of the enemy. The National Socialist -authorities resorted to force. - -The Germans had, from the first, the possibility of imposing their -policy of force on that kind of labor whose particular status guaranteed -recruitment and apparent submission—the prisoners of war. From 1940 on, -the German military authorities organized labor task forces in prison -camps. They constantly increased the importance of these task forces, -which were put at the disposal of agricultural economy and the war -industry. - -The importance of the work required from war prisoners is substantiated -by the report on forced labor and the deportation of workers, which I -have submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-22 (Document -Number F-515). We find on Page 68 of the French and German texts the -following estimates: There were, at the end of 1942, 1,036,319 French -prisoners of war in Germany; 987,687 had been assigned to the work -groups and only the surplus, that is 48,632 prisoners, remained -unemployed. - -The utilization of prisoners of war in German factories does not -constitute a distinct phenomenon which can be dissociated from the -general plan for the recruiting of foreign workers; it is, on the -contrary, an integral part of this plan. - -The National Socialists have always considered that the obligation to -work applied just as much to war prisoners as to the civilian workers of -the occupied territories. They have on many occasions expressed this -conviction. I refer especially to three documents. - -The first is the decree of the appointment of the Defendant Sauckel, -which I submitted to the Tribunal at the beginning of my explanatory -remarks. - -The second document to which I wish to draw the attention of the -Tribunal is the 10th decree of Sauckel, which I submitted some time ago -under Document Number RF-17. This decree formulates the principle of the -obligation to work and applies to war prisoners, according to the terms -of its Article 8. - -Finally, Sauckel had, in another document, affirmed that the prisoners -of war were to be subject to work in the same manner as civilian -workers. This is found in the letter which he wrote to the Defendant -Rosenberg on 20 April 1942, some days after his appointment, to explain -his project to the latter. This is Document 016-PS, which my American -colleague, Mr. Dodd, has already submitted to the Tribunal. I present it -as Exhibit Number RF-45. I shall not read from it, but I point out that -on Page 20 of the German text the problem of compulsory labor is treated -in the general heading entitled, “Prisoners of war and foreign workers.” - -These documents bring a double proof to the Tribunal. First of all, they -reveal the willingness of the National Socialists to force prisoners to -work in behalf of the German war economy within the general frame of -their recruiting policy. In the second place, these documents establish -that the utilization of prisoners of war was not undertaken only by -military authorities; this utilization was ordered and systematized by a -civilian organization—that of the Arbeitseinsatz. As well as the -responsibility of the Defendant Keitel, it entails also that of the -German leaders who conducted the labor policy: the Defendant Sauckel, -the Defendant Speer, and the Defendant Göring. - -The Tribunal knows that international law regulates the conditions under -which prisoners of war may be forced to work. The Hague Convention -formulated rules which were closely defined by the Geneva Convention in -Articles 27, 31, and 32: - - “Article 27: Belligerents may use as workers healthy war - prisoners, according to their rank and their capabilities, with - the exception of officers and corresponding ranks. Nevertheless, - if officers, or those of similar rank, ask for suitable work, it - will be supplied for them as far as possible. Noncommissioned - officers, who are war prisoners, can be required to work only as - supervisors, if they do not expressly request remunerative - occupation. . . . - - “Article 31: The work furnished by the prisoners of war. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: We consider these documents as official and sufficiently -authentic. - -M. HERZOG: These rules of international law determine positively the -legal powers of the nation having prisoners of war in its custody. It is -legitimate to force prisoners of war to work during their captivity, but -this includes three legal limitations: - -1. It is forbidden to compel noncommissioned officers who are prisoners -to work, unless they have expressly requested to do so. - -2. War prisoners must not be used for dangerous work. - -3. Prisoners must not be associated with the enemy war effort. - -The National Socialist authorities systematically neglected these -imperative provisions. They exercised violent constraint on -noncommissioned officers held in captivity, to force them to join labor -crews. They included war prisoners as workers in their factories and in -the workyards, without considering the nature of the work imposed upon -them. The utilization of war prisoners by National Socialist Germany -took place under illegal and criminal conditions. This I affirm and I -will prove it to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will take a recess for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, Your Honors. From 1941, the Germans exercised -direct pressure on noncommissioned officers to force them to engage in -productive work for the Reich war economy. This pressure, after the -failure of propaganda methods, took the form of reprisals. Insubordinate -noncommissioned officers were subjected to ill-treatment; they were sent -to special camps, such as Coberczyn, where they were put under a -disciplinary regime. Some incurred penal sentences because of their -refusal to work. I submit, as proof, the report of the Ministry of -Prisoners, Deportees, and Refugees of the French Government, Document -UK-78(2), which is, in my document book, Exhibit Number RF-46. The -document is in a white file. I shall read from the bottom of Page 19 in -the French original, Page 10 of the German translation: - - “Work of noncommissioned officers. - - “On this subject the Geneva Convention was explicit: - Noncommissioned officers who are war prisoners can be subjected - to work only as supervisors, unless they make an express request - for a remunerative occupation. - - “In conformity with this article a certain number of - noncommissioned officers refused to work from the beginning of - their captivity. The number of imprisoned noncommissioned - officers was, at the end of 1940, about 130,000 and represented - later a very important source of labor for the Reich. Therefore, - the German authorities strove by every means to induce the - greatest possible number of objectors to work. To this effect, - during the last months of 1941, the noncommissioned officers who - did not volunteer for the work were, in most camps, subjected to - an alternating regime. For a few days they had to undergo - punishments such as the reduction of food rations, doing without - beds, compulsory physical exercises for a number of hours, and - particularly the _pelote_ (punishment drill). During another - period they were promised work according to their liking, and - other material advantages, for example, special regulations for - insurance, an extra number of letters, and higher wages. These - methods led a certain number of noncommissioned officers to - accept work. The noncommissioned officers who persisted in their - refusal to work were subjected to a very severe disciplinary - regime and to arduous physical exercises.” - -The National Socialist military authorities utilized the prisoners of -war for dangerous work. The French, British, Belgian, and Dutch -prisoners were used to transport munitions, to load bombs on planes, to -repair aviation camps, and to construct fortifications. The proof of the -use of prisoners of war for the transport of munitions and for the -loading of bombs on planes is furnished by the affidavits of repatriated -French prisoners of war. These affidavits have been assembled in the -report of the Ministry of Prisoners, which I have just quoted and which -I shall quote again. - -I now quote Page 27 of the French document, Page 14 of the German -translation. It is the same document from which I have just quoted, -Exhibit Number RF-46, Page 27: - - “(b) The requisition of prisoners for the construction of - fortifications and for the transport of munitions, very often in - the close vicinity of the firing line. - - “The war prisoners, Kommando 274 of Stalag II B, complain, - December 1944, of being employed on Sundays in the construction - of antitank trenches. - - “On 2 February 1945 the prisoners of Stalag II D, evacuated on - account of the advance of the Russian Army, worked, as soon as - they arrived at Sassnitz, at fortification works and antitank - works, in particular around the city. - - “After falling back from Stalag III B, the war prisoners were - engaged until the end of April in earthworks, digging trenches, - and in transporting aviation bombs. - - “Kommando 553 at Lebus was obliged to carry out work in the - front lines under the fire of Russian artillery. Numerous - comrades, drawn back to Fürstenwalde, were employed in loading - bombs on German bombers. In spite of their protests to the - International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva and to the - colonel commanding Stalag III B, about billeting in barns, very - bad hygiene, and insufficient food, the latter answered that he - was obeying superior orders of the OKW, ordering the prisoners - to dig trenches.” - -The National Socialist leaders, for that matter, admitted that they used -French and British prisoners of war for military work on airdromes -exposed to Allied bombardment. - -I offer in proof two notes, the first addressed by the OKH to the War -Prisoners Section of the Wehrmacht, and the second by “Wilhelmstrasse” -to the German representative of the Reich Foreign Office at the -Wiesbaden Armistice Commission. - -The memorandum of the OKH, dated 7 October 1940, constitutes Document -F-549; I submit it to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-47, and I -read it in full: - - “The demand of the French Delegation shall be considered - unfounded. The lodging of war prisoners in camps situated in the - vicinity of aviation fields is not in contradiction to the rules - of the rights of nations. - - “According to Article 9, Paragraph 4, of the Convention on the - Treatment of War Prisoners, of 27 July 1929, no prisoners of war - shall be exposed to the fire of the combat zone. Combat zone in - this sense is to be understood as the space in which normally a - battle between two armies is carried on, thus extending to a - depth of about 20 kilometers from the advance line. Places - exposed to possible aerial attacks, however, do not belong to - the combat zone. In this age of air warfare there no longer - exists any sure shelter. The fact of using war prisoners for the - construction of a camp and for the repairing of destroyed - runways does not seem to lend itself to any controversy. - - “According to Article 31 of the Convention quoted above, war - prisoners must not be used in works directly related to war - activity. The construction of shelters, houses, and camps is not - directly a war act. It is recognized that war prisoners may be - employed in the construction of roads. Accordingly their - utilization for the reconstruction of aviation camps that have - been destroyed is permissible. On the roads, trucks, tanks, - ammunition cars, _et cetera_, are driven, and on the aviation - fields there are planes. It is all the same. - - “On the other hand, it would be illegal to use war prisoners for - loading bombs, munitions, _et cetera_ on bombers. This would be - work directly related to war activity. - - “By reason of the legal position explained above, the OKH has - rejected the idea of withdrawing French prisoners of war - employed on work in the aviation camps.” - -I draw the attention of the Tribunal to this document. It emphasized the -bad faith of the leaders of National Socialist Germany, which was -two-fold: In the first place, the note of 7 October 1940, which I have -read, acknowledges that it is forbidden by international law to use -prisoners of war for the loading of bombs and ammunitions on bombers. -But I have just brought proof to the Tribunal that the French prisoners -of war were used for this purpose. In the second place, the note of the -OKH disputes the dangerous character of the work carried out on the -aviation fields. - -But the note of “Wilhelmstrasse,” to which I shall now refer, and which -I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-48 (Document Number -F-550), recognizes, on the contrary, that prisoners forced to work on an -aviation field incur grave danger because of the military purpose of -this work. - -I will read to the Tribunal a note of the German Foreign Office dated 14 -February 1941, Exhibit Number RF-48 (Document Number F-550): - - “Article 87 of the Agreement of 1929 on Prisoners of War - provides that, in case of difference of opinion on the subject - of the interpretation of the Agreement, the protecting powers - shall offer their services to settle the dispute. To accomplish - this, any protecting power may propose a meeting of - representatives of the belligerent powers. . . . France herself - assumes the responsibilities of a protecting power in questions - on prisoners of war.” - -I shall pass on from this quotation to Paragraph 2 of the same document: - - “As to the point in dispute, it is well to call attention to the - following: - - “The French conception, according to which prisoners of war may - not be quartered near airfields and may not be employed in - repairing runways, cannot be based on the exact content of - Articles 9 and 31; but, on the other hand, it is certain that - French prisoners of war quartered and employed under these - conditions are in a particularly dangerous situation, because - the airfields in occupied territories are used exclusively for - German military purposes and thus constitute a special objective - for enemy air attacks. - - “The American Embassy in Berlin has likewise made a protest - against a similar use of British prisoners of war in Germany. So - far no answer has been made, because a rejection of this protest - might result in German prisoners being employed in similar work - in England.” - -The utilization of war prisoners for the construction of fortifications -is substantiated by Document 828-PS, which I file with the Tribunal -under Exhibit Number RF-49. It is a letter of 29 September 1944, -addressed by the Chief of the German 1st Army Corps to the OKW, to give -an account of work on fortifications accomplished by 80 Belgian -prisoners of war. I quote: - - “According to the teletype referred to, it is reported that in - the territory of Stalag I A, Stablack Einsatzbereich 2-213, - Tilsit-Loten near Ragnit, there are 40 Belgian prisoners of war - and in Lindbach, near Neusiedel, 40 Belgian prisoners of war, - who are employed on fortification work.” - -There remains the task of proving that Allied prisoners, forced to work -in Reich armament factories, were associated with the enemy war effort. -To this end I first offer Document 1206-PS. This document is a -memorandum, dated 11 November 1941, concerning a report made 7 November -1941 by the Reich Marshal. The document, consequently, establishes the -direct responsibility of the Defendant Göring. The use of Russian war -prisoners is treated in a general way in this document, but it deals -also with the use of war prisoners of Western European countries. I -submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-50, and I -read: - - “Berlin, 11 November 1941. - - “Notes on report made by the Reich Marshal at a meeting of 7 - November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air. - - “Subject: Employment of Russian labor in the war economy.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Has that already been put in by the United States? - -M. HERZOG: I think, Mr. President, that it was presented by the United -States Prosecution. I shall, therefore, simply quote an extract, the -fifth and sixth paragraphs of the first page, concerning the employment -of French and Belgian war prisoners on individual employment in the -economy of armament. This use of war prisoners in the Reich munitions -factories corresponded to a common plan. It is the result of a -systematic policy. The administrative offices for labor deliberately -assigned to armament factories all war prisoners who seemed capable of -carrying out skilled work. I quote, in this connection, Document -3005-PS, Exhibit RF-51. It is a circular addressed, in 1941, by the -Ministry of Labor to the heads of employment offices concerning the use -of French and Russian prisoners of war. This document has been submitted -and commented upon by my American colleague, Mr. Dodd. I shall, -therefore, not read it. I simply point out that this circular deals with -the employment of all French war prisoners in the armament factories of -the Reich. - -After the capitulation of Italy, Italian soldiers who had fallen into -the hands of the Germans—they were not called prisoners of war, but -rather “military internees”—were forced to work. I offer in this -connection, a directive of the Defendant Bormann, of 28 September 1943, -Document 657-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number -RF-52. - -The Italian military internees were in three categories; some asked to -continue the struggle on the side of the German army; others desired to -keep a neutral attitude; others turned their arms against their former -allies. The military internees of the second and third categories were, -in the terms of the circular, to be forced to work. I read: - - “Circular Number 55/43 G.R.S., top secret. Concerning the - treatment and employment of Italian military internees. - - “The OKW, in connection with the Plenipotentiary General for - Allocation of Labor, has regulated the treatment and the - employment of Italian military internees. The most important - directions of the ordinances of the OKW are the - following. . . .” - -I shall skip the rest of the first page and proceed to Page 2 of the -French translation: - - “The Italian internees who, when investigated, do not declare - themselves ready to continue the struggle under German command, - are put at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for - Allocation of Labor, who has already given the necessary - instructions for their employment to the heads of the regional - labor offices. - - “It is to be noted that Italian military internees must not be - employed together with the British and American prisoners of - war. . . .” - -The prisoners of war offered passive resistance to German force. The -National Socialist authorities intervened again and again to attempt to -increase their output. I refer to Document 233-PS, which I submit to the -Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-53. It is a directive of the OKW of 17 -August 1944. The purpose is to indicate to the war prisoner bureaus -measures capable of increasing the production of the prisoners. I read -from the document: - - “Subject: Treatment of War Prisoners—Increase in Production. - - “The measures taken until now with regard to the treatment of - war prisoners and the increasing of their production have not - given the hoped-for results. The offices of the Party and those - of economy continually complain of the poor labor output of all - the war prisoners. The object of this circular is to make known - the directives for prisoners of war made in agreement with all - interested offices of the Party and State. Accordingly all guard - companies and their auxiliaries are to be given detailed - instructions. - - “1. Collaboration with the Hoheitsträger of the NSDAP. - - “The co-operation of all officers in charge of war prisoners - with the Hoheitsträger of the Party must be intensified to an - even greater extent. To this end the commanders of the - prisoners-of-war camps shall immediately detail, for all the - Kreise in their command, an energetic officer acquainted with - all questions concerning prisoners of war, to act as liaison - officer to the Kreisleiter. This officer shall have the duty of - settling in closest collaboration with the Kreisleiter, - according to the instructions of the camp commander, all - questions concerning prisoners of war which might be of public - interest. - - “The aim of this collaboration must be: (a) To increase the - labor output of war prisoners; (b) to solve all arising - difficulties quickly and on the spot; (c) to organize the - employment of war prisoners in the Kreise in such a way that it - meets with the political, military, and economic requirements. - - “The Chancellery of the Party will give the necessary orders to - the Gauleiter and the Kreisleiter. - - “2. Treatment of prisoners of war. The treatment of prisoners of - war shall be dictated, within limits compatible with security, - by the sole purpose of increasing the labor output to the utmost - extent. In addition to just treatment, providing the prisoners - with the food due them according to stipulations, and with - proper billets, supervision of the labor output is necessary to - achieve this highest possible production. - - “Available means must be employed with extreme rigor as regards - lazy and rebellious prisoners.” - -The resistance of war prisoners caused the German labor bureaus to use a -subterfuge to force them to work. I refer to the operation called the -transformation of war prisoners into free workers. It consisted in -transforming prisoners of war into so-called free workers, to whom a -labor contract was offered. The operation was perfected by the Defendant -Sauckel in the course of one of his trips to Paris on 9 April 1943. To -Germany it offered the advantage of permitting the use of transformed -prisoners in armament factories without directly violating the Geneva -Convention. For the prisoners it presented only an illusory advantage, -the decrease of the surveillance to which they were subjected. In -reality the length and the nature of the work imposed upon them was in -no way changed; their housing conditions and the quality of their -rations remained unchanged. Moreover, this operation, presented by -German propaganda as a special measure to war prisoners, brought about a -deterioration of their legal status. - -The prisoners of war were not fooled; in most cases they refused to -co-operate with this German maneuver. Some agreed to do it, but a number -of these took advantage of the first leave granted them because of their -change in status, and fled. The report of the Statistical Institute on -Forced Labor, which I submitted to the Tribunal this morning under -Exhibit Number RF-22, (Document Number F-515) gives in this connection -the following information. I quote it, Page 70 of the French text, Page -70 of the German translation. I shall read the second paragraph: - - “The transformation of prisoners into ‘free’ workers, which was - realized or carried out as the second Sauckel act and which - because of this fact must be counted in the present list as - dating from 25 April 1943, was decided by him, Sauckel, in the - course of a trip to Paris on 9 April 1943. It was to afford, - after the prisoner had signed his contract, leave to go to - France which was dependent on the return of the men who had gone - on leave before. Two attempts were made to carry out this plan. - As of 24 April 1943, out of 1,000 on leave, 43 did not return. - In the month of August following, out of 8,000 on leave, 2,000 - did not return. A last appeal directed to them was published in - the press of 17 August without result. There is no third - experiment, and the transformation in practice limited itself to - the removal of sentinels and of camp guards, but did not change - either the nature or the duration of the work or the housing - conditions or the rations. On the other hand, it entailed loss - of rights to receive packages from the International Red Cross - and loss of the diplomatic protection of prisoners of war.” - -The forced utilization of war prisoners did not permit the German -authorities to solve the labor problem of the war economy. That is why -they applied their policy of force to the civilian populations of the -occupied territories. - -The National Socialist authorities systemized their policy of force, -from 1942 on, by instituting compulsory labor in the different occupied -territories. From the end of 1941 it has been confirmed that neither the -recruiting of voluntary workers nor the utilization of prisoners led to -a solution of the problem of the labor required for the war economy. The -Germans then decided to proceed to the forced enrollment of civilian -workers. They decreed a veritable civilian mobilization, the execution -of which characterizes their criminal activity. - -I refer to a circular of 29 January 1942, issued by Dr. Mansfeld on the -responsibility of the Defendant Göring. I remind the Tribunal that I -have submitted this Document Number 1183-PS already under Exhibit Number -RF-26. I read the passage from the document where I stopped this -morning, Page 2, last paragraph of the French translation, Page 2; last -paragraph also of the German original: - - “In order to avoid effects detrimental to the armament industry, - all considerations must yield to the necessity of filling in - every case the gaps in the labor supply caused by extensive - drafting into the Wehrmacht. To this end the forced mobilization - of workers from the occupied territories must not be overlooked - if voluntary recruitment should not succeed. The mere - possibility of compulsory mobilization will, in many cases, - facilitate recruiting. - - “Therefore I ask you to take immediate steps in your district to - promote the employment of workers in the German Reich on a - voluntary basis. I herewith request you to prepare for - publication, regulations to render possible forced mobilization - of labor in your territory for Germany, so that they may be - decreed at once in case recruiting on a voluntary basis remains - without the success necessary to relieve labor in the Reich.” - -The appointment of the Defendant Sauckel may be considered as -preparatory measure for the establishment of compulsory labor. It was -necessary that a central authority be set up in order to co-ordinate the -activity of the different labor departments to proceed to the -mobilization of civilian workers. The terms explaining the motives of -the decree of appointment are explicit: The mission of the -Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor consists in satisfying the labor -needs of the German economy through the recruiting of foreign workers -and the utilization of war prisoners. The decree of Sauckel dated 22 -August 1942, which I have submitted to the Tribunal under Document -Number RF-17, expresses, moreover, the will of the defendant to set -about recruiting by means of coercion. - -The institution of compulsory labor represents deliberate violation of -international conventions. The deportation of workers is forbidden by -several stipulated regulations which have the value of actual law. I -shall quote, first of all, Article 52 of the Annex to the Fourth -Convention of the Hague. I have already given a commentary on it to the -Tribunal to demonstrate that the requisitioning of labor effected by the -occupation authorities was illegal. Much more, the institution of -compulsory labor was prohibited by Article 52. Compulsory labor was -imposed upon foreign workers in the interest of the German war economy. -It was carried out in armament factories of National Socialist Germany. -It deprived the occupied territories of labor necessary for the rational -exploitation of their wealth. It therefore is not within the framework -of that labor requisition which Article 52 of the Hague Convention -authorizes. - -The prohibition of forced labor is, moreover, affirmed by another -international convention. It is a question of the Convention of 25 -September 1926 on slavery, of which Germany is a signatory. This treaty -makes forced labor equivalent to slavery in its Article 5. I ask the -Tribunal to refer to it. - -Deportation of workers is the subject of a formal prohibition. Forced -labor in German war factories was, therefore, instituted in flagrant -violation of international law and of all pledges subscribed to by -Germany. The National Socialist authorities transgressed positive -international law; they likewise violated the law of nations. The latter -guarantees individual liberty, on which the principle of forced -recruitment is a characteristic attack. - -The violation of treaties and the contempt of the rights of individuals -are the tenets of National Socialist doctrine. Therefore, the defendants -proceeded not merely to the mobilization of foreign workers; they -proclaimed the necessity and the legitimacy of forced labor. I shall, -first of all, indicate to the Tribunal certain declarations made by the -defendants which amount to admissions. I shall thereupon indicate how -the occupation authorities introduced the service of compulsory work in -the different occupied territories. I shall demonstrate, finally, that -the Germans took measures of violent coercion in an attempt to assure -the execution of the civilian mobilization which had been decreed. - -The legitimacy of forced enrollment has been upheld by Hitler. The proof -of this can be found in the report of the Führer conferences held on 10, -11, and 12 August 1942. It is contained in Document R-124 which I -presented this morning under Exhibit Number RF-30. I shall not read it -to the Tribunal, because my American colleague, Mr. Dodd, has done so -during his presentation on forced labor. I point out that the document -to which I refer indicates that the Führer was in agreement with the -exercise of all the necessary compulsion in the East as well as in the -West, if the question of recruiting foreign workers could not be -regulated on a voluntary basis. - -The necessity of making use of compulsory labor was expressed in -identical terms by certain defendants. - -I shall not stress the numerous statements of the Defendant Sauckel to -which I have already drawn the attention of the Tribunal. The -explanatory statement of his decree of 22 August 1942, the program -included in his letter of 24 April 1942, and the policy advocated in his -speech at Posen in February 1943, reproduce faithfully the determination -of the defendant to justify the principle of forced recruiting. I shall -not revert to this. - -I present to the Tribunal the declaration of the Defendant Jodl. This -declaration is an extract from a long speech made by General Jodl, 7 -November 1943 at Munich before an audience of Gauleiter. This speech is -Document L-172. I offer it in evidence to the Tribunal under Exhibit -Number RF-54. I shall read Page 2 of the French translation, Pages 38 -and 39 of the German original: - - “The dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making - more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories - occupied by us. Here right and wrong conceptions are mixed - together. I believe that as far as labor is concerned, the - utmost has been done, but where this is not yet the case, it - would appear preferable from the political point of view to - abstain from compulsory measures and instead to aim at order and - economic effort. In my opinion, however, the time has now come - to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark, - Holland, France, and Belgium to compel thousands of idle persons - to carry out fortification work, which takes precedence over all - other tasks. The necessary orders for this have already been - given.” - -The German Labor Service had not waited for the appeal of General Jodl -to decree the mobilization of civilian foreign workers. I am going to -show the Tribunal how compulsory labor was instituted and organized in -France, Norway, Belgium, and Holland. - -I should like to remind the Tribunal that in Denmark there was never any -legal regulation for forced labor and that forced labor was carried out -as a simple _de facto_ measure. - -I also wish to remind the Tribunal that compulsory labor was introduced -in a special form in Luxembourg and in the French departments of Alsace -and Lorraine. The occupation authorities incorporated the citizens of -Luxembourg and the French citizens residing in the departments of -Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, and Moselle, in the labor service of the Reich. -This incorporation was carried out by ordinances of Gauleiter Simon and -Gauleiter Wagner. The ordinances constitute an integral part of the -Germanization plan for territories of Luxembourg, Alsace, and Lorraine. -Their scope exceeds that of the measures of forced enrollment which were -taken in other occupied territories. That is why I refer the Tribunal, -on this point, to the explanation which will be given in the trial brief -of M. Edgar Faure. - -Two German texts of a general nature serve as a foundation for the -legislation on forced labor in the occupied territories of Western -Europe. - -The first is the decree of Sauckel of 22 August 1942, to which I have -drawn the attention of the Tribunal on several occasions. This decree -prescribes the mobilization of all civilian workers in the service of -the war economy. Article 2 prescribes that this decree is applicable to -occupied territories. This decree of 22 August 1942 thus constitutes the -legal charter of the civilian mobilization of foreign workers. This -mobilization was confirmed by an order of the Führer of 8 September -1942. It is Document 556(2)-PS, Exhibit Number RF-55, which I submit to -the Tribunal and from which I shall read: - - “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht; General - Headquarters of the Führer: 8 September 1942. - - “The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be - erected in the area of Army Group West necessitate in the - occupied territory the utilization of all available workers to - the fullest extent and to their utmost capacity. The assignment - of indigenous workers, made up to now, is insufficient. In order - to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory labor and - the prohibition of changing the place of employment without - permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. - - “Furthermore, in future, the distribution of food and clothing - ration cards to those subject to compulsory labor shall depend - on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to - accept an assigned job, as well as leaving the place of work - without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in - the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. - - “The GBA”—that is, the office of the Defendant Sauckel—“in - agreement with the military commanders or the Reich - Commissioners, will issue the appropriate directives.” - -The forced enrollment of foreign workers was preceded by preliminary -measures to which the order of 8 September 1942 refers—which I have -just read. I am speaking of the freezing of labor. To carry out the -mobilization of workers it was necessary for the public services to -exercise strict control over their use in the industrial enterprises of -occupied territories. This control had a double purpose: It was to -facilitate the census of workers suitable for work in Germany and to -prevent workers from avoiding the German requisition by alleging a real -or fictitious employment. The National Socialist authorities exercised -this control by restricting the liberty of hiring and discharging, which -they had given to the authorities of the labor bureaus. - -In France, the freezing of labor was brought about by the law of 4 -September 1942. I shall shortly explain to the Tribunal the conditions -under which this law was formulated. I shall, for the moment, simply -submit it to the Tribunal under Document Number RF-56 and ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. - -In Belgium, the freezing of labor was carried out by the ordinance of -the military commanding officer of 6 October 1942. I submit Document -Number RF-57, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. - -Finally, in Holland, where compulsory labor was instituted as early as -1941, an ordinance of the Reich Commissioner, dated 28 February 1941, -which I offer to the Tribunal under Document Number RF-58, organized the -freezing of labor. - -The immobilization of labor was brought about under an economic pretext -in all countries. In reality it constituted a preliminary measure for -the mobilization of workers, which the National Socialists immediately -proceeded to carry out. - -In France compulsory labor was established by the legislation of the -pseudo-government of Vichy, but this legislation was imposed upon the -_de facto_ French authorities by the defendants, and especially by -Sauckel. The action which Sauckel brought against the Government of -Vichy, to force it to favor the deportation of workers into Germany, was -exercised in four phases: I shall briefly review for the Tribunal the -history of these four Sauckel actions. - -The first Sauckel action was initiated in the spring of 1942, soon after -the appointment of the defendant as Plenipotentiary for Allocation of -Labor. The German armament industry had an urgent need of workers. The -service of the Arbeitseinsatz had decided to recruit 150,000 skilled -workers in France. Sauckel came to Paris in the month of June 1942. He -had several conversations with French ministers. Otto Abetz, German -ambassador in Paris, presided over these meetings. They brought about, -the following results: - -In view of the reluctance of French authorities to establish compulsory -labor, it was decided that the recruiting of 150,000 skilled workers -should be carried out by a pseudo-voluntary enrollment. This was the -beginning of the so-called exchange operation, to which I have already -drawn the attention of the Tribunal. - -But the Tribunal knows that the exchange operation was a failure and -that, despite an intensification of German propaganda, the number of -voluntary enrollments remained at a minimum. The German authorities then -put the Vichy Government under the necessity of proceeding to forced -enrollment. I offer in evidence the denunciatory letter of 26 August -1942, addressed by the German, Dr. Michel, Chief of the Administrative -Staff, to the Delegate General for Franco-German economic relations. -This is French Document F-530, which I shall submit to the Tribunal as -Exhibit Number RF-59: - - “Paris, 26 August 1942. - - “Military Commander in France, economic section; to M. Barnaud, - Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations; Paris. - - “President Laval promised Gauleiter Sauckel, Plenipotentiary - General for Allocation of Labor, to make every effort to send to - Germany, to help German armament economy, 350,000 workers, of - which 150,000 should be metal workers. - - “The French Government intended at first to solve this problem - by recruitment, especially of the _affectés spéciaux_. This - method has been abandoned and that of voluntary enrollment has - been attempted with a view to the liberation of prisoners. The - past months have shown that the end in view cannot be achieved - by means of voluntary recruitment. - - “In France, German armament orders have increased in volume and - urgency. Moreover, special tasks have been set, the - accomplishment of which depends upon the supply of a very - considerable number of workers. - - “In order to assure the realization of the tasks for which - France is responsible in the sphere of the Arbeitseinsatz, the - French Government must now be asked to put into execution the - following measures: - - “1) The publication of a decree, concerning change of place of - work. By virtue of this decree, leaving the place of employment - and engaging labor depends on the approval of certain specified - authorities. - - “2) The institution of compulsory registration of all persons - out of work, as well as of those who do not work full-time or - are not permanently employed. This compulsory registration is to - ensure the fullest recruitment possible of all the reserves - still available. - - “3) The publication of a decree for the mobilization of workers - for tasks important to the policy of state. This decree is to - ensure: (a) The necessary labor for Germany; (b) the workers - necessary in France for the carrying out of orders which have - been transferred there and the workers needed for special tasks. - - “4) Publication of a decree ensuring an adequate supply of - apprentices. This decree is to impose upon French enterprise the - duty of turning out, by means of apprenticeship and systematic - training, young workers possessing adequate qualifications. - - “For the Military Commander, the Chief of the Administrative - Staff.”—signed—“Dr. Michel.” - -Dr. Michel’s letter forms the basis for the law relative to the -utilization and the allocation of labor. It is the law of 4 September -1942, which I have submitted to the Tribunal under Document Number -RF-56. - -In application of the law, all Frenchmen between 18 and 50 who did not -have employment for more than 30 hours a week, were forced to state this -at their local town hall. A decree of 19 September 1942 and a directive -of 22 September provided regulations as to how this declaration had to -be made. - -Sauckel’s first action was achieved through a legislative plan; the -defendant had merely to dip into the labor resources which were -established by it. But the resistance of the French workers caused his -recruiting plan to fail. This is why Sauckel undertook his second -action, beginning in January 1943. - -The second Sauckel action is marked by the introduction of compulsory -labor, properly speaking. Until then workers had been the only victims -of the policy of force of the defendants. The latter understood the -demagogic argument which they could derive from this _de facto_ -situation. They explained that it was inadmissible that the working -classes of the occupied territory should be the only ones to participate -in the German war effort. They demanded that the basis of forced labor -be enlarged by the introduction of compulsory labor. - -This was established by two measures. A directive of 2 February 1943 -prescribed a general census of all French males born between 1 January -1912 and 1 January 1921. The census took place between 15 and 23 -February. It had just been put in force when the law and decree of 16 -February 1943 appeared. These regulations introduced compulsory labor -for all young men born between 1 January 1920 and 31 December 1922. I -submit them to the Tribunal under Documents Numbers RF-60 and 61, of -which I ask the Court to take judicial notice. - -The action carried out by the defendants to impose this exceptional -legislation is substantiated by numerous documents. I particularly draw -the attention of the Tribunal to four of these, which permit us to -retrace the activities of the Defendant Sauckel during the months of -January and February 1943. On 5 January 1943 Sauckel transmitted to the -different departments of his administration an order of the Führer, -which the Defendant Speer had communicated to him. This is Document -556(13)-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-62. I -shall read its first paragraph: - - “On 4 January 1943, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Minister Speer - telephoned from the general headquarters of the Führer giving - the information that, by virtue of a decision of the Führer, it - was no longer necessary, when recruiting skilled and unskilled - labor in France, to have any particular regard for the French. - Recruitment could be carried on there with pressure and more - severe measures.” - -On 11 January 1943 the Defendant Sauckel was in Paris. He attended a -meeting which brought together at the Military Commander’s all -responsible officials of the labor service. He announced to them that -new measures of compulsion were to be taken in France. I refer you to -the minutes of the meeting which constitute Document 1342-PS, which I -submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-63. I shall read from -Page 2 of the French translation; Page 1, fourth line, of the second -paragraph of the German original: - - “Gauleiter Sauckel likewise thanks the various services for the - successful carrying out of the first action. Immediately after - the beginning of the new year, he is obliged to announce further - severe measures. There is a great new need of labor for the - front as well as for the Reich armament industry.” - -I skip to the end of the paragraph. I shall read from the next -paragraph: - - “The situation at the front calls for 700,000 soldiers fit for - front-line service. The armament industry would have to lose - 200,000 key workers by the middle of March. I have received an - order from the Führer to find 200,000 foreign skilled workers as - replacements and I shall need for this purpose 150,000 French - skilled workmen, while the other 50,000 can be drawn from - Holland, Belgium, and other occupied countries. In addition, - 100,000 unskilled French workers are necessary for the Reich. - The second action of recruitment in France makes it necessary - that by the middle of March 150,000 skilled workers and 100,000 - unskilled workmen and women be transferred to Germany.” - -The Defendant Sauckel went back to Germany a few days later. On 16 -February he was in Berlin at the meeting of the Central Planning Board. -He gave a commentary on the law which was to appear that very day and -revealed that he was the instigator of it. I refer once more to the -minutes of the conferences of the Four Year Plan, included under -Document Number R-124, which I submitted this morning to the Tribunal -under Exhibit Number RF-30. I shall read an extract from this document, -which my American colleagues have not mentioned. It is Page 7 of the -French translation of the document, Page 2284 of the German original; -this is the situation in France: - - “My collaborators and I having succeeded, after difficult - discussions, in persuading Laval to introduce the law of - compulsory labor in France, this law has now been so - successfully extended, thanks to our pressure, that by yesterday - three French age-groups had already been called up. So we are - now legally qualified to recruit in France, with the assistance - of the French Government, workers of three age-groups whom we - shall be able to employ henceforth in French factories, but - among whom we shall also be able to choose some for our own - needs in the Reich and send them to Germany.” - -The Defendant Sauckel returned to France on 24 February. I offer in -evidence to the Tribunal the letter which he addressed to Hitler before -his departure, to inform him of his journey. It proves the continuity of -the action of Sauckel. The letter constitutes Document 556(25)-PS, which -I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-64, and I shall read -it: - - “Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, to the Führer; - general headquarters of the Führer. - - “My Führer: - - “I beg herewith to take leave of you before my intended journey - to France. The purpose of my journey is: - - “1) To put at the disposal of the Reich, within the given time, - skilled labor to replace German key workers being drafted into - the Wehrmacht. May I add that Field Marshal Keitel and General - Von Unruh received a communication from me yesterday to the - effect that half of these replacements for key men, that is - 125,000 French qualified skilled men, have already arrived in - the Reich on 1 January 1943 and that a corresponding number of - soldiers can be called to the colors. I shall now make sure in - France that the second half shall arrive in the Reich by the end - of March, or earlier if possible. The first French program was - executed by the end of December. - - “2) To assure the necessary labor for the French dockyards for - the carrying out of the programs drawn up by Grand Admiral - Dönitz and Gauleiter Kaufmann. - - “3) To assure the necessary labor for the programs of the - Luftwaffe. - - “4) To assure the necessary labor for the other German armament - programs which are in progress in France. - - “5) To make available supplementary labor in agreement with - State Secretary Backe, with a view to intensifying French - agricultural production. - - “6) To have discussions, if necessary, with the French - Government on the subject of the carrying out of the labor - service, the calling up of age-groups, and so forth, with a view - to activating the recruitment of labor for the benefit of the - German war economy.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a good time to break off. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 19 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-EIGHTH DAY - Saturday, 19 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, Your Honors, at the end of yesterday’s session -I was expounding to the Tribunal the conditions under which the -compulsory labor service was progressively imposed in France. I reached -the second action of the Defendant Sauckel as set out in the laws and -decrees of 16 February 1943. Sauckel’s second action accelerated the -enforced enrollment of Frenchmen during the months of February and March -1943. Several tens of thousands of young men of the 1940 and 1942 -classes were deported to Germany by the application of the law of 16 -February. The tempo of these deportations slowed down in the month of -April, but the Arbeitseinsatz immediately formulated new requirements. -On 9 April 1943 the Defendant Sauckel asked the French authorities to -furnish him with 120,000 workers during the month of May and 100,000 -during the month of June. In June he made it known that he wished to -effect the transfer of 500,000 workers up to 31 December. - -Sauckel’s third action was about to begin. It was to be marked, on 3 -June 1943, by the total mobilization of the 1942 class. All exemptions -provided by the law of 16 February and subsequent texts were withdrawn, -and the young men of the 1942 class were tracked down throughout France. - -In reality, Sauckel’s third action was especially manifested by a -violent pressure on the part of the defendant, tending towards a mass -deportation by forced recruiting. I offer in evidence three documents -which testify to the action taken by Sauckel in the summer of 1943. - -The first document is a letter from Sauckel to Hitler, dated 27 June -1943. Drafted by the defendant upon his return from a trip to France, it -contains an outlined plan for the recruiting of French workers for the -second half of 1943. Its object was, on the one hand, to secure 1 -million workers to be assigned in France to French armament factories -and, on the other hand, 500,000 French workers to be deported to -Germany. This letter constitutes Document 556(39)-PS, which I submit to -the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-65. I quote: - - “Weimar, 27 June 1943. - - “My Führer: - - “Herewith I beg to report my return from my official trip to - France. - - “Inasmuch as the free labor reserves in the territories occupied - by the German Armed Forces have been, numerically, absorbed to - saturation point, I am now carefully examining the possibilities - of mobilizing additional labor reserves in the Reich and the - occupied territories to work on German war production. - - “In my reports of 20 April I was allowed to point out that - intensive and careful utilization must be made of European labor - forces in territories submitted to direct German influence. - - “It was the purpose of my recent stay in Paris to investigate - the possibilities still existing in France for the recruitment - of labor by extensive conferences and my own personal - inspection. On the basis of a carefully established balance - sheet I have come to the following decision: - - “1. Assuming that war economy measures are carried out in France - which would at least prove partially effective or approximately - approach, in efficacy, the measures carried out in Germany, a - further million workers, both men and women, could be assigned - to the French war and armament industries up to December 1943 - for work on German orders and assignments. In this case - additional German orders might be placed in France. - - “2. In consideration of these measures and given a careful study - of the subject together with the co-operation of our German - armament services and the German labor recruiting offices, it - should be possible to transfer a further 500,000 workers, both - men and women, from France to the Reich between now and the end - of the year. - - “The prerequisites for the realization of this program, drafted - by me are as follows: - - “1. Closest collaboration between all German offices especially - in dealing with the French services. - - “2. A constant check on French economy by joint commissions, as - already agreed upon by the Reich Minister of Armaments and War - Production Party Member Speer, and myself. - - “3. Constant, skillful, and successful propaganda against the - cliques of De Gaulle and Giraud. - - “4. The guarantee of adequate food supplies to the French - population working for Germany. - - “5. An emphatic insistence on this urgency before the French - Government, in particular before Marshal Pétain, who still - represents the main obstacle to the further recruiting of French - women for compulsory labor. - - “6. A pronounced increase in the program which I have already - introduced in France, for retraining workers to trades essential - to war production.” - -I skip the next and read the last paragraph: - - “I therefore beg you, my Führer, to approve my suggestion of - making available 1 million French men and women for German war - production in France proper in the second half of 1943 and, in - addition, of transferring 500,000 French men and women to the - Reich before the end of the current year. - - “Yours faithfully and obediently,”—Signed—“Fritz Sauckel.” - -The document to which I would now like to call the Tribunal’s attention -proves that the Führer gave his approval to Sauckel’s program. A note -drawn up on 28 July 1943 by Dr. Stothfang, under the letterhead of the -Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor (Arbeitseinsatz), gives -a report on a discussion between Sauckel and the Führer. It is Document -556(41)-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-66. I -shall limit myself to reading the last paragraph: - - “d) The transfer envisaged for the end of the year of 1 million - French workers to the war industries in France, and the intended - transportation of 500,000 other French workers to the interior - of the Reich has been approved by the Führer.” - -Finally a document establishes that the Defendant Sauckel, on the -strength of Hitler’s approval, attempted to realize his program by -working on the French authorities. This document is a letter from -Sauckel to Hitler. It is dated 13 August 1943, upon the defendant’s -return from a trip to France, Belgium, and Holland. It is Document -556(43)-PS. I shall read it to the Tribunal. It is Exhibit Number RF-67: - - “Weimar, 13 August 1943. - - “My Führer: - - “I beg to report my return from my official trip to France, - Belgium and Holland. In tough, difficult, and tedious - negotiations I have imposed upon the occupied Western - territories, for the last 5 months of 1943, the program set - forth below and have prepared very detailed measures for - realizing it: In France—with the military commander, the German - Embassy, and the French Government; in Belgium—with the - military commander; and in Holland with the offices of the Reich - Commissioner. - - “The program provides: - - “1. In France the transfer of 1 million French workers, both men - and women, from the civilian to the German war industries in - France. This measure will enable further considerable placing of - German orders in France. - - “2. Soliciting and recruiting of 500,000 French workers for work - in Germany. This figure should not be made known publicly. - - “3. In order to stalemate any passive resistance from large - groups of French officials, I have ordered, in agreement with - the military commander in France, the introduction of labor - recruiting commissions for each two French departments and - placed them under the supervision and direction of the German - Gau offices. Only in this manner can the complete recruitment of - the French labor potential and its intensive utilization be made - possible. The French Government has given its approval.” - -If the Tribunal will allow me, I shall quote the rest of this letter; -the following paragraphs concern Belgium and Holland. It will allow me -to refer to this document later without reading it again: - - “4. A program was secured in Belgium for the employment of - 150,000 workers in the Reich and, with the approval of the - military commander in Belgium, an organization for compulsory - labor corresponding to that in France was decided upon.” - -I skip and proceed to the fifth paragraph: - - “5. A program has likewise been prepared for Holland, providing - for the transfer of 150,000 workers to Germany and of 100,000 - workers, men and women, from Dutch civilian industries to German - war production.” - -Such was Sauckel’s program in 1943. His plan was partly thwarted by the -resistance of officials and patriotic workers. Proof of this is -furnished by an admission of the defendant. I am referring to the report -on a conference of the central office for the Four Year Plan held on 1 -March 1944. I submitted this document to the Tribunal yesterday as -Exhibit Number RF-30 (Document R-124). I shall read from the first page -of the French translation, second paragraph, German text, Page 1768: - - “Last autumn, as far as foreign manpower is concerned, the labor - recruiting program has been severely battered. I do not wish to - elaborate on the reasons here. They have been discussed at - length; all I have to say is: The program has been wrecked.” - -Sauckel, however, was not discouraged by the difficulties encountered in -1943. In 1944 he attempted to realize a new program by the trick of his -fourth action. - -The National Socialist authorities decided to secure, in 1944, the -transfer of 4 million foreign workers to Germany. This decision was made -on 4 January 1944 during a conference at the headquarters of the Führer -and in his presence. The report on this conference constitutes Document -1292-PS. I submit it herewith to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-68, -and I read from Page 3 of the French translation, Page 6 of the German -original, last paragraph: - - “Final results of the conference: - - “1. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor shall - procure at least 4 million new workers from the occupied - territories.” - -The details concerning the contingents demanded from each occupied -territory must have been determined on 16 February 1944, during a -conference of the central office for the Four Year Plan. I submitted the -report of this session at the outset of my explanations, under Exhibit -Number RF-20. I am quoting the conclusions today. They will be found in -Document Number F-675, first page of the translation, third page of the -German original. - - “Results of the 53rd session of the Central Planning Board. - Labor recruiting in 1944. - - “1. About 500,000 new workers might be mobilized from German - home reserves by extraordinary efforts. . . .” - -I skip the rest. - - “2. Recruiting of Italian labor to the number of 1,500,000; of - these—1 million at the rate of 250,000 per month from January - to April and 500,000 from May to December; - - “3. Recruiting of 1 million French workers at equal monthly - rates from 1 February to 31 December 1944 (approximately 91,000 - per month); - - “4. Recruiting of 250,000 workers from Belgium; - - “5. Recruiting of 250,000 workers from the Netherlands.” - -I abstain from quoting since the other paragraphs concern the Eastern -European countries. - -The Tribunal has seen that France was called upon to furnish a large -contingent of workers. After the 15th of January, Sauckel went to Paris -to dictate his demands to the French authorities. - -The fourth Sauckel action consisted of two distinct measures: The -adoption of the procedure known as the combing of industries, and the -publication of the law of 1 February 1944, which widened the sphere of -application of compulsory labor. The system of combing the industries -led the labor administration to carry out direct recruiting in the -industrial enterprises. Mixed Franco-German commissions were set up in -each country. They determined the percentage of workers to be deported. -They proceeded to requisition and transfer them. - -The practice of combing the industries represents the realization of the -projects elaborated by Defendant Sauckel as early as 1943. In the -documents which I have read to the Tribunal Sauckel announced, in fact, -his intention of creating mixed labor commissions. - -The law of 1 February 1944 marked the culminating point of Sauckel’s -actions in the field of legislation. It extends the scope of application -of the law of 4 September 1942. As from February 1944 all men between -the ages of 16 and 60 and all women between the ages of 18 and 45 were -subject to compulsory labor. I submit to the Tribunal the law of 1 -February 1944 under Exhibit Number RF-69 (Document RF-69) with the -request judicial notice be taken of it. - -The proof of the pressure that Sauckel exerted on the French authorities -in order to impose on them the publication of this law is furnished by a -report of the defendant to Hitler. This report is dated 25 January 1944. -It was, therefore, drafted during the negotiations which characterized -the fourth Sauckel action. It constitutes Document 556(55)-PS, which I -submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-70. I shall read this -document: - - “My Führer: - - “On the 22d of January 1944 the French Government, together with - Marshal Pétain, accepted to a large degree my demands for - increasing the working week from 40 to 48 hours as well as for - extending the compulsory labor law in France and utilizing - French manpower in Germany. - - “The Marshal did not agree to the compulsory labor for French - women in the Reich; but he did agree to compulsory labor for - women inside France, limited to women between the ages of 26 and - 45. Women between 15 and 25 are to be employed only at their - place of residence. - - “Since this, nevertheless, represents appreciable progress in - comparison with the extremely difficult negotiations which I had - to conduct in Paris, I approved this law in order to save - further loss of time, on condition that the German demands were - energetically met and carried out. - - “The French Government has likewise accepted my demand that - French officials sabotaging the enforcement of the compulsory - labor law should be punished by severe penalties including the - death penalty. I have left no doubt that further and more rigid - measures will be adopted if the demands for the manpower - required are not fulfilled. - - “Your ever obedient and faithful, Fritz Sauckel.” - -I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the problem of compulsory labor -of women referred to in the two preceding documents. For a long time the -French authorities categorically opposed the introduction of female -labor. In return the Defendant Sauckel did not cease to exercise violent -pressure. - -On the 27th of June 1943, in a letter to Hitler, he suggested that an -energetic statement of German needs be made before the French -Government. I have already quoted this letter to the Tribunal, Exhibit -Number RF-65 (Document 556(39)-PS). I shall not revert to it, but I -emphasize the fact that the law of 1 February did not satisfy Sauckel -and did not in the least appease his demands at all. His dissatisfaction -and his determination to pursue his policy of compulsion become apparent -from a report of 26 April 1944, bearing his signature; that the report -has been forwarded is certified by Berk, one of his assistants. - -There actually were four reports submitted jointly under Document Number -1289-PS, Exhibit Number RF-71, and I quote from the second page: - - “1) France. The problem of women. - - “At the time of the promulgation of the French compulsory labor - law, the French authorities (Marshal Pétain in particular) have - urgently desired that women be exempted from performing - compulsory labor in Germany. In spite of serious objections the - G.B.A. approved of this exemption. The reservation was made, - however, that the approval was given on condition that the - contingents imposed were met; or else the G.B.A. would reserve - himself the right of taking further measures. Inasmuch as the - contingents are far from being met, the demand for extending the - compulsory labor service to women must also be addressed to the - French Government.” - -The fourth Sauckel action, therefore, was led in such a manner as to -utilize all of France’s manpower. The French resistance and the -development of the military operations hindered the execution of the -Sauckel plan. The defendant, in the meantime, had contemplated -extraordinary measures to be taken on the day the allied armies were to -land. I quote again Document 1289-PS, Exhibit Number RF-71; and I read -on Page 3: - - “Measures concerning compulsory labor in the case of invasion: - - “To some extent precautions already have been taken to evacuate - the population of those areas invaded and to protect valuable - manpower from being seized by our enemies. In view of the actual - situation of labor utilization in Germany, it is necessary to - induct efficient workers to the greatest extent possible into - efficacious employment within the Reich. Orders to this effect - on the part of the Wehrmacht are indispensable for carrying out - these measures. - - “The following text might be proposed for an order by the - Führer. . . .” - -I shall not read the text of the order proposed by Sauckel. - -The Allied victory, however, came so quickly that Sauckel did not have -the chance to realize fully his plan of mass deportation. All the same, -he started to carry it out, and deportations of workers went on up to -the day of liberation of the territory. Several hundred thousand French -workers were finally stationed in Germany as a result of the various -Sauckel actions. Will the Tribunal please bear this in mind. - -The compulsory labor service was introduced in Norway in the same manner -as in France. The defendants imposed upon the Norwegian authorities the -publication of a law instituting the compulsory registration of -Norwegian citizens, and prescribing their enrollment by force. I quote -in this respect the preliminary report on the crimes of Germany against -Norway, a report prepared by the Norwegian Government and submitted to -the Tribunal as Document Number UK-79. I now submit it as Exhibit Number -RF-72, and I quote from the first page, third paragraph: - - “The result of Sauckel’s order as to Norway was that on 3 - February 1943, a Quisling ‘law’ relating to compulsory - registration of Norwegian men and women for so-called ‘national - labor effort’ was promulgated. Terboven and Quisling openly - admitted that the law was promulgated in order that the - Norwegian people should use their manpower for the benefit of - the German war effort. In a speech on 2 February Terboven - stated, among other things, that he himself and the German Reich - stood behind this law; and he threatened to use force against - anyone who tried to prevent its execution.” - -In Belgium and in the Netherlands the German authorities used a direct -procedure. The compulsory labor service was organized by ordinances of -the occupying power. - -In Belgium these were ordinances of the military commander and in the -Netherlands ordinances of the Reich Commissioner. I remind the Tribunal -of the fact that the authority of the military commander in Belgium -extended to the north of France. - -An ordinance of 6 March 1942 established the principle of compulsory -labor in Belgium. It was published in the Belgian _Verordnungsblatt_ of -1942, Page 845. I submit it to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-73, -and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The ordinance of 6 -March excluded the possibility of forced deportation of workers to -Germany. However, such deportation was ordered by a decree of 6 October -1942, which was published in the Belgian _Verordnungsblatt_ of 1942, -Page 1060. I submitted it to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-57 in -the course of my explanations. - -These carryings-on in Belgium gave rise to interventions and protests by -leading Belgian personalities, among others the King of Belgium and -Cardinal Van Roay. - -The ordinances instituting compulsory labor in Belgium and the north of -France bore the signature of General Von Falkenhausen, but the latter -proclaimed his ordinance of 6 October on the order of Sauckel. I refer -once more to the testimony of General Von Falkenhausen, which I have -submitted to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-15. I ask your -permission to quote the following passages, first page, fifth paragraph: - - “Q: ‘On 6 October 1942 a decree was published which instituted - compulsory labor in Belgium and in the departments of northern - France for men between the ages of 18 and 50 years and for - single women from 21 to 25 years.’ - - “A: ‘I was Commander-in-Chief for northern France and Belgium.’ - - “Q: ‘Does the witness recall having promulgated this decree?’ - - “A: ‘I do not remember exactly the text of this decree because - it was issued following long arguments with the labor deputy - Sauckel.’ - - “Q: ‘Did you have any trouble with Sauckel?’ - - “A: ‘I was fundamentally opposed to the establishment of - compulsory labor, and consented to promulgating the decree only - after receiving orders.’ - - “Q: ‘Then this decree was not issued on the initiative of Von - Falkenhausen himself?’ - - “A: ‘On the contrary.’ - - “Q: ‘Who gave instruction in this matter?’ - - “A: ‘I suppose that at that time Sauckel was already responsible - for manpower and that at that time he gave me all instructions - on Hitler’s orders.’” - -I skip and take up the quotation again on Page 3 of the French -translation, fourth paragraph: - - “Q: ‘Since you were opposed to the idea of compulsory labor, - didn’t you protest when you received these instructions?’ - - “A: ‘There were unending quarrels between Sauckel and myself. In - the end this contributed greatly to my resignation.’” - -The violence of the pressure exerted by the Defendant Sauckel in Belgium -in order to impose his plan of recruitment by force is also demonstrated -by the document which I have just submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit -Number RF-67 (Document Number 556(43)-PS). The Tribunal will remember -that it is the report addressed on 13 August 1943 by Sauckel to Hitler -on his return from France, Belgium, and Holland. - -Finally, I have to deal with the introduction of compulsory labor in the -Netherlands. I request the Tribunal to charge the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart as well as the Defendant Sauckel with the institution of -compulsory enrollment in the occupied Dutch territories. - -As a matter of fact, the deportation of the Dutch workers was organized -by ordinances of the Reich Commissioner. They established all the more -the responsibility of the defendant, who in his quality as Reich -Commissioner, derived his powers directly from the Führer. - -The Defendant Seyss-Inquart introduced the compulsory labor service in -the Netherlands by an ordinance of 28 February 1941, published in the -Dutch _Verordnungsblatt_ of 1941, Number 42. I have referred to this -ordinance as Document Number RF-58 in the course of my explanation and -asked the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. - -As in Belgium the compulsory labor service could originally be enforced -in the interior of the occupied territories only; but just as in -Belgium, it was soon extended in order to permit the deportation of -workers to Germany. The extension was put into realization by an -ordinance of Seyss-Inquart of 23 March 1942, which appeared in Number 26 -of the _Verordnungsblatt_, 1942. I submit it to the Tribunal as Document -Number RF-74, and I ask the Tribunal to add it to the Record. - -The Defendant Seyss-Inquart has thus paved the way on which the -Defendant Sauckel was to be enabled to proceed to action. Sauckel -actually utilized all the human potential of the Netherlands. New -measures were soon necessary—measures which Seyss-Inquart adopted. - -An ordinance dated 6 May 1943, _Verordnungsblatt_, 1943, Page 173, -ordered the mobilization of all men from 18 to 35 years of age. I submit -this decree to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-75. - -Moreover, as soon as 19 February 1943 Seyss-Inquart had issued a -regulation which permitted his services to take all measures in the -utilization of labor which they considered to be opportune. - -This ordinance, which appeared in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of 1943, is -submitted to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-76. - -The extent of deportation from Holland in 1943 is attested to by a -letter of 16 June 1943 from Sauckel’s representative in the Netherlands. -This letter, which bears French Document Number F-664, is submitted to -the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-77. I quote: - - “In conformity with the census decree of 7 May 1943, the 1920 to - 1924 classes have been registered on filing cards. Although this - involved very much work it was nevertheless possible to send - 22,986 workers to the Reich, and in addition the prisoners of - war put at our disposal. During the month of June the deficiency - of the month of May will be made up. - - “These classes include, according to the Statistical Service of - the Kingdom of Holland, 80,000 each. It is from these classes - that transfers to the Reich have been made so far. Up to 1 June - 1943, 446,493 persons have been transferred to the Reich and a - number of them have returned from there. The figures as per - index are as follows: 1921 class, 43,331; 1922 class, 45,354; - 1923 class, 47,593; 1924 class, 45,232. - - “As up to 80 percent have been deferred, it is now imperative to - begin transporting entire classes to the Reich. The Reich - Commissioner has given his agreement to this action. The other - authorities involved—of economy, armament, agriculture, and the - Armed Forces—pressed by necessity, have given their approval.” - -At the end of the year 1944, the German authorities increased their -pressure on the Netherlands. During that period tens of thousands of -persons were arrested within 2 days in Rotterdam. Systematic raids took -place in all the larger cities of Holland, sometimes improvised, -sometimes after the population had been publicly summoned to appear in -designated places. I submit to the Tribunal various proclamations of -this kind. They form Document 1162-PS and have already been submitted to -the Tribunal by Mr. Dodd. I shall not read them again. I use them in -support of my argument and submit them as Exhibit Number RF-78. - -These documents do not reveal isolated facts; they show a systematic -policy which the defendants were to pursue up to 5 May 1945, when the -capitulation of Germany brought liberation to the Netherlands. - -I still owe the Tribunal a supplementary explanation. The defendants did -not stop at introducing compulsory labor service in the occupied -territories. I have said that they proceeded to criminal coercion in -order to ensure that the mobilization of foreign workers was carried -out. I am going to prove this fact. - -The measures taken by the National Socialist authorities to guarantee -the forced enlistment of foreign workers cannot be disassociated from -the procedures they applied to ensure the so-called voluntary -enlistment. The pressure was more violent, but it sprang from the same -spirit. The method was to deceive, and where this proved unsuccessful to -use coercion. The defendants very soon realized that no kind of -propaganda would lend the cloak of justice to compulsory labor in the -eyes of their victims. If they had any doubts in this respect, these -would have been dissipated by the reports of the occupation authorities. -The latter were unanimous in their reports of the political trouble -provoked by this compulsory enlistment and of the resistance encountered -by it. That is why the defendants once again used force in their attempt -to ensure that the civilian mobilization decreed by them was carried -out. - -First in line among the coercive measures to which the Germans took -recourse, I mention the withholding of the ration cards of the -recalcitrants. The Tribunal knows from the circular letter of Dr. -Mansfeld, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-26 (Document 1183-PS), that -this measure had been proposed ever since January 1942, and will recall -that by decree of the Führer of 8 September 1942, which I submitted as -Exhibit Number RF-55 (Document 556(2)-PS), this measure was put into -effect. This order provided that food and clothing ration cards were not -to be issued to persons incapable of proving that they were working, nor -to those who refused to do compulsory work. - -Hitler’s order was put into effect in all occupied territories. In -France circulars imposing decrees by the occupation authorities -prohibited the renewal of ration cards of those French people who had -eluded the census of 16 February 1943. In Belgium the forfeiture of -ration certificates was regulated by an order of the military commander. -It is the order of 5 March 1943, published in the _Verordnungsblatt_ for -Belgium, which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-79. - -General Von Falkenhausen, the signatory of this order, admitted its -grave significance during the interrogation, which I have submitted to -the Tribunal under Document Number RF-15 and to which I refer again. -General Von Falkenhausen declared that the Defendant Sauckel was the -originator of this order and that he had refused to grant an amnesty -proposed by his services. I quote, Page 4 of the French translation, -fifth paragraph: - - “Q: ‘Does the witness remember an order of 5 March 1943, by - which those refusing to enter the compulsory labor service had - their ration cards withdrawn?’ - - “A: ‘I do not remember. At the time when the order was issued - for men from 18 to 50 years old the implementing orders were not - given by myself but by my offices, and I am not conversant with - the details of the application of reprisals. I was not the - executive head of the administration. I was above it.’ - - “Q: ‘But at that time you were informed of the means of pressure - and manner of treatment which the authorities thought fit to - employ?’ - - “A: ‘I do not wish to deny my responsibility for all that - happened. After all, I was aware of many things. I remember in - particular the order regarding ration cards, because on various - occasions I proposed that an amnesty be declared for persons who - were obliged to live illegally and who did not have a ration - card.’ - - “Q: ‘To whom was this proposal made?’ - - “A: ‘To Sauckel, with the consent of President Revert.’ - - “Q: ‘What was the attitude taken by Sauckel at that time?’ - - “A: ‘He refused to grant such an amnesty.’” - -In Holland, likewise, the renewal of ration certificates which did not -bear the stamp of the labor office was prohibited. - -The defendants, however, used a method of coercion even more criminal -than the forfeiture of ration cards. I refer to the persecution directed -against the families of those who refused to do compulsory labor. I call -this method criminal, because it is based on the concept of family -responsibility which is contrary to the fundamental principles of the -penal law of civilized nations. It was, nevertheless, sanctioned by -several legislative texts issued or imposed by the National Socialists. - -In France, I quote the law of 11 June 1943, which I submit to the -Tribunal as Document Number RF-80 with the request that it take judicial -notice thereof. - -In Belgium, I refer to the order of the military commander of 30 April -1943, which appeared in the _Verordnungsblatt_ for Belgium of 6 May -1943, and particularly to Paragraphs 8 and 9. I submit this order to the -Tribunal as Document Number RF-81, with the request that it take -judicial notice thereof. - -Judicial action by the defendants was likewise directed against the -employers and against the officials of the employment bureaus. In France -the action was initiated by two laws of 1 February 1944. I emphasize -that these laws were issued on the same day as the compulsory labor law, -and I affirm that they were imposed at the same time. In support of my -statement, I submit the admission of the Defendant Sauckel, in his -letter of 25 January 1944, which I read a while ago to the Tribunal -under Exhibit Number RF-70 (Document 556(55)-PS). I submit to the -Tribunal the laws of 1 February 1944 as Document Number RF-82 with the -request that it be added to the Record. - -There were still other measures of coercion. One of these, for instance, -was the closing of the faculties and schools to defaulting students. It -was decreed in Belgium on 28 June 1943; in France, on 15 July 1943. In -Holland the students were victims of a systematic deportation in -February and March 1943. I quote in this connection a letter of 4 May -1943, which brings proof of the action carried out through Holland -towards a systematic deportation. This is Document F-665, which I submit -as Exhibit Number RF-83 of my book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this is a good time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, Your Honors, at the suspension of the session -I was about to read to the Tribunal the letter of 4 May 1943, which -gives evidence of the action taken in Holland towards a systematic -deportation of the students. I quote: - - “Subject: Action against students. - - “The action will start on Thursday morning. As it is now too - late to have this published in the press today, an announcement - by the Higher SS and Police Leader will be made over the radio - beginning tomorrow at 7 o’clock; it will be published tomorrow - in the morning and the evening papers. Besides that, we will - follow the directives given in yesterday’s telegram.” - -Following is the text of the proclamation: - - “Ordinance on the registration of students.” - -I will skip the first paragraph and I quote: - - “1. All persons of the male sex who have attended a Dutch - university or academy during the years 1942-43 and have not yet - finished their studies according to the curriculum—referred to - below as ‘students’—are to report between 1000 and 1500 on 6 - May 1943 to the commander of the sector of the SS and the - Security Police competent for their respective residence for the - purpose of their induction into the compulsory labor service.” - -I now skip Paragraphs 2 and 3 and quote: - - “4. (1) Persons violating this ordinance or trying to circumvent - it, particularly such persons who do not comply with their duty - to register or either intentionally or through negligence state - any false data will be punished by imprisonment and/or unlimited - fine, unless other laws providing a more severe penalty are - applicable. . . . - - “(4) Those exercising paternal authority or guardianship over - the students are co-responsible for their reporting as - prescribed. They are subjected to the same penalties as the - offenders themselves. - - “5. This ordinance becomes effective on promulgation.” - - Signed—“The Higher SS and Police Leader with the Reich - Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories.” - -Since no measures whatsoever succeeded in intimidating the workers in -the occupied territories, the defendants finally resorted to their -police forces to ensure the arrest of those workers destined for -deportation to Germany. This intervention by the police had been -demanded by the Defendant Sauckel. - -I submit two documents in evidence. The first consisted of the minutes -of a conference which took place on 4 January 1944 at the headquarters -of the Führer. I have just submitted this document to the Tribunal as -Exhibit Number RF-68 (Document 1292-PS). I quote, French translation, -Page 2, last paragraph; German original, middle of Page 4: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor (GBA) - Sauckel, declared that he would try with fanatical determination - to obtain this manpower. Up to now he had always kept his - promises regarding the number of workers to be provided; with - the best will in the world, however, he was not in a position to - make a definite promise for 1944. He would do anything possible - to provide the manpower required for 1944. The success would - depend mainly on the number of German police put at his - disposal. If he had to rely on the indigenous police his project - could not be carried out.” - -I refer now to the statements made by Sauckel at the conference of the -central office for the Four Year Plan on 1 March 1944. It is Exhibit -Number RF-30 (Document R-124), to which I repeatedly have called the -attention of the Tribunal. The passage which I am about to quote has not -yet been referred to before the Tribunal. Page 3 of the French -translation, German text, from Page 1775 on: - - “The term ‘S-factory’”—S-Betrieb—“in France is actually - nothing else but a protection against Sauckel’s grasp. That is - how the French look at it, and they certainly cannot be expected - to think differently. They are Frenchmen in the first place, who - are faced with a German point of view and German actions - different from theirs. It is not up to me to decide whether the - protected factories (Schutzbetriebe) are useful and necessary. I - have described the situation only from my point of view. - Nevertheless, I still hope to succeed eventually by using my old - organization of agents on the one hand and, on the other hand, - by those measures which I have fortunately been able to wrest - from the French Government. - - “In the course of negotiations lasting 5 to 6 hours I wrested - from M. Laval the concession that the death sentence may be - imposed on officials who sabotage the recruitment of labor and - other measures. Believe me, it was very difficult. I had to - fight hard to succeed, but I did succeed. And I am requesting, - especially of the Armed Forces that, in case the French - Government does not really put its mind to it, most drastic - action be taken now by the Germans in France. Please do not - resent my following remark: Several times, when in company of my - assistants, I have faced situations in France which caused me to - ask, ‘Is there no respect in France for the German lieutenant - and his 10 men?’ For months on end everything I said was - paralyzed by the reply, ‘What do you want, Mr. Gauleiter? Don’t - you know that we have no police forces at our disposal? We are - powerless in France.’ - - “This was the reply given over and over again. How, in the face - of these facts, am I to achieve labor recruitment in France? The - German authorities must co-operate; and if the French, despite - all their promises, do not remedy the situation, we Germans must - make an example of one case and, on the provisions of this law, - put some prefect or mayor against the wall if he does not - co-operate, else not a single Frenchman will go to Germany.” - -By such means the deportation of workers to Germany finally was -achieved, by arresting them, and by the threat of reprisals. It was a -logical consequence of the National Socialist system that the policy of -recruiting foreign workers was accomplished by police terror. - -I have told the Tribunal that the resistance offered by the prisoners of -war and by the workers of the occupied territories against the -activities of the defendants, which were in turn insidious and brutal, -wrecked the plan for the recruitment of foreign workers. The Defendant -Sauckel encountered the greatest difficulty in carrying out the programs -which he had persuaded Hitler and the Defendants Göring, Speer, and Funk -to accept. - -From this it does not follow that Nazi Germany did not succeed in -carrying out mass deportations of foreign workers. The number of native -workers from the occupied territories of Western Europe who were -deported into Germany is very high. More numerous still were those -workers compelled to work at home in factories and workyards under the -control of the occupation authorities. - -I shall give the Tribunal statistical information which will enable it -to verify my statements. These statistics are fragmentary. They are -excerpts from reports compiled by the governments of the occupied -countries after their liberation and from reports sent during the war by -the Arbeitseinsatz office to its superiors. - -The statistics of Allied origin are incomplete. The records on which -they are based have been partially destroyed. On the other hand, the -administrations of the occupied territories are in possession of -second-hand information only whenever the requisitions of workers were -made directly by the occupation authorities. As to the German -statistics, they are also incomplete since the Allied authorities have -not yet discovered all the records of the enemy. - -It is, however, possible to give to the Tribunal an exact evaluation of -the extent of the deportations effected by Germany. This evaluation will -furnish proof that the violations of international law committed by the -defendants did not remain in the tentative stage characterized by a -beginning only—though reprehensible as such; they brought about social -disorder such as, under penal law, constitutes the perpetration of the -crime. - -I shall first submit to the Tribunal the statistics furnished by the -official reports of the French Government. The French Government’s -report has been published by the Institute of Market Analysis. It -contains numerous statistical tables from which I quote the total -figures. The figures are as follows: 738,000 workers were pressed into -compulsory labor service in France; 875,952 French workers were deported -to German factories; 987,687 prisoners of war were utilized for the -Reich war economy. A total of 2,601,639 workers of French citizenship -thus were pressed into work serving the war effort of National Socialist -Germany. - -From the official report of the Belgian Government it appears that -150,000 persons were pressed into compulsory labor; and the report of -the Dutch Government gives a figure of 431,400 persons; but it should be -noted that this figure does not take into account the systematic raids -undertaken during November 1944, nor the deportations carried out in -1945. - -I am submitting to the Tribunal exact figures which cover all the stages -of the policy of recruiting foreign labor. These figures are taken from -the reports of the Defendant Sauckel himself or of various -administrative offices concerned with the deportation of labor. The -extent of labor utilized in the occupied territories is demonstrated by -the statistics concerning workers who were used in constructing -fortifications of the so-called Atlantic Wall as part of the -Organization Todt, which I recall was directed by the Defendant Speer -after the death of its founder. These statistics are to be found in a -teletype message sent to Hitler by the Defendant Sauckel on 17 May 1943. -It is Document 556(33)-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit -Number RF-84. I quote: - - “The Delegate for the Four Year Plan. The Plenipotentiary - General for Allocation of Labor, Berlin, to the Führer, - headquarters of the Führer. - - “My Führer! I beg to submit to you the following figures on the - manpower employed in the Todt Organization: - - “In addition to the manpower assigned to the entire German - industry by the Allocation of Labor since I took office, fresh - workers have also been constantly supplied to the Todt - Organization. The total figure of the workers employed by the - Todt Organization was as follows: End of March 1942, 270,969; - end of March 1943, 696,003. - - “It should be noted that the Allocation of Labor has with great - speed and energy assigned workers preferably to the Todt - Organization in the West for the purpose of completing the work - on the Atlantic Wall. This is all the more remarkable because in - France, Belgium, and Holland. . . .” - -I skip a few lines and quote from Page 2: - - “Despite the difficulties involved, the manpower strength of the - Todt Organization in the West was increased from 66,701 workers - at the end of March 1942 to 248,200 workers at the end of March - 1943.” - -The number of foreign workers deported to Germany by 30 September 1941 -is furnished by a report which was found in the archives of the OKW. It -is Document 1323-PS, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-85. According -to this document, 1,228,686 foreign workers were employed in Germany on -30 September 1941. Of that number 483,842 came from the occupied Western -territories. I quote from this document the number of labor deportees by -country of origin. I shall confine myself to the columns of interest to -the Western states, since the statistics of workers deported from the -East of Europe come within the province of my Soviet colleagues: - - “Denmark, 63,309; Holland, 134,093; Belgium, 212,903; France, - 72,475; Italy, 238,557.” - -Finally, on 7 July 1944, Sauckel, in one of his last reports, informed -the National Socialist Government of the results of his campaign during -the first half of 1944. I quote the document, which bears the Number -208-PS and which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-86. I -read from the second page: - - “C. The foreigners came from. . . . France except the north, - 33,000; Belgium, including the north of France, 16,000; - Netherlands, 15,000; Italy, 37,000.” - -This is the fresh manpower put at the disposal of German industry during -the period of 1 January to 30 June 1944. - -I have furnished the proof I owed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal will, -moreover, remember Sauckel’s admission at the 58th conference of the -Four Year Plan, which I have read to you previously. Sauckel admitted -that there were 5 million foreign workers in Germany, of whom 200,000 -were actually volunteers. - -The materiality of the crime exposed is at the same time established by -the circumstances of its perpetration and by the multitude of the -victims affected. To prove the gravity of its effect, I have but to -recall the treatment to which foreign workers were subjected in Germany. - -German propaganda always claimed that foreign workers deported to -Germany were treated on equal basis with German workers: the same living -conditions, the same labor contracts, and the same discipline. This -contention, as such, is not conclusive. My American colleagues have -furnished proof of the blows which the National Socialist conspirators -have dealt to the dignity and decency of the life of the German worker. -The reality is worse yet. Foreign workers did not enjoy the treatment in -Germany to which they were entitled as human beings. I affirm this and I -will prove it to the Tribunal. - -But before going into that I wish to call the Tribunal’s attention to -the significance of the new crime which I am denouncing. It does not -only make the crime of deportation complete but provides its true -meaning also. I said that the policy of the defendants in the occupied -territories could be summed up as follows: - -Utilization of the productive forces and extermination of the -unproductive forces. This is the principle representing one of the -favorite concepts of National Socialism, on the basis of which the -treatment inflicted on foreign workers by the defendants should be -judged. The Germans have exploited the human potential of the occupied -countries to the extreme limit of the strength of the individuals -concerned. They showed some consideration for foreign workers only -insofar as they wished to increase their output. But as soon as their -capacity for work decreased, the foreign workers shared the common lot -of deportees. - -I shall prove my argument by expounding to the Tribunal the working and -living conditions and rules of discipline which were imposed on foreign -workers deported to Germany. - -I request the Tribunal to charge the Defendant Sauckel with the facts I -am going to denounce. He was put in charge of the working conditions for -foreign workers, following an agreement to which he freely consented. -The text of this agreement, made with Ley, the Chief of the German Labor -Front, on 2 June 1943, was published in the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_, 1943, -Part I, Page 558. I submitted this to the Tribunal at the beginning of -my presentation as Exhibit Number RF-18. - -This agreement shows that the treatment of foreign workers was subject -to control by the inspection department of the Allocation of Labor -(Arbeitseinsatz). The Defendant Sauckel could therefore not ignore the -mistreatment to which foreigners were subjected. If not prescribed it -was tolerated by him. - -The working conditions of workers deported to Germany provided the first -evidence of the determination of the defendants to exploit the human -potential of the occupied territories to the extreme limit of its -strength. - -First I call the attention of the Tribunal to the working hours imposed -on foreign workers. The working hours were legally set at 54 hours per -week by Sauckel’s decree of 22 August 1942. Actually, most foreign -workers were subjected to still longer working hours. Rush work, which -necessitated overtime, was mostly assigned to foreigners. It was not -unusual for the latter to be forced to work 11 hours a day, that is, 66 -hours a week, provided they had one day off per week. - -For this purpose I quote the report of the Minister for Prisoners, -Deportees, and Refugees, Document UK-78(3), which I submit as Exhibit -Number RF-87. I quote Paragraph 2: - - “Working Hours: The average number of working hours was 11 and - sometimes 13 a day in certain factories, for example, - Maschinenfabrik, Berlin (31). In Berlin-Spandau, the Alkett - factory imposed 10¼ hours work on day shift and 12 hours on - night shift. At Königsberg the caterpillar-tread factory, Krupp, - imposed 12 hours a day.” - -The work of foreign workers was remunerated by wages identical with -those of the German workers. - -I call the attention of the Tribunal to the illusory character of this -equality. The policy of freezing wages was a permanent element of the -wage and price policy pursued by the National Socialist Government; -consequently, the wages of the workers employed in Germany remained -limited. They were, moreover, heavily burdened with impositions and -taxes. Finally and above all, they were encroached upon by fines which -the German employers had the right to impose upon their workers. These -fines could reach the amount of the weekly wage for slight breaches of -discipline. - -I submit in evidence Document D-182. These are two drafts of speeches to -foreign civilian workers. One of them is intended for Russian and Polish -workers. I leave this to be dealt with by my Soviet colleagues. I submit -the other to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-88, and I quote: - - “Draft of an address to foreign civilian workers, ‘Maintenance - of Labor Discipline,’ January 1944. - - “I must inform you of the following: - - “The increasing lack of punctuality and absenteeism have caused - the competent authorities to issue stricter regulations to - ensure labor discipline whereby the competence of the employers - to impose penalties has been extended. Violations of labor - discipline, such as repeated tardiness, being absent without - cause or excuse, leaving a job without authorization, will in - the future be punished by fines up to the average daily wage. In - more serious cases, for example, for repeated absences without - cause or excuse, or insubordination, fines up to the average - weekly salary will be imposed. In such cases, moreover, the - additional ration cards may be taken away for a period up to 4 - weeks. . . .” - -The precariousness of wages which, after these various cuts, were -actually received by the foreign workers did not allow them to raise -their standard of living in the places to which they had been deported. -I maintain that this standard was insufficient and that the attitude of -the Arbeitseinsatz in this matter constitutes a characteristic violation -of the elementary principles of the rights of man. I will confirm this -by submitting to the Tribunal proof of the inadequacy of food, lodging, -and medical care to which the foreign workers were entitled. - -The German propaganda services issued, in France, illustrated pamphlets -in which the accommodations for foreign workers were represented as -being comfortable. It was quite different in reality. - -I will not dwell on this point. Mr. Dodd, my American colleague, has -already submitted and commented upon Document D-288, an affidavit by Dr. -Jäger, chief medical officer in charge of the work camps in the Krupp -factories. I will not reread this document to the Tribunal, but I would -like to repeat that in this document Dr. Jäger stated that French -workers—prisoners of war working in the Krupp factories—had been -billeted for more than half a year in kennels, urinals, unused ovens. -The kennels were 3 feet high, 9 feet long, and 6 feet wide, and the men -had to sleep there five in a kennel. I submit this document, which is to -support my argument, as Exhibit Number RF-89. - -To this unsanitary accommodation often inadequate food was added. In -this respect I wish to explain the following to the Tribunal: - -I do not claim that the foreign workers deported to Germany were -systematically exposed to starvation, but I do maintain that the leading -principle of National Socialism finds its expression in the food -regulations for foreign workers. They were decently fed only insofar as -the Allocation of Labor wished to maintain or to increase their capacity -for work. They were put on a starvation diet the moment when, for any -reason whatsoever, their industrial output diminished. They then entered -that category of unproductive forces, which National Socialism sought to -destroy. - -On 10 September 1942 the Defendant Sauckel declared to the First -Congress of the Labor Administration of Greater Germany: - - “Food and remuneration of foreign workers should be in - proportion to their output and their good will.” - -He developed this point of view in documents which I am offering in -evidence to the Tribunal. - -I refer, in the first place, to the letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, -which is Document 016-PS and which I shall not read since it has already -been read to the Tribunal by my American colleagues. I wish, however, to -draw the Tribunal’s attention to the second paragraph, Page 20, of this -document, which concerns the food supply of prisoners of war and foreign -workers: - - “All these people must be fed, lodged, and treated in such a way - that they may be exploited to the maximum with a minimum of - expense.” - -I ask the Tribunal to remember this formula—the aim to exploit the -foreign labor to the maximum at a minimum of expense. It is the same -concept which I find in a letter of Sauckel of 14 March 1943 addressed -to all Gauleiter. It is Document 633-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal -as Exhibit Number RF-90: - - “Subject: Treatment and care of foreign labor. - - “Not only our honor and prestige and, still more than that, our - National Socialist ideology which is opposed to the methods of - plutocrats and Bolshevists, but also cool common sense in the - first place demand proper treatment of foreign labor, including - even Soviet-Russians. Slaves who are underfed, diseased, - resentful, despairing, and filled with hate, will never yield - that maximum of output which they might achieve under normal - conditions.” - -I skip now to the next to the last paragraph: - - “But since we will need foreign labor for many years and the - possibility of replacing them is very limited I cannot exploit - them on a short-term policy nor can I allow wasting of their - working capacity.” - -The criminal concept revealed by these documents is particularly -manifest in the establishment of the food sanctions which were inflicted -on the deported workers. I refer to Document D-182, which I have just -submitted as Exhibit Number RF-88, and I remind the Tribunal that it -provides the possibility of inflicting on recalcitrant workers the -penalty of a partial suppression of food rations. Moreover, the foreign -workers, who were all the more exposed to diseases and epidemics since -they were poorly lodged and fed, did not enjoy proper medical care. - -I submit in evidence a report made on 15 June 1944 by Dr. Février, head -of the health service of the French Delegation with the German Labor -Front. It is Document F-536. I submit it as Exhibit Number RF-91, and I -quote from the last paragraph at Page 15 of the French original, Page 13 -of the German translation: - - “At Auschwitz, in a very fine camp of 2,000 workers, we find - tubercular people who were recognized as such by the local - German doctor of the Arbeitsamt going about freely; but this - doctor neglects to repatriate them out of hostile indifference. - I am now taking steps to obtain their repatriation. - - “In Berlin, in a clean hospital, well lighted and ventilated, - where the chief doctor, a German, makes the rounds only once in - 3 weeks, and a female Russian doctor every morning distributes - uniformly the same calming drops to every patient, I have seen a - dozen consumptives, three of them released prisoners. All of - them except one have gone beyond the extreme limit at which - treatment might still have had some chance of proving - effective.” - -No statistics have been made of foreign workers who died during their -deportation. Professor Henri Dessaille, Medical Inspector General of the -Labor Ministry, estimates that 25,000 French workers died in Germany -during their deportation. But not all of them died of diseases. To slow -extermination was added swift extermination in concentration camps. - -The disciplinary regime over the foreign workers was, in fact, of a -severity contrary to the rights of man. I have already given some -example of penalties to which the deported workers were exposed. There -were still more. The workers who were deemed recalcitrant by their -supervisors were sent to special reprisal camps, the ‘Straflager’; some -disappeared in political concentration camps. - -I remind the Tribunal that I have already, indirectly, proved this fact. -In the course of my presentation I submitted under Exhibit Number RF-44, -the ordinance of Sauckel of 29 March 1943 which extends the term of the -labor contracts by the length of time which the workers spent in prison -or in internment camps. - -I will not dwell on this point. Mr. Dodd, my American colleague, has -submitted to the Tribunal the documents which prove the shipment of -labor deportees to concentration camps. For the rest, I take the liberty -of referring the Tribunal to the presentation which M. Dubost will -deliver to the Tribunal within a few days. - -I emphasize, however, the significance of this persecution of foreign -workers. It constitutes the completion of the crime of their deportation -and the proof of the coherence of the German policy of extermination. - -I have already reported to the Tribunal the events which marked the -civilian mobilization of foreign workers for the service of National -Socialist Germany. I have shown how the device of compulsory labor was -inserted into the general framework of the policy of German domination. -I have denounced the methods employed by the defendants to enforce the -recruitment of foreign labor. I have emphasized the importance of the -deportations undertaken by the Arbeitseinsatz, and I have recalled how -the deported workers were treated and ill-treated. - -The policy of compulsory labor includes all the infractions under the -jurisdiction of the Tribunal: Violation of international conventions, -violation of the rights of man, and crimes against common law. - -All the defendants bear functional responsibility for these infractions. -It was the Reich Cabinet which set up the principles of the policy of -enforced recruitment; the High Command of the German Armed Forces -carried them out in the workshops of the Wehrmacht, the Navy, and the -Air Force; the civilian administrations made use of it to support the -German war economy. - -I retain more particularly the guilt of certain of the defendants: -Göring, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, co-ordinated the -planning and the execution of the plans for the recruitment of foreign -workers. Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, -counter-signatory of Hitler’s decrees, integrated compulsory labor with -his manpower policy. Funk, Reich Minister of Economics, and Speer, -Minister for Armament and War Production, based their program of war -production on compulsory labor. Sauckel, finally, Plenipotentiary -General for Allocation of Labor, proved to be the resolute and fanatical -agent—to use his own words—of the policy of compulsory enrollment -which, in Holland, was promoted and carried out by Seyss-Inquart. - -The Tribunal will appreciate their respective responsibility. I request -the Tribunal to condemn the crime of mobilization of foreign workers. I -ask the Tribunal to restore the dignity of human labor which the -defendants have attempted to degrade. - -M. CHARLES GERTHOFFER (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): -Mr. President, Your Honors, the French Prosecution is in charge of the -part of the Indictment concerning the deeds charged to the defendants -which were perpetrated in the countries of Western Europe, as provided -for by Article VI of the Charter of 8 August 1945. This text provides -for violations of the laws and customs of war which concern persons on -the one hand and private and public property on the other hand. - -The part of the Indictment concerning persons, that is, ill-treatment -inflicted on prisoners of war and on civilians, torture, murder, -deportation, as well as devastations not justified by military -exigencies, were presented to you and will be presented to you by my -colleagues. M. Delpech and I will have the honor to present to you the -pillage of private and public property. - -The Tribunal will have to be informed of the most arid part of the -presentation of the French prosecution. We shall strive to present it as -briefly as possible, to shorten the quotation of the numerous documents -submitted to the Tribunal, and to avoid, whenever possible, statistical -material in order to bring only the principal facts to light. -Nevertheless, sometimes we will go into detail in order that the -Tribunal may appreciate certain characteristic facts now charged to the -defendants, facts which are customarily designated as “economic -looting.” - -Before approaching this subject, I should like to ask the Tribunal’s -permission to express the gratitude of the Prosecutors of the Economic -Section of the French Delegation to their colleagues of the other Allied -delegations, and particularly to those of the American section of the -economic case who have been kind enough to put at our disposal a great -number of German documents discovered by the United States Army, and -important material means for their reproduction in a sufficient number -of copies. - -I shall have the honor of presenting in succession to the Tribunal: 1) -General remarks on the economic looting of the occupied countries of -Western Europe, 2) the special case of Denmark, 3) that of Norway, 4) -that of Holland. My colleague, M. Delpech, will present 5), the part -covering Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. I shall have the -honor of presenting to you 6), the part relating to France, and also the -conclusion. Finally, a special statement, 7), will be devoted to the -works of art. - -In the course of the presentation, we shall submit a certain number of -documents. We shall quote only the passages which seem to us the most -important, when the same document relates to several different -questions; we shall quote those excerpts concerning each question when -it is presented, indicating each time the reference in the document -book, since it is impossible to make known to you all the excerpts at -the same time because of the complexity of facts. - -In his speeches and in his writings, Hitler never concealed the economic -aims of the aggression of which Germany was to become guilty. The -theories of race and living space increased the envy of the Germans at -the same time as they stimulated their bellicose instincts. - -After having conquered Austria and Czechoslovakia without bloodshed, -they turned against Poland and prepared to attack the countries of -Western Europe, where they hoped to find what was lacking to assure -their domination. - -This fact is revealed in particular by Document EC-606, discovered by -the United States Army, which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number -RF-92. This is the minutes of a conference held by the Defendant Göring -on 30 January 1940, with Lieutenant Colonel Conrath and Director Lange -of the machine-constructing group attending. The following is the -principal passage of the minutes: - - “Field Marshal Göring told me at the beginning that he had to - inform me of the intentions of the Führer and of the economic - measures resulting therefrom. - - “He stated: The Führer is firmly convinced that he shall succeed - in bringing about a decisive conclusion of the war in 1940 by - making a great attack in the West. He assumes that Belgium, - Holland, and northern France will fall into our possession; he, - the Führer, forms his opinion on the calculation that the - industrial areas of Douai and Lens, of Luxembourg, of Longwy and - Briey might, as far as raw materials are concerned, replace the - deliveries from Sweden. - - “Therefore, the Führer has decided, in disregard for the future, - to stake fully our reserves of raw materials, at the expense of - possible later years of war. The soundness of this resolution is - supported with the Führer by the view that the best stocks are - not stocks of raw materials but stocks of finished war - materials. Moreover, when the aerial war begins, it must be - taken into account that our finishing factories may be - destroyed. The Führer is furthermore of the opinion that the - maximum output must be achieved in 1940 and consequently that - long-range production programs should be put aside in order to - accelerate those which can be terminated in 1940.” - -When the invasion began the countries of Western Europe were glutted -with products of every kind; but after 4 years of methodical looting and -enslavement of production, these countries are ruined, and their entire -population is physically weakened as the result of rigorous -restrictions. - -To achieve such results, the Germans used every method, particularly -violence, trickery, and blackmail. - -The purpose of the present statement will be to specify the main -spoliations ordered by the German leaders in the countries of Western -Europe and to show that they constitute, as far as they are concerned, -War Crimes which come under the jurisdiction of the International -Military Tribunal for major war criminals. - -It is not possible to draw an exact balance sheet of the German looting -and of the profit derived by them as the result of the enslavement of -production in the occupied countries. On one hand, we do not have enough -time; on the other hand, we find ourselves faced with actual impotence -resulting from the secret nature of certain operations and the -destruction of archives through acts of war or deliberate destruction at -the time of the German rout. - -Nevertheless, the documents now collected and the information gathered -make it possible to give a minimum estimate of the extent of spoliation. -However, I shall ask the Tribunal’s permission to make three preliminary -remarks: - -1) The numerous acts of individual looting committed by the Germans will -not be referred to by this presentation since they come under the -competence of a different jurisdiction. - -2) We shall only mention for the Record the incalculable, economic -results of German atrocities, for instance, the financial loss -experienced by the immediate relatives of breadwinners murdered, or the -loss suffered by certain victims of ill-treatment, who are totally or -partially, temporarily or permanently, incapacitated for work, or the -damage resulting from the destruction of localities or buildings for the -purpose of vengeance or intimidation. - -3) Finally, gentlemen, we shall not discuss the damage resulting from -purely military operations, which cannot be considered as economic -results of War Crimes. When damage caused by military operations is -referred to, some separate valuation will be necessary. - -With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall make a few general remarks -on the economic looting of Western European occupied territories. -Economic looting is to be understood as the removal of wealth of every -kind, as well as the enslavement of the production of the various -occupied countries. - -To reach such results in countries which were generally highly -industrialized and where numerous stocks of manufactured goods and -abundant reserves of agricultural products existed, the German venture -was faced with real difficulties. - -At first, although the Germans had used this procedure to its maximum -extent, requisitions were not adequate. In fact, they had to find the -opportunities for ferreting out all sorts of things, which were -sometimes hidden by the inhabitants, and on the other hand, they had to -maintain for their own profit the economic activity of these countries. - -The simplest way of becoming masters of the distribution of existing -products and of production was to take possession of almost all means of -payment and, if necessary, to impose by force their distribution in -exchange for products or services, at the same time combating the rise -of prices. - -Faced with starvation the populations were thus naturally forced to work -directly or indirectly for the benefit of Germany. - -The first part of this presentation will be divided into five chapters: -1) Seizure of currency by the Germans; 2) sequestering of the production -of the occupied territories; 3) individual purchases, which should not -be confused with individual acts of looting; 4) the black market, -organized by and for the profit of Germany; 5) examination of the -question of economic looting from the viewpoint of international law and -in particular of the Hague Convention. - -First chapter—seizure of currency by the Germans: - -To have at their disposal all means of payment, the Germans used almost -the same methods in the various occupied countries. First, they took two -principal measures. One was the issue of paper money, by ordinance of 9 -May 1940, published on Page 69 of the _Verordnungsblatt für die -besetzten französischen Gebiete_, official German gazette, which will -subsequently be referred to by its official abbreviation VOBIF, which I -submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-93. This ordinance -concerned Denmark and Norway; and on 19 May 1940 was rendered applicable -to the occupied territories of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and France. -The Germans proceeded to issue bank notes of the Reichskreditkasse which -were legal tender only in the respective occupied countries. - -The Germans then took a second measure: The blocking of existing -currency within the occupied countries as a result of the ordinance of -10 May 1940, published in VOBIF, Page 58, which I submit as Document -Number RF-94. In regard to Holland these ordinances are those of 24 -June, 14 August, 16 August, and 18 September 1940, which are submitted -as Document Numbers RF-95, 96, 97, and 98. In regard to Belgium these -ordinances are those of 17 June and 22 July 1940, submitted as Document -Numbers RF-99 and 100. - -These measures, notably the issuing of paper money, left exclusively to -the whim of the Germans without any possible control on the part of the -financial administrations of the occupied countries, were to serve, as -we shall see, as powerful means of pressure to impose the payment of -enormous war tributes under the pretext of maintaining occupation troops -as well as alleged payment agreements known as “clearing,” which -functioned almost exclusively to the benefit of the occupying power. - -The Germans thus procured for themselves, under false pretenses, means -of payment from which they profited by realizing considerable sums for -their sole benefit. - -All agricultural and industrial products, raw materials, goods of every -kind, or services, for which Germany apparently made regular payment by -means of either notes of the Reichskreditkasse or by so-called clearing -agreements or by war tributes known as indemnities for the maintenance -of occupation troops, were exacted with full knowledge that no -redemption would be forthcoming. Thus, we can be sure that, as a rule, -such regulations were purely fictitious and were the most regularly used -fraudulent procedure to effect the economic looting of the occupied -countries of Western Europe. - -These questions will be examined in a more exact manner later on. I -shall limit myself for the moment to pointing out to the Tribunal that -to effect the economic looting of the occupied countries with their own -money, it was necessary that this money should preserve an appreciable -purchasing power. Therefore, the efforts of the Germans were directed -toward stabilization of prices. A severe regulation prohibiting rises in -prices was subsequently promulgated by several decrees—VOBIF, Pages 8, -60, and 535, submitted as Document Number RF-101. Nevertheless, the -application of such measures could not prevent economic laws from -playing their part. The payment of excessive tributes, considering the -resources of the invaded countries, could not but have as their primary -result a continuous rise of prices. The leaders of the Reich were -perfectly aware of the situation and watched very attentively the rise -in prices, which they were attempting to moderate. - -This we know principally from the secret reports of Hemmen, President of -the Armistice Commission for German Economic Questions, which we will -discuss when we examine the particular case of France. - -Chapter 2—Sequestering of the production of the occupied countries: - -When the Germans invaded the countries of Western Europe great disorder -was created as the result. The population fled before the advance of the -enemy. Industries were at a stand-still. German troops guarded the -factories and prevented anyone from entering. - -I am not able to give you a list of the enterprises affected by this -situation, since there was almost no exception. - -Nevertheless, as an example, we will present to the Tribunal the -original of one of the numerous posters exhibited in industrial plants -in France. I submit this poster as Document Number RF-102. It is dated -Paris, 28 June 1940. One text is in German, and the other is in French. -Here is the French text: - - “By order of General Field Marshal Göring of 28 June 1940, the - Generalluftzeugmeister took possession of this factory as - trustee. Only persons having special permits from the - Generalluftzeugmeister, Verbindungsstelle, Paris, may enter.” - -Hardly had the factories been occupied by the military when German -technicians, at the heel of the troops, proceeded methodically to remove -the best machines. - -It is revealed by a secret report of Colonel Hedler, dated December 1940 -and emanating from the Economic Section of the OKW, Pages 77 and 78, -that the removal of the best machines from the occupied territories was -to be organized, in spite of the terms of Article 53 of the Hague -Convention. - -This document is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-103 (Document EC-84). - -On the other hand, immediately after the invasion, the working -population, their resources being exhausted, naturally gravitated around -these factories in the hope of securing their means of subsistence. -Problems of an identical nature arose in all the occupied countries: to -stop the looting of machinery, which was taking place at an alarming -rate; and to keep the workers employed. - -The Germans for their part forced the factories to resume work under the -pretext of assuring subsistence to the population. The ordinance of 20 -May 1940, published in the VOBIF, Page 31, which we submit as Document -Number RF-104, applicable to the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and -France, orders that work should be resumed in all enterprises and -industries of food supply and agriculture. The same text provided for -the appointment of temporary administrators in case of absence of the -directors or in other cases of emergency. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are there any objections to breaking off? - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTY-NINTH DAY - Monday, 21 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -M. GERTHOFFER: Mr. President, Your Honors, at the end of the last -session I had the honor of beginning the account of the French -Prosecution on the economic pillage. In the first chapter I had -indicated to you succinctly how the Germans had become masters of the -means of payment in the occupied countries by imposing war tributes -under the pretext of maintaining their army of occupation and by -imposing so-called clearing agreements, functioning to their benefit -almost exclusively. - -In a second chapter, entitled “Sequestering of Production in the -Occupied Territories,” I had the honor of expounding to you that, after -the invasion, the factories were under military guard and that German -technicians proceeded to transfer the best machines to the Reich; that -the working population, having come to the end of their resources, -grouped themselves around the factories to ask for subsidies; and, -finally, that the Germans had ordered the resumption of work and had -reserved for themselves the right to designate provisional -administrators to direct the enterprises. - -At the same time, the Germans exercised pressure over the rulers of the -occupied countries and over the industrialists to bring the factories -back to productivity. In certain cases they themselves placed -provisional German administrators in charge and insinuated that the -factories would be utilized for the needs of the occupied populations. - -On the whole, to avoid unemployment and to maintain their means of -production, the industrialists, little by little, resumed their work, -endeavoring to specialize in the manufacture of objects destined for the -civilian populations. Resorting to various means of pressure, the -Germans imposed the manufacture of defensive armaments and then -progressively of offensive armaments. They requisitioned certain -enterprises, shut down those which they did not consider essential, -distributed the raw materials themselves, and placed controllers in the -factories. - -The German control and seizure continually expanded in conformity with -secret directives given by the Defendant Göring himself, as can be seen -in a document dated 2 August 1940, discovered by the Army of the United -States, which bears the Document Number EC-137, and which I place before -the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-105. This is the essential passage of -the document: - - “The extension of the German influence over foreign enterprises - is an objective of German political economy. It is not yet - possible to determine whether and to what extent the peace - treaty will effect the surrender of shares. It is now, however, - that every opportunity should be used for German economy, in - time of war, to obtain access to material of interest to the - economy in occupied territories and to prevent removals that - might hinder the realization of the above-mentioned aim. . . .” - -I stop this quotation here. After having had knowledge of such a -document, there can be no further doubt about the intentions of the -German rulers. The proof of the putting into execution of such a plan is -shown in a document which will be read when the particular case of -France will be dealt with in the course of this exposé. - -The Tribunal will be informed about a study of a certain Michel, Chief -of the Administrative General Staff on Economic Questions, deputy to the -German commanding officer in France, which brings out the extent of the -dictatorship of the Reich over the occupied countries in economic -matters. The control of the enterprises in occupied countries was -assured by civil or military officials who were on the spot and also, -later on, by similar German enterprises, which had become their -“Paten-Firma.” - -To give an example of this economic domination, here are the orders -received by an important French company. This involves the -Thomson-Houston Company, and I present a letter to the Tribunal under -Document Number RF-106 in the French documentation, which is addressed -to this establishment. It is dated Paris, 8 October 1943. - - “Société des Procédés Thomson-Houston, 173 Boulevard Haussmann, - Paris. - - “You are fully responsible for the punctual, careful, and - reasonable filling of the German orders which are passed to you, - both as regards the giver of the order and my office, which is - the competent agency for all orders given to France. - - “To facilitate for you the execution of your obligations, the - firm of the Allgemeine Elektricitäts Gesellschaft, Berlin (NW - 40), Friederich-Karl-Ufer 2-4, is designated by me as the - ‘Paten-Firma.’ I attach the greatest importance to close - collaboration on technical matters with the above-mentioned - firm. The Paten-Firma will have the following functions: - - “1) To co-operate in the establishment of your production plan - to utilize your capacities; - - “2) To be at your disposal for all technical advice which you - may need, and to exchange information with you; - - “3) To serve as an intermediary, if need be, for negotiations - with German authorities; - - “4) To keep me informed as to anything that might occur which - might prevent or limit the fulfillment of your obligations. - - “In view of assuring these tasks, the Paten-Firma is authorized - to delegate a Firmenbeauftragter to your firm, and when - necessary, technical engineers from other German firms who may - have handed you important orders. - - “In order to permit the Paten-Firma to accomplish its task it - will be necessary to give the firm or its Firmenbeauftragter the - necessary information on everything that relates to the German - orders and to their execution: - - “1) By placing at its disposal your correspondence with your - supply houses and with your subcontractors; - - “2) By informing it now of the extent to which the capacities of - your factories are being utilized and permitting it to check on - the production; - - “3) By letting it take part in your conferences and see your - correspondence with the German authorities. - - “It is your duty to inform the Paten-Firma or their - Firmenbeauftragter immediately about any orders which you may - receive.” - -This is the end of the quotation. - -Almost all the important enterprises in the occupied territories were -thus placed under the control of German firms, with the double aim of -favoring the Reich’s war effort and of achieving by progressive -absorption an economic preponderance in Europe, even in case of a peace -by compromise. - -In the agricultural sphere the Germans used similar means of pressure. -They made wholesale requisitions of products, leaving the population -with quantities clearly insufficient to assure their subsistence. - -I now take up the third chapter devoted to individual purchases by the -German military or civilian forces in the occupied countries. - -If the present statement cannot take up individual acts of pillage or -the numerous thefts committed in the occupied countries, it is important -nevertheless to mention the individual purchases, these having been -organized methodically by the German rulers to benefit their own -nationals. - -At the beginning of the occupation the soldiers or civilians effected -purchases by means of vouchers of doubtful authenticity which had been -handed them by their superiors. Soon, however, the Germans had at their -disposal a sufficient quantity of money to allow them to purchase -without any kind of rationing, or by means of special vouchers, -considerable quantities of agricultural produce or of objects of all -kinds, notably textiles, shoes, furs, leather goods, _et cetera_. Thus, -for instance, certain shoe stores were obliged to sell every week, in -exchange for special German vouchers, 300 pairs of men’s, women’s, or -children’s shoes for town wear. - -This is indicated in an important report of the French economic control, -to which I will have occasion to refer several times in the course of -this presentation and which I submit to the Tribunal under Document -Number RF-107. - -The individual purchases which constitute a form of economic pillage -were, I repeat, not only authorized but organized by the German rulers. -In fact, when the Germans returned to their country they were encumbered -by voluminous baggage. A postal parcel service had been created by the -Germans for the benefit of their nationals living in the occupied -countries. The objects were wrapped in a special kind of paper and -provided with seals that enabled their entry, duty free, into Germany. - -In order to get an idea of the volume of individual purchases, it is -important to refer to the declarations of one Murdel, ex-director of the -Reichskreditkasse at present detained in Paris, who was heard before an -examining magistrate of the Cour de Justice de la Seine on 29 October -1945. This is the declaration made by Murdel on the subject of -individual purchases, and I submit it in evidence as Document Number -RF-108. - -The judge asked Murdel the following question: - - “What were the needs of the army of occupation? What purchases - did you have to make on its account?” - -Murdel answered: - - “It is impossible for me to answer the first part of the - question. I had tried during the occupation to obtain - information on this point, but it was objected that this was a - military secret which I had no right to know. What I can tell - you is that we settled the pay of the troops and that a private - earned from 50 to 60 marks, a noncommissioned officer 50 percent - more, and an officer considerably more, naturally. I have no - idea what forces the occupation army may have included, as these - forces were extremely variable.” - -I skip a few lines to make this shorter. Murdel adds: - - “Apart from this, every soldier on leave returning from Germany - had the right to bring back with him a certain number of marks - (50). The same was the case for any German soldier who was - stationed for the first time in France. We exchanged the marks - into French francs. I value the total of the sum that we paid - out each month in this way at 5,000 million francs.” - -One may thus estimate at about 250,000 million francs, at least, the -individual expense incurred in France by the Germans, of which amount -the greater part was used for the purchase of products and objects sent -to Germany, to the detriment of the French population. - -To show the size of these costs, I would add that the amount of 5,000 -million francs a month, in other words 60,000 million francs a year, is -greater than the budget receipts of the French State in 1938, for these -were only 54,000 million francs. - -After having viewed the individual purchases, I shall enter upon a -fourth chapter devoted to the organization of the black market by the -Germans in the occupied territories. The population of the occupied -countries had been subjected to a severe rationing of products of all -kinds. They had been left only obviously insufficient quantities for -their own vital needs. - -These regulations made available a large quantity of the stock -production which the Germans seized by means of operations that were, to -all appearances, regular: requisitions, purchases by official services, -individual purchases, or those in exchange for vouchers of German -priority. We have just seen that these purchases represented for France, -alone, an average of 5,000 million francs per month. - -But such regulations produced, as a corollary, a depletion of -merchandise and the concealment of products with the aim of keeping them -from the Germans. This state of affairs gave birth, in the occupied -countries, to what was called the black market, that is to say, -clandestine purchases made in violation of regulations on rationing. - -The Germans themselves were not slow in proceeding, to an ever greater -extent, to purchase on the black market, mostly through agents and -sub-agents, recruited among the most doubtful elements of the -population, whose work was to find out where these products could be -found. - -These agents, compromised by violations of the legislation on rationing -which they had committed, enjoyed absolute immunity; but they were -constantly under the threat of denunciation on the part of their German -employers in case they should slow up or stop their activity. Often -these agents also fulfilled functions for the Gestapo and were paid by -commissions, which they obtained in black market transactions. - -The different German organizations in the occupied countries fell into -the habit of making clandestine purchases that became increasingly -important in volume. Indeed, they began to compete among themselves for -this merchandise, the chief result of which was to increase the prices, -thus threatening to bring about inflation. The Germans, while they -continued to profit by the clandestine purchases, were anxious that the -money which they used should maintain as high a value as possible. - -To obviate such a situation, the rulers of the Reich decided in June -1942 to organize purchases on the black market methodically. Thus the -Defendant Göring, the Delegate of the Four Year Plan, gave to Colonel -Veltjens, on 13 June 1942, the mission of centralizing the structure of -the black market in the occupied countries. This fact emerges from -several documents discovered by the Army of the United States, of which -I submit the first to you as Document Number RF-109. It is the -nomination of Colonel Veltjens, signed by the Defendant Göring himself. -I do not want to take up the time of the Tribunal in giving a complete -reading of these documents. I think that they cannot be contested, but -if this should occur later, I will reserve for myself the privilege of -reading them later, unless the Tribunal would prefer me to read them -immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our ruling. The documents -which we cannot take judicial notice of must be read if they are to be -put in evidence. You need only read the portions of the document which -you require to put in evidence—not necessarily the formal parts, but -the substantial parts which you require for the purpose of your proof. - -M. GERTHOFFER: This is the letter of 13 June 1942, signed by the -Defendant Göring. - - “Owing to the simultaneous purchases of goods by the different - branches of the Wehrmacht and other organizations on the - so-called black market, a situation has developed in some - occupied territories which hampers the methodical exploitation - of these countries for the needs of German war economy, is also - harmful to German prestige, and endangers the discipline - necessary in the military and civilian administration. This - deplorable state of things can no longer be tolerated. I - therefore charge you to regularize these commercial transactions - in agreement with the services that are involved and, - particularly, with the chiefs of the administration of the - occupied territories. In principle, commercial transactions in - the occupied territories that are made outside the framework of - the normal provisioning, or constituting a violation of price - regulations, must be limited to special cases and can be carried - out only with your previously given assent. I approve your - proposal that only to trading companies controlled by the Reich - should be assigned the handling of these goods, in the first - place the ‘Roges.’ - - “I beg you to submit, at the earliest possible date, a detailed - plan of operation for starting your activity in Holland, - Belgium, France, and Serbia. (In Serbia it is Consul General - Neuhausen who is to be in charge.) This plan must include the - seizure of port installations and machinery and tools of - enterprises to be closed down in the occupied territories. As to - the results of your work, I beg you to submit a report to me - every month through my representative; the first to be sent on 1 - July 1942. - - “If necessary, the Central Planning Board will decide as to the - distribution of merchandise thus purchased.”—Signed—“Göring.” - -Thereupon, on 4 September 1942, the Defendant Göring had given orders -for the complete collection of all merchandise of use, even if signs of -inflation should result from this act, in the occupied territories. This -is shown by a report signed “Wiehl,” concerning the utilization of funds -derived from occupation costs. I submit this to the Tribunal as Exhibit -Number RF-110 (Document Number 1766-PS). - -Shortly after, on 4 October 1942, the Defendant Göring made a speech on -the occasion of the Harvest Festival, a speech that is reported in _Das -Archiv_ of October 1942, Number 103, Page 645. In this speech the -Defendant Göring stated implicitly that he meant purchases on the black -market in the occupied countries to continue for the benefit of the -German population. I submit a copy of this article as Document Number -RF-111 and I quote from it the following passage: - - “I have examined with very special care the situation in the - occupied countries. I have seen how the people lived in Holland, - in Belgium, in France, in Norway, in Poland, and wherever else - we set foot. I have noticed that although very often their - propaganda speaks officially of the difficulty of their food - situation, in point of fact this is far from being the case. Of - course everywhere, even in France, the system of ration cards - has been introduced; but what is obtained on these ration cards - is but a supplement, and people live normally on illegal - commerce. - - “The recognition of this has caused me to make a firm decision, - creating a principle which must be rigidly adhered to. The - German people must be considered before all others in the battle - against hunger and in the problem of food supply. It is my - desire that the population of the territories which have been - conquered by us and taken under our protection shall not suffer - from hunger. If, however, through enemy measures difficulties of - food supply should arise, then all must know that if there is to - be hunger anywhere it shall in no case be in Germany. . . .” - -The United States Army has discovered a secret report, made on 15 -January 1943, by Colonel Veltjens, in which he gives an account of his -activity over a period of 6 months to the Defendant Göring. This is -Document Number 1765-PS, which I submit now to the Tribunal as Exhibit -Number RF-112. It is not possible for me to give a complete reading of -this report. I shall simply read certain passages of it. - -In the first part of his report Veltjens explains the reasons for the -rise of the black market in these terms: - - “1) The reduction in merchandise as a result of the regulations - and rationing. . . . - - “2) The impossibility of stabilizing prices. . . . - - “3) The impossibility of price control on German lines owing to - lack of personnel in the German control organizations. - - “4) The neglect of practical support for counter-measures on the - part of the local administrative authorities, especially in - France. - - “5) The half-hearted penal justice of the local judiciary - authorities. - - “6) The lack of discipline of the civilian population. . . .” - -Then under the same number 6), a little further, Veltjens indicates: - - “The activity of the German services on the black market grew - little by little to such an extent that more and more unbearable - situations arose. It was known that the black market operators - offered their merchandise to several bureaus at the same time - and that it was the one which gave the highest price who - obtained the merchandise. Thus, the different German formations - not only vied with each other in obtaining the merchandise, but - also they caused the prices to rise.” - -Further on in his report, Veltjens indicates that he has assumed the -direction of the service created by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan -in these terms: - - “Finally, in June 1942, in agreement with all the central - services, the delegates for the special missions (B. f. S.) were - charged with taking in hand the seizure and the central control - of the black market. Thus, for the first time, a necessary - preliminary condition was created for effectively dealing with - the problem of the black market.” - -In the second part of his report, Veltjens explains the advantages of -the organization in charge of which he was placed and he writes, among -other things: - - “It has been stated that purchases on the black market in their - present volume would become in the long run too much for the - budget of the Reich. In answer to this it must be pointed out - that the greater part of the purchases were made in France and - were financed by occupation costs. Out of a total of purchases - amounting to 1,107,792,819 RM, the sum of 929,100,000 RM was - charged to the French for occupation costs so that the Reich - budget was not involved for that amount.” - -After having indicated the inconveniences of the black market, Veltjens -concludes: - - “In recapitulating”—writes Veltjens—“it must be stated that, - in view of the supply situation in the Reich, now as before we - cannot do without black market purchases as long as there are - still hidden stocks which are important for carrying on the war. - To this vital interest all other considerations must be - subordinated.” - -In a third part of this same report, Veltjens deals with the technical -organization of his offices. Here are some interesting passages: - - “The general direction and supervision of the purchases is the - task assigned to the control services which have been newly - created for this purpose, as follows: - - “a) Supervisory service in France, with headquarters in Paris; - - “b) supervisory service in Belgium and the North of France, with - headquarters in Brussels; - - “c) supervisory service in Belgium and in the North of France, - auxiliary service Lille, with headquarters in Lille; - - “d) supervisory service in Holland with headquarters in The - Hague; - - “e) supervisory service in Serbia with headquarters in - Belgrade.” - -Then Veltjens tells us that purchases themselves were carried out by a -restricted number of licensed purchasing organizations, that is, 11 for -France, 6 for Belgium, 6 for Holland, 3 for Serbia. - - “So”—he writes—“all the purchases are subject to the central - control of the delegate for the special missions.” - -Further on Veltjens adds: - - “The financing of the purchases and the transport of merchandise - are to be carried out by the Reich-owned Roges m. b. H. The - merchandise is then to be distributed to the purchasers in the - Reich by Roges in accordance with instructions from the Central - Planning Board, or departments appointed by the Central Planning - Board and in order of urgency.” - -In the fourth section of his report Veltjens gives the volume of the -operations carried out up to the date of 30 November 1942, that is to -say, in less than 5 months, as his organization had not begun its -activity before 1 July 1942. Here are the figures that Veltjens gives: - - “The volume of purchases made (up to 30 November 1942): - - “(a) Since the inauguration of the purchases directed by the - German commanders or the Reich Commissioner, and of the directed - distribution of merchandise in the Reich, there has been - purchased a total of 1,107,792,818.64 Reichsmark: In France a - total amount of 929,100,000 Reichsmark; in Belgium 103,881,929 - Reichsmark; in Holland 73,685,162.64 Reichsmark; and in Serbia - 1,125,727 Reichsmark.” - -Veltjens adds: - - “The payment in France is made from the account of the - occupation costs, and in the other countries by means of - clearing.” - -Then Veltjens gives a table of merchandise purchased in this way over -the period of these 5 months. I shall simply give a summary to the -Tribunal: - - “1) Metals, 66,202 tons valued at 273,078,287 Reichsmark; 2) - textiles, a total value of 439,040,000 Reichsmark; 3) leather, - skins, and hides to a total value of 120,754,000 Reichsmark. - -Veltjens adds: - - “Further purchases comprised: Industrial oils and fats, edible - oils and fats, wool, household articles, mess articles, wines - and spirits, engineering equipment, medical articles, sacks, _et - cetera_.” - -Veltjens then gives a table of the increase in prices during these 5 -months. Then he states the principle that the black market must be -utilized solely to the benefit of Germany and be severely repressed when -it is utilized by the populations of the occupied countries. On this -subject he actually writes: - - “1. Extension of price control. As an increase of the personnel - of the German controlling offices may not be possible, or may be - possible only to a limited extent, it will be necessary to - obtain from the local administration authorities greater - activity in this respect. - - “2. Application of severe penalties, on German lines, for - violations of regulations. This is the only means of remedying - the lack of discipline among the civilian populations, arising - from their individual and liberal ideas. A check of the - sentences that have been passed by the local tribunals is to be - recommended. - - “3. The promise of rewards for denouncing violations of the - rationing regulations, equivalent to a high percentage of the - value of the goods seized on account of the denunciation. - - “4. The hiring of informers and of agents provocateurs. - - “Further to hinder illegal production: - - “5. Closing of all enterprises that are not working for the war - industry. - - “6. Closing or merging of enterprises whose capacity or - production is being only partly exploited. - - “7. Closer control of the productivity of factories. - - “8. Close examination of the quantity of raw materials allotted - for the German orders placed in France. - - “9. A policy of prices which affords the enterprises adequate - profit and thus guarantees their means of existence.” - -Examining the demands of the rulers of the occupied countries with -relation to the German purchases on the black market, Veltjens writes: - - “Moreover, lately the French and Belgian economic and government - circles, among others the Chief of the French Government - himself, have considered it necessary to complain about the - organized German buying. In response to remonstrations of this - kind, it should be pointed out—in addition to various other - arguments—that on the part of the Germans, too, there is - naturally the greatest interest in the disappearance of the - black market. But the chief responsibility for its existence - rests with the government authorities themselves for their - incompetence regarding price control and their negligence in - meting out just punishment, whereby lack of discipline among - their own population is encouraged.” - -The Tribunal will allow me to stress the value of the argument developed -by Veltjens by reminding it that the Germans were the principal -purchasers on the black market, and that their agents enjoyed absolute -immunity. - -Finally, speaking of the machinery in the factories, Veltjens writes in -his report: - - “Another order of the delegate for the special missions concerns - seizure of the machinery of closed factories. It is an - established fact that great capacities, particularly of machine - tools, are not being utilized at present, while at home they are - urgently needed for armament production. After an agreement by - the delegate of special missions, the military commander, and - the plenipotentiary for machine production, there has been - created in France, at the armament inspection office, an office - for the distribution of machines (Maschinenausgleichstelle). - - “The creation of Maschinenausgleichstellen in Belgium and - Holland is pending. One of the main difficulties, in this field, - is to overcome the resistance of the owners of the factories, as - well as that of the local government offices of the occupied - territories. - - “The occupation authorities will have to use every means to - break this resistance.” - -In conclusion, Veltjens alludes in his report to the Roges company, -which was a special organization for the transport to Germany of the -booty captured in the occupied countries, and more particularly, of -products acquired by operations on the black market. One of the -directors of this organization, called Ranis, was interrogated on 1 -November 1945, and declared in substance that the Roges company had -begun its activity in February 1941, succeeding another organization. On -the whole he confirms the facts that are reported in Veltjens’ report. I -shall therefore simply submit a copy of his interrogation to the -Tribunal under Document Number RF-113. - -The scope of the operations on the black market is thus established by -German documents which cannot be contested by the opposite side. I beg -to point out to you that these documents prove that within 5 months, in -three countries, these operations amount to the sum of 1,107,792,818 -Reichsmark. We shall come back to certain details when examining the -special situation of certain countries. However, it is necessary for me -to indicate the reasons why the Defendant Göring finally came to decide -that the black market operations should be suspended. - -Indeed, on 15 March 1943, under the pretext of avoiding the risk of -inflation in the occupied countries, Göring decided that black market -purchases be suspended. We have just seen that the Defendant Göring -worried little about the fate of the population of the occupied -countries, since he had decided that the black market purchases were to -continue even at the risk of inflation. - -The true reason is the following: While the official German -organizations were buying at prices which were strictly fixed by them, -the clandestine organizations were accepting much higher prices. The -merchandise was therefore always gravitating to the black market, to the -detriment of the official market; and clandestine production in the end -absorbed the normal production. - -Finally it must be added that the corruption resulting from such -practices in certain circles of the German Armed Forces became -disquieting to the German leaders. The black market was therefore -suppressed officially on 15 March 1943, but some purchasing bureaus -continued their clandestine activities until the time of liberation but -on a much smaller scale than before 15 March 1943. - -I cite a passage of the report of the French Economic Control which I -have just put into evidence as Document Number RF-107 and which gives an -idea of the disorder that was created by the German actions and which -shows the reasons why the Reich authorities officially suspended the -black market purchases—Page 21 of the French text: - - “That was the time when champagne, cognac, and benedictine were - handled by lots of 10,000 to 50,000 bottles and _pâte de foie - gras_ by the ton! From the very beginning the general corruption - had affected a great number of the Wehrmacht officers, attracted - by the sumptuous life which surrounded them. It penetrated so - far into the German military circles that, from the lower mess - sergeant up to the superior officer, each one was implicated - with the worst traffickers, demanding commissions on all the - deals. In a clandestine sale of wool thread the authorities - found themselves face to face with a general of the Air Force.” - -Around them soon flocked all the bad elements of France, swindlers and -other habitual criminals. Then came a crowd of all the customary trade -traffickers, brokers, and out-of-work agents, generally unimportant -middlemen. - -It is understood that in such a circle, composed of unknown and elusive -people, the black market deals which were transacted without invoices -and in cash, and without written receipts, except those of the German -offices, cannot today be easily disclosed and evaluated. - -I resume the quotation at Page 22: - - “Originating in the course of the year 1941, the commercial - agitation of these Parisian purchasing bureaus continued in this - manner for about 20 months. But, after having attained its peak - at the end of 1942, this activity came to an abrupt end in March - 1943, a victim of its own excesses. - - “Actually, during the entire occupation production prices were - strictly limited by the French authorities and even more so by - the German economic services which were systematically opposed - to any increase in prices and anxious, above all, to maintain - large purchasing power for the French money at their disposal. - - “But, since the supplies delivered to the enemy under contract - were being paid for at prices hardly better than the legal ones, - the clandestine purchasing agencies accepted at the same time - rates several times higher for the same products. - - “So the conveying of merchandise to the German black market - increased more and more, while the secret production of goods to - be forwarded through these dark channels increased. The disorder - became rapidly such that, in certain branches of industry, - deliveries according to contract could not be carried out except - with great delay, in spite of the menacing protests of the - German authorities. - - “Completely aghast, the French Ministry of Industrial Production - had to inform the German authorities that the national - production would soon no longer be able to meet its obligations. - - “This obvious situation, together with the necessity of putting - an end to the incredible corruption brought about by the black - market in the Wehrmacht, led the Reich Government, if not - totally to suppress the black market, at least to consider - closing the Paris purchasing bureaus. - - “This measure was made effective 13 March 1943 according to an - agreement between Bichelonne and General Michel. - - “However”—and this is very significant—“the German economic - services did not fail to ask in compensation for a considerable - rise in the quotas fixed under the agreements. Thus for the - Kehrl plan alone this rise amounted to 6,000 tons of textiles. - - “Only a few bureaus were able to carry on their activities until - the liberation, either by endeavoring to execute their purchases - through Roges (D’Humières, Economic Union, _et cetera_), or - collaborating with military authorities buying supplies and with - the bureaus of the German Air force and the Navy.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. GERTHOFFER: In the course of my explanations I shall come back to the -case of each particular country, concerning the black market operations, -in order to show their extent. But I think that, just now, it is -established by the Veltjens report, as well as by the passages from the -French Economic Control report which I had the honor to read to the -Tribunal, that the black market was organized by the leaders of the -Reich, and especially by the Defendant Göring. - -And to finish the general observations concerning economic plundering, I -beg the Tribunal’s permission to give a few explanations from the legal -point of view. That is the subject of Chapter 5 of this first part. - -From a legal point of view it is not contestable that organized -plundering of the countries invaded by Germany is prohibited by the -International Hague Convention, signed by Germany and deliberately -violated by her, even though her leaders never failed to invoke this -Convention every time they tried to benefit by it. - -Section III of the Hague Convention, entitled “The Military Authority -over the Territories of the Enemy State,” relates to economic questions. -These clauses are very clear and need not be discussed. If the Tribunal -will allow me to recall them in reading, here is Section III of the -Hague Convention which I put into the document book as Document Number -RF-114, and which is entitled, “The Military Authority over the -Territories of the Enemy State”: - - “Article 42: A territory is considered occupied when it is - placed actually under the authority of the hostile army. The - occupation extends only to the territories where this authority - has been established and can be exercised. - - “Article 43: The authority of the legitimate power having in - fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter. . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we can take judicial notice of these articles of -the Convention. - -M. GERTHOFFER: I shall therefore not read this article, since the -Tribunal knows the Convention, and shall simply limit myself to certain -juridical remarks. - -These texts of the Hague Convention show in a very clear way that the -Germans could seize in occupied countries only what was necessary for -the maintenance of troops indispensable in the occupation of the -territories. All items which were levied beyond these limits were in -violation of the texts which you know, and consequently these acts were -acts of plundering. - -Counsel for the Defense may contend that all these prescriptions must be -put aside, because Germany had set herself the goal of continuing the -war against Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States of America. The -Defense may claim that, because of this, Germany was in a state of need -and had to counter the prescriptions of the Hague Convention, trying to -interpret the Article 23 G as allowing destruction or seizure even of -private property. - -I shall immediately answer that this text does not lay down rules -relating to the conduct of the occupant in enemy territory. These last -prescriptions are contained, I repeat, in Articles 42 to 56, but they -referred to the conduct, which the belligerents must observe in the -course of the combat. - -The words “to seize” in the sentence, “. . . to seize enemy property -except in cases where . . . these seizures are absolutely demanded by -military necessity,” mean—and there can be no discussion as to -translation because actually the French text is binding—the words “to -seize” mean not to appropriate a thing, but to put it under the -protection of the law with a view to leaving it unused, in the state in -which it was found, and keeping it for its true owner or for whoever can -show right to it. Such a seizure permits the military authority, as long -as the action lasts, to prevent the owner from using the property -against its troops, but it does not authorize the military authority in -any case to appropriate it for itself. - -Acts of economic plunder are all contrary to the principles of -international law and furthermore are formally provided for by Article -6b of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of August 1945. - -These constant violations of the Hague Convention had the result of -enriching Germany and permitted her to continue the war against Britain, -the Soviet Union, and the United States, while they ruined the invaded -countries, the populations of which, subjected to a regime of slow -famine, are now physically weakened and, but for the victory of the -Allies, would be on the road to progressive extermination. - -These inhuman deeds therefore constitute War Crimes which come within -the competency of the International Military Tribunal as far as the -leaders of the Reich are concerned. - -Before finishing this rapid summary of juridical questions, the Tribunal -will permit me to refute in advance an argument which will certainly be -presented by the Defense, especially as far as economic plunder is -concerned. They will claim that your high jurisdiction did not exist, -that international penal law had not yet been formulated in any text -when the defendants perpetrated the acts with which they are at present -charged, and that therefore they could not be condemned to any sentence -whatsoever by virtue of the principle of non-retroactivity of penal -laws. - -Why, Gentlemen, is this principle adopted by modern legislation? It is -indisputable that any person who is conscious of never having violated -any legal prescription could not be condemned because of acts which were -committed in such circumstances. - -For example, somebody issues a check without funds to cover it, before -his country had adopted a penalty for such an offense. But the case -which is submitted to you is quite different. The defendants cannot -maintain that they were not conscious of having violated legislation of -any kind. First of all, they violated international conventions: The -Hague Convention of 1907, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1938, and -then they violated all the penal laws of the invaded countries. - -How, in these proceedings, shall economic plunder be qualified? Theft, -swindling, blackmail, and even, I will add, murder—since, in order to -attain their aims, the Germans have premeditated and committed numerous -murders which enabled them to intimidate the population in order to -plunder them better. - -From the point of view of domestic law, these deeds certainly fall under -the application of Articles 295 and the following ones of the French -penal code, and especially of Article 303, which stipulates as guilty of -murder all offenders, of whatever category, who, to execute their -crimes, resort to torture or perpetrate barbarous acts. I will add that -the defendants violated even the German criminal code, in particular -under Articles 249 and following. - -Counsel for the Defense will certainly stress that some leaders of the -invaded countries were in agreement with the Reich Government as to the -economic collaboration, and that consequently the Reich Government -cannot be charged with acts which derive from these agreements. - -Such arguments must be refuted: - -1.) If, in all the invaded countries, patriots resisted with more or -less courage, it is true that some of them, out of inertia, fear, or -self interest, turned traitors to their country. They have been or will -be condemned. But the crimes committed by certain of them cannot be -exonerating or even extenuating circumstances in favor of the -defendants, especially since the latter had very often put these -traitors in to manage the occupied countries. The fact of having brought -individuals to turn traitor to their country only aggravates, on the -contrary, the heavy charges against the defendants. - -2.) These so-called agreements had all been obtained by pressure or by -threat. The concluded contracts show that they were solely in favor of -Germany, who, as a matter of fact, never brought any compensation or -illusory benefits—very often their burdensome nature is seen from the -mere reading of such contracts, as I will have the honor to show in -certain particular cases. - -With these explanations my general observations on the economic pillage -are concluded, and if the Tribunal is willing we can examine the -particular case of Denmark. - -When the Germans invaded Denmark, contrary to all the prescriptions of -the law of nations and to their engagements, they were not certain of -rapidly dominating Western Europe. At first they laid down the principle -that they would not take anything in the country, but after their -success of May 1940 their attitude changed; and little by little they -treated Denmark more or less like the other occupied countries. - -Nevertheless, they sought to achieve annexation pure and simple, and -took rigorous measures against the population only in the course of -1942, when they saw that they would not be able to win Denmark over. -From the economic point of view, and to assure their domination, they -tried to have at their disposal the majority of the Danish means of -payment, and they used to this effect two methods which to a great -extent were used by them in other countries: (1) The levying of a -veritable tribute of war, under the pretext of maintaining their army of -occupation; (2) the functioning of the so-called clearing agreement to -their almost exclusive benefit. These two methods should be studied in -Chapter I of this statement. - -Chapter I, German seizure of the means of payment; costs of occupation. - -Article 49 of the Hague Convention stipulates that if the occupant -levies a tax the money will only be for the army of occupation or for -the administration of the territory. - -The occupant can therefore levy a tax for the maintenance of its army, -but this tax must not exceed the sum strictly necessary. The needs of -the army of occupation mean, not the costs of armament and equipment, -but only the costs of billeting, food, and pay. I say normal expenses, -which exclude luxuries. - -Article 52 authorizes the occupying power to exact from the communes or -inhabitants, for the needs of the army, requisitions in kind and -services, with the express condition that they should be proportionate -with the resources of the country and of such a nature that they should -not imply for the population the obligation to take part in operations -against their own country. - -The same Article 52 stipulates that levies in kind shall be paid as far -as possible in cash; otherwise they are to be confirmed by receipts and -the sums due paid as soon as possible. - -In other words, the Hague Convention allows the occupying army to -requisition in occupied territories what is necessary for the -maintenance of the troops but under two conditions, apart from -contributions in kind: 1) That the requisitions and the services should -be proportionate to the resources of the country, that is to say, that -sufficient should be left over for the inhabitants, to enable them at -least to live; 2) that the levies should be paid as soon as possible. -This is not a question of fictitious payment made with funds extorted -from occupied countries, but actual payment, which implies supplying -real equivalents. - -Article 53 of the Convention of The Hague which permits the occupying -powers to seize everything which could be turned against them—and in -particular, cash, funds, and securities of all kinds belonging to the -state of the occupied country—does not authorize the occupying power to -appropriate them. - -According to information furnished by the Danish Government, when the -Germans entered Denmark they declared that they would not demand -anything from the country, but that supplies for the German Army would -come from the Reich. - -Nevertheless, instead of buying Danish crowns to permit their troops to -spend money in Denmark, as early as 9 May 1940 they imposed the -circulation of notes of the Reichskreditkasse, which is shown in Number -26 of the VOBIF, which I have already submitted under Document Number -RF-93. - -Upon the protestations of the National Danish Bank against the issuing -of foreign paper money, the Germans withdrew these notes from -circulation, but demanded the opening of an account at the National -Bank, promising to draw upon it only for sums which were essential for -the maintenance of their army in Denmark. - -But the Germans did not lose time in violating their promises and in -levying on their account, in spite of the Danish protests, sums -infinitely superior to the needs of the army of occupation. - -According to the information given by the Danish Government, the Germans -levied, per month, an average of 43 million crowns in 1940; 37 million -crowns in 1941; 39 million crowns in 1942; 83 million crowns in 1943; -157 million crowns in 1944; 187 million crowns in 1945. The total of -these levies amounts, according to the Danish Government, to 4,830 -million crowns. - -I submit, as Document Number RF-115, the financial report of the Danish -Government concerning this, a report to which I shall refer again in the -course of this statement. - -The indications of the Danish Government are corroborated by a German -document discovered by the United States Army, Document EC-86, Page 11, -which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-116. - -This is a secret report of 10 October 1944, written by the Arbeitsstab -Ausland, and concerns the requisition of funds of the occupied -territories. - -On Page 11 the following is said: - - “Denmark is not considered as occupied territory, and therefore - does not pay occupation expenses. The means necessary for the - German troops are placed at the disposal of the central - administration of the Reichskreditkasse by the Central Danish - Bank, through channels of ordinary credit. In any case, for the - duration of the war uniform payment by Denmark is assured.” - -The writer of this report says that the levies to 31 March 1944, for -occupation expenses, amount to: 1940-1941, 531 million crowns; -1941-1942, 437 million crowns; 1942-1943, 612 million crowns; 1943-1944, -1,391 million crowns; which represents, up to 31 March 1944, levies -amounting to 2,971 million crowns. This corresponds to the information -given by the Danish Government for approximately the same period—2,723 -million crowns. - -The same German report shows that the rate of exchange for the mark, as -compared to the rate of exchange for the crown, had been fixed by the -occupying powers at 47.7, then at 53.1 marks per 100 crowns. - -Even though the Germans claim, against all evidence, that Denmark was -not an occupied territory, they levied in this country the total sum of -4,830 million crowns, an enormous sum in view of the number of -inhabitants and the resources of the country. In reality, this was -nothing other than a war tribute which Germany imposed under the pretext -of furnishing means of payment to her army stationed in Denmark. - -The maintenance of the army necessary for occupying Denmark did not -necessitate such large expenses. It is evident that the Germans used, as -in other countries, the majority of the funds extorted from Denmark to -finance their war effort. - -Chapter II, clearing. - -In 1931 Germany faced financial difficulties, which she used as a -pretext to declare a general moratorium on all her foreign obligations. -Nevertheless, to be able to continue, to a certain extent, her -commercial operations with foreign countries, she concluded with most of -the other nations agreements permitting the payment of her commercial -debts, and even of certain financial debts, on the basis of a system of -compensation called “clearing”. - -Ever since the beginning of the occupation, 9 April 1940, and for its -duration, the Danish authorities did everything they could, but in vain, -to counteract German activity in this direction. - -Under the pressure of occupying forces Denmark could not prevent her -credit in the clearing balance from constantly increasing, owing to the -German purchases which were made without the guarantee of any -equivalent. According to the Danish Government, the credit balance of -the account progressed in the following way: 31 December 1940, -388,800,000 crowns; 31 December 1941, 784,400,000 crowns; 31 December -1942, 1,062,200,000 crowns; 31 December 1943, 1,915,800,000 crowns; 31 -December 1944, 2,694,600,000 crowns; 30 April 1945, 2,900 million -crowns. - -These data are corroborated by those of the German report which I -submitted a few minutes ago under Exhibit Number RF-116 (Document Number -EC-86), and according to which, on 31 March 1944, the Germans had -procured for themselves means of payment, through clearing, amounting to -a total sum of 2,243 million crowns. - -It has not been possible to establish the use the occupants made of the -sum of 7,730 million crowns which they obtained fraudulently, to the -detriment of Denmark, with the help of the indemnity of occupation and -of clearing. - -The information which we have up to now does not enable us to estimate -the extent of the operations carried out by the Germans on the black -market. Nevertheless, the writer of the report of 10 October 1944, -presented previously, indicates; and I quote: - - “An estimate of the amounts spent on the black market must not - be made. Of course, one may assume that members of the Wehrmacht - are buying at top prices butter and other products in Denmark. - But it is impossible to fix these sums even approximately, for - the black market seems to be less widespread and less well - co-ordinated than in the other occupied territories of the West, - and is closer to the structure of the German black market with - its fluctuating prices. Nevertheless, the prices of the Danish - black market can generally be considered as much lower than the - German prices. It is, therefore, not possible to speak of an - average high price, as for instance in France, Belgium, and - Holland.” - -It is worth noting that the Germans, and especially members of the -Wehrmacht, used to operate on the black market and that payment was -effected with funds extorted from Denmark. - -Concerning the apparently regular requisitions, we also lack the -necessary information to be able to give precise details. Nevertheless, -according to a secret report of 15 October 1944, addressed by the German -officer of the Economic Staff for Denmark to his superiors in Frankfurt -an der Oder, a document discovered by the United States Army and which I -submit as Document Number RF-117, the following goods were requistioned -by his department: - - “From January to July 1943, 30,000 tons of turf; in May 1944, - 6,000 meters of wood. . . .” - -The writer adds that they tried to push this production to 10,000 cubic -meters per month. - - “. . . in September 1944, 5,785 cubic meters of cut timber, - 1,110 meters of uncut timber, 1,050 square meters of plywood, - 119 tons of paint for ships, and special wood for the navy.” - -Gentlemen, this is but an enumeration of the requisitions which just one -German section happened to make within a short time. - -Denmark had to furnish large quantities of cement. Germany furnished -her, in exchange, with the coal necessary for this manufacture. - -According to this report which I have mentioned, in August 1944 the -Germans bought in Denmark foodstuffs for over 8,312,278 crowns. These -figures are less than the truth. According to the last information we -have received from the Danish Government, the requisitions of -agricultural items alone amounted, on an average, to 70 million crowns -per month; which represents, for 60 months of occupation, requisitions -to a value of 4,200 million crowns. - -Chapter III, requisitions not followed by payment. - -Apart from that which they managed to buy with the help of crowns which -were deposited in their accounts under the pretext of the maintenance of -the army of occupation and of clearing, the Germans appropriated an -important quantity of things without having paid for them in any -seemingly regular manner. - -It was in this way that they appropriated supplies from the Danish Army -and Navy—lorries, horses, means of transport, furniture, clothing, the -amount of which to date has not been evaluated but might be estimated at -about 850 million crowns. Many requisitions and secret or even apparent -purchases have not yet been estimated exactly. - -The same report, submitted under Document Number RF-115, contains, on -the part of the Danish Government, an approximate and provisional -estimate of the damages sustained by Denmark and of the German plunder, -which amounts to 11,600 million crowns. - -The information which we have to date does not permit me to give any -more particulars concerning Denmark. I will, therefore, if the Tribunal -will permit me, begin with the particular case of Norway. - -The economic plundering of Norway. - -The German troops had only arrived in Norway when Hitler declared, on 18 -April 1940, that the economic exploitation of that country should be -proceeded with, and for that reason Norway must be considered as an -enemy state. - -The information which we have on the economic plundering of Norway is -rather brief; but it is, nevertheless, sufficient to estimate the German -activity in this country during the entire period of the occupation. - -Norway was subjected to a regime of most severe rationing. As soon as -they entered the country, the Germans tried—and this was contrary to -the most elementary principles of International Law—to draw from Norway -the maximum resources possible. - -In a document discovered by the United States Army, Document Number -ECH-34, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-118, a document which -consists of the _Journal de Marche_ of the economy and armament service -in Norway, written in April 1940, we have excerpts of the directives -relative to administration and economy in the occupied territories. - -Here are some excerpts from this document: - - “Directive of Armament Economy: - - “Norwegian industry, to the extent to which it does not directly - supply the population, is, in its essential branches, of - particular importance for the German war industry. That is why - its production must be put, as soon as possible, at the disposal - of the German armament industry, if this has not already been - done. This production consists mainly of intermediate products, - which require a certain amount of time to be turned into useful - products, and of raw materials which—such as aluminum, for - example—can be used while we wait for our own factories, which - are being built, to be in a position to produce. - - “In this connection, above all, the following industrial - branches must be taken into consideration: - - “Mining plants for the production of copper, zinc, nickel, - titanium, wolfram, molybdenum, silver, pyrites. - - “Furnaces for the production of alumina, aluminum, copper, - nickel, zinc. - - “Chemical industries for the production of explosives, synthetic - nitrogen, calcium nitrate, superphosphate, calcium carbide, and - sodium products. - - “Armament industries, naval dockyards, power stations, - especially those which are supplying electric current to the - above-named industries. - - “The production capacities of these industries must be - maintained at the highest possible level for the duration of the - occupation. - - “A certain measure of assistance by the Reich will, at times, be - necessary to overcome industrial bottlenecks which are to be - expected on account of the cutting off of English and overseas - imports. - - “Of particular importance is the guaranteeing of raw material - industries which to a considerable part depend on overseas - imports. - - “For the moment it may be left undecided whether a future supply - of bauxite from the German stocks is necessary for utilizing the - capacities of the aluminum plants.” - -As soon as the troops entered Norway, Germany issued notes of the -Reichskreditkasse which were legal tender only in Norway and which could -not be used in Germany. As in the other occupied countries, this was a -means of pressure to obtain financial advantages, which were supposedly -freely given by the brutally enslaved countries. - -The Germans did their best to become masters of the means of payment and -of Norwegian credit by the two methods which have become classic: -Imposition of a veritable war tribute, on the pretext of the maintenance -of the army of occupation, and also the working of a system of clearing -to their profit. - -German seizure of the means of payment. - -First, indemnities for the maintenance of the army of occupation. - -At the beginning of the occupation, the Germans used for their purchases -notes of the Reichskreditkasse. The Norwegian holders of this paper -money used to change it at the Bank of Norway, but this financial -institution could not obtain from the Reichskreditkasse any real -equivalent. In July 1940 the Bank of Norway had to absorb 135 million -Reichsmark from the Reichskreditkasse. To avoid losing control over -monetary circulation, the Bank of Norway was obliged to put the -Norwegian notes at the disposal of the Germans, who drew checks on the -Reichskreditkasse which the Bank of Norway was obliged to discount. - -The debit account of the Bank of Norway, following the German levies, -amounted to: - -1,450 million crowns at the end of 1940; 3,000 million crowns at the end -of 1941; 6,300 million crowns at the end of 1942; 8,700 million crowns -at the end of 1943; 11,676 million crowns at the liberation of the -country. - -All the Norwegian protests were in vain in the face of German -extortions. The constant threat of the new issuing of notes of the -Reichskreditkasse as instruments of obligatory payment beside the -Norwegian currency obliged the local financial authorities to accept the -system of levies on account, without actual cover, which was less -dangerous than the issuing of paper money over the circulation of which -the Norwegian administration had no power of control. - -This may be seen in particular from a secret letter sent on 17 June 1941 -by General Von Falkenhorst, Commander-in-Chief in Norway, to the Reich -Commissioner, Reichsleiter Terbeven, a copy of which was found not long -ago in Norway and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number -RF-119. In this document, after having stated that one could not reduce -the expenses of the Wehrmacht in Norway, Von Falkenhorst writes: - - “I am, however, of the opinion that the problem cannot be solved - at all in this manner. The only remedy is to abandon completely - the actual monetary system by introducing Reich currency. But of - course this does not come into my domain. I regret, therefore, - that I am not able to propose any other remedies to you, - although I am fully conscious of the seriousness of the - situation in which you find yourself.” - -To the indemnities for the alleged maintenance of the army of occupation -must be added a sum of 3,600 million crowns paid by the Norwegian -Treasury for the billeting of German troops. This information comes to -us from a report from the Norwegian Government, which I submit as -Document Number RF-120. - -From the sum of approximately 12,000 million crowns levied for the -alleged maintenance of the occupation troops, a large part was used for -other purposes; for the police and propaganda, in particular, the -occupation spent 900 million crowns. This comes from a second report of -the Norwegian Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-121. - -Secondly, clearing. - -The clearing agreement of 1937 for the barter of goods between Norway -and Germany remained in force during the occupation but it was the Bank -of Norway which had to advance the necessary funds for the Norwegian -exporters. The Germans also concluded clearing agreements in the name of -Norway with other occupied countries, neutral countries, and with Italy. - -At the liberation, the credit balance of Norwegian clearing amounted to -90 million crowns but this balance does not show the actual situation. -In fact: - -1) The imports destined to the German military needs in Norway were -handled through clearing in a very improper manner; - -2) For certain goods especially (pelts, furs, and fish) the Germans had -demanded that exportation should be made to the Reich. Then they sold -these products again in other countries, especially Italy as far as fish -was concerned; - -3) The Germans, who controlled the fixing of prices, systematically -raised the price of all products imported into Norway which, moreover, -were used for the greater part for the military needs of the occupation. -On the other hand, they systematically lowered the prices of the -products exported from Norway. - -In spite of all their efforts and sacrifices, and owing to the -fraudulent operations of the occupiers, the Norwegian authorities could -not prevent a very dangerous inflation. - -From the report of the Norwegian Government, which I submitted under -Document Number RF-120 a few moments ago, it is seen that the paper -currency which in April 1940 amounted to 712 million crowns, rose -progressively to reach, on 7 May 1945, 3,039 million crowns. An -inflation of this extent, resulting from the activities of the -occupiers, enables us to measure the impoverishment of the country. The -same report indicates that the Germans did not manage to seize the gold -of the Norwegian Bank, as that had been hidden in good time. - -Let us now, Gentlemen, examine the levies in kind. - -The Germans proceeded, in Norway, to make numerous requisitions which -were or were not followed by so-called regular payments. According to -the report of the Norwegian Government, here is the list of -requisitioned goods: Meat, 30,000 tons; dairy products and eggs, 61,000 -tons; fish, 26,000 tons; fruit and vegetables, 68,000 tons; potatoes, -500,000 tons; beverages and vinegar, 112,000 tons; fats, 10,000 tons; -wheat and flour, 3,000 tons; other foodstuffs, 5,000 tons; hay and -straw, 300,000 tons; other fodder, 13,000 tons; soap, 8,000 tons. - -But this list which I have just read to the Tribunal includes only the -official purchases, which were made with Norwegian currency and paid for -through clearing; it does not include the illicit purchases. - -At present, it is not yet possible to make estimates. As an example, we -can say, however, that the export of fish, most of which went to -Germany, for 1 year only (1942) came to about 202,400 tons, whereas the -official requisitions during the whole occupation amounted only to -26,000 tons. - -As in other occupied territories, the Germans forced the continuation of -work under threat of arrest. - -Most of the Norwegian merchant fleet escaped from the Germans; -nevertheless, they requisitioned all the ships they could, especially -most of the fishing boats. - -Even if the occupier could not seize all railway rolling stock, trams, -as well as about 30,000 motor vehicles, were transported to Germany. - -If we refer to the report of 10 October 1944 of the German Economic -Service, which I submitted under Exhibit RF-116 (Document Number EC-86), -we will see that the writer of the report himself estimates that the -effort demanded from Norway was beyond her possibilities; and he writes: - - “. . . Norwegian economy is especially heavily burdened by the - demands of the occupation Forces. For this reason the cost of - occupation had to be limited to cover only a part of the - expenses of the Wehrmacht. . . .” - -After having mentioned that the cost of occupation which had been -collected up to January 1943 amounted to 7,535 million crowns, which -corroborates the data given by the Norwegian Government, the writer of -the German report says: - - “This sum of more than 5,000 million Reichsmark is, indeed, very - high for Norway. Much richer countries, as for example, Belgium, - pay hardly more, and Denmark does not even supply half of this - sum. These large payments can only be made possible by German - additions. It is, therefore, not surprising that the - German-Norwegian trade is in Germany’s favor—that is, it is - subsidized. Norway, owing to her very small population, can - hardly put labor at the disposal of the German war economy. She - is, therefore, one of the few countries which owe us certain - amounts in clearing.” - -Further on, the writer adds: - - “. . . If we deduct approximately 140 million Reichsmark from - the expenses of the occupation and the various credits - calculated above, we have Norwegian payments to the still - considerable amount of approximately 4,900 million Reichsmark.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -M. GERTHOFFER: I had the honor, this morning, of relating to you how the -occupiers were able to exact great quantities of the means of payment -from Norway. We shall now see, from the first data which have been given -us, the use to which the occupiers put these means of payment. - -The Germans seized, as in the other occupied countries, considerable -private property on some pretext or other—property belonging to Jews, -Freemasons, or Scout associations. It has been impossible, so far, to -make a very exact evaluation of this spoliation. We can therefore only -give some indication from memory. According to the report of the -Norwegian Government, submitted under Document Number RF-121, in 1941 -the Germans seized all the radio sets. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you any evidence to support the facts you are -stating now? - -M. GERTHOFFER: This is based on information contained in the report of -the Norwegian Government which I have submitted under Document Number -RF-121. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -M. GERTHOFFER: According to that report, in 1941 the Germans seized -almost all the radio sets belonging to private individuals. The value of -these radio sets is approximately 120 million kroner. The Germans -imposed heavy fines on the Norwegian communities under the most varied -pretexts, notably Allied bombing raids and acts of sabotage. - -In the report presented under Document Number RF-121 the Norwegian -Government gives two or three examples of these collective fines: on 4 -March 1941, after a raid on Lofoten, the population of the small -community of Ostvagoy had to pay 100,000 kroner. Communities also had to -support German families and families of “Quislings.” - -On 25 September 1942, after a British raid on Oslo, one hundred citizens -were obliged to pay 3,500,000 kroner. In January 1941 Trondheim, -Stavanger, and Vest-Opland had to pay 60,000, 50,000, and 100,000 -kroner, respectively. In September 1941 the municipality of Stavanger -was obliged to pay 2 million kroner for an alleged sabotage of telegraph -lines. In August 1941 Rogaland had to pay 500,000 kroner, and Aalesund -had to pay 100,000 kroner. - -It can thus be stated in principle that, by various procedures which -differed hardly from those employed in other countries, the Germans -during the occupation of Norway not only exhausted all the financial -resources of that country but placed it considerably in debt. - -It has not been possible to furnish a detailed account of German -extortions, whether made after requisitions, followed or not by -indemnities, or by purchase, apparently conducted by mutual agreement -fictitiously settled with those very means of payment extorted from -Norway. - -In the report which I have submitted under Document Number RF-121, the -Norwegian Government tabulated the damages and losses suffered by its -country. I shall give a summary of this table to the Tribunal. - -The Norwegian Government estimates that the damages suffered by industry -and commerce amount to a total of 440 million kroner, of which the -Germans have paid, fictitiously of course, only 7 million kroner; -merchant vessels to the value of 1,733 million kroner, for which Germany -has made no settlement; damage to ports and installations amounts to 74 -million kroner, for which Germany has settled fictitiously only to the -extent of 1 million kroner; for railroads, canals, airports, and their -installations, the spoliation represents the sum of 947 million, for -which Germany has fictitiously paid 490 million kroner; roads and -bridges, 199 million kroner, for which the settlement amounts to 67 -million; spoliation of agriculture reached 242 million kroner, of which -only 46 million have been settled; personal property, 239 million, of -which nothing has been settled; various requisitions, not included in -the preceding categories, amount to 1,566 million kroner, for which the -occupier, fictitiously, has settled up to the amount of 1,154 million -kroner. The Norwegian Government estimates that the years of man-labor -applied to the German war effort represent a sum of 226 million kroner. -It estimates, on the other hand, that the years of man-labor lost to the -national economy by deportation to Germany and forced labor by the order -of Germany amounts to 3,122 million kroner. Forced payments to German -institutions amount to 11,054 million kroner, for which Germany has made -no settlement whatsoever. The grand total, according to the Norwegian -Government, is 21,086 million kroner, which represents 4,700 million -dollars. - -Norway suffered particularly during the German occupation. Indeed, -though her resources are considerable, notably timber from the forests, -minerals such as nickel, wolfram, molybdenum, zinc, copper, and -aluminum, nevertheless Norway must import indispensable food products -for feeding her population. - -As the Germans had absolute control over maritime traffic, nothing could -come into Norway without their consent. They could therefore, by -pressure, as they had to do in France by means of the line of -demarcation between the two zones, impose their demands more easily. The -rations, as fixed by the occupiers, were insufficient to insure the -subsistence of the Norwegian population. The continued undernourishment -over a period of years resulted in very serious consequences: Disease -multiplied, mortality likewise increased, and the future of the -population has been jeopardized by the physical deficiencies of its -younger element. - -These are the few observations which I had to make on the subject of -Norway. I shall, if the Tribunal will permit, now deal with the part -which relates to the Netherlands. - -Economic pillage of the Netherlands. - -In invading the Netherlands in contravention of all the principles of -the law of nations, the Germans installed themselves in a country -abundantly provided with the most varied wealth, in a country in which -the inhabitants were the best nourished of Europe and which, in -proportion to the population, was one of the wealthiest in the world. -The gold reserve of Holland exceeded the amount of bills in circulation. -Four years later when the Allies liberated that country, they found the -population afflicted by a veritable famine; and apart from the -destruction resulting from military operations, a country almost -entirely ruined by the spoliation of the occupation. - -The dishonest intentions of Germany appear in a secret report by -Seyss-Inquart on his governorship. This report, dating from 29 May to 19 -July 1940, was discovered by the United States Army. It has been -registered under the number Document 997-PS, and I submit it to the -Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-122. These are the chief extracts from -this report: - - “It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a - large number of economic and also police measures had to be - taken, the first ones of which were for the purpose of reducing - the consumption of the population in order to obtain supplies - for the Reich, on the one hand, and to secure a just - distribution of the remaining supplies, on the other hand. With - regard to the task assigned, endeavors had to be made for all - these measures to bear the signature of Dutchmen. The Reich - Commissioner therefore authorized the Secretaries General to - take all the necessary measures through legal channels. - - “In fact, to date, nearly all orders concerning the seizure of - supplies and their distribution to the population and all - decrees regarding restrictions on the moulding of public opinion - have been issued. But agreements concerning the transport of - extraordinarily large supplies to the Reich have also been made, - all of which bear the signatures of the Dutch Secretaries - General or the competent economic leaders, so that all of these - measures have the character of being voluntary. It should be - mentioned in this connection that the Secretaries General were - told in the first conference that loyal co-operation was - expected of them, but that they were entitled to resign if - something should be ordered which they felt they could not - endorse. Up to date none of the Secretaries General have made - use of this privilege, so that one may reasonably conclude that - they have complied with all requests of their own free will. - - “The seizure and distribution of food supplies and textiles have - been almost completed. At least all the appropriate orders have - been issued and are being executed. - - “A series of instructions concerning the reorientation of - agriculture have been issued and are being executed. The - essential point is to use the available fodder in such a way - that as large a stock as possible of horned cattle, about 80 - percent, will be carried over into the next farming season, at - the expense of the disproportionately high stock of chickens and - hogs. Rules and restrictions have been introduced in the - organization of traffic, and the rationing of gasoline was - applied on the same lines as in the Reich. - - “Restriction of the right to give notice at work, as well as to - cancel leases, has been issued in order to curb the liberal and - capitalistic habits of the Dutch employers and to avoid unrest. - In the same way the terms for repayment of debts have been - extended under certain circumstances. . . . - - “. . . the ordinance concerning registration and control of - enemy property, as well as confiscation of the property of - persons who show hostility to the Reich and to Germans, were - issued in the name of the Reich Commissioner. On the basis of - this ordinance an administrator has already been appointed for - the property of the royal family. - - “Stocks of raw materials have been seized and, with the consent - of the General Field Marshal, distributed in such a way that the - Dutch have enough raw materials to maintain their economy for - half a year, so that they receive the same allocation quotas as - obtain in the Reich. The same principle of equal treatment is - being used in the supply of food, et cetera. This enabled us to - secure considerable supplies of raw materials for the Reich, as - for instance 70,000 tons of industrial fats, which is about half - the amount which the Reich is lacking. Legislation concerning - exchange has been introduced on the same pattern as in the - Reich. - - “Finally we succeeded in causing the Dutch Government to supply - all the amounts which the Reich and the German administration in - the Netherlands need, so that these expenses do not burden the - Reich budget in any way. - - “Sums of guilders have been made available to redeem the - occupation marks to the amount of about 36 million; an - additional 100 million for the purposes of the occupation army, - especially for extension of the airports; 50 million for the - purchase of raw materials to be shipped to the Reich, so far as - they are not booty; and amounts to guarantee the unrestricted - transfer of the savings of the Dutch workers brought into the - Reich, to their families, _et cetera_. Finally, the rate of - exchange of the occupation marks, set at first by the Army High - Command in the proportion of 1 guilder to 1.50 Reichsmark, has - been reduced to the correct proportion of 1 guilder to 1.33 - Reichsmark. - - “Above all, however, it was possible to obtain the consent of - the President of the Bank of The Netherlands, Trip, to a measure - suggested by Commissioner General Fischböck and approved by the - General Field Marshal, namely the unrestricted mutual obligation - of accepting each other’s currency. That means that the Bank of - The Netherlands is bound to accept any amount of Reichsmark - offered to it by the Reich Bank and in return to supply Dutch - guilders at the rate of 1.33, that is, 1 Reichsmark equals 75 - cents. The Reich Bank alone has control in these matters, not - the Bank of The Netherlands, which will be notified only of - individual transactions. - - “This ruling goes far beyond all pertinent rulings hitherto made - with the political economies of neighboring countries, including - the Protectorate, and actually represents the first step towards - a currency union. In consideration of the significance of the - agreement, which already affects the independence of the Dutch - State, it is of special weight that the President of the Bank, - Trip, who is very well-known in western banking and financial - circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above - sense.” - -As you will see from the explanations which I shall have the honor of -submitting to you, it was chiefly in the Netherlands that the Germans -used all their ingenuity in extorting the means of payment. This -spoliation will form the subject of the first chapter. - -We shall then examine the use made by the occupiers of these means of -payment. In a second chapter we shall discuss the black market; in a -third, we shall consider the acquisition made in a manner only outwardly -regular; a fourth chapter will be devoted to various kinds of -spoliation. Finally, we shall touch upon the chief consequences to the -Netherlands of this economic pillage. - -Chapter 1, German seizure of means of payment. - -A.) Indemnity for occupation costs. - -I have already had the privilege, Gentlemen, of explaining under what -conditions and within what limit, by virtue of the Hague Convention, the -occupying power may raise contributions in money for the maintenance of -its army of occupation. - -I shall confine myself to reminding the Tribunal that these costs which -are charged to the occupied countries can include only the costs of -billeting, feeding, and possibly of paying those soldiers strictly -necessary for the occupation of territories. - -The Germans knowingly ignored these principles by imposing upon the -Netherlands the payment of an indemnity for the maintenance of their -troops which was far out of proportion to the needs of the latter. - -According to information furnished by the Netherlands Government, which -is contained in three reports (the reports of Trip, Hirschfeld, and the -Minister of Finance) which I submit as Document Number RF-123, the -following sums were exacted on the pretext of being indemnity for the -maintenance of occupation troops: 1940 (7 months), 477 million guilders; -1941, 1,124 million guilders; 1942, 1,181 million guilders; 1943, 1,328 -million guilders; 1944, 1,757 million guilders; 1945 (4 months only), -489 million guilders. That makes a total of 6,356 million guilders. - -A sum as considerable as this constitutes a veritable war tribute raised -on the pretext of the maintenance of an army of occupation. Germany thus -fraudulently circumvented the regulations of the Hague Convention to -seize a considerable amount of means of payment. - -B.) Clearing. - -In 1931 Germany, faced with economic and financial difficulties, -declared a general moratorium on her previous commitments. Nevertheless, -in order to be able to continue her foreign commercial operations, she -had concluded with most of the other countries, notably with the -Netherlands, agreements making possible the settling of commercial debts -and, to a certain extent, of financial debts, on the basis of the -exchange system called “clearing.” - -Before the war there existed on the Netherlands “clearing” an excess of -imports from Germany. But after the first months of occupation there -was, on the contrary, a considerable excess of exports to Germany, -whereas the receipts coming from that country dropped perceptibly. - -From the month of June 1940 onward the Germans exacted from the Dutch -declarations of foreign currency, gold, precious metals, securities, and -foreign credits, as can be seen from the Ordinance of 24 June 1940, -submitted as Document Number RF-95. Moreover, the Dutch could, by virtue -of the same ordinance, be obliged to sell their stocks to the Bank of -The Netherlands. - -The German Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, forced the Bank of The -Netherlands to make advances in guilders to maintain equilibrium in -clearing, since Germany could furnish no equivalent in merchandise. On -the other hand, it was decided that the clearing system should be -utilized for the delivery of merchandise as well as for the payment of -any debts. - -In fact the Germans could buy merchandise and transferable securities in -Holland without furnishing any equivalent. The credits in marks of the -Dutch sellers were blocked in the Bank of The Netherlands which, on its -part, had been obliged to make an equivalent advance on the clearing -exchange. - -To attempt to limit the fall of the Dutch account on the clearing -exchange, and to avoid the transfer by this means of guilders or of -transferable stock into Germany, on 8 October 1940, the Secretary -General of Netherlands Finance imposed a large tax on the marks that -were blocked on the clearing exchange. - -However, under date of 31 March 1941, the credit of the Netherlands -exceeded 400 million guilders, which in fact had been advanced by the -Netherlands Government. At this point the occupiers demanded: - -1) That a sum of 300 million guilders be withdrawn from the balance of -400 million and deposited in the German Treasury under the heading of -“Military Occupation Costs Incurred ‘Outside’ The Netherlands,” and this -was independent of payments already made by that country for the -occupation costs. - -2) By a decision of the Reich Commissioner, under date of 31 March 1941, -reported in the _Verordnungsblatt_ in France, Number 14, which I submit -to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-124, payment operations with the -Reich were no longer to pass through the clearing exchange but to be -operated directly from bank to bank, which would create direct credits -of the Netherlands banks on the German banks at the imposed exchange of -100 Reichsmark for 75.36 guilders. - -3) By a decree of the same date, 31 March 1941, which I submit as -Document Number RF-125, the tax on blocked marks, created on 8 October -1940 by the Netherlands authorities, was abolished. - -Faced with this situation, particularly dangerous to the Netherlands -treasury, Mr. Trip resigned his position as Secretary General for -Finance and President of The Netherlands Bank. - -The Reich Commissioner replaced him with Rost von Tonningen, a notorious -collaborator who complied with all the demands of the occupying power. - -As the private banks were unwilling to keep credits in marks at a rate -very disadvantageous to the real parity of 100 Reichsmark to 75.36 -guilders, they transferred their credits in marks to the Bank of The -Netherlands. The credit account of the Institute of Exports to Germany, -through operations with that country, rose considerably; while the -credit balance as of 1 April 1941 amounted to 235 million guilders, it -was to rise by 1 May 1945, to 4,488 million guilders. - -According to information given by the Netherlands Government, this -credit was accounted for by purchases of all kinds of merchandise made -by the Germans in Holland, of transferable stock or other valuable -papers, by payment of services imposed upon Dutch enterprises, the wages -of workers deported to Germany, and the liquidation debts incurred by -the occupiers. - -Apart from these two methods—indemnities for the occupation troops and -clearing—the Germans procured resources for themselves in another -way—by imposing collective fines, and this in violation of the -provisions of Article 50 of the Hague Convention. - -In the course of the occupation, under every pretext, the Germans -imposed, by way of reprisal or intimidation, considerable fines upon the -municipalities. These fines had to be paid by the inhabitants, with the -exception of persons of German nationality, members of pro-Nazi -associations (NSB, Waffen-SS, NSKK, Society for Technical Aid Services -of the Dutch-German cultural community), and persons working for the -Germans. According to information which has been obtained up to the -present, of only 62 municipalities the total fines thus imposed amounted -to a minimum of 20,243,024 guilders. This is based on testimony of the -Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-126. - -From the same testimony, in the archives forgotten by the Germans at The -Hague, there have been discovered two copies of letters relative to -these collective fines. According to the first of these copies, which is -a letter of 8 March 1941, collective fines amounting to 18 million -guilders had been raised at the beginning of the year 1941. From the -second, we learn that Hitler had given the order to employ this sum for -National Socialist propaganda in the Netherlands. I quote: - - “Reich Commissioner, The Hague, 1808, 8 March 1941. - - “To Liaison Headquarters, Berlin, 1720 hours; to be submitted - immediately to Reichsleiter M. Bormann. - - “A sum of 18.5 million guilders representing contributions - exacted as reprisals from some Dutch cities, will arrive in the - next few days. The Reich Commissioner is inquiring whether the - Führer has earmarked this sum for a special purpose or if it is - to be used in the same way as the Führer has previously ordered - in the case of confiscated enemy property. At that time the - Führer stipulated that these sums should be spent in the - Netherlands for the needs of the community under the proper - political considerations. - - “Heil Hitler!”—Signed—“Schmidt, Münster, Commissioner - General.” - -This, then, is the translation of the answer, Document Number RF-126: - - “Obersalzberg, 19 March 1941, 1000; Number 4. - - “Reichsleiter M. Bormann. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment! Some of the copies which you have just -submitted to us don’t seem to be accurate and the passage which you have -just been reading is omitted from some of them. - -[_Another copy of the document was presented to the President._] - -I now have another copy of the document from which you have read. The -two copies which have been handed up are not identical. - -M. GERTHOFFER: The document has possibly been improperly numbered. There -are two documents, Number RF-126, which should have been indicated as -RF-126(1), and RF-126(2). The representative of the Government of The -Netherlands certifies the accuracy of the translation of the first copy; -and in the second RF-126 document the same representative of the -Netherlands Government certifies the existence of the copy of the answer -from the headquarters of the Führer. - -THE PRESIDENT: The first document is the one you have just read out. The -second document begins with the words, “J’ai soumis aujourd’hui.” Is -that the second document to which you are referring? - -M. GERTHOFFER: It is the second document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Could we see the originals? They are two different -documents, are they? But they both begin in exactly the same way. - -M. GERTHOFFER: The two documents have been submitted by the Netherlands -Government. The representative of the Government of The Netherlands who -has delivered them certifies that these two documents were found in the -Netherlands among German papers. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on. - -M. GERTHOFFER: The Dutch Government was obliged to make important -payments into the German account; and in the reports submitted as -Document Number RF-123, it is clearly stated that: - -1) The Germans required that a sum of 300 million guilders, which was -written to the credit of the Bank of The Netherlands, be used for the -needs of their army of occupation outside the Netherlands and that a sum -of 76 million guilders in gold be deposited for the same use. The total -which the Netherlands had to pay under this pretext, namely, the -maintenance of armies of occupation in other countries, was 376 million -guilders. - -2) From June 1941 on, the Netherlands was obliged to pay, as a -contribution to the expenses of the war against Russia, a monthly sum of -37 million guilders, of which a part was payable in gold. The total of -the sum that Germany raised under this heading is 1,696 million -guilders. - -3) The Bank of The Netherlands was obliged to undertake the redemption -of Reichskreditkasse notes to the sum of 133 million guilders. - -4) The costs of the civilian German government in Holland were charged -to that country and amounted to 173 million guilders. - -5) The Dutch Treasury was, moreover, obliged to pay 414 million guilders -to the Reich account, covering divers expenses, such as wages of Dutch -workers deported to Germany, the costs of evacuation of certain regions, -costs of the demolition of fortifications, so-called costs for guarding -railroads, funds placed at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner, and -for various industries utilized by the Germans. - -6) The Germans in July 1940 seized 816 bars of gold bullion belonging to -the Bank of The Netherlands, which were in the wreck of a Dutch ship -sunk at Rotterdam, which represented, including costs of recovery, 21 -million guilders. - -7) The Government of The Netherlands was obliged to bear annual expenses -of 1,713 million guilders to assure the financing of new administrative -services imposed on Holland by the occupying power. - -In this way, Holland lost 8,565 million guilders. Altogether, including -the raising of the gold from a ship sunk in the Meuse, the payments -actually made to Germany amount to 11,380 million guilders. If these -costs are added to the costs of occupation and clearing, the total of -the financial charges imposed on Holland during the occupation amounts -to the sum of 22,224 million guilders. - -These operations had serious consequences for the economy of the -Netherlands. Indeed, the gold supply, which on 1 April 1940 amounted to -1,236 million guilders, had, by 1 April 1945, fallen to 932 million -guilders, owing to German levies. - -The paper money in circulation, on the contrary, had risen from 1,127 -million guilders on 1 April 1940, to 5,468 million guilders on 1 April -1945. - -When the Germans occupied the Netherlands, a great portion of the gold -of the Bank of The Netherlands had been sent abroad. - -However, the Germans, under various pretexts, seized all the gold that -was found in the vaults of the bank. I recall that, under the heading of -indemnity for occupation, they collected 75 million gold guilders; and -for the forced contribution of the Netherlands in the war against -Russia, they demanded about 14.4 million gold guilders. - -Rost von Tonningen, Secretary General of Finance and President of the -Bank of The Netherlands, appointed by the Germans, wrote on 18 December -1943 to the Reich Commissioner that there had not been any gold in -Holland since the preceding March. The copy of this letter is submitted -as Document Number RF-127. - -A document discovered by the United States Army, listed under Number -ECR-174, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-128, consists of a report -of the Commissioner of the Bank of The Netherlands of 12 June 1941. It, -too, states that the gold reserve of the Bank of The Netherlands -amounted, on 12 June 1941, to 1,021.8 million guilders, of which only -134.6 million guilders were in Holland, the rest being either in -England, South Africa, or the United States. The same report specifies -that all the gold in Holland had been removed. - -Not only did the Germans seize the gold of the Bank of The Netherlands, -but they also made requisitions of the gold and other means of foreign -payment in the possession of the population. The occupying power obliged -private individuals to deposit gold which was in their possession with -the Bank of The Netherlands, after which this gold was requisitioned and -handed over to the Reichsbank. A sum of approximately 71.3 million -guilders was paid in this way to the public in exchange for the -requisitioned gold. - -In the same way also the Germans bought from the public various foreign -stocks to a sum of 13,224,000 guilders, and Swedish Government -securities to a sum of 4,623,000 guilders. - -With important financial means which they had at their disposal, the -Germans proceeded to make large purchases in Holland. Such purchases, -made with funds extorted from the Netherlands, cannot be considered as -having been made in exchange for a real equivalent, but realized only by -fictitious payments. - -The Germans, in addition to numerous cases of requisitions which were -followed by no kind of settlement, proceeded to illicit purchases on the -black market and purchases outwardly regular. They thus procured a -quantity of things of all kinds, leaving to the population only a -minimum of products insufficient to insure their vital needs. - -In the second chapter of this presentation we shall examine the illicit -purchases on the black market; and in a third chapter, the purchases -that were carried out in seemingly regular ways. - -Chapter 2, the black market. - -As in all other occupied countries, in Holland the Germans seized -considerable quantities of merchandise on the black market, in violation -of the legislation on rationing which they themselves had imposed. - -It has not been possible, in view of the clandestine nature of the -operations, to determine even approximately the quantities of all kinds -of objects which the Germans seized by this dishonest means. However, -the secret report of the German Colonel Veltjens, which I had the honor -of submitting this morning under Exhibit Number RF-112 (Document Number -PS-1765) gives us for a period of 5 months, from July to the end of -November, some indications of the scope of the German purchases. I quote -a passage from the Veltjens report: - - “In the Netherlands, since the beginning of the action, the - following purchases were made and paid for by ordinary bank - remittances: Non-ferrous metals, 6,706,744 Reichsmark; textiles, - 55,285,568 Reichsmark; wool, 753,878 Reichsmark; leather, skins, - and hides, 4,723,130 Reichsmark; casks, 254,982 Reichsmark; - furniture, 272,990 Reichsmark; food and comestibles, 590,859 - Reichsmark; chemical and cosmetic products, 152,191 Reichsmark; - various iron and steel wares, 3,792,166 Reichsmark; rags, - 543,416 Reichsmark; motor oil, 52,284 Reichsmark; uncut - diamonds, 25,064 Reichsmark; sundries, 531,890 Reichsmark. - Total: 73,685,162 Reichsmark.” - -These purchases were paid for by checks on the banks. A large quantity -of other merchandise, the amount of which it has not been possible to -determine, was paid for by cash with guilders coming from the so-called -occupation indemnity. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. GERTHOFFER: In Chapter 3, which deals with the economic plundering of -the Netherlands, we will treat the question of purchases of apparent -regularity from information provided for us by the Government of The -Netherlands. - -Industrial production. - -From testimony given by the representative of the Dutch Government, -which I submit as Document Number RF-129, it is clear that the Germans -utilized to their own profit the greater part of the industrial -potential of the Netherlands; all important stocks which were in the -factories were thus absorbed. The value of these stocks was not less -than 800 million guilders. Moreover, the occupants proceeded to the -removal of a large amount of machinery. In certain cases these -requisitions were not even followed by fictitious settlements. It has -not yet been possible to establish a balance sheet of these spoliations, -which often included all the machinery of an industry. - -As an example, we may indicate that on a requisition order of 4 March -1943, coming from the Reich Commissioner, all the machinery and -technical equipment, including the drawings and blueprints of all the -workshops and accessories of the blast furnaces of an important factory, -were removed without any indemnity and transported to the vicinity of -Brunswick for the Hermann Göring Works. This is shown in the document I -submit as Document Number RF-130. - -The Germans had set up in all the occupied countries a certain number of -organizations charged specially with the pillaging of machines. They had -given them the name of Machine Pool Office. These organizations, which -were under the armament inspection, received demands from German -industry for means of production and had to fulfill these demands by -requisitions on the occupied countries. - -Moreover, groups of technicians were charged with locating, dismantling, -and transporting the machinery to Germany. The organization of these -official groups of pillagers can be learned from German documents which -are to be brought to your attention when the special case of Belgium -will be outlined to you. - -We learn from the report of 1 March 1944, addressed to the military -commandant, that the Machine Pool Office of The Hague could satisfy only -a small proportion of the demands. Thus, under date of 1 January 1944, -these demands totalled 677 million Reichsmark, whereas in the month of -January only 61 million marks worth of machinery had been delivered as -against the new demands of 87 million which made a total demand for -machinery of 703 million Reichsmark at the end of January 1944. This is -shown in a document submitted as Document Number RF-131. - -Before leaving the Netherlands the Germans effected large-scale -destruction with a strategic aim, so they said, but above all with the -desire to do damage. When they demolished factories, they removed -beforehand and transported to Germany the machinery which they could -dismantle, as well as the raw materials. They acted in this manner -particularly with respect to the Phillips factories in Eindhoven, -Hilversum, and Bussum; the oil dumps of Amsterdam and Pernes; the -armament factories of Breda, Tilburg, Berg-op-Zoom, and Dordrecht. These -facts are dealt with in the report of the economic officer attached to -the German military commander in Holland, under date of 9 October 1944, -which I submit as Document Number RF-132. - -The same report gives some information on the organization of German -looters specialized in the removal of machinery. I give here some -extracts: - - “The Phillips Works at Eindhoven was the first and the most - important military objective to be dealt with.” - -A little farther on the writer continues: - - “Before the invasion by the enemy we succeeded in destroying - these important continental works for the manufacture of radio - valves, lamps, and radio apparatus. This was done after - Volunteer Commando 7”—Fwi.Kdo. 7—“had previously removed the - most valuable metals and special machines.” - -Farther on he writes: - - “Already on 7 September a commando unit transported in trucks to - the Reich most important non-ferrous metals (wolfram, manganese, - copper) and very valuable apparatus from the Phillips Works. - Volunteer Commando 7 continued to participate in the transfer of - finished and semi-finished products as well as machines from the - Phillips Works. Due to the enemy’s occupation of Eindhoven, the - removal came to a stop. Then the clearing out of the branch - factories of Phillips at Hilversum and Bussum took place. Here - it was possible to remove completely all stocks of non-ferrous - metal products, finished and semi-finished goods, machinery, and - blueprints and designs necessary for production. - - “At the same time removal commandos were detailed to the heads - of the various provincial branch offices under the - representative of the Reich Ministry of Armaments and War - Production in the Netherlands. - - “In agreement with the forementioned services and the competent - civil offices, these commandos carried through the removal of - important raw materials and products, as well as machinery. - Through the unswerving and commendable zeal of officers, - officials, Sonderführer, and enlisted men it was possible, - during the month of September, to remove to the Reich - considerable stocks of raw materials and products and to supply - the troops with useful material. This action was initiated and - directed in the western and southern districts of the - Netherlands by the officer in charge of volunteers in the - Netherlands.” - -Then the writer ends, by saying: - - “For the task of evacuation and for the preparation of the ARLZ - measures within the area of 15th Army Command, a squad under the - command of Captain Rieder was detached by Volunteer Commando 7 - which also had to act as liaison with the quartermaster staff of - the 15th Army Command. In this case, too, in close co-operation - with the civil officers and Department IVa of 15th Army Command, - good work was done by the removal of raw materials and scarce - goods as well as machinery. These actions commenced only at the - end of the month covered by this report.” - -Requisition of raw materials. - -Together with the removal of machinery the Government of The Netherlands -gives us exact figures on the stocks of raw materials and manufactured -articles. Apart from the stocks located in the factories, the Germans -acquired considerable quantities of raw materials and manufactured -articles amounting to not less than 1,000 million guilders. This -evaluation does not include the destruction resulting from military -operations, which ranges around 300 million guilders. - -Agriculture. - -The Germans proceeded to make requisitions and wholesale purchases of -agricultural produce and livestock. A final estimate of these -requisitions, amounting to a minimum of 300 million guilders, is as yet -impossible. To give an idea of their magnitude we point out that at the -end of the year of 1943 the Germans had seized 600,000 hogs, 275,000 -cows, and 30,000 tons of preserved meats, as is given in the testimony -of the representative of the Netherlands Government, which I submit as -Document Number RF-133. - -In passing, we point out—although this question will be taken up again -by my colleague in his presentation of war crimes against persons—that -on 17 April 1944, without any apparent strategic reason, 20 hectares of -cultivated lands were flooded at Wieringermeer. - -Transport and communications. - -The Germans made enormous requisitions of transport and communication -material. It is not yet possible to draw up an exact inventory of them. -Nevertheless, the information given by the Netherlands Government makes -it possible to form an idea of the magnitude of these spoliations. - -I submit as Document Number RF-134 information given by the -representative of the Netherlands Government concerning transport and -communication. This is a summary of it: - -(a) Railways—of 890 locomotives, 490 were requisitioned; of 30,000 -freight cars, 28,950 were requisitioned; of 1,750 passenger cars, 1,446 -were requisitioned; of 300 electric trains, 215 were requisitioned; of -37 Diesel-engine trains, 36 were requisitioned. In general, the little -material left by the Germans was badly damaged either by wear and tear, -by military operations, or by sabotage. In addition to rolling stock, -the Germans sent to the Reich considerable quantities of rails, signals, -cranes, turntables, repair cars, _et cetera_. - -(b) Tramways—the equipment was removed from The Hague and Rotterdam to -German cities. Thus, for example, some 50 tramcars with motors and 42 -trailers were sent to Bremen and Hamburg. A considerable amount of -rails, cables, and other accessories were removed and transported to -Germany. The motor buses of the tramway companies were likewise taken by -the occupying power. - -(c) The Germans seized the greater part of the motorcars, motorcycles, -and about 1 million bicycles. They left the population only those -machines which would not run. - -(d) Navigation—the Germans seized a considerable number of barges and -river boats, as well as a considerable part of the merchant fleet, -totalling about 1.5 million tons. - -(e) Postal equipment—the Germans seized a large quantity of telephone -and telegraph apparatus, cables, and other accessories, which has not -yet been computed; 600,000 radio sets were confiscated. - -I now come to Chapter 49, miscellaneous spoliation. - -Forced labor demanded by the occupier. - -From information given by the Netherlands Government, which I submit as -Document Number RF-135, a great number of Dutch workers were obliged to -work either in Holland or in Germany. About 550,000 were deported to the -Reich, which represents a considerable number of hours of work lost to -the national production of the Netherlands. - -Plunder of the royal palaces. - -The furniture, private archives, stable equipment and carriages, and -wine cellars of the royal house were plundered by the Germans. In -particular, the Palace of Noordeinde was completely looted of its -contents, including furniture, linen, silverware, paintings, tapestries, -art objects, and household utensils. A certain number of similar objects -were removed from the Palace of Het Loo and were to be used in a -convalescent home for German generals. - -The archives of the royal family likewise were stolen. This is shown by -a report given by the representative of the Netherlands Government, -which I submit as Document Number RF-136. - -Pillage of the city of Arnhem. - -Besides numerous cases of individual looting, which are not dealt with -in this present statement, there was a systematically organized pillage -of entire cities. In this manner the town of Arnhem was despoiled in -October and November 1944. The Germans brought in miners from Essen who, -under military orders, proceeded in specialized gangs to dismantle all -the removable furniture and send it and objects of all kinds to Germany. -This is shown in the testimony given by the representative of the -Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-137. - -The consequences of economic plundering in the Netherlands are -considerable. We shall just mention that the enormous decrease of the -national capital will result in production being below the needs of the -country for many years yet to come. But the gravest consequence is that -affecting the public health, which is irreparable. - -The excessive rationing, over many years, of food, clothing, and fuel, -ordered by the occupiers to increase the amount of spoliation, has -brought about an enfeeblement of the population. The average calorie -consumption by the inhabitant, which varied between 2,800 and 3,000, -dropped in large proportions to about 1,800 calories, finally to fall -even to 400 calories in April 1945. - -Starting from the summer of 1944, the food situation became more and -more serious. The Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, forbade the -transport of foodstuffs between the western and northern zones of the -country. This measure, which was not justified by any military -operations, seems only to have been dictated by hatred for the -population, only to persecute and intimidate them, to weaken and -terrorize them. - -Not until about December 1944 was this inhuman measure lifted; but it -was too late. Famine had already become general. The death rate in the -cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Delft and Gouda -increased considerably, rising from 198 to 260 percent. Diseases which -had almost been eliminated from these regions reappeared. Such a -situation will have irreparable consequences for the future of the -population. These facts are given in two reports which I submit as -Documents Numbers RF-139 and 140. - -By ordering such severe rationing measures in order to get for -themselves products which were indispensable to the existence of the -Netherlands, which is contrary to all principles of international law, I -may say that the German leaders committed one of their gravest crimes. - -My statements concerning Holland are concluded. My colleague, M. -Delpech, will now state the case for Belgium. - -M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. -President, Gentlemen, I have the honor of presenting to the Tribunal a -statement on the economic plundering of Belgium. - -As early as 1940 the National Socialist leaders intended to invade -Belgium, Holland, and northern France. They knew that they should find -there raw materials, equipment, and the factories which would enable -them to increase their war potential. - -As soon as Belgium had been occupied, the German military administration -did its best to reap the maximum benefit. To this end the German leaders -took a series of measures to block all existing resources and to seize -all means of payment. Important supplies built up during the years 1936 -to 1938 were the object of enormous requisitions. The machines and -equipment of numerous enterprises were dismantled and sent to Germany, -bringing about the closing down of numerous factories and in many -sectors an enforced consolidation. - -Given the highly industrial character of this country, the occupying -authorities imposed, under threats of various kinds, a very heavy -tribute upon Belgian industries. Nor was agriculture spared. - -The third part of the French economic exposé deals with a study of all -these measures. This will be the subject of four chapters. - -Chapter 1 deals with the German seizure of the means of payment. The -second chapter will be devoted to clandestine purchases and an account -of the black market. Chapter 3 will deal with purchases of apparent -regularity while the fourth chapter will concern impressment. - -In a fifth chapter the acquisition of Belgian investments in foreign -concerns will be presented to the Tribunal, before concluding and -emphasizing the effect of the German intrusion on the public health. -Finally, a few remarks will be presented concerning the conduct of the -Germans after they had annexed the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. - -Chapter 1, German seizure of means of payment. - -To enslave the country from an economic point of view, the most simple -procedure was to secure the possession of the greater part of the means -of payment and to make impossible the export of currency and valuables -of all kinds. - -There is an ordinance of 17 June 1940 which forbids the export of -currency and valuables of all kinds. This ordinance was published in the -_Verordnungsblatt_ for Belgium, Northern France, and Luxembourg and will -hereafter be called by its usual abbreviated form VOBEL. This ordinance -was published in VOBEL, Number 3, and was submitted under Document -Number RF-99. In the VOBEL of the same day appeared a notice dated 9 May -1940, which regulated the issuing of Reichskreditkasse notes to provide -the occupation troops with legal tender. By this means the Germans made -possible the buying, without supplying any equivalent, all they desired -in a country abounding with products of all kinds, without the -inhabitants being able to protect their possessions against the invader. - -The occupier used, in addition, three other methods for securing the -greater part of the means of payment. These three methods were: The -creation of an issuing bank, the imposition of war tribute under the -pretext of maintaining occupation troops, and the working of a system of -clearing to their profit alone. These measures will be fully dealt with -in three sections which now follow. - -Establishment of an issuing bank. - -As soon as they arrived in Belgium the Germans established an office for -supervising banks, which was entrusted at the same time with the control -of the National Bank of Belgium. This was ordered on 14 June -1940—VOBEL, Number 2, which is submitted as Document Number RF-141. - -At this time the directorate of the National Bank of Belgium was outside -the occupied territories; but the amount of notes on hand would have -been insufficient to insure normal circulation, as a great number of -Belgians had fled before the invasion, taking with them a large quantity -of paper money. These are, at least, the reasons which the Germans put -forward for establishing an issuing bank by the ordinance of 27 June -1940, published in VOBEL, Numbers 4 and 5, which I submit as Document -Number RF-142. - -By virtue of this last ordinance, 27 June 1940, the new issuing bank -with a capital of 150 million Belgian francs, 20 percent of which had -been issued in coin, received the monopoly for issuing paper money in -Belgian francs. As a matter of fact, the National Bank of Belgium no -longer had the right to issue money. The cover of the issuing bank was -not represented by a gold balance but: 1) by credits from discount -operations and loans granted in conformity with Article 8 of the new -statutes; 2) monies owed to the National Bank of Belgium, as well as -coin which was in circulation for the account of the public treasury; 3) -finally, the third means of cover—foreign currency and francs, -particularly German money, including Reichskreditkasse notes as well as -assets at the Reichsbank, at the Office of Compensation for the Reich, -and the Reichskreditkasse. - -The German Commissioner who had been appointed by a decree of 26 June -1940 became the controller of the issuing bank—decree of 26 June 1940, -published in VOBEL, Number 3, Page 88, and submitted as Document Number -RF-143. - -After the return to Belgium of the directors of the National Bank, on 10 -July 1940, an agreement between this bank and the new issuing bank was -effected by the nomination of the head of the new issuing bank to the -position of director of the National Bank of Belgium. - -The issuing bank proceeded to put out a large amount of notes, so much -so that on 8 May 1940 the currency in circulation amounted to 29,800 -million Belgian francs. On 29 December 1943 it amounted to 83,200 -million Belgian francs, and on 31 August 1944 it was 100,200 million -Belgian francs, that is to say, an increase of 236 percent. - -The issuing bank functioned; but not without certain difficulties, -either with the military command, its own staff, or with the National -Bank of Belgium. Actually, besides its function of issuing, the new bank -had as a principal function operations relating to postal orders and to -currency, as well as operations with German authorities, notably as -concerned the occupation indemnity and, above all, clearing. - -The National Bank of Belgium lost its right to issue paper money but -resumed its traditional operations for private as well as state -accounts, particularly transactions on the open market. - -These data, Gentlemen, are corroborated by the final report of the -German military administration in Belgium, ninth part, dealing with -currency and finance. This final report of the German military -administration in Belgium was discovered by the United States Army, and -it is a document to which we shall refer many times. It is Document -Number ECH-5 and is submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-144. - -The ninth part, which is of interest here, was written by three chiefs -of the administration section of Brussels: Wetter, Hofrichter, and Jost. - -In spite of the establishment of the issuing bank, Reichskreditkasse -notes were valid in Belgium until August 1942; but it was the National -Bank of Belgium that was obliged to absorb these notes in September -1944, and on account of this, Belgian economy suffered a loss of 3,567 -million Belgian francs. This number is given by Wetter in the foregoing -report, Page 112, the excerpt of the report being submitted as Document -Number RF-145. - -Moreover, from information given by the Belgian Government, the issuing -bank had in hand at the moment of liberation of the territory a sum -totalling 644 million in Reichskreditkasse notes; and further, it had -assets in a transfer account of 12 million Reichsmark on the books of -the Reichskreditkasse, that is to say, a total loss of 656 million -Belgian francs—the figure given in a report of the Belgian Government, -which is submitted as Document Number RF-146. - -Occupation costs. - -Let us now take the occupation costs. Article 49 of the Hague Convention -stipulates that if the occupier makes a levy in money, it will be only -for the needs of the army of occupation or for the administration of the -territory. The occupier can, therefore, impose a tax for the maintenance -of his army; but this must not exceed the effective force strictly -necessary. On the other hand, the words “needs of the army of -occupation” do not mean the expenses of armament and equipment but -solely the costs of billeting, food, and normal pay, which excludes, in -all cases, luxury expenses. - -Moreover, Article 52 authorizes the occupying authority to exact, for -the use of its army, requisitions in kind and in service on the express -condition that they shall be proportionate to the resources of the -country and that they should not involve the population with the -obligation to take part in military operations against their own -country. The same Article 52 stipulates, moreover, that levies in kind -will be, as far as possible, paid in cash. - -Consequently the Germans exacted a monthly indemnity of 1,000 million up -to August 1941. On that date the indemnity was increased to 1,500 -million per month. By the end of August 1944, the payments under that -designation totaled 67,000 million Belgian francs. This number cannot be -contested by the Defense, since in the report quoted, Pages 103 and -following, the said Wetter wrote in June 1944 that the total sum of -Belgian francs paid for the army of occupation was 64,181 million—the -passage in the report is submitted as Document Number RF-147. - -But this sum of 64,000 million was completely disproportionate to the -needs of the occupying army. This is shown in the report of Wetter, in a -passage which is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-148. On Page 245 of this -report it is said that on 17 January 1941 the general who was -Commander-in-Chief in Belgium had asked the High Command of the Army if -the indemnity covered only the expenses of occupation. This point of -view was not accepted by the commanding general, who, by order of 29 -October 1941, specified that the indemnity of occupation was to be used -not only for the needs of the occupying army but also for those of the -operating armies. Moreover, on Page 11 of the original German text of -the same report it is written—and I shall read to the Tribunal an -excerpt which will be found in the document book under Document Number -RF-149, the second paragraph: - - “As the increase in the expenses of the Wehrmacht made it clear - that it would be impossible to manage with this amount, the - military administration demanded that the calculation of the - occupation costs should be straightened out by deducting all - expenses foreign to the occupation proper. This concerned - especially the larger purchases of all kinds which the military - services made in Belgium, such as horses, motor vehicles, - equipment, all of which was designated for other territories and - was written off as occupation costs. - - “By a decision of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, dated 11 - June 1941, the financing of other than true occupation costs was - to be met by clearing. To comply with this decree, beginning in - July 1941, the administration of the military commander ordered - a monthly report to be rendered of all expenses other than those - required for the occupation but which so far had been paid under - the account of occupation costs, in order to have these expenses - refunded through clearing. Thanks to this, large sums could be - recovered and put into the account of occupation costs.” - -Before concluding the examination of this point concerning war tribute, -that tribute called occupation costs, it is necessary to point out that -the Germans had already demanded, by the decree of 17 December 1940, -submitted as Document Number RF-150, that the costs of billeting their -troops should be charged to Belgium. Owing to this, the country had to -meet expenses totalling 5,900 million francs, which went for billeting -German troops, costs of installation, supplies, and furniture. - -In his report Wetter writes on Page 104—the excerpt submitted as -Document Number RF-147—that at the end of June 1944 the Belgian -payments for billeting troops totalled 5,423 million francs. - -Clearing. - -We now come to the third part of German plundering—clearing. The -issuing of Reichskreditkasse notes and the war tribute, called -“occupation costs,” were not sufficient for Germany. Her leaders created -a system of clearing which enabled them to procure, unduly, means of -payment totalling 62,200 million Belgian francs. - -As soon as they arrived in Belgium, by the decrees of 10 July, 2 August, -and 5 December, 1940—which appear in the document book under the -Numbers RF-151, RF-152, and RF-153—the Germans specified: - -1) That all payments on debts of people resident in Belgium to their -creditors in Germany had to be paid into an account called the “Deutsche -Verrechnungskasse, Berlin.” This was an open account on the books of the -National Bank of Belgium in Brussels, an account kept in belgas in spite -of the prohibition on currency of 17 June 1940, the prohibition to which -I have already referred concerning the blocking of means of payment in -the country. - -By the decision of 4 August 1940, it was moreover prescribed that the -carrying out of clearing would henceforth no longer be entrusted to the -National Bank of Belgium but to the issuing bank in Brussels, which, as -I have already had the honor of pointing out, had been established by -the occupying power and was under their absolute control. - -2) The Germans laid down a second measure whereby all debtors resident -in the Reich should pay their Belgian creditors by way of the open -account at the issuing bank in Brussels, at the following rate of -exchange; 100 belgas to 40 marks, that is to say, 1 mark for 12.50 -Belgian francs. - -These arrangements, moreover, were extended to the countries occupied by -Germany with a view to facilitating their operations in those countries; -they were even extended to certain neutral countries by various similar -decrees appearing in the ordinance book. - -The mission of the issuing bank in Brussels consisted, therefore, on the -one hand, of receiving payments from all persons or agencies established -in Belgium which had foreign engagements and, on the other hand, to pay -those persons or agencies established in Belgium which had foreign -credit. - -In other words, every time an exporter delivered goods to an importer of -another country which belonged to the clearing system, it was the -issuing bank which settled the invoice and which entered as equivalent, -in the ledgers, a corresponding credit at the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse -in Berlin—the German Clearing Institute in Berlin. In the case of -imports, the inverse procedure was followed. - -In fact, under the German direction, this system functioned to the -detriment of the Belgian community which, at the moment of the -liberation, was creditor in clearing to the extent of 62,665 million -Belgian francs. It was the National Bank of Belgium which had been -forced to make advances to the issuing bank to balance the account of -the German Clearing Institute. - -A large number of operations made through clearing had no commercial -character whatever but were purely and simply military and political -expenses. - -From information given by the Belgian Government, the clearing -operations could be summarized in the following manner—and I take the -figures from a report of the Belgian Government previously cited, which -has been presented as Document Number RF-146: Of the total transactions, -93 percent were Belgium-German clearing operations; merchandise amounted -to 93 percent, and services 91 percent. - -If one considers the part taken respectively by merchandise, services, -or capital, one obtains a very significant picture. The entire clearing -transactions of Belgium with foreign countries totalled, on 2 September -1944, the sum of 61,636 million Belgian francs, of which 57,298 million -were for Belgium-German operations, 4,000 million only with France, -1,000 million with the Netherlands, and 929 million with other -countries. - -It is only in the sector of goods and services that the want of -equilibrium is apparent due in large measure to requisitions of property -and services made by Germany for her own account. It is known that the -so-called exports affected especially metals and metal products, -machines, and textile products, nine-tenths of which were seized by the -Reich, which made itself thereby guilty of real spoliation. - -As to the transfer of capital, during the first period of the occupation -it was particularly intense. It concerned the forced realization of -Belgian capital in foreign countries, as well as the forced cession to -German groups of Belgian assets blocked in Germany. No effective -compensation was given in exchange. The transfers made for services were -principally for payments for Belgian labor in foreign countries. - -The credit balance of these services on 2 September 1944 is as follows, -in Belgian francs: Total clearing operations dealing with services, -20,016 million—that is to say, for payment of labor 73 percent of the -total. For Germany alone, 18,227 million—that is, 72 percent of the -total amount. For France only 1,621 million Belgian francs—that is to -say, a very small part. - -Not content with requisitioning workers for forced labor in Germany or -in the occupied territories, the Germans compelled Belgium to bear the -financial burden and imposed it either through the liquidation of the -transferred savings in clearing or by the remittance of Belgian notes to -the Directorate of the Reich Bank in Berlin for payment of workers in -national currency. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to go into these clearing -operations again? In each case of the various countries which have been -dealt with, the same clearing operations have taken place, have they -not? Then perhaps it is really unnecessary to do it over again for -Belgium. - -M. DELPECH: Very well, Your Honor. At all events, the Germans recognized -the fact, and the figures taken from the report previously cited support -the conclusions of our statement. - -Before ending this chapter concerning German seizure of the means of -payment, it is fitting that the attention of the Tribunal be brought to -the order of 22 July 1940, by which the Germans fixed the rate of the -Belgian franc at 8 Reichspfennig, that is to say 12.50 francs per mark; -and in the forementioned report Wetter writes concerning this matter, on -Pages 37 and 38, a passage which I ask the Tribunal’s permission to read -and which is in the document book as Document Number RF-158. - - “The _de facto_ maintenance of the pre-war parity was moreover - of considerable political importance because a large group of - the population would have considered a sharp devaluation or a - repeated change of parity as a maneuver of exploitation.” - -The following observation in connection with this conception must be -made: The occupiers had no need in Belgium to decree, with the view of -promoting their economic exploitation, that the Belgian franc should -have a lesser value when, as a matter of fact—contrary to what occurred -in France—they had, at the moment they entered Belgium, instituted new -currency over which they had the control. - -Lastly, let us mention that Germany obliged the Vichy Government to -deliver 221,730 kilos of gold amounting, at the 1939 value, to 9,500 -million francs; but as France had returned this gold to the Bank of -Belgium, this question will be treated under the economic exploitation -of France. - -Recapitulation. - -To sum up, the means of payment seized by the army of occupation may be -seen from the following figures: - -Reichskreditkasse notes, 3,567 million; various bills and accounts on -the books of the Reichskreditkasse, 656 million; war tribute under the -pretext of occupation costs, 67,000 million; to which may be added the -credit balance of clearing 62,665 million; total (in Belgian francs), -133,888 million. - -The Germans thus seized no less than 130,000 million Belgian francs, -which they used for outwardly regular purchases, for payment of their -requisitions, and to make clandestine purchases on the black market. -These so-called purchases and requisitions will be treated in the -following chapters. - -Chapter 2, clandestine purchases, black market. - -As in all the other occupied territories, the Germans organized a black -market in Belgium as early as October 1941. - -According to a secret report on the black market, called “Final Report -of the Control Office of the Military Commander in Belgium and in the -North of France, Concerning the Legalized Emptying of the Black Market -in Belgium and in the North of France,” a report covering the period -from 13 March 1942 to 31 May 1943—Exhibit Number RF-159 (Document -Number ECH-7) in the document book—the reasons given by the Germans for -this organization of the black market are three in number: - -1) To check competition on the black market between various German -buyers; 2) to make the best use of the Belgian resources for the -purposes of German war economy; 3) to do away with the pressure -exercised on the general standard of prices and by this to avoid all -danger of inflation which would result in endangering German currency -itself. - -This same report tells us, Pages 3 and following, that an actual -administrative organization was set up by the Germans for carrying out -this policy. The bookkeeping was done by the Clearing Institute of the -Wehrmacht, which combined all the operations in its books. The direction -of purchases was regulated by a central organization, the name of which -changed as the years went by and which had a certain number of -organizations subordinate to it, particularly a whole series of -purchasing offices. - -The central organization was set up in accordance with the decree of the -military commander in Belgium, dated 20 February 1942. It was formed on -the 13th of the following March; and as soon as it was created it -received special directives from the delegate of the Reich Marshal, -Defendant Göring. This delegate was Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens, of whom -we spoke this morning. - -This organization was only established to co-ordinate the legalization -and direction of the black market, as had been determined upon, and -planned following conferences between the Commissioner General and the -Military Commander of Belgium with the Chief of the Armament Inspection. -According to the terms of that agreement, which reinforced a declaration -of 16 February 1942 emanating from the Reich Minister for Economics, the -aim was to drain the black market and in accordance with directives, in -a legal form, with the main idea of safeguarding the supply requirements -of the German Reich. - -This organization had its offices in Brussels. The purchases themselves -were regulated by a certain number of specialized offices, the list of -which is given on Page 5 of the forementioned report. These organisms -received their orders from the Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft, which has -already been mentioned at the beginning of the statement on the economic -exploitation of Western Europe. - -The role of Roges was very important in the organization of the black -market. In effect it was four-fold: - -1) The purchasing directives, once the authorization had been given by -the central office in Brussels, were transmitted by Roges to the proper -purchasing office. - -2) The delivery of goods bought and marked for the Reich were made -through Roges which took charge of their distribution in Germany. Pg578 - -3) Roges financed the operations. - -4) It was Roges which was entrusted with paying the difference between -the rate of purchase—generally very high because of the black market -rate—and the fixed official rate of sale on the German domestic market. -The difference was covered by an equalizing fund, supplied from the -occupation costs account, to which the Reich Minister of Finance put -sums at the disposal of Roges through the channel of the Ministry of -Armament. - -The forementioned report furnishes a complete series of interesting -particulars on the functioning of the central organization itself. It is -interesting to note that the central office in Brussels was instructed -by order of the Military Commander in Belgium, dated 3 November 1942, to -have a branch at Lille set up for the north of France. At the same time, -the Brussels office was authorized to instruct its branch office at -Lille. In the document book, under Document Number RF-160, a final -report of the Lille office is mentioned. This report, drawn up on 20 May -1943, gives a whole series of interesting particulars on the functioning -of this organization. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock now. M. Delpech, I think it would be the -wish of the Tribunal, if it were possible, for you to omit any parts of -this document which are on precisely the same principles with those -which have already been submitted to us in connection with the other -countries. If you could, I think that would be convenient for the -Tribunal. Of course, if there are any essential differences in the -treatment of Belgium then, no doubt, you would draw our attention to -them. - -M. DELPECH: Certainly, Your Honor. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, ‘Defense’ versus -‘Defence’. Unlike prior Blue Series volumes I and II, all French, German -and eastern European names and terms include accents and umlauts: hence -Führer and Göring, etc. throughout. - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in -the trial. - -An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document's presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 5)_, -by Various.] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Militar, by Various - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NUREMBERG TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOL 5 *** - -***** This file should be named 54917-0.txt or 54917-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/9/1/54917/ - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US. - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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