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diff --git a/old/54905-0.txt b/old/54905-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b2b5ee2..0000000 --- a/old/54905-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43777 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trials of War Criminals before the -Nuernberg Military Tribunals under, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Volume II - -Author: Various - -Release Date: June 14, 2017 [EBook #54905] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIALS--WAR CRIMINALS--LAW 10, VOL 2 *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US. - - - - - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIALS - OF - WAR CRIMINALS - BEFORE THE - NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS - UNDER - CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 - - - [Illustration] - - - VOLUME II - - - NUERNBERG - OCTOBER 1946-APRIL 1949 - - For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, - U.S. Government Printing Office - Washington 25, D. C. — Price $2.75 (Buckram) - - - - - CONTENTS - - - _The Medical Case_ - - (Introductory material and basic directives under which trials - were conducted together with Chapters I-VIII-E of Medical Case - are printed in Volume I.) - - Page - VIII. Evidence and Arguments on Important Aspects of the Case - (cont’d) 1 - F. Necessity 1 - G. Subjection to Medical Experimentation as Substitute - for Penalties 44 - H. Usefulness of the Experiments 61 - I. Medical Ethics 70 - 1. General Principles 70 - 2. German Medical Profession 86 - 3. Medical Experiments in other Countries 90 - IX. Ruling of the Tribunal on Count One of the Indictment 122 - X. Final Plea for Defendant Karl Brandt by Dr. Servatius 123 - XI. Final Statements of the Defendants, 19 July 1947 138 - XII. Judgment 171 - The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 172 - The Charge 173 - Count One 173 - Count Two and Three 174 - Count Four 180 - The Proof as to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 181 - Permissible Medical Experiments 181 - The Medical Service in Germany 184 - The Ahnenerbe Society 188 - Karl Brandt 189 - Handloser 198 - Rostock 208 - Schroeder 210 - Genzken 217 - Gebhardt 223 - Blome 228 - Rudolf Brandt 235 - Mrugowsky 241 - Poppendick 248 - Sievers 253 - Rose 264 - Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz 272 - Brack 277 - Becker-Freyseng 281 - Schaefer 285 - Hoven 286 - Beiglboeck 290 - Pokorny 292 - Oberheuser 294 - Fischer 296 - Sentences 298 - XIII. Petitions 301 - XIV. Affirmation of Sentences by the Military Governor of the - United States Zone of Occupation 327 - XV. Order of the United States Supreme Court Denying Writ of - Habeas Corpus 330 - Appendix 331 - Table of Comparative Ranks 331 - List of Witnesses in Case 1 332 - Index of Documents and Testimony 336 - - _The Milch Case_ - - Introduction 355 - Order Constituting Tribunal 357 - Members of Military Tribunal II 359 - Prosecution Counsel 359 - Defense Counsel 359 - I. Indictment 360 - II. Arraignment 365 - III. Opening Statements 366 - A. Opening Statement for the Prosecution 366 - B. Opening Statement for the Defense 377 - IV. Selections from the Documents and Testimony of Witnesses of - Prosecution and Defense 385 - A. Slave Labor 385 - 1. General Slave Labor Program in Germany 385 - 2. The Central Planning Board 444 - 3. The Jaegerstab 524 - 4. Generalluftzeugmeister 596 - B. Medical Experiments 623 - C. Curriculum Vitae and Excerpts from the Testimony of - the Defendant Milch 633 - V. Closing Statements 690 - A. Closing Statement of the Prosecution 690 - B. Closing Statement of the Defense 730 - VI. Final Statement of the Defendant, 25 March 1947 772 - VII. Judgment 773 - A. Opinion and Judgment of the United States Military - Tribunal II 773 - B. Concurring Opinion by Judge Michael A. Musmanno 797 - C. Concurring Opinion by Judge Fitzroy D. Phillips 860 - VIII. Petitions 879 - A. Extract from Petition for Clemency to Military - Governor of United States Zone of Occupation 879 - B. Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States - for Writ of Habeas Corpus 883 - IX. Affirmation of Sentence by the Military Governor of the - United States Zone of Occupation 887 - X. Order of the United States Supreme Court, 20 October 1947, - Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus 888 - Appendix 889 - List of Witnesses in Case 2 889 - Index of Documents and Testimony 891 - - - - - VIII. EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS ON - IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE CASE—Continued - - - F. Necessity - - a. Introduction - -The defense generally argued that the medical experiments took place -because of military necessity or the national emergency presented by -war. The defendant Sievers argued that his participation in various -experiments was a necessary part of his participation in a resistance -movement in Germany. The defendant Hoven argued that the concentration -camp inmates, who were killed by him or with his approval and knowledge, -were selected by the camp leadership which had been formed by the -political inmates themselves. Hoven also argued that the inmates killed -were all dangerous criminals who collaborated voluntarily with the SS, -and if they would not have been removed, the political inmates would -have been exterminated by these criminals and by the SS. He concluded -that it was therefore necessary, in order to prevent greater harm, -either to kill these “stool pigeons” personally or to give his approval -for their extermination. - -On the argument of military necessity and national emergency, extracts -from the final plea for the defendant Gebhardt are included on pages 5 -to 12. On the general question of necessity, extracts are included from -the examination of the defendant Karl Brandt by Judge Sebring on pages -29 to 30, and from the cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert -witness, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy on pages 42 to 44. The prosecution discussed -the general question of necessity in its opening statement. - -The argument of the defendant Sievers that his participation was -necessary in connection with resistance to the Nazi leadership appears -in his final plea, an extract from which is given on pages 13 to 25. -From the evidence supporting the claim of Sievers, extracts from the -testimony of defense witness Dr. Friedrich Hielscher are included on -pages 30 to 41. The prosecution’s reply to Sievers’ special defense was -made, in part, in the prosecution’s closing statement, an extract of -which appears on pages 4 to 5. The argument of the defendant Hoven that -the killing of concentration camp inmates, of which he was accused, was -justifiable homicide appears in his final plea, an extract of which is -set forth on pages 25 to 28. The prosecution’s reply to this special -defense is set forth in the closing brief against the defendant Hoven, -an extract of which will be found on pages 2 to 4. - - b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Prosecution - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT HOVEN_ - - * * * * * - -(Hoven) tried to justify the killings [of concentration camp inmates] by -stating that these inmates were informers, spies, and stool pigeons of -the SS and therefore had to be exterminated. He said that if they had -been permitted to carry on with their activities, the illegal camp -management would have been wiped out and the criminal inmates in the -camp would have gained the upper hand. Hoven’s attempt at justification -for the killing of inmates of concentration camps is, of course, no -defense. It may well be true that Hoven sympathized and even -collaborated with the illegal camp management. It may also be true that -some of his victims may have been killed by him on the basis of -suggestions put forward by this illegal camp management. But it goes -without saying that these political prisoners, who instigated the murder -of their opponents, were in no position to judge whether it was really -necessary to kill them for the sake of the camp community. They only -judged this emergency from their own point of view, i.e., from the point -of view of the benefit of themselves. Hoven himself had no judgment at -all in this respect and simply made himself the willing and bought tool -of a small clique in the camp, who undoubtedly often tried to eliminate -not only persons whose activities were considered detrimental to the -well-being of their fellow inmates, but also personal opponents and -enemies. That Hoven was corrupted by the inmates and paid for his -murders is proved by the testimony of several witnesses. - -Kogon testified: - - “I can only conclude that both motives, the political motive and - the motive of corruption, were active in the case of Dr. Hoven. - _If Dr. Hoven expressed any desire—and he expressed many - desires—then these wishes were always filled._” (_Tr. p. - 1213._) - - “_He himself expressed many wishes constantly and all possible - advantages were given him by such people whom he had saved._” - (_Tr. p. 1214._) - -Kirchheimer testified to the same effect. (_Tr. p. 1346._) The defense -witness Pieck painted pictures for Hoven and his family, and the defense -witness Horn in his affidavit stated that Hoven was very corrupt. The -prisoners knew it and they corrupted him in every possible manner and -made him gifts of furniture, underwear, and food. There were periods in -which complete workshops were erected for Hoven in which thirty or more -inmates were working. - -Pieter Schalker testified before the Dutch Bureau for the Investigation -of War Crimes in Amsterdam that Hoven played an exceptionally evil role -and had innumerable deaths on his conscience owing to completely -inadequate medical attention. In later years, when it became obvious -that Germany would be defeated, he changed his attitude towards the -inmates. (_NO-1063, Pros. Ex. 328._) When Schalker was interrogated by -the commissioner of the Tribunal on the motion of defense counsel, he -amplified his statement by saying that Hoven stole the food which was -furnished for the experimental subjects in Block 46 and also obtained -other items such as shoes, toys, and women’s clothing. - -The testimony of the affiant Ackermann, who was an inmate in the -pathological department under Hoven, proves that Hoven participated in -the customary brutal crimes in concentration camps. He said— - - “Dr. Hoven stood once together with me at the window of the - pathological section and pointed to a prisoner, not known to me, - who crossed the place where the roll calls were held. Dr. Hoven - said to me: ‘I want to see the skull of this prisoner on my - writing desk by tomorrow evening.’ The prisoner was ordered to - report to the medical section, after the physician had noted - down the number of the prisoner. The corpse was delivered on the - same day to the dissection room. The postmortem examination - showed that the prisoner had been killed by injections. The - skull was prepared as ordered and delivered to Dr. Hoven.” - (_NO-2631, Pros. Ex. 522._) - -Hoven also approved the beating of concentration camp inmates. -(_NO-2313, Pros. Ex. 523_; _NO-2312, Pros. Ex. 524._) One of these -inmates died. - -On 20 August 1942, Hoven suggested to the camp commander of Buchenwald -that the reporting of deaths of Russian political prisoners be -discontinued in order to save paper. He said— - - “It is requested that the question should be examined whether it - is necessary to issue reports of the death of political - Russians. According to a direction issued last week, an issue of - only one form was required. This may effect a saving of paper, - but as political Russians are for the greatest number among the - dead prisoners at the present time, more time and paper could be - saved if these death reports were dropped. Notifications of - death could be made as before, as for the Russian prisoners of - war.” (_NO-2148, Pros. Ex. 570._) - -The proof has shown that beside the sixty inmates who were admittedly -killed by him, Hoven participated in the killing of many other inmates -of the Buchenwald concentration camp who suffered from malnutrition and -exhaustion. He selected the victims for the transports who were later -killed in the Bernburg Euthanasia Station. His defense that all his -activities were done only for the benefit of the political inmates in -the concentration camp is clearly ridiculous and without foundation. - -It is interesting to note that Hoven’s defense that he killed for -idealistic motives is the same he used in the proceedings against him in -1944, only then his alleged idealistic motive was “to prevent a scandal -in the interest of the SS and the Wehrmacht.” (_NO-2380, Pros. Ex. 527_; -see also, _NO-2366, Pros. Ex. 526_.) - - * * * * * - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE - PROSECUTION_[1] - - * * * * * - -In Sievers we have an unresisting member of a so-called resistance -movement. He asks the Tribunal to free him from guilt for his bloody -crimes on the ground that he was really working as an anti-Nazi -resistance agent. Nor was he a latecomer to the resistance movement; -according to him, he has been resisting since 1933. Yet in those 14 -years, yes to this very day, he has not performed one overt act against -the men who ran the system he now professes to have always detested. He -joined the Nazi Party as early as 1929 and the SS in 1935. He stayed -with Himmler’s gang until the last days of the collapse. He came to -Nuernberg in 1946, not to give evidence of the horrible crimes of which -he had first-hand knowledge, but to testify in defense of the SS. During -his testimony before the International Military Tribunal, he -consistently denied any knowledge of, or connection with, crimes -committed by the Ahnenerbe of the SS. It was left to the -cross-examination of Mr. Elwyn Jones to prove him the murderer and -perjurer that he is. Nor did he show any signs of resistance in this -trial except to the manifold crimes with which he is charged. Not one -new fact did he reveal to this Tribunal, although specifically asked to -tell all he knew. If asked today, he will assure one and all that there -is not a guilty man in the dock, and least of all himself. But, for -purposes of argument, let us concede the truth of his many lies. It does -not harm our case. It is not the law that a resistance worker can commit -no crime and, least of all, against the people he is supposed to be -protecting. It is not the law that an undercover agent, even an FBI -agent, can join a gang of murderers, lay the plans with them, execute -the killings, share the loot, and go his merry way. Many are the -policemen who have been convicted for taking part in crimes they were -entrusted to prevent. No, the sad thing is that this collector of living -Jews for transformation into skeletons has only one life with which to -pay for his many crimes. - - * * * * * - - c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense - - _EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT - GEBHARDT_[2] - - * * * * * - - _The State Emergency and War Emergency as Legal Excuse_ - -The evidence proved furthermore that the experiments to test the -effectiveness of sulfanilamide were necessary to clarify a question -which was not only of decisive importance for the individual soldier and -the troops at the front but above and beyond this care for the -individual, it was of vital importance for the fighting power of the -army, and thus for the whole fighting nation. All efforts to clarify -this question by studying the effect of casual wounds failed. Although -drugs of the sulfanilamide series—the number of which amounts to -approximately 3,000—had been tested for more than 10 years, it was -impossible to form an even approximately correct idea of the most -valuable remedies. It was impossible to clarify this question in -peacetime by the observation of many thousands of people with casual -wounds and by circularized inquiries. Nor could a clear answer be found -to this question of vital importance to many hundreds of thousands of -soldiers by observation of the wounded in field hospitals during the -war. In this argumentation it is impossible and also unnecessary to -examine details of the problem of wound infection and its control in -modern warfare. I may assume that the importance of this question is -known to the Tribunal and needs no further proof since this question not -only played a part in the German Army but was a matter of special -research and measures in the armies all over the world. - -In 1942 the conditions in the German Army and in the Medical Services of -the Wehrmacht became intensified only insofar as with the beginning of -the campaign against the Soviet Union new difficulties presented -themselves in this sphere, too. In the campaigns against Poland and -France it had been possible to master the wound infections by the usual -surgical means, but the difficulties in the war against the USSR -increased beyond all measures. It is unnecessary to examine the reasons -for this more closely here. It is clear that they resulted from the -great distances and poor traffic conditions, but they were also caused -by climatic conditions prevailing there. - -The fighting power of the German Army was so affected by the heavy -casualties that it was impossible to allocate a correspondingly large -number of experienced surgeons to the main dressing stations in order to -control bacterial wound infection with surgical measures. - -During the presentation of evidence the difficult situation in which the -German armies found themselves in the winter of 1941-42 on the Moscow -front and in the south around Rostov was repeatedly stressed. Here it -was demonstrated clearly that the German Wehrmacht, and with it the -German people, were involved in a life and death struggle. - -The leaders of the German Wehrmacht would have neglected their duty if -confronted with these facts, had they not attempted to solve, at any -price, the problem as to which chemical preparations were capable of -preventing bacterial wound infection and, above all, gas gangrene, and -also whether effective means could be found at all. Whatever the answer -to this question was, it had to be found as soon as possible in order to -avert an imminent danger and to throw light on a question which was -important to the individual wounded soldier as well as to the striking -power of the whole army. After the failure of all attempts to solve the -problem through clinical observation of incidental wounds and other -methods, and, in view of the particularly difficult situation and -especially of the time factor, there was nothing left but to decide the -question through an experiment on human beings. The responsible leaders -of the German Wehrmacht did not hesitate to draw the conclusions -resulting from this situation, and the head of the German Reich, who was -at the same time Commander in Chief of the German Wehrmacht, gave orders -for a final solution of this problem by way of large scale -experimentation. - -Let us examine the legal conclusions to be drawn from this situation as -it existed in 1942 for the German Wehrmacht and therefore for the German -state—in particular regarding the assumption of an existing national -emergency. - -The problem of emergency and the specific case of self-defense has been -regulated in almost all criminal codes in a way applicable only to -individual cases. The individual is granted impunity under certain -conditions when “acting in an individual emergency arising for himself -or others”. The administration of justice and legal literature, however, -recognize that even the commonwealth, the “state,” can find itself in an -emergency, and that acts which are meant to and actually do contribute -to overcome this emergency may be exempt from punishment. - -1. First of all, the question has been raised whether the conception of -self-defense, conceived to cover individual cases, can be extended to -include a state self-defense, meaning a self-defense for the benefit of -the state and the commonwealth. The answer to this question was a -unanimous affirmative. - -2. The same reasoning, however, as applied to self-defense is also -applicable to the conception of an emergency, as embodied, for example, -in Section 54 of the German Penal Code and in almost all modern systems -of penal law. These provisions, too, were originally conceived to cover -individual cases. But, using them as a starting point, legal literature -and the administration of justice arrive at a recognition in principle -of a national emergency with a corresponding effect. With regard to the -definition of the concept of an emergency generally given in the penal -laws, the application of these provisions to the state, while justified -in itself, can only be effected in principle. - -When the idea of an emergency is applied to the state and when the -individual is authorized to commit acts for the purpose of eliminating -such a national emergency, here, as in the case of the ordinary -emergency determined by individual conditions, the objective values must -be estimated. The necessary consequences of conceding such actions on -the part of the individual must be that not only is he absolved from -guilt, but moreover his acts are “justified”. In other words, the -so-called national emergency, even though it is recognized only as an -analogous application of the ordinary concept of emergency in criminal -law, is a legal excuse. But what does “application” in principle to the -cases of national emergency mean? Whether a national emergency is -“unprovoked” or not, whether, for example, the war waged is a “war of -aggression” can obviously be of no importance in this connection. The -existence of the emergency only is decisive. The vital interests of the -commonwealth and the state are substituted for the limitation of -individual interests. Summarizing, we can define the so-called national -emergency as an emergency involving the vital interests of the state and -the general public which cannot be eliminated in any other way. As far -as such emergency authorizes action, not only may a legal excuse be -assumed but a true ground for justification exists. - -I shall examine later how far an erroneously assumed national emergency, -a so-called putative emergency, is possible and is to be considered as a -legal excuse. What consequences arise from this legal position in the -case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt? - -1. As proved by the evidence the general situation in the various -theaters of war in the year 1942 was such that it brought about an -“actual”, that is, an immediately imminent danger to the vital interests -of the state as the belligerent power and to the individuals affected by -the war. The conditions on the eastern front in the winter of 1941-42 as -they have been repeatedly described during the submission of evidence -created a situation which endangered the existence of the state, through -the danger of wound infection and the threat to the survival of the -wounded and the fighting strength of the troops arising therefrom. - -It must be added that the past World War was fought not only with man -and material but also with propaganda. In this connection I refer to the -statements of the defendant Gebhardt in the witness stand as far as they -concern information given to him by the Chief of Office V of the Reich -Security Main Office, SS Gruppenfuehrer Nebe. This information shows -that at that particular time the enemy tried to undermine the fighting -spirit of the German troops with pamphlets describing the organization -and material of the German Wehrmacht Medical Service as backward, while -on the other hand praising certain remedies of the Allied Forces, for -instance penicillin, as “secret miracle weapons”. - -2. The assumption of a state of national emergency presupposes that the -action forming the subject of the indictment was taken in order to -remove the danger. By this is meant the objective purpose of the action, -not just the subjective purpose of the individual committing the action. -The question, therefore, is whether the sulfanilamide experiments were -an objectively adequate means of averting the danger. This, however, -does not mean that the preparations really were an adequate means of -expertly combatting the danger. According to the evidence there can be -no doubt that these assumptions really did exist. - -3. Finally, there must not be “any different way” of eliminating the -national emergency. One must not misunderstand this requirement. Not -every different way, which could be pursued only by corresponding -violations, excludes an appeal to national emergency. The requirement -mentioned does not mean that the way of salvation pursued must -necessarily be the only one possible. Of course, if the different -possibilities of salvation constitute evils of different degrees, the -lesser one is to be chosen. It must also be assumed that a certain -proportion should be kept between the violation and the evil inherent in -the danger. In view of the fact, however, that in the present case many -tens of thousands of wounded persons were in danger of death, this -viewpoint does not present any difficulty here. - -According to the evidence there can be no doubt that a better way could -not have been chosen. On the contrary, it has been shown that in -peacetime as well as in wartime everything was tried without success to -clarify the problem of the efficacy of sulfanilamides. And the fact, -too, that prisoners were chosen as experimental subjects who had been -sentenced to death and were destined for execution, and to whom the -prospect of pardon was held out and actually granted cannot be judged in -a negative sense. This fact cannot be used as an argument when examining -the legal viewpoint, because participation in these experiments meant -the only chance for the prisoners to escape imminent execution. In this -connection I refer to the explanations I have already given in -connection with the so-called probable consent. - - _Excuse_ - -In addition to the general national emergency discussed, the literature -of international law recognizes also a special war emergency. According -to this, “in a state of self-defense and emergency, even such actions -are permitted which violate the laws of warfare and therefore -international law.” But in the sense of international law the “military -necessity of war” which by itself never justifies the violation of the -laws of warfare differs from self-defense and emergency. Emergency and -necessity of war, however, are different concepts. The emergency due to -which the self-preservation and the self-development of the threatened -nation are at stake justifies, according to general principles -recognized by the national laws of all civilized countries, the -violation of every international standard and thus also of the legal -principles of the laws of warfare. When applying the concepts of -self-defense and emergency as recognized by criminal and international -law, the illegality of violations committed is excluded if the nation -found itself in a situation which could not be relieved by any other -means. - -In this connection the following must be pointed out: - - I have already explained that the experimental subjects, on whom - the sulfanilamide experiments forming the subject of this case - were performed, came under German jurisdiction, even if one - holds the opinion that Poland’s case was not one of genuine - “debellatio” but only of “ocupatio bellica”.[3] However, - whatever opinion one might hold with regard to this question, - there can be no doubt that assuming an emergency according to - international law, the performance of the experiments would have - been justified even if at the time the experimental subjects had - still been citizens of an enemy nation. Decisive for the - regulation of the conditions of such persons according to - international law are the “Regulations Respecting the Laws and - Customs of War on Land” annexed to the Hague Convention, dated - 18 October 1907. According to the above statements, however, - even a violation of such special conventions, as contained for - instance in the special prohibitions of Article 23, is justified - during a genuine war emergency. The fact that the special - conditions characterizing a real war emergency are existent - invalidates the objection that citizens of another country - should not have been used for the experiments. - - _The Evaluation of Conflicting Rights and_ - _Interests as Legal Excuse_ - -According to well-considered opinions, we must start from the premise -that the defendants, both in principle and in procedure, are to be tried -according to German criminal law. They lived under it during the period -in question and were subject thereto. For this reason I wish to approach -one more viewpoint which should be considered independently, and in -addition to the legal excuses already mentioned, when judging the -conduct of the defendants. - -For many years the legal provisions for emergency cases have proved -inadequate. For a long time an endeavor was made to fill the gaps with -theoretical explanations of a general nature, and finally the Reich -Supreme Court handed down basic decisions expressly recognizing an -“extra legal emergency”. The considerations on which they were based are -known as the “objective principle of the evaluation of conflicting -rights and interests.” In the legal administration of the Reich Supreme -Court and in further discussions this principle, to be sure, is combined -with subjective considerations of courses of action taken by the -perpetrator in the line of duty. Therefore it is necessary to discuss -both considerations, that of evaluating conflicting rights and interests -and that of compulsion by duty together, even if we must and shall keep -them distinctly separated for the time being. - -The consideration of an evaluation of conflicting rights and interests -as legal excuse is generally formulated as follows: - - “Whoever violates or jeopardizes a legally protected right or - interest of lesser value in order to save thereby a legally - protected right or interest of greater value does not act in - violation of the law.” - -The lesser value must yield to the greater one. The act, when regarded -from this point of view, is justified, its unlawfulness—and not merely -the guilt or the perpetrator—is cancelled out. - -This so-called principle of evaluating conflicting rights and interests -is first of all a formal principle which establishes the precedence of -the more valuable right or interest as such. This formal evaluation -principle requires on its part a further material evaluation of the -rights or interests comparatively considered. This evaluation again -requires the adoption of the law and its purport to the general attitude -of a civilization and, finally, to the conception of law itself. - -Let us examine the conclusions to be drawn from this legal situation in -our case: Agreement and so-called likely agreement, just as well as a -national emergency and a war emergency, constitute special legal -justifications, the recognition of which allows us to dispense with a -recourse to the general principle of evaluating conflicting rights and -interests. The latter retains its subsidiary importance. Furthermore, -those two special legal justifications refer in their purport to a fair -and equitable way of thinking as well as to the proportional importance -of various types of evils; thus they themselves include the conception -of evaluating conflicting rights and values. For this reason, among -others, the following must be explained in detail at this point: - -A national emergency and a war emergency were unmistakably in existence -in 1942. Every day the lives of thousands of wounded were endangered -unless the threatening wound infection could be checked by the -application of proper remedies and the elimination of inadequate -remedies. The danger was “actual”. Immediate help had to be provided. -The “public interest” demanded the experimental clarification of this -question. The evidence has shown that the question could not be -clarified by experiments on animals or by the observation of incidental -wounds. - -The last word on this question, however, is not said merely by reference -to the public interest. Opposed to the public interest are the -individual interests. The saying “necessity knows no law” cannot claim -unlimited validity. But just as little can the infringement on -individual interests in order to save others be considered as “contrary -to good morals”. The evidence has shown that the members of the -resistance movement of Camp Ravensbrueck who were condemned to death -could only escape imminent execution if they submitted to the -experiments which form the subject of this indictment. There is no need -to examine here and now whether the experimental subjects did give their -consent or whether they presumably would have consented, if, from their -personal point of view and in the full knowledge of the situation, they -could have made a decision within the meaning of an objective judicial -opinion based on probability. What really matters is the question of -whether after a just and fair evaluation of the interests of the general -public and the real interests of the experimental subjects, the -defendant could conclude that, all circumstances considered, the -execution of the experiments was justifiable. Without doubt this -question can be answered in the affirmative. Quite apart from the -interest of the state in the execution of the experiments, participation -in the experiments was in the real and well-considered interest of the -experimental subjects themselves, since this participation offered the -only possibility of saving their lives through an act of mercy. - - * * * * * - - _The Defendant’s Erroneous Assumption of an Emergency_ - (_Putative Emergency_) - -I have already mentioned the circumstances which justify the assumption -of a national emergency and a war emergency caused by the special -conditions prevailing in 1942. If these conditions actually prevailed, -the illegality of the act and not only the guilt of the perpetrator -would be excluded for reasons previously enumerated. If the defendant -had erroneously assumed circumstances which if they really had existed -would have justified a national emergency and a war emergency, then, -according to the general principles already mentioned, the intent of the -defendant and thus his guilt would also be eliminated in this respect. -The evidence, especially the defendant’s own statements on the witness -stand, leaves no doubt that, when the experiments began in 1942, he had -assumed the existence of such circumstances which were indeed the -starting point and motive for ordering and carrying out these -experiments. - - * * * * * - - _EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT - SIEVERS_[4] - - * * * * * - -May I remind you of the exciting part of my case in chief which dealt -with Sievers’ participation in the resistance against the National -Socialist government and administration. By putting forward his activity -in a resistance movement, the defendant Sievers does not endeavor to -obtain a mitigation of an eventual condemnation. In my opinion, this -activity must under all circumstances result in his acquittal, even -though, contrary to expectation the High Tribunal should tend towards -the opinion that Sievers had participated in the accused crimes. - -In the first place it is my intention to discuss a series of legal -questions that have at all times been acknowledged in the criminal law -of all civilized nations. It is not by any means the task of the High -Tribunal to apply any special article of law, but, from general legal -and legal-philosophical principles, to lay down a rule finding and -creating a new law to meet a new situation. It need hardly be said that -first and foremost I am supporting my own client. But in your verdict, -you, your Honors, are not judging only this defendant. Beyond this -particular case your verdict has a far more extensive, general, nay, -world-wide importance. For it is the first time that a tribunal of such -importance is to decide upon the actions of a member of a resistance -movement. Consequently, your judgment is a fundamental one and a -signpost for our time for many, many other defendants and accused men in -this connection who have stood before this Tribunal or will be brought -before other courts. Your decision for all time extends to cover -thousands and thousands of men who, at some time, may be put in the -position of opposing some criminal system of government by similar means -as Sievers did. On this our globe there are still autocracies and -totalitarian dictatorships and it requires only little foresight to -realize that other dictatorships may involve other international -entanglements and wars of the most horrible nature. Furthermore, in the -future, mankind will again and again be in sore need of courageous men -who for the sake of their nation and for the welfare of mankind oppose -themselves to such dangerous doings. It is for such champions and for -such groups of champions that your verdict will be a criterion and a -signpost. You are deciding in advance the future possibilities and the -sphere of action of future resistance movements against criminal -governments and their chiefs. You are offered the opportunity of -checking such movements by your verdict. But you are also able to give -them the safety necessary for their dangerous enterprise and the success -of their proceedings. How and where would such helpers be found in -future if, apart from the immediate peril, they have to reckon with the -additional danger of being called to account by the very people for whom -they risked their lives? And therefore, your Honors, with your verdict -in the Sievers case you take upon you a responsibility before the whole -world and for all time to come, a responsibility as is seldom placed -upon a tribunal. But on the other hand you can also say with pride that -with this judgment you render an immeasurable service to the world in -its struggle for peace and justice. - -Therefore the reasons for your verdict in the Sievers case are so -immensely important, far more important than the trifling Sievers case -can be in the universal history of all times. I am forced to detail the -particulars of these problems. - -It goes without saying that the member of a resistance movement can only -refer to his resistance, if this resistance is lawful. This will not -always be the case; for, political crime and similar actions committed -for political motives are crimes and will remain such. He who removes a -political adversary only to take his position or to open the way for his -partisans acts unlawfully and is liable to punishment. The situation, -however, becomes different if not only a political discussion is -interrupted by murder, but where a tyrant whose government is inscribed -with bloody letters in the annals of mankind is at last felled to the -ground. In this case the perpetrator is supported by an acknowledged -excuse. This excuse is self-defense. - -According to the German Penal Code, Article 53, an action is not -punishable if it is committed in self-defense. And self-defense is such -defense as is necessary to ward off from oneself or another person an -imminent unlawful attack. - -These principles are, however, not only German legal stipulations. They -are legal values of all nations and all times. To a large extent they -tally with human sentiments and are termed “the great law of defense.” -They are already found in Roman law in the formulation “vim vi expellere -[repellere] licet”—force may be driven out by force—and have been -enthusiastically taken over by English common law and by American law, -as stated by Wharton, “Criminal Law”, paragraph 613. They authorize -every individual to ward off injury from himself or another person with -all necessary means at his command. From this point of view too the -struggle against a criminal government threatening the peace of the -world, preparing aggressive wars, ready without any purpose or need to -plunge the whole world into immeasurable misery from sheer striving for -power, from presumption and conceit; struggle and resistance against -such a government and such guidance are lawful and permissible, no -matter by what means they may be carried on. Since the end of the war -even, the opinion has been maintained more and more that such a struggle -is not only lawful and permissible but is even the duty of every -individual. Is not the collective guilt of the whole German nation -substantiated by the charge that it witnessed the doings of the Nazi -government without interfering at least with a secretly clenched fist in -its pocket? Murder and manslaughter, bodily injury and restriction of -liberty inflicted upon the potentates and responsible men of such a -system are acts of self-defense for the benefit of peace and mankind. -They are lawful and exempt from punishment; they are a duty if there is -no help possible in any other way. - -From times immemorial this question concerning the lawfulness and duty -of committing political murder has engaged not only lawyers but also a -large number of poets and philosophers. Friedrich von Schiller justified -the murder committed on Gessler as the last desperate attempt to escape -slavery. Thus the juridical vindication of murdering a criminal tyrant -is paralleled by its high moral estimation. - -But it may happen that not only the real assailants come to grief. He -who has to ward off an attack may be forced to implicate a third person -hitherto not involved. This case too is provided for in the German Penal -Code and is termed “necessity”. The regulation of Article 54 runs as -follows: “No punishable act has been committed when the -act—self-defense apart—was committed in an emergency, which could be -met in no other way, to escape a present danger to the life or body of -the perpetrator or a relative of his.” - -The legal codes of all nations and all ages have been compelled to face -the problem of the conflict between two legal values which can only be -solved by hurting or even annihilating one of the two. Justice cannot -insist with utter consistency upon the individual respecting foreign -rights and sacrificing his own at all costs and under any circumstances. -A Frenchman says to this question: “Cette théorie est admirable pour des -saints et pour des héros, mais elle n’est point faite pour la vulgaire -humanité”—“This theory is admirable for saints and heroes, but it is -not for common humanity”—[Pradier—Fodéré, vol. I, page 367, Traité du -droit international public européen et américain.] “Quod non est licitum -in lege, necessitas facit licitum”—“What is not permitted by law, -necessity makes permissible”—[says the Roman law], and the French -lawyer Rossi says: “L’acte ne peut être excusable lorsque l’agent cède à -l’instinct de sa propre conservation, lorsqu’il se trouve en présence -d’un peril imminent, lorsqu’il s’agit de la vie.”—“The act can be -excused only when the perpetrator yields to the instinct of -self-preservation, when he finds himself faced with imminent danger, -when life itself is at stake.”—An old German legal proverb runs: -“Necessity knows no law.” Last but not least, American law deals with -this problem under the name “necessity” (_Wharton, “Criminal Law,” par. -642_), a literal translation of the German expression “Not”. So by -virtue of necessity a shipwrecked sailor may push his fellow-sufferer -from the board which is too small to save both of them. If applied to -resistance movements against criminal governments, these principles mean -that third persons hitherto unconcerned may also be involved, if there -is no other alternative, if “Not”, “necessitas”, “necessity” requires it -peremptorily and unavoidably. - -You, your Honors, are called upon to bring the principles of -“self-defense” and of “necessity”, “this great law of defense” to their -common denominator, to apply them to the Sievers case and thus insert -them into the unwritten rules of the international relations of public -and political law. The Anglo-Saxon legal way of thinking and the -principles of natural law will give you valuable support in forming the -verdict. - -Now I can turn to the specific case of Sievers. - -In order to judge his actions the following questions are of a decisive -importance: Was there a German resistance movement at all? Did the -Hielscher group belong to this resistance movement? Was this group to be -taken seriously and what were its aims? Was Sievers a member of this -group and what were his tasks? What was his attitude in performing these -tasks? Were there also other possibilities for him? It has frequently -been maintained that there was no German resistance movement. But _the -German resistance existed_. - -I must, however, confess that the question “Where was this resistance?” -readily suggests itself to such people as are not acquainted with the -internal conditions of Germany, above all during the war. I must also -grant the fact that scarcely more than Stauffenberg’s plot with its -staggering consequences came before the public. - -He who puts such a question completely misjudges the conditions under -which the whole resistance movement had to work against the Nazi -Government. He forgets that up to the fatal date of 20 July 1944, he had -also no idea of the group round Stauffenberg. I am therefore all the -more forced to give a concise exposition of the situation which in the -Third Reich everybody opposing the Nazi Government had to face. - -From the very beginning it was the aim of the authoritarian government -to get hold of every German man, every German woman, all children, and -old men in order to bring them up in the spirit of the new method of -government. The totalitarian striving for power did not stop short at -personal freedom. It removed professional and economic organizations, -cultural and social institutions, some of which were reestablished in -another form, subject to the control of the Nazi Government. - -It was against this state of things that the struggle set in from the -very beginning. Nothing would be more wrong than to believe that this -struggle could be waged in the open street with large quantities of -propaganda material, display of physical force, with fire arms, bombs, -war, and rumors of war. Even in the trade unions, the most consistent -and resolute adversaries of the new government in 1933, such a method -was not possible. This government kept a tight rein over the whole -public apparatus controlling in an increasing degree the private spheres -through the organizations of the SD, Gestapo, etc. The ambiguous -stipulations of the law against malicious acts or insults to the state -and party (Heimtueckegesetz) made possible the imprisonment of people -even for accidental deprecatory remarks. Political discrimination and -the constant danger of being sent to a concentration camp were the -effects of many innocent remarks. No newspaper could have been found to -agitate against the oppressors. But if handbills were secretly -distributed the contents of which defamed the Nazi government, the whole -apparatus of the police, Gestapo, SD, etc., was set in motion. The -possession of weapons was considered circumstantial evidence of -treasonable enterprises and meant capital punishment for the imprudent. -It must be added that there was a widely extended spy system sticking to -everybody’s heels. One had even to guard oneself against one’s nearest -relations and children. - -These few words concerning the internal situation of Germany were -necessary as an answer to the absurd question put in Stockholm to the -witness Hielscher: “Why did you not speak in the open market place -[publicly]?” (_Tr. p. 5935._) - -The most obvious kind of opposition was offered by the two great -Christian churches. How much and how often were the antichrist and his -false prophets not preached against, how many clergymen of all -confessions were sent to prisons, penitentiaries, concentration camps, -nay, to death? It is true, the churches could venture forth more openly -than other people. For they did not intend to participate in a -_forcible_ removal of the system, in the killing of its leaders and -representatives, in the fight with arms. But the nonecclesiastical -resistance groups had realized that the Nazi dictatorship could not be -overthrown without violence; they were not subject to the -political-philosophical impediments and restrictions of the churches, -they could not throw off the mask until the day of action had dawned. Up -to that time they were condemned to be silent, they had to camouflage, -acting on the old principle of all conspirators: “Never speak of your -aim, but always think of it!” If they had forgotten this principle, -sooner or later unquestioningly they would have been betrayed by a spy -and liquidated by the Gestapo. They would never have got as far as -action. Did not the group round Stauffenberg act in this way too? Who -knew of its existence before the bomb burst in Hitler’s headquarters on -20 July 1944? The same was the case with all the other resistance groups -which unfortunately no longer had the possibility of acting and some of -which were traced and secretly killed in spite of this. - -The fact that all of them existed is proved, however, by the small -number of publications: the pamphlets of Emil Henk, of Franklin L. Ford -and other authors, and Neuhaeusler’s book, “Cross and Swastika”. - -But downright classical witnesses are the numerous bloody victims whom -the People’s Court of Justice [Volksgerichtshof] and the Gestapo had -sent to the concentration camps and to death. - -One of these groups was the group around Hielscher, a member of which -was the defendant Sievers. - -_There was a Hielscher group, it existed, it acted._ Hielscher himself -is an unimpeachable witness of this. In connection with 20 July 1944, he -was imprisoned for three months and was to be hanged. Hielscher’s -illegal activity is sworn to by many other no less trustworthy -witnesses. As the first of them I mention the political emigrant Dr. -Borkenau, who had been working against National Socialism at least since -1928. He had known Hielscher since 1928. He speaks of his hostility to -National Socialism, of a “sharp attitude”. At that time he frequently -negotiated and conspired with Hielscher, who set forth the methods of -his fight. During his emigration, Dr. Borkenau watched Hielscher’s -activity from abroad and again and again he heard: “Hielscher keeps on -fighting”. If we are told so by an emigrant, we may well believe it. -Another witness who never lost connection with Hielscher was Dr. Topf, -who himself was an active member of the resistance movement. He too -described Hielscher as a violent antagonist of National Socialism, -working and struggling unswervingly. I refer to the many affidavits -which I presented in this connection. - -It does not speak against Hielscher’s oppositional activity that he did -not stand out more in public. For him too, camouflaging up to the moment -of decision was an imperative requirement, and Dr. Borkenau calls it a -downright masterpiece that he so eminently succeeded in doing so. - - _Sievers was a member of the Hielscher group_ - -There cannot be the least doubt of this fact. Apart from all the -testimony, the whole personality of my client excluded any Nazi -attitude. His nature and his development necessarily made him a decisive -adversary of Hitler’s system of oppression, terror, and murder. Both his -origin and the interests of his youth brought him into contact with -people who kept aloof as much as possible from the Nazi way of thinking. -He was the son of a director of ecclesiastical music; he pursued -historical and religious studies. His nature led him to the Boy Scouts, -in short to such interests as National Socialism calumniated with all -its powers of ridicule and combated violently with stubborn dislike. All -those persons who either testified or in affidavits gave evidence about -his character describe him as follows: an upright man with lofty ideals -of deeply rooted humanity and a strong sense of law and justice. If you -combine this picture of Sievers painted by notorious anti-Fascists with -all the authenticated aid that Sievers bestowed on victims of Nazism, it -is only a small step to the conviction that Sievers was also a member of -a resistance movement. - -Perhaps the prosecution may say: “I do not believe all these stories, -for both Hielscher and Sievers did not achieve anything.” - -That would wrong Sievers to a high degree, your Honors! Other resistance -groups too had the misfortune that they had not more opportunity to act. -The witness Hielscher exposed very clearly the reasons why a standstill -was inevitable after the failure of the plot on 20 July 1944. As -Hielscher and his associates could no longer depend upon the army, they -were compelled to start again from the very beginning. - -What were the intentions and the mission of the defendant Sievers within -the Hielscher group? Hielscher himself answers that. Sievers’ tasks were -of two kinds: (1) Gathering news from the immediate proximity of Himmler -as basis for the disposal of the resistance forces with regard to place, -time, and kind of action. (2) Sievers was not only a spy and a scout; at -the moment of action he was destined and ready to do away with Himmler. -These two tasks require a double legal examination: Were they in -themselves permissible, lawful, or even a duty? The answer to this -question is to be found in the principles which I evolved in the idea of -self-defense in the sphere of political struggle. What measures was he -allowed to take? To what extent could he venture to advance into the -domain of criminality? To what extent could he involve uninitiated third -persons in his plans, even actual victims of Nazism? The rules of -“necessity” lead the way for judging and solving this problem. - -In taking up the first question I can be relatively brief. After all we -know today, it is an irrefutable fact that Hitler and his accomplices -terrorized the German Nation and the whole world in a criminal way and -with criminal means, that from the beginning they were an immediate -peril to peace and all civilization and that finally the worst -apprehensions turned to ghastly reality. Therefore the first -prerequisite for the defense of “necessity” is beyond all doubt a -present illegal attack on the highest goods of mankind. To put it in the -words of the German Penal Code that was the “necessity” (“not”) which -was to be warded off. - -But we also know that this defense was not to be accomplished with the -normal means of a democratic parliamentary system. I described the truly -diabolical organization by which it had been rendered impossible to make -use of these means. Thence follows that the removal of Hitler and his -accomplices was the only possible expedient to break and smash this -system. Less hard and violent means were not available. - -As a matter of course it follows that Hielscher’s plan to do away with -Himmler had become legal and compulsory for those in the position to -execute it. After the evidence of Hielscher and other trustworthy -witnesses, it cannot be denied that Sievers had been charged with this -task. - -If it was justified to do away with Himmler, the accompanying and -preparing scouting-activity was justified too. - -Before answering the question to what extent Sievers could involve third -persons, I have to sketch in a few lines the tactics of Hielscher and -the position of Sievers. - -It was not in vain that Hielscher himself gave full particulars on this -question. We also heard other witnesses, Dr. Borkenau, Dr. Topf. Sievers -clearly outlined his tasks. All this evidence is in such unanimous -agreement that no doubt of its truth could arise. - -Hielscher was one of the first and few people who realized that the way -to take measures against the system could be only from within the ranks -of the party itself. He had gained the firm conviction that a prospect -of success could be seen only by doing away with the heads of the Nazi -Government and assuming the government from the top and that nothing, -nothing at all, was to be anticipated from a revolution of the people -from below. A revolution of such a kind would have been of no avail, as -it would very quickly have been stifled in torrents of blood. - -The knowledge of these facts required four groups of measures to be -taken, the particulars of which Hielscher detailed on 15 April: - - Preparation of the undertaking by a well-camouflaged - organization of trusted men and spies within the ranks of the - NSDAP, i.e., the Trojan Horse policy. - - Placing suitable courageous men in positions as near as possible - to leading personages of Nazism, the most dangerous of whom was - Himmler. - - Doing away with Himmler and other leaders of the Nazi Government - upon a given cue. - - Taking over the government by an organization prepared in - advance. - -In spite of all liberty of action granted to the “activists” of his -group, Hielscher had realized that success could only be expected if -everybody, in strict discipline, obeyed his orders only. This was the -only way for him to hold the reins and to give the cue at the right -moment. Here I must emphasize that within the scope of this -indispensable discipline, Sievers in all details acted in complete -unison with Hielscher, that in all important moments he described the -real state of affairs and asked for his instructions. In this way -Hielscher obtained ample information of everything enacted around -Sievers and of what Sievers did himself. Sievers was nothing but the -tool in the hands of the leader of the movement. Therefore, your Honors, -your verdict affects Sievers’ commissioner, Hielscher, in just the same -way as Sievers himself. Hielscher is condemned together with Sievers, as -he is acquitted with Sievers. With the same courage of responsibility -with which he placed Sievers and other accomplices in most dangerous -positions, Hielscher could declare at the end of his evidence that he -not only took but also _claimed_ the whole responsibility for all the -deeds with which his follower Sievers would be charged as a result in -this trial. - -Hielscher sketches the task of Sievers as follows: In the belly of the -Trojan horse, i.e., under the color of eager and enthusiastic -cooperation his duty would be (_a_) to scout and to spy, (_b_) profiting -by his influence, to place other persons in similar positions for the -same purposes, or in places where they would be given the possibility of -working undisturbed, (_c_) to back endangered members of the resistance -movement and if possible to rescue them, and finally (_d_) to do away -with Himmler at the moment of action. - -This last item was the essential point of the task of my client. All the -other tasks were inferior to this aim and assignment, they only served -to prepare and support it. It is from this point of view that his whole -conduct must be understood and all his acts judged. - -What did Sievers achieve in the sphere of this task? - -I cannot reiterate all the details that I set forth in the first part of -my plea. I came to the conclusion that Sievers did not make himself -guilty of complicity or assistance in the facts charged in the -indictment. If, however, you suppose with the prosecution that Sievers -is to be found guilty of some of the counts of the indictment, it is my -task to justify this conduct before the forum of a concept of justice -transcending codified law, and to expound it to the Tribunal. - -How did it come about that in 1942 Sievers remained in his position when -the Ahnenerbe came into contact with medical experiments which possibly -might assume a criminal character? We must not forget that Sievers was -assigned the removal of Himmler and that in the Hielscher group he was -the only person who could have been entrusted with such a task. Properly -speaking, in Hielscher’s group he had the key position; the success or -failure of the whole enterprise depended on him alone. For Himmler was -the most dangerous personality in the Nazi system, because in his -quality of Chief of the Police and Commander of the Reserve Army all the -internal political armed forces were concentrated in his hand. -Consequently he had the power of nipping in the bud every rebellion. -Himmler was able to rule without Hitler, whereas Hitler could not rule -without Himmler. The latter was to be done away with first. Should -Himmler be overlooked or should he somehow succeed in escaping, the -whole enterprise would be endangered. Himmler’s importance is therefore -the measure of the importance of Sievers, who had to be ready for the -decisive blow in Himmler’s immediate proximity. To ask if this post -could be abandoned is to answer it in the negative. - -As Sievers was fully conscious of the importance of such a decision, he -became involved in the greatest internal conflict of his life. Of two -evils, the worse had to be avoided and the smaller to be endured, or -both of them to be shunned. - -To do the latter would certainly have been the most convenient solution. -That Sievers got into this conflict amply demonstrates his consciousness -of responsibility, his love of justice and humanity. As to the struggle -with his soul, he certainly did not succeed in getting the better of -himself. Too many questions depended on his decision, not only for -himself but above all for the resistance movement as a whole. We must -try to look into the soul of a man, who, on the one hand, was exposed to -the pressure of an enormous aversion to the approaching threatening -events and, on the other hand, knew only too well that in his position -he could no longer fulfill his task if he obeyed his personal impulses. -Perhaps it would have been possible for Sievers to leave his office -without creating a great sensation and without considerable disadvantage -for himself. Could he not have retired to cooperate in some innocuous -scientific research? But in doing so Sievers would have been a runaway, -a deserter. In his agony of soul, Sievers applied to Hielscher who after -mature consideration and deliberation came to the decision: _Sievers -will stay!_ - -For the post in Himmler’s proximity could not be renounced. If Sievers -abandoned it, Hielscher would be under the necessity of entrusting him -with another position near Himmler or of replacing him by another member -of the movement with the same task. Was this possible? Would he, -remaining near Himmler, have not time and again come into the same -dilemma? Was it possible to wait and see? Could it be expected that -another man would be more successful? Would not Sievers, in spite of all -circumspection, have raised suspicion in substantiating his withdrawal? -For to do so openly and with protest would have been downright madness. -Imagine only the danger he would have conjured up for himself and his -associates! What could his withdrawal have availed? One more question: -if Sievers’ withdrawal could have prevented the human experiments at -all, that would have been only a partial success. For as to the aim in -its totality, the removal of Himmler and the Nazi Government, nothing -would have been gained but a further delay of the decision or the -impossibility of achieving it because of the loss of the key position. -As still more victims of the Nazi Government would have been the result, -a partial success had to be sacrificed in favor of the great aim. - -If you try to answer these questions there cannot be the least doubt -that the decision Hielscher arrived at was the only possibility. - -That brings me to the last, to the most important point of my defense, -to the question: - - “How was Sievers to act in his position?” - -Without any doubt, he was compelled to make certain concessions. He was -forced to camouflage, i.e., to accommodate himself outwardly to his -surroundings which he was going to spy on and to remove. Every spy has -to camouflage and I do not betray a secret in mentioning that in wartime -many a man donned the uniform of the enemy. It is generally known that -in 1942 the French General Giraud performed his escape from German -captivity in the uniform of a German general. - -When Sievers was a member of the party from 1929 to 1931, when later on -he joined the NSDAP and the SS again, when he filled higher positions in -these organizations, when he held the position of Reich Manager of the -Ahnenerbe and suffered himself to be promoted to a higher rank in the -SS, without any doubt at all that was part of the camouflage measures -which Hielscher, Dr. Borkenau, Dr. Topf, and other witnesses call the -indispensable prerequisite, the compulsory mask for the tasks of the -defendant Sievers. - -Nobody will pretend that these camouflages which were to render possible -a legally approved, nay, desirable aim, are in themselves punishable and -illegal. Sievers’ outward membership in the SS is therefore excused by -its camouflage purpose. And it is equally unobjectionable that -occasionally he played the part of a good Nazi. The duty of doing so had -expressly been urged upon him by Hielscher. The career of the organizer -or an active member of a German underground movement would have found a -sudden end if he had not behaved like a Nazi. - -All the more seriously must I turn to the question of Sievers’ consent -to and further participation in the human experiments and the -establishment of the collection of skeletons, in which third persons -suffered bodily injury. - -Here the question is raised where are the bounds of necessity if it -involves actions which in themselves are punishable facts. The answer to -this question is the essential point of the Sievers case. - -The legal orders of the world set up the principle: “_The legal values -damaged by the action committed under necessity, must not be of a -disproportionally greater value than the protected and rescued legal -value._” That is the principle of proportion concerning which Wharton -[“Criminal Law”], paragraph 642, says, “Sacrifice of another’s life, -excusable when necessary to save one’s own.” - -What were the competing legal values in the Sievers case? - -On the one hand, there was the civilization of the world, the peace of -the earth, humanity, the lives and existence of millions of men -threatened and hurt by Hitler’s criminal government. Such actions are -called crimes against peace and humanity by the new international law -which threatens them with the severest punishments. The Allied Nations -considered these legal values worthy of their soldiers enthusiastically -going to war and death for them. - -On the other hand, you will find the lives of individuals, their bodily -safety, the respect and esteem of their personality, their liberty and -the free expression of their will, certainly legal values of no less -high value. There may have been hundreds of victims. But it was a meager -number in comparison with the multitudes that Hitler, Himmler, and their -accomplices had already murdered and continued murdering. - -My question runs: Which of the two contending legal values is more -valuable from the point of view of proportion? - -I am far from excusing the ghastly crimes that happened in the -concentration camps or even minimizing them, but with all my abhorrence -for them I cannot help answering: The protection of civilization and -humanity deserves preference over the life and health of individuals, -deplorable as the inevitable sacrifices may be. So finally it was -necessary, absolutely requisite, to put up with the violation of the -less valuable legal values and to rescue the more precious, the whole. -Sievers’ remaining at his post in the Ahnenerbe was absolutely necessary -for the removal of Himmler. - -Of course it would not be difficult to state _post festum_ that Sievers -could have acted differently, that he ought not have advanced thus far. -But up to now nobody has been able to tell us _how_ he should have -acted. Even the public prosecutor did not try to make a concrete -proposal. - - * * * * * - - _EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT - HOVEN_[5] - - * * * * * - -In two further parts of my closing brief I dealt with the killings which -Dr. Hoven either undertook himself or which were undertaken with his -knowledge. - -In part (b) of the closing brief, I stated that these killings had no -connection with the euthanasia plan. - -I further stated that it can be considered proved that Dr. Hoven killed -only two prisoners himself, and that about 50 or 60 prisoners were -killed by order of those responsible for the German and foreign -political prisoners with the knowledge of Dr. Hoven. - -I have set forth a legal evaluation of these killings in a further -paragraph under (e) of the closing brief. - -The legal arguments as set forth in the closing brief are taken from the -work of the well-known American criminologist Wharton, _Criminal Law_. -The first part of this argument contains, under (e), the literal -quotations from this book. - -According to common law, the killing of a man can be either murder, -manslaughter, excusable homicide, or justifiable homicide. Excusable -homicide and justifiable homicide are not punishable. - -The present American law does not differentiate between justifiable -homicide and excusable homicide. I refer to my closing brief, -particularly to the statements of Wharton in his book _Criminal Law_, -12th edition, volume I, 1932, pages 826 to 879. According to Wharton, -excuse and justification for a homicide are either repulsion of -felonious assault, or prevention of felony. - -The right of self-defense, i.e., repulsion of felonious assault, is -restricted to a narrowly defined number of persons. - -On the other hand, everybody is entitled to prevent a crime. I refer to -the details contained in my legal arguments of my closing brief. - -Killing a man to prevent a felonious crime requires the following -conditions which are set forth in my closing brief: - - (1) The perpetrator must have the bona fide belief that the - commission of a felonious crime is immediately impending. It is - not a condition that such a crime would actually have been - committed. The bona fide belief of the accused is quite - sufficient. In this connection I refer to the legal arguments of - the closing brief. - - (2) This belief of the accused must not be negligently adopted. - - (3) There must not be any other possibility of preventing a - crime than the killing of a person. In other words—the killing - must be the only means available to prevent the crime. - -The prosecution’s assertion in its final plea, “One must not kill five -to save five hundred”, therefore, cannot be considered generally valid -either from the point of view of German or American law. - -On the basis of the statements of the prosecution, I have not been able -to see clearly whether that sentence had reference only to the -justification of experiments on human beings or else to the killings -which were carried out by Dr. Hoven or with his knowledge. - -The justification of the killings is materially distinguished from that -of the experiments. Those spies, stool-pigeons, and traitors, for whose -killing Dr. Hoven accepted responsibility when in the witness stand, had -planned to commit serious crimes against their fellow prisoners. -Therefore, if the three prerequisites which I mentioned are given, we -are concerned with cases of justifiable or excusable homicide. - -In my closing brief, I elaborately explained that these conditions -existed in the case of all the killings for which Dr. Hoven accepted the -responsibility. - -The defendant Dr. Hoven had the conviction and good faith that the spies -and traitors, who were killed by him or with his knowledge, were about -to commit serious crimes, resulting in the death of numerous inmates of -the Buchenwald concentration camp. During his examination on the witness -stand, Dr. Hoven gave a thorough description of this. - -The decision on these killings was not reached by Dr. Hoven alone. Dr. -Hoven had no cause for that. It was not his life that was endangered by -those spies or traitors. It was, on the contrary, the committee of -political German and foreign prisoners, many of whom are today holding -high office in their countries. Those persons guaranteed to Dr. Hoven -that only such individuals would be killed who already had been active -and would continue to be active as spies and as traitors. These -statements by Dr. Hoven were expressly confirmed by a number of -witnesses who were heard on this subject. These observations may be -found in the affidavits I submitted. Above all it has been proven that -only such people of whom Dr. Hoven held that conviction were done away -with. Dr. Hoven testified to that effect and it has been reaffirmed by -the witnesses Dorn, Dr. Kogon, Seegers, and Hummel. - -In his interrogation of 23 October 1946, Dr. Hoven stated expressly that -he killed or knew only of the killings of such persons of whom he was -certain that their deaths were necessary to save the lives of a -multitude of political prisoners from the various countries. At that -early date he expressly emphasized that he refused to carry out any of -the killing orders of the Camp Commander Koch; the prisoners who were -covered by these orders were put into the hospital or hidden in some -other way by Dr. Hoven. - -Dr. Hoven had not negligently adopted the conviction that their killing -was essential for the salvation of huge numbers of prisoners. - -This is proved first of all by the testimony of the witness Dorn, who -gave many details as to the means and methods employed by Dr. Hoven and -the illegal camp administration in becoming convinced of the necessity -for the killings. Dr. Hoven supplemented those statements. Furthermore, -they were corroborated by the testimony of the witnesses Hummell, Dr. -Kogon, Seegers, Philipp Dirk, Baron von Pallandt, and van Eerde through -their affidavits. - -Actually, the prevention of the planned crimes, i.e., the mass murder of -a multitude of German and foreign political prisoners, could be -accomplished only through the killing of the spies and traitors. There -was no other means. What should Dr. Hoven have done to prevent the -crimes planned by the spies and traitors? Those spies collaborated with -the SS camp commanders to carry out Himmler’s program to destroy the -political prisoners. To whom should Dr. Hoven have turned? Perhaps to -the SS camp commanders who worked with the spies and traitors? Or -perhaps to the Gestapo or to the police who worked under Himmler’s -orders? - -There was no other way but the one which Dr. Hoven chose in order to -prevent crimes. I showed that with details in my closing brief. There I -assembled the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and defense -who were heard on this point. - -Here, I merely wish to stress the following statements by witnesses: - -In this courtroom, Dr. Kogon, a convinced Christian and a deeply -religious man, said: “There was really no other possibility for the men -of the illegal camp administration. I, as a convinced Christian, do not -deny those men the right to have killed people in an emergency who in -collaboration with the SS endangered the lives of individuals or of -many.” - -The witness Pieck stated: “It may be that the liquidation of many -political prisoners and of SS spies employed in the camp may make Dr. -Hoven a murderer in the eyes of many; yet, for me and others who -understood the real situation he was a soldier fighting on our side and -risking a great deal.” - -Pieck expressed the same opinion also in a letter to the Dutch Ministry -of Justice, a letter that was co-signed by the City Council of Amsterdam -and Mr. Droering, head of a department of the State Institute for War -Documentation in The Hague. - -Pieck is one of the few who is best equipped to answer these questions, -for he belonged to the committee of German and foreign political -prisoners which formed itself at Buchenwald. - -Father Katjetan, presently Supreme Abbot of one of the largest religious -orders in Czechoslovakia, a former prisoner of the concentration camp -Buchenwald, declared, in the presence of witness Dr. Horn, that those -killings were an inevitable necessity for the preservation of the -inmates who had been abandoned by justice in the camp. - -Even the prosecution witness Roemhild had to admit on the stand that it -would have been impossible to save 20,000 prisoners if those spies or -traitors whom Dr. Hoven killed or of whose killing he knew had remained -alive. - -Let me ask in this connection: What would have happened if a man of -Kushnir Kushnarev’s caliber had not been killed, and if the murder of -the Russian prisoners of war in the Buchenwald camp had been continued? -Would Dr. Hoven not stand before this Tribunal even then? Then, would -not the same charge be made against Dr. Hoven as the one levelled -against the Japanese Governor of the Philippines who was tried before an -American Military Court for not having prevented atrocities and abuses? - - * * * * * - - d. Evidence - - _Testimony_ - Page - Extract from the testimony of defendant Karl Brandt 29 - Extracts from the testimony of defense witness Dr. Friedrich 30 - Hielscher - Extract from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 42 - Andrew C. Ivy - - EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT[6] - -_EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -JUDGE SEBRING: Witness, this question of the necessity for an -experiment, is it your view that it is for the state to determine the -extreme necessity for such an experiment and that thereafter those who -serve the state are to be bound by that procedure? I think you can -answer that “yes” or “no”. - -DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT: This trial shows that it will be the task of the -state under all circumstances basically to clarify this question for the -future. - -Q. Witness, as I understood your statements a moment ago, they were that -the physician, having once become the soldier, thereafter must -subordinate such medical-ethical views as he may have when they are in -conflict with a military order from higher authority, is that true? - -A. I didn’t want to express it in that form. I did not mean to say that -the physician, the moment he becomes a medical officer, should change -his basic attitude as a physician. Such an order can in the very same -way be addressed to a physician who is not a soldier. I was referring to -the entire situation as it prevailed with us in Germany during the time -of an authoritarian leadership. This authoritarian leadership interfered -with the personality and the personal feelings of the human being. The -moment an individuality is absorbed into the concept of a collective -body, every demand which is put to that individuality has to be absorbed -into the concept of a collective system. Therefore, the demands of -society are placed above every individual human being as an entity, and -this entity, the human being, is completely used in the interests of -that society. - -The difficult thing, and something which is hard to understand -basically, is that during our entire period, and Dr. Leibbrandt referred -to that, everything was done in the interests of humanity so that the -individual person had no meaning whatsoever, and the farther the war -progressed, the stronger did this principal thought appear. This was -designated in the end as “total war,” and in accordance with that, the -leaders of the state gave orders quite generally and demanded that -orders be carried out. It was very tragic for a number of persons, not -only within the framework of these experiments, but also in other -situations that they had to work under such orders. Without considering -the entire situation as it prevailed in Germany, one cannot understand -the question of these particular experiments at all. - - * * * * * - - EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS - DR. FRIEDRICH HIELSCHER[7] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -DR. WEISGERBER: Witness, your name is Friedrich Hielscher? - -WITNESS HIELSCHER: Friedrich Hielscher. - -Q. You were born on 31 May 1902 in Plauen, and you are now living in -Marburg, that is right? - -A. Yes. - -Q. What is your profession? - -A. I am a scholar. - -Q. And since when have you taken an active part in politics? - -A. Since 1927. - -Q. Did you belong to a definite political ideology? - -A. No. I had a group of students to whom I expounded my historical and -philosophical theories and ideas. - -Q. How did it happen that you became an opponent of the NSDAP so early? - -A. From the information available to me I knew the personal inferiority -of the National Socialist leaders. I could observe that they were -constantly lying and that what they really wanted was undesirable. - -Q. Did you believe, as early as 1928, that the NSDAP would come to -power? - -A. No, not in 1928. In 1930, after the first election battle at which -the Party was victorious, I considered it possible. In 1931 I considered -it probable. In 1932 I felt that it was certain. - -Q. Did you join any definite political party with the intention of -combating the NSDAP? - -A. No. I considered it impossible for any of the 33 German parties, with -their bureaucratic methods, to be able to prevent a fascist -dictatorship, or if it had come into existence, to overthrow it. - -Q. What methods did you think were the right ones? - -A. The fascist dictatorship is a mass machine in a technical age. -Therefore it seemed to us to be out of the question, when confronting -such a mass body, to act openly. It seemed impossible to carry out -propaganda publicly. We were convinced that the only thing possible was -to form very small cadres which would not be recognizable to an outsider -and which at the proper time could be employed for a coup d’etat. - -Q. Then that was more or less the method of the Trojan Horse? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Were you, in your ideas and in your efforts to combat this movement -alone or did you have associates? - -A. First, a selected group of my students were willing to collaborate in -this illegal work; second, I knew quite a number of personages of -various political backgrounds with whom I agreed that this regime would -not last. - -Q. That was before 1933? - -A. That was around 1933—1932-33. - -Q. Now came the 30th of January 1933, the so-called seizure of power, -and now your real work began. How and when did you apply your method of -the Trojan Horse? - -A. This group of my students, who were willing to collaborate, I made -into an illegal organization, with dues, secrecy, and other necessary -conditions, and I appointed people who were willing and suitable to get -into important Party positions. - -Q. When and how did you meet the defendant Wolfram Sievers? - -A. As far as I can recall, I met Sievers about 1929, on one of my -historical-philosophical lecture trips. He was a Boy Scout at that time. -He spoke up during the discussion and we took a liking to each other. - -Q. Did Sievers show at that time that he was opposed to the NSDAP? - -A. That was a matter of course with the people with whom I had anything -to do at all. - -Q. And did you consider him suitable to work in your circle? - -A. Yes. - -Q. In 1929 Sievers joined the NSDAP. Was that done with your knowledge? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Did you advise him to do so or how did it come about? There had to be -some special reason, since you were both opponents of this political -party. - -A. That was the first time, aside from 1923, when the NSDAP was talked -about, and it was useful to know what was going on in this growing -machine—were there any people of good will within the machine, what -were the leaders doing, what plans were being made, what organization -was being set up. - -Q. Then first of all you wanted to find out what intentions the NSDAP -had? - -A. Yes, and specifically in the youth work, because that had to be the -most important in the long run. - -Q. Now, in 1931 Sievers resigned from the NSDAP again; did he do that -with your knowledge? - -A. Yes. - -Q. On your orders? - -A. Yes, one might say that. We discussed it, and I considered it the -thing to do. - -Q. Now, why should he suddenly leave the Party since he had been sent -into the Party with the definite purpose of getting information? - -A. He had found out what he was to find out, the nature and the make-up, -especially of the youth organization. It was just as inferior as we had -thought, and even at that time it was so corrupt that without any -further plan—and we had no plan at the time—without any further plan -it was not necessary to have him continue. - -Q. Now, in the year 1933, Sievers, as the Tribunal has already been -told, again joined the NSDAP; was this also done on your behalf? - -A. Yes. At that time we were already a thoroughly organized -organization. We were already asking for volunteers, who were willing -and who were capable of working up in the sense of the Trojan Horse. -Sievers seemed suitable, and he was willing. - -Q. Were you able to get him any position within the Party? - -A. No. I was not able to help him to obtain any position, and in the -second place I had no intention of telling the individual persons whom I -trusted, in detail, what they were to do. - -Q. Then it was up to the skill of the individual to get into a position -from which he would be able to carry out the assignment which you gave -him? - -A. Yes. - -Q. And how did Sievers obtain this position? - -A. He got into this with Hermann Wirth in the Ahnenerbe. - -Q. Who was Hermann Wirth? - -A. Hermann Wirth was a rather crazy student of pre-history, who had -excellent material and terrible concepts. - -Q. Was Wirth already in contact with the Ahnenerbe at that time? - -A. As far as I know he was one of the founders. - -Q. Then, as you say, Sievers got in contact with Wirth, and through -Wirth he got into the Ahnenerbe? - -A. Yes. He was there from 1935 on as Reich Business Manager. - -Q. Now, did you give Sievers any specific assignment in the spirit of -your movement? - -A. As soon as it was clear that there was a possibility of exploiting -Himmler’s racial romancing and half-education, the assignment developed -to gain Himmler’s confidence with the aid of the Ahnenerbe and to get as -close to him as possible. We, that is my group, were among the people -who very early recognized the special personal danger of Himmler, and in -the second place from the beginning we had been determined that one day -we would have to overthrow the Party regime by force, and for that -purpose one has to get as close as possible to the most dangerous man. - -Q. And what were the duties which Sievers had this time? When he first -belonged to the NSDAP, you said he was to get information about the -intentions of the youth movement of the NSDAP. - -A. This time, of course, he had to get as many details as he could from -the office of the Reich Leader SS, and transmit them to us. We had to -protect people. We had to build up camouflage positions. We had to help -the other people and in turn to remain unrecognized. - -Q. And how did Sievers carry out these duties? - -A. Well, it will be best if I begin with myself. I myself was known and -considered undesirable by the Party leadership. - -Q. You mean the NSDAP? - -A. Well, yes, of course. The Party leaders knew me and considered me -undesirable. I had already been under arrest and had had my house -searched. I was watched by the Gestapo, and in order to build up my -organization I needed to be able to travel anywhere without arousing -suspicion. Consequently, Sievers gave me a fake research assignment, -which was to study Indo-Germanic culture, customs of the annual -festivals. - -Q. Sievers said during direct examination that he himself could not -issue any research assignments; you said that you received a fake -research assignment from him; wasn’t this research assignment actually -issued by the curator, Professor Wuest? - -A. Yes. If things were going well, and Wuest was in a good mood, or had -been drinking with Sievers, it was possible to persuade him to do -something, and so he succeeded in persuading Wuest that I was efficient -for this research assignment, and so I was given this assignment. And -what concerned Indo-Germanic customs could be found anywhere. I was -given a false pass as a section chief, though I was not a section chief, -and was not a member of the SS nor the Ahnenerbe. - -Q. And with this pass you were able easily to get visas to go abroad? - -A. Not necessarily. I needed a little more for that purpose, but it was -easier. - -Q. Then the actual purpose of this fake research assignment was that -you, who were a suspect, might appear in a more harmless light and would -be able to move rather freely and without supervision? - -A. Yes. - - * * * * * - -Q. What did Sievers do in order to further the activities of your -organization? - -A. For instance, he took care of supplying all information which was of -importance. He told us what troops of the Waffen SS were in Germany -during the war. He gave us fake official trips and he worked out a plan -for an assassination, which was to be carried through by our group in -case the generals’ plan did not come off. We all thought it was not safe -to rely on the generals. In March 1944, Werner Haften told me by order -of Stauffenberg that one would have to take into account the fact that -the generals would have to be moved into action by a certain -assassination and everyone was to make his own preparations, in case he -had any, in such a manner as if he was the only one active. That was the -situation in March 1944. We worked out a substantial plan to remove, if -possible, Himmler and Hitler simultaneously, but in case of doubt -Himmler himself. We were of a completely different opinion there than -the other groups. - -Q. What concrete preliminary work was done for the assassination in your -group? - -A. Sievers was the only one in our group who came into question -regarding that assassination because he was the only one so close to -Himmler. He was therefore assigned this task and we worked out this -matter as far as the detailed plan was concerned; all that was necessary -now was to press the button. - -Q. And for what period of time was this assassination intended? - -A. We started our preparations in the year 1943, and we could have -started at the earliest at the end of 1943. Then we finally thought of -the middle of 1944 because Schulenburg and Luening told me that the -generals would be ready around that time. - -Q. Well, an assassination is a matter for quick decision. Is it not -true, therefore, that all these long preparations that you are telling -us about are rather surprising? - -A. The following would have to be taken into consideration: Around -Himmler and Hitler there was a strong guard, a strong ring of guards, -through which none could get unless he was carefully searched and -checked. Secondly, and that I already emphasized, one did not have to be -quite sure that the generals would carry out that assassination, but one -had to be sure that a sufficient number of generals were ready to remove -the National Socialist system immediately after the assassination, for -the elimination of just these two people would have no political purpose -whatsoever. We did not intend to carry out a Putsch but we intended to -remove a political system, a political order, and for that reason we had -to wait until the situation became right and the generals were ready. - -Q. Now, the question crops up whether these plans for the assassination -of Hitler and Himmler were only in your fantasy, or the fantasy of your -collaborators, or was there any real basis or concrete preparation for -such assassination? - -A. I already said that the preparations had been worked out in the -detailed technical points insofar as the location, the shooting, etc., -were concerned. - -Q. And who would have assassinated Himmler and Hitler? - -A. Sievers was to do that and a few young men belonging to my -organization. - -Q. And why was it in effect not carried out? - -A. After the Stauffenberg assassination had failed, the Wehrmacht -circles that came into question were eliminated by Himmler and therefore -it was no longer possible to remove that system. The only consequence of -any attempted assassination would have been—since the foreign political -situation would not have changed—that the people would have said again, -“This is the stab in the back for the victorious front line.” - -Q. What did Sievers do to further your activity in addition to what you -have already said? - -A. He, for instance, supported my representative, Arnold Deutelmoser, -when he was put on the list of those who were to be removed under the -pretext of the assassination which took place in Munich at the -Buergerbraeu. He also protected Bomas who was working in the -Netherlands. He protected Dr. Schuettelkopf whom we had sent into the -RSHA and it was possible for him in turn to send me to Sweden. He saved -Niels Bor, Professor Seyb of Oslo University, and he saved a number of -Norwegian students, etc. - -Q. Do you know that Sievers informed you about Himmler’s double play in -the case of the minister Popitz, and that as a consequence he saved that -entire group against measures by Himmler? - -A. Yes. The following thing happened. One day Sievers approached me and -said that he had just heard Himmler ridicule in a close circle an -attempt on the part of Popitz. He said that Minister Popitz with the -mediation of the lawyer Lampe had approached Himmler and tried to -persuade him to bring about a change of the National Socialist system, -perhaps by removing Hitler. He said Himmler thought it was very funny -that these men had so little sense as to think of him in that -connection. Thank God one could enter negotiations with them because -certainly nobody in the country was behind these people, but it did seem -that these gentlemen had many foreign political relationships and it -would be advisable to find out what in effect was behind it all and to -enter into negotiations with them. We were quite surprised about the -naive attitude shown by Himmler, and I sent Deutelmoser to Reichwein -whom I knew had connections with Popitz. In that way Popitz was warned. -Reichwein was so surprised and hardly wanted to believe the situation. - -I was asked to participate in a conference, and Reichwein after having -convinced himself that all of this was true promised to warn all of the -gentlemen concerned in Berlin and then asked Deutelmoser, who was to go -to Norway shortly thereafter to notify Reichwein’s friend, Stelzer, the -present Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, in order to see that -he, too, took the necessary precautionary measures. In this way we hoped -that a number of these people had actually been saved. Popitz, however, -himself was careless and was captured. - -Q. This conspiracy could not have been carried out unless you had the -necessary financial means at your disposal. How did you get these means? - -A. Everyone of our people, be it man or woman, had agreed to give up ten -percent of their monthly income for that illegal work. Many gave a -substantially larger sum. - -Q. How about Sievers? - -A. Sievers gave more than he had to. - -Q. Do you know the case of the three hundred Norwegian students who on -the basis of Sievers’ intervention were released from the concentration -camp Buchenwald? - -A. Yes. Terboven, or some other official in Norway, disliked some -demonstration which occurred there, and as a result arrested three -hundred students. Through some dark channels they were brought into the -concentration camp at Buchenwald. Sievers found out about that, and if I -remember correctly, he was in a position to see to it that these -students were released from the concentration camp, making use of -Himmler’s Nordic ideas to this end. - -Q. In that case you think that Sievers’ activity was substantially -important for your resistance movement? - -A. Yes. That was true of my organization, for he protected and covered -me as its chief, and, secondly, as far as I know, he was the only man -belonging to any resistance movement who was as close as he to the Reich -Leader SS. If any other group had brought any such information as he -did, I would have noticed that it could have only come from the same -source. - -Q. Witness, I shall have a document handed to you which was submitted by -the prosecution. This is Document NO-975, Prosecution Exhibit 479. It is -a letter sent by Sievers to Dr. Hirt. Would you please look at that -letter? - -A. Yes. - -Q. This letter contains a tone of voice which seems to indicate that he -tried to cover Dr. Hirt’s activity. Dr. Hirt was working in the -Anatomical Institute of the Strasbourg University. I assume, for reasons -which we shall mention later, that you know Hirt’s name. How do you -explain that tone in this letter? - -A. I think that this is very proper and praiseworthy. I would have -thought it very foolish of Sievers if he adopted any other tone in any -of his official correspondence. It was his task to say “yes” but act in -a negative way. There couldn’t have appeared any pretense of any -disapproval on his part. The more active one had to be in an -anti-National Socialist way, the more one had to speak in favor of -National Socialism. - -Q. I shall now turn to another complex of questions. Sievers is indicted -in this trial as having participated in a number of crimes. Did Sievers -at any time tell you about the so-called research assignments of Dr. -Rascher and Dr. Hirt who was just mentioned? These were experiments -carried out in the concentration camps. - -A. Sievers, as far as I remember, came to me in the year 1942 and told -me very excitedly that Himmler in his desire to extend the Ahnenerbe -Society had embarked on the thought of including experiments on human -beings in the work of the Ahnenerbe Society. He said that he did not -succeed in frustrating that. He said that he had no desire whatsoever to -participate in these horrible acts and asked me what to do. At that time -we considered this horrible situation very thoroughly and thought of -what we could do. It was quite clear to us what the SS intended here, -and it was questionable whether responsibility could be assumed for any -such acts, whether it would be advisable to be the instrument of Himmler -if he embarked on any such acts, measures where human beings were -degraded to the level of insects. - -The following considerations proved to be decisive for us: If Sievers -left, not one person, not one subject in these experiments would be -saved. If Sievers stayed there as a technical secretary, he could throw -sand into that machinery and would, perhaps, be in a position to save -somebody. In addition, the entire plan and the entire overthrow of the -Party stood or fell with Sievers staying at his post. The experiments on -human beings were only part of this horrible Party system, and one had -to concentrate on the decisive points in order finally to remove -everything, and, as I have said before, there was no other way into the -staff of the Reich Leader SS. We therefore concluded that if Sievers -resigned because of that, it was sure that he would be eliminated and -probably all the people he had ever entrusted with a research -assignment, and everything that we had done so far would be lost if he -left, and if anyone was to be saved at all, he could only be saved by -Sievers remaining at his post. - -Q. If I have understood you correctly, Sievers at first wanted to resign -from his position as Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe? - -A. Yes. That is correct. - -Q. Did Sievers approve of these arguments which you and your friends put -forward in favor of his staying with the Reich Leader SS as the Reich -Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe? Did he do it immediately or only -after trying to persuade him for some time? - -A. This took a number of days, because Sievers, according to his nature, -was softer than many of us and did not want to agree with us. We finally -had to appeal to his sense of duty and persuade him that he had to do it -and that it was the only way. - -Q. Among other matters, it was considered that by Sievers remaining at -his post, there would be a possibility of mitigating these horrible -experiments? - -A. The chance wasn’t very great but we were convinced that this would be -the only way possible, if at all. Then it could only be done in that -manner. If I may say so, this was such a horrible situation that we -always had to come back to it and we were very lucky at least to have -the hope of saving a number of people. Other opponents of the SS system -have told me about similar dilemmas which were just as difficult, and -where the alternative was yet more horrible, and where persons, -according to my belief and knowledge, acted correctly. If the Tribunal -would permit me I could relate a few almost incredible situations which -were even worse. - -PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: In what connection are these narrations, Witness? - -WITNESS HIELSCHER: In connection with the question as to whether it was -morally justifiable to enable Sievers to remain at his post. - -PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: Such matters as that would not be material in -this inquiry. - - * * * * * - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -MR. HARDY: Now, what did Sievers ever tell you about the Sievers-Hirt -skeleton collection? Did he ever tell you about that? - -WITNESS HIELSCHER: Yes. He told me that Himmler had ordered—as far as I -know, it was in connection with Jewish commissars who were under this -terrible execution order which was valid in the East—that some of them -were to be selected and used for the skeleton collection. The order was -from Himmler, as Sievers reported to me. - -Q. And did you know what they were going to do with these people? - -A. Yes. It was the same as in the experiments. There a danger of death -was a possibility; here it was certain. - -Q. You knew, of course, that they were going to stand these people up, -pick them out, select them according to size, take their anatomical -measurements, then ship them to Natzweiler and at Natzweiler kill them, -then deflesh them, then send the skeletons to the Strasbourg University -for collection? And you knew that? - -A. Yes. - -Q. A fine thing for a resistance man to be involved in, isn’t it? - -A. The situation, as I have said repeatedly, was as follows: We made no -distinction in the real evaluation of the skeleton collection and other -experiments in which there was this so-called “volunteering” and in -which the result was the same—in our eyes, they were the same thing. I -should like to emphasize one more thing. Does one have the moral right -to tolerate a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil? - -Q. Just a moment. Now in connection with the skeleton collection, do you -further know that they dispensed with the idea of taking Jewish -commissars but selected Jewish inmates of concentration camps? - -A. Yes. What particular persons were selected I do not know, of course, -but I knew that a number of Jews were to be gassed and were selected for -this anthropological collection. That was the same case as in the Ghetto -of Lodz. The Jewish commander of the Ghetto—that was Lieutenant -Rosenblatt—after he had gained confidence in me because I had gone in -with a false pass, said personally to me: “I was picked out by the SS. -When a new group of Jews comes into this Ghetto of Lodz and crowds the -Ghetto, I have to select exactly the same number of Jews and I know that -they will be gassed. That is, I was selected by the SS to determine who -is to be gassed. Now, I ask you in the name of God, Mr. Hielscher, you -are a Christian, what am I to do? I had nothing to do with that. I have -asked the Rabbis. I have asked the old people themselves, and we have -come to the conclusion that I must stay in this office. At least I can -determine the persons—I can at least select the oldest people who can’t -stand life in a ghetto and perhaps, in this way, perhaps I will be able -to save the life of one person. These two old people that I am telling -you about were about seventy years old. There were five Christians among -the Jews. At least I was able to see that these two old people were -gassed together. They asked me to tell their daughter that we were able -to achieve at least that. Tell me, did I do right or not?” That is still -more horrible because the man could not even reduce the number. I was -ashamed that the people who were in charge of this camp were called -Germans. But I said: “You have acted right and you are justified in the -eyes of God.” - -Q. Now, Dr. Hielscher, I assume that the defense counsel has shown you -all the documents concerning the skeleton collection. Is that right? - -A. Yes. - -Q. There won’t be any need for me to go over them. You have stated in -connection with the one document that was presented to you today on the -stand that this was a very praiseworthy act on the part of Sievers in a -negative way. Since you are familiar with all the skeleton collection -documents—I had intended to go into each one but I will just go into -that one. That is Document NO-088, Prosecution Exhibit 182. This is a -document which was written by Sievers. You will see that his signature -appears thereon. Do you recognize the signature at the bottom of the -letter? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Well, Sievers here is proposing a way in which they can destroy the -skeleton collection so that it will not be known to any one—that is, to -the Allies when they overrun Strasbourg. And you will notice, two-thirds -of the way through, the one paragraph that states: “The viscera could be -declared as remnants of corpses apparently left in the anatomical -institute by the French.” You see that? - -A. Yes. - -Q. “In order to be cremated.” Now this is an idea of one Wolfram -Sievers, wherein he is suggesting that these, or the results of these -criminal activities be left so that they may, by the Allies, be blamed -on to the French, and bearing in mind, of course that the French, as -well as the United States, Great Britain, and other Allies were equally -as interested as the resistance movements in defeating the Nazi regime, -were they not? - -A. I have already said that it was Sievers’ duty to say “yes” and to act -negatively, but, of course, I did not praise this action, but I praised -the vocabulary, the formulation. He spoke like a Nazi. The concrete -question in such a case was simply as follows: Can anyone be saved here -or not? If no one can be saved, what can I do to keep up the appearance -of a Nazi since I know that Obersturmbannfuehrer Neuhaus suspects that I -have some contact with the resistance movement? Sievers, since the 20th -of July, or rather since my arrest, was constantly seeing to it that his -actions looked like Nazi actions, insofar as no one was actually killed; -that was part of his duty, part of the mask without which the -organization could not operate. - -Q. Yes. But from this letter does it not suggest that he was willing to -allow an innocent Frenchman to answer for the crimes which flowed out of -this skeleton collection activity? - -A. If you show me— - -Q. I have asked you—does it not appear from this letter, this letter -signed by Sievers, that he was willing to allow a Frenchman to suffer -for the crimes committed during the course of the collection of these -skeletons? - -A. Yes. The letter quite deliberately, I believe, creates this -impression. That was the purpose of it, like all such letters. - - * * * * * - - EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT WITNESS - DR. ANDREW C. IVY[8] - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, take the following case. You are in a city in -which the plague is raging. You, as a doctor, have a drug that you could -use to combat the plague. However, you must test it on somebody. The -commander, or let us say the mayor of the city, comes to you and says, -“Here is a criminal condemned to death. Save us by carrying out the -experiment on this man.” Would you refuse to do so, or would you do it? - -WITNESS DR. IVY: I would refuse to do so, because I do not believe that -duress of that sort warrants the breaking of ethical and moral -principles. That is why the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention were -formulated, to make war, a barbaric enterprise, a little more humane. - -Q. Do you believe that the population of a city would have any -understanding for your action? - -A. They have understanding for the importance of the maintenance of the -principles of medical ethics which apply over a long period of years, -rather than a short period of years. Physicians and medical scientists -should do nothing with the idea of temporarily doing good which, when -carried out repeatedly over a period of time, would debase and -jeopardize a method for doing good. If a medical scientist breaks the -code of medical ethics and says, “Kill the person,” in order to do what -he thinks may be good, in the course of time that will grow and will -cause a loss of faith of the public in the medical profession, and hence -destroy the capacity of the medical profession to do its good for -society. The reason that we must be very careful in the use of human -beings as subjects in medical experiments is in order not to debase and -jeopardize this method for doing great good by causing the public to -react against it. - -Q. Witness, do you not believe that your ideal attitude here is more or -less that of a single person standing against the body of public -opinion? - -A. No I do not. That is why I read out the principles of medical ethics -yesterday, and that is why the American Medical Association has agreed -essentially to those principles. That is why the principles, the ethical -principles for the use of human beings in medical experiments, have been -quite uniform throughout the world in the past. - -Q. Then you do not believe that the urgency, the necessity of this city -would make a revision of this attitude necessary? - -A. No, not if they were in danger of killing people in the course of -testing out the new drug or remedy. There is no justification in killing -five people in order to save the lives of five hundred. - -Q. Then you are of the opinion that the life of the one prisoner must be -preserved even if the whole city perishes? - -A. In order to maintain intact the method of doing good, yes. - -Q. From the point of view of the politician, do you consider it good if -he allows the city to perish in the interests of preserving this -principle and preserving the life of the one prisoner? - -A. The politician, unless he knows medicine and medical ethics, has no -reason to make a decision on that point. - -Q. But as a politician he must make a decision about what is to happen. -Shall he coerce the doctor to carry out the experiment, or shall he -protect the doctor from the rage of the multitude? - -A. You can’t answer that question. I should say this, that there is no -state of no politician under the sun that could force me to perform a -medical experiment which I thought was morally unjustified. - -Q. You then, despite the order, would not carry out the order, and would -prefer to be executed as a martyr? - -A. That is correct, and I know there are thousands of people in the -United States who would have to do likewise. - -Q. And do you not also believe that in thousands of cities the -population would kill the doctor who found himself in that position? - -A. I do not believe so because they would not know. How would they know -whether the doctor had a drug that would or would not relieve? The -doctor would not know himself, because he would have to experiment -first. - -Q. Witness, I put a hypothetical case to you. If we are to turn to -reality other questions would arise. I simply want to hear now your -general attitude to this problem. You are then of the opinion that a -doctor should not carry out the order. Are you also of the opinion that -the politician should not give such an order? - -A. Yes. I believe he should not give such an order. - -Q. Is this not a purely political decision which must be left at the -discretion of the political leader? - -A. Not necessarily. He should seek the best advice that he can obtain. - -Q. If he is informed that this one experiment on this one prisoner would -save the whole city, he may give the order despite the fact that the -doctor does not wish to carry it out, is that what you think? - -A. He could then give the order, but if the doctor still believed that -it was contrary to his moral responsibilities, then the doctor should -not carry out the order. - -Q. That is another question, whether or not he carries it out, but in -such cases you consider it is permissible to give that order, is that -what I understood you to say? - -A. After he has obtained the best advice on the subject which he can -obtain. - -Q. Then he can give the order. Yes or no? - -A. Yes. - - * * * * * - - - G. Subjection to Medical Experimentation as Substitute - for Penalties - - a. Introduction - -Several of the defendants argued that medical experiments, alleged as -criminal, upon concentration camp inmates were justified because they -were a substitute for penalty or punishment previously imposed on the -experimental subjects. Counsel for the defendant Gebhardt argued that -the experimentation amounted to a complete pardon as sentences of death -had been imposed and hence that the experimentation, not always deadly, -saved human lives. The prosecution’s argument on this point is -illustrated by an extract from the closing statement, set forth on pages -44 to 49. On this general question, selections have been taken from the -closing brief for the defendant Karl Brandt and from the final plea of -the defendant Gebhardt. These appear below on pages 49 to 56. The -following selections from the evidence appear in pages 56 to 61: extract -from the direct examination of the defendant Mrugowsky; -cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert witness, Dr. Andrew C. -Ivy. - - b. Selection from the Argumentation of the Prosecution - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE - PROSECUTION_[9] - - * * * * * - -Another of the rather common defenses urged by the defendants is that -the experimental subjects were criminals condemned to death who, -provided they survived the experiment, were rewarded by commutation of -their sentence to life imprisonment in a concentration camp. For one who -has even the slightest knowledge of the conditions in concentration -camps and the life expectancy of an average inmate, this alleged defense -assumes the aspect of a ghastly joke. We need only recall the remark -made by one of the women used by Rascher to reward his frozen victims in -Dachau, who when asked by him why she had volunteered for the camp -brothel, replied: “rather half a year in a brothel than half a year in a -concentration camp.” But the defects in this spurious defense run much -deeper. Concentration camps were not ordinary penal institutions, such -as are known in other countries, for the commitment of persons convicted -of crimes by courts. The very purpose of concentration camps was the -oppression and persecution of persons who were considered undesirable by -the Nazi regime on racial, political, and religious grounds. Hundreds of -thousands of victims were confined to concentration camps because they -were simply Jews, Slavs, or gypsies, Free Masons, Social Democrats, or -Communists. They were not tried for any offense and sentenced by a -court, not even a Nazi court. They were imprisoned on the basis of -“protective custody orders” issued by the RSHA. Tens of thousands were -condemned to death on the single order of Himmler, who, as Gebhardt put -it so well, “had the power to execute thousands of people by a stroke of -his pen.” (_Tr. p. 4025._) There were, indeed, a relatively small group -of inmates who might be classed as ordinary criminals. These were men -who had served out their sentences in an ordinary prison and then were -committed to concentration camps for still further detention. A -memorandum of 18 September 1942 by Thierack, the Minister of Justice, -concerning a conversation with Himmler, tells us the fate of those -unfortunates: - - “The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of - their sentence to the Reich Leader SS to be worked to death. - Persons under protective arrest, Jews, gypsies, Russians and - Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and - Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the - decision of the Reich Minister for Justice.” (_654-PS, Pros. Ex. - 562._) - -The proof in this case has demonstrated beyond all doubt that so-called -criminals sentenced to death were very rarely used in any of the -experiments. True it is that Himmler said prisoners condemned to death -should be used in those high-altitude experiments where the -long-continued activity of the heart after death was observed by the -experimenters. He was generous enough to say that if such persons could -be brought back to life, then they were to be “pardoned” to -concentration camp for life. But even this unique amnesty had no -application to Russians and Poles, who were used exclusively in those -experiments. - -But, assuming for the moment, that this alleged defense might have a -mitigating effect under some circumstances, it certainly has no -application to this case. Be it noted that this is an affirmative -defense by way of avoidance or mitigation. There has been no proof -whatever that criminals sentenced to death by an ordinary court could -possibly be executed in a concentration camp. Such matters were within -the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, not Himmler and the SS. The -experimental subjects we are dealing with are those that Himmler could -condemn by a “stroke of his pen.” If the inmate used in the experiments -was condemned for merely being a Jew, Pole, or Russian, or, for example, -having had sexual intercourse with a Jew, it does not answer the -criminal charge to say that the victim was doomed to die. -Experimentation on such a person is to compound the crime of his initial -unlawful detention as well as to commit the additional crime of murder -or torture. As has been said by another tribunal, “Exculpation from the -charge of criminal homicide can possibly be based only upon bona fide -proof that the subject had committed murder or any other legally -recognized capital offense; and, not even then, unless the sentencing -tribunal with authority granted by the state in the constitution of the -court declared that the execution would be accomplished by means of a -low-pressure chamber.”[10] - -In this connection, it might be noted that German law recognized only -three methods of execution, namely, by decapitation, hanging, and -shooting. (_German Penal Code, Part I, Section 13; Reichsgesetzblatt -[Reich Law Gazette], 1933, Part I, p. 151_; _Reichsgesetzblatt 1939, -Part I, p. 1457_.) Moreover, there is no proof that any of the -experimental subjects had their death sentence commuted to any lesser -degree of punishment. Indeed, in the sulfanilamide crimes it was the -experiment _plus_ later execution for at least six of the subjects. - -Since the defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser have put -particular stress on this alleged defense, I should like to make a few -remarks in that connection, but it should be remembered that they apply -with equal force to most of the other defendants. Gebhardt, speaking for -his co-defendants Fischer and Oberheuser, took the position that the -Polish women who had been used in the sulfanilamide experiments had been -condemned to death for participation in a resistance movement and that -by undergoing the experiments voluntarily or otherwise, they were to -have their death sentences commuted to some lesser degree of punishment, -provided they survived the experiments. This was no bargain reached with -the experimental subjects; their wishes were not consulted in the -matter. It was, according to Gebhardt, left to the good faith of someone -unnamed to see to it that the death sentences were not carried out on -the survivors of the experiments. Certainly Gebhardt, Fischer, and -Oberheuser assumed no responsibility or even interest in that regard. - -It should be pointed out that the proof shows that the experimental -subjects who testified before this Tribunal were never so much as -afforded trial; they had no opportunity to defend themselves against -whatever crimes they were said to have committed. They were simply -arrested and interrogated by the Gestapo in Poland and sent to the -concentration camp. They had never so much as been informed that they -had been _marked for_, not sentenced to, death. Article 30 of the -Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to -the Hague Convention, specifically provides that even a spy “shall not -be punished without previous trial”. - -Gebhardt would have the Tribunal believe that _but for_ the experiments -all these Polish girls would be dead; that he preserved the evidence -which was used against him. Nothing could be further from the truth. -There is no proof in the record that these women would have been -executed if they had not undergone the experiments. The witness Maczka -is living proof of the contrary. She was arrested for resistance -activities on 11 September 1941 and shipped to Ravensbrueck on 13 -September. She was not an experimental subject yet she lives today. -Substantially all of the Polish experimental subjects arrived in -Ravensbrueck in September 1941. These girls had not been executed by -August 1942 when the experiments began. There were some 700 Polish girls -in that transport. There is no evidence that a substantial number were -ever executed even though most of them were not experimented on. - -The proof submitted by the prosecution has shown beyond controversy that -these Polish women _could not have been legally executed_. The right to -grant pardons in cases of death sentences was exclusively vested in -Hitler by a decree of 1 February 1935. On 2 May 1935, Hitler delegated -the right to make negative decisions on pardon applications to the Reich -Minister of Justice. On 30 January 1940, Hitler delegated to the -Governor General for the occupied Polish territories the authority to -grant and deny pardons for the occupied Polish territories. By edict -dated 8 March 1940, the Governor General of occupied Poland ordered -that— - - “The execution of a death sentence promulgated by a regular - court, a special court, or a police court martial, shall take - place only when my decision has been issued not to make use of - my right to pardon.” (_NO-3073, Pros. Ex. 534._) - -Thus, even though we assume _arguendo_, that the experimental subjects -had all committed substantial crimes, that they were all properly tried -by a duly constituted court of law, and that they were legally sentenced -to death, it is still clear from these decrees that these women could -not have been legally executed until such time as the Governor General -of occupied Poland had decided in each case not to make use of his -pardon right. There has been no proof that the Governor General ever -acted with respect to pardoning the Polish women used in the -experiments, or, for that matter, any substantial number of those not -used in the experiments. The only reason these 700 Polish women were -transported from Warsaw and Lublin to Ravensbrueck, in the first place, -was because the Governor General had not approved their execution. -Otherwise they would have been immediately executed in Poland. At the -very least, these women were entitled to remain unmolested so long as -the Governor General took no action. He may never have acted or, when he -did, he may have acted favorably on the pardon. Who is to say that the -majority of these 700 women did not live through the war even though -they did not undergo the experiments? Certainly it was incumbent on the -defense to prove the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. This -it did not do by any evidence. - -The defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser certainly cannot claim -that they believed in good faith that the Polish women could have been -legally executed. Even the camp doctor, Schiedlausky, knew that the -Governor General had to approve each execution. Moreover, the large -number of 700 women being sentenced to death at this early stage of the -war was enough to put any reasonable person on notice that something was -wrong. - -Additionally, the uncontroverted evidence proves that survival of the -experiments was no guarantee whatever of avoiding execution in any -event. At least six of the experimental subjects were proved to have -been executed after having survived the experiments. It was not a -question of the experiment _or_ execution but rather the experiments -_and_ execution. Indeed, in February 1945, an effort was made to execute -all of the experimental subjects but, because of confusion in the camp -due to the war situation, the experimental subjects were able to obtain -different identification numbers and so avoid detection. - -But even if one takes the case of the defense at its face value, the -Tribunal is in effect asked to rule that it is legal for military -doctors of a nation at war to experiment on political prisoners of an -occupied country who are condemned to death, to experiment on them in -such a way that they may suffer death, excrutiating pain, mutilation, -and permanent disability, all this without their consent and in direct -aid of the military potential of their enemy. There would, of course, be -no valid reason for limiting such a decision to civilian prisoners; the -experiments would certainly have been no worse had they been performed -on Polish or American prisoners of war. It is impossible to consider -seriously this ghoulish ruling being sought for by the defense. - - c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT - KARL BRANDT_ - - * * * * * - - _The Medical Experiments as Substitute for Penalty_[11] - -The indictment embraces certain medical experiments, which are called -war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to paragraphs 10 and -15 of the indictment, these experiments are designated as crimes, as a -violation of the general principles of criminal law as evolved from the -penal law of all civilized nations, as well as violations of the -national penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were -committed. An indication of their punishable character was seen in the -fact that the experiments were carried out _without the consent of the -persons experimented upon_. - -We must examine whether this _consent_ of the person subjected to -experiments is always necessary or whether it can be replaced _by an -order of the state_ through the penal administration, and further, if -the same law applies to the execution of sentences on foreigners. If -consent to the human experiment by the person experimented on can be -replaced by an order of the state, then the person responsible for the -experiment cannot be punished in cases where the experiments were -carried out through the _official penal administration in accordance -with the order_. - -No _legal regulations_ regarding the question of admissibility of -medical experiments in civilized countries are _known_. However, it is a -fact that such experiments have been carried out to a greater or lesser -extent within the memory of man in all countries and up till now have -remained unopposed. But with the development of medical knowledge and -modern methods of research, experiments on human beings have increased -considerably. Today, when research, to solve its problems and meet its -challenges, has advanced into the most widely differentiated spheres, -they are considered absolutely necessary. Accordingly, human experiments -will continue to increase with the progress of science and the _problem_ -that this trial has raised will always be _urgent_. - -Moreover, reference is made to the opinion of the Washington anatomist, -E. V. Cowdry, on the necessity of human experiments in cancer research -(_Karl Brandt 50, Karl Brandt Ex. 56_), and the order for human -experiments on the part of the British Military Government for Professor -McCance in Wuppertal. The knowledge of such experiments on human beings -was, as literature shows, at first limited to medical specialist circles -and the official authorities concerned. Only in recent times has _the -public_ been cautiously informed. (_Becker-Freyseng 60, Becker-Freyseng -Ex. 58._) Complete instruction of the public is only necessary so that, -in case of an eventual discussion, sound judgment of the actions of the -researcher may be possible. - -Reference is also made to the remarkable publication on the malaria -experiment on 800 prisoners in the United States, published in the -widely circulated periodical “Life” (_Karl Brandt 1, Karl Brandt Ex. -1_). The number of the imprisoned persons to be experimented upon was -even more than 2,000, according to the radio account submitted. - -Repeated reports on such experiments have so far been _received without -opposition_ by specialist circles, the authorities, and also the general -public. From that can be gathered what in principle is considered -permissible and right by competent authorities and the public. The -experiments actually carried out are a mirror of the existing laws and -one can by way of _legal sociological investigation find the norms of -law_ that have validity. This is done where the law is not codified. In -the same manner, the International Military Tribunal has derived the -existing international law on the basis of its phenomena and the same -procedure leads to the determination of the common law. Inasmuch as -positive regulations exist in the United States which are contradictory -to the law derived from the phenomena, these legal regulations must be -produced or else the _conclusions_ that can be drawn from the -experiments must be regarded _in favor of the defendant_ as valid law -and an expression of fundamental principles of punishment. - -The defense has in the present situation only very limited literature at -its disposal for the comprehension and explanation of these legally -important facts of the case. However, the little that is available is -already so revealing that one must come to the conclusion that medical -experiments on human beings are not only admissible on principle, but in -addition, that it also does _not_ violate _the basic principles of -criminal law_ of civilized nations to carry out _experiments on -convicts_. - -The _question_ today is not whether experiments on human beings may be -carried out but only under what circumstances and _how_ these -experiments may be undertaken. Moreover, the prosecution itself has -declared that human experiments are admissible on principle. - -It is not intended here to go into the experiments which were made on -the healthy and the sick and _corpus vile_ at the _time_ when modern -research was in _its infancy_ and without participation of government -authorities. Insight into those times can be obtained from the book by -the Russian physician _Wressajew_ “Confession of a Physician” (_Karl -Brandt 48, Karl Brandt Ex. 55_), published about 1900. The book reveals -some of the experiments that were then known to medical experts and it -follows that the governments did not interfere but in the interest of -medical progress permitted such experiments without trying to protect -the individual as the person experimented upon. The states then either -_considered_ such experiments _compatible with criminal law_, or they -acquiesced in the camouflaging of the “voluntariness” of the person -experimented upon which was customary in consideration of the law. No -governmental intervention as the result of such medical experiments is -known. - -With the development of health administrations, _governmental -supervision_ has been increasingly instituted in all countries and one -can consider all that was admitted in medical experiments with the -consent of the administration and without opposition as the _sediment of -the existing law_. This is true particularly of recent times where -governmental direction is on the increase. - -Particular attention must be given here to the experiments in state -institutes on convicts and those sentenced to death. - - * * * * * - - _EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR - DEFENDANT GEBHARDT_[12] - - * * * * * - - _The Agreement by the Experimental Persons as Legal Justification_ - -I shall now deal with the individual reasons for the exclusion of -injustice and guilt, which according to the result of the evidence -preclude the culpability of the defendant’s behavior. I am hereby taking -into consideration that the assumption of only one of the reasons for -the exclusion of punishment which we shall now deal with suffices to -justify the defendant’s behavior and to exonerate him of the offense in -the sense of a personal culpability because of his commission or -omission. The individual reasons for the exclusion of culpability are -discussed without taking into consideration whether the examination of -any further similar reasons is superfluous, since the assumption of -another reason for the exclusion of culpability suffices to secure the -intended success. Evidence has proved that the experiments for testing -sulfanilamides were carried out, to begin with, on fifteen professional -male criminals who had been sentenced to death. Had they survived the -experiments, they would have been granted a pardon therefor. Considering -that this part of the experiment is not a subject of the indictment, I -need not go into detail about it. - -To the second and third group (the sulfanilamide experiments) belonged -as experimental subjects members of the Polish Resistance Movement, who, -in view of their activity in this illegal movement, had been sentenced -to death by German courts martial. - -It is a principle of German criminal law that in any case the consent of -the offender precludes the illegality of the action. This principle is -not only found in German law but is an established part of practically -all legal systems. Consequently, we have to examine the question whether -the experimental subjects gave their consent to the experiments. When -examining the question whether legally effective consent had been given, -it will not matter so much whether the experimental subjects expressly -declared their consent. However, if generally acknowledged principles -are applied, one may presume that they expressed their consent in some -obvious manner. It is clear that consent could also have been given -tacitly and by conclusive action. - -However, it is true that all the female witnesses examined in court -testified that they did not give their consent to the experiments. The -Tribunal, in evaluating these facts, will have to take into -consideration that these witnesses were in a special position at that -time, as they also are today. It stands to reason that under these -circumstances many things may appear different to them today from the -way they actually happened five years ago. It might be true that the -experimental subjects did not give their actual consent to these -experiments. It might even be true that they were not asked before the -experiments whether they consented to the experiments. Nevertheless this -would not exclude the possibility that, considering their position at -that time and being certain that they could not escape execution in any -other way, they nevertheless did consent to the experiments, however -tacitly. This supposition would coincide with the fact that, for -instance, none of the experimental subjects had ever made any complaint -or mentioned to the defendant Fischer, who had regularly changed the -dressings, that they did not consent to the experiments. - - _The Presumed Consent of the Experimental Subjects as - Legal Justification_ - -The illegality of an action is excluded not only if the injured person -agreed either actually or tacitly, but if there could have been a -possible consent. These are the cases where the consent of the injured -person could be expected normally, but where for some reason or another -such a consent was actually not given. Numerous attempts have been made -in legal literature and also in judicial decisions to do justice to this -situation which so often occurs in practice. Not all of these theories -need to be discussed since the decisive points of view have by now been -clarified. At first an attempt was made to settle this question by -applying the law referring to unauthorized acting for and on behalf of -another person. Serious objections were raised against this transfer of -concepts of civil law to criminal law. The criminal idea of consent is -to be extended instead to include so-called supposed consent. I -understand this as an objective judicial judgment based on -probabilities, namely, that the person concerned would have given his -consent to the action from his personal point of view if he had fully -known and realized the situation. Wherever such a judgment could be -applied, it should have the same effect as the judicial finding of an -actual consent. - -However, other courts and scientists base their reason for justification -upon “action for the benefit of the injured person”. If correctly -viewed, no actual contradiction to an assumed comment could be seen -therein. On the contrary one may say perhaps that this could be -considered as an independent argument for justification. - -In modern literature and judicial practice, the tendency prevails to -combine the two last mentioned viewpoints by demanding them -cumulatively. It is not comprehensible, however, why such simultaneous -existence of two arguments for justification should be required when -each argument in itself is decisive. - -A well-known teacher of criminal law in Germany stated the following -conception of this idea: “Should the injured person not consent, the -action in his behalf and for his benefit is to be considered lawful if -his consent could have been expected according to an objective judgment. -The primary justifying argument here is not that the injured person has -waived his right of decision, but that a positive action was performed -for his benefit.” - -The practical result, in spite of the theoretical objections raised -against such a combination, could hardly be different. For the -“objective judicial sentence based on probabilities,” here applied for, -which is decisive and upon which the so-called supposed consent would -have to be based, will regularly result from an action that under given -circumstances is performed for the “benefit of the injured person.” - -Applying these general principles to the sulfanilamide experiments, -there can hardly be any doubt that the experimental subjects would have -agreed if they had been fully aware of their position. The experimental -subjects had already been sentenced to death and their participation in -these experiments was the only possibility for them to avoid execution. -If the Tribunal now tries to assess the probability that the -experimental subjects would have agreed to submit to those experiments -if they had had full knowledge of the position and the certainty of -their eventual execution, there can in my opinion be very little doubt -as to the result of this examination. - -Nor can there be two opinions regarding the question whether, under -circumstances prevailing at that time, the utilization of the prisoners -for these experiments was “in the interest of the wounded”. - -The evidence has shown that the other members of the Polish Resistance -Movement, who were sentenced to death by court martial and who were in -the concentration camp at Ravensbrueck awaiting the confirmation of the -verdict which was given by the Governor General of the occupied Polish -territory, were really shot only after a complicated and protracted -procedure. Their participation in these medical experiments was the only -chance for them as condemned persons to save their lives. Their -participation in these experiments was not only in their interest but it -also seems to be inconceivable that the prisoners, if they had been -fully aware of their position and had known of the forthcoming -execution, would not have given their consent for the experiments. - - * * * * * - - _The Defendant’s Erroneous Assumption of an Agreement by the - Experimental Subjects_ - -The evidence has shown that the experimental subjects in Camp -Ravensbrueck were not selected by the defendant Karl Gebhardt nor by any -of the other defendants, but that the selection was made by the -competent agency within the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin or the -political department of the Ravensbrueck concentration camp. During the -conference at the beginning of July 1942, in which the conditions for -the experiments were agreed upon, it was expressly assured that the -experimental subjects were persons sentenced to death who were to be -pardoned if they survived the experiments. - -In view of the fact that the defendant Gebhardt did not himself select -the experimental subjects and that, on the other hand, no complaints of -any kind on the part of the experimental subjects were ever reported to -him,—the defendant Fischer was not in a position to make any personal -observations along these lines either—we now must examine the question -of the legal position of the defendant Gebhardt if he erroneously -assumed the consent of the experimental subjects. - -In criminal law it is a generally recognized principle that there can be -no question of intentional action if there existed an erroneous -assumption of justificatory facts. This principle can also be found in -Article 59 of the German Penal Code.[13] But beyond that, this legal -principle may be considered one of the principles which is generally -valid and which is derived from the general principles of the criminal -law of all civilized nations, thus representing an inherent part of our -modern conception of criminal law. In application of this principle—and -even if the Court does not consider the consent of the experimental -subjects as proved and, therefore, does not provide the prerequisites -for a legal excuse for objective reasons—we still cannot assume an -intentional act on the part of the defendant Gebhardt if he acted under -the “erroneous assumption of consent by the experimental subjects.” - - _The Erroneous Assumption of Probable Agreement_ - -The same applies if the defendant Gebhardt erroneously assumed a -probable consent of the experimental subjects. We do not mean here an -erroneous assumption with regard to the legal suppositions of such a -one, but the erroneous assumption of such facts, which, had they -existed, would have induced the Tribunal to recognize the “probable -consent.” I am referring here to my argumentation for the legal excuse -represented by the “probable consent,” which I understand as “an -objective opinion concerning the law, based on probability and according -to which the person concerned would have consented to the act from his -own personal standpoint, if he had been fully aware of the -circumstances.” Provided that the defendant Dr. Gebhardt assumed the -existence of such circumstances which seems certain according to the -evidence, and even if he did so erroneously, the intent and thus the -crime in this case would also be excluded according to the generally -acknowledged principle. - - * * * * * - - d. Evidence - - _Testimony_ - Page - Extract from the testimony of defendant Mrugowsky 56 - Extract from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 60 - Andrew C. Ivy - - EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY[14] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -DR. FLEMMING: You know that General Taylor, in his opening speech, said -that this experiment with aconitine had not been conducted in order to -find an antidote to aconitine but in order to ascertain how long it -takes to kill a human being in this manner. Please tell the Tribunal -whether this concerned an experiment. - -DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY: This was not an experiment in the actual sense of -the word. It was the legal execution of five thieves, and some special -facts were to be ascertained during this execution. The details were as -follows: One day the chemist of the Reich Criminal Police Office, Dr. -Wittmann, came to me. He asked me to attend an execution as the official -doctor. As the reason for this request he added that in the General -Government in Poland a high official had been injured when he was -attacked with a revolver; that the bullet had inflicted only a harmless -flesh wound, but nevertheless the person had died after a few hours with -symptoms of poisoning. The person who had attacked him had been -arrested, and the rest of the ammunition was a hollow ball which -contained a crystallized poison. The Chemical Institute of the Reich -Criminal Police Office tested this and found that it was aconitine. The -ammunition was of Russian origin. There is no aconitine in Germany; it -is imported. The question was whether this was the first case of the -beginning of poison warfare against Germany. We had been expecting such -a method of warfare for some time. For that reason there was not only -criminal interest in clearing up this case but a general interest of the -greatest importance. This ammunition was to be tested on five thieves -who were to be executed anyhow, and it was to be seen whether this -crystallized poison contained another poison which had not been found in -the chemical tests. The remainder of the original Russian ammunition was -to be used, and also German ammunition which had been made in imitation -of the Russian. At the same time—and this was the main purpose of the -experiment—it was to be discovered how much time would elapse between -the injury and the appearance of the symptoms of poisoning, in order, if -necessary, to be able to use an antidote. This question was of such -great importance because an antidote to aconitine is hardly known, and -if this had actually been the beginning of poison warfare, then efforts -would have to be made immediately to find an antidote. Therefore, the -head of the Reich Criminal Police Office asked me, and the Chief of the -Criminal Technical Office also asked me, to participate in the execution -myself, although that was not actually my work; but Dr. Wittmann said he -did not know of any toxicologist except one in Berlin; they had all been -drafted, and as a bacteriologist I had a certain amount of experience in -symptoms of poisoning connected with bacteria and, therefore, he asked -me to take over this job. I was rather unwilling to do so. I pointed out -to Dr. Wittmann that the regular police in Vienna had a pharmacologist -who was very experienced and I suggested that he should be called upon; -but this was not done because of the poor communications resulting from -the air warfare. Since, on the other hand, this question was doubtless -of great significance and should not be postponed, I finally declared -myself willing to fulfill this request. In accordance with the purpose -of this job, I made not only the usual report, but a rather more -detailed report on the symptoms of poisoning. There is the report which -we have here in this prosecution document. - -Q. You have said that this ammunition which was captured was of Russian -production. How can that be proved? - -A. The prosecution itself proved that. To this Document NO-201, -Prosecution Exhibit 290, some files were attached which were not -included in my report. There are three drawings of cross-sections of -these bullets which were made and handed in to the Institute. The -heading is “Poison bullet from a Russian pistol, calibre 7.65” and -details about the construction of this bullet. - -Q. You say that this photostatic copy of the drawings of the bullet was -not part of your report. How is that shown? Will you compare the stamps -in the diary? - -A. The report which I handed in is dated 12 September 1944, and then the -next day it was received by the Criminal Technical Office, and the -receipt stamp carried the number “Secret 53”. The drawings, however, -have a different secret journal number, that is, 15-1944. If the number -G-53 was in September then, if the distribution of letters received is -assumed to be even throughout the year, I should assume that the Reich -Criminal Police Office received these drawings in March of the same -year. At that time I did not know anything about this attack, and the -experiment had not been started yet. Nor did I know any details about -the possibility of such poison warfare. - -Q. Who was present at the execution? - -A. Dr. Ding, who happened to be in Berlin and whom I took with me in -order to support my observations; it was he who conducted the actual -medical examination. I, myself, merely ascertained the occurrence of -death. Also Dr. Wittmann, representing the Criminal Technical Institute; -also a representative of the camp commandant, I believe the adjutant; -and an Untersturmfuehrer who performed the execution, that is, actually -shot the people. It is possible that there were others whom I do not -remember and whose names I do not know. - -Q. Did you investigate in any way who these people were who were -executed, and by what court they had been condemned to death? - -A. I talked with the people; they understood German; they were -apparently Germans. I considered them ethnic Germans [Volksdeutsche] of -whom we had large numbers in Germany at that time. On the other hand, I -knew that in concentration camps executions were carried out, and I had -been told that this was an official matter and that there had to be an -official representative of the camp commandant present. The fact that -such a representative was present at this execution was sufficient for -me to assume that the matter actually was official and, on the other -hand, I had no opportunity to be informed of the sentence or anything -like that. - -Q. Then you did not see the death sentence order before it was carried -out? - -A. No. I did not have the opportunity because the doctor is merely -called in to an execution to ascertain when death occurs, but I am -convinced that it was not my duty to examine the sentence order, for I -had nothing to do with the actual execution. The order was given by the -representative of the camp commandant; someone who was attached to the -commandant’s office actually shot the people, and I was merely there to -ascertain when death occurred and to note the symptoms of poisoning, but -Dr. Ding did the latter for me. The official information from a high -authority was sufficient proof to me for the legality of the execution. - -Q. In the case of two of the five thieves, the poison had no effect. You -saw the suffering of the other three from the poison; why did you not -shorten this suffering? - -A. The sight of this execution was one of the most horrible experiences -of my life. On the other hand, I could not shorten the symptoms for in -the first place there was no antidote against aconitine available. If it -is in the circulation, then there is no possibility of removing it. In -the second place, it was the express purpose to find out how long the -symptoms of poisoning last in order in later cases to be able to use an -antidote, which it was hoped would soon be discovered. - -Q. Did you know that executions in Germany can only be carried out by -shooting, by hanging, or by beheading, and did you not have any -misgivings when this execution was carried out in a different way? - -A. I am not a jurist; I do not know the methods of execution. On the -other hand, I have already said that in my opinion the state itself has -the right to determine the method of death for its citizens in wartime -and doubtless has the right to determine the method of an execution. -Here the suspicion had arisen that poison war was beginning against -Germany. This seemed to be supported by the finding of poison Russian -ammunition. Since the investigations were carried out by the highest -authorities in the Reich, I had no doubt about the juridicial -admissibility upon which I, as a doctor, had no influence. - -PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: Witness, were each of these men struck by more -than one bullet or only by one bullet each? - -DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY: Each one was shot only once in the thigh; two of -these five persons were immediately killed by another shot, because the -first shot of the poison ammunition had hit the artery in the thigh and -their suffering was immediately stopped; but the others had only flesh -wounds and after a certain period of time, symptoms of poisoning -appeared; that was three people. - -DR. FLEMMING: Did you have anything else to do with the previous history -of this execution? - -MRUGOWSKY: No. - - * * * * * - - EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT WITNESS - DR. ANDREW C. IVY[15] - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I should like to ask your permission to -put to the witness a small newspaper notice from the newspaper “The -People” of 3 March 1946. This is an English newspaper. Regarding the -defendants before the IMT, the following was stated: “The opinion of -some people is that they should be condemned very soon.” Then it says: -“Others believe that they should be made to expiate their crimes by -helping to cure cancer, leprosy, and tuberculosis as experimental -subjects.” - -Is the thought of atonement contained therein? - -WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes, but it is expressed in a hysterical manner. - -Q. Yes. I agree with you. - -Witness, do you believe that if a person does not volunteer for an -experiment, the state can order such atonement? - -A. No. - -Q. Do you not believe that you can expect something of a prisoner that -goes beyond his actual sentence if at the same time people outside -prison are subject to such burdens? - -A. No. Those ideas were given up many years ago in the science and study -of penology. The primary objective of penology today is reformative, not -punitive, not expiative. - -Q. Witness, is that the recognized theory of penology throughout the -whole world today? - -A. It may not be the recognized theory throughout the whole world today, -but it is the prevailing theory in the United States. There is one other -aspect that is quite large and essential, and that is the protective -aspect of imprisonment to protect society from a habitual criminal. - -Q. Witness, if a soldier at the front is exposed to an epidemic and can -be almost certain that he will catch typhus and deserts and hides behind -the protecting walls of a prison, would you not consider it justifiable -if he is persuaded to volunteer for an experiment that concerns itself -with typhus? - -A. Will you read the question again? - -Q. If a soldier deserts from the front where typhus is raging for fear -that he too will contract typhus and prefers to be imprisoned in order -thus to save himself, do you think it is right for him to be persuaded -while he is serving his sentence to subject himself to a typhus -experiment? - -A. As a volunteer? Yes. - -Q. I see. And would you not take a step further, if this prisoner says, -“No, I refuse, because if I do this there wouldn’t have been any point -in my deserting; I deserted in order to save myself. My buddies may die -but I would just prefer not to.” - -A. The answer to that question is no. - -Q. Don’t you admit that one can hold a different view in this matter? - -A. Yes, but I don’t believe it could be justified. - - * * * * * - - - H. Usefulness of the Experiments - - a. Introduction - -Both by testimony and argument the defense claimed that the medical -experiments had generally been useful in furthering medical science, -that in some cases the experiments alleged as criminal had increased the -speed of the progress of medical science, and that in some cases there -was no other alternative for the development of medical science except -to conduct experiments on human beings. The prosecution, in addition to -arguing that voluntary participation by the subject of experimentation -was a prerequisite of legal experiments, argued that the experiments -turned out to be entirely useless for medical science and human -progress, and that in some cases it was doubtful if considerations of -medical science played any controlling role in the decision to conduct -the experiments. - -Selections from the defense argumentation have been made from the final -pleas for the defendants Becker-Freyseng and Beiglboeck. Extracts from -these final pleas appear below on pages 62 to 64. A part of the opening -statement of the prosecution (vol. I, p. 37 ff.) was devoted to this -topic. Defense evidence on the usefulness of the experiments has been -selected from the direct examination of the defendants Mrugowsky and -Rose. Extracts from their testimony appear below on pages 66 to 70. - - - b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense - - _EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR - DEFENDANT BECKER-FREYSENG_[16] - - * * * * * - -At the moment I consider one factor above all to be material. It is the -following question: Was everything done, when the sea-water experiments -were being planned, to furnish all data required for establishing the -necessity of the experiments? And I think I can definitely answer this -question in the affirmative. - -The defense has proved the high sense of responsibility applied to the -inquiry on the necessity of the sea-water experiments. Scientists of -international reputation, like Professor Dr. Eppinger and Professor -Heubner, were consulted, and they definitely answered this question in -the affirmative. More cannot be expected or demanded in the way of a -sense of responsibility. In my opinion, the mere fact that these -scientists were asked their opinion on the issue in question shows that -everything was done on the part of the Chief of the Medical Service of -the Luftwaffe and his office to reach the right decision in this -question. - -With regard to the purely objective judgment of the sea-water -experiments and their necessity, I should like to refer to the -statements made in my closing brief for Dr. Becker-Freyseng. - -At this point, I should, however, like to add the following: The -prosecution has tried to make out that it was the purpose of these -sea-water experiments to decide whether Berkatit removes the salt from -sea water. This contention of the prosecution has in no way been proved. -I must stress here again, most emphatically, that this was never the -purpose of the sea-water experiments. - -All people concerned realized that Berkatit does not remove the salt -from sea water. The question which was to be clarified and which -necessitated the experiments was rather the following: Under the action -of the vitamins contained in Berkatit, will the kidneys be capable of -producing a urine with a higher sodium chloride concentration than is -normally the case? Dr. Eppinger answered this question neither in the -affirmative nor in the negative; he stated that this question could be -decided only by experiment. - -In addition there was another question to be decided, as to whether in -case of shipwreck it would be more desirable to endure thirst, or -whether marooned fliers should be advised to drink small quantities of -salt water. In 1942-1944 this question was also raised in the United -States and England and there, too, human experiments were carried out. -But all these individual questions were only part of the great issue of -how shipwrecked persons could be helped to escape the agony and danger -of dying from thirst. These issues were the basis for the experiments -conducted in 1944. In my opinion it is not admissible to construe -arbitrarily another issue today and to contend on the basis of such -issue, which never existed, that these experiments were not necessary. -These medical issues alone necessitated the experiments. There were -other issues too, to which I want to make short reference. - -Until 1944 the world lacked an agent to make sea water drinkable. Such -an agent was an absolute necessity. Nobody denied even then that -Wofatit, developed by the defendant Schaefer, would have been an ideal -agent for this purpose. It was, however, equally clear that this agent -could only be manufactured by withdrawing the necessary raw material, -namely silver, from other war-essential uses. - -Furthermore, it was not denied that Berkatit did not require critical -raw materials in the same measure. Another circumstance to be considered -was that Berkatit could have been produced in existing plants, whereas -it would have been necessary to erect new plants for the production of -Wofatit. Accordingly, these technical reasons favored the introduction -of Berkatit. It can hardly be denied that it was necessary for a medical -officer conscious of his responsibilities in war to consider these -reasons when reaching a decision. Incidentally, the expert of the -prosecution, Professor Ivy, also stated that these reasons were -definitely worthy of consideration. - -Accordingly it had to be clarified, whether Berkatit could not, after -all, be introduced for distribution to persons facing the risk of -shipwreck, and the inquiry into this question was all the more necessary -as, according to the opinion of Professor Eppinger and Professor -Heubner, Berkatit apparently contained vitamins which eliminated the -risks incurred by human beings when drinking sea water. Whether the -opinion of the experts, Heubner and Eppinger, was right or not, could, -at that time as today, only be established by experiment. - -Hence if the defendant Dr. Becker-Freyseng, who examined all these -factors and applied all precautions possible, became convinced in 1944 -that the experiments could not be avoided, and if, from this viewpoint, -in his official capacity as a consultant (Referent) he reported to his -highest authority at that time, Professor Dr. Schroeder, that he -considered the experiments necessary, then, in my opinion, he can in no -way be charged under criminal law on that account. - -Therefore, in my opinion, it has been proved that Dr. Becker-Freyseng -considered these experiments necessary and that he was entitled to -consider them necessary. And this question alone can be made the basis -for an inquiry into his guilt under criminal law. - -With regard to this point, I would like in conclusion to refer to the -testimony of Professor Dr. Vollhardt. This world-famous physician, this -research scientist, recognized as such in international circles, upon -whom, only a few weeks ago, on the occasion of his 75th birthday, the -highest German decoration of science was bestowed, namely the Goethe -Medal for Art and Science, a ceremony in which nearly all European -countries, also America, joined, stated before this high Tribunal, and I -quote: - - “I regarded it as sign of a sense of responsibility that in view - of the increasing number of flying accidents, the sea-emergency - question was taken up and these experiments were launched.” - -Insofar, I consider it proved that the planning of these experiments was -in no way objectionable. - - * * * * * - - _EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR - DEFENDANT BEIGLBOECK_[17] - - * * * * * - -Even medical science on both sides had to assist warfare. I have before -me the index of the best known scientific English periodicals from the -war period, “The Lancet” and “Nature”. Now, after the war, General T. J. -Betts of the United States War Department and Professor W. T. Sinsteat -of the British Supply Office declared that the captured German -scientific results accomplished during the war were of the greatest use -for the economic progress of British and American industry. Even the -terrible freezing experiments of Dr. Rascher proved to be of greatest -use for America in the war against Japan. (_Becker-Freyseng 31, -Becker-Freyseng Ex. 18._) - - - - - c. Evidence - - _Defense Documents_ - - Doc. No. Def. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freyseng Extracts from Harper’s 65 - 31 Ex. 18 Magazine entitled “Secrets - by the Thousand” by C. - Lester Walker. - - _Testimony_ - - Extract from the testimony of defendant Mrugowsky 66 - Extracts from the testimony of defendant Rose 69 - - - BECKER-FREYSENG DOCUMENT 31 - BECKER-FREYSENG DEFENSE EXHIBIT 18 - -EXTRACTS FROM HARPER’S MAGAZINE ENTITLED “SECRETS BY THE THOUSAND” BY C. - LESTER WALKER - -Someone wrote to Wright Field recently saying he understood this country -had got together quite a collection of enemy war secrets, that many were -now on public sale, and could he, please, be sent everything on German -jet engines. The Air Documents Division of the Army Air Force answered: -“Sorry—but that would be fifty tons.” - -Moreover, that fifty tons was just a small portion of what is today -undoubtedly the biggest collection of captured enemy war secrets ever -assembled. If you always thought of war secrets—as who hasn’t—as -coming in sixes and sevens, as a few items of information readily handed -on to the properly interested authorities, it may interest you to learn -that the war secrets in this collection run into the thousands, that the -mass of documents is mountainous, and that there has never before been -anything quite comparable to it. - - * * * * * - -One Washington official has called it “the greatest single source of -this type of material in the world—the first orderly exploitation of an -entire country’s brainpower”. - -How the collection came to be goes back, for beginnings, to one day in -1944 when the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff set in motion a colossal -search for war secrets in occupied German territory. They created a -group of military-civilian teams, termed the Joint Intelligence -Objectives Committee, which was to follow the invading armies into -Germany and uncover all her military, scientific, and industrial secrets -for early use against Japan. These teams worked against time to get the -most vital information before it was destroyed, and in getting it -performed prodigies of ingenuity and tenacity. - - * * * * * - - III - -In matters of food, medicine, and branches of the military art, the -finds of the search teams were no less impressive. And in aeronautics -and guided missiles they proved to be downright alarming. - - * * * * * - -“As for medical secrets in this collection”, one Army surgeon has -remarked, “some of them will save American medicine years of research; -some of them are revolutionary—like, for instance, the German technique -of treatment after prolonged and usually fatal exposure to cold.” - -This discovery—revealed to us by Major Alexander’s search already -mentioned—reversed everything medical science thought about the -subject. In every one of the dread experiments the subjects were most -successfully revived, both temporarily and permanently, by immediate -immersion in hot water. In two cases of complete standstill of heart and -cessation of respiration, a hot bath at 122° brought both subjects back -to life. Before our war with Japan ended, this method was adopted as the -treatment for use by all American Air-Sea Rescue Services, and it is -generally accepted by medicine today. - - EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY[18] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -DR. FLEMMING: I further submit an excerpt from the testimony of -Generalarzt Dr. Schreiber which he made on 26 August 1946 before the -International Military Tribunal. This can be found in the transcript of -the International Military Tribunal for that date. This is Mrugowsky -Document 27. I offer it as Mrugowsky Exhibit 45. Answering the question, -“What scientific value did the experiments [typhus experiments in -Buchenwald] of the specialist Ding have”? Generalarzt Dr. Schreiber -answered, “In my opinion they had no scientific value at all because -during the war we had already gained much experience and collected a -great deal of data in this field. We were thoroughly acquainted with the -composition and qualities of our vaccine and no such tests were required -any longer. Many of the vaccines examined by Ding were not used any more -at all and were rejected.” - -Would you define your position to that statement? - -DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY: I do not know how Schreiber could have expressed -that opinion, nor do I know whether he is in possession of full -knowledge of the results of this work. I never discussed this question -with him and I therefore cannot examine it. This much is clear, however, -that Schreiber is speaking of a later period of time, for the vaccines -that were no longer produced were not produced because the experiments -of Ding had proved their inferiority. The epidemiological examination of -the various vaccines during the war only originates from a later period, -in particular the years 1943 and 1944. The exploitation of these -experiences only originates from the last years of the war and it is, -therefore, my opinion that this testimony of Schreiber is incorrect. - -Q. I am interrupting you and I shall have Handloser Exhibit 14 shown to -you. We are here concerned with an excerpt of a scientific thesis by -Geheimrat Otto. Do you know Geheimrat Otto? - -A. Yes, I know Geheimrat Otto. He is probably the best typhus expert not -only in Germany but in Europe, who has dealt with typhus all his life. - -Q. From this excerpt you will see that Geheimrat Otto says, still in -1943: - - “While the efficacy of lice vaccines has already been tested on - a large scale in Poland, Ethiopia, and China, and the vaccine - has proved its value, it is still necessary to gather - large-scale practical experiences with lung and vitelline - membrane vaccines. In animal experiments they have proved of - equal value with the former.” - - Would you say something on that? - -A. Professor Otto says here that even in the year 1943 the vitelline -membrane vaccine and the vaccines from lungs of animals were not -sufficiently known. That confirms what I have just testified and that is -in answer to Dr. Schreiber’s statement. - -Q. The witness Bernhard Schmidt, who was interrogated here, stated that -human experiments were superfluous for the purpose of testing vaccines -and that the value of the individual typhus vaccines could have been -ascertained in an epidemiological way. What is your opinion in that -connection? - -A. This is my opinion also. It is my opinion that these tests could have -been carried out in an epidemiological manner. I represented that point -of view before Grawitz and Himmler from the very beginning. - -Q. You stated yesterday that to test this matter in an epidemiological -way, a large number of persons would have had to be vaccinated and -compared with a large number of persons who were not vaccinated. Would -such a long experiment have been possible considering the circumstances -prevailing during the war? - -A. Such a test would have been possible. It was actually introduced by -me within the framework of the ministry. It is a matter of course, -however, that the results can only be collected at a very late date and -can only be exploited at a much later date. In the case of the entire -experiment we were concerned with bridging over this space of time. - -Q. In carrying out this examination one could have found that one -vaccine has only a very small effectiveness, as was actually found out -in the case of the Behring vaccine. In that case would you say that the -mortality of persons vaccinated with the inferior vaccine would have -been much greater than the entire amount of fatalities as they occurred -in Buchenwald? You know that the statement regarding the fatality -figures fluctuated between 100 and 120. - -A. That could be assumed to be the case with certainty. A comparison is -the manner in which all tests are carried out in this field. I shall -give you a few examples for that. When Emil von Behring in the year 1890 -discovered the diphtheria serum, it was at first used by a physician of -the Berlin Charité in the case of diphtheria-infected children. He -treated about 1,200 children suffering from diphtheria with that serum. -He registered a mortality rate in the case of these children, in spite -of the treatment, of approximately 22 percent. Just as many children did -not receive the serum but were treated in a different manner. In this -group the mortality rate was double, approximately 44 percent. These 240 -or 250 children who died, and who were in that control group could -certainly have been saved if they had been given the blessing of that -diphtheria serum. But that was in reality the purpose of that test and -one had to take into account that a larger ratio of fatalities would -result in the group to be compared and that then the value of the serum -would be recognized. - -Q. I think that this example will suffice. In that case you are really -admitting that an objection against experiments in Buchenwald could not -be justified? - -A. During the war I did not work on any disease as ardently as on -typhus. I treated thousands of patients who fell ill with typhus and -examined them. I believe that in the case of such an experience one -gains some knowledge of the disease. I often considered that question -and I hold the opinion that my objection at the time was perhaps not -justified by events. On the other hand, it is my opinion that in the -case of every task one has to keep the question in mind whether one is -in a position to execute that task. I must admit even today that in -spite of the success of the experiments, which cannot be denied, I would -act similarly in yet another position and would assume the same attitude -as I assumed at that time. Even today I would not be prepared to carry -out any such experiments personally or have them carried out upon my -responsibility, although success undoubtedly would come about. - - - EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROSE[19] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -DR. FRITZ: What do you know about the reasons for this protest (against -experiments) being ignored and the typhus experiments being carried out -in spite of it? - - * * * * * - -DEFENDANT ROSE: The Buchenwald experiments (with typhus vaccine) had -four main results. First of all, they showed that belief in the -protective effect of Weigl vaccine was a mistake, although this belief -seemed to be based on long observation. Secondly, they showed that the -useful vaccines did not protect against infection, but almost certainly -prevented death, under the conditions of the Buchenwald experiments. -Thirdly, they showed that the objections of the biological experts to -the vitelline membrane vaccines and to the lice vaccines were -unjustified, and that vitelline membrane, rabbit lungs, and lice -intestines were of equal value. We learned this only through the -Buchenwald experiments. This left the way open to mass production of -typhus vaccines. - -The Buchenwald experiments showed in time that several vaccines were -useless. First, the process according to Otto and Wohlrab, the process -according to Cox, the process of Rickettsia Prowazeki and Rickettsia -murina, that is, vaccine from egg cultures; secondly, the vaccines of -the Behring works which were produced according to the Otto process, but -with other concentrations; finally the Ipsen vaccines from mouse liver. -The vaccines of the Behring works were in actual use at that time in -thousands of doses. They always represented a danger to health. Without -these experiments the vaccines, which were recognized as useless, would -have been produced in large quantities because they all had one thing in -common: their technical production was much simpler and cheaper than -that of the useful vaccines. In any case, one thing is certain, that the -victims of this Buchenwald typhus test did not suffer in vain and did -not die in vain. There was only one choice, the sacrifice of human -lives, of persons determined for that purpose, or to let things run -their course, to endanger the lives of innumerable human beings who -would be selected not by the Reich Criminal Police Office but by blind -fate. - -How many people were sacrificed we cannot figure out today; how many -people were saved by these experiments we, of course, cannot prove. The -individual who owes his life to these experiments does not know it, and -he perhaps is one of the accusers of the doctors who assumed this -difficult task. - - - I. Medical Ethics - - - 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES - - a. Introduction - -In a case involving the charge that human beings were subjected to -medical experiments of many kinds under varying circumstances, it was -inevitable that questions of medical ethics became a part of the proof -and the argumentation. - -The prosecution’s rejoinder to the statement of the defendant Rose -appears on page 71. As illustrations of the defense position on medical -ethics, extracts have been taken from the final pleas for the defendants -Gebhardt and Beiglboeck. These appear on pages 71 to 77. Considerable -testimony was given on this question by defendants and by expert -witnesses, and appears on pages 77 to 86. Selections from this testimony -have been taken from the direct examination of the defendant Rose, the -cross-examination of the prosecution witness Professor Werner -Leibbrandt, and from the direct examination of the prosecution witness -Dr. Andrew C. Ivy. - -The judgment of the Tribunal deals at some length with the medical -ethics applicable to experimentation on human beings (p. 181 ff.). - - b. Selection from the Argumentation of the Prosecution - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT - OF THE PROSECUTION_[20] - - * * * * * - -In view of the clear and unequivocal proof of the defendant Rose’s -participation in the typhus murders of Buchenwald he can only plead that -he didn’t enjoy doing what he did, that he objected to the experiments -at the Third Meeting of the Consulting Physicians of the Wehrmacht in -May 1943. But this is his condemnation, not his salvation. In March 1942 -he was in Buchenwald and saw what was being done. In May of the same -year he asked Mrugowsky to test a vaccine for him in those experiments. -Four inmates were killed as a result. In May 1943, he objected to the -experiments in what he describes as strong terms. But in December, he -was again instigating still another experiment which resulted in the -murder of six men. He is a living example of a man who could have -abstained from participating in these crimes without threat of harm to -his person or position by any agency of the Nazi Government. He was not -arrested and tried by the SS because of his objection. He was not -committed to a concentration camp. In spite of that, he voluntarily -participated in these same crimes to which he said he objected. With his -knowledge, prestige, and position, he is even more culpable than the -miserable and inexperienced Ding who actually performed the experiments -in the murder wards of Buchenwald. - - * * * * * - - c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense - - _EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR - DEFENDANT GEBHARDT_[21] - - * * * * * - - _The Principles of Medical Ethics and the Applicable Law_ - -During the hearing of evidence, views were repeatedly given on the -question of which principles of medical ethics are to be considered when -performing experiments on human beings. In my opening statement before -the evidence was submitted I pointed out that in the case of these -defendants there is no reason to examine fundamental questions of -medical ethics in these proceedings. Law and ethics are measured by -different standards which sometimes contradict each other. The same -applies to the principles of general ethics as well as to those of a -particular profession. A deed offending the recognized principles of -medical ethics does not necessarily constitute a crime. Only the cogent -precepts of the law can be used as the basis for a verdict, and not the -unwritten regulations and convictions existing inside a profession. - -However, it cannot be concluded from this that the principles of medical -ethics and their practical application were of no importance at all in -these proceedings. These principles cannot, of course, be applied -directly. At the same time there is no doubt that the principles of -medical ethics and above all their practical application in recent -decades can play an indirect part insofar as they have to be taken into -consideration when interpreting the law. However, evidence has now -proved that in recent decades and even earlier, numerous experiments -were carried out on human beings, and, moreover, on persons who did not -volunteer for such purpose. In this respect I refer to the statements of -the expert Professor Dr. Leibbrandt, witness for the prosecution. I -furthermore refer to the extensive evidence submitted by the prosecution -on this question from which it appears that in numerous cases -experiments were carried out on human beings, of the nature and degree -of danger of which they could not have been aware and to which they -would never have agreed voluntarily. The only conclusion which can be -drawn from these facts is that during recent decades views on this -question have changed in the same way as the relations between the -individual and the community in general have changed. In this connection -I need not give the detailed reasons which led to this development. It -is a fact that, at least in Europe, the state and the community have -taken a different attitude toward the individual. However differently -one may write about the change in these relations in detail, one thing -is certain, namely, that the state has more and more taken possession of -the individual and limited his personal freedom. This is evidently one -of the accompanying facts of technics and the modern mass-state. It must -be added that the development of medicine in the course of the last -decades has led to discriminating formulations of questions which can no -longer be solved by means of the laboratory and animal experiments. - -The evidence has shown that not only in Germany and perhaps not even -primarily in this country, the reorganization of the relationship -between community and individual has resulted in new methods in the -sphere of medical science. In nearly all countries experiments have been -performed on human beings under conditions which entirely exclude -volunteering in a legal sense. - -Immediate consequences arise for the interpretation of the law from this -change of medical views and above all from the change in medical -practice, since the essence of the law is universal and abstract and -naturally does not state the limits and the conditions under which -experiments on human beings are permissible and the borderline of the -criminality of such an experiment. The real practice regarding this -question is all the more important for the interpretation of the law -since almost every law, including Control Council Law No. 10, contains -standard rudiments of case facts, which means that determination in a -particular case can only be the outcome of a judicial judgment. No -special proof is needed to show that the question when and within what -limits medical experiments are admissible calls for a judicial judgment, -and that this cannot be established without taking practical experience -into consideration, not only in Germany but also outside Germany. The -standard rudiments of case facts are part of the legal facts and deal -with illegality as characteristic of the punishable act. Actual medical -practice inside and outside Germany, however, has not only to be -considered when examining the question as to whether the actions -constituting the subject of the indictment are illegal, but above all it -is fundamentally important when answering the further question as to -whether the actions constituting the subject of this procedure -constitute a criminal offense. In view of the fact that a criminal -offense is not likely to be a permanent psychological fact but a -standard computed fact in the sense of a personal reproach, the Court -for this reason also will not overlook the fact that particularly during -the last years, even outside Germany, medical experiments were performed -on human beings who undoubtedly did not volunteer for these experiments. -The unity of law and the indivisibility of its basic idea exclude -judging one and the same fact simultaneously according to different -legal principles and standards. - -I shall comment later on the question of whether the defendants in the -performance of the experiments which constitute the indictment acted -primarily in their capacity as physicians, or whether their conduct—if -a just decision is to be rendered—must no longer be regarded from the -viewpoint of war service as medically trained research scientists. - - * * * * * - - _EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR - DEFENDANT BEIGLBOECK_[22] - - * * * * * - -If one confronts the doctor with that type of scientist who, with the -test tube in his laboratory, with the syringe or the surgical knife in -his hand, steps on animal and human corpses, in order so fanatically to -satisfy his scientific instinct, then we very decidedly object to such a -scientist. We have found this type in the documents of this trial in the -person of Dr. Rascher, whose name casts a dark shadow over the -proceedings. Dr. Leibbrandt, the protector of medical ethics, would -therefore have rendered a good service to German science if, in his -capacity as a psychiatrist, we had pointed out that Rascher, this sadist -and psychopathist, had nothing whatsoever to do with real science. - -It is my duty as a defense counsel to emphasize energetically that it is -not permissible to construct from local coincidences any connection -between my client and Rascher and his system. - -The scientific research worker sees his task in the discovery of the -unknown in order to equip the doctor with new weapons in his fight for -human life. I briefly want to demonstrate with two examples why the -modern medical profession cannot renounce the scientific research work -that was impossible without great efforts and sacrifices (1) giving a -brief description of the development of modern surgery; (2) mentioning -the school to which the defendant Beiglboeck belonged as a pupil and a -teacher. I do not give this second example in order to glorify my -country, but because the particular influence of its teachers is -decisive for the spiritual standard of the personality. - -At the beginning of modern surgery stands that mighty figure of English -surgery, Joseph Lister, whose great idea it was that the surgeon should -not fight the inflammation of the wound but should prevent its cause, -i.e., germs entering externally. - -Thanks to bacteriology, anti-sepsis was changed into asepsis. - -Over the entrance gate of the General Hospital in Vienna we read the -words “Saluti et solatio aegrorum—Dedicated to the health and -consolation of the sick.” These words not only demand the highest -accomplishment of the doctor’s duties but are the motive for the most -successful work in the large field of medical research. Theory and -practice joined together in order to become a piece of living humanity. -I would go beyond the limits of my task if I mentioned all the names -that spread the glory of Vienna University throughout the world. But -their penetration into the world of the unknown was always a hazardous -enterprise which demanded courage and sacrifice. - -I want to quote the words of one of the great doctors, Professor -Wagner-Jauregg, who says in his book “Fever and Infection Therapy”, - - “The vaccination against malaria was certainly a risk, the - outcome of which could not be foreseen. It was dangerous for the - patient himself and this to a much higher degree than the - treatment with tuberculin and other vaccines, and it also was a - danger for the surroundings and even for the community.” - -And, on page 136, it states “Three patients died after having been -vaccinated with blood infected with malaria tropica and not with malaria -tertiana”; and “The tragic outcome of this experiment was discouraging, -and only a year later could the author decide to proceed with the -malaria vaccinations * * *.” - -Nobody talks of these victims today, but Wagner-Jauregg’s revolutionary -discovery is known and adopted throughout the world and has become the -common property of all peoples for the benefit of suffering mankind. - -These doctors who knew that the fight against disease and death was a -thorny path were all more than ready to sacrifice their own lives. - -The real scientist and the real doctor, therefore, do not oppose each -other. However, the scientist must not forget that nature is the -expression of the divine will and that only this cognition can save him -from the “hybris”, the boundlessness which for the Greek tragedians was -the greatest vice of mankind. - -Above all, the words of the greatest German physician, Theophrastus -Bombastus von Hohenheim, called Paracelsus, must be applied to both -scientist and doctor “The doctor grows with his heart, he comes from God -and is enlightened by Nature—the best of all drugs is Love.” - -My learned colleagues have compiled a long list of documents on human -experiments especially from the Western democracies. It would be unjust, -however, to conceal the enormous benefit of the human experiment. The -fact that Paul Ehrlich dared to release his drug “Salvarsan” before it -had been sufficiently tested saved thousands from the dangerous -consequences of one of the worst epidemics. The fact that Strong took -the responsibility upon himself to perform the probably very dangerous -experiment with plague bacilli made it possible to vaccinate thousands -of persons and to save them from almost certain death. The fact that -Strong was in a position to prove that beri-beri was a disease caused by -a deficiency, and that Goldberger proved the same for pellagra, made it -possible to fight this deficiency and to liberate entire countries from -one of their worst diseases. - -With regard to the criminal law, however, and the judgment of crimes -against humanity, it is the decisive result that in other countries, -too, under their own generally prevailing medical and ethical -convictions, doctors carried out similar or the same experiments for the -benefit of scientific research or in consideration of a crisis in their -country. - -When I said that the surroundings had an influence on the doctor’s -attitude, I did not mean the second determining factor of our -individuality, the material influence on the organism which might modify -or mitigate the influence of the actual conditions at the time upon the -decisions of a physician. - -Concentration camp, militarism, and peoples’ court—three important -pillars of the Third Reich—they have collapsed. They are not to be -forgotten, however, when examining the guilt of the individual. Every -German had to fear them in one form or another. And then came the war. -War was once called “the steel bath of the peoples”. Heraklit called it -“the father of all things”. I can only repeat the judgment of the IMT -that “war is the evil itself.” This is true to the highest degree for -the last war. It was a total, a terrible war. Even medical science on -both sides had to assist warfare. I have before me the index of the best -known scientific English periodicals from the war period, “Lancet” and -“Nature”. Now, after the war, General T. J. Betts of the United States -War Department and Professor W. T. Sinsteat of the British Supply Office -have declared that the captured German scientific accomplishments during -the war were of the greatest use for the economic progress of British -and American industry. Even the terrible freezing experiments of Dr. -Rascher proved to be of the greatest use for America in the war against -Japan. (_Becker-Freyseng 31, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 18._) And what about us -soldiers? We stood in the air-raid shelters, the Socialist beside the -Party member. We did not complain. We saw villages go up in flames, -innocent women and children become the victims of air raids. We saw our -country, the Fatherland, in distress, and, even if we hated Hitler and -his followers like the plague, we believed that we had to fulfill our -duty to our country to the bitter end. One cannot explain these things, -they have to be experienced. In such times a doctor is placed -unwillingly between Scylla and Charybdis, between his concept of his -profession and his duty as a soldier. It is easy today to say with -pathos from an academic chair “_numquam nocere!_” A man does not say -now, “I was a member of the resistance. Day in and day out I was trying -to help persons who were racially and politically persecuted.” He says, -“Then, like everyone else, I merely did my duty.” - -Abraham Lincoln, one of the greatest Americans, said in a speech before -the American Congress in 1862, “The dogmas of the quiet past are -inadequate to the stormy present. * * * In the face of new events we -must think and act in a new way.” - -With this I intend to conclude my statements about medical ethics and to -repeat the words which Liek wrote at the end of his book, “The Doctor -and His Mission”, “If we want to abolish undesirable conditions in -medicine, we must follow our conscience—to help and to heal, that is, -today as always, the mission of the doctor.” - - * * * * * - - d. Evidence - - _Testimony_ - Page - Extracts from the testimony of defendant Rose 77 - Extracts from the testimony of prosecution witness Professor 80 - Werner Leibbrand - Extracts from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 82 - Andrew C. Ivy - - - EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROSE[23] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -DR. FRITZ: You heard the lecture which Dr. Ding gave on his experiments -at the Third Conference of Consulting Physicians in the Section for -Hygiene and Tropical Hygiene? - -DEFENDANT ROSE: Yes. That was the time when I protested openly against -this whole method. - -Q. Well, what happened? - -A. Dr. Ding gave his lecture in a camouflaged form as in his article for -the Journal of Hygiene and Infectious Diseases. Therefore, the -unsuspecting listener could not tell that it was about experiments on -human beings. - -When the discussion began, I commented on the results of these -experiments. That part of my statement is contained in the record of the -conference. It is Document Rose 38, which has already been submitted. -(_Rose 38, Rose Ex. 10._) I do not intend to read these remarks, I -simply want to point out that one can find there what I said about the -technical aspect of the experiments and about the results. - -Then I spoke of the ethical side of the whole thing and this part of my -statement has been stricken from the record. I cannot, of course, -reproduce today the exact wording but only the sense of what I said. I -said more or less as follows: As important and as basic as the results -may have been, they were nevertheless achieved at the cost of a number -of human lives. We as hygienists should object against a life and death -experiment being performed as the prerequisite for the introduction of a -vaccine. So far, the customary procedure had been the testing with -animal experiments and subsequent determination of tolerance by human -beings and epidemiological exploitation. This procedure had proved its -value. We had to stick to it and we couldn’t let other political and -state authorities force us to conduct human experiments. I spoke much -longer at the time. I spoke for at least ten minutes. Ding replied that -he could pacify my conscience. The experimental subjects had been -criminals condemned to death. My answer was: I knew that myself. I was -not interested in the individuals concerned but in the principle of -human experiments in testing vaccines. At this comment Professor -Schreiber interrupted the discussion. He said he protested against my -criticism and if we wanted to discuss basic ethical questions we could -do that during the recess. He would have this part of the discussion -stricken from the record and that was done. After the meeting various -participants came to me and we discussed the whole matter. Some agreed -with me; others were convinced that in such an important question human -experiments were justified. Of course, those people who [_sic_] believed -Ding’s assurance that the subjects were criminals condemned to death. I -no longer remember the individual men with whom I talked during the -recess and I don’t know who was in favor and who was against it. The -only one I remember is Professor Mrugowsky because he spoke as an SS -member and the experiments had been conducted by an SS doctor, and -because I thought that Mrugowsky was Ding’s superior in every way. Of -course, I remember that Mrugowsky of all people came and said that, in -principle, he agreed with me, and that he had expressed similar -misgivings to Grawitz and that Grawitz had rejected his misgivings. Then -I also learned from Mrugowsky that Himmler was behind all these -experiments. - - * * * * * - -DR. FRITZ: Did you later discuss the matter of experiments on human -beings before a large group of people? - -DEFENDANT ROSE: Yes. That happened once again before a large number of -people, but it was not about typhus experiments. It must have been about -October 1944. The question at hand then was grippe. There was a meeting, -a rather large meeting at which grippe vaccine was discussed. A number -of people reported on the vaccines which they had developed in the -laboratory. Among others, Professor Herzberg reported on a vaccine made -from dead grippe virus, and Professor Haagen on a vaccine made from -living avirulent grippe virus, which he had already tested on personnel -at the Strasbourg clinic. Someone in the meeting, I don’t remember who, -suggested that the Haagen tests had been insufficient, and that this -vaccine should be tested on a larger number of persons. There was no -mention of concentration camps then but of student companies. I had -considerable misgivings about such experimental vaccination and -expressed them. I said that I considered the experimental basis -inadequate for these vaccines to be used on human beings. I was not -convinced that the virus had been sufficiently attenuated. There was a -danger that the vaccine would lead to infection, and one could not take -that responsibility on one’s self. It was first of all intended to -observe the effectiveness of the protection by determining whether -people fell ill of grippe in natural ways after being vaccinated. Then -someone else made the suggestion that this would take too long, and we -did not know whether there would be an influenza epidemic during that -time, and that therefore after the vaccines the subject should be -infected with a virulent virus. Since I had already expressed objections -to the vaccination, I opposed this proposal even more strongly, and the -result of this discussion was that infections were not carried out, but -it was decided to carry out the vaccination. Whether these vaccinations -were carried out or not, I do not know. At any rate I read no order to -the effect that anyone should perform the vaccinations nor did I ever -read a report that the vaccinations were carried out. Only later on in -imprisonment did I hear that similar experiments, such as were then -discussed, and of which I disapproved, were carried out by the British -Medical Service on German PW’s. Genzken probably participated personally -in this, but I had heard about this before in the internment hospital -Karlsruhe where there were people who had experienced these -vaccinations. - - * * * * * - - EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS - PROFESSOR WERNER LEIBBRANDT[24] - - * * * * * - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you stated that the performance of experiments -on human beings, as is the subject of the indictment here, can be -ascribed to biological thought. What do you mean by biological thought? - -WITNESS LEIBBRANDT: By biological thought I mean the attitude of a -physician who does not take the subject into consideration at all, but -for whom the patient has become a mere object, so that the human -relationship no longer exists, and a man becomes a mere object like a -mail package. - -Q. You spoke of thinking as a biologist. Do I understand that you see -therein an action belonging to biological thought? - -A. An exaggeration of the purely mechanical or biological point of view, -because the physician is not merely a biologist, he is also a biologist. -Primarily, however, a physician is a man who assists the human being and -not a scientific judge of biological events. - -Q. Could there not be other causes for the experiments, such as a -collective state thinking? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Witness, you used the expression “demoniac order”. What do you mean -by that? - -A. By demoniac order I mean the following: If I define as a basis for -medical activity merely the maintenance and safeguarding of the -substance of the nation according to blood, the result is that -everything which falls outside this pretense has to be cleared away. -That is a mild expression of what actually happened, namely, -extermination. - -Q. Then your demoniac order only refers to the blood aspect. Could it -not be applied to the purely state collective aspect as well? - -A. Could you give an example so that I can understand it better? - -Q. I mean that experiments were undertaken and that the voluntary act of -the individual is replaced by the act of the state, namely, by the -voluntary approval given by the state. - -A. Between the collective idea and the state order on the one hand and -the medical individual on the other, there stands something rather -important—the human conscience. - - * * * * * - -Q. Professor, if all these experiments were actually conducted, and also -as you said this morning and as Moll’s book shows, Moll alone published -approximately six hundred works about thousands of such experiments (on -human beings), must one not say that wide circles of medical men judge -the question of experiments on human beings under certain conditions -differently from you—from an ethical point of view? - -A. That I cannot say, because even Moll writes at the end of this work -that it is part of a physician’s morals to restrain his urge for natural -research in favor of the basic medical attitude as laid down in the oath -of Hippocrates, namely, to cause no arbitrary harm to his patient. - -Q. But in your opinion, Professor, how should a doctor work in the -interest of suffering humanity in cases where, as you have just said, -there is no possibility of experiments on animals? - -A. The concept of humanity is a very dangerous concept. It is most -dangerous of all for the physician. For the physician, the individual -stands above all humanity and the individual unfortunately has sunk very -low in these last few years. - -Q. I believe that you have not quite answered my question. I asked: How -do you think the doctor should solve certain questions even in the -interest of the individual—questions which cannot be tested with animal -experiments and test tubes, as is the case with malaria for instance. -This is a problem which must be cleared up if he is to help his -suffering patients. - -A. That is naturally a very difficult question. But in the end the main -thing will always be that a risk must have certain limits. - -Q. Thank you. Now I come to another point. This morning, Professor, you -expressed disapproval about a book which the defendant Mrugowsky wrote -on medical ethics. May I ask, have you read this book? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Do you know Mrugowsky personally? - -A. No. - -Q. Then you do not know his ethical point of view? - -A. I said that it was quite an ironical joke of world history for -someone to quote the high medical ethics of Hufeland in the form of -excerpts from his writings, as far as I remember, with a few connecting -words and to combine these quotations in a modest little volume, while -on the other hand we now know how it was entangled organizationally with -the deeds under discussion here. I am only speaking about the -entanglement and not about the objective guilt which has not yet been -proved. - -Q. And from where else do you infer Mrugowsky’s entanglement with the -facts under discussion here, apart from the fact that he is one of the -defendants indicted? - -A. After all, he was the Chief of the SS Hygienic System, and the -medical principles of an ethical nature personified by the SS have -become clear to me during the last few years. There seems to me to be a -large gap between these two things, between these deeds of SS medical -ethics and the ethics of Hufeland. I might perhaps understand how a man -like Mr. Haubhold could be enthusiastic about a one-sided interpretation -of political medicine by Josef Peter Frank in the 18th century. But I -cannot understand how the SS ethics can be connected up with the honest -ethics of Christian Hufeland. - -Q. Professor, you just told us you do not know Mrugowsky at all? - -A. No. - -Q. Then how can you express a judgment on his personal ethical attitude? -You are merely judging from the fact that he belonged to the SS. Before -you express such an opinion as you are doing, before you talk about a -joke of world history, must you not first know the personal attitude of -the person you are criticizing, and is it not quite possible that his -personal attitude was such as is expressed in this book? - -A. I don’t believe that one can hold a leading position in the SS and -then talk about such personal ethics, unless, of course, in ethical -questions one does what is called double bookkeeping. - -Q. But you admit that all your criticism is pure assumption, in no way -based on personal knowledge of the person criticized? - -A. I do not know Mr. Mrugowsky. - -Q. Thank you. I have no more questions. - - EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT - WITNESS DR. ANDREW C. IVY[25] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -MR. HARDY: Now, Professor Ivy, before adjournment you were beginning to -discuss medical ethics in the United States. - - * * * * * - -Do you have there also the principles and rules as set forth by the -American Medical Association to be followed? - -WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes. - -Q. What was the basis on which the American Medical Association adopted -those rules? - -A. I submitted to them a report of certain experiments which had been -performed on human subjects along with my conclusions as to what the -principles of ethics should be for use of human beings as subjects in -medical experiments. I asked the association to give me a statement -regarding the principles of medical ethics and what the American Medical -Association had to say regarding the use of human beings as subjects in -medical experiments. - -Q. Would you kindly pass up to me that ruling of the principles put out -by the American Medical Association? This apparently isn’t what I am -referring to, Doctor. Do you have a publication which is published by -the American Medical Association entitled “Principles of Ethics -Concerning Experimentation on Human Beings”? - -A. Not with me here. - -Q. Well now, you have, first of all, a basic requirement for -experimentation on human beings, “(1) the voluntary consent of the -individual upon whom the experiment is to be performed must be -obtained.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. “(2) The danger of each experiment must be previously investigated by -animal experimentation,” and “(3) the experiment must be performed under -proper medical protection and management.” - -Now, does that purport to be the principles upon which all physicians -and scientists guide themselves before they resort to medical -experimentation on human beings in the United States? - -A. Yes. They represent the basic principles approved by the American -Medical Association for the use of human beings as subjects in medical -experiments. - -JUDGE SEBRING: How do the principles which you have just enunciated -comport with the principles of the medical profession over the civilized -world generally? - -A. They are identical, according to my information. It was with that -idea in mind that I cited the principles which were mentioned in this -circular letter from the Reich Minister of the Interior dated 28 -February 1931 to indicate that the ethical principles for the use of -human beings as subjects in medical experiments in Germany in 1931 were -similar to those which I have enunciated and which have been approved by -the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association. - -MR. HARDY: Is it possible that in some field of scientific research -investigation by animal experimentation would be inadequate? - -A. Will you repeat that question? I did not get it. - -Q. Is it possible in some fields of medical research that -experimentation or investigation on animals would be inadequate? - -A. Yes. The experiment on trench fever is a very good example. - -Q. How would you investigate the danger of the experiment prior to -resorting to the use of human beings? - -A. The hazard would have to be determined by a careful study of the -natural history of the disease. - -Q. Does malaria also fall into that category? - -A. We can use animals to some extent in malarial studies, canaries and -ducks, for example, develop malaria; and in research designed to -discover a better drug for the treatment of malaria we can use Avian -Malaria as a sort of screen method to detect which compounds might be -employed with some assurance and might be effective in human malaria. In -that way we decrease the random and unnecessary experimentation on man. - -Q. To your knowledge have any experiments been conducted in the United -States wherein these requirements which you set forth were not met? - -A. Not to my knowledge. - -MR. HARDY: Your Honor, I have no further questions concerning medical -ethics to put to Dr. Ivy; however, I do have one question concerning the -high-altitude experiments which I wish to go back to at the conclusion -of that complex, in high altitude, and I will have completed my direct -examination. - -PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: The Tribunal has no questions of the witness. Do -I understand that you have completed your examination of the witness? - -MR. HARDY: No. I have not; I have a further question to put to him, but -I was going to leave the case of medical ethics. - -PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: We have no questions on that subject; you may -proceed. - -MR. HARDY: Dr. Ivy, in medical science and research is the use of human -subjects necessary? - -WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes, in a number of instances. - -Q. Is it frequently necessary and does it perform great good to -humanity? - -A. Yes. That is right. - -Q. Do you have an opinion that the state, for instance, the United -States of America, could assume the responsibility of a physician to his -patient or experimental subject, or is that responsibility solely the -moral responsibility of the physician or scientist? - -A. I do not believe the state can assume the moral responsibility that a -physician has for his patient or experimental subject. - -DR. SEIDL: I object to this question in that it is a purely legal -question which the Court has to answer. - -DR. SAUTER (for the defendants Ruff and Romberg): If I am not mistaken, -a document was read this morning which said that the state assumes the -responsibility. I believe that I am not mistaken in this. I also want to -point out something else, gentlemen, in order to supplement what Dr. -Seidl just said. - -The question asked here is always what the opinion of the medical -profession in America is. For us in this trial, in the evaluation of -German defendants, that is not decisive. In my opinion the decisive -question is for example, in 1942, when the altitude experiments were -undertaken at Dachau, what the attitude of the medical profession in -Germany was. From my point of view as a defense counsel I do not object -if the prosecution asks Professor Ivy what the attitude or opinion of -the medical profession in Germany was in 1942. If he can answer that -question, all right, let him answer it, but we are not interested in -finding out what the ethical attitude of the medical profession in the -United States was. In my opinion a German physician who in Germany -performed experiments on Germans cannot be judged exclusively according -to an American medical opinion, which moreover dates from the year 1945 -and was coded in the years 1945 and 1946 for future use; it can also -have no retroactive force. - -PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: The first objection imposed by Dr. Seidl might be -pertinent if the question of legality was concerned, a legal -responsibility, that would be a question for a court. The question of -moral responsibility is a proper subject to inquire of the witness. - -As to Dr. Sauter’s objection, the opinion of the witness as to medical -sentiment in America may be received. The counsel’s objection goes to -its weight rather than to admissibility. The witness could be asked if -he is aware of the sentiment in America in 1942 and whether it is -different from this of the present day or whether it does not differ. -The witness may also be asked whether he is aware of the opinion as to -medical ethics in other countries or throughout the civilized world. But -the objections are both overruled. - -MR. HARDY: It is your opinion, then, that the state cannot assume the -moral responsibility of a physician to his patient or experimental -subject? - -WITNESS DR. IVY: That is my opinion. - -Q. On what do you base your opinion? What is the reason for that -opinion? - -A. I base that opinion on the principles of ethics and morals contained -in the oath of Hippocrates. I think it should be obvious that a state -cannot follow a physician around in his daily administration to see that -the moral responsibility inherent therein is properly carried out. This -moral responsibility that controls or should control the conduct of a -physician should be inculcated into the minds of physicians just as -moral responsibility of other sorts, and those principles are clearly -depicted or enunciated in the oath of Hippocrates with which every -physician should be acquainted. - -Q. Is the oath of Hippocrates the Golden Rule in the United States and -to your knowledge throughout the world? - -A. According to my knowledge it represents the Golden Rule of the -medical profession. It states how one doctor would like to be treated by -another doctor in case he were ill. And in that way how a doctor should -treat his patient or experimental subjects. He should treat them as -though he were serving as a subject. - -Q. Several of the defendants have pointed out in this case that the oath -of Hippocrates is obsolete today. Do you follow that opinion? - -A. I do not. The moral imperative of the oath of Hippocrates I believe -is necessary for the survival of the scientific and technical philosophy -of medicine. - - * * * * * - - - 2. GERMAN MEDICAL PROFESSION - - a. Introduction - -The position of the German medical profession under the Hitler regime -was the subject of argument by both prosecution and defense. The -prosecution discussed the matter in the early part of its opening -statement (vol. I, p. 29 ff.). Selections from the argumentation of the -defense on this point have been taken from the final plea for the -defendant Blome and from the closing brief for the defendant Rostock. -These appear on pages 86 to 90. - - b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense - - _EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR - DEFENDANT BLOME_[26] - - * * * * * - -Furthermore, I have another matter at heart, especially in my capacity -as defense counsel for this defendant: Blome was Deputy Reich -Physicians’ Leader; he will, therefore, to a certain degree, easily be -regarded as the representative of the German medical profession during -the Hitler regime. Now, there is great danger that the entire German -medical profession will be identified with its former leader, Dr. Conti, -and with the crimes he was charged with during this trial; the German -medical profession fears that those crimes which, _in fact_, were -committed by _individual_ doctors, who may have been rightly charged, -are to be taken as typical of the entire medical profession. Indeed, -during the last months we could hear in the press and on the radio that -the entire medical profession was here in the prisoners’ dock; -unfortunately, by thus generalizing, the matter was presented as though -the entire medical profession was corrupt and that the majority of -German physicians had committed such crimes or at least approved them, -as stated here in the indictment at the trial. This conception is wrong -and unjust. The German medical profession numbered about 80,000 members -and if we add the Wehrmacht physicians and the official physicians, one -arrives at about 100,000 physicians. Now let us compare with this total -number the small number of physicians and researchers here in the dock. -There are altogether 20 men. Of what importance is such an insignificant -number for the judging of the entire profession? If out of 5,000 German -physicians one single person committed a crime, it is impossible to draw -a conclusion from these few exceptions regarding the behavior and morals -of the whole class. And even if we suppose that perhaps another few -hundred physicians and researchers not here in the dock had taken part -in the “experiments on human beings” and in the “euthanasia action”, the -number of guilty persons in comparison with the total number of the -entire profession is still too small to entitle one to consider the -entire profession as criminal, and morally inferior because some -individuals committed a wrong. - -There is yet another point of view. It stands to reason that not all -experiments on human beings can be excused and justified, not even -during a time of total warfare and under a dictatorship, and no decent -person would ever think of excusing the way and manner in which the -Hitler State carried out the “Euthanasia Program.” However, it is an -incontestable fact that large-scale experiments on human beings cannot -altogether be avoided and are, in fact, carried out throughout the whole -world, and that there are different viewpoints concerning the problem of -euthanasia, even to a limited extent in the circles of conscientious -physicians when this is carried out on a proper legal basis, and when, -in addition, full precautions are taken to prevent abuses. It must not -be overlooked that the deterioration of the medical profession claimed -in connection with this trial is connected exclusively with the problem -of experiments on human beings and with euthanasia, but that no -accusations are made against the professional practice of the German -physicians in any other respects; there are especially no accusations -referring to the relationship between the sick patient and the physician -whom he had chosen as a helper and confidant to restore his health. This -confidence in the attending physician felt by the patient has remained -completely untouched by this trial. - -We Germans have our own opinion about our physicians, we know their -conscientiousness and willingness to render help; especially during the -war we have been able to observe and appreciate their readiness to -sacrifice themselves; we know that the good qualities that made the -German physicians and researchers a model in former decades were not -lost during Hitler’s time, and it would be a pity if the abuses, which -have been revealed and proved by this trial, should serve to undermine -the confidence of the German people in their physicians and expose them -to the contempt of all civilized nations. - -Individual researchers, who out of ambition or a passion for research -did not value a human being’s life more than that of a rabbit, should -not be considered representative of the German physicians’ profession, -nor should those physicians of the concentration camps, who for lack of -a conscience or for some other wicked reason gave fatal injections to -prisoners or tortured them to death, be regarded as representative of -the German medical profession. No. Representative of a model German -physician during Hitler’s time, too, is the non-political, practicing -physician, who, even if he did perhaps formally belong to the Party, -strongly opposed from the bottom of his heart all kinds of violence and -intolerance, who is closely bound to his nation and its needs, the -practicing physician who cared for his patients in the most devoted -manner day after day and night after night during the time of total war -and fearful bombardments, which is especially hard for a physician; or -who as military physician served at the front far from home, from his -practice, from his family, fairly sharing all the hardships, dangers, -and privations with his soldiers. And the surgeon who, as director of -his clinic, operated and cured and helped from morning till night -wherever he could help without having time to breathe, let alone to take -part in political activity, he also is representative of the model -German physician during Hitler’s time too. - -I do not know what verdict you will arrive at respecting one or the -other of these defendants; but, as defense counsel of the former Deputy -Reich Physicians’ Leader, I beg you to make it clear by your verdict -that in judging the defendant, if you must condemn him, you do not -condemn and defame the entire German medical profession, but that the -abuses which were committed were individual acts such as, perhaps, -happened in all professions during Hitler’s time without necessitating a -condemnation of the entire profession. These were individual acts -arising perhaps partly from personal criminal tendencies of individual -fanatics, partly from being connected with the excesses of a total war -in a dictatorship of unscrupulous violence. - -If beside the 23 defendants there is a 24th sitting in the dock, -invisible to our eye, he is not of the German medical profession but the -SS spirit of Himmler and of a dozen other murderers of millions of -people. This spirit might have led a fanatic to forget his professional -ethics and to commit crimes. But the entire medical profession remained -sound and conscious of its duty. - -May your verdict not completely rob the German people of their -confidence in their physicians but restore it to them, and I have no -doubt that after the present crisis has been overcome and in more normal -circumstances, the German medical profession will prove to its people -that as a body it never forgot nor will ever forget the professional -ethical commandments of the Hippocratic oath. - - * * * * * - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR - DEFENDANT ROSTOCK_ - - _Introduction_ - -Mr. President, your Honors: - -The great English historian and sociologist, Thomas Carlyle, once said, -“Your life, and were you the humblest of human beings, is not a wild -dream but a lofty fact.” I do not want to speak to you in this courtroom -without first recalling this saying and thereby seeing before my eyes -the picture of the great number of our fellow human beings whose lives -have really become a wild dream. The fact on which this trial is based, -that defenseless human beings were used by doctors of my country for -experiments and in part died after suffering tortures, cannot be denied. -I, myself, would doubt the clarity of my judgment as a German jurist if -I did not realize that general human rights, such as the fundamental -standards anchored in all civilized nations, have been violated thereby. -Medical science should bring help and healing to suffering humanity. I -am proud to state that it was German doctors who, in the last century, -saved millions of human beings from the most serious and fatal diseases -by their research. Let me remind you only of names such as Robert Koch, -Emil von Behring, Paul Ehrlich, Theodor Billroth, and August Bier, or -medicines such as Germanin, atabrine, Salvarsan, diphtheria serum, -tetanus serum, and many others. If it were possible to achieve such -decisive results in any other way, this would only confirm the actual -truth, that no one, no matter how highly placed and no matter how -important his aims, has the right to lower other human beings to the -level of guinea pigs by force. How could a man venture to dispose in -that way of the life and health of his fellow men, be they ever so -humble? It seems to me that this involves a fundamental contradiction to -the duty of the doctor, a violation of the dignity of the individual, -and a presumption which cannot remain without horrible results. There -may be doubtful cases, there may be borderline cases, but the solution -of these questions can be based on only one principle, which is that all -creatures in human form have an equal right to life and health. Humanity -would be in a sad state if again and again there were not volunteers -from the ranks of physicians and laymen who made themselves available -for experiments, conscious of their contribution toward saving and -healing other human beings. But how can a man dare simply to designate -others to suffer and die, when they, too, like to live and be free from -want and fear, just like he himself? * * * - - - 3. MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES - - a. Introduction - -The practice of medical experimentation upon human beings in other -countries was brought out by the defense in an effort to show that the -medical experimentation in which these defendants engaged was not -criminal. Extracts from the argumentation of the defense have been -selected from the closing briefs for the defendants Karl Brandt and -Ruff. These appear below on pages 90 to 93. From the evidence on this -question, the following appear below on pages 95 to 121: Selections from -defense documents, followed by extracts from the cross-examination of -one of the prosecution’s expert witnesses Dr. Andrew C. Ivy and an -extract from the cross-examination of the defendant Rose. - - b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR - DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT_ - - * * * * * - -Reference has furthermore been made to the _extraordinarily large number -of persons_ available _for experiments_. With regard to the experiments -made and on the basis of the evidence of this trial, experiments on a -large scale have been made only in rare cases, and these may be compared -in size with experiments on a large scale outside of Germany, as they -were made even in peacetime; reference is made once more to the malaria -experiment. (_Karl Brandt 1, Karl Brandt Ex. 1._) - -If one considers the _number of persons sentenced to death_ who were -subjected to experiments, the number is comparable to those eleven -condemned persons for the poison experiment in Manila. (_Becker-Freyseng -60a, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 59._) - -One should compare, among others, the plague experiments by Strong in -1912 on 900 convicts, including an experiment on 42 persons some of whom -were persons sentenced to death, and the typhus experiments by Hamdi on -153 persons. (_Becker-Freyseng 60a, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 59._) - -If the number of condemned persons used for experiments in these -proceedings appears high, it should be taken into consideration that the -number of persons sentenced to death under the laws of war is also -unusually high. For the protection of the country, criminal laws are, -during wartime, applied more rigorously in all countries in order to -guarantee safety at home during the absence of the male population at -the front. The number of ordinary criminals who have been punished on -account of acts committed by taking advantage of war conditions, and -especially of the blackout, is already unusually high; it is, therefore, -not even necessary to include herein the persons sentenced for political -crimes. - -In this connection the viewpoint of the _English scholar Mellenby_ of -the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine deserves special -consideration. (_Becker-Freyseng 60, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 58._) In the -well-known medical journal “The Lancet” of 1 December 1946, this doctor -quotes particularly the _political conditions_ in Germany as decisive -and as an excuse for the accused persons. One may not, therefore, -subsequently refer to the general conditions in Germany during the war -years in order to judge the _acts committed during this time_ more -severely. - -The number of human guinea pigs used in the experiments alleged by the -prosecution is about 2,000. The number of human guinea pigs known to the -defense from published data amounts to more than 11,000 persons. If -among those, minor experiments are also to be found, it may be supposed -that the experiments published contain only the material fit to be known -to the public. Publications show the results but not the sacrifices and -undesirable incidents. That which the defense can present is not the -result of an exhausting criminal investigation. - -Looking at only these experiments which were considered fit for -publication, one cannot possibly come to the conclusion that they were -made only with volunteers. I refer in this connection to the compilation -of experiments in Document Karl Brandt 117, Karl Brandt Exhibit 103, -namely 32 experiments on at least 1,580 persons: they are experiments on -persons sentenced to death, prisoners and soldiers, women and girls; the -experiments are often carried out in such a way that it cannot be -presumed the subjects volunteered. - -Voluntary service of the human guinea pigs has not been claimed either; -only in two cases has it specifically been pointed out. The volunteers -in one of these experiments were medical students. Outstanding in this -document are 13 experiments with at least 223 children. One cannot -assume that the parents had given their consent. In this connection -reference is made to Document Karl Brandt 93, Karl Brandt Exhibit 29, -regarding the experiments of Professor McCance. - - _EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR - DEFENDANT RUFF_ - - * * * * * - -Experiments which time and again have been described in international -literature without meeting any opposition do not constitute a crime from -the medical point of view. For nowhere did a plaintiff arise from the -side of the responsible professional organization, or from that of the -administration of justice, to denounce as criminal the experiments -described in literature. On the contrary, the authors of those reports -on their human experiments gained general recognition and fame; they -were awarded the highest honors; they gained historical importance. And -in spite of all this, are they supposed to have been criminals? No! In -view of the complete lack of _written_ legal norms, the physician, who -generally knows only little about the law, has to rely on and refer to -the admissibility of what is generally recognized to be admissible all -over the world. - -The defense is convinced that the Tribunal, when deciding this problem -without prejudice, will first study the many experiments performed all -over the world on healthy and sick persons, on prisoners and free -people, on criminals and on the poor, even on children and mentally ill -persons, in order to see how the medical profession in its international -totality answers the question of the admissibility of human experiments, -not only in theory but also in practice. - -It is psychologically understandable that German research workers today -will, if possible, have nothing to do with human experiments and will -try to avoid them, or would like to describe them as inadmissible even -if before 1933 they were perhaps of the opposite opinion. However, -experiments performed in 1905-1912 by a highly respected American in -Asia for the fight against the plague, which made him famous all over -the world, cannot and ought not to be labelled as criminal because a -Blome is supposed to have performed the same experiments during the -Hitler period (which, in fact, however, were not performed at all); and -experiments for which, before 1933, a foreign research worker, the -Englishman Ross, was awarded the Nobel prize for his malaria -experiments, do not deserve to be condemned only because a German -physician performed similar experiments during the Hitler regime. One -should not say that experiments, where different diseases or different -drugs from those referred to in this trial were dealt with, have no -connection with the charges of this indictment because of this -difference and that, therefore, they are of no importance as evidence. -In the foreground there stands the basic question as to the conditions -under which such experiments are permissible; whether they refer to -plague or typhus, to tuberculosis or jaundice, is a secondary question -which concerns the medical expert more than the jurist. - -Decisive for this trial is the question whether the conditions under -which experiments were performed by the defendants were those -internationally recognized as for the experiments which were performed -by foreign research workers with the approval of all civilized humanity. - -If one wants to arrive at a just and satisfactory decision, one must -disregard the fact that here German research workers are accused. On the -contrary, one has to strive toward obtaining an international basis to -represent the present international opinion on human experiments, one -which for decades, if not for centuries, will form the criterion for the -permissibility of human experiments. We, as jurists, can only render a -service to the development of medical science and therewith to humanity -if we endeavor to establish an incontrovertibly clear view of today’s -international opinion on human experiments, whether these experiments -were performed by Germans or by foreigners. - - - - - c. Evidence - - _Defense Documents_ - - Doc. No. Def. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - Karl Brandt 1 Karl Brandt Ex. 1 Extract from “Life” 95 - Magazine concerning - malaria experiments on - convicts in U. S. - penitentiaries. - - Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freyseng Statement of Professor 95 - 60 Ex. 58 Dr. Hans Luxenburger and - Dr. Hans Halbach - concerning the report on - experiments on human - beings in world - literature - (Becker-Freyseng 60a, - Becker-Freyseng Ex. 59). - - Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freyseng Extracts from report on 96 - 60a Ex. 59 experiments on human - beings in world - literature; excerpts from - various newspapers and - medical weeklies. - - Karl Brandt 117 Karl Brandt Excerpts from the 103 - Ex. 103 dissertation “Infection - Experiments on Human - Beings” by Alfred - Heilbrunn of the Hygiene - Institute of the - Wuerzburg University, - 1937, concerning - experiments on human - beings in other - countries. - - _Testimony_ - - Extracts from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 110 - Andrew C. Ivy. - Extract from the testimony of defendant Rose 118 - - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT KARL BRANDT 1 - KARL BRANDT DEFENSE EXHIBIT 1 - -EXTRACT FROM “LIFE” MAGAZINE CONCERNING MALARIA EXPERIMENTS ON CONVICTS - IN UNITED STATES PENITENTIARIES - -_Extract from “Life”, Vol. 18, Nr. 23 of June 4, 1945_ - - _Prison Malaria_ - -Convicts expose themselves to disease so doctors can study it. - -In three United States penitentiaries men who have been imprisoned as -enemies of society are now helping science fight another enemy of -society. At the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, the Illinois -State Penitentiary, and New Jersey State Reformatory some 800 convicts -volunteered to be infected with malaria so medical men can study the -disease. The experimenters, who are directed by the Office of Scientific -Research and Development, have found prison life ideal for controlled -laboratory work with humans. Their subjects all eat the same food, sleep -the same hours, and are never far away. The prisoners are not pardoned -or paroled for submitting to infection. - -Prison malaria experiments underline the fact that malaria is still a -very serious medical problem. In the United States there are 1,000,000 -cases a year. The existing drugs (mainly quinine and atabrine) control -malaria but cannot keep it from recurring long after the original -infection. The goal of malaria research is to find a new drug which will -cure the disease permanently. - - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT BECKER-FREYSENG 60 - BECKER-FREYSENG DEFENSE EXHIBIT 58 - - STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR DR. HANS LUXENBURGER AND DR. HANS HALBACH -CONCERNING THE REPORT ON EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS IN WORLD LITERATURE - (SEE ALSO BECKER-FREYSENG 60a, BECKER-FREYSENG EX. 59) - - _Experiments on Human Beings as Viewed in World Literature_ - -I, Professor Dr. med. Hans Luxenburger, specialist in nervous diseases, -resident at 35, Liebigstrasse, Munich, and I, Dr. ing. and Dr. med. -Erich Hans Halbach, physician, of Prien-Chiemsee, have first been -advised that we shall render ourselves liable to punishment if we give a -false affidavit. We declare under oath that we have ascertained the -correctness of the enclosed excerpts of scientific works and books, that -is to say, with respect to the excerpts bearing the following numbers: -1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, -27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, -48, 54 * * * by comparison with the original; with respect to the -numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 19, 41, 43, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 by -certified photostatic copies, copies, translations or excerpts submitted -to us by attorney at law Dr. Edmund Tipp. - -We made the report “Experiments on Human Beings as Viewed in World -Literature” to the best of our knowledge for presentation as evidence -before the American Military Tribunal I in the Palace of Justice, -Nuernberg, Germany. - -Munich, 14 April 1947 - - [Signed] Prof. Dr. Hans Luxenburger - Dr. Hans Halbach - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT BECKER-FREYSENG 60a - BECKER-FREYSENG DEFENSE EXHIBIT 59 - -EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS IN WORLD LITERATURE; - EXCERPTS FROM VARIOUS NEWSPAPERS AND MEDICAL WEEKLIES - - _Excerpt from the Certified Translation_ - -_Author_: Ladell, W.S.S. (Med. Research Committee). -_Title_: Effects after Taking Small Quantities of Sea-Water. An - experimental study. (From the research staff, National Hospital, Queen - Square). -_Quotation_: The Lancet No. 6267 (October 1943) page 441. -_Purpose_: Contribution to the physiology of persons who received the - same food and drinking water as shipwrecked persons in lifeboats. - Studies regarding the effect of the drinking of sea water on the - chloride balance, urea excretion, urine amount, and loss of body weight - of shipwrecked persons. - -_Procedure_: - - 1. Three experimental persons, after one day without water, drank - 240 cc. fresh water and 180 cc. sodium chloride 3.5 percent solution - daily for 4½ days. - 2. Ten experimental persons, after one day without water, drank - 540 cc. fresh water and 180 cc. sea water daily for 5 days; the - following 4 days, 5 of these experimental persons drank 60 cc. fresh - water daily, the following 4 days the other 5 experimental persons - drank 60 cc. fresh water and 180 cc. sea water daily. - 3. Eleven experimental persons, after one day without water, drank - 540 cc. fresh water daily for 5 days; 6 of these experimental persons - received 60 cc. water and 180 cc. sea water daily for the following 4 - days. - 4. Two experimental persons, after one day without water, drank - 370 cc. fresh water each for 2 days, for the following 3 days daily - 240 cc. fresh water each, plus 400 cc. sea water, the next 36 hours - only 600 cc. sea water. - All experimental persons moreover took only sea-rescue emergency - rations in limited quantities, with 1 gr. sodium chloride at the - most. -_Experimental persons_: 17 experimental persons from a naval hospital - submitted “voluntarily to the severe experimental conditions”, without - physical injury. - - _Excerpt from Certified Report 19_ - -_Author_: Cameron and Karunaratne. -_Quotation_: Journal of Pathology and Bacteriology 42, 13 (1936). -_Purpose_: Studies of the poisonous effect of carbontetrachloride on - human beings (report). -_Experiment_: Carbontetrachloride is administered to healthy criminals - before their execution. The effect of the poison on the liver is - determined by way of an autopsy. (Therapeutical normal doses 3.0 cc.: - maximum dose 5.0 cc.) - - 2 test persons receive twice 6 cc. (Nichols and Hampton) - 3 test persons receive twice 4 cc. (Docherty and Nichols) - 2 test persons receive twice 5 cc.^{*} (Docherty and Burgess) - 1 test person receive twice 5 and 3 cc.^{*} (Docherty and Burgess) - 3 test persons receive twice 10 cc. (Leach, Haughwout and Ash) - ^{*} with subsequent laxative. - -_Result_: In some cases changes in the liver, in others none. -_Test persons_: 11 criminals sentenced to death. - - _Excerpt from Original 20_ - - _Author_: Lt. Col. Kendall, A.E., Lt. Col. Dickinson, S.P., Lt. Col. - Forrester, J.S. - _Title_: The Treatment of Bacillary Dysentery in Chinese Soldiers with - Sulfaguanidine and Sulfadiazine. - _Quotation_: American Journal of Medical Science 211,103 (January, - 1946). - _Purpose_: Page 103: “The opportunity to make controlled observations of - the efficacy of sulfaguanidine and sulfadiazine in the treatment of - acute bacillary dysentery has recently presented itself to us. In an - Army general hospital in northeastern India caring for Chinese and - American troops, we have observed many hundreds of cases within the - past year. It early became apparent that we were dealing with a - relatively benign form of the disease with a uniformly favorable - outcome. Under these circumstances, it seemed both justifiable and - important to utilize the opportunity to determine to what extent - sulfonamide therapy shortened the course of the disease or otherwise - favorably influenced its course.” - _Experiment_: “The present communication describes the results of such - an investigation, carried out in the 7-month period from June through - December 1943, in which the results of treatment were compared in 334 - Chinese patients with bacillary dysentery, one-third received - sulfaguanidine and one-third, sulfadiazine.” - _Results_: Page 109: “Neither drug shortened the course of the disease, - ameliorated the symptoms, nor altered the eventual outcome.” - _Test persons_: 334 Chinese soldiers patients. - - _Excerpt from the Original Report No. 23_ - - _Author_: See below. - _Title_: Trench Fever Report of Commission Medical Research Committee, - American Red Cross, University Press 1918. Trench Fever, Bruce, Final - Report of the War Trench Fever Investigation Committee, Journal of - Hygiene 1921, page 258. - _Quotation_: Reference in Kolle-Kraus-Uhlenhut, Manual of Pathogenic - Micro-organisms. VIII/1, 1302, (1930). - _Purpose_: “The American Commission (President: Strong, Members: Swift, - Ople, McNeal, Beetjew, Pappenheimer, Peacoc, Rapport) interpreted its - task in a preponderantly practical way, trying to clarify the methods - of transmission and to safeguard the troops from infection. The - English Commission (President: Bruce. Members: Harvey, Bacot, Byam, - Trench, Arkwright, Fletcher, Hird, Plimmer) set itself the task of - investigating the disease completely and thoroughly, particularly also - the causative agent.” - _Experiment_: “The experiments of the English-American Commissions, - those of transmitting Quintana with the entire blood were largely - positive, and the intravenous injection showed better results than the - intramuscular and particularly the subcutaneous. - “Experiments for the transmission of lice were carried out by the - English and American Commissions on the two bases: The bite of lice - and the rubbing in of infected lice secretion.” - The first announcement of the American Commission on successful - transmission of lice came on 14 February 1918; the first successful - experiment on the transmission of lice of the English Commission on 9 - March. - - _Transmission Experiments_: - - with Plasma positive in 7 cases - with Serum negative - with red blood corpuscles positive 3 times in 4 experiments - with blood from skin which has negative - been scratched - - _Infection_: - - with secretion of lice positive - with sputum and saliva positive once in 4 experiments - with urine of patients rubbed into positive 5 times in 8 experiments - the skin - through the conjunctiva positive - through the urethra not successful - through the mouth not successful - through food and drink not successful - - _Experimental persons_: Approximately at least 100 - _Result_: Clarification of the etiology and the methods of transmission. - - _Excerpts from the Original Report No. 25_ - - _Author_: Hamdi. - _Title_: Results of Immunization Tests against Typhus. - _Quotation_: Journal for Hygiene 1916, 82. Quoted in - Kolle-Kraus-Uhlenhut, Manual of Pathogenic Micro-organisms VIII/2, - 1204 (1930). - _Purpose_: See title. - _Experiment_: “By means of virulent blood of patients, Hamdi was in a - position to check on a large number of persons who had been treated - before partly with the blood of patients (80), partly with the blood - of reconvalescents (54), partly with a mixture of both blood types - (19) * * *. Upon the infection with the blood of patients, none of the - thrice protectively vaccinated persons became ill, two out of seven - persons who had been protectively vaccinated only twice became ill.” - _Experimental persons_: “In the first place, these experiments concerned - persons who had been sentenced to death for crimes,” - “* * * large number * * *.” - _Result_: Effectiveness of protective vaccination was proved. - - _Excerpt from Original Report No. 26_ - - _Author_: Doerr, R. - _Title_: Pappataci Fever and Dengue. - _Quotation_: Kolle-Kraus-Uhlenhut, Manual of Pathogenic Micro-organisms - VIII/1, 501 et seq. (1930). - _Purpose_: Research in Etiology and Transmission of Pappataci Fever. - _Experiment_: II. Pappataci Fever. Page 508: “The organism circulates in - the blood of the patients during the first 24 hours after the - beginning of the fever. Its presence is betrayed only from the - pathogenicity (infectivity) of the blood for healthy and receptive - (not immune) human beings. If such an individual were to be injected - with the blood of a subcutaneously feverish person he would fall ill * - * * of a fever attack typical in every respect. This experiment was at - first successfully performed by Doerr (1908), later by Doerr and Russ - in the Hercegovina, by Birt in Malta, by Tedeschi and Napolitani in - Italy, by Lepine (Three Days Fever in Syria, Bull. Soc. path. exot. - _20_, 251, 1927) in Syria. The experiment was repeated by Kligler and - Ashner in Palestine and furnished positive results in about 35 single - experiments. In this connection it must be considered that, almost - without exception, the inoculated persons lived in areas free from - epidemics and phlebotomus so that an accidental natural infection was - out of the question from the beginning.” - Page 513: “But Whittingham and Rook brought infected phlebotomus - from Malta to England. They succeeded in breeding imagines from the - eggs of flies laid in England and infecting human beings by the bites - of these flies, that is producing fever attacks. In this way, the - question of where the virus of the Pappataci fever remains over the - winter would apparently be answered.” - - _Experimental persons_: About 35. - _Result_: Determination and confirmation of the etiology and the method - of transmission. - - _Report After the Original No. 33_ - - _Author_: Goldberger, Joseph (USA Public Health Service 1914). - _Quoted from_: Bernhard Jaffe, Scientists in America, Overseas Edition - Incorporated, New York 1944, page 401 et seq. - _Purpose_: Proof that pellagra is a deficiency disease. - _Experiment_: One-sided deficiency diet (restricted in quality) which - caused 7 severe cases of pellagra. - _Experimental persons_: 12 voluntary prisoners of the Rankin-Prison-Farm - to whom their freedom was promised after survival of the experiment, - with the agreement of the governor of the state. All survived and were - set free. - - _Excerpt from Original 44_ - - _Author_: Fraenkel, E. - _Title_: Report on Infectious Colpitis Epidemica Observed in Children. - _Quoted from_: Arch. Path. Anath. a. Physiol. (Virchow) _99_, 251 - (1885). - _Purpose_: Page 263: Confirmation of the suspicion of an “infection of - the conjunctiva caused by vaginal secretion.” Animal tests showed - negative results. - _Experiment_: Page 263: “By chance I had the possibility to inoculate - the vaginal secretion (of sick women) into the conjunctiva of 3 - children patients who were in the final stage of the disease (two were - suffering from atrophia infantum, the third from cheesy pneumonia) * * - *.” - Page 264: “The two pus-producing patients had suffered for - several weeks from their colpitis.” - _Result_: 2 children died—1½ and 2 days after the inoculation without - showing any reactions. The third child contracted conjunctivitis, - which healed after treatment, and died on the 10th day. - _Experimental subjects_: 3 moribund children. - - _Excerpt from Original 48_ - - _Author_: Current Comment. Summary of a study taken from Epidemiology - Unit No. 50. - _Title_: Cholera Studies in Calcutta. - _Quotation_: Journal of the American Medical Association _130_, 790 - (1946). - _Aim_: Page 790: “* * * control experiment on the treatment of cholera * - * *.” - _Experiment_: Page 790: “* * * in a highly endemic or epidemic area of - India, patients were taken in rotation as they were admitted to the - hospital and assigned to the following group according to the - treatment given: - A, sulfaguanidine; - B, control; - C, sulfadiacine; - D, penicillin; and - E, sulfadiacine and penicillin combined. - - All patients received supportive treatment in the form of i.v. - hypertonic and isotonic solution of sodium chloride and oral - stimulants as indicated of offset dehydration, emaciation, and - circulatory failure.” - - _Result_: Page 791: - - 1. Patient treated with plasma in addition to chemo-therapy: - death rate: zero. - 2. Patients receiving chemo-therapy alone: death rate 1.1 - percent. - 3. Control group consisting of all patients who had not received - treatment or who had insufficient treatment or only supportive - treatment: death rate 38.3 percent. - “The dramatic effect of plasma is still more evident if the shock - or collapse cases are segregated and tabulated. There were, in all, - 78 severely ill patients in that group. The results in the group - showed a mortality rate of 95.8 percent for the control group, 15.8 - percent for the chemo-therapy, and no mortality in the group treated - with plasma plus chemo-therapy.” - - _Experimental subjects_: - - No numbers given, presumably several hundred, nonvoluntary as - clinical serial tests. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT KARL BRANDT 117 - KARL BRANDT DEFENSE EXHIBIT 103 - - EXCERPTS FROM THE DISSERTATION “INFECTION EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS” - BY ALFRED HEILBRUNN OF THE HYGIENE INSTITUTE OF THE WUERZBURG - UNIVERSITY, 1937, CONCERNING EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS IN OTHER - COUNTRIES - - _Excerpt from “Infection Experiment on Human Beings”_ - -Inaugural Dissertation for the Attainment of the Degree of a Doctor of -Medicine at the Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin; - - submitted by: Alfred Heilbrunn, - Hofgeismar (Hesse Nassau) 1937 - -From the Hygiene Institute of Wuerzburg University. (Dean: Professor M. -Knorr) - -Printed by: F. W. Gadow and Son, Hildburghausen. - -(The pamphlet is in the library of the Erlangen University.) - - * * * * * - - _MALARIA_ - -Infection experiments with malaria take up much space in literature. The -desire to acquire an exact knowledge of this disease, so important to -various countries, makes this fact appear quite understandable. -Therefore, numerous experiments on human beings were carried out even -before the discovery of the plasmodium malariae and without knowledge of -the transmission by anopheles. In the following enumeration, these -experiments will be quoted chronologically, thus giving a picture of how -the knowledge of the etiology, the infectiousness and the transmission -of malaria, was discovered through infection experiments on human -beings. - -1. (LV 7) * * * SALISBURY (quoted from Mannaberg: Malaria Diseases, -Vienna 1899. Nothnagel, Special Pathology and Therapy II 2.) * * * -Experiment: * * * Two * * * men * * * after 12 and 14 days, fell ill -with typical tertiana. The same experiment in a second case again turned -out a positive result. - -2. (LV 8) * * * DOCHMANN (Dochmann: The Doctrine of febris intermittens. -St. Petersburg Medical Journal. No. 20, quoted from Virchow-Hirsch 1880) -* * *. His experiments * * *. 1st experiment: He inoculated * * * a -healthy 30-year-old man subcutaneously with * * * feverish chills. - - * * * * * - - 2d experiment: * * * Inoculation of three men * * * - - 1st man: * * * fever - - 2d man: Only passing indisposition. - - 3d man: Stayed completely well. - - 3d experiment: Inoculation of a woman * * * - - * * * shivering fits, fever, * * * - -3. (LV 9) * * * GERHARD (Gerhard: quoted from Olpp: Famous Tropical -Physicians Publ. Quello, Tuebingen) * * * transmitted * * * malaria from -a sick person to a healthy one through subcutaneous blood injections. - - * * * * * - -4. (LV 10) * * * MARCHIAFAVA and CELLI (Marchiafava and Celli: New -Research on Malaria Infection, Progress of Medicine, 1885, 787, 795) * * -* Five experiments were carried out on patients suffering from nervous -disorders. - -1. Experiment: Experimental subject a 17-year-old man with myelitis -transversa * * * - - * * * progress of fever - - * * * spasm * * * - - * * * swelling of the spleen * * * - -An examination of the blood gave an excellent confirmation of the -malaria nature of the fever attacks * * * - -2. Experiment: Experimental subject a 68-year-old man with hemichorea. - - * * * * * - - Characteristic attack of malaria, * * * moderate spleen tumor. - -3. Experiment: Experimental subject a 32-year-old man with multiple -sclerosis. - - * * * * * - - * * * characteristic attacks, spleen tumor. - - * * * * * - -4. Experiment: Experimental subject a 47-year-old man with multiple -sclerosis. - - * * * * * - - No pathological manifestations in the blood picture. - -5. Experiment: Experimental subject a 23-year-old man with poliomyelit. -ant. - - * * * * * - - * * * fever * * * - -These experiments showed that— - - (1) in the blood of malaria patients, corpuscles were often - found in the interior of the red blood corpuscles in amoeboic - movement and susceptible to coloring with aniline. - - (2) the disease is transmissible, and that the same amoeboic - formations were found in the blood of the experimental subjects - as in the blood of the donors. The scientists carried on the - work on the basis of these results and came to the conclusion - that these amoeboic corpuscles were the morbific agents of - malaria. In order to be quite sure they made another inoculation - experiment. - - Experimental subject was a 43-year-old man with paralysis - agitans. - - * * * * * - - * * * continual subnormal temperature accompanied by bad general - condition . . . - - * * * plasmodia moving in the blood * * * - -5. (LV 11) The experiments of MARCHIAFAVA and CELLI are confirmed by a -whole series of other Italian authors. I found the experiments in the -book of MANNABERG (page 7) in the form of tables and reproduce them here -in the same way. (vide pages 10-13) * * * - - (LV 12) CELLI (Celli: quoted from Mannaberg (7)) had several - persons in the Roman hospital S. Spirito drink water from the - Pontinc Marshes and from the marshes near Rome and found that - these persons did not contract malaria. - - (LV. 13) BRANCALEONE (Brancaleone: quoted from Mannaberg (7)) - repeated the same experiment in Sicily with the same negative - result. - - (LV. 14) ZERI (Zeri: quoted from Mannaberg (7)) had 9 persons, - for a period of 5-20 days, drink 1.5 litres of water each (in - toto 10-60 l.) from a malaria district; he let 16 persons inhale - the same water when sprayed. He administered it to 5 persons per - rectum: none of the experimental persons got malaria. Also - SALOMONE MARIO (LV. 15: Mario quoted from Mannaberg (7)) - registered the same negative result. - - * * * * * - - No results were found in support of the water theory. It only - remained to examine whether mosquitoes transmitted malaria - through their sting. - -6. (LV. 18) * * * BASTIANIELI (vide Mannaberg (7)) * * * To imitate the -sting of the mosquito he did nothing but insert the point of the Pravaz -syringe, moistened with malaria blood, under the skin. That sufficed in -some cases to produce a severe case of malaria. - - * * * * * - -7. (LV. 20) * * * 1895 ROSS (Ross, page 9) let 4 mosquitoes of the -species anopheles suck themselves full on the Indian Abdul Radir who had -numerous crescent-shaped formations in his blood, and on 25 May he let -the twenty-year-old Lutschmann, who was stated never to have been sick -before, be stung by them. On 5 June the latter contracted fever which -lasted for 3 days. - - * * * * * - -8. (LV. 23) In 1917 WAGNER-JAUREGG (Wagner-Jauregg: Psych. neurol. -weekly 1918) introduced artificial malaria infection to cure progressive -paralysis. Following this, now experiments were initiated. - - * * * * * - -9. (LV. 25) F. MUEHLENS and W. KIRSCHBAUM (Muehlens and Kirschbaum: -Further Parasitological Observations on Artificial Malaria Infection of -Paralytics. Archives for Ship and Tropical Hygiene 1924, Vol. 28, No. 4, -page 131) in 1924 report on artificial malaria infection for the -treatment of paralysis. - - * * * * * - - _DIPHTHERIA_ - - * * * * * - -Despite the Behring therapeutic serum and the protective vaccine -developed by Behring, the field of diphtheria immunity has always -interested various research experts. Their efforts were all directed -toward developing safe, _active_ immunity. - -48. (LV. 137) As early as 1902 DZIERGOWSKY (Dziergowsky, quoted from -Seeligmann and Happe: The Position of the Active Protective Vaccine -against Diphtheria. Result of Hygiene 11, 1930) reported on several -experiments to protect human beings against diphtheria by a number of -subcutaneous injections with a gradually increasing dose of -Diphtheria-Toxin. - - * * * * * - -49. (LV. 138) BLUMENAU (Blumenau, page 137) worked on this principle in -1909. He soaked cotton wads in undiluted toxin and placed them -alternately in the right and then in the left nostril of children from -3-12 years of age. He attained an antitoxin titer increase of up to 10 -A.E. per ccm. of serum. - -50. (LV. 139) BANDI and GAGNONI worked with killed bacteria (Bandi and -Gagnoni, page 137). They injected measles convalescents with a 4-day-old -crush of diphtheria bacilli cultures on agar which had been killed at -55° Centigrade * * *. - -51. (LV. 141) BOEHME and RIEBOLD (Boehme and Riebold, One Way of Active -Immunization against Diphtheria, Munich Medical Weekly 1924, 232) were -the first to use living diphtheria bacilli for vaccination of human -beings. After extensive experiments on guinea pigs, they proceeded to -experiment on human beings. They used a diphtheria lymph, which they -named Diphcutan, a mixture of living, highly toxic diphtheria bacilli -cultures in N_{a}C1. Sixty-two persons were vaccinated with this lymph -with 10-20 scratches each on the upper arm. Those vaccinated were— - - 22 children from 1½-5 years of age, - 11 children from 6-10 years of age, - 17 children from 10-15 years of age, - 2 youths from 15-20 years of age, and - 9 adults from 20-50 years of age. - - * * * * * - -52. (LV. 142) EBERHARD (Eberhard, Contributions toward active -Immunization against Diphtheria. Hygiene Journal 105, page 614) tested 4 -different vaccines produced by the Marburger Behringwerke for their -suitability for immunization of humans and for use in public vaccination -stations. - - * * * * * - -53. (LV. 143) BAYER used the lymph suggested by BOEHME and RIEBOLD -(Bayer, On active Immunization against Diphtheria. Yearbook of Infant -Therapeutics 1925, 273) and vaccinated 87 children with it * * *. - -54. (LV. 144) MUELLER and MEYER (Mueller and Meyer, Diagnosis and -Immunization of children threatened with Diphtheria. Journal of Infant -Therapeutics 39, 405, 1925). They also checked the experiments by BOEHME -and RIEBOLD with the same methods, vaccinated 53 children who had shown -a positive reaction to the SCHICK test. - - * * * * * - - _TYPHUS_ - -55. (LV. 149) REITANO (Reitano, quoted from Rontal, Journal of -Bacteriology 1933 III, page 112) vaccinated human beings with virus -contained in dog ticks and produced typhus. - -56. (LV. 150) One immunization experiment dating from the World War cost -the lives of 50 Turkish soldiers. In the year 1915 immunization -experiments against typhus were to be carried out in the hospitals of -the 3d Turkish Army with inactivated blood from a diseased person. The -doctor concerned took the blood from typhus convalescents and injected -it, as HAMDI (Hamdi, On the Results of Immunization Experiments against -Typhus-Exanthem. Hygiene Journal, 1916, 235) reports without having -inactivated it, into 120 soldiers. Each received 5 ccm. subcutaneously. -One soldier died after 14 days, others contracted typhus which, however, -progressed in a satisfactory manner. After this the doctor vaccinated -another 310 soldiers in the same way. Of these, 174 became ill and 49 -died. On the average the incubation period was 12 days. - - * * * * * - - _PLAGUE_ - -62. (LV. 165) * * * BULARD (A. F. Bulard, De Moru, The Oriental Plague, -Paris 1839) * * * - - * * * * * - -Experiments continued to be carried out on condemned persons. On 17 -August at 8 o’clock in the morning, 18-year-old Ibrahim Hassan, who had -been condemned to death, was dressed in the shirt, underwear, and jacket -of a person seriously ill with the plague. Immediately after this he was -placed in the bed of one of the patients which was still warm from the -patient’s fever. Until 21 August there was no sign that even the -slightest infection had taken place. No symptoms of the disease had -developed. On the evening of the same day, however, he complained of a -slight headache, loss of energy started, the blood circulation -accelerated * * * - -A Plague Bubo developed in the left groin * * * 25 August: Further -vomiting of dark green matter. The tongue is dry and has a slightly -brackish appearance. The pulse is light and quick. Respiration is jerky, -the features are distorted. In the night death occurs. - -On 7 August at 8 o’clock in the evening, Mohammed Ben Ali who has been -condemned to death was dressed in the shirt, underwear, and jacket of a -person seriously ill with the plague. Immediately thereafter he was -placed in the patient’s bed. Until the 22d no symptoms of disease. On -the morning of the 23d severe outbreak of the disease. Tottering gait, -then walking impossible. Extreme loss of energy, appearance of being -seriously ill * * * - - * * * * * - -On 18 August we inoculated a person condemned to death with blood -through 4 vaccinational cuts in the fold of the right arm. This blood -was taken from a head vein of a plague patient who had been ill for 2 -days * * * - -On 22 and 30 August a second person, condemned to death, with a -plethoric constitution and of strong build was inoculated with blood. -The first time in a fold of the left arm and in the right groin area, -the second time in the opposite positions. On the area of the -vaccination only the natural reddening and infections caused by the -vaccination instrument appeared, nothing else. - - * * * * * - -“A third person condemned to death was inoculated with the fluid taken -from a Plague Bubo in the groin and in the shoulder. This same person -had dressed in the clothes of a plague patient 20 days previously and -had contracted the plague with all its severe symptoms. The skin and -tissue of this experimental subject remained refractory towards any -absorption of the poison. Even when the inoculation with blood was -repeated 8 days later, no disease resulted.” - - * * * * * - - _SMALLPOX_ - -In 1791, the teacher Plett of Holstein successfully vaccinated three of -his landlord’s children in Starkendorf near Kiel. Later on when an -epidemic occurred they did not contract the disease, while their -brothers and sisters which had not been vaccinated fell sick. - -81. (LV. 220) JENNER started from these premises. (Jenner, quoted from -Paschen, K.Kr.U., Manual on pathological micro-organisms, T. VIII, 1, -P821). In his first test, he inoculated with variola 16 persons who had -suffered from cowpox previously. They did not fall sick. - -In 1796, a milkmaid who suffered from a finger injury contracted an -infection when milking a cow sick with cowpox. She developed a case of -cowpox. With the contents of one pustule, Jenner vaccinated a boy. The -boy developed typical vaccine pustules at the vaccination area of his -arm. Two weeks later, Jenner carefully inoculated the boy on both arms -with new pustule matter. No sickness ensued, and a second inoculation -also was negative. Thus, clear proof was furnished that cowpox -transmitted to human beings possessed the same protective value as that -produced in animals. - -However, another epidemic was necessary before Jenner’s success was -recognized. In this instance he inoculated 6 children directly from the -cow. They developed a slight infection, and a subsequent inoculation -failed. - -The success of Jenner’s experimental infections on human beings have -resulted in a blessing for all mankind inasmuch as his fundamental -experiments on human beings have caused the extermination of variola in -all countries that have compulsory vaccination. - - EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT - WITNESS DR. ANDREW C. IVY[27] - - * * * * * - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you are an expert in the field of aviation -medicine? - -WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes. - -Q. May I ask you what fields within aviation medicine you have worked on -specifically, because my clients, who are recognized specialists in this -field, attach importance to ascertaining precisely what fields you have -worked in particularly? - -A. I have worked particularly in the field of decompression or pressure -drop sickness, and I have also worked in the field of anoxia or exposure -to altitude repeatedly at a level of 18,000 feet to ascertain if that -has any effect in the causation of pilots’ fatigue. - -Q. At what time did you specifically concern yourself with the fields -you have just named? Was that before the Second World War, during the -Second World War, or was it earlier than that? - -A. My interest in these fields of aviation medicine, including free fall -which I did not mention, started in 1939. - -Q. Regarding your specific work in this field, Witness, you have also -issued publications. I believe you spoke of two publications. Did I -understand you correctly, or were there more? - -A. There were two in the field of decompression sickness. There was one -publication in the field of the effects of repeated exposure to a mild -degree of oxygen lack. My other work has not yet been published but was -submitted in the form of reports to the Committee on Aviation Medicine -of the National Research Council of the United States. - -Q. When were these two papers published of which you just told us; when, -and were they printed by a publishing house? Did they appear in a -journal or a periodical? - -A. One appears in the Journal of Aviation Medicine either in September -or October of 1946. The other appears in the Journal of the American -Medical Association in either December or January 1946 or 1947. The -publication on the effect of repeated exposure to mild degrees of oxygen -lack at altitude appears in the quarterly bulletin of Northwestern -University Medical School and part of the work, insofar as its effect on -the elimination of the basis in the urine is concerned, appeared in the -Journal of Biological Chemistry around 1944 or 1945, I am not sure of -that date. - -Q. Theretofore, Witness, you had thus made no publication in the field -of aviation medicine before the papers of which you just gave the dates -of publication? - -A. The question is not clear. - -Q. You just gave us the titles of the publications you have published -and when; now I ask whether before the dates you just gave, you did not -have any publications in the field of aviation medicine? - -A. No. My first research started in 1939. - -Q. You, yourself, have carried out experiments too; is that not so? - -A. Yes. - -Q. With human experimental subjects, of course? - -A. Yes, and on myself. - -Q. And with a low pressure chamber? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Were these frequent experiments, or were the experiments in which -you, yourself, took part only infrequent in number? - -A. The experiments in which I took part were infrequent in number -compared to the total number of experiments which I performed. - -Q. Did you take part in these experiments as the director of the -experiments, as the person responsible, or were you usually the -experimental subject yourself? - -A. I served in both capacities. For example, I have frequently gone to -the altitude of 40,000 feet to study the symptoms of bends with an -intermediate pressure device, which we produced in our laboratory. I -have been to 47,500 feet on three or four occasions, on one occasion at -52,000 feet for half an hour. I have frequently been to 18,000 feet -without supplemental oxygen in order to study the effect of the degree -of oxygen lack present there for my ability to perform psycho-motor -tests. - -Q. Can you tell us approximately during what year you began these -experiments of your own? - -A. In 1939. - -Q. 1939; did you at this time carry out explosive decompression -experiments too? Witness, one moment please, the English for that is -“explosive decompression.” That is thus the experiment in which one -ascends slowly to a certain height, let us say 8,000 meters, and then -all at once suddenly one is brought up to a height of 15,000 meters; -that is, first slowly up to 8,000 and then suddenly to, let us say, -15,000—that is what I understand under the term “explosive -decompression” experiment, and my question is: whether you also carried -out such experiments and if so when and to what extent? - -A. I carried out over one hundred experiments on explosive decompression -in various laboratories on animals, the rabbit, the dog, the pig, and -the monkey. I did not serve as a subject myself in experiments on -explosive decompression, but a student who was trained with me in -physiology, Dr. J. J. Smith, did the first experiments on explosive -decompression in which human subjects were used, at Wright Field. I am -familiar with the work which Dr. Hitchcock did on this subject at Ohio -State University in which he studied some one hundred students under -conditions of explosive decompression. - -Q. To what altitude, Witness; to what maximum altitude did you carry -your own explosive decompression experiments? - -A. In animals it was up to 50,000 feet; in the case of human subjects, -the maximum was 47,500 with pressure breathing equipment. - -Q. This altitude you reached in your own experiments. Now, Doctor, it -would interest me to know to what maximum altitude have any experiments -in explosive decompression been carried in America; what do you know -about this maximum altitude? - -A. I believe that 47,500 or slightly above is the maximum. - -Q. Witness, do you know the German Physiologist Dr. Rein; Professor -Rein, do you know his name; R-e-i-n from Goettingen? - -A. Yes. - -Q. At the moment he is the Ordinarius for Physiology at Goettingen, he -is a rector at the university and a member of the Scientific Advisory -Committee for the British Zone. On the basis of your own knowledge, do -you consider Professor Rein an authoritative scientist in the field of -physiology and aviation medicine? - -A. I consider him an authoritative physiologist, I am not acquainted -with his work in the field of aviation medicine. - -Q. Mr. President, I previously put in evidence—I want to recall that -now—an expert opinion from this Dr. Rein regarding Dr. Ruff. (_Ruff 5, -Ruff Ex. 3._) This expert testimony is from Professor Rein. - -In your own experiments, Witness, you also used conscientious objectors, -is that not so? Did I understand you correctly? - -A. Yes, in some of the experiments. - -Q. Will you tell us why you used conscientious objectors? Were they -particularly adapted for these experiments; or what was the reason for -you, as one conducting experiments, to use especially conscientious -objectors? - -A. It was their duty, their volunteer duty to render public service. -They had nothing else to do but to render public service. In the -experiments in which we used the conscientious objectors, they could -devote their full attention to the experiments. Many of the subjects, -which I have used, have been medical students or dental students, who -besides serving as subjects had to attend their studies in schools. In -the experiments we did on the conscientious objectors, they could not -attend school at the same time and carry on or perform all the tests -they were supposed to perform. For example, we used a group of -conscientious objectors for repeated exposure to an altitude of 18,000 -feet without the administration of supplemental oxygen. These tests -involved the following of a strict diet, they involved the performance -of work tests and psycho-motor tests, which required several hours every -day to perform. Another group of conscientious objectors that I used -were used for vitamin studies in relation to fatigue. - -These conscientious objectors had to do a great deal of carefully -measured work during the day as well as to perform psycho-motor tests so -medical students or dental students could not be used. We had to have -subjects who could spend their full time on the experiments.[28] - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, from the answers that you have given so far, I am still not -clear in my mind precisely why you hit upon conscientious objectors in -particular as the experimental subjects. You said there were two groups -of them: some were in prison and some had to perform public service. -From the latter group you took your experimental subjects, but please -give me a clear answer to the question: Why did you specifically use -such conscientious objectors for your altitude experiments? - -A. They could devote full time to the experimental requirements. They -did not have to do any other work as was the case of medical students or -dental students, the only other type of subjects that I had available to -me. - -Q. Doctor, these persons were obliged to perform public service. If -these conscientious objectors had not been there or if they had been -used for public service, then you would not have had any experimental -subjects. There must be a specific reason why you specifically used -conscientious objectors and I ask you, please, to tell me that reason. - -A. Well, we could not have done the experiments unless the conscientious -objectors had been available. That is the answer to your question. - -Q. Could you not have used prisoners, even conscientious objectors who -refused to do public service and were therefore in prison without doing -any work? Could you not have used them? - -A. Well, that would have meant that I and my assistants would have to go -to the prison which was quite a distance away. The conscientious -objectors could come to us at the university where they could live in -the university dormitory or in the university hospital. - -Q. Doctor, if your experiments were really important—perhaps important -in view of the state of war—then it is difficult to understand why the -experiments could not have been carried out in a prison, let us say. -Other experiments have been carried out in prisons to a large extent, -and on another occasion. Doctor, you told us that you simply had to get -in touch with the prisoners; you simply wrote them a letter or you put -up a notice on the bulletin board and then, to a certain extent, you had -prisoners available. Can you give me no other information as to why you -used specifically and only conscientious objectors? - -A. No. If it had been convenient and necessary for me to use prisoners, -I believe that we could have had prisoner volunteers for this work. - -Q. Witness, were you ever in a penitentiary as a visitor? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Did you see there how the criminals condemned to death were housed? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Are they completely at liberty there or are the criminals condemned -to death locked up in their cells? - -A. They were locked up in their cells. - -Q. Now, can you please tell us how a criminal condemned to death is to -see the notice that you would put on the bulletin board? You told us -today that it was very simple—you simply put a notice on the bulletin -board—and for hours now I have been trying to figure out how a criminal -condemned to death, who is locked up in his cell, is going to see that -notice on the bulletin board. - -A. While these prisoners are taken out for their meals, they can pass by -a bulletin board, or a piece of paper with the statement on it which I -read can be placed in their cells for reading or, as a large group in -the dining room, the statement can be read to them. - -Q. Are criminals condemned to death together at meals in America? So far -as I know, there too the criminal condemned to death is given his food -through an opening in the cell door; he cannot eat in a common mess -hall. - -A. Yes. But you must recall that I did not specify that the criminals -which were used for malaria experiments were prisoners condemned to -death; neither did I specify that if I were to go to a penitentiary to -see if I could get volunteers for a nutrition experiment that I should -select prisoners condemned to death. - -Q. If you are speaking here of condemned criminals as experimental -subjects, are you speaking of criminals condemned to death or just of -criminals who have just received some sentence or other? - -A. I have not used prisoners or criminals condemned to death. You have -been using that statement. I have used prisoners. - -Q. You spoke only of prisoners then? - -A. That is correct. - -Q. Are those prisoners in pre-trial imprisonment who have not yet been -put on trial or are those prisoners who have already received some -sentence? - -A. Prisoners who have already received some sentence. - -Q. In other words, prisoners who have been condemned or sentenced? - -A. But not necessarily to death. - -Q. Yes, other sentences, aside from the death sentence, included. Did -you as a scientist interest yourself in the question of why a person was -sentenced, for what crimes he was sentenced? - -A. No, I did not. - -Q. Did you at least concern yourself with the question whether the man -was condemned, was sentenced by a regular court or a court martial, or -an extraordinary court? - -A. None of these prisoners would have been sentenced by a court martial; -they would have been sentenced by an ordinary civilian court. - -Q. How do you know? Did you see the personal files of these prisoners or -did you see the opinions and sentences on the basis of which the -prisoner had been incarcerated? - -A. Only on the basis of the type of prisoner that would be incarcerated -in a certain penitentiary. - -Q. How do you, as a doctor, know exactly what sort of prisoner is -incarcerated in this penitentiary and what sort of prisoner is -incarcerated in another prison? How do you know that? - -A. That’s a matter of common knowledge to one who reads the newspapers, -the press, and who is generally informed on such matters. In a Federal -penitentiary then you might have prisoners who have been incarcerated -because of court martial. - -Q. Are inmates of Federal penitentiaries used for experiments too, as -far as you know? - -A. Yes. They may be. - -Q. In other words, political prisoners too, that is, prisoners who were -condemned by a court martial or by another court? - -A. We have no political prisoners in the United States. - -Q. Are not prisoners condemned for high treason or treason and the like? -Those are political crimes. - -A. Not to my knowledge. - -Q. For conspiring with the enemy during the war; such cases have not -only arisen but they have also been punished, and you must know that -from reading your newspaper, Professor; those are political prisoners. -Do you not have those in America? - -A. Not to my knowledge. - -Q. Doctor, if I understood you correctly, you stated this morning that a -medical experiment with fatal consequences is to be designated either as -an execution or as a murder; is that what you said? - -A. I did not say that. - -Q. What did you say then? - -A. It was more or less as I quoted it, as I remember, I said that under -the circumstances which surrounded the first death in high-altitude -experiments at Dachau, which Dr. Romberg is alleged to have witnessed, -Dr. Rascher killed the subject; that the death could be viewed only as -an execution or as a murder; and if the subject were a volunteer, then -his death could not be viewed as an execution. - -Q. Witness, in your opinion, is there a difference whether the -experiments are to be traced back to the initiative of the experimenter -himself, or whether they are ordered by some authoritative office of the -state which also assumes the responsibility for them? - -A. Yes. There is a difference, but that difference does not pertain, in -my opinion, to the moral responsibilities of the investigator toward his -experimental subject. - -Q. I cannot understand that, Doctor. I can imagine that the state gives -an experimenter the order, particularly during wartime, to carry out -certain experiments, and that in peacetime, on his own initiative, the -researcher would not carry out such experiments unless he was ordered to -by the state. You must recognize this difference yourself. - -A. That does not carry over to the moral responsibility of the -individual to his experimental subject. I do not believe that the state -can assume the responsibility of ordering a scientist to kill people in -order to obtain knowledge. - -Q. Witness, that is not the question. I am not interested in whether the -state can order some one to murder; I am interested in the question -whether, in your opinion, the state can order, let us say dangerous -experiments, experiments in which perhaps fatalities may occur. In -America, too, deaths occurred several times in experiments; what is your -view on this? - -A. The state, as far as I know, in the United States of America has -never ordered scientists to perform any experiment where death is likely -to occur. - -Q. Doctor, I did not say where death was probable, I said where death is -possible, and I ask you to answer the question I put to you. If deaths -are probable, then you are correct, then it is murder. If deaths are -possible, then I want to know what you say to that. And, let me remind -you, Doctor, that even in the American Air Force deaths did occur; in -other words, death was possible. - -A. Yes, I agree that it is possible for deaths to occur accidentally in -experiments which are hazardous. As I said in my testimony under such -conditions when they do occur, their cause is investigated very -thoroughly as well as the circumstances surrounding the death. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, you spoke yesterday of a number of experiments carried out -in the United States and in other countries outside of Germany. For -example, pellagra, swamp fever, beri-beri, plague, etc. Now, I should -like to have a very clear answer from you to the following question. In -these experiments which you heard of partly from persons involved in -them and partly from international literature, did deaths occur during -the experiments and as a result of the experiments or not? Professor, I -ask you this question because you said yesterday that you examined all -international literature concerning this question and, therefore, have a -certain specialized knowledge on this question. - -A. I also said that when one reviews the literature, he cannot be sure -that he has done a complete or perfect job. - -So far as the reports I have read and presented yesterday are concerned, -there were no deaths in trench fever. There were no deaths mentioned, to -my knowledge, in the article on pellagra. There were no deaths -mentioned, to my knowledge, in the article on beri-beri, and there were -no deaths in the article, according to my knowledge, in Colonel Strong’s -article on plague. I would not testify that I have read all the articles -in the medical literature involving the use of human beings as subjects -in medical experiments. - -Q. And, in the literature which you have read, Witness, there was not a -single case where deaths occurred? Did I understand you correctly? - -A. Yes. In the yellow fever experiments I indicated that Dr. Carroll and -Dr. Lazare died. - -Q. That is the only case you know of? - -A. That’s all that I know of. - - * * * * * - - EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROSE[29] - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -MR. MCHANEY: Now, would the extreme necessity for the large scale -production of typhus vaccines and the resultant experiments on human -beings in concentration camps have arisen had not Germany been engaged -in a war? - -DEFENDANT ROSE: That question cannot simply be answered with “yes” or -“no”. It is, on the whole, not very probable that without the war, -typhus would have broken out in the German camps, but it is not -altogether beyond the bounds of possibility because in times of peace -too typhus has broken out in individual cases from time to time. The -primary danger in the camps is the louse danger, and infection by lice -also occurs in times of peace. If typhus breaks out in a camp that is -infected with lice, a typhus epidemic can arise in peacetime too, of -course. - -Q. But Germany had never experienced any difficulty with typhus before -the war. Isn’t that right? - -A. Not for many decades, no. - -Q. You stated that nine hundred persons were used in Dr. Strong’s plague -experiments? - -A. Yes, I know that number from the literature on the subject. - -Q. What is the usual mortality in plague? - -A. That depends on whether it is bubonic plague or lung pest. In one, -namely, bubonic plague, the mortality can be as high as sixty or seventy -percent. It also can be lower. In lung pest, the mortality is just about -one hundred. - -Q. How many people died in Dr. Strong’s plague experiments? - -A. According to what his reports say, none of them died, but this result -could not have been anticipated because this was the first time that -anyone had attempted to inoculate living plague virus into human beings, -and Strong said in his first publication in 1905 that he himself was -surprised that no unpleasant incidents occurred and that there was only -severe fever reaction. That despite this unexpectedly favorable outcome -of Strong’s experiments the specialists had considerable misgivings -about this procedure can be seen first of all from publications where -that is explicitly stated; for example, two Englishmen say that, -contrary to expectations, these experiments went off well but -nevertheless this process cannot be used for general vaccination because -there is always the danger that, through some unexpected event, this -strain again becomes virulent. Moreover, from other works that Strong -later published it can be seen that guinea pigs and monkeys that he -vaccinated with this vaccine died not of the plague, but of the toxic -affects of the vaccine. All these difficulties are the reason why this -enormously important discovery which Koller and Otto made in 1903, and -Strong in 1905, has only been generally applied, for all practical -purposes, since 1926. That is an indication of the care and fear with -which this whole matter was first approached, and Strong could not know -ahead of time that his experiments would turn out well. I described here -the enormous concern that Strong felt during all these months regarding -the fact that that might happen which every specialist feared, viz., -that the virus would become virulent again. That is an enormous -responsibility. - -Q. Be that as it may, nobody died. That is a fact, isn’t it? - -A. If anyone did die, the publications say nothing about it. There were -deaths only among the monkeys and guinea pigs that are mentioned in the -publication. If human beings died, there is no mention in the -publication. It is generally known that if there are serious accidents -in such experiments as this, they are only most reluctantly made public. - -Q. Now, Professor, I have no wish to limit you but, as I understand it, -you have explained these things in considerable detail during the four -days in which you have already testified. If you can give a short answer -to my question that is all I want. If I want any further explanation -I’ll ask you for it. - -Now, what is the normal death rate in beri-beri? - -A. That depends on the medical care given. If the care is good, the -mortality is zero, and if they have no medical care at all, then a lot -of them die. - -Q. Sixty to eighty percent would probably die if they were not treated. -Is that right? - -A. Beri-beri lasts for many, many months before a person dies, and -usually one does not die of beri-beri in sixty days—that would be a -severe case. - -Q. How many people did Strong use in his beri-beri experiments? Is -twenty-nine all you know about? - -A. So far as I know from the literature, the number was twenty-nine. - -Q. Well, it says in the literature that he used only twenty-nine. Is -that right? - -A. So far as I know, yes. - -Q. And one of those died? - -A. According to what the literature says, one of them died. - -Q. What is the mortality in typhus? - -A. That varies enormously. It depends on the epidemic. In some epidemics -the mortality is five percent. In general, you count on a mortality of -twenty percent. In the Serb-Albanian epidemic in 1915, there was a -mortality of seventy percent, but that mortality rate is so -extraordinarily high that it is generally assumed that probably, in -reality, there were more cases of typhus than were actually reported. - -Q. Well, we could take roughly five to thirty percent as the mortality. -Is that right? - -A. Yes. That is what the textbooks generally say. - -Q. What was the mortality in the Buchenwald experiments, Professor? - -A. In the controlled cases in the experiments that I knew of, the -mortality rate was thirty percent. - -Q. Among the controls, you figured thirty percent? - -A. Yes. There were ten control persons in the first group of -experiments, and of them, three died. - -Q. Three died? Well, but I assume that you have read through the Ding -diary and let us assume for the moment that it is correct. Didn’t you -say that they also used control persons in the four or five other series -of experiments? - -A. In the controlled cases where they were testing the vaccine, the -general mortality rate was thirty percent. But then there were these -therapeutic experiments in which, according to the diary, blood -infections were undertaken and, in this case, the diary does mention an -unusually high mortality rate. - -Q. Well, Professor, for your information, we have figured out five -control series in the Ding diary, and I mean by controls those that were -not treated with anything. The mortality ranges between fifty-four to -one hundred percent and averaged eighty-one percent. Do you accept those -figures as correct? I mean, do you think that’s right? - -Q. No. That does not correspond with the impression I got from the -numbers in the diary, but I did not calculate it so precisely as all -that. I looked at the individual experiments and it is true that, for -instance, in these therapeutic experiments, Ding’s work mentions a -mortality of something like fifty to fifty-five percent, and then there -is one series that deals with blood infection where of twenty people, I -believe nineteen died. - -Q. Let me put it to you, Professor, is it not a fact that they were not -dealing with epidemic typhus in Buchenwald, but with a super-typhus, -developed from man to man passage, which was much more virulent and much -more deadly than any typhus you could expect in an epidemic? - -A. That I cannot judge because I have no knowledge of the work done in -Buchenwald and can only refer to what Ding’s diary says, which I regard -as unreliable. - -Q. Well, if you regard it as reliable, Doctor, and if you figure out the -deaths among the untreated control persons and find a mortality which -averaged eighty-one percent, will you not, as a scientist and an expert -on tropical diseases, concede that they had developed a highly virulent, -something we might call a super-typhus, in Buchenwald? Isn’t that right, -Professor? - -A. As a scientist, I am accustomed to state my opinion on the basis of -reliable documentation and not on the basis of such falsifications which -are produced for a special purpose. - -Q. I can appreciate that you do not regard the document as reliable, -Professor, but we will investigate that a little later. - - * * * * * - ------ - -[1] Closing statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July -1947, pp. 10718-10796. - -[2] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15 July 1947, pp. -10874-10911. - -[3] See section on Status of Occupied Poland under International Law, -vol. I, pp. 974-979. - -[4] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 16 July 1947, pp. -11020-11048. - -[5] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18 July 1947, pp. -11268-11288. - -[6] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 3, 4, 5, -6, 7 Feb. ’47, pp. 2301-2661. - -[7] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15, 16 -Apr. 1947, pp. 5926-5994. - -[8] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13, -14 June 1947, pp. 9029-9824. - -[9] Closing statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July -47, pp. 10718-10796. - -[10] United States _vs._ Erhard Milch. Concurring Opinion of Judge -Musmanno, vol. II, sec. VII, B. - -[11] See also excerpts from the closing brief for the defendant Karl -Brandt (Section VIII E, vol. I, pp. 983-990). - -[12] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15 July 47, pp. -10874-10911. - -[13] Art. 59 of the German Penal Code reads: - - “If a person in committing an offense did not know of the - existence of circumstances [Tatumstaende] constituting the - factual elements of the offense as determined by statute - [gesetzlicher Tatbestand] or increasing the punishment, then - these circumstances may not be charged against him. - - “In punishing an offense committed through negligence, this - provision applies only insofar as the lack of knowledge does not - in itself constitute negligence for which the offender is - responsible.” - -[14] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 26, 27, -28, 31 March, 1, 2, 3 Apr. 47, pp. 5000-5244, 5334-5464. - -[15] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13, -14, 16 June 47, pp. 9029-9324. - -[16] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18 July 47, pp. -11289-11309. - -[17] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 July 47, pp. -11128-11152. - -[18] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 26, 27, -28, 31 March, 1, 2, 3 Apr. 47, pp. 5000-5244, 5334-5464. - -[19] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18, 21, -22, 23, 24, 25 April 47, pp. 6081-6484. - -[20] Closing statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July -1947, pp. 10718-10796. - -[21] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15 July 47, pp. -10874-10911. - -[22] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 July 47, pp. -11128-11152. - -[23] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18, 21, -22, 23, 24, 25 April 1947, pp. 6081-6484. - -[24] Professor of History of Medicine at Erlangen University. - -Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 27 Jan. 1947, -pp. 1961-2028. - -[25] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13, -14 June 1947, pp. 9029-9324. - -[26] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 16 July 47, pp. -10972-10994. - -[27] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13, -14, 16 June 47, pp. 9029-9324. - -[28] To the question of conscientious objection in the United States, -see Section VIII E—Voluntary Participation of Experimental Subjects, -cross-examination of Dr. Ivy (vol. I, p. 944 ff.). - -[29] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18, 21, -22, 23, 24, 25 April 47, pp. 6081-6484. - - - - - IX. RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL ON COUNT - ONE OF THE INDICTMENT[30] - - -PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: The Secretary General will note for the record -the presence of all the defendants in Court. - -The Tribunal will now announce its ruling on the motion of certain -defendants against Count I in the indictment concerning the charge of -conspiracy. - - _MILITARY TRIBUNAL I_ - -Count I of the indictment in this case charges that the defendants, -acting pursuant to a common design, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly -did conspire and agree together to commit war crimes and crimes against -humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article 2. It is -charged that the alleged crime was committed between September 1939 and -April 1945. - -It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of the -International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. 10 has -defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against humanity as a -separate substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction -to try any defendant upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a -separate substantive offense. - -Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge of -conspiracy, also alleges unlawful participation in the formulation and -execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity -which actually involved the commission of such crimes. We, therefore, -cannot properly strike the whole of Count I from the indictment, but -insofar as Count I charges the commission of the alleged crime of -conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, distinct from any war -crime or crime against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that -charge. - -This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or effect of -Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, or as denying to -either prosecution or defense the right to offer in evidence any facts -or circumstances, occurring either before or after September 1939, if -such facts or circumstances tend to prove or to disprove the commission -by any defendant of war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in -Control Council Law No. 10. - ------ - -[30] Tr. pp. 10717-10718, 14 July 47. - - - - - X. FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT[31] - BY DR. SERVATIUS - - - Mr. President, your Honors: - -I cannot comment on all the questions which the prosecution brought up -this morning. I must limit myself to a few things and can refer to my -closing brief where I have gone into considerable detail on all these -questions. - -This morning I heard the detailed legal arguments advanced by the -prosecutor. I have commented particularly on these legal questions in my -closing brief, and I will now merely make a few brief comments. - -The prosecution assumes that Law No. 10 is an independent law. This is -not correct, for it designates itself explicitly as a law for the -execution of the London Charter and declares that Charter to be an -integral part of the law. - -Now, the sole purpose of the London Charter is to punish disturbances of -international legal relations, and not what has happened or is happening -somewhere within an individual state. Any other interpretation would put -an end to the conception of sovereignty, and it would give right of -intervention into the affairs of other states. - -In the trial before Tribunal III, Case No. 3, against Flick et al.,[32] -General Taylor referred to an alleged right of intervention, quoting a -considerable amount of literature with regard to this right of -intervention into the internal affairs of another country. - -I have ventured to refer to the position taken concerning this by one of -the four signatory powers of the London Charter, a signatory power which -was itself the victim of intervention in the name of civilization, the -Soviet Union. I have attached the said literature to part I of my -closing brief. - -The Soviet Union drew a clear inference from the intervention to which -it had been exposed by the Entente at the end of the First World War and -obtained an alteration in the text of the London Charter, under which -intervention would have been possible, by insisting that the text, which -was ambiguous in consequence of the punctuation, be altered by the -insertion of a comma. This comma was so important that the -representatives of the four signatory powers met on purpose to discuss -it. - -It results therefrom that the internal affairs of a country cannot be -affected by the London Charter and, consequently, by Law No. 10. -Punishment by this Tribunal of acts committed by Germans against Germans -is therefore inadmissible. - -The prosecution further discussed at length this morning another -question, that is the question of conspiracy. I have also commented on -that in my closing brief. I will merely make a brief reply here to the -prosecution. - -The point of view of the defense, that a charge of conspiracy as an -independent offense is inadmissible, was confirmed by the Tribunal’s -decision of today. In that way the leak in the dike, so to speak, was -stopped, and one cannot let the ocean pour into the land from the other -side by declaring the conception of conspiracy admissible under common -law. - -The conception of conspiracy is really only a technical expedient of the -jurists. Its purpose is to effect, beyond the number of accomplices in -the true sense of the word, other persons who are considered deserving -of punishment, but who cannot be proved guilty of complicity. - -This may be done where the law against conspiracy is common law. If, -however, this law is introduced in Germany after the event and applied -to facts which have occurred in the past, this would mean that by a -detour of the law of procedure new conceptions of offense would be -introduced into material law. This would amount to an _ex post facto_ -law and is, therefore, illegal according to legal principles generally -recognized. - -The purpose of enlarging the circle of participants cannot be attained -under Law No. 10 by breaking up the conception of conspiracy into its -component parts and introducing forms of complicity hitherto unknown in -Germany. - -Now, I shall read my statement proper: - -In the closing statement against the defendant Karl Brandt the -prosecution discussed very little the counter-evidence brought forward -by the defense in the course of the proceedings. They relied to a large -extent on evidence already advanced in the indictment. - -The affidavits of the defendants themselves play a special part in -support of the prosecution. For the defendant Karl Brandt they are -important with respect to his position and consequent knowledge of the -event referred to in the indictment. - -If these affidavits contain imputations they can only be used, according -to the Tribunal’s statement, against the affiants themselves. As far as -they involve the defendant Karl Brandt, however, they have been -clarified in respect to the decisive issues. But in spite of this -correction the first statements may prejudice credibility unless good -reasons justify such correction. - -Here the result of interrogations made in the initial proceedings is in -contradiction to the evidence given before the Tribunal. On the basis of -practical experience, German law considers as valid evidence only the -result of an interrogation made by a judge. The reason is the lack of -impartiality which may be found, quite naturally, in the case of an -interrogating official who is to conduct the prosecution. The capacity -of the interrogator to elicit the truth impartially depends on his -character, his training, and his professional experience. - -The qualification of the interrogators has been attacked here by the -defense, but the prosecution has made no effort to substantiate it. - -In order to form a judgment it is also important to know the general -lines on which the prosecution carries out its interrogations. Under -German law the prosecutor also has to ascertain and put forward -exculpating material when investigating a case personally or through -assistants. As to American procedure, Justice Jackson clearly rejected -this principle during the trial before the International Military -Tribunal and said he could never serve two masters. - -This critical view of the affidavits is confirmed by their contents, -which frequently show the struggle between the interrogator and the -interrogated person. He is no classical witness who says, “I believe,” -“I presume,” “as far as I remember,” and so on, for he shows thereby -that he can give no positive information. And such testimony becomes -completely worthless if conclusions are drawn in the form of, “It would -have been impossible for him,” “he might have known,” “perhaps he was -the highest authority,” and so forth. - -Not only individual words thus demonstrated that the testimony is -composed of conclusions, but whole parts of the reports show the same -character. - -In view of all this, the defendants’ contentions are to be believed, -that they raised objections but succumbed to the weight of the prepared -record presented to them and signed, trusting that they would have an -opportunity later to clarify deficiencies and to state their true -opinion. - -This criticism of the defendants’ affidavits is also called for in the -case of the affidavits given by the witnesses for the prosecution. Facts -are recorded therein which the witnesses did not know themselves, but -which they had only heard about, and which they presumed after having -been made to believe them by persuasion. The individual cases in which -objections are to be raised on these lines have been dealt with in the -closing brief. - -The charges advanced against the defendant Karl Brandt include medical -experiments on human beings and euthanasia. In both cases the defendant -is charged with having committed crimes against humanity. - -The press comments on the proceedings, anticipating the sentence and -publishing articles about base characters and depravity. Pamphlets with -striking titles appear. - -On the other hand the Tribunal will make itself acquainted with the -literature collected by the defense as evidence. If one reads this -literature one loses one’s self-confidence and cannot conclude without -admitting that these are problems which persons not considered criminals -tried to solve before the defendants. These are problems of the -community. The individual may make suggestions for their solution, but -the decision is the task of the community and therefore of the state. -The question is how great a sacrifice may the state demand in the -interest of the community? This decision is for the state alone. - -How the state decides depends on its free discretion, and finds its -limit only in the rebellion of its citizens. In obeying the orders of -his state, the defendant Karl Brandt did no wrong. If sentence is passed -against him, it would be a political sentence against the state and the -ideology it represents. - -One can condemn the defendant Karl Brandt only by imposing on him the -duty of rebellion and the duty of having a different ideology to his -environment. - -It is contended that the state finds its limits in the eternal basic -elements of law, which are said to be so clear that anyone could discern -their violation as a crime, and that loyalty to the state beyond these -limits is therefore a crime. One forgets that eternal law, the law of -nature, is but a guiding principle for the state and the legislator and -not a counter-code of law which the subject might use as a support -against the state. It is emphasized that no other state had made such -decisions up to now. This is true only to a certain extent. It is no -proof, however, that such decisions were not necessary and admissible -now. There is no prohibition against daring to progress. - -The progress of medical science opened up the problem of experiments on -human beings already in the past century, and eventually made it ripe -for decision. It is not the first time that a state has adopted a -certain attitude with regard to euthanasia with a change of ideology. - -Only the statesmen decide what is to be done in the interests of the -community, and they have never hesitated to issue such a decision -whenever they deemed it necessary in the interest of their people. -Thereupon their rules and orders were carried through under the -authority of the state, which is the basis of society. - -Inquisition, witch trials, and revolutionary tribunals have existed in -the name of the state and eternal justice, and the executive -participants did not consider themselves criminals but servants of their -community. They would have been killed if they had stood up against what -was believed to be newly discovered eternal justice. What is the subject -to do if the orders of the state exceed the customary limits which the -individual himself took for inviolable according to tradition. - -What did the airman think who dropped the first atomic bomb on -Hiroshima? Did he consider himself a criminal? What did the statesmen -think who ordered this atomic bomb to be used. We know from the history -of this event that the motive was patriotism, based on the harsh -necessity of sacrificing hundreds of thousands to save their own -soldiers’ lives. This motive was stronger than the prohibition of the -Hague Convention, under which belligerents have no unlimited right in -the choice of methods for inflicting damage on the enemy. - -“My cause is just and my quarrel honorable,” says the king. And -Shakespeare’s soldier answers him: “That’s more than we know.” Another -soldier adds: “Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough -if we know we are the king’s subjects; if his cause be wrong, our -obedience to the king wipes the crime out of us.” - -It is the hard necessity of the state on which the defense for Karl -Brandt is based against the charge of having performed criminal -experiments on human beings. - -Here also—in addition to the care for the population—the lives of -soldiers were at stake, soldiers who had to be protected from death and -epidemics. In Professor Bickenbach’s experiment, the issue was the lives -of women and children who without 45 million gas masks would have been -as unprotected against the expected gas attack as the Japanese were -against the atomic bomb. Biological warfare was imminent, even praised -abroad as cheaper and more effective than the atomic bomb. - -Is it really against the law and all political morals if the state in -such a situation provides for the expected emergency and orders the -necessary medical experiments to be performed on its own citizens? As -applied to foreigners such procedure is limited in principle. In my -closing brief I have discussed the exceptions. - -What is to be done is decided not by the physician but by the political -leader. Even the expert Dr. Ivy had to grant him the fundamental -authority. - -The question is why, with the legal position so clear, a man like Keitel -refused to have such experiments carried out in the Wehrmacht, and why -some of the defendants themselves try to disprove any connection with -the experiments. The answer is that a measure may be as unavoidable as -war and yet be abhorred in the same way. - -Unlike Professor Ivy, these men certainly considered these experiments -an evil, and their desire was not to become involved in them personally, -if possible, and not to allow troops to participate in them who should -not be burdened with such questions and who had no insight into the -necessity of the measures to be taken. In spite of everything, Germany -was not yet so “communized” that all private feelings in the individual -had disappeared. - -The prosecution opposes to this necessity the condition of absolute -voluntariness. - -It was a surprise to hear from the expert Professor Ivy that in the -penitentiaries many hundreds of volunteers were pressing for admission -to experiments, and that more volunteered than could be used. I do not -want to dispose of this phenomenon with irony and sarcasm. There may be -people who realize that the community has the right to ask them for a -sacrifice. Their feeling of justice may tell them that insistence on -humanity has its limits. If humanity means the appeal to the strong not -to forget the weak in the abundance of might and wealth, the weak should -also make their contribution when all are in need. - -But what if in the emergency of war the convicts, and those declared to -be unworthy to serve in the armed forces, refuse to accept such a -sacrifice voluntarily, and only prove an asocial burden to state and -community and bring about the downfall of the community? Is not -compulsion by the state then admissible as an additional expiation? - -The prosecution says “No”. According to this human rights demand the -downfall of human beings. - -But there is a mixture of voluntariness and compulsory expiation, -“purchased voluntariness.” Here the experimental subject does not make a -sacrifice out of conviction for the good of the community but for his -own good. The subject gives his consent because he is to receive money, -cigarettes, a mitigation of punishment, etc. There may be isolated cases -of this nature where the person is really a volunteer, but as a rule it -is not so. - -If one compares the actual risk with the advantage granted, one cannot -admit the consent of these “voluntary prisoners” as legal, in spite of -all the protective forms they have to sign, for these can only have been -obtained by taking advantage of inexperience, imprudence, or distress. - -Looking through medical literature, one cannot escape the growing -conviction that the word “volunteer”, where it appears at all, is used -only as a word of protection and camouflage; it is hardly ever missing -since the struggle over this problem became acute. - -I will touch only briefly on what I have explained in detail in my -closing brief. No one will contend that human beings really allowed -themselves to be infected voluntarily with venereal disease; this has -nowhere been stated explicitly in literature. Cholera and plague are -also not minor inconveniences one is likely to undergo voluntarily for a -trifle in the interest of science. Above all, it is not customary to -hand over children for experimental purposes, and I cannot believe that -in the 13 experiments carried out on a total of 223 children, as stated -in Document Karl Brandt 117, Karl Brandt Exhibit 103, the mothers gave -their consent. Would not the mothers have deserved the praise of the -scientist for the sacrifice they trustfully made in the interest of -science, praise which is otherwise liberally granted to real volunteers -in reports on experiments? - -Is it not likely to have been similar to the experiments carried out by -Professor McCance? (_Karl Brandt 93, Karl Brandt Ex. 29._) The German -authorities who condemn the defendants in a particularly violent form -have no objection to raise here against the order to hand over weakling -children to a research commission for experimental purposes. The -questionnaires which the Tribunal approved for me in order to get -further information about this matter have not been answered as the -higher authorities did not give permission for such statements to be -made. This silence says enough; it is proof of what is supposed to be -legal today in the line of “voluntariness”. - -It is repeatedly shown that the experiments for which no consent was -given were permitted with the full knowledge of the government -authorities. It is further shown that these experiments were published -in professional literature without meeting any objection, and that they -were even accepted by the public without concern as a normal phenomenon -when reports about them appeared in popular magazines. - -This happens at a time when the same press is stigmatizing as crimes -against humanity the German experiments which were necessary in the -interests of the state. Voluntariness is a fiction; the emergency of the -state hard reality. - -In all countries experiments on human beings have been performed by -doctors, certainly not because they took pleasure in killing or -tormenting, but only at the instigation and under the protection of -their state, and in accordance with their own conviction of the -necessity for these experiments in the struggle for the existence of the -people. - -The German doctor who acted in conformity with the German regulations -can no more be punished than the American doctor who complied with the -requests of his state in the way which is customary there. - -Justice is indivisible. - -To what extent is the defendant Karl Brandt implicated in the medical -experiments? - -The prosecution says he is implicated in almost all the experiments and -refers to his position and his connections. They state that he was the -highest Reich authority in the medical spheres; there, however, they are -misled by an error in translation, for Karl Brandt only had the powers, -regulated in a general way, of an “Oberste Reichsbehoerde” [Supreme -Reich Authority], and the practice of those powers was restricted to -special cases. - -This is apparent from the three known decrees and from the explanation -thereof given by witnesses. Moreover, Karl Brandt was not given these -functions until 1944 when these experiments were practically finished, -as is shown by the time schedule submitted to the Tribunal for -comparison. - -It has been proved that the defendant Karl Brandt himself, in a -broadcast, publicly called his position as Reich Commissioner a -“Differential”. In fact, Karl Brandt’s task was not to order but to -adjust; it was a task designed to fit his character. - -We have also learned from the presentation of evidence that the -defendant Karl Brandt did not have the machinery at his disposal for -issuing orders which was necessary for a supreme Reich authority; he -lacked the staff and the means. No one who is acquainted with a -government administration will think it possible that, under these -circumstances, the defendant Karl Brandt might have been able to enforce -his point of view against the resistance of the old agencies; no one -will even think it probable that anything would have been done to -facilitate such an attempt by the “new master”. - -Consequently, Karl Brandt’s position was not such as to justify the -conclusion drawn by the prosecution as to his general knowledge. There -was no official channel by which everything was bound to come to his -knowledge, for he was not the superior of other authorities. - -It is true that the defendant Karl Brandt was supposed to be informed -about fundamental matters, that he had the right to intervene, and so -on. But these were only possibilities, not in conformity with conditions -in practice. We have seen that Conti opposed him and that Himmler -prohibited direct contact with Karl Brandt within his sphere. - -Therefore Karl Brandt can be brought into connection only with the -events in which he participated directly. - -Here it is first of all striking that the defendant Karl Brandt, who is -supposed to have been the highest authority, appears only very rarely. - -There are three so-called troop experiments: the testing of drinking -water, concentrated food, and an ointment for burns. - -Further, three medical experiments are connected with the defendant Karl -Brandt. The hepatitis experiments, which he is said to have suggested, -were not carried out. While that research was continued during the -following years, Karl Brandt, who is said to have sponsored it -particularly, is mentioned by none of the numerous witnesses and -experts, and his name is not mentioned in any document. Is it not, -therefore, a plausible explanation that Grawitz confused the names? - -The second case is the request to hand over 10 prisoners for two days -for an experiment not named. This cannot refer to a real medical -experiment, for such an experiment cannot be carried out in such a short -time with the necessary tests and observations. The speedy return of the -experimental subjects indicates that the experiment was not dangerous. - -Finally, the defendant Karl Brandt is connected with the phosgene -experiments by Bickenbach, which caused the death of four Germans -sentenced to death. But precisely here Bickenbach’s affidavit shows that -the defendant Karl Brandt was outside the whole framework of the -experiment in Himmler’s sphere, and that he was merely approached to -mediate. The order came from Himmler. The experiments must have seemed -innocuous to the defendant Karl Brandt since Bickenbach wanted to carry -them out on himself. - -On the other hand, there was the state emergency and the enormous -importance of the discovery that the taking of a few urotropin tablets -might give the ardently desired protection to all against the expected -gas attack and, as the result of the experiment shows, actually did so. - -Now the prosecution endeavors to establish a connection of Karl Brandt -with the other experiments via the Reich Research Council. It is true -that one can establish such a connection theoretically on paper, but the -links of the chain break when one examines them closely. Only the head -of the specialized department decided on the so-called research -assignments, and he only investigated whether the aim was necessary for -war, not how the experiment was to be carried out. He could not inform -others of matters about which he did not know himself. - -The defendant Karl Brandt is further charged with not having protested -in one case when he heard about deaths caused by experiments on persons -sentenced to death in the well-known lecture on sulfanilamide. I must -point out that even if this experiment had been inadmissible, silence -would not be a crime, for assent after the act is without importance in -criminal law, and one can only be connected with plans and enterprises -as long as they have not been concluded. - -Now the prosecution has introduced in its closing brief a new charge -holding the defendant Karl Brandt responsible for negligence. In this -respect I should like to point out that no indictment for negligence has -been brought in, and that the concept of crime against humanity -committed by negligence cannot exist. - -Therefore, it will be sufficient to emphasize that the alleged -negligence depends on the existence of a duty of supervision and the -right to give orders through other agencies. In every state the spheres -of competence are separated, and it is not possible for everyone to -interfere in everything on the basis that everyone is responsible for -everything. - -The prosecution says that the defendant Karl Brandt ought to have used -his influence and availed himself of his intimate relations with Hitler -to stop the experiments. Even presuming that he was aware of the facts -as crimes, his guilt would not be of a legal, but only of a political or -moral nature. Until now nobody has been held criminally responsible for -the conduct of a superior or a friend; the question of criminal law, -however, is the only one the Tribunal has to consider. As a matter of -fact this close relationship did not exist. The defendant Karl Brandt -was the surgeon who had to be in attendance on Hitler; Dr. Morell, the -latter’s personal physician, soon tried to undermine the confidence -placed in Karl Brandt so that he was given commissions which removed him -further and further from the sphere of his medical activity. - -The alleged intimate relations were eventually crowned by the dictation -of a death sentence against Karl Brandt without his having been granted -even a hearing on the charges advanced against him. - -If one sums up everything relating to the medical experiments and -follows to a large extent the charges of the prosecution, it is an -established fact that it is not shown that the defendant Karl Brandt -participated in any way in experiments on prisoners of war and -foreigners, or that he was cognizant of them. Therefore, no war crime or -crime against humanity has been committed, and consequently punishment -under Law No. 10 is excluded. I refer in this connection to the legal -arguments in my closing brief. - -The second problem is euthanasia. - -The authorization of 1 September 1939 was issued before the period of -the medical experiments, at a time when the defendant Karl Brandt was -still closely attached to the Fuehrer’s headquarters and to Hitler as an -accompanying physician. - -In my closing brief I have explained in detail that the defendant Karl -Brandt did not participate in the Action 14 f 13, with the “special -treatment” of prisoners in concentration camps, occurrences which were -given the name of euthanasia only here in the trial. - -Neither did the defendant Karl Brandt take any part in the extermination -of Jews in Auschwitz, which again has nothing in common with the idea of -euthanasia. - -I have further shown that the so-called “wild euthanasia”, which was -carried out simultaneously with and immediately after legal euthanasia, -was not instigated by Karl Brandt. The stopping of euthanasia in August -1941 has been proved, and therefore that was the end of the defendant -Karl Brandt’s duties; for what would have been the meaning of this -cessation if, after it, increased activity was to set in? The contacts -of Karl Brandt after the cessation have been clarified as being the -consequence of his activities connected with evacuation for air -protection. Where the name of the defendant Karl Brandt is mentioned -otherwise, it obviously serves only as means of information for -uninformed people who never saw or heard anything of him themselves. - -I shall deal here with euthanasia only to the extent that it is -officially dealt with under the ordinance of 1 September 1939. -Concerning the “Reich committee”, I refer to my closing brief. - -The presentation of evidence has established that the defendant Karl -Brandt actually had no “administrative and medical office” from which -the whole organization might have been administered. On the contrary, it -is a fact that Bouhler declared himself solely responsible for the -procedure; this is testified to by unequivocal documents. - -Nor has any regulation or instruction become known which was issued by -Karl Brandt. Not a single document was signed by him. He made no -speeches and conducted no discussions. - -But what did he do and what was his duty? - -His duty was not to carry out euthanasia; he was only to be informed in -special cases in order to be able to report to Hitler. This was in -conformity with the existing conditions—his presence at and -simultaneous attachment to the Fuehrer’s headquarters, and to Hitler. - -Only once was Karl Brandt seen active, and that is in the negotiations -with Pastor von Bodelschwingh, which led to the result, amazing for us, -that the defendant Karl Brandt won Bodelschwingh’s sympathy, and after -the collapse the latter said in a radio interview that Brandt was an -idealist but not a criminal. - -But the defendant Karl Brandt took note of interrogation forms, he -inspected a registrar’s office, and he co-signed the authority for -physicians to execute euthanasia. - -What could the defendant Karl Brandt learn from the forms? - -The prosecution thinks that Jews and foreigners were to be affected in -the first instance. The affidavit by the director of the Jewish lunatic -asylum, in which all the insane Jews of Germany were concentrated, -proves that this was not the case. - -The prosecution says that all persons unfit for work were to be killed -as “useless eaters”. But it is a fact that even work-houses were -requested to give information only about cases of really grave insanity. - -What did the defendant Karl Brandt know about the procedure? - -He knew that the authorization which was issued was not an order given -to the doctor, but only conferred on him the right to act on his own -responsibility after the most careful consideration of the patient’s -condition. This was a clause inserted in the ordinance of 1 September -1939 on Karl Brandt’s initiative. - -The defendant Karl Brandt knew that the specialists, whom he did not -know, were chosen by the Ministry of the Interior, and that the experts -were eminent men in their special spheres. - -The defendant Karl Brandt also knew that the authorities concerned saw -no reason to object to the execution of the measure, and that even the -chief jurists of the Reich declared the legal foundations to be -irreproachable, after having been informed of the facts. - -Within this framework the defendant Karl Brandt approved of official -euthanasia and supported it. - -But the prosecution even calls euthanasia a thousand-fold murder. In -their opinion there was no formal law, and it is alleged that the expert -Dr. Lammers confirmed this. - -Yes, but he also stated that even an informal ordinance was valid. Even -an order issued by the Fuehrer had the force of law, as can be clearly -seen from the indisputable effects of such orders, in particular in -relation to foreigners. - -But for the defendant Karl Brandt it is of no importance whether the -ordinance of 1 September 1939 was actually valid or not; the only -important thing is that he had reason to believe it was valid and that -he could rely on this opinion. - -German courts have already dealt with cases of the practice of -euthanasia; but these cases occurred after the official procedure had -been stopped, as at Hadamar, or after persons had been killed who could -never have come under the powers conferred by the ordinance, or other -crimes were committed. - -It should be observed that these sentences always confirm the base -motives of the offenders. On the other hand, these courts were concerned -with the question of public law only to the extent that they confirm -that no formal law was available. In one case the court restricted -itself to information given by a member of the prosecution staff in the -trial before the International Military Tribunal. - -The real objections to euthanasia are not based on a formal point of -view, but rather on the same reasons which are advanced against the -admissibility of the medical experiments. - -Even an insane person of the lowest grade may not be killed it is said. -No human being may presume to kill another human being. - -But the right to kill in war is accepted in international law, and -public law allows the suppression of a revolt by violence. - -What prevents the state from ordering killing in the sphere of -euthanasia too? - -The answer is that there is no motive which might justify an action of -this kind. - -The economic motive of eliminating “useless eaters” is certainly not -sufficient for such measures. Such a motive was never upheld by the -defendant Karl Brandt; it was apparently mentioned by others as an -accompanying contingency and later taken up by counter propaganda. - -The defendant Karl Brandt considered the motive of pity for the patient -to be the decisive one. This motive is tacitly accepted for euthanasia -on the deathbed, and doctors in all countries increasingly acknowledge -it. - -In former times the courts were repeatedly concerned with killings -committed out of pity, and in sensational trials, juries found offenders -not guilty who freed their nearest relatives from the torment of life. - -Who would not have the desire to die while in good health rather than to -be forced by all the resources of medical science to continue life -degraded to an animal’s existence! Only misguided civilization keeps -such beings alive; in the normal struggle for existence Nature is more -charitable. - -But the legislator has hitherto refrained from giving authority to kill -in such cases. But he can solve the problem if he wants to. The reasons -for his restraint are exactly those which led in this case to the -disguising of those measures and to the secrecy observed. There is the -fear of base intrigues concerning inheritance, the mental burden of the -relatives, and so on. The individual does not want to bear this burden, -nor is he able to do so. It can be taken over only by the state, which -is independent of the desires of those concerned. - -That such is the will of the great majority of those who really come -into touch with these problems was shown by the result of the inquiry -conducted by Professor Meltzer, which has been offered in evidence. It -was carried out by him many years ago in order to obtain an argument -against euthanasia and its principal supporters, Binding and Hoche. He -obtained the reverse of what he had himself expected as an expert. - -But I see a third motive which unconsciously plays an important part; it -is the idea of sacrifice. - -A lunatic may cause the mental and economic decay of a family and also -ruin it morally. - -If healthy human beings make great sacrifices for the community and lay -down their lives by order of the state, the insane person, if he could -arouse himself mentally and make a decision, would choose a similar -sacrifice for himself. - -Why should not the state be allowed to enact this sacrifice in his case -and impose on him what he would want to do himself? - -Is the state to be forbidden to carry out such euthanasia until the -whole world is a hospital, while the creatures of nature keep -unblemished through what is believed to be the brutality of Nature? - -The decision as to whether such an order given by the state is -admissible or not depends on the conception of the social life of -mankind and is, therefore, a political decision. - -Neither the defendant Karl Brandt nor anyone else who participated in -legalized euthanasia would ever have killed a human being on his own -authority, and in the German sentences passed the blameless former life -of the persons stigmatized as mass-murderers is always emphasized. - -This is a warning to be cautious. Did they really commit brutalities, or -were they sentenced only because they were not in a position to swim -against the tide of times and to oppose it with their own judgment? - -A Christian believing in dogma will turn away in pity from this way of -thinking. But if the order to use euthanasia to the desired limited -extent was really in such contradiction to the commandment of God that -everyone could realize it, then it is incomprehensible why Hitler, who -never withdrew from the church, was not excommunicated. - -This must remove the burden of guilt which one now wants to pile up. -Then humanity would have clearly realized at the time that in this -devilish struggle man cannot prevail for God stands for Justice. - -If there are offenders there are many co-offenders, and one understands -Pastor Niemoeller saying: “We are all guilty.” - -This is a moral or a political guilt, but cannot be shifted to a single -person as criminal guilt. - -I have thus shown the fundamental lines along which the actions of the -defendant Karl Brandt have to be judged. - -The primary consideration for the judgment of this Tribunal is that no -prisoners of war or foreigners were submitted to euthanasia with the -knowledge or the desire of the defendant Karl Brandt. - -Thus the defendant Karl Brandt cannot be punished under Law No. 10 on -this count either. What happened between Germans is not subject to the -decision of this Tribunal. - -Finally, the defendant Karl Brandt is also charged with having been a -member of the SS, an organization which has been declared criminal. -Evidence to show that the defendant Karl Brandt knew of a criminal aim -of this organization and approved of it must be brought by the -prosecution. A reference to the general assertions in these proceedings -is not sufficient proof, for precisely here the prosecution cannot -prevail with their assertions in regard to Karl Brandt. - -As to the details, I refer to the statements made in my closing brief. - -The fact that the defendant Karl Brandt was the only member of the SS -who at the same time retained his position as a medical officer in the -army shows that his honorary rank in the SS was really only a formality, -and that he was no true member of this organization. - -When the defendant Karl Brandt testified here that he wore the uniform -of the SS with pride, this only shows that he, like the majority of the -SS men, knew nothing about the criminal aims. In judging the -organization of the SS, the International Military Tribunal was aware -only of a small part of the whole, looking, so to speak, through a -keyhole into a dark corner. - -Nor could the defendant Karl Brandt have any personal knowledge of -Himmler’s secrets, for Himmler rejected him personally, as is shown by a -number of affidavits. Since the defendant Karl Brandt could not obtain -information even in his own sphere of medicine, how is he to have -obtained knowledge of other matters? - -I do not want to repeat the affidavits which give information about the -basic attitude of the defendant Karl Brandt and show that he adopted an -attitude which was incompatible with the mentality supposed to be -typical of the SS. In this connection I merely refer to the statements -made by Pastor Bodelschwingh, Dr. Gerstenmaier, Meyer-Bockhoff, Philipp -Prince of Hesse, and others. - -If I, as the defense counsel, consider Karl Brandt’s conduct as a whole -and see the wounds he has received in the struggle of life, I must -acknowledge that he is a man and not a criminal. - -For the Tribunal’s decision, however, the only conclusive fact is that -the defendant Karl Brandt did not disturb the circle of international -law, for he committed no war crimes and consequently no crimes against -humanity. I, therefore, ask that defendant Karl Brandt be acquitted. - ------ - -[31] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July 47, pp. -10797-10817. - -[32] United States _vs._ Friedrich Flick et al. See vol. VI. - - - - - XI. FINAL STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS, - 19 JULY 1947 - - - A. Final Statement of Defendant Karl Brandt[33] - -There is a word which seems so simple—order; and how colossal are its -implications. How immeasurable are the conflicts which hide behind the -word obey. Both affected me, obey and order, and both imply -responsibility. I am a doctor and on my conscience lies the -responsibility of being responsible for men and for life. Quite -dispassionately the prosecution has brought the charge of crime and -murder and they have raised the question of my guilt. It would have no -weight if friends and patients were to shield me and speak well of me, -saying I had helped and I had healed. There would be many examples of my -actions during danger and my readiness to help. All that is now useless. -As far as I am concerned I shall not evade these charges. But the -attempt to vindicate myself as a man is my duty towards all who believe -in me personally, who trusted in me and who relied upon me as a man as -well as a doctor and a superior. - -No matter how I was faced with the problem, I have never regarded human -experiments as a matter of course, not even when no danger was entailed. -But I affirm the necessity for them on grounds of reason. I know that -opposition will arise. I know things that disturb the conscience of a -medical man, and I know the inner distress that afflicts one when ethics -of every form are decided by an order or obedience. - -It is immaterial for the experiment whether it is done with or against -the will of the person concerned. For the individual the event seems -senseless, just as senseless as my actions as a doctor seem when -isolated. The sense lies much deeper than that. Can I, as an individual, -detach myself from the community? Can I remain outside and do without -it? Could I, as a part of this community, evade it by saying I want to -live in this community, but I don’t want to make any sacrifices for it, -either of body or soul? I want to keep a clear conscience. Let them see -how they can get along. And yet we, that community and I, are somehow -identical. - -Thus I must suffer these contradictions and bear the consequences, even -if they remain incomprehensible. I must bear them as my lot in life, -which allocates to me its tasks. The meaning is the motive—devotion to -the community. If on its account I am guilty, then on its account I will -be answerable. - -There was war. In war, efforts are all alike. Its sacrifices affect us -all. They were incumbent upon me. But are those sacrifices my crime? Did -I tread on the precepts of humanity and despise them? Did I pass over -human beings and their lives as if they were nothing? Men will point at -me and cry “euthanasia”, and falsely, “the useless”, “the incapable”, -“the worthless”. But what actually happened? Did not Pastor -Bodelschwingh, in the middle of his work at Bethel last year, say that I -was an idealist and not a criminal? How could he say that? - -Here I am, subject of the most frightful charges, as if I had not only -been a doctor, but also a man without heart or conscience. Do you think -that it was a pleasure to me to receive the order to permit euthanasia? -For 15 years I had toiled at the sickbed and every patient was to me -like a brother. I worried about every sick child as if it had been my -own. My personal lot was a heavy one. Is that guilt? - -Was it not my first thought to limit the scope of euthanasia? Did I not, -the moment I was included, try to find a limit and demand a most -searching report on the incurables? Were not the appointed professors of -the universities there? Who could there be who was better qualified? But -I do not want to speak of these questions and of their execution. I am -defending myself against the charge of inhuman conduct and base -intentions. In the face of these charges I fight for my right to humane -treatment! I know how complicated this problem is. With the utmost -fervor I have tortured myself again and again, but no philosophy or -other wisdom helped me here. There was the decree and on it there was my -name. It is no good saying that I could have feigned sickness. I do not -live this life of mine in order to evade fate if I meet it. And thus I -assented to euthanasia. I fully realize the problem; it is as old as -mankind, but it is not a crime against man nor against humanity. It is -pity for the incurable, literally. Here I cannot believe like a -clergyman or think as a jurist. I am a doctor and I see the law of -nature as being the law of reason. In my heart there is love of mankind, -and so it is in my conscience. That is why I am a doctor! - -When I talked at the time to Pastor Bodelschwingh, the only serious -admonisher I knew personally, it seemed at first as if our thoughts were -far apart; but the longer we talked and the more we came into the open, -the closer and the greater became our mutual understanding. At that time -we were not concerned with words. It was a struggle and a search far -beyond the human sphere. When the old Pastor Bodelschwingh left me after -many hours and we shook hands, his last words were: “That was the -hardest struggle of my life.” For him as well as for me that struggle -remained; and the problem remained too. - -If I were to say today that I wish this problem had never come upon me -with its convulsive drama, that would be nothing but superficiality in -order to make me feel more comfortable in myself. But I am living in -these times and I see that they are full of antitheses. Somewhere we all -must make a stand. I am fully conscious that when I said “Yes” to -euthanasia I did so with the deepest conviction, just as it is my -conviction today, that it was right. Death can mean deliverance. Death -is life—just as much as birth. It was never meant to be murder. I bear -a burden, but it is not the burden of crime. I bear this burden of mine, -though with a heavy heart, as my responsibility. I stand before it, and -before my conscience, as a man and as a doctor. - - B. Final Statement of Defendant Handloser[34] - -During my first interrogations here in Nuernberg, in August 1946, the -interrogator declared to me: - -First, you have been the Chief of the Army Medical Service. Whether or -not you knew of inadmissible experiments does not matter here. As the -Chief, you are responsible for everything. - -Secondly, do not make the excuse that among other nations the same or -similar things have happened. We are not concerned with that here. The -Germans are under indictment, not the others. - -Thirdly, do not appeal to your witnesses. They, of course, will testify -in your favor. We have our witnesses, and we rely upon them. - -Those were the guiding principles of the prosecution up to the last day -of these proceedings. They have remained incomprehensible to me, because -I always believed a criminal to be a man who did wrong, and because I -was of the opinion that even the prosecution endeavored to be objective, -at least after the end of the presentation of evidence. The final plea -by the prosecution, however, has shown me that I made a mistake. The -speech by the prosecution did not take into account the material -submitted in evidence, but it was a summarized repetition of one-sided -statements by the prosecution without taking into account that which was -submitted in the course of the presentation of evidence in my case. - -I am quite convinced that the high Tribunal has gained a true impression -of my activity and of my attitude. Just as I have tried throughout my -entire life to fulfill the tasks allotted to me by fate according to the -best of my capacity and in the full knowledge of my responsibility, so -have I also tried to stand this most serious task before this Court with -the aid of the strongest weapon which I possess—that is the truth. - -If there is anything which could console me for the mental suffering of -the last months, it is the consciousness of knowing that before this -Court, before the German people, and before the people of the world, it -has been made clear that the serious general charges of the prosecution -against the Medical Corps of the German Armed Forces have been proved to -be without any foundation. - -It can be seen how unjust these charges were by the fact that no charges -have been raised or any proceedings initiated against a single leading -doctor of the German Armed Forces in combat or at home. As the last -Medical Inspector of the Army, and as Chief of the Medical Service of -the Armed Forces of Germany, I think with pride of all the medical -officers to whose untiring devotion countless wounded and sick patients -of this dreadful war owe their lives and cure and their possibilities of -existence. Never and nowhere were the losses of an army medical corps -greater than those among the medical officers of the German Armed Forces -in carrying out their duties. - -More than 150 years ago, the motto and guiding principle created for -German military doctors and their successors was “Scientiae, Humanitati, -Patriae” (For Science, Humanity, and Fatherland). Like the medical -officers in their entirety I also have remained true to that guiding -principle in thought and in deed. Realizing the outcome of the events of -these recent times, may the joint endeavors of all the nations succeed -in avoiding in future the immeasurable misfortune of war, the dreadful -side of which nobody knows better than the military doctor. - - C. Final Statement of Defendant Rostock[35] - -I have nothing to add to the pertinent statements by my defense counsel, -Dr. Pribilla, regarding the individual points of the indictment in this -trial; but with regard to the general position of German medical science -during this war, there are a few words, which I would like to say from -this dock. - -During my direct examination I have already stated why I, as the Chief -of the so-called “Science and Research” department undertook to work for -medical science as late as 1943 and 1944. At that time the problem was -to avoid, or at least to minimize, the great and acute danger of -teaching and research, and with that Germany’s universities, becoming -completely destroyed. When this had been prevented at the very last -moment, there arose the task and the duty of improving the means and the -possibilities of basic research which had been more and more restricted -in the course of the war, and through dwindling resources research in -Germany would have come to a standstill. Due to the chaotic development -of the last year of the war, success was comparatively small. There -were, however, some results and there were a few things which were saved -after the end of the war. - -Today through the evidence produced in this trial, I know the reasons -which paralyzed the work at the time. It was the striving for power on -the part of certain organizations which used the effective support of -certain executive departments of the Third Reich who held unrestricted -power. It was the principle of totalitarianism which these organizations -followed particularly in the case of what they called the “university -science”. It was there, however, that we had founded the tradition of -German science recognized the world over. In contrast to that, their -aim, as shown in some of the testimonies given in this trial and some of -the documents submitted, was to found a “politically directed science” -of their own. That was the reason why my personal efforts and those of -the health and medical services, which I have referred to in this trial, -did not achieve complete success. Today, at the end of this trial, that -is now clear to me. At that time, in the year 1944, we did not know of -this masterly camouflaged and, therefore, so very dangerous opponent to -that branch of science with which I myself had grown up. - -Throughout my life I have never worked for one form of a state or -another, or for any political party in Germany, but simply and solely -for my patients and for medical science. - - D. Final Statement of Defendant Schroeder[36] - -It is very difficult for a defendant to find the right final words here. -In methodical, detailed work throughout the last months, the defense has -tried to rebut the charges of the prosecution. - -When now the prosecution states in its final plea that details do not -matter so much, but that the entire complex of questions has to be -considered as a whole, that one has to look at matters as at a bundle of -sticks, not as individual branches and twigs of the bundle. If, -furthermore, the prosecution refers to a sentence pronounced in the Far -East by an American Military Court, by which a Japanese general and -military commander was sentenced only because, as a commander, he bore -the responsibility for all the acts of his troops, regardless of whether -he ordered them, knew of them, approved of them, or did not even know of -them—if, gentlemen of the Tribunal, these principles are decisive for -proceedings, then I have to ask, why bother at all to start proceedings -of that kind, to prepare them, and to carry them out? Those decisions -could be made much more quickly. - -What can I, as a defendant, bring against these arguments? That can be -said in a few words: myself, my work, my acts as a doctor and a soldier -in 35 years of service. Not the craving for glory and honor was the -purport of my life’s work, but the firm intention to put my entire -capacity, my full knowledge, into the service of my beloved Fatherland; -to help the soldier, as a physician, to heal the wounds caused by -wartime and peacetime service, both as a physician for the individual, -as well as a medical officer for the mass of troops which were in my -care. - -That was the aim and object of my work. I do not believe that I have -deviated from that path. My eyes always looked towards the final goal: -to help and to heal. - - E. Final Statement of Defendant Genzken[37] - -During my testimony I stated before the Tribunal that I took no part in -the types of experiments of which I am accused. I have nothing to add to -what my defense counsel Dr. Merkel has said. I have striven to lead a -decent life as a doctor and as a soldier. If my fatherly concern for my -2,500 doctors and 30,000 men of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS was -mentioned here in this courtroom, it is nevertheless my duty to speak -from this place on behalf of those men who, in the majority, were decent -and brave doctors and medical attendants. I am proud to have been their -leader, a leader of those who sacrificed their lives and blood with -unceasing fervor to help me in building up the organization of the -Medical Service of the Waffen SS, and to overcome the tremendous losses -among the ranks of our comrades at the front. - -The soldiers of the Waffen SS have proved to history—in the focal -points of uncounted battles during an uneven struggle—that they could -rank among the finest troops on this earth as far as training, -efficiency, readiness of sacrifice, soldierly valor, and contempt of -death were concerned. Actions of modern warfare have presented to some -extent a picture of murder and horror on both sides. Who dares to raise -his head before God and gainsay that? - -The men of the Waffen SS went as vanquished into captivity, out of -unimaginable physical and mental war distress. That captivity was not -free of bloodshed, ill-treatment and degradation of various kinds. To -the men of the Waffen SS there was added to the weight of such captivity -the frightful realization of the fact that their supreme commander, -Himmler, had misused their cloak of honor and deceived them, that they -had been cheated and then deserted by him. These decent men of the front -Waffen SS certainly did not deserve that fate, the fate of being branded -as members of a criminal organization. - -My request and my wish is that our former opponents should realize the -honest idealism of these victims, do justice to it, and give them back -belief in justice. - - F. Final Statement of Defendant Gebhardt[38] - -I wish to thank the high Tribunal for having granted me an opportunity, -in the witness box, to describe my personal position in 1942 in such -detail. - -The historical situation at that time placed me in a totalitarian state -which, in turn, placed itself between the individual and the universe. -Virtues in the service of the state were paramount virtues. Beyond that -I do not know anywhere where the intellect was not debased as a tool for -war. Everywhere, in some way values and solutions were put into the -service of the war. And here again, in the intellectual field, the first -step is the decisive one. I may be permitted to recall that in the war -of nerves, it was propaganda with and for “medical preparations” which -caused the first step, the order to examine the question of -sulfanilamides. - -In my final statement today may I be permitted to describe my entire -attitude. In doing so, I may perhaps utilize the most important of the -four American freedoms, that is to say the freedom of speech, until the -very end in such a way that I will refrain from any denunciation or from -incriminating others. - -Without exaggerating the importance of my own person, a physician can -only be measured according to his conception of medical science. -Basically, I was neither a cold technical specialist nor a pure -scientist. I believe that I have always tried, for example when carrying -out surgical experiments, to see every disease as a human condition of -suffering. I did not look on my task as something to serve my own -advantage, or as a cheap gesture of theoretical pity, but as a personal -active support to the trembling existence of the suffering patient. My -goal as a physician was not so much purely technical therapy for the -individual patient, as therapeutical care for the particularly -underprivileged group of the poor, the children, the cripples, the -neurotics. - -I am anxious that it should be believed that it was not due to moral -baseness nor to the selfish arrogance of the scientist that I came into -contact with experiments on human beings. On the contrary, during the -entire period in question I had experiments in my field of research -carried out on animals. It was only because I was the competent -responsible surgical expert that I was informed about the imminent -experiments on human beings in my field of surgery, which had been -ordered by the state authorities. After the order had been given, it was -no longer a question of stopping these experiments, but the problem was -the method of their execution. - -My problems as an expert consisted of the following: For one, the -experiments that had been ordered had to be of practical scientific -value, for the purpose of testing immunization to protect thousands of -injured and sick. On the other hand, I considered humane safety measures -for the experimental subjects most important. The main point for me was -never the purpose and the object of the experiments, but the manner in -which they were carried out. To realize that in a humane way I did not -remain aloof and restrict myself to theoretical instruction in the field -of surgery, but I myself took part, with my clinic and with all its -safety measures. - -I hope that this will show that in carrying out experiments I tried with -the best of intentions to act primarily in the interest of the -experimental subjects. We did not take advantage of the unlimited -opportunities given us by Himmler, that is to say, the surgical -experiments were not followed by others. I believe that as far as was -possible at that chaotic period I fulfilled my duty as an expert, -because these experiments did not increase in the field of surgery in -spite of the crescendo of the catastrophic policy. My desire was to help -and not to give a bad example. - -In seeing my responsibility in this way I, of course, made a decision -for myself. I hope that hitherto I have always faced criticism, even -from foreign countries, without any secrecy, but also without any -feeling of guilt for my activities as an expert. - -Through these activities, however, as a military physician, not through -my own initiative, I was brought into contact with concentration camps. -I can understand how heavily that deadly shadow must lie upon anyone who -was ever active there. In the ghostly phenomenon of that sphere, which -at that time was unknown to me as well, we can now in retrospect begin -to realize the frightfulness of the negative ideology of extermination -becoming combined secretly with the negative selection of the guards. -Only from the documents of the international trial have we been able to -see definitely that of the 35,000 guard troops, only 6,000 were SS men -who were unfit for combat. The rest were scum, conscripts, foreigners, -etc., who with the greatest injustice and to our bitter shame were given -the same Waffen SS uniform as we wore at the front. As head of a -well-known clinic, known for its measures of safety, in the interest of -the experimental subjects, within the framework of my duty as an expert -as I saw it, I got in touch with concentration camp doctors. As far as -it was at all possible I tried to exclude that atmosphere from my sphere -of work. That my counter-actions went beyond purely clinical safety -measures for the experimental subjects may, I think, be seen from the -following fact: Of the several thousand foreign inmates of this -concentration camp—among whom, as we were told here, there were at -least seven hundred Polish women—only 200 were turned over to the Red -Cross at the end of the war. Of these two-hundred, however, sixty were -my experimental subjects, as was proved. - -Just as I have tried to clarify my actions as a doctor and to explain my -good intentions and possibilities for influence, so my final thought -should be devoted to self-criticism, above all as regards on my moral -obligation. - -In a parody on the words of Heinrich Heine we see today that: “Just to -have been an SS man is fate in itself”. Although I believe and hope that -in that terrible confusion between the decent Waffen SS and the -executive organization, I did my duty as a specialist, an officer, and a -human being, I still feel bound to make every form of reparation for -this confusion. My possibilities for doing that of course are limited. - -Without seeking sensation I offered to undergo an experiment on myself -as proved, and that without any surgical safety measures, as soon as the -first opportunity arose. My responsibility for the execution of the -experiments carried out with good intention, and especially for those -who were my subordinates, I have emphasized. I have a further criticism -and responsibility, which I spoke of not only now in the dim light of my -own defense but already in May 1945 on the day when Himmler released us -from our oath and from our orders, and he himself left his post without -reserve. It was my endeavor with others to prevent any illegal -continuation of an SS conception, and for that purpose to take the -burden off the shoulders of our credulous youth by making the SS -generals responsible. - -Today as a private individual I can only repeat what I am ready to do, -at least as far as my former professional standing is concerned. - -Where, in spite of my earnest endeavors, reproach and guilt seem to -cloud the picture in the sphere for which I was responsible, may the -consequences affect me in such a way that I may make the path easier for -the younger men who, believing in me, also joined the SS as surgeons. I -believe that this pile of rubble, Germany, with its wasted biological -material, cannot afford to let these fine young doctors perish in camps -and in other inactivity. Also I know every measure which would make the -work easier for the old German universities and their respected -teachers. - -I have summarized my point of view in order to help avoid possible -mistakes. From unwholesome social conditions it is a pathological and -deceptive escape, then as well as today—here and everywhere, to unite -and combine spiritual with economic and political concepts. It is a -disastrous error to confuse the organized unanimity of voices with -harmony. Destructive criticism only brings intolerant lack of -cooperation, which interrupts all cohesion. The private as well as the -public conscience cannot be subjugated to any official virtue, nor to -any temporal moral principles. It can only find its place within a -God-given order. - -In the spirit of “earthly constructive pessimism”, as I wrote before the -war, in this alone consideration for the painful reality of this social -catastrophe seems to be found. - -My last sentence is to express our personal gratitude to Dr. Seidl who -has stood by the side of my colleagues and myself so conscientiously and -with such human kindness. - - G. Final Statement of Defendant Blome[39] - -I have testified quite openly before this high Tribunal that -particularly up to the outbreak of war I was a confirmed National -Socialist and follower. I have also explained why I became a Party -member in 1931, and that because political conditions in Germany at the -time were moving with giant strides towards a final conflict between -Communism and National Socialism, as a result of the economic chaos and -the impotence of the German governments after 1919. I have said that I -joined the National Socialist Party because I rejected the dictatorial -form of the Communist system. In my book “The Doctor in the Struggle”, -which was put to me by the prosecution here in cross-examination, I also -explained why I went over to National Socialism. This book, however, -which was published in 1941, at the time of Germany’s greatest -victories, clearly shows my repudiation of the Second World War, to -which I do not refer with a single word, not even a hint, although my -experience in the First World War takes up considerable space in this -book. - -After the First World War, Germany was in great difficulties. The -situation became progressively worse and more unbearable, when at the -turn of the thirties the economic crisis spread throughout the world and -even seized hold of the United States. At that time I realized that in -such hard times a nation which is drifting toward despair seeks a leader -and follows him in blind confidence as soon as he can show great -successes. - -That in the case of Hitler these were only sham successes or temporary -successes the German people realized only gradually, only step by step, -and only at a time when it was too late to shake off the dictatorship -again by their own strength. For years the German people were deceived -by the leaders as to the true situation. With deliberately lying -propaganda, Hitler’s governmental system until the last moment kept -proclaiming final victory to the German people, even in the winter of -1944, and even in the spring of 1945, when the Reich cabinet and the -Party leaders long knew that a terrible collapse was imminent. This -governmental system thus irresponsibly imposed on the exhausted body of -the German nation still further useless losses of life and property. - -Since the collapse, particularly since the International War Crimes -Trial at Nuernberg, we see clearly that this frivolous method of -betrayal of their own people was a fitting part of the systematical -murder of foreign peoples and races by the millions. - -I believe that there is no other example in history of the boundless -confidence of a people in their leader being so boundlessly misused and -disappointed. - -The German people were blinded in their faith in their Fuehrer, in a -leader who constantly pretended to them and the world a love of peace, a -humane character, a selfless care for the people. Thus the German people -became the victim of a political gambler. His unrestrained supreme power -apparently knew only the choice between ruling and destroying. Hitler’s -ambition, as I know and judge it today, had only one aim: _At any price_ -to go down in history as a great man. Hitler achieved this goal 100 -percent. He went down in history as one of the greatest tyrants of all -time, tremendous in his mania for ruling, tremendous in his brutality in -the achievement of his ends, not hesitating even at the murder of his -best friends, his oldest followers, if they were in his way. - -Relying upon the blind confidence of his deceived people, Hitler created -a system in which all individualism, all sentiment of freedom, all -personal opinion of the citizens was nipped in the bud and turned into -slavery. - -He succeeded in this with the aid of a very small circle of closest -associates, who had fallen under his hypnotic influence, in part perhaps -themselves deceived by this man, but who became willing tools in his -hand for the enslavement of the German people and the decimation of -whole nations. - -Under the fatal influence of a clever, deliberately lying propaganda, -against which even other countries were as good as powerless, the German -people and the German doctor, too, believed that they were following an -honorable leader and serving a good cause; they all considered it the -highest moral duty not to desert the Fatherland in times of emergency -and particularly in wartime, but to do their duty to the very extreme, -especially since in this war the life or death of the nation was at -issue. - -During the times of total warfare, the times of air raids, hunger, and -the danger of epidemics, working conditions for the German doctor were -terribly hard; so difficult that today one can hardly imagine what -German doctors accomplished in those days for friend and foe alike. -Whether we twenty doctors here in this dock are accused justly or -unjustly, it is a great injustice in any case to defame German doctors -in general in public, as is constantly being done. As former Deputy -Reich Physicians’ Leader I know conditions in the German medical -profession during the Hitler period, and I must say even today that in -its _totality_ the German medical profession was efficient, decent, -industrious, and humane. Their willingness to work under the most -difficult conditions that one can imagine, their unselfishness to the -utmost, their courage and their helpfulness were exemplary. Beyond all -praise were in particular the numerous old doctors who were already -living in retirement and who, in spite of their great age, returned to -the service of the sick, and those innumerable women doctors who, -married, and often the mothers of many children, deserted their -household duties for the difficult work of medical practice during -wartime. - -The whole German people knew this, in whose midst and under whose eyes -the German medical professions spent the years of distress and fright, -and who, therefore, will continue to place unlimited confidence in -German doctors. - -Of myself I can say that I have always, particularly during the Hitler -period, devoted all my efforts to keeping the medical profession at a -high scientific and ethical level and to developing it. And I found in -this effort the full support of all German doctors, including the most -famous scientists and chief physicians of medical institutions. -Well-known scholars throughout the world supported this work, which was -_above_ [unintelligible] parties and enjoyed an international -reputation. - -But in the course of this trial it has become clearer to me day by day -just how criminal the Hitler system was, to which I sacrificed in good -faith many years of my life, and I am so deeply moved inside me that I -must confess to myself: For years I held a responsible position in a -system which today I must curse just as much as I curse all those who -forced upon the German people such a tyranny of crime and debasement of -man. - -It was my mistake that I stayed in the post where fate had placed me and -in which I had hoped to be able to do good for our people and my -profession. It would often have been simpler to give up this post when I -began to realize, step by step, the depravity of the Third Reich. If I -did not do so, but stayed at my post until the bitter end, I did this -because I considered it my duty, especially in the hard times of total -war, and because again and again I succeeded either in protecting the -medical profession from harm or in preventing crimes against humanity. -Even today I would have to consider it cowardice if I had left my post -in 1941 or 1942 only to bring myself to safety or to evade threatened -responsibility. - -I feel myself free of the guilt of ever having committed or furthered -crimes against humanity. - - H. Final Statement of Defendant Mrugowsky[40] - -My attorney and I made every effort during my examination on the witness -stand and by means of the considerable evidence which we submitted to -refute the charges which have been raised against me, just as much as we -tried to assist in ascertaining the truth. - -The outcome of the trial and the evidence against me is in the hands of -the Tribunal and the closing brief, and in the reply to comprehensive -documentation of the prosecution. I am firmly confident on the basis of -this trial that this high Tribunal will examine the evidence objectively -and carefully. Thus in my final speech I merely would like to draw your -attention to the fact that my life in its entirety was solely devoted to -my profession and my science. It was my aim, not by any means to -represent some political ideology, but to go to the university and to -reach the position of a free and independent doctor and scientist. - -The prosecution has charged us, the defendants, with destructive -tendencies which were supposed to have been the causes of our actions. I -know that I am free of such tendencies. They never occurred to my -collaborators and myself at any time. In the Waffen SS too, the troops -of which were among the bravest divisions of the German Armed Forces, -such tendencies never played a part. - -As far as my own concepts of the ethical duties of the doctor are -concerned, they are contained in my book regarding medical ethics, and I -believe always to have acted according to the principles of that book -and lived according to them. My life, my actions, and my aims were -clean. That is why now that at the end of this trial I can declare -myself free of personal guilt. - - I. Final Statement of Rudolf Brandt[41] - -Now, after this trial has reached its final stage, my conscience is -confronted with the question of whether I consider myself guilty or -innocent. My responsibility, in my opinion, is to be tested by a -threefold question: - - First, did I participate in the experiments directly and - actively? - - Second, did I at least have any knowledge of the criminal - character of the experiments on human beings? - - Third, what, if I had known, could have been my attitude towards - Himmler? - -What my basic opinion is of crimes against humanity I did not only -declare myself on the witness stand but this has also been testified to -by a very competent foreign witness, a Swedish medical counsellor, Felix -Koersten. - -Before this Tribunal and in the full knowledge of what I say I confess -that I abhor—and did abhor—any crime against humanity in the years -past and during my activity as a so-called personal Referent of Himmler. -But I also frankly declare that perhaps during the course of these last -years my way of thinking was not always in my conscious mind as it is -today. But I never participated in a crime against humanity knowingly, -intentionally, or with premeditation when passing on the letters, -orders, etc., which Himmler issued to third persons, and the result of -which was the commission of cruelties on human beings. - -I am confident that from the evidence and from the content of the -various defense affidavits the Tribunal will be convinced that in truth -my real sphere of power did in no way correspond to the face value of my -official position. My real sphere of power was extremely small. It did -not exceed that of a well-paid stenographer in the office of an -influential man in Germany. If the Tribunal were to start from this -fact, it would approach reality much closer than the prosecution did in -its indictment. - -I got into contact with Himmler when I was a young, immature man who -came from a family in modest circumstances. Nothing else but my ability -as a stenographer, which I had obtained through my industry, was the -reason for that, and this was my position until the last days of the -German collapse, in spite of promotions in rank. At that time I was only -too glad to get that job because it enabled me to support my parents -financially. - -When I started work with Himmler, I got, without intermediate stages, -into an agency, the chief of which was to combine, among other -functions, the highest executive powers in his hands a short time -afterwards. - -I am convinced that I would not sit here under a grave indictment if I -had had the opportunity to continue my education, if I had made a start -in a subordinate agency, and had risen little by little into a higher -position. Unfortunately, I have always been a lone wolf as long as I -lived, and I never was fortunate enough to have an older friend who -could have corrected my political inexperience and my gullibility. - -If, however, through all those years, I represented Himmler’s ideology, -I did so only because I did not know the criminal part of Himmler’s -character. Since I lived, so to speak, divorced from the world around me -and was only devoted to my more than plentiful work, I only learned -after the collapse what stupendous crimes are to be booked on Himmler’s -account. - -The evidence has shown that I neither knew a concentration camp nor had -anything to do with concentration camps in my official capacity; nor had -any influence on the system of the concentration camps, their -administration and management, nor on the treatment of prisoners. For -this reason I didn’t know the measure of the tragedies which were -enacted there. - -Those matters, into which I had sufficient insight during my restless -daily activities to permit me to distinguish between good and evil, were -on a plane where they need not shun the light of sun. - -I do not deny that some of the documents submitted here by the -prosecution went through my hands, but I do deny—and I pray the -Tribunal may believe me—that I knew the contents of the documents -particularly the reports and therefore the essential core of the human -experiments. - -I know that appearances are against me. Only these external appearances -led the prosecution to indict me in this trial and to pass their comment -on me during their closing speech, without penetrating to the bottom of -matters. This way they arrived at a completely wrong appraisal which -does not correspond to the facts and overrates my position and my -activities. - -These appearances which speak against me will be dispelled as soon as my -real position will be considered in which I found myself as -[administrative officer] so-called personal Referent of Himmler for many -years. On the witness stand I testified to the truth, which has been -confirmed by witnesses who knew the real facts from their own -experience. - -It does not run counter to experience that among thousands of incoming -and outgoing items of mail—that is, hundreds of thousands during the -course of the years—there should be an insignificantly small number of -documents which a personal Referent on the orders of his chief, passes -on to third persons without knowing their contents more closely, the -more so if they concern matters which have nothing to do with the normal -duties of the personal Referent. - -I believe that an American tribunal will know how to appraise the -foregoing, though I am rather afraid that the situation as it existed in -Germany during the years before the collapse and prevailed in high -government agencies will never really be brought home to American -judges. - -Therefore, I refuse to discuss again my position at that time and the -ignorance of criminal experiments on human beings which was the -consequence thereof. In this respect I agree with my defense counsel. -Neither need I fear Professor Ivy’s statement who declared that even a -layman must have been outraged by reading the reports of Rascher, -because the fact that the layman should have read the passages of the -reports wherefrom the obvious violation of human dignity is evident was, -as a matter of fact, the natural prerequisite for Professor Ivy’s -opinion, and that prerequisite did not exist in my case. - -In accordance with the truth I repeat what I have said in the witness -stand, that I had a general knowledge of experiments on human beings, I -can no longer say when and on what particular opportunity I gained that -knowledge. But this fact alone does not deserve death, because I never -had the feeling that I had participated in such crimes by my activity in -the personal Referat [administrative office]. - -Such a knowing participation demands that the personal Referent knows -the contents and the import of Himmler’s letters, orders, etc., and -passes them on in spite of this knowledge of the contents and their -import. I just said that appearances are against me, but I believe I did -prove that I did not possess that knowledge. I pray the Tribunal to -follow the line of this evidence and, I think, this is not asking too -much since the experience of everyday life speaks in my favor. - -The various affidavits which I have submitted and which were the subject -of excited argument have found their explanation. In some points I have -erred and I have tried to correct my errors. I did not want to speak an -untruth knowingly which might be detrimental or unfavorable to a third -person. I ask the Tribunal not to forget that I was in a very low -general condition when I signed these affidavits. Only a few months -previously I weighed only forty-four kilograms; consequently my mental -power was reduced to a minimum. - -During my activities which stretched over many years I exclusively acted -on the express orders of Himmler without ever making a decision on my -own initiative. I may take it that this fact has fully been proved. - -The question what attitude I should have assumed had I known the details -of inhuman experiments I can only answer in a hypothetical way. Had I -had an approximate knowledge, as I have it today, I would have struggled -against passing on such an order by virtue of my general view on -questions of humanity. Since, however, I did not have that knowledge it -could not come to any opposition on my part. I ask that consideration be -given to the fact that during all those years, I regarded matters which -were in my field from my own point of view, and tried to live up to my -own ideals. I saw my duty in carrying out my task faithfully and in the -conduct of a clean, personal life. I always strove not to cause any -damage to any human being, but to understand the situation of any person -in need of help, and then to help him as I myself would have wished to -be helped or treated had I been in his position. I remind you of the -statement of the witness Meiner, on 21 March 1947. - -The fact that my signatures are on the documents which have been -submitted by the prosecution has moved me deeply because my entire view -of humanity and the principles of humanity is quite opposed to that. -What I understand by humanity, also begins to apply to the small details -of life also for me. - -In spite of my good intentions, and this I say in answer to a question -put in the beginning—in spite of my good intentions I was drawn into a -guilt, I see it as a guilt into which human beings can be involved by -tragic circumstances without any intention on their part. But the -recognition of this guilt was sufficient to shake severely my mental and -moral balance. - - J. Final Statement of Defendant Poppendick[42] - -I joined the SS at a time not to commit crimes, but because a number of -my friends whom I knew to be idealists were members of the SS. Their -membership caused me to join. That I thereby became a member of a -criminal organization was unimaginable for me at that time, just as it -is incomprehensible for me today. - -My activity in the Main Race and Settlement Office was devoted to the -problem of the family, an activity which in view of the destructive -tendencies during the period of the First World War seemed important to -me. If my expectations as a physician were disappointed in more than one -point, at least I considered myself justified to hope that in the end -this activity would have positive results. The intentions were always -toward a constructive policy for the good of the family. Never did I -have anything to do with negative population policies, such as the -sterilization program of the state. The assertion of the prosecution -that positive and negative population policies belong together as the -two sides of one and the same program, is erroneous. - -Then there were purely organizational reasons which brought about my -direct subordination under the office of that man whose name today has -such an inhuman sound—I mean Grawitz. The impression which the -prosecution has rendered of my activity and position in Grawitz’ office -is not in accordance with the facts, in spite of some features which -seem to support the assertions made by the prosecution. - -As for medical experiments on inmates—experiments on human beings were -nothing surprising to me, nor anything new. I knew that experiments were -carried out in clinics. I knew that the modern achievements of medical -science had not been brought about without sacrifices. However, I do not -recall that in experiments in clinics the voluntariness of the person to -be experimented on was an absolute requirement, which now seems to be -taken as a matter of fact, according to the discussions in this trial. I -knew furthermore, that some scientific problems can only be solved by -experiments in series with conditions remaining constant, and that -therefore soldiers and particularly soldiers in camps are used for -experiments in all countries. Under these circumstances it did not -appear surprising to me that during the war, scientists also carried out -experiments in series in concentration camps. I did not have the least -cause to assume that these scientists in the camps would go beyond the -scope of that which otherwise everywhere in the world of science was -customary. What I knew about medical experiments in the SS was, in my -opinion, as little connected with criminal matters as those experiments -of which I knew from my clinical experience before 1933. - -In March of this year a young doctor, Dr. Mitscherlich, in a very -one-sided way, published material for an indictment under the already -prejudiced title, “The Dictates of Contempt for Human Life”. Of the -problematic there was little in this book. The basis for a judgment and -a conviction were clearly given. During the very last days, however, the -chief of Dr. Mitscherlich, a well-known Professor from Heidelberg, -Weizsaecker, published a study on the fundamental questions belonging to -this subject under the title “Euthanasia and Experiments on Human -Beings”, which he submitted to the defendants. But here now fortunately -we find an entirely different language. The problem itself becomes -obvious. If one reads this booklet then the extent of the problem with -its complications becomes clear. - -The oath of Hippocrates, according to Weizsaecker, has nothing to do -with the problem. Weizsaecker applies entirely different ethical norms. -Rightly, medicine of today as a whole is studied, not only the German -medicine under Hitler. It shows that experts who consider themselves -competent even today are only in the middle of their endeavor to clarify -the problems at the basis, that being the first requirement for their -solution. - -Before this trial all of these matters were no problems for me. I did -not know of any transgressions. Moreover, I was always convinced that -anything which came to my knowledge about experiments on human beings in -clinics of the state before 1933, and within the scope of the SS in -later years, were conscientious efforts of serious scientists to the -good of mankind. - -The ethical foundation of these matters also seemed to be there until -this trial. Therefore, after sincere examination of my conscience, I -cannot find any feelings of guilt and expect with a clear and peaceful -conscience the verdict of the Tribunal. - - K. Final Statement of Defendant Sievers[43] - -Your Honors, in his opening plea, my defense counsel already stated -quite openly and frankly that all events were going to be presented with -which I was in any way connected, and in this hour which is so important -to me, I can state to the best of my conscience that when I furnished my -defense counsel with information, and during my own examination on the -witness stand, I always spoke the full truth. - -I have, in fact, had the satisfaction to hear my testimony confirmed by -a witness for the prosecution. During my examination as a witness on the -stand, I said quite truthfully that the experimental subjects to whom I -had talked in connection with the last experiment in Natzweiler had -confirmed to me that they were voluntary subjects. Witness Nales, -witness for the prosecution, confirmed my testimony during his -examination on the 30th of June in this courtroom. - -With regard to the charge of participation in the malaria experiments, I -have stated that I had nothing to do with malaria experiments. Witness -Vieweg, called by the prosecution, confirmed this testimony of mine, as -also did witness Stoehr. - -I testified that the two experimented subjects whom I met in connection -with the altitude experiments, in reply to a question by me, confirmed -specifically that they had volunteered. Witness Neff of the prosecution -confirmed this voluntary status of the witnesses. Likewise Dr. Romberg -during his direct examination stated on the strength of his own -knowledge that my testimony was correct. The only experimental subject -whom I met in connection with the typhus experiments upon my definite -question regarding the voluntariness of his testimony, confirmed that -this was so. My testimony was also confirmed through the affidavit of a -former prisoner, and witness, Grunzenhuber, contained in my second -document book. - -The prosecution believed that they had to charge me with having placed -myself at the disposal of the IMT on the behalf of the SS. This was -rather a peculiar statement considering my own defense in this trial. I -explained when I was on the stand that without my own initiative, in -fact against my own will, the defense counsel for the SS called me in -order to use me as a witness. Attorney Pelckmann, then defense counsel -of the SS, has confirmed the correctness of my statements in an -affidavit. According to that, I immediately informed Pelckmann at the -time in writing regarding my former membership in the resistance -movement against the National Socialist regime and told him I was not a -suitable witness. At the same time I presented attorney Pelckmann with a -copy of my letter, in which I placed myself at the disposal of the -International Military Tribunal as a witness as early as 20 December -1945, as the IMT record shows. I have stated my regrets on this same -witness stand, that my preparedness to aid justice and to help in -prosecuting past crimes was not accepted and that considerable evidence -was thus destroyed. - -As early as August last year, I furnished the prosecution with a report -about my activities in the resistance movement, indicating again my -willingness. This was passed over, however, when I stated that I was not -prepared to sign affidavits which were not completely true. I openly and -frankly stated at that point that I did not understand this action. I -had to do this, and I could do it because I had been looking for truth -and right at the risk of my life, undaunted, even during the time of -tyranny. Was one now to be a collaborator in methods which I thought had -passed with the National Socialist regime; and which, as remains my firm -conviction, would never lead to a true pacification of this world such -as we all desire? I am mentioning this with regret and only because I -have always claimed that I myself, and my statements, in responsible -situations, deserve to be believed. The prosecution did not only feel in -a position to doubt my credibility, but they even consented to call me a -liar during their argument, against their better knowledge and their -better conscience. Consequently, I had to draw your attention to the -testimony of various witnesses which confirmed, in full, my testimony on -the stand in these complicated matters. I can truly be satisfied that it -was not up to me, but to the prosecution’s own witnesses, to contradict -the incorrect statements made against me. History will honor such -action, and judge the persistent attempt to stick to preconceived ideas. -There is no blessing connected with it. I am only sorry for those who -are misguided by false ideas. My firm conviction that this high Tribunal -will fully believe my testimony during my defense is based on these -facts. - -In this connection, with reference to the experiences which I have just -described, I am forced to say how on the other hand it calmed and -strengthened me, and gave me confidence to see with what wisdom, calm, -and patience this high Tribunal stood above matters and disclosed a -conduct of trial in which one could feel sheltered; all my friends, who -fought in the secret resistance movement with me and repeatedly attended -this trial in the audience, share these sentiments with me. - -I have explained to you, your Honors, for what reasons I was in -immediate, direct contact with the NSDAP and the SS. I have told you how -I always tried to prevent the Ahnenerbe from becoming involved in -medical research. This attempt failed, due to the ambitious attitude of -Himmler. Only on the strength of my own feelings had I to find an -attitude with regard to this new question of experiments on human -beings. I did not approve of them, and I attempted to take the -consequence, which could only be that I immediately resigned from my -post as the Reich manager of the Ahnenerbe. I think the testimony of the -witness Hielscher, in this stand, and the affidavits from witness -Deutelmoser, witness Dellmann, witness Schmitz, and others prove beyond -doubt that I had the true intention of resigning from the Ahnenerbe. And -these witnesses have also clearly testified why I didn’t do so, not -because of personal ambition, not for reasons of comfort, or for what -other low reasons might be attributed to me in this point. It was due to -the persistent urging on the part of my political friends that I -remained, in order to serve further the task which had taken me to the -NSDAP and the SS. Inwardly I rejected contact with human experiments -even as I refused to be a follower of the NSDAP and of the ideology they -represented. Outwardly, I had to live up to the name of a National -Socialist if I was to hold on to the political ideal to which I had -devoted myself since 1929 and not endanger it. In his affidavit, witness -Niebhausen, who was the most important member in the circle of the -secret German resistance, and who has acted on behalf of Dr. Kempner -too, and who is obviously a personality beyond reproach, says that his -illegal activity which continued for five years would have been quite -impossible without my assistance. I do not, indeed, know what the -prosecution is prepared to recognize as being a resistance against the -Nazi regime, if not even such activities as these. It is not necessary -to relate again all the details which have been testified to in this -courtroom. - -That in true recognition of the consequences which might be daily -expected for myself and my family I devoted myself to resistance, -continued in it undaunted, and never abandoned it, is now the only -reason why I find myself in this dock. For that reason, I look forward -to the judgment of this Tribunal with confidence, due to my conviction -that I have lived for a good cause and acted on it, on behalf of -something which—then as today—filled me with true belief. - - L. Final Statement of Defendant Rose[44] - -Mr. President, may it please the Tribunal, the scientists who are among -the defendants in this trial are confronted with a principal difficulty, -the fact that purely scientific questions have been made political, -ideological questions by the prosecution. In the opening speech by the -Chief of Counsel, General Taylor, the political and ideological nature -of the indictment has been expressed as clearly as possible. - -A subject of the personal charges against myself is my attitude toward -experiments on human beings ordered by the state and carried out by -other German scientists in the field of typhus and malaria. Works of -that nature have nothing to do with politics or with ideology, but they -serve the good of humanity, and the same problems and necessities can be -seen independently of any political ideology everywhere, where the same -dangers of epidemics have to be combated. - -Just as Claus Schilling, in his malaria research, had to make -experiments with human beings, before him and after him malaria -scientists of various nations had to carry out experiments on human -beings. Just as Haagen, on his own initiative, but with the approval of -competent authorities of the state, tested the value of a new, living -typhus vaccine, before him that was done in the course of fighting -plague by your great compatriot, Richard B. Strong, when he experimented -on natives of the Philippines, who were not American citizens, with the -approval of your government. - -Just as Dr. Ding, on the instruction of the highest and decisive -authorities of the German civilian health administration, tested the -value of the typhus vaccine on humans in times of greatest typhus -danger, others have done so before him in less pressing emergencies, -sometimes in agreement with, sometimes upon the instruction of their -governments. - -From the witness stand I testified about the actual role which I played -in regard to the charges of human experiments with malaria and typhus. -And I have explained from the witness stand the legal evaluation of my -actions, and they have been submitted to you by my defense counsel, Dr. -Fritz. I need not add anything to it. But, as a matter of principle, I -stated my attitude towards the experiments on human beings in medical -research, not first of all in this courtroom, but also when the National -Socialist German Government was at the height of its limitless power. At -that time I was cut short by a man, Professor Schreiber, who about a -year ago in this very courtroom, claimed to be a defender of medical -ethics. - -The fact is undoubted that human experiments, which were exactly the -same as those, the participation in which I am unjustly charged with, -have been carried out in other countries, above all, in the United -States which has indicted me. That has led the prosecution to place the -center of gravity of its charges upon the outside conditions of the -persons put at my disposal for experiments by the German authorities. In -that connection the question of whether they were voluntary was put into -the foreground. I shall not discuss the question as to what extent the -doctor who is charged with the experiments is responsible for these -external, formal questions, at least a doctor who was so far removed -from the experiments themselves as I was. But in connection with the -principal question of subjects being volunteers, I have to make a few -statements. A trial of this kind presents probably the most unsuitable -atmosphere to discuss questions of medical ethics. But since these -questions have been raised here, they have to be answered. Everyone who, -as a scientist, has an insight into the history of dangerous medical -experiments, knows with certainty the following fact. Aside from the -self-experiments of doctors, which represent a very small minority of -such experiments, the extent to which subjects are volunteers is often -deceptive. At the very best they amount to self-deceit on the part of -the physician who conducts the experiment, but very frequently to a -deliberate misleading of the public. In the majority of such cases, if -we ethically examine facts, we find an exploitation of the ignorance, -the frivolity, the economic distress, or other emergency on the part of -the experimental subjects. I may only refer to the example which was -presented to the Tribunal by Dr. Ivy when he presented the forms for the -American malaria experiments. - -You yourselves, gentlemen of the Tribunal, are in a position to examine -whether, on the basis of the information contained in these forms, -individuals of the average education of an inmate of a prison can form a -sufficiently clear opinion of the risks of an experiment made with -pernicious malaria. These facts will be confirmed by any sincere and -decent scientist in a personal conversation, though he would not like to -make such a statement in public. That I myself am, on principle, an -opponent of the idea of dangerous experiments on human beings is known -to you gentlemen of the Tribunal. - -The state, however, or any human community which, in the interest of the -well-being of the entire community, did not want to forego the -experiments on human beings, only bases itself on ethical principles as -long as it openly assumes the full responsibility which arises -therefrom, and imposes sacrifices on enemies of society to atone for -their crimes and does not choose the method of apparent voluntary -submission, which imposes the risk of the experiment on the experimental -subjects, who are not in a position to foresee the possible -consequences. - -The prosecutor in his plea criticized the preponderance of affidavits -during the presentation of evidence on the part of the defense. The -difficulties which exist for a defendant in prison in the Germany of -today to acquire other documents are almost prohibitive. In order to -give a few examples: When the malaria experiments of Schilling were -discussed, the prosecution, among other material, submitted to the -Tribunal an excerpt from the well-known Dachau sentence concerning the -statements contained therein about the number of victims in these -experiments. I have stated in the witness box that I would rather sit -here as a defendant than put my signature on the opinion which would -confirm these statements. How right I was in making that statement can -be seen from a letter by Professor Allenby of the University of London -which, unfortunately, has only now been received by my defense counsel, -in which he termed the statement that 300 experimental subjects had -died, a grotesque untruth. My defense counsel in his final plea has -quoted the passage of that letter. - -The prosecution at that time when the excerpt of the Dachau sentence was -submitted, promised that the entire files of the Dachau trial would be -put at our disposal. Unfortunately, all my efforts to gain an insight in -these files have been in vain. - -When State Secretary Dr. Conti during the war was toying with the idea -to commission Professor Schilling, who was at that time in Italy, with -malaria research in Germany, I, at that time, Chief of the Tropical -Medical Department of the Robert Koch Institute, was first of all -assigned by the Reich Ministry of the Interior to give an opinion. In -this opinion, for reasons which I have explained in the witness box, I -rejected Schilling’s plan. Had one followed my advice, the experiments -by Schilling in Dachau would never have taken place. In the course of -these proceedings I made all efforts to come into the possession of that -opinion but in this case also I was unsuccessful, although that opinion -in two copies is in the hands of the military government, possibly even -in this building. - -Also, in vain, I attempted to get the file note, so important for my -defense, which I dictated to the witness Block about my conferences with -State Secretary Conti and President Gildemeister, after I had gained -knowledge about the conduct of the typhus experiments in Buchenwald. -What little correspondence I had with Professor Haagen is apparently -entirely in the hands of the prosecution. In spite of that, it has been -submitted only in part to you. That fact offered an opportunity to the -prosecution to interpret passages taken out of the context incorrectly. -Unfortunately, I have no opportunity to force anyone to submit the -missing documents which would clarify matters in my favor. - -To evaluate the work of Haagen, and my defense counsel has pointed that -out already, the statement of an unbiased expert would have been of -decisive importance. Therefore, I can only regret that the interrogation -of the Frenchman Georges Blanc for whom I applied and who has the best -knowledge in this field, did not take place, although he had volunteered -to appear before this Tribunal as an expert. - -Professor Lecrout, Director of the Institute Pasteur in Paris, was -frequently in Nuernberg during this trial. After an interview, the -prosecution refrained from calling him as an expert witness to clarify -some difficult questions resulting from the work of Haagen. I ask the -high Tribunal to draw its conclusions from these facts and to assure -that the lack of these pieces of evidence should not result in a damage -to my interests. - -Prosecutor McHaney has explained in his plea that one still had to find -that doctor among the defendants who would have subjected himself to -such experiments as are covered by the indictment here. I do not feel -that that concerns me. Not only from the statement which I have made -here before you but also from my case history, which was available to -the authorities of the prison long before indictment, it can be seen -that not only did I repeatedly offer myself as an experimental subject -to test vaccines but that frequently in my official capacity and in my -research work I gave myself injections with cholera, typhus, malaria and -hepatitis epidemica and that I am still suffering from the consequences. - -Finally, Prosecutor McHaney has asserted in his plea that all of those -indicted here are guilty of murder, and that includes me too. If the -Tribunal were to look at the present problem from this point of view, I -would regret having said a single word in my defense. However, if you -believe me, that in all actions of mine which have been discussed here, -I was only moved by sincere devotion to duty, then I put my fate with -confidence into your hands. - - M. Final Statement of Defendant Ruff[45] - -May it please the Tribunal: As far as the written and oral statements of -my defense counsel are concerned which deal with the points of the -indictment, and as far as my activities as a doctor and scientist are -concerned, I have nothing or hardly anything to add. I can only repeat -today what I said at the end of my examination when I was on the stand. -After detailed inquiry into my conscience, I still today hold the belief -that I never sinned against my duty as a man and as a doctor. - - N. Final Statement of Defendant Brack[46] - -Your Honor, I cannot be described as one of the earliest followers of -Hitler. In 1929, I joined the NSDAP when more than six million German -voters were already backing Hitler. His later successes during the years -of peaceful reconstruction consolidated my conviction that he had -forever liberated Germany from the misery in which it seemed to have -fallen. For all those years I had no reason to have any misgivings with -regard to Hitler’s personality. Therefore I also believed in the -legality of the euthanasia decree as it emanated directly from the head -of the state. The state officials and doctors, competent for me at that -time, told me that euthanasia had always been an endeavor of mankind and -was morally as well as medically justified. Therefore, I never doubted -the legal character of the euthanasia decree. - -In this connection, however, I was assigned duties, the extent and -importance of which I could not foresee. Neither my training nor my -qualifications sufficed for this task. Nobody can deny, however, my good -faith in its justification. I frankly admitted what I did in the -framework of the euthanasia measures and tried to prove that my -collaboration was merely of a subordinate nature and exclusively -directed by human aspects. I cannot be made responsible for later -actions carried out by other offices and without my knowledge. These -were the measures which I deeply regretted, in which the prohibition of -the inclusion of foreign nationals and Jews was infringed. - -Through my activity in the Fuehrer’s Chancellery, I early became -acquainted with the Gestapo terror. The testimonies of my witnesses -prove how I fought against them and the concentration camp system. I did -so because I felt that I was obliged to help those who suffered from -arbitrariness and oppression. I did not do it because I already -recognized in it at that time symptoms of a leadership that always and -only knew arbitrariness and oppression. - -But this is particularly the reason why I was so shocked about the -misuse of some of the euthanasia institutions for the Action 14 f 13; -this action affected particularly those persons whose detention I -considered unjust, and which I therefore opposed. It was only in this -courtroom, however, that I learned of this action. - -That I did not hate the Jews has been proved by numerous documents. -Without hatred of the Jews, however, participation in the extermination -of Jews is unthinkable. The measures of suppression to which the Jews -were subjected forced me to give them the same assistance within my -competence as I accorded to the political persecutees. Thus during the -course of the years I helped hundreds of thousands of persons by my -activity. Thus only could the sterilization suggestions come into -existence. They were nothing but an attempt to prevent the extermination -of innumerable Jews. - -In spite of all the efforts of my defense counsel, it was impossible to -procure the witnesses who could testify to this effect. They preferred -to evade their responsibility of serving the truth. I am utterly alone. -I must leave it to this high Tribunal to ascertain on the basis of the -presented expert scientific opinions that all my proposals were actually -so formulated as to show my convictions of their harmlessness, and the -impossibility of realizing them. - -I must also leave it to the Tribunal to judge whether a man who intended -the extermination of the Jews would apply for service with the army, -just at the moment when the aim which he is alleged to have pursued was -achieved, and the extermination measures had started. Or does it not -appear paradoxical to assume that one and the same man should give his -approval of the extermination of the Jews, and in fact aid such a -program, and, at the same time, save Jews he has never known, such as -Georgii, Passow, Meyer, Warburg, and others, from these measures? - -I can only emphasize that particularly the sterilization suggestions to -Himmler appeared to me to be the last possibility to take any action to -save Jewry. Had I been indifferent to the Jewish fate, I would not be -accused today. But I also tried in this respect, as was my habit, to -give assistance and I am still convinced, that it had at least delaying, -if not preventative effect. It is certain that many Jews were in this -way saved from destruction. The realization that such proposals should -never have been made by me on the strength of my medical knowledge, my -capacities, or my position at the time, even to the best of my -intention, is something I could not reach until this trial was in -progress. My good intention, which was the basis of these proposals, and -my good will to help by means of them cannot be denied by anybody, and -can in no event be understood as my conscious cooperation in the -extermination of the Jews. - - O. Final Statement of Defendant Romberg[47] - -In the course of this trial, I have had full opportunity to speak in my -defense. With special gratitude we realize the great opportunity offered -to us, of which we took advantage, which was given by the possibility of -individually questioning Professor Ivy in this trial. I have seen how -the Tribunal itself, by a precise questioning, clarified the facts, and -to the statements made by my defense counsel I have nothing to add, -because they are the truth. - - P. Final Statement of Defendant Becker-Freyseng[48] - -Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I also was given opportunity -to submit all the statements and the evidence required to refute the -charges of the indictment. For that I have to thank the Tribunal and my -defense counsel, Dr. Tipp. But I have nothing to add to it. For all the -irrelevant, spiteful talk with which outside circles believed they had -to twist around the objectivity of these proceedings like thorn bushes, -the verdict of this Tribunal must be and will be the appropriate answer. -I look forward to it with the firm conviction that I never failed in my -duty to mankind as a physician and scientist, and as a soldier to my -Fatherland. - - Q. Final Statement of Defendant Weltz[49] - -I have nothing to add to the statement made by my defense counsel. I -thank Dr. Wille for his efforts made in my defense. - - R. Final Statement of Defendant Schaefer[50] - -May it please the Tribunal, since I consider myself entirely innocent, I -have nothing more to add. I ask to be acquitted, if possible, even -before the verdict. - - S. Final Statement of Defendant Hoven[51] - -I have nothing to add to Dr. Gawlik’s plea of yesterday. I would at this -point like to thank my defense counsel for the considerable help he has -given me. - - T. Final Statement of Defendant Beiglboeck[52] - -May it please the Tribunal, the experiments which I conducted, I did not -carry out on my own initiative, neither according to the plans of my -own, nor spontaneously. The medical part was played with the knowledge -and approval of my clinical teacher, and civilian superior for more than -ten years, I was a disciple of Eppinger. During those ten years I had -come to know and respect his ways of thought and his superior knowledge. -My relations to him were based on deep personal gratitude and -awe-inspired devotion. If there was anything which he considered right -and important, then for psychological reasons alone, it would have been -difficult for me to believe the contrary. - -The experiments were to solve the problem of saving human life and that -had to be approved. It was a military order which compelled me to carry -them out in the atmosphere of a concentration camp. I struggled against -it, and was inwardly opposed to it, and tried to avoid the task, but I -was not successful. So I had to carry it out. - -May it please the Tribunal, in your evaluation of this fact, please do -not fail to consider that this did not happen in times of peace, nor in -a country which granted its citizens individual freedom of decision in -all matters, personal and professional, but during the bitter days of a -most horrible war. What I carried out, I did in accordance with a plan -previously determined and specified. I did not overstep the limits of my -task. I had to require of my experimental subjects to undergo hardships; -they suffered from thirst with all of its unpleasant sensations, with -its physical and mental characteristics. It was in the nature of the -experiments, and this could not be avoided. I did not, however, do this -without first informing myself by an experiment on my own system of what -I expected them to undergo, nor did I expect it of anyone else, unless I -was firmly convinced that he undertook it voluntarily. It is not true to -say that I might have forced anybody to do it, neither psychologically, -by reprisals, nor by threat, nor by force of arms. Many eyewitnesses -have agreed that my conduct was never brutal or inhuman towards any of -the experimental subjects under my care. Among these witnesses are even -some who were brought here to testify against me. - -At last, in the final stage of this trial, one experimental subject -could be found who thought it appropriate to introduce a dramatic note -in an atmosphere artificially created. You will decide how much -credibility you will attribute to this witness. Based on a layman’s -misinterpretation of nondangerous, indeed harmless medical procedures, -combined with the uncertain recollection emotionally presented by more -or less distorting and misconstruing my motives, the attempt was made to -lend an impression to my experiments and to my own personality. - -In contradiction to that, a few others who came from the concentration -camp and who loved the truth have painted another picture which reveals -that my behavior in the medical sense, as well as from the human point -of view, was correct, to say the least. By my experiments, no human life -was sacrificed, nor did they result in any lasting damage to their -health. I also believe, I have proved that I intervened for the inmates, -as far as that was within my power and that I did not consider my -experimental subjects as individuals of an inferior type whom I could -well afford to ill-treat, for ideological reasons, as has been charged. - -For over 15 years as a physician, I always felt the strongest -responsibility for those entrusted to my care. Thousands who were my -patients will confirm it. My assistants and colleagues have testified to -it. I was never directed by any sentiment other than that of a human -being and of a physician. The experiments as they were actually -conducted never went beyond what can be justified by the physician. I -consider myself free of guilt as a physician and as a human being. - - U. Final Statement of Defendant Pokorny[53] - -Your Honors, during this trial I have often asked myself what I should -have done at the time in order to record my true motive for the letter I -had written to Himmler. But I believe that at the time when I dispatched -this letter, I could not do anything else but to talk to the people in -whom I had confidence and who I knew would not betray me, and confide in -them my true reasons. - -If today, this letter, which is against me, may seem objective, then -this is a fact with which I must bear, although to the end I must say in -correspondence with the truth that selfish reasons were not the cause of -my writing this letter, but that letter was written because at the time -I had heard facts about Himmler’s plans, and, because at that time in my -position, standing lonely and slandered because of my family -implications in a small town in Czechoslovakia, I felt that I was able -to take the action described. - -I retain the hope that you, my judges, will draw your conclusions from -my conduct and the situation in which I found myself at the time, and -will come to the conviction that the true motive was a different one -than that which is objectively shown by this letter, and that you will -not sentence me but will believe me in what I have not only told you, my -judges, but others previously during my interrogations and what I have -told my friends, at a time when this present situation had not arisen, -in order to clarify my motives as being true. - -With this hope I am looking forward to your judgment, and in that -connection I am thinking of my children who, for years now, have lived -under the protection of an allied power, and who will not believe that -their father, after everything that he has suffered, could possibly have -acted as an enemy to human rights. - - V. Final Statement of Defendant Oberheuser[54] - -I have nothing to add to the statements I have made from the witness box -under oath. In administering therapeutical care, following established -medical principles, as a woman in a difficult position, I did the best I -could. Moreover, I fully agree with the statements made by my defense -counsel and will refrain, at this late stage of the trial, from making -any further statements. - - W. Final Statement of Defendant Fischer[55] - -Your Honors, when this war began I was a young doctor, 27 years of age. -My attitude towards my people and my Fatherland took me to the front -line as an army doctor. I there joined an armored division, where I -remained until I was incapacitated due to the loss of an arm. For only a -very brief period, during these years of war, I worked as a medical -officer in a military hospital back home. There too, my conception of my -duties was directed by the wish to serve my country. During this time of -my work at home, I received the order, the execution of which made me a -subject of the indictment of this trial. - -The order for my participation in the experiments originated from my -highest medical and military superior and was passed on to me, as the -assistant and first lieutenant, through Professor Gebhardt. Professor -Gebhardt was the famous surgeon and much honored creator of Hohenlychen. -He was a scientific authority whom I looked up to with reverence and -confidence. As a general of the Waffen SS he was my unconditional -military superior. I believed him, that I had been earmarked by him to -assist in the solution of an urgent medical problem which was to bring -help and salvation to hundreds of thousands of wounded soldiers, and -which was to be a cure for them; and I believed that this problem would -mean a question of life and death to my people who were fighting for -their existence. I believed unconditionally that this order had come to -me from the head of the state, and that its execution was a necessity -for the state. I considered myself first as bound by this order, as were -the thousands of soldiers whom I had seen walk to their deaths during my -years at the front, following an order by the state. This moving -impression from the front bound me doubly, particularly since I had had -the privilege during that time of working in a hospital at home. I -considered myself, particularly at home, doubly bound like every soldier -at the front to obey the order of my Fatherland unconditionally. - -What this order demanded from me had been introduced as a method of -modern medicine in all civilized countries. I was only concerned in the -clinical part of it, and that was taking place just as a course of -treatment in the institute of Hohenlychen, or any other clinic. What I -did was what was ordered, and I did nothing beyond that order. I -believed that I, as a simple citizen, did not have the right to -criticize the measures of the state, particularly not at a time in which -my country was engaged in a struggle for life and death. - -I hope that through my unconditional service at the front and through my -two wounds, I have shown that I did not only expect others to make -sacrifices at this time, but that I was prepared at any time to -sacrifice myself with my life and my health. Within the scope of the -order given to me I did what I could, in my limited position as an -assistant doctor, for the life of the experimental subjects and for an -exact and proper clinical development of the experiment. I never could -expect and foresee that deaths would occur. When such fatalities did -occur, contrary to all expectation, I was as shaken by that event as I -was by the death of a patient in our clinic. After that, the experiments -were immediately discontinued, and I went back to the front. - -Together with Professor Gebhardt, I reported about these experiments to -the German public. Like many other Germans, there are many things which, -in retrospect, I see more clearly today and in another light than in the -past years. In my young life I have tried to be a faithful son of my -people, and that brought me into this present miserable position. I only -wanted what was good. In my life I have never followed egotistical aims, -and I was never motivated by base instincts. For that reason, I feel -free of any guilt inside me. I have acted as a soldier, and as a soldier -I am ready to bear the consequences. However, that I was born a German, -that is something about which I do not want to complain. - ------ - -[33] Tr. pp. 11311-11314. - -[34] Tr. pp. 11315-11316. - -[35] Tr. pp. 11316-11317. - -[36] Tr. p. 11318. - -[37] Tr. pp. 11318-11319. - -[38] Tr. pp. 11319-11324. - -[39] Tr. pp. 11325-11328. - -[40] Tr. pp. 11328-11329. - -[41] Tr. pp. 11330-11335. - -[42] Tr. pp. 11335-11338. - -[43] Tr. pp. 11338-11342. - -[44] Tr. pp. 11342-11347. - -[45] Tr. pp. 11347-11348. - -[46] Tr. pp. 11348-11351. - -[47] Tr. p. 11351. - -[48] Tr. p. 11352. - -[49] Tr. p. 11352. - -[50] Tr. p. 11352. - -[51] Tr. p. 11352. - -[52] Tr. pp. 11352-11355. - -[53] Tr. pp. 11355-11356. - -[54] Tr. p. 11356. - -[55] Tr. pp. 11356-11358. - - - - - XII. JUDGMENT - - -Military Tribunal I was established on 25 October 1946 under General -Orders No. 68 issued by command of the United States Military Government -for Germany. It was the first of several military tribunals constituted -in the United States Zone of Occupation pursuant to Military Government -Ordinance No. 7, for the trial of offenses recognized as crimes by Law -No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany. - -By the terms of the order which established the Tribunal and designated -the undersigned as members thereof, Military Tribunal I was ordered to -convene at Nuernberg, Germany, to hear such cases as might be filed by -the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes or his duly designated -representative. - -On 25 October 1946 the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes lodged an -indictment against the defendants named in the caption above in the -Office of the Secretary General of Military Tribunal at the Palace of -Justice, Nuernberg, Germany. A copy of the indictment in the German -language was served on each defendant on 5 November 1946. Military -Tribunal I arraigned the defendants on 21 November 1946, each defendant -entering a plea of “not guilty” to all the charges preferred against -him. - -The presentation of evidence to sustain the charges contained in the -indictment was begun by the prosecution on 9 December 1946. At the -conclusion of the prosecution’s case in chief the defendants began the -presentation of their evidence. All evidence in the case was concluded -on 3 July 1947. During the week beginning 14 July 1947 the Tribunal -heard arguments by counsel for the prosecution and defense. The personal -statements of the defendants were heard on 19 July 1947 on which date -the case was finally concluded. - -The trial was conducted in two languages—English and German. It -consumed 139 trial days, including 6 days allocated for final arguments -and the personal statements of the defendants. During the 133 trial days -used for the presentation of evidence 32 witnesses gave oral evidence -for the prosecution and 53 witnesses, including the 23 defendants, gave -oral evidence for the defense. In addition, the prosecution put in -evidence as exhibits a total of 570 affidavits, reports, and documents; -the defense put in a total number of 901—making a grand total of 1,471 -documents received in evidence. - -Copies of all exhibits tendered by the prosecution in their case in -chief were furnished in the German language to the defendants prior to -the time of the reception of the exhibits in evidence. - -Each defendant was represented at the arraignment and trial by counsel -of his own selection. - -Whenever possible, all applications by defense counsel for the procuring -of the personal attendance of persons who made affidavits in behalf of -the prosecution were granted and the persons brought to Nuernberg for -interrogation or cross-examination by defense counsel. Throughout the -trial great latitude in presenting evidence was allowed defense counsel, -even to the point at times of receiving in evidence certain matters of -but scant probative value. - -All of these steps were taken by the Tribunal in order to allow each -defendant to present his defense completely, in accordance with the -spirit and intent of Military Government Ordinance No. 7 which provides -that a defendant shall have the right to be represented by counsel, to -cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and to offer in the case all -evidence deemed to have probative value. - -The evidence has now been submitted, final arguments of counsel have -been concluded, and the Tribunal has heard personal statements from each -of the defendants. All that remains to be accomplished in the case is -the rendition of judgment and the imposition of sentence. - - - THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL - -The jurisdiction and powers of this Tribunal are fixed and determined by -Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany. The pertinent portions of -the Law with which we are concerned provide as follows: - - ARTICLE II - - “1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: - - * * * * * - - “(_b_) _War Crimes._ Atrocities or offenses against persons or - property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, - including but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or - deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian - population from occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of - prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, - plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of - cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by - military necessity. - - “(_c_) _Crimes against Humanity._ Atrocities and offenses, - including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, - deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts - committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on - political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in - violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated. - - “(_d_) Membership in categories of a criminal group or - organization declared criminal by the International Military - Tribunal. - - “2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in - which he acted is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in - * * * this Article, if he (_a_) was a principal or (_b_) was an - accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or - abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part therein or - (_d_) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its - commission or (_e_) was a member of any organization or group - connected with the commission of any such crime * * *. - - * * * * * - - “4. (_a_) The official position of any person, whether as Head - of State or as a responsible official in a Government - Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or - entitle him to mitigation of punishment. - - (_b_) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of - his Government or of a superior does not free him from - responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in - mitigation.” - -The indictment in the case at bar is filed pursuant to these provisions. - - - THE CHARGE - -The indictment is framed in four counts. - -COUNT ONE—_The Common Design or Conspiracy._ The first count of the -indictment charges that the defendants, acting pursuant to a common -design, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree -together to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in -Control Council Law No. 10. - -During the course of the trial the defendants challenged the first count -of the indictment, alleging as grounds for their motion the fact that -under the basic law the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to try the -crime of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense. The -motion was set down for argument and duly argued by counsel for the -prosecution and the defense. Thereafter, in one of its trial sessions -the Tribunal granted the motion. That this judgment may be complete, the -ruling made at that time is incorporated in this judgment. The order -which was entered on the motion is as follows: - - “It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of - the International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. - 10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against - humanity as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this - Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any defendant upon a charge - of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense. - - “Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge - of conspiracy, also alleges unlawful participation in the - formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and - crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission - of such crimes. We, therefore, cannot properly strike the whole - of count I from the indictment, but, insofar as count I charges - the commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a separate - substantive offense, distinct from any war crime or crime - against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that charge. - - “This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or - effect of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, - or as denying to either prosecution or defense the right to - offer in evidence any facts or circumstances occurring either - before or after September 1939, if such facts or circumstances - tend to prove or to disprove the commission by any defendant of - war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in Control - Council Law No. 10.” - -COUNTS TWO AND THREE—_War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity._ The -second and third counts of the indictment charge the commission of war -crimes and crimes against humanity. The counts are identical in content, -except for the fact that in count two the acts which are made the basis -for the charges are alleged to have been committed on “civilians and -members of the armed forces [of nations] then at war with the German -Reich [* * *] in the exercise of belligerent control”, whereas in count -three the criminal acts are alleged to have been committed against -“German civilians and nationals of other countries.” With this -distinction observed, both counts will be treated as one and discussed -together. - -Counts two and three allege, in substance, that between September 1939 -and April 1945 all of the defendants “were principals in, accessories -to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with -plans and enterprises involving medical experiments without the -subjects’ consent * * * in the course of which experiments the -defendants committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, -atrocities, and other inhuman acts.” It is averred that “such -experiments included, but were not limited to” the following: - - “(_A_) _High-Altitude Experiments._ From about March 1942 to - about August 1942 experiments were conducted at the Dachau - concentration camp, for the benefit of the German Air Force, to - investigate the limits of human endurance and existence at - extremely high altitudes. The experiments were carried out in a - low-pressure chamber in which the atmospheric conditions and - pressures prevailing at high altitude (up to 68,000 feet) could - be duplicated. The experimental subjects were placed in the - low-pressure chamber and thereafter the simulated altitude - therein was raised. Many victims died as a result of these - experiments and others suffered grave injury, torture, and - ill-treatment. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Schroeder, - Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Ruff, - Romberg, Becker-Freyseng, and Weltz are charged with special - responsibility for and participation in these crimes. - - “(_B_) _Freezing Experiments._ From about August 1942 to about - May 1943 experiments were conducted at the Dachau concentration - camp, primarily for the benefit of the German Air Force, to - investigate the most effective means of treating persons who had - been severely chilled or frozen. In one series of experiments - the subjects were forced to remain in a tank of ice water for - periods up to 3 hours. Extreme rigor developed in a short time. - Numerous victims died in the course of these experiments. After - the survivors were severely chilled, re-warming was attempted by - various means. In another series of experiments, the subjects - were kept naked outdoors for many hours at temperatures below - freezing. * * * The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, - Schroeder, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, - Sievers, Becker-Freyseng, and Weltz are charged with special - responsibility for and participation in these crimes. - - “(_C_) _Malaria Experiments._ From about February 1942 to about - April 1945 experiments were conducted at the Dachau - concentration camp in order to investigate immunization for and - treatment of malaria. Healthy concentration camp inmates were - infected by mosquitoes or by injections of extracts of the - mucous glands of mosquitoes. After having contracted malaria the - subjects were treated with various drugs to test their relative - efficacy. Over 1,000 involuntary subjects were used in these - experiments. Many of the victims died and others suffered severe - pain and permanent disability. The defendants Karl Brandt, - Handloser, Rostock, Gebhardt, Blome, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, - Poppendick, and Sievers are charged with special responsibility - for and participation in these crimes. - - “(_D_) _Lost (Mustard) Gas Experiments._ At various times - between September 1939 and April 1945 experiments were conducted - at Sachsenhausen, Natzweiler, and other concentration camps for - the benefit of the German Armed Forces to investigate the most - effective treatment of wounds caused by Lost gas. Lost is a - poison gas which is commonly known as mustard gas. Wounds - deliberately inflicted on the subjects were infected with Lost. - Some of the subjects died as a result of these experiments and - others suffered intense pain and injury. The defendants Karl - Brandt, Handloser, Blome, Rostock, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, and - Sievers are charged with special responsibility for and - participation in these crimes. - - “(_E_) _Sulfanilamide Experiments._ From about July 1942 to - about September 1943 experiments to investigate the - effectiveness of sulfanilamide were conducted at the - Ravensbrueck concentration camp for the benefit of the German - Armed Forces. Wounds deliberately inflicted on the experimental - subjects were infected with bacteria such as streptococcus, gas - gangrene, and tetanus. Circulation of blood was interrupted by - tying off blood vessels at both ends of the wound to create a - condition similar to that of a battlefield wound. Infection was - aggravated by forcing wood shavings and ground glass into the - wounds. The infection was treated with sulfanilamide and other - drugs to determine their effectiveness. Some subjects died as a - result of these experiments and others suffered serious injury - and intense agony. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, - Rostock, Schroeder, Genzken, Gebhardt, Blome, Rudolf Brandt, - Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Becker-Freyseng, Oberheuser, and Fischer - are charged with special responsibility for and participation in - these crimes. - - “(_F_) _Bone, Muscle, and Nerve Regeneration and Bone - Transplantation Experiments._ From about September 1942 to about - December 1943 experiments were conducted at the Ravensbrueck - concentration camp, for the benefit of the German Armed Forces, - to study bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, and bone - transplantation from one person to another. Sections of bones, - muscles, and nerves were removed from the subjects. As a result - of these operations, many victims suffered intense agony, - mutilation, and permanent disability. The defendants Karl - Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Oberheuser, - and Fischer are charged with special responsibility for and - participation in these crimes. - - “(_G_) _Sea-Water Experiments._ From about July 1944 to about - September 1944 experiments were conducted at the Dachau - Concentration camp, for the benefit of the German Air Force and - Navy, to study various methods of making sea water drinkable. - The subjects were deprived of all food and given only chemically - processed sea water. Such experiments caused great pain and - suffering and resulted in serious bodily injury to the victims. - The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Schroeder, - Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, - Becker-Freyseng, Schaefer, and Beiglboeck are charged with - special responsibility for and participation in these crimes. - - “(_H_) _Epidemic Jaundice Experiments._ From about June 1943 to - about January 1945 experiments were conducted at the - Sachsenhausen and Natzweiler concentration camps, for the - benefit of the German Armed Forces, to investigate the causes - of, and inoculations against, epidemic jaundice. Experimental - subjects were deliberately infected with epidemic jaundice, some - of whom died as a result, and others were caused great pain and - suffering. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, - Schroeder, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, - Sievers, Rose, and Becker-Freyseng are charged with special - responsibility for and participation in these crimes. - - “(_I_) _Sterilization Experiments._ From about March 1941 to - about January 1945 sterilization experiments were conducted at - the Auschwitz and Ravensbrueck concentration camps, and other - places. The purpose of these experiments was to develop a method - of sterilization which would be suitable for sterilizing - millions of people with a minimum of time and effort. These - experiments were conducted by means of X-ray, surgery, and - various drugs. Thousands of victims were sterilized and thereby - suffered great mental and physical anguish. The defendants Karl - Brandt, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Brack, - Pokorny, and Oberheuser are charged with special responsibility - for and participation in these crimes. - - “(_J_) _Spotted Fever (Fleckfieber)[56] Experiments._ From about - December 1941 to about February 1945 experiments were conducted - at the Buchenwald and Natzweiler concentration camps, for the - benefit of the German Armed Forces, to investigate the - effectiveness of spotted fever and other vaccines. At - Buchenwald, numerous healthy inmates were deliberately infected - with spotted fever virus in order to keep the virus alive; over - 90 percent of the victims died as a result. Other healthy - inmates were used to determine the effectiveness of different - spotted fever vaccines and of various chemical substances. In - the course of these experiments 75 percent of the selected - number of inmates were vaccinated with one of the vaccines or - nourished with one of the chemical substances and, after a - period of 3 to 4 weeks, were infected with spotted fever germs. - The remaining 25 percent were infected without any previous - protection in order to compare the effectiveness of the vaccines - and the chemical substances. As a result, hundreds of the - persons experimented upon died. Experiments with yellow fever, - smallpox, typhus, paratyphus A and B, cholera, and diphtheria - were also conducted. Similar experiments with like results were - conducted at Natzweiler concentration camp. The defendants Karl - Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Schroeder, Genzken, Gebhardt, Rudolf - Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Rose, Becker-Freyseng, - and Hoven are charged with special responsibility for and - participation in these crimes. - - “(_K_) _Experiments with Poison._ In or about December 1943 and - in or about October 1944 experiments were conducted at the - Buchenwald concentration camp to investigate the effect of - various poisons upon human beings. The poisons were secretly - administered to experimental subjects in their food. The victims - died as a result of the poison or were killed immediately in - order to permit autopsies. In or about September 1944 - experimental subjects were shot with poison bullets and suffered - torture and death. The defendants Genzken, Gebhardt, Mrugowsky, - and Poppendick are charged with special responsibility for and - participation in these crimes. - - “(_L_) _Incendiary Bomb Experiments._ From about November 1943 - to about January 1944 experiments were conducted at the - Buchenwald concentration camp to test the effect of various - pharmaceutical preparations on phosphorus burns. These burns - were inflicted on experimental subjects with phosphorus matter - taken from incendiary bombs, and caused severe pain, suffering, - and serious bodily injury. The defendants Genzken, Gebhardt, - Mrugowsky, and Poppendick are charged with special - responsibility for and participation in these crimes.” - -In addition to the medical experiments, the nature and purpose of which -have been outlined as alleged, certain of the defendants are charged -with criminal activities involving murder, torture, and ill-treatment of -non-German nationals as follows: - - “7. Between June 1943 and September 1944 the defendants Rudolf - Brandt and Sievers * * * were principals in, accessories to, - ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected - with plans and enterprises involving the murder of civilians and - members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the - German Reich and who were in the custody of the German Reich in - exercise of belligerent control. One hundred twelve Jews were - selected for the purpose of completing a skeleton collection for - the Reich University of Strasbourg. Their photographs and - anthropological measurements were taken. Then they were killed. - Thereafter, comparison tests, anatomical research, studies - regarding race, pathological features of the body, form and size - of the brain, and other tests were made. The bodies were sent to - Strasbourg and defleshed. - - “8. Between May 1942 and January 1944[57] the defendants Blome - and Rudolf Brandt * * * were principals in, accessories to, - ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected - with plans and enterprises involving the murder and mistreatment - of tens of thousands of Polish nationals who were civilians and - members of the armed forces of a nation then at war with the - German Reich and who were in the custody of the German Reich in - exercise of belligerent control. These people were alleged to be - infected with incurable tuberculosis. On the ground of insuring - the health and welfare of Germans in Poland, many tubercular - Poles were ruthlessly exterminated while others were isolated in - death camps with inadequate medical facilities. - - “9. Between September 1939 and April 1945 the defendants Karl - Brandt, Blome, Brack, and Hoven * * * were principals in, - accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and - were connected with plans and enterprises involving the - execution of the so-called ‘euthanasia’ program of the German - Reich in the course of which the defendants herein murdered - hundreds of thousands of human beings, including nationals of - German-occupied countries. This program involved the systematic - and secret execution of the aged, insane, incurably ill, of - deformed children, and other persons, by gas, lethal injections, - and divers other means in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums. - Such persons were regarded as ‘useless eaters’ and a burden to - the German war machine. The relatives of these victims were - informed that they died from natural causes, such as heart - failure. German doctors involved in the ‘euthanasia’ program - were also sent to the eastern occupied countries to assist in - the mass extermination of Jews.” - -Counts two and three of the indictment conclude with the averment that -the crimes and atrocities which have been delineated “constitute -violations of international conventions * * *, the laws and customs of -war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal -laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries -in which such crimes were committed, and of Article II of Control -Council Law No. 10.” - -COUNT FOUR—_Membership in Criminal Organization_: The fourth count of -the indictment alleges that the defendants Karl Brandt, Genzken, -Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Brack, Hoven, -and Fischer are guilty of membership in an organization declared to be -criminal by the International Military Tribunal, in that each of these -named defendants was a member of the SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONAL -SOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the SS) -after 1 September 1939, in violation of paragraph 1 (_d_) Article II of -Control Council Law No. 10. - -Before turning our attention to the evidence in the case we shall state -the law announced by the International Military Tribunal with reference -to membership in an organization declared criminal by the Tribunal: - - “In dealing with the SS the Tribunal includes all persons who - had been officially accepted as members of the SS including the - members of the Allgemeine SS, members of the Waffen SS, members - of the SS Totenkopf Verbaende, and the members of any of the - different police forces who were members of the SS. The Tribunal - does not include the so-called riding units * * *. - - “The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the - Charter the group composed of those persons who had been - officially accepted as members of the SS as enumerated in the - preceding paragraph who became or remained members of the - organization with knowledge that it was being used for the - commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the - Charter, or who were personally implicated as members of the - organization in the commission of such crimes, excluding, - however, those who were drafted into membership by the State in - such a way as to give them no choice in the matter, and who had - committed no such crimes. The basis of this finding is the - participation of the organization in war crimes and crimes - against humanity connected with the war; this group declared - criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had ceased to - belong to the organizations enumerated in the preceding - paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.” - - - THE PROOF AS TO WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES - AGAINST HUMANITY - -Judged by any standard of proof the record clearly shows the commission -of war crimes and crimes against humanity substantially as alleged in -counts two and three of the indictment. Beginning with the outbreak of -World War II criminal medical experiments on non-German nationals, both -prisoners of war and civilians, including Jews and “asocial” persons, -were carried out on a large scale in Germany and the occupied countries. -These experiments were not the isolated and casual acts of individual -doctors and scientists working solely on their own responsibility, but -were the product of coordinated policy-making and planning at high -governmental, military, and Nazi Party levels, conducted as an integral -part of the total war effort. They were ordered, sanctioned, permitted, -or approved by persons in positions of authority who under all -principles of law were under the duty to know about these things and to -take steps to terminate or prevent them. - - - PERMISSIBLE MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS - -The great weight of the evidence before us is to the effect that certain -types of medical experiments on human beings, when kept within -reasonably well-defined bounds, conform to the ethics of the medical -profession generally. The protagonists of the practice of human -experimentation justify their views on the basis that such experiments -yield results for the good of society that are unprocurable by other -methods or means of study. All agree, however, that certain basic -principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal -concepts: - -1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. - -This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give -consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of -choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, -duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; -and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements -of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding -and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the -acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there -should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the -experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all -inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects -upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation -in the experiment. - -The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent -rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the -experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be -delegated to another with impunity. - -2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the -good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and -not random and unnecessary in nature. - -3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of -animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the -disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will -justify the performance of the experiment. - -4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary -physical and mental suffering and injury. - -5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an _a priori_ reason -to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, -in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as -subjects. - -6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by -the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the -experiment. - -7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided -to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of -injury, disability, or death. - -8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified -persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through -all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the -experiment. - -9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at -liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical -or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be -impossible. - -10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be -prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably -cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and -careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment -is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental -subject. - -Of the ten principles which have been enumerated our judicial concern, -of course, is with those requirements which are purely legal in -nature—or which at least are so clearly related to matters legal that -they assist us in determining criminal culpability and punishment. To go -beyond that point would lead us into a field that would be beyond our -sphere of competence. However, the point need not be labored. We find -from the evidence that in the medical experiments which have been -proved, these ten principles were much more frequently honored in their -breach than in their observance. Many of the concentration camp inmates -who were the victims of these atrocities were citizens of countries -other than the German Reich. They were non-German nationals, including -Jews and “asocial persons”, both prisoners of war and civilians, who had -been imprisoned and forced to submit to these tortures and barbarities -without so much as a semblance of trial. In every single instance -appearing in the record, subjects were used who did not consent to the -experiments; indeed, as to some of the experiments, it is not even -contended by the defendants that the subjects occupied the status of -volunteers. In no case was the experimental subject at liberty of his -own free choice to withdraw from any experiment. In many cases -experiments were performed by unqualified persons; were conducted at -random for no adequate scientific reason, and under revolting physical -conditions. All of the experiments were conducted with unnecessary -suffering and injury and but very little, if any, precautions were taken -to protect or safeguard the human subjects from the possibilities of -injury, disability, or death. In every one of the experiments the -subjects experienced extreme pain or torture, and in most of them they -suffered permanent injury, mutilation, or death, either as a direct -result of the experiments or because of lack of adequate follow-up care. - -Obviously all of these experiments involving brutalities, tortures, -disabling injury, and death were performed in complete disregard of -international conventions, the laws and customs of war, the general -principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -civilized nations, and Control Council Law No. 10. Manifestly human -experiments under such conditions are contrary to “the principles of the -law of nations as they result from the usages established among -civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of -public conscience.” - -Whether any of the defendants in the dock are guilty of these atrocities -is, of course, another question. - -Under the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence every defendant in a -criminal case is presumed to be innocent of an offense charged until the -prosecution, by competent, credible proof, has shown his guilt to the -exclusion of every reasonable doubt. And this presumption abides with a -defendant through each stage of his trial until such degree of proof has -been adduced. A “reasonable doubt” as the name implies is one -conformable to reason—a doubt which a reasonable man would entertain. -Stated differently, it is that state of a case which, after a full and -complete comparison and consideration of all the evidence, would leave -an unbiased, unprejudiced, reflective person, charged with the -responsibility for decision, in the state of mind that he could not say -that he felt an abiding conviction amounting to a moral certainty of the -truth of the charge. - -If any of the defendants are to be found guilty under counts two or -three of the indictment it must be because the evidence has shown beyond -a reasonable doubt that such defendant, without regard to nationality or -the capacity in which he acted, participated as a principal in, -accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, or was -connected with plans or enterprises involving the commission of at least -some of the medical experiments and other atrocities which are the -subject matter of these counts. Under no other circumstances may he be -convicted. - -Before examining the evidence to which we must look in order to -determine individual culpability, a brief statement concerning some of -the official agencies of the German Government and Nazi Party which will -be referred to in this judgment seems desirable. - - - THE MEDICAL SERVICE IN GERMANY - -Adolf Hitler was the head of the Nazi Party, the German Government, and -the German Armed Forces. His title as Chief of the Government was “Reich -Chancellor”. As Supreme Leader of the National Socialist German Workers’ -Party, commonly called the NSDAP or Nazi Party, his title was “Fuehrer”. -As head of Germany’s armed military might he was “Supreme Commander in -Chief of the German Armed Forces [Supreme Commander of the German Armed -Forces], or Wehrmacht”. - -The staff through which Hitler controlled the German Armed Forces was -known as the “Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht” (OKW). The chief of this -staff was Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. - -Under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht were the Supreme [High] -Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Supreme [High] Command of -the Navy (OKM) was headed by Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz. The Supreme -[High] Command of the Army (OKH) was headed by Field Marshal Walter von -Brauchitsch until December 1941, and thereafter by Hitler himself. The -Supreme [High] Command of the Air Force (OKL) was headed by Reich -Marshal Hermann Goering. - -Each of the three branches of the Wehrmacht maintained its own medical -service. - -_Army Medical Service._ The defendant Handloser was the head of the Army -Medical Service from 1 January 1941 to 1 September 1944. While in this -position he served in two capacities, namely; as Army Medical Inspector -and as Army [Heeres] Physician. These positions required the maintenance -of two departments, each separate from the other. At one time or another -there were subordinated to Handloser in these official capacities the -following officers, among others: Generalarzt Professor Schreiber and -Professor Rostock; Oberstabsaerzte Drs. Scholz, Eyer, Bernhard Schmidt -and Craemer; Oberstabsaerzte Professor Gutzeit and Professor Wirth; -Stabsarzt Professor Kliewe and Professor Killian, and Stabsarzt Dr. -Dohmen. Under his supervision in either or both of his official -capacities were the Military Medical Academy, the Typhus and Virus -Institute of the OKH at Cracow [Krakow] and Lemberg [Lvov], and the -Medical School for Mountain Troops at St. Johann. - -_Luftwaffe Medical Service._ From the beginning of the war until 1 -January 1944 Hippke was Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. -On that date the defendant Schroeder succeeded Hippke and remained in -that position until the end of the war. - -Subordinated to Schroeder as Chief of the Medical Service of the -Luftwaffe were the following defendants: Rose, who was consulting -medical officer on hygiene and tropical medicine; Weltz, who was chief -of the Institute for Aviation Medicine in Munich; Becker-Freyseng, a -consultant for aviation medicine in Schroeder’s office; Ruff, the chief -of the Institute for Aviation Medicine in the German Experimental -Institute for Aviation in Berlin; Romberg, Ruff’s chief assistant, who -toward the end of the war attained the position of a department head at -the Institute; Schaefer, who, in the summer of 1942, was assigned to the -staff of the Research Institute for Aviation Medicine in Berlin to do -research work on the problem of sea emergency; and Beiglboeck, a -Luftwaffe officer who performed medical experiments on concentration -camp inmates at Dachau in July 1944 for the purpose of determining the -potability of processed sea water. - -Under Schroeder’s jurisdiction as Chief of the Luftwaffe Medical Service -was the Medical Academy of the Luftwaffe at Berlin. - -_SS Medical Service._ One of the most important branches of the Nazi -Party was the Schutzstaffel of the NSDAP, commonly known as the SS. -Heinrich Himmler was chief of the SS with the title of Reichsfuehrer SS, -and on his personal staff, serving in various and sundry official -capacities was the defendant Rudolf Brandt. - -The SS maintained its own medical service headed by a certain Dr. -Grawitz, who held the position of Reich Physician SS and Police. - -_Medical Service of the Waffen SS._ The SS branch of the Nazi Party, in -turn, was divided into several components, of which one of the most -important was the Waffen, or Armed, SS. The Waffen SS was formed into -military units and fought at the front with units of the Wehrmacht. Such -medical units of the Waffen SS as were assigned to the field, became -subordinated to the Medical Service of the Army, which was supervised by -Handloser. - -The Chief of the Waffen SS Medical Service was the defendant Genzken. -His immediate superior was Reich Physician SS and Police Grawitz. - -Six other defendants in the dock were members of the Medical Service of -the SS, under Grawitz, namely; Gebhardt, who in 1940 became surgical -adviser to the Waffen SS and who in August 1943 created and took over -the position of chief clinical officer of the Reich Physician SS and -Police; Mrugowsky, who became Chief of the Hygiene Institute of the -Waffen SS under Genzken in November 1940, and when the Institute was -taken from Genzken’s supervision on 1 September 1943 and placed under -direct subordination to Grawitz, remained as chief; Poppendick, who in -1941 was appointed Chief Physician of the Main Race and Settlement -Office in Berlin and who in 1943 also became chief of the personal staff -of the Reich Physician SS and Police; Hoven, who from the beginning of -1941 until July 1942, served as the assistant, and from then to -September 1943, as chief physician at the Buchenwald concentration camp; -Fischer, an assistant physician to the defendant Gebhardt; and finally -the defendant Oberheuser, who in December 1940 became a physician at the -Ravensbrueck concentration camp, and thereafter, from June 1943 until -the end of the war, served as an assistant physician under the defendant -Gebhardt at Hohenlychen. - -_Civilian Medical Service._ Throughout the war the Civilian Medical -Services of the Reich were headed by a certain Dr. Leonardo Conti. Conti -had two principal capacities (1) he was the State Secretary for Health -in the Ministry of the Interior of the Government; in this capacity he -was a German civil servant subordinated to the Minister of the -Interior—first Wilhelm Frick and later, Heinrich Himmler; (2) he was -the Reich Health Leader of the Nazi Party; in this capacity he was -subordinated to the Nazi Party Chancellery, the Chief of which was -Martin Bormann. In his capacity as Reich Health Leader, Conti had as his -deputy the defendant Blome. - -_Reorganization of Wehrmacht Medical Service._ In 1942 a reorganization -of the various medical services of the Wehrmacht was effected. By a -Fuehrer decree of 28 July 1942, Handloser became Chief of the Medical -Services of the Wehrmacht, while at the same time retaining his position -as Chief Physician of the Army and Army Medical Inspector. Under the -decree referred to, Handloser was given power and authority to supervise -and coordinate “all tasks common to the Medical Services of the -Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS and the organizations and units subordinate or -attached to the Wehrmacht.” He was also commanded “to represent the -Wehrmacht before the civilian authorities in all common medical problems -arising in the various branches of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS and -organizations and units subordinate or attached to the Wehrmacht” and -“to protect the interests of the Wehrmacht in all medical measures taken -by the civilian authorities.” - -Handloser thus became supreme medical leader in the military field, as -was Conti in the civilian health and medical service. - -By a subsequent Fuehrer decree of 7 August 1944 Handloser was relieved -of his duties as Chief Physician of the Army and Army Medical Inspector, -but retained his position as Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service. - -By the decree of 28 July 1942 pursuant to which Handloser became Chief -of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht, the defendant Karl Brandt -became empowered, subordinate only to, and receiving instructions -directly from, Hitler “to carry out special tasks and negotiations to -readjust the requirements for doctors, hospitals, medical supplies, -etc., between the military and the civilian sectors of the Health and -Medical Services.” The decree also directed that Brandt “is to be kept -informed about the fundamental events in the Medical Service of the -Wehrmacht and in the Civilian Health Service” and “is authorized to -intervene in a responsible manner.” - -A subsequent decree issued 5 September 1943 extended the powers of the -defendant Karl Brandt by providing: “The plenipotentiary for the Medical -and Health Services * * * is charged with centrally coordinating and -directing the problems and activities of the entire Medical and Health -Service according to instructions. In this sense this order applies also -to the field of medical science and research, as well as to the -organizational institutions concerned with the manufacture and -distribution of medical material. The plenipotentiary for the Medical -and Health services is authorized to appoint and commission special -deputies for this sphere of action.” - -By a later decree of 25 August 1944 Karl Brandt was made Reich -Commissioner for Sanitation and Health for the duration of the war; the -decree providing: - - “In this capacity his office ranks as highest Reich Authority” - and he is “authorized to issue instructions to the offices and - organizations of the State, Party, and Wehrmacht which are - concerned with the problems of the medical and health services.” - -Thus, by this series of decrees, the defendant Karl Brandt, within this -sphere of competence, became the supreme medical authority of the Reich -subordinate to no one but Hitler. - -Three of the defendants are not physicians. - -The first is the defendant Brack who became subordinated to Bouhler at -the time the latter was appointed Chief of the Chancellery of the -Fuehrer, in 1934, and remained with Bouhler throughout the war. - -The second is the defendant Rudolf Brandt who, from the time he joined -the staff of Himmler in 1933, served for a twelve-year period in varying -capacities. At first Rudolf Brandt was a mere clerk in the staff of the -Reichsfuehrer SS but by 1936 had risen to chief of the personal staff of -Himmler. In 1938 or 1939 he became Himmler’s liaison officer to the -Ministry of the Interior and particularly to the Office of the Secretary -of the Interior. When Himmler became Minister of the Interior in 1943 -Rudolf Brandt became Chief of the Ministerial Office; when Himmler -became President of the Ahnenerbe Society, Rudolf Brandt became liaison -officer between Himmler and the Reich Secretary of the Ahnenerbe -Society, defendant Wolfram Sievers. - -The third is the defendant Sievers, who was a member of Himmler’s -personal staff and Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe Society from -1 July 1935 until the end of the war. - - - THE AHNENERBE SOCIETY - -The Ahnenerbe Society, of which Sievers was Reich Business Manager, was -in existence as an independent entity as early as 1933. On 1 July 1935 -the Ahnenerbe became duly registered as an organization to conduct or -further “research on the locality, mind, deeds and heritage of the -Northern race of Indo-Germans and to pass on the results of this -research to the people in an interesting manner.” On 1 January 1942 the -Society became part of the personal staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS and -thereby a section of the SS. Its management was composed of Heinrich -Himmler as President, Professor Dr. Wuest, Rector of the University of -Munich, as Curator, and the defendant Sievers as Reich Business Manager. -Subsequently, during the same year, the Institute of Military Scientific -Research was established as a part of the Ahnenerbe. Its purposes are -defined in a letter written by Himmler to Sievers, which directed the -following with reference to the Ahnenerbe: - - “1. To establish an Institute for Military Scientific Research. - - 2. To support in every possible way the research carried out by - SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Professor Dr. Hirt and to promote all - corresponding research and undertakings. - - 3. To make available the required apparatus, equipment, - accessories and assistants, or to procure them. - - 4. To make use of the facilities available in Dachau. - - 5. To contact the Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative - Main Office with regards to the costs which can be borne by the - Waffen SS.” - -In its judgment, the International Military Tribunal made the following -findings of fact with reference to the Ahnenerbe: - - “Also attached to the SS main offices was a research foundation - known as the Experiments Ahnenerbe. The scientists attached to - this organization are stated to have been mainly honorary - members of the SS. During the war an institute for military - scientific research became attached to the Ahnenerbe which - conducted extensive experiments involving the use of living - human beings. An employee of this institute was a certain Dr. - Rascher, who conducted these experiments with the full knowledge - of the Ahnenerbe, which were subsidized and under the patronage - of the Reichsfuehrer SS who was a trustee of the - foundation.”[58] - -We shall now discuss the evidence as it pertains to the cases of the -individual defendants. - -The evidence conclusively shows that the German word “_Fleckfieber_” -which is translated in the indictment as “spotted fever” is more -correctly translated by “typhus.” This is admitted, and in this -judgment, in accord with the evidence, we use the word typhus instead of -“spotted fever.” - - - KARL BRANDT - -The defendant Karl Brandt is charged with special responsibility for, -and participation in, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone, -Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, -Epidemic Jaundice, Sterilization, and Typhus Experiments, as alleged -under counts two and three of the indictment. He is also charged in -counts two and three with criminality in connection with the planning -and carrying out of the Euthanasia Program of the German Reich. Under -count four of the indictment he is charged with membership in the SS, an -organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International -Military Tribunal. - -Karl Brandt was born 8 January 1904 at Muehlhausen, Alsace, then a -portion of Germany, studied medicine, and passed his medical examination -in 1928. He joined the National Socialist Party in January 1932, and -became a member of the SA in 1933. He became a member of the Allgemeine -SS in July 1934 and was appointed Untersturmfuehrer on the day he joined -that organization. During the summer of 1934 he became Hitler’s “Escort -Physician”—as he describes the office. - -He was promoted to the grade of Obersturmfuehrer in the Allgemeine SS on -1 January 1935, and in 1938 was classed as deferred in order that in -case of war he might be free to serve on the staff of the Reich -Chancellery in Hitler’s headquarters. During the month of April 1939 -Karl Brandt was promoted to the rank of Obersturmbannfuehrer in the -Allgemeine SS. In 1940 he was transferred from the Allgemeine SS to the -Waffen SS, in which commissions were equivalent to those of the army. On -30 January 1943 he received a grade equivalent to that of major general -in the Waffen SS, and on 20 April 1944 was promoted to the grade of -lieutenant general in that organization. Having at some previous date -been relieved as Hitler’s escort physician, he was again appointed as -such in the fall of 1944. On 16 April 1945 he was arrested by the -Gestapo, and the next day was condemned to death by a court at Berlin. -He was released from arrest by order of the provisional government under -Doenitz on 2 May 1945. On 23 May 1945 he was placed under arrest by the -British authorities. - -By decree bearing date 28 July 1942, signed by Hitler, Keitel, and -Lammers, Karl Brandt was invested with high authority over the medical -services, military and civilian, in Germany. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this -decree, referring to Karl Brandt, read as follows: - - “3. I empower Professor Dr. Karl Brandt, subordinate only to me - personally and receiving his instructions directly from me, to - carry out special tasks and negotiations to readjust the - requirements for doctors, hospitals, medical supplies, etc., - between the military and the civilian sectors of the Health and - Medical Services. - - “4. My plenipotentiary for Health and Medical Services is to be - kept informed about the fundamental events in the Medical - Service of the Wehrmacht and in the Civilian Health Service. He - is authorized to intervene in a responsible manner.” - -By decree bearing date 5 September 1943, signed by Hitler and Lammers, -Brandt’s authority was strengthened. This decree reads as follows: - - “In amplification of my decree concerning the Medical and Health - Services of 28 July 1942 (RGBL. I, P. 515) I order: - - “The plenipotentiary for the Medical and Health Services, - General Commissioner Professor Dr. med. Brandt, is charged with - centrally coordinating and directing the problems and activities - of the entire Medical and Health Services according to - instructions. In this sense this order applies also to the field - of medical science and research, as well as to the - organizational institutions concerned with the manufacture and - distribution of medical material. - - “The plenipotentiary for the Medical and Health Services is - authorized to appoint and commission special deputies for his - spheres of action.” - -By further decree bearing date 25 August 1944, signed by Hitler, -Lammers, Bormann, and Keitel, Karl Brandt received further authority. -This decree reads: - - “I hereby appoint the General Commissioner for Medical and - Health matters, Professor Dr. Brandt, Reich Commissioner for - Sanitation and Health [Reich Commissioner for Medical and Health - Services] as well, for the duration of this war. In this - capacity his office ranks as highest Reich authority. - - “The Reich Commissioner for Medical and Health Services is - authorized to issue instructions to the offices and - organizations of the State, Party, and Wehrmacht, which are - concerned with the problems of the Medical and Health Services.” - -Prosecution Exhibit 445, a letter bearing date at Munich, 9 January -1943, signed by Conti and marked “Strictly Confidential” directed to the -Leaders of Public Health Gau Offices of the National Socialist German -Workers’ Party, refers to a decree of the Fuehrer on “Suspending the -Pledge to Secrecy in Special Cases.” The letter continues: - - “For your strictly confidential information I am sending - attached Fuehrer decree and the circular letter I am writing on - that subject to the heads of the medical chambers.” - -Another portion of the exhibit consists of a copy of Conti’s letter, -also bearing date 9 January 1943, to the heads of the medical chambers, -and reads as follows: - - “Strictly Confidential. - - “Subject: Fuehrer decree on suspension of pledge to secrecy in - special cases. - - “Gentlemen: - - “I am sending you enclosed a Fuehrer decree which I received - from Professor Dr. Brandt. - - “Communications having bearing on the Fuehrer decree should be - directed to the following address: Professor Doctor Karl Brandt, - Personal Attention, Berlin W8, Reich Chancellory. - - “It is left to the discretion of the physician who is handling - the case whether he wishes to acquaint the patient with the - information himself.” - -Hitler’s decree, bearing date 23 December 1942, reads as follows: - - “I not only relieve physicians, medical practitioners and - dentists of their pledge to secrecy towards my Commissioner - General Professor Dr. med. Karl Brandt, but I place upon them - the binding obligation to advise him—for my own - information—immediately after a final diagnosis has established - a serious disease, or a disease of ill-boding character, with a - personality holding a leading position or a position of - responsibility in the State, the Party, the Wehrmacht, in - industry, and so forth.” - -Concerning this matter Karl Brandt testified that the decree “in special -cases” relieved German physicians from one of the generally accepted -principles of medical practice. - -From the year 1942 to the end of the war Karl Brandt was a member of the -Reich Research Council and was also a member of the Presidential Council -of that body. - -Karl Brandt, then, finally reached a position authorizing him to issue -instructions to all the medical services of the State, Party, and -Wehrmacht concerning medical problems (Hitler Decree bearing date 25 -August 1944). The above decrees of Hitler disclose his great reliance -upon Karl Brandt and the high degree of personal and professional -confidence which Hitler reposed in him. - -It may be noted that by the service regulation governing the Chief of -the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht, issued by Keitel 7 August 1944, -the chief of those medical services was required to pay due regard to -the general rules of the Fuehrer’s Commissioner General for Medical and -Health Departments. The regulation contained the following: - - “3. The Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht will - inform the Fuehrer’s Commissioner General about basic events in - the field of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht.” - -By a pre-trial affidavit made by the defendant Handloser and put in -evidence by the prosecution, Handloser makes the statement that Karl -Brandt was his “immediate superior in medical affairs.” - -SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS - -Certain sulfanilamide experiments were conducted at Ravensbrueck for a -period of about a year prior to August 1943. These experiments were -carried on by the defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser—Gebhardt -being in charge of the project. At the Third Meeting of the Consulting -Physicians of the Wehrmacht held at the Military Medical Academy in -Berlin from 24 to 26 May 1943, Gebhardt and Fischer made a complete -report concerning these experiments. Karl Brandt was present and heard -the reports. Gebhardt testified that he made a full statement concerning -what he had done, stating that experiments had been carried out on human -beings. The evidence is convincing that statements were also made that -the persons experimented upon were concentration camp inmates. It was -stated that 75 persons had been experimented upon, that the subjects had -been deliberately infected, and that different drugs had been used in -treating the infections to determine their respective efficacy. It was -also stated that three of the subjects died. It nowhere appears that -Karl Brandt made any objection to such experiments or that he made any -investigation whatever concerning the experiments reported upon, or to -gain any information as to whether other human subjects would be -subjected to experiments in the future. Had he made the slightest -investigation he could have ascertained that such experiments were being -conducted on non-German nationals, without their consent, and in -flagrant disregard of their personal rights; and that such experiments -were planned for the future. - -In the medical field Karl Brandt held a position of the highest rank -directly under Hitler. He was in a position to intervene with authority -on all medical matters; indeed, it appears that such was his positive -duty. It does not appear that at any time he took any steps to check -medical experiments upon human subjects. During the war he visited -several concentration camps. Occupying the position he did, and being a -physician of ability and experience, the duty rested upon him to make -some adequate investigation concerning the medical experiments which he -knew had been, were being, and doubtless would continue to be, conducted -in the concentration camps. - -EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS - -Karl Brandt is charged with criminal responsibility for experiments -conducted for the purpose of discovering an effective vaccine to bring -about immunity from epidemic jaundice. Grawitz, by letter dated 1 June -1943, wrote Himmler stating that Karl Brandt had requested his -assistance in the matter of research on the causes of epidemic jaundice. -Grawitz stated that Karl Brandt had interested himself in this research -and desired that prisoners be placed at his disposal. The letter further -stated that up to that date experiments had been made only on animals, -but that it had become necessary to pursue the matter further by -inoculating human beings with virus cultures. The letter stated that -deaths must be anticipated, and that eight prisoners who had been -condemned to death were needed for the experiments at the hospital of -the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen. Under date of 16 June 1943 -Himmler acknowledged the letter from Grawitz and directed that eight -criminals in Auschwitz, Jews of the Polish Resistance Movement condemned -to death, should be used for experiments which should be conducted by -Dr. Dohmen at Sachsenhausen. Karl Brandt’s knowledge of experiments on -non-German nationals is clearly shown by the foregoing. - -LOST (MUSTARD) GAS EXPERIMENTS - -It is clear from the record that experiments with Lost gas were -conducted on concentration camp inmates throughout the period covered by -the indictment. The evidence is that over 200 concentration camp -inmates, Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Germans, were used as experimental -subjects. At least 50 of these subjects, most of whom were -nonvolunteers, died as a direct or indirect result of the treatment -received. - -Karl Brandt knew of the fact that such experiments were being conducted. -The evidence is to the effect that he knew of Lost gas experiments -conducted by Bickenbach at Strasbourg during the fall of 1943, in which -Russian prisoners were apparently used as subjects, some of whom died. - -A letter written by the defendant Sievers to the defendant Rudolf -Brandt, dated 11 April 1944, points to the fact that Karl Brandt knew of -still other such experiments. The letter states, that in accordance with -instructions he, Sievers, had contacted Karl Brandt, at Beelitz, and had -reported to him concerning the activities of a certain Dr. Hirt, who the -evidence shows had been experimenting with Lost gas upon concentration -camp inmates at Natzweiler. In the letter, Sievers states, further, that -Karl Brandt had told him that he would be in Strasbourg in April and -would then discuss details with Dr. Hirt. - -Knowledge of the conduct of at least some of the experiments was -confirmed by Karl Brandt when he testified in his own behalf. He stated -that pursuant to competent authority he had engaged in studies -concerning defense measures against poison gas. He admitted receiving a -report from Hirt, and that one reading the report could reach the -conclusion that human beings had been experimented upon in connection -with injuries from Lost gas. - -FREEZING, MALARIA, BONE, MUSCLE AND -NERVE REGENERATION AND BONE TRANSPLANTATION, -SEA-WATER, STERILIZATION, -AND TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Karl Brandt is -criminally responsible on account of the experiments with which he is -charged under these specifications. - -The defendant Karl Brandt certainly knew that medical experiments were -carried out in concentration camps upon human subjects, that the -experiments caused suffering, injury, and death. By letter bearing date -26 January 1943 Karl Brandt wrote to Wolff at the Fuehrer’s (Hitler’s) -headquarters asking if it were possible to carry out “nutritional -experiments” in concentration camps. The nature of the desired -experiments does not appear, nor does the evidence show whether or not -such experiments were ever made. The letter, however, indicates Brandt’s -knowledge of the fact that human subjects could be made available for -experimentation. - -Defendant Rudolf Brandt, by letter dated 4 September 1944, wrote -Baumert, evidently a member of Himmler’s staff, stating that Karl Brandt -had telephoned and requested that Himmler direct that 10 prisoners from -Oranienburg should be made available as of the next day for two days to -test a certain drug. The letter stated that the prisoners would not be -injured by the test. - -It appears from an official note filed by Kliewe of the Army Medical -Inspectorate, dated 23 February 1944, referring to a conversation with -the defendant Blome on that date, that experiments concerning biological -warfare connected with plant parasites, etc., had been made; that up to -that date no experiments had been conducted in the field of human -medicine; but that such experiments were necessary and were in -contemplation. The memorandum continues: - - “Field Marshal Keitel has given permission to build; - Reichsfuehrer SS and Generalarzt Professor Brandt have assured - him of vast support. By request of Field Marshal Keitel the - armed forces are not to have a responsible share in the - experiments, since experiments will also be conducted on human - beings.” - -It is significant that Hitler’s Chief of Staff should deem it advisable -to direct that the Wehrmacht should have nothing to do with experiments -on human subjects. - -EUTHANASIA - -Defendant Karl Brandt is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with criminal activities in connection with the euthanasia -program of the German Reich, in the course of which thousands of human -beings, including nationals of German occupied countries, were killed -between 1 September 1939 and April 1945. - -On his own letterhead Hitler, at Berlin, 1 September 1939, signed a -secret order reading as follows: - - “Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D., are charged with the - responsibility of enlarging the authority of certain physicians - to be designated by name in such a manner that persons who, - according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a most - careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a - mercy death.” - -Bouhler was holding a high office in the NSDAP. He was not a physician. - -The foregoing order was not based on any previously existing German law; -and the only authority for the execution of euthanasia was the secret -order issued by Hitler. - -The evidence shows that Bouhler and Karl Brandt, who were jointly -charged with the administration of euthanasia, entered upon the duties -assigned them in connection with the setting up of processes for -carrying out the order. A budget was adopted; the method of determining -candidates for euthanasia was established; a patients’ transport -corporation was organized to convey the selected patients to the gassing -chambers. Questionnaires were prepared which were forwarded to the heads -of mental institutions, one questionnaire to be accomplished concerning -each inmate and then returned to the Ministry of the Interior. At the -Ministry the completed questionnaires were examined by so-called -experts, who registered their professional opinions thereon, returned -them to the appropriate office for final examination, and orders were -issued for those patients who by this process were finally selected for -extermination. Thereafter the condemned patients were gathered at -collection points, from whence they were transported to euthanasia -stations and killed by gassing. - -Utmost secrecy was demanded of the executioners throughout the entire -procedure. Persons actively concerned in the program were required to -subscribe a written oath of secrecy and were warned that violation of -that oath would result in most serious personal consequences. The -consent of the relatives of the “incurables” was not even obtained; the -question of secrecy being deemed so important. - -Shortly after the commencement of operations for the disposal of -“incurables”, the program was extended to Jews, and then to -concentration camp inmates. In this latter phase of the program, -prisoners deemed by the examining doctors to be unfit or useless for -labor were ruthlessly weeded out and sent to the extermination stations -in great numbers. - -Karl Brandt maintains that he is not implicated in the extermination of -Jews or of concentration camp inmates; that his official responsibility -for euthanasia ceased at the close of the summer of 1941, at which time -euthanasia procedures against “incurables” were terminated by order of -Hitler. - -It is difficult to believe this assertion, but even if it be true, we -cannot understand how this fact would aid the defendant. The evidence is -conclusive that almost at the outset of the program non-German nationals -were selected for euthanasia and exterminated. Needless to say, these -persons did not voluntarily consent to become the subjects of this -procedure. - -Karl Brandt admits that after he had disposed of the medical decisions -required to be made by him with regard to the initial program which he -maintains was valid, he did not follow the program further but left the -administrative details of execution to Bouhler. If this be true, his -failure to follow up a program for which he was charged with special -responsibility constituted the gravest breach of duty. A discharge of -that duty would have easily revealed what now is so manifestly evident -from the record; that whatever may have been the original aim of the -program, its purposes were prostituted by men for whom Brandt was -responsible, and great numbers of non-German nationals were exterminated -under its authority. - -We have no doubt but that Karl Brandt—as he himself testified—is a -sincere believer in the administration of euthanasia to persons -hopelessly ill, whose lives are burdensome to themselves and an expense -to the state or to their families. The abstract proposition of whether -or not euthanasia is justified in certain cases of the class referred to -is no concern of this Tribunal. Whether or not a state may validly enact -legislation which imposes euthanasia upon certain classes of its -citizens is likewise a question which does not enter into the issues. -Assuming that it may do so, the Family of Nations is not obligated to -give recognition to such legislation when it manifestly gives legality -to plain murder and torture of defenseless and powerless human beings of -other nations. - -The evidence is conclusive that persons were included in the program who -were non-German nationals. The dereliction of the defendant Brandt -contributed to their extermination. That is enough to require this -Tribunal to find that he is criminally responsible in the program. - -We find that Karl Brandt was responsible for, aided and abetted, took a -consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises -involving medical experiments conducted on non-German nationals against -their consent, and in other atrocities, in the course of which murders, -brutalities, cruelties, tortures and other inhumane acts were committed. -To the extent that these criminal acts did not constitute war crimes -they constituted crimes against humanity. - -MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment Karl Brandt is charged with being a -member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the -International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that -Karl Brandt became a member of the SS in July 1934 and remained in this -organization at least until April 1945. As a member of the SS he was -criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against -humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Karl Brandt guilty, -under counts two, three, and four, of the indictment. - - - HANDLOSER - -Under counts two and three of the indictment the defendant Handloser is -charged with special responsibility for, and participation in, -High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost (Mustard) Gas, Sulfanilamide, -Bone, Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, -Epidemic Jaundice, and Typhus Experiments. - -The charge of participation in the high-altitude experiments has been -abandoned by the prosecution, and hence will not be considered further. - -Handloser was a professional soldier, having been commissioned in the -Medical Department of the German Army in 1910. During the First World -War he rose to the position of commanding officer of a division medical -unit, and on 1 September 1939 he was appointed Chief Medical Officer of -the 14th German Army. After service in the field, on 6 November 1940 he -was appointed Deputy Army Medical Inspector. He became Army Medical -Inspector on 1 January 1941, and the following April was given the -additional appointment of Chief Medical Officer of the field forces, -holding both positions until 28 July 1942, when he became Chief of the -Wehrmacht Medical Service. He retained also his other appointment and -performed the duties of both positions. He was retained in his position -as Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service on 1 September 1944, but -relieved of the duties pertaining to the other office which he had -theretofore held, he having exercised the functions of both offices -until the date last mentioned. His professional career is more -particularly described above. - -Handloser states that prior to his last appointment in 1944 he was -authorized to issue “instructions,” but not orders—testifying that -after his latest appointment he had authority to issue orders to the -chiefs of the medical services of all branches of the Wehrmacht. He also -had jurisdiction over scientific medical institutes, etc., as designated -by the service regulations promulgated at the time of his last -appointment. While the chief medical officers of the army, navy, and -Luftwaffe were under their appropriate military superiors, Handloser had -authority to coordinate the activities of all the Wehrmacht medical -services and to establish their coordinated action. As to the Waffen SS, -his authority extended only to such units of that organization as were -attached to and made part of the Wehrmacht. - -Handloser testified that the utilization of medical material and -personnel were, insofar as the Wehrmacht was concerned, within his -jurisdiction after the entry of the decree of 28 July 1942, and that -upon occasion he called meetings of the chief medical officers of the -Wehrmacht and specialists in appropriate fields of medicine, in an -effort to avoid duplication of certain research problems in connection -with malaria, typhus, paratyphus, and cholera. - -As Army Medical Inspector he was also _ex officio_ president of the -Scientific Senate, but testified that this body did not meet after 1942. -As an army physician he denied any special knowledge concerning -scientific problems peculiarly affecting the navy or the Luftwaffe; but -on an organization chart prepared by him and received in evidence as -Prosecution Exhibit 9 he is shown as subordinated to Karl Brandt and as -Chief of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht occupying the position of -superior over the Army Medical Service and the chiefs of the Medical -Services of the Navy and Luftwaffe and certain other subordinate -agencies pertaining to the Wehrmacht. The chart also indicates his -authority over the Chief of the Medical Office [Service] of the Waffen -SS and components of the Waffen SS when attached to the Wehrmacht. - -It appears that Handloser had much to do in connection with the calling -of meetings of the “Consulting Physicians”; that he designated some of -the subjects to be discussed at these meetings; and that his -subordinate, Schreiber, arranged the details. - -At the Second Meeting of Consulting Surgeons held 30 November to 3 -December 1942 at the Military Medical Academy, he addressed those -present (referring to the meeting as “This Second Work Conference -East”), observing that representatives of the three branches of the -Wehrmacht, of the Waffen SS and Police, of the Labor Service, and the -Organization Todt, were also present. He called attention to the -presence of Conti, Head of the Medical Services in the Civilian Sector. - -At the Fourth Meeting of Consulting Physicians held at Hohenlychen, 16 -to 18 May 1944, Karl Brandt—in addressing the meeting—said that -Handloser, a soldier and a physician, was “responsible for the use and -the performance of our medical officers”. - -Schreiber, until 30 May 1943 a close subordinate of Handloser in his -capacity of Army Medical Inspector, was a member of the Reich Research -Council, paying particular regard to the control of epidemics as his -special field. Schreiber frequently reported to Handloser, with whom he -had worked for some years. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -Professor Dr. Holzloehner, who with Drs. Finke and Rascher performed -freezing experiments on concentration camp inmates at Dachau, made -reports on at least two occasions to groups of army physicians -concerning cold and freezing problems. The first such report was made at -a meeting held on 26 to 27 October 1942, which was called to consider -problems concerning cold. Schreiber, who held a responsible position -under Handloser from 1 April 1942 to 31 May 1943, was present at this -meeting, as was Craemer, head of the Mountain Medical School of the army -at St. Johann, which was also under Handloser’s jurisdiction. During the -meeting and after Holzloehner had made his report, Rascher also made -statements before the meeting concerning these experiments, from which -it was obvious that statements contained in the reports were based upon -observations made by experimenting on human beings. From the two reports -it was clear that concentration camp inmates had been experimented upon -and that some deaths had resulted. - -Holzloehner was invited to lecture again upon this subject at the Second -Meeting of the Consulting Physicians of the Wehrmacht, held 30 November -to 3 December 1942, at the Military Medical Academy at Berlin. Handloser -heard this talk by Holzloehner and testified that the matter of cold and -freezing was one of the most important problems to the army. - -We think it manifestly clear from the evidence dealing with freezing -that Handloser had actual knowledge that such experiments had been -conducted upon inmates at Dachau concentration camp, during the course -of which suffering and deaths had resulted to the experimental subjects. - -SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS - -Handloser is charged with participation in the sulfanilamide experiments -conducted by the defendant Gebhardt. These experiments were conducted at -Ravensbrueck concentration camp during a period extending from 20 July -1942 to August 1943 upon concentration camp inmates without their -consent. While these experiments were still in progress Gebhardt was -invited to present a report on his research findings at the Third -Meeting of the Consulting Physicians held on 18 and 19 May 1943, at the -Military Medical Academy in Berlin. Handloser was present at that -meeting; in fact, he had addressed the meeting prior to Gebhardt’s -giving his report. - -As stated elsewhere, Gebhardt made a frank and candid report of what he -had been doing at Ravensbrueck; honestly telling the group that his -experimental subjects were not volunteers but were concentration camp -inmates condemned to death, who had been given the hope of reduction of -sentence should they survive the experiments. By means of charts to -illustrate his lecture, he made it clear that deaths had occurred among -the human subjects. When on the witness stand, the defendant Gebhardt -testified that prior to the meeting of consulting physicians he had -discussed with either Schreiber or the defendant Rostock the subject -matter of the lecture to be given, and that at that time Schreiber had -stated that he had received data concerning the experiments through -official channels. - -At that time Schreiber was a direct subordinate of the defendant -Handloser, and we think it may be fairly assumed that Schreiber’s -knowledge was the knowledge of Handloser. However, be that as it may, -the evidence is clear that Handloser heard the lecture by Gebhardt, as -well as a subsequent lecture on the same subject matter given by the -defendant Fischer. There can be no question, therefore, but that when -Handloser came away from the meeting he was fully informed of the fact -that medical experiments were being conducted in Ravensbrueck -concentration camp with inmates who were nonvolunteers. Moreover, he -knew that deaths had occurred among the experimental subjects. - -After the meeting of consulting physicians had ended, Gebhardt returned -to Ravensbrueck and conducted several more series of sulfanilamide -experiments. The subjects used for the later experiments were Polish -women who had been condemned to Ravensbrueck without trial, and who did -not give their consent to act as experimental subjects. Three of these -were killed by the experiments. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -Under counts two and three of the indictment Handloser is charged with -special responsibility for, and participation in, typhus experiments -conducted in the Buchenwald concentration camp which were supervised by -a certain Dr. Ding, and like experiments conducted in the Natzweiler -concentration camp by a certain Dr. Haagen. As shown elsewhere in the -judgment, these experiments were unlawful and resulted in deaths of -non-German nationals. - -There can be no question but that in 1941 typhus was a potential menace -to the German Army and to many German civilians. The use of an adequate -typhus vaccine was therefore a matter of prime importance. The -distribution of vaccines to the Wehrmacht was within the control of -Handloser. In the exercise of his functions he was also interested in -typhus vaccine production. - -The Typhus and Virus Institutes of the OKH at Cracow [Krakow] and -Lemberg [Lvov] were engaged in the production of the Weigl vaccine from -the intestines of lice. This vaccine was thought to be effective, but -the production procedure was complicated and expensive; hence, -sufficient quantities of this vaccine could not be furnished. Another -vaccine—the so-called Cox-Haagen-Gildemeister vaccine, produced from -egg-yolk cultures—could be quickly produced in large quantities, but -its protective qualities had not been sufficiently demonstrated. - -Evidence is before the Tribunal that the general problem was discussed -at a meeting held in Berlin, 29 December 1941, attended by Dr. Bieber of -the Ministry of Interior; Gildemeister; Dr. Scholz, a subordinate of -Handloser; two physicians of the “governing body of the Government -General”; and three representatives of the Behring Works. It is stated -in the minutes of this conference that— - - “The vaccine which is presently being produced by the Behring - Works from chicken eggs shall be tested for its effectiveness in - an experiment.” - -For the purpose above referred to, Dr. Demnitz of the Behring Works -would contact Dr. Mrugowsky. The minutes of the meeting were prepared by -Bieber, under date 4 January 1942. - -A copy of the minutes of the meeting last referred to was forwarded to -the Army Medical Inspectorate at Berlin. It thus appears that a -representative of Handloser’s office, Scholz, attended the meeting, and -that a copy of the minutes was forwarded to the Army Medical -Inspectorate. - -There is also evidence that on the same day a conference was held -between the defendant Handloser, Conti of the Ministry of Interior, -Reiter of the Health Department of the Reich, Gildemeister of the Robert -Koch Institute, and the defendant Mrugowsky, at which time it was -decided to establish a research station at Buchenwald concentration camp -to test the efficacy of the egg-yolk, and other vaccines on -concentration camp inmates. As a result of the conference an -experimental station was established at Buchenwald under the direction -of Dr. Ding, with the defendant Hoven acting as his deputy. - -Inasmuch as some of this information comes from Prosecution Exhibit 287, -referred to as the “Ding Diary”, a discussion of the document is now -appropriate. - -Dr. Ding (who later changed his name to Schuler) was a very ambitious -man who was apparently willing to engage in any professional activity -which he thought might further his medical career. He gladly seized upon -the opportunity to conduct experiments on concentration camp inmates in -connection with the vaccine study. - -Every German officer holding a position comparable to that held by Dr. -Ding was required to keep a journal or diary showing his official -activities. It appears that Ding kept two diaries. Ding’s personal diary -containing official and personal entries and work reports has -disappeared; his official log or journal concerning his work at -Buchenwald is the document in evidence. This diary was kept by one Eugen -Kogon, an inmate at Buchenwald. He made the actual entries and Ding -verified and signed them. - -Kogon, an Austrian subject, testified for the prosecution. We learn from -his testimony that he was a former newspaper editor and held other -highly responsible positions. He was sent by the German authorities to -Buchenwald in 1939 as a political prisoner. In April 1943 he was -assigned to Ding as a clerk or assistant. For many months prior to that -time, however, he had been on extremely friendly terms with Ding and as -a consequence was completely familiar with Ding’s operations. Indeed, so -close was the attachment that during the first half of the year 1942 -Ding had dictated the first portion of the diary which is in evidence, -and Kogon had transcribed it. After officially becoming Ding’s assistant -in 1943 all correspondence of every nature with which Ding was concerned -passed through the hands of Kogon. - -The diary came into Kogon’s possession at the breaking up of the camp, -and remained in his possession, as he testified, until he delivered it -to the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes at Nuernberg. - -It is manifest that the entries in the diary were often not made on the -day they bear date; but this does not mean that it has no probative -value. Almost every entry in the diary is personally signed by Ding. -Time and again the entries in the diary have been corroborated by other -credible evidence. The defendants themselves who were familiar with -operations at Buchenwald have confirmed the entries in important -essential particulars. We consider the diary as constituting evidence of -considerable probative value, and shall give to the entries such -consideration as under all circumstances they are entitled to receive. - -The first entry in the Ding diary, under date of 29 December 1941, reads -as follows: - - “Conference between Army Sanitation Inspection [Inspector], - General Chief Surgeon Professor Dr. Handloser; State Secretary - for the Department of Health of the Reich, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr. - Conti; President Professor Reiter of the Health Department of - the Reich; President Professor Gildemeister of the Robert Koch - Institute (Reich Institution to Combat Contagious Diseases) and - SS Standartenfuehrer and Lecturer (Dozent) Dr. Mrugowsky of the - Institute of Hygiene, Waffen SS, Berlin. - - “It has been established that the need exists, to test the - efficiency of, and resistance of the human body to, the typhus - serum extracted from egg yolks. Since tests on animals are not - of sufficient value, tests on human beings must be carried out.” - -This entry preceded by only a few days the actual commencement of the -experiments on concentration camp inmates to determine the efficiency of -the egg-yolk vaccine. - -It seems certain that the foregoing entry in the Ding diary was written -or rewritten at some date later than that which it bears, but the entry -may be accepted as evidence of probative value to the fact that it was -agreed by some persons in authority that experiments with vaccine -prepared from egg yolks be made on concentration camp inmates at -Buchenwald. The next entry in the diary bears date 2 January 1942, and -reads as follows: - - “The concentration camp Buchenwald is chosen for testing the - typhus serums. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Ding is charged with these - tests.” - -Handloser testified that many conferences concerning typhus vaccine took -place and that he was interested in the testing of chicken-egg vaccine -“on a sufficient number of persons in a certain vicinity, that is, -within an area where typhus had already occurred or there was imminent -danger existing.” He also testified that during the summer of 1941 he -met Mrugowsky, who was recommended to him by Schreiber, Handloser’s -subordinate. He also testified that he discussed the matter of the -chicken-egg vaccines with Gildemeister and Conti. Handloser testified -that he was present at many conferences, both at the front and in rear -echelons, where such matters were discussed. Mrugowsky, in a letter -dated 5 May 1942, reported to Eyer (who was a subordinate of Handloser) -of the Typhus and Vaccine Institute of the High Command at Cracow -[Krakow], describing the results of the first series of experiments -carried out in Buchenwald. The experiments covered both the Weigl and -egg-yolk vaccines. This report called attention to the fact that two -experimental subjects had died. - -An entry in the Ding diary dated 8 February 1943 states that Dr. Eyer -and Dr. Schmidt, a hygienist on the staff of the Medical Inspectorate, -visited the Typhus and Virus Institute at Buchenwald. Schmidt, a -subordinate of Handloser from 1942 until August 1944, stated that he and -Eyer had visited Buchenwald. He testified that his visit was concerned -only with yellow fever vaccine tests which were being carried out at -that station. This statement by the witness is not convincing. From the -Ding diary it appears that infected lice were received by Ding prior to -30 November 1942. If this is correct, these lice could have come only -from an institute under control of the army over which Handloser had -jurisdiction. - -Ding reported on his activities at the meeting of the Consulting -Surgeons of the Wehrmacht held in May 1943 in Berlin. Handloser was -present at that meeting but may not have heard the report, the report -having been made to the hygiene section, which was presided over by -Schreiber, Handloser’s subordinate. Defendant Rose, having heard the -report, openly objected to the character of the experiments carried out -at Buchenwald. Schreiber, then, had full knowledge of the nature of the -experiments there carried on. Rose’s vigorous objection was doubtless a -subject of general interest. - -Handloser testified that on at least two occasions he discussed with -Mrugowsky matters connected with vaccines against typhoid, typhus and -other diseases. He stated that he was unable to fix the dates of these -conferences. - -The entries in the Ding diary clearly indicate an effective liaison -between the Army Medical Inspectorate and the experiments which Ding was -conducting at Buchenwald. There is also credible evidence that the -Inspectorate was informed of medical research carried on by the -Luftwaffe. The experiments at Buchenwald continued after Handloser had -gained actual knowledge of the fact that concentration camp inmates had -been killed at Dachau as the result of freezing; and that inmates at -Ravensbrueck had died as victims of the sulfanilamide experiments -conducted by Gebhardt and Fischer. Yet with this knowledge Handloser in -his superior medical position made no effort to investigate the -situation of the human subjects or to exercise any proper degree of -control over those conducting experiments within his field of authority -and competence. - -Had the slightest inquiry been made the facts would have revealed that -in vaccine experiments already conducted at Buchenwald, deaths had -occurred—both as a result of artificial infections by the lice which -had been imported from the Typhus and Virus Institute of the OKH at -Cracow [Krakow] or Lemberg [Lvov], or from infections by a virulent -virus given to subjects after they had first been vaccinated with either -the Weigl, Cox-Haagen-Gildemeister, or other vaccines, whose efficacy -was being tested. Had this step been taken, and had Handloser exercised -his authority, later deaths would have been prevented in these -particular experiments which were originally set in motion through the -offices of the Medical Inspectorate and which were being conducted for -the benefit of the German armed forces. - -These deaths not only occurred with German nationals, but also among -non-German nationals who had not consented to becoming experimental -subjects. - -OTHER EXPERIMENTS - -The defendant Handloser is also charged with special responsibility for, -and participation in, Malaria, Lost Gas, Bone, Muscle and Nerve -Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, and Epidemic Jaundice -Experiments. In our view the evidence is insufficient to show any -criminal connection of the defendant Handloser with regard to these -experiments. - -The law of war imposes on a military officer in a position of command an -affirmative duty to take such steps as are within his power and -appropriate to the circumstances to control those under his command for -the prevention of acts which are violations of the law of war. The -reason for the rule is plain and understandable. As is pointed out in a -decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States, entitled -Application of Yamashita, 66 Supreme Court [Reporter] 340-347, 1946— - - “It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops - whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of - their commander would almost certainly result in violations - which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its - purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war - from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an - invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable - measures for their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes - that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the - operations of war by commanders who are to some extent - responsible for their subordinates.” - -What has been said in this decision applies peculiarly to the case of -Handloser. - -In connection with Handloser’s responsibility for unlawful experiments -upon human beings, the evidence is conclusive that with knowledge of the -frequent use of non-German nationals as human experimental subjects, he -failed to exercise any proper degree of control over those subordinated -to him who were implicated in medical experiments coming within his -official sphere of competence. This was a duty which clearly devolved -upon him by virtue of his official position. Had he exercised his -responsibility, great numbers of non-German nationals would have been -saved from murder. To the extent that the crimes committed by or under -his authority were not war crimes they were crimes against humanity. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Siegfried Handloser -guilty under counts two and three of the indictment. - - - ROSTOCK - -The defendant Rostock is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in, -Malaria, Lost (Mustard) Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle and Nerve -Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, Epidemic Jaundice, and -Spotted Fever Experiments. - -Rostock was a physician of recognized ability. From 1933 to 1941 he -occupied successively the positions of senior surgeon of the Surgical -Clinic in Berlin, Professor of Surgery of the University of Berlin, and -Deputy Director of the University Clinic. In 1941 he was appointed -Director of the Surgical Clinic, and in 1942 he became Dean of the -Medical Faculty of the University of Berlin. Prior to the war he had -joined the NSDAP, and in 1939 he was assigned to military duty as a -consulting surgeon. In 1942 he was appointed consulting surgeon to the -Army Medical Inspectorate and was subordinate to the Military Medical -Academy in Berlin. He attained the rank of brigadier general, medical -department (reserve). In 1943 he was appointed Chief of the Office for -Medical Science and Research, a department under the supervision of -defendant Karl Brandt, in which position Rostock remained until the end -of the war. From the time he received the last mentioned appointment, -Rostock acted as Brandt’s deputy on the Reich Research Council. - -As Karl Brandt’s deputy Rostock was his agent in the field of medical -science and research—Rostock being charged with the duty of -coordinating and directing problems and activities concerning the -medical health service insofar as science and research were concerned. -Rostock was informed concerning medical research conducted by the -several branches of the Wehrmacht. As head of the Office for Science and -Research, he assigned research problems and designated some as “urgent”. -It was his duty to avoid duplication of work in scientific research and -to decide whether or not a suggested problem was worthy of a research -assignment. It is clear that Rostock and Karl Brandt were intimate -friends of years standing. - -The prosecution does not contend that Rostock personally participated in -criminal experiments. It vigorously argues, however, that—with full -knowledge that concentration camp inmates were being experimented -upon—he continued to function upon research assignments concerning -scientific investigations, the result of which would probably further -experiments upon human beings. The prosecution then argues that his -knowledge concerning these matters, considered together with the -position of authority which he occupied in connection with scientific -research and the fact that he failed to exercise his authority in an -attempt to stop or check criminal experiments, renders him guilty as -charged. - -In this connection the prosecution relies upon its Exhibit 457, a -document which bears date at Berlin, 14 September 1944. It is headed, -“Commissioner for Medical and Health Matters,” followed by “The Delegate -for Science and Research.” Below appears: - - “List of medical institutes working on problems of research - which were designated as urgent by the discussion on research on - 26 August 1944 in Beelitz. - - “(Summary according to the 650 orders for research submitted to - us.)” - -The document then contains a list of research assignments numbered “1” -to “45.” Numbers 42 and 44 read as follows: - - “_Strasbourg_ - - “42. Hygiene Institute (Haagen) virus research - - * * * * * - - “44. Anatomical Institute (Hirt) Chemical warfare agents.” - -The document bears Rostock’s signature. Five of the problems concern -hepatitis research, and three, virus research. - -It appears from the evidence that Rostock’s duties included the -avoidance of duplication in the distribution of assignments for medical -research. If the head of the medical department of a branch of the -Wehrmacht assigned to some particular physician or institute a -particular scientific or medical problem, a copy of the assignment would -be forwarded to Rostock, who would then coordinate the matter by -ascertaining whether or not that assignment was being worked on by some -other agency or whether it would lead to worthwhile results. Who -classified as “urgent” the 45 of the 650 orders for research does not -appear; but it may be assumed that Rostock approved that classification. - -Doubtless Rostock knew that experiments on concentration camp inmates -were being conducted. He presided over the meeting of surgeons held in -May 1943, and there heard statements that experimental subjects had been -artificially infected. Doubtless he knew that the experiments were -dangerous and that further experiments would probably be conducted. -However, it does not appear that either Rostock or any subordinate of -his directed the work done on any assignment concerning criminal -experiments. Certain of these experiments were classified as “urgent” at -a “discussion on research” as above set forth. Nothing in the -designation of any such assignment as appears in Prosecution Exhibit 457 -contains on its face anything more than a matter of proper scientific -investigation. - -The record does not show that the position held by Rostock vested in him -any authority whatsoever other than as above stated. No experiments were -conducted by any person or organization which was to the least extent -under Rostock’s control or direction. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Paul Rostock -is not guilty as charged under the indictment, and directs that he be -released from custody under the indictment when this Tribunal presently -adjourns. - - - SCHROEDER - -The defendant Schroeder is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in, -High-Altitude, Freezing, Sulfanilamide, Sea-Water, Epidemic Jaundice, -Typhus and other vaccines, and Gas Experiments. The prosecution has -abandoned the charge that he participated in the sulfanilamide -experiments and hence that subject will not be considered further. - -The defendant served as a medical officer with the infantry during the -First World War. In the period prior to 1931 he was attached as medical -officer to a number of military units. On 1 January 1931 he was -transferred to the Army Medical Inspectorate as a consultant (Referent) -on hospital matters and therapeutics with the rank of Oberstabsarzt -(major). In 1935 Schroeder became chief of staff to Generalarzt Hippke -in the newly established Medical Department of the Reich Ministry for -Aviation. He retained this position after Hippke was made Inspector of -the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe in 1937. In February 1940 Schroeder -was appointed air fleet physician for Air Fleet II with the rank of -Generalstabsarzt (major general). On 1 January 1944 he replaced Hippke -as Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. Simultaneously he was -promoted to Generaloberstabsarzt (lieutenant general), which was the -highest rank obtainable in the medical services. As Chief of the Medical -Service of the Luftwaffe, all medical officers of the German Air Force -were subordinated directly or indirectly to Schroeder. After he became -Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe his immediate superior was -Handloser, who was Chief of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht. - -HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS - -These experiments were performed at Dachau concentration camp for the -benefit of the Luftwaffe during the year 1942. Details of the -experiments are discussed in other portions of this judgment. - -During the period from 1941 to the end of 1943 the defendant Schroeder, -in his position as air fleet physician of Air Fleet II, was in the -operational zone of Air Fleet II, which comprised the Mediterranean -area. He did not become Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe -until 1 January 1944. There is no evidence that while air fleet -physician he exercised or could have exercised any control over -experiments then being conducted for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. - -EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS - -Schreiber, a member of Handloser’s staff, who presided over a conference -held in Breslau in June 1944 for the purpose of co-ordinating jaundice -research, assigned groups of physicians to work together on jaundice -problems. Dohmen, Gutzeit, and Haagen were assigned to one of these -groups. On 27 June 1944 Haagen, a Luftwaffe officer, wrote his -collaborator Kalk, a consultant to Schroeder, asking, “Could you in your -official position take the necessary steps to obtain the required -experimental subjects?” - -The record shows that Haagen subsequently conducted epidemic jaundice -experiments on prisoners at Natzweiler concentration camp. There is no -evidence, however, to establish Schroeder’s criminal connection with -these experiments. At most, all that can be said for this evidence is -that Schroeder may have gained knowledge of the experiments through -Kalk, a member of his staff—but even that fact has not been made plain. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -Freezing experiments were carried out at Dachau concentration camp for -the benefit of the Luftwaffe, during the year 1942. Details of these -experiments are discussed elsewhere in this judgment. - -It is conclusively shown from the evidence dealing with freezing that as -early as the year 1943 Schroeder had actual knowledge that such -experiments had been conducted upon inmates at Dachau concentration -camp, during the course of which suffering and deaths had resulted to -the experimental subjects. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -Experiments in connection with typhus were conducted at Schirmeck and -Natzweiler concentration camps during the years 1942, 1943, and 1944. -The details of these experiments are discussed elsewhere in this -judgment. - -The experiments were carried out by a Luftwaffe medical officer, -Professor Dr. Haagen. As a medical officer of the Luftwaffe he was -subject to Schroeder’s orders after the latter became Chief of the -Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. The office of Schroeder issued and -approved the research assignments pursuant to which these experiments -were carried out. It provided the funds for the research. One of the -chief collaborators in the program was the defendant Rose, consultant to -the Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. - -Correspondence was carried on between Haagen and the Chief of Staff for -the defendant Schroeder with reference to whether a typhus epidemic -prevailing at Natzweiler was connected in any manner with the vaccine -research then being conducted. The office of the Chief of the Medical -Service of the Luftwaffe received reports on the experiments from which -it could be clearly perceived that typhus vaccine experiments were being -performed on concentration camp inmates. - -While the experiments were in progress, Schroeder admits having visited -Haagen at Strasbourg, but denies that he talked with Haagen about the -experiments. The defendant’s assertion that the experiments were not -discussed does not carry conviction. - -As has been pointed out in this judgment, the law of war imposes on a -military officer in a position of command an affirmative duty to take -such steps as are within his power and appropriate to the circumstances -to control those under his command for the prevention of acts which are -violations of the law of war. - -This rule is applicable to the case of Schroeder. At the time he became -Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, Schroeder knew of the -fact that freezing experiments for the benefit of the Luftwaffe had been -carried out at Dachau concentration camp by Luftwaffe medical officers. -He knew that through these experiments injury and death had resulted to -the experimental subjects. He also knew that during the years 1942 and -1943, typhus vaccine research had been carried out by the Luftwaffe -officer, Haagen, for the benefit of the Luftwaffe Medical Service, at -Natzweiler and Schirmeck concentration camps—and had he taken the -trouble to inquire, he could have known that deaths had occurred as a -result of these experiments. - -With all this knowledge, or means of knowledge, before him as commanding -officer, he blindly approved a continuation of typhus research by -Haagen, supported the program, and was furnished reports of its -progress, without so much as taking one step to determine the -circumstances under which the research had been or was being carried on, -to lay down rules for the conduct of present or future research by his -subordinates, or to prescribe the conditions under which the -concentration camp inmates could be used as experimental subjects. - -As was the case with reference to the freezing experiments at Dachau, -non-German nationals were used as experimental subjects, none gave their -consent, and many suffered injury and death as a result of the -experiments. - -GAS EXPERIMENTS - -Experiments with various types of poison gas were performed by Luftwaffe -Officer Haagen and a Professor Dr. Hirt in the Natzweiler concentration -camp. They began in November 1942 and were conducted through the summer -of 1944. During this period a great many concentration camp inmates of -Russian, Polish, and Czech nationality were experimented on with gas, at -least 50 of whom died. A certain Oberarzt Wimmer, a staff physician of -the Luftwaffe worked with Hirt on the gas experiments throughout the -period. - -We discussed the duty which rests upon a commanding officer to take -appropriate measures to control his subordinates, in dealing with the -case of Handloser. We shall not repeat what we said there. Had Schroeder -adopted the measures which the law of war imposes upon one in position -of command to prevent the actions of his subordinates amounting to -violations of the law of war, the deaths of the non-German nationals -involved in the gas experiments might well have been prevented. - -SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS - -Sea-Water experiments were conducted on inmates of Dachau concentration -camp during the late spring and summer of 1944. The defendant Schroeder -openly admits that these experiments were conducted by his authority. -When on the witness stand he related the circumstances under which these -experiments were initiated and carried through to completion. - -As related by Schroeder the experiment on making sea water drinkable was -a problem of great importance. Two methods were available in Germany, -each of which to some extent had been previously tried, both on animal -and on human subjects. These were known as the Schaefer and the Berkatit -processes. Use of the Schaefer method on sea water produced a -satisfactory liquid essentially the same in its effects and potable -qualities as ordinary pure drinking water. The Schaefer process, -however, called for quantities of silver, which were thought to be -unavailable. Use of the Berka process, however, resulted merely in -changing the taste of sea water, thus making it more palatable, without -at the same time doing away with danger to health and life which always -results from consuming considerable quantities of untreated sea water. -Materials were available for the Berka process, but Schroeder did not -feel that it could be adopted until more was known of the method. At -Schroeder’s direction, the defendant Becker-Freyseng arranged for a -conference to be held at the German Air Ministry in May 1944 to discuss -the problem. Present at the conference, among others, were Berka and the -defendants Becker-Freyseng and Schaefer. - -There is no doubt that the conference was well informed, and discussed -all current data upon the subject. Such fact appears from the minutes of -the meeting, in which it is stated: - - “* * * Captain (med.) Dr. Becker-Freyseng reported on the - clinical experiments conducted by Colonel (med.) Dr. von Sirany, - and came to the final conclusion that he did not consider them - as being unobjectionable and conclusive enough for a final - decision. The Chief of the Medical Service is convinced that, if - the Berka method is used, damage to health has to be expected - not later than 6 days after taking Berkatit, which damage will - result in permanent injuries to health and—according to the - opinion of N.C.O. (med.) Dr. Schaefer—will finally result in - death after not later than 12 days. External symptoms are to be - expected such as dehydration, diarrhea, convulsions, - hallucinations, and finally death.” - -It was concluded at this meeting that it would be necessary to perform -further sea-water experiments upon human beings in order to determine -definitely whether or not the Berkatit method of treating sea water -could be safely employed and used in connection with the German war -effort. These experiments were planned to be carried on in group series, -each of which would require six days, and would be made upon human -beings in this order: one group would be supplied only with -Berkatit-treated sea water; a second group would receive only ordinary -drinking water; a third group would receive no water of any kind; the -fourth group was to be given such water as was generally provided in -emergency sea-distress kits, then used by German military personnel. - -In addition to the first experiment it was agreed that a second -experiment should be conducted. The notes of the meeting which deal with -the second experimental series read as follows: - - “Persons nourished with sea water and Berkatit, and as diet also - the emergency sea rations. - - “Duration of experiments—12 days. - - “Since in the opinion of the Chief of the Medical Service, - permanent injuries to health, that is, the death of the - experimental subjects, has to be expected, as experimental - subjects such persons should be used as will be put at the - disposal by the Reichsfuehrer SS.” - -On 7 June 1944 Schroeder wrote to Himmler through Grawitz asking for -concentration camp inmates to be used as subjects in the sea-water -experiments, which letter reads in part as follows: - - “Highly Respected Reich Minister: - - “Earlier already you made it possible for the Luftwaffe to - settle urgent medical matters through experiments on human - beings. Today again, I stand before a decision which, after - numerous experiments on animals as well as human experiments on - voluntary experimental subjects, demands a final solution. The - Luftwaffe has simultaneously developed two methods for making - sea water potable. The one method, developed by a medical - officer, removes the salt from the sea water and transforms it - into real drinking water; the second method, suggested by an - engineer, leaves the salt content unchanged, and only removes - the unpleasant taste from the sea water. The latter method in - contrast to the first, requires no critical raw material. From - the medical point of view this method must be viewed critically, - as the administration of concentrated salt solutions can produce - severe symptoms of poisoning. - - “As the experiments on human beings could thus far only be - carried out for a period of four days, and as practical demands - require a remedy for those who are in distress at sea up to 12 - days, appropriate experiments are necessary. - - “Required are 40 healthy test subjects, who must be available - for 4 whole weeks. As it is known from previous experiments that - necessary laboratories exist in the concentration camp Dachau, - this camp would be very suitable * * *” - -Various other parties took part in correspondence upon this application, -one of the writers suggesting that Jews or persons held in quarantine be -used as experimental subjects. Another correspondent nominated asocial -gypsy half-breeds as candidates for the treatment. Herr Himmler decided -that gypsies, plus three others for control purposes, should be -utilized. - -In fairness to the defendant it should be stated that he contests the -translation of the second sentence in the first paragraph of the letter -written by him to Himmler, which the prosecution interprets as meaning -that experiments could no longer be conducted on voluntary subjects, and -that the words “demands a final solution” meant that involuntary -subjects in concentration camps should be employed. Regardless of -whether or not the letter quoted by us is a correct translation of the -German original, the evidence shows that within a month after the letter -was sent to Himmler through Grawitz, sea-water experiments were -commenced at Dachau by the defendant Beiglboeck. - -The method by which the experimental subjects were chosen is not known -to the defendant Schroeder. As he explained from the witness stand with -reference to his letter and the subsequent procedure, “I sent it away -only after I had consulted [about] the possibility of the experiment -with Grawitz, and after I had informed him how the whole thing was -thought [of] by us, so that he could pass on this information to Himmler -in case it became necessary. Then this letter was sent off, and after -possibly four weeks when Beiglboeck had arrived at Dachau—in the -meantime, he was given an opportunity to carry out this work. Whatever -lay in between that, how in the administrative way this was organized, -we never learned * * * it was an inter-office affair * * *. We only saw -the initial point and the end point of this route.” - -Thus began another experiment conducted under the auspices of the -defendant Schroeder, wherein the initiator of the experiment failed to -exercise the personal duty of determining that only consenting human -subjects would be used, but left that responsibility to others. Again is -demonstrated the case of an officer in a position of superior command -who authorizes the performance of experiments by his subordinates while -failing to take efforts to prescribe the conditions which will insure -the conduct of the experiments within legally permissible limits. - -The evidence shows conclusively that gypsies of various nationalities -were used as experimental subjects. Former inmates of Auschwitz -concentration camp were tricked into coming to Dachau with the promise -that they were to be used as members of a labor battalion. When they -arrived at Dachau they were assigned to the sea-water experimental -station without their consent. During the course of the experiment many -of them suffered intense physical and mental anguish. - -The Tribunal finds that the defendant Schroeder was responsible for, -aided and abetted, and took a consenting part in, medical experiments -performed on non-German nationals against their consent; in the course -of which experiments deaths, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, and other -inhuman acts were committed on the experimental subjects. To the extent -that these experiments did not constitute war crimes they constitute -crimes against humanity. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Oskar Schroeder -guilty under counts two and three of the indictment. - - - GENZKEN - -The defendant Genzken is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in, -Sulfanilamide, Spotted Fever, Poison, and Incendiary Bomb Experiments. -The prosecution has abandoned the two latter charges and hence they will -not be considered further. The defendant is also charged under count -four of the indictment with membership, after 1 September 1939, in an -organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International -Military Tribunal—namely, the SS. - -Genzken was commissioned in the Medical Service of the German Navy in -1912 and served through the First World War in that capacity. From 1919 -to 1934, he engaged in the private practice of medicine. He joined the -NSDAP in 1926, and in October 1934 he was again commissioned as a -reserve officer of the naval medical department. On 1 March 1936 he was -transferred to the medical department of the SS, with the rank of major, -and assigned to the medical department of a branch of the SS, which in -the summer of 1940 became the Waffen SS. He served as chief surgeon of -the SS hospital in Berlin, and was director of the department charged -with supplying medical equipment and with the supervision of medical -personnel in concentration camps. He was also medical supervisor to -Eicke, the head of all the concentration camps, which were within -Genzken’s jurisdiction insofar as medical matters were concerned. In May -1940, Genzken was appointed Chief of the Medical Office of the Waffen SS -with the rank of senior colonel, Grawitz being his medical superior. He -retained this position until the close of the war. In 1942 he was -designated as Chief of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS, Division D -of the SS Operational Headquarters. On 30 January 1943 he was appointed -Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant in the Waffen SS. - -SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS - -The sulfanilamide experiments referred to in the indictment were -conducted by the defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser at -Ravensbrueck concentration camp between 20 July 1942 and August 1943. -During this period of time, four of the medical branches of the Waffen -SS were under Genzken, including Office XVI, Hygiene, of which the -defendant Mrugowsky was chief. - -It is submitted by the prosecution that the evidence proves Mrugowsky to -have given support and assistance to these experiments, and that, -consequently, Genzken becomes criminally liable because of the position -of command he held over Mrugowsky. It is also urged that because Genzken -attended the meeting in Berlin at which Gebhardt and Fischer gave their -lecture on the experiments, this likewise shows criminal connection. - -That Mrugowsky rendered assistance to Gebhardt in the sulfanilamide -experiments at Ravensbrueck is clearly proved. Mrugowsky put his -laboratory and co-workers at Gebhardt’s disposal. He furnished the -bacterial cultures for the infections. He conferred with Gebhardt about -the medical problems involved. It was on the suggestion of Mrugowsky’s -office that wood shavings and ground glass were placed in artificially -inflicted wounds made on the subjects so that battlefield wounds would -be more closely simulated. It also appears that Blumenreuter, who was -the chief of Office XV under Genzken’s direction, may have furthered the -experiments by furnishing surgical instruments and medicines to -Gebhardt. - -The Tribunal finds that Genzken was not present at the Berlin meeting. - -Although Mrugowsky and Blumenreuter may have aided Gebhardt in his -experiments, the prosecution has failed to show that it was done with -Genzken’s direction or knowledge. - -The prosecution, therefore, has failed to sustain the burden with regard -to this particular specification. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -The series of experiments which are the subject of this specification -were conducted at Buchenwald concentration camp and began in January -1942. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Ding, who was attached to the Hygiene -Institute of the Waffen SS, was in charge of these experiments—with the -defendant Hoven serving as his deputy. - -Until 1 September 1943 both Mrugowsky, the Chief of the Hygiene -Institute, and Ding, were subordinate to Genzken. Until the date last -mentioned the chain of military command in the field of hygiene and -research was as follows: Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding. - -Prior to 1939 Ding had been camp physician at Buchenwald, and as such -was subordinate to Genzken. During the early months of the war Genzken -served as an army surgeon in the field, Ding being his adjutant. During -the fall of 1941 Ding returned to Buchenwald and Genzken to his office -at Berlin. During their service in the field Genzken and Ding had become -warm personal friends. Ding was attached to the Hygiene Institute of the -Waffen SS and was engaged in typhus research for the Institute. Genzken -testified that Mrugowsky and the Hygiene Institute were in his chain of -command prior to 31 August 1943. He further testified that after the -date last mentioned his office had nothing to do with Ding save to -provide money for Ding’s expenses, there being no other budget from -which money was available. Mrugowsky testified that Genzken was his -superior officer until 1 September 1943, and knew that the Hygiene -Institute was working on the problem of providing an efficient vaccine -against typhus. It is admitted that Ding was carrying out medical -experiments on concentration camp inmates in order to determine the -effect of various typhus vaccines. - -It is not contended that such experiments were not carried out. In the -course of these experiments two buildings or “blocks” were used. The -experiments were conducted in Block 46, and when satisfactory vaccine -was decided upon, Block 50 was used for the preparation of vaccines. - -During the course of the experiments with vaccines in March 1942, Ding -himself contracted typhus. Genzken testified that he was aware of the -fact that concentration camp inmates were subjected to experiments, but -stated that he was not advised as to the method of experimentation. - -It is clear that the experiments necessary to decide upon a satisfactory -vaccine preceded by a considerable period the production of the vaccine. -Genzken testified that vaccine production began in December 1943, that -the production establishment only moved into Block 50 in the middle of -August, and that when production actually began “this establishment had -already come under the agency of Grawitz and it was not subordinated any -more” to him. - -Under date of 9 January 1943 the Ding diary contains a lengthy entry -stating that by Genzken’s order the typhus research station became the -“Department of Typhus and Virus Research,” that Dr. Ding would be head -of this department, and that during his absence defendant Hoven would -act in his place. The entry further stated that Ding was appointed chief -department head for special missions in hygiene, etc. The Ding diary is -discussed elsewhere in this judgment. Considering the demonstrated -desire of Ding for his personal aggrandizement, this entry is not -entitled to entire credit, as written. It refers to Genzken as “Major -General”—which rank he did not receive until a few weeks after 9 -January 1943. The entry, however, has some probative value upon the -question of Ding’s status during the year 1943. - -Genzken testified that he “approved” the establishment of Ding’s -department for vaccine research. He also testified that his department -furnished necessary funds from its budget for Ding’s investigations. - -From the evidence it appears that prior to 1 September 1943, Mrugowsky -reported regularly to Genzken, on an average of once per week, either -orally or in writing. - -Under date 5 May 1942, Mrugowsky signed a written report upon the -subject, “Testing Typhus Vaccines.” This report went to six different -offices: the first copy, to Conti; the second copy, to Grawitz; and the -third copy, to Genzken. The report commences: “The tests of four typhus -vaccines made by us on human subjects at the instigation of the Reich -Health Leader Dr. Conti had the following results * * *”. It is stated -that the mortality of victims of typhus during an epidemic “was around -30 percent” and that “during the same epidemic four groups of -experimental subjects were vaccinated with one each” of the four types -of vaccine described in the beginning of the report. - -“The experimental subjects were mostly in their twenties and thirties. -Care was taken when selecting them that they did not come from typhus -districts and also to ensure an interval of four to six weeks between -the protective vaccination and the outbreak of the clinical symptoms of -the disease. According to experience this period is imperative to -achieve immunity.” - -The effects of the four vaccines tested were described as follows. The -report on the Weigl vaccine states that “nobody died”. The report on the -Gildemeister and Haagen vaccine also states that no deaths occurred. The -report on the Behring-Normal vaccine states that one person died. The -experiment with the Behring-Strong vaccine reports one death. - -The last paragraph of the report states: “In the last two groups the -symptoms were considerably stronger than in the first groups * * *. No -difference between the two vaccines of the Behring Works was observed. -The attending physicians stated that the general picture of the disease -in group four was rather more severe compared with that of the patients -of group three.” - -In a summation, Mrugowsky recommended the use of a vaccine “produced -according to the chicken egg process, which, in its immunization effect, -is equal to the vaccine after Weigl.” - -“The effectiveness of protection depends on the method used in making -the vaccine.” - -Of course, experiments with vaccines, conducted because of the urgent -need for the discovery of a protective vaccine, would lead to scant -results unless the subjects vaccinated were subsequently in some manner -effectively exposed to typhus, thereby demonstrating the effectiveness -or noneffectiveness of the vaccination. While Mrugowsky’s report, above -referred to, makes no reference to an artificial infection, it does -state without further explanation that two deaths occurred, and in the -last paragraph, quoted above, compares the severity of “the diseased” -between groups three and four. - -On cross-examination Mrugowsky testified that Dr. Ding was to lecture at -a meeting of consulting surgeons in the spring of 1943, and that the -witness informed Genzken concerning “the intended amount of vaccines to -be produced by the SS.” Mrugowsky testified that he gave Genzken this -information for three reasons: first, that Genzken had to be advised of -the fact that Ding, as a member of the Waffen SS, was to give a lecture -to the surgeons; second, that Genzken should be informed concerning “the -effectiveness of a number of vaccines to be used for troops”; third, -that Genzken should know when he could expect the first production of -vaccines for the SS and the amounts he could count on for each month. -Mrugowsky further testified: - - “The conference with Dr. Genzken was extremely brief. As far as - I remember we were standing close to his desk. I told him that - the various vaccines which I mentioned to him had a different - effect; I told him that the effect varied as to the length of - the temperature and a reduction of fatalities; and I told him - that after having vaccinated the entire SS we could count on - some protective effect for all soldiers. On that occasion I - showed him a few charts which Ding had handed over to me at that - time, the same charts which Ding reproduced in his paper, and I - used these charts in order to explain the effectiveness of the - vaccines to him.” - - Q. “The mortality figures and the temperature figures could be - derived from these charts, couldn’t they?” - - A. “Yes. If I remember correctly, on the heading of these charts - the information was given what the day of the infection was. - This entire conference was very brief and it is quite possible - that Dr. Genzken—who was only concerned with the most important - points which he had to know—it is quite possible that he - overlooked that. I had no cause to point it out to him in - particular since I was not reporting to him about Ding’s series - of experiments but was only reporting to him about the - protective value of various vaccines which he, as medical chief, - had to know. These were two completely different points of - view.” - -The Tribunal is convinced that prior to 1 September 1943, Genzken knew -the nature and scope of the activities of his subordinates, Mrugowsky -and Ding, in the field of typhus research; yet he did nothing to insure -that such research would be conducted within permissible legal limits. -He knew that concentration camp inmates were being subjected to cruel -medical experiments in the course of which deaths were occurring; yet he -took no steps to ascertain the status of the subjects or the -circumstances under which they were being sent to the experimental -block. Had he made the slightest inquiry he would have discovered that -many of the human subjects used were non-German nationals who had not -given their consent to the experiments. - -As the Tribunal has already pointed out in this judgment, “the duty and -responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon -each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It -is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to -another with impunity.” - -We find that Genzken, in his official capacity, was responsible for, -aided and abetted the typhus experiments, performed on non-German -nationals against their consent, in the course of which deaths occurred -as a result of the treatment received. To the extent that these -experiments did not constitute war crimes they constituted crimes -against humanity. - -MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment Genzken is charged with being a -member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the -International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that -Genzken became a member of the SS on 1 March 1936 and voluntarily -remained in that organization until the end of the war. As a -high-ranking member of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS he was -criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against -humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Karl Genzken -guilty, under counts two, three, and four of the indictment. - - - GEBHARDT - -The defendant Gebhardt is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in, -High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle -and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, Epidemic -Jaundice, Sterilization, Typhus, Poison, and Incendiary Bomb -Experiments. - -The defendant Gebhardt held positions of great power and responsibility -in the Medical Service of the SS in Nazi Germany. He joined the NSDAP in -1933 and the SS at least as early as 1935. He took part in the Nazi -Putsch of 1923, which aimed at the overthrow of the so-called Weimar -Republic, the democratic government of Germany, being then a member of -the illegal Free Corps, “Bund Oberland.” When, in 1933, the hospital at -Hohenlychen was founded, Gebhardt was appointed chief physician of this -institution. In 1938 he became the attending physician to Himmler. He -was also personal physician to Himmler and his family. In 1940 Gebhardt -was appointed consulting surgeon of the Waffen SS and, in 1943, chief -clinical officer (Oberster Kliniker) of the Reich Physician SS and -Police, Grawitz. In the Allgemeine SS Gebhardt attained the rank of a -Gruppenfuehrer (major general), and in the Waffen SS the rank of major -general in the reserve. - -SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS - -The purpose for which these experiments were undertaken is defined in -counts two and three of the indictment. - -In the Ravensbrueck concentration camp during a period from 20 July 1942 -until August 1943, the defendant Gebhardt, aided by defendants Fischer -and Oberheuser, performed such experiments upon human subjects without -their consent. Gebhardt personally requested Heinrich Himmler’s -permission to carry out these experiments, and attempts to assume full -responsibility for them and for any consequences resulting therefrom. He -himself personally carried out the initial operations. - -While it is not deemed strictly necessary in this judgment to describe -in any detail the procedure followed in performing these experiments, a -brief statement will now be made thereon. The first experimental -subjects consisted of 15 male concentration camp inmates used during -preliminary experiments in July 1942, but later 60 Polish women, who -were experimented on in 5 groups of 12 subjects each. - -In the first series of experiments the healthy subjects were infected -with various bacteria, but resulting infections were not thereafter -considered sufficiently serious to furnish an answer to the problem -sought to be solved and further experiments were then undertaken. - -Dr. Gebhardt has admitted that in the second series of experiments three -of the subjects died as a result of the treatment received. All of these -subjects were persons who had been selected by the concentration camp -authorities and who were not consulted as to their consent or -willingness to participate. Notwithstanding this, however, the -experimental subjects protested against experiments both orally and in -writing, stating that they would have preferred death to continued -experiments, since they were convinced that they would die in any event. - -An examination of the evidence presented to this Tribunal in connection -with sulfanilamide experiments performed upon unwilling and -nonconsenting concentration camp inmates indicates conclusively, that -participating human subjects were used under duress and coercion in -experiments performed upon their bodies; that persons acting as subjects -incurred and suffered physical torture and the risk of death; that in -the experiments here discussed at least five deaths of subjects were -caused therefrom. - -It is claimed by Dr. Gebhardt that all of the non-German experimental -subjects were selected from inmates of concentration camps, former -members of the Polish Resistance Movement, who had previously been -condemned to death and were in any event marked for legal execution. -This is not recognized as a valid defense to the charge of the -indictment. - -The Polish women who were used in the experiments had not given their -consent to become experimental subjects. That fact was known to -Gebhardt. The evidence conclusively shows that they had been confined at -Ravensbrueck without so much as a semblance of trial. That fact could -have been known to Gebhardt had he made the slightest inquiry of them -concerning their status. Moreover, assuming for the moment that they had -been condemned to death for acts considered hostile to the German forces -in the occupied territory of Poland, these persons still were entitled -to the protection of the laws of civilized nations. While under certain -specific conditions the rules of land warfare may recognize the validity -of an execution of spies, war rebels, or other resistance workers, it -does not under any circumstances countenance the infliction of death or -other punishment by maiming or torture. - -BONE, MUSCLE AND NERVE REGENERATION AND BONE -TRANSPLANTATION EXPERIMENTS - -These experiments were carried out in Ravensbrueck concentration camp -during the same time, and on the same group of Polish women used in the -sulfanilamide experiments. Upon these Polish inmates three kinds of bone -operations were performed—artificially induced fractures, bone -transplantations, bone splints—the conditions of the operations being -specially created in each particular case. Some girls were required to -submit to operations several times. In one instance small pieces of -fibula were taken out; in another instance the periosteum of the leg was -removed. Cases occurred where subjects were experimented on by -deliberately fracturing their limbs in several places and testing the -effect of certain treatments. In at least one case bone incisions were -performed on a subject six different times. In another case the shoulder -blade of a subject was removed. - -Further recital of these activities is as unnecessary as were the -operations themselves. The testimony heard and exhibits filed and -examined by the Tribunal conclusively sustain the allegations of the -indictment with reference to the experiments mentioned therein. - -SEPSIS (PHLEGMON) EXPERIMENTS - -A witness whose testimony must be accepted as credible testified -concerning these experiments in which concentration camp inmates were -used without their consent and were thereafter infected with pus. He -testified as to at least two series of experiments which resulted -fatally for 12 of the subjects. - -The prosecution claims, and it is likely that these biochemical -experiments which were performed in the Dachau concentration camp were -complementary to and formed parts of the sulfanilamide experiments in -Ravensbrueck. The evidence, however, is not sufficient to establish the -criminal connection of Gebhardt with these experiments. - -SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS - -Dr. Gebhardt’s position, which has been mentioned in this judgment as -that of an official and personal associate of Heinrich Himmler—part of -whose duties concerned concentration camp medical experiments, was -partially defined by an order issued by Himmler 15 May 1944 directing -that an opinion from Gebhardt would be required before any experiments -thereafter could be carried out on such human subjects. This order -stated that all medical experiments to be carried out at the -concentration camps had to have Himmler’s personal approval. It appears, -however, that while the application for permission to carry out -experiments involving human subjects was required to be obtained from -Himmler—yet before such application could be examined, a critical -opinion of the chief clinical officer of the SS, Dr. Gebhardt, -concerning its technical aspects was required to accompany it. Complying -with this order Gebhardt, in reference to sea-water experiments, wrote— - - “I deem it absolutely right to support the Luftwaffe in every - way and to place a general physician of the Waffen SS at - disposal to supervise the experiments.” - -This alone is deemed to be sufficient to show that Dr. Gebhardt knew -about, and approved, the performance of the sea-water experiments as -charged in the indictment. - -STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS - -Details of the sterilization experiments will be dealt with elsewhere in -this judgment; and it is unnecessary to repeat them here, except to the -extent necessary to inquire the part, if any, taken by Gebhardt therein. - -On 7 and 8 July 1942 a conference took place between Himmler, Gebhardt, -SS Brigadefuehrer Gluecks, and SS Brigadefuehrer Clauberg, to discuss -the sterilization of Jewesses. Dr. Clauberg was promised that the -Auschwitz concentration camp would be placed at his disposal for -experiments on human beings and animals, and he was requested to -discover by means of fundamental experiments a method of sterilizing -persons without their knowledge. During the course of the conference, -Himmler called the special attention of all present “to the fact that -the matter involved was most secret and should be discussed only with -the officers in charge and that the persons present at the experiments -or discussions had to pledge secrecy.” - -From this evidence it is apparent that Gebhardt was present at the -initial meeting which launched at least one phase of the sterilization -program in the concentration camps, and thus had knowledge and gave at -least passive approval to the program. - -HIGH-ALTITUDE, FREEZING, MALARIA, LOST GAS, EPIDEMIC -JAUNDICE, TYPHUS, POISON, AND INCENDIARY BOMB EXPERIMENTS - -Details as to the origin of and procedure followed in these experiments -are discussed elsewhere in this judgment, and will not be repeated. Our -only concern is to determine to what extent, if any, the defendant -Gebhardt took part in the experiments. - -In these enterprises the defendant seems not to have taken any active -part, as he did in the sulfanilamide experiments and in other programs. -It may be argued that his close connection with Heinrich Himmler creates -a presumption that these experiments were conducted with Gebhardt’s -knowledge and approval. Be that as it may, no sufficient evidence to -that effect has been presented, and a mere presumption is not enough in -this case to convict the defendant. - -Attention has been given to the brief filed by counsel for the defendant -Gebhardt. For the most part it is unnecessary to discuss the theories -presented in this brief, for the reason that the main reliance of the -defense seems to be that in his connection with the experiments charged -in the indictment, Dr. Gebhardt acted as a soldier in the execution of -orders from an authorized superior. We cannot see the applicability of -the doctrine of superior orders as a defense to the charges contained in -the indictment. Such doctrine has never been held applicable to a case -where the one to whom the order is given has free latitude of decision -whether to accept the order or reject it. Such was the situation with -reference to Gebhardt. The record makes it manifestly plain that he was -not ordered to perform the experiments, but that he sought the -opportunity to do so. Particularly is this true with reference to the -sulfanilamide experiments: Gebhardt, in effect, took them away from -Grawitz to demonstrate that certain surgical procedures advocated by him -at the bedside of the mortally wounded Heydrich at Prague in May of 1942 -were scientifically and surgically superior to the methods of treatment -proposed by Dr. Morell, Hitler’s personal physician. The doctrine, -therefore, is not applicable. But even if it were, the fact of such -orders could merely be considered, under Control Council Law No. 10, as -palliating punishment. - -Another argument presented in briefs of counsel attempts to ground -itself upon the debatable proposition that in the broad interest of -alleviating human suffering, a state may legally provide for medical -experiments to be carried out on prisoners condemned to death without -their consent, even though such experiments may involve great suffering -or death for the experimental subject. Whatever may be the right of a -state with reference to its own citizens, it is certain that such -legislation may not be extended so as to permit the practice upon -nationals of other countries who, held in the most abject servitude, are -subjected to experiments without their consent and under the most brutal -and senseless conditions. - -We find that Gebhardt, in his official capacity, was responsible for, -aided and abetted, and took a consenting part in medical experiments -performed on non-German nationals against their consent; in the course -of which deaths, maiming, and other inhuman treatment resulted to the -experimental subjects. To the extent that these experiments did not -constitute war crimes they constituted crimes against humanity. - -MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment Gebhardt is charged with being a -member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the -International Military Tribunal, namely the SS. The evidence shows that -Gebhardt became a member of the SS at least as early as 1933 and -voluntarily remained in that organization until the end of the war. As -one of the most influential members of the Medical Service of the Waffen -SS he was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and -crimes against humanity as charged under counts two and three of the -indictment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Karl Gebhardt -guilty under counts two, three and four of the indictment. - - - BLOME - -The defendant Blome is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in -Malaria, Lost Gas, and Sulfanilamide Experiments, the extermination of -tubercular Poles, and the execution of the Euthanasia Program. Proof has -also been adduced for the purpose of showing that he participated in the -freezing bacteriological warfare, and blood coagulation experiments. - -The charge with reference to sulfanilamide experiments has been -abandoned by the prosecution and hence will not be considered further. - -The defendant Blome studied medicine at Goettingen and received his -medical degree in 1920. From 1924 to 1934 he engaged in private -practice. In the latter year he was summoned to Berlin where, in 1935, -he reorganized the German medical educational system. He also acted as -adjutant in the central office of the German Red Cross and as business -manager of the German Physicians’ Association, which position he held -until the end of World War II. In 1938 he became President of the Bureau -of the Academy for International Medical Education. From 1939 on Blome -acted as deputy for Dr. Leonardo Conti who was leader of the German -Physicians’ Association, Head of the Main Office for Public Health of -the Party, and Leader of the National Socialist Physicians’ Association. -In 1941 he became a member of the Reich Research Council, and in 1943 -was appointed Plenipotentiary for Cancer Research, connected with the -research commission for protection against biological warfare. - -Blome joined the SA in 1931 and became the chief medical officer of the -SA in the province of Mecklenburg. In 1934 he was appointed a province -office leader, and in the SA he attained a rank equivalent to that of -major general. In 1943 he was awarded the highest decoration of the Nazi -Party. - -As Plenipotentiary for Cancer Research, it was his duty to determine -which research problems should be studied and to assign such problems to -scientists best fitted to investigate them. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -The prosecution argues that Blome is criminally responsible for -participation in the freezing experiments as charged in the indictment. -In the subparagraph which particularly refers to freezing, Blome is not -named among the defendants charged with special responsibility for the -experiments. Moreover, the record does not contain evidence which shows -beyond a reasonable doubt that Blome bore any responsible part in the -conduct of the freezing experiments. - -MALARIA EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence is insufficient to disclose any criminal responsibility of -the defendant in connection with the malaria experiments. - -LOST GAS EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence is insufficient to disclose any criminal responsibility of -the defendant in connection with these experiments. - -EXTERMINATION OF TUBERCULAR POLES - -The basis for the prosecution’s case against the defendant in this -regard is to be found in a series of letters with reference to the -tuberculosis menace in the Reichsgau Wartheland, which had been overrun -by the German Reich and settled by its citizens. - -During the year 1941 the German Government began a program of -extermination of the Jewish population of the eastern occupied -territories. On 1 May 1942 Greiser, the German Military Governor of -Reichsgau Wartheland, wrote Himmler advising him that “as to the 100,000 -Jews in the district, the ‘special treatment’ approved by Himmler was -about completed.” The letter then continued: - - “* * * I ask you for permission to rescue the district - immediately, after the measures taken against the Jews, from a - menace which is increasing week by week, and use the existing - and efficient special commandos for that purpose. - - “There are about 230,000 people of Polish nationality in my - district who were diagnosed to suffer from tuberculosis. The - number * * * infected with open tuberculosis is estimated at - about 35,000. This fact has led in an increasingly frightening - measure to the infection of Germans who came to the Warthegau - perfectly healthy * * *. A considerable number of well known - leading men, especially of the police, have been infected lately - and are not available for the war effort * * *. The ever - increasing risks were also recognized and appreciated by the - deputy of the Reich Leader for Public Health, Comrade Professor - Dr. Blome * * *. - - “Though in Germany proper it is not possible to take appropriate - draconic steps against this public plague, I think I could take - responsibility * * * to have cases of open tuberculosis - exterminated among the Polish race here in the Warthegau. Of - course, only a Pole should be handed over for such an action who - is not only suffering from open tuberculosis, but whose - incurability is proved and certified by a public health officer. - - “Considering the urgency of this project I ask for your approval - in principle as soon as possible. This would enable us to make - the preparations with all necessary precautions now to get the - action against the Poles suffering from open tuberculosis under - way, while the action against the Jews is in its closing stages. - - “Heil Hitler! - “GREISER” - -Two days later Koppe, the police leader on Greiser’s staff, wrote to -Rudolf Brandt restating Greiser’s proposal and urging Brandt to call the -matter to Himmler’s attention. Brandt promptly acknowledged the letter, -advising Koppe that the proposal had been referred to the Chief of the -Security Police for opinion, but that the final decision would rest with -Hitler. - -On 9 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police rendered his opinion to -Himmler: “I have no scruples against having the protectorate members and -stateless persons of the Polish race * * * who are afflicted with open -tuberculosis, submitted to the special treatment in the sense of the -proposal of Gau Leader Greiser. * * * The individual measures, though, -will first have to be discussed thoroughly with the Security Police, in -order to carry out the execution with the least possible attraction of -attention.” The opinions thus rendered undoubtedly received the full -approval of Himmler, for on 27 June 1942 Rudolf Brandt passed on to -Greiser a letter from Himmler containing the following decision: - - “Dear Comrade Greiser: - - “I have no objection to having protectorate people and stateless - persons of Polish origin who live within the territory of the - Warthegau and are infected with tuberculosis handed over for - special treatment as you suggest; as long as their disease is - incurable * * *. I would like to request, however, to discuss - the individual measures in detail with the Security Police - first, in order to assure inconspicuous accomplishment of the - task * * *. - - [Signed] “H. HIMMLER” - -The Himmler letter was acknowledged by Greiser on 21 November 1942, -Greiser advising Himmler that in pursuance of the permission given him -to apply “special treatment” to tubercular Poles he had made -arrangements for an X-ray examination of all people in the territory, -but that now that “special treatment” had been approved, Blome, Deputy -Chief of the Public Health Office of the NSDAP was raising objections to -its execution. A copy of Blome’s letter to Greiser was enclosed for -Himmler’s information. - -Blome’s letter to Greiser is dated 18 November 1942. It opens by -recalling various conversations between the writer and Greiser -concerning the campaign against tuberculosis in the Warthegau, and then -proceeds to consider the matter in detail; the letter proceeding: - - “With the settlement of Germans in all parts of the Gau, an - enormous danger has arisen for them * * *. What goes for the - Warthegau [* * *] also holds true for the other annexed - territories * * *. - - “Therefore, something basic must be done soon. One must decide - the most efficient way in which this can be done. There are - three ways to be taken into consideration: - - “1. Special treatment of the seriously ill persons, - - “2. Most rigorous isolation of the seriously ill - persons, - - “3. Creation of a reservation for all TB patients. - - “For the planning, attention must be paid to different points of - view of a practical, political and psychological nature. - Considering it most soberly, the simplest way would be the - following: Aided by the X-ray battalion, we could reach the - entire population, German and Polish, of the Gau during the - first half of 1943. As to the Germans, the treatment and - isolation is to be prepared and carried out according to the - regulations of Tuberculosis Relief. The approximately 35,000 - Poles who are incurable and infectious will be ‘specially - treated’. All other Polish consumptives will be subjected to an - appropriate cure in order to save them for work and to avoid - their causing contagion.” - -Blome then proceeds, stating that he has made arrangements for -commencement of the “radical procedure”, but suggests that some -assurance should be procured that Hitler would agree to the project. The -letter then goes on to say— - - “I could imagine that the Fuehrer, having some time ago stopped - the program in the insane asylums, might at this moment consider - a ‘special treatment’ of the incurably sick as unsuitable and - irresponsible from a political point of view. As regards the - Euthanasia Program it was a question of people of German - nationality afflicted with hereditary diseases. Now it is a - question of infected sick people of a subjugated nation.” - -Blome then voices the opinion that if the program is put into execution, -it cannot be kept secret and will be made the basis for much adverse and -harmful propaganda both at home and abroad. He suggests accordingly that -before the program is commenced all points of view should again be -presented to Hitler. - -Continuing, Blome writes that if Hitler should forbid the radical -proposal suggested by Greiser, three other solutions were open (1) -consumptives and incurables could be isolated with their relatives; (2) -all infectious consumptives might be strictly isolated in nursing -establishments; (3) the consumptives might be resettled in a particular -area. If the latter plan were adopted, the sick could reach the assigned -territory on foot, and thus save the costs of transportation. - -Blome’s letter finally concludes— - - “After a proper examination of all these considerations and - circumstances, the creation of a reservation, such as the - reservations for lepers, seems to be the most practicable - solution. Such a reservation should be able to be created in the - shortest time by means of the necessary settlement. Within the - reservation one could easily set up conditions for the strict - isolation of the strongly contagious. - - “Even the case of the German consumptives represents an - extremely difficult problem for the Gau. But this cannot be - overcome, unless the problem of the Polish consumptives is - solved at the same time.” - -The evidence shows that the letter from Greiser to Himmler, with Blome’s -suggestions enclosed, was acknowledged by Himmler on 3 December 1942 -with the following final decision: - - “Dear Party Comrade Greiser: - - “I have received your letter of 21 November 1942. I, too, - believe that it would be better to take into consideration the - misgivings set forth by Party Member Dr. Blome. In my opinion it - is impossible to proceed with the sick persons in the manner - intended, especially since, as you have informed me, it will be - possible to exploit the practical results of the tests only in - six months. - - “I suggest you look for a suitable area to which the incurable - consumptives can be sent. Besides the incurables, other patients - with less severe cases of tuberculosis could quite well be put - into this territory, too. This action would also, of course, - have to be exploited with the appropriate form of propaganda. - - “Before writing you this letter I again thoroughly thought over - whether the original idea could not in some way be carried out. - However, I am convinced now that it is better to proceed the - other way.” - -The prosecution maintains that this series of letters which have been -referred to establishes the criminal participation of the defendant -Blome in the extermination of tubercular Poles. We cannot follow the -argument. It is probable that the proposal to isolate tubercular Poles, -as suggested by Blome and approved by Himmler, was at least partially -carried out; although the record discloses but little with reference to -what actually transpired. It may be that in the course of such a program -Poles may have died as the result of being uprooted from their homes and -sent to isolation stations; but the record contains no direct credible -evidence upon the subject. Blome explained from the witness stand his -letter to Greiser by saying that it was written in order to prevent the -extermination program of tubercular Poles from being put into execution. -Certainly, his letter indicates on its face that he opposed the “special -treatment” suggested by Greiser. - -We cannot say, therefore, that the explanation offered is wholly without -substance. It at least raises a reasonable doubt in our minds concerning -the matter. Blome knew Hitler and Himmler. He well knew that any -objections to “special treatment” based on moral or humanitarian grounds -would make but small impact upon the minds of men like these Nazi -leaders. He knew, moreover, that before Greiser’s proposal for -extermination would be abandoned a plan which appeared to be better must -be suggested. If viewed from the standpoint of factual and psychological -considerations, it cannot be held that the letter was not well-worded -when considered as an attempt to put an end to the plan originally -adopted, and to bring the substitution of another plan not so drastic. -Whatever may have been its purpose, the record shows that, in this -particular, the letter did in fact divert Himmler from his original -program and that as a result thereof the extermination plan was -abandoned. - -EUTHANASIA PROGRAM - -Blome is charged with criminal responsibility in connection with the -Euthanasia Program, but we are of opinion that the evidence is -insufficient to sustain the charge. - -BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - -The prosecution contends that the evidence in the case established -Blome’s guilt in connection with research concerning different forms of -bacteriological warfare. Blome, who was plenipotentiary for cancer -research in the Reich Research Council, admits that the problem of -cancer research was allied with the research commission for protection -against biological warfare. He admits further, that he was placed in -charge of an institute near Poznan in which the problems of biological -warfare were to be investigated, but states that the work being done at -the Poznan institute was interrupted in March 1945 by the advance of the -Russian army. - -This latter fact seems to be confirmed by the evidence. In this -connection Schreiber appeared as a witness before the International -Military Tribunal. His testimony given there has been received in -evidence before this Tribunal. From the testimony it appears that Blome -visited Schreiber at the Military Medical Academy, Berlin, during March -1945 and stated to him that he, Blome, had abandoned his institute in -Poznan due to the advance of the Russians, but before leaving had -attempted to destroy his installations as he feared that the Russians -might discover that preparations had been made in the institute for -experiments on human beings. - -Counsel for the prosecution has brought to our judicial notice a finding -by the International Military Tribunal in its judgment wherein it is -found that— - - “In July 1943 experimental work was begun in preparation for a - campaign of bacteriological warfare; Soviet prisoners of war - were used in the medical experiments, which more often than not - proved fatal.” (_See “Trial of the Major War Criminals”, Vol. I, - p. 231._) - -It is submitted by the prosecution that this finding of the -International Military Tribunal, when considered in connection with -other evidence in the case, requires this Tribunal to find the defendant -Blome guilty under the indictment. - -The suggestion is not tenable. It may well be that defendant Blome was -preparing to experiment upon human beings in connection with -bacteriological warfare, but the record fails to disclose that fact, or -that he ever actually conducted experiments. The charge of the -prosecution on this item is not sustained. - -POLYGAL EXPERIMENTS - -The prosecution has introduced evidence which suggests that Blome may be -criminally responsible for polygal experiments conducted by Rascher at -Dachau, in which Russian prisoners of war were used as experimental -subjects. In our view the evidence does no more than raise a strong -suspicion; it does not sustain the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Kurt Blome not -guilty as charged under the indictment and directs that he be released -from custody under the indictment when this Tribunal presently adjourns. - - - RUDOLF BRANDT - -Under counts two and three of the indictment the defendant Rudolf Brandt -is charged with special responsibility for, and participation in, -High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle -and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, Epidemic -Jaundice, Sterilization, and Typhus Experiments. He is also charged -under these counts with criminal responsibility for the murder of 112 -Jews for the purpose of completing a Skeleton Collection for the Reich -University of Strasbourg, for the murder and ill-treatment of tubercular -Poles, and for the Euthanasia Program carried out by the German Reich. - -Under count four of the indictment he is charged with membership in an -organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International -Military Tribunal. - -The prosecution has abandoned the charge of participation in the bone, -muscle and nerve regeneration and bone transplantation experiment; -hence, it will not be considered further. - -The defendant Rudolf Brandt joined the Nazi Party in 1932. He was -commissioned a second lieutenant in the SS in 1935. In approximately ten -years he rose to the rank of SS colonel. He is one of the three -defendants in the case who is not a physician. - -From the commencement of his career in the Nazi organization until his -capture by the Allied Forces in 1945 he was directly subordinate to and -closely associated with the leader of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, and he -had full knowledge of his chief’s personal and official interests and -activities. - -To Himmler, Rudolf Brandt was first of all an important and trusted -clerical assistant. The record shows him to have been an unusually -proficient stenographer. That is the road by which he finally arrived at -a position of considerable power and authority as personal Referent on -Himmler’s Personal Staff, Ministerial Counsellor in the Ministry of the -Interior, and a member of the Ahnenerbe. Acting for Himmler during his -absences, Rudolf Brandt, in these positions, had a tremendous -opportunity to and did exercise personal judgment and discretion in many -serious and important matters. - -HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS - -These experiments extended from March to August 1942. Their details are -dealt with elsewhere in this judgment. A portion of the evidence in this -specification consists of correspondence between the defendant Rudolf -Brandt and various others in the German military service who were -personally engaged in, or were closely connected with, the physical -details of the experiments performed. The correspondence just previously -mentioned was admitted in evidence, is well authenticated, and even -standing alone, without additional oral testimony—of which there was -also plenty—is deemed amply sufficient to disclose beyond reasonable -doubt that except for the sanction and diligent cooperation of the -defendant Rudolf Brandt, or someone occupying his position, the -high-altitude experiments mentioned in the indictment could not have -been conducted. - -Taken altogether, the evidence on this item discloses that during the -period between March and August 1942, certain medical experiments were -conducted at the Dachau concentration camp in Germany for the benefit of -the German Air Force, to determine the limits of human endurance and -existence at extremely high altitudes. Various human beings, -unwillingly, and entirely without their consent, were required and -compelled to, and did participate in the aforesaid experiments as -subjects thereof. The said nonconsenting subjects were prisoners of war, -German civilians and civilians from German occupied territory, whose -exact citizenship, in many cases, could not be ascertained. Among the -experimental subjects there were numerous deaths, estimated by witnesses -at 70 or 80, resulting directly from compulsory participation in the -experiments. Exact data on the total fatalities cannot be stated, but -there is convincing evidence that during the last day’s operation of the -high-altitude experiments, five participating and nonconsenting subjects -died as the result thereof. The greater number of the experimental -subjects suffered grave injury, torture and ill-treatment. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -In this experiment, or series of experiments, Rudolf Brandt is -established as an intermediary and necessary aid between Heinrich -Himmler, who authorized the work to be done, and those who were -appointed by him actually to perform the ruthless task. Evidence is -conclusive that Rudolf Brandt at all times knew exactly what -experimental processes would be carried out. He knew that the procedure -followed was to select from the inmates at Dachau such human subjects as -were considered most suitable for experimental purposes. He knew that no -consent was ever deemed necessary from the persons upon whom the -experiments were to be performed. He knew that among the experimental -subjects were non-German nationals, including civilians and prisoners of -war. - -The exact number of deaths cannot be ascertained from the evidence, but -that fatalities occurred among the experimental subjects has been proved -beyond a reasonable doubt. - -LOST (MUSTARD) GAS EXPERIMENTS - -On this specification, an affidavit of the defendant Rudolf Brandt which -is confirmed by other evidence reads substantially as follows: - - “Towards the end of the year 1939, experiments were conducted at - the Sachsenhausen concentration camp on persons who were - certainly not all volunteers, in order to ascertain the efficacy - of the different treatment of wounds inflicted by Lost gas. Lost - is a poisonous gas which produces injurious effects on the - epidermis. I think it is generally known as mustard gas. * * * - Therefore, experiments were conducted on inmates of - concentration camps. As far as I understand, the experiments - consisted of inflicting wounds upon various parts of the bodies - of the experimental subjects and infecting them thereafter with - Lost. Various methods of treatment were applied in order to - determine the most effective one * * *. - - “In the second half of 1942, Hirt (Dr. August Hirt) together - with * * * who served in the Luftwaffe, initiated experiments on - inmates of the Natzweiler concentration camp. The inmates for - these as well as other experiments were simply chosen by Pohl’s - office, the Economic and Administrative Main Office, WVHA. In - order to be employed for such purposes, the experiments on human - subjects with Lost gas had been carried on during the years 1943 - and 1944 in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp as well as in - the Natzweiler concentration camp. The result was that some of - the inmates died.” - -In the course of the gas experiments above referred to, testimony in the -record discloses that a considerable amount of correspondence was -carried on by persons concerned (except the experimental subjects -themselves), and it appears that some, at least, of this was referred to -Rudolf Brandt for action, upon which he personally intervened -sufficiently to associate himself actively with the conduct of the work -being done. And so he must be regarded as criminally responsible. - -STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS - -Rudolf Brandt is charged, as in the indictment set forth, with special -responsibility under the above heading. The means by which sterilization -experiments or processes were to be made or utilized included X-ray -treatment, surgery, and drugs. - -No specific instances of any drug being actually used have been clearly -shown by oral testimony, or exhibits herein submitted in evidence. In -reference to the X-ray and surgery methods of sterilization, however, -Rudolf Brandt is shown by the evidence to have taken a moving part in -the preparation of plans, and in their execution, sufficient to justify -the Tribunal in finding his criminal connection therewith. An affidavit -executed by the defendant Rudolf Brandt reads as follows: - - “Himmler was extremely interested in the development of a cheap, - rapid sterilization method which could be used against enemies - of Germany, such as the Russians, Poles, and Jews. One hoped - thereby not only to defeat the enemy, but to exterminate him. - The capacity for work of the sterilized persons could be - exploited by Germany, while the danger of propagation would be - eliminated. This mass sterilization was part of Himmler’s racial - theory; particular time and care were devoted to these - sterilization experiments.” - -We learn from the record that persons subjected to treatment were -“young, well-built inmates of concentration camps who were in the best -of health, and these were Poles, Russians, French, and prisoners of -war.” - -It goes without saying that the work done in conformity with the plans -of Himmler, substantially aided by the cooperation of Rudolf Brandt, -brought maiming and suffering to great numbers of people. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -Medical experiments ostensibly conducted to benefit Germany in the -prevention of typhus fever were carried on in the Natzweiler -concentration camp beginning with the year 1942. The details of these -experiments have been dealt with elsewhere in this judgment. - -In the evidence it is proved that not less than 50 experimental subjects -died as a direct result of their participation in these typhus -experiments. Persons of all nationalities were used as subjects. -Regarding these enterprises, Rudolf Brandt, in his own affidavit, admits -that these experimental subjects did not volunteer but were conscripted -and compelled to serve without their consent being sought or given. - -Inasmuch as information on the typhus experiments, both before and after -their performance, was furnished, as a matter of course, to Himmler -through Brandt, the defendant’s full knowledge of them is regarded as -definitely proven. - -Here, again, the managing hand of the defendant is shown. The smooth -operation of these experiments is demonstrated to have been contingent -upon the diligence with which Rudolf Brandt arranged for the supply of -quotas of suitable human experimental material to the physicians at the -scene of the experiment. - -In view of these proven facts, the defendant Rudolf Brandt must be held -and considered as one of the defendants responsible for performance of -illegal medical experiments where deaths resulted to the nonconsenting -human subjects. - -SKELETON COLLECTION - -In response to a request by Rudolf Brandt, on 9 February 1942 the -defendant Sievers, business manager of the Ahnenerbe, submitted to him -certain data on the alleged desirability of securing a Jewish skeleton -collection for the Reich University of Strasbourg. The report furnished -to the defendant Brandt contained among other things the following: - - “By procuring the skulls of the Jewish Bolshevik Commissars, who - personified a repulsive yet characteristic humanity, we have the - opportunity of obtaining tangible scientific evidence. The - actual obtaining and collecting of these skulls without - difficulty could be best accomplished by a directive issued to - the Wehrmacht in the future to immediately turn over alive all - Jewish Bolshevik Commissars to the field police.” - -On 27 February 1942, Rudolf Brandt informed defendant Sievers that -Himmler would support the enterprise and would place everything -necessary at his disposal; and that Sievers should report again in -connection with the undertaking. - -Testimony and exhibits placed before this Court are abundantly -sufficient to show that the plan mentioned was actually put into -operation; that not less than 86 people were murdered for the sole -purpose of obtaining their skeletons. Much more could be said in -reference to this revolting topic, but it would add nothing to the -judgment. The fact that Rudolf Brandt showed an initial interest and -collaborated in the undertaking is enough to require a finding that he -is guilty of murder in connection with the program. - - MALARIA, SEA-WATER, AND EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS; AND THE - CHARGE OF THE MURDER AND MISTREATMENT OF POLES - -It appears to be well established that Himmler sponsored, supported, -furthered or initiated each of these enterprises. Doubtless Brandt knew -what was going on, and perhaps he helped in the program. The evidence is -not sufficient, however, to justify such a finding. - -The Tribunal finds that the defendant Rudolf Brandt was an accessory to, -ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, was knowingly connected -with plans and enterprises involving, and was a member of an -organization or group connected with, the commission of medical -experiments on non-German nationals, without their consent, in the -course of which experiments murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, -atrocities, and other inhuman acts were committed; and the murder of no -less than 86 non-German Jews for a skeleton collection. To the extent -that these crimes were not war crimes they were crimes against humanity. - -MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment Rudolf Brandt is charged with being a -member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the -International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that -Rudolf Brandt became a member of the SS in 1933, and remained in this -organization until the end of the war. As a member of the SS he was -criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against -humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment. - -An extremely persuasive and interesting brief on behalf of the defendant -Rudolf Brandt, filed by his attorney, has received careful attention by -this Tribunal. Therein it is urged that Rudolf Brandt’s position under -Heinrich Himmler was one of such subordination, his personal character -so essentially mild, and he was so dominated by his chief, that the full -significance of the crimes in which he became engulfed came to him with -a shock only when he went to trial. This plea is offered in mitigation -of appalling offenses in which the defendant Brandt is said to have -played only an unassuming role. - -If it be thought for even a moment that the part played by Rudolf Brandt -was relatively unimportant when compared with the enormity of the -charges proved by the evidence, let it be said that every Himmler must -have his Brandt else the plans of a master criminal would never be put -into execution. - -The Tribunal, therefore, cannot accept the thesis. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Rudolf Brandt -is guilty under counts two, three and four of the indictment. - - - MRUGOWSKY - -The defendant is charged under counts two and three of the indictment -with special responsibility for, and participation in, Freezing, -Malaria, Sulfanilamide, Typhus, Poison, Epidemic Jaundice, and -Incendiary Bomb Experiments. Charges were made concerning certain other -medical experiments, but they have been abandoned by the prosecution. - -Mrugowsky joined the NSDAP in 1930 and the SS in 1931. He ultimately -rose to the rank of senior colonel in the Waffen SS. - -In 1938 Mrugowsky became a member of the staff of the SS medical office, -as hygienist. At the beginning of 1939 he founded the Hygiene -Bacteriological Testing Station of the SS in Berlin, whose purpose was -to combat epidemics in the SS garrison troops of the Waffen SS. In 1940 -the station was enlarged and renamed the “Hygiene Institute of the -Waffen SS.” Mrugowsky became its chief and at the same time Chief of the -Office for Hygiene in the Medical Service of the Waffen SS under -Genzken. - -In his dual capacity Mrugowsky was answerable to Genzken in all -questions concerning epidemic control and hygiene in the Waffen SS, but -as Chief of the Hygiene Institute, was military superior and commander -of the Institute and its affiliated institutions with power to issue -orders. - -The Medical Service of the Waffen SS was reorganized on 1 September -1943. Mrugowsky and the Hygiene Institute were transferred from under -Genzken and became directly subordinated to Grawitz as Reich Physician -SS and Police. By this transfer Mrugowsky became chief hygienist under -Grawitz, but remained Chief of the Hygiene Institute. - -TYPHUS AND OTHER VACCINE EXPERIMENTS - -The details concerning the vaccine experiments conducted at Buchenwald -concentration camp have been related elsewhere in this judgment and -hence the details need no further discussion. - -As pointed out in the case against Handloser, there is evidence in the -record that on 29 December 1941 a conference was held in Berlin attended -by Mrugowsky at which the decision was reached to begin research tests -at Buchenwald to determine the efficacy of egg yolk, and other vaccines -as protection against typhus. As a result of the conference, such an -experimental station was established at Buchenwald under the direction -of Dr. Ding with the defendant Hoven acting as his deputy. - -Except for a few tests conducted early in 1942, all experiments were -carried out in Block 46—so-called clinical block of the station. In the -autumn of 1943 a vaccine production department was established in Block -50 and this also came under the supervision of Dr. Ding-Schuler. - -It would burden this judgment unnecessarily to narrate in detail the -various tests and experiments carried out by Ding at Buchenwald as a -result of the decisions reached at higher levels. All of them conformed -to a more or less uniform pattern, with certain groups of inmates being -inoculated with vaccines, other groups (known as control groups) being -given no immunization, and finally both groups being artificially -infected with a virulent virus, and the results noted upon the -experimental subjects. - -We learn from the Ding diary, the authenticity and reliability of which -has been discussed at length in other portions of the judgment, the -methods employed, and the results obtained in at least some of the -experiments. - -For example: In “Typhus vaccination material research series I”, which -began on 6 January 1942, 135 inmates were vaccinated with Weigl, -Cox-Haagen-Gildemeister, Behring-Normal, or Behring-Strong, vaccines; 10 -persons were used for control. On 3 March 1942 all test subjects, -including control persons, were artificially infected with virulent -virus of Rickettsia-Prowazeki furnished by the Robert Koch Institute. -Five deaths occurred; three in the control group and two among the -vaccinated subjects. - -In “Typhus vaccine, research series II”, from 19 August to 4 September -1942, 40 persons were vaccinated with two different vaccines; 19 persons -were used for control. Subsequently all were artificially infected with -virulent virus; four deaths among the control persons occurred. - -The entries in the diary concerning “Typhus vaccine experimental series -VII” read as follows: - - “28 May 43-18 June 1943: Carrying out of typhus vaccination for - immunization with the following vaccine (1) 20 persons with - vaccine ‘Asid’, (2) 20 persons with vaccine ‘Asid Adsorbat’, (3) - 20 persons with vaccine ‘Weigl’ of the Institute for Typhus and - Virus Research of the High Command, Army (OKH) Krakow (Eyer) * * - *. All experimental persons got very serious typhus. 7 Sept. 43: - Chart and case history completed. The experimental series was - concluded. 53 deaths (18 with ‘Asid’) (18 with ‘Asid Adsorbat’) - (9 with ‘Weigl’) (8 control) 9 Sep. 43: Charts and case - histories delivered to Berlin. Dr. Ding, SS Sturmbannfuehrer.” - -Concerning “Typhus vaccine experimental series VIII” began on 8 March -1944 the following entry appears in the diary: - - “Suggested by Colonel M.C. of the Air Corps, Professor Rose - (Oberstarzt) the vaccine ‘Kopenhagen’ (Ipsen-Murine-vaccine), - produced from mouse liver by the national serum institute in - Copenhagen, was tested for its compatibility on humans. 20 - persons were vaccinated for immunization by intramuscular - injection * * *, 10 persons were contemplated for control and - comparison. 4 of the 30 persons were eliminated _before_ the - start of the artificial injection because of intermittent - sickness * * *. The remaining experimental persons were infected - on 16 April 44 by subcutaneous injection of 1/20 cc. typhus sick - fresh blood * * *. The following fell sick: 17 persons - immunized: 9 medium, 8 seriously; 9 persons control, 2 medium, 7 - seriously * * *. 2 June 44: The experimental series was - concluded. 13 June 44: Chart and case history completed and sent - to Berlin. 6 deaths (3 Kopenhagen) (3 control). Dr. Ding.” - -“Typhus vaccine experimental series IX” began on 17 July 1944. Twenty -persons were immunized with the vaccine “Weimar” produced by the -department for Typhus and Virus Research of the Hygiene Institute of the -Waffen SS; and for comparison, another group of 20 persons were -immunized with vaccine “Weigl” produced from lice by the Army High -Command (OKH) in Cracow [Krakow]. Still another group of 20 persons were -used for the control group. On 6 September 1944 the 60 experimental -persons were infected with fresh blood “sick with typhus” which was -injected into the upper arm. As a result, all experimental persons -became sick, some seriously. The narration of this experimental series -closes with the cryptic report: “4 Nov 44: Chart and case history -completed, 24 deaths (5 ‘Weigl’) (19 Control). Dr. Schuler.” - -These entries are but few of the many which we have taken at random from -the Ding diary, dealing with the sordid murders of defenseless victims -in the name of Nazi medical science. Many more could be set forth if -time and space permitted. An analysis of the Ding diary discloses that -no less than 729 concentration camp inmates were experimented on with -typhus, at least 154 of whom died. And this toll of death takes no -account of the certain demise of scores of so-called “passage” persons -who were artificially infected with typhus for the sole purpose of -having at hand an ever-ready supply of fresh blood “sick with typhus” to -be used to infect the experimental subjects. - -There is some evidence to the effect that the camp inmates used as -subjects in the first series submitted to being used as experimental -subjects after being told that the experiments were harmless and that -additional food would be given to volunteers. But these victims were not -informed that they would be artificially infected with a highly virulent -virus nor that they might die as a result. Certainly no one would -seriously suggest that under the circumstances these men gave their -legal consent to act as subjects. One does not ordinarily consent to be -the special object of a murder, and if one did, such consent would not -absolve his slayer. - -Later, when news of what was happening in Block 46 became generally -known in the camp, it was no longer possible to delude the inmates into -offering themselves as victims. Thereupon, the shabby pretense of -seeking volunteers was dropped and the experimental subjects were taken -arbitrarily from a list of inmates prepared by the camp administration. - -Other experiments were also carried out in Block 46 of Buchenwald to -test typhoid, para-typhoid A and B, and yellow fever. - -As in the typhus experiments, nonconsenting human subjects were used, -including not only German criminal prisoners but also Poles, Russians, -and Frenchmen, both civilians and prisoners of war. - -In all the typhus experiments, death resulted to many experimental -subjects. As to each of these experiments the evidence is overwhelming -that they were carried out by Ding under the orders or authority of the -defendant Mrugowsky. - -POISON EXPERIMENTS - -On 11 September 1944 Mrugowsky, Ding, and a certain Dr. Widmann carried -out an experiment with aconitin nitrate projectiles in the Sachenshausen -concentration camp. Details of the experiment are fully explained by a -“Top Secret” report of the sordid affair in a letter written by the -defendant Mrugowsky to the Criminological Institute, Berlin. The letter -follows: - - “Subject: Experiments with aconitin nitrate projectiles. - - To the Criminological Institute - Attn: Dr. Widmann - Berlin - - “In the presence of SS Strumbannfuehrer Dr. Ding, Dr. Widmann, - and the undersigned, experiments with aconitin nitrate - projectiles were conducted on 11 September 1944 on 5 persons who - had been condemned to death. The projectiles in question were of - a 7.65-mm caliber, filled with crystalized poison. The - experimental subjects, in a lying position, were each shot in - the upper part of the left thigh. The thighs of two of them were - cleanly shot through. Even afterwards, no effect of the poison - was to be observed. These two experimental subjects were - therefore exempted. - - “The entrance of the projectile did not show any peculiarities. - Evidently, the arteria femolaries of one of the subjects was - injured. A light stream of blood issued from the wound. But the - bleeding stopped after a short time. The loss of blood was - estimated as having been at the most ¾ of a liter, and - consequently was on no account fatal. - - “The symptoms of the condemned three showed a surprising - similarity. At first no peculiarities appeared. After 20-25 - minutes a motor agitation and a slight ptyalism set in but - stopped again. After 40 to 45 minutes a stronger salivation set - in. The poisoned persons swallowed repeatedly, but later the - flow of saliva became so strong that it could not even be - overcome by swallowing. Foamy saliva flowed from their mouths. - Then choking and vomiting set in. - - “After 58 minutes the pulse of two of them could no longer be - felt. The third had a pulse rate of 76. After 65 minutes his - blood pressure was 90/60. The sounds were extremely low. A - reduction of blood pressure was evident. - - “During the first hour of the experiment the pupils did not show - any changes. After 78 minutes the pupils of all three showed a - medium dilation together with a retarded light reaction. - Simultaneously, maximum respiration with heavy breathing - inhalations set in. This subsided after a few minutes. The - pupils contracted again and their reaction improved. After 65 - minutes the patellar and achilles tendon reflexes of the - poisoned subjects were negative. The abdominal reflexes of two - of them were also negative. The upper abdominal reflexes of the - third were still positive, while the lower were negative. After - approximately 90 minutes, one of the subjects again started - breathing heavily, this was accompanied by an increasing motor - unrest. Then the heavy breathing changed into a flat, - accelerated respiration, accompanied by extreme nausea. One of - the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. To do so he - introduced four fingers of his hand up to the knuckles into his - throat, but nevertheless could not vomit. His face was flushed. - - “The other two experimental subjects had already early shown a - pale face. The other symptoms were the same. The motor unrest - increased so much that the persons flung themselves up, then - down, rolled their eyes, and made meaningless motions with their - hands and arms. Finally the agitation subsided, the pupils - dilated to the maximum, and the condemned lay motionless. - Masseter spasms and urination were observed in one case. Death - occurred 121, 123 and 129 minutes after entry of the projectile. - - “_Summary._ The projectiles filled with approximately 38 mg. of - aconitin nitrate in solid form had, in spite of only - insignificant injuries, a deadly effect after two hours. - Poisoning showed 20 to 25 minutes after injury. The main - reactions were: salivation, alteration of the pupils, negative - tendon reflexes, motor unrest, and extreme nausea. - - “MRUGOWSKY - “SS Lecturer Oberfuehrer and Office Chief.” - -The defendant attempts to meet this charge with the defense that the -subjects used in this experiment were persons who had been condemned to -death and that he, Mrugowsky, had been appointed as their legal -executioner. - -One need but read the letter introduced in evidence to arrive at the -conclusion that the defense has no validity. This was not a legal -execution carried out in conformance with the laws and rules of war, but -a criminal medical experiment wherein wounds were inflicted on prisoners -with the sole end in view of determining the effectiveness of poisoned -bullets as a means of taking life. The hapless victims of this dastardly -torture were Russian prisoners of war, entitled to the protection -afforded by the laws of civilized nations. As has been said, in -substance, in this judgment: While under certain specific conditions the -rules of land warfare may recognize the validity of an execution by -shooting, it will not under any circumstances countenance the infliction -of death by maiming or torture. - -SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS - -That Mrugowsky rendered assistance to Gebhardt in the sulfanilamide -experiments at Ravensbrueck is plainly shown by the record. Mrugowsky -put his laboratory and co-workers at Gebhardt’s disposal. He furnished -the cultures for the infections. It was on the suggestion of Mrugowsky’s -office that wood shavings and ground glass were placed in the wounds of -the subjects so that battlefield wounds would be more closely simulated. - -GAS OEDEMA EXPERIMENTS - -Toward the end of 1942 a conference was held in the Military Medical -Academy, Berlin, to discuss the effects of gas oedema serum on wounded -persons. During the conference, several cases were reported in which -wounded soldiers who had received gas oedema serum injections in large -quantities suddenly died without apparent reason. Mrugowsky, who -participated in the conference, expressed the possibility that perhaps -the deaths had been due to the phenol content of the serum. As a step -toward solving the problem Mrugowsky ordered Dr. Ding-Schuler, his -subordinate, to take part in a euthanasia killing with phenol and to -report on the results in detail. - -In pursuance of the order given, Dr. Ding and the defendant Hoven killed -some of the concentration camp inmates at Buchenwald with phenol -injections and Ding reported his findings to his superior officer, -Mrugowsky, as required by the order. - -FREEZING, INCENDIARY BOMB, AND EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE -EXPERIMENTS - -As to these items the Tribunal is of the view that the evidence is -insufficient to sustain the charges. - -It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant -Mrugowsky was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a -consenting part in, and was knowingly connected with plans and -enterprises involving medical experiments on non-German nationals, -without their consent, in the course of which experiments, murders, -brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhuman acts -were committed. To the extent that these crimes were not war crimes they -were crimes against humanity. - -COUNT FOUR - -Under count four of the indictment, the defendant is charged with being -a member of an organization declared criminal by the International -Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. - -The evidence proves that Mrugowsky joined the NSDAP in 1930 and -voluntarily became a member of the Waffen SS in 1931. He remained in -these organizations throughout the war. As a member of the Waffen SS, he -was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes -against humanity as discussed in this judgment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Joachim -Mrugowsky is guilty under counts two, three, and four of the indictment. - - - POPPENDICK - -The defendant Poppendick is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in, -High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Sulfanilamide, Sea-Water, Epidemic -Jaundice, Sterilization, Typhus, and Poison experiments. He is charged -under count four with being a member of an organization declared -criminal by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal. - -The charges with reference to high-altitude and poison experiments have -been abandoned by the prosecution and hence will not be considered -further. - -Poppendick studied medicine at several German universities from 1921 to -1926 and passed his state examination in December of the latter year. He -joined the NSDAP on 1 March 1932 and the SS on 1 July following. He rose -to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the SS and to the rank of senior -colonel in the Waffen SS. He was also a member of a Nazi Physicians’ -Association. In August 1935 he was appointed as a physician in the Main -Race and Settlement Office in Berlin and became chief physician of that -office in 1941. He held the latter appointment until the fall of 1944. - -From 1 September 1939 until sometime in 1941, Poppendick was on active -duty in the army as a surgeon. During the latter year he resumed his -duties with the Race and Settlement Office in Berlin. Between 1939 and -1943, he performed some duties as a member of the staff of the Reich -Physician SS and Police, Dr. Grawitz, taking care of special -assignments. - -In the fall of 1943 Poppendick was made Chief of the Personal Office of -Grawitz, which position he retained until the end of the war. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence is that Poppendick gained knowledge of the freezing -experiments conducted by Rascher at Dachau, as the result of a -conference held between Rascher, Grawitz, and Poppendick on 13 January -1943 for the purpose of discussing certain phases of the research. The -evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Poppendick was -criminally connected with these experiments. - -MALARIA EXPERIMENTS - -The prosecution contends that Poppendick is criminally responsible for -the malaria experiments conducted by Dr. Schilling at Dachau. Dr. -Ploetner was engaged in the malaria experiments as a subordinate of -Schilling. Sievers’ Diary, which is in evidence, contains a notation -that on 23 May 1944 Grawitz, Poppendick, Ploetner, and Sievers held a -conference, which had probably been arranged by Poppendick three days -previously by telephone. The subject of the conference is not disclosed -by the diary entry, but it appears elsewhere in the diary that on 31 May -1944 Grawitz sanctioned Ploetner’s collaboration with Schilling. - -Poppendick testified as a witness on his own behalf that he had heard -that Schilling was carrying on special investigations at Dachau -concerning immunity from malaria. He stated further that his knowledge -of the nature of the investigations went no further. The record does not -contradict his testimony. - -The Tribunal finds that the evidence does not disclose beyond a -reasonable doubt that Poppendick was criminally connected with the -malaria experiments. - -SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS - -Poppendick attended the Third Meeting of Consulting Surgeons at the -Military Medical Academy, Berlin, and heard lectures by Gebhardt and -Fischer concerning the sulfanilamide experiments, which have been -discussed elsewhere in this judgment. Under date of 7 September 1942 he -signed a certificate to a true copy of a report, concerning -sulfanilamide experiments which had been conducted at Ravensbrueck, made -by Gebhardt to Grawitz. Grawitz forwarded the report, or a certified -copy thereof, to Himmler. - -We are of the opinion that Poppendick had knowledge of the criminal -nature of the experiments conducted by Gebhardt and Fischer at -Ravensbrueck, but the defendant’s criminal connection with any such -experiments has not been proved by the evidence. - -SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence does not disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that Poppendick -was criminally implicated in these experiments. - -EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence does not disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that Poppendick -was criminally implicated in these experiments. - -STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS - -Poppendick was Chief Physician of the Main Race and Settlement Office. -The judgment of the International Military Tribunal found that this -office was “active in carrying out schemes for Germanization of occupied -territories according to the racial principles of the Nazi Party and -were involved in the deportation of Jews and other foreign nationals.” -(_See the “Trial of the Major War Criminals,” Vol. 1, p. 270._) - -Testifying before this Tribunal, Poppendick stated that the Nazi racial -policy was twofold in aspect; one policy being positive, the other, -negative in character. The positive policy included many matters, one -being the encouragement of German families to produce more children. The -negative policy concerned the sterilization and extermination of -non-Aryans as well as other measures to reduce the non-Aryan population. -According to Poppendick’s testimony, he was not concerned with the -execution of negative, but only with positive measures. - -By letter dated 29 May 1941 Grawitz wrote to Himmler concerning a -conference held on 27 May 1941 at which Dr. Clauberg was present, and -discussed his “new method of sterilization of inferior women without an -operation.” - -Poppendick by letter dated 4 June 1941, which referred to a previous -telephone conversation with Grawitz, wrote Rudolf Brandt stating that he -was enclosing “the list of physicians who are prepared to perform the -treatment of sterility” as requested by Himmler. The list referred to is -evidently the same as was contained in a letter from Grawitz to Himmler, -dated 30 May 1941, which stated: “In the following, I submit a list of -specialists in charge of the treatment of sterility in women according -to the method of Professor Clauberg.” - -It is shown by the evidence that Clauberg later carried out -sterilization experiments on Jewesses at Auschwitz. Similar experiments -were carried out in other concentration camps by SS doctors who were -subordinate to Grawitz. It is evident that Poppendick knew of these -sterilization experiments, although it is not shown that he was -criminally connected with them. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -It is not clear from the evidence that Poppendick was criminally -connected with, or had knowledge of, the nature of the typhus -experiments at Buchenwald, or the type of subjects upon which they were -conducted. - -INCENDIARY BOMB EXPERIMENTS - -There is some evidence in the record to the effect that after incendiary -bomb experiments were completed at Buchenwald, reports of the -experiments were forwarded to Poppendick and Mrugowsky. It is evident -that through the reports Poppendick gained knowledge of the nature of -the experiments, but the record fails to show criminal responsibility of -the defendant in connection therewith. - -PHLEGMON EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence clearly proves Poppendick’s knowledge of these experiments, -but it fails to show the defendant’s criminal connection therewith. - -POLYGAL EXPERIMENTS - -The record does not show Poppendick’s knowledge of or connection with -these experiments. - -HORMONE EXPERIMENTS - -The prosecution contends that the evidence shows Poppendick’s criminal -responsibility in connection with a series of experiments conducted at -Buchenwald by Dr. Varnet, a Danish physician who claimed to have -discovered a method of curing homosexuality by transplantation of an -artificial gland. - -Under date 15 July 1944, Poppendick wrote to Dr. Ding at the -concentration camp Buchenwald as follows: - - “By request of the Reichsfuehrer SS the Danish doctor SS - Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Varnet has been given opportunity to - continue his hormone research with the SS, particularly the - development of his artificial gland. The Reichsfuehrer SS - anticipates certain results from the treatment of homosexuals - with Vamet’s artificial gland. The technical preparations have - come to such a point that experiments on human beings can be - started within a reasonable space of time. - - “As SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. Lolling informed me, the - concentration camp Weimar-Buchenwald has been directed to make - available 5 prisoners for SS Sturmbannfuehrer Varnet’s - experiments. These prisoners will be made available to SS - Sturmbannfuehrer Varnet by the camp physician at any time. - - “SS Sturmbannfuehrer Varnet intends to go to Buchenwald shortly - in order to make certain necessary preliminary tests on these - prisoners. In case there will be special laboratory tests, you - are requested to assist Varnet within the scope of your - possibilities. - - “Particulars on Varnet’s research were sent today to the camp - physician of Weimar-Buchenwald for his information.” - -There is evidence that during the summer of 1944 Dr. Varnet conducted -the experiments referred to in Poppendick’s letter. However, the -nationality of the prisoners used for the experiments is not shown, nor -has it been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the experiments were -harmful or caused death, or injury to the experimental subjects. - -We have given careful consideration to the evidence concerning the -charges made by the prosecution against the defendant Poppendick. -Certainly the evidence raises a strong suspicion that he was involved in -the experiments. He at least had notice of them and of their -consequences. He knew also that they were being carried on by the SS, of -which he was and remained a member. - -But this Tribunal, however, cannot convict upon mere suspicion; evidence -beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary. The evidence is insufficient to -sustain guilt under counts two and three of the indictment. - -MEMBERSHIP IN A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -The defendant Poppendick is charged with membership in an organization -declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military -Tribunal, namely, the SS. Poppendick joined the SS in July 1932. He -remained in the SS voluntarily throughout the war, with actual knowledge -of the fact that that organization was being used for the commission of -acts now declared criminal by Control Council Law No. 10. He must, -therefore, be found guilty under count four of the indictment. - -With reference to the nature of punishment which should be imposed under -such circumstances, the International Military Tribunal has made the -following recommendation: - - “1. That so far as possible throughout the four zones of - occupation in Germany the classifications, sanctions, and - penalties be standardized. Uniformity of treatment so far as - practical should be a basic principle. This does not, of course, - mean that discretion in sentencing should not be vested in the - Court; but the discretion should be within fixed limits - appropriate to the nature of the crime. - - “2. Law No. 10 * * * leaves punishment entirely to the - discretion of the trial court even to the extent of inflicting - the death penalty. - - “The De-Nazification Law of 5 March 1946, however, passed for - Bavaria, Greater Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden, provides - definite sentences for punishment in each type of offense. The - Tribunal recommends that in no case should punishment imposed - under Law No. 10 upon any members of an organization or group - declared by the Tribunal to be criminal exceed the punishment - fixed by the De-Nazification Law. No person should be punished - under both laws.” - - (_See “Trial of the Major War Criminals,” Vol. 1, p. 257._) - -In weighing the punishment, if any, which should be meted out to the -defendant for his guilt by reason of the charge contained in count four -of the indictment, this Tribunal will give such consideration to the -recommendations of the International Military Tribunal as may under the -premises seem meet and proper. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds the defendant Helmut Poppendick not guilty -under counts two and three of the indictment, and finds and adjudges the -defendant Helmut Poppendick guilty as charged in the fourth count of the -indictment. - - - SIEVERS - -The defendant Sievers is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in, -High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sea-Water, Epidemic -Jaundice, and Typhus Experiments, and with extermination of Jews to -complete a skeleton collection. Under count four of the indictment, he -is charged with being a member of an organization declared criminal by -the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. - -The prosecution has abandoned the charge of participation in the -Epidemic Jaundice experiments, and hence, this charge will not be -considered further. - -Sievers is one of the three defendants who are not physicians. He joined -the NSDAP in 1929 and renewed his membership in the Nazi Party in 1933. -He joined the SS at the end of 1935 on the suggestion of Himmler. In -this organization he attained the rank of a Standartenfuehrer (colonel). - -From 1 July 1935 until the war ended, Sievers was a member of Himmler’s -personal staff and Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe Society. -According to a statute of 1 January 1939, the purpose of the Ahnenerbe -was to support scientific research concerning the culture and heritage -of the Nordic race. The Board of Directors was composed of Himmler as -president, Dr. Wuest as curator, and Sievers as the business manager. -Sievers was responsible for the business organization administration and -the budget of the Ahnenerbe. The place of business was Berlin. Sievers -supported and participated in the medical experiments which are the -subject of the indictment, primarily through the Institute of Military -Scientific Research which was established by order of Himmler dated 7 -July 1942 and was administratively attached to the Ahnenerbe. - -On 1 January 1942 Himmler ordered the establishment of an entomological -institute; in March 1942 the Institute Dr. Rascher in Dachau; and in the -first month of the year 1942, the Institute Dr. Hirt, at Strasbourg. -These subsequently became part of the Institute for Military Scientific -Research. - -Sievers was, for all practical purposes, the acting head of the -Ahnenerbe. In this capacity he was subordinated to Himmler and regularly -reported to him on the affairs of this Society. The top secret -correspondence of Himmler concerning the Ahnenerbe was sent to Sievers. -The charter of the Ahnenerbe defines Sievers’ duties as follows: - - “The Reich Business Manager handles the business affairs of the - community; he is in charge of the business organization and - administration. He is responsible for the drawing up of the - budget and for the administration of the treasury.” - -Sievers was responsible for the entire administrative problems of the -secretary’s office, bookkeeping and treasury. Besides that he also had -to manage the Ahnenerbe publishing house. In June 1943 Professor Dr. -Mentzel, who among other things was Chief of the Business Managing -Advisory Council of the Reich Research Council, appointed Sievers as his -deputy. By this act Sievers did not become a member of the Reich -Research Council but held only an honorary position. - -In a letter to the defendant Rudolf Brandt, dated 28 January 1943, -Sievers defines his position as Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe -as follows: - - “My duty merely consists in smoothing the way for the research - men and seeing that the tasks ordered by the Reichsfuehrer SS - are carried out in the quickest possible way. On one thing I - certainly can form an opinion; that is, on who is doing the - quickest job.” - -Sievers received orders directly from Himmler on matters of research -assignments for the Ahnenerbe and he reported directly to Himmler on -such experiments. Sievers devoted his efforts to obtaining the funds, -materials, and equipment needed by the research workers. The materials -obtained by Sievers included concentration camp inmates to be used as -experimental subjects. When the experiments were under way, Sievers made -certain that they were being performed in a satisfactory manner. In this -connection, Sievers necessarily exercised his own independent judgment -and had to familiarize himself with the details of such assignments. - -HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS - -The details of these experiments are discussed in other portions of this -judgment. Sievers’ activities in the high-altitude experiments are -revealed clearly by the evidence. Rascher, in a letter to Himmler dated -5 April 1942, states as follows: - - “SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers took a whole day off to watch - some of the interesting standard experiments and may have given - you a brief report * * * I am very much indebted to - Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers as he has shown a very active - interest in my work in every respect.” - -Sievers admitted that he reported to Himmler about his visit to Dachau. -On the basis of the reports of Sievers and Rascher, Himmler authorized -Rascher to continue the high-altitude experiments in Dachau, in the -course of which the evidence shows that 180 to 200 inmates were -experimented upon; that 70 to 80 of them died. Rascher became associated -with the Ahnenerbe in March 1942, and during the entire time covered by -the period of the high-altitude experiments, Rascher was attached to the -Ahnenerbe and performed the high-altitude experiments with its -assistance. On 20 July 1942, when the final report on high-altitude -experiments was submitted to Himmler, Rascher’s name appeared on the -letterhead of the Ahnenerbe Institute for Military Scientific Research -as shown by the cover letter, and the inclosed report bore the statement -that the experiments had been carried out in conjunction with the -research and instruction association “Das Ahnenerbe”. Sievers had actual -knowledge of the criminal aspects of the Rascher experiments. He was -notified that Dachau inmates were to be used. He himself inspected the -experiments. Sievers admitted that Rascher told him that several died as -a result of the high-altitude experiments. - -Under these facts Sievers is specially chargeable with the criminal -aspects of these experiments. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -Before the high-altitude experiments had actually been completed, -freezing experiments were ordered to be performed at Dachau. They were -conducted from August 1942 to the early part of 1943 by Holzloehner, -Finke and Rascher, all of whom were officers in the Medical Services of -the Luftwaffe. Details of the freezing experiments have been given -elsewhere in this judgment. - -In May 1943 Rascher was transferred to the Waffen SS and then proceeded -alone to conduct freezing experiments in Dachau until May 1945. Rascher -advised the defendant Rudolf Brandt that Poles and Russians had been -used as subjects. - -The witness Neff testified that the defendant Sievers visited the -experimental station quite frequently during the freezing experiments. -He testified further that in September 1942 he received orders to take -the hearts and lungs of 5 experimental subjects killed in the -experiments to Professor Hirt in Strasbourg for further scientific -study; that the travel warrant for the trip was made out by Sievers; and -that the Ahnenerbe Society paid the expenses for the transfer of the -bodies. One of the 5 experimental subjects killed was a Dutch citizen. - -Neff’s testimony is corroborated in large part by the affidavits of the -defendants Rudolf Brandt and Becker-Freyseng, by the testimony of the -witnesses Lutz, Michalowsky and Vieweg, and by the documentary evidence -in the record. In the Sievers’ diary, there are numerous instances of -Sievers’ activities in the aid of Rascher. On 1 February 1943 Sievers -noted efforts in obtaining apparatus, implements and chemicals for -Rascher’s experiments. On 6 and 21 January 1944 Sievers noted the -problem of location. Rascher reported to Sievers periodically concerning -the status and details of the freezing experiments. - -It is plain from the record that the relationship of Sievers and Rascher -in the performance of freezing experiments required Sievers to make the -preliminary arrangements for the performance of the experiments to -familiarize himself with the progress of the experiments by personal -inspection, to furnish necessary equipment and material, including human -beings used during the freezing experiments, to receive and make -progress reports concerning Rascher, and to handle the matter of -evaluation and publication of such reports. Basically, such activities -constituted a performance of his duties as defined by Sievers in his -letter of 28 January 1943 to Rudolf Brandt, in which he stated that he -smoothed the way for research workers and saw to it that Himmler’s -orders were carried out. - -Under these facts Sievers is chargeable with the criminal activities in -these experiments. - -MALARIA EXPERIMENTS - -Details of these experiments are given elsewhere in this judgment. These -experiments were performed at Dachau by Schilling and Ploetner. The -evidence shows that Sievers had knowledge of the nature and purpose of -these criminal enterprises and supported them in his official position. - -LOST GAS EXPERIMENTS - -These experiments were conducted in the Natzweiler concentration camp -under the supervision of Professor Hirt of the University of Strasbourg. -The Ahnenerbe Society and the defendant Sievers supported this research -on behalf of the SS. The arrangement for the payment of the research -subsidies of the Ahnenerbe was made by Sievers. The defendant Sievers -participated in these experiments by actively collaborating with the -defendants Karl Brandt and Rudolf Brandt and with Hirt and his principal -assistant, Dr. Wimmer. The record shows that Sievers was in -correspondence with Hirt at least as early as January 1942, and that he -established contact between Himmler and Hirt. - -In a letter of 11 September 1942 to Gluecks, Sievers wrote that the -necessary conditions existed in Natzweiler “for carrying out our -military scientific research work”. He requested that Gluecks issue the -necessary authorization for Hirt, Wimmer, and Kieselbach to enter -Natzweiler, and that provision be made for their board and -accommodations. The letter also stated: - - “The experiments which are to be performed on prisoners are to - be carried out in four rooms of an already existing medical - barrack. Only slight changes in the construction of the building - are required, in particular the installation of the hood which - can be produced with very little material. In accordance with - attached plan of the construction management at Natzweiler, I - request that necessary orders be issued to same to carry out the - reconstruction. All the expenses arising out of our activity at - Natzweiler will be covered by this office.” - -In a memorandum of 3 November 1942 to the defendant Rudolf Brandt, -Sievers complained about certain difficulties which had arisen in -Natzweiler because of the lack of cooperation from the camp officials. -He seemed particularly outraged by the fact that the camp officials were -asking that the experimental prisoners be paid for. A portion of the -memorandum follows: - - “When I think of our military research work conducted at the - concentration camp Dachau, I must praise and call special - attention to the generous and understanding way in which our - work was furthered there and to the cooperation we were given. - Payment of prisoners was never discussed. It seems as if at - Natzweiler they are trying to make as much money as possible out - of this matter. We are not conducting these experiments, as a - matter of fact, for the sake of some fixed scientific idea, but - to be of practical help to the armed forces and beyond that, to - the German people in a possible emergency.” - -Brandt was requested to give his help in a comradely fashion in setting -up the necessary conditions at Natzweiler. The defendant Rudolf Brandt -replied to this memorandum on 3 December 1942 and told Sievers that he -had had occasion to speak to Pohl concerning these difficulties, and -that they would be remedied. - -The testimony of the witness Holl was that approximately 220 inmates of -Russian, Polish, Czech, and German nationality were experimented upon by -Hirt and his collaborators, and that approximately 50 died. None of the -experimental subjects volunteered. During the entire period of these -experiments, Hirt was associated with the Ahnenerbe Society. - -In early 1944 Hirt and Wimmer summarized their findings from the Lost -experiments in a report entitled “Proposed Treatment of Poisoning Caused -by Lost.” The report was described as from the Institute for Military -Scientific Research, Department H of the Ahnenerbe, located at the -Strasbourg Anatomical Institute. Light, medium, and heavy injuries due -to Lost gas are mentioned. Sievers received several copies of this -report. On 31 March 1944, after Karl Brandt had received a Fuehrer -Decree giving him broad powers in the field of chemical-warfare, Sievers -informed Brandt about Hirt’s work and gave him a copy of the report. -This is proved by Sievers’ letter to Rudolf Brandt on 11 April 1944. -Karl Brandt admitted that the wording of the report made it clear that -experiments had been conducted on human beings. - -Sievers testified that on 25 January 1943, he went to Natzweiler -concentration camp and consulted with the camp authorities concerning -the arrangements to be made for Hirt’s Lost experiments. These -arrangements included the obtaining of laboratories and experimental -subjects. Sievers testified that the Lost experiments were harmful. On -the visit of 25 January 1943, Sievers saw ten persons who had been -subjected to Lost experiments and watched Hirt change the bandages on -one of the persons. Sievers testified that in March 1943 he asked Hirt -whether any of the experimental subjects had suffered harm from the -experiments and was told by Hirt that two of the experimental subjects -had died due to other causes. - -It is evident that Sievers was criminally connected with these -experiments. - -SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS - -These experiments were conducted at Dachau from July through September -1944. Details of these experiments are explained elsewhere in the -judgment. - -The function of the Ahnenerbe in the performance of sea-water -experiments conducted at Dachau from July through September 1944 was -chiefly in connection with the furnishing of space and equipment for the -experiments. Sievers made these necessary arrangements on behalf of the -Ahnenerbe. As a result of Schroeder’s request to Himmler through Grawitz -for permission to perform the sea-water experiments on inmates in -Dachau, Himmler directed on 8 July 1944 that the experiments be made on -gypsies and three other persons with other racial qualities as control -subjects. Sievers was advised by Himmler’s office of the above -authorization for experiments at the Rascher station at Dachau. - -On 27 June 1944, Rascher was replaced by Ploetner as head of the -Ahnenerbe Institute for Military Scientific Research at Dachau. Sievers, -on 20 July, went to Dachau and conferred with Ploetner of the Ahnenerbe -Institute and the defendant Beiglboeck, who was to perform the -experiments, concerning the execution of the sea-water experiments and -the availability of working space for them. Sievers agreed to supply -working space in Ploetner’s department and at the Ahnenerbe -Entomological Institute. - -On 26 July 1944, Sievers made a written report to Grawitz concerning -details of his conference at Dachau. Sievers wrote that 40 experimental -persons could be accommodated at “our” research station, that the -Ahnenerbe would supply a laboratory, and that Dr. Ploetner would give -his assistance, help, and advice to the Luftwaffe physicians performing -the experiments. Sievers also stated the number and assignment of the -personnel to be employed, estimating that the work would cover a period -of three weeks and designated 23 July 1944 as the date of commencement, -provided that experimental persons were available and the camp commander -had received the necessary order from Himmler. In conclusion, Sievers -expressed his hope that the arrangements which he had made would permit -a successful conduct of the experiments and requested that -acknowledgment be made to Himmler as a participant in the experiments. - -In his testimony Sievers admitted that he had written the above letter -and had conferred with Beiglboeck at Dachau. As the letter indicates, -Sievers knew that concentration camp inmates were to be used. - -Sievers had knowledge of and criminally participated in sea-water -experiments. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -Detailed description of these experiments is contained elsewhere in this -judgment. Sievers participated in the criminal typhus experiments -conducted by Haagen on concentration camp inmates at Natzweiler by -making the necessary arrangements in connection with securing -experimental subjects, handling administrative problems incident to the -experiments, and by furnishing the Ahnenerbe station with its equipment -in Natzweiler for their performance. - -On 16 August 1943, when Haagen was preparing to transfer his typhus -experiments from Schirmeck to Natzweiler, he requested Sievers to make -available a hundred concentration camp inmates for his research. This is -seen from a letter of 30 September 1943 from Sievers to Haagen in which -he states that he will be glad to assist, and that he is accordingly -contacting the proper source to have the “desired personnel” placed at -Haagen’s disposal. As a result of Sievers’ efforts, a hundred inmates -were shipped from Auschwitz to Natzweiler for Haagen’s experiments. -These were found to be unfit for experimentation because of their -pitiful physical condition. A second group of one hundred was then made -available. Some of these were used by Haagen as experimental subjects. - -That the experiments were carried out in the Ahnenerbe experimental -station in Natzweiler is proved by excerpts from monthly reports of the -camp doctor in Natzweiler. A number of deaths occurred among non-German -experimental subjects as a direct result of the treatment to which they -were subjected. - -POLYGAL EXPERIMENTS - -Evidence has been introduced during the course of the trial to show that -experiments to test the efficacy of a blood coagulant “polygal” were -conducted on Dachau inmates by Rascher. The Sievers’ diary shows that -the defendant had knowledge of activities concerning the production of -polygal, and that he lent his support to the conduct of the experiments. - -JEWISH SKELETON COLLECTION - -Sievers is charged under the indictment with participation in the -killing of 112 Jews who were selected to complete a skeleton collection -for the Reich University of Strasbourg. - -Responding to a request by the defendant Rudolf Brandt, Sievers -submitted to him on 9 February 1942 a report by Dr. Hirt of the -University of Strasbourg on the desirability of securing a Jewish -skeleton collection. In this report, Hirt advocated outright murder of -“Jewish Bolshevik Commissars” for the procurement of such a collection. -On 27 February 1942, Rudolf Brandt informed Sievers that Himmler would -support Hirt’s work and would place everything necessary at his -disposal. Brandt asked Sievers to inform Hirt accordingly and to report -again on the subject. On 2 November 1942 Sievers requested Brandt to -make the necessary arrangements with the Reich Main Security Office for -providing 150 Jewish inmates from Auschwitz to carry out this plan. On 6 -November, Brandt informed Adolf Eichmann, the Chief of Office IV B/4 -(Jewish Affairs) of the Reich Main Security Office to put everything at -Hirt’s disposal which was necessary for the completion of the skeleton -collection. - -From Sievers’ letter to Eichmann of 21 June 1943, it is apparent that SS -Hauptsturmfuehrer Beger, a collaborator of the Ahnenerbe Society, -carried out the preliminary work for the assembling of the skeleton -collection in the Auschwitz concentration camp on 79 Jews, 30 Jewesses, -2 Poles, and 4 Asiatics. The corpses of the victims were sent in three -shipments to the Anatomical Institute of Hirt in the Strasbourg -University. - -When the Allied Armies were threatening to overrun Strasbourg early in -September 1944, Sievers dispatched to Rudolf Brandt the following -teletype message: - - “Subject: Collection of Jewish Skeletons. - - “In conformity with the proposal of 9 February 1942 and with the - consent of 23 February 1942 * * * SS Sturmbannfuehrer Professor - Hirt planned the hitherto missing collection of skeletons. Due - to the extent of the scientific work connected herewith, the - preparation of the skeletons is not yet concluded. Hirt asks - with respect to the time needed for 80 specimens, and in case - the endangering of Strasbourg has to be reckoned with, how to - proceed with the collection situated in the dissecting room of - the anatomical institute. He is able to carry out the maceration - and thus render them irrecognizable. Then, however, part of the - entire work would have been partly done in vain, and it would be - a great scientific loss for this unique collection, because - hominit casts could not be made afterwards. The skeleton - collection as such is not conspicuous. Viscera could be declared - as remnants of corpses, apparently left in the anatomical - institute by the French and ordered to be cremated. Decision on - the following proposals is requested: - - “1. Collection can be preserved. - - “2. Collection is to be partly dissolved. - - “3. Entire collection is to be dissolved. - - “Sievers” - -The pictures of the corpses and the dissecting rooms of the Institute, -taken by the French authorities after the liberation of Strasbourg, -point up the grim story of these deliberate murders to which Sievers was -a party. - -Sievers knew from the first moment he received Hirt’s report of 9 -February 1942 that mass murder was planned for the procurement of the -skeleton collection. Nevertheless he actively collaborated in the -project, sent an employee of the Ahnenerbe to make the preparatory -selections in the concentration camp at Auschwitz, and provided for the -transfer of the victims from Auschwitz to Natzweiler. He made -arrangements that the collection be destroyed. - -Sievers’ guilt under this specification is shown without question. - -Sievers offers two purported defenses to the charges against him (1) -that he acted pursuant to superior orders; (2) that he was a member of a -resistance movement. - -The first defense is wholly without merit. There is nothing to show that -in the commission of these ghastly crimes, Sievers acted entirely -pursuant to orders. True, the basic policies or projects which he -carried through were decided upon by his superiors, but in the execution -of the details Sievers had an unlimited power of discretion. The -defendant says that in his position he could not have refused an -assignment. The fact remains that the record shows the case of several -men who did, and who have lived to tell about it. - -Sievers’ second matter of defense is equally untenable. In support of -the defense, Sievers offered evidence by which he hoped to prove that as -early as 1933 he became a member of a secret resistance movement which -plotted to overthrow the Nazi Government and to assassinate Hitler and -Himmler; that as a leading member of the group, Sievers obtained the -appointment as Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe so that he could -be close to Himmler and observe his movements; that in this position he -became enmeshed in the revolting crimes, the subject matter of this -indictment; that he remained as business manager upon advice of his -resistance leader to gain vital information which would hasten the day -of the overthrow of the Nazi Government and the liberation of the -helpless peoples coming under its domination. - -Assuming all these things to be true, we cannot see how they may be used -as a defense for Sievers. The fact remains that murders were committed -with cooperation of the Ahnenerbe upon countless thousands of wretched -concentration camp inmates who had not the slightest means of -resistance. Sievers directed the program by which these murders were -committed. - -It certainly is not the law that a resistance worker can commit no -crime, and least of all, against the very people he is supposed to be -protecting. - -MEMBERSHIP IN A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment, Wolfram Sievers is charged with -being a member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of -the International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows -that Wolfram Sievers became a member of the SS in 1935 and remained a -member of that organization to the end of the war. As a member of the SS -he was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes -against humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the -indictment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Wolfram Sievers -guilty under counts two, three and four of the indictment. - - - ROSE - -The defendant Rose is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in Typhus -and Epidemic Jaundice Experiments. - -The latter charge has been abandoned by the prosecution. - -Evidence was offered concerning Rose’s criminal participation in malaria -experiments at Dachau, although he was not named in the indictment as -one of the defendants particularly charged with criminal responsibility -in connection with malaria experiments. Questions presented by this -situation will be discussed later. - -The defendant Rose is a physician of large experience, for many years -recognized as an expert in tropical diseases. He studied medicine at the -Universities of Berlin and Breslau and was admitted to practice in the -fall of 1921. After serving as interne in several medical institutes, he -received an appointment on the staff of the Robert Koch Institute in -Berlin. Later he served on the staff of Heidelberg University and for -three years engaged in the private practice of medicine in Heidelberg. -In 1929 he went to China, where he remained until 1936, occupying -important positions as medical adviser to the Chinese Government. In -1936 he returned to Germany and became head of the Department for -Tropical Medicine at the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin. Late in August -1939 he joined the Luftwaffe with the rank of first lieutenant in the -Medical Corps. In that service he was commissioned brigadier general in -the reserve and continued on active duty until the end of the war. He -was consultant on hygiene and tropical medicine to the Chief of the -Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. From 1944 he was also consultant on -the staff of defendant Handloser and was medical adviser to Dr. Conti in -matters pertaining to tropical diseases. During the war Rose devoted -practically all of his time to his duties as consultant to the Chief of -the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, Hippke, and after 1 January 1944, -the defendant Schroeder. - -MALARIA EXPERIMENTS - -Medical experiments in connection with malaria were carried on at Dachau -concentration camp from February 1942 until the end of the war. These -experiments were conducted under Dr. Klaus Schilling for the purpose of -discovering a method of establishing immunity against malaria. During -the course of the experiments probably as many as 1,000 inmates of the -concentration camp were used as subjects of the experiments. Very many -of these persons were nationals of countries other than Germany who did -not volunteer for the experiments. By credible evidence it is -established that approximately 30 of the experimental subjects died as a -direct result of the experiments and that many more succumbed from -causes directly following the experiments, including non-German -nationals. - -With reference to Rose’s participation in these experiments, the record -shows the following: The defendant Rose had been acquainted with -Schilling for a number of years, having been his successor in a position -once held by Schilling in the Robert Koch Institute. Under date 3 -February 1941, Rose, writing to Schilling, then in Italy, referred to a -letter received from Schilling, in which the latter requested “malaria -spleens” (spleens taken from the bodies of persons who had died from -malaria). Rose in reply asked for information concerning the exact -nature of the material desired. Schilling wrote 4 April 1942 from Dachau -to Rose at Berlin, stating that he had inoculated a person -intracutaneously with sporocoides from the salivary glands of a female -anopheles which Rose had sent him. The letter continues: - - “For the second inoculation I miss the sporocoides material - because I do not possess the ‘Strain Rose’ in the anopheles yet. - If you could find it possible to send me in the next days a few - anopheles infected with ‘Strain Rose’ (with the last consignment - two out of ten mosquitoes were infected) I would have the - possibility to continue this experiment and I would naturally be - very thankful to you for this new support of my work. - - “The mosquito breeding and the experiments proceed - satisfactorily and I am working now on six tertiary strains.” - -The letter bears the handwritten endorsement “finished 17 April 1942. L. -g. RO 17/4,” which evidence clearly reveals that Rose had complied with -Schilling’s request for material. - -Schilling again wrote Rose from Dachau malaria station 5 July 1943, -thanking Rose for his letter and “the consignment of atroparvus eggs.” -The letter continues: - - “Five percent of them brought on water went down and were - therefore unfit for development; the rest of them hatched almost - 100 percent. - - “Thanks to your solicitude, achieved again the completion of my - breed. - - “Despite this fact I accept with great pleasure your offer to - send me your excess of eggs. How did you dispatch this - consignment? The result could not have been any better! - - “Please tell Fraeulein Lange, who apparently takes care of her - breed with greater skill and better success than the prisoner - August, my best thanks for her trouble. - - “Again my sincere thanks to you!” - -The “prisoner August” mentioned in the letter was doubtless the witness -August Vieweg, who testified before this Tribunal concerning the malaria -experiments. - -Rose wrote Schilling 27 July 1943 in answer to the latter’s letter of 5 -July 1943, stating he was glad the shipment of eggs had arrived in good -order and had proved useful. He also gave the information that another -shipment of anopheles eggs would follow. - -In the fall of 1942 Rose was present at the “Cold Conference” held at -Nuernberg and heard Holzloehner deliver his lecture on the freezing -experiments which had taken place at Dachau. Rose testified that after -the conference he talked with Holzloehner, who told him that the -carrying out of physiological experiments on human beings imposed upon -him a tremendous mental burden, adding that he hoped he never would -receive another order to conduct such experiments. - -It is impossible to believe that during the years 1942 and 1943 Rose was -unaware of malaria experiments on human beings which were progressing at -Dachau under Schilling, or to credit Rose with innocence of knowledge -that the malaria research was not confined solely to vaccinations -designed for the purpose of immunizing the persons vaccinated. On the -contrary, it is clear that Rose well knew that human beings were being -used in the concentration camp as subjects for medical experimentation. - -However, no adjudication either of guilt or innocence will be entered -against Rose for criminal participation in these experiments for the -following reason: In preparing counts two and three of its indictment -the prosecution elected to frame its pleading in such a manner as to -charge all defendants with the commission of war crimes and crimes -against humanity, generally, and at the same time to name in each -sub-paragraph dealing with medical experiments only those defendants -particularly charged with responsibility for each particular item. - -In our view this constituted, in effect, a bill of particulars and was, -in essence, a declaration to the defendants upon which they were -entitled to rely in preparing their defenses, that only such persons as -were actually named in the designated experiments would be called upon -to defend against the specific items. Included in the list of names of -those defendants specifically charged with responsibility for the -malaria experiments the name of Rose does not appear. We think it would -be manifestly unfair to the defendant to find him guilty of an offense -with which the indictment affirmatively indicated he was not charged. - -This does not mean that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was -inadmissible against the charges actually preferred against Rose. We -think it had probative value as proof of the fact of Rose’s knowledge of -human experimentation upon concentration camp inmates. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -These experiments were carried out at Buchenwald and Natzweiler -concentration camps, over a period extending from 1942 to 1945, in an -attempt to procure a protective typhus vaccine. - -In the experimental block at Buchenwald, with Dr. Ding in charge, -inmates of the camp were infected with typhus for the purpose of -procuring a continuing supply of fresh blood taken from persons -suffering from typhus. Other inmates, some previously immunized and some -not, were infected with typhus to demonstrate the efficacy of the -vaccines. Full particulars of these experiments have been given -elsewhere in the judgment. - -Rose visited Buchenwald in company with Gildemeister of the Robert Koch -Institute in the spring of 1942. At this time Dr. Ding was absent, -suffering from typhus as the result of an accidental infection received -while infecting his experimental subjects. Rose inspected the -experimental block where he saw many persons suffering from typhus. He -passed through the wards and looked at the clinical records “of * * * -persons with severe cases in the control cases and * * * lighter cases -among those vaccinated.” - -The Ding diary, under dates 19 August-4 September 1942, referring to use -of vaccines for immunization, states that 20 persons were inoculated -with vaccine from Bucharest, with a note “this vaccine was made -available by Professor Rose, who received it from Navy Doctor Professor -Ruegge from Bucharest.” Rose denied that he had ever sent vaccine to -Mrugowsky or Ding for use at Buchenwald. Mrugowsky, from Berlin, under -date 16 May 1942, wrote Rose as follows: - - “Dear Professor: - - “The Reich Physician SS and Police has consented to the - execution of experiments to test typhus vaccines. May I - therefore ask you to let me have the vaccines. - - “The other question which you raised, as to whether the louse - can be infected by a vaccinated typhus patient, will also be - dealt with. In principle, this also has been approved. There - are, however, still some difficulties at the moment about the - practical execution, since we have at present no facilities for - breeding lice. - - “Your suggestion to use Olzscha has been passed on to the - personnel department of the SS medical office. It will be given - consideration in due course.” - -From a note on the letter, it appears that Rose was absent from Berlin -and was not expected to return until June. The letter, however, refers -to previous contact with Rose and to some suggestions made by him which -evidently concern medical experiments on human beings. Rose in effect -admitted that he had forwarded the Bucharest vaccine to be tested at -Buchenwald. - -At a meeting of consulting physicians of the Wehrmacht held in May 1943, -Ding made a report in which he described the typhus experiments he had -been performing at Buchenwald. Rose heard the report at the meeting and -then and there objected strongly to the methods used by Ding in -conducting the experiments. As may well be imagined, this protest -created considerable discussion among those present. - -The Ding diary shows that, subsequent to this meeting, experiments were -conducted at Buchenwald at the instigation of the defendant Rose. The -entry under date of 8 March 1944, which refers to “typhus vaccine -experimental series VIII”, appears as follows: - - “Suggested by Colonel M. C. of the Air Corps, Professor Rose - (Oberstarzt), the vaccine ‘Kopenhagen’ (Ipsen-Murine-vaccine) - produced from mouse liver by the National Serum Institute in - Copenhagen was tested for its compatibility on humans. 20 - persons were vaccinated for immunization by intramuscular - injection * * *. 10 persons were contemplated for control and - comparison. 4 of the 30 persons were eliminated before the start - of the artificial injection because of intermittent sickness * * - *. The remaining experimental persons were infected on 16 April - 44 by subcutaneous injection of 1/20 cc. typhus sick fresh blood - * * *. The following fell sick: 17 persons immunized: 9 medium, - 8 seriously; 9 persons control: 2 medium, 7 seriously * * *. 2 - June 44: The experimental series was concluded 13 June 44: Chart - and case history completed and sent to Berlin. 6 deaths (3 - Copenhagen) (3 control). Dr. Ding.” - -When on the witness stand Rose vigorously challenged the correctness of -this entry in the Ding diary and flatly denied that he had sent a -Copenhagen vaccine to Mrugowsky or Ding for use at Buchenwald. The -prosecution met this challenge by offering in evidence a letter from -Rose to Mrugowsky dated 2 December 1943, in which Rose stated that he -had at his disposal a number of samples of a new murine virus typhus -vaccine prepared from mice livers, which in animal experiments had been -much more effective than the vaccine prepared from the lungs of mice. -The letter continued: - - “To decide whether this first-rate murine vaccine should be used - for protective vaccination of human beings against lice typhus, - it would be desirable to know if this vaccine showed in your and - Ding’s experimental arrangement at Buchenwald an effect similar - to that of the classic virus vaccines. - - “Would you be able to have such an experimental series carried - out? Unfortunately I could not reach you over the phone. - Considering the slowness of postal communications I would be - grateful for an answer by telephone * * *.” - -The letter shows on its face that it was forwarded by Mrugowsky to Ding, -who noted its receipt by him 21 February 1944. - -On cross-examination, when Rose was confronted with the letter he -admitted its authorship, and that he had asked that experiments be -carried out by Mrugowsky and Ding at Buchenwald. - -The fact that Rose contributed actively and materially to the -Mrugowsky-Ding experiments at Buchenwald clearly appears from the -evidence. - -The evidence also shows that Rose actively collaborated in the typhus -experiments carried out by Haagen at the Natzweiler concentration camp -for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. - -From the exhibits in the record, it appears that Rose and Haagen -corresponded during the month of June 1943 concerning the production of -a vaccine for typhus. Under date 5 June 1943 Haagen wrote to Rose -amplifying a telephone conversation between the two and referring to a -letter from a certain Giroud with reference to a vaccine which had been -used on rabbits. A few days later Rose replied, thanking him for his -letters of 4 and 5 June and for “the prompt execution of my request.” -The record makes it plain that by use of the phrase “the prompt -execution of my request” was meant a request made by Rose to the Chief -of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht for an order to produce typhus -vaccine to be used by the armed forces in the eastern area. - -Under date 4 October 1943 Haagen again wrote Rose concerning his plans -for vaccine production, making reference in the letter to a report made -by Rose on the Ipsen vaccine. Haagen stated that he had already reported -to Rose on the results of experiments with human beings and expressed -his regret that, up to the date of the letter, he had been unable to -“perform infection experiments on the vaccinated persons.” He also -stated that he had requested the Ahnenerbe to provide suitable persons -for vaccination but had received no answer; that he was then vaccinating -other human beings and would report results later. He concluded by -expressing the wish and need for experimental subjects upon whom to test -vaccinations, and suggested that when subjects were procured, parallel -tests should be made between the vaccine referred to in the letter and -the Ipsen tests. - -We think the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from this -letter is that Haagen was proposing to test the efficacy of the -vaccinations which he had completed, which could only be accomplished by -infecting the vaccinated subjects with a virulent pathogenic virus. - -In a letter written by Rose and dated “in the field, 29 September 1943”, -directed to the Behring Works at Marburg/Lahn, Rose states that he is -enclosing a memorandum regarding reports by Dr. Ipsen on his experience -in the production of typhus vaccine. Copy of the report which Rose -enclosed is in evidence, Rose stating therein that he had proposed, and -Ipsen had promised, that a number of Ipsen’s liver vaccine samples -should be sent to Rose with the object of testing its protective -efficacy on human beings whose lives were in special danger. Copies of -this report were forwarded by Rose to several institutions, including -that presided over by Haagen. - -In November 1943, 100 prisoners were transported to Natzweiler, of whom -18 had died during the journey. The remainder were in such poor health -that Haagen found them worthless for his experiments and requested -additional healthy prisoners through Dr. Hirt, who was a member of the -Ahnenerbe. - -Rose wrote to Haagen 13 December 1943, saying among other things “I -request that in procuring persons for vaccination in your experiment, -you request a corresponding number of persons for vaccination with -Copenhagen vaccine. This has the advantage, as also appeared in the -Buchenwald experiments, that the test of various vaccines simultaneously -gives a clearer idea of their value than the test of one vaccine alone.” - -There is much other evidence connecting Rose with the series of -experiments conducted by Haagen but we shall not burden the judgment -further. It will be sufficient to say that the evidence proves -conclusively that Rose was directly connected with the criminal -experiments conducted by Haagen. - -Doubtless at the outset of the experimental program launched in the -concentration camps, Rose may have voiced some vigorous opposition. In -the end, however, he overcame what scruples he had and knowingly took an -active and consenting part in the program. He attempts to justify his -actions on the ground that a state may validly order experiments to be -carried out on persons condemned to death without regard to the fact -that such persons may refuse to consent to submit themselves as -experimental subjects. This defense entirely misses the point of the -dominant issue. As we have pointed out in the case of Gebhardt, whatever -may be the condition of the law with reference to medical experiments -conducted by or through a state upon its own citizens, such a thing will -not be sanctioned in international law when practiced upon citizens or -subjects of an occupied territory. - -We have indulged every presumption in favor of the defendant, but his -position lacks substance in the face of the overwhelming evidence -against him. His own consciousness of turpitude is clearly disclosed by -the statement made by him at the close of a vigorous cross-examination -in the following language: - - “It was known to me that such experiments had earlier been - carried out, although I basically objected to these experiments. - This institution had been set up in Germany and was approved by - the state and covered by the state. At that moment I was in a - position which perhaps corresponds to a lawyer who is, perhaps, - a basic opponent of execution or death sentence. On occasion - when he is dealing with leading members of the government, or - with lawyers during public congresses or meetings, he will do - everything in his power to maintain his opinion on the subject - and have it put into effect. If, however, he does not succeed, - he stays in his profession and in his environment in spite of - this. Under circumstances he may perhaps even be forced to - pronounce such a death sentence himself, although he is - basically an opponent of that set-up.” - -The Tribunal finds that the defendant Rose was a principal in, accessory -to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with -plans and enterprises involving medical experiments on non-German -nationals without their consent, in the course of which murders, -brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhuman acts -were committed. To the extent that these crimes were not war crimes they -were crimes against humanity. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Gerhard Rose guilty -under counts two and three of the indictment. - - - RUFF, ROMBERG, AND WELTZ - -The defendants Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz are charged under counts two and -three of the indictment with special responsibility for, and -participation in, High-Altitude Experiments. - -The defendant Weltz is also charged under counts two and three with -special responsibility for, and participation in, Freezing Experiments. - -To the extent that the evidence in the record relates to the -high-altitude experiments, the cases of the three defendants will be -considered together. - -Defendant Ruff specialized in the field of aviation medicine from the -completion of his medical education at Berlin and Bonn in 1932. In -January 1934 he was assigned to the German Experimental Institute for -Aviation, a civilian agency, in order to establish a department for -aviation medicine. Later he became chief of the department. - -Defendant Romberg joined the NSDAP in May 1933. From April 1936 until -1938 he interned as an assistant physician at a Berlin hospital. On 1 -January 1938 he joined the staff of the German Experimental Institution -for Aviation as an associate assistant to the defendant Ruff. He -remained as a subordinate to Ruff until the end of the war. - -Defendant Weltz for many years was a specialist in X-ray work. In the -year 1935 he received an assignment as lecturer in the field of aviation -medicine at the University of Munich. At the same time he instituted a -small experimental department at the Physiological Institute of the -University of Munich. Weltz lectured at the University until 1945; at -the same time he did research work at the Institute. - -In the summer of 1941 the experimental department at the Physiological -Institute, University of Munich, was taken over by the Luftwaffe and -renamed the “Institute for Aviation Medicine in Munich.” Weltz was -commissioned director of this Institute by Hippke, then Chief of the -Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe. In his capacity as director of -this Institute, Weltz was subordinated to Luftgau No. VII in Munich for -disciplinary purposes. In scientific matters he was subordinated -directly to Anthony, Chief of the Department for Aviation Medicine in -the Office of the Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe. - -HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence is overwhelming and not contradicted that experiments -involving the effect of low air pressure on living human beings were -conducted at Dachau from the latter part of February through May 1942. -In some of these experiments great numbers of human subjects were killed -under the most brutal and senseless conditions. A certain Dr. Sigmund -Rascher, Luftwaffe officer, was the prime mover in the experiments which -resulted in the deaths of the subjects. The prosecution maintains that -Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz were criminally implicated in these -experiments. - -The guilt of the defendant Weltz is said to arise by reason of the fact -that, according to the prosecution’s theory, Weltz, as the dominant -figure proposed the experiments, arranged for their conduct at Dachau, -and brought the parties Ruff, Romberg, and Rascher together. The guilt -of Ruff and Romberg is charged by reason of the fact that they are said -to have collaborated with Rascher in the conduct of the experiments. The -evidence on the details of the matter appears to be as follows: - -In the late summer of 1941 soon after the Institute Weltz at Munich was -taken over by the Luftwaffe, Hippke, Chief of the Medical Service of the -Luftwaffe, approved, in principle, a research assignment for Weltz in -connection with the problem of rescue of aviators at high altitudes. -This required the use of human experimental subjects. Weltz endeavored -to secure volunteer subjects for the research from various sources; -however, he was unsuccessful in his efforts. - -Rascher, one of Himmler’s minor satellites, was at the time an assistant -at the Institute. He, Rascher, suggested the possibility of securing -Himmler’s consent to conducting the experiments at Dachau. Weltz seized -upon the suggestion, and thereafter arrangements to that end were -completed, Himmler giving his consent for experiments to be conducted on -concentration camp inmates condemned to death, but only upon express -condition that Rascher be included as one of the collaborators in the -research. - -Rascher was not an expert in aviation medicine. Ruff was the leading -German scientist in this field, and Romberg was his principal assistant. -Weltz felt that before he could proceed with his research these men -should be persuaded to come into the undertaking. He visited Ruff in -Berlin and explained the proposition. Thereafter Ruff and Romberg came -to Munich, where a conference was held with Weltz and Rascher to discuss -the technical nature of the proposed experiments. - -According to the testimony of Weltz, Ruff, and Romberg, the basic -consideration which impelled them to agree to the use of concentration -camp inmates as subjects was the fact that the inmates were to be -criminals condemned to death who were to receive some form of clemency -in the event they survived the experiments. Rascher, who was active in -the conference, assured the defendants that this also was one of the -conditions under which Himmler had authorized the use of camp inmates as -experimental subjects. - -The decisions reached at the conference were then made known to Hippke, -who gave his approval to the institution of experiments at Dachau and -issued an order that a mobile low-pressure chamber which was then in the -possession of Ruff at the Department for Aviation Medicine, Berlin, -should be transferred to Dachau for use in the project. - -A second meeting was held at Dachau, attended by Ruff, Romberg, Weltz, -Rascher, and the camp commander, to make the necessary arrangements for -the conduct of the experiments. The mobile low-pressure chamber was then -brought to Dachau, and on 22 February 1942 the first series of -experiments was instituted. - -Weltz was Rascher’s superior; Romberg was subordinate to Ruff. Rascher -and Romberg were in personal charge of the conduct of the experiments. -There is no evidence to show that Weltz was ever present at any of these -experiments. Ruff visited Dachau one day during the early part of the -experiments, but thereafter remained in Berlin and received information -concerning the progress of the experiments only through his subordinate, -Romberg. - -There is evidence from which it may reasonably be found that at the -outset of the program personal friction developed between Weltz and his -subordinate Rascher. The testimony of Weltz is that on several occasions -he asked Rascher for reports on the progress of the experiments and each -time Rascher told Weltz that nothing had been started with reference to -the research. Finally Weltz ordered Rascher to make a report; whereupon -Rascher showed his superior a telegram from Himmler which stated, in -substance, that the experiments to be conducted by Rascher were to be -treated as top secret matter and that reports were to be given to none -other than Himmler. Because of this situation Weltz had Rascher -transferred out of his command to the DVL branch at Dachau. Defendant -Romberg stated that these experiments had been stopped soon after their -inception by the adjutant of the Reich War Ministry, because of friction -between Weltz and Rascher, and that the experiments were resumed only -after Rascher had been transferred out of Weltz Institute. - -While the evidence is convincingly plain that Weltz participated in the -initial arrangements for the experiments and brought all parties -together, it is not so clear that illegal experiments were planned or -carried out while Rascher was under Weltz command, or that he knew that -experiments which Rascher might conduct in the future would be illegal -and criminal. - -There appear to have been two distinct groups of prisoners used in the -experimental series. One was a group of 10 to 15 inmates known in the -camp as “exhibition patients” or “permanent experimental subjects”. -Most, if not all, of these were German nationals who were confined in -the camp as criminal prisoners. These men were housed together and were -well-fed and reasonably contented. None of them suffered death or injury -as a result of the experiments. The other group consisted of 150 to 200 -subjects picked at random from the camp and used in the experiments -without their permission. Some 70 or 80 of these were killed during the -course of the experiments. - -The defendants Ruff and Romberg maintain that two separate and distinct -experimental series were carried on at Dachau; one conducted by them -with the use of the “exhibition subjects”, relating to the problems of -rescue at high altitudes, in which no injuries occurred; the other -conducted by Rascher on the large group of nonvolunteers picked from the -camp at random, to test the limits of human endurance at extremely high -altitudes, in which experimental subjects in large numbers were killed. - -The prosecution submits that no such fine distinction may be drawn -between the experiments said to have been conducted by Ruff and Romberg, -on the one hand, and Rascher on the other, or in the prisoners who were -used as the subjects of these experiments; that Romberg—and Ruff as his -superior—share equal guilt with Rascher for all experiments in which -deaths to the human subjects resulted. - -In support of this submission the members of the prosecution cite the -fact that Rascher was always present when Romberg was engaged in work at -the altitude chamber; that on at least three occasions Romberg was at -the chamber when deaths occurred to the so-called Rascher subjects, yet -elected to continue the experiments. They point likewise to the fact -that, in a secret preliminary report made by Rascher to Himmler which -tells of deaths, Rascher mentions the name of Romberg as being a -collaborator in the research. Finally they point to the fact that, after -the experiments were concluded, Romberg was recommended by Rascher and -Sievers for the War Merit Cross, because of the work done by him at -Dachau. - -The issue on the question of the guilt or innocence of these defendants -is close; we would be less than fair were we not to concede this fact. -It cannot be denied that there is much in the record to create at least -a grave suspicion that the defendants Ruff and Romberg were implicated -in criminal experiments at Dachau. However, virtually all of the -evidence which points in this direction is circumstantial in its nature. -On the other hand, it cannot be gainsaid that there is a certain -consistency, a certain logic, in the story told by the defendants. And -some of the story is corroborated in significant particulars by evidence -offered by the prosecution. - -The value of circumstantial evidence depends upon the conclusive nature -and tendency of the circumstances relied on to establish any -controverted fact. The circumstances must not only be consistent with -guilt, but they must be inconsistent with innocence. Such evidence is -insufficient when, assuming all to be true which the evidence tends to -prove, some other reasonable hypothesis of innocence may still be true; -for it is the actual exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis but -that of guilt which invests mere circumstances with the force of proof. -Therefore, before a court will be warranted in finding a defendant -guilty on circumstantial evidence alone, the evidence must show such a -well-connected and unbroken chain of circumstances as to exclude all -other reasonable hypotheses but that of the guilt of the defendant. What -circumstances can amount to proof can never be a matter of general -definition. In the final analysis the legal test is whether the evidence -is sufficient to satisfy beyond a reasonable doubt the understanding and -conscience of those who, under their solemn oaths as officers, must -assume the responsibility for finding the facts. - -On this particular specification, it is the conviction of the Tribunal -that the defendants Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz must be found not guilty. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -In addition to the high-altitude experiments, the defendant Weltz is -charged with freezing experiments, likewise conducted at Dachau for the -benefit of the German Luftwaffe. These began at the camp at the -conclusion of the high-altitude experiments and were performed by -Holzloehner, Finke, and Rascher, all of whom were officers in the -medical services of the Luftwaffe. Non-German nationals were killed in -these experiments. - -We think it quite probable that Weltz had knowledge of these -experiments, but the evidence is not sufficient to prove that he -participated in them. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Siegfried Ruff -is not guilty under either counts two or three of the indictment, and -directs that he be released from custody under the indictment when this -Tribunal presently adjourns; and - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Hans Wolfgang -Romberg is not guilty under either counts two or three of the -indictment, and directs that he be released from custody under the -indictment when this Tribunal presently adjourns; and - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Georg August -Weltz is not guilty under either counts two or three of the indictment; -and directs that he be released from custody under the indictment when -this Tribunal presently adjourns. - - - BRACK - -The defendant Brack is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in, -Sterilization Experiments and the Euthanasia Program of the German -Reich. Under count four the defendant is charged with membership in an -organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International -Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. - -The defendant Brack enlisted in an artillery unit of an SA regiment in -1923, and became a member of the NSDAP and the SS in 1929. Throughout -his career in the Party he was quite active in high official circles. He -entered upon full-time service in the Braune Haus, the Nazi headquarters -at Munich, in the summer of 1932. The following year he was appointed to -the Staff of Bouhler, business manager of the NSDAP in Munich. When in -1934 Bouhler became Chief of the Chancellery of the Fuehrer of the -NSDAP, Brack was transferred from the Braune Haus to Bouhler’s Berlin -office. In 1936 Brack was placed in charge of office 2 (Amt 2) in the -Chancellery of the Fuehrer in Berlin, that office being charged with the -examinations of complaints received by the Fuehrer from all parts of -Germany. Later, he became Bouhler’s deputy in office 2. As such he -frequently journeyed to the different Gaue for the purpose of gaining -first-hand information concerning matters in which Bouhler was -interested. - -Brack was promoted to the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer in the SS in 1935, -and in April 1936 to the rank of Obersturmbannfuehrer. The following -September he became a Standartenfuehrer in the SS, and was transferred -to the staff of the Main Office of the SS in November. In November 1940 -he was promoted to the grade of Oberfuehrer. - -In 1942 Brack joined the Waffen SS, and during the late summer of that -year was ordered to active duty with a Waffen SS division. He apparently -remained on active duty until the close of the war. - -STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS - -The persecution of the Jews had become a fixed Nazi policy very soon -after the outbreak of World War II. By 1941 that persecution had reached -the stage of the extermination of Jews, both in Germany and in the -occupied territories. This fact is confirmed by Brack himself, who -testified that he had been told by Himmler that he, Himmler, had -received a personal order to that effect from Hitler. - -The record shows that the agencies organized for the so-called -euthanasia of incurables were used for this bloody pogrom. Later, -because of the urgent need for laborers in Germany, it was decided not -to kill Jews who were able to work but, as an alternative, to sterilize -them. - -With this end in view Himmler instructed Brack to inquire of physicians -who were engaged in the Euthanasia Program about the possibility of a -method of sterilizing persons without the victim’s knowledge. Brack -worked on the assignment, with the result that in March 1941 he -forwarded to Himmler his signed report on the results of experiments -concerning the sterilization of human beings by means of X-rays. In the -report a method was suggested by which sterilization with X-ray could be -effected on groups of persons without their being aware of the -operation. - -On 23 June 1942 Brack wrote the following letter to Himmler: - - “Dear Reichsfuehrer: - - “* * * Among 10 millions of Jews in Europe, there are, I figure, - at least 2-3 millions of men and women who are fit enough to - work. Considering the extraordinary difficulties the labor - problem presents us with I hold the view that those 2-3 millions - should be specially selected and preserved. This can however - only be done if at the same time they are rendered incapable to - propagate. About a year ago I reported to you that agents of - mine have completed the experiments necessary for this purpose. - I would like to recall these facts once more. Sterilization, as - normally performed on persons with hereditary diseases is here - out of the question, because it takes too long and is too - expensive. Castration by X-ray however is not only relatively - cheap, but can also be performed on many thousands in the - shortest time. I think, that at this time it is already - irrelevant whether the people in question become aware of having - been castrated after some weeks or months, once they feel the - effects. - - “Should you, Reichsfuehrer, decide to choose this way in the - interest of the preservation of labor, then Reichsleiter Bouhler - would be prepared to place all physicians and other personnel - needed for this work at your disposal. Likewise he requested me - to inform you that then I would have to order the apparatus so - urgently needed with the greatest speed. - - “Heil Hitler! - “Yours - “VIKTOR BRACK.” - -Brack testified from the witness stand that at the time he wrote this -letter he had every confidence that Germany would win the war. - -Brack’s letter was answered by Himmler on 11 August 1942. In the reply -Himmler directed that sterilization by means of X-rays be tried in at -least one concentration camp in a series of experiments, and that Brack -place at his disposal expert physicians to conduct the operation. - -Blankenburg, Brack’s deputy, replied to Himmler’s letter and stated that -Brack had been transferred to an SS division, but that he, Blankenburg, -as Brack’s permanent deputy would “immediately take the necessary -measures and get in touch with the chiefs of the main offices of the -concentration camps.” - -A Polish Jew testified before the Tribunal that while confined in -Auschwitz concentration camp he was marched to Birkenau and forcibly -subjected to severe X-ray exposure and was castrated later in order that -the effects of the X-ray could be studied. - -A French physician of Jewish descent who was confined at Auschwitz from -September 1943 to January 1945, testified that near Auschwitz was -Birkenau camp where people were sterilized by SS doctors. About 100 male -Poles who had been sterilized at Birkenau were attended by the witness -after the operation. Later this group was castrated by the camp -physicians. - -The record contains other evidence from which it is manifestly plain -that sterilization by means of X-rays was attempted on groups of persons -who were painfully injured thereby; and that castration followed the -X-ray procedures. - -Brack’s part in the organization of the sterilization program with full -knowledge that it would be put into execution, is conclusively shown by -the record. - -EUTHANASIA PROGRAM - -The Euthanasia Program, which was put into effect by a secret decree of -Hitler on the day that Germany invaded Poland, has been discussed at -length in the judgment in the case against Karl Brandt. - -Brack contends that he was basically opposed to this program and that, -on occasion, he assisted certain of his Jewish friends to escape from -its consequences. But be that as it may, the evidence is that whatever -sentiments Brack may have entertained toward individual members of the -race, he was perfectly willing to and did act as an important -administrator in furthering the Euthanasia Program. After it had gotten -under way, he wrote letters to various public officials, explaining to -them how to keep the matter secret and to allay the public sentiment -against the program. - -This much is shown by Brack’s own statements. As a witness on the stand -he testified that while at first he did not understand the full import -of the program, he decided, after a talk with Bouhler, to collaborate in -carrying out the assignment and to execute Bouhler’s orders. - -He participated in the initial meetings called for the purpose of -placing the project in operation. He was present at meetings of the -experts, as well as the administrative discussions. He often acted as -Bouhler’s representative, frequently making decisions which called for -the exercise of personal judgment and a wide latitude of discretion. - -Brack admitted that such were his activities in the program, that one -might well have come to the conclusion that he was the influential man -in euthanasia. - -As Bouhler’s deputy he addressed a meeting at Munich, where he explained -the purpose of Hitler’s decree and mentioned the draft of a law which -was being prepared to give complete legislative sanctify to -euthanasia—a law, incidentally, which was never in fact enacted. He -represented Bouhler in April of 1941 at a meeting attended by Nazi -judges and prosecutors. He testified that the Ministry of Justice had -become considerably embarrassed because of the Euthanasia Program, and -that he was present at the meeting for the purpose of imparting -information concerning the salutary features of euthanasia to those who -were present. - -Brack gave the Tribunal considerable information concerning the method -of extermination by euthanasia, stating that the program was so designed -as to render the process inconspicuous and painless. In December 1939, -or January 1940, Brack, Bouhler, Conti, and some other doctors were -present at the administration of euthanasia to four experimental -subjects. The victims were led into a gas chamber which had been built -to resemble a shower room. The patients were seated on benches and -poisonous gas was let into the chamber. A few moments later the patients -became drowsy and finally lapsed into a death sleep without even knowing -they were being executed. On the basis of this execution “Hitler decided -that only carbon monoxide was to be used for killing the patients.” -According to Brack these persons were not Jews, because, as Bouhler had -explained to him, “the philanthropic action of euthanasia should be -extended only to Germans.” - -The evidence is plain that the euthanasia program explained by the -defendant, gradually merged into the “Action 14 f 13,” which, briefly -stated, amounted to an extermination of concentration camp inmates by -methods and agencies used in euthanasia. One of the prime motives behind -the program was to eliminate “useless eaters” from the scene, in order -to conserve food, hospital facilities, doctors and nurses for the more -important use of the German Armed Forces. Many nationals of countries -other than Germany were killed. - -Brack’s direct connection with and participation in the execution of -euthanasia is conclusively proved by the evidence in the record. - -MEMBERSHIP IN A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment the defendant Brack is charged with -being a member of the organization declared criminal by the judgment of -the International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows -that Brack became a member of the SS in 1929, and voluntarily remained -in that organization until the end of the war. As a member of the SS he -was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes -against humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the -indictment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Viktor Brack guilty -under counts two, three and four of the indictment. - - - BECKER-FREYSENG - -The defendant Becker-Freyseng is charged under counts two and three of -the indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in, -High-Altitude, Freezing, Sulfanilamide, Sea-Water, Epidemic Jaundice, -and Typhus Experiments. - -The prosecution has abandoned all charges except as to high-altitude, -freezing, sea-water and typhus experiments, and hence only these will be -considered. - -The defendant Becker-Freyseng joined the Nazi Party in 1933. In 1940 he -was drafted into the Luftwaffe. In 1943 he was promoted to the rank of -Stabsarzt in the Luftwaffe. - -From August 1941 until May 1944 the defendant was an assistant -consultant to Anthony, Chief of the Referat for Aviation Medicine, -Berlin. This department dealt with all questions concerning aviation -medicine and reported to the Chief of the Medical Service of the -Luftwaffe. When Schroeder became Chief of the Medical Service of the -Luftwaffe on 1 January 1944, the defendant became the consultant for -aviation medicine in Schroeder’s office. - -HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS - -As shown elsewhere in the judgment, high-altitude experiments for the -benefit of the Luftwaffe were conducted at Dachau concentration camp on -non-German nationals, beginning in February or March 1942. These -experiments had been approved, in principle at least, by Hippke, Chief -of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. A mobile low-pressure chamber -which had been in the possession of the department of aviation medicine, -Berlin, was transferred to Dachau for use in the experiments. -Concentration camp inmates were killed while being subjected to -experiments conducted in the chamber. - -During the time the experiments were conducted, defendant -Becker-Freyseng was an assistant consultant to Anthony, Chief of the -Referat for Aviation Medicine, Berlin. All low-pressure chambers owned -by the Luftwaffe were under the general control of that office. - -It is submitted by the prosecution that the record shows that -Becker-Freyseng was a principal in, accessory to, aided, abetted, took a -consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises -involving the commission of these experiments. - -The evidence upon this charge is not deemed sufficient to preponderate -against a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilty participation in -the experiments here involved. - -FREEZING EXPERIMENTS - -It is claimed that in June 1942 Becker-Freyseng was informed from -certain of his official files that a meeting to consider experiments to -investigate the treatment of persons who had been severely chilled or -frozen would be held in Nuernberg the following October (referred to as -the “Cold Congress”). It is contended that the directive which set the -experiment into motion was issued from the office of the department for -aviation medicine, that the funds and equipment were supplied by that -office, and that Becker-Freyseng had knowledge of the experiments, and -that he admitted such knowledge. - -As to all this, the proof is clear that Becker-Freyseng was actively -employed in organizing and was present at the so-called “Cold Congress.” -But more than the evidence discloses is needed to establish that he had -any later part in or connection with the experiments themselves, or that -he had any controlling relationship to their initial establishment. - -TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS - -The evidence is insufficient to disclose any criminal responsibility of -the defendant Becker-Freyseng in connection with the typhus experiments. - -SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS - -We have discussed the sea-water experiments in that portion of our -judgment which deals with the case of the defendant Schroeder. As was -pointed out there, two methods of making sea water drinkable were -available to the Luftwaffe. One, the so-called Schaefer method, had been -chemically tested and apparently produced potable sea water; the other, -the so-called Berka process, which changed the taste of the sea water -but did not reduce the salt content. - -Becker-Freyseng, as chief consultant for aviation medicine in the office -of Schroeder, arranged for a conference to be held in May 1944 to -discuss the testing of these two methods. At the conference the -defendant reported on various clinical experiments which had been -conducted by a certain von Sirany to test the Berka process. He came to -the conclusion that the experiments had not been conducted under -sufficiently realistic conditions of sea distress to make the findings -conclusive. - -As a result of the conference it was decided that new experiments should -be conducted. - -We learn from the report of the meeting, which is in evidence, that two -series of experiments were to be conducted. The first, a maximum period -of six days, during which one group of subjects would receive sea water -processed with the Berka method; a second group, ordinary drinking -water; a third group no water at all; and the fourth group, such water -as would be available in the emergency sea distress kits then used. -During the duration of the experiment all persons were to receive only -an emergency sea diet, such as provided for persons in distress at sea. - -In addition to the 6-day experiment it was determined that a 12-day -experiment should be run. The plan for this series reads as follows: - - “Persons nourished with sea water and Berkatit, and as diet also - the emergency sea rations. - - “Duration of experiments: 12 days. - - “Since in the opinion of the Chief of the Medical Service - permanent injuries to health, that is the death of the - experimental subjects, has to be expected, as experimental - subjects such persons should be used as will be put at the - disposal by [the] Reichsfuehrer SS.” - -By letter dated 7 June 1944 Schroeder requested the Reichsfuehrer SS to -allow him to use concentration camp inmates for the sea-water -experiments. The letter stated among other things the following: - - “As the experiments on human beings could thus far only be - carried out for a period of four days, and as practical demands - require a remedy for those who are in distress at sea up to 12 - days, appropriate experiments are necessary. - - “Required are 40 healthy test subjects, who must be available - for 4 whole weeks. As it is known from previous experiments that - necessary laboratories exist in the concentration camp Dachau, - this camp would be very suitable * * *.” - -When on the stand as a witness, the defendant Becker-Freyseng admitted -that he prepared the substance of the letter for Schroeder’s dictation -and signature. - -Thus with actual knowledge of the nature of the Berka process, and the -fact that if used over prolonged periods it would cause suffering and -death, Becker-Freyseng counselled and conferred with his chief -concerning the necessity for experiments wherein the process would be -used. He gave advice upon the exact procedure to be used in the 6-day -and 12-day experimental series. He framed the letter to Himmler -requesting the use of concentration camp inmates at Dachau for -experimental subjects. He called the defendant Beiglboeck to Berlin to -explain to him the details and purpose of the experiments. He issued the -order under which Beiglboeck went to Dachau to begin the experiments. He -received Beiglboeck’s report after the experimental series had been -concluded. - -Throughout all stages of the affair, from its inception to its -conclusion, the defendant knew of the dangerous nature of the -experiments. He knew that deaths were reasonably to be expected. He knew -that concentration camp inmates were to be used as experimental -subjects. It is impossible to believe that he supposed that the inmates -of the camps, who were to be furnished by Himmler, were to be -volunteers. The entire language of the letter, which was written to -Himmler asking for experimental subjects, entirely refutes such -implication. - -The evidence shows conclusively that gypsies of various nationalities -were used as experimental subjects. They were former inmates of -Auschwitz who had been tricked into coming to Dachau under the promise -that they were to be used in a special labor battalion. When they -arrived at Dachau they were detailed to the sea-water experiments -without their voluntary consent being asked or given. - -During the course of the experiment many of the experimental subjects -were treated brutally and endured much pain and suffering. - -It is apparent from the evidence that Becker-Freyseng was criminally -connected with the experiments, and that the experiments were -essentially criminal in their nature. To the extent that the crimes -committed by him or under his authority were not war crimes, they were -crimes against humanity. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Hermann -Becker-Freyseng guilty under counts two and three of the indictment. - - - SCHAEFER - -The defendant Schaefer is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with personal responsibility for and participation in -Sea-Water Experiments. - -Konrad Schaefer was a scientist whose special field of research was -chemical therapy. In November 1941 he was drafted into the Luftwaffe. In -spring of the following year he was transferred to the Luftwaffe -Replacement Depot in Salow, and from there to the Luftwaffe base at -Frankfurt on the Oder. In summer of 1942 he was transferred to Berlin -and assigned to the staff of the Research Institute for Aviation -Medicine. His chief assignment at the Institute was to do research on -the problem of sea emergency for the Luftwaffe. This included research -work on various methods to render sea water potable. Schaefer remained -in his position at the Institute without ever having attained officer -rank. - -In May of 1944 the defendant was ordered to be present at a meeting to -be held at the German Air Ministry in Berlin, called to consider further -research on making sea water potable. Some months previous to the -meeting Schaefer had developed a process which actually precipitated the -salts from sea water, but it was thought by the Chief of the Luftwaffe -Medical Service to be too bulky and expensive for military use by the -Luftwaffe. - -Present at the meeting were Schaefer; Becker-Freyseng, research advisor -to Schroeder; Christensen, of the Technical Bureau of the Reich Ministry -of Aviation; and others. The subject of discussion was the feasibility -of using the Schaefer process, or of turning to another process known as -the Berka Method. The latter method, while cheap, did not precipitate -salts from sea water and was dangerous to health when used for a period -of time—as Schaefer, previous to the meeting, had already reported to -Schroeder. Nevertheless, those in command of the meeting agreed that -experiments should be conducted on concentration camp inmates to -determine the extent to which the Berka method might be usable. - -The experiments later conducted have been described at length in dealing -with the case of Schroeder. Due to his attendance at this meeting, -Schaefer is sought to be held criminally responsible in connection with -the sea-water experiments. - -The record has received careful attention from the Tribunal. - -Nowhere have we been able to find that Schaefer was a principal in, or -accessory to, or was otherwise criminally involved in or connected with -the experiments mentioned. In fact, the record fails to show that the -defendant had anything to do with these experiments, except such as -might be implied from his attendance at several meetings of the parties -who were actively interested therein. Nowhere in the testimony or -elsewhere is it revealed that Schaefer voted for commencement or -prosecution of the experiments or in any other manner aided in their -execution. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Konrad Schaefer not -guilty of the charges contained in the indictment, and directs that he -be released from custody under the indictment when the Tribunal -presently adjourns. - - - HOVEN - -The defendant Hoven is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with special responsibility for and participation in Typhus -and other Vaccine Experiments, Gas Oedema Experiments, and the -Euthanasia Program. In count four he is charged with being a member, -after 1 September 1939, of an organization declared criminal by the -International Military Tribunal. - -Hoven joined the SS in 1934 and the Nazi Party in 1937. Soon after the -outbreak of the war he joined the Waffen SS. In October 1939 he became -assistant medical officer in the SS hospital at Buchenwald concentration -camp. In 1941 he was appointed medical officer in charge of the SS -troops stationed in the camp. He became assistant medical officer at the -camp inmate hospital, and in July 1942 he became chief camp physician. -He remained in the latter position until September 1943. At that time he -was arrested on the order of the SS police court in Kassel for having -allegedly murdered an SS noncommissioned officer who was a dangerous -witness against Koch, the camp commander. - -TYPHUS AND OTHER VACCINE EXPERIMENTS - -The vaccine experiments with which Hoven is charged were conducted at -Buchenwald under the supervision of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Ding, alias -Ding-Schuler. They have already been described at length in other -portions of this judgment. - -The prosecution has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Hoven was a -criminal participant in these experiments. In collaboration with the SS -camp administration he helped select the concentration camp inmates who -became the experimental subjects. During the course of selection he -exercised the right to include some prisoners and to reject others. -While perhaps not empowered to initiate new series of experiments on his -own responsibility—that apparently being a power which only Ding could -exercise—the defendant worked with Ding on experiments then in -progress. He supervised the preparation of diary notes, fever charts, -and report sheets of the experiments. Occasionally he injected some of -the subjects with the vaccines. He acted as Ding’s deputy in the conduct -of the experiments. He was in command of experimental Block 46 in Ding’s -absence. During the period of Hoven’s activity in the experimental -station no less than 100 inmates were killed as a result of the typhus -experiments. Many of these victims were non-German nationals who had not -given their consent to be used as experimental subjects. - -GAS OEDEMA EXPERIMENTS - -It is asserted in an affidavit made by Dr. Ding-Schuler, who was in -charge of Blocks 46 and 50, Buchenwald, that toward the end of 1942 a -conference was held in the Military Medical Academy, Berlin, for the -purpose of discussing the fatal effects of gas oedema serum on wounded -persons. During the conference, Killian, of the Army Medical -Inspectorate, and the defendant Mrugowsky reported several cases in -which wounded soldiers who had received gas oedema serum injections in -high quantities died suddenly without apparent reason. Mrugowsky -suspected that the fatalities were due to the phenol content of the -serum. To help solve the problem Mrugowsky ordered Ding to take part in -a euthanasia killing with phenol and to report on the results in detail. -A few days later Hoven, in the presence of Ding, gave phenol injections -to several of the concentration camp inmates with the result that they -died instantly. In accordance with instructions, Ding made a report of -the killings to his superior officer. - -The fact that Hoven engaged in phenol killings is substantiated by an -affidavit voluntarily made by Hoven himself prior to the trial, which -was received in evidence as a part of the case of the prosecution. In -the affidavit Hoven makes the following statement: - - “There were many prisoners who were jealous of the positions - held by a few political prisoners and tried to discredit them. - These traitors were immediately killed, and I was later notified - in order to make out statements that they had died of natural - causes. - - “In some instances I supervised the killings of these unworthy - inmates by injections of phenol, at the request of the inmates, - in the hospital assisted by several inmates. Dr. Ding came once - and said I was not doing it correctly, and performed some of the - injections himself, killing three inmates who died within a - minute. - - “The total number of traitors killed was about 150, of whom 60 - were killed by phenol injections, either by myself or under my - supervision, and the rest were killed by beatings, etc., by the - inmates.” - -EUTHANASIA PROGRAM - -The details of the Euthanasia Program have been discussed by us at -length in dealing with the charges against certain other defendants; -consequently they will not be repeated here. - -In the Hoven pre-trial affidavit, portions of which were quoted while -discussing gas oedema serum experimentation, the defendant gives us a -partial picture of the Euthanasia Program, in the following statement: - - “In 1941 Koch, the camp commander, called all the important SS - officials of the camp together and informed them that he had - received a secret order from Himmler that all mentally and - physically deficient inmates should be killed, including Jews. - 300 to 400 Jewish prisoners of different nationalities were sent - to the ‘euthanasia station’ at Bernburg for extermination. I was - ordered to issue falsified statements of the death of these - Jews, and obeyed the order. This action was known as ‘14 f 13’.” - -When the defendant Hoven took the stand in his own defense, he attempted -to discredit the effects of the statements contained in his affidavit by -testifying that the affidavit was taken as a result of interrogations -propounded to him by the prosecution in English, and that he was not -sufficiently familiar with the language to be fully aware of the -inculpatory nature of the statements he was making. - -The Tribunal is not impressed with these assertions. The evidence shows -that prior to the war the defendant had lived for several years in the -United States, where he had acquired at least an average understanding -and comprehension of the English language. When he was on the witness -stand, the Tribunal questioned him at length in order to ascertain the -extent of his knowledge of English, and in particular, of his -understanding of the meaning of the words used by him in his affidavit. -As a result of this questioning the Tribunal is convinced that no undue -or improper advantage was taken of the defendant in procuring the -affidavit, and that at the time of his interrogation by the prosecution, -Hoven knew and understood perfectly well the nature of the statements he -was making. - -The facts contained in the Hoven affidavit were convincingly -substantiated by other evidence in the record, the only real difference -being that the evidence shows the defendant to have been guilty of even -many hundreds more murders than are admitted by him in his affidavit. As -stated, in essence, by one of the prosecution witnesses in connection -with the subject, Hoven personally killed inmates in the hospital -barracks by injection. These people were mostly suffering from -malnutrition and exhaustion. Hoven must have killed 1,000 of every -nationality. These inmates were killed on the initiative of Hoven with -no requests from the illegal camp administration or the political -prisoners. - -It is obvious from the evidence that throughout his entire service at -Buchenwald, Hoven attempted to serve three masters: the SS camp -administration, the criminal prisoners, and the political prisoners of -the camp. As a result he became criminally implicated in murders -committed by all three groups involving the deaths of non-German -nationals, some of whom were prisoners of war and others of whom were -civilians. In addition to these, he committed murders on his own -individual responsibility. There can be nothing said in mitigation of -such conduct. To the extent that the crimes committed by Hoven were not -war crimes, they were crimes against humanity. - -MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment the defendant is charged with being a -member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the -International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that -Hoven became a member of the SS in 1934, and remained in this -organization throughout the war. As a member of the SS he was criminally -implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, -as charged under counts two and three of the indictment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Waldemar Hoven -guilty, under counts two, three and four of the indictment. - - - BEIGLBOECK - -The defendant Beiglboeck is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in -Sea-Water Experiments. - -The defendant Beiglboeck, an Austrian citizen, was a captain in the -medical department of the German Air Force from May 1941 until the end -of the war. In June 1944, while stationed at the hospital for -paratroopers at Tarvis [Tarvisio], Italy, he received orders from his -military and medical superior, defendant Becker-Freyseng, to carry out -sea-water experiments at Dachau. - -The sea-water experiments have been described in detail in those -portions of the judgment dealing with defendants Schroeder and -Becker-Freyseng. - -The defendant Beiglboeck testified that he reported to Berlin at the end -of June 1944, where Becker-Freyseng told him the nature and purpose of -the experiments. Upon that trip he also reported to and talked with the -defendant Schroeder. From these conversations he learned that the prime -purpose of the experiments was to test the process developed by Berka -for making sea water potable and also to ascertain whether it would be -better for a shipwrecked person in distress at sea to go completely -without sea water or to drink small quantities thereof. - -It appears from the record that the persons used in the experiments were -40 gypsies of various nationalities who had been formerly at Auschwitz -but who had been brought to Dachau under the pretext that they were to -be assigned to various work details. These persons had been imprisoned -in the concentration camps on the basis that they were “asocial -persons.” Nothing was said to them about being used as human subjects in -medical experiments. When they reached Dachau some of them were told -that they were being assigned to the sea-water experiment detail. - -Beiglboeck testified that before beginning the experiments he called the -subjects together and told them the purpose of the experiments and asked -them if they wanted to participate. He did not tell them the duration of -the experiments, or that they could withdraw if ever they reached the -physical or mental state that continuation of the experiment should seem -to them to be impossible. The evidence is that none of the experimental -subjects felt that they dared refuse becoming experimental subjects for -fear of unpleasant consequences if they voiced any objections. - -The defendant testified that pursuant to the order that had been given -him, it was necessary that the subjects thirst for a continuous period; -and that the question of when, if ever, they should be relieved during -the course of the experiment was a matter which he reserved for his own -decision. - -During the course of the experiments the subjects were locked in a room. -As to this phase of the program the defendant testified that “They -should have been locked in a lot better than they were, because then -they would have had no opportunity at all to get fresh water on the -side.” - -At the trial the defendant produced clinical charts which he said were -made during the course of the experiments and which, according to the -defendant, showed that the subjects did not suffer injury. On -cross-examination the defendant admitted that some of the charts had -been altered by him since he reached Nuernberg in order to present a -more favorable picture of the experiments. - -We do not think it necessary to discuss in detail what is shown by the -charts either before or after the fraudulent alterations. We think it -only necessary to say that a man who intends to rely on written evidence -at a trial does not fraudulently alter such evidence from any honest or -worthy motive. - -The defendant claims that he was at all times extremely reluctant to -perform the experiments with which he is charged, and did so only out of -his sense of obedience as a soldier to superior authority. Under Control -Council Law No. 10 such fact does not constitute a defense, but will be -considered, if at all, only in mitigation of sentence. - -In our view the experimental subjects were treated brutally. Many of -them endured much pain and suffering, although from the evidence we -cannot find that any deaths occurred among the experimental subjects. - -It is apparent from the evidence that the experiments were essentially -criminal in their nature, and that non-German nationals were used -without their consent as experimental subjects. To the extent that the -crimes committed by defendant Beiglboeck were not war crimes they were -crimes against humanity. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Wilhelm Beiglboeck -guilty under counts two and three of the indictment. - - - POKORNY - -The defendant Pokorny is charged with special responsibility for, and -participation in, criminal Sterilization Experiments, as set forth in -counts two and three of the indictment. - -It is conceded by the prosecution that, in contradistinction to all -other defendants, the defendant Pokorny never held any position of -responsibility in the Party or State Hierarchy of Nazi Germany. Neither -was he a member of the Nazi Party or of the SS. Formerly a -Czechoslovakian citizen, he became a citizen of the Greater German Reich -under the Munich Agreement of October 1938. During the war he served as -a medical officer in the German Army and attained the rank of captain. - -The only direct evidence bearing on the guilt of the defendant is a -letter written by Pokorny to Himmler in October 1941, suggesting the use -of a drug, caladium seguinum, as a possible means of medical -sterilization of peoples of the occupied territories. The letter -follows: - - “To the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German - Folkdom, - - SS Himmler, Chief of Police, - - Berlin. - - “I beg you to turn your attention to the following arguments. I - have requested Professor Hoehn to forward this letter to you. I - have chosen this direct way to you in order to avoid the slower - process through channels and the possibility of an indiscretion - in regard to the eventually enormous importance of the ideas - presented. - - “Led by the idea that the enemy must not only be conquered but - destroyed, I feel obliged to present to you, as the Reich - Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom the - following: - - “Dr. Madaus published the result of his research on a _medicinal - sterilization_ (both articles are enclosed). Reading these - articles, the immense importance of this drug in the present - fight of our people occurred to me. _If, on the basis of this - research, it were possible to produce a drug which, after a - relatively short time, effects an imperceptible sterilization on - human beings, then we would have a new powerful weapon at our - disposal._ The thought alone that the 3 million Bolsheviks, at - present German prisoners, could be sterilized so that they could - be used as laborers but be prevented from reproduction, opens - the most far-reaching perspectives. - - “Madaus found that the sap of the Schweigrohr (caladium - seguinum) when taken by mouth or given as injection to male but - also to female animals, after a certain time produces permanent - sterility. The illustrations accompanying the scientific article - are convincing. - - If my ideas meet your approval the following course should be - taken: - - 1. Dr. Madaus must not publish any more such articles. (The - enemy listens!) - - 2. Multiplying the plant (easily cultivated in greenhouses!) - - 3. Immediate research on human beings (criminals!) in order to - determine the dose and length of the treatment. - - 4. Quick research of the constitutional formula of the effective - chemical substance in order to - - 5. Produce it synthetically if possible. - - “As German physician and Chief Physician of the Reserves of the - German Wehrmacht, retired (d.R.a.D.), I undertake to keep secret - the purpose as suggested by me in this letter. - - “Heil Hitler! - [Signed] “Dr. Pokorny - “Specialist for skin and venereal diseases. - - “Komotau, October 1941.” - -The defendant has attempted to explain his motives for sending the -letter by asserting that for some time prior to its transmittal he had -known of Himmler’s intentions to sterilize all Jews and inhabitants of -the eastern territories, and had hoped to find some means of preventing -the execution of this dreadful program. He knew, because of his special -experience as a specialist in skin and venereal diseases, that -sterilization of human beings could not be effected by the -administration of caladium seguinum. He thought, however, that if the -articles written by Madaus could be brought to the attention of Himmler, -the latter might turn his attentions to the unobtrusive method for -sterilization which had been suggested by the articles and thus be -diverted, at least temporarily, from continuing his program of -castration and sterilization by well-known, tried and tested methods. -Therefore the letter was written—so explained the defendant—not for -the purpose of furthering, but of sabotaging the program. - -We are not impressed with the defense which has been tendered by the -defendant and have great difficulty in believing that he was motivated -by the high purposes which he asserted impelled him to write the letter. -Rather are we inclined to the view that the letter was written by -Pokorny for very different and more personal reasons. - -Be that however as it may, every defendant is presumed to be innocent -until he has been proved guilty. In the case of Pokorny the prosecution -has failed to sustain the burden. As monstrous and base as the -suggestions in the letter are, there is not the slightest evidence that -any steps were ever taken to put them into execution by human -experimentation. We find, therefore, that the defendant must be -acquitted—not because of the defense tendered, but in spite of it. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Adolf Pokorny -is not guilty of the charge contained in the indictment, and directs -that he be discharged from custody under the indictment when the -Tribunal presently adjourns. - - - OBERHEUSER - -The defendant Oberheuser is charged under counts two and three of the -indictment with Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and -Bone Transplantation, and Sterilization Experiments. - -The charge of participation in the sterilization experiments has been -abandoned by the prosecution and will not be considered further. - -The defendant Oberheuser joined the league of German Girls (BDM) in 1935 -and held the rank of “block leader.” In August 1937 she became a member -of the Nazi Party. She was also a member of the Association of National -Socialist Physicians. She volunteered for the position of a camp doctor -in the women’s department of the Ravensbrueck concentration camp in 1940 -and remained there until June 1943. She was then given a position as -assistant physician in the Hohenlychen Hospital under the defendant -Gebhardt. - -Regarding her connection with both the sulfanilamide and the bone, -muscle, and nerve regeneration and bone transplantation experiments, the -same facts are applicable as were presented in the cases of the -defendants Fischer and Gebhardt. Fischer and Oberheuser were Gebhardt’s -active agents in carrying out these experiments. They did a great deal -of the actual work. They personally committed atrocities involved in the -experiments. - -A few facts produced in evidence regarding the special work of defendant -Oberheuser in these experiments are entitled to comment. - -Oberheuser was thoroughly aware of the nature and purpose of the -experiments. She aided in the selection of the subjects, gave them -physical examinations, and otherwise prepared them for the operation -table. She was present in the operating room at the time of the -operations and assisted in the operational procedures. She faithfully -cooperated with Gebhardt and Fischer at the conclusion of each operation -by deliberately neglecting the patients so that the wounds which had -been given the subjects would reach the maximum degree of infection. - -Testimony of the witness Sofia Maczka, an X-ray technician in the camp -at Ravensbrueck, is that deaths occurred among the experimental -subjects. Most of these deaths could have been averted by proper -post-operative care, proper treatment, or by the amputation of badly -infected members. - -In one instance—the case of a Krystina Dabska—small pieces of bone -were cut from both legs of the subject. Witness Maczka testified that -she read on the cast of the patient that on one leg periosteum had been -left and on the other leg periosteum had been removed together with -bone. Because she was of the opinion that the purpose of the experiment -had been to check regeneration, the witness asked the defendant -Oberheuser, “How do you expect to get regeneration of bone if the bones -are removed with periosteum?” To this the defendant replied, “That is -just what we want to check.” - -Nonconsenting non-German nationals were used in at least some of the -experiments. Many of them died as a result of the experiments. To the -extent that the crimes committed were not war crimes, they were crimes -against humanity. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Herta -Oberheuser is guilty under counts two and three of the indictment. - - - FISCHER - -The defendant Fischer is charged under counts two and three with -Sulfanilamide and Bone, Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and Bone -Transplantation Experiments. - -Fritz Fischer joined the Allgemeine SS in February 1934 and the NSDAP in -1939. In the latter year he joined the Waffen SS and was assigned to the -SS unit in the Hohenlychen Hospital as a physician subordinated to the -defendant Gebhardt. In June 1940 he was transferred to the SS regiment -Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler”, and returned the same year to Hohenlychen -as assistant physician to Gebhardt, where he remained until May 1943. He -then served as a surgeon on both the eastern and western fronts and, -after having been wounded in August 1944, came back to Hohenlychen as a -patient. In December 1944 he was assigned to the Charity Hospital in -Berlin, but returned again to Hohenlychen as Gebhardt’s assistant in -April 1945. In the Waffen SS he attained the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer -(major). - -SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS - -Gebhardt, as shown elsewhere in this judgment, was in personal charge of -the work being done in this field by his assistant Fritz Fischer. That -the latter performed most of the sulfanilamide experimental work is not -denied by him; on the contrary, he freely admits it. The defense offered -in his behalf is twofold; that the experimental subjects were to have -alleged death sentences, then impending, commuted to something less -severe in the event they survived the experiments; and that defendant -Fischer was acting under military orders from his superior officer, -Gebhardt. These defenses have been considered and separately rejected in -other parts of this judgment. - -It is true, however, that paragraph 4 (_b_) of Article II of Control -Council Law No. 10 reads: - - “The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his - government, or of a superior, does not free him from - responsibility for crime, but may be considered in mitigation.” - -It is unnecessary to take up and answer all the arguments that might be -presented upon whether or not Fischer is entitled to a mitigation of -sentence due to the circumstances claimed as the basis of such -mitigation. He acted with most complete knowledge that what he was doing -was fundamentally criminal, even though directed by a superior. Under -the circumstances his defense must be rejected, and he must be held to -be guilty as charged. - -BONE, MUSCLE AND NERVE REGENERATION AND BONE -TRANSPLANTATION - -These experiments have been discussed in connection with the case of the -defendant Gebhardt, who was assisted therein by the defendant Fischer. -Testimony and exhibits now constituting parts of the record in this case -reveal that Fischer has offered no substantial defense to the charge. -Indeed, criminal connection with these experiments is admitted, and the -admission includes the defendant’s own testimony that he personally -performed at least some of the operations. It only remains for the -Tribunal to hold that on the specification above-mentioned the defendant -Fischer is guilty. - -To the extent that the crimes committed by defendant Fischer were not -war crimes they were crimes against humanity. - -MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION - -Under count four of the indictment Fritz Fischer is charged with being a -member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the -International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that -Fritz Fischer became a member of the SS in 1934 and remained in this -organization until the end of the war. As a member of the SS he was -criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against -humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment. - -CONCLUSION - -Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Fritz Fischer -is guilty under counts two, three, and four of the indictment. - - [signed] WALTER B. BEALS - PRESIDING JUDGE. - HAROLD L. SEBRING - JUDGE. - JOHNSON T. CRAWFORD - JUDGE. - - - - - SENTENCES - - PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: Military Tribunal I has convened this - morning for the purpose of imposing sentences upon the - defendants who have been on trial before this Tribunal and who - have been adjudged guilty by the Tribunal. - -“KARL BRANDT, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of -war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization -declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military -Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you. -For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted -Military Tribunal I sentences you, Karl Brandt, to death by hanging. - -“SIEGFRIED HANDLOSER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you -guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the -indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which -you have been and now stand convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences -you, Siegfried Handloser, to imprisonment for the full term and period -of your natural life, to be served at such prison or prisons, or other -appropriate place of confinement, as shall be determined by competent -authority. - -“OSKAR SCHROEDER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty -of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the -indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which -you have been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you, -Oskar Schroeder, to imprisonment for the full term and period of your -natural life, to be served at such prison or prisons, or other -appropriate place of confinement, as shall be determined by competent -authority. - -“KARL GENZKEN, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of -war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization -declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military -Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you. -For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted, -Military Tribunal I sentences you, Karl Genzken, to imprisonment for the -full term and period of your natural life, to be served at such prison -or prisons, or other appropriate place of confinement, as shall be -determined by competent authority. - -“KARL GEBHARDT, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of -war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization -declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military -Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you. -For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted, -Military Tribunal I sentences you, Karl Gebhardt, to death by hanging. - -“RUDOLF BRANDT, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of -war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization -declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military -Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you. -For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted, -Military Tribunal I sentences you, Rudolf Brandt, to death by hanging. - -“JOACHIM MRUGOWSKY, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you -guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an -organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International -Military Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed -against you. For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand -convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you, Joachim Mrugowsky, to death -by hanging. - -“HELMUT POPPENDICK, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you -guilty of membership in an organization declared criminal by the -judgment of the International Military Tribunal, as charged under the -indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which -you have been and now stand convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences -you, Helmut Poppendick, to imprisonment for a term of ten years, to be -served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of -confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority. - -“WOLFRAM SIEVERS, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty -of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an -organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International -Military Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed -against you. For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand -convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences you, Wolfram Sievers, to death -by hanging. - -“GERHARD ROSE, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of -war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the indictment -heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which you have -been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you, Gerhard -Rose, to imprisonment for the full term and period of your natural life, -to be served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of -confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority. - -“VIKTOR BRACK, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of -war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization -declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military -Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you. -For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted, -Military Tribunal I sentences you, Viktor Brack, to death by hanging. - -“HERMANN BECKER-FREYSENG, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you -guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the -indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which -you have been and now stand convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences -you, Hermann Becker-Freyseng, to imprisonment for a term of twenty -years, to be served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate -place of confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority. - -“WALDEMAR HOVEN, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty -of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an -organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International -Military Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed -against you. For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand -convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences you, Waldemar Hoven, to death -by hanging. - -“WILHELM BEIGLBOECK, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you -guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the -indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which -you have been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you, -Wilhelm Beiglboeck, to imprisonment for a term of fifteen years, to be -served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of -confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority. - -“HERTA OBERHEUSER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty -of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the -indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which -you have been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you, -Herta Oberheuser, to imprisonment for a term of twenty years, to be -served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of -confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority. - -“FRITZ FISCHER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of -war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization -declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military -Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you. -For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted -Military Tribunal I sentences you, Fritz Fischer, to imprisonment for -the full term and period of your natural life, to be served at such -prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of confinement, as shall -be determined by competent authority.” - ------ - -[56] A more correct translation is typhus, see vol. I, p. 13. - -[57] Indictment originally read “January 1943” but was amended by a -motion filed with the Secretary General. See Arraignment, vol. I, p. 22. - -[58] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 269, Nuernberg, 1947. - - - - - XIII. PETITIONS - - - a. Introduction - -Article XV of Ordinance No. 7 of Military Government for Germany (US) -provides that the judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or innocence -of any defendant shall be final and not subject to review. However, -Article XVII provides that the Military Governor has the power to -mitigate, reduce, or otherwise alter the sentence imposed by the -Tribunal, but may not increase the severity thereof. The petitions on -behalf of defendants seeking a revision of the sentences have ordinarily -been called clemency pleas. - -All 16 defendants found guilty by the Tribunal in case No. I petitioned -for clemency to the Military Governor of the United States Zone of -Occupation in accordance with Article XVII of Ordinance No. 7. Each of -the condemned defendants, with the exception of the defendant -Poppendick, also petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States -for a writ of habeas corpus and for a writ of prohibition against the -proceeding or an order nullifying the trial and setting the defendants -at liberty. Moreover, all defendants, with the exception of the -defendant Becker-Freyseng, filed appeals of some kind with the Secretary -of War. From these various types of petitions, six are set forth below -in whole or in part as follows: petition of appeal to the Secretary of -War for the defendant Karl Brandt, page 302; petition for a writ of -habeas corpus and a writ of prohibition to the Supreme Court of the -United States by the defendant Rose, pp. 303 to 306; extracts from the -petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of prohibition to the -Supreme Court of the United States by the defendant Schroeder, pp. 307 -to 308; petition for review to the Military Governor of the United -States Zone of Occupation for the defendant Genzken, pp. 309 to 318; -clemency plea to the Military Governor of the United States Zone of -Occupation for the defendant Rudolf Brandt, pp. 319 to 321; and clemency -plea to the Military Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation -for the defendant Poppendick, pp. 322 to 326. - - - - - b. Selections from the Petitions to the Military Governor, the - Supreme Court of the United States, and to the - Judge Advocate General - - _FOR THE DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT_ - Nuernberg, 4 September 1947. - -The -Secretary of War, -Judge Advocate General, -War Department, -Washington, D.C., -United States of America. -Professor Dr. Karl BRANDT, Petitioner, - Defense Counsel Dr. R. Servatius, attorney-at-law, Cologne - _vs._ - United States of America -Petition of Appeal - - No.—— - -As defense counsel of the defendant Professor Dr. med. Karl Brandt, I -herewith lodge an appeal against the verdict of the Military Tribunal -No. I at Nuernberg in Case I, of 19 and 20 August 1947, by which the -defendant was sentenced to death. For justification of my appeal against -the indictment on which the verdict is based, as well as the verdict -itself, I refer to the following documents, copies of which are -attached: - - (_a_) Application for review, dated 28 August 1947, addressed to - the Chief of Military Government for the American Zone of - Occupation in Germany. - - (_b_) Application for writ of habeas corpus, dated 28 August - 1947, addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States of - America. - -It follows from these attached documents that the defendant Karl Brandt -was unlawfully deprived of the possibility to lodge an appeal before a -Military Tribunal consisting of medical experts. - -A re-trial before a court of higher order is necessary in order to -re-examine the errors committed by the Tribunal in ascertaining the -facts of the case and applying the law. - -I request: - - (_a_) that the verdict of the Military Tribunal, dated 20 August - 1947, be annulled. - - (_b_) that a court of appeal be formed for a new trial of the - case. - - [Signature] DR. R. SERVATIUS - _Attorney-at-law_. - - - - - _FOR THE DEFENDANT ROSE_ -Prof. Dr. med. Gerhard Rose Nuernberg, 4 September 1947 - POW A/938984 -Palace of Justice, -Nuernberg, Germany - - Defense Counsel: Dr. Heinz [Hans] Fritz - Attorney-at-law, - Bavariaring 14, - Munich, Germany - - To the - Supreme Court of the United States of America - Washington, D.C. - - Prof. Dr. med. Gerhard Rose, Petitioner - _vs._ - United States of America - - Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - and - Petition for Writ of Prohibition - - No.—— - -I, the undersigned Prof. Dr. Gerhard Rose, was sentenced, in the verdict -of the American Military Tribunal I in Nuernberg, Germany, that was -announced on 19 and 20 August 1947, of Case I, United States of America -_vs._ Karl Brandt and others, for war crimes and crimes against -humanity, as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 Dec 1945, to -life imprisonment. - -I pray: - - (1) that a writ of habeas corpus be issued by this Court, - directed to Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, Commanding - General, United States Army Forces, Germany, commanding him to - produce the body of the petitioner before your Court or some - member thereof at a time and place therein to be specified, then - and there to receive and to do what your honorable Court shall - order concerning his confinement and trial as an accused war - criminal and that he be ordered returned to the status of, and - internment as a prisoner of war in conformity with the - provisions of Article 9 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, - 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and of - paragraph 82 of the Rules of Land Warfare [U. S. Field Manual - 27-10], and - - (2) that a writ of prohibition be issued by this Court - prohibiting the respondent from proceeding with the trial and - that the petitioner be discharged from the offenses and - confinement aforesaid, - - (3) that the costs of the court shall not be levied, because I - am a prisoner of war and my property has been confiscated by the - Control Council for Germany. - -As reasons for the above requests I offer the following: - - The sentence imposed on me not only violates valid international - law, but also legal principles whose observance by all the - courts of the United States is guaranteed by the Constitution of - the United States of America. - - The basic principle that has been violated is that no one may be - deprived of the judge [justice] provided for by law and that - each defendant must be granted a regular trial. - -The following violations are charged in particular: - - The sentence was passed in violation of Article 63 of the Geneva - Convention of 1929. I am a medical officer and was Generalarzt - in the Reserve, which is equivalent to a brigadier general in - the Medical Corps in the American Army. In May 1941 I was in the - Luftwaffe hospital at Kitzbuehl in Austria and became a prisoner - of war. Shortly afterwards I was flown to England and taken to - Camp Latimer (Bucks), known as POW Camp 7. There I was - registered as a prisoner of war in the middle of June 1945 and - received the POW number A 938984. I was informed that I was a - British prisoner of war. I am still a prisoner of war today, - because I was neither discharged _de facto_ nor was I ever given - discharge papers or shown discharge papers that had been filled - out. As a prisoner of war I have a right to have my case tried - by a court martial, as would be correct in case an Allied - medical officer of equal rank were to be indicted on the same - charges. This Court must not only be an officers’ court composed - of judges holding corresponding rank, but it must also be a - professional court, because it must be composed of medical - officers. Since the American Military Tribunal I is not such a - court, it was, for example, not in a position to correctly judge - my activity as scientific consultant medical officer in - relationship to that of a commanding officer. - - Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 purposely makes no - differentiation between crimes that a prisoner of war commits - during his prisoner of war captivity and those which he - committed before he became a prisoner of war. In accordance with - the purpose and spirit of the Geneva Convention of 1929, the - prisoners of war are to be protected by this provision from - being brought up before a special court or from any limitation - of their legal rights. - - (2) There is a violation of Article 64 of the Geneva Convention - because the legal remedies that would be available to an Allied - medical officer in a corresponding case cannot be used in the - case of the sentence that has been imposed upon me, because - Article 15 of Ordinance No. 7 of the American Military - Government in Germany provides that the verdicts of the Military - Tribunals are final and incontestable. - - (3) There is a violation of Article 60 of the Geneva Convention, - because Switzerland was not informed, as the protecting power - for prisoners of war, of the criminal proceedings pending - against me. - - (4) The sentence imposed on me violates generally recognized - legal principles. It is based on the Control Council Law No. 10, - dated 20 December 1945, and the _ex post facto_ definitions - contained therein. The sentence has inflicted punishment on me - for crimes against humanity, that is, on the basis of an act - which was for the first time declared punishable by Control - Council Law No. 10. - - The suspension of this universally recognized legal principle by - a new law cannot change justice itself. The validity of this - special law must be tested by the court. - - (5) The sentence violates the basic principle _nulla poena sine - culpa_, because it punished me according to Article II, 2_c_ and - _d_ of the Control Council Law. These parts of the Control - Council Laws allow punishment for mere consent to an act and for - a merely objective “connection” with the planning or execution - of such act. These provisions represent new substantive law that - has been created _ex post facto_. - - (6) During the trial I was limited in my defense in an - inadmissible way. My defense counsel, Attorney Dr. Fritz, twice - requested, in the prescribed manner, that Prof. Dr. Blanc, a - French citizen and director of the Pasteur Institute in - Casablanca, Morocco, be summoned as an expert witness in the - examination of the research work of Prof. Haagen. The medical - research work of Prof. Haagen concerns such difficult medical - problems that it cannot, in my opinion, be judged by judges who - lack medical training, without the expert testimony of a capable - specialist. However, the Court did not approve the requests. - This is in my opinion the only reason that I was found guilty in - connection with the research work of Haagen. - - (7) It is further asserted that the principle of oral - proceedings was violated. In the final stages of the trial the - Court ordered a partly written procedure. Although the main - trial had lasted many months and there was an extremely abundant - amount of material to discuss, from a factual as well as a legal - standpoint, my defense counsel was only allowed one hour for his - closing speech. As for the remaining arguments he was advised to - present a closing brief. In this way the protection of publicity - was denied and the guarantee removed that the Court would really - take cognizance of these written statements. - - It was not possible for me to receive information concerning - these written statements of my co-defendants in time to take - action thereon. - - The contents of the closing brief which my defense counsel - submitted, and the contents of his rebuttal to the closing brief - submitted by the prosecutor against me have obviously not been - considered in the findings of the Court, although the Court - described the closing brief which it demanded as the most - important part of the defense. The English translations of the - closing brief and rebuttal to the closing brief of the - prosecution arrived so late that it seems impossible that the - Court could have taken note of the contents before writing the - verdict. - - Several closing briefs which had been submitted by the defense - counsels of my co-defendants were not even available at the time - when the verdict was read. - - I assume that the Court could not peruse the rebuttal of my - defense counsels to the closing brief of the prosecution before - writing the verdict, because the verdict, insofar as it pertains - to my case, contains several obviously false statements of facts - and furthermore does not even analyze these statements. - - (8) The verdict does not have, according to the provisions of - Military Government Ordinance No. 7, sufficient reasons to back - it up. For instance, it is impossible to determine whether the - Court investigated the possibility of duress that would preclude - punishment. - -Insofar as incompetency of the American Military Tribunal No. I is -asserted in my case, I point to the fact that it was not possible for me -to object earlier on account of Article II _e_ of Ordinance No. 7. - -I reserve the right to submit further statements and evidence later. - - [Signature] DR. GERHARD ROSE. - - - - - _FOR THE DEFENDANT SCHROEDER_ - -To the -Supreme Court -of the United States of America -Washington -through the office of the General Secretary of the -U. S. Military Tribunal I -Nuernberg. - -Oskar Schroeder, Petitioner - _vs._ -The United States of America - - Oskar Schroeder, former Generaloberstabsarzt (Lieutenant - General) of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) at present in the - prison of the Court in Nuernberg, Germany. - - Counsel for the defendant: Dr. Hanns Marx at present at the - Military Tribunal I Nuernberg, Roonstrasse 15. - -_Writ of Habeas Corpus and_ - -_Writ of Prohibition_ - - * * * * * - -Here too, the Court found that I am guilty merely because of the fact -that contrary to duty I did not supervise my subordinates. - -Finally the judgment found me guilty with regard to the responsibility -for gas experiments. Here the judgment states: - - “A certain Oberarzt Wimmer, a staff physician of the Luftwaffe - worked with Hirt on the gas experiments throughout the period. - - “We discussed the duty which rests upon a commanding officer to - take appropriate measures to control his subordinates, in - dealing with the case of Handloser. We shall not repeat what we - said there. Had Schroeder adopted the measures which the law of - war imposes upon one in position of command to prevent the - actions of his subordinates amounting to violations of the law - of war, the deaths of the non-German nationals involved in the - gas experiments might well have been prevented.” - - * * * * * - - III - -A further infringement against the habeas corpus is the fact that while -I have been found guilty as being responsible for the Lost experiments, -although I have never been indicted on this count. - -The verdict of the Military Tribunal I states on page 11 the names of -those defendants who have been accused of having borne special -responsibility for the Lost (mustard) gas experiments. My name does not -appear on that list. - -On page 187 of the verdict, the Court describes the importance that this -enumeration of defendants has in relation to the various individual -counts of the indictment. It says: - - “In preparing counts II and III of the indictment, the - prosecution elected to frame its pleadings in such a manner - [page 7 of the original] as to charge all defendants with the - commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, generally, - and at the same time to name in each subparagraph dealing with - medical experiments only those defendants particularly charged - with responsibility for each particular item.” - -The Court goes on to say: - - “In our view this constituted in effect, a bill of particulars - and was, in essence, a declaration to the defendants upon which - they were entitled to rely in preparing their defenses, that - only such persons as were actually named in the designated - experiments would be called upon to defend against the specific - items.” - -As the Court repeatedly gave evidence during the course of the -proceedings that it adhered to this view I did not defend myself, did -not need to defend myself and could not defend myself against the -accusation that I had participated in the Lost experiments. - -Although the Court finds on page 187 of the verdict: - - “We think it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant to find - him guilty of an offense with which the indictment affirmatively - indicated he was not charged,” - -it has still found me guilty because of responsibility for the Lost -experiment, so that in view of the Court’s own statements as contained -in the verdict, my sentence constitutes, insofar as it concerns this -matter, a gross injustice. - -I believe that the sentence of the Military Tribunal I violates a -principle insofar as each defendant must be told clearly what crime he -has been charged with, and that he must have opportunity to defend -himself against these accusations. - -It is this principle that is being violated in the findings of the Court -against me. In my opinion, it infringes thus the principle of legal -heading laid down in the habeas corpus. It is therefore obviously -unjust, according to the wording of the verdict itself. - - * * * * * - - - - - _FOR THE DEFENDANT GENZKEN_ -Dr. R. Merkel -Defense Counsel of Defendant Dr. Karl Genzken - Nuernberg, 2 September 1947. - -To the -American Military Governor for Germany -General Lucius D. Clay -_via_ -the Secretary General of the -Military Tribunal I -Nuernberg. - -_Concerning_: Confirmation of the sentence of Military Tribunal I, - Nuernberg, of 19 August 1947. - -Karl Genzken, defendant in Case I, defended by Attorney-at-Law Dr. R. -Merkel, Nuernberg, by verdict of Military Tribunal I of 19 August 1947 -was found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership -in the SS—counts two, three, and four of the indictment—and was -sentenced to life imprisonment. - -I request that the sentence may not be confirmed, since the defendant is -innocent of the punishable participation in the typhus experiments in -Buchenwald with which he is charged. - -The verdict of Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg of 19-20 August 1947 -decided that Genzken in his official position was responsible for, -cooperated in, and promoted the typhus experiments which were carried -out on non-Germans against their will, and in the course of which, and -as a result of which, cases of death occurred. - -On the basis of the verdict it is certain that the defendant himself did -not actively participate in the typhus experiments; he never entered the -Buchenwald concentration camp during the war and never saw the typhus -experimental station in Block 46. - -The verdict is based on the presupposition— - -(1) that Genzken before 1 September 1943—as superior of Mrugowsky, the -Chief of the Hygiene Institute, and of Ding in his capacity as an -assistant in this Institute—has had the command and thus the official -supervision over the experiments in the typhus experimental station in -Block 46 of the Buchenwald concentration camp, - -(2) that Genzken before 1 September 1943 was acquainted with the kind -and scope of the activity of Mrugowsky and Ding, who were supposedly -subordinated to him in the field of typhus research, and - -(3) that he nevertheless failed to make sure that this research work was -carried out within legally permissible limits. - -These statements of the verdict are not correct, since they do not take -into account in any way the actual facts which emerged on the basis of -the extensive evidence submitted by the prosecution and defense. - - I - _Genzken had no command and no official supervision over the - typhus experiments in Block 46_ - -The research for a new typhus vaccine for the Waffen SS was purely -scientific research in the medical field. In contrast to the Chiefs of -the Medical Services of the three Wehrmacht branches (Army, Air Corps, -Navy) scientific research and planning did not belong to the tasks -delegated to the Chief of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS. The -official agency in charge of scientific research and planning for all -the organizations of the SS and the police was rather exclusively Reich -Physician SS and Police Professor Dr. Grawitz (pages 4-6 of closing -brief of the defense). - -Exhibit No. 39 of the prosecution proves that Grawitz in 1942 without -success requested funds for the intended establishment of several -research institutes. However, in view of the imminent pressing danger of -typhus, Grawitz, at the order of Himmler, gave the command to establish -a typhus experimental station in connection with and sharing the funds -appropriated for Block 46 of the Buchenwald concentration camp and in -December 1941 he appointed Dr. Ding of the Hygiene Institute of the -Waffen SS head of Block 46. In reference to this Mrugowsky states: -“Himmler did not order me to take charge of these experiments, but at -the suggestion of Grawitz assigned these duties to Dr. Ding.” (_p. 5067 -of the English transcript._) In the affidavit of S. Dumont, we read: -“Mrugowsky told me that Grawitz will transmit Himmler’s order direct to -Ding” (_Document Mrugowsky 38, Exhibit 13, p. 50 Document book Mrugowsky -I_). Finally Blumenreuther declares in his affidavit of 3 February 1947 -(_Document Mrugowsky No. 26, Exhibit 6, p. 170 Document Book Mrugowsky -I_) as follows: “In 1942 Grawitz brought about Himmler’s order to -establish in the Buchenwald concentration camp an experimental station -for typhus research and appointed Dr. Ding to take charge of this -experimental station.” Thus Ding left the Hygiene Institute, when his -research work began, and from this time on he was no longer a -subordinate of Genzken, but as chief of the research department in Block -46 was directly, immediately, and exclusively subordinate to Grawitz. As -oldest hygienic expert, Grawitz consulted his consulting hygienist -Mrugowsky in the course of his researches concerned with typhus. This -latter called himself “Reich Physician SS and Leading Police Hygienist” -in his report of 5 May 1942 which was mentioned in the verdict -(_Mrugowsky, Exhibit 20, p._ _86, Doc. Book Mrug. I_). As a result of -the shortage of hygienists, Mrugowsky, in his capacity as head of the -only Hygiene Institute on the home front, was available also to the -Reich Physician for his medical duties concerned with all the branches -of the SS and for his scientific research tasks. As head of the Hygiene -Institute and as head of Office XVI concerned with questions of group -hygiene of the Waffen SS, Mrugowsky was subordinate to Genzken, not -however in his capacity as hygienic consultant to the Reich Physician. -In connection with these problems, to which belonged also the typhus -vaccine research, Mrugowsky was subordinate only to Reich Physician SS -Grawitz and not to Genzken. If, as the verdict presupposes, the -relationship of giving orders had really been the following: -Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding, then Genzken would have had to -take orders from Grawitz and would have been called for conferences with -Grawitz. This has not been established by the prosecution. - -Through the examination of witnesses by prosecution and defense, it was -established that there were two separate institutions in Buchenwald: the -typhus research institute from December 1941 in Block 46 and the typhus -vaccine manufacturing station from the fall of 1943 in Block 50 (_see -page 35, Closing Brief of the Defense and Exhibit Genzken Exh. No. 5_). -The manufacturing station in Block 50, and Ding as its head, would have -been subordinate to Dr. Genzken as such if the manufacture of the new SS -typhus vaccine had been started before 1 September 1943. However, this -was definitely not the case; it was still in a preparatory state (_see -page 46, closing brief of the defense_). If on page 96 (German text) of -the verdict it is furthermore stated that the official channels were -arranged in this manner: _Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding_, then -this statement also is in obvious contradiction to the facts established -in a clear and conclusive manner by the examination of witnesses. - -Because, as far as the channels of command for the typhus experimental -station are concerned, the following points prove that these channels of -command ran _Himmler-Grawitz-Ding_ for Block 46: - -(1) Dr. Morgen states in his affidavit Mrugowsky Exh. 107 (_Doc. Mrug. -114, Doc. Book Mrug. Supplement II, p. 54_), that Grawitz gave written -and direct order to Ding to carry out the typhus research without -Genzken’s participation. Ding showed Morgen the written order from -Grawitz. - -(2) The letterhead which Ding used before spring 1943, as head of the -experimental station for typhus and virus research, read as follows: -“Reich Fuehrer SS—Typhus-Experimental Station, Buchenwald” (_see Doc. -Genzken No. 2, Genzken Exh. 8_). - -(3) The prosecution witness Kogon confirms the fact that all reports -went through Mrugowsky directly to Grawitz and not by way of Genzken. - -(4) Genzken and Mrugowsky both testify under oath that Himmler and -Grawitz gave the order for the establishment of the experimental station -to Ding directly. - -(5) In Exhibit 283 of the prosecution, Ding states “that Grawitz, in -agreement with the leading physician of the concentration camp Dr. -Lolling appointed Dr. Hoven as Ding’s deputy in Buchenwald”. The -appointment, therefore, did not take place by way of Genzken. - -The order channel, Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding, as stated in -the verdict, is based exclusively on the affidavit of Dr. Hoven dated 24 -October 1946, Prosecution Exh. No. 281. When he was interrogated, Hoven -stated under oath that this channel of command was correct only for the -manufacturing station in Block 50 and not for the research institute in -Block 46 (_see p. 9913 of the English record_). When Mrugowsky was -interrogated, he also stated under oath “that this command relationship -referred solely to the vaccine _manufacture_ in Block 50. This chain of -command did not refer to Block 46, and insofar as it is touched by it, -this channel of giving orders is not correct” (_see p. 46 closing brief -of the defense_). - -From all this evidence it follows conclusively that Hoven’s statement -cannot be used as supporting evidence for a conviction against Genzken. -For he was not a station on this channel of giving orders and had never -had anything to do about giving orders concerning the carrying out of -the typhus experiments in Block 46 until 1 September 1943. - -If, therefore, the verdict states that Genzken was responsible for the -carrying out of the typhus experiments, then the verdict does not take -into consideration the proven fact that not Genzken, but Grawitz was the -one who gave the order to carry out research experiments in the -concentration camp Buchenwald on concentration camp inmates. Only he who -gives the order to carry out an action and who was a party to it in some -other ways can be responsible for the act. Nothing of the sort has been -proved against Genzken. If, as established by Document Mrug. Exh. No. -107, Grawitz gave the order to carry out typhus experiments to Ding, -then it is impossible that Genzken too could have given such an order, -if for no other reason, because he was never the competent authority for -scientific research and projects. Furthermore on the basis of his -testimony as a witness, it has been established that he never received -an order to this effect by Grawitz, and that Grawitz purposely excluded -him from exerting any influence on the research projects in Block 46. - -In Genzken Exhibit No. 3, Mrugowsky confirms “that Grawitz, in -conversations with him, frequently emphasized that he—Grawitz—was the -only one responsible for research and planning assignments within the -SS, and that Genzken had nothing to do with them.” - -The assumption in the verdict is, therefore, not correct that Ding -undertook typhus research “for” the Hygiene Institute (_page 97, German -text of the verdict_). As already mentioned above and as proved beyond -doubt during the trial, Ding did not undertake these typhus experiments -for the Hygiene Institute of the Waffen SS, but exclusively for his -employer and commander, Grawitz. - -Genzken, therefore, was not responsible for the carrying out of the -typhus experiments, since he neither commanded nor ordered those -experiments. - -If furthermore the Tribunal is trying to construe incriminating evidence -against Genzken by claiming that Genzken provided the funds for Ding’s -expenses (_see page 97 and 99 of the German text_), this too is a -mistake. Genzken expressly said under oath that he never provided any -money for Ding’s experiments, but that only for Ding’s personal needs -had funds been transferred to the Waffen SS through the medical office. -In the Genzken Document No. 17, Genzken Exhibit No. 15, Rudolf Tonndorf -says “that he never paid or ordered payment for the upkeep or provided -other funds for scientific experiments or for institutions which served -such purposes, because such scientific research work was not the concern -of the medical office of the Waffen SS, but exclusively that of the -office of the Reich Physician of the SS and Police, Dr. Grawitz.” - -In Genzken Exhibit No. 8, Barnewald states under oath “that the entire -administrative care for Block 46 was the concern of the Buchenwald camp -administration through the official channels via the patients’ building -of the concentration camp. The administration of the medical office of -the Waffen SS had officially nothing to do with administrative matters -concerning Block 46.” - -On page 6 of the Ding diary—Prosecution Exhibit No. 287—it says that -Pohl, the Chief of the Main Administrative and Economic Office, gave the -order for the enlargement of a block of stone buildings. On page 9 of -that same document a conference between Ding and two representatives of -the Main Administrative and Economic Office is mentioned (Barnewald and -Schlesinger), who occupied themselves with the breeding of experimental -animals for the experimental department. - -Not Genzken, but the authorities competent for the economic supply of -the concentration camps, namely, the Main Administrative and Economic -Office therefore carried through the financing of the typhus experiments -via the camp administration of the concentration camp Buchenwald. - - II - _Genzken had no knowledge of the character and of the extent of - the experiments carried out in the field of typhus research - in Block 46_ - -The statement in the verdict (_page 105_) “that Genzken knew that the -prisoners were subjected to cruel medical experiments, in the course of -which deaths were occurring,” is not proved in any way. - -The verdict itself (_page 98_) states that Genzken said “that he was -aware of the fact that concentration camp inmates were subjected to -experiments, and that he stated that he was not advised as to the -_methods_ of experimentation.” In the cross-examination, Genzken -emphasized that the number of the experimental persons, of the series of -experiments, the number of dead, the cultures for infections, and the -passages had only become clear to him through the trial, and that the -names “Block 46” and “Block 50” had been entirely unknown to him up to -the trial. As proved by the evidence it is clear, beyond doubt, that -Genzken was not informed either by Grawitz, nor by Ding, nor by -Mrugowsky about the details of the experiments. Grawitz who distrusted -Genzken, consciously never informed Genzken about a single case of his -many secret experiments upon human beings in which, according to the -documentary evidence he participated. The defense has given sufficient -evidence for this fact. Grawitz even prevented Mrugowsky from informing -Genzken (_Document Genzken, Exhibit No. 3_): “This is none of Genzken’s -business.” - -It has also been made very clear by the defense that Ding had never -given any oral or written information about the details of the -experiments. The prosecution could not produce any evidence for such -information. - -The verdict speaks about a “warm personal friendship between Genzken and -Ding” (_page 97_). Their relationship never was more than one of -official comradeship. They did not use the intimate “Du” in addressing -each other. Ding was never a guest at Genzken’s house. Once Ding was -presented to Frau Genzken. The two women did not know each other at all. - -Ding’s scientific reports concerning his research went directly to -Grawitz via Mrugowsky. To the question whether it was not true that -reports concerning the typhus experiments in Block 46 went to the office -of the Reich Physician of the SS and of the Police Grawitz, the -prosecution witness Kogon answered by saying: “This is correct” (_see p. -1290 of the English Transcript_). Mrugowsky said in this connection: - -“The reports were never presented to Genzken through me but in a new -envelope went directly to Grawitz” (_see p. 5366 of the English -Transcript_). Finally the witness Dumont in figure 7 of her affidavit -(_Document Mrugowsky, Exhibit 13, page 51, Document Book Mrug. I_) -declared: “The reports which Ding made concerning his experiments with -prisoners were directed to Grawitz via the Hygiene Institute.” - -The verdict tries furthermore to base the fact that Genzken knew about -the typhus experiments via stating that once a report by Mrugowsky of 5 -May 1942 went to him and that besides this, he had been personally -informed about everything by Mrugowsky. Both conclusions are also wrong -and are in direct contradiction to the evidence. - -The only document of the prosecution which, according to the distributor -mentions the name of Genzken at all, is the report by Mrugowsky of 5 May -1942, mentioned in the verdict (_page 99 and following_). The -conclusions which the Tribunal feels compelled to have to draw from this -report to the prejudice of Genzken do not apply if only for the reason -that this report was _never_ made available to Dr. Genzken. Mrugowsky -said in this respect: “This report was not presented to Genzken himself -but was even later on, until the end, in the files of Amt XVI.” (_See -reply of the defense to the closing brief of the prosecution, p. 5_). -Genzken cannot be made responsible for something he, as has been proved, -never knew. If he never saw that report of Mrugowsky and if he never -knew of its existence, it cannot serve as an incriminating evidence -against him. - -It is not correct, that before 1 September 1943 Mrugowsky gave -regularly, on the average once a week, oral or written reports -concerning the typhus experiments to Genzken. Mrugowsky only said that -about once a week he reported to Genzken on the hygiene of the troops at -the meeting of the Referenten[59] of the medical office. Mrugowsky did -this in his capacity as leading hygienist of the medical office -(Sanitaets-Amt). Mrugowsky never reported to Genzken about the typhus -experiments, on the occasion of these weekly reports and meetings of -Referenten (Heads of Referate, Departments in a Ministry), if only -because of the fact that these experiments did not fall within the scope -of the work of the medical office of the Waffen SS, and because, upon -Grawitz order, they were to be kept strictly secret. Written reports -were never made at all. The established fact that in the medical office -there was not the slightest information about, nor was there ever any -discussion of, typhus experiments or any other experiments upon human -beings in concentration camps, in itself shows that on Mrugowsky’s part, -no oral or written reports were submitted to the medical office of the -Waffen SS. Four participants in such meetings of the Referenten of the -medical office have borne witness to this fact (_see p. 52 of the -closing brief for the defense_). - -The sole report of the spring of 1943 has been described in detail by -Mrugowsky. His explanations were incorporated into the verdict word for -word. The Tribunal thus considers them to be true and accurate. -Mrugowsky and Genzken both stated under oath that Genzken had not seen -that infection dates and incidents of death had been marked in the -charts which were submitted to him. Mrugowsky stated literally as -follows: “I had no cause to call his attention to these things expressly -because actually I made no report to him concerning Ding’s experimental -series, but merely wanted to give him factual information concerning the -protective effect of certain vaccines, which he as head of the medical -office had to know.” - -On pages 25-26, the verdict states: “In Anglo-Saxon law, every defendant -in a criminal proceedings for a crime of which he is accused is -considered innocent until the prosecution has brought sound credible -proof of his guilt, excluding all reasonable doubt. This assumption -applies to the defendant throughout all the stages of the trial, until -such proof has been brought. ‘Reasonable doubt’ is, as the name implies, -doubt that is in keeping with reason, a doubt that a reasonable person -would entertain.” - -These statements must be completely and entirely agreed to. But, when -applied to this very case of defendant Genzken and especially to his -alleged knowledge of the experiments, it can under no circumstances be -said that the evidence brought by the prosecution is sufficient to -provide the judge with a lasting conviction giving him the moral -certainty the accusation is true. For Genzken did not see Mrugowsky’s -report, and the single report made by Mrugowsky presents, according to -the latter’s statement, no sound and conclusive proof of Genzken’s -knowledge. - -The verdict holds Genzken responsible (_p. 103_) “for having -nevertheless neglected to reassure himself that his experimental work -was being carried out within permissible legitimate limits.” - - III - _Genzken had no official supervisory power and no chance - to intervene by giving orders and also no reason - at all to reassure himself_ - -As witness, Genzken himself stated that he had merely known that a new -typhus vaccine was to be produced in an institute at Buchenwald. Genzken -had no knowledge whatsoever in this specialized field of hygiene, as -well as no bacteriological training at all, and had never conducted -scientific research work. He had no reason at all to assume that, in -connection with this research, prisoners would be used in a criminal -manner. He was merely of the opinion that the prisoners were brought in -for purposes of checking the efficacy of the vaccine, in the form of -experimental series which were generally customary in medical research. -It was only during the course of the trial that he for the first time -learned of deliberate infections and that there had been many deaths -during the experimental series. He could not know anything about these -facts, especially because the assignment of the prisoners was, as a -concentration camp matter, completely outside of his sphere of duties. -When, on page 103 (German text), the verdict implies that Genzken had -undertaken no steps to reassure himself about the condition of the -experimental subjects or of the circumstances under which they had been -taken to the experimental block, this implication of the verdict is also -incorrect, because the prisoners were not assigned by the medical office -of the Waffen SS, but by the office in charge of the administration of -the concentration camp in collaboration with the Reich Criminal Police -Office. Until the trial, he had not even known that non-Germans were -called in as experimental subjects. This and the fact that all -experiments were kept strictly secret made it impossible for Genzken to -institute investigations or to undertake steps to reassure himself about -the condition of the experimental subjects. If, finally, on page 98 of -the verdict, reference is made to Ding’s diary in order to support the -judgment, it must above all be stated that there are grave doubts as to -the probative value of this document (_see p. 27 and the following of -the closing brief for the defense_). The verdict asserts that Kogon kept -the original diary. That is not in keeping with the facts; in any case -it would have been impossible for the period from December 1941 to June -1943, because Kogon only became Ding’s secretary on the latter date -(_see p. 1259 of the English Transcript_). On page 99 of the verdict, -the Tribunal itself makes the following statement in connection with the -entry for 9 January 1943 referred to in order to incriminate Genzken: -“if Ding’s proven attempts at self-glorification are taken into account, -one should not credulously accept this entry in its existing form.” Thus -in this connection the statements on page 25 and 26 of the verdict -regarding the Tribunal’s conviction apply in particular. If even the -Tribunal, and quite rightly so, feels considerable doubts as to the -correctness and significance of this entry, it is not permissible to use -it in order to the prejudice of the defendant. Besides, Genzken -expressly declared as also confirmed by Kogon (_see p. 1228 of English -Tr._) that he never expressed his approval with regard to the department -for typhus research, but that this entry would have to be interpreted as -his consent to the change of name of the vaccine _production_ -laboratory. This intended change of name was not effected until after 1 -September 1943, thus at a time when Genzken was no longer responsible. -(_See p. 32 and following of the closing brief for the defense._) - -The verdict states at the end of the opinion for Genzken’s sentence that -he was responsible for the typhus experiments and that he assisted in -them and furthered them. - -In the face of all this, the result of the case in chief is once again -to be summarized as follows: - - Genzken had no responsibility, no authority to give orders, and - no official supervisory power regarding the Typhus Experimental - Station in Block 46 of the Buchenwald concentration camp. All - these were in the hands of Grawitz. The latter gave direct - orders for the experiments to be carried out to Ding who was his - immediate subordinate. Ding’s reports went directly through - Mrugowsky to Grawitz and never to Genzken. The latter had no - knowledge whatsoever of the criminal methods of the experiments. - Genzken had no responsibility, no official supervisory power, - and no possibility to interfere by an order; owing to his - ignorance of the facts, he had no cause to reassure himself of - the conditions under which the experiments took place. Therefore - a sentence in connection with counts two and three of the - indictment ought not to follow. I, therefore, ask that the - verdict should not be confirmed on these points, as Genzken is - not guilty of a war crime or of a crime against humanity as is - clearly proved by the evidence. - - With regard to his membership in the SS, this fact alone is not - sufficient to bring about his conviction before the American - Military Tribunal. In addition, it would be necessary that his - knowledge of _criminal_ experiments should have been proved as - in the Poppendick case. However, in accordance with the above - statements this is not the case. - - Only the competent German Denazification Board could convict the - defendant for his SS membership. I therefore propose that the - case be referred to the Denazification Board competent for his - home town Preetz/Holstein. - - [Signature] DR. R. MERKEL, - _Attorney-at-Law_. - - - - - _FOR THE DEFENDANT RUDOLF BRANDT_ - -Dr. Kurt Kauffmann -Counsel for the Defense of the Defendant Rudolf Brandt - - Nuernberg, 2 September 1947 - -To the Military Governor of the American Zone of Occupation in Germany. - -Through the Secretary General at Military Tribunal No. I, Nuernberg. - -As counsel for the defense of Rudolf Brandt, who has been sentenced to -death, I herewith petition that the judgment of the American Military -Tribunal No. I, dated 19-20 August 1947, not be confirmed. - -It is perhaps the grandest task of a human being and counsel for the -defense to intercede on behalf of another person and to commend him to -the clemency of the mighty. - -Clemency appeals to the understanding of the great for human weakness. -Clemency is the opposite of pure criticism and spiteful anger. - -For this reason I remain quiet in the face of the sentence pronounced; I -do not raise any complaint because, in one point or another, the -decision of the Tribunal does not perhaps entirely agree with my opinion -of the course of events, of the position of the defendant at that time, -and of his character. - -This petition for clemency wants once more to go into the depths of the -thoughts which basically were already the subject of my final plea. - -One may well believe that at the beginning of the trial, after I had -studied the case of Rudolf Brandt, I recognized that this task was -hardly to be rewarded with success; nevertheless it seemed to me that it -was worth my efforts to take over the defense, since I believed—then as -well as now—that Rudolf Brandt is guilty to receive any kind of -punishment but not the death sentence. - -Not a few of the statements made in my final plea serve this idea. I -must admit, however, that even I, as the counsel for his defense, -arrived at this conviction only on the strength of the characterization -of the personality of the defendant contained in my document book, as -well as on the strength of my own judgment of him, which sees in Brandt -a beast of burden which dragged on day and night without really -recognizing the contents of its burden; for the burden which it carried, -together with the weights, which make this trial such a terrible one, -were only a small fraction of the gigantic burden under which the bearer -himself was not visible any more. - -This comparison can be drawn without difficulty from the evidence -presented by the defense. - -I take the liberty—because it seems characteristic in this respect—to -refer to some pieces of evidence which have already been submitted to -the Tribunal, namely: - - (1) the affidavit of Medizinalrat Felix Kersten of Stockholm - (_Document Book Rudolf Brandt, page 8_). - - (2) two affidavits from Schellenberg and Dr. Stuckart (_Document - Book Rudolf Brandt, pp. 16-17 and pp. 23-24_). - - (3) I once more refer to the final plea of Rudolf Brandt - (_English transcript, pages 11330-35_). - - (4) I attached two letters of the World Jewish Congress in Paris - and Stockholm, addressed to the above-mentioned Felix Kersten, - which had been rejected by the Tribunal as unessential pieces of - evidence, which, however, throw a distinct light on the - personality of Felix Kersten, who, on his part, defends so - warmly Rudolf Brandt. - -The fact that Rudolf Brandt did not make his own decisions but was under -the command of Himmler can be found a mitigating consideration according -to Law No. 10 of the Control Council, Article II 4 _b_. - -I appeal to the generosity of the great to make use of this possibility -to mitigate the sentence. - -A sentence of imprisonment is also a heavy expiation. - -The counsel for the defense again and again feels tempted to regret that -these trials are too drawn out and through their long duration have a -negative effect on the broad masses of the German people. If it is to be -the goal of these trials to punish the main war criminals, these -procedures should be shortened. The people are not interested any more -in the course of these trials, apart from the trial against Goering and -others during its first stages; one reason for this is, of course, the -general plight; because the hunger of the people, the great mortality, -the problem of the prisoners of war who are not returned to their -families, the conditions in the East push everything else aside. -Furthermore, the long duration of the trials causes even the most lively -interest to slacken. But it also seems wrong to pronounce death -sentences after such a long duration of proceedings. In the case of the -trial of the International Military Tribunal, the people were still able -to connect the long duration of the proceedings with the sentences -pronounced, because each proceeding was an individual event. The -following trials, however, among them, therefore, the doctors’ trial, -are much too much drawn out with regard to German legal opinion. If such -a drawn-out procedure closes with a death sentence, that death -punishment seems hardly justified anymore. German trial procedure does -not know such long drawn-out proceedings, the final result of which is a -death sentence. The special peculiarities of the Anglo-American trial -procedures are the cause for such trials that last for months and -months. It has also to be remembered that the defendants in each case -have been in custody for almost or more than two years when the trial -finally began. Procedures ending with death sentences will have to be -carried through much faster. It is in contradiction to one’s reactions -that death sentences are pronounced against defendants with whom not -only counsel for the defense has worked together for many months, but -who also for many months appeared daily in court and were respected by -the court, since they are rightly considered innocent until their guilt -is finally established. - -Neither should one forget that the defendants themselves, after having -been held in custody for inquiry for such a long time and having gone -through such long drawn-out procedures, have already atoned more for -their crimes than if there had been a quick procedure started -immediately after the collapse of Germany. - -If I may impose on the instance for clemency I beg to read some parts of -my final plea; then, I don’t have to repeat myself here. (_Cf. -statements on page 14 V, 1_; _furthermore pages 18-20, 27, 43 C_). - - [Signature] DR. KAUFFMANN. - - - - - _FOR THE DEFENDANT POPPENDICK_ - Nuernberg, 1 September 1947 - -Georg Boehm, Attorney -Defense Counsel -Military Tribunal I -Nuernberg, 115 Zerzabelshofstrasse - -The -Military Commander -of the U.S. Occupation Zone -Germany - - Petition - of Attorney Georg Boehm, Defense Counsel at - Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg - - for the defendant - Helmut Poppendick, at present in the courthouse prison at - Nuernberg, _concerning alteration of the sentence passed_ - _by Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg_ - -The defendant Helmut Poppendick was acquitted of the charges of having -committed war crimes and crimes against humanity (counts two and three) -in the sentence of the Military Tribunal I at Nuernberg in Case I, -United States of America against Karl Brandt _et al._, on 19 August -1947, and found guilty only, as an SS member, of membership in an -organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal -(count four). On 20 August 1947, the defendant Helmut Poppendick was -sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment merely on account of membership in -the SS. - - I. _The sentence exceeds the maximum penalty_ - -According to the recommendations of the International Military Tribunal -(_The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military -Tribunal, Vol. I, p. 288_), inserted into the sentence of the Medical -Case, a maximum penalty is provided for the punishment of members of -organizations declared criminal. The IMT recommendation provides in -detail that “in no case is the penalty, imposed on the basis of Law No. -10 upon a member of an organization or group declared criminal by the -Tribunal, to be more severe than the one provided in the Denazification -Law”. The Denazification Law, dated 5 March 1946, valid for the U.S. -Occupation Zone of Germany, referred to as a standard for comparison, -provides the maximum penalty of 10 years in a labor camp. According to -present penal regulations, 10 years’ imprisonment is, however, a more -severe penalty than being sent to a labor camp for the same period. _10 -years’ imprisonment_ _exceeds, therefore, the penalty provided in the -recommendation of the IMT._ The sentence against Poppendick does not -give any special reason for exceeding the maximum penalty. - - II. _More lenient evaluation of the group of persons within the - SS who only knew about crimes without, however, - being involved in them_ - -The sentence of the International Military Tribunal declares punishable -in the sense of the statute “the group composed of those persons who -were officially admitted as members * * * in the SS, became or remained -members of the organization knowing that use was made of them for -committing acts declared punishable by Article 6 of the Statute, _or_ -who were involved in committing such crimes as members of the -organization.” According to a reasonable interpretation of this -provision, if mere membership is punished, one has to differentiate -between those persons involved in committing such crimes and those -persons only knowing about the commission of such crimes within the SS. -According to a sound sense of justice, the provided maximum penalty for -membership in the SS cannot possibly be valid for both groups of -persons. On the contrary, the group having only knowledge has to be -punished more lightly than the group involved in crimes. A penalty -_inferior_ to the provided maximum penalty has, therefore, to be imposed -on the first mentioned persons among the SS members called to account. -The Tribunal clearly stated that the defendant Helmut Poppendick was not -involved in the crimes of the SS and, in this way, made it clear that -not even on account of his rank or official position was he able to -prevent crimes. The Tribunal only tried to impute knowledge on the part -of the defendant Poppendick of definite experiments specified in the -indictment. _For this reason the maximum penalty should not be imposed -in the case of the defendant Poppendick._ - - III. _Knowledge of the defendant Poppendick_ - -The Tribunal imputed to the defendant Poppendick, who was Oberfuehrer of -the Waffen SS and Obersturmbannfuehrer of the General SS: (1) knowledge -of freezing experiments; (2) sulfanilamide experiments; (3) -sterilization experiments; (4) incendiary bomb experiments; (5) phlegmon -experiments, without, however, being criminally involved in them. - -(1) Knowledge of freezing experiments is imputed to the defendant -Poppendick because he was subsequently invited to participate in a -conference between Grawitz and Dr. Rascher in January 1943. As Rascher -was at that time an officer in the Luftwaffe and all his collaborators -were not members of the SS, this series of experiments (at least in -January 1943) cannot be interpreted as a series of experiments within -the SS and consequently as crimes of the SS. There is no proof of -knowledge of such experiments after January 1943. - -(2) The defendant Poppendick knew as much about Professor Gebhardt’s -sulfanilamide experiments as Professor Rostock who was acquitted by the -same Tribunal, i.e., that prisoners sentenced to death were used for -these experiments. - -(3) Knowledge of sterilization experiments is imputed to the defendant -Poppendick by means of a simple assumption, although the Tribunal -pointed out in several passages of the judgment that a mere assumption -of guilt, in our case of knowledge, is insufficient. Poppendick only -worked in the Race and Settlement Office as a doctor dealing with -hereditary questions for members of the SS and their families; as -medical superintendent he had to supervise this activity and the social -welfare doctors. These matters were purely internal SS affairs. If the -Race and Settlement Office occasionally dealt, amongst other measures, -with one of racial policy through its field offices, the doctors were -not involved in any case, and there is not the least indication that -Poppendick knew or ought to have known about such measures. Even the -judgment itself reveals to what extent the real sterilization -experiments were kept secret. - -(4) On page 112 (German), the Tribunal points out, that in conferences -concerning sterilization experiments (Poppendick never took part in such -conferences) each participant had to undertake to maintain absolute -secrecy. Neither the defendant Poppendick’s statement nor the evidence -submitted reveal that Poppendick had any knowledge of sterilization -experiments, let alone of extermination measures. - -(5) In the case of the phlegmon experiments it has not been proved that -Poppendick had any knowledge of them. Here, too, the assertion that he -had such knowledge is based on a mere assumption. - -It has, however, nowhere been proved that defendant Helmut Poppendick -knew about the experiments in such a way as to necessitate his realizing -that non-Germans were being used for such experiments. In its verdict -the Tribunal has consistently followed the principle that it must be -proved that crimes were committed on non-German nationals (_see pp. 50, -51, 70, 91, 103, 131, 160, German text_). In contrast to this the -Tribunal left open the question as to how far the state is entitled to -carry out experiments on its own citizens; it stated when dealing with -the question of guilt: “* * * whatever right a state may have concerning -its own citizens” (_see pp. 114, 195, German_). The Tribunal, therefore, -in all essentials confined itself to the question of to what extent -crimes were committed on non-Germans. _No conclusive evidence has been -brought against defendant Helmut Poppendick in each single case to prove -his knowledge of experiments carried out on non-Germans._ In reality, -nothing is more suitable to explain under whatever point of view we have -to look at defendant Poppendick’s knowledge of experiments, than his -words at the end of the trial: “As to medical experiments on prisoners, -human experiments were nothing striking and nothing new to me. I knew -that experiments were being conducted in hospitals. I knew that the -triumphs of modern medicine had not been achieved without sacrifices. I -admit I cannot remember that in experiments in hospitals, the voluntary -participation of the experimental subjects had to be such an -indispensable and obvious prerequisite, as it appears to be according to -the argumentation heard in this trial. Furthermore, I know that some -scientific questions can only be solved by serial experiments in an -unchanging environment, and that, therefore, in all countries, -experiments are often conducted, particularly on soldiers in camps. -Under these circumstances I was not at all surprised that during the war -serial examinations and experiments were also carried out by scientists -in concentration camps. I had not the slightest reason to assume that -these scientists in the camps went beyond what was usual everywhere else -in the world of science. As far as I was concerned, what I knew about -medical experiments in the SS had just as little to do with criminal -acts as the experiments about which I knew from my internship before -1933.” - - IV. _Consequences for future jurisdiction arising from the - penalties imposed by the sentence on Poppendick_ - -The sentence imposed on Helmut Poppendick for his membership in the SS -is altogether the first sentence in the American Zone against an SS -member of this kind. Therefore, it has to be regarded as a precedent for -all military tribunals and possibly, later on, for German courts, whose -task it will be to punish members of criminal organizations. To sum up -its consequences, the sentence creates a precedent, that— - - 1. Every SS leader with a rank higher than Poppendick’s, who - knew of SS crimes committed on Germans and non-Germans, can, on - principle, only be sentenced to the maximum penalty. - - 2. Every member of the SS involved in crimes can be sentenced up - to this maximum penalty again only on account of his SS - membership. What penalty can, for example, be inflicted on an SS - Obergruppenfuehrer who saw how the gas chambers were run at - Auschwitz, without, however, being otherwise involved in the - extermination of the Jews; a man thus having, so to speak, the - highest degree of knowledge derived from SS membership? _It is - obvious that such a sentence as the one passed on Poppendick - deprives future tribunals of all latitude of discretion, - transforms the maximum penalty into the average penalty, and in - this way renders the recommendation of the IMT absurd._ - - V. _Prevention of further possibilities of appeal_ - -The defendant Poppendick, whose domicile is in the British Zone, would -consequently under normal circumstances have to be tried by a tribunal -(Spruchgericht) set up in the meantime in consequence of the British -Ordinance No. 69. Because he has been sentenced by a Nuernberg Military -Tribunal as a member of an organization declared criminal _he loses the -two further appeals_ provided for by Ordinance No. 69 and its -implementation regulations for the British Zone. _Therefore this is the -only legal way still open to him to state his case._ - - VI. _Personal Conditions_ - -I make the following application for reduction of penalty with even -greater emphasis, because the defendant has already been amply punished -for his SS membership. His family has lost all its property and has not -a pfennig left. His wife must support her four little children aged 3 to -7 by the labor of her hands under the most primitive conditions, without -having a chance during her husband’s entire term of imprisonment to -obtain the slightest financial assistance for herself and her children. - -The defendant used his considerable abilities as a physician to help -many people, both Germans and foreigners, during the long years of his -medical practice, without ever even mentioning this during the trial, -because it is a physician’s duty to help suffering humanity. The -defendant, who is not involved in the crimes dealt with by this -Tribunal, suffers sufficiently under his outward discrimination as an SS -member. - -In view of all these circumstances and with the request for careful -examination of the case, I make in conclusion the - - _Application_ - -1. _For the sentence of imprisonment for ten years inflicted on -defendant Helmut Poppendick to be reduced to a tolerable term of -imprisonment, perhaps to be commuted into a shorter term of confinement -in a labor camp, and at the same time_ - -2. _For the 2¼ years’ detention already served by the defendant to be -included in the then newly-determined term of imprisonment._ - - [Signature] G. BOEHM, - _Attorney-at-Law_. - ------ - -[59] According to German terminology a “Referent” (plural: “Referenten”) -is an official with expert knowledge of a specialized subject in a -government or private organization. - - - - - XIV. AFFIRMATION OF SENTENCES BY THE - MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE UNITED - STATES ZONE OF OCCUPATION - - - OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT - FOR GERMANY (U. S.) - - Office of the Military Governor - APO 742 - - Berlin, Germany - 22 November 1947 - -AG 013. 3 (LD) - - SUBJECT: Petitions for Review and for Habeas Corpus in the case of the - _United States of America_ v. _Karl Brandt et al._, Case 1, - Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg, Germany (Medical Case) - - TO: Secretary General - Military Tribunals - APO 696-A, U.S. Army - -1. Inclosed herewith you will find original orders denying petitions for -clemency submitted by the following persons convicted in Case Number 1 -before Military Tribunal I: - - Karl Brandt Siegfried Handloser - Oskar Schroeder Karl Genzken - Karl Gebhardt Rudolf Brandt - Joachim Mrugowsky Helmut Poppendick - Wolfram Sievers Gerhard Rose - Viktor Brack Hermann Becker-Freyseng - Waldemar Hoven Wilhelm Beiglboeck - Herta Oberheuser Fritz Fischer - -2. Please formally advise the petitioners through their respective -attorneys of the action taken by the Military Governor upon these -petitions. - - FOR THE MILITARY GOVERNOR: - [Signed] G. H. Garde - G. H. GARDE - Lieutenant Colonel, AGD - Adjutant General - -Incls: a/s - -Telephone BERLIN 42361 - - - - - HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND - - Office of the Commander-in-Chief - - APO 742 - - Berlin, Germany - - In the Case of Military Tribunal I - The United States of America Case No. 1 - _vs._ - Karl Brandt, et alii - - _Order with Respect to Sentence of Karl Brandt_ - -In the case of the United States of America against Karl Brandt et alii, -tried by United States Military Tribunal I, Case No. 1, Nuernberg, -Germany, the defendant, Karl Brandt, on 20 August 1947, was sentenced by -the Tribunal to death by hanging. A petition to modify the sentence, -filed on behalf of the defendant by Dr. R. Servatius, his defense -counsel, has been referred to me pursuant to the provision of Military -Government Ordinance No. 7. I have duly considered the petition and the -record of the trial and in accordance with Article XVII of said -Ordinance it is hereby ordered that: - - 1. The sentence imposed by Military Tribunal I upon Karl Brandt - be, and hereby is, in all respects, confirmed. - - 2. Pending action on petitions filed by the defendant with - authorities other than the Office of Military Government for - Germany, (U.S.), the execution of the death sentence be stayed - until further order by me. - - 3. The defendant be confined until further order in War Crimes - Prison No. 1, Landsberg, Bavaria, Germany. - - [Signed] Lucius D. Clay - LUCIUS D. CLAY - General, U.S. Army - Commander-in-Chief, European Command - and Military Governor - - - - - HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND - - Office of the Commander-in-Chief - - APO 742 - -In the Case of The -United States of America - _vs._ -Karl Brandt, et alii - - Military Tribunal I - Case No. 1 - - _Order with respect to sentence of Siegfried Handloser_[60] - -In the case of the United States of America against Karl Brandt, et -alii, tried by United States Military Tribunal I, Case No. 1, Nuernberg, -Germany, the defendant Siegfried Handloser, on 20 August 1947, was -sentenced by the Tribunal to life imprisonment. A petition to modify the -sentence, filed on behalf of the defendant by Dr. Otto Nelte, his -defense counsel, has been referred to me pursuant to the provisions of -Military Government Ordinance No. 7. I have duly considered the petition -and the record of the trial and in accordance with Article XVII of said -Ordinance, it is hereby ordered that: - - _a._ the sentence imposed by Military Tribunal I, on Siegfried - Handloser be, and hereby is, in all respects confirmed; - - _b._ the defendant be confined in War Crimes Prison No. 1, - Landsberg, Bavaria, Germany. - - [Signed] Lucius D. Clay - LUCIUS D. CLAY - General, U.S.A. - Commander-in-Chief, European Command - and Military Governor - ------ - -[60] The sentences imposed upon the remaining 14 defendants were -confirmed in all respects by the Military Commander of the United States -Zone of Occupation by identical orders. - - - - - XV. ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME - COURT DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - - - Monday, 16 February 1948 - - No. 286, Misc. Karl Brandt, petitioner, _v._ The United States - of America; - - No. 287, Misc. Viktor Brack, petitioner, _v._ The United States - of America; - - No. 288, Misc. Rudolf Brandt, petitioner, _v._ The United States - of America; - -No. 299, Misc. Wilhelm Bieglboeck, petitioner, _v._ The United States of -America. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas -corpus and prohibition are denied. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice -Murphy, and Mr. Justice Rutledge are of the opinion that the petitions -should be set for hearing on the question of the jurisdiction of this -Court. Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision -of these applications.[61] - -[The execution of death sentences imposed on Karl Brandt, Rudolf Brandt, -Karl Gebhardt, Joachim Mrugowsky, Viktor Brack, Wolfram Sievers, and -Waldemar Hoven were ordered on 14 May 1948 by the Military Governor. -Executions were carried out at Landsberg prison on 2 June 1948.] - ------ - -[61] The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus -and prohibition in the case of the other defendants were also denied. - - - - - APPENDIX - - - Table of Comparative Ranks - - U. S. German U. S. Navy German Med. SS SA - Army Army Navy Svcs.(A) - -2d Leutnant Ensign Leutnant Assistenza Untersturm Sturmfuehr - Lieuten zur See rzt fuehrer er. - ant - -1st Oberleutn Lieutenant Oberleutna Oberarzt Obersturmf Obersturmf - Lieuten ant (junior nt zur uehrer uehrer. - ant grade) See - -Captain Hauptmann Lieutenant Kapitaenle Stabsarzt Hauptsturm Hauptsturm - (senior utnant fuehrer fuehrer. - grade) - -Major Major Lieutenant Korvettenk Oberstabsa Sturmbannf Sturmbannf - Commande apitaen rzt uehrer uehrer. - r - -Lieutenan Oberstleu Commander Fregattenk Oberfeldar Obersturmb Obersturmb - t tnant apitaen zt annfuehrer annfuehrer - Colonel . - -Colonel Oberst Captain Kapitaen Oberstarzt Standarten Standarten - zur See fuehrer fuehrer - Oberfuehre Oberfuehre - r (B) r (C). - -Brigadier Generalma Commodore Konteradmi Generalarz Brigadefue Brigadefue - General jor ral t hrer hrer. - -Major Generalle Rear Vizeadmira Generalsta Gruppenfue Gruppenfue - General utnant Admiral l bsarzt hrer hrer. - -Lieutenan General Vice Admiral Generalobe Obergruppe Obergruppe - t der Admiral rstabsarzt nfuehrer nfuehrer. - General Infante - rie, - der - Artille - rie, - etc. - -General Generalob Admiral Generaladm Oberstgrup - erst iral penfuehrer - . - -General Generalfe Admiral of Grossadmir Reichsfueh Stabschef. - of the ldmarscha the al rer - Army ll Fleet - -(A) Ranks for the Medical Service of the German Army and the German Air -Force are identical. Ranks for the Medical Service of the German Navy -differ somewhat but are for the most part immaterial here. Dr. -Fikentacher held the rank of Admiraloberstabsarzt which is equivalent to -that of Generaloberstabsarzt. - -(B) Equivalent to a senior Colonel. - -(C) Same as B above. - - - - - List of Witnesses in Case I - - [Note.—All witnesses in this case appeared before the Tribunal. - Prosecution witnesses are designated by the letter “P”, defense - witnesses by the letter “D”, and the Tribunal witness by the - letter “T”. The names not preceded by any designation represent - defendants testifying in their own behalf. Extracts from - testimony in this case are listed in the index of documents and - testimony.] - - │ │ │ - │ │ │ Pages - │ Name │ Dates of testimony │ (mimeographed - │ │ │ transcript) - │ │ │ -P│ALEXANDER, Dr. Leo │20 Dec 46 │805-814; 832-838; - │ │ │848-855; 864-869 - │ │ │ -D│AUGUSTINICK, Dr. │27, 28 Feb 47 │3701-3737 - │ Herbert │ │ - │ │ │ - │BECKER-FREYSENG, │19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27,│7774-8243; 8255-8292 - │ Hermann │28, 29 May 46 │ - │ │ │ - │BEIGLBOECK, Wilhelm │6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 │8666-9028; 9326-9328 - │ │Jun 46 │ - │ │ │ -D│BLOCK, Maria Lotte │16, 17 Apr 47 │6002-6031 - │ │ │ - │BLOME, Kurt │13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20,│4450-4811 - │ │21 Mar 47 │ - │ │ │ -D│BORKENAU, Franz │14, 15 Apr 47 │5890-5908 - │ │ │ - │BRACK, Viktor Hermann │12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19 │7413-7772 - │ │May 47 │ - │ │ │ - │BRANDT, Karl │3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Feb 47 │2301-2661 - │ │ │ - │BRANDT, Rudolf │24, 25, 26 Mar 47 │4869-4994 - │ │ │ -P│BROEL-PLATER, Maria │19, 20 Dec 46 │785-804 - │ │ │ -P│BROERS, Constantyn │30 Jun 47 │10386-10406 - │ Johan │ │ - │ │ │ -D│CHRISTENSEN, Heinz │24 Feb 47 │3430-3454 - │ │ │ -D│DORN, Paul Friedrich │5, 6 Jun 47 │8574-8665 - │ │ │ -P│DZIDO, Jadwiga │20 Dec 46 │838-848 - │ │ │ -P│EYER, Olga │15 Jan 47 │1755-1779 - │ │ │ - │FISCHER, Fritz │10, 11, 12 Mar 47 │4266-4384 - │ │ │ - │GEBHARDT, Karl │4, 5, 6, 7, 10 Mar 47 │3931-4256 - │ │ │ - │GENZKEN, Karl │28 Feb; 3 Mar 47 │3773-3891 - │ │ │ -P│GRANDJEAN, Henri-Jean │6 Jan 47 │1099-1105; 1119-1120 -D│GUTZEIT, Kurt │7, 10 Feb 47 │2692-2764 - │ │ │ -D│HAAGEN, Eugen │17, 18, 19, 20 Jun 47 │9408-9712 - │ │ │ -P│HALL, Ferdinand │3 Jan 47 │1048-1073 - │ │ │ - │HANDLOSER, Siegfried │11, 12, 13, 18 Feb 47 │2815-3104 - │ │ │ -D│HARTLENBEN, Hans │19 Feb 47 │3189-3231 - │ │ │ -D│HEDERICH, Karl Heinz │8, 9 May 47 │7262-7291 - │ │ │ -P│HENRI PIERRE, Henri │18 Dec 46 │708-722 - │ │ │ -D│HIELSCHER, Friedrich │15, 16 Apr 47 │5926-5994 - │ │ │ -P│HIRTZ, Georg │8 Jan 47 │1291-1300 - │ │ │ -P│HOELLENRAINER, Karl │27 Jun 47; 1 Jul 47 │10229-10234; 10508-10544 - │ │ │ -D│HOERING, Felix │17 Apr 47 │6031-6078 - │ │ │ -D│HORN, Videslaw │31 Mar, 1 Apr 47 │5245-5333 - │ │ │ - │HOVEN, Waldemar │21, 23, 24 Jun 47 │9761-10004 - │ │ │ -P│IVY, Dr. Andrew Conway │12, 13, 14, 16 Jun 47 │9029-9324 - │ │ │ -D│JAEGER, Rolf │28 May 47 │8244-8255 - │ │ │ -D│JENTSCH, Werner │26 Feb 47 │3582-3602 - │ │ │ -D│JUNG, Friedrich │26 Jun 47 │10148-10154 - │ │ │ -D│KARLSTETTER, Maria │25 Feb 47 │3455-3461 - │ │ │ -P│KAROLEWSKA, Vladislava │20 Dec 46 │815-832 - │ │ │ -P│KIRCHHEIMER, Fritz │8, 9 Jan 47 │1321-1348 - │ │ │ -D│KOCH, Ernst │26 Jun 47 │10120-10144 - │ │ │ -P│KOGON, Dr. Eugen │6, 7, 8 Jan 47 │1150-1290 - │ │ │ -D│KOSMEHL, Dr. Herbert │12 Mar 47 │4387-4446 - │ │ │ -P│KUSMIERCZUK, Maria │20 Dec 46 │856-864 - │ │ │ -D│LAMMERS, Hans Heinrich │7 Feb 47 │2661-2692 -P│LAUBINGER, Josef │27 Jun 47 │10198-10229 - │ │ │ -P│LEIBBRANDT, Werner │27 Jan 47 │1961-2028 - │ │ │ -P│LEVY, Robert │17 Dec 46 │550-561 - │ │ │ -P│LUTZ, Wolfgang │12 Dec 46 │266-308 - │ │ │ -P│MACZKA, Sofia │10 Jan 47 │1430-1462 - │ │ │ -D│MAY, Eduard │14 Apr 47 │5869-5889 - │ │ │ -D│MEINE, August │21, 24 Mar 47 │4831-4867 - │ │ │ -D│METTBACH, Ernst │21 Jun 47 │9714-9757 - │ │ │ -P│MENNECKE, Fritz │16, 17 Jan 47 │1866-1946 - │ │ │ -P│MICHALOWSKI, Father Leo│21 Dec 46 │871-886 - │ │ │ - │MRUGOWSKY, Joachim │26, 27, 28, 31 Mar 47; │5000-5244; 5334-5464 - │ │1, 2, 3 Apr 47 │ - │ │ │ -P│NALES, Gerrid Hendrick │30 Jun 47 │10409-10471 - │ │ │ -T│NEFF, Walter │17, 18 Dec 46 │595-695 - │ │ │ - │OBERHEUSER, Herta │3, 8 Apr 47 │5478-5528 - │ │ │ -D│PFANNMUELLER, Hermann │9, 12 May 47 │7291-7412 - │ │ │ -D│PIECK, Henry │20 Mar 47 │4722-4755 - │ │ │ - │POKORNY, Adolf │25, 26 Jun 47 │10007-10109 - │ │ │ - │POPPENDICK, Helmut │8, 9 Apr 47 │5530-5651 - │ │ │ -P│ROEMHILD, Ferdinand │14 Jan 47 │1627-1664 - │ │ │ - │ROMBERG, Hans Wolfgang │1, 2, 5, 6 May 47 │6764-7032A - │ │ │ - │ROSE, Gerhard │18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 │6081-6484 - │ │Apr 47 │ - │ │ │ - │ROSTOCK, Paul │20, 21, 24 Feb 47 │3258-3430 - │ │ │ - │RUFF, Siegfried │25, 28, 29, 30 Apr 47 │6490-6739 - │ │ │ - │SIEVERS, Wolfram │9, 10, 11, 14 Apr 47 │5656-5869 - │SCHAEFER, Konrad │2, 4 Jun 47 │8349-8399; 8494-8571 - │ │ │ -D│SCHMIDT, Bernhard │19 Feb 47 │3144-3188 - │ │ │ -P│SCHMIDT, Edith │9 Jan 47 │1364-1383 - │ │ │ -P│SCHMIDT, Walter Eugen │16 Jan 47 │1816-1863 - │ │ │ - │SCHROEDER, Oskar │25, 26, 27 Feb 47 │3469-3582; 3602-3700 - │ │ │ -P│STOEHR, Heinrich │17 Dec 46 │574-594 - │ Wilhelm │ │ - │ │ │ -D│TOPF, Erwin │15 Apr 47 │5908-5924 - │ │ │ -D│TRUX, Rudolf │26 Jun 47 │10110-10120 - │ │ │ -P│TSCHOFENIG, Joseph │17 Jun 47 │9329-9363 - │ │ │ -P│VIEWEG, August Heinrich│13, 16 Dec 46 │418-468 - │ │ │ -D│VOLLHARDT, Franz │3 Jun 47 │8400-8490 - │ │ │ -P│VORLICEK, Joseph │17 Jun 47 │9383-9407 - │ │ │ - │WELTZ, Georg August │6, 7, 8 May 47 │7035-7254 - │ │ │ -D│WITT, Fritz │28 Feb 47 │3740-3753 - │ │ │ -D│WUERFLER, Paul │18, 19 Feb 47 │3104-3144 - - - - - INDEX OF DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY - - - Document No. Exhibit No. Description Vol-Page - -NO-005 Pros. Ex. 279 Letter from Grawitz to I-344 - Himmler, 22 November 1944, - requesting prisoners for - experiments. - -NO-011 Pros. Ex. 188 Note from Himmler to Grawitz, I-504 - 16 June 1943, concerning - epidemic jaundice - experiments at - concentration camp - Sachsenhausen. - -NO-018 Pros. Ex. 404 Letter from Himmler to Brack, I-856 - 19 December 1940, - requesting that euthanasia - station Grafeneck be - discontinued and that - motion pictures be shown to - dispel rumors. - -NO-035 Pros. Ex. 142 Letter from Pokorny to I-713 - Himmler, October 1941, - concerning a sterilization - drug to be used against - Germany’s enemies. - -NO-036 Pros. Ex. 143 Letter from Himmler, 10 March I-714 - 1942, to Pohl (initialed by - Rudolf Brandt) concerning a - sterilization drug and - suggesting further research - on criminals. - -NO-038 Pros. Ex. 147 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-715 - Pohl, June 1942, - transmitting an inquiry by - Himmler as to the progress - made with experiments for - medical sterilization. - -NO-039 Pros. Ex. 153 Letter from Gund to Himmler, I-717 - 24 August 1942, concerning - research in medical - sterilization and - development of - sterilization drugs. - -NO-046a Pros. Ex. 148 Letter from Pohl to Himmler, I-716 - 3 June 1942, concerning the - development of a - sterilization drug by the - firm of Dr. Madaus and Co. - -NO-046b Pros. Ex. 149 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-717 - Pohl, 11 June 1942, asking - him on behalf of Himmler to - set up a large hothouse for - the development of a - sterilization drug. -NO-080 Pros. Ex. 5 Fuehrer Decree, 28 July 1942, I-81 - concerning the Medical and - Health Services. - -NO-081 Pros. Ex. 6 Second Fuehrer Decree, 5 I-83 - September 1943, concerning - the Medical and Health - Services, 1943. - -NO-082 Pros. Ex. 7 Fuehrer Decree, 25 August I-83 - 1944, concerning the - appointment of a Reich - Commissioner for Medical - and Health Services, 1944. - -NO-085 Pros. Ex. 175 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-784 - Brandt, 9 February 1942, - and report by Hirt - concerning the acquisition - of skulls of - Jewish-Bolshevik - Commissars. - -NO-086 Pros. Ex. 177 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-750 - Brandt, 2 November 1942, - requesting with Himmler’s - approval, 150 skeletons. - -NO-087 Pros. Ex. 181 Letter from Sievers to I-751 - Eichmann, (copy to Rudolf - Brandt), 21 June 1943, - concerning selection of - subjects for a skeleton - collection. - -NO-098 Pros. Ex. 263 Memorandum from Sievers to I-337 - Rudolf Brandt, 3 November - 1942, concerning research - in the Natzweiler - concentration camp. - -NO-099 Pros. Ex. 268 Report by Hirt and Wimmer on I-341 - the proposed treatment of - poisoning caused by Lost - gas. - -NO-121 Pros. Ex. 293 Letter from Haagen to Hirt, I-578 - 15 November 1943, - concerning prisoners to be - used as experimental - subjects for tests with - typhus vaccine. - -NO-122 Pros. Ex. 298 Letter dictated by Rose, I-579 - addressed to Haagen, 13 - December 1943, concerning - experimental subjects for - vaccine experiments. -NO-123 Pros. Ex. 303 Letter from Haagen to Hirt, 9 I-580 - March 1944, concerning - experiments conducted with - typhus vaccine and - requesting experimental - subjects. - -NO-125 Pros. Ex. 194 Letter from Haagen to I-506 - Gutzeit, 27 June 1944, - concerning epidemic - jaundice experiments on - human beings. - -NO-139 Pros. Ex. 317 Letter from Dr. Grunske to I-581 - Haagen, 7 March 1944, - concerning reports on - yellow fever virus - experiments requested by a - Japanese medical officer. - -NO-158 Pros. Ex. 410 Letter from Hirche, I-858 - administrator of the Mental - Institution Bernburg, to - camp commandant of the - Gross-Rosen concentration - camp, 19 March 1942, with - list of inmates transferred - from the concentration camp - to Bernburg. - -NO-177 Pros. Ex. 133 Minutes of conference at the I-448 - Reich Ministry of Aviation, - 20 May 1944, concerning - methods for making sea - water potable. - -NO-182 Pros. Ex. 137 Letter from Sievers to I-454 - Grawitz, 24 July 1944, - concerning experiments of - the potability of sea - water. - -NO-183 Pros. Ex. 136 Teletype from Rudolf Brandt I-453 - to Grawitz, undated, - concerning experimental - subjects. - -NO-184 Pros. Ex. 132 Letter from the Technical I-447 - Office of the Reich - Minister of Aviation - (Goering) to Himmler’s - office, 15 May 1944, - concerning methods to - render sea water potable. - -NO-185 Pros. Ex. 134 Letter from Schroeder to I-452 - Himmler and Grawitz, 7 June - 1944, requesting subjects - for sea-water experiments. -NO-193 Pros. Ex. 264 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-340 - Brandt, 22 April 1943, - regarding prevention of Dr. - Wimmer’s transfer to active - duty with the air force. - -NO-201 Pros. Ex. 290 Report from Mrugowsky to the I-635 - Criminological Institute, - 12 September 1944, - concerning experiments with - aconitine nitrate - projectiles. - -NO-203 Pros. Ex. 161 Covering letter from Brack to I-719 - Himmler, 28 March 1941, - with report on experiments - concerning sterilization - and castration by X-rays. - -NO-205 Pros. Ex. 163 Letter from Brack to Himmler, I-721 - 23 June 1942, proposing - sterilization of two to - three million Jews. - -NO-206 Pros. Ex. 164 Letter from Himmler I-722 - (counter-signed by Rudolf - Brandt), 11 August 1942, - addressed to Brack, - concerning Himmler’s - interest in sterilization - experiments. - -NO-208 Pros. Ex. 166 Letter from Blankenburg to I-723 - Himmler, 29 April 1944, - regarding employment of Dr. - Horst Schumann on - experiments concerning the - influence of X-rays on - human genital glands in - connection with similar - experiments conducted at - concentration camp - Auschwitz. - -NO-211 Pros. Ex. 169 Letter from Professor I-724 - Clauberg to Himmler, 30 May - 1942 (referring to a letter - from Rudolf Brandt), - concerning the urgency of - research into biological - propagation and - sterilization without - operation, and draft of a - “Research Institute for - Biological Propagation”. - -NO-212 Pros. Ex. 173 Letter from Professor I-730 - Clauberg to Himmler, 7 June - 1943, reporting on research - in connection with the - sterilization of women. -NO-213 Pros. Ex. 171 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-729 - Clauberg, 10 July 1942, - transmitting instructions - of Himmler to perform - sterilizations on Jewesses - at concentration camp - Ravensbrueck. - -NO-216 Pros. Ex. 170 Memorandum of Rudolf Brandt, I-728 - July 1942, on a discussion - between Himmler, Gebhardt, - Gluecks, and Clauberg - concerning sterilization - experiments conducted on - Jewesses. - -NO-218 Pros. Ex. 56 Letter from Rascher to I-150 - Himmler, 16 April 1942, - reporting on high-altitude - experiments with fatal - results and on experiments - conducted together with - Romberg. - -NO-220 Pros. Ex. 61 Letter from Rascher to I-152 - Himmler, 11 May 1942, and - secret report concerning - high-altitude experiments. - -NO-224 Pros. Ex. 76 Note by Romberg on showing of I-174 - film in office of State - Secretary Milch, and - proposed report to Milch, - 11 September 1942. - -NO-227 Pros. Ex. 11 Fuehrer Decree of 7 August I-84 - 1944 concerning the - reorganization of the - Medical Services of the - Wehrmacht. - -NO-228 Pros. Ex. 206 Affidavit of defendant I-371 - Fischer, 19 November 1946, - concerning sulfanilamide - experiments conducted in - the concentration camp - Ravensbrueck. - -NO-231 Pros. Ex. 116 Letter from Rascher to I-255 - Sievers, 17 May 1943, - concerning a conference - with Gebhardt on freezing - experiments. - -NO-234 Pros. Ex. 83 Letter from Rascher to I-219 - Himmler, 10 September 1942, - transmitting intermediate - report on freezing - experiments (_1618-PS_). - -NO-244 Pros. Ex. 201 Letter from Himmler (signed I-770 - by Rudolf Brandt) to - Greiser, 27 June 1942, - concerning the - extermination of tubercular - Poles. -NO-246 Pros. Ex. 196 Letter from Greiser to I-776 - Himmler 1 May 1942, - concerning the plan for - mass extermination of - tubercular Poles. - -NO-247 Pros. Ex. 197 Letter from Koppe to Rudolf I-769 - Brandt, 3 May 1942, - concerning the killing of - tubercular Poles. - -NO-250 Pros. Ex. 203 Letter from Blome to Greiser, I-771 - 18 November 1942, - concerning the mass - extermination of tubercular - Poles. - -NO-257 Pros. Ex. 283 Extract from the affidavit of I-572 - Dr. Erwin Schuler, 20 July - 1945, concerning typhus - experiments. - -NO-257 Pros. Ex. 283 Extract from a sworn I-686 - statement by Dr. Erwin - Schuler (Ding), 20 July - 1945, concerning euthanasia - with phenol injection. - -NO-264 Pros. Ex. 60 File note for SS I-151 - Obersturmfuehrer - Schnitzler, 28 April 1942. - -NO-265 Pros. Ex. 287 Diary of the Division for I-557 - Typhus and Virus Research - at the Institute of Hygiene - of the Waffen SS (Ding - diary) 1941 to 1945. - -NO-268 Pros. Ex. 106 Letter from Hippke to I-252 - Himmler, 19 February 1943, - on freezing experiments in - Dachau. - -NO-285 Pros. Ex. 86 Letter from Rascher to Rudolf I-221 - Brandt, 3 October 1942, - stating that Sievers would - obtain four gypsy women for - rewarming through body - warmth. - -NO-286 Pros. Ex. 88 Letter from Goering’s office I-223 - to Himmler, 8 October 1942, - with attached invitation to - the conference on “Medical - Problems Arising from - Hardships of Sea and - Winter.” - -NO-289 Pros. Ex. 72 Letter from Hippke to I-173 - Himmler, 8 October 1942, - thanking the latter for his - assistance in high-altitude - experiments in Dachau. -NO-292 Pros. Ex. 111 Letter from Rascher to Rudolf I-253 - Brandt, 4 April 1943, - reporting on dry-freezing - experiments in Dachau. - -NO-299 Pros. Ex. 190 Letter from Haagen to I-505 - Schreiber, 12 June 1944, - concerning epidemic - jaundice experiments. - -NO-303 Pros. Ex. 32 Table of organization of the I-88 - “Ahnenerbe” from the files - of the Ahnenerbe Society. - -NO-320 Pros. Ex. 103 Letter from Sievers to I-246 - Brandt, 28 January 1943, - and Rascher’s report on his - discussions with Grawitz - and Poppendick. - -NO-322 Pros. Ex. 114 Letter from Rascher to I-254 - Keindl, 28 April 1943, - about previous freezing - experiments conducted at - Sachsenhausen. - -NO-323 Pros. Ex. 94 Memorandum of Rascher on I-245 - women used for rewarming in - freezing experiments, 5 - November 1942. - -NO-365 Pros. Ex. 507 Unsigned draft letter from I-870 - Dr. Wetzel to Rosenberg, 25 - October 1941, dealing with - Brack’s collaboration in - the construction of gas - chambers for the - extermination of Jews. - -NO-371 Pros. Ex. 186 Affidavit of defendant Rudolf I-503 - Brandt, 14 October 1946, - concerning experiments to - determine the cause of - epidemic jaundice. - -NO-402 Pros. Ex. 66 Letter, 29 September 1942, I-155 - and report, 28 July 1942, - from Romberg and Ruff to - Himmler concerning - experiments on rescue from - high altitudes. - -NO-409 Pros. Ex. 249 Report from Grawitz to I-657 - Himmler, 29 August 1942, - concerning experiments with - biochemical remedies - conducted at the Dachau and - Auschwitz concentration - camps. -NO-422 Pros. Ex. 33 Letter from Himmler to I-89 - Sievers, 7 July 1942, - concerning the - establishment of an - “Institute for Military - Scientific Research” within - the Ahnenerbe Society. - -NO-426 Pros. Ex. 160 Extract from the affidavit of I-842 - defendant Brack, 14 October - 1946, describing - administrative details and - procedure of the Euthanasia - Program. - -NO-428 Pros. Ex. 91 Report of 10 October 1942, on I-226 - cooling experiments on - human beings. - -NO-429 Pros. Ex. 281 Extract from the affidavit of I-555 - defendant Hoven, 24 October - 1946, concerning typhus and - virus experiments. - -NO-429 Pros. Ex. 281 Extracts from the affidavit I-685 - of Waldemar Hoven, 24 - October 1946, concerning - the killing of inmates by - phenol and other means. - -NO-429 Pros. Ex. 281 Extract from the affidavit of I-847 - defendant Hoven, 24 October - 1946, concerning the - transfer of concentration - camp inmates to euthanasia - stations for extermination. - -NO-432 Pros. Ex. 119 Letter from Rascher to Neff, I-258 - 21 October 1943, concerning - dry-freezing experiments. - -NO-438 Pros. Ex. 240 Report from the Institute for I-678 - Military Scientific - Research, (Department Dr. - Rascher) on “Polygal 10”. - -NO-441 Pros. Ex. 205 Affidavit of defendant Rudolf I-775 - Brandt, 24 October 1946, - concerning the plan to - exterminate tubercular - Polish Nationals. - -NO-472 Pros. Ex. 234 Affidavit of the defendant I-376 - Fischer, 21 October 1946, - supplementing his affidavit - concerning sulfanilamide - experiments. -NO-520 Pros. Ex. 374 Letter from the chief of the I-854 - Institution for - feeble-minded in Stetten to - Dr. Frank, 6 September - 1940, requesting that - euthanasia be carried out - only after legal basis was - created. - -NO-571 Pros. Ex. 285 1943 Work Report for I-573 - Department for Typhus and - Virus Research. - -NO-579 Pros. Ex. 288 Extract from a report on the I-644 - Findings of 2 January 1944, - on a skin ointment—R 17—for - phosphorus burns. - -NO-610 Pros. Ex. 41 Inmates of the Dachau I-898-900 - concentration camp in - different stages of - simulated altitude in the - low-pressure chamber; - postmortem dissections of - high altitude experimental - subjects showing air - bubbles in blood vessels in - subarachnoid space of brain - and under pleura of - anterior chest wall. (_See_ - selections from - photographic evidence of - the prosecution.) - -NO-645 Pros. Ex. 3 Table of organization of the I-91 - Reich Commissioner for - Health and Medical - Services, drawn by the - defendant Karl Brandt. - -NO-656 Pros. Ex. 247 Memorandum by SS I-680 - Obersturmbannfuerer Wolff, - 8 May 1944; letters from - Dr. Kahr to Rascher, 10 and - 16 December 1943. - -NO-660 Pros. Ex. 377 Note by Sellmer, 6 December I-855 - 1940, describing the method - of selection for - euthanasia. - -NO-690 Pros. Ex. 120 List of research projects I-259 - from the files of the Reich - Research Council. - -NO-794 Pros. Ex. 259 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-336 - Brandt, 27 June 1942, - concerning mustard gas and - its effect on human beings. - -NO-807 Pros. Ex. 185 Tank containing formaldehyde I-905-908 - for the preservation of - corpses; corpses assembled - in tanks prior to - dissection; corpse showing - incisions in preparation - for dissection. (_See_ - selections from - photographic evidence of - the prosecution.) -NO-842 Pros. Ex. 405 Letter from Brack to Dr. I-857 - Schlegelberger, 18 April - 1941, forwarding forms for - euthanasia and suggesting - that death notifications - should not follow a - stereotyped form. - -NO-856 Pros. Ex. 125 Extracts from the review of I-289 - the proceedings of the - general military court in - the case of the United - States _vs._ Weiss, - Ruppert, _et al._, held at - Dachau, Germany. - -NO-861 Pros. Ex. 232 Affidavit of Sofia Maczka, 16 I-402 - April 1946, concerning - experimental operations on - inmates of the Ravensbrueck - concentration camp. - -NO-875 Pros. Ex. 230 Affidavit of Mrs. Zdenka I-400 - Nedvedova-Nejedla, M.D., of - Prague, concerning - experimental operations - conducted on fellow inmates - in Ravensbrueck - concentration camp. - -NO-891 Pros. Ex. 414 Directive of the Reich I-863 - Minister of the Interior, 6 - September 1944, ordering - euthanasia extended to - insane Eastern workers. - -NO-894 Pros. Ex. 38 Fuehrer Decree, 9 June 1942, I-90 - concerning the Reich - Research Council. - -NO-907 Pros. Ex. 412 Extract from letter from Dr. I-861 - Fritz Mennecke to his wife, - 25 November 1941, - concerning his activities - as physician selecting - inmates of concentration - camp Buchenwald for - euthanasia. - -NO-978 Pros. Ex. 480 Letter from Sievers to I-349 - Gluecks, 11 September 1942, - concerning military - scientific research work to - be conducted at Natzweiler - concentration camp. -NO-1007 Pros. Ex. 413 Circular from Gluecks to I-862 - concentration camp - commandants, 27 April 1943, - stating that in the future - only insane prisoners - should be used for Action - “14 f 13” (euthanasia). - -NO-1080 A, E, F Pros. Ex. 219 Exposures of the witness I-901-902 - A, E, F Maria Kusmierczuk who - underwent sulfanilamide and - bone experiments while an - inmate of the Ravensbrueck - concentration camp. (_See_ - selections from - photographic evidence of - the prosecution.) - -NO-1082 A, C Pros. Ex. 214 Exposures of the witness I-903 - A, C Jadwiga Dzido who underwent - sulfanilamide and bone - experiments while an inmate - of the Ravensbrueck - concentration camp. (_See_ - selections from - photographic evidence of - the prosecution.) - -NO-1135 Pros. Ex. 334 Confirmation, 30 August 1940, I-848 - of the transfer of mental - patients with list of - transferred patients - attached. - -NO-1424 Pros. Ex. 462 Affidavit of Fritz Friedrich I-676 - Karl Rascher, M.D., 31 - December 1946, concerning - the life and activities of - Dr. Sigmund Rascher. - -NO-1852 Pros. Ex. 456 Extract from report on I-345 - medical experiments - addressed to Karl Brandt. - -NO-2734 Pros. Ex. 473 Extracts of letter from I-660 - Grawitz to Himmler, 7 - September 1942, and report - on gas gangrene - experiments. - -NO-3963 Pros. Ex. 528 Extracts from affidavit of I-710 - Karl Wilhelm Friedrich - Tauboeck, 18 June 1947, - concerning the development - of, and experiments with - sterilization drugs. - -343-A-PS Pros. Ex. 62 Letter from Milch to Wolff, I-172 - 20 May 1942, regarding - continuation of - experiments. -343-B-PS Pros. Ex. 70 Letter from Milch to Himmler, I-172 - 31 August 1942, - acknowledging receipt of - reports by Rascher and - Romberg on high-altitude - experiments. - -615-PS Pros. Ex. 246 Letter from Dr. Hilfrich, I-845 - Bishop of Limburg, to the - Reich Minister of Justice, - 13 August 1941, protesting - against the killing of - mentally ill people. - -630-PS Pros. Ex. 330 Letter from Hitler to Karl I-848 - Brandt and Bouhler, 1 - September 1939, charging - them with the execution of - euthanasia. - -1553-PS Pros. Ex. 428 Extract from the field I-865 - interrogation of Kurt - Gerstein, 26 April 1945, - describing the mass gassing - of Jews and other - “undesirables”. - -1580-PS Pros. Ex. 107 Letter from Himmler to I-253 - Rascher, 26 February 1943, - on freezing experiments in - the concentration camps - Auschwitz and Lublin. - -1581-A-PS Pros. Ex. 48 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-144 - Sievers, 21 March 1942, - concerning Rascher’s - participation in - high-altitude experiments. - -1582-PS Pros. Ex. 45 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-143 - Rascher, undated, informing - him that prisoners would be - made available for - high-altitude research. - -1602-PS Pros. Ex. 44 Letter from Rascher to I-141 - Himmler, 15 May 1941, - concerning high-altitude - experiments on human - beings. - -1609-PS Pros. Ex. 92 Letter from Himmler to I-244 - Rascher, 24 October 1942, - and note by Rudolf Brandt. - -1611-PS Pros. Ex. 85 Letter from Himmler to I-221 - Rascher and Sievers, 22 - September 1942, ordering - rewarming in freezing - experiments through - physical warmth. -1612-PS Pros. Ex. 79 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-176 - Rascher, 13 December 1942, - and Himmler’s order - assigning Rascher to - high-altitude experiments. - -1613-PS Pros. Ex. 90 Letter from Rascher to I-225 - Himmler, 16 October 1942, - transmitting report on - cooling experiments on - human beings (_NO-428_). - -1616-PS Pros. Ex. 105 Letter from Rascher to I-249 - Himmler, 17 February 1943, - and summary of experiments - for rewarming of chilled - human beings by animal - warmth, 12 February 1943. - -1618-PS Pros. Ex. 84 Intermediate report, 10 I-220 - September 1942, on intense - chilling experiments in the - Dachau concentration camp. - -1619-PS Pros. Ex. 87 Teletype from commandant of I-223 - Dachau concentration camp - to Rudolf Brandt, 7 October - 1942, stating that four - women would be available - from Ravensbrueck - concentration camp for - Rascher’s experiments. - -1696-PS Pros. Ex. 357 Letter from Dr. Conti to the I-849 - Mental Hospital in - Kaufbeuren, 16 November - 1939, requesting that - questionnaires (attached) - be filled out for - individual patients; letter - from the General Sick - Transport Company to the - Mental Hospital in - Kaufbeuren, 12 May 1941, - stating that the company - would remove mental - patients; report from the - Provincial Association for - Social Welfare in Swabia, 6 - May 1941, that all - transferred patients had - died; letter from Gaum, 24 - November 1942, to Dr. - Leinisch stating that - epileptics would be made - available for research. - -1971-A-PS Pros. Ex. 49 Letter from Rascher to I-144 - Himmler, 5 April 1942, and - report, undated, on - high-altitude experiments. -1971-B-PS Pros. Ex. 51 Letter from Himmler to I-148 - Rascher, 13 April 1942, - requesting a repetition of - high-altitude experiments - on prisoners condemned to - death. - -1971-C-PS Pros. Ex. 50 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-147 - Rascher, 13 April 1942, - regarding his success with - high-altitude experiments. - -1971-D-PS Pros. Ex. 52 Teletype from Rascher to I-149 - Rudolf Brandt, 20 October - 1942, requesting - clarification on the pardon - granted by Himmler. - -1971-E-PS Pros. Ex. 53 Teletype from Rudolf Brandt I-149 - to Schnitzler, 21 October - 1942, concerning the pardon - granted by Himmler. - -3896-PS Pros. Ex. 372 Extract from the affidavit of I-853 - Dr. Ludwig Sprauer, 23 - April 1946, concerning the - organization of the - Euthanasia Program. - -Becker-Freyseng 31 Becker-Freysen Extracts from Harper’s II-65 - g Ex. 18 Magazine entitled “Secrets - by the Thousand” by C. - Lester Walker. - -Becker-Freyseng 42 Becker-Freysen Affidavit of Dr. Ludwig I-455 - g Ex. 29 Harriehausen, 9 January - 1947, regarding use of - patients in sea-water - experiments. - -Becker-Freyseng 60 Becker-Freysen Statement of Professor Dr. II-95 - g Ex. 58 Hans Luxenburger and Dr. - Hans Halbach concerning the - report on experiments on - human beings in world - literature (Becker-Freyseng - 60a, Becker-Freyseng Ex. - 59). - -Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freysen Extracts from report on II-96 -60a g Ex. 59 experiments on human beings - in world literature; - excerpts from various - newspapers and medical - weeklies. - -Karl Brandt 1 Karl Brandt Extract from “Life” magazine II-95 - Ex. 1 concerning malaria - experiments on convicts in - U.S. penitentiaries. - -Karl Brandt 12 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Dr. Walther I-350 - Ex. 11 Scheiber on his efforts to - purchase experimental - animals in Spain and bring - them to Germany. -Karl Brandt 18 Karl Brandt Extracts from the affidavit I-871 - Ex. 15 of Dr. Werner Kirchert, 29 - January 1947, stating that - Karl Brandt was not - involved in the Euthanasia - Program. - -Karl Brandt 19 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Alfred I-872 - Ex. 16 Rueggeberg, 23 January - 1947, concerning radio - discussions on euthanasia. - -Karl Brandt 23 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Eduard Woermann, I-873 - Ex. 19 18 January 1947, concerning - discussion of Karl Brandt - and Pastor Bodelschwingh on - euthanasia. - -Karl Brandt 101 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Dr. Otto Ambros, I-351 - Ex. 41 21 April 1947, concerning - the urgency of experiments - in the field of - chemical-warfare agents and - their countermeasures. - -Karl Brandt 103 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Dr. Walter I-352 - Ex. 42 Mielenz, 21 April 1947, - concerning the assignment - of Karl Brandt in - connection with chemical - warfare. - -Karl Brandt 117 Karl Brandt Excerpts from the II-103 - Ex. 103 dissertation “Infection - Experiments on Human - Beings” by Alfred Heilbrunn - of the Hygiene Institute of - the Wuerzburg University, - 1937, concerning - experiments on human beings - in other countries. - -Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from report on the I-377 -Oberheuser 1 Fischer, First Conference East of - Oberheuser Ex. Consulting Specialists on - 6 18 and 19 May 1942 at the - Military Medical Academy, - Berlin. - -Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from report on the I-378 -Oberheuser 3 Fischer, Third Conference East of - Oberheuser Ex. Consulting Specialists on - 10 24 to 26 May 1943 at the - Military Medical Academy, - Berlin. - -Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from “Clinic and I-405 -Oberheuser 6 Fischer, Practice”, weekly journal - Oberheuser Ex. for the Practicing - 9 Physician, regarding bone - transplantation. - -Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from affidavit of Dr. I-377 -Oberheuser 21 Fischer, Karl Friedrich Brunner, 14 - Oberheuser Ex. March 1947. - 20 -Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from affidavit of Dr. I-407 -Oberheuser 21 Fischer, Karl Friedrich Brunner, 14 - Oberheuser Ex. March 1945, concerning - 20 scientific experiments - conducted at the clinic of - Hohenlychen. - -Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from affidavit of Dr. I-408 -Oberheuser 22 Fischer, Josef Koestler concerning - Oberheuser Ex. Dr. Gebhardt’s activities, - 21 27 February 1947. - -Rose 11 Rose Ex. 27 Extract from report of I-298 - Professor Dr. E. - Gildemeister concerning the - activities of the Robert - Koch Institute—Reich - Institute for the fight - against infectious - diseases. - -Rose 16 Rose Ex. 12 Extracts from the affidavit I-581 - of Professor Otto Lenz, - director of the Robert Koch - Institute in Berlin. - -Rose 46 Rose Ex. 20 Extract from a certified I-582 - statement, 4 March 1947, of - J. Oerskov, M.D., director - of the State Serum - Institute in Copenhagen. - -Rose 47 Rose Ex. 35 Affidavit of Professor Dr. I-300 - Hans Luxenburger, 24 March - 1947, concerning Rose’s - interest in therapeutical - malaria treatments. - -Rose 50 Rose Ex. 49 Extract from the affidavit of I-302 - Professor Dr. Ernst Georg - Nauck, M.D., Hamburg 4, - Bernhard-Nocht-Institute - for nautical and tropical - diseases. - -Mrugowsky 115 Mrugowsky Ex. Extracts from the affidavit I-647 - 108 of Udo Von Woyrsch, 3 May - 1947, concerning - experiments on combating - injuries due to phosphorus - incendiary bombs. - -Sievers 45 Sievers Ex. 46 Extract from the affidavit of I-752 - Dr. Gisela Schmitz, 27 - March 1947, on Siever’s - position in the Ahnenerbe - Society and his connection - with the skeleton - collection. - -Sievers 54 Sievers Ex. 50 Regulations for the Commandos I-754 - (Einsatzkommandos) of the - Security Police and the - Security Service to be - activated in Stalags. -Blome 1 Blome Ex. 8 Extracts from the affidavit I-778 - of Dr. Oskar Gundermann, 28 - December 1946, stating that - Blome opposed the plan to - exterminate tubercular - Poles and that the plan was - never carried out. - -Blome 14 Blome Ex. 6 Extracts from a report on the I-777 - German Tuberculosis - Conference of 18 to 20 - March 1937, at Wiesbaden. - -Pokorny 19 Pokorny Ex. 27 Affidavit of Dr. Helmuth I-874 - Weese, 19 March 1947, - concerning use of caladium - seguinum for sterilization. - - TESTIMONIES - - Vol- - Page - -Dr. Leo Alexander I-386, 417 -Beiglboeck I-468 -Blome I-780 -Brack I-732, 876 -Karl Brandt I-506, 892, 900; - II-29 -Rudolf Brandt I-183, 757 -Jadwiga Dzido I-381 -Gebhardt I-388, 667 -Dr. Eugen Haagen I-606 -Handloser I-265 -Dr. Friedrich Hielscher II-30 -Karl Hoellenrainer I-456 -Dr. Andrew C. Ivy I-994; -II-42, 60, 82, - 110 -Miss Karolewska I-409 -Eugen Kogon I-583, 637, 648, 993 -Werner Leibbrandt II-80 -Dr. Mennecke I-875 -Mrugowsky I-595, 651, 688; - II-56, 66 -Walter Neff I-177, 260 -Romberg I-186 -Rose I-308, 586, 973; - II-69, 77, 118 -Schmidt I-890 -Schroeder I-269 -Sievers I-274, 682 -Stoehr I-664 -Vieweg I-303 -Vollhardt I-474 - - - - - “_The Milch Case_” - - _CASE NO. 2_ - - MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. II - - THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - —_against_— - ERHARD MILCH - - - - - INTRODUCTION - - -The trial of Erhard Milch, formerly a Field Marshal in the German Air -Force, is officially designated _United States of America vs. Erhard -Milch_ (Case No. 2), and was heard by Military Tribunal II in the Palace -of Justice at Nuernberg. The proceedings lasted from 13 November 1946 to -17 April 1947, in the course of which period the Court convened 39 -times. The prosecution consumed 8 and the defense 28 trial days. A -chronological table of the trial follows: - - Indictment filed 13 November 1946 - Indictment served 14 November 1946 - Arraignment 20 December 1946 - Prosecution opening statement 2 January 1947 - Defense opening statement 27 January 1947 - Prosecution and defense closing 25 March 1947 - statements - Judgment 16 April 1947 - Sentence 17 April 1947 - Affirmation of sentence by Military 17 June 1947 - Governor, U.S. Zone of Occupation - Order of the U.S. Supreme Court 20 October 1947 - denying writ of habeas corpus - -The prosecution introduced into evidence 161 written exhibits, some of -which contained several documents. The defense introduced 51 written -exhibits. The Tribunal heard the oral testimony of 3 witnesses who were -called by the prosecution; 27 witnesses called by the defense were heard -by the full court, and 3 before a commissioner. One witness was called -by the Tribunal on its own motion. The defendant Milch testified at -length in his own behalf. - -The members of the Tribunal, and prosecution and defense counsel, are -listed on the ensuing pages. Prosecution counsel were assisted in -preparing the case by Walter Rapp, Chief of the Evidence Division, -Norbert Barr and Bevenuto Selcke, interrogators, and Robert Blakeslie, -Nancy Fenstermacher, and Tempa Altman Watson, research and documentary -analysts. - -The material selected for this volume was principally compiled by Mr. -Paul H. Gantt as case editor, working under the general supervision of -Mr. Drexel A. Sprecher, Deputy Chief Counsel and Director of -Publications, Office, United States Chief of Counsel for War Crimes. -Catherine W. Bedford, Henry Buxbaum, Emilie Evand, Gertrude Ferencz, -Helga Lund, Gwendoline Niebergall, and Johanna K. Reischer assisted in -selecting, compiling, editing and indexing the numerous papers. - -John H. E. Fried, Special Legal Consultant to the Tribunals, reviewed -and approved the selection and arrangement of the material as the -designated representative of the Nuernberg Military Tribunals. - -Final compilation and editing of the manuscript for printing was -administered by the War Crimes Division, Office of the Judge Advocate -General, under the direct supervision of Richard A. Olbeter, Chief, -Special Projects Branch, with Alma Soller as editor, Amelia Rivers as -assistant editor and John W. Mosenthal as research analyst. - - - - - ORDER CONSTITUTING TRIBUNAL II - - - OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) - APO 742 - - 16 DECEMBER 1946 - -GENERAL ORDERS } -No. 85 } - - PURSUANT TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE NO. 7 - -1. Effective as of 14 December 1946, pursuant to Military Government -Ordinance No. 7, 24 October 1946, entitled “Organization and Powers of -Certain Military Tribunals”, there is hereby constituted, Military -Tribunal II. - -2. The following are designated as members of Military Tribunal II: - - ROBERT M. TOMS Presiding Judge - FITZROI D. PHILLIPS^{*} Judge - MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO Judge - JOHN J. SPEIGHT Alternate Judge - -^{*} OMGUS General Orders No. 5, 21 January 1947, corrected spelling to -Fitzroy D. Phillips. - -3. The Tribunal shall convene at Nurenberg, Germany, to hear such cases -as may be filed by the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes or by his duly -designated representative. - - BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAY: - - C. K. GAILEY - _Brigadier General, GSC_ - _Chief of Staff_ - - -OFFICIAL: SEAL: - G. H. GARDE Office of Military Government - _Lieutenant Colonel, AGD_ for Germany (U. S.) - _Adjutant General_ - -DISTRIBUTION: “B” plus -2—AG MRU USFET - - - - -[Illustration: TRIBUNAL II—CASE TWO - L. to R.: _F. Donald Phillips_; _Robert M. Toms, presiding_; - _Michael A. Musmanno_; _John J. Speight, alternate_.] - -[Illustration: _Former Luftwaffe Field Marshal Milch, - seated in the defense counsel section of courtroom one, - listens with his lawyer Dr. Bergold and his brother Werner - as Tribunal II announces its verdict in his case._] - -[Illustration: _Defendant Erhard Milch with_ - _his counsel, Dr. Friedrich Bergold._] - -[Illustration: _Mr. Clark Denny, Chief - Trial Counsel of Case II._] - - - - - MEMBERS OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL II - -ROBERT M. TOMS, Presiding - Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Detroit, Michigan - -FITZROY DONALD PHILLIPS, Member, - Judge of the Superior Court for the 13th Judicial District of the - State of North Carolina - -MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO, Member, - United States Naval Reserve, on military leave from Court of Common - Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania - -JOHN JOSHUA SPEIGHT, Alternate, - Prominent member of the Bar of the State of Alabama - - ASSISTANT SECRETARIES GENERAL - -Judge RICHARD D. DIXON From 20 December 1946 to 25 March 1947 -Major MILLS C. HATFIELD From 16 April 1947 to 17 April 1947 - - PROSECUTION COUNSEL - -CHIEF OF COUNSEL: - Brigadier General TELFORD TAYLOR - -CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL: - Mr. CLARK DENNEY - -ASSISTANT TRIAL COUNSEL: - Mr. JAMES S. CONWAY - Miss DOROTHY M. HUNT - Mr. HENRY T. KING, JR. - Mr. RAYMOND J. MCMAHON, JR. - Mr. MAURICE C. MYERS - - DEFENSE COUNSEL - -Dr. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD - Main Counsel -Dr. WERNER MILCH^{*} - Assistant Counsel - -^{*} Brother of the defendant Milch. - - - - - I. INDICTMENT - - -The United States of America, by the undersigned Telford Taylor, Chief -of Counsel for War Crimes, duly appointed to represent said Government -in the prosecution of war criminals, charges the defendant Erhard Milch -with the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined -in Control Council Law No. 10,[62] duly enacted by the Allied Control -Council on 20 December 1945. The defendant Milch between 1939 and 1945 -was State Secretary in the [Reich] Air Ministry (Staatssekretaer im -Reichsluftfahrt ministerium), Inspector General of the Air Force -(Generalinspekteur der Luftwaffe), Deputy to the Commander in Chief of -the Air Force (Stellvertreter des Oberbefehlshabers der Luftwaffe), and -Member of the Nazi Party (Mitglied der NSDAP). The defendant Milch was -also Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe (Generalfeldmarschall in der -Luftwaffe) 1940-45, Aircraft Master General (Generalluftzeugmeister) -1941-44, Member of the Central Planning Board (Mitglied der “Zentralen -Planung”) 1942-1945, and Chief of the Jaegerstab 1944-1945. The war -crimes and crimes against humanity charged herein against the defendant -Milch include deportation, enslavement and mistreatment of millions of -persons, participation in criminal medical experiments upon human -beings, and murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and -other inhumane acts. - - COUNT ONE - -1. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully, -wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined by Article II of -Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, -ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with -plans and enterprises involving slave labor and deportation to slave -labor of the civilian populations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, -Hungary, and other countries and territories occupied by the German -Armed Forces, in the course of which millions of persons were enslaved, -deported, ill-treated, terrorized, tortured, and murdered. - -2. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully, -wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined by Article II of -Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, -ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with -plans and enterprises involving the use of prisoners of war in war -operations and work having a direct relation with war operations, -including the manufacture and transportation of arms and munitions, in -the course of which murders, cruelties, ill-treatment, and other -inhumane acts were committed against members of the armed forces of -nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in custody of the -German Reich in the exercise of belligerent control. - -3. In the execution of the plans and enterprises charged in paragraphs 1 -and 2 of this count, millions of persons were unlawfully subjected to -forced labor under cruel and inhumane conditions which resulted in -widespread suffering. At least 5,000,000 workers were deported to -Germany. The conscription of labor was accomplished in many cases by -drastic and violent methods. Workers destined for the Reich were sent -under guard to Germany, often packed in trains without adequate heat, -food, clothing, or sanitary facilities; other inhabitants of occupied -countries were conscripted and compelled to work in their own countries -to assist the German war economy and on fortifications and military -installations. The resources and needs of the occupied countries were -completely disregarded in the execution of the said plans and -enterprises. Prisoners of war were assigned to work directly related to -war operations, including work in munitions factories, loading bombers, -carrying ammunition, and manning antiaircraft guns. The treatment of -slave laborers and prisoners of war was based on the principle that they -should be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them -to the greatest possible extent at the lowest expenditure. - -4. The defendant Milch from 1942 to 1945 was a member of the Central -Planning Board which had supreme authority for the scheduling of -production and the allocation and development of raw materials in the -German war economy. The Central Planning Board determined the labor -requirements of industry, agriculture, and all other phases of German -war economy, and made requisitions for and allocations of such labor. -The defendant Milch had full knowledge of the illegal manner in which -foreign laborers were conscripted and prisoners of war utilized to meet -such requisitions, and of the unlawful and inhumane conditions under -which they were exploited. He attended the meetings of the Central -Planning Board, participated in its decisions and in the formulation of -basic policies with reference to the exploitation of such labor, -advocated the increased use of forced labor and prisoners of war to -expand war production, and urged that cruel and repressive measures be -utilized to procure and exploit such labor. - -5. During the years 1939-1945 the defendant Milch, as State Secretary in -the Air Ministry, Inspector General of the Air Force, Deputy to the -Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, -Aircraft Master General, and Chief of the Jaegerstab, had responsibility -for the development and production of arms and munitions for the German -Air Force. The defendant Milch exploited foreign laborers and prisoners -of war in the arms, aircraft, and munitions factories under his control, -made requisitions for and allocations of such labor within the aircraft -industry, and personally directed that cruel and repressive measures be -adopted towards such labor. - -6. Pursuant to the order of the defendant Milch, prisoners of war who -had attempted escape were murdered on or about 15 February 1944. - -7. The said war crimes constitute violations of international -conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 46, and 52 of the -Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, and 31 of the -Prisoner-of-War Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war, -the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws -of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in -which such crimes were committed, and Article II of Control Council Law -No. 10. - - COUNT TWO - -8. Between March 1942 and May 1943 the defendant Milch unlawfully, -wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined in Article II of -Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, -ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with -plans and enterprises involving medical experiments without the -subjects’ consent, upon members of the armed forces and civilians of -nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in the custody of -the German Reich in the exercise of belligerent control, in the course -of which experiments the defendant Milch, together with divers other -persons, committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, and other -inhumane acts. Such experiments included, but were not limited to, the -following: - - (_A_) _HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS._ From about March 1942 to - about August 1942 experiments were conducted at the Dachau - concentration camp for the benefit of the German Air Force to - investigate the limits of human endurance and existence at - extremely high altitudes. The experiments were carried out in a - low-pressure chamber in which the atmospheric conditions and - pressure prevailing at high altitudes (up to 68,000 feet) could - be duplicated. The experimental subjects were placed in the - low-pressure chamber and thereafter the simulated altitude - therein was raised. Many victims died as a result of these - experiments and others suffered grave injury, torture, and - ill-treatment. - - (_B_) _FREEZING EXPERIMENTS._ From about August 1942 to about - May 1943 experiments were conducted at the Dachau concentration - camp primarily for the benefit of the German Air Force to - investigate the most effective means of treating persons who had - been severely chilled or frozen. In one series of experiments - the subjects were forced to remain in a tank of ice water for - periods up to 3 hours. Extreme rigor developed in a short time. - Numerous victims died in the course of these experiments. After - the survivors were severely chilled, rewarming was attempted by - various means. In another series of experiments, the subjects - were kept naked outdoors for many hours at temperatures below - freezing. The victims screamed with pain as parts of their - bodies froze. - -9. The said war crimes constitute violations of international -conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 46 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Prisoner-of-War -Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war, the general -principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which -such crimes were committed, and of Article II, of Control Council Law -No. 10. - - COUNT THREE - -10. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully, -wilfully, and knowingly committed crimes against humanity, as defined by -Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, -accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was -connected with plans and enterprises involving slave labor and -deportation to slave labor of German nationals and nationals of other -countries in the course of which millions of persons were enslaved, -deported, ill-treated, terrorized, tortured, and murdered. The -particulars of these crimes are set forth in count one of this -indictment and are incorporated herein by reference. - -11. Between March 1942 and May 1943 the defendant Milch unlawfully, -wilfully, and knowingly committed crimes against humanity as defined in -Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 in that he was principal in, -accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was -connected with plans and enterprises involving medical experiments, -without the subjects’ consent, upon German nationals and nationals of -other countries, in the course of which experiments the defendant Milch, -together with divers other persons, committed murders, brutalities, -cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts. The -particulars of such experiments are set forth in count two of this -indictment and are incorporated herein by reference. - -12. The said crimes against humanity constitute violations of -international conventions, the laws and customs of war, the general -principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which -such crimes were committed, and Article II of Control Council Law No. -10. - -WHEREFORE, this indictment is filed with the Secretary General of the -Military Tribunals and the charges herein made against the above-named -defendant are hereby presented to the Military Tribunals. - - TELFORD TAYLOR - Brigadier General, USA - Chief of Counsel for War Crimes - Acting on Behalf of the United States of America -Nuernberg, 13 November 1946 - ------ - -[62] See vol. I, this series, pref. pp. III thru XXVIII for basic -papers. - - - - - II. ARRAIGNMENT[63] - - -THE MARSHAL: Military Tribunal No. 2 is now in session. God save the -United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Marshal will ascertain whether the defendant, -Erhard Milch, is present in Court. - -THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, the defendant is present in the -Court. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is counsel for the defendant, Dr. Bergold, also -present? - -THE MARSHAL: Dr. Bergold is also present in the courtroom. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Prosecution may proceed with the arraignment by -reading the indictment. - - [At this point Mr. Clark Denney read the indictment. See p. - 360.] - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The defendant will stand. You have heard the -indictment just read? - -ERHARD MILCH: Yes. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: And it has been translated into the German -language which you understand? - -ERHARD MILCH: Yes. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: For more than 30 days you have had in your -possession a copy of this indictment translated into the German -language? - -ERHARD MILCH: Yes. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: You have also had the benefit of Dr. Bergold’s -counsel for at least 30 days? - -ERHARD MILCH: Yes. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Now then to this indictment how do you plead, -guilty or not guilty? - -ERHARD MILCH: Not guilty. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Secretary General will enter upon the records -of the Court the defendant’s plea of not guilty. You may be seated. - -The Tribunal has set Thursday, the second day of January 1947 for the -commencement of the trial of this action. Will the United States be -ready on that date? - -MR. DENNEY: The Government will be ready at that time, your Honor. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Dr. Bergold, will you be ready to proceed with the -trial on the second of January? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes. - - * * * * * - ------ - -[63] Tr. p. 7. - - - - - III. OPENING STATEMENTS - - - A. Opening Statement for the Prosecution[64] - -MR. DENNEY: May it please your Honors, this defendant is Erhard Milch, -Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, -State Secretary in the Air Ministry, Generalluftzeugmeister, sole -representative of the Wehrmacht on the Central Planning Board, Chief of -the Jaegerstab,[65] and member of the Nazi Party. - -This man is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in that he -took part in the program for the enslavement and ill-treatment of the -civilian population of vast territories conquered by the armed forces of -Germany and in the employment of prisoners of war in tasks forbidden by -the laws and customs of war. He is also accused of the torture and -murder of concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war who were made -the unwilling subjects of savage and fatal medical experiments. - -The life of Erhard Milch is a story of personal and professional -betrayal. A man of high intelligence, of great executive ability, he -misused these talents to dedicate them to a scheme for conquest and a -plan for the enslavement of the world. The 10 years of military service -of the defendant from the age of 18 to 28 which took him through the -First World War were a perfect preparation for the tasks to come. From -1915 to 1919, Milch was a scout, observer, adjutant and squadron leader -in the German Air Force. At the very infancy of military aviation, the -defendant began an association which was to last through his entire -public career. It was at this time that he learned the needs and the -problems of flying men, a knowledge which was to stand him in such good -stead in his work as the founder of the Luftwaffe. - -The defendant never dissociated himself from the aims and ideals of -German militarism. He became one of the silent army of men who -remembered, hated, and hoped; but unlike many others, this man did not -sit idly by. He did not wait passively for Germany to rise again, he -devoted his best efforts towards that end. In 1921, only 1 year after -his discharge from the army, we find him working as chief of air -operations [flights] in the new business of commercial aviation. - -There is no necessity to fill out in detail the successive steps in the -defendant’s rise in civilian air transportation—a few broad strokes -suffice. The next significant event in his career came in 1925 when he -joined the state-sponsored Lufthansa which within 3 years he was to form -into the nucleus of a new air force. It is no euphemism that he was -called the Father of German Air Transportation. - -When Hitler came into power in 1933, Milch acceded to the requests of -both Goering and Hitler and assumed the additional duty of State -Secretary in the Air Ministry. It was understood from the start, and it -was confirmed in 1937, that Milch would succeed Goering as Chief of the -German Air Force in the event of the latter’s death or withdrawal. By -the time the new Luftwaffe had publicly emerged from such embryos as the -Air Sport League, the Air Defense League, and the Flying [Flieger] -Hitler Youth, the defendant had become a Generalleutnant (the equivalent -of the American major general). The honors which followed: field marshal -in the Luftwaffe in 1940, which was gained from 2 months’ participation -in the invasion of Norway; Generalluft-Zeugmeister in 1941; member of -the Central Planning Board in 1942; Chief of the Jaegerstab in 1944, -were proof alike of the evil genius of Erhard Milch and of his complete -compatibility with the Nazi ambitions and methods. - -This defendant became a member of the Nazi Party in May 1933. His work -in the Party was important. He was indeed one of the little group of -specialists of whom Mr. Justice Jackson, in his closing address before -the International Military Tribunal, aptly said: - - “It is doubtful whether the Nazi master plan could have - succeeded without their specialized intelligence which they so - willingly put at its command. They (speaking of Goering, Keitel, - Jodl, and the rest) did so with knowledge of its announced aims - and methods and continued their services after practice had - confirmed the direction in which they were tending. Their - superiority to the average run of Nazi mediocrity is not their - excuse. It is their condemnation.”[66] - -Various Germans allowed themselves to be absorbed into the Nazi Party -for a variety of reasons. Depression, financial and business betterment, -ambition, discouragement with the previous political situation, and -human weakness in the face of terrorism, all played their part in the -recruitment of the Nazi machine. There were few cases in which a man -made as clear, as deliberate, and as discreditable a choice of Nazism as -did Milch. - -The high esteem in which the defendant was held by Hitler and his -position within the inner circle of Nazi militarists can be seen from -the fact that he was one of a party of fourteen of Hitler’s highest and -most trusted officers who attended a conference in the new Reich -Chancellory on 23 May 1939, at which Hitler made known to his military -chiefs his plans and objectives. (_L-79._) - -All in all, two points stand out in even a quick survey of Milch’s -career: First, he never accepted the defeat of Germany in the First -World War; his life between the wars was devoted to the work of placing -Germany in a position to challenge the world in the matter of air -supremacy; and second, he was a man who was unlikely to allow either -difficulty or honor to stand in the way of the accomplishment of his -purpose—the objectives of the Nazi Party. If these characteristics are -borne in mind, much of the defendant’s fanaticism and the unbelievable -savagery with which he adhered to the Nazi plan for conquest at the -expense of all values of human decency may be seen as the natural -consequences of the acts of a man with his criminal philosophy. - -We have then, at the outbreak of the war this man, already within the -inner circle, already devoted to the Nazi scheme of things and quite -essential to their fulfillment, with a record of organization and with -the work of preparation behind him—poised with his companions for the -kill. We see the air armadas, which were the labor of his love, helping -to shatter Poland within 18 days, helping to reduce the Lowlands to -smoking ruins within a few days’ time, assisting in the subjugation of -the French military machine and in driving the British from the -continent in a period of a few weeks. We see the hordes of the -Fatherland racing on and on with the air arm always overhead, preparing -the way, until Germany had overrun a territory from the Normandy Coast -to Moscow, and from the North Sea to El Alamein. - -Then began the occupation, the next step in the plan of the Third -Reich—an empire which was to last a thousand years. Over an entire -continent there spread the deadly rigor of a “Pax Germanica” in which -there was to be one citizen class, one race of supermen, and the -balance, one class of slaves. At first the occupation overlords -maintained the appearance of legality. They gave receipts for the -property they plundered, they offered inducements to the laborers they -shanghaied, they went through the mockery of signing contracts which -were both illusory and fraudulent. But even this sham disappeared as the -war went on, and as early as 1942, the German occupation appeared in -public as the ugly thing it was, complete with armed recruiters, -military escorts on deportation trains and prison camps for the workers -brought into Germany. Mr. Justice Jackson, in his opening address on -behalf of the United States of America before the International Military -Tribunal,[67] vividly described the character and extent of the -slave-labor program in the following words: - - “Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible - and extensive slaving operation in history. On few other - subjects is our evidence so abundant and so damaging. In a - speech made on 25 January 1944 the defendant Frank, Governor - General of Poland, boasted, ‘I have sent 1,300,000 Polish - workers into the Reich.’ (_059-PS, p. 2._) The defendant Sauckel - reported that ‘out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived - in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily.’ * * * Children of - 10 to 14 years were impressed into service * * *. - - “When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were - forced into war work in flagrant violation of international - conventions (_016-PS_). Slave labor came from France, Belgium, - Holland, Italy, and the East. Methods of recruitment were - violent (_R-124_, _018-PS_, _204-PS_). The treatment of these - slave laborers was stated in general terms, not difficult to - translate into concrete deprivations, in a letter to the - defendant Rosenberg from the defendant Sauckel, which stated: - - * * * * * - - “‘All the men’ (prisoners of war and foreign civilian - workers) ‘must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a - way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at - the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure * * *’ - (_016-PS_)”. - -Working as we do every day with crimes of unbelievable enormity, we are -apt to become quite deadened to the hideous nature of specific crimes. -It is, therefore, well to stop and consider the particular offenses with -which this man stands charged. - -Crimes are best evaluated in terms of the rights they violate. The evil, -slavery, which is the deprivation of another’s liberty, is best judged -through a consideration of its opposite good, freedom. Freedom is, to an -extent, properly regarded as the symbol of human progress, the measure -of civilization. Much of man’s history can be expressed in terms of his -fight for freedom. Man’s personal freedom is his most precious -prerogative, the exercise of his free will is his distinctive function. -The building of a legal structure to protect the freedom of the -individual is the basic purpose of good government. Men have lived for -freedom, worked for it, fought for it, and died for it. - -It is precisely because of their destructive effects on the freedom of -the individual that governments such as the Nazi German State are so -hatefully and essentially evil. The Nazi rise to power is a story of -duress which ripened into slavery, first for the people within Germany -and then for those in the lands she conquered. The enforced labor -program was no expedient forced upon Germany by the exigencies of war. -It was a basic concept of the Nazi scheme and the permanent destiny of -those who would come under the German yoke. - -It is most natural, therefore, that Control Council Law No. 10, which -was enacted for the guidance of this and other tribunals which are set -up for the trial of the principals in the crime of Nazi Germany, should -deal in very severe terms with that most Nazi of all crimes—slavery. -Article II, paragraph 1 (sec. _b_) specifically names among the -enumerated war crimes the ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor of -civilian populations from occupied territory and the murder or -ill-treatment of prisoners of war. Paragraph 1 (sec. _c_) specifies as a -crime against humanity, deportation of civilian populations. Article II, -paragraphs 2 and 3 proclaim that anyone taking a principal or consenting -part in these crimes, or belonging to a plan or enterprise for the -commission of these crimes, is guilty of an offense for which the death -penalty may be prescribed. - -The prosecution will prove that Milch was a principal in the deportation -into slave labor of civilian populations from occupied territories. It -will show that he was involved in the murder and ill-treatment of -prisoners of war. Evidence will be presented which will prove that he -was engaged in plans and enterprises which directly involved the use of -slave labor. We will show that this man was as much concerned with the -employment of slave labor as was any man in Germany. In his positions as -a member of the Central Planning Board, as Generalluftzeugmeister, and -as Chief of the Jaegerstab, he had full opportunity to hear all the grim -details of the exploitation of slave labor. He participated in decisions -and formulated basic policies with reference to its use, and over and -above all this he showed his personal animosity and his gratuitous -fanaticism in constantly urging the most repressive and cruel measures -in the procurement and exploitation of foreign workers. - -During the course of this trial, an attempt will be made to distinguish -among that which this defendant did as Generalluftzeugmeister, as Chief -of the Jaegerstab, as State Secretary for Air, and as a member of the -Central Planning Board. At times it will be difficult, if not -impossible, to state in just which capacity he was acting at a -particular time. We must emphasize now that it is not essential to the -proof of this case that we should be able always to specify the exact -capacity in which the defendant acted. The multiplicity of his -connection with the slave-labor program is his greatest condemnation, -and it is because he knew so much and did so much that there can be no -excuse for him. - -Erhard Milch operated at a policy level high in the chain of command -above the work boss and the concentration camp guard. We need not show -him driving the workers to their tasks or crowding them into the hovels -in which they lived. We are not primarily concerned with the minute -details of the slave-labor program which were carried out by minions who -obeyed men like the defendant. We were dealing with a planner of a great -crime, and it has not been difficult for the law to seek out and punish -those who plan as well as those who obey. The law would indeed be -derelict if only those were punished who pulled the trigger to kill, or, -comparably speaking, ran a slave camp in which people worked an 84-hour -week and dragged out a miserable existence under conditions from which -death was welcome relief. - -This defendant cannot plead in truth that he did not know that the use -of slave labor was wrong. He cannot use even the technical excuse, so -common among the Nazis, that this was not illegal because the Nazi law -authorized it. Official sanction of slavery would have been a law so -evil that even the Nazi masters dared not proclaim it. A search through -the mass of decrees and pronouncements which passed for law during the -regime of Adolf Hitler fails to reveal sanction for slavery of foreign -laborers. On the other hand, certain prohibitory laws survived from a -more respectable day. - -Paragraph 234 of the German Criminal Law (published in 1942 in Munich -and Berlin, pp. 364-365) provides that “whoever seizes another by ruse, -threat or force in order to expose him in a state of helplessness, or to -deliver him into slavery, bondage, or a foreign military or naval -service shall be punished for kidnapping by confinement in a -penitentiary.” This law was in force during the Nazi regime and was -published in the most recent edition of German Criminal Law which we -have been able to find. - -That maltreatment was commonplace in the course of the enforced labor -program in Germany is well known; that starvation, murder, and all types -of personal abuses took place is notorious. All of this was found as a -fact in the decision of the International Military Tribunal. There can -be no question of the responsibility of the defendant for the murders -and privations which were the inevitable byproduct of the slave-labor -program. - -But we need not follow the crime of slave labor down to its last detail -in order to show the defendant as the murderer he was. We can and will -prove that he directly participated in crimes of which murder was often -the intended and on numerous occasions the inevitable result. - -The prosecution charges, and will prove, that he took an important, -responsible, and essential part in the practice of experiments upon -human beings carried out against their wills and in callous disregard of -the lives of its victims. - -Cut then to bare essentials the charges set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 -of count two of the indictment and in paragraph 11 of count three can be -summarized by the statement that the defendant was officially connected -with and took a consenting part in enterprises in which criminal medical -experiments were performed upon involuntary subjects. - -The nature and extent of these experiments and the fact that they were -conducted for the specific benefit of the Luftwaffe will be shown in -some detail. We will prove that the defendant was the responsible -Luftwaffe officer with ultimate supervisory authority over the -experiments. The Court will see that throughout the duration of these -experiments, the defendant was constantly treated by all concerned as -the ultimate authority within the Luftwaffe in control of the -experimental equipment and in charge of certain personnel who were -actively engaged in them. - -Evidence will be presented which will prove that the defendant was -thoroughly informed of the criminal activities of Dr. Rascher, the -experimenter, and his associates. We will prove that a conference was -held at the defendant’s office, that films were shown there, that -communications were sent to him from highest Nazi sources which -specifically referred to opposition on the part of “narrow-minded -doctors” to the experiments. A web of evidence will be adduced to -portray the defendant, as he really was, an active partner in crime. We -will show that the defendant authorized the initiation of freezing -experiments and that he ordered an extension of the high-altitude -experiments for a period of 2 months, during which extended period a -number of experimental subjects died. - -At the conclusion of the evidence with respect to the medical -experiments upon human beings there will remain no doubt that Erhard -Milch was a knowing, willing, and active participant in murder. - -Throughout the trial the prosecution will place before the Court a -number of statements which will portray him as a man who believed no -tears should be shed for the victims of total war when German soldiers -every day were making the ultimate sacrifice for the Fatherland. This -man was not a hard-headed, single-minded production chief whose only -problem was to get things done and whose rash statements were the -impetuous remarks of an over-worked executive. Milch will be shown as a -man who boasted of his responsibility in the hanging of prisoners of -war, who urged that any effort on the part of foreign workers to strike -during enemy action should be met with rifle fire, who offered -protection to slave supervisors who should mistreat their subjects. We -will show that he was not too busy to inform himself fully of everything -with which he was officially connected and that over and above this he -went out of his way to learn the most minute details of matters with -which he was very remotely connected. - -And now a brief word about the type of evidence with which the -prosecution will prove its case. It must be borne in mind that we are -not concerned with a single localized incident or with a series of such -incidents. The proof which we must show cannot be brought forth from the -daily events of ordered society. It must be drawn from the cold ashes of -a broken nation. The documents which will be brought into Court have -been taken from all corners of a continent. They have one common feature -which elevates them in the hierarchy of evidence to a place above the -story of sincere but fallible eyewitnesses. These documents are official -German records, some of them records of the defendant’s own -organizations. In some cases they bear the defendant’s signature or his -handwritten initials. In every case they are authentic records compiled -by Germans, accurate because there was no reason for falsification or -exaggeration, thorough because of a national fetish for attention to -detail, reliable because they were made at times when the German -fortunes of war were high and their scriveners had no reason to fear -that one day they would be confronted with their hand-made records of -criminality. - -It would seem that at this point there should be some discussion of the -various organizations with which the defendant was connected. - -We are concerned principally with that part of the OKW (Oberkommando der -Wehrmacht), Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, known as the OKL -(Oberkommando der Luftwaffe), the High Command of the German Air Force. -The Chief of the OKL was Reich Marshal Hermann Goering. His Inspector -General and State Secretary in the Air Ministry was the defendant Erhard -Milch. As such, from July 1940, he held the rank of field marshal -(comparable to the American rank of general of the armies).[68] - -The other two branches of the OKW with which we are incidentally -concerned were the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), High Command of the -Army, and the OKM (Oberkommando der Marine), High Command of the Navy. -The army was commanded by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch until December -1941, at which time it was taken over by Hitler. The navy was commanded -by Grand Admiral [Admiral of the Fleet] Raeder until 1943, thereafter by -Grand Admiral Doenitz. - -The Luftwaffe Medical Service came under this defendant in his capacity -as Inspector General of the Luftwaffe. The Medical Service was headed by -Dr. Erich Hippke until January 1944; thereafter it was headed by Dr. -Oskar Schroeder. - -There was an experimental institute in Berlin called the DVL which was a -technical research institution for aero-research. This was subordinate -to the defendant in his position as Generalluftzeugmeister. - -We now turn to the Central Planning Board. This was established by a -Goering decree, pursuant to a Hitler order of 22 April, 1942. The Board -consisted of Albert Speer, Erhard Milch, and Paul Koerner. Later, by a -supplementary Goering decree, in September 1943, Walter Funk was added -to the Board. Speer and Milch were the dominant members, and Koerner and -Funk played comparatively minor roles. The Central Planning Board was, -in effect, a consolidation of all controls over German war production. -The Board was found by the International Military Tribunal to have “had -supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and the -allocation and development of raw materials. * * *”[69] Hand in hand -with this goes the corollary of the procurement and allocation of labor. -Reich Marshal Goering, in his decree of 22 April, 1942, stated in -part——“It (the Central Planning Board) encompasses that which is -fundamental and vital. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the -execution of its directives”. The Central Planning Board requisitioned -labor from Sauckel with full knowledge that the demands would be -supplied by foreign forced labor, and the Board determined the basic -allocation of this labor within the German war economy. Sauckel was the -servant of the Central Planning Board in the procurement of slave labor. -There are records of some 50-odd meetings of the Board between the time -of its establishment in 1942, and 1945. The defendant was present at all -but a few of these meetings and on occasion his was the dominant voice. -The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning -Board determined the total number of laborers needed for German -industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually by deportation -from occupied territories. - -It is worthy of note that Speer was appointed Reich Minister for -Armaments and Munitions on 2 February 1942, Sauckel was appointed -Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation on 21 March 1942, and the -Central Planning Board was created on 22 April 1942. - -Turning now to the defendant’s position as Chief of the Jaegerstab. The -Jaegerstab was formed pursuant to a Speer decree of 1 March 1944, for -the purpose of increasing the production of German fighter aircraft, -which, because of effective and heavy raids by strategic air forces of -Great Britain and America, had suffered a production decrease to a -figure below 1,000 planes a month. - -Because of this reduced production of fighter planes, Milch had -requested Speer to establish a commission to deal with this most vital -problem. The commission was created and Speer and Milch were joint -chiefs. The Jaegerstab was actually a group of experts, drawn from the -various phases of German industry and supplemented by representatives of -the various Ministries concerned, such as Labor, Supply, Transportation, -Power and Energy, Raw Materials, Health, Repairs, and so forth. - -Meetings were held almost daily, in the beginning at the Air Ministry in -Berlin and later at Tempelhof airfield in the same city. The Jaegerstab -functions were these: the quick repair of plants damaged in bombing or -strafing operations, the dispersal of German aircraft plants, and the -construction of underground factories for aircraft production. - -As it was with the Central Planning Board, so it was with the -Jaegerstab, a major problem was the procurement of slave labor. The -workers for the Jaegerstab were procured from the Sauckel Ministry, from -occupied countries, and from the SS, who supplied concentration camp -inmates and Hungarian Jews. - -So successful was the work of the Jaegerstab that Speer decided to -enlarge its functions to include other phases of armament and munitions -production. Accordingly, on 1 August 1944, he issued a decree expanding -the functions of the Jaegerstab and changing its name to Ruestungsstab. - -The position of Generalluftzeugmeister was taken over by the defendant -in 1941, following the death of Colonel General Ernst Udet. In this post -the defendant was in charge of all technical research in the Luftwaffe -and his was the over-all responsibility for all aircraft production. As -such he spoke for the Luftwaffe in the meetings of the Central Planning -Board and in conferences with Hitler. It is obvious that here again the -procurement of labor was a primary consideration for one who had the -complete responsibility for keeping the Luftwaffe in the air. - -In the trial before the International Military Tribunal, it was -determined that 5,000,000 laborers were deported to Germany. Of these, -4,800,000 did not come voluntarily. - -The evidence will show that the defendant’s responsibility was as great, -if not greater, than was Sauckel’s. Erhard Milch raised his voice in -demanding that foreign labor be procured by any methods and in -advocating that cruel and repressive measures be taken by those in -charge of these laborers. There is no record of any utterance by him, -which can be offered as a mitigating circumstance to his complete -complicity in the criminality of the slave-labor program. - -The evidence on the altitude and freezing experiments will reveal him as -a man completely without concern for the welfare and lives of the -wretched, unwilling victims of the criminal tortures conducted for the -benefit of the Luftwaffe. - -The series of trials, of which this is one, if it is to serve its -purpose in exposing and punishing the abuses of Nazidom, must strike -hard at the cores of savage German militarism and its technical -counterpart, industry for war. Erhard Milch is the foremost example of -the union between German militarism and German heavy industry. What -useful purpose is served by condemning these two and allowing their -sponsors, men like Milch, to go unpunished? - -We take it as a fundamental proposition that man is not the helpless -product of his environment. Civilization is a lengthy chronicle of men -who triumphed over difficulty. Its survival depends on the moral fibre -of individuals who can use circumstance, not be determined by it. If -society must answer for the actions of men, and not men for the course -of society, then, indeed, governments are our masters and not our -servants; then, indeed, law dictates but does not express justice. -Erhard Milch lived during years of violence and in an evil environment -but he was a man well able to overcome these factors and become a force -for good. It was by his own free choice that he followed the line of -least resistance and became one of the evil spirits who cast a dark -shadow of war and crime over Germany and the world. He had a choice -between the easy wrong and the hard right—he chose the former. Peace, -order, and progress depend on men of sufficient courage to choose at -times a hard, just path. Ours indeed is an exacting standard, but the -rewards are great, and the alternative is chaos. - ------ - -[64] Opening statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript. - -[65] See section IV A3, p. 524 ff. - -[66] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XIX, pp. 417-18, Nuremberg, -1947. - -[67] Ibid., vol. II, pp. 139-140. - -[68] See Table of comparative ranks, p. 331. - -[69] Trial of Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 331. - - - - - B. Opening Statement for the Defense[70] - -DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, I undertake now to present the -evidence for the defense. The prosecution has painted the blackest -possible picture of the man I am here to defend. It has pronounced a -moral judgment on him, even for the period of his life, which, according -to the indictment, is not to be judged by this Tribunal. - -Because of the great difference between the American and the German -people I have no knowledge of whether such a method of prosecution is -customary in the United States of America. The good principles of law -which were practiced in Germany before 1933 provided that even counsel -for the prosecution should not reproach the defendant for anything that -is not subject to examination by the Tribunal. The meaning of this is -that defense counsel also should be in a position to express his views -with regard to these charges. This, according to my opinion, seems to be -a fair principle. - -Therefore, if it please the Tribunal, it shall be my aim in the course -of my submission of evidence to prove by witnesses who have been -approved and by the defendant himself that the charges made by the -prosecution are incorrect, and I shall aim to prove that also for the -charges which are not contained in the indictment. - -Erhard Milch has never in his life been a traitor, as a person or in his -profession, not even at the end of the National Socialist rule when he -himself was threatened as to his life and his honor. As a man of high -intelligence and great talent for organization, he always tried to do -his best for his people and for the world. - -To say of him that he misused his talent and devoted his life to a plan -for conquest and enslavement of the world is to have a completely wrong -conception of reality. He was never a militarist in the bad sense of the -word. Never did he arm secretly before 1933 nor make use of the peaceful -instrument of the commercial air fleet for any sinister purposes. He, -the man who wanted to devote himself only to the tasks of peace, the man -who in his capacity as director of the German Lufthansa collaborated -with many European air transport companies and who conceived this -collaboration as almost a forerunner of a unified Europe; he, the man -who in 1937 devoted all his efforts, together with a few wise and -courageous statesmen, to the attempt to bring about a full understanding -and a large scale collaboration between France, Belgium, and Germany -(unfortunately, the high Tribunal has not given me permission to furnish -complete proof for this fact); he, Erhard Milch, truly never tried to -enslave the world. If he had succeeded in his plans in 1937, then there -would have been no 1938. And, all the more, there would not have been -the horrible period of 1939 to 1945, the period in which the battle -against intolerance became so hard and so complicated that we might -think today that, as in an Arabian tale, this spirit of intolerance -freed itself from the bottle and spread itself over so wide an area -that, even today, it causes actions which one day must also be condemned -by the just and the wise. - -I shall prove that from the moment when this man tried, in 1937, to -achieve his plans for peace he lost the confidence of his superiors. He -never belonged to the intimate circle in which his superiors confided, -even less so after 1937. They employed him unwillingly and only because -they believed that they could not spare him because of his ability. It -is cheap and easy to say now that this man should have denied his -superiors the benefit of his talents. We shall prove that he tried to do -so. But who can dare to judge with certainty what went on in the heart -of such a man who was terribly aware of what dangers threatened his -people, once the fateful step of starting the war had been taken? -Neither did he want this step nor could he prevent it. - -Should he really have chosen the path of revolt, this man who was -brought up in a world in which, for all ages, military obedience had -been an inviolate law, this man who had a passionate love for his -people? How many human beings in any country are capable of breaking the -chains of their education, and turn against the laws which have been -inviolate for them ever since their childhood? - -There is no punishable guilt, perhaps even no moral guilt in the fact -that a man cannot free himself from the world of his education. Because -it is the very essence of all education to give the man unbreakable laws -and to create around him what philosophers call “the environment proper -to his own nature.” Therefore, he has not made himself guilty by doing -what his education and the conceptions of his environment made him call -his duty, in a war which he did not want, which he tried to prevent; and -the stopping of which he advised again and again after it had started. -This duty, he felt, was to do his work and to prevent the worst which he -anticipated, namely, the terrible devastation of his fatherland and its -complete and helpless collapse. - -I shall prove that he always, even after the war had broken out, -concerned himself with questions of defense only; that he wanted to -strengthen the fighter force, a defensive weapon with which he wanted to -prevent the doom of the German cities. Perhaps, one day, the necessity -for this doom will be judged differently. I shall prove that he -condemned the attack against Soviet Russia as folly, and that he tried -to prevent it. I shall show that in the spring of 1943 he submitted to -Hitler detailed proposals for an immediate termination of the war and -that he told him without reserve that the war was lost. - -If it is true that from that moment onward he made efforts again and -again to strengthen the fighter force, and that he took part in the -creation of the Jaegerstab, who can reproach him with the intention to -prolong the war if it will be proved that he knew that the enemy air -forces would make a desert of Germany? Was it inhuman that he tried to -prevent this total destruction even if the war was lost? He alone could -not end the war. But he could try to prevent the inferno in Germany from -becoming full reality. What true lover of his own country in any part of -the world would not make the same attempt? Never can he be considered -guilty on account of that, and even less so because of the fact that in -other countries also voices have arisen and still arise which say that -during the destruction of Germany many a thing happened which was not -always compatible with military necessity. - -Despite the pains he took, his superiors mistrusted him so much that -both Goering and Hitler contemplated to have him put out of the way. - -I shall show that he never endorsed the theory of the superman and of -the master race; that he always remained humane and that he intervened -on behalf of friends with disregard for his own security. He never was -cruel. It may be that some of the minutes carry wild speeches about him -which must strike your Honors who come from a different world and are -used to different customs as terrible and incomprehensible. I shall -prove to you that in the barracks yards, which made the first impress on -the sensitive mind of young Milch, wild expressions were quite common -and that in German barracks yards bombastic expressions were considered -normal and truly militaristic style. Nobody in Germany did at any time -take these expressions at face value. For this human element in -particular, the old saying holds true that dogs which bark do not bite. - -This man, however, was all the more inclined to use these shocking -expressions due to the fact that in a number of accidents he had -suffered severe concussions of the brain as a result of which he was -more susceptible to fits of anger than other people; all the more so -since he was overburdened with work and always frantic because time was -too short. But witnesses will appear before this Tribunal who will -confirm that no one in his surroundings took these fits of wrath, these -crazy words, seriously; that these expressions never went further than -the circle of his intimates, and that they in no way had any effect. His -raving and yelling would make so little impression that when people -around him noticed he was about to have another fit of rage, one would -hear the familiar quotation: “In a moment somebody will be hanged again -and then nothing happens.” - -I shall show that this man knew nothing at all of the many abominable -happenings which occurred out in the country, sometimes committed by -persons who were under his command, and that, for example, the -connection with the experiments at Dachau were so remote and incidental -that he could not even surmise what the men there undertook to do. The -sphere of his duties was so terrific, the burden of his work so great -that he truly would have needed to be a superman if he were expected to -have known all that the prosecution finds out today from records and -from the examination of the offenders. It is appropriate to use a Latin -quotation here with a little change: “_Quod est in actis, non semper est -in munde._” Not everything that the investigating mind uncovers at a -later date and interconnects was so in actual fact. The poet says “Easy -for him to speak who speaks last.” This man is charged with letting -prisoners be abused and killed. I shall prove that this was not so. I -shall even prove that, for example, he did everything possible to -protect so-called terror fliers from being lynched. He was a man who -tried to attenuate verdicts pronounced by competent courts of justice -and who never favored death sentences. - -The prosecution charges him with the enslavement of the peoples of -Europe. I shall prove that he never aspired to enslavement; that -information on deportations and shanghaiing never reached him; and that, -on the contrary, information reached him which was bound to confuse his -judgment and which permitted him to engage in deeds which now are -considered as wrong. Up to this day the opinion still prevails that -everybody in Germany knew everything about all the cruelties. Slowly, -however, the recognition comes through that this is not correct. In the -“Neue Zeitung”, the official organ of the military government, a German -anti-Fascist by the name of Arnold Weiss Reuthel, whose book on the -concentration camps is considered noteworthy by the newspapers, -published an article “On the Psychological Causes.” There he states -literally: - - “One would have termed anybody who informed the public of such - happenings a scoundrel or a lunatic. This also explains why - people who did not see these things with their own eyes and did - not suffer from them day after day, even today still refuse to - believe that they actually happened. Yes, to me too it seems - today often a dream and impossible when I think back and try to - persuade myself that they really happened, the fearful excesses - to which I was a witness during my 5 years in the concentration - camp.” - -Thus writes, be it noted, a man who suffered for years in a -concentration camp himself. It has been proved again and again that the -most painstaking secrecy was maintained regarding the atrocities. This -is no hollow talk. This is the truth. The actual perpetrators -dissembled, denied, lied, in a way that could not have been surpassed in -cunning. The documents show you, Honorable Judges, that it was forbidden -for Rascher to make reports without Himmler’s authorization. Himmler -wanted to draw the veil of secrecy over everything. But even with a -Hitler, Sauckel, for example, soft-pedalled all his doings in the -procuring of the foreign workers. Regarding this, I will submit -evidence. - -I shall also show that the assignment of these workers was not a point -in any program existing from the outset; that it was exclusively an -emergency device which the exigencies of the war forced upon Germany. So -at least all this had to appear to him, the man who did not belong to -the innermost circle. That he could not think otherwise will be -demonstrated to the Court, to the Tribunal. - -It is misleading when the honorable representative of the prosecution in -his opening speech points out that this man had more to do with the use -of forced labor than any other man in Germany. The International -Military Tribunal, in its judgment on Speer, whose position, as no one -in this courtroom can doubt, was far more powerful and significant than -that of this man here, has stated:[71] “Speer’s position was such that -he did not have to deal directly with the atrocities and the carrying -out of the forced labor program.” On Sauckel, the International Military -Tribunal says:[72] “It is nevertheless established beyond all doubt that -Sauckel had the over-all responsibility for the slave-labor program.” I -shall offer evidence that Sauckel actually also had the sole power over -the manner in which the people were recruited and brought to Germany, -and over the urgent work for which they were required. - -The prosecution submitted much evidence in Document Books No. IA and IB -which contain the speeches and decrees of all kinds of persons and -offices in Germany and in the territories formerly occupied. In my -opinion, however, it never proved that the defendant knew of all these -things, much less that he had anything to do with them. I shall prove -that he knew nothing of all this and that it was all so far remote from -his sphere of action that, logically speaking and considering his -numerous tasks, he could know nothing about it. - -I ask permission to remark here that in cases of this kind it is perhaps -after all not in keeping with the rules of true justice to charge one -person with everything that happened somewhere and was committed by -someone among a people of eighty million. In my opinion the concept of -conspiracy is in such a case inflated to the point of monstrosity. It -was created for conditions of a narrower and smaller scope where it was -within the framework of a man’s possibilities to keep an over-all view -of his associates and their deeds. But to extend the concept of -conspiracy over an entire nation and, simultaneously, over numerous -organizations with millions of members, that no longer can be -commensurate with true justice. This would result in the creation of a -conspirator to whom would be ascribed a Godlike stature. That, however, -would be a distortion of an intelligent legal thought. - -It must, therefore, be demanded that in the case of each document, of -each act, with due consideration of the extent of the defendant’s -working sphere and, consequently, with due consideration for his working -capacity, one should examine whether he could obtain knowledge thereof, -whether he could humanly anticipate, examine any of them, and by reason -of his authority, could somehow prevent them. - -Finally, I shall prove to you that the documents submitted to you as -official documents are not exact, not reliable; that they never were -examined by the defendant and his associates, and that they contain -inaccuracies, distortions, and wilful deceptions. - -Regarding the powers and position held by the defendant, a number of -witnesses and the defendant himself will attest that his powers were not -so great nor so permanent as the prosecution assumes. - -We will show that while the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe was -subordinate to him in his capacity of Inspector General of the -Luftwaffe, this subordination was more a formal than a practical one, -that the staff of the Medical Service was not at all subordinate to him -and that especially he did not have under his direction the DVL (German -Experimental Institute for Aviation). - -We shall further prove that even the Central Planning Board did not have -the significance that the prosecution assumes, that this agency was much -more an advisory and information agency, that it was chiefly occupied -with the allocation of raw materials and that only those decisions of -the meetings were binding which were summarized in the so-called -“Results.” - -Finally, we shall show that although, it is true, the defendant was one -of the founders of the Jaegerstab, he was not its chief and that his -importance in this connection was far less than it would appear on first -consideration. The work of the Jaegerstab and of the defendant was aimed -solely at the protection of Germany against bombing attacks, and Milch -very soon lost all influence in this Jaegerstab. - -In the presentation of all this evidence, I would ask the high Tribunal -to have in mind one difficulty which, particularly in this case, is -nearly insurmountable. - -The documents submitted by the prosecution are only parts of a body of -material the extent of which can be termed gigantic. When one considers -that the Jaegerstab, for instance, from the time of its establishment -held daily meetings and that from those meetings only these few -stenographic records of a few sessions have been submitted that appear -in the document books of the prosecution, then one realizes that not -even five percent of the material pertaining to the Jaegerstab has been -submitted. - -Similar, although perhaps not equally striking, is the situation with -reference to the minutes of the Central Planning Board. All these -documents which were not submitted are not accessible to me at all. Does -not, however, justice demand that the material in its entirety should be -available to the defense counsel for examination? Already it has been -possible for me to discover in the incriminating documents numerous -passages which throw a different light on the indictment. Is it not -highly probable, then, that numerous other passages may be found in all -of the other material likely to extenuate to a high degree the guilt of -the defendant, or which, in any case, might show many things in a better -light? - -In an ordinary trial with a considerably narrower scope it is much -easier for a defendant to conduct his defense than here where material -of such volume is at hand that even if he had the best of memories, it -would be impossible for him to point out to me, his counsel, where and -what kind of exonerating material can be found. That simply surpasses -the capacity of the human memory, of the human ability to think. - -In passing, I would say that probably in all of the armies which fought -in this war the responsible men used strong language during meetings and -discussions which, had they all gone down in records, would today cause -the milder ones to shake their heads. Wrath, impatience, worry, and -anguish because of damages sustained frequently lead responsible persons -to wild utterances. What counts is not whether such words are uttered -but the deeds which come after such excitement dies away. - -The prosecution had many long months to prepare its case. We, the -defendant and I, received the real documents on the indictment only in -January. It is beyond human capacity to examine everything within such a -short period of time with the thoroughness which is necessary to -assemble the required counter-evidence. The presentation of argument on -the part of the defendant must therefore, be full of gaps. It is -particularly difficult in this case because within the short time -available for preparation it is impossible to study all the problems -which are brought to light as a result of the Dachau experiments. This -calls for special technical knowledge which a man such as the defendant, -who never studied medicine, simply cannot possess. However, as this -trial is held simultaneously with the trial on the Dachau -experiments,[73] the danger exists that the important and exonerating -facts brought to light there, through the defendant experts and their -well informed counsel, cannot be properly appraised in the present case, -and in this way the cause of justice is endangered. - -All of this I merely say in order to ask your Honors not to lose sight -of these angles in judging this present case. Honorable Judges, please -bear that in mind also when examining the documents which I shall submit -and, giving ear to that extent to the voice of humanity and of justice, -lend your assistance to a man who, cut off for so long and bitter a time -from all his information and other aids to support his memory, has been -called upon to defend himself before you. If at any time the fundamental -principle of penal justice, which exists since the days of the wise -Romans, should find application, “_In dubio pro reo_” (In case of doubt -favor the accused), it should find strict application in this case. That -is what I wanted to tell you as an introduction. - ------ - -[70] Opening statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript 27 January -1947. Tr. pp. 494-504. - -[71] IMT mimeographed German transcript p. 16614. See also Trial of -Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 332, Nuremberg, 1947. - -[72] Ibid., p. 16598. See also Trial of Major War Criminals, vol I, p. -321. - -[73] United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See vol. I. - - - - - IV. SELECTIONS FROM THE DOCUMENTS AND - TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES OF PROSECUTION - AND DEFENSE - - - A. Slave Labor - - - I. GENERAL SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM IN GERMANY - - _Prosecution Documents_ - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - L-79 3 Extract from minutes of Fuehrer 387 - conference, 23 May 1939. - EC-68 6 Letter from the Ministry of 389 - Finance and Economics of - Baden, 6 March 1941, - containing directives - regarding the treatment of - Polish farm workers. - 3005-PS 7 Extracts from letter from the 392 - Reich Labor Ministry to - presidents of regional labor - offices, 26 August 1941, - concerning the use of French - and Russian PW’s. - EC-194 8 Memorandum of Keitel, 31 393 - October 1941, concerning the - use of PW’s in the armament - industry. - 1206-PS 9 Outlines of directives of 395 - Goering regarding the - employment of PW’s in the - armament industry, 7 November - 1941. - 3040-PS 10 Extracts from secret order of 399 - Himmler, 20 February 1942, - concerning the commitment and - treatment of manpower from - the East. - 016-PS 13 Letter from Sauckel to 405 - Rosenberg, 24 April 1942, and - extracts from report on - Sauckel’s labor mobilization - program, 20 April 1942. - 084-PS 16-A Extracts from interdepartmental 408 - report of the Ministry for - Occupied Eastern Territories, - 30 September 1942, concerning - the status of eastern - laborers. - 294-PS 19-A Extracts from top secret 411 - memorandum, signed by - Braeutigam, 25 October 1942, - concerning effects of slave - labor program. - L-61 20 Letter from Sauckel to the 413 - presidents of labor offices, - 26 November 1942, concerning - deportation and employment of - Poles and Jews. - 1063-D-PS 21 Extract from order of Mueller, 415 - 17 December 1942, concerning - prisoners qualified for work - to be sent to concentration - camps. - 1526-PS 25 Extracts from letter from 416 - German-appointed Ukrainian - main committee to Frank, - February 1943. - 407-V-PS 30 Extracts from letter from 418 - Sauckel to Hitler, 14 April - 1943, concerning labor - questions. - 407-IX-PS 33 Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 420 - 3 June 1943, concerning - foreign labor situation. - 3000-PS 34 Extracts from report rendered 422 - to Riecke, - Ministerialdirektor in the - Ministry of Agriculture, 28 - June 1943, on experiences in - political and economic - problems in the East. - 265-PS 35 Extracts from report by Leyser 423 - to Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, - on conditions in the district - Zhitomir. - 204-PS 39 Extracts from memorandum of a 424 - conference, 18 February 1944, - concerning the release of - indigenous labor for purposes - of the Reich. - R-103 40 Extracts from a letter from the 426 - (German-appointed) Polish - main committee to the General - Government of Poland on the - conditions of Polish workers - in Germany, 17 May 1944. - 208-PS 55 Report by Sauckel, 7 July 1944, 428 - on the accomplishments of - labor mobilization in the - first half of 1944. - 3819-PS 56 Minutes of a conference on 11 430 - July 1944 attended by Milch, - concerning the labor problem. - - _Defense Documents_ - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - R-124 1 Extract from report on Fuehrer 438 - conference attended by Milch - on 19 February 1942. - R-124 32 Extract from the Fuehrer 438 - conference minutes, 21 and 22 - April 1942. - R-124 2 Extract from the Fuehrer 439 - conference minutes of 3, 4, 5 - January 1943. - 407-II-PS 3 Report from Sauckel to Hitler, 439 - 10 March 1943, concerning - difficulties originating from - the draft of manpower in - former Soviet territories. - R-124 33 Extract from report on Fuehrer 441 - conference of 30 May 1943. - R-124 4 Extract from report of Fuehrer 442 - conference of 11-12 September - 1943. - R-124 34 Extract from Fuehrer conference 443 - of 1-4 January 1944, - concerning Speer’s report on - the French labor situation. - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-79[74] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3 - - EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE, 23 MAY 1939 - - Top Secret - -To be transmitted by officer only - - Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39 - -Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery. -Adjutant on duty: Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt. -Present: The Fuehrer, Field Marshal Goering, Grand Admiral [Admiral of the - Fleet] Raeder. Col. Gen. [General] von Brauchitsch, Col. Gen. - Keitel, Col. Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) [Lt. General] - Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewind, Col. (GSC) - Jeschonnek, Col. (GSC) Warlimont, Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt, Capt. - [Army] Engel, Lt. Comdr. Albrecht, Capt. [Army] v. Below. - -Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims. - -The Fuehrer defined as _the purpose of the conference_: - - 1. Analysis of the situation. - 2. Definition of the tasks for the armed forces arising from the - situation. - 3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks. - 4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from - these consequences. - -Secrecy is the first essential for success. The Fuehrer’s observations -are given in systematized form below. - -Our present situation must be considered from two points of view: (1) -the actual development of events between 1933 and 1939; (2) the -permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies. - -In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military -situation improved enormously. - -Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the -same. - -Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of -power had been effected without the participation of Germany. - -This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities -of life make themselves felt, and Germany reemerges as a Great Power. -All demands are regarded as “Encroachments”. The English are more afraid -of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. - -A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, -too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the -creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of -the problems demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving -the problems by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. -Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without -invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property. - -Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis -of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally -it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or -decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a -solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that. - -We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is shared by two -other nations—Italy and Japan. - -The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All -measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our -aims. - -After 6 years the situation is today as follows: - -The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart -from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the -shedding of blood. - -The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance. - -The Pole is no supplementary enemy. Poland will always be on the side of -our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always -had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm. - -Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of -expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food -supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be -expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural -fertility, thorough German exploitation will enormously increase the -surplus. - -There is no other possibility for Europe. - -Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the -food problem. [Remember]—blockade! - -If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of -extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvest we -shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace. - -The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and -will be available as a source of labor. - -The problem “Polish” is inseparable from conflict with the West. - -Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus -Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia. - -It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved -by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude of Poland. - -The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees -danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of -the victory. - -There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with -the _decision_: - -_To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity._ - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-68 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 6[75] - - LETTER FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS OF - BADEN, 6 MARCH 1941, CONTAINING DIRECTIVES REGARDING - THE TREATMENT OF POLISH FARM WORKERS - - 49-7 - Copy - - III B 5 C (in pencil) - Karlsruhe, 6 March 1941 - -Minister of Finance and Economics of Baden -Provincial [Land] Food Office Dept. A. -(Provincial Farmers Association) - Confidential Only for Official Business -To all District Farmers Associations [Kreis] - -Subject: Directives regarding the treatment of foreign farm workers of - Polish nationality. - -The agencies of the Reich Food Estate, Provincial Farmers Association of -Baden, have received the results of the negotiations with the Higher SS -and Police Leader in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941, with great -satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned over to the -District Farmers Associations. Below, I promulgate the individual -regulations, as they have been laid down during the conference and how -they are not to be applied accordingly: - - 1. Fundamentally, farm workers of Polish nationality no longer - have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be - accepted any more by any official agency. - - 2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may not leave the - localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1 - October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1 - April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours. - - 3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are - possible, for riding to the place of work in the field, if a - relative of the employer or the employer himself is present. - - 4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly - prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. - Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is - permitted. - - 5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural - entertainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish - nationality. - - 6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to farm - workers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in the - village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor’s - Office, and then only one day per week. The day, which is - determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will also be - determined by the Rural Councillor’s Office. This regulation - does not change the curfew regulation, mentioned above under No. - 2. - - 7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly - prohibited, and wherever it is established, it must be reported. - - 8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after work - is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or - in the living quarters of the Poles. - - 9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by - farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited. - - 10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very - exceptional cases, by the local police authority (mayor’s - office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to - visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office - or the District Farmers Association, or whether he wants to - change his place of employment. - - 11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The - farm workers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as - the interests of the enterprise demand it, and as it is demanded - by the employer. There are no time limits to the working time. - - 12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to - farm workers of Polish nationality, if instructions and good - words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such - case by an official agency. - - 13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should if possible be - removed from the community of the home, and they can be - quartered in stables, etc. No remorse whatever should restrict - such action. - - 14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases when - crimes have been committed by farm workers of Polish nationality - which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for - instance, unwillingness to work, impertinent behavior; it is - compulsory even in minor cases. An employer who loses his Pole - who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a - compulsory report will receive another Pole from the competent - labor office on request with preference. - - 15. In all other cases, only the state police is still - competent. - -For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated if it is -established that the necessary distance from farm workers of Polish -nationality has not been kept. The same applies to women and girls. -Extra rations are strictly prohibited. Noncompliance of the Reich -tariffs for farm workers of Polish nationality will be punished by the -competent labor office by the taking away of the worker. - -In any case of doubt, the Provincial Farmers Association—IB—will give -information. - -Forwarding in writing of the above agreement to the farm workers of -Polish nationality is strictly prohibited. - -These regulations do not apply to Poles who are still prisoners of war -and are thus subordinated to the armed forces. In this case, the -regulations published by the armed forces apply. - - Heil Hitler! - BY ORDER: - [Signed] DR. KLOTZ - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3005-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 7 - - EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM THE REICH LABOR MINISTRY TO - PRESIDENTS OF REGIONAL LABOR OFFICES, 26 AUGUST 1941, - CONCERNING THE USE OF FRENCH AND RUSSIAN PW’S - -Vol. 78-L - - Annex 1 to the Decree of the Reich Minister of Armament - and Munitions - -THE REICH MINISTER OF LABOR -_Va 5135/1277_ - Nr. 371-4770/41 secret 216/985 - - Berlin, SW 11, 26 August 1941 - - Special Delivery - -To the Presidents of Regional Labor Offices - (including Nuernberg Branch Office) - -Subject: Use of Russian PW’s. -Reference: Circular of 14 August 1941—Va 5135/1189—. - -Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal [Goering], 100,000 men are to -be taken from among the French PW’s not yet employed in armament -industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry (airplane -industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting therefrom will be filled by -Soviet PW’s. The transfer of the above-named French PW’s is to be -accomplished by 1 October. Russian PW’s can be utilized only in larger -concentrated groups under the well-known, tougher employment conditions. -In the civilian field the regional labor offices will have to determine -immediately those work projects where French prisoners of war can be -withdrawn and replaced by Soviet groups. For the time being, no -additional assignment of Soviet prisoners of war can be considered. -Initially all replacement possibilities must be completely exhausted. -Similarly, all French PW’s no longer needed are not to be channeled into -agriculture and forestry any more, but exclusively into armament -industry (aircraft industry). - -All branches of economic life employing French PW’s, with the exception -of armament industry and mining, are to be encompassed in determining -those work projects where exchanges are feasible. The absolute necessity -that Soviet PW replacements be employed in larger concentrated groups, -requires, among other things, special checking of all larger -construction projects of any kind (including construction of the Reich -railroads, navigational and cultivation projects). Reich Minister Dr. -Todt has already consented to the exchange of French PW’s employed by -the Reich super highways. In agriculture the exchange can naturally be -effected only in the case of large estates (especially estates with -outlying farms). - -Exchange of PW’s will frequently encounter resistance. The factories -concerned will be reluctant to exchange the trained and proven French -PW’s for Soviet PW’s. In such cases the labor offices have to draw the -factories’ attention to the necessities of state, and to the directive -of the Reich Marshal. - -As soon as the regional labor offices have determined the work projects -affected by the exchange, they will inform the Service Commands -Headquarters, indicating how many French PW’s are being made available -and how many Soviet PW’s will be needed to replace the French PW’s. -Without my express consent not more than 120 Soviet PW’s may be -requested for each 100 French PW’s made available. Since the determining -factors in the allocation of Soviet PW’s are military and -counter-intelligence considerations, final decision about the exchange -rests with the Service Commands [Military Districts] Headquarters. - - * * * * * - -The first 100,000 French prisoners of war shall be channeled into the -aircraft industry. * * * - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-194 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 8 - - MEMORANDUM OF KEITEL, 31 OCTOBER 1941, CONCERNING THE - USE OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY - - Copy - Fuehrer Headquarters, 31 October 1941 -The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - Secret -WFSt/Abt. L (II Org/IV Qu [sic] -No. 0 2588/41 Secret -Subject: Use of prisoners of war in the war industry. - -The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for -the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through -discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to extent and date. Its -possible extent will by no means correspond to expectations and -requirements in view of the great demand. - -The Fuehrer has now ordered that also the working power of the Russian -prisoners of war should be utilized to a great extent by large scale -assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite -for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be -planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers’ goods for every -day life, and perhaps rewards for production. - -For labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz], the following may be considered -as examples: - -I. _Armed Forces._ - -_a._ Clearing and construction units of all kinds in the occupied -eastern territories. - -_b._ Work and construction battalions in the other occupied territories -and in Germany. - -_c._ Large scale employment in units to relieve soldiers in labor -service. - -II. _Construction and Armament Industry._ - -_a._ Work units for construction of all kind, particularly for the -fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for -essential war plants). - -_b._ Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way -that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war -under guidance and supervision (perhaps after withdrawal and transfer to -other employment of the German workers). - -III. _Other War Industries._ - -_a._ Mining as under II _b_. - -_b._ Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc. - -_c._ Agriculture and forestry in closed units. - -The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the -basis of above examples by: - -To I. The armed forces. - -To II. The Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions and the Inspector -General for the German road system, in agreement with the Reich Minister -of Labor and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Economic Armament -Office). - -Commissioners of the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions are to be -admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of -skilled workers. - -To III. The Reich Minister of Labor. Limitations are— - - 1. The securing of guards to protect the German people from - dangers. - - 2. Housing in closed camps. - - 3. Securing adequate nourishment. - -The observance of the counter-intelligence regulations which apply for -the use of prisoners of war will be supervised by military -counter-intelligence agencies as until now. - -OKW (AWA)[76] will furnish the Reich Minister of Labor with blueprints -based on professional selection for the appropriate use of labor and -will also permanently provide workers for assignment to the labor -utilization [Arbeitseinsatz]. - -Furthermore, the Commander in Chief of the Army is asked to take the -necessary measures for the recruiting of voluntary labor in the eastern -operational zone in cooperation with the Reich Minister of Labor. - - [Signed] KEITEL - -Distribution: - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1206-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 9 - - OUTLINES OF DIRECTIVES OF GOERING REGARDING THE - EMPLOYMENT OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY, - 7 NOVEMBER 1941 - - Draft -Rue(IV) - Berlin, 11 November 1941 - Top Secret - 6 Copies—6th Copy - - _NOTES ON OUTLINES LAID DOWN BY THE REICH MARSHAL - [GOERING] AT THE MEETING OF 7 NOVEMBER - 1941 IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY [RLM]_ - -Subject: Employment of laborers in war industries - -The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war -industries has changed basically. So far, a total of 5 million prisoners -of war—employed so far 2 million. - -Directives for employment: - -Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into the armament - industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.] -Belgians: Individual employment, transposition into the armament - industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.] -Serbs: Preferably agriculture. -Poles: If feasible, no individual employment. - -Output of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly -line work, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled -workers. - -Readiness of Russians to work in the operational area is strong. In the -Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free -labor. In Krivoi Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the -destruction of the factories. - - _Employment of Russian PW’s_ - -As a rule, employment in groups [geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz]; no -individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not -only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time proper. -As a rule soldiers in the camp. - -One has to distinguish between _employment in_: - - 1. Operational area, - 2. Reich Commissariats (occupied territories in the East), - 3. General Government, and - 4. Interior and Protectorate. - -To 1: In the _operational area_ take preferably into consideration: - - _a._ Railroads. - _b._ Highway construction. - Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with - increased speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PW’s. - _c._ Clearing work. - _d._ Agriculture. - The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the - feeding of the German people. If necessary Frenchmen and Belgians - are to be used for directing the work of the Russian farm workers - in the eastern area. If farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of - workers. Transfer of German farmers only where actual success can - be expected. - _e._ Railroad-repair-factories, etc. - -Best supervision: “Field kitchen”. Quick evacuation from operational -area necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (escaping and joining -with partisan and robber bands). - -Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East -Prussia desirable.) - -Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible. - -From construction battalions 69,000 workers have been transferred to the -armament industry: replacement by prisoner-of-war battalions. - -Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction -battalions (machine [wood or metal] operators). Investigation by army -desirable. Express will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is -used in the proper place. If necessary, repeated checking should be -instituted. - -To 2: The same applies to employment in _Reich Commissariats_. - -To 3: The above is also applicable to the _General Government_. - -Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of -machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the General -Government is not fully utilized and, on the other hand, the machinery -cannot be made use of for a long time in other places. - -To 4: In the _Interior and the Protectorate_ it would be ideal if entire -factories could be manned by Russian PW’s except the employees necessary -for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the -following are to have priority: - - _a._ At the top, _coal mining industry_. - - Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to - suitability for employment of Russians. At times manning - the entire plant with Russian laborers. - - _b._ _Transportation_ (construction of locomotives and cars, - repair shops). - - Railroad repair and industry workers are to be sought - out from the PW’s. Railroad is most important means of - transportation in the East. - - _c._ _Armament industries._ - - Above all factories producing tanks and guns. Possibly - also construction of parts for airplane engines. - Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned - exclusively by Russians. For the remainder, employment - in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, - production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In - emergency, erect in individual places barracks for - occasional workers which are used as unloading details - and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior - through communal authorities.) - -The General Armed Forces Office of the Supreme Command Armed Forces -[OKW/AWA] is competent for _transporting_ Russian PW’s, employment -through “_Planning Board for Employment of all PW’s_.” If necessary, -offices of Reich Commissariats. - -No employment where _danger to people_ [_fuer Menschen_] or their supply -exists, i.e., factories sensitive to explosions, waterworks, powerworks, -etc. No contact with German population, especially no “solidarity”. -German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians. - -_Food_ is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Supply their own food (cats, -horses, etc.). - -_Clothing_, _billeting_, _messing_ somewhat better than at home where -part of the people live in caverns. - -_Supply of shoes_ for Russians, as a rule wooden shoes; if necessary -install Russian shoe repair shops. - -Examination of _physical fitness_, in order to avoid importation of -diseases. - -_Clearing of mines_ as a rule by Russians, if possible by selected -Russian engineers. - -Employment offices for _civilian workers_ to be kept separate from those -for PW’s. In this respect the wage problem is to be considered. -Furthermore, families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule -employment in groups [geschlossener Einsatz]. - -_Some aspects for labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in general._ - -Rather employ PW’s than _unsuitable foreign workers_. Draft Poles, -Dutchmen, etc., if necessary as PW’s, and employ them as such, if work -through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action. - -General employment of all _German women_ repudiated by the Fuehrer. - -Where Russians can be employed, _labor service_ is not to be used. Labor -service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the -principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War -situation to be taken into consideration. - -_As a matter of principle, central interests precede local interests_, -therefore no resistance from Reich Commissioners and other local -authorities against labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in the homeland. - -_Savings in wages_ are to be offset by compensatory contributions [to -the Reich] by the respective management. - -_Express order by the Fuehrer._ Under no circumstances may the _wage -level in the East_ be raised or assimilated to the wages in western -Germany. Strong action is imperative against recruiting agents who offer -high wages. - -It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of _wages for foreign -workers_. - -_Foreigners not to be treated like German workers_, on the other hand do -not provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters. - -The _welfare installations_ of the German Labor Front [DAF] are _under -no circumstances_ to be used by PW’s or eastern workers. - -All agencies are to promote maximum _utilization of Russian manpower_. - -Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly -organized in the operational area. _Speed_ is necessary, as the mass of -manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets). - -Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of _escaping -prisoners_. Especially in and around Berlin, strictest guarding is -essential. - - [illegible initials] - -Distribution: - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3040-PS[77] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 10 - - EXTRACTS FROM SECRET ORDER OF HIMMLER, 20 FEBRUARY 1942, - CONCERNING THE COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF - MANPOWER FROM THE EAST - - _GENERAL COLLECTION OF DECREES [ALLGEMEINE_ - _ERLASSAMMLUNG (AES)]_ - Part 2 - Secret - _Printed by RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) I Org_ -Section 2 A III f - -Commitment of Manpower from the East. Circular Decree of the Reich -Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the -Interior dated 20 February 1942—S IV No. 208/42 (foreign workers). - -Enclosed I am sending you general regulations concerning the recruiting -and the committing of manpower from the East for your information and -careful attention. - -I have the following additional directives for the Security Police and -the SD [Security Service]: - - _A. MANPOWER FROM THE ORIGINAL SOVIET RUSSIAN - TERRITORY_ - -_I. General security measures._ - -1. The commitment of manpower in the Reich from the original Soviet -Russian territory results in greater dangers than any other employment -of foreigners in spite of the special standards of their way of living, -since a complete separation from the German and other foreign laborers -and a strict supervision will frequently, in practice and especially at -the place of work, scarcely be effected. The Security Police is charged -with the responsibility for preventing the danger and it must do -everything to accomplish its tasks; that is, to diminish the -possibilities of danger to a minimum. Since enforcements cannot be -counted on, it is the special task of the inspectors and state police -administrative offices to urge the other administrative offices, charged -with the commitment of the manpower, to take over the affairs of the -Security Police within the sphere of their jurisdiction. - - * * * * * - -_III. Combatting violations against discipline._ - -1. According to the equal status of the manpower from the original -Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must -be exercised in the quarters and at the working place. Violations -against discipline, including work refusal and loafing at work, will be -fought exclusively by the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. The smaller -cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to -instruction of the state police administration offices with measures as -provided for in the enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards -shall be permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But -this may be done only for a cogent cause. The manpower should always be -informed about the fact that they will be treated decently when -conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work. - -2. In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at the -disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police -office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they will be treated, as -a rule only with strict measures, that is, with transfer to a -concentration camp or with special treatment. - -3. The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual manner. - -4. In especially severe cases special treatment is to be requested at -the Reich Security Main Office, stating personal data and the exact -history of the act. - -5. Special treatment consists of hanging. It should not take place in -the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the manpower -from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special -treatment; at that time they are warned about the circumstances which -led to this special treatment. - -6. Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional -reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be requested. - - * * * * * - -_IV. Subversive activities against the Reich._ - -Anti-Reich activities, especially dissemination of communist ideology, -propaganda of disunity, sabotage acts, are to be fought against with the -strictest measures. The care in obtaining information shall not suffer -through quick arrests, in order to catch the whole group of -perpetrators. Anti-Reich conduct is, as a rule, to be punished by -special treatment, in slighter cases a transfer to a concentration camp -may be considered. - -_V. Criminal violations [Kriminelle Verfehlungen]._ - -1. As a matter of principle, criminal violations—regardless of whether -committed inside or outside the camp—shall be punished by state police -measures. * * * - -2. Criminal offenses [Kriminelle Delikte] are generally to be punished -as violations against discipline, that is, the state police measures -provided for, shall take place in cases of smaller violations, and -special treatment shall take place in cases of crimes—such as, murder, -homicide, and robbery. - -3. Concerning capital crimes against German persons, punishment by -criminal court procedure may, however, in an individual case appear -suitable. If the (superior) state police agency considers this -opportune, it can transfer the case to the prosecuting attorney, under -the provision that pursuant to the criminal laws, one can safely count -on the death penalty for the perpetrator. - -_VI. Sexual Intercourse._ - -Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original Soviet -Russian territory. Because of their closely confined quarters they have -no opportunity for it. Should sexual intercourse occur -nevertheless—especially by the individually employed manpower on the -farms—the following is directed: - -1. For every case of sexual intercourse with our German countrymen or -women [deutschen Volksgenossen oder Volksgenossinnen] special treatment -is to be requested for male manpower from the original Soviet Russian -territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female manpower. - -2. When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign workers, the -conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is to -be punished as severe violation of discipline with transfer to a -concentration camp. - -_VII. Measures against fraternization with manpower from the original -Soviet Russian territory._ - -1. Special attention is to be paid to the fundamental segregation of -manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory from the German -population. It is important to prevent a penetration of communistic -ideology into the German population by cutting off every contact not -directly pertaining to the work and, if possible, to avoid every -solidarity between German people and the manpower from the original -Soviet Russian territory. Against Germans who act to the contrary, steps -are to be taken by the state police according to the situation of the -individual case. - -2. If German countrymen or women should exercise sexual intercourse or -commit indecent acts with manpower from the original Soviet Russian -territory, transfer to a concentration camp is to be requested. - -3. The intercourse between other foreign workers employed in the Reich -and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory also brings -great dangers to be dealt with by the Security Police; therefore, it -should also be fought with measures against the foreign workers. As a -rule, the transfer to a correction camp (deportation for Italians) will -be proper; this also applies to cases of sexual intercourse. - -_VIII. Search._ - - * * * * * - -2. When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment. - - * * * * * - - _B. MANPOWER FROM THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND - FOREIGN MANPOWER, NOT OF POLISH ORIGIN, - FROM THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT AND FROM - THE ANNEXED EASTERN TERRITORIES_ - -_I. General._ - -1. This manpower is to be treated uniformly in the Reich by the state -police. In view of the political attitude of these nations, or ethnic -groups [Volksstaemme] toward the Reich on the one hand and their -position in the East on the other hand, they are to be governed by the -regulations valid for foreign manpower in general, but are subject to -special limitations in their way of living. - -2. These limitations consist essentially in a conspicuous separation of -this manpower from the German people. Since the employment and housing -of this manpower is not closely confined and guarded, it is the task of -the Secret State Police to be especially watchful about the observation -of the mentioned principle. The Secret State Police has to inform the -offices charged with the employment of foreigners through constant -communication, that this principle will be considered in all measures of -work employment. Settlement of these persons in the Reich, individual -billeting in spite of existing collective quarters, position superior to -that of a German worker, etc., must not be tolerated. As far as these -people themselves violate the established principle, and act unlawfully -against Germans by insubordination and acts of violence, such a conduct -will be met with state police measures. - -3. This manpower must, however, by no means be put on the same level as -the Poles or the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, on -account of their nations’ fundamental antagonism toward the Polish -people and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to -them—especially by the establishment of an active intelligence service -among this manpower—since their rather receptive attitude toward the -German nation might change into the opposite, but at least could -stiffen, because too high political expectations are not fulfilled. - - * * * * * - -_III. Fighting against breach of labor contract._ - -1. The fight against breach of labor contract of this manpower is -principally the duty of the Secret State Police. - -2. This does not mean, of course, an interference with the activity of -the Reich trustee of labor, with the means at his disposal in the -regulation and settlement of industrial difficulties as long as no -active intervention is necessary. If more stringent measures are -necessary, the Reich trustee of labor will transfer the proceedings to -the Secret State Police. - -3. In every case, however, it is the task of the (superior) state police -agency to check whether the violation of the working duty by this -manpower is not caused by the plant through breach of contract as well -as general bad treatment. If the conduct of the concerned manpower -appears justified through the fault on the part of this plant, the state -police is not to interfere, since this is free manpower. - -4. In any other case, however, immediate action is necessary and, in -case of a breach of contract on part of this manpower, the transfer to a -correction camp is to be ordered, as a rule. In cases of severe -repetition the transfer to a concentration camp can also be requested. -In the cases of breach of contracts handled by the state police, the -Reich trustee of labor has to be informed each time about the decision. - -_IV. Criminal violations._ - - * * * * * - -3. * * *. Crimes against decency, acts of violence, and acts of sabotage -are to be punished, as a matter of principle, by state police measures -(special treatment); however, I have no objection against a transfer of -the inquiry proceedings to the competent public prosecutor if, pursuant -to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the -perpetrator. In these cases it is to be ascertained what the outcome of -the trial is; should, against expectations, a death sentence not be -passed, a report has to be made to me, attaching copy of the judgment. - -Inquiry proceedings concerning other offenses are, as a rule, to be -transferred to the competent public prosecutor. If a strong increase of -crimes is noted in certain spheres, then there are no objections at all -against punishing purely criminal acts, as a deterrent example, by state -police measures. - - * * * * * - -_VI. Sexual intercourse with Germans._ - -1. The sexual intercourse of the manpower from the Baltic states as well -as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the General -Government and from the annexed eastern territories with Germans is -punishable by severest penalties. (Changed by Circular Decree dated 23 -October 1943.) The workers will be thoroughly instructed through the -attached orientation sheet (enclo. 3) [not reproduced] in the foreign -languages when they report upon their arrival at the local police -offices. An instruction of the German population will be effected -through the Party administration offices. - -2. The district [Kreis] police offices have received instructions to -arrest without delay workers who violate this regulation and to report -them to the competent (superior) state police agency. - -3. For male manpower who had sexual intercourse with Germans, special -treatment is to be requested, for female manpower, transfer into a -concentration camp. The directives issued for the special treatment of -Polish civil workers are valid correspondingly; this is also applicable -for the treatment of the involved German persons. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016-PS[78] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 13 - - LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO ROSENBERG, 24 APRIL 1942, AND - EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON SAUCKEL’S LABOR - MOBILIZATION PROGRAM, 20 APRIL 1942 - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation -GBA - - Berlin W. 8, 24 April 1942 - Mohrenstrasse 65 - (Thuringia House) - Phone: 126571 - - [Stamp] - - Bureau of Ministry [Ministerbuero] - received 27 April 1942, No. 0887 Min. 28/v - Dr. K.P. has been informed - -Very esteemed and dear Party Member Rosenberg: - -Enclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please -excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections. - - Heil Hitler! - Yours, - [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL - 5 copies -copy for Mr. Wittenbacher. - [Signed] WACHS - Chancellory 1 May 1942 - [Kanzlei] - [Stamp] MISCHKE - read: ILFL/KS 4.5.42 - filed: 1-5, 5/5 42 Pg - -To The Reich Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories, -Party Member Rosenberg -Berlin - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -The Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation - 20 April 1942 -Sckl./We. - _The Labor Mobilization Program_ - - * * * * * - -The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich -and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting -armed forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of -the armed forces and also for the nutrition of the homeland. The raw -material as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their -human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the -profit of Germany and their allies. - - * * * * * - -VII. * * * Should we succeed with the help of the Party to convince all -the German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of -the labor mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed to take -good care of and keep up the morale of all the men, women, and the -German youths who work within the labor mobilization program under -extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, as far as their physical and -mental capabilities of endurance are concerned and should we furthermore -be able, also with the help of the Party, to use the prisoners of war as -well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without -harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war and -nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most difficult -part of the labor mobilization program. - - _The Task and its Solution_ - -(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can assure you, -nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest labor problem of -all times, especially with regard to figures.) - - * * * * * - -B. _The Solution_: - - * * * * * - -3. The armament and nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only -to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign -labor. - -Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program which I found -when I took charge of my mission. - -The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of -May-June in order to assure in time and under any circumstances the -availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for an -increased production, in view of coming operations of the army, as well -as of agricultural labor in the sector of the German food economy. - -All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the -East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the -German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be -brought to the highest possible level. - -It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous number of -foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that -purpose is the occupied territories of the East. - -Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of -the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not -succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis, -we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor. - - * * * * * - - _Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers_ - -The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a -gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has -become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of -labor program in this war. - -All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to -exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable -degree of expenditure. - -It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and -mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he has proved himself -the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him -correctly and humanely, even when we expect useful work of him. - -As long as the German armaments industry did not make it absolutely -necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet -prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the -Soviet territories. This has now become impossible and the working -capacity of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent. - - * * * * * - -Therefore, I want to impress most cordially but also most emphatically -upon all the men and women who participate decisively in this war in the -labor mobilization program, the necessity to comply with all these -necessities, decisions and measures, according to the old National -Socialist principle: - - Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work, - that is, for the future of our Nation! - - [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL - [Stamp] - -(The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation) - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS[79] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 16-A - - EXTRACTS FROM INTERDEPARTMENTAL REPORT OF THE MINISTRY - FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES, 30 SEPTEMBER 1942, - CONCERNING THE STATUS OF EASTERN LABORERS - - Berlin NW 7, Hegelplatz 2, 30 September 1942 - -Central Office for Members of Eastern Nations -Ih (ZO) - -Subject: Present situation of the Eastern Labor Problem - -* * * The manner and method by which the problems created through the -importation of millions of members of the eastern peoples into the Reich -are being solved is relevant with respect to two big tasks: - -1. the development of the _war situation_, - -2. the enforcement of the German _claim for leadership in the East_ -after the end of the war. - - * * * * * - -* * * The facts which, by the fall of 1942, have been changed only -partially or incompletely, are, among other, as follows: - -1. The _definition_ of workers from the occupied territories of the USSR -was narrowed down to the legal labor and social labor concept of -“Eastern workers”; thereby, a particular “employment relationship of a -special type” was created among “foreigners”—something which had to be -looked upon, by those affected, as degrading. - -2. The _drafting_ of eastern male and female workers often occurred -without the necessary examination of the capabilities of those -concerned, so that 5 to 10 percent sick and children were transported -along. On the other hand, in those places where no volunteers were -obtained, instead of recruiting them pursuant to labor conscription law, -coercive measures were used by the police (imprisonment, penal -expeditions, and the like). - -3. The _allocation_ to enterprises was not undertaken by considering the -occupation and previous training but according to the chance assignment -of the individual to the respective transports or transient camps. - -4. The _billeting_ did not follow the policies for other foreigners, but -was done like for civilian prisoners, in camps which were fenced in with -barbed wire and were heavily guarded and which they were not permitted -to leave. - -5. The _treatment_ by the guards was, on the average, without -intelligence and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, in -enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, were -exposed to the ridicule of the Poles and Czechs, among other things. - -6. The _food_ was so bad and insufficient in the camps for the eastern -laborers employed in industry and mining that, on the average, the good -capability of the camp members dropped quickly and many sicknesses and -deaths occurred. - -7. _Payment_ was carried out in the form of a ruling in which the -industrial worker would be left on the average with 2 or 3 RM each week, -and the farm laborers with even less, so that the wage transfer to their -homes became illusory, not to mention the fact that no procedure was as -yet developed for such transfer. - -8. The _postal service_ with their families was not feasible for months -because of the lack of preparatory measures, so that instead of factual -reports, wild rumors arrived in their countries—among others, by way of -emigrants. - -9. The _promises_ which had been made time and time again in the areas -of enlistment were in gross contradiction with the facts mentioned under -3 to 8. - -Apart from the natural impairment of morale and working capacity -resulting from these measures and conditions, the result was that the -_Soviet propaganda_ seized upon this matter and exploited it carefully; -for this, an ample basis was provided not only by the actual conditions -and the letters which reached the home country [of the workers] in spite -of the initial blockade, as well as by stories of fugitives and such, -but also by the clumsy publications in the German press about the -respective legal regulations. As early as April 1942, Commissar of -Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in his _note_ to the enemy powers referred to -this, especially in section III of that note in which among other things -it is stated: - - “The German administration is stamping under its feet the long - recognized laws and customs of warfare by ordering its troops to - take into captivity the male civilian population, in many places - even the women, and to apply to them the kind of regime, which - the Hitlerites have introduced for the prisoners of war. This - does not only mean _slave labor_ for the captured peaceful - inhabitants but in most cases also inescapable death by - starvation or death through sickness, corporal punishment, and - organized mass murders. - - “The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear which has - been very widely practiced by the German-Fascist Army at the - time of its advance is taking on a mass character; it is carried - out at direct orders of the Supreme Command of the German Armed - Forces (OKW) and its effects are especially cruel in the - immediate rear areas during the retreat of the German Army. In a - series of documents which have been found by units of the Red - Army at the staffs of destroyed German units, there is a - reference to the Order of the High Command under No. 2974/41 of - 6 December 1941 which orders the deportation of all grown men - from the occupied places to prisoner of war camps. * * * - - “Sometimes, all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the men - were torn away from their families, or mothers were separated - from their children. Only the smallest number of these deported - people have been able to return to their homes. _These returnees - report about unheard-of degradations, heaviest forced labor, - enormous numbers of deaths among inhabitants because of - starvation and tortures, about the murder by the Fascists of all - the weak, wounded, and sick._” - - * * * * * - -The effects of this large-scale radio, press, and leaflet propaganda -which is based on documentary evidence, a propaganda operating even into -German-administered territories, must be considered as one of the main -reasons for this year’s stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as -the threatening increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the -General Government. - -In the meantime, after a _betterment of the condition of the eastern -laborers_ had been insisted upon, not only by the Main Office for -Politics in the Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories, -which has been able to find support in the repeated requests by the High -Command of the Armed Forces, but also by the gentleman charged with the -responsibility for all labor employment as well as the Department of -Labor Employment in the German Labor Movement, which has the supervision -of the eastern laborers—those previously existing legal and police -rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in the 8-10,000 camps in -the Reich have, on the whole, been improved. * * * - -In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, which in many -cases can be traced back to the personal intervention of the -Plenipotentiary General of Labor Allocation, the _total situation_ of -the eastern laborers (sampling date: 1 October 1942) must still be -considered _unsatisfactory_, * * *. - -There remains such a _quantity of grievances and problems_ that it would -be impossible to relate now. - - * * * * * - - [Signed] GUTKELCH - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294-PS[80] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 19-A - - EXTRACTS FROM TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM, SIGNED BY - BRAEUTIGAM,[81] 25 OCTOBER 1942, CONCERNING - EFFECTS OF SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM - - Copy - Top Secret Matter of State [Geheime Reichssache] - [handwritten:] II 1 1161/44 g Rs. - Memorandum - -In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the -destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the Greater -Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial -territory for colonizing purposes and economic exploitation. - -* * * With the instinct characteristic of the eastern peoples, even the -primitive person has soon found out that for Germany, the slogan -“liberation from Bolshevism” was merely a pretext, in order to enslave -the Slavic peoples of the East in her own manner. But lest any doubts at -all exist as to this German war aim, the German public is, to an ever -increasing extent, unabashedly pointing at this intention. Not only for -Germany is the conquered territory publicly being claimed as -colonization area, but even for Germany’s bitter enemies, the Dutch and -Norwegians. * * * - - * * * * * - -Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be -named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of -thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps. -Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is -especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for -prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, while complaints about the -treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and -English, have not been heard of. It is obvious that nothing was so -suitable for strengthening the resistance of the Red Army as the -knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to be met. -To be sure, the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here by -unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the fate -of the prisoners of war. However, this improvement is not to be ascribed -to political insight, but to the sudden realization that our labor -market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced the -grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from the -occupied eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger -like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany. -Now the food question suddenly no longer existed. With the usual -unlimited abuse of the Slavic humanity, “recruiting” methods were used -which probably have their model only in the blackest periods of the -slave trade. - -A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health or -age, the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately -that many more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious -illnesses and other incapabilities for work. It need not be emphasized -that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the -resistance of the Red Army; of course, these methods were used only in -the Soviet Union, and in no way remotely resembled this form in enemy -countries like Holland or Norway. Actually we have made it quite easy -for Soviet propaganda to augment the hate for Germany and the National -Socialist system. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in -spite of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this -bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in order to -break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously, the Main Department for -Politics has struggled unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring -workers and their treatment within Germany on a rational foundation. -Originally it was thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost -efforts with a minimum of food. Here, as well, not political insight, -but merely the most primitive biological knowledge has led to an -improvement. Now 400,000 female household workers from the Ukraine are -to come to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly that -these people have no right to free time and may not visit theaters, -movies, restaurants, etc., and may leave the house at the most three -hours a week, except for duty purposes. - -In addition, there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reich -Commissariat itself. With an unequalled arrogance, we put aside all -political knowledge and, to the happy surprise of all the colored world, -treat the peoples of the Occupied Eastern Territories as whites of class -2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany -and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for them, no -social services must be given them. Their sustenance interests us only -insofar as they are still capable of labor, and, in every respect, they -are given to understand that we regard them as of minute value. - - * * * * * - -Berlin, 25 October 1942 - - [Signed] BRAEUTIGAM - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-61 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 20 - - LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO THE PRESIDENTS OF LABOR OFFICES, - 26 NOVEMBER 1942, CONCERNING DEPORTATION AND - EMPLOYMENT OF POLES AND JEWS - - Copy - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation - - Berlin S.W. 11, Saarlandstr. 96 - 26 November 1942 - - Va 5431/7468/42 g - -To the Presidents of the Landes -Labor Offices (excl. Labor -Office Brandenburg) - - Special-delivery letter - Secret - -Subject: Employment of Jews. _Specif_: Replacement of Jews in - war-essential jobs by Polish labor. - -In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security -Service, Jews still employed will now be evacuated from the territory of -the Reich and replaced by Poles, who are being deported from the General -Government. - -The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service has informed -me on 26 October 1942, that it is anticipated that during the month of -November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district will begin, in -order to make room there for the resettlement of Germans. - -Poles slated for evacuation, as a result of this measure, will be -committed to concentration camps and put to work insofar as they are -criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles, if fit for labor, -will be transported without their families to the Reich, particularly to -Berlin; there they will be put at the disposal of the labor allocation -offices to serve as replacements for Jews to be eliminated from armament -factories. - -The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of -Polish labor will be deported _at once_. This will apply first to Jews -engaged in unskilled labor since they can be exchanged most easily. The -remaining so-called “qualified” Jewish laborers will be left in the -industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently -familiar with the work processes by a period of apprenticeship to be -determined for each case individually. Loss of production in individual -industries will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum. - -I reserve the right to issue further instructions. Please inform the -labor offices concerned accordingly. - - - -To the President of the Landes Labor Office Brandenburg, Berlin W. 62 - -I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as the -removal of Jews allocated for work concerns your district, too, I -request that you take the necessary measures in cooperation with the -competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and of the -Security Service. - - [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-D-PS[82] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 21 - - EXTRACT FROM ORDER OF MUELLER, 17 DECEMBER 1942, - CONCERNING PRISONERS QUALIFIED FOR WORK - TO BE SENT TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS - - Berlin, 17 December 1942 - -The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service -B. Nr. IV 656/42 Secret - - Secret - -Distribution—Secret: - - All Commanders of the Security Police and the Security Service - - All Inspectors of the Security Police and the Security Service - - All Commandants of the Security Police and the Security Service - - All Chiefs of State Police Headquarters - -For information: - - The Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office, - - SS Obergruppenfuehrer [Lt. Gen.] Pohl - - All Higher SS and Police Chiefs - - The Inspector of Concentration Camps - -For reasons of war necessity, which need not be specified here, the -Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered on 14 -December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be -committed to the concentration camps before the end of January 1943. - -In order to reach this number, the following measures are required: - -1. As of now (and for the time being, until 1 February 1943) eastern -workers or such foreign workers, who have been fugitives, or who have -broken contracts, insofar as they do not belong to allied, friendly, or -neutral states, are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest -concentration camps under observance of the simplest formalities listed -under No. 3. In order to eliminate or forestall complaints by outside -public offices, explanations will be furnished, if required, stating -that the measures are essential for reasons of public security on the -basis of the facts in the individual cases. - -2. The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police and the -Security Service, and the Chiefs of the State Police Headquarters will -make immediate checks, applying especially rigorous and strict -standards, on (a) prisons, and (b) labor correction camps. All prisoners -fit for work, if at all possible physically and from a humanitarian -aspect, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, -according to the following instructions, even if criminal procedures -have already been or will be instituted in the near future. Only such -prisoners who are to remain in solitary confinement, for investigation -purposes, may be left. - - * * * * * - - By order: - [Signed] MUELLER - Certified correct. - [Signed] HELLMUTH -[Seal of Secret State Police] Chief Secretary of Police - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS[83] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 25 - - EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM GERMAN-APPOINTED UKRAINIAN - MAIN COMMITTEE TO FRANK, FEBRUARY 1943 - - Copy - -Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytch, -Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee - - Krakow, February 1943 - -To the Governor General, -Reich Minister Dr. Frank. - -Your Excellency: - -Complying with your request I am sending you this letter, in which I -should like to state briefly the critical conditions and the distressing -incidents which are creating an especially grave situation for the -Ukrainian population in the General Government. * * * - - * * * * * - -_II. Measures of labor procurement._ - -The general nervousness is enhanced yet by the wrong methods to obtain -labor, which have been used increasingly in recent months. - -The wild and ruthless manhunt carried on everywhere in towns and -country, in streets, public squares, railway stations, even in churches, -as well as in homes at night, has badly shaken the sense of security of -the population. Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized -anywhere and at any time by the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and -being taken into an assembly camp. The family does not know what has -happened to him, until weeks or months later one or the other gives news -of his fate by a postcard. - -I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs: - - _a._ During such a drive a schoolboy in Sokal lost his life and - another was wounded (App. 2). - - _b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with - identity cards, were assigned in Krakow to a transport of - “Russian prisoners of war” and delivered into a punishment camp - in Graz (App. 3). - - _c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany - by the labor office in the middle of January, were sent via East - Prussia to Pskov in Russia, where most of them died as a result - of the very severe conditions (App. 4). - - _d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment - (Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys from classes (Biala - Podlaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieszow) (App. 5). - - * * * * * - -_III. Question of Personal Security._ - -Of a much worse character are the mass executions of absolutely innocent -persons * * *. - - * * * * * - - _Appendix 12_ - - * * * * * - -As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the -shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great -indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian -population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews are -coming to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is -commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German -sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian -“Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki). - -The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German -authorities and even keep away from the communal kitchens, for fear that -those in need may be considered as beggars and shot. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 30 - - EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 14 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING - LABOR QUESTIONS - -G.B.A. - - April 14th, [1943] - -Sckl./We. - - Forwarded We. - [in ink] April 15th - -To the Fuehrer -Obersalzberg - -My Fuehrer, - -As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the -eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers -from the east for the German war economy in the coming months. - -The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfilment of -the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas, too, -will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer. - -With the addition of about 150,000 workers who furthermore may be -obtained from Poland and from the other territories, it will then be -possible by summer again to put 5-600,000 workers at the disposal of -German agriculture and 1,000,000 workers at the disposal of the armament -and other war industries. - -I ask for your approval to have the new French workers come into the -Reich under conditions similar to those of the last group. I have taken -contact with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW). - -Since the largest part of the Belgian civilian workers and prisoners of -war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar -statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000 -Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a -very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has -repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my -Fuehrer. - -1. After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of -Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added -to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this -year. - -As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their -feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably -regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich -presents a shining example compared to the methods of the capitalist and -bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and -blunders still occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with -the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum. - -In addition to the foreign civilian workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war -are also employed in the German economy. - -2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches -of the German war economy: - - Armament 1,568,801 - Mining industry 163,632 - Building 218,707 - Transportation 199,074 - Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544 - Other branches of the economy 480,298 - -In addition to the foreign workers, 5 million male and female German -workers were channelled into the German war economy proper through -transfer from enterprises unimportant to the war effort, to -war-essential industries, etc. - - * * * * * - - Yours faithfully and obediently, - [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL - -The following persons received a copy of the above version: - -Reich Marshal Goering - -Reichsleiter Bormann - -Reich Minister Dr. Lammers - -Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels - -Additional text on the original letter to the Fuehrer. - -Since I will be in the eastern territories on April 20th, I ask you, my -Fuehrer, to accept in advance my most sincere congratulations along with -those of my district [Gau] and my family. - -Let me assure you that the district [Gau] of Thuringia and I will serve -you and our dear people with all our strength. - -It is the most fervent wish that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the -best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete -satisfaction. - - Faithfully and obediently yours - [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 33 - - LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 3 JUNE 1943, CONCERNING - FOREIGN LABOR SITUATION - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation -1751/43 [pencilled] - forwarded on 6 June 1943 - - Berlin W 8, 3 June 1943 - -To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany -The Fuehrer’s Headquarters. - -My Fuehrer, - -I beg to be permitted to read to you [a report] on the situation of the -labor allocation for the first 5 months of 1943. - -The following number of new foreigners and prisoners of war was for the -first time put at the disposal of the German war industry: - - January 1943 120,085 - February 1943 138,354 - March 1943 257,382 - April 1943 160,535 - May 1943 170,155 - ———— - TOTAL 846,511 - -I may remark that it was possible to reach this figure of 850,000 only -under great difficulties which had not existed during the previous year -and only because all labor allocation agencies, particularly also in the -occupied territories, approached their task with the greatest devotion. - -Unfortunately, quite a number of our officials and employees became -victims of assassination, attack, and the like, by partisans. - -In addition to the labor forces put at the disposal of the economy -within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were made available -within the occupied territories by the agencies of the Labor Allocation -Administration to the Organization Todt as well as to the enterprises -working for the German war economy in the East and the West. -Furthermore, it was possible to assign to the Wehrmacht, in addition to -a large number of laborers, some considerable numbers of labor -volunteers. - -Moreover, by virtue of the order concerning compulsory registration, -dated 27 January 1943, the following number of men and women are made -available. - - │ Men │ Women │ Total -February │ 14,594 │ 163,012 │ 177,606 -March │ 45,606 │ 494,931 │ 540,537 -April │ 19,315 │ 269,374 │ 288,689 -May │ 11,485 │ 186,683 │ 198,168 - │ ———— │ ———— │ ———— - TOTAL │ 91,000 │ 1,114,000 │ 1,205,000 - -However, approximately 600,000 of these persons are available only for -less than 48 hours of work per week. - -Altogether German war industry recruited 2,000,000 laborers during 5 -months of 1943. - -Furthermore, as regards wage control and increase of the output of the -laborers in the various European territories, especially in France, -negotiations were conducted as well as arrangements made and regulations -issued, which enabled us to keep the wage system in the occupied -European territories in order to secure, as far as possible, the living -conditions of laborers working for German interests, in spite of the -difficult conditions created by the war, and to increase production by -means of wage regulations also in these territories. The coordination of -these measures was achieved through agreements with the respective -armament and agricultural agencies, as well as with the Reich -Commissioner for Price Control. - - Heil! - Yours faithfully and obediently, - [Signed] SAUCKEL - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3000-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 34 - - EXTRACTS FROM REPORT RENDERED TO RIECKE, - MINISTERIALDIREKTOR IN THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, - 28 JUNE 1943, ON EXPERIENCES IN POLITICAL - AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE EAST - -Freitag, Chief of Main Office III -with the Commissariat General in Minsk - - Minsk, 28 June 1943 - Secret! - - [stamp] - Main Group Food and Agriculture - Rec’d. 14 July 1943; no encl. - III E 733/43 Secret - -To Ministerialdirektor Riecke -in Berlin - -Subject: Report on experiences in political and economic problems in the - East, particularly the Commissariat General White Ruthenia. - - * * * * * - -* * * The task of the military agencies and, subsequently, of the German -administration, is: “Exploitation of the region for the German war -economy,” and the motto: “Everything you do for Germany is right, -everything else is wrong!” - - * * * * * - -* * * The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had -disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months and -weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and -economic effect * * * From * * * White Ruthenia, approximately 50,000 -people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to -be obtained. Considering the total population of 2.4 million, these -figures are impossible * * *. - - * * * * * - -* * * Due to the sweeping drives [Grossaktionen] of the SS and police in -November 1942, about 250,000 acres of farmland are left unused, as the -population has gone and the villages have been razed. - - * * * * * - - [Signed] FREITAG - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS[84] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 35 - -EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY LEYSER TO ROSENBERG, 30 JUNE 1943, ON CONDITIONS - IN THE DISTRICT ZHITOMIR - -The Commissioner General - - Zhitomir, 30 June 1943 - Secret - -Oral report on the situation in the general district [Generalbezirk] -Zhitomir, by Commissioner General Leyser, delivered at a conference with -Reich Minister Rosenberg, in Vinnitsa, on 17 June 1943. - -Mr. Reich Minister, - - * * * * * - -The symptoms created by the _recruiting of workers_ are, no doubt, well -known to the Reich Minister through reports and his own observations. -Therefore, I shall not report them. It is certain that a recruitment of -labor, in the sense of the word, can hardly be spoken of. _In most -cases, it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force._ The -population has been stirred up to a large extent and views the -transports to the Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from -the former exile to Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems. - - * * * * * - -To date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have been sent to the -Reich from the general district Zhitomir. It can be taken for granted -that, during the month of June, this number is going to rise to -approximately 200,000. - - * * * * * - -The struggle which has to be carried on is hard and full of sacrifices. -But it will and must be carried through. Enormous moral forces have been -mobilized in the personnel of the civil administration in their daily -efforts. The successes which they were able to achieve so far are -impressive, particularly with regard to the resistance encountered. May -I, therefore, be permitted at the conclusion of this report to thank all -my co-workers for their excellent work. They know that they are -practically on the front. I can promise your Excellency, that we all -shall do our duty now, and in the future, as our Fuehrer has ordered. - - [Signed] LEYSER - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 204-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 39 - - EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM OF A CONFERENCE, 18 FEBRUARY 1944, CONCERNING - THE RELEASE OF INDIGENOUS LABOR FOR PURPOSES OF THE REICH - -The City Commissioner in Kaunas. - Kaunas, 18 February 1944. - _PROCUREMENT OF INDIGENOUS WORKERS FOR - PURPOSES OF THE REICH_ - -Numerous drives for the purpose of recruiting indigenous workers for the -Reich have taken place since the entry of German armed forces into the -general district [Generalbezirk] Lithuania in June 1941. A few weeks -after the entry of the German troops, thousands of Lithuanian male and -female farm workers were recruited at the instigation of the military -administration, to work for 6 months on large estates in the Gau East -Prussia. _Unfortunately, the promises made then were not kept._ These -farm workers were not released after 6 months nor after 12 months; their -families remaining behind were left without any support for months; they -were for a long time refused a short vacation in Lithuania, and now it -is even considered to transfer these farm workers, recruited in 1941 for -6 months, to the armament industry in the Reich. - -The second major drive was started by the armed forces in the spring of -1942 and concerned the _collecting of approximately 7,000 male workers -as so-called transport helpers_. The action, which was rushed into -without sufficient propaganda preparation, was greatly handicapped by -unwise measures on the part of the nervous armed forces command. Thus -for instance, the Lithuanians, ordered to the official agencies “only -for registration”, were not allowed to return home and were taken away -under military escort to the local barracks, leaving them no way of -either saying good-by to their families or putting in order their most -important personal affairs. No wonder that the enemy propaganda -exploited this “blemish” with avidity comparing the procedure with the -deportation methods used barely a year ago by the Soviets. - -Until most recent times, numerous additional drives have been undertaken -for the purpose of obtaining volunteers for the armed forces, the police -and the Reich Labor Service, or for obtaining workers for the armament -industry in the Reich. * * * - - * * * * * - -Finally it must be recalled that the indigenous administration in its -present form and since its inception _has completely failed_ in the -question of procuring workers for the Reich. * * * - - * * * * * - -3. Gauleiter Sauckel requested that _30,000 indigenous workers for the -Reich_ be recruited at short order and be shipped to Germany. At a -conference between the Commissioner General and the First Councillor -General [Ersten Generalrat] on 7 September 1943, the latter offered to -assume the entire responsibility for the execution of this drive for the -native administration and to recruit and ship the specified number of -30,000 workers by 7 November 1943. - - * * * * * - -4. In the meantime, Gauleiter Sauckel made an _additional demand_ to the -effect that the general district Lithuania had to furnish _100,000 -native workers_ (instead of the 30,000 demanded up until now) _for the -Reich_. At a conference with all the general councillors on 24 January -1944, the commissioner general did not leave any doubts as to the fact -that this number would have to be furnished regardless of any -consideration, even at the risk of leaving many work projects in the -general district unfinished and permanently removing workers needed on -jobs in the country. The responsibility for the execution of this new -drive lies again in the hands of the local administration, and, with the -consent of the commissioner general, indigenous conscription commissions -have been formed with all district chiefs and all chiefs of judicial and -local districts. The total number to be made available has been divided -up into contingents, and the quota to be furnished by every mayor or -district chief was exactly determined. This is the way the matter looks -in the district of the City of Kaunas: - - New quota, to be supplied 7,000 workers - 20 percent addition 1,400 workers - ——————— - TOTAL 8,400 workers - -In the district of the City of Kaunas, according to the records of my -labor office on 1 February 1944, there were 7,000 unfilled jobs in -industry and the agencies of the armed forces, police, etc., so that to -all intents and purposes 15,400 workers would have to be found in the -city of Kaunas alone, in order to comply fully with the demands of the -Reich and the local economy. _And all that with a total indigenous -population of only a little over 130,000._ - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-103[85] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 40 - -EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE (GERMAN-APPOINTED) POLISH MAIN COMMITTEE -TO THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND ON THE CONDITIONS OF POLISH WORKERS - IN GERMANY, 17 MAY 1944 - -Polish Main Committee -5 Vischer Street, Krakow - - Krakow, 17 May 1944 - -To the Administration of the General Government, -Main Department Internal Administration, -Dept. Population and Welfare, -13 University Street, Krakow - -No. Pa 1/724 - ———— - 6699/44 - -Subject: Situation of the Polish Workers in the Reich. - -The living conditions of about 2 million Polish male and female workers -in the Reich have given rise to shortcomings which are largely lowering -the will and the capacity to work of many workers, endanger their health -and even their lives, and also have a strong influence on the situation -of their families within the General Government, thus directly affecting -the sphere of our own work. - -These bad conditions are felt with particular intensity by those groups -of workers who have been assigned for work in factories and have been -lodged in large camps [Massenlagern]. With regard to workers on the -land, they occur as individual cases and are more easily dealt with. * * -* - - * * * * * - -Food relief allotments—We receive letters from the camps for eastern -workers and their large families, beseeching us for food. The quantity -and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called fourth -category of rations—is absolutely insufficient to maintain the energies -spent in heavy work. 3.5 kg. bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, -cooked with swedes or other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a -meager addition of potatoes now and then, is a hunger ration for a heavy -worker. - -Sometimes punishment consists of starvation, which is inflicted e.g., -for refusal to wear the badge “East”. Such punishment has the result -that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim, Saxony). The -consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and -tuberculosis. The spread of tuberculosis among the Polish factory -workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the -community camps, because energy spent in the heavy work assigned to them -cannot be replaced. - - * * * * * - -The quantities of bread and [other] food fixed for Polish children in -the camps is thoroughly insufficient for building up substance for -growing and developing their bodies. In some cases children up to the -age of 10 and even more are allotted 200 grams of bread daily, 200 grams -of butter or margarine and 250 grams of sugar monthly, and nothing else -(factory in Zeititz, near Wurzen, Saxony). * * * - - * * * * * - -_Care of Children_—* * * An indication of the awful conditions this may -lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers (camp -for eastern workers “Waldlust”, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are -cases of 8-year-old, weak and undernourished children put to forced -labor and perishing from such treatment. * * * - -_Health Care_—The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the -state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by many cases -of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to -the General Government unfit for work. Their state of health is usually -deteriorated past hope of recovery. - -The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and -malnutrition is not recognized as a disease condition until the illness -manifests itself in high fever and fainting spells. - - * * * * * - -_Protection of the Family_—Grave depression is caused among the eastern -workers by the order forbidding marriage among them within the borders -of the Reich. * * * No less suffering is caused by the separation of -families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from -their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor. - - * * * * * - -_Religious Care_—If under these bad conditions there is no moral -support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at -least such moral support which the religious feeling of the Polish -population require should be maintained and increased. The elimination -of religious services, worship, and religious care from the life of the -Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when -there is a religious service for other people, and other measures show a -certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and -outlook of the workers. * * * - - * * * * * - -[Stamp] THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE - - [Signed] [name illegible] - President - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 208-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 55 - - REPORT BY SAUCKEL, 7 JULY 1944, ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS - OF LABOR MOBILIZATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1944 - -Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan -Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation - - Berlin W8, 7 July 1944 - 65 Mohren Street - Thuring House - - Secret - -NR 520/44/g Dr. ST/Ka - - _Special Delivery Letter_ - -To: All Top Reich Authorities - The Reich Leader of the NSDAP - All Top Army Agencies - All Gauleiters - -Subject: Accomplishments of the Labor Mobilization in the first half of - 1944. - -Enclosed I am submitting the total figures on additional manpower placed -at the disposal of the German war effort by the German Labor Offices in -the first half-year of 1944. They represent only such manpower that was -not previously employed in the German war effort. - -According to the quota of 4,050,000 laborers set for this year, -2,000,000 new workers would have had to be secured in the first half of -the year. Because of increased difficulties in Italy and in the occupied -Western countries, regrettably one-half million less than that were -found. If despite the known difficult situation it was possible to -mobilize 1,500,000 people in the first half of the year, it is solely -due to the exertion of all available energy. - -Since the Proclamation of 17 February 1944, around 62,000 women have -reported for “Voluntary Honorary Service,” and 52,000 of them have -already been assigned to work. - - Heil Hitler! - [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL - - -Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan -Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation - - Berlin, 7 July 1944 - _New Manpower Placed at the Disposal of the Economy - between 1 January and 30 June 1944_ - -A. Entire Economy: - - Total 1,482,000 - - Of these were: Germans 848,000 - Foreigners 537,400 - War prisoners 96,600 - -B. Breakdown of allocation of [the persons listed under] A: - - Agriculture and Forestry 231,000 - Of them, foreigners 156,000 - Mining 46,000 - Of them, foreigners 34,000 - Metal industry 415,000 - Of them, foreigners 250,000 - All other [branches of] economy 790,000 - Of them, foreigners 194,000 - -C. Origin of foreign labor: - - Occupied Eastern Territories 284,000 - General Government 52,000 - Protectorate 23,000 - France, excluding Northern France 33,000 - Belgium, including Northern France 16,000 - Netherlands 15,000 - Italy 37,000 - Rest of Europe 77,400 - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3819-PS[86] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 56 - - MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE ON 11 JULY 1944 ATTENDED BY MILCH, CONCERNING - THE LABOR PROBLEM - - _LIST OF ATTENDANCE FOR THE CONFERENCE IN THE - REICH CHANCELLERY ON 11 JULY 1944 1600 HOURS_ - - Name Official capacity Agency -Dr. Kuehne Chief of Mil. Adm. [illegible] - -(1) Warlimont General of Artillery [Lt. OKW - Gen.] - -Dr. Kohlhaase Director of Labor Section of the Supreme - Commissioner, Adriatic Coast, - Trieste - -Dr. Landfried State Secretary, Chief of Italy - Mil. Adm. - -(2) Walter Funk and Albert Speer - -Milch [illegible] - -(3) Krosigk - -(3) Steengracht State Secretary Foreign Office - -Abetz Ambassador German Embassy in Paris - -Hanel [?] Major General Armaments Commissioner Staff, - France - -von Linstow Colonel, GSC Military Commander, France - -Sass Colonel, GSC General [Plenipotentiary] for - Italy - -Franssen Major General Armaments Inspector, Belgium - -Waeger Major General Armaments Office - -Sarnow Ministerialdirektor Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section - -Koegel Lieut. Col., GSC Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section - -Reeder Chief of Mil. Adm. Brussels - -Heider Chief of General Staff Brussels -(4) Ley - -(5) Sauckel Labor Plenipotentiary Berlin - -H. Backe Minister Reich Food Ministry - -Marrenbach Chief [of Dept.] German Labor Front - -Leyers Armaments Plenipotentiary Italy - -Also present: - - Ministerial Direktor Klopfer (Party Chancellery) - Ministerialrat Froehling - Ambassador Rahn - Dr. Huber - (6) Chief of Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner - General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann - Colonel Meixner (OKW) - -(1) United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. See vols. X and XI. - -(2) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of Major War -Criminals, vols. I-XIII, Nuremberg, 1947. - -(3) United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker et al. See vols. XII, XIII -and XIV. - -(4) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major -War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947. - -(5) Ibid. - -(6) Ibid. - - - Berlin, 12 July 1944 - -_To Rk. 5815 C_ - -Subject: Stepped-up Procuring of Foreign Manpower - - Executive Conference, 11 July 1944 - -_Note_ - -Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs -and representatives indicated in the attached list of those present. No -guarantee can be given for the completeness of the list, as not all -participants signed the register. - -_Reich Minister Dr. Lammers_[87] reported by way of introduction on the -various proposals on hand by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor -Allocation calculated to bring about the increase in labor in Germany -which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited -the theme of the discussion by saying that all possibilities were to be -examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be -offset, for example, the question of the reestablishment of an -acceptable price and wage differential between the Reich and non-German -territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the -solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion -could be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must -be examined how the police agencies, regarding the inadequacy of which -the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation has serious complaints, -could be strengthened, on the one hand, through bringing influence to -bear on the foreign governments and, on the other, through reorganizing -the indigenous police forces by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, the -police or other German agencies. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then gave -the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, Gauleiter -Sauckel. - -_Gauleiter Sauckel_ stated that the present deficit of the half-year -program for 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be filled by 30 June of the -current year, totals 500,000. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured -up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were -apprentices and women, two categories which cannot be regarded as -full-fledged workers. Of the 560,000 foreigners put to work, -three-fourths came from the East alone. This result was a scandal -considering that the German people now are mobilized for work to the -fullest extent and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German -authorities in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers -were still idling. In mobilizing the manpower we did not exert the -necessary severity and, in particular, we were unable to achieve the -necessary unity of the German authorities. It was quite improper for -German authorities to interfere irresponsibly in the tasks of the GBA -[Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation]. He had to have much greater -freedom of action, just as was the case in 1942. With the present -methods of recruitment for voluntary employment we would not make any -progress, for one thing because any volunteers still available exposed -themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow -countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly hired and decently -treated at their jobs, they would do completely satisfactory work. -Attention to the wage and price questions connected with the subject was -desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If no -effective action were taken now, our manpower mobilization program would -fail, with the consequence that the combat troops would no longer -receive the weapons they need. - -_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, stressed that the -Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same -standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. The -Foreign Office, however, could do nothing except press the foreign -governments more or less urgently to meet German demands, and this has -been done consistently up to the present. The police power was handled -by others who, therefore, would now have to voice their opinion on the -subject of the conference. - -_The Deputy for the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont_, referred to a -recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had -to put themselves at the disposal of the task to secure manpower. -Wherever the Wehrmacht was not employed exclusively in essential -military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal -defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be -_assigned_ for the purposes of the GBA [Sauckel]. General Warlimont made -the following practical suggestions: - - _a._ The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over - the additional task of securing manpower in the partisan areas. - Everyone who cannot fully show cause for his presence in these - areas is to be seized for labor; - - _b._ When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food, - are wholly or partly evacuated, the population suitable for - labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the - Wehrmacht; - - _c._ The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the - areas near the front is to receive special attention with the - assistance of the Wehrmacht. - -_Gauleiter Sauckel_ accepted these suggestions with thanks and said that -he expected that a certain measure of success would no doubt be achieved -by these means. - -On behalf of the _Military Commander of Belgium and Northern France_, -the _Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder_, put up for -discussion the possibility of expanding the Military Police, now -totaling only 70, and of the Civilian Searching Service -[Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 strong). If -the Military Police were increased to 200, appreciable results could be -achieved. Upon inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont -promised on behalf of the OKW that the searching service would be -reinforced. - -On further inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, as to whether the -population suitable for work could not be taken along as the troops -withdrew from an area, _Colonel Saas_ ([_Plenipotentiary_] _General for -Italy_) stated that Field Marshal Kesselring had already directed that -the population in a zone of 30 kilometers’ depth behind the front was to -be “captured”. This measure, however, could not be extended to areas -extending farther behind the lines, because of the most severe shock -that would be inflicted on the whole structure of these areas, -especially in regard to the industry still in full production. - -_Gauleiter Sauckel_ was of the opinion that widest circles of the -Wehrmacht saw something disreputable in the labor recruiting program. -There had been actual instances where German soldiers had endeavored to -protect the population from being taken away by German labor recruiting -agencies. Therefore it was essential to explain to the front troops the -extraordinary importance of labor recruiting. In contrast to the much -too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevist conception of war -for the fighting troops, on occupying a new territory, to put the entire -population to work at once. The question for the administration thus was -not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. It would be -necessary to establish a few object lessons, and the passive resistance -would quickly change into active cooperation. Nor ought one to shrink -from proceeding drastically against the administrative heads -[Behoerdenleiter] themselves who sabotage the labor recruitment. Not the -small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible -administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other -means too must be applied. Thus it would be advisable to remove a large -part of the exceptional Italian crops in order to improve the rations of -the German and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the -entirely insufficient rations for the Italian military internees who -were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute -for these military internees gradually altered. This would release a not -inconsiderable labor potential. - -_Reich Leader Dr. Ley_ underscored these statements and suggested the -establishment of a searching service made up by all German forces in the -non-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless recruiting in -large areas. - -These proposals were countered by the following objections: - -_Reich Minister Funk_ holds that ruthless raids would entail -considerable disturbances in the industries of the non-German -territories. The same opinion is held by the _Chief of the Military -Administration of Italy, State Secretary Dr. Landfried_, who believes -that the German forces making up the executive body are too weak, and -fears that the Italian population would escape seizure in great numbers -and flee to uncontrollable areas. - -_Reich Minister Speer_ states that he had an interest in both promoting -increased labor recruiting for the Reich and maintaining the production -in the non-German territories. Up to the present, 25 to 30 percent of -the German war production was furnished by the occupied Western -territories and Italy, with Italy alone supplying 12½ percent. The -Fuehrer had recently decided that this production must be maintained as -long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, -especially in the field of transportation. The Military Administration, -in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, was easily capable to seize -sufficient foreign workers at its present strength, as only a relatively -small police force was needed for that purpose. The chief need was for -stricter orders, but violent measures or large-scale round-ups were not -to be carried out. Rather it would be advisable to proceed gradually -with clean methods. - -On behalf of the _Military Commander in France, Chief of Military -Administration Dr. Michel_, referred to the statements of State -Secretary Dr. Landfried and stated that the situation in France was -similar. The calling up of entire age groups was being prepared in -France, but had not yet begun as the German military authorities had not -yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French -authorities could not be doubted, but it was lacking partly at the lower -and middle levels. The friendly administrators and individuals willing -to work and showing cooperativeness toward the German authorities, -exposed themselves to reprisals by the French population. - -_Ambassador Abetz_ confirmed these statements. The application of severe -measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, was of no avail. -Such a policy only served to drive the population into the Maquis. In -these territories, where there were large German armed forces, it would -no doubt be possible to obtain a few more ten-thousands of workers. Then -these same German forces could be employed in police duty, which would -also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which -was being considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In -this connection it might be possible to transfer the manpower of entire -industries in a body. - -The _Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner_, declared himself -willing, if asked by the GBA, to place the Security Police at his -disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For -all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable -whether entire age groups could be seized with these feeble forces. In -his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on -the foreign governments. - -_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, commented to the -effect that the agreements made with the foreign governments were -entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, upon -requests of the Foreign Office, to issue the necessary orders. If these -orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate police power -of the foreign governments themselves. In France, it had been reduced to -a minimum for political reasons. In Italy an executive power was no -longer extant. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to -exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not -expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked -Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy. - -_Ambassador Rahn_ believes that there is still a sufficient number of -workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out, -although 2/3 of the Italian territory and population had been lost. He -had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was -generally successful until the fall of Rome, as could be seen from the -fact that it was possible to seize 200,000 Italians for military -service. Since that time the situation in Italy had become extremely -difficult, however, as the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the -Italian people. The German authorities had done what they could to -neutralize these effects and to that end had merged all executive power -in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of -violent methods on a large scale was impracticable because it would -cause complete disorder and disrupt production. The best example for -this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the -strikes in Turin, when 10 percent of all factory labor forces were to be -conscripted because they were shirkers. A force of 4,000 Germans was -brought together for that purpose. The result was that the food and -power supply of Turin was cut off by the resistance movement so that -250,000 workers had to stop working. This could not be tolerated in view -of the substantial contribution of the Italian armament industry to the -war effort. Field Marshal Kesselring declared that continuation of -forced recruitment would cause not only the loss of the armament -production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater -of war. In the face of this statement the hardiest political will must -keep silent. The only thing which could be done was the execution of the -forced recruitment in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn -believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out: - -_a._ The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued. - -_b._ To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with -machinery and workers. - -_c._ The transfer of wage savings of the Italian workers in Germany to -their homeland, which is not functioning well, is to be ensured. For -this purpose an automatic procedure is to be introduced which Ambassador -Rahn had already proposed in another connection. - -_d._ The system of the induction of age classes will be resumed when the -German military authorities consider the time ripe. - -In answer to the reported remark of Field Marshal Kesselring, _General -Warlimont_ (OKW) commented that this remark was unknown to the OKW. The -OKW’s approval of this standpoint could therefore not yet be assumed. - -_Gauleiter Sauckel_ declared that all these proposals were inadequate -since they were not suited to mobilize the masses of manpower which he -needed. The execution of all these proposals had already been tried in -practice since the labor mobilization authorities had at no time limited -themselves to any single method. He still had to name as seriously -damaging to the execution of the labor mobilization plan the fact that -his far-reaching jurisdiction and powers had been made the subject of -discussion. What he needed, as already said, was “elbow room”. - -At the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Gauleiter Sauckel -declared himself willing to set up several programmatic demands on which -he would consult with the interested parties and which then would be -submitted to the Fuehrer with a request for endorsement and translation -into law. A written formulation will follow. For the time being the -Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation presents his demands as -follows: - -_a._ The proposals of General Warlimont will be discussed directly among -the interested parties and will be carried out jointly. - -_b._ The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation receives -permission to establish local security and recruiting machineries for -labor recruitment, which will operate on the basis of his orders and -directives without interference by other offices. - -_c._ The regulations on recruitment of labor for Germany promulgated by -French and Italian authorities are to be given solid foundations by -concrete implementation orders which guarantee the most active -collaboration of foreign authorities in the acquisition of manpower. - -After these statements were made Reich Minister Dr. Lammers closed the -meeting, pointing out that he would leave the further handling of the -problem to those concerned, as proposed. - - [Initialed] L. [LAMMERS] - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 1 - - EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE ATTENDED - BY MILCH ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942 - - _POINTS OF DISCUSSION ON VISIT TO FUEHRER HEADQUARTERS - ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942_ - - * * * * * - -16. Upon recommendation of Field Marshal Milch, the Fuehrer decides that -the 6-month contracts for foreign workers should be dropped and that tax -regulations, which stand in the way against this measure, are to be -rescinded. Rather, contracts are to be introduced which would provide, -in the event of employment of longer duration (exceeding six months), a -single lump sum compensation of some kind—also in view of the fact that -there would be a corresponding saving of the cost of travel back and -forth. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 32 - - EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES, - 21 AND 22 APRIL 1942 - - _POINTS OF DISCUSSION FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE - OF 21 AND 22 APRIL 1942_ - - * * * * * - -SPEER: - -20. The Fuehrer explains clearly in an elaborate form that he does not -approve the bad food dispensed to the Russians. The Russians must -absolutely be given sufficient food, and Sauckel has to see to it that -this food will now be guaranteed by Backe. - -21. The Fuehrer is surprised that the civilian Russians are kept like -prisoners of war behind a barbed wire fence. I told him that this was -due to a decree issued by him. The Fuehrer knows nothing of such a -decree. I request the documents pertaining thereto to be included in the -forthcoming Fuehrer file and at the same time to see to it that Sauckel -will arrange to have the civilian Russians no longer treated like -prisoners of war. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 2 - - EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES - OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943 - - Berlin, 8 January 1943 - _POINTS OF DISCUSSION AT THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE - OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943_ - - * * * * * - -SPEER: - -55. The Fuehrer demands unequivocally that in no case must it be -permitted that France be less burdened than Germany. Germany must -sacrifice her blood for this war. We must insist that France intensify -her economic contribution. Any French workers on that job showing signs -of resistance will be deported, if necessary, as civilian internees. At -the slightest attempt of sabotage the most rigorous measures must be -taken. Any maudlin humanitarianism is out of place. - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS[88] - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 3 - - REPORT FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 10 MARCH 1943, CONCERNING - DIFFICULTIES ORIGINATING FROM THE DRAFT OF - MANPOWER IN FORMER SOVIET TERRITORIES - - _Teletype_ - 10 March 1943 - -To the Fuehrer -Fuehrer Headquarters - -_With the urgent request to be submitted to the Fuehrer in person -immediately for decision_ - -Subject: Difficulties originating from draft of manpower in former Soviet - territories. - -My Fuehrer, - -You may be assured that the labor assignment is being pushed by me with -fanatical will but also with circumspection and with due consideration -for economic and technical as well as human necessities and conditions. - -Replacement for soldiers who will be relieved and the stockpiling of -additional labor needed for the armament programs can and will be -carried through, notwithstanding the fact that especially during the -last two winter months the greatest difficulties had to be overcome. Yet -it was possible to make 258,000 foreign workers available to the war -economy for January and February alone despite the fact that in the East -transports practically ceased. The employment of German men and women is -in full progress. - -Inasmuch as the difficulties of the winter months will now gradually -disappear, and as preparations were made by me, also the transports from -the East can again be resumed in full measure. Although the yield of the -registration and employment of German men and women is excellent, the -employment of the strongest and most efficient foreigners who are used -to work cannot be neglected. - -Unfortunately, some of the commanding generals [Oberbefehlshaber] in the -East have prohibited the compulsory enrollment of men and women in the -conquered Soviet territories for—as Gauleiter Koch[89] informs -me—political reasons. - -My Fuehrer, in order to enable me to carry out my assignment, I ask that -these orders be rescinded. I consider it entirely impossible that the -population of former Soviet nationality could be accorded a greater -measure of consideration than our German people on whom I have been -forced to place very drastic measures. Should it no longer be possible -to enforce the compulsion to work in the East, nor to draft labor, then -the German war economy and agriculture will likewise no longer be able -to fulfil their tasks in full measure. - -I myself am of the opinion that under no circumstances should the -commanders of our armies give credence to the Bolshevist propaganda of -atrocities and defamation. After all, it is to the interest of the -generals themselves that replacements for the troops be made in -opportune time. - -I take permission to point out that—without wishing to discredit their -best will—it is impossible to put German women—entirely inexperienced -in work—into the place of hundreds of thousands of excellent workers -who now have to go to the front as soldiers. It must be possible for me -to replace them with people from the Eastern territories. - -I myself report to you that all foreign nationals who are working with -us are being treated satisfactorily according to humane standards; that -they are being treated correctly and fairly; they are being fed, housed, -yes, even clothed. Because of my own experience in the service of -foreign nations, I am even bold enough to claim that never before have -foreign workers been so decently treated anywhere in the world as is -being done by the German people during this the hardest of all wars. - -I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to cancel orders which prevent the -enrollment of foreign male and female workers and to kindly advise me -whether my concept of the assignment as laid down herein still is -correct. - -I ask your permission to report to you in person on several important -points of the labor recruitment early next week, possibly on Tuesday. - -In lasting gratitude, loyalty and obedience, yours, - - [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 33 - - EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 30 MAY 1943 - - Obersalzberg, 1 June 1943 - _Fuehrer Conference on 30 May 1943_ - - * * * * * - -SPEER: -[Marginal Note] Schieber, Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, Keitel, Waeger. - -19. The coal situation causes the Fuehrer to call a meeting with -Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, and Keitel. - -At this meeting will be discussed the allocation of sufficient labor for -the coal district, the removal of Russian prisoners of war from farming -and small war industries (insofar as they are employed as unskilled -labor) and their replacement by other workers from the Ukraine, Poland, -etc. - -Furthermore it is intended, if possible, to raise the food rations of -the German miners, even above present levels. The Russians are to get -plentiful additional rations, which will be individually allotted by -plant managers on the basis of efficiency. - -Additionally the German workers—and particularly also the Russian -prisoners of war—will receive bonuses for higher production in the form -of tobacco and similar items. - -The details are to be discussed in a preliminary conference so as to -establish uniform data as regards quantities, etc., for submission to -the Fuehrer. - -On no account must we capitulate to existing conditions on the coal -question. Coal is _the_ critical basis for maintaining our production -and the entire domestic economy. - -[Marginal Note] Saur, Kippung, Milch, Dornberger. - -20. The Fuehrer desires that in areas which are certainly recurrent -targets of enemy air attacks (Ruhr District, Krupp-Essen) about 100 to -200 rocket projector batteries be installed, which experimentally are to -fire a steady stream of rockets set for the computed altitude of the -enemy formations. - -Some of these rockets will, on detonating, loose wire coils. The Fuehrer -expects, after all, significant and not only psychological effects from -massed, unaimed fire against concentrated air attacks on these targets. - -Milch and Dornberger are to state their views on the subject. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 4 - - EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF - 11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943 - - 14 September 1943 - _FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943_ - - * * * * * - -DETHLEFFSEN: - -16. The Fuehrer brings up the question of air force matériel production -and the discussion with Messerschmitt, and asks for my personal -intervention with the Reich Marshal [Goering] and Field Marshal Milch to -cut down appreciably on the number of aircraft types. - -17. The Fuehrer approves Messerschmitt’s recommendation that a monthly -conference be held on questions pertaining to developments and -productions for the Luftwaffe, on the introduction of new types and -modifications with the participation of construction designers and -production experts. This is to be discussed with Field Marshal Milch. - -MILCH: - -18. The Fuehrer is displeased that the long-range Messerschmitt plane -had not yet been taken up by the Luftwaffe. M. is said to have been -unable to obtain the support of the Luftwaffe for it. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 34 - - EXTRACT FROM FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944, - CONCERNING SPEER’S REPORT ON THE FRENCH - LABOR SITUATION - - 6 January 1944 - _FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944_ - - * * * * * - -[Marginal Note] Kehrl, Waeger. - -The Fuehrer has been informed of the differences of opinion with the -Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. According to my arguments, -the principal thing is to exploit the industry of France for Germany to -a larger extent, in order to be able to locate there about 1 million -additional workers. However, Sauckel is of the opinion that first of all -workers have to be brought to Germany. - -The Fuehrer explains that in his view the transfer to France is of -extreme importance, be it only on account of the possibility to increase -the production of iron connected therewith. In spite of this, in his -opinion, one cannot do without bringing additional French labor to -Germany. It must, therefore, be attempted to find a happy union of both -things. In this connection he proposes to designate protected works in -France, in order to induce the French to work in these plants just -through the pressure of allocation of labor for Germany. Upon my -statement that the protected plants have already been established, he -affirms again the importance of this institution and the necessity to -create here a basis of long-range confidence. He thinks that it is my -affair whether I will be able to do without French labor or not; Sauckel -could be only happy if I would do without them. - -Upon my reply that this is not the only problem, but that also the -question of the _executive power_ is involved, since otherwise a loss of -prestige for Germany and a disorder in the allocation of French labor -would be inevitable, the Fuehrer declares that this is, of course, one -of the most important bases for further discussions. I then told him -that on 3 January there will be a meeting between Himmler, Keitel, -Sauckel, and myself (Kehrl) (is the Foreign Office to be included?), at -which these problems will be discussed. Subsequently there shall be a -meeting with him, at which the possibility of executive power in France, -as far as the allocation, and the transport of French workers to Germany -is concerned, will be laid before him. (Kehrl to do advance work, that -we also make a claim for executive power for the protection of the -factories in France against terror bands.) - ------ - -[74] The basic importance of this Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 was -emphasized by the IMT Judgment. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vol. -I, pp. 188 and 200, Nuremberg, 1947. - -For translation of entire document see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, -vol. VII, pp. 847-854, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, -1946. - -[75] When the prosecution introduced this document in evidence, the -following colloquy ensued (Tr. p. 49): - -JUDGE SPEIGHT: Do you establish a chain between all of these documents -which you read and the defendant? - -MR. DENNEY: If your Honor please, the prosecution, in presenting these -documents, has in mind to give an over-all picture of the way slave -labor was treated in Germany, going back to the early days showing that -this defendant knew because of attendance at the May 1939, conference -that slave labor was going to be employed. Then as Air Ordnance Master -General, later as Chief of the Jaegerstab, and later as a member of the -Central Planning Board, we will connect him with enterprises involving -slave labor. - -JUDGE SPEIGHT: Very well. - -[76] Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. See -case of United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al., vols. X, XI. - -[77] For more complete translation of document see Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. V, pp. 744-754, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[78] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. III, pp. 46-59, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[79] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. III, pp. 130-146, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[80] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. III, pp. 242-251, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[81] Otto Braeutigam, member of the Economic Political Department of the -Foreign Office. As of May 1941 detached by the German Foreign Office to -Rosenberg’s Agency, the Eastern Ministry (Ost-Ministerium). - -[82] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. III, pp. 778-9, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[83] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 79-93, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[84] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. III, pp. 234-238, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[85] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, -vol. VIII, pp. 104-107, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, -1946. - -[86] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, -vol. VI pp. 760-772, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946. - -[87] United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker, et al. See Vols. XII, -XIII, XIV. - -[88] After Dr. Bergold read this document into the record he made the -following statement (Tr. pp. 520-521): - - “Which proves that until March 1943, the commanders in the - conquered territories were opposed to the labor conscription, - and that it was Sauckel who demanded that this opposition be - removed, because he was of the opinion that foreign people had - to produce the same as the German people. It is further - important that he didn’t declare that to the Fuehrer alone but - also to the defendant [witness] Speer and the defendant Milch. - Accordingly, the defendant [witness] Speer later on will attest - that never before have foreigners been treated so fairly. In - other words, he lied to the men who were to work with him.” - -[89] 1130-PS. See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 797-799, -U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946. - - - - - 2. THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD - - _EXCERPT FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION - REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD, 6 JANUARY 1947_[90] - -MR. DENNEY: We come now to the part of the proof which places the -defendant in the very center of the Slave Labor Program. - -We have shown that from the outset of the war and prior thereto, he was -thoroughly informed of the Nazi plan for total war, which contemplated -the full use of all human material resources within the homeland. We -will show he was active in the formation and announcement of decisions -of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board exercised -jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use. He -carried out the master plan for requisition, allocation, and use of -human raw material for the war machine. There are words we will have by -necessity to repeat as we introduce the documents—requisition, -allocation, and use. - -Our evidence will show that Milch, a member of the Central Planning -Board, belonged to an organization—and here again we have another -important word “belong”. He was one of two most essential men in the -Planning Board that guided the decisions of that organization. - -We will present to the Court excerpts from the minutes of some 12 -conferences at every one of which Milch was present, starting with the -first held in April 1942 and ending with the fifty-eighth held in May -1944. Actually, he was at all but eight conferences, and we use the -figure “eight” advisably. We are not sure, he may have been in some of -those. There is no question that he was in every one of those meetings -which we introduce here. On occasions when Speer was not present Milch -presided. We will show he actively participated when the Central -Planning Board arrived at decisions with respect to the request, -allocation, and use of this labor. - -We will show he was active in the formation of the announcement of -decisions of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board -exercised jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use -of labor. And all of them were prisoners of war and were allocated to -the German war effort. Requisition, allocation, and use were the -dominating voice. Decisive influence, active participation, forced -labor, illegal occupation—these are the words with which we are -concerned, and these are the things with which he concerned himself. - - Evidence - - _Prosecution Documents_ - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - R-124 48-B Stenographic record of the 447 - first conference of the - Central Planning Board on 27 - April 1942. - - R-124 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 448 - transmitting the statutes of - the Central Planning Board. - - 1510-PS 58 Extracts from decree of 16 450 - September 1943, defining the - duties of the Planning Office - of the Central Planning - Board. - - 3721-PS 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452 - September 1945, regarding the - jurisdiction of the Central - Planning Board. - - NI-1098 63 Extracts from affidavit of 456 - Fritz Sauckel, 22 September - 1946, regarding the - jurisdiction of the Central - Planning Board. - - R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 457 - eleventh conference of the - Central Planning Board, 22 - July 1942. - - R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 459 - seventeenth conference of the - Central Planning Board, 28 - October 1942. - - R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 461 - minutes of twenty-first - conference of Central - Planning Board, 30 October - 1942. - - R-124 48-B Extracts from stenographic 465 - minutes of the twenty-third - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 3 November - 1942. - - R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 467 - minutes of the thirty-third - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 16 February - 1943. - - R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 471 - minutes of the thirty-sixth - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 22 April - 1943. - - R-124 48-A Report of the forty-second 475 - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 23 June 1943. - - R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 478 - minutes of the fifty-third - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 16 February - 1944. - R-124 48-B Report on the fifty-third 479 - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 16 February - 1944. - - R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 484 - minutes of the fifty-fourth - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 1 March 1944. - - R-124 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498 - fifty-sixth conference of the - Central Planning Board, 4 - April 1944. - - NOKW-287 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 499 - April 1943, concerning the - protection of industry. - - R-124 48-A Speer’s minutes of a conference 501 - with Hitler on 8 July 1943. - - R-124 48-A Extract from the report by Saur 502 - of the conference with the - Fuehrer, 5 March 1944. - - _Defense Documents_ - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - R-124 5 Extract from the stenographic 509 - report of the eleventh - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 22 July 1942. - - R-124 6 Extract from the stenographic 510 - minutes of the twenty-second - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 2 November - 1942. - - R-124 7 Extract from the stenographic 510 - minutes of the thirty-second - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 12 February - 1943. - - R-124 8 Extract from the stenographic 511 - minutes of the thirty-third - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 16 February - 1943. - - R-124 9 Extract from stenographic 516 - minutes of the thirty-ninth - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 23 April - 1943. - - R-124 31 Extracts from the stenographic 517 - minutes of the fifty-fourth - conference of the Central - Planning Board, 1 March 1944. - - _Testimony_ - - Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert 502 - Speer before commission on 19 February 1947 - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B - - STENOGRAPHIC RECORD OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE - CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 27 APRIL 1942 - - Berlin, 27 April 1942 - - Secret - - _“THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD” IN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN_ - - _1ST CONFERENCE_ - -Present: - The three members: - Reich Minister Speer, - Field Marshal Milch, - State Secretary Koerner. - Furthermore: - State Secretary Dr. Schulze-Fielitz, Ministry of Munitions, - Ministerialrat von Normann, Four Year Plan. - -Result: - -I. The _Central Planning_ in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich -Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942—VP 6707 g) is a task for -leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters. It makes -unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of its directives. -The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous institutions difficult -to control, but always on individuals and fully responsible persons who -are free in the selection of their work methods and their collaboration -as far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning. - -II. _Discussion of the situation in iron._ - -A. The objective is to reach a production of 2,2 million tons per month. -In the first place it has to be established whether, after taking into -account the excessive requests which were certainly made and of the -difficulties confronting an increase of production (coal, transport) the -present figures are sufficient (2 million tons). For the distribution in -the third quarter these 2 million tons have to serve in any case as a -basis. - -B. The principles of distribution and the new quotas will be discussed -in a subsequent conference with a wider circle of participants (see -special protocol). - -C. The _iron-producing industry_ will be organized into a Reich -association. It is to be established and made to operate as soon as -possible. The creation of an interimistic liaison organization (Planning -Group Iron) has, therefore, been abandoned. The task of the Reich -Association ends with the production of iron and before the distribution -of the iron. - -D. For the position of president of the Reich Association Iron, -Generaldirektor Voegler and Geheimrat Roechling[91] are suggested. -Roechling was chosen, the appointment of whom would be approved by the -Fuehrer, according to Reich Minister Speer. State Secretary Koerner will -submit the proposal to the Reich Marshal [Goering]. - -III. The reorganization of the Upper Silesian Territory with the object -of the highest and best utilization for war economy in mind is urgent. -The selection of locations and the determining of capacities in this -territory has to be expedited with regard to raw material, transport, -and labor. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B - - LETTER OF 20 OCTOBER 1942 TRANSMITTING THE STATUTES - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. -Central Planning Board. -_Z. P. 1_ - - Berlin, October 20, 1942 - -Enclosed I send you, for your information, the statutes of the Central -Planning Board with the request to support the office of the “Central -Planning Board” in every possible way in its work, and to direct, more -particularly, your section chiefs and reporters to forward all -information requested orally or by writing, in the shortest possible -time. By this collaboration of your section chiefs and reporters, the -building up of a larger apparatus in the framework of the “Central -Planning Board” is to be avoided. - - BY ORDER: - [Typewritten] WALTHER SCHIEBER - Certified: SCHWINGE - Ministerialregistrator - -[Stamp of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.] - -Distribution to— - - _a._ The highest Reich authorities. - _b._ The Reich Protector. - _c._ The Governor General. - _d._ The executive authorities in the occupied territories. - - _STATUTES OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - -1. The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the Reich -Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals only with the -decision of basic questions. Professional questions remain the task of -the competent departments, which in their fields remain responsible -within the framework of the decisions made by the Central Planning -Board. - -2. In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have the -execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning Board -appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies appointed by -each of three members of the Central Planning Board; one of these three -deputies shall be appointed chief of the office. - -[Handwritten marginal note on left side of the document: “To be -forwarded”.] - -3. In accordance with the attached Table of Organization [not -reproduced], the office appoints reporters. These reporters are at the -disposal of all members of the Central Planning Board. The office -appoints one reporter to keep the record. - -4. Office and reporters have to see to it, above all, and to draw the -attention of the Central Planning Board, if necessary, to the required -measures, that— - - _a._ All decisive tasks of war economy are achieved quickly, - without red tape, and ruthlessly, by mutual adapting of all - composing branches. - - _b._ All such work as is obviously without importance for - winning the war, be discontinued. - -5. _Tasks of the office_ - - _a._ The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning - Board in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning - Board have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in - advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks - with the competent departments, etc. - - _b._ On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the - office sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central - Planning Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that - the deadlines fixed are complied with. - - _c._ The members of the office keep the members of the Central - Planning Board informed between the sessions. - -6. The distribution of work, dealing with incoming mail, etc., is -arranged by the office itself. The members of the office sign: “By -order” of the Central Planning Board. - -7. _Tasks of the reporters_ - -Reporters have to keep in constant touch with the departments, with -regard to the sectors of work they are in charge of. In the regular -sittings of the office they report on the progress made and on the -measures which are required for the carrying on of the war economy, -especially for the increase in production, for other improvements in the -supply with raw materials, and for necessary changes in distribution. -They do the preliminary work for the meetings of the board (see also 5 -_a_) and in their working sector they are primarily responsible for the -execution, within the established time limits, of the decisions of the -Central Planning Board. - -Berlin, 20 October 1942. - - [Typewritten] MILCH - [Typewritten] SPEER - [Typewritten] KOERNER - - [Stamp] -Berlin 6-11-1942 -No. L 16-501 - -Copy to the State Secretary for his information. - - [Typewritten] DR. SCHATTENMANN - -Certified: Schulz, Reg. Sekr. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1510-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 58 - - EXTRACTS FROM DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1943, DEFINING THE - DUTIES OF THE PLANNING OFFICE OF THE - CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD - - Berlin, 16 September 1943 - -_DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1948 OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY GENERAL FOR ARMAMENT -TASKS WITHIN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN AND OF THE REICH MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT -AND WAR PRODUCTION CONCERNING THE TASK OF THE PLANNING OFFICE_ - -The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has established a Planning -Office in my department by decree of 4 September 1943 for the purpose of -concentrated handling of all fundamental questions of war economical -planning. - -In this connection I order: - - I - -1. The Planning Office prepares the decisions of the Central Planning -Board and supervises their execution. - -2. In this connection it will especially prepare the distribution to -consumers of basic materials (for instance, iron, metals, coal, mineral -oil, nitrogen, and other important raw materials). - -3. As a working basis for Central Planning Board, the Planning Office -has to draw up plans for production and distribution for the entire war -economy, the demand schedules being based on the demands of the entire -German sphere of power. In this connection imports and exports are to be -considered. The entire planning is to be synchronized in advance with -the participating departments and specialist offices, taking into -account production requisites. The Planning Office will constantly have -to summarize and to evaluate the necessary statistical material. - -4. The Planning Office will have to submit to the Central Planning Board -for decision the proposed assignment of manpower to the individual big -sectors of employment (trade industry for war effort [gewerbliche -Kriegswirtschaft], traffic, foodstuffs, etc.). It also has to evaluate -statistically the carrying through of the assignments. - - * * * * * - -6. The Planning Office will have to advocate towards the Reich Ministry -of Economics the requirements of war industry in connection with the -establishment of import and export quotas. - -It has to report constantly to the Central Planning Board about the -state of imports essential for war economy. - - * * * * * - - II - - * * * * * - -4. The Planning Office has to evaluate statistically the industrial and -war production existing within the power sphere of Greater Germany or of -the states allied with the Reich; it has to develop out of that -evaluation proposals for a common exchange of production in order to -increase the initial war production. - - * * * * * - - [Signed] SPEER - The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production - Plenipotentiary General for - Armament Tasks within the Four Year Plan - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3721-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT NO. 41-A[92] - - TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, REGARDING - THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD - -TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL TAKEN AT NUERNBERG, GERMANY, 1030 HOURS TO -1210 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, BY JOHN J. MONIGAN JR., MAJ., CAC, -OUSCC - -MAJOR MONIGAN: Principally, what I am interested in are the functions -and responsibilities of the Central Planning Board in their relationship -to your office and their relationship to industry. - -SAUCKEL: I believe that this Central Planning Board was founded about -three months after my taking over my office. The Board was founded in -accord with a law by the Fuehrer or just upon an agreement between the -Fuehrer and Speer and Goering, I don’t know which. The leader and -chairman of this Central Planning Board was Speer himself. It was -founded to transfer the work from the Four Year Plan to Speer, I think, -because Goering was already ill at that time, and there also were -difficulties about which I am not informed. Speer always took on the job -of making great changes in production and put it under his own -direction. Constant members of this Central Planning Board were the -State Secretary and Field Marshal Milch, and State Secretary Koerner. -These three were responsible for the decisions of the Central Planning -Board and for internal matters and they went through this office if they -were worked out by other people inside the office. I was only called to -this Central Planning Board when my task was discussed, and the demands -were put before me and my agencies by Speer, the Four Year Plan -[Office], as well as by Milch. The Fuehrer himself told me to fulfil -these demands without question. In other words, if Speer asked me for a -certain amount of workers, for instance, several thousand, I could not -refuse him. The particular minister had to give the number to the -Central Planning Board and that was the only place where the number of -workers could be discussed. In the Central Planning Board it was decided -how many workers I was able to supply to these various sections like -Milch and Speer, agriculture, and so on. If it came to an argument, -these discussions were brought before the Fuehrer and he then decided -himself. - -Q. Would the Central Planning Board, in their outline of workers to be -provided for agriculture and for Speer and for Milch’s industries, etc., -just give you the numbers of workers which they required, or would you -get the final destination of the workers too, say panzers [tanks] and -machine guns, and so on, from the Central Planning Board? - -A. In general, I always got the numbers for the sections in large, -except for Speer who always demanded individual allocations of workers -to agriculture or mining; in other words, Speer always demanded a -certain number of workers for a certain kind of work. - -Q. Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in general for the -broad field, but in Speer’s work you would get them allocated by -industry, and so on. Is that right? - -A. The others only received whatever was left over, because Speer told -me once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for Speer -and that I mainly am his man, he mentioned it very often, without -reference to the countries involved. It was very unnatural, that process -of doing these things. These smaller plants, instead of ordering their -workers from the next higher echelons, gave their orders to the very -highest, to Speer, who in turn handed them down to the lower ones and to -me, and this was the reason for the Rotzettel (red slip) system which -had to be fulfilled by me without question. In practice it came to this -that if a factory actually didn’t need any workers but Speer demanded -them for that factory I had to supply these workers without being able -to discuss or to tell him that it would be a waste of manpower; I just -had to do it because Speer had complete domination. - -Q. When it was determined in the Central Planning Board that say a -thousand workers would be required by Speer, how did these workers find -their way from all over Germany and Europe into the Krupp factory, for -instance? - -A. The orders were given from higher echelons down to lower echelons; -for instance, the transports were either turned over from one office to -another or the lower echelons in Berlin, for instance, got orders to -transfer certain men from one factory which happened to be in Berlin to -another factory which was also in Berlin. This happened also through the -cooperation among the various offices who were headed by Hildebrand. The -orders were discussed in a so-called daily schedule of trains which was -decided upon in all these meetings. - -Q. Well, as I understand it, you would get a requirement for say a -thousand workers for panzers, say; now, in Germany certain factories -would be making tread, some would be making turrets, and some would be -making other things. Now, of that thousand workers needed for tank -production some would be working on treads and some would be working on -other things. How did they get into the particular factories which were -making the specific products? - -A. This was accomplished by giving orders recklessly through the various -offices. A factory, for instance, got an order to send 20 or 30 men to -another place, and they were just ordered to go there. This was the -reason for the Notdienstverordnung [Emergency Service Decree] where the -workers were forced by a decree to obey any order which was given to -them. - -Q. After the workers were conscripted inside the Reich and outside, they -would be worked according to certain skills and technical specialties, -would they not? - -A. As far as possible, they were used according to the profession they -had been trained in. - -Q. And the local Gau labor offices, etc., would have a list of all the -workers according to their skills, would they not? - -A. Yes, there were detailed files about this. This was the basic -principle: There were various offices which only were concerned about a -certain kind of trade or skill. - -Q. So, when you got the request from the Central Planning Board for a -hundred thousand men for tank production, would you, through your -ministry, tell the various offices that you needed so many welders and -so many machine tool people, etc., and then tell them how many of each -specialty you wanted? - -A. When I got these orders my assistants were always present and they in -turn took down the individual numbers required for this kind of work. I -also received rosters which pointed out in detail how many people were -needed for certain productions and how many were needed in a certain -place. There was also, besides the red-slip system, another one, which -was a system used after the red-slip system. We called this the -Dringlichkeitsstufen—that means the priority system for workers. These -Dringlichkeitsstufen, which were divided according to place and kind of -work, were given to me in the presence of my assistants and they in turn -worked out these plans. The influence of Speer was so great that -sometimes he specifically asked for certain specialists from a certain -factory to be turned over to another place. It also happened that we -were not even told about these things. If we were not able to supply him -with workers from inside Germany, we had to take them from the other -departments or from foreign countries. There was always a reserve of -something like 500,000 people who went to schools where they were -trained for the armament production. - -Q. That was 500,000 German and foreign workers? - -A. Yes. - -Q. When a requirement was fixed for Speer or for Milch in the Central -Planning Board and they called you in and said we need 500,000, or some -number of workers, would they give at that time the breakdown of what -kind of workers they wanted, or would they give a blanket request for -500,000 without the listing of specialties? - -A. Naturally, they gave a detailed breakdown. For instance, they only -asked for miners, but they also asked for specialists in that kind of -work. - -Q. The requirements would be stated in detail for the kind of work, not -only whether it should be a mine worker, but, for instance, a locomotive -engineer in a mine, or something like that, would they not? - -A. Naturally, since there are many kinds of professions; I, for -instance, put in charge of the mining President Dr. Gaertner who was -always oriented about the different jobs which were required in that -field of work. - -Q. Then after you got the detailed specification of the qualifications -of the workers desired, would you also get a statement as to what places -they would work in, and so on? - -A. This was just the remarkable thing about it, especially from Speer; -factories were always mentioned and they were also mentioned by -priority; for instance, the ones that always were working on the -so-called Fuehrer orders had priority over the others. Speer actually -controlled the small places, not step by step, but directly from the -highest echelon. - -Q. So that you would be informed at the Central Planning Board, at least -for Speer’s factories, about the specialists and the place to which they -were supposed to be sent, is that right? - -A. The Central Planning Board determined only the numbers for a certain -time, three months or so. These orders were then forwarded to the -individual offices, who were working for me, from all kinds of -industries; the Central Planning Board met only every two weeks or so. - -Q. The Central Planning Board would decide that Speer would get so many -hundred thousand and Milch would get so many hundred thousand, and that -the agricultural program would get so many hundred thousand. Then, that -was agreed upon, if they all agreed upon it among themselves in the -Central Planning Board, and had no disputes regarding the number. But if -there were disputes, then the Fuehrer would decide? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Then, after they decided a hundred thousand for Speer, then the -section chiefs (in the rings for tank treads, and machine guns, etc.) -would meet with your section later and say we need so many hundred -thousand, we need 10,000 who are welders and 10,000 who are metal -workers, etc., is that right? - -A. Yes. A daily conference was held among the different offices where it -was decided how many workers were needed for the individual industries. -It did not occur that when a factory asked for a certain amount of men, -it was like that: Speer said this factory has to be supplied with so and -so many workers. In peacetime it was different. - -Q. And the requirements of Speer were met as a matter of priority among -all the other industries; first Speer and then the others? - -A. Yes. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NI-1098 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 63 - - EXTRACTS FROM AFFIDAVIT OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1946, REGARDING - THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD - -A. 1. I, Fritz Sauckel, born in Hassfurt-Unterfranken on 27 October 1894 -was honorary Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS and SA, Reich Governor -[Reichsstatthalter], Commissioner for Reich Defense and Gauleiter of -Thuringia. Since 1942 I was Plenipotentiary General for Manpower and -from 1933 on I was a member of the Reichstag. I state upon oath the -following facts which are known to me personally: - - * * * * * - -L. 1. The Central Planning Board intervened in the problem of foreign -workers to the extent of determining priorities and in representing and -demanding the requirements of the economics branches consolidated in the -Central Planning Board. It also transmitted these demands to the -Fuehrer. The competent gentlemen of the Central Planning Board at the -same time of course represented their ministries as heads. Thus I am not -in a position today to say whether Speer, for instance, spoke in one or -the other capacity in connection with any special matter. At any rate -the Central Planning Board determined the total labor requirements. In -practice I only obtained labor for them. - -2. I attended sessions of the Central Planning Board only when questions -concerning the mobilization of labor were involved. Sometimes only my -representatives, Dr. Timm, Landrat Berk, Stothfang, or Dr. Hildebrand, -attended. - -3. The competent gentlemen from Speer’s Ministry also attended. Speer -had a labor mobilization department where the requirements of industry -were collected and confirmed. - -4. Milch produced the figures for aviation. The same was done by Speer -in his sphere of activity. Speer and Milch, however, also exerted -influence on the allocation of workers. How far this came within their -capacity as members of the Central Planning Board I cannot say; in any -case they did this in their ministerial capacity. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 22 JULY 1942 - - Berlin 24 July 1942 - Dr. Goe/W - -Reich Minister Speer -Minister’s Office - - Secret - _REPORT ON THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE “CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD” ON 22 JULY 1942_ - -Present: - - Reich Minister Speer - Field Marshal Milch - State Secretary Koerner - Kommerzialrat Roechling Reich Association Iron - Dr. Rohland Reich Association Iron - Von Bohlen und Halbach Reich Association Iron - Dr. Langen Reich Association Iron - Bergassessor Sohl Reich Association Iron - Gauleiter Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for Labor - Mobilization - State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry - General Director Pleiger Reich Association Coal - Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal - Major General Gablenz Reich Air Ministry - Colonel Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry - Ministerial Director Gramsch 4 Year Plan - Ministerial Advisor Normann 4 Year Plan - Dr. Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Dr. Stellwaag Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Major Wagner Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Brigadier General Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Lieutenant Colonel Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Ministerial Advisor Dr. Wissmann Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Dr. Goerner Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - - * * * * * - -Securing of food. A net influx of 1 million foreign workers is counted -on. This number was not reached in the past months. Even with an influx -of more than 1 million in the coming months, the 1-million peak will -actually not be surpassed in view of current departures of workers. Food -for this 1 million is secured.[93] - -To what extent an improvement of the food situation, through a sharper -hold on the production outside of Germany, could be accomplished. - - * * * * * - -Every day a train load of the forces recruited in the East will be -directed to the coal mines until the figure of 6,000 is achieved. -Prisoners of war are being obtained, at present, from camps in the -General Government. 51,000 prisoners of war in the Senne Camp. In the -district east of the General Government there are 74,000 prisoners of -war available. Up till now an elimination quota of 50 percent of -unemployable people has been reckoned with in the allocations to coal -mining. It is considered necessary that not too high demands should be -placed on the choice of prisoners of war. The Miner’s Union doctors -[Knappschaftsaerzte] are to be informed that a different standard is to -be established for the prisoners of war than for German miners. - -For the consecutive order in which the prisoners of war are to be put to -work, it will be laid down, that before the metal workers are chosen, -the coal mining in the first place and requirements for the loading and -unloading commands in the second place are to be considered. - -Field Marshal Milch undertakes to accelerate the procuring of the -Russian prisoners of war from the camps. - - [Typewritten] DR. ING. GOERNER - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE SEVENTEENTH CONFERENCE - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 28 OCTOBER 1942 - - Berlin, 30 October 1942 - -The Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan -Central Planning Board - - _REPORT ON THE 17TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD ON 28 OCTOBER 1942, 0930 HOURS_ - - Increase of Coal Production -_Allocation of Labor_ - -Coal production in the Ruhr district has increased to 390,000 tons per -day. Any further increase depends on whether the requirements for labor -are being met. About 104,000 men are required. Furthermore 7,800 -men—originally 16-17,000 requirements having been brought down by -rationalization—are needed for the supplying industry, 6,800 of these -for the machine industry. 5,000 more unskilled workers are furthermore -required to secure the transport of mine-timber which is essential for -reason of variety [Sortimentsgruenden]. - -The intake capacity of the mining industry for the month of November is -44,000 prisoners of war, of whom 25,000 are for the Ruhr district, and -12,600 eastern workers, 7,500 of whom are for the Ruhr district. Total -requirements so far amount to 191,000 laborers of whom 90,700 were -wanted by the Ruhr District. Up to 24 October a total of 123,000 was -allocated. These numbers are still to be checked up by the Reich -Association Coal (RVK) and Mr. Sauckel. - -According to the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, the following -number of prisoners of war is at present at hand. - - Within the Reich (on the way and in camp) 30,000 - Remainder of prisoners of war (outstanding from a total of 60,000 - 150,000 and promised up to the beginning of December) - At camps in the General Government 15,000 - -Of these the following can be regarded as available up to 1 December: - - Within the Reich 15,000 - Of the remaining prisoners of war 10,000 - From the General Government 7,500 - ——— - Total about 32,000 - -Therefore, as compared to the required 44,000, there is a deficit of -about 12,000. Moreover, 10,000 civilian laborers from the East can be -put up by exchanges from the agricultural sector which is 2,000 less -than required so that the November deficit amounts to 14,000 and, in -comparison with the total requirements of the mining industry of -104,000, there is a deficit of 62,000. The deficit increases by the -smaller number of prisoners of war the size of which is still to be -ascertained by the Commissioner of Labor. - -The mining industry is in a position to use any amount of eastern labor -instead of prisoners of war. Therefore, it is to get preference at the -combing-out of the agricultural sector. There is no objection to a -temporary accommodation of eastern labor at prisoner-of-war camps -(without barbed wire, etc.). - -The requirements of the supply industry are to be met by the Red Label -method [Rotzettelverfahren]. Constructors are to be provided by -canvassing at the French prisoner-of-war camps for officers. - - [Typewritten] DR. STEFFLER - - * * * * * - -Present: - - Reich Minister Speer - Field Marshal Milch - State Secretary Koerner Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Staatsrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Brig. Gen. Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Lt. Col. v. Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Herr Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Oberberghauptmann Gabel Reich Economic Ministry - Colonel Dr. Krull Reich Economic Ministry - Oberbergrat Otto Reich Economic Ministry - State Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Traffic Ministry - Staatsrat Heinberg Reich Traffic Ministry - Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan - Min. Rat Steffler Four Year Plan - Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation - Oberreg. Rat Hildebrand Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation - Gen. Dir. Pleiger Reich Association Coal - Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal - Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal - Dir. Winkaus Plenipotentiary for Mining Requirements - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF TWENTY-FIRST - CONFERENCE OF CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 30 OCTOBER 1942 - - _EXCERPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 21ST - CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - -Re: Labor supply and direction of labor held on 30 October 1942, -afternoon, at the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munitions. - - Berlin, Pariser Platz 3 - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: There is but one possibility, and that is, that the moment the -Wehrmacht takes prisoners in operational territory, they are to be -immediately turned over to us. We will move them away much faster than -the Wehrmacht. - -MILCH: The correct thing to do would be to have all Stalags transferred -to you by order of the Fuehrer. The Wehrmacht takes prisoners and as -soon at it relinquishes them, the first delivery goes to your -organization. Then everything will be in order. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but we do not have sufficient personnel for guarding the -prisoners. - -(MILCH: The Wehrmacht should have to provide you with that!) - -SAUCKEL: As soon as prisoners of war are taken, they should be placed at -our disposal and we would then allocate them in a fair manner. However, -with the present method we get nothing or only a fraction of what the -Wehrmacht had promised us, although the prisoners had been taken by the -Wehrmacht. - -TIMM: We can hardly hope to achieve that, since this might have -something to do with the convention concerning the treatment of -prisoners of war. - -MILCH: The man who acts there for you can wear a uniform all right and -be a soldier. Only his superior will not be Herr Reinecke but Herr -Sauckel. - -For psychological reasons emphasis should be placed on first of all -covering the requirements of the Wehrmacht branches, without other -considerations. The feeling, we don’t get it anyway, has gradually -permeated our whole air force industry—and I heard the same about the -army. I will admit that these gigantic allocations are completely -misjudged. For example, in the Luftwaffe where from an original -allocation of 480,000, a balance of 150,000 was left over [per Saldo -uebrig]. The plants always look only at the balance [Saldo]. However, -there are many plants also who have suffered an actual decrease in -manpower, especially in a young industry like ours, which is occupied -with the manufacture of very special products. This industry has many -young people, of whom many again have been drafted into the Wehrmacht. -This drafting is done in such an idiotic way that one actually has to -feel ashamed. All three experimenting engineers working on a development -which may have an important bearing on the outcome of the war are simply -drafted. They are not sent to the front or into training but sit around -in the back somewhere and are guarding some camp. No consideration -whatsoever is given to individual cases. Of course the plants then call -for replacements. The masses cannot fill these breaches, and qualified -replacements we cannot supply at all. Herr Dr. Werner, for example, -writes a letter to Herr Schieber of which he forwards a copy to me and -which states that production figures established in the delivery -schedules can no longer be met, owing to the fact that for weeks -partially even for months, no manpower has been allocated, and that even -current withdrawals cannot be replaced by the labor offices -[Arbeitsaemter]. The fact, that we can no longer meet the demands of the -rising production, that backlogs are increasing more and more, fills him -with rising apprehension. He then goes into details, but always reverts -to the same conclusion: everything might be accomplished, we could even -get the necessary material; in the final analysis we fail, however, in -one important aspect in connection with our whole armament program—the -allocation of manpower. If only we had, if only we had—thus it goes all -day and in every conference. - -I am convinced that many people are beginning to put in fake requests -and exaggerate their requirements. There is only one way to straighten -out this affair. In my department, I do it this way: if for months a -spare part cannot be found, the entire front begins to hoard this -article; so, for instance, the tail skid of a Ju 52. Then we proceeded -to manufacture triple the amount of the expected requirements, yet no -tail skids were available. Ordnance stock piles were filled with it; but -they did not issue any. I then said: We will now manufacture nothing but -tail skids until we hear shouts not to send any more. Thus, an affair -like that gets finally straightened out. And here likewise we must say -for once: We will supply the required laborers to the industry, if -necessary by depriving other fields. Agriculture, at the moment can -spare laborers; it does not need them from 15 November to 15 March of -next year. It is just a waste to have to feed them. Only a small number -will be needed for the procurement of wood. Thus we are able to -generously help industry and later on again replenish agriculture. At -the same time we have the advantage of getting fairly well-fed people. -As Herr Timm recently explained, prisoners of war from the Ukraine would -not serve our purpose; they could not regain their physical strength on -what they get to eat in the industry. Even supplying them with better -food than we give to our own people would not be sufficient to get them -beyond a still weakened condition. In agriculture they get additional -food. Don’t muzzle the mouth of a beast when food lies all around it. -This is also of advantage to prisoners of war and workers from the East. - -However, we have to finally do away with the general feeling: we have -nothing and we want yet anything; we have been forsaken by God and the -Fuehrer; constantly more and more is demanded of us; how can we still -believe in this great program? We can only carry it out if we have such -faith in it, as is spoken of in the Bible. In January we started with a -monthly production of 2,000 engines; today we have reached 4,000, and in -a year and a half I must reach 14,000. That of course is a gigantic -achievement for a month. Every engine has at least 1,200 h.p. If in -measurements of horsepower I compare the present with the former World -War, then the present achievement is 40 times as great. What an immense -amount of manpower was available at that time for an industry so totally -different from ours! Yet today we must come up to more than three times -that, which we have already done. That means, that in airplane engines -alone we have to achieve 135 to 140 times as much as we did in the World -War. Dr. Werner who is responsible for the engine industry proposed how -this can be done. He said: We must apply a mass production scale -everywhere, or else we will not accomplish it. He has very progressive -ideas in this field. With the airplane engine, it can be done for sure. -Crankshafts and connecting rods, etc., we can produce on a mass -production scale. Today we manufacture 40,000 connecting rods. However, -we still have no machines today that assemble these products -individually on the assembly line. The Americans have such machines. We -are lacking about 10 construction engineers and 5 mechanics; they just -simply cannot be procured. One must for once satisfy the needs of the -people again. I have always put them off until November and told them -that Sauckel would produce the necessary labor from agriculture. - - * * * * * - -SPEER: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the -sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories where -doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is -nothing to be said against SS and police taking drastic steps and -putting those known as slackers into concentration camps. There is no -alternative. Let it happen several times and the news will soon go -around. - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: We talked of taking the waiters out of the restaurants in -Germany. But in this respect we have absolutely an abundance in France, -the General Government and the Protectorate. As long as we have not -skimmed that off, we could not take the responsibility towards the -German people for such a measure. Again a cable of the Foreign Minister -has burst into my recent negotiations in France stating that under no -circumstances should the Ministry Laval be put into peril. The Fuehrer -has said: If the French show no good will, then I shall retake the -800,000 French PW’s. If they show good will, then the French wives can -follow their husbands to Germany and work there. Of course, he said, I -have an interest that Laval remains in power. The Ministry Laval will -remain, it depends only on us. And Laval cannot go back after he has -reproduced in his speech and spoken before the French passages which he -has taken verbally out of my appeal. Only Pétain could bring him to -fall. I wish to draw your attention to the fact, however, that in France -there is a surplus of young men all of whom we could use in Germany. If -we expect our people to accept severest restrictions then we cannot -admit such luxuries in Paris as, e.g., small restaurants with bands of -25 musicians and two waiters per table. I am firmly convinced, if we are -brutal also against the others then we can extract quite a considerable -number of men out of the General Government—I sent an efficient man, -President Struwe, over there—and of the Protectorate. This need not -interfere with the armament industry over there. There is, therefore, no -fear that the demand could not be met. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B - -EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE - CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 3 NOVEMBER 1942 - - Secret - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 23D CONFERENCE OF - CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - - _Concerning the fixing of iron quotas, on 3 November 1942, 1600_ - _hours in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions,_ - _Berlin, Pariser Platz 3_ - - * * * * * - -PLEIGER: * * * For the physical strain on the miners, who practically -work two Sunday shifts each month, is such that they could not stand it -for another six months. In other words—this is the important point—the -quota of approximately 95,600 men is still lacking and must be assigned -to work now at last; it was promised to me at one time. The gentlemen of -the Ruhr tell me: We have our huts ready. Some of them are not -completely furnished, and I reproached the people for it. They answered, -however: But you promised us workers for about half a year. We have -always been ahead with our huts. How can you reproach us now, our huts -were not ready. The workers assigned to us will be taken care of. I -would be very thankful if Sauckel would be induced to assign to us the -quota of workers. - -SPEER: He received the instruction in the last conference of the Central -Planning Board to assign workers first of all to the coal-mining -industry as well as to the iron-producing industry, for you the amount -of 44,000 plus 12,000, plus 7,500 for the feeder industry, plus 5,000 -for pit props. The same holds true for Mr. Rohland. - -PLEIGER: In our conferences it must always be taken as a basis that the -Reichsbahn, with regard to the allocation of cars, is at least in the -same position as they were last year. - -(SPEER: That’s pretty bad.) - -—No, it allocated over 80,000 cars in December. - - * * * * * - -SPEER: Can you give me by name any smelters or other people which could -be taken out? - -(ROHLAND: Yes.) - -This would still be another 50 or 100, I guess. - -ROHLAND: I figure about 40 men per Martin furnace. If we take away 20 or -15—let’s say 20—as trained Martin furnace smelters, we would have 300 -men. 300 smelters could help us a lot. But when will they come? - -SPEER: Then we could deceive the French about the industry in such a -way, as if we would release among the prisoners of war the rollers and -smelters—they have—if they give us their names. - -ROHLAND: We opened our own office in Paris. In other words, you mean the -French should report the smelters who are prisoners of war in Germany? - -MILCH: I would simply say: You will get two people for one of this kind. - -SPEER: The French firms know exactly who is a smelter among the -prisoners of war. There you should make it appear, as if they would be -released. They give us the names and then we take them out. Try it. - -ROHLAND: That’s an idea. - -MILCH: We in the Luftwaffe and airplane industry will also try to find -out: Who is a roller, smelter, or furnace mason. - -ROHLAND: But by the time the people arrive, the quarter of the year will -be over. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-THIRD - CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, - 16 FEBRUARY 1943 - - Secret! - - Top Secret State Matter - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE[94] - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - - _Concerning Labor Supply on 16 February 1943 at 1600 hrs. at the_ - _Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions 3,_ - _Pariser Platz, Berlin_ - - * * * * * - -TIMM: I should like to say something about the labor supply -possibilities. Perhaps you will permit me to emphasize the negative side -a little. The greatest difficulties result from the fact that the supply -of labor outstanding could not be fully dispatched from the East, but -came in in ever diminishing numbers. One may say that they have almost -become completely exhausted. Eastern laborers during the last six weeks -arrived only in smaller numbers than in former times, so that they can -hardly be included to an appreciable amount on the credit side of the -supply account. In any case their numbers are small. The foremost reason -is that in former months most transports were dispatched from the -Ukraine while the main recruitment areas were those which in the -meantime have become operational areas, or even are no longer in our -hands. The forecasts we made applied to a large extent to the transport -of people from the Caucasus district, the Kuban, from areas like -Stalingrad. We prepared measures which should enable us to draw more -eastern workers again during the following months. I venture to think -that we should be able, on a conservative calculation, to transfer -during the month of March between 150,000 and 200,000 laborers from the -East to the West. - -(SPEER: Including or excluding those needed for agriculture?) - -Including those needed for agriculture. But in my opinion it will be -necessary to apply much pressure, since just those districts are -concerned which have been pacified to a certain extent, and for the same -reason will not be very much inclined to release labor. This is -calculated on the assumption that some labor has to be released also -from the eastern and northern parts of the East. - -The second area, capable of releasing a considerable amount of labor is -the General Government and that for the January estimate which has been -drawn up with particular caution as I again wish to emphasize. We expect -that the figures will be surpassed rather than not reached. I think we -can expect a number of 40,000, of which, it is true, a part will have to -be given to agriculture, if we intend no more than to cover the losses -which we had to inflict last autumn. - -Beyond this it ought to be possible in my opinion to employ within the -Reich, and especially for the mining industry, part of the Polish -Building Service. I venture to think one ought to enlarge this -organization in such a way that more age groups than so far are called -up for it, since this procedure is functioning. The younger age groups -which in fact are especially suited for mining could be dispatched to -the Reich. In this case the supervisors who are provided for the -greatest part by the Building Service, will be needed only in very small -numbers in the Reich. - -The next area would be the Protectorate on which I cannot make a final -statement today. We have been promised for the month of March about -10,000 laborers. But I am of the opinion that some loosening-up is -possible. The Plenipotentiary will soon in a personal visit take in hand -the possibility of this loosening-up. - -France is included in the account with 100,000 laborers for March. -Messages which I received permit us to hope that this number will be -increased in the middle of March. Belgium is included with 40,000, -Holland with 30,000, Slovakia with 20,000, who, it is true, are -exclusively suited for agriculture, since their share of individual -workers has been completely delivered. This item consists exclusively of -agricultural laborers, owing to a state treaty. For the remaining part -of the foreign areas I included another 10,000. This amounts altogether -to 400,000 laborers who should arrive in March. One might be entitled to -add for the last month altogether 10,000 prisoners of war. These are men -to be drawn from the East. It can be expected that this number might -under certain conditions be surpassed, since the High Command intends -especially for operational reasons, to take the prisoners of war back to -the Reich, particularly from the areas threatened by the enemy. - -A former item concerns the fluctuation of labor which certainly amounts -to about 100,000 laborers. Then there are items which at the moment -cannot be estimated—the yield from the threatened areas and from the -“Stoppage-action”. Here I cannot venture to name final figures, but I -hope to be able to do so next month. - -SAUCKEL: Of course, we regret very much that last autumn we were unable -to recruit as much as we would have liked in the areas which now are -again in enemy hands. This is partly due to the fact that we were not -assisted in the degree we had expected. Moreover we were not able to -effect the removal of the civil population which had been planned. These -events are an urgent reminder of the fact that it is necessary to employ -foreign laborers at once and in great numbers in Germany proper and in -the actual armaments industry. You may be certain that we wish to -achieve this. We have not the slightest interest in creating -difficulties for an armaments office, even for those working for German -interest abroad, by taking labor away from them to an unreasonable -extent. But on this occasion I should like to ask you to try and -understand our procedure. We Germans surely have sent to the front -between 50 and 75 percent of our skilled workers. A part of them has -been killed while the nations subjugated by us need no longer shed their -blood. Thus they can preserve their entire capacity with regard to -skilled workers, inasmuch as they have not been transferred to Germany -which is the case only for a much smaller percentage than all of us -supposed, and in fact they do use them partly for manufacturing things -which are not in the least important for the German war economy. If we -proceed energetically against this abuse, I ask you to give me credit -for so much reason that I do not intend to damage the foreign interests -of the German armaments industry. The quality of the foreign worker is -such that it cannot be compared with that of the German worker. But even -then I intend to create a similar proportion between skilled and workers -trained for their job, as it exists in Germany by force of tradition, -since it has come about that we had to send men to the front in much -larger numbers than we requested France or any other country to do. -Moreover we shall endeavor increasingly to bring about on a generous -scale the adaptation of the French, Polish, and Czech workers. I do not -see for the moment any necessity for limiting the use of foreign labor. -The only thing I ask for is that we understand each other, so that the -immense difficulties and friction between the respective authorities -disappear and the program drawn up by us will by no means be frustrated -by such things. - -There are without a doubt still enough men in France, Holland, Belgium, -the Protectorate, and the General Government to meet our labor demands -for the next months. I confess that I expect more success from such a -procedure with respect to heavier work or for work where shifts of 10 or -more hours are customary, than from relying on the use of German women -and men exclusively. We shall have better success by proceeding this way -provided the foreign workers still obey, which remains a risk we always -run, than by using weaker German women and girls as labor in places of -very important armament work, where foreigners may be used for security -reasons. * * * - -* * * The situation in France is this; after I and my assistants had -succeeded after difficult discussions in inducing Laval to introduce the -Service Act this act has now been enlarged, owing to our pressure so -that already yesterday three French age groups have been called up. We -are now, therefore, legally and with the assistance of the French -Government entitled to recruit laborers in France from three age groups, -whom we can use in French factories in the future, but of whom we may -choose some for our use in Germany and send them to Germany. I think in -France the ice is now broken. According to reports received they now -have begun to think about a possible break-through by the Bolshevists -and the dangers which thereby threaten Europe. The resistance which the -French Government has hitherto shown is diminishing. Within the next -days I shall go to France in order to set the whole thing into motion, -so that the losses in the East may be somewhat balanced by increasing -recruitment and calling-up in France. - -If we receive comprehensive lists in time, we shall, I think, be able to -cover all demands by dispatching in March 800,000 laborers. - -SPEER: Recruitment abroad as such is supported by us. We only fear very -much that the skilled workers extracted from the occupied countries do -not always reach the appropriate factories in Germany. It might -certainly be better if we acted in such a way that the parent firms of -Germany which work with the French and Czech factories would comb out -the foreign workers more than before for their own use. - -SAUCKEL: We made an agreement with Field Marshal Milch. You will get the -factories which are urgently needed for your airplane motors, etc.; -these will be completely safeguarded. In the same way I promised Admiral -of the Fleet Doenitz[95] today that the U-boat repair firms proper are -absolutely safeguarded. We shall even be able to provide our own -armament factories on French soil with labor extracted from French -factories, in the main from the unoccupied territory where there still -are metal works which have their full complement of skilled workers -without even having been touched so far. - -HILDEBRAND: May I point out at this point that we have to figure that we -shall be deprived of the Italian workers this year. This according to -present discussions, concerns 300,000 men altogether, or 15 to 20,000 a -month. If we deduct the first installment, the remaining ones to a great -part are just highly skilled metal workers. - -SAUCKEL: This is a request of the Fuehrer, but he has not yet finally -decided. - -HILDEBRAND: But we have been told to be prepared to lose these men. - -SPEER: We ourselves quite support the combing-out abroad. On the other -hand we must be entitled—and this was agreed—to exclude or prefer -particular kinds of work, e.g., the armor factories. In France we are -more and more turning towards giving up finishing processes and -stressing the subcontracting. It is the foundries and similar works, -e.g., for the use of the aluminum industry, which we wish to use to -capacity. We could force the production of Opel, so that in this case -Peugeot who manufacture the forged parts for Opel, the parent firm, -might demand more labor for this while the rest of their workers would -be taken over by Opel. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH - CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, - 22 APRIL 1943 - -Dr. Jaenicke -Secret - - Top Secret State Matter - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 36TH CONFERENCE - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - -_Concerning 1943-44 coal economy plan. Held on Thursday, 22 April 1943, -1550 hours at the Festival Hall at the Zoo, Jebenstr._ - - * * * * * - -SPEER: Throughout the winter we have seen that in the last instance it -is coal which provides the basis for all plans we wish to execute in -other respects, and most of you are also aware of our intention to -increase the manufacture of iron. Here also it will again be coal which -in the last instance will tip the scales, whether or not we shall be -able to accomplish this increase of iron production. Seen from the -Central Planning Board, we are of the opinion that the demand for coal -as well as the demand for iron ought to be coordinated in a separate -plan, and that this plan ought to receive about the same degree of -urgency as the Krauch plan, and that with regard to labor, the -conditions required for the execution of that plan must be established. -Perhaps Mr. Timm will be able to state how he expects the question of -the miners to be developed; unfortunately the miners cannot be taken -from the German reservoir, in their place we shall have to use very -strong foreigners. - -TIMM: At the moment, 69,000 men are needed for hauling that coal. We -want to cover this by finding within the Reich 23,000 men, viz., healthy -prisoners of war, etc., who are especially suitable for mining—and by -dispatching 50,000 Poles from the General Government. Out of these about -30,000 men have been supplied up to 24 April, so that about 39,000 men -are still outstanding for January to April. The demand for May has been -reported to us at 35,700. The difficulties existed especially with -regard to recruitment in the General Government, since in every district -surrounding Germany there is an extraordinary resistance to recruitment. -In all countries we have to change over more or less to registering the -men by age groups and to conscripting them in age groups. They do appear -for registration as such, but as soon as transport is available, they do -not come back so that the dispatch of the men has become more or less a -question for the police. - -Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extraordinarily -serious. It is well known that vehement battles occurred just because of -these actions. The resistance against the administration established by -us is very strong. Quite a number of our men have been exposed to -increased dangers, and it was just in the last two or three weeks that -some of them were shot dead, e.g., the head of the labor office in -Warsaw who was shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This -is how matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done -with the best will remain extremely difficult unless police -reinforcements are at hand. - - * * * * * - -SPEER: These [women] we can use in the Reich. There are a great number -of Russian PW’s and laborers who are employed at places where they need -not be employed. There can be an exchange. The only thing is to do this -with unskilled workers, and not to take the workers from the industry -where they were trained with difficulty. - -KEHRL: Where we are late in completion of a task, or where we lose an -opportunity, we can make up for it. But any coal which we cannot haul at -once is definitely lost for use in this war. This is why we cannot do -enough to force the allotment to the pits. - -SPEER: But not by forcible actions in smashing what we toilsomely built. - -(KEHRL: We need not do that!) - -You ought to add the conscripted labor. - -TIMM: We must endeavor to get German men for working at the coal-face. - -KEHRL: We subsist on foreigners who live in Germany. - -TIMM: These men are concentrated within a very small area. Otherwise -there might be trouble in this sector. - -SPEER: There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the -Russian PW’s have been distributed, and this statement is quite -interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received 30 -percent. I always complained about this. - -TIMM: The highest percentage of PW’s are Frenchmen, and one ought not to -forget that it is difficult to employ them at the coal-face. The number -of Russians living within the Reich is small. - -ROHLAND: In the mines one should exclusively use eastern people, not -western ones. - -SPEER: The western men collapse! - - * * * * * - -SPEER: In any case we ought to force the coal production with all our -power. I now have here a statement on the distribution of the Soviet -prisoners. There are 368,000 altogether. Of these are: 101,000 in -agriculture; 94,000 in the mining industry—who are not available in any -case; 15,000 in the building materials industry; 26,000 in iron and -metal production where they cannot be extracted either; 29,000 in the -manufacture of iron, steel, and metal goods; 63,000 in the manufacture -of machines, boilers, and cars, and similar appliances, which means in -armaments industry; and 10,000 in the chemical industry. Agriculture has -received by far the most of them, and the men employed there could in -the course of time be exchanged for women. The 90,000 Russian PW’s -employed in the whole of the armaments industry are for the greatest -part skilled men. If you can extract 8-10,000 men from there, it would -already be the limit. - -KEHRL: Would it not be possible to add Serbians, etc.? - -SOGEMEIER: We ought not to mix too much. - -ROHLAND: For God’s sake, no Serbians! We had very bad experiences with -mixing. - - * * * * * - -SPEER: Everything depends on the amount of the influx from abroad. - -SCHIEBER: If anyway nothing arrives, the mines certainly will get -nothing. - -TIMM: Gauleiter Sauckel is perfectly convinced that the transports will -be on their way within a short time. Now the front has been consolidated -at last. - -SCHIEBER: We ought to be grateful that the weather has allowed the -farmer to keep things going in some way despite the little labor being -available to him. For the farmer, the coal supply is just as important -as for the whole of the armaments industry. When we discuss tomorrow the -nitrogen problem we shall see the same; our first need is coal. - -KOERNER: On 1 April we had in agriculture a deficit of about 600,000 -laborers. It had been planned to cover it by supplying labor from the -East, mainly women. These laborers will first have to be supplied until -other laborers are released from agriculture. We are just entering the -season where the heaviest work in the fields has to be done, for which -many laborers are necessary. Much labor is needed for the hoeing of the -fruits, and it is to be hoped that this year the harvest can be started -early which would be rendered much more difficult if an exchange of -labor would have to take place. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: We ought to except certain areas of the Protectorate to which the -orders are being directed, and extract nothing there until a surplus is -found out subsequently. For the time being it cannot be ascertained. -There are enough other areas of the Protectorate which are not affected -by the industry plan and some labor could be extracted from them at -once. We ought to name the places which are excepted from our action. - -TIMM: In this the authorities on the other side ought to participate; -they are in the best position to tell the places from where nothing must -be extracted. - -MILCH: If one proceeds as I proposed, and Timm agreed to it, no damage -can be done. This ought to be done in any case. For the rest I -completely agree; we must now supply the mines with labor. The greatest -part of labor which we can supply from the East will indeed be women. -But the eastern women are quite accustomed to agricultural work, and -especially to the type of work which has to be done these coming weeks, -the hoeing and transplanting of turnips, etc. The women are quite -suitable for this. One thing has to be considered: first you must supply -agriculture with the women, then you can extract the men, laborer for -laborer. It is not the right thing if first the men are taken away and -the farmers are left without labor for 4 to 6 weeks. If the women arrive -after such time they arrive too late. - -SPEER: Beyond this we are prepared to release from all parts of the war -economy, in exchange for women, any Russian PW’s or other Russian who is -employed as auxiliary laborer. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - REPORT OF THE FORTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD, 23 JUNE 1943 - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -Central Planning Board -Z.P. 148 - - Berlin W 8, 24 June 1943 - Leipziger Strasse 3 - - 24 copies, 17th copy - - Top Secret State Matter - _REPORT ON THE 42D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD ON 23 JUNE 1943, 1600 HOURS_ - - _Coal situation_ - -The manpower situation in the coal mining industry, particularly in the -hard coal mining industry, is still unsatisfactory, and necessitates an -extension of the measures decided upon at the 36th Conference of the -Central Planning Board, held on 22 April 1943. - -The intensive discussion yielded as the most expedient solution the use -of Russian prisoners of war to fill the existing vacancies. The more -homogeneous character of the shifts will bring about the necessary -higher output resulting both from an increased capacity of such shifts -and particularly from a restriction of fluctuations. - -1. The present drive, which is to be carried out throughout the German -economy proper, aims both at freeing Russian labor, fit for work in the -mining industry and actually not employed as semi-skilled workmen, and -at replacing it by additionally imported labor consisting of eastern -workers, Poles, etc. Thus, about 50,000 workmen are expected to be made -available up to the end of July 1943. This drive is to be accelerated. - -Furthermore as an immediate measure it should be suggested to the -Fuehrer—RVK [Reich Association Coal] and GBA [Plenipotentiary General -for Labor Allocation] submitting the necessary figures for the statement -to the Fuehrer—that 200,000 Russian prisoners fit for the heaviest work -be made available from the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the chiefs of -the army groups [Heeresgruppenchefs]. The prisoners will be selected on -the spot by medical officers of the mining industry and officials of the -office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation will take -charge of them there and then. Provisions are to be made for an -extension of this program in order to satisfy any demand for manpower, -which will have accumulated up to the end of the year 1943. - -The manpower needed by the mining transport industry -[Bergbau-Zubringer-Industrie] and by the iron-producing industry may be -supplied from that same source provided that the necessities of the coal -mining industry have previously been adjusted. - -The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be raised by a -premium system. For this purpose, the present pay restrictions are to be -lifted and the manager [Betriebsfuehrer] be allowed to distribute -amongst the workers, according to his discretion, one Reichmark per head -per day as premium for particular services rendered. - -Furthermore, care will be taken that workmen can exchange these -premiums, which will be paid out in camp money [Lagergeld] for goods. It -is intended to put at their disposal various provisions (e.g., sunflower -seeds, etc.) beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items for daily -use, etc. - -The Reich Food Ministry in conjunction with the Reich Association Coal -and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs will clarify the question -whether, beyond that, something else can be changed as far as rations -are concerned. - -2. Equally, in occupied countries, labor is to be tied more securely to -the various factories by means of the distribution of additional ration -cards as premium for good services. This refers in particular to the -General Government and the occupied territories in the East. The output -demanded of the General Government is to be fixed at the proposed -amount, and the additional rations for armament workers may then be -rated accordingly. - - [Typewritten signature] DR. GRAMSCH -Present: - - Reich Minister Speer - Field Marshal Milch - Staatstrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Oberbuergermeister Liebel Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Major General Waeger Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Dr. Ing. Groener Reich Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - President Kehrl Reich Economic Ministry - Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan - Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary General for Labor - Allocation (GBA) - Staatsrat Pleiger Reich Association Coal (RVK) - Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal (RVK) - Dr. Rosenkranz Reich Association Coal (RVK) - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE FIFTY-THIRD - CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, - 16 FEBRUARY 1944 - - Secret! - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 53D CONFERENCE - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - - _Concerning Supply of Labor held on 16 February 1944, 10 o’clock,_ - _in the Reich Air Ministry_ - -Present: Milch (for Central Planning Board), Kehrl, Backe, etc. - -MILCH: The armament industry employs foreign workers to a large extent, -according to the latest figures—40 percent. The new allocations of the -Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation consist mostly of -foreigners and we lost a lot of German personnel which was called up. -Specially the air industry being a young industry employs a great many -young people who should be called up. This will be very difficult as is -easily seen if one deducts those working for experimental stations. In -mass production the foreign workers by far prevail. It is about 95 -percent and higher. Our best new engine is made 88 percent by Russian -prisoners of war and the other 12 percent by German men and women. 50-60 -Ju 52’s which we now regard only as transport planes are made per month. -Only 6-8 German men are working on this machine, the rest are Ukrainian -women who have beaten all the records of trained workers. - - * * * * * - -The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s trustworthy -hands who will make them work, all right. This is very important for -educating people and has also a deterrent effect on such others who -would likewise feel inclined to shirk. - - * * * * * - -* * * It is, therefore, not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners -unless we compel them by piece work or have the possibility of taking -measures against foreigners who are not doing their bit. But if the -foreman lays hands on a prisoner of war or smacks him, at once there is -a terrible uproar, the man is put into prison, etc. There are sufficient -officials in Germany who think it their most important duty to stand up -for human rights instead of war production. I, too, am all for human -rights. But if a Frenchman says, “You fellows will all be hanged and the -chief of the factory will be beheaded first”, and if then the chief -says, “I am going to hit him”, then he is in a mess. He is not -protected, but the “poor fellow” who said that to him is protected. I -have told my engineers, “I am going to punish you if you don’t hit such -a man; the more you do in this respect the more I shall praise you. I -shall see to it that nothing happens to you.” This is not yet -sufficiently known. I cannot talk to all plant leaders. I should like to -see the man who stays my arm because I can take care of anybody who does -so. If the little plant leader does that he is put into a concentration -camp and runs the risk of losing the prisoners of war. In one case two -Russian officers took off with an airplane but crashed. I ordered that -these two men be hanged at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I -left that to the SS. I expressed the wish to have them hanged in the -factory for the others to see. * * * - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B - - REPORT ON THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1944 - - [Marginal notes] St. 10-44 VII Top Secret - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -Central Planning Board -Z.P. 7 g. Rs. -Pl. 030053 - - Berlin, 18 February 1944 - W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3 - - Secret - 31 copies, 3d copy - [Milch’s initial] - M - _REPORT ON THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD ON 16 FEBRUARY 1944, - ON LABOR ALLOCATION 1944_ - -The purpose of this conference is to determine the labor needs and -resources for the 1st quarter and the whole year of 1944. The session is -opened by the discussion of the data submitted by the planning office -(see enclosures 1-9). On the basis of the planning office’s estimate of -the requirements (enclosure 9) these turn out, after discussion with the -individual allottees, to be the following: - - First Second-Fourth - Quarter-44 Quarter-44 Total - in 1000’s -Agriculture 70 (1) 70 (2) 140 -Forestry and Timber Industry 40 (3) . . (4) 40 -Armament and War Production 544 (5) 3,000 (6) 3,544 -Air Raid Damages 100 50 150 (7) -Communications 85 (8) 265 350 -Distribution . . . . . . -Public Administration 62 (9) . . 62 -Wehrmacht Administration 130 . . 130 - ——— ——— ——— - 1,031 3,385 4,416 - -(1) Not including the 200,000 of whom 100,000 each will flow back from -industry and forestry. - -(2) Not including the demand for seasonal workers amounting usually to -62,000. - -(3) 25,000 for forestry and 15,000, including 8,000 women for the timber -industry, as against a peacetime requirement of 150,000 male and 40,000 -female seasonal workers, although now considerably increased production -(1943:70 million cubic meters; 1944:80 million cubic meters) and -particularly heavy combing-out through draft. - -(4) Starting autumn 1944, the usual necessary transfer from agriculture. - -(5) Found to be a priority requirement for February with the -Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation. - -(6) Starting March, 200,000 monthly as compensation for fluctuations—2 -million for period March to December 1944. Plus compensation for return -to agriculture 100,000 (cp. note 1) including 30,000 retrained workers -who perhaps will have to be covered by an over-all exchange system and -about 900,000 as replacement for draftees, as reserves for increased -programs, etc., making about 3 million men all told for the period from -March to December 1944. - -(7) 150,000 is the minimum requirement in addition to the hitherto -assigned 70,000 OT, 100,000 GB construction and 118,000 workmen to the -local and district assignments and 42,000 workers centrally assigned. -The mobile formations are to be increased and sometimes to be reinforced -by local help, particularly by people unemployed through bombings. - -(8) Including 75,000 for the Reichsbahn, 1,000 for inland navigation, -7,000 for motor traffic, 2,000 for minor railways. - -(9) Including 27,000 for the Reichspost and 35,000 for the Red Cross. - -In this estimate, real fluctuation (departure from work) as well as -fictitious fluctuation (change of work location) are taken into account. -Fictitious fluctuation is still to be variously estimated in the various -branches. For the armament section it is estimated at 50 percent of the -total fluctuation (cp. note 6). The total requirements of approximately -4.4 million would thus decrease by up to 1 million. The above estimate -of requirements ought, therefore, in no case to exceed the requirements -determined at the Fuehrer’s conference on 4 January 1944, comprising -only the real fluctuation and amounting to 4,05 million namely: - - 1. Maintenance of the status of activity in the whole of 2,5 million - the war economy including agriculture, taking into - account the replacement of deficiencies due to drafts - into the Wehrmacht, deaths, illness, expiration of - contract, etc. (real fluctuation) - 2. For additional armament tasks and removal of bottleneck 1,30 million - situations in armament plants - 3. Air raid defense constructions, etc. 0,25 million - ————— - Total 4,05 million - -Kehrl is charged with the task of ascertaining the magnitude of real and -fictitious fluctuation, and as a basis thereto, on behalf of the Central -Planning Board, together with the competent offices, to determine the -concepts, “real and fictitious fluctuation,” furthermore the concepts, -assignment, reserves [Aufstockung], etc., in a uniform terminology which -will be binding for all agencies concerned. - -The following resources are the GBA’s [Sauckel’s] estimated coverage of -the requirements: - - 1. With the utmost efforts, other workers can be mobilized 500,000 - from German domestic reserves (getting hold of labor - unemployed as result of enemy air raids, compulsory - registration, shutting down, combing out measures) - 2. Recruitment of Italian labor numbering at the rate of 1,500,000 - 250,000 a month from January to April—1,000,000 and - 500,000 from May to December - 3. Recruitment of French labor at equal monthly rates, 1,000,000 - from 1 February to 31 December 1944 (approx. 91,000 per - month) - 4. Recruitment of labor from Belgium 250,000 - 5. Recruitment of labor from the Netherlands 250,000 - 6. Recruitment of labor from the eastern territories, 600,000 - occupied former Soviet territories, Baltic states, and - General Government - 7. Recruitment of workers from other European countries 100,000 - ————— - Approximately 4,2 million - -In addition, the following possibilities are seen for the mobilization -of more reserves: Intensification of employment of women (in England, 61 -percent of women between 14 and 65 are conscripted for the war economy, -in Germany only 46 percent) especially in agriculture (more stringent -application of the Goering ordinance), reduction in number of domestic -assistants, reduction of the idle classes (Sauckel-Kehrl-Himmler, in -this respect regional round-ups are to be carried out separately for -foreigners, men and women) improvement of the sanitary system (saving up -to 3 percent), working out of equitable contractual wages with incentive -wage premiums. The planning office undertakes in common with the GBA -[Sauckel] the examination of these possibilities for an intensified -mobilization. Kehrl is moreover commissioned to make a general -examination of the question of an improvement of industrial labor -assignment. Everyone concerned will transmit their data on faulty -assignment of workers to the planning office. If necessary, this -question will be handled at a special session of the Central Planning -Board. - -For the 1st quarter of 1944 the following resources (including a -fictitious fluctuation of about 50,000 per month) are given by the -estimate of the GBA [Sauckel]: - - Assignments in January 145,000 - Assignments February-March 500,000 - ———— - Approximately 650,000 - -The adjustment of requirements and coverage will be effected at another -session of the Central Planning Board. - - [Signed] STEFFLER -Present: - - Field Marshal Milch - State Secretary Koerner - President Kehrl - Ministerial Councillor Steffler - Maj. Gen. Waeger Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Teuscher Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - KVV Chief Bosch Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Ministerial Councillor Wissmann Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Lt. Col. Schaede Ministry for Armament and - Munitions - Provincial Counsellor Berk Plenipotentiary for Labor - Allocation - State Secretary Hayler Reich Economic Ministry - General of Engineers Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry - Staff Engineer Kaufmann Reich Air Ministry - Staff Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Transport Ministry - Ministerial Director Hassenpflug Reich Transport Ministry - Ministerial Councillor Hennig Reich Transport Ministry - State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry - State Secretary Alpers Reich Office for Forestry - Prof. Abetz Reich Office for Forestry - State Secretary Gutterer Propaganda Ministry - Mayor Ellgering Propaganda Ministry - Gen. Weidemann OKW - Major Koch OKW - -Distribution: - - Reich Minister Speer 1st copy - Reich Minister Funk 2d copy - Field Marshal Milch 3d copy - State Secretary Koerner 4th copy - President Kehrl 5th copy & 6th - Engineer Goerner 7th copy - Ministerial Councillor Steffler 8th & 9th copies - Maj. Gen. Waeger 10th copy - KVV Chief Bosch 11th copy - Ministerial Councillor Wissmann 12th copy - Provincial Councillor Berk 13th copy - State Secretary Hayler 14th copy - General Engineer Sellschopp 15th copy - State Secretary Ganzenmueller 16th copy - State Secretary Backe 17th copy - State Secretary Alpers 18th copy - State Secretary Gutterer 19th copy - Gen. Weidemann 20th copy - Major Koch 21st copy - Planning Office 22d & 23d copies - Registry V.P. 24th & 31st copies - -Pla. 160/ 11.2. - - List of persons invited to the Conference of the Central - Planning Board on 16 February 1944: - - Chairman: Field Marshal Milch - -Participants: - - Reich Minister of Economy Funk - State Secretary Koerner - State Secretary Dr. Backe - General Forester Dr. Alpers - State Secretary Dr. Ganzenmueller - State Secretary Dr. Gutterer - President Kehrl - Maj. Gen. Waeger - Ministerial Manager Dr. Timm (crossed out and replaced by Provincial - Councillor Berk) - Military Government vice-regent Dr. Bosch - Ministerial Councillor Dr. Steffler - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING - BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE_[96] - _OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - - Re: Labor Supply on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 10 o’clock, at the - Ministry for Air Transport - -SAUCKEL: Field Marshal [Milch], Gentlemen, it goes without saying that -we shall satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the -Central Planning Board. In this connection I wish to state that I call -such deliveries as can be made by the Plenipotentiary for Labor -Allocation “possible” by stressing every nerve of his organization. -Already on 4 January I had to report to the Fuehrer with the greatest -regret that for the first time I was not in a position to guarantee -delivery of the grand total of 4,050,000 men then calculated in the -Fuehrer’s Headquarters for the year 1944. In the presence of the Fuehrer -I emphasized this several times. In the previous years I was able to -satisfy the demands, at least with regard to the number of laborers, but -this year I am no longer able to guarantee them in advance. In case I -can deliver only a small number, I should be glad if those arriving -would be distributed by percentage within the framework of your program. -Of course, I shall readily agree if I am now told by the board: Now we -have to change the program; now this or that is more urgent. It goes -without saying that we will satisfy the demands whatever they may be, to -the best of our ability, with due regard to the war situation. So much -about figures! - -We have no reason to contest the figures as such, for we ask nothing for -ourselves. We are not even able to do anything with the laborers we -collect; we only put them at the disposal of industry. I only wish to -make some general statements and ask for your indulgence. - -In the autumn of last year the supply program, inasmuch as it concerns -supply from abroad was frustrated to a very great extent; I need not -give the reasons in this circle; we have talked enough about them, but I -have to state: the program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium, -and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from these -countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these -countries themselves. For months—sometimes I visited these countries -twice within a month—I have been called a fool who against all reason -travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went -so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders -not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled -over whether or not Sauckel was a fool. If one’s work is smashed in such -a way, repair is very, very difficult. * * * - - * * * * * - -* * * Today I am able to report that we stopped that decrease. According -to most accurate statistics, which I had ordered, we have today again -including foreign workers and prisoners of war, the same number of 29.1 -million which we had in September. But we have added nothing since that -time. Thus we dispatched to the Reich in those two months no more than -4,500 Frenchmen which amounts to nothing. From Italy only 7,000 -civilians arrived. This, although from 1 December until today, I have -had no hour, no Sunday, and no night for myself. I have visited all -these countries and travelled through the whole Reich. My work was -terribly difficult, but not for the reason that no more workers are to -be found. I wish to state expressly, in France and in Italy there are -still men galore. The situation in Italy is nothing but a European -scandal, the same applies to a certain extent to France. Gentlemen, the -French work badly and support themselves at the expense of the work done -by the German soldier and laborer, even at the expense of the German -food supply, and the same applies to Italy. I found out during my last -stay that the food supply of the northern Italians cannot suffer any -comparison with that of the southern Italians. The northern Italians, -viz., as far to the south as Rome are so well nourished that they need -not work; they are nourished quite differently from the German nation by -their Father in Heaven without having to work for their bread. The labor -reserves exist but the means of touching them have been smashed. - -The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no -executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a -sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch -them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole -batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was -done in olden times for “shanghaiing”, went hunting for men and made -them drunk by using liquor as well as words in order to dispatch them to -Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor -supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming, -with the help of the Higher SS and Police Leader, a number of natives, -but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of -these men. * * * - - * * * * * - -* * * Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make -my work more difficult. According to reports received within the last -days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity, -and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very -much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to -emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories -which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of -mind, and as recently as last summer I charged Mr. Hildebrand with an -inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to -extract from French medium and small factories—80 percent of all French -factories are small enterprises with only 36-40 working hours—1 million -laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more for -dispatch to Germany. To use 1 million within France should be quite -possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up -the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased, -as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new -categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally -no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to -repeat my thesis: A French workman, if treated in the right way, does -double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he -has here twice the value he has in France. I want to state clearly and -fearlessly—the exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in -connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a -grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the -decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are -to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will -remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program -prescribed to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies -to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough -skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the -French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a -smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like -in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident. -If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me, you must be -prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term “protected -factory” is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and -feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the -Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for -use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to -French eyes as a German of whom they may say, Sauckel is here stopped -from acting for German armament! * * * On the other hand, I have grounds -for hoping that I shall be just able to wiggle through, first by using -my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying -upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from -the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted -from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened -for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and -certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required -a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France, -Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French -Government does not do so. Don’t take it amiss, I and my assistants in -fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to -ask, is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant -with his 10 men. For months every word I spoke was countered by the -answer: But what do you mean, Mr. Gauleiter, you know there is no -executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France! -This I have been answered over and over again. How then, am I to -regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one -solution—the German authorities have to co-operate with each other, and -if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans -must make an example of one case, and, by reason of this law, if -necessary put prefect or burgomaster against the wall, if he does not -comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched -to Germany. During the latter quarter the belief in a German victory and -in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make has sunk -below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new -French ministers, especially Henriot [French (Vichy) Minister of -Propaganda] will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good -impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to -impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the -situation in France. - -In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. * * * - -Moreover, I am offended, and this grieves me most, by the statement that -I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German -authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who -have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this -slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. * * * - -* * * Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with -economics and labor supply, inquired of me, why do you fetch these -people to Germany at all? You make trouble for this area and render our -existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply: It is my duty -to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer -a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by -my ill-famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to -transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German -traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer the German -armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit -for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 2,500,000 men are in -question as has been calculated in the Fuehrer conference. It is the -flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have -always been one of those who says: If only energetic measures are -applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God’s -name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen -our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions from Thuringia are -frequently mentioned in the armed forces report, I can only tell you -that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages -has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the -World War [I] by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as -Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best -kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the -front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace -them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland, -and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and -extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can get. In this -circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite -the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a -year. Even the Fuehrer has been told so. It goes without saying that -just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the -last quarter at least 1½ million workers whom I would have been able to -deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been -better. It was due to that “artificial atmospheric screen”, that they -did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My -duty to the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you, -Gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfill it. A -start has been made, and as many as 262,000 new workers have arrived, -and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order. -How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided -according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall -always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and -to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with -intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such -collaboration exists. * * * - - * * * * * - -MILCH: * * * I now proceed to the important question, where are we still -able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt -the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short -appearance here in order to give his opinion on Italy. I agree with your -statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work -abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can’t do your job. Too -many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no -executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and -stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or -consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in -giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation, -probably because they are not smart enough. In this way, however, your -work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at -the same time. For we have it before our eyes what close relations exist -between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the -armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In -case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain -degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have -never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this -would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by -not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have -grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are, -therefore, at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced -by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal -hatred against us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have -been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present -the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly -convinced and have said several times, if invasion starts, sabotage of -all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence, and -then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available -to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will -have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more -dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc. If one had shown -the nailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace -would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts. -This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I -am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will -be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to -kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that -their supply of arms in the West is rather ample since the English are -dropping them from planes. I consider it an idiotic statement if you, -Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon -as you arrive the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to -Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist, -they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this -is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of -the fact that your opposite number, the executive is not able to prevent -their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the -problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and -this is why you cannot deliver the 4,050,000 workers. As long as it is -feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive, -as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found -out on the other side, I do not think, Party Comrade Sauckel, that you -will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The -men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and -power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army -alone can exercise effective executive. If some say they cannot do this -kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are training -forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which -could all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the -partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in -the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task at -Stalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65,000 men of the army, and at -the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km. -and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their -assistance. In the rear there were great masses of men who had retreated -in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available -neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am -aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have -seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the -army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich -Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question -to the Fuehrer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the -duties of the military commanders. There ought to be orders of such -lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that -things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these -duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every -passing day. The same applies to Italy as well. - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the -future also for the protected factories are working like a suction pump; -and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker -if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of -mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring -into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by -the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers -within the quarter ending 30 May. Hardly 7,000 arrived in the two months -which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the -protected factories, and only the chaff remains for my purpose to send -them to Germany. At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to -larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in -Italy, i.e., the number of protected factories, will not be further -increased. - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: This indeed is the decisive question, the one we are dealing -with now. If half of the program for 4 million workers to be brought to -Germany—in other words 2 million—cannot be fulfilled, the employment -of labor in Germany will fall off this year. The more useful workers, -however, are in France, and of course in Italy too, employed in the -protected factories. Therefore if I am not to touch the protected -factories which are situated in these countries, this will have the -effect that the less valuable workers instead of the more valuable type -will arrive in Germany. And here we have to ponder about what is in fact -more important and expedient. If we give up using these people in -Germany, where we effectively rule the factories, where moreover we keep -to a different labor discipline and reach better labor results than in -France proper, then we give up the valuable kind, and then I shall only -be able to transport to Germany the less valuable kind of people who -still can be found on the streets of France or Italy, or people like -waiters, hairdressers, small folk from tailor shops, etc. - -MILCH: What is the percentage of protected factories in Italy compared -with the whole of Italian labor? - -SCHIEBER: I think 14 percent, but I don’t have the figures here. - -MILCH: Would not the following method be better: We could take under -German administration the entire food supply for the Italians and tell -them: Only he gets any food who either works in a protected factory or -goes to Germany. - -SAUCKEL: True, the French worker in France is better nourished than the -German worker is in Germany, and the Italian worker too, even if he does -not work at all, is better nourished in the part of Italy occupied by us -than if he works in Germany. This is why I asked the German food -authorities over and over again to improve also the food of the German -worker introducing the “factory sandwich”. When I am in Paris, of -course, I go to Maxim’s. There one can experience miracles of -nourishment. The Fuehrer still thinks that in these countries only very -rich men who can go to Maxim’s are well provided with food. Thereupon I -sent my assistants to the Paris suburbs, to the estaminets and lunch -restaurants and was told that the Frenchmen who eat there did not feel -the shortage caused by the war to any degree comparable with what our -nation has to experience. The average French citizen too can still buy -everything he wishes. - -(Interruption: This is still more so in small places!) - -Yes. Moreover, the Frenchman can pay for what he can get. Therefore he -has no reason for wishing to go to Germany in order to get better food. -This unfortunately is the case. - -MILCH: Is there nothing we can do? True, we might not be able to control -the distribution to the customer, but we ought to be able to intervene -at an earlier stage of distribution. - -KOERNER: We have requested from France really immense amounts of food; -these requests have always been fulfilled; often after some pressure, -but they have been fulfilled. - -MILCH: But there is a simple remedy, let us cease supplying the troops -from Germany, but tell them to provide the food for themselves from -France. Then in a few weeks they will have everything eaten up, and then -we can start distributing the food to the Frenchmen. - -KOERNER: In France there still is for the time being a rationing system. -The Frenchmen had his ration card on which he receives the minimum. The -rest he provides in other ways, partly by receiving food parcels which -we cannot touch at all. Every year we increase our food demands to the -French Government who always satisfied them, though very frequently -yielding to pressure, and in proportion to the harvest results, were -they good or bad. In Italy the situation is that food is not rationed at -all. The Italian can buy and eat what he wants, and since an Italian -always has money and deals in the black market, he is in a much better -situation than our German worker who practically has nothing but what he -gets on his card. - -MILCH: But don’t we even send food to Italy? - -KOERNER: We are exchanging certain goods. - -SAUCKEL: Moreover we are now at the point that the families of French -and Italian workers are no longer in a better position owing to the -money transfer if their bread-winning members are working in Germany -than if they remain abroad; now nothing remains to induce them to go to -Germany. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: Unfortunately, Reich Minister Speer is not present today. He -certainly must have had an opinion about the whole system. His agreement -with Bichelonne was to activate an additional labor supply in France -itself for our armament with the aid of existing French capacities. We -cannot compute the result here of what was achieved by that action. -Whether the result he dreamed of has been achieved cannot be decided -just yet; that is, have the S-plants given us an increase of armaments -which is greater than what we would have achieved if the people had -worked in Germany? I would propose that Minister Speer himself one day -clarify this problem again. Because if only a negative result had been -achieved, he would automatically change his point of view too. - -The first question is: Is the percentage of trained people in the -S-plants so great that all the others are to be regarded as rubbish? And -the second question is: Is it possible at all, with the lack of -so-called executive power and differing opinions on this question, to -seize and transfer to Germany the remaining 80 percent who are not in -the S-plants? So, in view of the general political and organizational -conditions in France, would you be able to transfer some 10-15 percent -of the best of these 80 percent? - -SAUCKEL: I’ll have to get them. - -MILCH: Can you do it at all? - -SAUCKEL: Today I cannot promise anything. Today I can only do my work. - -MILCH: I mean, in reference to the other 80 percent, if your hands are -not tied by different circumstances, that first, there is nothing to -attract these people to Germany; that second, they reckon with Germany’s -defeat in a short time; that third, they are attached to their families -and to their country; and that fourth, they shun work because they can -still exist, and without it they look on the whole period as a period of -transition. On the other hand you have the fact that the army does not -assist you and that the German authorities are hostile to each other, a -fact which is very cleverly utilized by the French. - -SAUCKEL: That has changed since my last visit. All German authorities, -the Military Commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Field Marshal -Sperrle, have supported me considerably in these affairs. - -(MILCH: I refer to the smaller authorities, the executive ones.) - -That has been spoiled—pardon me if I have to bring this up—because all -departments, even armaments over there, were of the opinion up to 4 -January, that my claims and, especially, my figures, were crazy. - -(MILCH: But only people who could not understand such figures.) - -Up to 4 January it was the same everywhere, from the military commander -to the German Ambassador and the German armament departments. Up to then -all the agencies in France had in general held the opinion: it has not -been decided yet by any means, Sauckel’s figures are not correct, so we -have to take it easy here. And that penetrated naturally down to the -lower ranks of French authorities too. - -MILCH: That is just what I mean about the differences of opinion between -you and Minister Speer. You say: The best thing for me is to approach -the protected industries; Speer says: Leave those people alone, take 80 -percent away from the others. And if one is neutral, one has to say, -always with the provision that these 20 percent in the S-plants really -achieve something for us, Speer is right when he says: Please do not -touch my 20 percent; there are enough among the 80 percent for your use. -And now I say: Why do you not take the others? Is it so difficult to -approach them? - -SAUCKEL: No. I need the people as well. The fact is that Speer’s plants -are filling up nowadays. For instance, I received the information the -day before yesterday that the urge to work for the protected industries -is especially strong in France just now and so the supply of skilled -workers to Germany is practically cut off. Skilled workers can only be -found in these plants. - -KEHRL: May I explain briefly the opinion of my Minister? Otherwise the -impression might be created that the measures taken by Minister Speer -had been unclear or unreasonable, and I want to prevent this. Seen from -our viewpoint, the situation is as follows: Up to the beginning of 1943 -manufacturing for Germany was done in France only to a relatively modest -extent, since generally only such work was transferred for which German -capacity did not suffice; these were some few individual products, and -moreover some basic industries. During all this time a great number of -Frenchmen were recruited and voluntarily went to Germany. - -(SAUCKEL: Some were recruited forcibly.) - -The drafting started after the recruiting no longer yielded adequate -results. - -SAUCKEL: Out of the five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, -not even 200,000 came voluntarily. - -KEHRL: Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight pressure -was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers. After this -recruitment no longer yielded satisfactory results, we started drafting -according to age groups, and with regard to the first age group the -success was rather good. Up to eighty percent of the age group were -registered and sent to Germany. This started about June of last year. -Following developments in the Russian war and the hopes raised thereby -in the western nations, the results of this calling-up of age groups -became considerably worse, as can be proved by the figures noted; viz., -the men tried to dodge this call-up for transport to Germany, partly by -simply not registering at all, partly by not arriving for the transport -or by leaving the transport en route. When they found out through these -first attempts during the months of July and August that the German -executive either was not able or was not willing to catch these shirkers -and either to imprison them or take them forcibly to Germany, the -readiness to obey the call-ups sank to a minimum. Therefore, relatively -small percentages were caught in individual countries. On the other -hand, these men, moved by the fear the German executive might after all -be able to catch them, did not enter French, Belgian, or Dutch -factories, but took to the mountains where they found company and -assistance from the small partisan groups there. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: Another question. Since now through the transfer of various -industries so much is covered by French labor, as in the textile -industry, etc., a corresponding number of German workers would -necessarily become free as a result of that. - -KEHRL: Then they will not be requisitioned here, though they would have -been formerly. - -TIMM: Nobody is going to be released. Probably other requests will be -sent to the same factories. - -SAUCKEL: In this respect I must also draw attention to the fact that the -German factories which were shut down were much more up to date and -probably worked with less personnel than the French factories. - -MILCH: But we want all the factories to work for armaments. - -KEHRL: That would also result in spreading the risk in case of air -warfare. - -MILCH: I believe the system to be good, as a still more severe -commitment of workers for Germany would have the effect of making a -considerable part of them remain over there for good. I wish you had -something to back you up so you can have enough power to get it done. I -do not think that anyone in France will enforce it. - -SAUCKEL: But they will all right, if Germany goes at this thing the -right way. It is not the insignificant French workman who should be -punished, but the French policeman, who, instead of supplying people to -Germany, goes to them beforehand and says: I’m coming tomorrow; you’d -better get out. The French subordinate and intermediary authorities have -to be punished. - -MILCH: Even if Bichelonne and Laval have the best intention there will -be resistance from the mayors, the gendarmes, and the prefects, just -because these people are afraid that, first, they will be called to -account afterwards for it, and, second, because of their patriotism, -which makes them say: We must not work for the enemy of our country. -Therefore, I would like to have an authority in our administration which -would force these people to do it, because then the French could say: If -you force us, we will do it, but voluntarily we will not do it. The same -applies to Italy. There they say: Who knows who will win, whether it -will be Mussolini or Badoglio or the King; only, if you force us, we are -ready to do it. Therefore, we have to have something on our side which -will exercise this pressure. I don’t see at all why big divisions should -be necessary for this. The existing forces should be sufficient to -accomplish it. - -TIMM: I have the feeling that we are sticking too closely to the figures -and are neglecting the qualitative side of the question. The present -development may permit us to fulfill our programs with regard to -figures, but in the demands made by the factories the important thing -for them is to have so many metal workers, etc. Then we practically have -to say: You will only get unskilled workers. - -KEHRL: We realize that. The plants are getting unskilled workers, at the -utmost it may be possible to obtain skilled workers by transferring -plants from Italy to Germany. - -SAUCKEL: Then in the course of the year the factories will declare: We -cannot use these workers. And over against this you have the fact that -in France we have a reservoir of unused skilled workers. - -MILCH: I am not worrying about that. Naturally our plants will say: We -want skilled workers. But they also need a certain number of unskilled -workers. - -TIMM: Will it not happen that the officers making the demands say one -day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled -workers which cannot be justified? - -MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First, -Speer must have the proper perspective to see what has happened as the -result of all his agreements. - -I can imagine that first the _numerus clausus_ is introduced at once, so -that the extent of the output in the S-plants is fixed, and that -secondly it is decided later on that if a part of the S-plants has not -worked properly after a certain period, they lose their protection again -and the people from these plants can be transferred as a unit. I can -foresee already now that in air armaments, part of the plants will turn -out such bad production that I shall not be interested in keeping them -up. So, protection for certain plants will simply be discontinued. And -this will have a positive effect on the other plants, too, because they -will say: If we don’t do our work properly, we shall be transferred. Now -during the transfer it is necessary to see that people really do arrive -and do not run away before or during the transfer. If a transport has -left a town and has not arrived, 500 to 600 persons from this place must -be arrested and sent to Germany as prisoners of war. Such a thing is -then talked about everywhere. If actions like this and other similar -ones are carried out often, they would exert a certain pressure. The -whole thing would be made easier if we had control of food. The stuff -offered by the black market has to come from a certain depot, and there -we ought to cut in. - -KEHRL: That is difficult. The transport of food by parcel post has taken -on extraordinary proportions in France. - -MILCH: If I were military commander, I would simply confiscate the whole -of the parcel post! - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-D - - EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 4 APRIL 1944 - -The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -Central Planning Board -Z.P. 18 Secr. St. Papers Pl. 030056 - - Berlin, 8 April 1944 - [Signed] DR. GOERNER - - Top Secret State Matter - _REPORT ON THE 56TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD ON 4 APRIL 1944_ - - _Building Allocation 1944_ - - * * * * * - -The _Jaegerstab_ is to get a quota of 550 million including 150 million -definitely pledged from the reserve and the _air administration_ is to -have a quota of 200 million; both are to be checked against each other. -Regarding the air administration quota, precise details (as to specific -amounts, number of workers required, quantities of material, etc.) are -to be submitted, building projects for the supplying industry (optical -glass) are to be transferred to the office of armament supplies, trial -projects are to be discussed between the commissioner of building and -air H.C., the remaining demands are to be cleared between air chief -administration and the Chief of the General Staff. - - * * * * * - -The quota recipients will be informed of their respective quotas as of -guiding figures within the limits of which the commissioner of building -may give assignments. The quota recipients themselves are, on the basis -of these guiding figures, to re-plan their projects by concentrating on -priority issues and to report which of their building projects will have -to fall out including the resulting figures. Field Marshal Milch will -report to the Fuehrer on the total situation of building. Reports on the -quotas Air Ministry, Navy, Army, and Reichsbahn are to be sent to Field -Marshal Milch forthwith. - -Demands of labor, building materials, etc., as resulting from the quota -allocations are to be discussed with the planning office by the quota -recipients taking into account such amounts of the quota as were already -used up for building purposes since 1 January 1944. - - [Typed signature] STEFFLER. - -Present: - - Field Marshal Milch - Reich Minister Funk - State Secretary Koerner[97] - President Kehrl[98] - Dr. Ing. Goerner - Min. Rat Steffler - -[follow names of 27 others who attended, including Under Secretary -Ohlendorf,[99] Lt. Gen. (Artillery) Von Leeb,[100] and Professor -Krauch.[101]] - - [Signed] STAATSRAT SCHIEBER - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-287 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 49 - - LETTER FROM MILCH TO SAUCKEL, 8 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING - THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRY - - Copy - -The Reich Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Air Force -St/GL - - Secret - -File note: 16m 10 No. 220/43 secret (GL/A-W Wi 3 II) - - Berlin W 8, 8 April 1943 - 7 Leipziger Street - Tel. 12 0047, Ext. 5530 - -To the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation -Berlin SW 11 -96 Saarland Street - -Subject: Protection of Industry. - -The continuously increasing drafting of German workers from the -production as well as from the security teams (plant protection and -plant fireguards) make it necessary to assign more and more foreign -labor to the factories of the armament industry. This assignment of -foreign labor faces the plants of the armament industry with special -tasks of security, which cannot be guaranteed with the forces at present -at the disposal of the industry. According to what I have found out the -statistics of 31 December 1942 have already shown an unfulfilled demand -of 15 percent in plant protection personnel. Moreover, the extension of -the air force industry brings about a further increase in the -requirements for plant protection personnel, an increase which up to now -has not been covered by the labor offices. - -An investigation I made in a number of plants of the air force industry -a short while ago has shown that even after the introduction of the -compulsory labor law most of the labor offices could not make the -necessary forces available for protection and fireguard tasks, while -other labor agencies could not entirely satisfy the needs. The labor -office of Halberstadt has even refused to deal with this requirement -because these men were required for organizations without productive -value. - -In the field of the air force industry I already ordered, at the -beginning of the war, the 84-hour week for these sectors. So that no -further increase can be made with these working hours, for otherwise, -there would be an increase of illness which would bring about a further -unwarranted weakening in the numbers of the personnel. Even the decree -for the securing of the necessary forces of protectory guards, issued by -you on 29 December 1942, (File note: Va 5550.917) has not yet shown any -results up to now in the field of the armament industry. - -Therefore, you are urgently requested to direct the labor offices to -place at the disposal of the armament plants, upon their request as -quickly as possible the competent forces for plant protection and -fireguards, because otherwise normal security in the plants does not -seem to be guaranteed any longer. - -In the field of air force industry, this would involve approximately -2,500 to 3,000 men. - -We ask you to kindly inform us about the steps taken. - -Copy, for information, to: -OKW W Stb [Economic Staff of the Armed Forces] - - BY ORDER: - MILCH [Typewritten] - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - SPEER’S MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE WITH HITLER ON 8 JULY 1943 - - Top Secret State Matter - Berlin, 10 July 1943 - _CONFERENCE WITH THE FUEHRER, 8 JULY 1943_ - - * * * * * - -17. The Fuehrer laid down in the coal discussion that 70,000 Russian -prisoners of war fit for mining work should be sent each month to the -mines. He also pointed out that an approximate minimum of -150,000-200,000 fit Russian prisoners of war must be earmarked for the -mines in order to obtain the required number of men suitable for this -work. - -If the Russian prisoners of war cannot be released by the army, the male -population in the partisan infested areas should without distinction be -proclaimed prisoners of war and sent off to the mines. - -At the same time the Fuehrer ordered that prisoners of war not fit for -the mines should immediately be placed in the iron industry, in -manufacturing and supply industries, and in the armament industry. - -The Fuehrer further ordered that he should receive a monthly report -giving (_a_) the total number of Russian prisoners of war, and (_b_) the -number of Russian prisoners of war fit for mining, made available for -the mines and a report addressed to Field Marshal Keitel as to why the -remainder could not be used. - -The joint report of Sauckel and Pleiger is also to be sent to me. - - [Signed] SPEER - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A - - EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT BY SAUR OF THE CONFERENCE - WITH THE FUEHRER, 5 MARCH 1944 - - Top Secret State Matter - Berlin, 6 March 1944 - _POINTS FROM THE CONFERENCE (SAUR) WITH THE - FUEHRER ON 5 MARCH 1944_ - - _Jointly with Field Marshal Milch, Lt. Gen. of the Air Force_ - _Bodenschatz, Colonel von Below_ - - * * * * * - -18. Told the Fuehrer of the Reich Marshal’s wish for the future -utilization of the productive capacity of prisoners of war by giving the -direction of the Stalag to the SS, with the exception of the British and -Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal a good one and has asked -Colonel von Below to arrange matters accordingly. - - * * * * * - - (Prepared by Saur) - (Seen by Speer) - - EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY DEFENSE WITNESS - ALBERT SPEER[102] BEFORE COMMISSION ON 19 FEBRUARY 1947 - - * * * * * - -_EXAMINATION_ - - * * * * * - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, I would like to understand the machinery by -which labor was brought into Germany beginning with the request by any -particular department for any particular number of workers. Let us -suppose that someone appeared before the Central Planning Board and -said, “I will need fifty thousand men for a factory that I am about to -construct.” Now please tell us just what happened. Would you issue an -order to somebody? Would he then in turn order someone else and how did -these workers finally then arrive in Germany? - -WITNESS SPEER: If somebody on the Central Planning Board requested -labor, the Central Planning Board did not issue an order that these -workers must be supplied, but the Central Planning Board agreed that -those workers can be supplied. An order by the Central Planning Board, -Sauckel would not have accepted. That is a definite fact. - -It is quite clear that the requests for labor did not occur in these -long intervals between the meetings of the Central Planning Board, but -this had to happen in much shorter intervals and in a constant -collaboration with the people concerned, for the enemy air raids and -changes in programs which became necessary because of the military -situation made these changes very often necessary. Therefore, for the -whole of our armament industry and also for certain branches of -production outside armament that were in my ministry, we decided on -so-called framework contingents, and priority lists were drawn up. I do -not know whether you are interested in that part. - -Q. Well, not particularly. I want very succinctly a statement as to the -steps which ensue after the declaration of someone before the Central -Planning Board that he needed a certain number of workers. Who was -informed of this request? Who authorized the call for the workers? Who -submitted the demand? Who then at the other end gathered the workers? -Not in detail—I just want the steps in movement from the Central -Planning Board until the men actually arrived. - -A. The Central Planning Board did not deal with that matter anymore -afterwards. Let us say the request of labor, say, of the coal mining -industry—— - -Q. Yes. - -A. ——was reported to Sauckel by the coal mining industry itself. -Therefore, one could call a meeting of the Central Planning Board as a -statement for Sauckel that such labor is very important for the coal -mining industry, and that as far as possible he has to supply them. That -is necessary within the framework of economic planning, but beyond that -the Central Planning Board did not pursue the matter any further or was -not even in a position to do so. - -Q. Well, did you know there at the fountainhead of labor—because if you -made the request originally, that is what started the machinery in -motion—did you not know that bringing in workers forcibly from occupied -territories to work in the war operation constituted a violation of -international convention? Weren’t you aware of that right at the very -source? - -A. What I say now is not meant to be an excuse. I really did not know -it. Up to the beginning of my trial here, the regulations of -international law were unknown to me, and nobody ever drew my attention -to the fact that such regulations exist; but I want to say once more, I -don’t say this in order to excuse myself, here, but it is a fact that it -was like this. - -Q. Well, you were certainly quite aware from the decision of the -International Military Tribunal just how illegal and improper that was. - -A. I took note of it there, and, after all, I received my punishment for -it now. - -Q. Well, could you not have followed the same line of reasoning adopted -by the Tribunal, which, after all, was based upon international -convention? You were a man of education, a man of great cultural -attainments and of great technical ability, and it was because of these -attributes that you were chosen by Hitler to become the Minister of -Armaments. Could you not have reasoned that out by yourself? Wasn’t it -very clear and obvious? - -A. I believe that the general knowledge of the principles of -international law can only be brought to the knowledge of a wider circle -of legal laymen if after a war legal offenses committed during the war -will be revealed by a public trial, and thereby a more general knowledge -of offenses against international law becomes known. You know that I was -an architect and that such knowledge as I had in the field of law I -merely received from newspapers, and I knew, for instance, all about -various legal commitments of architects which are fairly extensive as -far as construction of buildings goes. - -I would say that a great mistake has been committed here by omitting -after the First World War to establish international legal conditions by -trials, and at the same time to adjust it to the developments of -technical warfare instead of which, after the First World War, the whole -question of the deportation of labor, for instance, was decided by the -highest German courts, and as far as I know, the decision of that court -was not particularly lucid. This is how the basis of ignorance is laid -in the field of international law, and I believe that many a mistake and -many a violation in this war could have been avoided or at least -mitigated if a general knowledge of international law had been -prevalent. - -Q. Would you say that had there been, following the First World War, -trials such as those we are now conducting, that you then would have -been aware of the illegality of the practices in which you were engaged; -or rather, you would have been aware of the illegality of such practices -and you then would not have participated in them? - -A. I am of the opinion that trials against the responsible men for the -First World War after its conclusion would have enlightened the public -and myself on the tenets of international law. I do not wish to go as -far as to say that I would not have committed these breaches of law, for -it is very difficult to excuse one’s self after the event by saying one -committed the act only through ignorance of international law. -Nevertheless, I should say that the observance of international law -would have been possible without losing much momentum in my armament -drive. Of course only that part of international law is meant here which -deals with the recruiting of labor, whereas the other factor, the -so-called legal looting of occupied territories as it is called, there -is no doubt that that would have been necessary for an increased output -of armaments. Violations of international law as far as the assignment -of labor was concerned were in my opinion not only unnecessary, but -unreasonable. We would have achieved more if we had observed -international law. This is a very complicated topic; I do not know -whether you are interested why this should be so. - -Q. Well, I merely want you to enlighten me, if you care to, on this -specific angle. You are considered a specialist. Now, had there been an -international trial following the First World War, and the decision in -that trial had been very clear and specific—as was the decision in this -trial—you would have then known the limitations very specifically on -the conduct of war; and having then known that you couldn’t do certain -things, would you then have refused to participate as you did in this -World War as a specialist? Having been put on notice that you cannot -take labor from other countries forcibly and throw them into the -armament industries—knowing all that, would you then have refused to -give your services to Hitler in the prosecution of this war? - -A. As to the first part of the question I wish to say if a trial and a -clear decision had been handed down after the First World War, then -certainly somebody would have put the international laws and regulations -on my desk; that is to say, he would have informed me of it. The second -question—it is not possible to give a simple answer to the second part -of the question for when I started my office in 1942 the war in all its -aspects had already departed from all existing international -regulations. Please don’t misunderstand me if I point out here that -economic warfare was waged by the British and Americans with extreme -concentration on bombing warfare, which was not a matter of national -reprisal because it hit industries in occupied territories. On the other -hand the war with Russia had gone beyond the normal limits, if I can -call it that. It is difficult for me to say who was the guilty party. - -Q. I do not refer to the time after the war had reached such a state -that there were no restrictions. I am speaking of the period before the -war started. I would like to know whether a man of your education could -have been enlisted in a practice which you knew and would then have -known was entirely illegal and contrary to international law as well as -the precepts and dictates of humanity. - -A. I would not have participated if I had known the whole documentary -material which became known in our first big trial. If I had known that -Hitler since 1938 had prepared for war and had tied the fate of his -people to his own to such an extent that his end was the end of his own -nation—— - -Q. I didn’t intend to enter into such a long discussion on this. All I -had in mind was that if those in your classification, as specialists, -would have observed international law, and would have known clearly what -international law was—the restrictions, the limitations and so on—and -if we assumed that these specialists were men of character, then, even -though Germany had at the helm a navigator who had become mad, he could -not have run the ship on to the rocks for the simple reason that you and -the other specialists who assisted in the present shipwreck, would have -refused to ship on a venture which was so obviously bound for the rocks, -internationally speaking. Is that true or not? - -A. That is so without a doubt. - -Q. And would you go so far as to say that had there been an -international trial of the proportions of the one we have just had, and -these which are now following, after the First World War, and the -knowledge resulting from decisions handed down would have become -well-known because of the punishments which would have been inflicted, -would you say that that might have served as a bar against a Second -World War? - -A. I do not wish to say that it could have stopped and Hitler—— - -Q. If Hitler had not had specialists, Hitler could not have wrecked the -world himself. Hitler had to have a Speer and had to have the others who -were condemned in the first International Military Tribunal. He could -not have done it alone. - -A. That’s quite clear, but these specialists were taken into their part -of the war without realizing what the connections were and an -international trial is not a wholly certain method to prevent a new war; -but I think it’s a very essential contribution toward that aim. I am -unable to answer your question by saying that Hitler would have been -unable to find collaborators if, after the First World War, these trials -had been held, but I do wish to say it would have been much more -difficult for him, also because our specialists were not very intimately -connected with the Party circles. - -Q. Well, I think that’s a point I wanted to find out; that, if the -specialists had refused to collaborate, knowing that the contribution of -their service meant a completely illegal undertaking, then Hitler could -not have conducted a war by himself and therefore there could not have -been a war? - -A. In technical warfare the specialists are decisive factors for the -conduct of war, but the specialists are not to be regarded as being the -parties principally responsible. They do not have the necessary -knowledge of the background, the political background—essential in view -of Hitler’s untruthfulness—to see where he is taking the ship. - -Q. The ship could go nowhere without you specialists. That’s all. - -A. I thank you. - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: Do you have any questions, Dr. Bergold? - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, sir, I have. Witness, his Honor has asked you how it -would be if a factory, for instance, would need and would request 50,000 -workers, which way and in which channel would take this request up to -the point in foreign territories where 50,000 foreigners would have been -gathered and taken to Germany for that purpose. Isn’t it correct that -such a proposal of bringing 50,000 workers to this factory did not mean -that 50,000 foreign workers would be brought but meant only that 50,000 -workers altogether were brought? That meant German workers as well as -foreign workers which were actually already in Germany and employed -there and also new recruits? That included all that, did it not? - -SPEER: I was deflected from my answer in that particular case and I did -not really give an answer to the question. If 50,000 workers were -requested for a certain branch in our industry the request gave a figure -which did not show how many of them were Germans and how many of them -were foreign workers. The bigger part of the workers which were supplied -came from what was called fluctuation. Fluctuation meant the transfer of -workers from one plant to another. It’s quite clear that production is -in a constant development. One always follows the other and in some -cases one orders particular workers and then it loses that importance -for military reasons. The plan is that some workers available are -constantly released and sent on to different plants or industries. A -second source was the newly mobilized German workers, I mean the women -workers, and a third source was the sending of foreign workers already -in Germany, and a fourth source the prisoners of war who were also sent -on from one branch to the next, and the fifth source consisted of some -that came in from foreign countries. How these various workers from -these various sources were distributed among branches, neither my -offices nor the factories who had requested workers could find out. That -was a matter which had to be decided by the labor exchanges because it -took an enormous amount of work to find the proper workers for the -proper branches. * * * - -Q. Thank you. Witness, do you know that when the French Government, -which at that time existed in Paris, had issued an order for the calling -up of labor did that mean compulsory labor? - -A. These details became known to me during the trial. My tasks were -enormous and at that time I did not bother much about details. I cannot -say anything about this from my knowledge. - -Q. Witness, you must know this; at the time when you had discussions -with Mr. Bichelonne, French Minister, I should think that the existence -of compulsory labor service in France should have been discussed at that -time. - -A. Perhaps I misunderstood you. I said quite clearly last time that I -knew about the fact that in occupied territories workers were taken to -Germany against their free will. The various districts, etc., are not -known to me. - -Q. No. I mean if such a decree had been issued at all. That’s what I am -speaking of. - -A. I had to assume that but I wasn’t actually informed about it. - -Q. Did you consider the French Government, which at that time was in -Paris, France—did you consider it a regular government? - -A. This is the same sort of question which his Honor put to me too. I -had no basis to find out whether the French Government was legal or not, -because these are problems of international law which are beyond me as a -layman. - -Q. Witness, do you not know that the Government of Pétain had been -recognized and was recognized by the American Government, and that the -American Government had an ambassador, if I recall correctly—and I am -not sure I can pronounce his name—at that time, Mr. Leahy, Admiral -Leahy? - -A. I know that, but I must say frankly that I did not spend my time -thinking about whether the French Government was legal or not. - -Q. Thank you. I have no further questions. - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, what I was endeavoring to elucidate, or have -you elucidate for us, was not whether you knew if a government was legal -or not, if it was recognized internationally or not. I wanted to draw -your attention to something quite more fundamental, and that was the -employment against its will of population in a war activity, all of -which was prohibited by international law. And if you and all the -specialists in the Hitler regime knew of the limitation and were -thoroughly aware, and the knowledge was so widespread that you couldn’t -help but know that it was illegal and that you would be punished if you -did it, that is, to bring in workers from another country and put them -into war operations—if that were a matter of such general knowledge -that every college man and every person that was well read would know of -it, would Hitler not have had difficulty in obtaining such a crew to run -a ship, regardless of what he may have had in mind as to the illegal -port which he hoped to attain by that voyage? - -SPEER: I can only speak about the time in which I worked, that is to -say, from 1942 onwards. In that time, I am sure that if these legal -matters had been made quite clear a large number of technicians or -industrial leaders would not have collaborated to the extent they did if -they had realized the illegality and the possible punishment. - -I would like to stress this particularly for the period from 1943 -onwards. From that time onwards, many intelligent people realized that -the war had been lost, and from that time onwards it would have made a -great impression if in former trials heavy punishment was meted out. Not -everybody would have been impressed; certain people would have followed -the old line, but the majority of so-called specialists, certainly— - -Q.—would have recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do. -I understand you to say that the majority of the specialists would have -recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do and would have -refused. That is what I understand you to say. - -A. Yes, that is what I wanted to say. - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: Very well. Thank you very much. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 5 - - EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH - CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, - 22 JULY 1942 - - _REPORT OF THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL_ - _PLANNING BOARD ON 22 JULY 1942_[103] - -[page 2 of original] - _Safeguarding of Food Supplies_ - -A net increase of one million foreign workers is anticipated. This -figure has not been reached during the past months. Even if more than -one million workers are brought here during the months to come, the -limit of one million will actually never be exceeded due to continued -losses. Food for this number of workers is guaranteed. - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 6[104] - - EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - TWENTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD, 2 NOVEMBER 1942 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 22D CONFERENCE_ - _OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD CONCERNING_ - _ASSIGNMENT OF LABOR, MONDAY, 2 NOVEMBER_ - _1942, 12:00 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH MINISTRY_ - _FOR AVIATION_ - - * * * * * - -MILCH: In my opinion agriculture has to be provided with its labor. If, -theoretically, agriculture could have been given 100,000 more men, there -would be 100,000 fairly well-fed men, while those we get now, -particularly the prisoners of war, are not exactly fit for work. If -agriculture will get them in time, they will again be able to feed these -people up again. However, it will not be very happy about it. * * * - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 7 - - EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - THIRTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD, 12 FEBRUARY 1943 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 32D CONFERENCE_ - _OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD—THE FOUR_ - _YEAR PLAN ON 12 FEBRUARY 1943_ - - * * * * * - -MILCH: Everybody sticks to his old methods until he is literally beaten -away from them. However, one must not only beat, one must give advice, -too. They must be good experts who will tell people: You will do that -this way or that; it is not necessary that you use just this sum. Who -does such a thing will never give in and say, I can do with less. Mining -has been partly beaten[105] into iron by saying we cannot give you -anything but iron on account of the shortage of lumber. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 8[106] - - EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL - PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1943 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE_[107] - _OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - -Subject: Assignment of Labor, 16 February 1943, 16 o’clock, in the Reich - Ministry for Armament and Munitions, Berlin. - - * * * * * - -SPEER: We are in complete agreement. You will not receive any list from -us for this action but the whole armament industry including the -anticipated deliveries will be devoted to this action. The -administrations too must be served at the same time. But the authorities -including army, air and navy shall not get a single person from the -action. This must be adhered to. You know what the Reich Minister Dr. -Lammers said: That he must therefore have some new women typists at the -Reich Chancellory at once. That makes no sense. - -MILCH: Where France is concerned, there exists in France an industry -which makes aircraft motors and parts, all complete. We have transferred -there all the things which can be made there without endangering secrecy -in any way. These are training aircraft, transport aircraft, etc. -However, since we want to make the most of the production in other ways, -we have moved away part of it to a large extent. As a whole these things -must be kept secret from the French but in every part subject to secrecy -there are only a few parts which are real secret. The bulk consists of -other parts. These have also gone there to a great extent just as we -engaged aircraft builders in France to a great extent. We now currently -have work waiting in France for several thousand aircraft builders. At -the moment the industry working for us there needs, according to its -claims, some 20,000 men, who are asked of us, in order to be able to -keep to the program. The production is still far behind that which was -agreed upon with you in the program. Whereas we in Germany fully carry -out our program, only 30 percent of it is carried out in France. In fact -it has only begun to function in the last weeks and months after we have -been more active there. In principle, we have excluded the State from -this whole cooperation with industry and set the German firms to work -with the French firms. - -Sponsor firms have been appointed so as to make the affair operate. This -system is not yet fully completed but has been favorably initiated -everywhere and indeed brings quite other returns to some extent. The -reproach is always made to us that nearly all Europe is at our disposal. -The production we draw from France, with the exception of motor cars, is -minute as regards the army. The whole French production potential is not -yet fully exploited by us or only to a quite small proportion. If it -were necessary for us to produce in France, because in Germany the -capacity, space machine tools, etc., which are not convenient for -removal are lacking, if the accommodation of the people were not so -difficult, etc., we would in fact be reduced to the point of taking -everything to Germany and have the work done here. But this would entail -too great a decrease in the production in our own country, not to -mention the reluctance of the people. - -We came to an agreement yesterday. I am very thankful that this matter -is now, thanks to yourself, Gauleiter Sauckel, together with Gen. v. d. -Heyde and Col. Brueckner, to be settled on the spot. It is difficult to -induce Frenchmen to come over here. An official agency alone cannot -either appreciate or realize this, only a sponsoring firm can realize -it. I therefore suggest that sponsor firms be called upon to cooperate, -precisely because in France the sub-contract system is very widespread. - -Behind the factory which actually organizes the thing, there are other -factories which belong to the semi-finished goods and preparatory -industry. This industry, however, can be supervised by our sponsor -industries. We should have to assign to our people the task of -investigating the individual firms and find out which people are working -for our program. All others we annex ourselves. When we have got hold of -them and annex them in German industry, that is, only those people who -are really necessary to us, it will be possible to utilize them in the -right way. - -The proportion of specialist workers there is higher than in this -country. We have indeed drained a certain number of them into our -factories last year because they were the easiest to get. The Frenchmen -must work with more specialists than we. We must work with more -specialists than the Russian, and the Russian must have still more -specialists than the American. In America they can place any simpleton -before any machine, he will put it right in a flash. Only the -installation requires a specialist. The man need only have arms; a head -is a superfluous luxury. - -In France the system is quite different. The Frenchman has adapted -himself to it and has always indeed had unemployment. A labor -organization as we conceive it does not exist. With the same number of -Frenchmen and all other installations, facilities, etc., being the same, -one will only obtain, as compared with German personnel, half at the -most or only one-third of the production, even if the personnel have all -good will and zeal. It is a matter of system. This system we cannot -simply alter, neither can the sponsor firms, but we must try in this way -to obtain from them to a certain extent the additional resources which -we need for our industry and armament. By proceeding thus, we can put -things right. I believe the sponsor firms have an obvious interest in -this. If industry has too many specialist workers there working for us, -let us draw upon them ourselves, because we are suffering a great -shortage of them. This resource should be left to our firms after this -extensive drain on specialist workers has been suffered. We want to -raise our armament. - -Now to another point. I have today ordered in my jurisdiction that an -extensive action should take place; today, when we are counting upon -obtaining a great number of women in virtue of the obligatory service -whose age limit we hope to see extended to 55. The British have extended -obligatory service to the age of 65. The additional 10 years are a -trifle exaggerated. Women are not able to go to the machines immediately -and perform heavy work. The few days that are necessary for them to -instruct the personnel are immaterial. We can still spare that much time -if it were not that it would convey to the population an impression to -the following effect: Now that we have reported for work, it is months -before we are called up. I have ordered, within my jurisdiction, that -the women should as much as possible be employed in offices where men -are now to be found, for instance in the wage offices, etc. In these, -women and elderly men can be easily trained, as they will be able to do -without further difficulty. In this way, men in the commercial offices, -etc., should be released for the accountancy offices and similar -offices. This involves, in the case of industry, over 20,000 individuals -and there are other branches besides. - -It amounts to quite a considerable number consisting solely of people -who, in view of the war economy, are unfortunately necessary now. These -men must now be placed at our machines insofar as they are not drafted, -that is to say, are not soldiers. These people are more likely to be -able to render better service at the machines or in the factories than -the women now assigned, insofar as women are disposed to go to the -machines. Of course, there will be women who have done such work before -and who are now willing to turn to this work but who have not reported -for work so far because they have not found it necessary to work for a -living on account of the dole. - -Where the assignment of women is concerned, I should suggest that, in -the process of the action, only those women be assigned for whom work at -the machine is not involved if a man is thereby released. - -TIMM: The danger lies in this that the draftees were partly to be -released without replacement having actually been forthcoming. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That is quite another matter. When female -auxiliaries of the Signal Corps are assigned, it is not additionally but -only in the proportion that soldiers are released thereby. There are -indeed several 100,000 men in the signal corps of the army and air -force. In our department, 250 to 300,000 have been such. Whether there -are so many now, I do not know. They are all young men fit for combat. I -have always campaigned against this and said: one ought to assign women -preferably so as to release soldiers. If that is done now, it will -really release a large number, it does not matter whether for the -workshop or for the front. Of course, there is a front somewhere in the -East too. This front will be maintained for a certain time. The only -useful thing the Russian will inherit from the territories evacuated by -us will be the people. It might be better in principle to withdraw the -population in time as far as 100 km. behind the front. The whole -civilian population will move back to 100 km. behind the front. Nobody -will now be assigned to trench [digging] work. - -TIMM: We tried to withdraw the population of Kharkov. 90 to 120,000 -people were required by the fortress commandant of Kharkov for trench -work alone so that in some cases we had to organize whole convoys. - -WEGER: Actual demolitions were even carried out. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: But that is done by the engineer corps. There is -definitely no more hope that more prisoners of war will come from the -East. - -SAUCKEL: The prisoners taken are used there. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We have made the request that there should be a -certain percentage of Russians with us in the antiaircraft artillery. -50,000 altogether are expected. 30,000 are already there as gunners. It -is a funny thing that Russians must operate the guns. The other 20,000 -are still missing. I received a letter from the High Command of the Army -yesterday saying: We can no longer turn over a single one, we have too -few ourselves. So this thing will not turn out so successfully for us. - -SPEER: It would be advisable to make the draft of women somewhat clearer -in the press. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That would primarily have to be placed in the -foreground. In this respect the question is whether I will receive the -accounts from our industry in time. The matter is bound to be settled -some time. There will be no deception. People who want to deceive also -deceive now, whether they have this personnel or not, whether their -accounts are up to date or not. The other people are honest. The mass -has not engaged in deception. Whether we are a little backward in -checking prices will not be very important. The most important thing is -to work. We know what is produced abroad, having now received the -figures. The Russian actually makes 2,000 aircraft a month in the way of -front-line aircraft. This figure is far higher than ours. This must not -be forgotten. We must get to the assembly line and produce quite other -figures. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 9 - - EXTRACT FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-NINTH - CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, - 23 APRIL 1943 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 39TH CONFERENCE_ - _OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - -Subject: Food Situation and Armament Industry. - - _Held on Friday 23 April 1943, 9:30 A.M. in the Festival Barrack_ - _near the Zoo, Jebenstrasse_ - - * * * * * - -MILCH: I am convinced that there are more Russian prisoners of war. At -that time 4,000,000 were captured. A large part of them died, however -the number of those who are still living is higher than we are told now. -We reckon here with hundred thousand Russian prisoners of war in the -agriculture. Altogether, we have 300,000 of them in the Reich. During -the First World War I had 200 Italian prisoners of war with me. These -prisoners were to be turned over, however, we kept ours by reporting -them dead in order to keep them. And these people also wanted to stay in -spite of the fact that we told them that they would be reported dead -even to their families. We dragged these prisoners around with us till -the end of the war. - -KEHRL: If the food supplies of the labor brought in from abroad are -taken from the German rations then, while we think that we are very rich -for having these people, the German rations are in reality reduced, and -the decrease in the working capacity of our own workers does more harm -than the good done by the new people. - -SPEER: But from the figures of this incoming labor we have to deduct -those who leave the country because of expired foreign agreements, and -the others which we lose because of cases of death or illness. On the -whole the increase of labor in our total war economy is not at all so -very important. (Interpolation: the more labor we fetch from the East, -the more this total figure will increase.) - -BACKE: But there is a limit, too, in the number of men we can absorb. At -that time we were told that one million was to be taken into the -country, from the East. Now we have already got several millions. - -MILCH: You cannot count that way. Before all these measures in the -second year of the war, the air force had 1.8 million men and today it -has less than two million. The whole air armament which is a -considerable part of the total war armament, in the course of the war or -in the last 2½ years of the war has not even increased by 10 percent. In -reality the total increase in this field amounts to about 125,000 to -150,000 men. We are always looking for those people. That is our main -problem. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 31 - - EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING - BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE[108] - OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_ - - Re: Labor Allocation on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 1000 hours, at the - Reich Air Ministry. - -SAUCKEL: * * * I have a Gau armament supervisor in Thuringia and I have -just been inspecting the plants in Thuringia. At the railroad car -factory in Gotha I have set things going so that within a few days it -will be turning out 20 percent of its production again. Everything has -been done. But one thing you must bear in mind: Labor allocation as an -institution must be independent and must remain so. Furthermore I must -ask you not to support constantly the opinion of the armament -inspectors: Sauckel must be put under the control of the Ministry then -everything will be better. Gentlemen, please see to it that that does -not happen this year. As a National Socialist of long standing I am -determined to cooperate unreservedly with you, the Minister for Armament -and Production, indeed with all those gentlemen, but, in consideration -of the difficulty in this sphere of work I must be given the amount of -freedom to make decisions of my own which was guaranteed me by the -Fuehrer’s decrees and those of the Reich Marshal. I would never have -taken on the task without these decrees, because I know it cannot be -accomplished without them. I beg you therefore, to create such an -atmosphere as is necessary among the lower ranks too so that the Gau -labor offices in the first place may be recognized as organizations -which are entrusted to me and put at my disposal for keeping the labor -commitment in order on the lower levels. * * * - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: I would like to insist on the fact that, in the future also, -the S-plants be checked; for the S-plants form a suction pump, and, -since it is known all over Italy and France, that whoever works in the -S-plants is protected from any interference on my part is proved by the -following fact. During the first three months I wanted to take out of -Italy 1 million people before 30 May. In these two months hardly 7,000 -men have come. That is just the difficulty. The bulk goes to the -S-plants, and only the dregs are left for employment in Germany. I would -like to achieve yet, that for the important plants in Italy, at least -the number of S-plants be restricted, that is that the number of -S-plants be not increased. - -SCHIEBER: In Italy for every protected plant there is an agreement made. -Over, beyond the situation on 15 February or 10 February, S-plants are -established only with the approval of the services under me. We have -them registered, and only when we aim at an agreement are they declared -protected plants. - -SAUCKEL: Now the question arises: If in such a protected plant there are -more hands than are needed according to German standards, could they be -handed over? - -SCHIEBER: They are to be combed through but the people combed through -are to be put only in other protected plants. Down there in Italy in -your services there is a demand for 7,000 hands and more. The gentlemen -are right to laugh at us saying: What does that mean, you want people, -but at the same time our great task must be the transfer of people! I -spoke with Leyers on Sunday and told him that I wished to have a -conversation with the Gauleiter about this matter: If the labor offices -state that there is still a certain surplus of hands employed, a -commissioner appointed by General Leyers must then visit the respective -plant together with a commissioner of Gauleiter Sauckel’s; they must -examine the situation, and these two gentlemen must then come to an -agreement, as to the people they remove from plants. * * * Besides these -promises concerning nutrition have not been kept to the extent we -wished. The extra food, as we had planned it has not yet appeared at all -so that there is no incentive felt; apart from this certain inner -evolutions are influencing industry at present in Italy, with the result -that especially the leading workmen who are so valuable for us partly -fail to come to the factory any more. They wait patiently until, during -the next three or four weeks, the elections and convocations in the -factories concerning socialization and the introduction of commissars, -etc., are over. * * * - -SAUCKEL: In Italy, it seems, things are going on smoothly in general, -but not yet in France. - -MILCH: When workmen are transferred how are their families ensured? - -SAUCKEL: Automatically. - -SCHIEBER: That is quite easy. If it is possible in any way, we shall -have the whole personnel transferred to another factory. * * * - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: Years ago we made an investigation like this in France and saw -that in German armament production, corresponding to districts A and B, -some 600,000 workers were occupied out of the total of some 2½ to 3 -million metal workers we had anticipated. Therefore there must still be -some more metal workers hidden in France, people who were formerly in -metal trades. - -MILCH: So 75 percent are still free, and 25 percent are tied up in the -S-industries. - -SAUCKEL: We have to deduct the prisoners of war who are now in Germany. -But there are hundreds of thousands of skilled workers who, according to -the agreements made, have returned to France and Belgium month after -month. - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: In reply to that I must ask you the following: What do you want -to do now in Germany? In Germany you now have plane construction, the -manufacture of highly expensive apparatus, complicated engine -construction, you have here in general the most complicated manufactures -in the world. If I brought the scum of French manpower to Germany for -you what would you get as regards production? We of the Labor Allocation -were always of the opinion in the French industries we must under all -circumstances maintain a certain level of the trained workers and a -certain degree of production. And we wanted to compel these French -industries to lower their level of a hundred percent skilled personnel -for the benefit of the German industries which have been bled of their -skilled hands. - -As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I considered my -task to be not the transfer to Germany of the scum of Europe, but the -bringing of efficient manpower. But a part of your gentlemen in France, -and in your Ministry too, had no understanding for this. That I must say -quite plainly. It would be mere child’s play for me to bring you the -refuse of Europe if you would be satisfied with it. I would simply grab -all the whores and gigolos in Paris and put them at your disposal, then -I would not have to touch your armament industries. But if I have to -provide you with real workers who will prove efficient in Germany, then -in France—and that was just my program—we must do the same as we did -in every German plant and in every German enterprise: when a German -company is split in two, some of the good workers and some of the bad -ones had to be given up and not just the bad workers. And French -armaments never were harmed thereby. It is a fact, is it not, that a -French worker of quality produces the double amount if he is put in a -German factory under German discipline, with German supervision and -German welfare? - -If we agree to re-examine all S-plants—and that is all I ask—and if we -take out all superfluous expert workers and assistant workers, then we -put them at the disposal of the other French enterprises which need -them, to the extent that they need them, and when they are satisfied, I -have to request that if I am to carry out my program, then from these -plants too, workers must be transferred to Germany. If that is not -approved of and it is insisted that the severe formula be observed: -S-plants are out of question for labor commitments to Germany, then, -according to my experience, this program of January 4 can hardly be -achieved. Then you are responsible for the decision of what was better -at the end of this year, to have these people in France or in Germany. -That is the responsibility you have to bear and which I shift from my -shoulders. I was told: Why did you not take the Russian workers away in -time, now they are in the Russian regiments. Exactly the same would -happen here. My opinion is that the introducing of S-plants was -altogether a great mistake which is damaging to the general interests of -Germany. The French government jumped to that with the greatest -cleverness. * * * That is the way we did it the first year, and up to -700,000 Frenchmen came to the Reich according to the program. These were -all decent French workers. From the fall of this year on this came to an -end. No more skilled French workers came, nor any others either. It was -the entire collapse of the labor allocation built up on the slogan: From -now on no worker needs to go from France to Germany. - - * * * * * - -KEHRL: The consideration which originated at that time with Minister -Speer and which led to the arrangement with Bichelonne was the -following: If I cannot transfer the people by force from France to -Germany to the extent necessary, which is shown, by developments now, -and if at the same time I run the danger of having the people leave the -plants in which they are now working for fear of being taken by force, -then it is a lesser evil for me to try and put these people to work in -France and Belgium, in which case I do not have to use German force to -get them across the frontier. Then at least I am sure that the people -are not running away from the plants in the first place and secondly -that additional employment will be brought there. - -He sent an invitation to Minister Bichelonne. The conferences took place -between the 16th and 18th September. The question was put to Bichelonne -to what extent the shifting of industries would be possible, and what -additional productions he could place, etc. This caused a change in the -policy of production. So far Minister Speer had chiefly shifted to -France all the urgent armament productions in those fields in which the -German capacity was insufficient. Now he said: I will not only shift -this to France, but I will also shift really important war production, -which is carried out at present in Germany with German labor, so that I -can release German labor in Germany and have this production carried out -in France, Belgium, and Holland. There is sufficient capacity in this -field in France and labor is also available in sufficient numbers. -Therefore a large part of the work can be accomplished there and I can -release the people in Germany. Thereby I am serving two ends: in the -first place I am setting free German labor and secondly I am utilizing -the French workers who are not working at all now because industry is at -standstill. And there is still a third factor, that Frenchmen will be -ready of their own accord to carry out such production as serves the -welfare of the civilian population, because with such work they are no -longer in danger of air raids and they are not working directly for the -war. So that they will not be considered as traitors to their country, -but are working for the advantage of their own country. - -This development has been encouraged in the meantime. The time is still -too short to make any definite statement as to the results. In some -fields the results are already quite exceptional. In some instances we -have transferred up to 50 percent and more of the total German -requirements to the West and the manufacturing is done there. The -transfer figures are rising rapidly from month to month. The coal and -power questions are of course great obstacles. We hope, however, to -overcome them in the course of this year, because by the middle of the -year we shall have increased 25 percent of the power supply in France by -water power, the necessary constructions for which will be finished by -them, and by the end of 1944 hydroelectric stations will be ready and -they will be equal to 50 percent of the present French power production. - -The idea in fact is this: to carry out there the work which up to now -has been done here and to release thereby German labor. There is yet -another reason for this. It has been pointed out by you time after time, -Gauleiter, that in these sections of industry, it is not easy to change -the workers. According to the Field Marshal’s description of the -situation, there is especially a lack of managers and supervising -personnel in the works and only German workmen can be considered for -such, and every worker, even if technically he is not so suitable, will -serve for purposes of management supervision and will lend some backbone -to the plant. - -As regards the question of the S-plants, Minister Speer put the -following question to Minister Bichelonne: Are you in a position to -provide the labor for such an extensive shifting program, which involves -a certain risk? To which Bichelonne, from his standpoint quite rightly -replied: If the people are not running away into the woods for fear of -being deported to Germany I shall get them to work in French plants. -From this discussion there resulted the idea of protected plants which, -as you said, were supposed to represent a protection against Sauckel. -Whoever is there is working for Germany and may not be deported to -Germany. You said that these plants worked like a suction pump. That is -just what they were meant to do. Labor was to be drawn in with a suction -process so that the plants were full to capacity and could work for us. -The existence of the S-plants cannot and may not be undermined. It is -backed by the German promise which was given in all solemnity and which -was supported by the signature of my Minister. - - * * * * * - -SAUCKEL: May I again draw attention to the matter of volunteers and to -the entire process of the allocation of French labor. There was never -any program carried out in France on a voluntary basis, but the programs -have been carried out for the Todt Organization the building of -fortresses in France, on the one hand, and for the assignment in France -to the plants working for Germany and also to the plants working for -transferred industries according to concrete agreements which I made -with the French government, on the other hand. The French government -fulfilled these conditions last year. It appointed people for the -western fortifications and for the Atlantic fortifications, it appointed -people for the plants and it appointed people for Germany. In the fall -of last year, towards the end of summer, Laval declared for the first -time that he was not going to send any more people to Germany and from -then on only very few Frenchmen arrived in Germany. - - * * * * * - -TIMM: Will it not happen that the offices making the demands say one -day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled -workers which cannot be justified? - -MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First -Speer must have a survey of what has happened as the result of all his -agreements. - - * * * * * - ------ - -[90] Tr. pp. 161-162. - -[91] Defendant in case of Government of France _vs._ Hermann Roechling. -See Vol. XIV. - -[92] DR. BERGOLD, Milch’s defense counsel, objected as follows (_Tr. p. -134_): “May it please the Tribunal, I would like to make a final -objection against the introduction of the exhibit just submitted by -prosecution, namely 41-A, for the following reason: this is an -interrogation of Sauckel, who, in conformance with the sentence passed -upon him, was executed. I am of the opinion that such an interrogation -cannot be used as evidence here, for, since Sauckel was executed, I have -no possibility whatsoever to ask him to appear here before the Tribunal -as a witness and to cross-examine him concerning his statements. In this -statement there are certain things which are not correct, and, due to -the fact that the person who made them is dead, they cannot be -corrected. The International Military Tribunal frequently ruled that -statements made by witnesses and affidavits can only be introduced when -it is possible for the defense counsel to bear these persons as -witnesses, and to ask prosecution to produce these people for -cross-examination. This is absolutely impossible in the case of Sauckel, -and I should like to ask the Tribunal to issue a ruling on whether or -not these statements can be used as evidence here. - -The Court ruled as follows (_Tr. p. 194_): - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Court has determined that under the Charter -and the Ordinance this exhibit is admissible. Its weight, however, in -view of the peculiar circumstances attending it, is, of course, still -for the Tribunal to determine. This ruling is made after conference with -the judges of Tribunal I, who had a similar problem presented, and who -made the same ruling as this Tribunal now makes. - -MR. DENNEY: If your Honors please, that question will come up again, -because we have interrogations and affidavits from other defendants in -the first trial, who have since either been executed or have taken their -own lives. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Tribunal feels that the very broad scope of -the section of the Charter and the Ordinance dealing with the admission -of evidence justifies the admission of this exhibit. - -[93] Defense introduced this paragraph as Defense Exhibit 5. See pp. -509-10. - -[94] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by -the defense as Defense Exhibit 8. See pp. 511-15. - -[95] Defendant before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the -Major War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947. - -[96] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by -the defense as Defense Exhibit 31. See pp. 517 to 523. - -[97] Defendants in case of United States _vs._ Ernst von Weizsaecker, et -al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV. - -[98] Same as note above. - -[99] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Otto Ohlendorf, et al. See -Vol. IV. - -[100] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. -See Vols. X, XI. - -[101] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Carl Krauch, et al. See -Vols. VII, VIII. - -[102] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 Feb. -and 4 Mar. 47, pp. 1136-1186, 1445-1457. - -[103] Prosecution introduced other portions of this report as -Prosecution Exhibit 48-A. See pp. 457-59. - -[104] Prosecution also introduced this document. - -[105] Defense counsel, Dr. Bergold, explained (_Tr. p. 523_): - - “This document shows that the defendant liked to use strong - language. It refers merely to the allocation. He speaks of - ‘beating’, yet he does not mean this literally but figuratively. - The high Tribunal will remember at one time he spoke of whips - being used to force certain people to use suggested methods. - That is not what he meant.” - -[106] Dr. Bergold stated (_Tr. p. 530_): “This document is submitted to -show that Field Marshal Milch was very much endeavouring to leave the -French workers in France with their own firms and only to transfer -orders over there. The International Military Tribunal has accounted as -exonerating circumstances in the case of Speer that he established in -France the protected plant system (Speer Betriebe); so far as Milch is -concerned, we wish to point out that he did the very same thing for the -airplane industry and that he tried to act in a reasonable way. I also -wish to say that the man always had in mind reasonable economic -propositions. Finally the document proves that individual remarks made -were of no consequence whatsoever, that they were only verbal flourish -which did not lead to any results. For instance, in the case of -antiaircraft batteries, the conference passes that point over, which is -shown by the last words of Speer and Milch. It is simply a marginal -remark. I will also prove that he did not say that on this occasion and -that the minutes were changed, because he had difficulties with Goering. -I shall show that this passage, criticizing Goering, was taken out of -the report because at that time serious difficulties arose between him -and Goering.” - -[107] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by -the prosecution as Prosecution Exhibit 48-A. See pp. 467-71. - -[108] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by -the prosecution as Exhibit 48-A, See pp. 484 to 498. - - - - - 3. THE JAEGERSTAB[109] - - _EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION - REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE - JAEGERSTAB, 13 JANUARY 1947_[110] - -MR. KING: If your Honors please, the prosecution begins now the -presentation of that phase of its case dealing with the defendant -Milch’s participation in the Jaegerstab. I might add that that has to do -with the slave labor phase of the Milch case. - -First, I wish to say a few words about the background of the Jaegerstab. -The Jaegerstab was formed on 1 March 1944 by decree of Albert Speer -issued pursuant to an order of Adolf Hitler. Our evidence will show, -however, that it was the defendant Milch who conceived and instigated -the formation of the Jaegerstab. - -The purpose of the Jaegerstab was increased production of fighter -aircraft. Fighter plane production had suffered severe set-backs due to -British and American air attacks. Defendant Milch and his Luftwaffe had -also suffered in the battle for new raw materials. - -Fighter aircraft were Germany’s principal defense against bombing raids. -Early in 1944 the defendant Milch had concluded that without adequate -fighter protection the entire German armament industry would soon be -destroyed. After repeated urgings, Milch was finally successful in his -efforts to create a special commission of top officials from various -ministries to undertake a special effort in the field of fighter -production. - -The Jaegerstab, therefore, was actually a concentration of experts drawn -from various ministries. Our evidence will show that the defendant Milch -and Speer were designated as the joint chiefs of the Jaegerstab with -Karl Adolf Saur acting as Chief of Staff. - -The methods adopted by the Jaegerstab in the execution of its tasks were -(1) transfer of German aircraft industry underground, (2) the -decentralization of German aircraft industry, (3) quick repair of -bombed-out plants. - -Our proof will show that the labor for this program, which was the -decisive consideration in the discussions of the Jaegerstab, was -obtained from three sources: (1) Sauckel Ministry, (2) concentration -camps, (3) direct recruitment from occupied countries. - - Evidence - - _Prosecution Documents_ - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - NOKW-017 54 Extracts from the minutes of 527 - the conference with air force - engineers and chief - quartermasters under - chairmanship of Milch, 25 - March 1944. - NOKW-261 70 Chart of the organization of 535 - the Jaegerstab drawn by Saur - with letter of transmittal to - prosecution staff, 14 - November 1946. - 1584-III-PS 71 Correspondence between Himmler 537 - and Goering, 9 March 1944, - concerning the use of - concentration camp prisoners - in the aircraft industry. - R-124 48-E Extracts from the minutes of 539 - discussions between Saur and - the Fuehrer, 6 and 7 April - 1944. - NOKW-247 61 Appointment of Field Marshal 540 - Milch as Goering’s - plenipotentiary for the - intensification of air force - armament. - F-824 57 Order of Field Marshal von 542 - Kluge regarding compulsory - recruitment of labor in the - West, 25 July 1944. - NOKW-337 75 Extracts from transcript of 544 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 6 - March 1944. - NOKW-338 75 Extracts from transcript of 545 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on - Friday, 17 March 1944. - NOKW-346 75 Extracts from transcript of 546 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference under - chairmanship of Field Marshal - Milch on Monday, 20 March - 1944. - NOKW-388 75 Extracts from transcript of 547 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 28 - March 1944. - NOKW-334 75 Extract from transcript of 550 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 25 - April 1944. - NOKW-362 75 Extracts from transcript of 552 - stenographic minutes of - Jaegerstab Conference on the - occasion of the 5th trip of - the “Hubertus Undertaking”, 2 - and 3 May 1944. - NOKW-390 75 Extract from transcript of 553 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 4 - May 1944. - NOKW-442 75 Extract from transcript of 554 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on 5 - May 1944. - NOKW-361 75 Extract from transcript of 554 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference during - the 6th journey of the - “Hubertus Undertaking” from - 8-10 May 1944. - NOKW-336 75 Extracts from transcript of 555 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on 26 - May 1944. - NOKW-359 75 Extracts from transcript of 557 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on 27 - June 1944. - NOKW-320 73 Extract from interrogation of 558 - Karl Otto Saur on 13 November - 1946, concerning the use of - concentration camp prisoners - in Jaegerstab construction. - NOKW-266 76 Affidavit of Fritz Schmelter, 559 - 19 November 1946, concerning - the organization of the - Jaegerstab. - - _Defense Documents_ - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - Speer Ex. 34 17 Order of Hitler, 21 April 1944, 560 - delegating to Dorsch - authority for Jaegerstab - constructions. - NOKW-337 12 Excerpts from the stenographic 561 - minutes of the Jaegerstab - Conference on 6 March 1944 in - the Reich Air Ministry. - NOKW-338 13 Excerpts from the stenographic 562 - minutes of the Jaegerstab - Conference presided over by - Field Marshal Milch on - Friday, 17 March 1944, 1100 - hours, in the Reich Air - Ministry. - NOKW-365 15 Extract from the stenographic 563 - minutes of the Jaegerstab - Conference, 12 April 1944. - NOKW-334 16 Extracts from stenographic 564 - minutes of the Jaegerstab - Conference, 25 April 1944. - NOKW-442 21 Extract from the stenographic 565 - minutes of the Jaegerstab - Conference, 5 May 1944. - NOKW-336 23 Excerpts from the stenographic 566 - minutes of the Jaegerstab - Conference on Friday, 26 May - 1944, at 10:00 o’clock. - - _Testimony_ - - Extracts of testimony of defense witness Fritz Schmelter 567 - Extracts of testimony of defense witness Xaver Dorsch 583 - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-017 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 54 - - EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE WITH AIR - FORCE ENGINEERS AND CHIEF QUARTERMASTERS UNDER - CHAIRMANSHIP OF MILCH, 25 MARCH 1944 - -[Handwritten note] To my files - Mi. - _Secret_ - _MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE WITH AIR FORCE ENGINEERS - AND CHIEF QUARTERMASTERS UNDER - THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHAL - MILCH ON SATURDAY, 25 MARCH 1944, - AT 10 O’CLOCK_ - -Dr. Koppert/Lm. -25 March 1944 - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Gentlemen! I welcome you. I have called you -together here in order to discuss with you questions of importance for -our German defense. - -Beginning with the year 1942, the Luftwaffe put special emphasis upon a -considerable increase in the number of fighter planes produced each -month which at that time amounted to 200 to 220. It was possible, by -July of last year, to exceed the figure of one thousand as the norm, in -accordance with our program. Then the heavy raids, especially against -our armament industry, began first against the preliminary industry -[Vorindustrie] in the Ruhr, then against our fighter and airplane -industry itself. The enemy enumerated 65 completely destroyed fighter -factories and factories producing parts for fighters in his lists. -Beginning in the middle of 1942 we undertook extensive evacuations, and -did so to small localities above ground, smaller places, and the like. -In so doing, about 4½ million square meters of factory space, productive -space, were evacuated. That was the maximum that could be accomplished -with the means at our disposal. We were lacking in transport space, we -were lacking in machine tools, and primarily we were lacking in skilled -workers and managerial forces, more of whom are of course needed in a -dispersed system of manufacture than in a centralized system. The -extraordinary drafting into the Wehrmacht and just at the end also the -SE 3-drive deprived the Luftwaffe armament industry of its key -personnel. We have in our employ today approximately 60 percent -foreigners and 40 percent Germans, whereby one has to take into -consideration that the women work in the factories only half a day. -Therefore, the ratio of Germans to foreigners becomes considerably more -unfavorable. The ratio is gradually approaching 90 percent foreign with -10 percent German supervising them. The rest of the Germans are -concentrated in development factories and the like. - -The enemy has now adopted a definite plan—as you as soldiers know -yourselves and learn constantly from foreign news—of destroying -aircraft production first, and mainly the production of fighter planes -and night fighters, in order to be able to deal with Germany as he -pleases. The enemy believes that this stage has almost been reached now. -There is, however, still some confusion in his news reports. One day he -expresses his amazement that the German fighter planes did not appear. -Then again the newspapers receive a secret directive: “Unpleasant -surprises do occur, so do not emphasize so strongly that the enemy has -already disappeared from the air.” On the whole, however, the enemy -hopes that it has come to the point where Germany’s backbone has been -broken or that at least that stage has almost been reached where the -enemy has been granted the possibility of dealing with Germany as he -pleases. - -Another plan our Western enemies have concerns the questions surrounding -the concept of the invasion. The invasion and its success would of -course also be favorably influenced by a destruction of German anti-air -raid defenses. - -We of the Luftwaffe armaments have been asking for over a year already -that a strong home defense in the air be set up. We have made efforts to -establish the prerequisites necessary for this, namely, the providing of -sufficient planes to serve as day and night fighters. * * * Being fully -aware that the strength of the Luftwaffe alone is insufficient both as -regards quotas and with respect to the workers, etc., in order to bring -about an extensive change in the field of air armaments, we applied to -Minister Speer and his colleagues to undertake a common special effort -in this field. The establishment of a Ruhr staff served as an example -for us; it was established at the time when the industry in the Ruhr -area seemed to be entirely put out of commission by the continuous -raids. At that time the Ruhr staff was set up and the necessary quotas, -buildings, etc., were put at its disposal. Thereby the entire situation -was changed. Minister Speer and his colleagues, fully aware that without -air armaments and without air defense the rest of the armament industry -would very soon be destroyed and become useless, agreed to this plan -enthusiastically and with initiative. Thus it came about that a definite -proposal was made to the Reich Marshal and the Fuehrer: the Jaegerstab -was created. The order of the Fuehrer provides clearly that the fighter -plane program which the Jaegerstab is starting has priority over all -other fields of armament, which means, to be sure, that other important -armaments are not to be infringed upon by it. * * * - - * * * * * - -The Jaegerstab is made up as follows: the direction is in the hands of -Reich Minister Speer and myself. Deputy for both of us, and at the same -time our chief of staff, is Hauptdienstleiter Dipl. Ing. Saur, who is -sitting on my left. Saur is the man who carried out the large-scale -armament program for the army and the navy in the Speer Ministry in -recent years in an exemplary manner. Saur again and again during the -past year and a half succeeded in raising the production figures in all -important fields and sometimes even in multiplying them. - -Further, I name only the leaders of the Jaegerstab. We have put the -question of over-all planning in the hands of Dr. Wegener. Construction -matters will be directed by Dipl. Ing. Schlempp. The evacuation -underground will be in the hands of SS Gruppenfuehrer Kammler. The -supply, one of the most essential factors, and everything in the way of -semi-manufactured material that comes to our factories for completion, -will be taken care of by Director Schaaf, deputy to Staatsrat Dr. -Schieber, the chief of the armament supply office -[Ruestungslieferungsamt] in Speer’s Ministry. Dr. Schmelter will take -care of labor commitment. Sites suitable for dispersal, confiscations, -etc., will be in the hands of Ministerialrat Speh of the armaments -supply office. Gruppenfuehrer Nagel of the Organization Speer will be in -charge of transportation. The supply of power will be in the hands of -General Director Fischer. Engineer Lange will be in charge of machinery, -Mr. Nobel of repairs. Reich railroad questions will be in the hands of -the President of the Reich railroad, Pueckler. Post Office: Oberpostrat -Dr. Zerbel. Health matters: Dr. Poschmann. Social welfare: Dr. -Birkenholz. Special problems for Me 262 and steel power units: Captain -Dr. Krome. Raw materials and quota system: Dr. Stoffregen. Questions of -technical simplification, etc.: Oberstabsing. Klinker. Office manager: -Petri. - -* * * On the spot the individual gentlemen are then told, supported by -the combined authority of the state, the Wehrmacht, and the Party, that -is, Saur and me—Speer is unfortunately still on sick leave, otherwise -he would also be present—what it is all about. That takes ten minutes. -After ten minutes the individual members of the Jaegerstab disappear and -get together with the men from the factory who are competent for their -sphere of activity. Thus, all pertinent questions are dealt with in the -conferences about the commitment of labor, and all competent men, who -have anything to do with the commitment of labor meet, especially the -president of the competent Provincial Labor Office. Thus it is -determined on the spot, in the individual spheres, what the factory -lacks. If the circumstances require it, it is immediately demonstrated -to the factory that their requests are nonsense. Unreasonable demands -and excessive claims are revised. Well-founded demands are immediately -filled. While the discussions are still going on, telegrams are sent to -the different offices, and the people are already set to work. In -general, the people arrive in 24 hours. Unfortunately there are -exceptions, for which the Wehrmacht sector is responsible. The Wehrmacht -does not work as smoothly and beautifully as civilian offices. It is an -error to believe that civilian offices are more bureaucratic than -military offices. On the basis of my continuous and extensive experience -I can assure you exactly the opposite is true. - - * * * * * - -* * * Our entire German ball-bearing industry, and that outside Germany, -was eliminated one hundred percent by the enemy in a, I must say, -brilliant attacking operation: Erfurt, Schweinfurt, Frankfurt on the -Main, Stuttgart, Italy. We were faced with the question whether without -ball bearings we could produce new planes at all, new tanks, or whether -we had to capitulate as an armament industry. For ball bearings are an -indispensable factor in modern armament industry. One finds and needs -them everywhere, even in places where one does not think of them at -first. Now it became apparent, thank God, that the branches of the -Wehrmacht had hoarded ball bearings and roller bearings in such large -masses that we got along for three months with the hoarded material -alone. In this case it was lucky that we still had so much, that so many -ball bearings had been hoarded. I have to admit that. But that is not -the normal way. It is certain that in the whole period up to now too -many spare parts have been requested just in order to gather such -hoards. And this in spite of the fact that not everything has been -attained by far, but only very large stocks. I should like to say that -with the material you have, 20 to 30,000 planes could be newly built or -newly equipped without further ado. That is how much material you have! -And this does not concern large parts; for in that field I was always -strict—it concerns rather all the accessories and apparatus. In -considering these figures one has to know that about 52 percent of the -total man-hours are spent in equipping a plane and only 48 percent in -building the aircraft frame and the engine. Only then does one realize -fully the importance for us of all that small junk that is lying around -all over. It is not necessary that the troops always take along all -their spare parts. * * * - -Gentlemen, in this connection I may call your attention to another -important point. If I visit an office and find out that something is -being hidden there, then I ask for the death penalty for such a crime -today! That is fraud! That is sabotage of the German armament industry! - - * * * * * - -Then there is still the human factor. We often had considerable -difficulty with the human factor. The fluctuation there is very -considerable. The quota of the Luftwaffe in the distribution of manpower -is constantly lowered. The foreigners run away. They do not keep to any -contract. There are difficulties with Frenchmen, Italians, Dutch. The -prisoners of war are partly unruly and fresh. These people are also -supposed to be carrying on sabotage. These elements cannot be made more -efficient _by small means. They are just not handled strictly enough._ -If a decent foreman would sock one of those unruly guys because the -fellow won’t work, then the situation would soon change. _International -law cannot be observed here._ I have asserted myself very strongly, and -with the help of Saur I have very strongly represented the point of view -that the prisoners, with the exception of the English and the Americans, -_should be taken away from the military authorities_. Soldiers are not -in a position, as experience has shown, to cope with these fellows who -know all the answers. I shall take very strict measures here and shall -put such a prisoner of war before my court martial. If he has committed -sabotage or refused to work, I will have him hanged, right in his own -factory. I am convinced that that will not be without effect. - -Anyhow, the strangest things occur in the treatment of the workers. It -is said that the people collapse, and then one has to find out that they -have a furlough of three or four days every eight weeks. That is dirty -business of the first order and treason to the country! Then perhaps a -construction battalion arrives and is supposed to be put to work. The -commanding officer, perhaps some overfed grade-school teacher, declares -that the men must drill and must take part in sports! Damn it, the -fellows are there to work so that the maximum amount of work will -result. One has to act very strictly here. A construction battalion was -ordered to Regensburg. The commanding officer was one of those scholars -who said he could not billet the men in peacetime conditions and, -therefore, he refused to start work. Such a guy should be convicted by a -court martial and hanged. I would be grateful if the gentlemen would -proceed in that manner. As with me in industry, so every stupidity is -possible everywhere else also. As chief, one has to take up these -matters. I know what kind of obstacles become apparent. There is -bureaucracy. It is not easy to go against bureaucracy. But we have to -cut through that also, and if you, Gentlemen, proceed with the right -attitude here, then we are already assured of success. - - * * * * * - -* * * In saying this I do not even consider the fact that the workshops -have first-class personnel, whereas we in the Luftwaffe armament -industry have Russians, French prisoners of war, Dutch, and members of -32 other nations. Obtaining interpreters alone presents a big difficulty -there. * * * - -A further question concerns the efforts for housing the machines. That -is very important, and I would be very grateful if you would think this -matter over also. In this manner you would not only facilitate the -question of spare parts but also the scarce supply of materials. Each -fighter plane contains about one ton of aluminum. Every small bomber -contains four tons of aluminum; and a larger bomber, seven to eight -tons. The captured bombers contain eleven to twelve tons of aluminum. -There are in any case tremendous amounts of material involved here. Let -us take twelve tons as normal for an American heavy bomber, or let us -say only ten tons, and let us assume that we actually shoot down 500 -such American bombers a month and that we can salvage them over our own -territory; that alone means 5,000 tons of aluminum, 5,000 tons: that is -25 percent of the aluminum quota at the disposal of the Luftwaffe. You -can see how important these questions are, too. We can certainly count -on more Americans being shot down in the future because we will have -more fighter planes. - - * * * * * - -I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all the -rabble that we have among the foreign workers there is of course a lot -of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is, the Russian prisoners -of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and illness. The incidence of -sickness of one-and-a-half to two percent which we have had up to now -has at least doubled and in some factories it has been increased to -eight, nine, and ten percent. That is, of course, done by previous -agreement. There the official physicians must undertake an examination -and if the physicians, who have to be very strict, find out that it is -not true, then we return the fellows to work by means of the whip. Then -the whip serves as cure. - -A further request which is very important from the point of view of -leadership! Sometimes we do not know in case of an alert what orders we -want to give for our factories. If a factory knows that it is about to -be attacked, and it has a few trench shelters but does not have a -bomb-proof shelter or the like, then the people simply run away from the -factory, automatically at each raid, after the first one, and they -usually cannot be caught the next day, either. That applies particularly -to the foreigners. We have, therefore, now issued the following order, -and have equipped the superiors accordingly with weapons and pistols: as -soon as a factory which has already been attacked a few times can count -on the raids being aimed at that particular factory again, then the -personnel leave the factory; but in closed groups by shops, under the -leadership of the man in charge of the shop, and, to the extent that -they are German personnel, they leave singing military songs. The people -are led away from the factory to a distance of 1,000 or 1,500 meters. -There they have to lie down in slit trenches and watch their factory -from there, so that they can immediately rush to it after the raid in -order to help and to save what can be saved. That is the only correct -way to do it. * * * - - * * * * * - -Gentlemen, you come from the fronts, and some of you were perhaps -surprised to see how Berlin looks. I recommend to you, if you still have -time today, to drive around in a bus and see Berlin. The center still -looks quite nice. But have a look at other districts of Berlin too, or -look at Frankfurt or Duesseldorf or whatever all of these places are -called, in their present condition; then you will admit to me that the -population will not be able to endure this condition permanently; not -that there is any danger of a revolution or any such thing as we know it -from 1918. But at a certain point a human being just cannot endure any -more. It is quite surprising how the population has endured this thing -so far or how it always gets on its feet again, when it is led in the -proper way by true leaders (Fuehrer) who, thank God, are present among -the people through the Party and the rest of the leadership. But you -must not forget, Gentlemen, the war of nerves has reached a point which -causes us in the leadership group worry. The people cannot endure that -forever. - -One does not have to see only how the people are working—I have told -you that—but also how they live, where they are living today, how they -are sleeping today. There are hundreds of thousands of Berliners who -have not known any heating for months, who have not been able to take a -bath for months, who have not been able to shave with warm water for -months, and the like. They are happy if they can still put their warm -coffee [Plirsch] in their stomachs in the morning and at noon their -soup. And with that they work seventy-two hours. It is a damned -difficult affair. Whoever does not understand that and whoever does not -say on this occasion: From now on our work will be done quite -differently than was the case so far, is a miserable wretch in my -opinion. And everyone of us and everyone you appoint has to be trained -to accomplish in this sphere what the others have been accomplishing for -a long time. We have to do that, we have to increase our production so -that we can push the enemy back in the next few weeks and months in the -same way as he has advanced to Berlin and farther, step by step. - - * * * * * - -Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down who blocks -your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask whether he is -allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For us, there is nothing but -this one task. We are fanatics in this sphere. We do not even consider -letting anything at all distract us from that task. No order exists -which could prevent me from fulfilling this task. Nor shall I ever be -given such an order. Now, do not let anything deter you, and get your -people to the point that no one deters them. If there is a little -hindrance from below, this is not due to ill will but to stupidity. -Gentlemen! In the fifth year of war stupidity is a crime! - - * * * * * - -Gentlemen, I know, not every subordinate can say: For me, the law no -longer exists, but he has to have someone who covers up for him, not out -of cowardice; but if you act according to the spirit of the old field -service regulation, “Abstaining from doing something hurts us more than -erring in the choice of the means,” and if, moreover, you keep in touch -and immediately clarify difficult points so that something can be done, -then we are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the -law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany: Either -we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these slipshod -methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer to fall while I -am doing something that is against the rules but that is right and -sensible and be called to account for it and, if you like, hanged, -rather than be hanged because Papa Stalin is here in Berlin, or the -Englishman. I have no desire for that. I would rather die in a different -way. But I think we can accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth -year of war. I repeat: The decision will come within the next six weeks! - - Heil Hitler! - (End: 12:20 hours) - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-261 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 70 - - CHART OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JAEGERSTAB DRAWN - BY SAUR WITH LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO PROSECUTION - STAFF, 14 NOVEMBER 1946 - - Nuernberg, 14 November 1946 - -K. O. Saur - -TO: Mr. King, via Prison Office. - -In accordance with your request enclosed please find the organization -chart of the Jaegerstab which was founded by decree of Reich Minister -Speer on 1 March 1944. The chart was drawn up from memory. - -The working methods of the Jaegerstab are disclosed in their essence by -the following paragraph from the Armament Staff Charter issued by Reich -Minister Speer on 1 August 1944. - - “Also in the future in order to prevent the Armament Staff from - developing gradually into an extensive agency, the regulation - concerning the purely personal membership will be maintained, as - was the case for the Jaegerstab. The technical work will be - done, therefore, in the office and agencies to which the - personal members belong, under the responsibility of the - competent office chiefs or agency directors.” - -The ministries and their offices or agencies responsible for the -different tasks are mentioned individually in the organization chart. - -For reasons of clarity, the Jaegerstab, as liaison office, has been -framed in red; the technological office, which then was under my own -responsibility has been framed in blue. [See legend on chart.] - - [Signed] SAUR - - - - -[Illustration: Chart: Responsible Groups and/or Main Departments.] - - - - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-III-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 71 - - CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIMMLER AND GOERING, 9 MARCH - 1944, CONCERNING THE USE OF CONCENTRATION CAMP - PRISONERS IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY - -1879/44 Secret 9 March 1944 - - Field-command office - -Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry. - -Reference: Teletype of 14 February 1944. - - 5 copies, 5th copy - Top Secret State Matter -Most honored Reich Marshal, - -Following my teletype letter of 18 February 1944, I herewith transmit a -survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.[111] - -This survey indicates that at the present time about _36,000 prisoners_ -are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total -of _90,000 prisoners_ is contemplated. - -The production is being discussed, established, and executed between the -Reich Ministry of Aviation and the Chief of my Economic Administrative -Main Office, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS -Pohl.[112] - -We shall render assistance with all forces at our disposal. - -The task of my Economic Administrative Main Office, however, is not -solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation -industry, as SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of -the required working speed through constant control and supervision of -the work-groups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the -results of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of -the fact that in enlarging our responsibility through a speeding up of -the total work better results can definitely be expected. - -We also have for some time adjusted our own stone quarries to production -for the air force. For instance, in Flossenbuerg near Weiden the -prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the -fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg, -which saw in the availability of our stonemason shops and labor forces -after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for -the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4,000 -prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2,000 -men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000 -single parts of various kinds for the fighter Me 109. - -In Oranienburg we are now employing 6,000 prisoners at the Heinkel works -for construction of the He 177. With these we are supplying 60 percent -of the total crew of the plant. - -The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions -regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from -the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with -premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8,000 prisoners. - -We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For -instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2,500 women are -working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and rudder -control. The plant has adjusted the total aerial production to employ -prisoners. In the month of January 30,000 devices as well as 500 rudder -controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are -increasing employment to 4,000 women. The performance of the women is -excellent. - -In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn (Brno) we produce also for -the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant supplies -14,000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for Me 109 to the -Messerschmitt Corporation, Augsburg. - -The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to -subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about 100,000 -prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of -14 February 1944 are already under way. - -I shall keep you, most honored Reich Marshal, currently informed on this -subject. - - Heil Hitler! - [Initialed] H.H. - [HEINRICH HIMMLER] - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-E - - EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SAUR - AND THE FUEHRER, 6 AND 7 APRIL 1944 - - Top Secret State Matter - -The Chief of the Technical Office -TA Ch S/Kr - - Berlin, 9 April 1944 - _MINUTES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FUEHRER - ON 6 AND 7 APRIL 1944_ - - * * * * * - -16. Reports made to the Fuehrer by myself [Saur] and Field Marshal -Milch, based on tables and drawings, as to the achievements of the -Jaegerstab stressing the satisfactory cooperation of the new -organization with all offices and plants. Reported in detail that plans -have been made for the best part of transfers, and that, as a first -installment, the decentralization above ground will be completed by -August, and, as the second installment, that the most vulnerable plants -will be underground by the end of the year. - -17. Field Marshal Milch reported on the result of a construction staff -meeting of the Central Planning Board according to which the most -important building projects only could materialize due to a great -tension in general conditions. In spite of this, the Fuehrer demands -that the two huge buildings of 600,000 square meters each should be -erected with all speed. He agrees that one of these buildings is not to -be made from concrete but—according to our suggestion—will be set up -as an extension of, and close to, the Middle Plant [Mittelwerk] as a -so-called “Middle-Building” [Mittelbau], and that this plant will be -placed under the direction of the Junkers Works. Plans have to be made -without delay to secure production in bottleneck items of the Junkers -Works, production of Me 262 at 1,000 per month, and fighters at 2,000 -per month. - -Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders and equipment, -the second big building project should not be set up in German territory -but in close vicinity to the border on suitable soil (preferably on -gravel base and with transport facilities) on French, Belgian, or Dutch -territory. The Fuehrer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be -set up behind a fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant -up in French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much -easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Fuehrer asks -that an attempt be made to set up the second works in a safer area, -namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible there, too, to -get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer himself will contact the -Reich Leader SS and will give an order that the required 100,000 men are -to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the -fact that the building organization of the Industry Association Silesia -[Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien] was a failure, the Fuehrer demands -that these works must be built by the O.T. [Organization Todt] -exclusively and that the workers should be made available by the Reich -Leader SS. He wants to hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss -details with all the men concerned. - - * * * * * - -The Fuehrer agrees that these items may be used as a basis for future -conferences. - - [signed] SAUR - [typed] (SAUR) - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-247 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 61 - - APPOINTMENT OF FIELD MARSHAL MILCH AS GOERING’S - PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF - AIR FORCE ARMAMENT - - _Copy_ - -The Reich Marshal of Greater Germany -Chairman of the Reich Defense Council - - Berlin, June [sic] - _AUTHORIZATION_ - -The war situation calls for the utmost intensification of the armament -capacity of the German Air Force within the shortest time. The goal of -the measures to be taken has to be the fourfold increase of the present -production in all branches of air force armament. I commission the State -Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation, Field Marshal Milch, with the -speediest execution of this intensification of armament ordered by the -Fuehrer. To secure the attainment of the end at which we aim I confer -herewith the most extensive power of authority on Field Marshal Milch -within the sphere defined as follows: - -1. Shutting-down and seizure of factories, decisions about -expropriations and forced leases, seizure and expropriation of -construction material in agreement with the Plenipotentiary General for -Construction, erection of auxiliary buildings exempted from restricting -provisions of the building police, of the office for the supervision of -industry, of air-raid protection, social institutions, etc., as far as -these provisions are incompatible with the fast completion of the -building projects. - -2. Confiscation, expropriation, and renting of machinery of all kinds -and its distribution to the armament factories of the Luftwaffe. Forced -transfer of workers who are unemployed or employed in industry of any -kind whatsoever, this not only for the erection of the buildings but -also for allocation to Luftwaffe armament factories. - -3. Confiscation of raw materials absolutely essential for the Luftwaffe -program; only superfluous raw materials may then be distributed in the -manner as now. This refers especially to light metals and gasoline. - -4. Removal and transfer of key personnel of the entire armament industry -irrespective of existing contracts under private law; cancellations of -or changes in existing powers of authorization, and issue of new powers; -creation of industrial associations, patent associations, merger of -companies; creation of new companies, and separation of uneconomically -working firms and their coordination or subordination to better managed -firms. - -5. Deviation from existing regulations about the financing of the war -and premiums in cases where the utmost intensification of output cannot -be achieved otherwise. In this connection due consideration has to be -given to the economical situation and to the financial capacity of the -firms involved. - -6. All decisions of and all measures taken by my plenipotentiary on the -basis of this authorization have to be regarded as if they were ordered -by me. These decrees and measures have priority in respect to all other -official directions and decrees as far as these are not compatible with -the speediest execution of the intensification of the production -capacity. - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT F-824 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 57 - - ORDER OF FIELD MARSHAL VON KLUGE REGARDING - COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT OF LABOR IN THE WEST, - 25 JULY 1944 - - Secret [Stamp] - - 2_a_ [Handwritten] - - Headquarters, 25 July 1944 - - 546 [Handwritten] - -Commander in Chief West Section -IaT No. 1731/44 secret - -Reference: 1. OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm.1) Qu.2 (West) No. 05201/44 secret of 8 - July 1944 (_distributed only to Commander in Chief West and - the Military Commanders._) - - 2. OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm.1) Qu.2 (West) No. 05431/44 secret of 19 - July 1944. - - (File Notes) - -Subject: Procurement of Labor in the West. - - With Ref. to 2, Chief OKW has ordered: - -“The communication of Field Marshal Von Kluge of 8 July, addressed to -the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production, crossed with my -order of the same day.” (OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm. 1) Qu. 2 (West) No. 05201/44 -secret). - -From this it is evident that, by order of the Fuehrer, under suspension -of orders to the contrary, the wishes of the Plenipotentiary for Labor -[Sauckel] and of Reich Minister Speer must, in principle, be carried -out. Further, to my teletype, the following additional general -directions apply in future, as a result of the conference of ministers -in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July, about which the Commander in Chief -West will have been informed by the military commander: - -Rejecting justified misgivings with regard to peace and security in the -interior of the country, seizures must be carried out wherever the -opportunities referred to in my above-mentioned teletype offer -themselves. As the only limitation, the Fuehrer has ordered that no -forcible means shall be employed against the population in the actual -combat area as long as it [the population] shows itself prepared to -assist the German Armed Forces. However, recruiting of volunteers from -among refugees from the combat zone is to be carried out vigorously. -Moreover, every means is justified to seize as much labor as possible -otherwise, apart from [using] the powers granted to the armed forces. - -In order to render as effective as possible the measures which have been -introduced, the troops are furthermore to be instructed in general as to -the necessity of the organization for conscription of labor in order to -put an end to the open and covert resistance which has arisen in many -instances. The field commandants and the offices of the military -administration must give wide support to the representatives of the -Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation and refrain from encroaching on -their sphere of activity. - -I now direct that the necessary orders in this sense be given and that I -be constantly informed about the measures taken and their execution. - -_Indorsement of Commander in Chief West_: - -In accordance with this, Commander in Chief West has reported the -following to the Chief of the OKW on 23 July 1944: - - 1. I have authorized the execution of the Sauekel-Laval agreement - of 12 May in spite of misgivings because of interior security. - - 2. I will issue more detailed directives for the execution of the - measures in the combat zone in accordance with OKW/WFST/Qu. - (Adm.1)/2 (West) No. 05201/44 secret of 8 July 1944. - - The Commander in Chief West - [Typewritten] VON KLUGE - Field Marshal - -Additional orders will follow. - - For the Commander in Chief West - The Chief of Staff - BY ORDER - (illegible signature) - Colonel, GSC - -Distribution: - High Command Army Group B - High Command Army Group G - Armored Group Command West - _Mil. Cmdr. in France_ - Armed Forces Commander in Belgium and northern France - -For Information: - - Commander in Chief West/Ic [Intelligence] -IaT (Draft) - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-337[113] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 6 MARCH 1944 - -SS MAJOR: [unidentified] I have already discussed with Lt. Col. Diesing -our requirements according to our construction plan in the immediate -program. From tomorrow 5,000 prisoners will be in readiness to carry out -this measure. For that we need 750 guard personnel. - - * * * * * - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We must distribute our German people as key -personnel. That is, out of three construction companies we can probably -make ten complete ones by introducing 70 percent foreigners. - -SS MAJOR: They must be skilled workers. In handling the prisoners, it -appears best that we should give 5 to 10 of them to one man who knows -his job. - -SAUR: The construction companies will be dissolved to provide key -personnel for teams 10 times or even 100 times their size. That is a -question which must be clarified by 10 a.m. tomorrow between the -Plenipotentiary General for Construction and the air force construction -units on one side and Kammler’s construction staff on the other. That -will be clarified by tomorrow and he then must say what he needs. The -Todt Organization must take part in the discussion, but I cannot consent -to the inclusion of the Todt Organization in the matter as a third -leading organization, as we would get confused. The Todt Organization -must bleed with the rest. It is the same as your construction companies. -It is the donor but he is the organizer and usufructuary. He is by all -means the usufructuary. For besides being organizer, he is the -usufructuary for the construction sites of the Plenipotentiary General -for Construction. - -SS MAJOR: Therefore it is important that these construction companies -should be under military leadership! - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: * * * We further appealed to the Fuehrer that we -should get the 64 miners who are in Berchtesgaden, as the work there -will probably soon be finished. He made the suggestion that we, like the -SS, should also train miners in the greater degree and mentioned the -figure of 10,000 who would have to be trained one after another because -they could not all be trained at once. - -SAUR: The SS should be told that the training of miners should rest -entirely with them because the SS runs the best mining school. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We must also ask the SS to get more miners from -Italy and Slovakia. - -SAUR: * * * We must bring more order into the PW base camps [Stalags]. -We have made a proposal that the PW base camps should be transferred to -the SS. The Italians and eastern peoples should be treated more roughly. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-338[114] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1944 - - * * * * * - -STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: * * * We already count on 100,000 men for the tasks -of the Jaegerstab. To transfer them would mean breaking into the rest of -the armament economy to an unheard-of degree. - - (SAUR: 100,000 without Kammler!) - -Including the labor we give Kammler but not including the concentration -camp people. - -SAUR: Right from the beginning we realized that 200,000 men would be -transferred. - -STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: I have just spoken to Prinzel about it. It is -absolutely necessary that the few German key personnel at our disposal -should be taken with the concentration camp inmates or with the other -subjugated people in such a proportion as will guarantee the best use of -this valuable German strength * * *. - - * * * * * - -STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: I am always getting demands for German labor. For -example: Here are 5,000 concentration camp inmates, give me 1,000 German -workers. I do not fulfill these requests in this proportion; otherwise -my German labor would soon come to an end. We have filled only a -fraction of the positions. I distribute German workers only in the ratio -of 1:10. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: The air force stresses the importance of getting the whole cave -for the purposes of manufacture. * * * - -PORSCHE: * * * I shall talk to Weiss again about our getting more -concentration camp people for finishing off the work. - - (DIESING: We probably shall not get them.) - -I’ll get them from the Reich Leader. I already have 3,500. Two of -Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl’s men are going to France to prepare everything -locally with regard to housing and feeding. - - * * * * * - -NOBEL: Can one be responsible for foreigners working as airfield control -personnel? The repair works say: yes! - - (MILCH: Not as pilots!) - -I do not think that is intended. The repair works said yesterday that it -would be a help to them if foreigners could be used as airfield control -personnel. * * * - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-346 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF - FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON MONDAY, 20 MARCH 1944 - - * * * * * - -SAUR: * * * As far as Hungary is concerned, I should be grateful if the -Field Marshal would call up Mr. Sauckel and tell him that the whole -group mobilized in Hungary should be primarily at the disposal of the -Jaegerstab. Large construction [of entrenchments] columns [Schanz -Kolonnen] must be formed. The people have to be treated like prisoners. -Otherwise it won’t work. - - * * * * * - -SAUR: Where are the 54,000 Czechs? - -MAHNKE: Of the 58,000 Czechs, 17,000 have been earmarked for -Czechoslovakia. 31,000 are intended for the Reich, and after that 26,000 -have been divided among the special commissions [Sonderausschusse]. -31,000 were for power units. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-388 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 28 MARCH 1944 - - * * * * * - -NOBEL: The labor situation in the repair sector is very unsatisfactory. -Of the 2,000 people promised me before from the Action Sauckel, not one -has yet arrived. There is no point in saying that people should apply to -the armament department [Ruestungskommando]. The armament departments -and inspectorates [Ruestungskommandos and Inspektionen] have not got -anybody. If these men are not roped in by higher authority, the repair -workshops cannot get any labor. My people are not in a position to stop -production because we have not received any men since 11 March. - -MEMBER OF THE JAEGERSTAB: I brought this matter up yesterday with -Ministerialdirigent Dr. Timm of the office of the Plenipotentiary -General for Labor Allocation, and told him that we handed in our request -on 17 March, but had not yet received any laborers. He could not tell me -anything but will let us know today. I will ask Schmelter, who is coming -to this meeting later, to follow up the matter. - -MILCH: Tell Schmelter, that if I can help in any way by calling Sauckel, -etc., he should let me know. - - * * * * * - -SCHMELTER: I have received such high demands, for instance today over -3,000, tomorrow over 5,000, and the day after, again over 4,000, that it -cannot possibly be that the labor is really needed, or else the firms do -not understand the program. What has been received from you, Mr. Lange, -has been passed on. It is also to be expected that these laborers will -come within the next 10-14 days. I have arranged with Sauckel that I -shall give out red tickets for the most urgent demands, first of all a -consignment of 10,000. That will do to begin with. These red tickets -will have priority, even over other red tickets. Of course, that will -cause difficulties over skilled workers. When we have a picture of the -number of skilled workers we need, we must decide from which branch of -manufacture we can remove them, for Sauckel does not have so many -skilled workers. Those who have already arrived are, for the most part, -from the East. That is still the most prolific source. Very few come -from the West and they are slowly starting to come from Italy. There are -comparatively few skilled workers among them. So we must decide what -factories are to be closed or restricted and where we shall take away -the skilled workers. I can only let you have details in a few days when -I have a complete picture of requirements. - -NOBEL: If I must speed up repair work in a limited time, I need the -labor at once. Since 16 March not one of the 2,000 people that Sauckel -was going to send has arrived. That is already two weeks ago. They tell -me that if they have to deliver 50 machines they must have 60 people -today or tomorrow. But that won’t work because I have not got the -people. I have always said—you will not get skilled workers. They -answer—then give us others. If we do not fulfill these demands, their -confidence in the Jaegerstab will be undermined. This morning I shall -get material from Hansen & Company in Muenster. The labor office there -is not yet clear about the set-up of the Jaegerstab and the priority of -the fighter program. It is the result of the bureaucracy of the -authorities. My men have to argue with the authorities and thereby lose -valuable time. - -SCHMELTER: It is now customary, if one fails to produce something to put -the blame on the labor office. I remind you of the Messerschmitt affair. - - (MILCH: That is not so in all cases.) - -Assuredly! The gentlemen were with me on Saturday. They had got back 50 -tool makers from the army into the bargain, which they had had in the -meantime, and said nothing about. First, they could not employ them, -secondly, they did not need them, and thirdly, they got them elsewhere. -Furthermore Sauckel puts the people at the disposal of the repair -department. It was immediately reported that the labor offices worked -too slowly. - -MILCH: You will make things easier for yourselves if you build up -gradually a small reserve of a few hundred people, at first 500 which -you can later raise to 2,000 so that you can cover immediately any need -that arises. Then our work will gain the respect of others. At the -moment it is like this—either we must transfer people and leave a gap -where it is less vital, or wait until the people are brought in by -Sauckel. When one sees the figures that Sauckel has produced and -ascertains what the armament industry has received, the comparison is -ridiculous. - -SCHMELTER: A letter is on the way from the minister to Mr. Sauckel. -During the first three months Sauckel has brought in between 300,000 and -400,000 people, but not even a miserable 66,000 red tickets could be -honored. - -MILCH: I personally cannot get over it! Take the help away from the -housewives! In the past year 800,000 domestic servants have been -negotiated and we are fighting for 2,000 men! - -SCHMELTER: In one year the demand for female domestic servants in -Germany has risen by 200,000, the demands of the armament industry -during the same period by 600. I have arranged that transports that come -from abroad are directed straight to the points of greatest need. - -MILCH: Every week 2,000 people come from the East. - - (SCHMELTER: Most of them go into agriculture.) - -The Jaegerstab has priority over agriculture. Can you not intercept -them? - -SCHMELTER: I have arranged that. The 2,000 are disposed of; some of them -are already at work. But it does not always happen that the reports of -the firms are 100 percent correct. We have often checked that up. It -often happens that firms take the people and put them into another -branch of production but still shout for people for the high priority -processes. - -(NOBEL: That is not the case in my repair industry!) - -FRYDAG: Yesterday, I was in Wiener-Neustadt. The works have a -considerable assignment and a hefty increase. Merely in order to get out -of the room unscathed I gave them 200 men from the airframes industry. - -SCHMELTER: In Wiener Neustadt there was a demand for 1,000 or 1,500. A -thousand were supposed to come from Air Fleet 2 in Italy. An engineer -official, Weidinger, was going to produce them. On Sunday I received a -phone call to the effect that the engineer official could not produce -them. - -FRYDAG: That is quite right. But you must put yourself in the firm’s -place. The firm must have these people. - -SCHMELTER: Then I must see to it that I take them from somewhere else. - -MILCH: You know our position. We are convinced that you do everything -you can. But we must now commit a robbery. We can no longer operate -along legal lines. - - (SCHMELTER: That is the only possibility.) - -There will be abuse but we must accept that. - -SCHMELTER: I shall go tomorrow to Mr. Sauckel and tell him that he must -give the fighter industry the next transport of workers from the East. -The proposal that the fighter industry should not give back the laborers -it received who originally worked in agriculture has been turned down by -Sauckel. I am commissioned to inform you of this. - -MILCH: That is out of the question. Nothing shall go out of the fighter -industry! - -SCHMELTER: I am commissioned to say that he must have this labor back -again. - -MILCH: Later, not now! One more thing. We must protect all the factories -working for the fighter program. We must say to them: You must not give -up people for anything whatsoever except on command of the Jaegerstab. -None can touch you, not even the local labor offices and the ministerial -authorities; requests for personnel must all be directed to the -Jaegerstab. We must put that out clearly as an order. - -(PETRI: That is already in previous minutes.) - -SCHMELTER: May I request that this order should be extended to the -management and repair personnel of the electricity and gas works. - -MILCH: I can only do it for the Jaegerstab. I am not doing it for the -bomber and other branches either as we have only that special authority. - -SCHMELTER: I should like to ask that it should only be done for -manufacture and not construction. - -MILCH: Agreed! We must write a letter to Keitel of the OKW and a letter -to Sauckel saying: Requests are to be made only directly to the -Jaegerstab. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-334[115] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 25 APRIL 1944 - - * * * * * - -[page 27] - -WEGENER: I have a question for Schmelter: Has the question of the -_transfer of western Europeans_ been clarified? - -WERNER: On this subject I can say that it is especially difficult for -BMW [Bavarian Motor Works], because we can only transfer Russians and -concentration camp inmates, and the guards for these are mainly Belgians -and French. - - * * * * * - -WEGENER: As far as I can remember, 200 key personnel are needed for -Markirch. - -MILCH: Perhaps that must be brought before the Fuehrer again. - -SCHAAF: Saur came back and said there was no more to be said on this -subject to the Fuehrer. - -MILCH: That is out of date now. I have discussed with Saur the fact that -we cannot keep up this state of affairs. Saur is of my opinion. It must -be discussed once more with the Fuehrer. I can discuss it again with the -Reich Marshal. We shall do what we can, but we cannot throw everything -into confusion without due consideration. How should we then manage to -produce! I am convinced that the Fuehrer will agree as soon as we can -put these people reasonably into barracks so that they do not come into -contact with the population. - - * * * * * - -SCHAEDE: Whenever French key personnel are brought to Lorraine, they run -away without fail in a short time. This one must tell the firm. Already -they do not come back from leave. - -MILCH: It will only work if we put these workers into barracks. We -cannot exactly treat them as prisoners. It must appear otherwise, but it -must be so in practice. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: I am personally convinced after talking to the Fuehrer that he -will agree as soon as it is made reasonable. The people should not be -able to mingle with the population and to conspire. Nor should they be -allowed to run around free, so that they can cross the frontier every -day. Both practices must be stopped. - - * * * * * - -HEYNE: I have two short points. Yesterday Maehrisch-Truebau was removed -from the program because the Quartermaster General told me the previous -night that it was possible to move in on the morning of 28 April. The -matter is already progressing. Last night I was called up again because -the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs did not quite agree with the new -accommodation in Brunswick of the prisoners from Maehrisch-Truebau for -some reasons of security. - -I should like to ask Major Kleber, who was also yesterday announced as -Mr. Saur’s liaison officer with the OKW, to exert some pressure here. - -Apart from that, General Schmidt said that there were also some fighter -units and suchlike in the barracks; that he could not move out as -quickly as that; he would not take orders; otherwise he would go to the -Reich Marshal. - -MILCH: I am of the opinion that that must be done at once. It’s all the -same to me if individual people do object. Protest does not interest me -at all, whether from the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs or from our -side. - -Kleber, would you be so good as to take care of this? - -KLEBER: As far as prisoners of war are concerned I can take care of it, -but not where it concerns the air force. That must be handled -separately. - -MILCH: Naturally. This matter must be handled by us. There was in fact, -another proposal but we do not want it. Otherwise someone else will come -complaining. - -KLEBER: I should like to transfer the prisoners further off to -Brunswick. - -MILCH: I think it is an excellent idea for the prisoners to go there if -Brunswick continues to be attacked. - - * * * * * - -SAUR: I must come back again to the question of _western European -workers_. Make an energetic attempt to make a _compromise within the -factories_. I think it will work out. I do not think the Fuehrer will -give in even if we put the French into barracks. He has spoken so firmly -and for reasons which I cannot but recognize. I am all the more thankful -that permission has been given for the Protectorate. I am going to see -State Minister Frank on Friday and I shall discuss with him the whole -question of dispersal in the Protectorate. I shall like Schmelter to -accompany me to Prague on Friday to discuss the question of transfer of -workers. - -MILCH: I said before that we wanted to carry out the transfer within the -factories. Then if something is left over, we should have to approach -the Fuehrer again, but only on condition that they are in barracks and -that there are replacements for them. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-362 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON THE OCCASION OF THE 5TH - TRIP OF THE “HUBERTUS UNDERTAKING”, 2 AND 3 MAY 1944 - - * * * * * - -[Page 65] - -MILCH: * * * I also ask that every time the civilian population is -attacked [Translator’s note: by low-flying aircraft], in private cars, -on [rail] roads, etc., the local offices make reports accordingly. The -Fuehrer has ordered extremely severe measures against these enemy crews -who harass the civilian population. There is not the slightest military -necessity for this and the Fuehrer intends absolutely to act according -to the Japanese pattern. (Enthusiastic applause!) We must only take -cases individually so that we have the necessary material and can -produce it. We owe that to our boys who are prisoners over there, who -will be held as hostages unless we have proper proof. - - * * * * * - -[Page 110] - -SCHNAUDER: * * * - -1. At the Heinkel factory at Barth there are 3,300 workers, consisting -of 300 Germans and 3,000 concentration camp inmates. Of the 3,000 -concentration camp inmates, 1,500 are men. In order to maintain their -working capacity it is necessary to evacuate these men too during -daylight air attacks. However, there are not enough guards and sometimes -there is a deficit of as many as 20. As guards cannot be drawn from any -other source, it has been decided that the factory is to arm as guards -certain men from its own ranks to guard the concentration camp inmates. -* * * - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-390 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 4 MAY 1944 - - * * * * * - -SAUR: 12. Can the arrival of the reported 50,000 Italians be relied on? -By what date will the first transport arrive? This wording is, frankly, -unintelligible. It was quite clear that the 50,000 Italians were coming -so that the transport facilities were guaranteed long ago. How did such -a report get into the minutes of 14 April? - - (Comment: The camps into which these people are to go don’t even - exist yet!) - -We shan’t get any further like this! Inform Mr. Schmelter. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Are they coming via Sauckel? - -SAUR: No. This is our own undertaking. Pueckel has clarified various -doubtful points with Nagel and got ready a large number of vehicles and -now all that comes to nothing. Schmelter must report on it tomorrow, not -in the sense of whether it can be done, but that this and that must be -done, and by such and such means. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-442[116] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 5 MAY 1944 - - * * * * * - -SCHMELTER: Then the transport of the Italians. 50,000 Italians have not -yet been transported. It was due to the fact that the escort for the -transport has not yet been appointed. The conversation yesterday with -the Plenipotentiary in Milan proved that the transport should leave -today for this place Woerl (?) [sic] where further distribution will be -undertaken. I booked another call this morning but did not get through. -I hope to be able to give more details tomorrow. - -MILCH: Has a proper reception center been set up in Woerl? - - (SCHMELTER: Yes.) - -Is it assured that the number of those leaving is in reasonable -proportion to those arriving? * * *: [sic] That shall be. A man has been -appointed by Schmelter to travel down there especially and control -directly the conscription of civilians. - -MILCH: Is there someone at the Escort Detachment Headquarters in Italy -responsible for seeing that people do not get out and run away during -the journey? - -* * * [sic] That is what the escorting personnel is there for. - - (MILCH: Someone of standing?) - -Dr. Wendt is responsible for the whole undertaking. - -MILCH: I am of the opinion that, if anyone jumps out, he should be shot; -otherwise a thousand will get on and only twenty will arrive there. The -Gendarmerie and all military posts must look out for those who abscond -on the journey. They will be arrested at once and will appear before a -court martial. - -(End of meeting 1225 hours). - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-361 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE DURING THE 6TH JOURNEY - OF THE “HUBERTUS UNDERTAKING” FROM 8-10 MAY 1944 - - * * * * * - -GABEL: We must have 1,000 underground workers at once. - -SAUR: Definitely. - -BORNITZ: The Erzberg [ore mine] has, furthermore, a loss of from 1,400 -to 1,500 men per annum due to climatic conditions. It goes up as high as -1,500 meters. - -SAUR: Do you give the men up systematically, and to whom? - -BORNITZ: Not systematically. They collapse, report sick, and the -foreigners do not come back. Some escape too, as in the mountain country -it is not possible to seal everything hermetically. - -(Comment: A year ago the labor potential of a large concentration camp -was thoroughly gone into. That possibility must not be entirely -disregarded). - -GABEL: Careful! Concentration camp internees are not strong enough to be -able to work underground. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-336[117] - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 26 MAY 1944 - - * * * * * - -[Page 31-32] - -REICH MINISTER SPEER: With regard to construction it is important that -we should not start more building than we can supply labor and equipment -for. Equipment is of secondary importance. We must not continue with the -mistakes we found in the air force armament industry when we took over, -i.e., the beginning of no end of buildings for which, at that time, only -20 to 30 percent of the necessary labor was available. - -SAUR: That is the case now unfortunately. We have at least 3 times as -many buildings under construction as we have labor available. - -REICH MINISTER SPEER: What is the news about the Hungarian Jews? - -KAMMLER: They are on the way. At the end of the month the first -transports will arrive for surface work on the surface bunkers. - - * * * * * - -[Page 33] - -SCHLEMPP: * * * Dorsch said yesterday that he wanted to bring 100,000 -Jews from Hungary, 50,000 Italians, 10,000 men from bomb damage repair, -also 1,000 from Waldbroehl (?) [sic]; then he wanted to get something -from Greiser’s zone by negotiation, then 4,000 Italian officers, 10,000 -men from South Russia and 20,000 from North Russia. That would be -220,000 altogether. - -REICH MINISTER SPEER: We have often made such calculations; but the -people never came. - - * * * * * - -[Page 34] - -KAMMLER: For all these measures [Translator’s note: A and B construction -measures which were the responsibility of the SS], I must take in 50,000 -more people in protective custody [Schutzhaeftlinge]. - - * * * * * - -[Page 43] - -REICH MINISTER SPEER: We shall carry out a special operation -[Sondereinsatz] of our own in order to build up reserves of manpower -[Schwerpunkte]. It will bring in 90,000 men in three installments of -30,000. - - * * * * * - -It will be experts who are called up. And it would be a good thing if -one linked up with it the conscription of tool makers within the firms -so that one would have a body of tool makers in the armament industry. -These people would get leave from this group and would function as armed -forces employees. If we make them armed forces employees we have the -advantage of being independent of Sauckel’s offices. - - * * * * * - -[Page 80] - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: How long do the Italian PW’s actually work here? - -SCHMELTER: As long as the factory works. There is a regulation that PW’s -must work so long. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Could you not look into this? You can see people on -the streets about 4 or 5 o’clock and nobody after that. - - (SCHMELTER: I can look into it!) - -I do not believe that any Italian prisoner of war works 72 hours. - - * * * * * - -[Page 81] - -SCHMELTER: * * * Dorsch will accompany me to Greiser to try and get 20 -to 30 thousand men out of him. - -REICH MINISTER SPEER: Kammler had his doubts about that before. - -REPRESENTATIVE OF KAMMLER: He didn’t think the 100,000 Jews would come. - -SCHMELTER: To that I can add the following. Till now two transports have -arrived at the SS camp Auschwitz. For fighter construction we were -offered only children, women, and old men with whom very little can be -done. * * * Unless the next transports bring men of an age fit for work -the whole action will not have much success. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-359 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75 - - EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF - THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 27 JUNE 1944 - - * * * * * - -[Page 27] - -SCHMELTER: I have another small point to bring up. I said once before -that we had fairly large numbers of English and American “Terror Flyers” -in air force camps, who cannot be used. It is a matter, in all, of about -17,000 people, approximately half officers and NCO’s who do not need to -work. That means that there are 6 to 9 thousand men in camps who just -sit about doing nothing. The suggestion that they should be put to work -has now been turned down on the grounds that it concerns especially -intelligent people trained in collecting information and, apart from -that, inclined to acts of sabotage. - -SAUR: Can we put them into the manufacture of component parts? - -LANGE: Perhaps we can employ them in underground factories. - -SAUR: We could employ them in the manufacture of component parts. Who is -responsible for this matter? - -KRAUSE: The Commission for Prisoners of War; it comes under the -Quartermaster General. - -SAUR: Will you undertake to put this matter in order? These people must -be put at the disposal of the component parts industry. That would be an -unbelievable help to us. - -SCHMELTER: It must be laid down that these people _all_ go into fighter -production or into the component parts industry. Otherwise a part will -be sent off elsewhere. The people in question are excellent people, good -material. - - * * * * * - -[Page 31] - -SCHMELTER: I have a few more points. Up till now 12,000 female -concentration camp internees, Jewesses, have been demanded. The matter -is now in order. The SS has agreed to deliver these Hungarian Jewesses -in batches of 500. Thus the smaller firms, too, will be in a position to -employ these concentration camp Jewesses better. I request that these -people should be ordered in batches of 500. - -MAHNKE: How many are still there? - -SCHMELTER: There are still enough there. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-320 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 73 - - EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF KARL OTTO SAUR ON - 13 NOVEMBER 1946, CONCERNING THE USE OF CONCENTRATION - CAMP PRISONERS IN JAEGERSTAB CONSTRUCTION - -Q. Were special factories built after the creation of the Jaegerstab? - -A. All building of factories above the ground was stopped, and -subterranean factories were built. We divided approximately 30 factories -into 700 individual workshops to avoid offering targets for attacks. - -Q. What kind of workers were used for this construction? - -A. The construction was divided into three parts: the two Kammler parts, -(_a_) new construction underground, and (_b_) expansion underground, and -the Todt Organization part. - -Q. This expansion program was directed by Kammler,[118] then? - -A. Parts (_a_) and (_b_) were directed quite independently by Kammler. -He had full authority from Goering as of 4 March 1944 and was then made -a member of the Jaegerstab. * * * The whole affair was carried out by -Kammler alone. - -Q. And the workers who were used for this purpose were concentration -camp prisoners? - -A. To my knowledge, they must have been concentration camp prisoners. - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-266 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 76 - - AFFIDAVIT OF FRITZ SCHMELTER, 19 NOVEMBER 1946, - CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JAEGERSTAB - -I, Fritz Schmelter, swear, testify, and state: - - 1. That, since about January 1944 until April 1945, I held, in - the end, the office of Ministerialdirigent in the Ministry for - Armament and War Production (Ministry Speer); that as - Ministerialdirigent I was in charge of the Division for Labor - Assignment, and from December 1944 until April 1945 of the - Central Department for Labor Assignment and Labor Output, and - that, as a holder of these positions I was also a member of the - Jaegerstab. - - 2. That Milch and Speer together were in charge of the - Jaegerstab; that Saur was the Chief of Staff and was, in this - capacity, the immediate subordinate of Milch and Speer. - - 3. That during its existence the Jaegerstab met almost every day - and that these meetings were presided over in most cases by - Milch, in the beginning, and later on by Saur; that Speer was - very rarely present and only on special occasions; that these - meetings took place, first, in the Reich Air Ministry and after - this was destroyed in the barrack at Tempelhof. - - 4. That in the meetings of the Jaegerstab the supply of labor - for the Luftwaffe was discussed; that, for the Jaegerstab, the - labor requirements necessary to the industry of the Luftwaffe - were discussed with the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation - (Ministry Sauckel); that Sauckel satisfied these requirements as - far as possible; that the Chief of Staff, in the Jaegerstab, - Saur occasionally also distributed the available labor to the - different Luftwaffe plants. - - 5. That in the year of 1944 the air raids made it necessary to - decentralize many of the plants of the Luftwaffe; that this - decentralization was ordered by the Jaegerstab; that many - factories of the Luftwaffe were transferred into subterranean - buildings and that for the completion of these subterranean - buildings concentration camp inmates and Jews were also used; - that the whole building program of the Jaegerstab was - established and controlled by this Jaegerstab itself. - - 6. That the above facts are personally known to me; that these - facts are known to me on account of the position I held and the - responsibility it gave me in the Jaegerstab and in the Ministry - Speer. - -I have read the above statement which consists of two pages in German, -and I state that this is the full truth, to the best of my knowledge and -belief. I have had the opportunity to make changes and corrections in -the above statements. I have given this testimony voluntarily, without -any promise of reward and without being, in any way, forced or -threatened. - -Nuernberg, 19 November 1946. - [Signed] DR. FRITZ SCHMELTER - - TRANSLATION OF SPEER EXHIBIT 34[119] - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 17 - - ORDER OF HITLER, 21 APRIL 1944, DELEGATING TO DORSCH - AUTHORITY FOR JAEGERSTAB CONSTRUCTIONS[120] - - Copy - -The Fuehrer - - Fuehrer’s Headquarters - 21 April 1944 - -To the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and -Head of the Todt Organization, Reich Minister Speer - -Berlin W 8 - -I delegate Ministerialdirektor Dorsch, Chief of the Todt Central Office, -to carry out the erection of the six fighter production buildings -ordered by me, while retaining his other functions in your sphere of -work. - -You are to be responsible for taking care of all the prerequisites -necessary for the speedy erection of these buildings. You are -particularly to effect the best possible coordination with the other -war-essential buildings, if necessary referring to me for a decision. - - [Signed] ADOLF HITLER - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-337[121] - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 12 - - EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 6 MARCH 1944 - IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY[122] - - * * * * * - -SAUR: I see a great many unknown faces and I do not know what business -all these gentlemen have here. I suggest that a check be made at the -door and that the showing of passes be mandatory. Otherwise there is -danger that other people may sneak in here. I demand therefore a -stricter control under all circumstances. Furthermore I would ask that -gentlemen remain at meetings only as long and no longer as their -business makes it necessary. I would therefore request that each -gentleman report his presence and state whether he has any matters of -general interest. These things could then be taken up first and that -would settle that and the man could leave. We only want one gentleman -for one subject, not a whole bunch of them. - - * * * * * - -SAUR: Does the term “construction company”[123] exist at all? I think it -does not exist. - -DIESING: We have construction companies with the Luftwaffe, among them -masons, slaters, window fitters, etc. That is how we arrived at the term -“construction company”. We cannot again withdraw the six construction -companies which we have taken from Berlin. For each building site we -need approximately 100 skilled people, this on the basis of a fixed -distribution key and we do not know where to get them. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: Now we come to the question of foreign exchange. Here the Fuehrer -has announced his consent that the requests of the Slovaks to purchase -antiaircraft guns, etc., be complied with. Saur has reported orally how -many antiaircraft guns have actually been finished and how far we have -exceeded the program. This is a good and acceptable method for us. - -We have furthermore approached the Fuehrer in order to obtain the 64 -miners, at present employed at Berchtesgaden, since the work there -should soon be finished. He said that we, like the SS, should train -miners on a larger scale too, and named the figure of 10,000 to be -trained in successive shifts because one cannot train them all at the -same time. - -SAUR: The gentlemen of the SS should be told of this, that the entire -training of miners is supposed to be done by the SS because the SS has -the best school for that. - -MILCH: Furthermore we must ask the SS to get hold of further miners from -Italy and Slovakia. - -SAUR: Barowski (?) [sic] must know that! This question must be cleared -up at once, today, in order to agree on the selection with the SS. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-338[124] - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 13 - - EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL - MILCH ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1944, 1100 HOURS, - IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY[125] - - * * * * * - -[Page 13] - -STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN:[126] Probably you have not understood me quite -correctly. When I asked this question, I did not have in mind the -projects of 600,000 and 800,000 square meters, - - (SAUR: But I did!) - -but the original 60,000 square meter works. I now ask: shall these -60,000 square meter works now be simply cancelled in consideration of -the big works, and are they no longer to be taken into consideration? -This seems hazardous to me because we must make the following -distinction. The construction capacity of underground works in mountains -and caves is entirely different from the one to be reckoned with at such -concrete works. It is available for concrete works and consequently it -should be used. It was not as if we had to go into caves or worm -ourselves into the mountain. The question of the big works is a very -difficult one for us from the point of view of capacity. It alone -requires another 25,000 workers. We reckon already now 100,000 men for -the tasks of the Jaegerstab. To switch to some other work would -constitute an inroad of unheard of proportions into the remaining -armament economy.[127] - - (SAUR: 100,000 without Kammler!) - -Including the manpower we give Kammler, but without the people from -concentration camps! - - * * * * * - -MILCH: We have been ordered to carry out these two construction projects -by the Fuehrer. If I now take a higher compression ratio and thus attain -much higher figures, even this higher figure would not prevent us from -having to deal with further shifting afterwards, besides concrete works -and cave works, smaller caves, tunnels, etc. It is now doubtless correct -to ascertain: (1) What has to be constructed, (2) for whom it has to be -constructed, (3) where it has to be constructed. We have to distribute -it in such a way that we can efficiently cope with manpower and all the -other questions, power, transportation, etc. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-365 - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 15 - - EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 12 APRIL 1944 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY HAUPTDIENSTLEITER_ - _SAUR, LATER ON PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD_ - _MARSHAL MILCH, ON WEDNESDAY, 12 APRIL_ - _1944, 10 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -SAUR: Please tell this to Schmelter. We are in an incredible situation -as a result of lack of manpower. Here we are in the middle of the month -already, and the 10,000 people allocated to us according to red slips -have not arrived yet. A way must be found to assure priority for -red-slip matters over all other allocations. Tell Herr Schmelter to -contact Gauleiter Sauckel today. Going further than that, the -discontinuation, transfer, or concentration of every other type of -production must be brought about by us at once. - -SCHAAF: The 4,000 people from Kahla! - -LANGE: Schmelter’s people complain particularly because they have no -means of making pressure demands to Sauckel which will also be complied -with. - -SAUR: Field Marshal, the best thing would be for you to approach Sauckel -yourself since he is the man in charge of labor allocation. - -MILCH: I shall tell him that the 10,000 red slips were not honored. - -BALCKE: On that I can report that the requests were sent out on the 5th -and that on the 11th they had not yet reached the labor offices. The way -is long, it is true. Therefore it is not yet possible for the people to -be employed. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-334[128] - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 16 - - EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 25 APRIL 1944 - - _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE_ - _OF 25 APRIL 1944, 10 O’CLOCK IN THE_ - _REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - _PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH_ - -Herr Saur does not appear until towards the end of the meeting. - - * * * * * - -WEGENER: I have a question for Schmelter: Has the question of the -_transfer of west European workers_ been settled? - -WERNER: On this I can say that especially for the Bavarian Motor Works -matters are particularly difficult because we can transfer only Russians -and concentration camp inmates, and the staff used for supervision -consists mostly of Belgians and Frenchmen. - - * * * * * - -KREUTZ: Mueller declared at one time—and he believed he could do -it—that he would try and shift a part of the head personnel within the -concern. - -SCHAEDE: If you bring the French key personnel to Lorraine, I can -guarantee you that they would run away within the shortest possible -time. That must be told to the firm. Even now they do not return from -their vacation. - -MILCH: It will work only if we place these people into barracks. It is -true we cannot treat them as prisoners of war; the outward appearance -must be different, but in actual practice that is just what it must be. - -SCHAEDE: I merely wanted to suggest to the firms to take along as few -French people as possible so that they would not lose them altogether, -and rather follow the system of Mueller. - -MILCH: Exactly. And if then there are still some left one can say that -this will be limited in terms of time, perhaps to several months, and -that in return certain advantages will be granted to them because they -will be subject to certain deprivation of their freedom. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: As early as today at noon, we may face the situation that -Bavarian Motor Works at Allach is completely destroyed and that we have -to get out. Then we cannot deal with things such as 200 or 300 French -people who cannot come to Lorraine. That must be explained to the -Fuehrer once more. Otherwise, I see no possibility for carrying through -our assignment. - -Personally, I am firmly convinced—after the conversations with the -Fuehrer—that he will then consent provided it is done in a sensible -way. The people must not sit together with the population and they must -not be able to conspire. Nor should they have sufficient freedom of -movement to be able to pass the green border line. Both of these things -must be prevented. - -In compensation for these restrictions we can, on the other hand, give -these people something and make them happy—be it even only cigarettes. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-442[129] - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 21 - - EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 5 MAY 1944 - - _THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB_ - _CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 5 MAY 1944, 10 O’CLOCK_ - _IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -SCHMELTER: I was supposed to report on the employment of labor in the -penal institutions.[130] The Minister of Justice has not yet forwarded -the complete list of workers available in the penal institutions. I have -made another inquiry. Dr. Schmelter (?) [sic] has appointed Attorney -Karl as special official in charge. He is the liaison to the Reich -Ministry of Justice. * * * - -HEYNE: Such conversations have taken place. They do not get us anywhere. -The thing we need is a listing of all localities showing how large a -number of prisoners are yet available there. Then we must see whether -they are required there. Herr Schmelter planned to concentrate the -skilled workers in those spots. There are only 2-3 percent skilled -workers in all among all prisoners. That is too little. - -MILCH: I suggest you are going to submit to me today a letter to -Thierack, to wit: Taking into consideration the extraordinary urgency of -the work in connection with the Jaegerstab we need this assistance. We -have failed for a long time unfortunately to obtain the compilation from -the authorities concerned. We need such and such data. I ask him to -concern himself personally with the matter and to let us have the -material in the very near future. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-336[131] - DEFENSE EXHIBIT 23 - - EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE - JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 26 MAY 1944, - AT 10 O’CLOCK - - * * * * * - -(Minister Speer and Field Marshal Milch entering.) - -MILCH: I welcome our Minister Speer for the first time in the circle of -the Jaegerstab, and would like to express my special happiness and at -the same time yours, that you, dear Speer, are again with us, well, -cheerful, and in the old creative spirit. - -This machinery, created by your orders, accomplished excellent things in -the three months of its existence. It has made special efforts to bring -the production of fighters and all that goes with them to a high level. - - * * * * * - -SCHMELTER: The reports of the board of examiners show that a larger -number could be deducted from the plants belonging to the Luftwaffe if -one succeeds in establishing joint direction for the department of plane -construction, the technical plant groups and companies. Up to now they -exist separately under three different commands and leaderships, and -that would make it possible to deduct more workers. The board of -examiners thinks that hundreds of laborers could be deducted if a single -command would be established. This must be done by Field Marshal Milch. - -MILCH: The Quartermaster General to whom all are subordinate! No one is -subordinate to me. - - * * * * * - - (SCHMELTER: Probably they will work in plants where people do - not work for 72 hours.) - -Isn’t it possible—to avoid injustice toward our workers—to have our -other plants work too, not all of them for 72 hours, but perhaps up to -64 hours? That should suffice if all would do it. - -SCHMELTER: I prepared already for the conference of the chiefs of the -various offices the suggestion that working hours in civilian production -should be increased. There are still many production plants working only -48 hours. - -MILCH: Then one can equalize and we need not work all the time for 72 -hours. - - * * * * * - - EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS FRITZ SCHMELTER[132] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -[Tr. pp. 717-734] - -DR. BERGOLD: Witness, will you give us your first name and your last -name? - -WITNESS SCHMELTER: Fritz Schmelter. - -Q. When were you born? - -A. On the first of March 1904. - -Q. What was your position at the end of the war? - -A. At the end of the war, I was Central Department Manager at the -Ministry of Armament. - - * * * * * - -Q. Thank you. Witness, when and in what position did you have to do -official business with the defendant? - -A. I had some dealings with him on official business after 1944 when I -became Chief of the Amtsgruppeneinsatz in the Ministry of Armament. I -saw him again after the Jaegerstab was formed, that is, after March -1944. - -Q. In your position in the Ministry of Armament, did you have anything -to do with the Central Planning Board? - -A. I had something to do with them insofar as the chief of staff of the -armament office was concerned. He was my chief. I had to write down the -necessary figures concerning labor assignments when I accompanied him to -certain sessions of the Central Planning Board as assistant. - -Q. What month was that, approximately? - -A. As far as I can remember the first session in which I participated -was in February or March 1944. I did not always participate in these -sessions, only in a few of them when I accompanied the man I mentioned -before. - -Q. Did the sessions of February and March 1944 deal with labor -assignments? - -A. Yes. - -Q. During these conferences, were they trying to clear the numbers or -the figures which were announced by Sauckel? - -A. In one of the conferences I remember they wanted to make Sauckel a -proposal concerning the distribution of labor he wanted to provide. I -remember that the Central Planning Board had a written proposal -submitted to him concerning requests about labor assignments. Sauckel -said that he would acknowledge this proposal but would take care of the -distribution personally. - -Q. Did they, during these sessions, try to find out whether the numbers -and figures Sauckel reported were correct? If he mentioned figures which -were too high, did they speak about those matters in this conference? - -A. I do not remember that day. But I know that in various conferences -the question of reliability of the figures played a great part. There -was always a difference between the figures Sauckel reported and those -Speer reported. - -Q. Did this apply to figures which Sauckel mentioned as having already -been brought in or did it apply to figures on labor still to come? - -A. That applied particularly to the numbers of laborers who had already -been brought. It was not possible to try to control the number of -laborers wanted because it was only something that was being planned, -nothing else. - -Q. That is correct, but from previous experiences, weren’t they in a -position to find out that Sauckel’s promises were not being kept? - -A. At the time they doubted that the figures which Sauckel reported -could ever be brought in. - - * * * * * - -Q. Is it correct that in your position, as a member of the Speer -ministry, or in your capacity as a member of the Todt Organization, you -very often participated in the staff meetings of Sauckel? - -A. Every month Sauckel would call such a staff meeting where -representatives of the most important labor assignment ministries took -part. I almost always participated in those meetings. - -Q. What other ministries apart from the Ministry of Armaments -participated in those conferences? - -A. The Air Ministry, the OKW, the Ministry of Economics, the -Agricultural Ministry, and I do not think I can remember anything -further. - - * * * * * - -Q. Did the defendant Milch ever participate in those sessions? - -A. No. Those were conferences in which the experts of the ministries -took part; not the leaders and not their representatives, either. - -Q. Who was the chief of the Air Ministry? - -A. Goering. - -Q. At these staff conferences, did Sauckel ever make any statements -saying he brought the laborers voluntarily to the Reich? - -A. I remember that Sauckel repeatedly said approximately the following: - - “They say that I am forcing laborers to come to Germany. Once - somebody said I went to foreign countries with a lasso and - caught people and brought them over to Germany. They said I - forced them to come to Germany.” - -Furthermore, he said: - - “I declare all those things are not true. The laborers are - brought to Germany by me on the basis of contracts with other - governments, as far as there are governments in those occupied - territories, or on the orders of the local military commanders - or other local German agencies.” - -He asked us to tell our superiors his opinion on that question. - - * * * * * - -Q. Is it known to you that there was an agreement with the French -Government according to which one prisoner of war would be released to -France for two laborers. - -A. Yes. - -Q. Is it known to you that the French workers during their activity in -Germany got leave once in a while? - -A. Yes. - -Q. A leave to France? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Did they ever return from their leave or did they just stay there? - -A. The greater part came back from their leave; quite a number did not -come back. Part of the laborers who went on leave did not come back. -Some of them came back. - -Q. Was that the larger part that came back or the smaller part? - -A. I did not hear any figures concerning that. As far as I know the -greatest of them came back. According to the factory manager, the larger -part always came back, but of course I have no exact figures. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, you then joined the Jaegerstab. Do you know anything about -the creation of the Jaegerstab? - -A. Approximately on the first of March, I do not remember the exact -date, I was asked by my chief of staff to go to the Air Ministry where -Milch and Mr. Saur were present. He said the air armament was so badly -damaged by the air raids that there had to be a fighter program. For -that purpose a staff needed to be developed to hold daily conferences -which would be necessary in order to increase the fighter production or -at least bring it to the same level that it used to be. A number of -gentlemen from air as well as from the armament industry were designated -to participate in these sessions and to report to their offices what had -taken place and put orders into effect. - -As a representative of the Armament Ministry, I was assigned to labor -assignment. Later on I heard that this Jaegerstab was under the -management of Speer and Milch and that Saur was the manager of the -Jaegerstab. Later on there were conferences almost daily, first at the -Air Ministry and later on at a barracks at the Tempelhof, near Berlin. -They dealt, first of all, with the production of the fighters and with -all the questions in connection with the fighters and also with labor -assignment. - -Q. Who directed these conferences? - -A. At the beginning Milch participated almost regularly in those -sessions and he was the one that actually led or presided over the -conferences; formally, that is, Mr. Saur was the speaker most of the -time. Mr. Speer very seldom, according to my recollection perhaps three -of four times, participated in those sessions, which on those particular -days were transferred to the Armament Ministry. - -Q. You just said that Milch at the beginning had the formal leadership. -From what time on did that cease? - -A. After the transfer into the Armament Ministry, or rather, into the -Caserne at Tempelhof—I don’t remember the date—Milch did not -participate as regularly as he did before. At those conferences, after -the transfer of the fighter staff into the Armament Ministry, he only -participated once or never. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, concerning the conferences of the staff, there were always -verbatim records taken. Is that known to you? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Apart from those minutes, were any other minutes taken? - -A. Yes. An extract of the verbatim record—I want to call it a “result -record”—was compiled and these records were sent to all of the offices -which were interested in those conferences. Those verbatim records which -were taken down by stenographers during the session, according to my -knowledge, were sent only to Mr. Speer, and of course they remained with -both Saur and Milch. In other words, very few copies were made. - -Q. Were these verbatim records ever controlled? - -A. No, I don’t think so. I don’t believe that the large records were -read or checked by someone else. - -Q. Can one say then that the decisions of the Jaegerstab were contained -in the records? - -A. Not only the decisions but also the more important deliberations that -took place. However, when decisions were made, then they were included -in the result records. - -Q. During these conferences did it ever occur that the participants were -not always present? - -A. That happened very often because the sessions lasted for a long time -and it happened many times that I, for instance, was called out and -ordered to take care of my business, at least by telephone, and the -members of the Jaegerstab themselves did not always participate in the -conferences, but later on—that is, from May on—they had -representatives or deputies replace them. - -Q. Did those sessions often result in individual discussions? - -A. That happened once in a while, particularly when technical questions -were discussed where very few experts could say something. - -Q. I shall now proceed to the labor assignment within the Jaegerstab. -How did the Jaegerstab deal with questions of labor assignment? - -A. Along with all the production discussions of other programs, labor -assignment questions were discussed at the sessions of the Jaegerstab. I -had the task, concerning these labor assignment questions, to pass them -through my office chief and so far as the tasks I had with the -Jaegerstab overlapped my other duties and tasks with other -organizations; in other words, if you want to know exactly or if you -want to have a detailed description of what my tasks were in general— - -Q. I want to know what you had to do with the labor assignment of the -Jaegerstab and what was your main task there; otherwise, we will be here -about an hour or so. - -A. Among other things, we had the task, on the basis of the reports of -the various factories which came over the Armament Inspectorates to me, -to write up a proposal how those red slips were to be distributed on -each individual production. In the Jaegerstab, I also had the task to -distribute those red slips in such a way that the most important -factories would get the necessary number of red slips. The red slips -were orders to the labor assignment offices or agencies of Speer; in -other words, to the Armament Inspectorates and to the armament -commandos, and were given from Sauckel to his labor assignment agencies -which were to provide preferentially the necessary amount of workers on -the basis of those red slips. I furthermore had the task to take care of -transfers of laborers who already were in the armament industry by -giving respective orders to my agency and requesting Sauckel to carry -out the transfer. Since in the fighter production, the question, in the -first place, concerned skilled workers only; transfers of this kind were -carried out. Skilled workers were no longer assigned to us by Sauckel in -1944. My main activity, therefore, concerned transfers from one of the -industries to the other, and as regards the Jaegerstab, in transfers -from the destroyed bomber factories or from other aircraft types to the -fighter factories which were working full time. - -I finally had the task to deal with deliveries of armament to the -Wehrmacht soldiers and I had to take care of those. In 1944, through -several actions, many laborers were withdrawn from the armament industry -and delivered to the army. That concerned particularly skilled workers. -It was my task then, together with those responsible for the production, -to take care of the distribution in such a manner that the armament -industry be hampered as little as possible in their production. - -Q. Is it known to you that Milch tried to see to it that no one from the -fighter factories had to go to the Wehrmacht? - -A. Yes, from all the factories, and particularly from the fighter -factories, they tried to send as few laborers as possible to the army. -At the beginning, in the early days of the Jaegerstab—in other words, -in the months of March and April, approximately—we tried to relieve the -fighter program from delivering laborers to the Wehrmacht. Later on, -this was very difficult. I know, however, that Milch tried his very best -to give as few people as possible to the Wehrmacht from Jaegerstab -production, that is, of the Jaegerstab factories. - -Q. Witness, you just said that, concerning the request for assignment of -workers, you made suggestions to Sauckel. In these meetings there is a -statement by Saur that says, “We take care of the labor assignment.” -What is correct now? Did you just request them or did the Jaegerstab -actually take care of the assignment? - -A. The Jaegerstab was not able to give orders to offices which did not -belong to the Speer Ministry or to the Air Ministry. In Jaegerstab, very -often Saur and perhaps Milch—I can’t remember, concerning Milch—used -such words. In reality, however, it was quite different. I appeared at -Sauckel’s and I was ordered to tell him about the creation of the -Jaegerstab and its importance concerning the fighter production, with -the request that when labor was distributed, the Jaegerstab production -should be considered in first place. An order to Sauckel was never given -by me and I am sure that Sauckel would certainly not have followed my -request, particularly as he always and repeatedly stressed the point -that he was independent and was responsible only to the leader of the -Four Year Plan and Hitler. - -Q. When Saur made such a statement, “We take care of the labor -assignment,” why do you think he said that? - -A. Well, once in a while such strong words were used. I never took this -statement very seriously and I didn’t react to it because I knew exactly -that nothing would happen afterwards, and nothing really happened. I was -sure that the labor assignment should have been taken care of by the -Jaegerstab, but it was impossible to take care of that for one single -production. Everyone who had something to do with labor assignment could -understand that. - -Q. Witness, you just spoke concerning boasting remarks. Is it known to -you that Milch often used such strongly exaggerated boasting remarks -during these meetings? - -A. I don’t remember single statements made by Milch but I am sure that -they occurred. What I wanted to say now is that it appeared to me that -Milch very often, particularly concerning the industry and his own -generals, wanted to boast in order to play the strong man. I believe, -however, that these statements did not always make the impression he -wished to create. - -Q. Do you mean to say that they were not taken seriously? - -A. Well, not quite seriously, anyway. - -Q. Were you present during the conference of the Jaegerstab where Milch -made a long speech to the air force engineers and the quartermaster -chiefs? - -A. I was there part of the time. I remember now. That was the session -which took place in the Air Ministry—there were 100 people there at the -time, and I have to remind you of the fact that I wasn’t present during -all those conferences. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, the prosecution introduced a document during the trial where -Goering gives Himmler a fighter group in exchange for the use of -concentration camp inmates which were put at the disposal of the air -force armament. Do you know anything about that? - -A. What fighter group do you mean? - -Q. I mean a squadron—a whole squadron was placed at the disposal of the -SS, and Goering wanted to have concentration camp inmates from the SS. -Do you remember anything about that? It was on the 15th of February -1944. - -A. I can’t remember that exactly. Goering, that is the Luftwaffe, put a -great number of soldiers at his disposal for immediate production. They -got their leave. But if there ever was such an exchange of concentration -camp inmates, I do not know today anymore. It could be possible; -however, I can’t tell for sure. - -Q. Witness, is it known to you that in the Jaegerstab they were often -transferred from the construction sector of the Plenipotentiary for -chemistry? - -A. No. In any case, I don’t know that this was done to a considerable -extent. It is possible that it also was said during my presence that the -Plenipotentiary for chemical industry had too many workers in the -construction sector and a few of them had to be transferred; lots of -complaints were made. However, I can’t remember anything concrete. - -Q. Witness, can you remember that Milch tried to be able to free certain -engineers from Hitler who were working in Berchtesgaden? - -A. I believe I can remember that. The question of engineers was -discussed very often because this was a big bottleneck in the -construction sector. I remember also that, concerning the construction -works in Berchtesgaden, it was discussed in this connection and that one -hoped to be able to get not only engineers but other skilled workers -from the construction works carried out in Berchtesgaden for Hitler. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, is it known to you that the use of concentration camp -inmates was carried out in closed groups? - -A. Yes, as far as the SS used concentration camp inmates, outside of -their own factories, this was obviously only done in larger groups of -about 500 to 1,000. - -Q. Is it possible that during constructions a few miners or engineers -were concentration camp inmates? - -A. When the rest of the workers were not concentration camp inmates, -then, according to the regulations of the SS, personally, I don’t -believe that there were certain concentration camp inmates in there, and -I don’t know of any such cases. I know that the SS always required that -the concentration camp inmates be taken in large numbers and that they -should be assigned in groups and billeted in groups. - -Q. In other words, is it possible that the SS also used people of their -own as miners, apart from those concentration camp inmates? - -A. I couldn’t tell you, because I did not know the situation with the -SS. However, that is possible. - - * * * * * - -Q. The question was: If the SS ever used miners from their own ranks and -if they trained them? - -A. No. I don’t know anything about that either. - -Q. Do you know if the SS had a miners’ school? - -A. No. I don’t know that either. I never heard of any miners’ school. -The miners learned by experience. - - * * * * * - -[Tr. pp. 743-759] - -Q. What do you know about labor utilization of English and American -prisoners of war? That is to say, Americans and British who were -captured in Germany? - -A. In 1944, that is to say, in my time, no new prisoners of war were -used because we didn’t capture any more. So far as I know, British and -American prisoners of war were not used in armament factories. -Repeatedly, proposals in this direction were made also in the case of -noncoms and officers. In the case of officers—it was Polish officers, -if I recall, no change in the regulations was made, so far as I recall. -Instructions were transmitted to the OKW, but I do not know if anything -came of them. - -Q. I come now to your two sworn affidavits of 19 November 1946; -Prosecution Exhibit 76 is a sworn affidavit of yours of that date. -NOKW-266, dated 19 November, * * *. - - * * * * * - -Q. Did you know that in 1944, in order to protect the aircraft industry, -underground and protected factories were built? - -A. Yes. - -Q. You know who gave the original order for this? - -A. So far as I know, the order for this relocation of industries in -subterranean plants was given by the Jaegerstab itself. I was not -competent in this matter, but naturally I took part in the discussion of -the Jaegerstab and heard it there. I heard that it was decided that a -bombed-out factory should be relocated to a different place which the -Jaegerstab would determine. - -Q. That’s no answer to my question. Witness, I asked: Who gave the -original order for the construction of these subterranean factories? Do -you know that? - -A. If I may repeat; you want to know who ordered in the first place that -these plants should be transferred to subterranean factories? That I do -not know. - -Q. Do you know Herr Kammler? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Do you know from whom he received the order to construct these -special subterranean factories? - -A. Here again I do not know precisely who gave him the original order. -In any event, at the first beginning of the Jaegerstab, Kammler became a -member and was commissioned to undertake the construction of -subterranean buildings for Jaegerstab protection. The Jaegerstab pointed -out to him individual objectives and he reported from time to time how -many square meters were now ready. But who first originally gave these -orders to Kammler, whether it was Himmler or Hitler or some agreement or -something like that, I don’t know. - -Q. Was Kammler commissioned into the Jaegerstab because of an order of -Himmler or because of some special order elsewhere? - -A. I am not able to say. I assume that Himmler also gave him an order. -The individual orders, what he was to build, he received from the -Jaegerstab. - - * * * * * - -Q. Did Kammler, within the Jaegerstab, represent Himmler? - -A. I do not know his powers or his functions and I cannot say. He was in -the construction sector. That I know, but Himmler had charge of more -things than construction. - - * * * * * - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Will you try to answer these questions as simply -and briefly as you can? Were Russian prisoners of war used in the -armament industry? - -WITNESS SCHMELTER: In the armaments plant Russian prisoners of war were -also employed. At what they were employed, I do not know, since they -were already there when I came and I did not myself inspect the plants. - -Q. Did you ever see Russian prisoners of war either manufacturing or -transporting munitions of war? - -A. In plants and in transports? No. Neither in plants nor in transports -did I see Russian prisoners of war. - -Q. That question is perfectly clear and you understand it? - -A. I shall repeat it. I was asked whether these prisoners of war -worked—whether I saw them in plants or in transport. - -Q. That’s right. - -A. And I answered in the negative. - -Q. Were Russian prisoners of war used in the decentralization of the -Luftwaffe after the heavy bombings? - -A. Not that I know of. So far as I know, after the heavy bombings -Russian prisoners of war were no longer available. They had already been -assigned elsewhere. I do know that after the heavy bombings, that is, in -the year 1944, new Russian prisoners of war were not used in armaments -or in the bombed out factories. It is, of course, possible that the -local labor offices used Russian prisoners of war for this purpose, but -we in the central offices knew nothing of this. - -Q. Will you answer the same questions as to Polish prisoners of war? - -A. So far as I know, Polish prisoners of war consisted solely of -officers. Only officers were available. The others had been freed. The -officers, however, in contradiction to many wishes that were expressed, -were not used. At least if they were, I know nothing of it. - -Q. Will you answer the same questions as to Hungarian Jews? - -A. Hungarian Jews, among other things, were used in the construction of -fighters—fighter planes. Female Hungarian Jews were also used in the -actual construction of fighter planes. - -Q. Were they voluntary workers? - -A. No. Those were inmates of concentration camps, prisoners at the -disposal of the SS. - -Q. So the Hungarian Jews who were employed in the manufacture of fighter -planes were forced to work in that connection? - -A. The Hungarian Jews, so far as I recall, were offered by the SS to be -employed in armament production. At first there were 1,000 of them or -500 who were employed. Then a number of plants said that they wanted -such workers and they were then allotted by the SS to these plants and -there they were obliged to work. - -Q. Then the SS, which was one branch of the German military -establishment simply dealt out the Hungarian Jews to anybody who needed -them? - -A. No. The Hungarian Jews, like all concentration camp inmates, were -housed in camps that were either in or near the plants and which were -constructed by the SS. They were then taken to work every day, and after -the work they were again brought back by the SS to the camps. Also, the -supervision of the work, for security reasons, was carried out by the -SS. So far as the technical side of it was concerned, it was carried out -by the representatives of the plant. - -Q. Of course you don’t claim they were paid for their work? - -A. That I do not know. I only know the general regulations concerning -concentration camp prisoners, and I know them in part. I know that these -prisoners, at least toward the end, also received some sort of wages. -What the payment was, I do not know. I do know that the plant had to -give the SS a certain amount for each prisoner, but what the prisoner -himself received, I do not know. - -Q. Do you know whether these Hungarian Jews worked through any contract -with a foreign government, as was the case in France? - -A. Let me repeat the question whether Hungarian Jews worked on the basis -of an agreement with a foreign power—foreign government. Was that the -question? - -Q. Yes. - -A. Not that I know of. - -Q. I have no other questions. One more question please. You said that -you know that Russian prisoners of war were working in the armament -factories but you didn’t know what kind of work they were doing. - -A. Yes. - -Q. Did you ever see them in any of the factories? - -A. No. - -Q. What do you think they were doing? - -A. I guess some of them were engaged in construction. So far as skilled -workers were concerned they were certainly working at tasks that they -were qualified to do. So far as they were unskilled workers they might -have been doing almost anything. - -Q. If they were working in munitions factories they were doing something -to manufacture munitions, were they not? - -A. If they worked in munitions factories then they must, of course, have -had something to do with manufacturing munitions. Even if they only -worked in the courtyard, or something like that, they still had -something to do with the manufacture of munitions. - - * * * * * - -JUDGE PHILLIPS: Witness, did you ever know of any prisoners of war, -especially Russians, being used to man antiaircraft guns? - -A. In the construction or in the use of the antiaircraft? - -Q. In the use of antiaircraft. - -A. Yes, I have heard of that. I heard that Russian prisoners of war were -used to man antiaircraft guns of that sort. - -Q. Do you have any idea how many were used for that purpose? - -A. No, I don’t. - -Q. Did you ever see them being used for that purpose? - -A. No. - -Q. On what fronts were they used? - -A. I believe they were used on the home front, not on the actual battle -front, but that is simply my opinion. - -Q. Against American planes, British planes, and Russian planes? - -A. They shot at whatever planes were over Germany. - - * * * * * - -DR. BERGOLD: Witness, you spoke of female Jews. When were these female -Jews employed? - -A. I do not know the precise date. It was the summer of 1944. In my -estimation, it must have been May. - -Q. Let me show you Document NOKW-359, Prosecution Exhibit 75. It is the -next to the last document of the prosecution, Stenographic Minutes of -the Jaegerstab Meeting of 27 June 1944. You said: “I have a few more -points. Up until now 12,000 female concentration camp internees, -Jewesses, have been demanded. The matter is now in order. The SS has -agreed to deliver these Hungarian Jewesses in batches of 500. Thus the -smaller firms, too, will be in a better position to employ these -concentration camp Jewesses. I request that these people should be -ordered in batches of 500.” - -Is this the point from when onward these females were used? - -A. Yes. It must have been about this time. The difficulty was the -following: The SS demanded that the females should be delivered in -batches of thousands only. Most factories could not use such a large -number of females. Consequently, the SS was asked if it could not -deliver them in smaller groups. That is the reason. - -Q. Witness, is there a difference between the concept of -“Ruestungsfabrik”, which means armament factory, and “Munitionsfabrik”, -which means a munitions factory? Is there a difference in Germany? - -A. “Ruestungsfabrik” took care of all sorts of armament production, -materials, finishing up the deliveries and so on and so forth. -“Munitionsfabrik” is the narrower concept and contents itself with the -manufacture of munitions only. - -Q. Did the “Munitionsfabrik” belong inside the concept of -“Luftruestung”, air armament? - -A. So far as the “Luftruestung” is concerned, they did, yes. The -limitation of these concepts was not, however, uniform. Unfortunately, -we had very few uniform concepts. They were often misused. - -Q. Were factories that made sheet metal and so on, armament factories? -Did they fall under the concept of armaments? - -A. They did, yes. - -DR. BERGOLD: Thank you. - - * * * * * - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - -MR. DENNEY: In one of these interrogations, on 30 December 1946, you -were asked what the Jaegerstab did to bring workers from Hungary into -Germany; do you recall that? - -A. Yes. - -Q. And do you recall that you made reference to certain trips of the -Jaegerstab to Hungary? - -A. Yes. - -Q. You made this statement: “The Jaegerstab, during its existence, made -at least a total of 10 to 12 trips”? - -A. Yes. - - * * * * * - -Q. All right. You were asked this question: “Who was in charge of these -trips?” And your answer was: “So far as I remember, it was Milch. Milch -participated in most trips of the Jaegerstab.” - -A. In most of them, yes. - -Q. In the same interrogation on 30 December, the record indicates that -you made this statement: “I know about 100,000 workers from Hungary; -however, these were Jews who were allocated to construction. I know -nothing about 8,000 workers who evidently were skilled workers, intended -for the fighter production program.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. You were then asked: “Is it known to you that these 100,000 Jews were -used by Todt in the interests of the Jaegerstab?” and you made the -following answer: “Yes, that is known to me.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. You were interrogated on 24 January and asked this question: “Do you -know whether the Luftwaffe, in the Luftwaffe industry, used -concentration camp prisoners, not in the building program, but for -production?” and your answer was: “I don’t know. I don’t think so, -except for women. The SS once offered us a lot of women. The difficulty -was that, at first, at least 1,000 and later 500 were to be employed. -Various firms got women after that, and I think that Heinkel, in -Oranienburg, used concentration camp prisoners, not only women, but all -the inmates.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. The answer was yes, if your Honor please. And Heinkel was an airplane -factory, was it not, producing the Heinkel plane? - -A. Yes. - -Q. On November 15, of last year, you were asked if you knew that Himmler -used concentration camp inmates for the underground buildings of the -Jaegerstab, and your answer: “Yes. You mean the finished buildings, do -you not?” And then you were asked: “The underground ones, the completion -of the existing caverns or tunnels, or the like, where concentration -camp inmates were employed?” and your answer: “Yes.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. And you were also asked: “Were these constructions built in the -interest of the Luftwaffe?” Your answer: “These new constructions? Yes.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. The next question: “Exclusively in the interest of the Luftwaffe? And -did the orders for the new constructions come from the Jaegerstab?” -Answer: “Whether other constructions were also built there? Probably, -yes.” Question: “I am only interested in the Luftwaffe.” Answer: “Also -for the Luftwaffe. I do not know whether for others. I would not like to -pin myself down.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. Later you were asked: “Do you know that prisoners of war were at all -employed in air armament?” and you stated: “Yes, I should like to say, -the armament plants. The air armament also employed prisoners of war in -its plants.” - -A. Yes. - - * * * * * - -Q. In reply to a question: “What was Field Marshal Milch’s position in -the Jaegerstab?” you stated, “There were two chairmen in the Jaegerstab, -Speer and Milch. In the first session, or rather in most of the -sessions, Milch participated personally; Speer did not. Speer was -present only in exceptional cases. In his position, Saur, who was at the -same time manager, initiated the contact with the rest of the armament -industry. Milch was Chief of the Jaegerstab, besides Speer.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. In the same interrogation of 15 November you made the following -statement: “Assignment of labor was involved in every question including -every question of production.” - -A. Yes. - -Q. On 26 November you made the following statement when you were -interrogated: “Mobilization of manpower as a matter which is closely -connected with production was very much discussed. Everybody had a word -to say, had a request for something and they suggested or said I could -do better, etc.” - -A. Yes. - - * * * * * - -_REDIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -DR. BERGOLD: Witness, as to the trip to Hungary, were you present when -the committee went to Hungary? - -A. No, I traveled only as far as Prague and returned. - -Q. Do you know the purpose of this trip to Hungary? - -A. Not precisely. I know that there was a question of production to take -place in Hungary, but precise information I do not have. - -Q. Do you know that there was a definite contract with Hungary? - -A. I heard about that subsequently. - -Q. Did you then hear that this trip had the purpose of bringing -Hungarian Jews to Germany? - -A. No. - -Q. Thank you. The prosecutor spoke to you of 100,000 Jews. Did you know -that these were to be used by Mr. Dorsch? - -A. Yes. - -Q. And, as far as the tasks that he had, mainly for the construction of -bombproof factories? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Do you know whether the Jaegerstab ordered these 100,000 Jews or -whether somebody else did? - -A. The employment of these 100,000 Jews in this construction -organization took place on Hitler’s orders. I, myself, was not present -at this discussion. Dorsch, however, was present and told me that Hitler -had ordered—had said Himmler had 100,000 Jews for bombproof factories -and was to make them available. - -Q. Do you know whether and in what number and when these Jews arrived to -carry out this construction work? - -A. I do not know precisely the dates. It was in the summer of 1944. Nor -do I know whether all of them arrived. Once I concerned myself with the -question regarding the guarding of these people. At that time the SS did -not have enough guard personnel and Hitler ordered Keitel to provide -10,000 soldiers which were to be withdrawn from the eastern front and to -make them available to the SS so that they, the SS, would have the -necessary guard personnel. Thereafter, I heard nothing further about the -matter and assumed that the Jews for the most part were employed. I -deduced this from the fact that I otherwise should have heard of it -probably. - -Q. I discussed just yesterday with you whether these buildings were -ordered by the Jaegerstab. I do not need to return to that question. -Were these constructions used exclusively by the Jaegerstab or for other -advantages, such as armored cars? - -A. Originally they were exclusively planned for fighter construction but -I do recall that, as time went on, there were also discussions of using -them for other manufacture, for instance, tanks, and this construction -was to take place in these buildings. Since, however, I had nothing to -do with this professionally, I can only report on this from hearsay. In -other words, I know nothing precisely. - -Q. The prosecutor quoted to you a statement of yours from an -interrogation; I shall ask you now did you make the statement in the -interrogation that Milch was responsible in air armament to seek out -workers individually? - -A. I don’t know how I should understand the word “seek out”; if you mean -that he went to foreign countries and searched for them personally, then -of course that is wrong. I did state in that interrogation that during -my activity in the Jaegerstab in March 1944 no individual actions in -foreign countries were carried out by Milch or the Jaegerstab. The -manpower was provided by Sauckel exclusively, or to the extent that they -were prisoners by the SS, or prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht. - -Q. And then they were transferred, as you said yesterday, to other -sectors? - -A. Yes. - -Q. You also said in this interrogation that in most of the meetings -Milch was present. - -A. At the beginning, I said. - -DR. BERGOLD: I have no further questions. - - EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS XAVER DORSCH[133] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -[Tr. p. 1361-1379] - -DR. BERGOLD: Please state to the Court your first and last name? - -WITNESS DORSCH: Xaver Dorsch. - -Q. When were you born? - -A. 28 December 1899. - -Q. What was your last position in the German Reich? - -A. I was Deputy Chief of the Todt Organization, in the Speer Ministry. - -Q. On the 28th of December 1946 you signed an affidavit? - -A. Yes, sir. - -DR. BERGOLD: Your Honor, this is Document NOKW-447, Prosecution Exhibit -74. - -Q. Witness, you made the following statement: - -“As deputy of Minister Speer in his capacity as Chief of the Todt -Organization, I received from Hitler, at the end of April 1944, an order -to construct with the Todt Organization six bombproof fighter factories, -of which two should have priority.” Can you tell me about the history of -this construction? - -A. Yes, but I must go into detail. - -Q. Proceed. - -A. Approximately eight months before this date, I made a suggestion to -Minister Speer about how bombproof fighter factories above ground could -be built, in this way, not only to secure manufacture, but also so that -they would be more secure against bomb damage while being built. - -The source was that the Todt Organization in France was doing a similar -construction job as a launching site for V-2 bombs. Speer told me that I -should take the plans with me on my next visit to the Fuehrer’s -Headquarters, and two weeks later I was with Speer, visiting Hitler, and -after other matters had been discussed, and before going, Speer -mentioned this matter and Hitler said: “We must absolutely achieve -bombproof aircraft factories because there is danger that transportation -might be attacked, and then we cannot make up the time we have lost.” -Hitler wanted large-size, big scale units, in which planes and fighters -could be protected from the beginning to the end, because he saw a -danger in the fact that transportation could be attacked and -interrupted, and then the different parts, if they were made in various -factories, could not be assembled. - -He said that he imagined the matter roughly as follows: In narrow -mountain valleys in Saxonian Switzerland, for example, caves could be -dug which would provide these bombproof factory installations. Then -Speer said, “Dorsch or the Todt Organization has another suggestion.” -Speer said that, and I then submitted to him my plans for the special -Todt Organization construction, which, as I said, had already been built -in France, and I also pointed out to him that such factories, even as -they were being built, were relatively safe against bomb attack. - -This was roughly eight months before this date in April on which this -commission of which I spoke in my affidavit was given to me. Hitler said -to me that it was a matter of indifference to him according to what -system these things were built, but that it was important to him that -something really serious should be done. - -On the next day there was a discussion on the same theme with Goering. -Speer’s representative Dethleffsen, as Plenipotentiary for construction -matters, and the leader of the main committee for construction, -Gaertner, were present. I had to explain again the thought behind this -special construction which I was proposing. Goering was enthusiastic and -said that that was the solution and that the Todt Organization should -begin immediately with that construction. Thereupon Speer said, “The -Todt Organization cannot build these factories because it builds only -outside the Reich, with the exception of the Ruhr district, and in the -Reich itself the Main Committee for Construction should carry out the -construction,” and for that reason, he had called the two gentlemen I -mentioned above. Goering also said that it was indifferent to him who -built the factories, that the important thing was that they should be -built soon. - -In April of 1944, I was visiting Speer near Meran when a call came that -I should immediately go to Hitler. Speer asked me if I had any idea what -was afoot, but I did not. I immediately went to Berchtesgaden. There -Hitler asked me, “What has become of your fighter production?” I told -him that I did not know precisely, because in the Reich the Todt -Organization did not do the constructing but another organization. He -was greatly excited and said roughly, that he had heard enough about -this other organization, that he did not want it, and he demanded that -the Todt Organization should take over that construction immediately. - -Then the plans were fetched overnight from Berlin. I explained the whole -system to him once more. I told him that I could only carry out this -construction if it were given priority above all other construction as -far as workers, machines, building materials, trucks, and so -on—whatever is needed in construction—were concerned. I was given -assurances that that priority would be given me, and I then took over -this construction project. - -I was able to assure myself that the Hauptausschuss Bau—the Main -Committee for Construction—which had been in charge before I took over -had begun constructions at three locations. On one of these we -immediately stopped work, because both architecturally and, as the -Jaegerstab told me, technically the factory was no good. - -Q. Witness, you then said that the wish to build these bombproof fighter -factories by the Todt Organization was communicated to you by the -Jaegerstab. What do you know about that personally? - -A. I know the following: The Jaegerstab, as far as the entire work of -the Plenipotentiary for construction was concerned, was not satisfied -with the work. Saur complained continuously about how work dragged on -and asked me repeatedly to step in and do something. He called me to his -meetings in the Jaegerstab and asked me to develop further plans. I was -called up continuously by other gentlemen. I remember Major Dr. Krohmer, -who also asked me to step in, and again and again I had to say that that -would not do because, I said the Todt Organization did not carry out -construction in the Reich. I was pressed continuously by the Jaegerstab, -because it was the organization that would benefit from these -constructions. - -Q. Do you know whether Milch went in that direction too, or only Saur? - -A. That I cannot say. I did not speak about that to him myself. I did -speak with Saur and a few other gentlemen—I believe with Schlempp who -was later representative of the Todt Organization in the Jaegerstab. - -Q. When was that first pressure on the part of Saur? Was that before -March of 1944? - -A. Yes. That was even earlier, but I cannot say precisely. It might have -been in February even. - -Q. Do you know whether Saur visited the Fuehrer on this matter? - -A. I was not present, but I assumed that it must have been so. I cannot -prove it, however. - -Q. So. This afternoon you told me what you thought Milch’s function was -in the Jaegerstab. You used a rather striking expression. Would you like -to repeat it here? - -A. I called him “the breakfast director”. I ask the defendant to pardon -the expression. He shouldn’t hold it against me. - -Q. What do you mean by this “breakfast director”? - -A. Well, it is sort of difficult for me to tell that. - -Q. Milch won’t be angry. - -A. Well, I only saw him at a Jaegerstab meeting once, when he invited me -and when he asked for the support of the Todt Organization. He explained -to me the general situation. He told me what his worries and troubles -were, but the real work, the whole functioning of the thing, I don’t -believe he concerned himself with. That is why I used the expression -“breakfast director,” but perhaps that was a little exaggerated. - -Q. I quite understand. After the end of April 1944, when you were -commissioned with these construction matters, what did you do? - -A. As I told Hitler very exactly, I took Todt Organization units from -France and from the Atlantic Wall. - -Q. How many were there? - -A. 2,000 or 3,000—I cannot remember. - -Q. Your affidavit says 10,000. - -A. No, that is incorrect. That cannot have been the number in France. -The second time that I went to the Plenipotentiary General for -chemistry, Prof. Krauch, and told him of the serious situation, and I -finally brought him to the point of giving me 15,000 workers from his -department. - -Q. What workers were those? - -A. First of all, in the Baltic States—that was a Todt Organization -itself—I took away most of the German workers, and took some elsewhere -as additional workers, engineers, experts of one sort or another, -machinists. Then came the attack on Leuna on the 10th or 12th of May -1944. That was on the occasion of the first attack on Leuna. I had a -talk with Hitler at that time. He said, “This cannot be tolerated—that, -at the very moment when we are so in need of oil, workers are taken away -from Leuna”. - -I then answered him that, first of all, I had undertaken this measure -before the air attack, and secondly, it was not a question of cutting -down on oil production, but of oil capacity. Hitler took over and said, -“No, that cannot be”. Then Speer said, “If we don’t get the workers, we -can’t do the building”. Hitler said, “Quiet down, you will get 50,000 -Italians,” and then I said, “I don’t believe that”, and I said that for -the following reasons: We, the Todt Organization, had such workers from -Italy for the construction program Riese in Silesia, but we did not do -this via Sauckel but by applying to Italian firms to take over -construction commissions in Germany, and then they automatically brought -their workers, their directors and architects, and so on, with them -particularly after we had assured them that we with our -organization—that is to say, with the Todt Organization in Italy—would -take care of paying wages, paying for the hospitalization fees, -insurance, and so on, but at the moment when workers were fetched by -Sauckel, I understood clearly that workers such as we needed would not -be provided in any considerable numbers. At any rate, I told Hitler, “I -do not believe in these Italian workers, and I won’t believe in them -until they have crossed the Brenner Pass.” He then said to me, “You can -believe in them because tomorrow Mussolini is signing an agreement that -1,000,000 workers will come to Germany.” - -* * * If I may mention it, it is also worthy of mention, that in -January, the beginning of January, I was at a conference with Hitler, or -rather, I did not take part in it, but I knew of it. There, a new worker -contingent was demanded, and in this conference Hitler himself named the -number of 250,000 workers for the construction; for aircraft -construction. In other words, it wasn’t Speer but Hitler who demanded -those workers, especially, and it is possible—that, at any rate, is the -way I construe it now—that he was thinking of these fighter plants. -Then I asked Hitler to permit me to use 10,000 Todt Organization workers -from Southern Russia. I must mention that here, because I did that as -Speer’s representative with Hitler. I could not have said to Speer that -he should give me these 10,000 workers. I had to do that through Hitler, -because the commanders in chief, in this case the commander in chief of -the army group in Southern Russia, were in charge of these people and -they had to be released by them. Thereupon these 10,000 workers got -under way toward Germany. However, they unfortunately arrived very -slowly and some of them never got to the fighter plant, but were taken -over by Speer to make ball bearings in Wellen, in Thuringia, and then, -when no workers came, the plants were to be built by Hungarian Jews. I -do not know precisely when it was, but I do remember an armaments -conference in Linz—I guess it was about the middle of June or maybe -later, but I can’t say for sure—and it was then that the first ones -began to arrive. - -Q. Were they approved by Hitler? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Witness, when you of the Todt Organization fetched Italians on your -own initiative, were they volunteers or were they more or less forced -labor? - -A. Precisely in Italy, we had a remarkable achievement because as a -matter of principle we turned to Italian firms, gave them commissions -and they provided the workers. I believe I can say that the Todt -Organization was known for taking model care of its workers. For -instance, in Norway and Holland, the Dutch or Norwegian Todt worker -received higher wages than the German Todt worker who was working right -beside him. I could make extensive statements on that if I wanted to, or -if I were given the opportunity. - -Q. But that is not an answer to my question, whether they were -volunteers or forced labor? - -A. They were not forced. They were brought by their firms. - -Q. Through the Italian firms? - -A. Yes, that was the intention from the very beginning, so that the -Italian firms could provide their trained and expert personnel to us, -and, in this way, they were simply volunteers; they did much better work -than if they were forced. - -DR. BERGOLD: No further questions. - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - -MR. KING: Witness, you stated that Milch was only present at a few of -the early meetings of the Jaegerstab. May I ask you— - -A. What I said refers only to those meetings of the Jaegerstab at which -I was present and that was perhaps four or five. - -Q. Now, you said, in your affidavit, which has been submitted as a -prosecution exhibit referred to by Dr. Bergold, that you received an -order for the construction of fighter factories at the end of April -1944? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Do you recall being present at a conference at Berchtesgaden with -Goering, among others, on the 19th of April 1944? - -A. I cannot say whether that was the precise date, but I did take part -in some such conference. - -Q. Do you recall who was present at that conference? - -A. Yes. Goering was there, Milch was there, the others I’m not sure -about. Saur—I’m not sure he was there. I knew for sure that Milch and -Goering were present, but as to the others I no longer recall. - -Q. Do you recall what was discussed at this conference? - -A. The construction of fighter plants was discussed then, and, if I -remember, Goering pointed out that the Todt Organization was to receive -all sorts of support but I do not remember the details at the moment. - -Q. And a few days later, on 21 April 1944, you received the order from -Hitler to build the six fighter plants? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Do you recall that possible sources of labor were discussed at this -meeting? That is, labor for the construction of the fighter factories? - -A. I should like to assume that, but I do not remember precisely. -Probably all sorts of conditions and possibilities were discussed, but I -cannot answer this precisely. - -Q. You were discussing a large-scale construction; you must have known -where this labor was to come from. Can you tell me what possible sources -were discussed at that meeting? - -A. I do not know whether or not that question was discussed at this -conference. I assume that it was, but that was such a long time ago that -it is impossible for me to recall these details. But I was clear in my -own mind about that fact. That we needed so and so many workers was of -course obvious. I did make the demand that this construction program -should receive top priority and I stated previously that I wanted -primarily German workers, which was then done, and in the sector of the -Plenipotentiary General for chemistry I wanted to take some workers; -that was the way in Germany that you got workers. Later, when we of the -Todt Organization took over the construction program in Germany, we saw -that a large number of construction offices had so little manpower that -they had to stop production and there again we found workers. The whole -situation was somewhat unclear because when we took over building these -fighter factories, the entire construction was turned over to the Todt -Organization, and no one could take the responsibility for such -important constructions unless he could control the direction of the -whole construction program, but, with the best will in the world, I -can’t recall the details. There were so many conferences, one followed -the other so rapidly, I do not any longer recall. - -Q. Who was your representative at meetings of the Jaegerstab? - -A. Schlempp, first of all; even before I was commissioned with this -task, he was the technical adviser or expert on construction. Saur asked -me at that time to regard him as the liaison man between the Todt -Organization and the Jaegerstab. Then, about the middle of June, -Schlempp became group leader of the unit in Prague, for which reason I -provided one of my best men, namely, Knipping and I used him in what had -previously been Schlempp’s capacity. - -Q. Do you recall that Schlempp, and later Knipping, reported on the -progress of it to the Jaegerstab? - -A. I am convinced that they did, because that was their job. - - * * * * * - -Q. Now can you give me percentagewise the breakdown of this labor by -groups, that is, prisoners of war labor, foreign labor, concentration -camp labor, German labor? - -A. That I could only do with the most general estimate, with vagueness. -In the case of Kaufering, there were perhaps sixty percent from the -concentration camps; however, prisoners of war, as far as I know, were -not there at all. The rest must have been Germans. In Muehldorf, where -the second factory was, the breakdown was roughly the same, but I really -cannot say. I visited each one of these factories only twice. Because of -the transportation situation of the Rhine bridges and the hydrogenation -plant situation, I did not have the time to visit them. - -Q. Now did you obtain any of this labor for the construction project? Do -you recall obtaining any of this from Schmelter? - -A. I take it that Hitler himself had approved these workers. Our request -went to Schmelter, and he was working his own men in that Todt -Organization, and in the Jaegerstab, and it was his job to settle the -details when they should come, and what they should be paid, and such -matters. That was Schmelter’s job, and Schmelter was told that this is a -technical staff, and he knew that Hitler had approved the workers, and -so it was his job to take care of the details, and to inform the -Einsatzgruppe what it should do. I did not carry much of these things in -detail after that. - -Q. Now do you recall how large a construction was at Kaufering? I am -speaking both at Kaufering I and Kaufering II? - -A. You mean the technical construction? - -Q. Yes. - -A. There was one main hall in Kaufering I, three hundred meters long, -ninety meters wide, with six stories. Kaufering II conducted production -later, but everything was concentrated in Kaufering I. - -Q. Do you recall how much of this construction was completed? - -A. I should think three-fourths. At the last time I visited this -construction shortly before the collapse, the machines were being set in -on one side of the building, and that is as far as it went. - -Q. And to whom was this plant allocated? - -A. That I cannot say. In my opinion the Messerschmitt, but I must be -careful in what I say here, because in the last week before the collapse -there were negotiations with the armament staff. I cannot remember what -that situation was in Kaufering, but in Muehldorf there was constant -talk of putting Buna in there. That changed continuously, dependent on -the war situation. Once Speer wanted to set up a steel foundry in the -fighter factory in the Rhineland, which was later changed. - -Q. Please answer the question. Now in these inspections at Kaufering, do -you recall any Luftwaffe representatives who inspected these -construction sites? - -A. That I don’t know. I cannot say. A colonel of the Luftwaffe was there -but in his capacity as representative of the armament commando or of an -armament office. - -Q. Now getting back to this meeting of 19 April 1944, do you recall that -Speer was present there? - -A. No. - -Q. How were your relations with Speer at that time? - -A. They were tense. Speer did not regard the Todt Organization as a sort -of construction organization. To make a statement, I should have to go -into great detail on this subject. - -Q. I think that suffices. Now with regard to the recruitment of these -fifty thousand Italians, which you discussed with Dr. Bergold, do you -recall who was to handle the recruitment of those Italians for work in -the Reich? - -A. To be sure that I do not make any false statement, is it your concern -who recruited the fifty thousand Italians that Hitler approved of? - -Q. My concern is through what channel were these Italians that were -promised Hitler by Mussolini, through what channels were they recruited? - -A. That was to be taken care of by Sauckel, but through the Todt -Organization, who had their office in Italy apply to Italian firms -ultimately, and that was done through the Todt Organization office in -Italy. - -Q. Now with regard to these Italians, do you know what provision was -made for the guarding of those that were to arrive, that is, en route? - -A. Of that I know nothing, because they did not arrive. They were not -watched, or guarded at all. They were free workers, there was no reason -to guard them. - -Q. Now, Witness, outside of Kaufering, can you tell me where and under -what names these other fighter factories were to be located? - -A. In Muehldorf, and then there was a factory in Vaihingen. - -Q. Just a minute. Now with regard to Muehldorf, can you tell me what -that was to be used for, who was it to be used by? - -A. First it was thought of as a fighter factory, and then, a few weeks -before the collapse, there was a conference of the armament gentlemen in -Munich, at which it was agreed that it could be used for the manufacture -of Buna; in other words, they changed their minds. - -Q. What time did that conference at Munich take place? - -A. That must have been about the end of March 1945. - -Q. Now, with regard to Muehldorf, can you tell me where, primarily this -labor was coming from? - -A. These were Hungarian Jews. There were Germans there. Where they came -from, that I don’t know. - -Q. Well, now, with regard to these Hungarian Jews, can you tell me -whether that was a result of a special action in Hungary? - -A. I don’t believe so, but I don’t know. We were only told that we were -going to receive Hungarian Jews. They were already in Germany, if I -remember, but where they came from I don’t know because I didn’t concern -myself with it. - -Q. But you do recall that Hungarian Jews were used on that site? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Now, with regard to these other factories, we have covered Kaufering -and Muehldorf, can you tell me the location of the others? - -A. Vaihingen—that was a factory that was already under construction -before the Todt Organization stepped in. - -Q. Witness, where was that located? - -A. V-a-i-h-i-n-g-e-n, and it is in Wuerttemberg. - -Q. And how large was that construction? - -A. It was a building about 100 meters by 60, four, five stories high. - -Q. And do you recall what type of workers was used in that construction? - -A. Concentration camp inmates, but I don’t know the number. - -Q. And that was in Thuringia? - -A. No, in Wuerttemberg. - -Q. Now do you recall that any of these factories was to be located in -the Protectorate? - -A. One was to be erected there, yes, in the neighborhood of Prague but -so far as I know they never got around to it. Perhaps the ground work -was carried out and the machines were shipped there, but the factory -itself was not actually built. Then there was to be another one in the -Rhineland. I have already mentioned that. - -Q. Witness, with regard to this factory in the Protectorate, can you -give me the code name for that factory? - -A. No, I don’t know it. It was about 50 kilometers north of Prague. - -Q. And that was to be used by what company? - -A. I can’t say, I don’t know. - -Q. Can you give me any indication of the size of that factory? - -A. The one north of Prague? Yes. That would have been about the same -size as Kaufering, roughly, but, as I say, I really don’t know whether -they got construction under way there. - -Q. But you were to construct it? - -A. Yes, it would have been done under my supervision, or under my -direction. I was Speer’s representative and chief of the Todt -Organization. - -Q. But you don’t know how far along or whether construction was -initiated there? - -A. I cannot say for sure. I suppose that they started the construction, -but so far as I know they really did not actually get this factory -built. - -Q. Now, with regard to this factory in the Rhineland, can you tell me -where that was to be located? - -A. I can’t remember the name any more. I was there once, and I can -perhaps locate it on the map. It was west of the Rhine, 70 or 80 -kilometers, but I can’t remember the name any longer. It was under -construction, and then the construction was interrupted by military -events, that is, about the time when the Americans entered the Rhineland -on the Ruhr. Nor do I know whether concentration camp inmates were used -there. - -Q. Do you recall whether foreign labor was used? - -A. In this factory? That I cannot say. - -Q. You don’t recall constructing any factories for Wiener-Neustadt? - -A. No. - -Q. Or for the automobile works at Steyr, in Austria? - -A. No. - -Q. Focke-Wulf, in Bremen? - -A. No, in Bremen we only built a U-boat factory. - -Q. Do you recall constructing any factories for Heinkel? - -A. That I don’t know. I wasn’t really interested in such questions, -because I received the data from the Jaegerstab, and the Jaegerstab did -the actual construction. The engineer of the Todt Organization built the -house, and then the Jaegerstab took care of the rest. There were no -discussions on my part with construction firms. Moreover, I didn’t even -have time to carry out such things. - -Q. But you got your labor through Schmelter, who was a member of the -Jaegerstab? - -A. Yes, he was a member of the Jaegerstab, and I have already said that -he was also the leader of labor allocation in the Todt Organization. He -was in charge. At first he was entirely within the Todt Organization, -and then later he was what you might call the leader for the allocation -of labor in Speer’s Ministry, and was in charge later of the allocation -of labor in the Todt Organization. At the same time, he performed the -same function in the Jaegerstab, so that automatically there was a -connection between the Todt Organization and the Jaegerstab. - -MR. KING: I have no further questions, your Honor. - -_REDIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -DR. BERGOLD: Witness, I have one more question. When did these Hungarian -Jews arrive at Muehldorf? - -A. I do not know about Muehldorf, but I can recall that at Kaufering the -first ones came—and here I must guess—at the end or the beginning of -June 1944. - -DR. BERGOLD: Thank you, I have no further questions. - -MR. KING: I have one further question, if your Honor pleases. - -DR. BERGOLD: I have just heard that the interpreter was inaccurate. The -witness spoke of the end and the middle of June, and the interpreter -said “the beginning of June”. - -THE INTERPRETER: “The middle or the end of June” is what the witness -said, but he is not sure about it. - -_RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - -MR. KING: Now, Witness, with respect to this construction at Kaufering, -can you tell me when that was initiated? - -A. In May of 1944 it must have begun, the beginning of May. - -Q. And that was also true of the other fighter factories that you were -to construct under the Hitler order? - -A. Perhaps two weeks later the construction in Muehldorf began; the -construction in Vaihingen that I mentioned before was already under way, -and I took it over. The construction in the Rhineland started -considerably later, it could have been perhaps at the end of June; -Prague came along much later. - -Q. Now, you say that you were at Kaufering on two separate occasions. -Did you have any opportunity to— - -A. (Interposing) I was in Kaufering three times. Do you want to know -when? In May 1944; at the beginning of January 1945; and then once more -just before the capitulation, perhaps two or three weeks before the -capitulation. - -Q. Do you recall anything about the conditions at Kaufering; that is, -the conditions of labor? - -A. I only saw the construction site. When I was in Munich, Niebermann, -who was responsible for construction, told me that the Hungarian Jews -were poorly clothed and poorly fed in part. I then told the competent SS -man, whose name I no longer recall—but he was there in Munich, in -Niebermann’s office—and I pointed out to him that this was the -responsibility of the SS and he should see to it that these men were -decently clothed. - -Q. Witness, do you recall any reports of deaths of Hungarian Jews on the -project? - -A. Roughly, in October, our physicians told us that the fatalities in -Kaufering were higher than normal. I then commissioned that physician to -take up negotiations with the SS to improve conditions. - -I should like to say explicitly that the Todt Organization was forbidden -to enter the camps. The physician tried to send medicines to the camp, -and was successful. I can remember a date, namely, one on which I was -operated on—that is why I remember it—in November, at which time the -physician told me that he had succeeded in bringing these bad hygienic -conditions to an end after considerable effort. I remember the date -because it coincided with a sickness of my own. - ------ - -[109] A group of experts, drawn from various phases of German industry -and supplemented by representatives of the various ministries. - -[110] Tr. pp. 300-1. - -[111] Survey is published as part of document in Nazi Conspiracy and -Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 120-126, U.S. Government Printing Office, -Washington, 1946. - -[112] Defendant in case of U.S. _vs._ Oswald Pohl, et al. See Vol. V. - -[113] Portions of this document were introduced by the defense as -Defense Exhibit 12. See pp. 561-62. - -[114] Other portions of this document were introduced by the defense as -Defense Exhibit 13. See pp. 562-63. - -[115] Portions of this document were introduced by the defense as Defend -Exhibit 16. See pp. 564-65. - -[116] Another portion of this document was introduced by the defense as -Defense Exhibit 21. See pp. 565-66. - -[117] Other portions of this document were introduced by the defense as -Defense Exhibit 23. See pp. 566-67. - -[118] Kammler was one of the leading officials of the Economic -Administrative Main Office of the SS -[Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt—WVHA]. See case of _United States_ vs. -_Oswald Pohl, et al._, (_Vol. V_), concerning the WVHA which -administered the utilization of concentration camp labor. - -[119] Document was Speer Exhibit 34 in Trial before International -Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XVI, p. -589, Nuremberg, 1947. - -[120] Defense Counsel, Dr. Bergold, explained (_Tr. p. 580_): “This -proves that the Fuehrer himself ordered these large construction works, -the execution of which is charged to the defendant. - -Although I mentioned before that the Jaegerstab was of the opinion that -it could only build one factory, the order was given by Hitler to build -six. That was an impossible number. He delegated this duty to Mr. -Dorsch. That man had his orders from the Fuehrer and not from the -Jaegerstab, which, of course, was no longer responsible for his -activities.” - -[121] Portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution as -Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 544-45. - -[122] DR. BERGOLD stated (_Tr. p. 567_): “I introduce this in order to -show that the Jaegerstab meetings not always prove who was there at a -certain given time and those meetings changed so that as far as the -defendant Milch is mentioned, this does not prove he was there all of -the time.” - -[123] DR. BERGOLD explained (_Tr. p. 568_): “There was introduced by the -prosecution and also presented an exhibit from this Jaegerstab -conference where the term ‘construction company’ was mentioned in such a -way. Those were companies of concentration camp inmates. This explains -the term ‘construction company’ clearly.” - -[124] Other portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution -as Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 545-46. - -[125] Chief of the Construction Department in the Speer Ministry. - -[126] Ibid. - -[127] DR. BERGOLD stated (_Tr. p. 751_): “The prosecution has alleged -that these great plants were made by slave labor, and I want to show -that this plant in which, according to the allegations of the -prosecution, Hungarian Jews were used, was not built by the Jaegerstab -and that therefore the prosecution has not proved altogether that the -Jaegerstab used Hungarian Jews. - -The passage will show in a very short time that concentration camp -inmates were not used. * * *” - -[128] Portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution as -Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 550-52. - -[129] Another portion of this document was introduced by the prosecution -as Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 554-55. - -[130] DR. BERGOLD stated (_Tr. p. 584_): “Your Honors, in all civilized -countries, also in Germany, penal prisoners have to work. If -concentration camp inmates were put to work in Germany, this was done -within the frame of the law which existed in Germany for the employment -of criminal prisoners. This was nothing special. This work of -concentration camp inmates cannot be considered slave work.” - -[131] Other portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution -as Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 555-57. - -[132] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 6, 7 -Feb. 47, pp. 717-759. - -[133] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 24 Feb. -47, pp. 1361-1379. - - - - - 4. GENERALLUFTZEUGMEISTER[134] - - Evidence - - _Prosecution Documents_ - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - NOKW-311 62 Extract from interrogation of 597 - Hermann Goering on 6 - September 1946, regarding - Milch’s position as - Generalluftzeugmeister (GL). - - NOKW-418 136 Extracts from stenographic 598 - minutes of GL-Conference, 5 - May 1942. - - NOKW-407 137 Extracts from stenographic 599 - minutes of GL-Conference, 27 - May 1942. - - NOKW-406 138 Extracts from stenographic 599 - minutes of the GL-Conference, - 7 July 1942. - - NOKW-408 139 Extracts from stenographic 600 - minutes of GL-Conference, 28 - July 1942. - - NOKW-409 140 Extracts from stenographic 601 - minutes of GL-Conference, 4 - August 1942. - - NOKW-412 141 Extracts from stenographic 602 - minutes of GL-Conference, 18 - August 1942. - - NOKW-416 142 Extracts from stenographic 602 - minutes of GL-Conference, 26 - August 1942. - - NOKW-286 144 Extracts from stenographic 605 - minutes of GL-Conference, 1 - September 1942. - - NOKW-245 157 Extracts from stenographic 606 - minutes of conference with - Goering, 22 February 1943, - regarding plans for airplane - construction. - - NOKW-449 148 Extracts from stenographic 607 - minutes of GL-Conference, 2 - March 1943. - - NOKW-195 143 Extracts from stenographic 608 - minutes of conference with - Goering, 28 October 1943. - - NOKW-180 155 Extracts from stenographic 613 - notes on the conference at - the Reich Marshal’s on - Thursday, 4 November 1943, 11 - o’clock at the Junkers Plant - in Dessau. - - _Testimony_ - - Extracts from testimony of defense witness Max Koenig 615 - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-311 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 62 - - EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF HERMANN GOERING ON 6 - SEPTEMBER 1946, REGARDING MILCH’S POSITION AS - GENERALLUFTZEUGMEISTER (GL) - - * * * * * - -INTERROGATOR: Now to the Milch case: Who was commissioned after 1941 -with the labor allocation in the Ministry for Air? - -GOERING: What am I to understand by “labor allocation”? - -Q. Labor allocation consisted of the drawing in of foreign workers or -German workers, especially of concentration camp inmates, in order to -free them for air force production. - -A. This matter went through Udet, the Chief of Supply for the Air Force, -until Udet’s death, and then it went through Milch. - -Q. In what manner did the Reich Air Ministry submit its requests to -Sauckel and the approximate figure for its requirements, the number of -workers, etc.? And if Sauckel received such a request from the Reich Air -Ministry, how did he undertake the distribution? - -A. The requests were made by Milch, it was he who said how many workers -the air force needed, and these were forwarded to Speer. Speer then -asked Sauckel for the workers for the entire armaments branch, almost -for the entire industrial branch, and he then made the distribution. It -was he in the end who made the final decision as to how many workers -went to the air force for instance, how many to the army, etc. As far as -I know, Sauckel had actually nothing to do with the distribution of -labor. The contingent was put at the disposal of the authorities. -Terrific pressure was continually brought to bear on Sauckel. If the -requested number was not brought, he was given hell. I personally -presided over a meeting where there were differences between Sauckel and -Speer. He wanted to have more, etc. There was a mix-up and that’s how I -know it; but the needs of the air force were put forward by Milch, that -is the Chief of Supply for the Air Force. When difficulties arose and -they did not get the people, and the program threatened to break down, -then they came to me and I supported their demands. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-418 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 136 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, - 5 MAY 1942 - -[Two handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] Mi. 10. - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT ON THE GL-CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY THE STATE SECRETARY, FIELD_ - _MARSHAL MILCH, ON TUESDAY, 5 MAY 1942,_ - _10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -ALPERS: The reason given is shortage of labor. And in fact there are -2,000 men lacking at Heinkel-Oranienburg. - -MILCH: As far as the French are concerned, 60,000 of the ones that we -had been promised are still missing. - - (Comment: 40,000 are missing.) - -If we get those men I would assign 2,000 to Heinkel-Oranienburg. - -FRYDAG: The French become worse and worse; I threw out 80 of them who -will be sent to concentration camps in Russia. They refused to work. The -French say at 4 o’clock: “I won’t work another hour,” and you cannot -make them work another hour. This happened four weeks ago all of a -sudden, when the first bombing attack on Paris took place, while before -that the French were the best people. - -MILCH: We were told in Oranienburg that they were good as long as they -didn’t get spoiled by our German people. - -FRYDAG: It happened here after we got the French from Messerschmitt; -according to the French they got a warm meal twice a day there and had -their laundry done. We cannot do either. We don’t have a warm meal twice -a day either. At Messerschmitt the living conditions were better. - -MILCH: Gablenz, I want you to get in touch with Reinecke concerning -these French. I demand that if the people refuse to work they -immediately be placed against the wall and shot before all the other -workers. I ask you to get in touch with the Reich Leader SS and to ask -him to discuss the matter with the Fuehrer. Now is the right time; -unless we do something effective now, the others will become bothersome. -I ask that their being sent to concentration camps be taken into -consideration too. I’ll tell you afterwards how you should act in such a -matter. - -So I do not agree. You should make another proposal. At the beginning -you cannot expect more. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-407 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 137 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, 27 MAY 1942 - -[Three handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] To my - -files Mi. 14 - -Vossen/Dr. Reynitz/Ca. - - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY THE STATE SECRETARY, FIELD_ - _MARSHAL MILCH ON WEDNESDAY, 27 MAY 1942,_ - _9 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -VON GABLENZ: Yesterday, the first[135] has exploded in France, at the -Arade plant, an explosive, a float, but no damage has been done. - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: What measures have been taken in consequence?—I -want to have a report on what has been done. How many people have been -shot and how many hanged? If that guy cannot be found today, fifty men -should be selected and if I were you I would hang three or four of them -whether they are guilty or not. It is the only way! - -(Mahnke hands another letter to the Field Marshal.) - -What do you think of that man? - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-406 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 138 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE GL-CONFERENCE, - 7 JULY 1942 - -[Two handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] St/R 21 - - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON_ - _7 JULY 1942, 10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: I do not like the engine. I have inspected it and -for the time being anyhow, I shall not take the 177 plane as a traveling -plane. - -With regard to the output of Prague I want to say this: Of course, one -must recognize good output, even of a foreigner. On the other hand, as -far as the French are concerned, something must be done now. Gablenz, -ring up Toennes and tell him that this is a crazy situation [tolle -Schweinerei]. However, we would still try first to arrange it in a -friendly way through Toennes. If that does not succeed, then I intend to -fill the new Heinkel plant in the east entirely with Frenchmen brought -down there by force. If they don’t work in France, they may work as -prisoners in Poland. After all we have to remember that it is we, and -not the French, who have won the war. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-408 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 139 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, - 28 JULY 1942 - -[Two handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] St/R 24 - -Vossen/Dr. Jonuschat/C - - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT ON THE GL-CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY STATE SECRETARY FIELD_ - _MARSHAL MILCH ON TUESDAY, 28 JULY 1942,_ - _10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -ALPERS: We have discussed whether a stronger pressure should not be put -upon French firms by both our liaison office and by us here. I have -talked with the French works managers myself. Actually they are all of -the same mind; they are willing to exert pressure, but then the workers -will leave them. In France there is no law that binds a worker to his -place of employment. - -MILCH: As far as we are concerned, that is very difficult. But at the -very moment when the deadline is passed for me, I shall say: Now there -is no more French production. The workers are sent on leave or taken -away immediately for other work. The French always want the proportion -1:5, but they only reach 1:2.3. In reality they have very much more, as -we have received only old French junk. If we consider the actual output -that we have received, then the proportion is not even 1:0.2, but -exactly the contrary: 5:1 in favor of the French! At the present time we -receive 8 to 9 planes from the French. I could well imagine that they -get out 45 for themselves. I shall shut the shop with a single stroke -and have the workers and the machines come to Germany. If it does not -work on a voluntary basis, then we do it by compulsory contracts. -Perhaps I shall first give them a week to think it over. - - (ALPERS: Amio himself is behind. For him the surfaces and tail - unit factories are situated just right.) - -—It is a fact that, on the whole, these people work in silent -opposition. One cannot blame them for it either, it is true, but they -should not have started the war. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-409 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 140 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, - 4 AUGUST 1942 - -[Handwritten marginal notes] To my files, personally St/R 25 - - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT ON THE GL-CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH_ - _TUESDAY, 4 AUGUST 1942, 10 A.M. IN THE_ - _REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -GEYER: In the west there is a danger of the French going on strike in -the event of a British attack. In that case, the whole of the engine -supply would be severely handicapped. - -MILCH: In such a case I would ask to be appointed military commander -myself. I would band the workers together and have 50 percent of them -shot; I would then publish this fact and compel the other 50 percent to -work, by beatings if necessary. If they don’t work, then they too will -be shot. I would get the necessary replacement somehow. But I hope the -military commander will do his duty. I’m not worried about it. The word -“strike” must never be used. For us there is only “living or dying”, but -not “striking”. That goes for the educated man as well as for the -worker, for the German [Inlaender] as well as for the foreigner. The -word “strike” means death for the man who uses it. - - * * * * * - -GABLENZ: Sauckel also made an effort but he does not have a completely -free hand. Lt. Col. Nickolai and Stending are still standing in between. - -MILCH: In spite of all, he has brought in quite a tidy number. Sauckel -has brought over 1.6 million people to Germany, 1.3 million from the -east and the rest from other countries. - -GABLENZ: We should not be sorry if Sauckel not only took care of getting -the workers, but also of distributing them. That way we would fare -better. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-412 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 141 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, - 18 AUGUST 1942 - -[page 1874 of original] - -[Handwritten marginal notes on attendance list] St/R 27 - - * * * * * - -[page 1932 of original] - -FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: As soon as the figures for August are ready I -request an exact account for my report to the Reich Marshal and also for -the conferences which I want to hold with Sauckel and Speer beforehand. -This account is to show how the labor question has developed, how great -the fluctuation is and which nationalities it involves, what real -requests we now have to make in the different sectors in order to cover -the needs for specialists and for skilled and unskilled labor, how many -of them can be foreigners, etc.? What happens to those who leave the -industry? Are they being compelled to work elsewhere? Are they, as I -proposed, under control in the camps supervised by the SS and considered -as being in mild concentration camps, or are these gentlemen allowed to -remain outside and do as they please? - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-416 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 142 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, - 26 AUGUST 1942 - -[Handwritten marginal notes] St/R 29 - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONFERENCE OF_ - _THE DIRECTOR OF SUPPLIES PRESIDED OVER BY_ - _FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON WEDNESDAY, 26_ - _AUGUST 1942, 11 A.M. IN THE REICH_ - _AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -MILCH: Is Quartermaster General 6 here? - -(Comment: Yes!) - -Do you know anything about it? - -(Comment: No!) - -Ask about it and inform Colonel Brueckner! - -FRYDAG: Another important consideration is the letter, which you -yourself have signed, Field Marshal, dealing with the expiration of the -labor contracts of the foreign workers. * * * - -MILCH: The Reich Marshal [Goering] wanted to bind these people by law at -one time, that was one idea. The Fuehrer’s plan would be more favorable. -He wishes that the workers be gradually all replaced by Russians for -whom there is no longer such a thing as expiration of contracts. - -(Comment: But there is a certain transition period!) - -BRUECKNER: You, Field Marshal, have yourself put your signature to this -matter. The contracts are to be extended till 1 October 1943. I hope -that it will be done. - - * * * * * - -MILCH: On the other hand, a number of these people have been drafted -into the armed forces. But if I consider the others, I arrive all the -same at a monthly total of about 30,000 who loaf around and fluctuate -from job to job. According to the suggestions of the Reich Marshal, -these people are to come under the care of Himmler and are to be handled -severely there. What has been done, so far, in this regard? Brueckner, -you know about this matter, don’t you? - - (BRUECKNER: Yes!) - -You do not seem to be informed quite correctly. Sometime ago we were -quite irritated about the fact that so many workers move about from one -factory to another, most of them antisocial elements who do not like to -work and whom the firms are possibly glad to get rid of because they do -nothing but complain and grumble, do no proper work, are constantly -late, shirk work where they can, pretend to be sick, etc. These people -were supposed to be handled more severely, and about a year ago the -Reich Marshal issued an order and gave the Ministry of Labor the job of -dealing with this matter firmly. Then the Ministry of Labor issued an -explanatory order which was nothing but a sabotage of the order and the -desire expressed by the Reich Marshal. I reported to the Reich -Marshal—in the very words which I have just used—that in this case his -will was clearly being sabotaged by some lawyers or other poor fellows -and that I asked him to take measures against it. He told me that he -would talk the matter over with Himmler. That is, I had suggested to him -that this matter could only be settled with the help of Himmler’s -organization. The armed forces are not in a position to do it. The -suggestion had been made that the armed forces should take care of these -people in camps but these workers are not ready for that. They have not -been condemned and in no way violate the existing laws, but act only -against their country which certainly does not yet come within the -sphere of the old legal nonsense. That is why Himmler should get these -people into his clutches because he can treat them outside the law. My -suggestion was that the people should be put into camps or, in part, -just get numbers. The person involved would have a passport in which it -is entered that he is a German of this or that category, and that his -number is so and so. Then there are subsequent entries: At this or that -time he did not work, at this or that time he was late, etc. If he -“loses” this passport—because he doesn’t want to have it anymore—off -he goes to the concentration camp immediately; the same thing happens if -he does not show it when ordered to do so. Once every month the pass is -checked by the local SD. If it shows that the man has been ill, or late -thirty times in one month, then the SD takes him along and gives him a -job in which he has to work 14 hours a day and where he is treated in -the way he deserves if he is not willing. The Reich Marshal has approved -this suggestion. Nevertheless I have not yet seen anything of the kind -being carried out. - -BRUECKNER: I know that such labor camps have been established. - -MILCH: In that case I want you to tell me exactly during the next -conference, where these camps have been established, who is in charge of -them, and how do we get these honorable gentlemen who do not want to -work into them? * * * It is a simple matter to have these people taken -care of somehow by the SD. It has only got to be taken in hand. I want -to have a report on it as soon as possible. Otherwise I will talk to -Himmler about it myself and see that this matter is taken very firmly in -hand. I see in these people the greatest danger for the home front. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-286 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 144 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, - 1 SEPTEMBER 1942 - -[Handwritten marginal notes] St/R 31 To my files - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY STATE SECRETARY FIELD_ - _MARSHAL MILCH ON WEDNESDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER_ - _1942, 10 A.M. IN THE REICH_ - _AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -DEUTSCHMANN: Reports have come in from front repair workshops that up to -40 percent of the people simply do not come to work. Because of the -difficulties in the food supply they simply go out into the country in -order to have something to eat. At the plant Mechanical Workshops -[Mechanische Werkstaetten] I have found out that the Poles have not come -because Russian pilots had dropped propaganda material. In one case, I -have seen that about 50 percent of the workers failed to come. - -MILCH: What do you do against that? - - (DEUTSCHMANN: For the time being, I did not do anything.) - -And where was that?—In Warsaw? In such a case, orders have to be given -that these workers get a good beating. And Russian prisoners of war are -used to give it to them. - -DEUTSCHMANN: Just at the time when the Russians attacked I was planning -to have 200 Poles transported to western Germany in order to fill a gap -in the hoop production there. The conditions of procurement in Warsaw -were such that I could afford it; therefore, I had no special reason to -take measures. - -MILCH: If those workers stay away from work just as they please then -they need a good beating and this punishment is to be administered by -Russians. Contact the SD; tell them that these workers had failed to -come to work and that I demand that they be punished and not by having -their food taken away from them but by the slightly milder punishment of -50 strokes each on their behind. - -DEUTSCHMANN: Various unfortunate occurrences have happened together. - -MILCH: I don’t care, these occurrences are none of my business. The -unfortunate occurrence for the person involved is when he gets his good -beating. And he should not fail to get it. - - (DEUTSCHMANN: We have already drawn the attention of the Reich - Leader SS to it; something is going to be done about it.) - -Such occurrences must not remain unpunished, they must not happen. If -those people mutiny and do not work, then I demand that some shooting is -done at those occasions. We do the same in Poland as the British do in -India, with the only difference that the British deal with their own -subjects, whereas we deal with the enemy. I want none of our people ever -to show lack of action. I make every section chief responsible to take -measures to that effect immediately. He is not to administer the -beatings himself but to go to the SD and demand that this or that is -done. What kind of measures they take we will leave to the SD, but I -want to have a report on what has been done in such cases! What do you -think would happen to a worker in Germany if he went on strike? - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-245 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 157 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF CONFERENCE - WITH GOERING, 22 FEBRUARY 1943, REGARDING PLANS - FOR AIRPLANE CONSTRUCTION - - * * * * * - -MILCH: * * * Just now things are not going well. Sauckel has agreed with -Speer and myself that von der Heyde is to go to Paris to ascertain on -the very spot what may be taken away. If we want to maintain the program -we require an additional 80,000 workmen over there. Sauckel said he -recognized that and promised to deliver them. If the promise is kept all -will be all right. - -REICH MARSHAL: What sense does it make to leave the workers there? - -MILCH: There is no good will in France, and you can really not expect it -from these fellows. But we will force them to work by not feeding them. - -REICH MARSHAL: I can do this here much better. - -MILCH: That’ll get us nowhere. We shall then have to shut down the -plants in France. - -REICH MARSHAL: The fault is this: Sauckel should have said: Milch, there -are too many skilled workers in that plant; take so-and-so many out for -your German plants; I am going to replace those skilled workers from our -French workers pool. Otherwise there is no sense in his taking them -away. - -MILCH: Until six months ago we piloted the whole French industry by way -of the government, but since then we changed and took sponsor-firms. * * -* - -REICH MARSHAL: I’ll tell Sauckel not to touch our industry at all. But -we must do it ourselves. - -MILCH: I told Sauckel that we will cooperate on all matters on the very -spot, that we will get the thing done but not smash up anything that is -producing for us or is going to produce. He admitted that his men had -acted wrongly. * * * Speer and myself are of the opinion that he must be -incorporated somehow in the Central Planning in order to secure manpower -for us as well as the material. Now we got the first workers in -November; prior to that date none at all. Of course, by taking into -account the many fluctuations he arrives at fantastic figures. We try to -diminish the fluctuations with the aid of Himmler and Ley. The military -physicians are put in to examine the men. I have proposed that a man who -leaves his working place more than three times a year, should be put -into a detention camp and be released only when he stays on the very -spot. * * * - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-449 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 148 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, - 2 MARCH 1943 - -[Handwritten marginal notes] To my files Mi - - Secret - - _SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_ - _PRESIDED OVER BY THE STATE SECRETARY FIELD_ - _MARSHAL MILCH ON TUESDAY, 2 MARCH 1943,_ - _10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_ - - * * * * * - -MILCH: Another question! All the reports from France show that the -French have got their heads full of political thoughts and ideas. On the -basis of the news they tell themselves: They are retreating on the -eastern front and the English and Americans are gradually getting afraid -that the Russians alone will be victorious. The French go on to say: If -the promises made to us by the Americans are really kept, our fortunes -are made. That has already led to our foreign workers slowly becoming -hostile. On principle I have to be informed of every case of -swinishness. I do not understand at all why Germany should put up with -it when Poles and Frenchmen explain to the people: Today indeed you are -still sitting in this work, but later we shall be the owners and if you -treat us properly we shall see to it then that you are shot dead -immediately and not tortured first. In all these matters energetic -interference must be made. I am of the opinion that there should be only -two types of punishment in such cases: firstly, a concentration camp for -foreigners, and secondly, capital punishment. If a certain number of -such hostile elements are removed and the others are informed, they will -then work better. Their love for us certainly won’t become any greater, -but neither will their hate, for it is already strong enough. In this -respect, too, energetic interference must be made and in no case must -the workers put up with it. The best method is to give the person -concerned one with a sledge-hammer and I shall treat with distinction -every man who does something like that whenever he hears such stupid -nonsense. We are living in a total war and the workers must be told that -they don’t have to put up with anything. Now the question is whether or -not the gentlemen believe on the whole that we achieve something worth -mentioning with our production in France. For then we must consider that -the establishments there will be besieged. Then the French would have to -be forced to come to Germany. There I must reflect on whether the -available means of compulsion are sufficient. That does not depend on -me. But, in the abstract, I see no difficulties in the way of getting -100,000 or 200,000 French workers to Germany, nor do I see any -difficulties in the way of keeping them in order. If a case of sabotage -occurs in one area, every tenth man in that area will be shot. Then such -acts of sabotage would cease of themselves. The western peoples are very -much afraid of death, while it is a quite different matter with the -Russians. - - * * * * * - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-195 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 143 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF CONFERENCE WITH GOERING, 28 - OCTOBER 1943 - - [Handwritten] Notes for Discussion No 116/43/KD st. 4th copy - [Signature] MILCH - - _STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF THE DISCUSSION WITH_ - _THE REICH MARSHAL ON 28 OCTOBER 1943,_ - _12 O’CLOCK AT KARINHALL_ - -Subject: Allocation of Labor. - Effects of the Drafting of Laborers. - -Participants: - Reich Marshal - Reich Minister Speer - Field Marshal Milch - Gauleiter Sauckel - General von der Heyde - Staatsrat Gritzbach - Ministerialrat Dr. Groennert - Ministerialdirektor Hildebrand - Landrat Berg - Lt. Colonel Biesing, GSC - Lt. Colonel von Brauchitsch, GSC - Director Frydag - Dr. Janicke/Dr. Eggeling/Bs - - 25 October 1943 - - * * * * * - -MILCH: Interesting are the figures on the decrease of prisoners of war -where one had believed they would remain stable. Between January and -August the figure went down for the Russians from 22,000 to 19,000; for -the others, from 48,000 to 28,000. In the summer the prisoners of war -decreased from 70,000 to 48,000. - - * * * * * - -REICH MARSHAL: But here you report to me and to the Fuehrer: From 1 -January to 30 September a total of 2,200,000 in manpower could be made -available for armament production, - -(Comment by SAUCKEL: But not for the first time.) - -among whom there are 770,000 prisoners of war. Through allocation -300,000 of these who had been drafted for armament and the armed -services, and those who left for other reasons, were replaced, and labor -for the most important armament industries was increased by 650,000, -from 5.3 million to 5.9 million. - -(Reading continued.) - -FRYDAG: Those are the total allocations. - -(REICH MARSHAL: I took that to be net allocation.) - -No, gross. - -MILCH: The Luftwaffe has increased by 150,000 men; the army by 240,000; -the navy by 50,000; military administration has remained stable. For the -Wehrmacht armament alone, there has been an increase of 400,000 men. -Then other industries, including state railway [Reichsbahn], postal -service, experts basic materials industry, make a total increase of 5.29 -million, i.e., an actual addition of 500,000 men in this whole area -within half a year. - - * * * * * - -REICH MARSHAL: Then there is one more question which again belongs here -and which in all seriousness must be discussed. Suppose that, in the -central sector of Holland, between Arnhem, Utrecht, and Dortrecht, I -place at your disposal for three days 15,000 young German -soldiers—recruits who have been there eight days, together with their -respective officers’ corps for handling the executive—to catch the -young Dutchmen (this would have to be carefully prepared, of -course)—would you expect good results? It goes without saying that -everything must be well organized in advance, transport to move them -out, camps to receive them here, far away from the Dutch frontier. - -SAUCKEL: Considering the Dutch population figure that amounts to -something. However, the same should be done in Poland and France. - -REICH MARSHAL: Naturally, after that has been done once, one has to -modify the system for the second blow. Then the Dutch people will no -longer be out in the streets on Sundays for pleasure promenades. - -SPEER: Care should be taken though, not to affect the protected -industries which we have established there. Their workers are also out -for walks on Sundays. - -REICH MARSHAL: First, all of the people must be brought together in a -pen [Pferch]; then they will be asked individually who works where, and -then the men will be selected accordingly. - -SAUCKEL: We should like to set an example. However, I do not like to -rely on this alone for the next year; but I should like to ask that one -have the confidence in us that, reasonably speaking we are doing things -in the right way. The factories which Speer barred to us * * *. - -REICH MARSHAL: Really I am not imposing. But when I constantly hear: I -could do very much if I only had the executive power, then I am ready to -assist you, not permanently, but then, for five days or one week, by -putting my men at your disposal. In France also we have training -regiments, and the army, too, could arrange to make certain units -available so as to make a big push. - -SAUCKEL: If I may be permitted to speak quite frankly, the conditions -are as follows: All of our Military Commanders, and also our -Commissioners General—with the exception of Koch—also the general -governors, take the stand that in all of their regions the supreme law -is tranquility and order. Also during the present era of war these -German people still feel—after all that is typically German—the -inherent obligation of maintaining order in their country and of somehow -protecting the local population. - - (REICH MARSHAL: They do not see Germany, but Seyss-Inquart sees - Holland only.) - -That is the greatest difficulty which we face, and in spite of the -obduracy which is there I am of the opinion that we really have more -friends in these countries than we imagine. I shall place my reports at -your disposal, among them a detailed report of a Flemish man, an -economist who lives with his wife in Weimar, works there, and who at the -same time looks after the Flemish people in my district. The matter is -as follows: Our highest political authorities in these countries -cultivate to some extent social contacts with the local high society; -thus in Belgium, bluntly stated, with elite circles, the high financial -circles, and leaders of industry. They show to the German commanders in -chief a certain demeanor of courteousness and of conventionality and -thereby satisfy our gentlemen to a great extent. Under this mask, -however, they permit their nearest subordinate organizations to -persecute and harass everybody who is in any way friendly to Germany. -Unwillingly and without being suspected by our gentlemen [Herren] we -have in this manner placed the Germans who were there under pressure. -They all have become fearful, and they bar their minds against Germany, -and those who really did something for Germany resign. - - * * * * * - -REICH MARSHAL: * * * Our method of procedure in the expansion of the -large air fields, Sauckel, would then be that, we try, first of all, to -get a hold of the available labor in the vicinity of the harbors in -France, Belgium, and Holland which so far has not been recruited in any -manner by Speer or by the Luftwaffe, or by you—just as the Russians do, -and as the British now also are doing in Southern Italy and Sicily. -There is a scarcity of water there and he who loafs is not permitted to -come near the water tap. They are very strict on this point. Now, in the -fifth year of the war, we too must be just as strict. And over and above -this I still need workers who will be fetched from regions farther away -if those from the immediate vicinity are not sufficient. And then come -specialists, whom Speer makes available from his organization, the -engine operators and so forth. If I am to rearm the Luftwaffe with -everything that is conceivable now, I do need a considerable reserve -stock of laborers. Technical workers must be included. This is in -addition to the number necessary for fulfilling needs arising from -actual fluctuation and departure of workers. Now that would have to be -considered in detail. - -SAUCKEL: May I call attention to the following: That which makes things -very difficult for me at the moment is the question of our currency. It -is a fact that prices in France, and in the entire west, are very much -out of proportion. If we bring the workers to Germany and, according to -German standards, we pay them just as well as the German workers, that -does not help them at all because their families living in the occupied -territories cannot buy anything with the money that the people transfer. -I should like to ask you, Herr Reich Marshal, to talk with Reich -Minister Funk and the other competent officials so that under all -circumstances and with all possible means the German mark will preserve -its purchasing power against the French franc, just as it was done on -the other side, during the World War. - -REICH MARSHAL: All we need to do is to fix the rate of exchange, just as -was done at that time with the dollar, i.e., today the German mark -equals 20 francs, tomorrow 23, then 27, then 40, etc., etc., up to one -million, or one billion. We have had all that. The same holds true for -the guilder. One cigarette now costs in Holland 1.50 guilders; formerly -it cost 10 cents. I merely have to say: 1.50 guilders equal to 10 -pfennigs, or one mark equals 15 guilders. - -SAUCKEL: That would solve a big problem in the wage question. - -REICH MARSHAL: The same is done in Belgium. I shall schedule a -discussion on that with Mr. Funk. With friendly nations it is more -difficult; nevertheless, there, too, we have to do it. - -SAUCKEL: There is still something I should like to say. If this -large-scale recruiting is carried into effect, even with coercion, it is -nothing but compliance with laws which were promulgated there by their -own governments, except that the governments declare they lack the -executive power. - -REICH MARSHAL: That is always the excuse; I simply shall give them the -executive power. - -Well, let me summarize it once more. We undoubtedly are agreed on the -fact that what Sauckel brings to us here, and that which to us appears -as stocking up, has been subject to a natural compromise and actually a -greater number of people was necessary, to make up for the losses. If it -had been impossible to obtain more labor there would, of necessity, have -been a decrease, merely by reason of the draft, the increased rate of -disease during the war, deaths, etc. The decrease in prisoners of war -should really be insignificant unless there are modifications; on the -contrary, I should like to see that the prisoners of war who had been -released, Norwegians, and so forth, be taken again. Insofar as officers -are concerned this has been done to a certain extent. It was the -greatest nonsense ever committed by us and for which nobody thanks us. -We have made prisoners of entire armies and we let them go again. We do -not get anything from Norway? - -SAUCKEL: No. Even Russians are being taken there, also French -specialists. - - (REICH MARSHAL: Why?) - -The tasks there are much bigger than the population could cope with. - - * * * * * - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-180 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 155 - - EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC NOTES ON THE CONFERENCE AT - THE REICH MARSHAL’S ON THURSDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1943, - 11 O’CLOCK AT THE JUNKERS PLANT IN DESSAU - - * * * * * - -THE REICH MARSHAL: Give the prisoner-of-war camp [Stalag] commander my -greetings and tell him I said the Stalag is the biggest racket in -Germany and merely a camp where get-aways are being organized wholesale. -The men do not even have to bother to dig a tunnel, since they can walk -out freely in broad daylight. The Italians get beaten up when they do -not work. * * * It is absolutely useless to take the Italians as -soldiers, for they report for duty, it is true, but then they bolt -again. We need them here, however, as workers for the 100,000 men -operation. In the second place, why do we not get the machines? If I -want to have them, I just have to occupy a factory by surprise. - -MILCH: There are no transportation facilities to make this possible. We -have to let certain plants go on working in Italy, such as ball -bearings, steel castings, and others, and we cannot take the people from -there. The same applies to the technical sphere. The people there are -working for us. All depends on our policy toward the Italians. I have -ordered that they can be beaten up if they do not work. I have also -given permission that Italians caught sabotaging be sentenced to death. -If this measure is not desired by the higher authorities, which seems to -be the case, we are powerless; then the Italians in the Reich will not -be of any use to us, and they will not do anything down there either. -Now the Italian has found the way out, he goes into the militia and, -once he is over there, he bolts. There is one other way to make him -work; if we do not provide the Italian with food and tell him: only -those who fight and work for us will get food. - -(THE REICH MARSHAL: That is what the Americans do!) - -Why do we not do it? In my opinion we should try to get the machines by -force. We can manufacture 1,000 pursuit planes in Italy and the engines -for them. The engines will go only through Junkers, the other parts only -through Messerschmitt. I should like to have the 109 and the 605 in -Italy while they are still working, so that we can modernize our -factories. We have the further advantage that the enemy drops his bombs -not only on Germany, but also on Italy. We can disperse industry there -in small valleys and we need not use the big Milan plants. The situation -there is rather favorable. - -THE REICH MARSHAL: Above all, this question must be discussed at once -with the Fuehrer. - - (End of the conference at 11:45 p.m.) - - * * * * * - -St -149-43 III gK [Stamp] - - Top Secret - -The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich -Adjutant’s office -Adj. 2019-43 top secret - -[Pencil note] For my files - - Berlin W 8 Leipziger Str. #3 - Telephone: 120044 - Headquarters, 12 Nov. 1943 - - 2 copies, 1st copy - - [initialed] Mi 15 Nov. - -To the State Secretary for Aviation and Inspector General of the Air -Force, Field Marshal Milch. - -Reich Air Ministry - -Forwarded herewith for your attention and further handling are the -uncorrected stenographic notes on the conference at the Reich Marshal’s -[Office] on 28 October 1943. - -Inclosure: - -Notes on conference No. 116-13 - -Top Secret—4th copy. - - [signature] BRAUCHITSCH - Lieutenant Colonel, GSC and Chief Adjutant - - EXTRACTS FROM TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS MAX KOENIG[136] - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -DR. BERGOLD: Will you please give the Court your first name and second -name? - -WITNESS KOENIG: Max Koenig. - -Q. When were you born? - -A. 19 August 1897. - -Q. What was your last position in the war with the Wehrmacht? - -A. Lieutenant colonel in the reserve. - -Q. And where were you? - -A. With the commander of the Luftwaffe in Rechlin in charge of the -testing station. - -Q. Is it known to you, Witness, whether and what sort of orders, if at -all, Milch gave with reference to the treatment of so-called terror -pilots? - -A. My department was subordinate to the GL, and therefore received -orders from that office concerning the treatment of pilots who had made -emergency landings, and such orders were to the effect to inform the -Buergermeister [mayors] and the councillors that the prisoners who had -made emergency landings should be sent to Oberursel at once. - -Q. Then were these orders given or were they repeated in certain cases? - -A. I myself went there in 1942 to that office and I remember very well -that the first orders in this respect were given in 1943 and then in -1944. - -Q. Have these orders provided for the taking of prisoners of all pilots -by the Luftwaffe and taking them to Oberursel? - -A. The GL ordered, followed by the threatening of heavy punishment if -the orders were not followed, that all pilots who bailed out or made -emergency landings should be taken at once in the quickest way possible -to Oberursel. - -Q. Did you transmit these orders to the mayors and councillors of your -district? - -A. These orders were passed on by the commander of the testing station -to the ground organization of the base, passed on to all Buergermeister -and the city councillors. - -Q. Can you confirm that these orders came from Milch? - -A. They came from the GL. It was even ordered how we should proceed. As -far as I can recall we were ordered, among other things, that the -contents of their pockets should be taken away from the pilots and sent -to Oberursel with an accompanying letter. - -Q. Did you know at that time that the Party wanted the pilots to be -treated in a different manner? - -A. I did not know that for we in Rechlin had hardly any contact with the -Party. - -Q. Therefore, you never corrected orders from the Party? Or would you -have done this? - -A. No. We were subordinate to the GL, and, therefore, we could only take -orders from that superior office. - -Q. Witness, what do you know within your office as to how concentration -camp inmates were treated? - -A. I should say this: When labor was requested for the building of a -pillbox, we were given a detachment from Oranienburg. These prisoners -were housed by the evacuating of our testing station, that means our -German soldiers, in Laerz, and prisoners from the concentration camp at -Oranienburg were moved into the billets of the German soldiers. There -were about a thousand of these. - -Q. Were the barracks in good condition? - -A. They were not barracks in the bad sense of the word. They were the -best billets which we had at our disposal in Laerz. They were new -buildings and contained, apart from the living rooms, a theater room, -and a big kitchen with, I believe, four stoves. I know the camp because -I visited it repeatedly. - -Q. Witness, what orders did you receive for treating of those people by -the GL? - -A. I remember two orders that were to the effect that all those who -actually worked, whether foreigners or concentration camp inmates, -should be treated well in order to save their good health and in order -to increase their production. - -Q. What has been done for that purpose? - -A. As far as their health was concerned, under this order, I repeatedly -saw to it that I obtained medical supplies from the hospital [Revier] of -Rechlin. - -Q. What you call the Revier is the hospital ward? - -A. “Revier” is the sickroom which, considering the bigness of the -agency, is approximately the equivalent to a hospital * * *. - -Q. Let us go back to concentration camp inmates. What has been done in -health matters? - -A. Near Rechlin, there was an estate called Boek. This estate consisted -of several thousand acres and apart from potatoes and turnips also -produced wheat. On orders from the GL we received from that estate for -the commando in Laerz and for the concentration camp and for the foreign -workers large quantities of goods produced there. - -Q. These concentration camp inmates; were they exploited unfairly? - -A. I can say this—I myself was in the hall east from there up to the -building of the commander, which was about a kilometer and a half. The -foreign workers and concentration camp inmates lived in smaller and -bigger groups and worked in such groups, but I could always observe them -when I walked along the lanes. It seemed that when the civilian and -other employees there were still working, the concentration camp groups -had already stopped working because they had to be in their camp at a -certain time. The time they needed to march to and fro was part of their -working hours. - -Q. Were they told to work particularly fast, or particularly heavy? - -A. I can say this that I could really judge them because after all I saw -them almost daily. Their work was not particularly slow, it wasn’t -particularly fast. And one couldn’t say they were driven on. - -Q. Were these people happy or did you hear complaints? - -A. Should complaints have occurred I would have been the first to hear -about them for it would have been my job to hear them, because I headed -the particular office for food and treatment which was the liaison -office between ourselves and the Stalags. I even listened at times to -outbursts of joy. And from the liaison office we bought everything, -beginning from cigarettes and other small gifts, foodstuffs, etc. This -was used both in the camps and foreign workers, and the foreign workers -were always running about freely there. - -Q. Did your office ask for concentration camp inmates or were they sent -to you by labor exchange on the basis of assignment of labor? - -A. We had to use two ways, we had to use two channels here—one through -labor exchanges and the other through the GL who ordered labor for us -and on the basis of our application with the labor exchanges and the GL, -this special commando and attachment came, whether on the basis of our -application I really don’t know. - -Q. Did you request concentration camp inmates or simply workers? - -A. I may say quite frankly here I asked for German workers and I -expected they would turn up but as we were under orders to maintain -secrecy, neither did I think of foreign workers nor concentration camp -inmates. - - * * * * * - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - -MR. DENNEY: Just what was your job in Rechlin? - -A. I was I B or I Bertha—that means an organization, and my job was -looking after the army. - - * * * * * - -Q. Well, in your position having to do with figures you possibly were -concerned with labor in Rechlin? - -A. From Rechlin we were ordered to build a shelter in Laerz, and to -carry this out we had to ask for labor. - -Q. Didn’t they consolidate requests for labor and give them to you and -you would send them up? - -A. Requests were sent on to the labor offices on the one hand, and on -the other hand to the GL. - -Q. And they were sent by you? - -A. They were sent by the commanding officer of the testing station, that -is, to say, my superior officer. - -Q. But you got them up and gave them to him to send them on? - -A. I worked on them and passed them on to my commanding officer. - -Q. You said that you had concentration camp workers—you also had -foreign workers didn’t you? - -A. There were about 1,000 concentration inmates and a certain number of -foreign workers—Russians, French, and Italians. - -Q. Did you have any prisoners of war? - -A. Yes. We had some prisoners of war. - -Q. How many people were employed there altogether? - -A. In Rechlin, prisoners of war and foreign workers, Germans, altogether -there were 4 to 5 thousand. - -Q. Well, now we have got 1,000 concentration camp workers. So that -leaves 3 to 4 thousand. How were those broken down among prisoners of -war, foreign workers, and Germans? - -A. Prisoners of war, roughly 500. There were about 300 foreigners, and -the rest were German civilians and German military personnel. - -Q. Now, these concentration camp workers, were they guarded? - -A. They were guarded in their own camps and in some cases on trucks were -taken to their places of work on the east Boek airstrip. - -Q. And the foreigners, were they guarded? - -A. I think they were at first a little guarded or, let us say, not at -all. - -Q. How about the prisoners of war? - -A. The prisoners of war were under a similar condition as there were not -very many guards at our disposal—guards were very few. - -Q. You talked about the concentration camp people marching back and -forth. Were they marching under guard? - -A. Yes. They marched under guard. - -Q. In the stockade? - -A. They were in large camps or huts under stockade and under guard. - -Q. Was there barbed wire around it? - -A. Yes. There was barbed wire. - -Q. And guards walking around? - -A. And guards, yes. - -A. Armed guards? - -A. Yes. They were armed. - -Q. Now, you told about passing on these orders about the terror fliers -to the Buergermeister [mayor]. The order that you spoke of that you got -from the defendant? - -A. From the GL. - -Q. The GL was Field Marshal Milch? - -A. That was Herr Milch. - -Q. And you gave those orders on to the Buergermeister about the -so-called “terror fliers”? - -A. The Buergermeister and county councillors. - -Q. And then one day you heard about four fliers who had parachuted or -made a forced landing—anyway they came down—and you sent your soldiers -over there and you were told that they were not available? - -A. No. The officer came back and said that the police had arrested the -four pilots who had made a forced landing, contrary to our order and -contrary to the regulations where the telephone number of our airfield -had to be passed on to the Buergermeister. The report to the -Buergermeister had the purpose to inform the airfield as quickly as -possible so that from there a truck could pick up the pilots. - -Q. Which police had taken these four fliers? - -A. Unfortunately, I do not know. The officer of the airfield came back -and reported that the police had fetched them. He didn’t see the police. -He merely was informed by the Buergermeister of this. - -Q. And then what did you do? Did you call the Buergermeister up? - -A. No. We passed this on to the airfield and the airfield reported this -to the Luftgau. The Luftgau is the next superior office above the -airfield. - -Q. Did they ever get these four fliers back? - -A. No. - -Q. They never got them back? - -A. I do not know where they were taken to. - -Q. You were the second man at Rechlin. You know that these orders were -passed on to the Buergermeister that you received through your immediate -superior from the Generalluftzeugmeister? - -A. I was not the second man. I was E commander—commander of that -office. I was purely an expert in I B. I was concerned in this because -Colonel Petersen of the SD commando ordered the airfield should make -investigations because of the Milch order to the effect that every pilot -should be at once taken to Oberursel. - -Q. At any rate, you didn’t do anything about this after you heard it? - -A. Oh, yes. The report was immediately sent to the Luftgau that the -pilots had been taken away. - -Q. Did you send the report? - -A. No. The report had to be sent by the competent office of the ground -organization—namely, the airfield. - -Q. You never made any effort to find out what happened to these four -Allied fliers? - -A. Oh, yes, that was passed on at once and the airfield having received -it sent it on to the Luftgau and continued to work on this matter. What -happened at the end I could not possibly find out because the Luftgau, -the next highest office, had to report on it through those channels of -command. - -Q. You never tried to find out, did you? Did you ever call up anybody -over at the Luftgau and ask them what happened to these four fliers? - -A. No. I could hardly do that because I belonged to the testing station -and there was a certain amount of dualism. It was rather like air -activity on the one hand and the ground organization on the other. - -Q. You knew what the Hitler order was about terror fliers, didn’t you? - -A. Yes. I learned about this much, much later after this emergency -landing in 1944. I heard about this in 1945 when I was interrogated in -Munich by the Reich Marshal Special Court. - -Q. What nationality were these pilots? - -A. I could not say that. I assumed they were Americans, but I could not -say that with certainty because we never saw the insignia of the -aircraft nor even the pilots themselves as we did not take them -prisoners. - -Q. Were there any SD units around where you were? - -A. In Rechlin itself, no, but my chief, Petersen, and I myself learned -later on that we were supervised by the SD service. - -Q. You say that in your position you would have heard complaints from -any of the workers, of whom you had four to five thousand of whom -approximately two-thousand were made up of concentration camp workers, -prisoners of war, and foreign workers. You never got a single complaint -from any of those people, is that right? - -A. No. I can only confirm that repeatedly the foreign workers gave -expressions of their gratitude for having this liaison office, which -consisted of a sergeant, and for the additional supplies which they thus -got from the Stalag. Strictly speaking, we would have been forbidden to -enter the concentration camp compound because it was part of -Oranienburg, and Oranienburg was an SS agency. - -Q. So you never were inside, were you, in the concentration camp? - -A. I went repeatedly there. I myself attended the hospital hours. That -is to say, I looked at the ill people before they saw the doctor and I -asked the doctor afterwards if he needed anything, and thereupon I got -the medical supplies from the airfield and for that purpose I was able -to do this because I was supported by the order of the GL. - -Q. The Generalluftzeugmeister was able to arrange it so you could go -into the camp and look around? - -A. On the basis of the order where it was my duty to look after the -people that they should be well-treated and well-looked after and, -therefore, I was admitted into their compound. - -Q. And the compound was under the jurisdiction of the SS who had -jurisdiction over * * *. - -A. (Interrupting) Yes. That was under the jurisdiction of the SS. - -Q. And they had jurisdiction over all of the concentration camps? - -A. I didn’t know that but all I know is that they came from Oranienburg -and that the regulations concerning that compound came from Oranienburg. - -Q. You knew that Himmler was head of the SS? - -A. I heard about that in 1945. - -Q. In 1945 you found out that Himmler was the Reich Leader SS? - -A. Yes. - -Q. I have no more questions. - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: Witness, you mean you did not know, before 1945, of the -power Himmler had in the SS? - -A. No, your Honor. Particularly in the testing station we did not -discuss that nor did we receive many reports there. The attitude of my -chief—I may perhaps say here, of the GL himself—it was known what -their attitude was towards the Party. We ourselves were under the -Gauleiter of Mecklenburg who supervised us. Therefore, we went to no -trouble to look into other matters. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: This testing station was in Germany, wasn’t it? - -A. Yes. Rechlin is roughly 120 kilometers northeast of Berlin on the -Muelef Lake [northwest of Berlin on Lake Mueritz]. - -Q. And an officer of the German army, 120 kilometers from Berlin, didn’t -know who Himmler was until 1945? - -A. Of course, I knew that Himmler was a Party member but that Himmler -had all the concentration camps under him I really didn’t know until -very much later. - -Q. But you knew he was head of the SS? - -A. I knew that he was an SS commander. I did not know until then that he -was the head of the SS. - -JUDGE PHILLIPS: How many concentration camp victims did you hear were -killed up to 1945, starved to death and killed? - -A. I did not know that and I only learned it from press notices which -came out in connection with the Nuernberg trials. - -Q. How many concentration camp workers were killed in your camp? - -A. Nobody was tortured or killed in our camp; not even one man. - -Q. Did any of them die a natural death while you were there? - -A. Nobody died; I can confirm to the Court that both the health and the -individuals’ happiness was such that there was neither case of death nor -complaint. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The name of this concentration camp I must know. -What was it? - -A. The camp was near Rechlin and was an agency attached to Oranienburg. - -Q. That was Oranienburg you were talking about? - -A. It must have been a branch of Oranienburg. Up to my resignation on 31 -January 1945, neither a torture nor a fatality occurred there. I said -that before, your Honor, and I should like to repeat it. - -Q. Don’t repeat it. - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: How many inmates were there in this camp; what was the -population of this camp? - -A. The camp was roughly about 1,000 people strong. - -Q. And how long were you there? - -A. From October 1942 until 31 January 1945. - -Q. And you say that in approximately three years’ time there was not one -death in this camp? - -A. Your Honor, the camp was not founded in 1942; as far as I can -remember, it only came at the end of 1943 or early in 1944. I cannot -give you the exact figure of the arrivals. I think it must have been at -the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944. - -Q. And in all that time there was not one single death in the entire -camp? - -A. Your Honor, I had not heard of one single case of death. Should one -case of death have occurred, it is possible that the SS in Oranienburg -would have been told. We ourselves had not heard of one case of death in -that camp, but during the day we assigned SS men in various groups. - -Q. Do you mean this camp was functioning as a health resort? - -A. On that, I can say, your Honor, that after the end of the war, I -heard that before the end of the war when people left, they left very -reluctantly, because there they were given food just as much as was -corresponding to their performance and, in turn, they were actually able -to work there. - ------ - -[134] Generalluftzeugmeister was translated as: Aircraft Master General, -Air Ordnance Master General, Chief of Supply for the Air Forces, Chief -of Air Forces Special Supply and Procurement Service, Director of -Supplies, and Director General of Air Force Equipment. - -[135] Word is missing in German original document. - -[136] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 Feb. -47, pp. 1189-1204. - - - - - B. Medical Experiments - - a. Introduction - -The defendant Milch was charged with participation in criminal medical -experiments. On this charge he was acquitted. Both the judgment and the -concurring opinions deal extensively with this topic; also Volume I of -this series, and the first part of the present volume, contains -considerable documentation from Case I (the Medical Case) on the same -medical experiments for participation in which the defendant Milch was -indicted. Hence, only a small portion of the evidence on medical -experiments offered in the Milch Case has been included in the present -volume. Some of the prosecution documents which were directly related to -the defendant Milch have been included here as well as the testimony of -the defense witness SS General Wolff. Documents NO-285, NO-289, NO-224, -343-A-PS, and 343-B-PS, published as part of the Medical Case, were also -introduced in the Milch Case. Further defense testimony on this topic -may be found by consulting the official record. - -The following defendants in Case I (the Medical Case) testified as -witnesses for the defendant Milch: Hans Wolfgang Romberg, Wolfram -Sievers, Hermann Becker-Freyseng, Georg August Weltz, and Rudolf Brandt. -In addition, six other defense witnesses testified regarding the medical -experiments: Erich Hippke, Walter Neff, Dr. Leo Alexander, Siegfried -Ruff, Karl Wolff, and Gerhard Engel. See list of witnesses for dates and -transcript page references on pages 889-90. - - b. Evidence - - PROSECUTION DOCUMENTS - - Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page - NOKW-041 113 Sworn statement by Hermann 626 - Goering, 27 September 1946, - concerning Milch’s position - as Inspector General of the - Luftwaffe. - - NO-219 83 Letter from Dr. Rudolf Brandt 626 - to Dr. Rascher, 27 April - 1942, concerning medical - experiment report for Himmler - and Milch. - - NO-261 89 Letter from Milch to Dr. 626 - Hippke, 4 June 1942, - concerning availability of - low-pressure air chamber for - experiments. - - 1607-B-PS 115 Letter from Dr. Rascher to Dr. 627 - Brandt, 20 July 1942, - concerning report on - high-altitude experiments. - - 1607-A-PS 115 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 628 - 25 August 1942, concerning - Dr. Rascher’s report on - high-altitude experiments. - - 1617-PS 111 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 629 - 13 November 1942, concerning - Rascher’s transfer to the - Waffen SS. - - NO-262 119 Letter from Dr. Hippke to SS 631 - Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, 6 - March 1943, concerning - Rascher’s transfer to the - Waffen SS. - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-041 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 113 - - SWORN STATEMENT BY HERMANN GOERING, 27 SEPTEMBER 1946, - CONCERNING MILCH’S POSITION AS INSPECTOR GENERAL - OF THE LUFTWAFFE - -I, Hermann Goering, swear, depose, and state: - -That I am the former Reich Marshal of the German Reich and the former -Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, that I have personal knowledge of -all the facts stated here, and that I know these facts because of the -position and responsibility which I had in the German Reich. - -That in approximately 1939 the former Field Marshal Erhard Milch was -appointed Inspector General [Generalinspekteur] of the Luftwaffe and -that as such he was directly responsible to me for the performance of -his duties. - -That the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe was in charge of all tasks -and responsibilities, with the exception of those which were concerned -with tactical operations (the latter were handled by my Chief of Staff). -The supervision of the inspections, as well as the affairs of the health -and medical inspections, was included in the tasks of the Office of the -Inspector General. Special questions, however, such as the number of -hospitals to be put at the disposal of the individual air fleets, fell -within the province of my Chief of Staff. - -That Generaloberstabsarzt [Lt. Gen., Medical Service] Dr. Erich Hippke -was Chief of the Medical Service [Sanitaetswesen] of the Luftwaffe -during the years 1941 till 1944 inclusive; that the Office of the Chief -of the Medical Service was directly responsible for the execution of all -medical research and experiments; that the Office of the Chief of the -Medical Service, i.e., Hippke’s office, was directly subordinated to the -Inspector General, the former Field Marshal Milch. - -I have read the foregoing deposition consisting of two pages, in the -German language, and declare that it is the full truth to the best of my -knowledge and belief. I have had the opportunity to make changes and -corrections in the above statement. I made this declaration voluntarily -without any promise of reward, and I was not subjected to any duress or -threat whatsoever. Nuernberg, 27 September 1946. - - [Signed] HERMANN GOERING - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-219 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 83 - -LETTER FROM DR. RUDOLF BRANDT TO DR. RASCHER, 27 APRIL 1942, CONCERNING - MEDICAL EXPERIMENT REPORT FOR HIMMLER AND MILCH - - Top Secret - - XI a-59 - - Fuehrer Headquarters, 27 April 1942 - -1198/42 -Bra-N - -To SS Untersturmfuehrer Dr. Sigmund Rascher - -Munich - -56 Troger Street - -Dear Comrade Dr. Rascher: - -The Reich Leader [Himmler] has seen your letter of 16 April 1942. He has -shown the same interest in this report as in the one you sent recently. -He would like you to make up for him an over-all report on the -experiments carried out to date, which he would like to present -personally to Field Marshal Milch. - -Kind regards to your wife and yourself, - - Heil Hitler! - Yours - - [initialed] R. Br. - SS Obersturmbannfuehrer - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-261 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 89 - - LETTER FROM MILCH TO DR. HIPPKE, 4 JUNE 1942, CONCERNING - AVAILABILITY OF LOW-PRESSURE AIR CHAMBER FOR EXPERIMENTS - -The State Secretary for Aviation and Inspector General of the -Luftwaffe - - Berlin W 8, Leipziger Street 7, 4 June 1942 - Telephone 12 00 47 -Dear Herr Hippke! - -According to the agreement with the Reich Leader SS the low-pressure air -chamber for experiments in the neighborhood of Munich is still to be -available for two further months. - -Moreover, Stabsarzt Dr. Rascher is, in addition to his tests in the -Luftwaffe, to be on duty for the present for the purposes of the Reich -Leader SS. - - Heil Hitler! - Yours - -Generaloberstabsarzt Professor Dr. Hippke - -Berlin-Tempelhof. - - Copy - -SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Wolff - -Berlin SW 11. - - Heil Hitler! - and kind regards, - Yours, - [signature] MILCH - - PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1607-B-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 115 - - LETTER FROM DR. RASCHER TO DR. BRANDT, 20 JULY 1942, CONCERNING REPORT - ON HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS - -Stabsarzt Dr. Rascher - -Ahnenerbe RF-SS - - Munich, 20 July 1942 - Top Secret - -SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. R. Brandt - -Berlin, RF-SS. - -Very esteemed Dr. Brandt, - -Enclosed please find a copy of the work of myself and Romberg, -“Experiments for Rescue from High Altitudes”. - -On 14 July 1942, I was ordered by the Reich Leader SS to send you the -above-mentioned report. The Reich Leader wants that report to be -forwarded to Field Marshal Milch, accompanied by a letter from him, -asking Milch to receive Romberg and me for a lecture. I believe to have -understood correctly that the Reich Leader thought you would submit to -him a letter to that effect for his signature. - -I was very glad to hear that the Reich Leader was satisfied with the -result of the work at Dachau and with the film, and that he ordered an -intensive continuation of the work in that field. - -I recommended Romberg for the War Merit Cross 2d Class -[“Kriegsverdienstkreuz II. Klasse”] on the request of SS -Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers. SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. Wuest ordered me -to notify you hereof. - -The Reich Leader furthermore decided on 14 July 1942 that the prisoner -Sobota and the two prisoners who work in the dissection room in Dachau -should be released and transferred to the group “Dirlewanger.” The exact -names are in possession of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers. The Reich -Leader has also issued an order to that effect to Major Suchaneck. - -I thank you cordially for everything and remain - - Heil Hitler! - [handwritten] Very faithfully yours, - [Signed] DR. S. RASCHER - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1607-A-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 115[137] - - LETTER FROM HIMMLER TO MILCH, 25 AUGUST 1942, CONCERNING - DR. RASCHER’S REPORT ON HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS - - Field Headquarters, 25 August 1942 - -Field Marshal Milch - - Secret -Dear Milch: - -Enclosed please find a report about experiments for rescue from high -altitudes, which have been carried out by Stabsarzt Dr. S. Rascher and -Dr. med. H. W. Romberg. I saw a film[138] produced by Dr. Rascher. - -I consider the results of those experiments as so important for the air -force, that I beg you to receive Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg - -I consider the results of those experiments as so important for the air -force, that I beg you to receive Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg that, after -having seen the film, you will also refer the matter to the Reich -Marshal because of its importance. - -I would be obliged if you could let me know your opinion in time. - - Friendly greetings and - Heil Hitler! - H. H. [initials of Himmler] - 27 August 1942 - [initial illegible] - -1 Enclosure - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1617-PS - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 111 - - LETTER FROM HIMMLER TO MILCH, 13 NOVEMBER 1942, CONCERNING RASCHER’S - TRANSFER TO THE WAFFEN SS - -The Reich Leader SS - -Berlin, SW 11, 8 Prinz Albrecht Street - -Field Command Post - - 13 November 1942 - Secret - -Dear Comrade Milch: - -You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended -for your consideration the work of a certain SS Fuehrer Dr. Rascher, who -is a medical officer of the air force reserve [Arzt des -Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe]. - -These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism at -great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged -cooling of the human body in cold water and similar problems which are -of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed by -us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the -responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals, who -deserve only to die [todeswuerdig], from concentration camps for these -experiments. - -Unfortunately, you had no time recently when Dr. Rascher wanted to -report on the experiments at the Ministry of Aviation. I had put great -hopes in that report, because I believed that in this way the -difficulties, based mainly on religious objections to Dr. Rascher’s -experiments—for which I assumed responsibility—could be eliminated. - -The difficulties are still the same now as before. In these Christian -medical circles the standpoint is being taken that it goes without -saying that a young German aviator should be allowed to risk his life -but that the life of a criminal—who is not drafted into military -service—is too sacred for this purpose and one should not stain oneself -with this guilt; at the same time it is interesting to note that credit -is taken for the results of the experiments while excluding the -scientist who performed them. - -I personally have inspected the experiments, and have—I can say this -without exaggeration—participated in every phase of this scientific -work in a helpful and inspiring manner. - -We two should not get angry about these difficulties. It will take at -least another ten years until we can get such narrow-mindedness out of -our people. But this should not affect the research work which is -necessary for our young, splendid soldiers and aviators. - -I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt of the reserve, from the air -force and to transfer him to the Waffen SS. I would then assume the sole -responsibility for having these experiments made in this field and would -put the results, of which we in the SS need only a part for the frost -injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of the air force. -However, in this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you -and Wolff, a “non-Christian” doctor should be entrusted who ought to be -not only a fully qualified scientist but also a man not prone to -intellectual theft and who could be informed of the results. This doctor -should also have good contacts with the administrative authorities so -that the results would really obtain a hearing. - -I believe that this solution—to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS, so that -he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility and on my -orders—is the best way. The experiments should not be stopped; we owe -that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air force, there would -certainly be much annoyance; because then I would have to submit to you -a number of unpleasant details caused by the arrogance and -presumptousness which Professor Dr. Holzloehner displayed in the Dachau -military post—which is under my command—during conversations with SS -Standartenfuehrer Sievers about my person. In order to save both of us -this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to -the Waffen SS as quickly as possible. - -I would be grateful if you ordered the low-pressure chamber being put at -our disposal again, together with the differential pumps -[Stufenaggregatpumpen], as the experiments should be extended to even -greater altitudes. - - Cordial greetings and - Heil Hitler! - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-262 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 119 - - LETTER FROM DR. HIPPKE TO SS OBERGRUPPENFUEHRER WOLFF, - 6 MARCH 1943, CONCERNING RASCHER’S TRANSFER - TO THE WAFFEN SS - -The Inspector of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe - - Berlin W 8, Leipziger Street 7, 6 March 1943 - -File No. 2299-43 secret Inspectorate - -Dear Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff! - -State Secretary Milch has given me your letter of 21 November last -year—Diary No. 1426/42 top secret—regarding the release of Stabsarzt -of the Luftwaffe Dr. Rascher to the Waffen SS. - -I am prepared to release Stabsarzt Dr. Rascher from the Luftwaffe, even -after the Reich Physician of the SS, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Grawitz -explained to me that he was unable to give me a replacement; I shall put -him at the disposal of the Waffen SS if Rascher himself desires this -release. I shall ask him about that. - -Your conception that I, as the responsible director of all -medical-scientific research work, would have been opposed to the -chilling experiments on human beings and so retarded their development -is erroneous. I immediately agreed to the experiments, because our own -previous experiments on large animals were concluded and supplementary -work was necessary. It is also highly improbable that I, who is -responsible for the development of all possibilities for rescuing our -airmen, would not do everything possible to further such work. When -Rascher explained his wishes to me, I agreed with him immediately. The -difficulties, Mr. Wolff, lie in an entirely different sphere: it is a -question of vanity on the part of individual scientists, every one of -whom _personally_ wants to bring out new research results, and very -often it is only with great effort that they can be led to work -unselfishly for the common good. None of them is without guilt in this -respect; Rascher is not either. - -If Rascher wants to build up his own research institute within the -framework of the Waffen SS, I have no objection. All research work -within the field of aviation medicine—that is, altitude—moreover, is -under my scientific supervision in my capacity as director of German -aviation medicine. This institute would then be under the supervision of -the Reich Physician of the SS, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Grawitz. - -Momentarily, however, this work _cannot_ be carried on because its -continuation would require a low-pressure chamber in which not only the -_altitude_ of the stratosphere, but also the stratospheric _temperature_ -can be established. But there is no such chamber available in Germany as -yet; a large chamber is being built in the new Berlin Research Institute -for Aviation Medicine, and I hope I shall be able to have it completed -in the course of this year. - -If Rascher, on the other hand, wishes to conduct other experiments not -concerned with altitude and chilling problems, these would not be under -_my_ supervision (_aviation_ medicine) but under the supervision of the -Medical Inspector of the Army (_military_ medicine), whom he would have -to contact. - -I am going to talk over all these problems with Rascher in old -comradeship, and I shall again notify you. - - With respectful compliments and - Heil Hitler! - [Signed] HIPPKE - ------ - -[137] When this document was introduced, Dr. Bergold made the following -statement (_Tr. p. 457_): “Please let me have the photostatic copy of -the original, so that I can make a statement. - -“I merely wanted to find out on the copy, whether there was any -‘receiving’ mark. Later on, in the course of the introduction of -evidence, I shall prove that all letters which are not signed with a red -pencil and do not carry the initials ‘Mi’ were never seen by the -defendant Milch but were forwarded directly. This letter does not show -the initials ‘Mi’. - -(Stepping forward and showing the Tribunal the document) “May it please -the Tribunal: Milch, whenever he received the letter, added his initials -‘Mi’; at all times, when Milch received a document, he indicated the -receipt with a date; he initialed with a date. These letters, which do -not show the initials, were received by his office but were not shown to -him. At a later date, I can prove this. I just wanted, at this time, to -call the Court’s attention to it.” - -[138] When this document was read, Presiding Judge Toms asked (_Tr. p. -458_): “Mr. McMahon, do you know whether the film referred to in this -letter is available?” - -MR. MCMAHON: As far as we know, your Honor, it is not available. In -regard to the one [letter] just referred to, I would like your Honor to -understand that the copies which we have come from the secret files of -Mr. Himmler, therefore, cannot show the initials of Milch, and so, in -fact, would not show that Milch had seen that. This letter was received -from the files of Himmler and would not have the initials of Milch, -saying that he had received this particular letter. - - - - - C. Curriculum Vitae and Excerpts from the Testimony - of the Defendant Milch - - TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-269 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 59 - - _A SHORT CURRICULUM VITAE OF FIELD MARSHAL - ERHARD MILCH_ - - Date Position Activity -30.3.92 Date of birth. -24.2.10 Officer candidate First Foot Artillery Regt. -18.8.11 Lieutenant Recruit training. -1.8.14 Lieutenant Adjutant, 2d Bn., Reserve, - First Foot Artillery Regt. -2.7.15 Lieutenant Air Force, Reconnaissance - Observer. -18.8.15 First Lieutenant Air Force, Reconnaissance - Observer. -Winter 16-17 First Lieutenant Air Force, Adjutant of a unit. -1917 First Lieutenant Chief of the Fifth Air - Squadron. -1918 First Lieutenant Detached service, commander of - an Inf. Company; Detached - service, commander of a - Field Artillery Battery. -18.8.18 Captain Air Force, commander of 204th - Air Squadron, commander of - Sixth Fighter Group. -1919 Captain Commander of 412th Border - Guard Squadron. -1920 Captain Detached service, commander of - Police Air Squadron. -End of 1920 Captain Resigned from military - service. -1921 Lloyd-Ostflug, later Civilian air transport - Danziger Luftpost company, Operation chief; - Civilian air transport - company, Manager. -1922 Junkers-Luftverkehr & Head of Traffic - Danziger Luftpost Department—Organizer of air - lines with Switzerland, - Austria, Hungary, Latvia, - Lithuania, Poland. -1923 Junkers-Luftverkehr & Id. - Danziger Luftpost -1924 Junkers-Luftverkehr & Head of air expedition to - Danziger Luftpost South America. Business - travel to the U.S.A. -1925 Junkers-Luftverkehr Head of General - Administration. -Nov. 1925 Deutsche Lufthansa Member of Technical Board. -Summer 1928 Deutsche Lufthansa Id. and Business Director. -30.1.33 Id. and Deputy Reich Id. concurrently with - Commissioner for direction of aviation under - Aviation supervision of Goering. -March 33 Deutsche Lufthansa and Id. in the Reich Ministry of - State Secretary Aviation. -May 1933 Join NSDAP Party member without - assignment of tasks for - Party. -Sept. 1933 Activated as Colonel Party membership suspended. -1934 Brigadier General Reich Air Ministry and - Deutsche Lufthansa. -1935 Major General Reich Air Ministry and - Deutsche Lufthansa. -1936 Lieutenant General Reich Air Ministry and - (Air Force) Deutsche Lufthansa. - Inspector General of the Air - Force -1938 General -1.9.39 General To operational Air Force. -11.4.-5.5.40 General Commander of Fifth Air Fleet. -Since 10.5.40 General Inspector General. -19.7.40 Field Marshal Inspector General. -Nov. 41 Field Marshal Id. and Chief of Air Force - Material (Development, - testing, procurement of Air - Force material). -April 42 Field Marshal Central Planning Board; - Allocation of raw materials. -March 44 Field Marshal Establishment of “Jaegerstab”. - Raising output of fighter - craft. -20.6.44 Field Marshal Resign posts of State - Secretary and Chief of Air - Force Material. -Jan. 45 Resign post of Inspector - General. -March 45 Field Marshal Hitler declines my - reinstatement. -4.5.45 Field Marshal Taken into British custody in - Holstein. - -1 November 1946. [Signed] ERHARD MILCH - - - - - EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT MILCH[139] - -[March 11] - -Erhard Milch, the defendant, took the stand and testified as follows: - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: The defendant will raise his right hand and repeat after -me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the -pure truth and will withhold and add nothing. - -(The defendant repeated the oath.) - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: You may be seated. - -_DIRECT EXAMINATION_ - -DR. BERGOLD: Witness, I do not have to tell you the same thing I tell -all the other witnesses; namely, that you should speak slowly and all -that. You have heard that several times. - -Give your full name. - -DEFENDANT MILCH: Erhard Milch. - -Q. When and where were you born? - -A. On 30 March 1892, in Wilhelmshaven. - -Q. Who were your parents? - -A. My father was a clerk with the Kriegsmarine [navy], and my mother was -born Vetter. - -Q. What education did you have? - -A. I attended the Gymnasium in Wilhelmshaven, and then from 1905 on I -went to the Joachimsthalsche Gymnasium in Berlin. - -Q. When did you matriculate? - -A. In February 1910. - -Q. What did you study then? - -A. I didn’t study, but four days later I went to the First Foot -Artillery Regiment in Koenigsberg in East Prussia, and I joined that -regiment as a cadet. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, what was your position in the Third Reich in 1933? - -A. I was State Secretary at that time; at first, it was not called a -ministry. It was called the Reich Commissar’s Office, because formal -measures for the formation of a ministry had to be considered both with -the Reich President as well as the Reichstag. At first, Goering was -Reich Commissar and I was Deputy Reich Commissar for Aviation. I think -it was in March that the Reich Ministry was formed; and at that moment I -became State Secretary. - - * * * * * - -[March 12] - -Q. * * * Witness, is it correct to say that in your capacity as -Inspector General you had to make trips abroad too, that is, you had to -take care of the comradely relationship with the air forces of other -countries? - -A. * * * Perhaps I can look up some notes to check the dates of my -trips. The visits which I made were only, some of them, in my capacity -as Inspector General. Some of them were made for purely personal -reasons, relations with people. For instance, the first visit which I -made at the request of Van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, that -must have been about 1936. I visited Belgium. The Belgian Ambassador in -Berlin, Count Kerkhove [Kerchove de Deuterghem], was a personal friend -of mine. One day he asked me to go to Belgium with him; the Prime -Minister Van Zeeland would like to see me. I was very astonished at this -idea and I asked him what the matter was. I then told him that I had to -have the permission of my superior officers. I received it. This was an -entirely private journey. The purpose of the trip, as I realized in -Belgium, was that Van Zeeland wished to come to terms with Germany, not -only formally but full-heartedly. Belgium, since the First World War, -had a treaty with France and was under an obligation to come to France’s -aid militarily by agreement with France. Van Zeeland wished to renounce -that treaty, and he wished to have similar terms with France as with -Germany. Belgium was also prepared in economic matters, which was a very -urgent point for Germany at the time, to make concessions, far-reaching -concessions. The visit started with a brief call on the King, who did -not refer to the purpose of the visit. This was purely a courtesy call, -but this call gave support to my trip. I saw that the Prime Minister -acted in accordance with his King. The plan as such—although as I -emphasized several times I am not a politician and it was not my -intention to interfere in foreign office matters, but here von Neurath -entirely agreed with my visit. He had not the bureaucratic mind—the -plan impressed me. Rather, I saw the possibility to create friendly -relations between Germany and Belgium, and via Belgium to France, and -later on via France to England itself. - -I was convinced that the over-privileged policy of balance of power no -longer applied since the First World War. The powers in Europe had been -dislodged too much and joint friendship between France and Britain was -definitely a British interest in that sense. - -When I returned I reported orally to von Neurath who entirely agreed -with that point of view. I also reported to Field Marshal von Blomberg, -who, apart from Goering, was my military superior. He took the same -line. I reported to Hitler and Goering. Both received my report but did -not express their own opinion. To my question whether and what I could -tell the Belgian Ambassador, I was told that would have to be done -through other channels, not through me. My orders had come to an end by -giving this report. This was my first visit and it was entirely -unofficial. - -Then I went to Belgium in May 1987. At that time, as a Luftwaffe man, I -was officially received by the Commander in Chief of the Belgian Air -Force, General Duvivier; also by the Minister of War and other -officials. That was a very friendly visit which also led to very good -personal relations between ourselves and their pilots. - -I was particularly interested in Belgium because in the First World War -Germany had marched through Belgium, had violated Belgian neutrality, -and had to make up for this now. I believed that the views as expressed -by Belgium on both occasions were aimed at finally burying the hatchet. -I assumed that there was a direct connection between my Belgian visit -and a visit by the French Ambassador Poncet who came to call on me in my -office and extended an invitation by the French Government on the -occasion of the International Exhibition. That visit took place from 4 -to 9 October 1937 in Paris with the full approval of Goering and Hitler. -The visit was most impressive since I believe it was the first time -since 1867 that a German officer was able to pay an official friendly -visit to France. The French told me with the greatest satisfaction that -that was the first time the French Company of Honor had presented its -arms since the Prussian Crown Prince had visited Paris in 1867. - -The French made great efforts to make the visit a success and I must say -they succeeded all along the line. The main point was joint military -inspections. Very cordial words were exchanged with the generals of the -French Air Force. I was accompanied by Udet and Count Kerkhove [Kerchove -de Deuterghem] who also had very good relations with France from other -times. The central point perhaps of the visit and its real purpose -occurred after a lunch given by Pierre Cot, the Minister of Aviation. On -my other side the Foreign Minister was sitting, and also the Minister of -the Navy was there. After lunch the three French Ministers, Wilmer, the -Commander in Chief of the French Air Force, Udet, and myself remained in -a special room and the French Foreign Minister asked me to take home -with me some propositions made by his office. - -I should add that our German Ambassador in France was also there, also -in the smaller circle. When I said that I didn’t want to interfere in -his business, he himself did not take any notice of it. He said that the -most important thing was to report to Hitler on my impressions. He -himself could not approach Hitler. The Ambassador was then Count -Welczeck. I was extremely surprised; I had no idea. I couldn’t imagine -that the Head of State should not see his own Ambassador. On that basis -I said I would only act as a postman, and as such would transmit what I -would be told. I would give my very best own will. - -The contents of the conversation were to have a far-reaching agreement -between the two countries, the main purpose being to establish a really -permanent and lasting peace between the two countries. I was able to -take over this assignment with the best conscience in the world. After -all, I said yesterday what I thought of military events in Europe in the -last thousand years. My impression was that the Foreign Minister was -very serious in this business, nor did I have any suspicions that this -might be a political trap and the Air Minister Cot who was always -described as communist in Germany, gave me a very good impression -indeed, and our conversations were very intimate and very frank. - -The French Foreign Minister at that time was called Delbos. The farewell -on the Le Bourget Airfield led to fraternization between all of us, and -between ourselves and five or six of the highest French generals. I must -not forget that one of the oldest French generals, General Keller, -expressed with tears in his eyes that he was convinced that the thousand -years war between France and Germany was now a matter of the past. We -also were deeply moved. - -On 9 October I flew from Paris to Berchtesgaden and reported to Hitler -at once. He ordered me to report to him as soon as I had returned. I may -perhaps say quite generally I could only see Hitler if Goering gave me -permission or ordered me to do so, or, of course, if Hitler himself -ordered me to come and see him. I myself could not go and see him as I -was merely a subordinate. - -In the presence of Udet I gave a report to Hitler lasting over two hours -on the evening of the 9th of October, when my impression was still very -fresh. Hitler listened very attentively, asked a number of detailed -questions. I could tell him all about the various details which we saw -and heard, not so much the military ones, but the political details. I -could never talk enough about these things. After all, it was a fairly -long conversation with the Head of State. I recommended all these things -very warmly and I asked him to take this extended hand and he would -represent the greatest glory if he would succeed in coming to a lasting -agreement with France based on the very far-reaching economic community -between the two countries. - -I compared this with the time of the German Customs League prior to 1870 -when the German states were linked together only through this Customs -League. I recalled to his memory that both countries, France and -Germany, had been a unit and a community for centuries at one time, and -what was greatness at that time today merely meant a normal state. I -want to express in particular that nobody pleaded that the two countries -should be politically linked together but that political collaboration -was a necessity. - -On 11 October, two days later, the Italian Ambassador called on me— - -Q. Just a minute. I have to ask another question. Is it correct that -during this conversation you also offered to go as a special envoy to -France and to complete this task? - -A. Oh yes, I told him that Count Welczeck should be called to Hitler in -order to give a report. Hitler said no, that is not necessary. I then -said that he must have somebody, if he wished to pursue this matter, who -enjoyed his confidence and also the confidence of the government to -which he was sent. I told him that I was prepared at all times to serve -under Welczeck as a special envoy only for that one task. I explained to -him that I regarded Welczeck as a man who enjoyed the confidence of the -French Government, and that it would be a pity if Hitler would not see -that man more frequently. - -Q. Witness, did Hitler take a position on this question or did he keep -silent again as he did before? - -A. Apart from putting questions to me he didn’t say anything decisive at -all. After all, I was not a Foreign Office official, and I could hardly -expect him to do so. Perhaps later on I can describe what I did as far -as Neurath is concerned. - -Q. But before that I would ask you one more question. In Belgium and in -France were you told why you of all persons were approached by these -foreign countries and had the confidence of these countries? - -A. The Belgians were explicit on that point. When I told Count Welczeck -that, after all, the Foreign Office was concerned here; that it would -not serve any useful purpose, he replied, “That will not be read higher -up. If you are the soldier coming to Hitler, he will listen to you, for, -after all, soldiers are your trump cards at the moment. Also we have -confidence in you, confidence that you will at least be able to see -Hitler; and he also has the confidence that you personally will do your -best in this respect.” - -Q. Witness, at that time did others also approach you, other diplomatic -representatives, and lend you their confidence? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Did you have the confidence of Mr. Messersmith? - -A. Oh, yes, Mr. Messersmith; but that was before all this. I think that -really took place in 1933, ’34 or perhaps in ’35. He visited me three -times. When he was the Consul General of the United States, he had some -difficulties with some American subsidiary companies in Germany. One was -Standard Oil, as far as I recall. I asked him why he wanted to see me -since that was not my business. Then he said that he had full confidence -that I would look after his interests. He had been told by other -diplomatic representatives that I was able to help him. - -Q. All right. Now, Witness, we come to the steps you took after your -report to Hitler, the steps you took later on. I ask you to tell about -that briefly. - -A. Perhaps I’ll do that. It was after my visit to England. - -Q. Very well, go ahead. - -A. On 11 October 1937, the Italian Ambassador came to see me. That was -Professor Attolico. He told me that the Italians had got very excited at -my Paris visit. It was believed that I had gone to make arrangements -there which were in contradiction to German-Italian agreements. I calmed -him down at once without giving him too many details; but he asked me to -pay a brief visit to Italy before going to England. We had been asked to -go to England on the 17th of October. An air force exhibition in Milan -was the occasion; and I was asked to open that exhibition on the 12th of -May. That, of course, was headlined by the Italian papers. Attolico came -and saw me after this and expressed his gratitude. He said that Delbos -had put a trap in front of me. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The witness gives the date as the 12th of May. Is -that what he meant for the exhibition in Milan? - -A. 12 October. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: What year? - -A. In October 1937. I went to Italy and then to England. The visit had -been arranged by the Royal Air Force as a reply to the visit paid to us -by the Royal Air Force in January 1937. At that time figures were -exchanged between us on planned armaments, that is to say the figures -concerning bombers, fighters, and so forth, by agreement with Goering -and Hitler. Here again the intention existed to know exactly what the -other was doing. The other point was the intention to come to terms on -all these questions. - -The visit to England lasted until 25 October. England had quite a lot to -show. The air force was very well organized and had first-rate -personnel. The visits were very cordial. Political conversations of an -official nature were not held; but unofficially we spent an evening in a -club, in a very small circle of ten people, perhaps less than ten. Lord -Swinton, who was then Minister of Aviation, took part, as well as the -leader of the opposition, Mr. Churchill, and Lord [Rt. Hon.] Amery, -Secretary of State for India, and from the British Air Force, Lord -Trenchard. - -We had brought General Stumpff and of course General Udet. This was more -in the nature of a personal contact and political questions were not -touched upon. The other hosts had told me before, “Today you meet your -first and second best enemy. Don’t be confused by this; but if there is -an attack, hit back.” That is what happened; but it was a very jolly -evening. - -Before we took off again, that is to say on 24 October, Mr. Eden, the -Foreign Secretary, rang me up. He said that he had been busy all the -time before, but could I see him now. I said that I should be delighted -but that a program had been arranged for us by the RAF to visit an -airfield tomorrow. I asked that if the program could be changed, would -he please contact the RAF. He told me that perhaps that would be a bit -too complicated and asked if perhaps I could see him later on. I could -be with him in two hours and thirty minutes since that was how long my -aircraft took from Berlin to London at that time. Unfortunately I never -saw Mr. Eden. - -I reported about that trip to England on 2 November. The report took -over two hours. Hitler was much more accessible than when I talked to -him about France. I reported particularly my talk with Mr. Churchill and -drew his attention to the seriousness which was expressed. Hitler -immediately interrupted me. He said, “Please do not worry at all; never -in my life will I do anything against Britain. The basis of my whole -policy is collaboration with Britain.” These words calmed me -considerably. I immediately explained to him once more that the way to -come to terms with England would be by Brussels and Paris, and I -explained why. - -I saw von Neurath on 11 October on the trip to France; and on 28 October -I reported to him on my trip to England in great detail. All I could -tell him at the time was what Hitler had said or had failed to say about -France. Neurath again was very impressed with me for having worked for -him in this sense. I was in agreement with him that without any further -invitations by him or Hitler I must not take any further steps. - -Then on 1 November 1937 I went and saw Field Marshal von Blomberg who at -that time was Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, that is to say, -Goering’s military superior. I reported to him. Blomberg in all things -entirely agreed with me, as had Neurath. Goering at that time did not -have enough time to see me. I asked on several occasions to be allowed -to report to him on these very important matters; but this did not -happen because he simply declined. - -Q. Witness, I think we can leave this field now. Will you only explain -briefly to the Tribunal whether you received foreign delegations, and of -which nations, and what happened at those occasions? - -A. I said before that the British had visited us in January 1937. After -that I had perhaps five or six visits from Englishmen. The French paid a -return visit in 1938. On that occasion again we returned the very -cordial welcome which the French had given to us. We showed the French -our troops and factories. Yesterday, reference was made by the witness -Vorwald[140] to this, who said that we only showed what the troops had -at their disposal at the time and what expressly had been permitted to -be shown by Goering, after a request had been made by the competent -department of the General Staff. I know that somebody has alleged that -Hitler at the end of the war said I had shown secret methods to foreign -visitors and damaged Germany thereby. That is a slanderous statement. It -was alleged that I had shown radar instruments, and at that time we -didn’t have any radar at all. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, were you ever Goering’s deputy in this capacity, and how -long? - -A. Until 1937 I was his deputy, and all offices in the Luftwaffe which -were subordinate to him were also subordinate to me. This applied to the -execution of orders. From 1937 onwards I was his deputy only in my own -sector, and this automatically as Chief of the General Staff in his -field, which applies also to the Generalluftzeugmeister. In any case it -was within my capacity to deputize for Goering in all matters as I was -the second senior officer of the Luftwaffe, and this was done only by -way of rank. But Goering reserved the right to appoint a deputy in -general, that is, especially always only for the Luftwaffe. This -authority he did not confer upon me. Even when he was on leave he kept -this right, he retained his command. I agreed with this arrangement -personally. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, what was the position at the beginning when you took over -the duties of GL? What measures did you take, and what was your aim? - -A. I can be brief in this connection, at least in regard to the first -point. General Vorwald yesterday spoke at length about it. No useful -developments for the immediate future were available. No bomber aircraft -of a new type was in existence, and as to mass production we stood very -poorly, as I previously described to you. Painstakingly we had -reorganized on 1 September, and it was only because of the extreme -devotion of industry and because of the faithful service rendered by our -German workers and those who helped them that it was possible to, shall -we say, bring about a miracle. - -The production figure in bombers was reached once more in the shortest -of time, in the spring of 1942. There was not a single individual -instance where our program as we had set it for ourselves was not -reached. This was something extraordinary. In the case of fighters, -there was a good type of fighter aircraft, or even two; namely, the -Focke-Wulf and the Messerschmitt, but there were no engines for those -fighters. We had to use incomplete engines to equip these aircraft, and -on the strength of my experience collected in my capacity as director of -the Lufthansa, I had to have tests carried out. My testing department in -Rechlin was excellently staffed, the commander being an excellent pilot -and technician, and it was due to their devotion that in a few months we -managed to get even these new engines ready although, according to human -estimate, we could not expect it. It was more through luck than -intelligence that we got that. - -Now that was the situation as I found it. The new organization, of -course, had not been started up, and I had to collect a few new, -extremely good experts. The men who were working there independently -were rather downhearted for a long time. As experts they had lost any -doubt in the outcome of the war, and they did not believe that it would -be possible once again to start up our armament program. - -The total number of aircraft in production was something in the -neighborhood of 800. That included trainer aircraft, transports, liaison -aircraft, such as the Storch; it even included towing aircraft which -were to be used for parachutists. As far as fighters were concerned, -production of those, when it was removed from under my care, had -increased by only about ten percent, although ’37, ’38, ’39, ’40, -’41—four years—five years—had elapsed. The saddest fact was that -among those 800 there were only 200 fighter aircraft, although both on -the British front and in the East, fighter planes were necessary. The -Russians had at their disposal a very large number of bombers, and even -if they were an elderly type, after all, we did have to have fighters to -keep them in check, and since the transport extended from the North to -the South over 2,000 kilometers, a large number of fighter units had to -be used in that campaign. This arm could not be supported with 200 -fighters. We needed more. - -The demand which I found from the General Staff, which of course made -all demands and had them confirmed by Goering, amounted to a total of -360 fighters which were to be obtained in 1942. It was said yesterday -that immediately I ordered a considerable increase. Several figures have -been mentioned by various witnesses. Actually, these increases were not -decided upon in one day. To begin with, it was to be doubled and a few -days later I said, “Let’s make it 1,000; that’s a round number,” and -later, in fact, there were 3,000 and later even we planned 5,000. We -knew at about that time just what we had to expect from our enemies. We -knew the types they had. - -America, in the initial period, still published their production figures -correctly subdivided according to types, and we also had an excellent -intelligence, and from analyzing aircraft that had been shot down and -from the numbers which were coded, and which could be deciphered by an -expert right away, we could discover right to the very last number what -they had produced. That was production that had been actually carried -out, and the figures found in the United States were not fictitious. -Industry, although with a certain amount of reticence and difficulty, -but certainly afterwards quite clearly fulfilled these figures. I still -know exactly that the plan ran to about 8,000 aircraft, and was -achieved, and that figure included four-engine bombers. Production under -Britain’s rearmament, too, was learned in detail, and I remember at the -time Great Britain was either already producing 800 four-engine bombers -a month or was just about to produce that number. - -You could calculate from that the number, the quantity of bombs which -could be brought to Germany, and regarding the function and size of the -bombs, of course we knew about that too. This was, of course, the reason -that previously as Inspector General I demanded that the entire force -should be built to defend our home country, this being the fundamental -principle of warfare, since without armaments and life at home, battles -at the front were unthinkable. I shall later have to come to this -question in more detail because I am probably the man who remembers this -most accurately, and as long as I am still about I would like to state -this clearly once again, because this is one of the most important -questions which probably existed in every war. This was the biggest -struggle that went on, and as I look back on it today I am surprised -that I did not despair over that struggle myself. - -Q. Witness, those measures which you planned, were they dictated by the -thought that with the campaign against Russia the situation of Germany -would become desperate? - -A. As I said earlier, the war on two fronts was the stab in the back of -this war as far as I was concerned, that I thought excluded victory once -and for all, and the only remaining question now was just how badly -fleeced we might escape from this whole affair. It was no longer -possible in my opinion to end this war by force of arms. It was only -possible by means of arms to attain a somewhat satisfactory final -position on the strength of which political and diplomatic steps would -have to take place. In order to achieve such a final position it was -necessary in the first place that Germany should be protected against -destruction, because once the war potential was destroyed it was -immaterial whether the fronts collapsed a little earlier or a little -later. They could not be held any longer. This thought, unfortunately, -was not understood by our leaders, or rather they did not agree with it -and turned it down and just did not come to it. The end did not come -until there was hardly one stone left intact. - -Q. Witness, in this connection I should like to ask you to show the -correctness of your present report and to prove that from the very start -you had these thoughts, and to submit to the Tribunal the remark you had -made in your diary when the Russian campaign started. - -A. I wrote in it, “The attack against Russia: the first day 1,800 -aircraft destroyed, mostly on the ground. The Russians left them there. -They didn’t expect that we would attack. They overestimated our -intelligence.” - -Q. What did you want to say by these words, “They overestimated our -intelligence?” - -A. Well, the Russians might have thought that no opponent would be so -foolish and so stupid to attack them now and create a war on two fronts. - - * * * * * - -[March 13] - -Q. Witness, do you know at what point the Central Planning Board was -ordered and how did the creation of this institute come about? - -A. Its creation must have taken place during the last days of March -1942. It originated from a discussion which Speer had with Hitler in the -latter’s headquarters. At the time when Speer had taken over armament -there was no higher authority which was acting according to clear-cut -points of view when distributing raw material. Until then we had been -receiving raw material through a certain department of the OKW. This -department in turn had been getting it from the Four Year Plan. The OKW -was distributing to the army, navy and air force but this department had -no expert knowledge. Consequently the continuity of armament suffered -under this. Speer quickly recognized the state of affairs and without my -having previous knowledge of it he tackled this question when talking to -Hitler. As a result Hitler appointed Speer as the central planner for -this subject. Subsequently Speer made the request that I should take on -this task together with him, since Speer had been in the armament -business rather briefly and since he said I would be able to help -him—at least this was the way Speer discussed the matter with me -shortly afterwards; I, myself, hadn’t been at that conference. Following -this, on 2 April 1942, Speer and I together went to see Goering since -Speer considered that this task, which, after all, was connected with -the Four Year Plan, should be discussed with Goering. Goering expressed -agreement but he demanded that a representative of State Secretary -Koerner, who was in official contact with the Four Year Plan should -enter the Central Planning Board. I know that Speer said at this point: -“It seems to me three are rather too many for this job”, and I said -“Well, I am only too willing to drop out. I have enough work as it is,” -and Speer interfered and said that was out of the question. Goering -said: “No, it is my view that there can be three.” That is how the -composition of the Central Planning Board was realized. I can anticipate -at this point that very much later Minister Funk joined the Central -Planning Board as a force which was done at the instance when the -so-called “War Production”—and in this case we are not talking about -the armament business but civilian requirements and the like—was -transferred from Funk’s Ministry to Speer’s Ministry. - -Q. Witness, did you, within the framework of the Central Planning Board -become the armed forces’ or air forces’ representative? - -A. No, right at the very beginning that had been decided upon by Hitler -that, namely, that in no way was I to look after my own interest there, -that is to say, the interest of the air force, that I should be above -the Party. Later on there were demands from the navy, which had not -known about this arrangement. They, too, wanted to have a representative -in the Central Planning Board. * * * - -Q. Witness, what were the actual tasks of this Central Planning Board? - -A. The tasks had been communicated to me by Speer and had been confirmed -through Goering. There was only distribution of raw materials to all -holders of priority permits. - -Q. Witness, what is what you call the “holder of a priority”? - -A. Well, the armed forces are such priority holders, and within the -armed forces the navy, army, and air force are holders of these -priorities. The coal industry holds these priorities; the steel -industry; the textile industry; the German cities and municipalities, -for their municipal requirements; the power supplying industry. - -Q. What about agriculture? - -A. Most certainly agriculture, for agricultural machinery requires -steel, requires coal, requires all sorts of things. Altogether, the -forms according to which we used to distribute, and which contained the -word “armament” on the left, contained on the right all the civilian -purchasers, all the buyers. There were approximately 40 to 45 civilian -holders of these priorities. - -Q. But then what did the Central Planning Board have to do with the Four -Year Plan, to which there seemed to be some sort of formal connection -through Speer? - -A. The Central Planning Board as such had nothing to do with the Four -Year Plan; only Speer, in his capacity as Armament Minister. - -Q. Did you ever report to Goering about the Central Planning Board? - -A. No, with the exception of that first meeting on 2 April 1942, when -the matter was reported to him. Apart from that meeting, I have never -talked to him or with him about the Central Planning Board. * * * - - * * * * * - -Q. From whom did the Central Planning Board have instructions? - -A. Directly from Hitler. - -Q. Through which channels were they given? - -A. Speer was with Hitler practically every week, for the reason of army -supplies, or other questions, sometimes staying with Hitler for several -days. On such occasions Hitler would mention his most important -problems. For instance, he would mention the sequence of priorities of -the various armament branches, which I explained to you yesterday. Quite -automatically, through this, the approximate priority ratings were laid -down. However, within the individual spheres, because of the events of -the war, there were current changes: At one moment one type of tank, and -then at another moment, another type of tank; or first one type of gun, -and then another type of gun, would be more important. That, of course, -necessitated considerable rapid changes in the allotment of raw -materials. That was the case, and to an even stronger degree, in the -case of munitions, so that currently, probably during every such -conference which took place in his office, Hitler used to express -special wishes, which of course meant orders for us. - -I personally took part in such conferences on nine occasions. -Occasionally Speer would take me along to have me appear on the stage -there, as he would put it. However, that ceased almost completely during -the last years. Anyway, I know for certain, according to my documents, -that I was there nine times. - -Let me add at this point that State Secretary Koerner[141] was never -there. Speer did not think that it was necessary for him to be taken -along, and Koerner would not impose his presence either. - -Q. So that during such a meeting for the receiving of orders of the -Central Planning Board, Koerner was never there? - -A. No, he was not there, and he did not know about it either. He didn’t -know, therefore, how strongly Hitler interfered in this sphere by giving -orders. - -Q. But didn’t you always report to him, either you or Speer, in the case -of the meetings of Central Planning Board? - -A. It might have come as an aside during the meetings; one of us might -have said, usually Speer, “Hitler has given this or that order,” but -that wasn’t anything very noticeable to Koerner. - -Q. Was it only because of the Central Planning Board that Speer went to -see Hitler? - -A. No, that was one very small portion of all the other discussions, -because Hitler was interested, to an extraordinary degree, in army -armament, and even right down to the most minute detail. He himself -decided, on his own initiative, the thickness of armor on armored -fighting vehicles; he decided upon the caliber and type of gun which -should be fitted to tanks; he decided the thickness and the caliber of -antitank defensive armor; he himself laid down, personally, the supply -rate of ammunition for every type of gun. I had an awful lot of -difficulty with him over antiaircraft ammunition in that connection, -since Hitler would never depart during that time, from anything which he -had once laid down. He had changed a great deal from his prewar days. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, it is your opinion that even this first record of the -Central Planning Board meeting is inexact and does not correspond with -the true discussions which took place? - -A. May I state quite basically in connection with this that I hardly -ever had my deputy with me when I went to the meetings; he had a lot of -other assignments and their meetings went on for several hours. -Koerner’s deputy, the representative whom he brought along, always kept -the minutes in the sense of observing Koerner’s meaning. Sometimes I did -read through these brief minutes, and I might say that I pointed out to -Koerner and Speer that facts always seemed altered considerably, but all -three of us used to laugh about it, and with a flick of the wrist we -used to consider it quite unimportant to have these minutes altered -afterwards because all of these minutes appeared of no importance -whatsoever. What was important were decisions of the Central Planning -Board, and they were taken down most exactly, and they contained to my -knowledge only contingencies of raw materials such as we had -distributed. * * * - -Q. Witness, on this occasion we might touch upon the value or lack of -value of the so-called verbatim minutes, now that we have come to this -subject, don’t you think? These verbatim minutes, which are very -comprehensive, very voluminous, even with reference to one meeting, -there was a whole volume it seems. Were they examined? - -A. No. That wasn’t possible. I might have examined one or the other -minutes at the beginning, and I did on one occasion try to make -improvements, but I found that it contained so many mistakes that the -time of reading and improving them would have amounted to fifty percent -more time than the actual meeting. These meetings often went on for four -or more hours or so, and I really did not have the time to sit down for -something like six hours afterwards in order to put the minutes right. I -know that there wasn’t any one who read through them, and I didn’t -really know why these records, these verbatim records, were prepared. I -thought perhaps it was a question of supervision for us, and I had no -cause to state that I would not allow myself to be supervised. If you -went to the pains of having one stenographer who would do nothing but -write, but who was stumped by the fact that we sometimes spoke too -quickly or not too clearly; a stenographer who often sat far away from -the man who was speaking, or who didn’t know the name of the man who was -speaking, there was bound to be a lot of muddle in that respect. He -didn’t know whether the man who was sitting on the left was talking or -his neighbor on the right, and one mistake after another occurred. I -gave it up pretty quickly after looking through these minutes. I once -asked the others whether they read through the minutes and they just -laughed at me, and said that they had more and better jobs on hand, and -I said so had I. - -Q. Witness, you have just said that these stenographers who sat on the -side could quite often not even distinguish between the speaker, whether -it was he or his neighbor. What was the custom; did you remain seated -while you were speaking, or did one always rise? - -A. No, no, we all stayed seated; we all remained seated and the -stenographer couldn’t always see who was speaking because on certain -occasions a lot of people were there. If you invited one man to a -meeting in Germany, then possibly he always brought his entire staff -along so that he could answer all the questions; and if you invited one, -sometimes fifteen or twenty showed up. I sometimes asked whether these -men didn’t have anything else to do because we were not really concerned -with details, only with the basic, larger points, and they used to say, -well, everybody is invited. - -Q. Witness, did it happen that specific orders were given to -stenographers to alter certain points or omit them? So that apart from -accidental mistakes, deliberate mistakes were being made? - -A. I have recollections of many occasions that Speer, who used to sit -next to me, would shout to the stenographer across the room and say, -“Leave that out, what the Field Marshal just said.” Unfortunately, -notorious before this Tribunal are the expressions and words I used, -which were not always too carefully chosen. I have always said during my -entire life what came to my mind at the moment, and I, as a soldier, was -never taught to hide my opinion. But sometimes, in order to refreshen -sometimes boring meetings, I used rather forceful language to shake up -the others a bit so that they would at last come out with their true -opinions, because many of the people were only there as experts on -individual points. Quite often ministers were there; even in Germany a -minister and a field marshal have a fairly high-ranking position; and -the German is rather more inclined to speak too much than too little. -Now, if they found that I too would use strong expressions on one -occasion, or another, then they would loosen up a bit and they would -start talking, since they felt that I had let go too. I was keen to have -clarity, and that the cat wouldn’t always run around the hot porridge, -because, after all, we had to know the truth and the real background. - -Since Speer was much more cautious and much more courteous, never having -been a soldier, I could allow myself the exhibition of freedom, and -unfortunately I did. - -Q. Yes, unfortunately. So that statements of that kind of yours were -either stricken or they were altered? - -A. That warning of Speer’s only came into force if I stated my criticism -of the higher leaders too severely. If, for instance, somewhere Hitler -had given assignments or orders which, to my view, were wrong, or even -as to orders coming from Goering or other people, the Minister of the -Interior or the Minister of the Police or some other person, then I even -here would state my frank criticism amongst these people. Usually I -didn’t have any other possibility to state my deviating opinion, and I -had the inner urge to say it out aloud. Speer, in my interest, would -have it struck out, and he told me a few times afterward, “For heaven’s -sake, do be careful. They will hang you one day.” But of course he meant -by the German side. Sometimes when I myself became aware of the fact -that in my criticism of these high-ranking gentlemen I had gone too far, -I would say to the stenographer, “Leave that out.” And on one or two or -three occasions I said, “Change it. Put someone else in there as having -been referred to,” because I myself discovered—mind you, I wasn’t -always aware that I criticized too severely, but since Speer told me so -a few times, I controlled myself a little more—that I had said too much -and that it was a mistake, and so I intervened myself. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, after our discussion concerning labor questions, in -connection with the decree concerning the Central Planning Board, I want -you to answer my question now, whether and what powers the Central -Planning Board had with reference to the Plenipotentiary General for -Labor, Sauckel? - -A. The Central Planning Board had no power to issue orders to Sauckel. - -Q. Who was it that gave Sauckel’s orders? - -A. Sauckel’s office had been formed by Hitler’s Decree. However, after -that it was taken into the Four Year Plan, so that formally Sauckel was -under Goering immediately. However, he received his orders from Hitler -himself. - -Q. As you said, the Central Planning Board had no powers toward Sauckel? - -A. None whatsoever. - -Q. However, don’t you know that Speer tried to win influence over -Sauckel? Did that occur in his capacity as a member of the Central -Planning Board, or did that occur in his capacity as Armament Minister? - -A. It only occurred in his capacity as Armament Minister. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, on this occasion I would like to ask you, what then do you -know about these concentration camps during the war? - -A. I only knew of two concentration camps, namely, Dachau and -Oranienburg. I visited Dachau personally in 1935; in other words, before -the war. That was the only time that I visited a concentration camp, -except for now as a prisoner of war. What there was inside the -concentration camps I do not know. In 1935 there were only Germans in -there; and I was very much surprised to learn after the collapse of -Germany that there were also foreigners in the concentration camps. I -did not know that. I am quite convinced that none of my collaborators -knew about these things in the concentration camps. We had been told at -the time that in these concentration camps criminals of various -categories were being detained. What I saw in 1935 were habitual -criminals. I thought it a very good idea that these people be not -allowed to walk around freely. When we were there these people had to -tell us their sentences; and there were several barriers full of people, -and there the average criminal record was twenty to thirty times rape of -small children. Therefore, I, being a father, believed that it was best -for these people to be locked up. - -However, I know that there were political people there; and I saw them, -too. There my opinion differed. But I was told that those people were -there on a temporary basis and would only be kept in there for a longer -period of time if they actually committed active sabotage against the -state. At Dachau most of the political people who were being detained -there as prisoners in 1935 were members of the SA, on account of the -Roehm Putsch in 1934, and that was the basis and reason for their being -there. - -I should like to add that I asked to be allowed to visit that -concentration camp at the time, together with other officers of my -branch, in other words, of the Luftwaffe, because during my meetings and -conversations with foreigners, I repeatedly heard the statement, -particularly from the British, “We understand your Hitler’s system very -well. There was no other way for you to go. However, we do not -understand your concentration camps.” That is why I decided to get some -sort of a picture for myself by seeing the camp. It took a little while, -but finally I got the permission to visit the concentration camp. That -at the time was my only contact with the question. - -Q. What was your impression of the camp? Was it clean? - -A. In 1935, well, yes, at that time it looked very well. There were good -barracks, absolutely waterproof, with two cots, one above the other. Our -barracks always had the same system anyway; and I was the only one to -get that principle in the Luftwaffe, so that there was quite a -revolution among the soldiers in the army. I witnessed one of their -meals. There was a good portion of food, meat, vegetables, potatoes, -quite a lot of soup. The people were thus well-fed. Of course, they had -to work. The work they did was not an easy task. Cleanness was -noticeable. The beds had sheets with a special design on them. The -entertainment of the people was taken care of. There was recreation. -They had a special room where they could hold speeches. They had -facilities for writing and reading. There was an excellent library there -which even according to its size and contents was very interesting. I -looked through the index one time. The man in charge of the library was -a Gruppenfuehrer of the SA and also a concentration camp inmate. I saw -the bakery, saw the butcher shop. - -At that time I am sure that there were no cruelties and no inhumane -equipment of any kind. Of course, I could not speak to these same -individuals and ask them how they like it in there. We were allowed to -talk to these people; but each of them was allowed only to say what his -sentence was. - -Q. Did you see what kind of work these inmates had to do? - -A. That was very hard. They worked on their own equipment, I believe, -not only for the camp but for all sorts of purposes and for the SS. In -other words, they made furniture for themselves and for the Waffen SS -for instance, cupboards, chairs, stools, tables. They also had a -locksmith shop there. As far as I know they did work outside the camp as -well. - -I believe there were special commands for cutting down trees; there were -special commands for splitting stones. However, I cannot go into detail -because I inserted this visit into one day—it was in the afternoon -after I had an inspection of the troops in Munich, which inspection I -finished about 9:30 in the morning, and at four o’clock in the afternoon -I had another inspection to carry out of the Luftwaffe, and in between I -saw the camp. I myself ate or tasted the food which the German inmates -had, and I thought it was very tasty, good, and sufficient. - -Q. Witness, at a time following that, did you ever hear, even if only -rumors, that inhumane acts were being committed in the concentration -camps? - -A. I cannot remember that anything had been mentioned in that -connection—anything that had anything to do with the truth or that -seemed like the truth. I can confirm the fact that there were quite a -few rumors during the war. However, all our efforts to find where these -rumors originated were not successful. We were not able to find out -anything at all. I had very few connections with the SS itself. - -Q. I shall come back to the SS later on. Now, Witness, as witnesses have -said, you yourself saw to it that persons in concentration camps were -freed, or were not committed to the concentration camps. Can one not -draw the conclusion from that that you were of the opinion that it was -not very good in the concentration camps; that bad things were happening -there, because in general one who has committed a criminal offense is -not protected from imprisonment? - -A. At the beginning I was quite convinced that these concentration camps -were just a temporary measure. I knew from the press that they had done -the same thing in Italy under the Mussolini regime, and that then, after -a few years, these institutions had been dissolved—at least that’s what -I heard at the time—and, since many things were being imitated here in -Germany which Mussolini’s Italy had done, I saw at that concentration -camp nothing but such an imitation. That certain abuses would occur -there, I could understand, because, after all, the National Socialist -movement itself, in its early beginnings, was a revolutionary group. -Even if it weren’t so, at least that’s what people said. I thought that -these things were only the childish diseases of the new regime. However, -if I ever heard anything, if anything was brought to my own personal -attention, then I thought it my human duty to help. That the parents of -anybody who is sent to a concentration camp or something are always -convinced of his innocence, can be understood and every one of us today -knows how unpleasant that is. However, certain other reasons prevailed -at the time, when a family wrote: that is probably the case with one of -the cases which was submitted here in an affidavit. The main reason was -not that the man was a Social Democrat leader. No. He was blamed for -other things, and they had to be cleared up. That is why my help took a -little bit longer here, and I believe that the man was vindicated. The -reproaches which they made to him, and which came from those greatest -pests whom we had at the time, the informers, had to be refuted by -bringing counter-evidence. - -Q. That’s enough, Witness. Now such people were taken out of the camp by -you. Then I’m sure that they came to see you and thanked you for it? - -A. No. They didn’t do that and I did not pay too much attention to that. -I told their parents and their relatives to restrain them from doing -that. Maybe they wrote a letter though, sometime, but I did not do it in -order to get their thanks and appreciation. - -Q. Witness, didn’t you ever speak to anybody who had been released from -a concentration camp and who then would have given you more details -about the concentration camp? - -A. I never spoke with anybody who had been released from a concentration -camp—at least, not that I know of. I never spoke with anybody about his -experience in a concentration camp. However, during my captivity, I -heard through other people that no one else ever heard about such things -either, because these people were not only prohibited from speaking, but -they were also so scared that they followed that order to the very -letter. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, you also visited factories, didn’t you, and you saw eastern -male or female workers there, didn’t you? - -A. Yes. - -Q. What was your opinion about these people. Didn’t they complain to you -or anything? - -A. I regarded it as absolutely natural that whenever I visited a factory -it was natural for me to talk to these workers, even if, in my official -capacity, I had nothing to do with that question. However, as a soldier -I was accustomed to act in that way. On each occasion I asked them how -they were, how the food was; I looked at the people and I saw how they -were clad and what kind of an impression they gave, generally speaking, -whether they looked healthy, whether they looked satisfied or not. I saw -Russians, and also Russian prisoners of war. Then I saw Russian female -civilian workers, namely, Ukrainians. I saw Frenchmen, namely French -civilian workers. There could have been prisoners of war among them, but -they were wearing protective overalls over their clothes. There could -have been workers from Slovakia, who considered themselves our allies, -but they were very, very few. Then there were quite a few Italian -workers there, those who had come on a voluntary basis at the time; -those so-called “Imis” (Italians who revolted against Mussolini and were -sent as prisoners of war to work in Germany) I did not see. - -Q. Did eastern workers, male or female, ever complain to you concerning -their work? - -A. No, they did not. On the contrary, the general impression of these -female Ukrainians who worked on the Junker 52’s was a very pleasing one. -The girls were singing; they were well fed; they were well dressed; and -they answered my questions in a nice, cheerful way. I spent about 20 -minutes with these girls. There were quite a few pretty ones among them, -and towards the end they flirted with me, and the girls were laughing -all the time. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, I will now enter into the question of what the Central -Planning Board has to do with labor questions at all? - -A. The Central Planning Board had considerable difficulties connected -with the question of getting raw materials. The acquisition of raw -materials was originally the tasks of the Ministry of Economics and then -of Speer in the Armament Ministry. On such raw materials depended the -armament program. - -The pacemaker among all these raw materials for the armament program was -steel, but the pacemaker in turn for steel was coal or coke production. -That was the biggest bottleneck, since, unfortunately, during the first -years of the war the youngest and strongest age groups of miners had -been called up for military service. Hitler had given us the order to -develop a steel production program amounting to 3.2 million tons per -month. This was to be done by Speer, and Speer had succeeded in reaching -the figure of 2.6 million tons, but that was the maximum. Hitler’s -armament program, however, had been based on the figure of 3.2 millions. -Hitler had demanded these armament programs and the experts had -calculated the amount of steel they needed for those programs. - -We in the Central Planning Board discussed the possibilities of getting -up to 3.2 million tons of steel, and Speer being the man for that part -of the production, ordered the men from the steel manufacturers’ union -to come and see him in a conference in which all steel problems, through -the self-administration of the industry, were dealt with. Speer was in -agreement with me, this is an aside which I must add, to the effect it -was a mistake to direct industry through the state, but that industry -ought to govern itself through committees of their own, coming from -their own ranks, and in this sense of course, these main committees and -rings which we have talked about must be understood. - -These gentlemen from the Reich Association Iron stated that the -possibilities existed that 3.2 million tons of steel could be -manufactured, subject to certain conditions. In that connection the main -prerequisite was a very much larger allocation of coke. Apart from that -they wanted certain additional matters for their own production, some -labor too. I remember the question of smelters which was submitted at -the time. I am not an expert, but at that time I did gather that we were -concerned with specialists with very considerable ability and knowledge, -since otherwise a few handful of men wouldn’t have been brought into our -conversation. At any rate, the main problem was coal. - -Speer, anyhow, during one of our conferences, sent for the men -representing the coal industry. Such a Reich Association Coal had -existed for some considerable time. These people stated that there was -enough coal in the mines but that human manpower was lacking to bring it -up. Speer in his capacity as Armament Minister now asked them to tell -him in writing what was needed. Now, these men apparently reported the -figures regarding workers they had, and during those conferences with -the coal representatives, always, of course with reference to the -question of steel, it was stated that all efforts on the part of the -Armament Ministry would have to fall down because of the labor shortage. - -Speer, as he told me, mentioned this to Hitler dozens of times. It was -here for the first time that various controversies arose between Speer -and Sauckel. - - * * * * * - -The first difficulties between Speer as Armament Minister and Sauckel -came to Hitler for decision. Speer said, “I’m short of workers”. Sauckel -said, “I have fulfilled all your demands”, and as proof he submitted his -figures. Between the figures which Speer had and those which Sauckel -had, no comparison was ever possible. They were based on different -suppositions. Speer was unable to obtain the basis for the figures which -were at Sauckel’s disposal. In their conflict Hitler took the side of -Sauckel. He wished thereby to exercise pressure on Speer to increase -armament. Speer was unable to do so because he did not have the workers -who had to produce coal. - -This struggle went on through the years. At first Speer still hoped that -Sauckel would still bring the workers into his factories until in the -summer of 1943 he gave up this hope. In the Central Planning Board this, -of course, was discussed, and it was also discussed how much steel we -could obtain for the next three months and how we could distribute it. -Always there was this contrast between the figures—Hitler wishes to -have 3.2 million tons of steel; we can only distribute 2.6 millions -because Speer is quite unable to produce more. The consequence was again -that Hitler reproached Speer for not producing more steel although -Sauckel had supplied the workers. The Central Planning Board was not -responsible for the quantity of raw materials at his disposal. Speer -asked me to give him my support in this question. I did so quite -frequently in the meetings and also when I reported to Goering because -we wished to convince Goering that we did not have the workers so that -Goering would intervene with Hitler in that sense. - -But I was unable to obtain Goering’s support. Goering took Hitler’s -side, and he said, “The workers are there”. All that was left now was -for Speer in the first line and we ourselves who wished to help him in -the second line to attack Sauckel. Sauckel escaped all meetings for a -long time. Sometimes he sent a representative, and in some cases he -himself appeared, but he and his representative pursued the same policy -by giving us a lot of figures and alleging they had fulfilled -everything. Our doubts in these figures increased. Hitler became more -and more impatient and the reproaches for Speer towards the end of 1943 -became insufferable. Whereas Hitler supported Speer until roughly the -middle of 1943 and regarded him as one of the first collaborators, the -relations became much more cool later on, and I explain that mainly -through this conflict. I myself had the same annoyance both with Goering -and with Hitler, who maintained in opposition to me that I had been -given all of the workers. - -Our mood wasn’t very nice about this, obviously because although we had -no personal ambition we did not wish to be blamed for something that we -were not responsible for, bad armament, and to have stated that because -of bad armament the war had been lost. That reproach, of course, we -could foresee, and it was obvious that we fought against it with every -means within our disposal. We felt ourselves to be quite innocent in -this field, but in order to prove our innocence, we were missing one -link in the chain, and that was to show beyond doubt that Sauckel’s -figures were untrue. They were not wrong by accident; they were -deliberately forged, in our opinion, because Sauckel wished to impress -Hitler with his own efficiency in his ability to fulfill all the demands -of Hitler in the sphere of labor. - -Sauckel pursued that policy up to 4 January 1944. Only when there was a -conference with Hitler on 4 January 1944, of which I was a participant, -did he there say for the first time to Hitler, “Up to now I always -fulfilled all your demands, my Fuehrer. Whether that will still be -possible with the new demands of four million workers, I can no longer -guarantee.” - -Q. Witness, we will come later to this conference. Now, I ask you to go -back to answer one question. Did the Central Planning Board have -authority to request labor and to distribute it? - -A. A clear “no” to both parts of the question. The question of labor was -discussed in the Central Planning Board only in the interest of Speer -because Speer needed help and knew I would always give him my support. * -* * - -* * * I may claim, for example, that throughout my activities, anyway -shortly after the beginning of the war, that is to say, on 9 November, -there were about sixty production managers of factories—no, not -managers but so-called men of trust [Vertrauensmaenner], elected by -workers—these men came to me and I found out they wanted to ask me to -get their rations increased. At that time the whole nutrition was based -upon lower rations; these people in our high industries were not -entitled to the supplementary rations for heavy workers, and these -people explained to me that now that there was a war, and they were -forced to work in different factories from peacetime, their housing was -much further away from their places of work, and in the morning and at -night they had to travel longer; and, therefore, their food was -insufficient. That gave me the idea to apply for a new supplementary -ration and as we became very set in this question, it became possible to -achieve that supplementary ration which was now for the benefit of all -workers. And I have now gotten hold of documentary evidence that -supplementary rations were also given to foreign workers; that was a -supplementary ration for foreign workers working long hours. As this -documentary evidence shows it is an affidavit actually the food of -German and foreign workers was the same. But I also wanted to say that -it is quite possible that there are cases where this principle was not -observed, but that was against the will of the German Government if it -happened. - -Q. Witness, that means that neither the labor office nor the Armament -Inspectorate were under your supervision, as the GL. - -A. Yes that is quite correct. - -Q. But Speer has testified that until the very end you did not renounce -the command of the air industry. What could you say to this effect? - -A. If Speer should mean that my personnel official, in the way I -described before, talked with his, Speer’s armament office, once a -month, then it is quite correct; but my officials might have used these -occasions, and how far he worked with my name on these occasions I do -not know. I hope he did so in order to get his point through. I was -never present. I never heard how these negotiations went on. Should -Speer mean, however, that my work in that field was the same as his in -his field, then he makes a mistake, for I did not have that organization -nor did I have the task. My field was only a very specialized one -compared to Speer’s field. * * * I might add perhaps, that Speer did not -know my organization; of course we never discussed it. He knew, of -course, that I had a technical office; he knew that I had a planning -office, and he also knew that I had an economic department for the -contracts of industry. After all, he fought a battle to take the whole -economic department into his sphere, and when I said he couldn’t -possibly do it, he waited until the whole armament industry came under -his charge. We two always settled everything in a friendly manner after -that up to the last moment. Even if there were a certain amount of -conflicting interests, which sometimes were quite considerable, -particularly between our subordinate officers—there were quite severe -battles between those subordinate officers at times—but we always -poured oil on the troubled waters, Mr. Speer and I. - -Q. Witness, but couldn’t it be, that in the sphere of the Central -Planning Board in presenting the labor demands of your industry, you -spoke for your own interests? - -A. I cannot recall, and I have read some of the records, but in not one -of them, there is not one word said that I had any special demands for -the Luftwaffe. Apart from the fact that once or twice I remarked that I -was equally badly off, that I didn’t get anything, but that doesn’t mean -that I was looking after my interests in the GL. If I talked about -workers at the Central Planning Board, I did so at Speer’s request, to -give him in the armament industry all the support. Speer was -particularly pleased when I played the wild man and became a little -strong. He once told me, “you are much better at this than I am; I am -only a civilian; I can’t do it as well as you can”. And sometimes he -pepped me up and said “Speak a little more fiercely, please”, which I -was only too delighted to do for him. That was meant to achieve -something which you may wish to ask me about a little later on: How we -could get Sauckel to speak clearly. How we could get rid of the -suspicion that we through our inefficiency cannot bring German industry -up to the high level, to the right level. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, during these conferences of the Central Planning Board did -it happen that the bulk of the workers was discussed, or was it rather a -question of bringing new workers into Germany? - -A. No, it was only the labor question as such, only inasmuch as it was -important for the increase of raw materials in accordance with Hitler’s -order, and indeed always as an attack on Sauckel in order to get him to -give us the people or to say he cannot do it. As we knew he could not -supply them, our main demand which we wished to achieve was an open -statement by Sauckel, “I haven’t got the workers whom you need”. - -Q. Witness, but if your air force industry, for instance, either the -labor offices or the Armament Inspectorates had made requests to Speer, -and when your planning office had checked these demands in order to find -out what was really necessary and what was unnecessary, was it a matter -of proposing what kind of workers you wanted to have and what kind of -workers should be distributed into these different production programs? -Was it a question of deciding whether you needed German workers or -rather more foreigners? - -A. We did that in one sense, that for certain factories we simply had to -have skilled workers, which we asked for, but never did we ask, “Give us -foreigners; give us prisoners of war”, and so forth. Our wishes were to -the effect to have Germans, but it was quite clear to us that there -weren’t enough German workers to fulfill the demands. Had they been -available, one needn’t have used prisoners of war or recruited foreign -workers or sent the prisoners of war to work unless they volunteered for -it. - - * * * * * - -[March 14] - -JUDGE PHILLIPS: The Tribunal understands you to say that Polish -prisoners of war were changed into civilian workers and that you no -longer considered them to be prisoners of war. How were they changed -into civilian workers from prisoners of war? - -A. Personally I cannot give you many details about this because that -happened as early as 1939, and at that time I was not connected with the -armament question. How it was worked I do not know. All I can imagine is -that there was no longer a Polish Government and that the Governor -General gave the order; whether any Polish office was asked, I don’t -know; it is only in the files here that I found something about some -Polish regional authority. I cannot give you any more clear details. - -DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, perhaps I can clarify the -matter. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let’s let the witness clarify it. Witness, you are -an old soldier. You have been a soldier for many years. How do you -transfer a prisoner of war into a civilian, by discharging him? - -A. Yes, he must be released from being a prisoner of war, and then there -are various possibilities. One possibility would be—and this was -resorted to by Germany—to make him a free worker and tell him that “You -are being released, but you must do some work. That is the conditions -which we put to you. You are being paid properly, and otherwise you live -as a free man.” - -There is also another possibility, which was the way chosen by the -Americans, by which a prisoner of war is released and then regarded as -an internee. I think that that procedure is not quite so favorable for -the man concerned. - -Q. You just transposed them from prisoners of war to civilian prisoners, -then? - -A. No, they were no longer prisoners. They were properly released, but -they signed a document which obliged them to do some work for Germany. - -Q. You imprisoned them by a document instead of in a stockade? - -A. They were no longer locked up, Sir. The Polish workers—I saw them in -the country, for instance—live quite freely. - -Q. Could they go where they liked? - -A. They could not change their places of work without permission. For -instance, if they were allocated to a farmer, they had to stay with that -farmer. Only if there were special reasons could they change their place -of work. Then they were transferred. - -Q. That is what you call freeing them? - -A. It was not complete freedom, but it was a better status than -previously when they were prisoners of war. - -Q. What would happen to one of these free workers if he walked away from -his place of employment? - -A. Sir, that is what I do not know myself. But may I say something else? -A German worker was not allowed to change his place of work either. -Freedom for a German was not any bigger than freedom for a Pole, as long -as the war lasted. - -Q. The German went home to his family every night, did he not? - -A. These Polish soldiers—I cannot speak comprehensively because I am -not particularly well informed here—but those I saw were young people, -and they lived with the farmer’s family. - -Q. Witness, you don’t mean to tell this Tribunal seriously that the -Polish worker, the former prisoner of war, had the same freedom of -movement that the German civilian had? - -A. I cannot speak on all fields of life because I do not know. All I do -know was that he was under the obligation to remain with his employer, -but, as I said before, the German worker had to remain with his -employer. - -Q. Oh, well, we had that in the United States, for that matter. I still -don’t remember your answering my question: What would happen to a Polish -worker who chose to walk away from his place of employment? - -A. I am unable to answer that. I know of no such cases, nor was I told -about one. - -DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant cannot know, -because he was a soldier, what the Polish worker had to do. Like the -German worker, the Polish worker would have been punished and brought -before a tribunal because he broke his contract, and he would have -received a small punishment. Thousands of German workers have been -punished for the same reason, and I have defended many a German worker -for the same charge. That would have happened—nothing else. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let me ask you, Dr. Bergold. Did you ever defend a -Polish worker for walking away from his employment? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I did. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: I have no inclination to dispute you. - -DR. BERGOLD: I defended quite a few foreign workers in wartime, not only -Poles, but Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutchmen. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Oh, maybe Belgians, Dutchmen, but Poles—? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, definitely. I am prepared to make that statement on -oath, Sir. - -DEFENDANT MILCH: May I supply an observation of my own on the Polish -question? Shortly before I was taken prisoner, I was in the country in -Schleswig-Holstein. In that region the only foreigners there were Poles. -Those Poles on the estate where I was, perhaps 30 or 40 of them, said -that they did not wish to return home, that they would ask to be allowed -to remain on the estate just as did their colleagues in the -neighborhood. These people were dressed very neatly on Sundays. They -looked very clean and healthy. They could not be told from any German in -the neighborhood there except for certain racial distinctions. All of -them had bicycles. On that bicycle they went on Sundays to the nearest -pub and met their girl friends and danced, and they told me themselves -that never before had they been so happy as they were in Germany. That -was at a time when the British were 50 kilometers away from their -village. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Perhaps that is why they were so happy. - -A. No. They said that they did not want to leave there now. They wished -to remain. - -Q. I think you misunderstood my point. Perhaps their happiness arose -from the fact that the British were only 50 kilometers away. - -A. No. I understood what you were trying to say, Sir, but I also talked -to the German employers there. I was there in a totally private -capacity, and I knew these people quite well. They were friends of mine, -and they told me that they were quite satisfied with their Poles, and -they also said that the Poles had done very good work and that the Poles -had asked to be allowed to remain after the collapse, because in those -days they did not wish to return to Poland and they were quite well -looked after here. - -May I ask the Court to believe me that we in Germany were not all of us -hangmen and people who delighted in other people’s misery. I may say -here that I think that the majority of the German people are -good-hearted and that they treat other people well and that these people -did not know that in some isolated places there were isolated criminals -who polluted our good name for a long time to come. The people are -suffering from that now, and they will suffer in the future. That is -what depresses all of us the most. Otherwise, one has to take the point -of view that all Germans are criminals and then it might be justified to -hang the lot. Then, please start on me. - - * * * * * - -DR. BERGOLD: Witness, after this question was discussed, you received -information that this employment of foreign workers was admissible. -Could you tell me now what you knew before, prior to that moment, -concerning this question? - -A. I know that after the First War, the question of deportation of -Belgium workers had been examined by a committee of the German -Reichstag. I know that this parliamentary committee examined people like -Hindenburg, Ludendorff, I think also Mackensen and others; and that many -questions were discussed, including that of Belgian civilian workers. As -far as I can recall, that committee was presided over by a man who had -been given the Nobel Prize, Professor Schuecking; I think that was his -name. However, I was very interested in it, and closely followed it -because Hindenburg whom I worshipped, was put before a court; and as far -as I can recall, no sentence was passed upon that score; and nobody was -reproached that international law had been violated. At that time the -Hague Convention existed and the first Geneva Conference had taken -place. I am not very well informed, but I think that was so. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, I shall now come to the 54th meeting, concerning two points -there. Witness, during that meeting[142] Sauckel mentioned that only a -very small percentage of those sent to Germany came on a voluntary -basis. This statement has been mentioned repeatedly in this trial and I -want you to say something about that. - -A. I might say that I do not remember having heard these words from -Sauckel. It is possible that I was not there at the moment when he said -that. However, it is possible that I overheard that remark, because -during those long meetings, we had discussions among each other. We were -also interested in other questions. During those long meetings there was -at least one meeting, probably more, during which our concentration was -not quite what it should have been. Had I heard it, I would have -believed Sauckel just as little as I believed all the figures he gave -us, because Sauckel had stated the contrary not long before. I know -exactly it was not so long before that he had declared how well his -system functioned and how he brought all these laborers on a voluntary -basis. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, I shall now leave the meetings of the Central Planning Board -and come to single questions in that connection. What do you know about -the use of British and American prisoners of war? - -A. According to my opinion and as far as I know, they went into the -respective camps and they were not used for labor. I never saw such a -prisoner of war any place. - -Q. * * * What orders did you have toward the middle of January 1943? -What orders did you receive from Hitler? - -A. On 15 January 1943, in the evening I was called up and summoned to go -to Hitler’s Headquarters the next day for a special mission. As far as I -know, I believe that it was General Bodenschatz who called me to the -Fuehrer’s Headquarters. The following morning I reported to Goering, who -happened to be in Berlin at that time. Goering knew that the question of -food for Stalingrad was involved. Stalingrad had been encircled for -months, and the whole Sixth German Army was in it. On the 16th, in the -morning, I flew to Hitler’s Headquarters in East Prussia; and then -Hitler either in the afternoon or in the evening gave me the information -that I should proceed to Czechoslovakia immediately by air in order to -supervise Stalingrad’s food supplies from there. - -Q. Witness, make it a little more brief, please. - -A. Yes. I tried to carry out this mission. When I received the mission, -the last airfield had been lost. The Russians had taken them. We looked -for smaller places which were rather difficult to find there in those -mountainous areas; and within the next few days we succeeded in carrying -out a considerable air lift of supplies. However, it was too late. The -resisting force of the defenders had broken down; the people were -starving; they had hardly any vehicles or horses. They could not get the -food from the landing places for the planes because they were too weak -to do so. They could not carry the containers so that the air lift of -supplies in the case of Stalingrad could not be kept up after the end of -January or the beginning of February. - -Q. Did you have a serious accident then? - -A. Yes. At that moment when I wanted to fly into Stalingrad, before I -hit the airfield, I was hit by a railroad engine, and I was seriously -injured. - -Q. Then you went back to Hitler? - -A. I carried out the mission first. Then when Stalingrad had fallen, I -withdrew and went to see Hitler and told him that I could not complete -my mission. He told me, however, that it was not I who had not carried -out the mission but that it was his fault. He said he gave me the orders -too late; he had wanted to give the orders to me much earlier but had -been talked out of it. - -Q. Witness, during that occasion, did you tell Hitler your opinion about -the war and the general situation of the war? - -A. It was on 4 February when I reported back to Hitler. Hitler on that -particular day was very crushed due to the loss of Stalingrad. It was -not possible to have a quiet talk with him. He did not receive me at -first, or my chief of staff, namely, General of the Tank Corps Model, -who had a corps within that fortress. We both were under the impression -that day that we would not be able to speak to him. However, he told me -in a few words, “Now, go right ahead to your GL task, manufacturing. Now -we will have transport planes in the first line, transport planes, and -more transport planes.” He was talking about Stalingrad. He thought that -had he had more transport planes he would have been able to keep -Stalingrad. - -With respect to Stalingrad, I had a long discussion with him on 5 March. -That was the last time I saw him. That was about a month later. I was -ordered to see him because he wanted to give me the mission to build -high-altitude and fast bombers and put them in the first line of -production. Those now were more important than transport planes. I -availed myself of that opportunity on that day and had prepared myself -in order to tell him my opinion about the general situation. That -discussion took place in the evening. I had dinner with him alone. That -was shortly before 9:00 o’clock; and it lasted until 3:15 a.m. Then in -contrast to all other discussions I had with him, I was the one who was -speaking all the time. - - * * * * * - -I told him first of all the truth about Stalingrad; and I told him that -the question of leaving an army was a military mistake, when according -to military and strategical points of view it should have withdrawn, -something which had been suggested both by myself and by the army. It -was a mistake; and it did end with the loss of 350,000 men on the German -side. However, a withdrawal in time would have saved the greatest part -of these soldiers. I told him that, after all, the Russians were not as -anxious to attack as that; that in the winter they themselves were in a -difficult position for attacking a German army and they would not have -dared. I told him then that that point was the last turning point in the -fate of the war. I told him that I had tried to reach him before the -Russian campaign. However, I had been unable to do so because it had -been forbidden. I said that the time was now five minutes past twelve. -We use that expression in Germany when something is completed; when it -is finished. I told him that by that I meant that the war was lost. I -apologized for not considering his nervous condition. There was no time -for that any more. I thought it my duty to tell him my sincere opinion; -as a field marshal I thought myself entitled to do so. - -I knew that he did not want to hear this. However, I wished that he -would hear me in spite of that. He could do with me whatever he wanted -to afterwards. I remembered, however, that he himself before the war had -used strong words against the bad advisers of Wilhelm II, who out of -cowardice, had not told him the truth. In no case did I wish to stand -before my own conscience with such a reproach on myself. He told me -then, “Yes, you can say today whatever you wish to say.” - -I told him then that he was no more in a position to attack in the East. -That those attacks which had already been developed, he should stop. -That he could only defend himself, and I was of the direct opinion that -instead of building great fortification works in France and Norway, that -during the whole of the spring, summer, and autumn, he should -concentrate on fortifying the Dnieper position, which lay about 800 -kilometers behind the Russian front, with all the means at his disposal, -with fortifications of concrete, etc., in a great width, between -two-hundred and three-hundred kilometers depth, and in that way there -would be strong fortifications and good shelter for soldiers, with good -equipment and food and ammunition, and that then he should take the -troops back to that position for the winter, and that he should give up -the whole territory in front of that fortification, out of which he -would not get anything at all, neither oil, coal, nor ore. By doing that -he would shorten the length of the Russian front, and in such a way that -the maintenance of those soldiers on the line would be much easier. -Apart from that he should take more care of the eastern forces, and I am -quite sure that on the whole eastern front of two-thousand kilometers, -of about ten million German soldiers, not one million of them were -fighting and he should take measures to change that. That was the only -point he carried out later on, and unfortunately only towards the end of -November of that year and the result was that the fighting infantry -units on the whole eastern front amounts to 265,000 men of the army. It -was impossible to hold that front with such a small number. - -I furthermore suggested to him that a great personnel change should be -made, namely, he himself should give up command over the army, that he -should place a simple general in that position. As it was, he held -before the German people a responsibility, which he could not bear. He -was no soldier in that sense, since he was not trained for that. I -suggested to him to dissolve my own branch as an independent Wehrmacht -unit and to put the Luftwaffe entirely under the Wehrmacht, since there -was no strategic air force any longer. - -Now what I had to say was special for the army, and this was certainly -of a personal nature, namely, to remove Reich Marshal Goering from the -Luftwaffe, and give him a different task. I said also that it was now -the opportune moment for the Reich Foreign Minister also to be removed -from his position. - -Q. Would you give the name? - -A. Von Ribbentrop. I suggested to him that the Field Marshal be put in -charge of the units at the front, and I gave as a reason that Keitel was -too lenient in reference to Hitler, and did not know how to get his -ideas across to Hitler; that he should have somebody who would force him -to observe correct military measures. I told him then that the most -important task in my opinion was the home defense of Germany; the air -home defense of Germany, and to consider as having the highest priority; -and also the fighter production should be placed in the first place, and -armaments. I showed him the figures of the English, the American and the -Russian armaments explicitly, and I showed him how these armaments would -have their effect over Germany, and also at what point, or at what time -this would happen. I reported to him that many false reports were made -to him, and I gave him an exact instance. I told him that he -overestimated himself, and his allies, and that he also underestimated -the Russians, and the attitude of Stalin personally, and that that had -led to the Stalingrad collapse, and he should be quite clear as to the -facts if the attack was continued in the East; that he could hold the -Dnieper position, and that if he held that position, the air defense -would be able to prepare a military preparation for peace if the enemy -would see that this crushing of Germany from the air was no longer -possible and if the Russians would see that they would not be able to -cross the Dnieper without being crushed; that I am sure with that -preparedness which should be started at once, we ought to be coming to a -peace. It might be possible to get away with bearable peace terms if -they would act immediately. - -Then I also discussed the peace question, and I told him he might make a -real peace with France without taking territory, and I was sure that -France would still consider that. The same applied to Belgium, and also -Holland, as well as Norway. A peace with these countries would then -induce the greater powers of the Western countries to be able to -conclude peace with Germany which would be endurable. - -Those were the main points of my opinion. I do not wish to recite -details. He listened to and interrupted me only once, and that was on -the question whether he could or could not attack in 1943, and I -remember exactly that I said to him more than twenty times, “You cannot -attack” and first he said in a quiet way, then got more excited and more -excited until he was very cross, and knocked on the table, “I must -attack.” I told him at the end, “I know I am very impolite, I don’t want -to discuss this question of attacking anymore. But be convinced I shall -not change my opinion.” - -Then he waited for a short while, and I began to speak of something -else, and then suddenly he said, “What would you say, Milch, if I would -only make a short attack in order to be able to push through the Russian -preparations before they can start developing.” I answered, “Wait a -minute, it is a defensive measure, because a soldier carries out his -defense by attacking in turn,” and he said, “Then we agree on that -point.” I said, “No, I don’t think we do. If you are successful you will -continue. I would say all the troops should go back after forty-eight -hours that no matter what. Think of Verdun in 1916 when the same mistake -was made; when they did not succeed in getting through on a surprise -attempt, they went doggedly on.” - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, what was the development after Stalingrad of your -relationship to Hitler and Goering? - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Before you go on, will you ask for the date of -this conference of Hitler’s again? - -A. It was on 5 March 1943. - - * * * * * - -On the question of how my relationship to Hitler and Goering developed -later on I have to say the following: It became worse and worse from -time to time. It was due to a struggle which I had about the German air -defense which contradicted Hitler’s idea of waging war, for this was the -specific field of the Luftwaffe and I as Inspector General of the -Luftwaffe was forced to make suggestions. I did not let this matter -drop, and I repeatedly brought it to the front, in contrast with -political proposals or proposals in the field of the army and navy, -which were outside of my field of tasks and which I could not bring to -anyone’s attention unless Hitler gave me his permission or if he wished -me to. - -Q. With respect to this conference, did you inform him of the fact that -you wanted to have Goering gone? - -A. Yes. I did. I told Goering about that. I did not want to stab him in -the back. - -Q. Then, what happened to your relationship with Goering? - -A. I do not believe that this single incident had any influence on our -relationship, which was bad anyway. Goering was not the kind of a man -who would hold it against me. He had a certain understanding of the -circumstances. There were other things that he did not like about me. - - * * * * * - -[March 17] - -Q. Witness, the last time you were giving us a description of the -suggestions you made with Hitler with regard to achieving a change. What -was the impression you had afterwards as to whether he was going to -follow your suggestions or not? - -A. At that time I first of all hoped that he would somehow react to my -suggestion, because in the case of the Stalingrad assignment which had -been given to me although too late, I saw indications that at that time -he still had confidence in me, and also in my military ability. During -the following weeks and months I waited for something to happen, but -nothing did. In the spring of 1943, after my conference, new attacks -were ordered by him on the eastern front. He was not making an attack -for the purposes of defense, he was going to try to reestablish the -front along the Volga River. He was also going to try again to advance -towards the Caucasus. It was only in November 1943 that he followed one -of my suggestions, namely, to ascertain how many men were fighting in -the East, as I said last Friday, and I need not repeat it. The attack -was catastrophic, but in spite of that, no basic changes were made after -that. All the other suggestions, political, military, and those -regarding the personnel, were not followed. Through that I lost my last -hope, namely, that a final basis favorable to Germany could be -established to bring an end to this war through political means, in -other words, peace negotiations, which might have had certain prospects -of success. - -Q. Witness, now I shall have to put to you this question. Why, after you -recognized that fact did you continue your activity at all. What were -the reasons which made you place your service at their disposal at all? - -A. The main reason was that I was responsible to my people, and even if -all the plans failed to materialize, I, nevertheless, still had one last -hope at least, that a proper air defense could be arranged for Germany -in order to protect our home country and the people from the worst, and -the destruction of their homes and places of culture. That was my main -reason. - -Q. What then are the steps that you took in order to achieve your last -final aim for the German people? - -A. After 1941 I had a constant struggle, I would like to say, with -Goering and with Hitler in order to achieve an air defense which I -considered necessary. My last effort then was the foundation of the -Jaegerstab. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, you have just testified that you had founded the Jaegerstab -in order gradually to leave your post. Did that further have any other -purpose, for instance, the removal of existing difficulties outside your -own department? - -A. Yes. Air armament within the entire armament program had very small, -very negligible powers. As Hitler especially demanded army and naval -rearmament, Speer’s Ministry for years had encroached on a large scale -in all matters which were important for my industry. As a result experts -and other workers had been simply taken away from us. The armament -inspectors and district military administrative authorities, both of -whom were under Speer, were able to carry this through. It was merely by -accident that I learned of this in individual cases, when, for instance, -one of the industrialists happened to come to see me. We raised -objections but we could not alter the situation, I mentioned this the -other day. I wanted to use the Jaegerstab in order to transfer part of -this responsibility for air armament to Speer and his ministry so that -such encroachment, which was particularly noticeable where materials -were concerned, should no longer happen. - -The man who had approximately the same task as my own in Speer’s -Ministry was Mr. Saur. Saur was a very clever man, very able, very -energetic, and since he was always sent to report to Hitler personally, -he knew Hitler and his intentions very well, and he knew therefore that -Hitler was not so keen on air armament, and from that he drew the -conclusion which led to these encroachments into our sphere. I was very -anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would share -in the responsibility. There was a struggle about this with Speer until -it finally came about that Saur joined the Jaegerstab. I did not want to -found the Jaegerstab without him, and it turned out that Saur now -tackled this new task very energetically and he did in fact succeed to -some extent in bringing Hitler at least to a standstill. But Hitler’s -views and Hitler’s orders he could not change. Apart from that it was -necessary, if I wanted to transfer armament work to Speer, for the final -armament would have to go through Saur’s hands eventually, so it was -essential that Saur should be included right from the start. - -Q. Thank you. Did you give him responsibility to a small or a large -extent within the Jaegerstab? - -A. Let me answer that like this: I gave him as much freedom of action as -possible, since he was going to take it over later, and it was his -nature that when any matter was placed in his hands he took it up very -energetically, and I was happy to see that he was going ahead so -vigorously. - -Q. Witness, you have made notes about everything you did during the war. -Can you tell this high Tribunal whether you gradually withdrew from the -Jaegerstab and how many meetings you participated in each month? - -A. In March, I participated in 15 meetings—they took place daily—and -two trips. In April, I participated in eight meetings, and one journey. -In May, I attended five meetings and took part in two journeys. In June -I attended two meetings only, and had also two journeys. In July, I -didn’t attend any meetings at all, neither did I participate in any -journey. I took more active interest in the journeys, totaling seven, in -order to go into the provinces and show that the handing over of my task -to Saur was taking place with my agreement. These are the figures: March -15, then eight, then five, then two. - -Q. You mean the meetings? - -A. Yes; that applies to meetings. In other words, I participated in a -total of 30 meetings. - -Q. But there was one more on 1 August 1944, wasn’t there? - -A. That was after my retirement. It was a meeting when Speer was in the -chair, in which the Jaegerstab was now finally discontinuing its work, -as the tasks of the Jaegerstab were now being incorporated with ordinary -armament under Speer in the armament staff. It was a purely formal -meeting of handing over, and I deliberately took part, so as not to -create the impression that I was leaving reluctantly or that I was angry -about anything, for, of course, the exact opposite was the case. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab have anything to do with workers? - -A. Do you mean building workers? - -Q. I mean generally speaking, for the moment. - -A. I see. Well, you have to draw a clear dividing line. There were two -completely different conceptions for us, armament workers and building -workers. Armament workers came through the existing channels; in other -words, requests were made to Sauckel by the industries, and Sauckel -fulfilled, or did not fulfill such requests. Information about this -first of all went to Speer’s Ministry through the Armament -Inspectorates, and secondly, there were statistical reports monthly from -industry to air force. Building workers, on the other hand, did not -concern any of us at all, not even statistically speaking; that is, -insofar as the GL was concerned and his representatives on the -Jaegerstab. This was entirely a problem for Todt’s Organization. We knew -absolutely nothing about this problem as far as we were concerned. - -Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab include a representative of the GBA, the -Plenipotentiary General for Labor, Sauckel, on its board? - -A. I cannot at this moment recollect that accurately, but I believe not. -As far as I know, for these questions there was only a representative -from Speer’s Ministry. That was Mr. Schmelter, who has been a witness in -this trial, and who on his part used to hear our requests and take our -requests to his ministry to help as far as he could. - -Q. In order to help in labor problems did Schmelter have to go to -Sauckel on his part? - -A. Yes, quite decidedly. He, on his own initiative, could not distribute -workers because he did not have any workers reserves of any kind. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, the construction work which Hitler stated had to be -constructed either by Kammler or Dorsch, was that all for the purpose of -the Jaegerstab or also for other armament purposes? - -A. I know that these constructions were meant for many other purposes -because if these questions were discussed in the Jaegerstab I repeatedly -heard Saur or some of his representatives saying, “We wish to change -this; we want to use this for making tanks; or here, for instance, we -will have V-2 rockets.” That is how it fluctuated. In any case, I know -that the subterranean constructions or tunnels were meant for other -armament purposes. - -Q. Witness, did you ever hear about the fact that for the construction -of the surface concrete factories concentration camp inmates were to be -used? - -A. I heard about that in the Jaegerstab, I believe; and that is how we -can explain Kammler’s task. - -Q. Witness, in your capacities as GL, as member of the Central Planning -Board, or member of the Jaegerstab, what did you have to do with the -concentration camp inmates? Did you apply for those? - -A. No, we had nothing whatsoever to do with it. But they were -requisitioned for industry through channels which I did not know at the -time. At that time I knew from a conference that in Oranienburg, at -Heinkel’s, people were being used from the concentration camps which -were near there. I heard one of my men say that the work that was being -done over there was good work, I myself did not see these inmates -working. However, at that time I was convinced of the fact, through my -visit to the concentration camp of Dachau in 1935, that these were, in -the main, only German criminals. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, did you hear in connection with labor for concrete -construction work, that Hitler gave orders for the use of one hundred -thousand Jews, or did the Jaegerstab request this? - -A. I am sure that the Jaegerstab did not do that. I cannot say for sure -if before the collapse I knew anything at all about this matter. I know -from the record that Hitler is said to have had a conference on 4 -January 1944 about this question. However, I know that that conference -lasted for quite a few days, I believe, from 1 to 4 January. I -participated for a very short time in that conference on 4 January. I do -not know, or I cannot recall, if during the time I was there they -discussed that point. - -Q. Did you later on find out that Jewish concentration camp inmates were -used in this construction? - -A. I never found out for sure. - -Q. However, in the sessions of the Jaegerstab they had discussed that -point? - -A. I cannot remember anything about it. Many things were discussed there -every day, so that it is not quite possible to remember every detail -that they discussed. - -Q. During those conferences or meetings, the number of which you had -mentioned, did you always participate in these conferences? - -A. No. I was called out very often. I left on my own initiative -sometimes in order to make certain arrangements in connection with my -other fields of work; otherwise, I should not have been able to do any -work whatsoever in my other spheres. At that time I had the whole set-up -of General Foerster under my orders, and also the entire training of the -Luftwaffe; on top of that were the questions of the Inspectorate General -and his problems. - -Q. Witness, I shall come now to your speech of 25 March 1944, which has -been repeatedly mentioned here, Document NOKW-017, Prosecution Exhibit -54. It is your speech to the chief engineers of the Luftwaffe and the -chief quartermasters. It says here at one point that for construction a -few hundred thousand laborers were being used who had been withdrawn -from other places. By that don’t you mean those 100,000 Jews we just -mentioned? - -A. No. Under no circumstances. At that time workers had been transferred -for these purposes from many other constructions which were already -under way. - -Q. Witness— - -A. May I add to that, this: I could not possibly imagine why Jews should -be used as construction workers. Therefore, I am sure that it would have -struck me if I had heard that, for Jews are not used as carpenters and -bricklayers. They are mostly people who work in offices, and one could -hardly expect construction work from them. I don’t believe that I -myself, as a man who has never done that kind of work, would be of any -use for it. - -Q. Witness, explain to us now the purpose of this speech of yours, which -uses rather strong language. - -A. During the severe air raids we had lost many stocks of material, -mainly of parts. The new output of these parts could not possibly keep -pace with the destruction. There was only one way left, namely, to take -these parts from troops’ stocks. The troops had large stocks over which -the GL himself had no power of disposal whatsoever. He just gave the -orders for the manufacture of them. The requests of the troops, in my -opinion, were always too high—4.2 billion marks’ worth of parts were -being ordered at that time, that is proof of it. If we wanted to have -these planes, which were half ready, in time, it was possible only if -the troops would give us some of their parts. Prior to this conference -many attempts to that effect had been made, but the Quartermaster -General, because of the veto of his chief quartermasters and chief -engineers, had refused my wishes. I was very annoyed about that. Saur -came to see me and stressed once more that the completion of the planes -was impossible. He thought that in the army that would have been taken -care of long ago, but in the Luftwaffe there did not seem to be any -definite power to give orders, and he would take this matter up with the -higher authorities. That, for the second time, made me very cross, and -when this conference took place immediately after these things, I spoke -in very strong terms in order that the Quartermaster General with his -staff should give me the parts that were needed. That was the purpose -and the aim of the whole thing, and contrary to what had happened -before, when they had refused me those parts, the harsh military speech -I made was crowned with success. - -Q. Witness, in this speech there are certain passages which in -themselves have nothing to do with those aims you just mentioned. I -would like to show you these passages. At one spot you come to the -question concerning labor, and you say that the portion assigned to the -Luftwaffe in the allocation of labor had been constantly diminished, -that the foreigners were running away and not keeping their contracts, -and that if a foreman reprimanded or beat one of these young laborers -who was engaged in sabotage, he, the foreman, got into trouble; and that -the international law could not be applied here and that you would see -to it yourself that the prisoners, with the exception of the Americans -and British, were removed from the power of the military -organization—then, if a man committed sabotage, he should be hanged in -his own factory or workshop. What does that have to do with this speech -and these aims that you mentioned? - -A. As far as prisoners of war were working with the Luftwaffe itself, -the Quartermaster General and the Chief Quartermaster had something to -do with it. This was to be a threat to that department, namely, that -certain rights would be withdrawn from them. Of course, I could not do -that. I don’t believe that Goering would have followed such a suggestion -of mine either. - -I have no excuse whatsoever for these words which I used. I have now had -the time to read this passage in peace, and I cannot understand it -myself. I can only repeat that I myself was in an impossible position. I -could see what was coming, and I could no longer help my people. At that -time—I do not wish to say this as an excuse, but just in order to -explain—I was still suffering very badly from my accident, and I could -not quite get over the concussion, because at that time I could not -possibly be absent for one minute. I knew that because my doctor was -worried about me and he tried to help me with all sorts of drugs and -medicines. - -Q. Witness, a number of witnesses who were here have stated that very -often you had outbursts of rage. At the time when you made that -statement did you have the sincere wish to carry through these measures? - -A. No. I can say that with a good conscience. Never, never in my life -did I do such a thing, and I believe that he who really knows me knows -exactly that, on the contrary, I was different. However, at that time I -simply had to give vent to my feelings, and I could not use strong words -to the people I really wanted to use them on. That was not consistent -with the discipline you have in an army. I also have to say that -immediately after such a discussion I myself no longer knew what I had -said during one of those outbursts of rage. Even today I could not say -for sure that I said that. However, I cannot deny it. - -Q. Witness, did you at that time use such wild expressions with -reference to these Luftwaffe gentlemen, and did you threaten them as -well? - -A. Yes. I did. I read now that I did so. I am very sorry even today that -I used such strong words against my comrades. - -Q. Later on in another place you said that people who acted as if they -were sick ought to be whipped to work and that the whip should be used -as a medicine. That is a similar statement? - -A. That was just silly talk, so to speak, and I also used strong words -about myself and called myself an idiot once in a while. - -Q. Did you ever issue orders to drive people to work with the whip? - -A. Never, and I am sure that I myself would have intervened in such a -case. - -Q. Did you ever have anybody hanged because of sabotage at any time. - -A. No. First, I did not do it. Second, I could not do it. I never had -anybody punished for sabotage in any way because that was not within my -competency, not even in the few instances where sabotage had actually -taken place. - -Q. Witness, weren’t you afraid, however, that if you spoke like that -before this circle of men, that those people would actually act -according to your words? - -A. In this circle there was nobody who could possibly have the power to -carry out such things, and second, I believe that everybody knew me, -because my friends even at that time had told me that I had lost my -control over myself. It was a very good thing that nobody took me -seriously at such a time. I also always promised myself that I would not -burst into rage again. However, at that time I did not have full control -over myself because the situation was becoming more serious every day. -Moreover, I knew that all this could have been avoided, that it had -never been necessary to go to war, but if so, that the war could have -been terminated long ago, and apart from all this, if nothing else, the -destruction of Germany could have been avoided. That thought did not -leave me alone day or night, and that actually contributed to these -explosions. When everything was over, from that day I became more quiet. - -Q. Witness, those people you spoke to were soldiers, were they not? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Could those soldiers, according to your knowledge, have possibly been -led to carry out these orders which were against international law? - -A. No, never. They quite rightly thought, as people often told me, that -I was crazy during such outbursts. I myself was in no position to judge -that, however. - -Q. Witness, however, a certain number of measures in contradiction to -international law were carried out in Germany. Did you know anything -about that, could you have thought then that maybe you were also causing -such measures against international law? - -A. No. I did not know about that, with the very few exceptions that were -discussed here. However, I never connected them with myself. There never -was any connection at any time. - - * * * * * - -[March 18] - -Q. Witness, after you received the Knight’s Cross in 1940, did you -receive any distinctions from Hitler, any decorations? - -A. Yes, I did, in 1940 I received the promotion to a field marshal, and -that was also in 1940. After 1940 I did not receive anything which I -considered a distinction as a soldier, because the bonus I received in -1942—yes, I will refer to that later—I couldn’t see any distinction in -that as a soldier. - -Q. Will you now talk of this bonus which you received? Give us some -details about it. - -A. Hitler sent his adjutant on my 50th birthday, with a picture of -Hitler, that is, a photograph, with a dedication, and a letter in which -he congratulated me, and there was a check inside to the amount of -250,000 marks. Hitler wrote in his letter that he knew I was leading a -very modest life and he would like to give me in this way the -possibility of making it a little pleasanter. - -I thanked Hitler, and I told him that I gladly accepted the money, -because after all I could not refuse it, as a compensation for the fact -that I had earned a little less by this amount than I would have earned -if I had remained with the Lufthansa, because my salary in the Lufthansa -was twice as high, and even later on, three times as high as the money I -received from the State. Consequently, I did not consider that as a gift -exceeding my merits. - -Q. Witness, did the Air Ministry not offer you a bonus, also? - -A. That was not a bonus but the President of the Air Ministry told me -that the industry wanted to give me a present to the value of 50,000 -marks. I told him that I rejected this present; it looked to me like -bribery. He immediately withdrew the offer, especially as he knew that -never in my life had I accepted a present from industry while I was in -government service. - - * * * * * - -Q. Was it possible for you to remove directors of industry, or to -appoint them? - -A. No. Either there were limited companies [G.m.b.H.], or shareholder -companies, and they had their own organizations, their own -administrations. The shareholders appointed the board of directors and -the board of directors decided who was to be the general manager, and we -never interfered with that. - - * * * * * - -Q. Witness, will you explain to the Tribunal how overburdened you were -with work during all these years? - -A. May I refer to my field of tasks which is shown in one exhibit? - -DR. BERGOLD: May I ask this Tribunal now to see the charts which are in -the document book—the first document? - - * * * * * - -A. Until the end of 1941 my main task was that of Inspector General of -the Luftwaffe. From that point onward, the work as GL took the first -place, while in my capacity as Inspector General I was continuously -travelling by plane. But as Inspector General I was tied more closely to -the Berlin ministry. Oh, I beg your pardon, I mean to say as GL. There -we had meetings every day; and in my capacity as GL I took over a -technical staff in the Ministry of over four thousand. I reduced this -staff to about half; but in spite of that the number of conferences and -meetings could not be reduced. Therefore, I had to go through the -incredible amount of papers which were to be read and also the papers -which had to be signed; and I had to take them home in the evening. I -think that always amounted to two large suitcases and sometimes even -three of them. On the average I would work at home until 2:00 o’clock, -a.m. The reading was the main task because in all technical matters I -had to be up to the mark myself; and that was not very easy for me -because, after all, I had not studied technique but rather was a -self-taught man as a soldier who had been a pilot. In the morning I -would start my duties at 9:00 o’clock or at 9:15. Generally I would eat -my lunch at my desk, and often I even ate my dinner at my desk, so that -I had the impression that I was overburdened with work. Even apart from -these two functions, as GL and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, the -direction of the different other offices in the Ministry made quite a -lot of work for me, though in my last position the excellent General -Foerster took most of the work off me. - -Q. Witness, are the offices correct as they are shown on this chart -which I have submitted to the Tribunal, and can you confirm them as -such? - - - - -[Illustration: _CHART OF MILCH’S POSITION SUBMITTED BY DEFENSE_] - - - - -A. Yes. - -DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, this concludes my -interrogation; and I make room now for the prosecution. - -_CROSS-EXAMINATION_ - -MR. DENNEY: You testified as a witness before the International Military -Tribunal on behalf of the defendant Goering, did you not? - -A. Yes, I did. - -Q. And in the course of your testimony before the Tribunal you stated -that you were the second highest officer in the air force? - -A. Yes, that was my rank. - -Q. So that the only one who ranked higher than you was Goering? - -A. Yes. - -Q. And that continued up until the time when you told us this morning -that you completely withdrew, which, I believe was some time in January -of 1945? - -A. Yes. May I remark here that from 1937 several officers were in the -second place. That is to say, the chief of the general staff, the chief -of the personnel office, and also the GL. We were all of the same rank, -as it were, but I was the most senior officer among them. - -Q. And under Goering there were really four echelons; that is, the chief -of staff, the inspector general, the GL, and the director of the -personnel office? - -A. Yes. They were all equal to each other. - -Q. Goering was on top, and then came these four in a parallel line below -him; is that right? - -A. Yes, under Goering. - -Q. And you, from 1941, November, following Udet’s death until sometime -in the middle of 1944, held both the office of GL and inspector general? - -A. That is correct. - - * * * * * - -MR. DENNEY: If your Honor pleases, I ask that this be marked Prosecution -Exhibit 133 for identification. This is a letter, dated 1 April 1943. -The writer of the letter is Sauckel, and the letter is addressed to the -defendant. - - “Most honored Field Marshal, - - “I take the liberty of enclosing in confidence three copies of - the speech I gave in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943, on the - occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting and beg you kindly - to peruse it. The figures contained in this speech refer to the - end of the year 1942. Of course, the figures given concerning - utilization of labor have again increased in the meantime. I - would ask for your continued sympathetic understanding of the - interests of manpower utilization, and your understanding and - assistance in my task as far as possible. On my side, I can - assure you that I always have asked the offices of the labor - allocation administration subordinate to me for close and - successful cooperation with all departments, and that I will do - so for the future too. - - “Heil Hitler, - “Yours respectfully, - [Signed] “Sauckel” - -And, on the 7th, the last page, the defendant acknowledges receipt of -this letter: - - “Most esteemed Gauleiter, - - “I thank you most cordially for kindly transmitting to me the - speech you made in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943 on the - occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting. - - “Heil Hitler! Yours.” - - * * * * * - -Q. Do you recall receiving it from Sauckel on 1 April 1943? - -A. No. At the beginning of April I wasn’t there the first few days. I -see a remark, by somebody else, on this document. It probably says—I -can’t read it very well—“for the files of the Central Planning Board”. -Perhaps this letter may have been submitted to me later on—I do not -know whether I replied myself. I certainly did not read the report -because otherwise I would be able to recall the figures. - -Q. But you did initial the letter, didn’t you? - -A. I do not know. I do not recall it at all. - - * * * * * - -MR. DENNEY: On the copy that your Honors have, I believe it’s apparent -in the upper left-hand corner of the first page, the defendant’s -initials appear there, as well as on the original letter. - - * * * * * - -Q. Now, do you ever recall saying that you would put the German workers -into concentration camps, the ones who did not work well? - -A. When I talked about slackers, I referred to education by Himmler, but -not to sending them into concentration camps. Himmler had other training -places for workers where such people who were disinclined to work were -being trained by making their supplementary rations dependent on their -production. - -Q. Don’t you recall that you asked that certain camps be set up -especially to take care of these German workers who weren’t doing well? - -A. I did not say that we should make a special camp, but that they -should go to the training camps which already existed and we could get -them back from there. I do wish to emphasize here these were people, -Germans, who did not do their duty towards their Fatherland. I thought -it justified that such people should be trained. - - * * * * * - -MR. DENNEY: Witness, I believe you said you kept a diary? - -A. A diary? You could not call it exactly a diary, I only took some -short notes concerning my stay, and I jotted down a few key words which -conveyed generally the most important matters. - -Q. That was lost, was it, or destroyed, when you were captured? - -A. It has not been lost. I still have it here. - -Q. That is what you are referring to? - -A. If I look up where I was at a particular day or what personalities I -met, I refer only to the most important questions, not to everything, I -can see whom I was with. Sometimes there is a table of contents, too, -which is more detailed, according to the interest I had in those -questions. For instance, for 28 October, which you referred to a while -ago, I only have the following: My dispute with Goering he had reported -to Hitler; he had not obtained anything, and now he started to vent his -bad humor on me. Then comes a short note again that there was a -conference afterwards with Goering. That was in Karinhall. It went on -for the whole day. It was one hour from Berlin by car. I noted down that -Speer was there, that Sauckel was there, Grawitz, von der Heyde, and -some others. There is no mention what subjects were discussed, but the -attendance of Sauckel clarifies the matter for me. That is an example of -how I would enter these notes in this book. - -Q. Insofar as you recall, you were at that meeting on 28 October? - -A. Yes, indeed. I have found it here in my book. - - * * * * * - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Mr. Denney, let’s get an unequivocal answer to -this. Did you put the initials on the letter from Sauckel? - -MILCH: The “Mi”, yes, indeed. - -Q. You wrote that? - -A. Yes, I did. I wrote it. Somebody else wrote “to the files—” - -Q. Never mind what somebody else wrote. Now, on the first page of the -pamphlet, the printed speech, there are some initials. Did you write -those? - -A. On the cover, yes; I did, “Mi, 6/4”, that is what I wrote. - -Q. All right. - -MR. DENNEY: Do you recall saying that Americans were never assigned to -work in any of the airplane factories? - -MILCH: Yes, I said that. - -Q. This is Document NOKW-364, which is a partial translation of the -minutes of the Jaegerstab, held on 19 June 1944. The cover page, which -is photostated here in the German, which will be given to the Secretary -General, bears the initials of the defendant. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is this a new exhibit? - -MR. DENNEY: Yes, your Honor. This will bear Prosecution Exhibit Number -135 for identification, if your Honor pleases. Document NOKW-364, a -partial translation of the minutes of the Jaegerstab of a meeting held -19 June 1944. On the covering page there appear the initials of the -defendant. Perhaps the Secretary General would be good enough to let Mr. -Blakeslee have the original so the cover page can be shown to the -defendant. Just show it to him, Mr. Blakeslee. - - (The document was handed to the defendant.) - - * * * * * - -MR. DENNEY: Do your records show that you attended a conference of the -GL on 4 August 1942? - -A. Yes, indeed. These discussions were twice a week. (_NOKW-409, Pros. -Ex. 140._) - - * * * * * - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: Curiosity consumes me as to what would happen if an -officer inferior in rank to yourself took you at your word and actually -executed a number of these workers or prisoners of war. Would that -officer then be punished? - -A. No one was there who would have been in a position to do that. Apart -from that, all those who were under my orders knew me and my way of -handling things. They knew that I didn’t mean it, and apart from that -they always laughed about my remarks when I let myself go, as they said. - -Q. In other words the comment of the Field Marshal in a matter of this -seriousness was really of no value? - -A. Because the people knew that I got excited very easily about certain -things, and these incidents here have been selected and produced. From -every one of these meetings which took place twice a month, there was a -long report and owing to one or other of these reports, maybe once or -twice, there would be a certain outburst or explosion, and then, as we -soldiers were accustomed to do, we would just get mad, that is all. -However, I didn’t intend to do anything about it and I spoke to those -under my orders when the opportunity offered. They pointed the matter -out to me. They knew exactly from my words that this was not meant -seriously. They knew exactly that no such order had been given and that -I myself would never cause anybody to be punished, not even then when it -might have been justified, for the very simple reason that I did not -have the power to administer punishments. - -JUDGE PHILLIPS: Mr. Denney read this paragraph to you, Document -NOKW-409, Prosecution Exhibit 140. I understood you to say this, that -the paragraph did not contain your attitude there, that you never gave -such an order, that when you were worried you sometimes used strong -language as a soldier would. Didn’t you say that? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Well, now whether you meant it or not, you would say these things, -and by so doing you counseled and advised others under you at a meeting -over which you presided to do such things. Whether you meant it or not -you did that, didn’t you? - -A. No, I never gave an order by using these words, because my people -spoke with me, and they knew afterwards from my words that I never meant -it earnestly. - -Q. Didn’t you say, “I would band the workers together and have fifty -percent of them shot. I would then publish this fact and compel the -other fifty percent to work by beating if necessary.” Did you say that -or not? - -A. I do not remember having said that. However, three days ago I believe -I said that, when I had such a rush of blood to my head, due to that -injury I had, and I couldn’t remember what I had said at that particular -moment. I just burst out with rage. - -Q. Well, if you did say that, you were advising and counseling others to -do that, were you not? - -A. No, that was not a counsel or an advice to anybody else. On the -contrary, it was known that if someone had done such a thing I would -have intervened myself. - - * * * * * - -[March 20] - -JUDGE MUSMANNO: Since we are on the subject of Jews, I would like to -refer to something which occurred at the first trial. Now you are not -compelled to discuss this matter if for any reason you prefer not to, -but you will recall that you were cross-examined by Justice Jackson on -the subject of your being Aryanized. Do you recall that? - -A. Yes, I recall it. - -Q. Now you gave an explanation at the trial which, however, was not -definite, it seems to have left something in mid-air, and since you have -given us quite a long autobiographical sketch of yourself, if you would -care to enlighten us on this point, you are free to do so. - -A. My point of view is as I stated at the time. - -Q. Yes. - -A. That point of view I still adhere to. - -Q. Let us see. You were asked certain questions and gave certain answers -as follows: - - “Question: At that time” (Goering had referred to 1933) “Goering - had you—we will have no misunderstanding about this—Goering - made you what you call a full Aryan; was that right? - - “Answer: I do not think he made me one; I was one. - - “Question: Well, he had it established, let us say. - - “Answer: He had helped me in clearing up this question, which - was not clear. - - “Question: That is, your mother’s husband was a Jew; is that - correct? - - “Answer: It was not said so. - - “Question: You had to demonstrate that none of your ancestry was - Jewish; is that correct? - - “Answer: Yes, everybody had to do that. - - “Question: And in your case that involved your father, your - alleged father, is that correct? - - “Answer: Yes.” [There the inquiry rested.] - -A. Yes. - -Q. Just what had to be done to demonstrate that you were a full Aryan, -and why did the question arise? - -A. The first time that question arose was in 1933, and the occasion was -the following: The president of the German Aero Club was reported as -being adverse to the Hitler regime, and I protected that man. Following -that, a man who was a member of the SA sent a letter to Goering, and I -may add that this was a man who was trying to become a state secretary -in the Air Ministry, and he had been deeply hurt when he, an old Party -member, had to take second place to me. In this letter he said that -State Secretary Milch was not a full Aryan. This happened in the summer -of 1933. Goering forwarded this letter to me, and I went to Goering. -Following that I was asked to submit my family tree. That is how this -matter arose. - -Q. In other words, you had to establish that no Jewish blood flowed in -your veins, is that correct? - -A. Yes, that is what I was supposed to do. - -Q. And you established that to their satisfaction? - -A. That was established. - - * * * * * - -Q. * * * Now, I understand you to say that the first time you learned of -the proposed war against Poland was on 21 August, and even then it was -not very clearly indicated that a war could actually be unleashed, and -that further it was not until the very end of the day, that is to say, -at five o’clock in the afternoon of 31 August that you were directed to -put the Luftwaffe, or all your forces, in readiness for the attack. Is -that correct? Is that what you said? - -A. On 31 August, not to get ready, but I received the order: “The attack -starts tomorrow,” that was the order for an attack, whereas, over-all -preparations had been made previously at the meeting which took place -with Hitler on 22 August, only then there was still the possibility of -negotiations which were still going on. These negotiations came to an -end on 31 August at 1700 hours. - -Q. Did you not tell this Tribunal that after the meeting of 23 May 1939 -you were convinced that war was not intended? - -A. 23d of May? - -Q. Yes, 23 May 1939? - -A. Yes. - -Q. That you had no intimation that Hitler intended an aggressive war on -Poland? - -A. Yes, because at that time, according to my recollection, Hitler -stated again and again that he was certainly going to settle the Polish -problem, but that he would not allow war to break out. - -Q. And that you had called to his attention the necessity of -manufacturing bombs, because you believed that hostilities might break -out? - -A. That was before that date, before the 23d, and also after the 23d, -because I myself did not share Hitler’s optimism. Although he may not -have intended to wage war, his policy might nevertheless have led to -war, for he alone was not the deciding factor, the others would have -something to say as well. - -Q. And that assumption lulled you into the conviction that there would -be no war, since he refused you authority to manufacture bombs? - -A. Today I must assume that, at that time I was not aware of it. - - * * * * * - -Q. When did you first learn that an attack on Russia was intended? - -A. At the beginning of January 1941—I beg your pardon—yes, that is -right, 1941, on 13 January actually. It was then that Goering, during a -conference with a large circle of commanding officers, informed us that -one’s attention should be turned to the East, as Hitler was fearing an -attack by the Russians. - -Q. Yes, and you finally came to the conclusion that the declaration of -war, or rather, the undeclared war against Russia was a crime against -Germany. - -A. Yes. - -Q. Did you think it was a crime against Russia? - -A. Yes, against Russia also. - -Q. Also? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Now, you endeavored to see Hitler to persuade him not to enter this -war. - -A. Yes. - -Q. And your immediate circle, your military friends, realized that it -was foolhardy to provoke a war with Russia and thereby establish two -fronts? - -A. Exactly the way I saw it, yes. My immediate circle were of the same -opinion as I was. - -Q. And all the generals were of the same impression—that it was -hopeless for Germany, and that further it was tragic and suicidal to -Germany to allow Hitler to take over the control of the armed forces? -You were practically unanimous in that belief, were you not? - -A. This was never discussed in any larger circles. - -Q. But you have testified—it is in the record—that you were all of -that belief. - -A. It transpired at a later stage, when it was discussed, that they were -all of the same opinion. - -Q. When was that? - -A. Later on in the course of the war. - -Q. When did you realize that it was a mistake to have Hitler as -Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces? - -A. I, personally? - -Q. When was it thoroughly recognized, even though not expressed at a -public meeting among the generals, that it was suicidal, a great -mistake, to have Hitler as Commander in Chief? - -A. That was the general point of view after Stalingrad. That is when it -became general. - -Q. And when was that? - -A. That was the end of January 1943. - -Q. Yes. You still had two and a half years of war ahead of you? - -A. Yes. - -Q. Why didn’t you do something about having Hitler removed? - -A. It was my duty toward my people to keep allegiance to him. I had -sworn an oath of allegiance to Hitler. I am only a human being who can -see this world subjectively and I cannot presume to be an impartial -judge on such questions. Moreover, I believe that in the whole of -Germany’s history there is not one instance of soldiers rising against -their military commander. I certainly do not know of one. - -Q. Even though you realized that Hitler was leading Germany into stark -annihilation and unspeakable hardship, and even though all the generals -were of that same belief, yet you upheld this fetish of an allegiance -which was destined, and very clearly so, to bring unparalleled misery to -the people that you professed to be faithful to? - -A. Your Honor, I personally did not presume to say that my judgment was -right, and that Hitler’s judgment, and the judgment of all those around -him, was wrong. - -Q. Then, you modify your statement that Hitler was wrong? You say that -he might have been right? - -A. No, no, I am not saying that. What I am trying to say is that it was -my point of view that the question whether the head of the state was to -be overthrown or not was a matter for the constitution, and that for -this eventuality the constitution and the state must surely have powers, -means through which in such cases there could be intervention; but then -it could not be the task of any individual general to take steps in such -questions, which were, after all, unlawful. - - * * * * * - ------ - -[139] The defendant Milch testified in his own behalf on eight full -trial days (March 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1947). His -testimony is recorded in 581 mimeographed pages (_Tr. pp. 1696-2276_). - -[140] Wolfgang Vorwald, former Commander of Luftgau (Air Force -Administrative Command) VII, Munich. - -[141] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Ernst von Weizsaecker, et -al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV. - -[142] Doc. R-124, Pros. Ex. 48-A, Conference of 1 March 1944, pp. -484-498. - - - - - V. CLOSING STATEMENTS - - - A. Closing Statement of the Prosecution[143] - -MR. CLARK DENNY: We close today the trial of a major war criminal—a -leader in a slaving operation, the enormity of which is without -historical parallel; a principal in a crime of murder in the ironic -masquerade of scientific progress which has shocked alike the world of -medicine and the world of laymen. The evidence set forth before the -Tribunal has shown that Erhard Milch was primarily implicated as a -leader in a program to bring laborers into Germany by force, of -allocating them to the various segments of the German war economy, and -of munitions. - -We deal here with a top military and economic planner who at all times -was fully informed as to the aims and objectives of the Nazi plan. -Unlike his colleagues Speer and Sauckel, Milch entered the conspiracy -early. The defendant was one of a small group of men who constituted the -leadership of the Reich. - -Before dealing directly with the responsibility of the defendant for the -crimes charged in the indictment, as shown by the evidence, we should -like to review, briefly, the law applicable to these crimes. - - _THE LAW_ - -The indictment charges and the evidence has connected the defendant with -a wide variety of crimes incident to the enforced labor program of the -Nazi regime. In themselves, these crimes are not new except in their -enormity. In domestic law they have, from ancient times, borne such -familiar titles as assault, battery, murder, kidnapping and pillage. In -international law the principles which protect the individual from undue -interference with his person and his personal freedom have given rise to -a series of kindred precepts governing the conduct of a nation which has -gained factual control over the citizens of another state. We shall -consider briefly some salient precepts and prohibitions of international -law up to, and including the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10. - -Much of the labor which supplied Germany with the tools of total war was -exacted from people who had been uprooted from their homes in occupied -territories and imported to Germany. Displacement of groups of persons -from one country to another is the proper concern of international law -insofar as it affects the community of nations. - -The law has recognized that some conditions may justify the transfer of -people from one country to another. Correspondingly, and with much more -relevance to the present case, international law has enunciated certain -conditions under which the fact of deportation becomes a crime. - -If the transfer is carried out without a legal title, as is the case -where people are deported from a country occupied by an invader while -the occupied enemy still has an army in the field, the deportation is -contrary to international law. The rationale of this rule lies in the -supposition that the occupying power has prevented temporarily the -rightful sovereign from exercising power over its citizens. - -Articles 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, and 56 of the Hague Regulations, which -limit the rights of the belligerent occupant, do not _expressly_ specify -as a crime the deportation of civilians from an occupied territory. -However, Article 52 states the following conditions under which services -may be demanded from the inhabitants of occupied countries: - - 1. They must be for the needs of the army of occupation; - 2. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country; and - 3. They must be of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in - the obligation to take part in military operations against their - own country. - -Insofar as this section limits the conscription of labor to that -required for the needs of the army of occupation, it is clear that the -use of labor from occupied territories outside of the area of occupation -is forbidden by the Hague Regulations. - -The illegality of the deportation of civilians in territories under -belligerent occupation was demonstrated in the First World War when the -Germans attempted a deportation program of Belgian workers into Germany. -This measure met with world-wide protest and was abandoned after about -four months. - -Among the voices raised in protest against the deportation of Belgians -by Germany in 1916-1917 was that of Lansing, Secretary of State. He -wrote: - - “The Government of the United States has learned with the - greatest concern and regret of the policy of the German - Government to deport from Belgium a portion of the civilian - population for the purposes of forcing them to labor in Germany, - and is constrained to protest in a friendly spirit but most - solemnly against this policy which is in contravention of all - precedent and all principles of international practice which - have long been accepted and followed by civilized nations in - their treatment of noncombatants in conquered territory.” - -Other protests were lodged with the German Government by Spain, -Switzerland, Netherlands, and Brazil, all neutral countries. -International lawyers all over the world condemned Germany’s action in -the strongest terms. - -The opposition in the German Reichstag accused the government of -violating the Hague Convention and refused to vote for the war budget. - -It is worthy of note, in passing, that the defendant has testified at -this trial that he knew of this effort at deportation of labor on the -part of Germany in the First War and that he was much interested in the -investigation conducted by a Reichstag Committee concerning this matter. -He could not have followed this investigation, as he admits he did, -without learning that the deportation in question was a violation of -international law. - -The second condition under which deportation becomes a crime occurs when -the purpose of the displacement is illegal. A conspicuous example of -illegality of purpose is found when the deportation is for the purpose -of compelling the deportees to manufacture weapons for use against their -homeland or to be assimilated in the working economy of the occupying -country. - -An attempt has been made by the defense in this trial to show that -persons were deported from France into Germany legally and for a legal -purpose, by pointing out that such deportations were authorized by -agreements between Nazi and Vichy French authorities. This defense is -both technically and substantially deficient. Many of the Vichy -Government’s highest officials, who held office by reason of and under -the protection of Nazi power, have been punished for treason by the -present legitimate government. And, too, the agreements themselves were -illegal—because they were exacted under duress, and because they were -void _ab initio_ because of their immoral content. It is common -knowledge that even the puppets of Vichy did not of their own accord -agree to the Nazi deportation measures. It is equally clear that these -agreements were _contra bonos mores_. Then, too, it was illegal for any -French Government to conclude agreements which provided for the -compulsory mass deportation of French workers to aid the enemy’s war -effort. At the time of the agreement between Germany and Vichy there was -merely a state of suspension of hostilities. French resistance had not -ceased, and the outcome of the war continued to be uncertain. Lastly, -the deportation agreements were invalid because their manifest purpose -was to aid Germany in the commission of the crime of aggressive war. -That an agreement in furtherance of an act which is illegal in -international law is invalid has been stated by various authorities. For -example, Professor Charles Cheney Hyde, of Columbia University, defines -as internationally illegal “agreements which are concluded for the -purpose of, and with a view to, causing the performance of acts which it -(international law) proscribes.” - -Professor Hall, page 382 of the 8th Edition of International Law (1924), -declares: - - “The requirement that contracts shall be in conformity with law - invalidates, or at least renders voidable, all agreements which - are at variance with the fundamental principles of international - law and their undisputed applications * * *.” - -Lauterpacht on International Law by L. Oppenheim, in volume I, page 706, -states: - - “It is a unanimously recognized customary rule of international - law that obligations which are at variance with universally - recognized principles of international law cannot be the object - of a treaty.” - -The final condition under which deportation becomes illegal occurs -whenever generally recognized standards of decency and humanity are -disregarded. This flows from the established principle of law that an -otherwise permissible act becomes a crime when carried out in a criminal -manner. - -A study of the pertinent parts of Control Council Law No. 10 strengthens -the conclusions of the foregoing statements, that deportation of the -population is criminal whenever there is no title in the deporting -authority or whenever the purpose of the displacement is illegal, or -whenever the deportation is characterized by inhumane or illegal -methods. - -Article II (1) (_b_) lists under war crimes “ill-treatment or -deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian -population from occupied territory.” It is clear that Law No. 10 -establishes the following separate and distinct crimes: ill-treatment of -civilians from occupied territories; deportation to slave labor of such -civilians; and deportation for any other purposes of such civilians. - -The prohibition of deportation of civilians from occupied territories -irrespective of the purpose, as stated in Control Council Law No. 10, is -a recognition of the principle of international law that a power in -belligerent occupation has no right or authority (title) to deport the -citizens of the occupied territories. The separate specification as a -war crime in Law No. 10 of ill-treatment of civilians from occupied -territories is a recognition of the rule of international law, as -heretofore discussed, that even an otherwise lawful deportation (by an -authority having title and for a legitimate purpose) is rendered illegal -where the deportees are ill-treated. - -Without entering into a detailed discussion of the evidence, it should -be pointed out at this point, that all these conditions for criminal -deportation were abundantly present in the enforced labor program of -Germany during the 2d World War, and that the _knowing connection_ of -the defendant with all phases of illegal deportation has been -established. - -Article II (1) (_c_) of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies certain -crimes against humanity. Among these is listed the “deportation * * * -(of) any civilian population * * *”. The general language of this -sub-section, as applied to deportation, indicates that Control Council -Law No. 10 has indeed unconditionally condemned, as a crime against -humanity, every instance of the deportation of civilians. Under this -sub-section, there would seem to be no room for argument as to the -legality of any agreement on the part of any government, legitimate or -illegitimate, which allows deportation of its subjects in time of war. - -We come now to a consideration of the crime of enslavement. Whereas -Article II (_b_) names deportation to slave labor as a war crime, -Article II (1) (_c_) states that the “enslavement * * * (of) any -civilian population” is a crime against humanity. Thus, Law No. 10 -treats as separate crimes, and different types of crime, “deportation to -slave labor” and “enslavement.” - -Article II (_b_) does not specify as a crime the detention (as -distinguished from the deportation) of civilians for use as slave labor -or for any other purpose. However, the section does stipulate that any -atrocities or offenses against persons which constitute violations of -the laws or customs of war, _including but not limited to_ deportation -to slave labor, are war crimes. Use or detention of persons from -occupied territories for slave labor or for any other purpose, in and of -themselves, _do_ constitute violations of the laws and customs of war. -Ergo, such use or detention is a _war crime_ within II (1) (_b_) of Law -No. 10. - -The _crime against humanity_ which is termed “enslavement” in Article II -(1) (_c_) of Law No. 10 is susceptible of two meanings. It can be -understood to embrace the initial act of deprivation of the freedom of -another, and an act whereby such deprivation is continued, or either of -them, or it may be interpreted as referring only to the initial measures -whereby a person is deprived of his freedom. - -It is the contention of the prosecution in this case that all phases of -the slave labor program, the taking, the transportation, the detention, -the use and the inhuman treatment of foreign workers as practiced by the -Nazi state and participated in by the defendant, constitute enslavement -within the meaning of Article II (1) (_c_). No sufficient reason appears -for the limitation of the crime to the mere initial act. In every true -and complete sense a person is enslaved from the moment when his liberty -is taken from him until the time when it is restored to him. It is more -than probable that if Law No. 10 is intended to limit the crime of -enslavement to the initial measures under which a person was deprived of -his liberty, there would have been some definite indication, either in -the language or in the context of the statute. - -Even if we were to concede the narrowest possible meaning for the term -“enslavement” in Article II (1) (_c_), so as to understand by it only -the first acts of deprivation of liberty, all acts under which such -people were kept in an enslaved status would be crimes against humanity, -because the same section defines as such any atrocities and offenses -committed against the civilian population. By express proviso -“enslavement” and “deportation” are only illustratively mentioned, and -“other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population” -constitute crimes against humanity. - -The result is that whether we adopt the broad interpretation of the term -“enslavement” or the narrower one, the deportation, the transportation, -the retention, the use and the inhuman treatment of civilian populations -are crimes against humanity. The prosecution charges that the defendant -was criminally connected with all the phases of the slave labor program, -whether these divisions be comprehended within the technical term -“enslavement” or be divided between the crime of “enslavement” and that -of “other inhuman acts.” - -We shall now make brief comment on the subject of the treatment and use -of prisoners of war. The Hague and Geneva Conventions merely codify the -precepts of the laws and usages of all civilized nations. Article 31 of -the Geneva Convention provides that “labor furnished by prisoners of war -shall have no direct relation to war operations.” Thus the Convention -forbids: - - 1. The use of prisoners of war in manufacture or transportation - of arms or munitions of any kind, and - - 2. The use of prisoners of war for transporting material - intended for combat units. - -The Hague Regulations contain comparable provisions. - -The essence of the crime of the misuse of prisoners of war derives from -the kind of work to which they are assigned—in other words, to work -directly connected with the war effort. The prosecution would like to -recall to the court the evidence which connects the defendant with both -the _illegal employment_ of prisoners of war and with their abusive -treatment. The Tribunal will recall that the defendant ordered the -murder of prisoners of war who attempted to escape. We will discuss this -crime more fully later. It will be remembered that there never has been -a substantial denial of the fact that prisoners of war were used to man -German antiaircraft batteries. Nor is it subject to doubt that prisoners -were used in air armament industries over which the defendant exercised -supervisory control. - -We now come to the consideration of the basic charges and the law -governing the defendant’s complicity in, and responsibility for, the -Medical Experiments Program. The fundamental crime with which the -defendant is charged in this connection is murder. Also involved are -various atrocities, tortures, offenses against the person, and other -inhuman acts. - -The applicable provisions of Control Council Law No. 10, Article II, are -(_b_) war crimes, (_c_) crimes against humanity. In connection with the -criminal Medical Experiments Program, the prosecution submits that the -defendant is guilty of— - - (_a_) War crimes, namely violations of the laws and customs of - war, as the medical experiments performed upon involuntary - persons, some of them nationals of countries at war with the - German Reich, involved the commission of murders, tortures, and - other inhuman acts. - - (_b_) Crimes against humanity, namely medical experiments - performed upon involuntary German nationals and nationals of - other countries, in the course of which, brutalities, murders, - and other inhuman acts were committed. - -Before we pass from the law involved in this case to a consideration of -the evidence, we wish to mention the legal basis for the prosecution’s -contention that the defendant must share the guilt which attaches to the -slave labor program and the conduct of medical experiments upon -unconsenting human beings. Control Council Law No. 10 defines for us the -theory upon which this trial proceeds in Article II, paragraph 2, when -it says: - - “Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in - which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined - in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (_a_) a principal or - (_b_) an accessory to the commission of any such crime, or - ordered or abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part - therein or (_d_) _was connected with plans or enterprises - involving its commission or_ (_e_) _was a member of any - organization or group connected with the commission of any such - crime_. * * *” [Emphasis added.] - -Without wishing to limit the scope of the testimony in this case, the -Tribunal’s attention is directed to the evidence which has established -that the defendant, as a member of the Central Planning Board, and the -Jaegerstab, and as Generalluftzeugmeister, and in every one of his -capacities, was connected with “plans and enterprises” for the -commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and was a “member -of organizations and groups”, within the meaning of subdivisions (_d_) -and (_e_) of paragraph 2, “connected with the commission of such -crimes”. - -Count One, paragraph 6, of the indictment charges the defendant Milch -with guilt in the murder of prisoners of war who had attempted to escape -from enforced labor in German war industry. The gist of this crime is -murder, which is, and always has been, prohibited by every country which -laid any claim to civilization. It was specified as a war crime under -the Hague and Geneva Conventions and under the provisions of Article II -of Control Council Law No. 10. The evidence which connects the defendant -with this crime will be discussed in another part of this summation. - -Law Number 10, Article II, paragraph 3 provides that the death penalty -or lesser sentences may be prescribed for the commission of war crimes -and crimes against humanity as defined in the statute. - -We turn now from the law to the evidence. In the presentation of its -case in chief, the prosecution first offered evidence to describe the -slave labor program in Germany in all its stark terror. It then turned -to a presentation of the proof which connected the defendant with the -slave labor program in two of his principal capacities, as member of the -Central Planning Board and as member of the Jaegerstab. Next there was -put in evidence the documents which established the defendant’s -connection with the medical experiments, and finally, after the defense -had put in its case, the defendant was confronted with the evidence of -additional documents which connected him with the detention and -mistreatment of slave labor in his capacity as Generalluftzeugmeister. -In summing up the evidence the prosecution wants to keep roughly the -same order. It will deal in turn with the evidence of the defendant’s -activities as member of the Central Planning Board and as member of the -Jaegerstab. The documents relating to the defendant as -Generalluftzeugmeister will then be dealt with and, in conclusion, the -defendant’s implication in the criminal medical experiments will be -discussed. - -When, in the course of presenting the evidence, we first turned our -attention from the general documents which established the body of the -crime of slave labor to the documents which were to prove the -defendant’s connection with that crime, we asked the Court’s attention -to certain key words which we said would run like small threads through -our proof. These words were cited to be “procurement, allocation and -use”. It was stated that we would often use them. We offered many -documents to prove Milch’s connection with each of the functions -described by these key words. Once again, we ask the Tribunal to keep -these words in mind. - -The Central Planning Board, which was established in April 1942, served -as a means of consolidating in a single agency all controls over German -war production. The minutes of the Central Planning Board which have -been submitted to the Tribunal reflect the dominant role played by the -defendant at meetings of the Board. - -The best evidence of the scope and authority of the Central Planning -Board is contained in the Board’s own minutes. The first conference of -the Central Planning Board was held on 27 April 1942. The duties and -responsibilities of the Board were announced in these words: - - “The Central Planning in the Four Year Plan (decree of the Reich - Marshal of Greater Germany [Goering] of 22 April 1942) is a task - for leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive - matters. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the - execution of its directives. The Central Planning does not rely - on anonymous institutions difficult to control but always on - individuals and fully responsible persons who are free in the - selection of their working methods and their collaborations, as - far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning.” - -Then, six months later, on 20 October 1942, the statutes of the Central -Planning Board were published and distributed. A portion of these -states: - - “The Central Planning Board created by the Fuehrer and Reich - Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy deals only - with the decision of basic questions. Professional questions - remain the task of the competent departments which in their - field remain responsible within the framework of the decisions - made by the Central Planning Board.” - -It is addressed to: “The highest Reich authorities, the Reich Protector, -the Governor General and the executive authorities in the occupied -countries.” The letter of transmittal stated in part: - - “Enclosed I send you for your information the statutes of the - Central Planning Board with the request to support the office of - the Central Planning Board in every possible way in its work, - and to direct, more particularly, your section chiefs and - reporters to forward all information requested orally, or by - writing, in the shortest possible time. By this collaboration by - your section chiefs and reporters, the building up of larger - machinery in the framework of the Central Planning Board is to - be avoided.” - -The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning -Board “had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and -the allocation and development of raw material”. - -It needs no emphasis that the effective performance of these functions -necessarily involved the Board in the requisitioning and distribution of -labor, and the records of the Board, which have been submitted, leave no -doubt that the Board exercised the authority conferred upon it in the -field of labor. The International Military Tribunal in its opinion found -that the Board requisitioned labor from Sauckel with full knowledge that -the demands could be supplied only by foreign forced labor, and that the -Board determined the basic allocation of this labor within the German -war economy. - -In assessing the guilt of the defendant Funk, the Court said:[144] - - “In the fall of 1943, Funk was a member of the Central Planning - Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for - German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually - by deportation from occupied territories. Funk did not appear to - be particularly interested in this aspect of the forced labor - program, and usually sent a deputy to attend the meetings, often - SS General Ohlendorf, the former Chief of the SD inside of - Germany and the former Commander of Einsatzgruppe D. But Funk - was aware that the Board of which he was a member was demanding - the importation of slave laborers, and allocating them to the - various industries under its control.” - -Bearing in mind the fact that Funk was a minor member of the Board, how -much greater is the responsibility of the defendant who was a dominant -figure on the Board throughout its existence. - -There is no need to review in historical detail the defendant’s personal -participation in the criminal activities of the Board. A few references -to the pattern for 1944 will suffice. The Tribunal will recall that -Albert Speer, the other dominant member of the Board, was ill during -most of this period. - -On 4 January 1944, demands were made at a Hitler conference that Sauckel -produce four million new workers from the occupied countries. The -defendant was present at the conference, and at this meeting, Sauckel, -in pledging himself to perform his recruitment tasks, indicated that the -demands could be met only by Himmler, and the promise of assistance was -forthcoming from the Reich Leader SS. - -The allocation of this labor to the various sectors of the German -economy was determined by the Board at its 53d meeting. The defendant -was the presiding officer at this meeting. The chart compiled by Milch -and found in his files shows his personal knowledge of the sources of -the labor being allocated. - -Sauckel was, however, unable to satisfy completely these demands. He -reported this inability at its 54th meeting. This meeting of the Board -was presided over by the defendant, and the minutes which we have -submitted show the subordinate position occupied by Sauckel with respect -to the Board. The Tribunal will recall Sauckel’s opening statement: - - “Field Marshal, gentlemen, it goes without saying that we shall - satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the - Central Planning Board.” - -And then later on in the meeting: - - “If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me * * *.” - -We shall not review in detail the minutes of this meeting, but the -Tribunal’s attention is again directed to the fact that Sauckel was -questioned closely by the defendant who suggested that the Wehrmacht be -assigned to the task of assisting in the recruitment drive. The -defendant suggested that French workers be coerced by a system of -premeditated starvation. In dealing with the problem of Italian -laborers, the defendant suggested that only those who went to Germany or -worked in protected factories be given food. - -As a further means of meeting the manpower shortage, consideration was -given to possible measures for increasing the productive power of -prisoners of war. Accordingly, on 5 March 1944, a conference was held at -the Fuehrer Headquarters. It is evident from the minutes which have been -submitted to the Tribunal that the defendant was in attendance. The -Tribunal will recall that the decision was made to give the direction of -the Stalags to the SS, in order to increase the production power of the -prisoners. This was not to apply to the Americans or the English. The -Tribunal will take judicial notice of the methods of the SS. - -On 7 July 1944, Sauckel issued a report showing new manpower placed at -the disposal of German war industry during the first half of 1944. We -shall not review in detail this report, but merely state that it is -proof of the Board’s directive to Sauckel. - -This report, however, showed a deficit, and on 11 July 1944 a further -conference was held to solve the question of how greater compulsion -could be exerted on persons to work in Germany. The defendant has -testified that he was in virtual retirement from production matters -since late June 1944. Yet the record of this conference shows that he -was present. The result of this conference was the greater utilization -of the Wehrmacht in the recruitment of forced labor. The directive of -Field Marshal von Kluge, which has been submitted in evidence, makes -specific reference to the results of this conference. - -Here, in brief, we have the picture. The defendant and the Board, of -which he was a dominant member, requisitioning forced labor from -Sauckel, allocating this labor to the various sectors of the German war -economy, and later improvising new and more brutal techniques of force -and terror for the recruitment of new labor. - -The defense, besides denying the power and authority of the Central -Planning Board, has challenged the authenticity and accuracy of its -transcripts. The prosecution has been compelled to rely upon these -minutes for much of its proof. - -In this connection, it might be said that these same transcripts -constituted the basis for findings of fact by the International Military -Tribunal. They are quoted in the decision of that Court. - -The statutes of the Central Planning Board, mentioned a few minutes ago, -show the extreme care taken to insure the accuracy of reporting these -meetings, as well as action taken or ordered to be taken. The statutes -of the Board provide in part: - - “In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have - the execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning - Board appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies - appointed by each of three members of the Central Planning - Board; one of these three deputies shall be appointed chief of - the office.” - -Then follows a handwritten marginal note which I shall omit. - - “In accordance with the attached distribution of work the office - appoints reporters. These reporters are at the disposal of all - members of the Central Planning Board. The office appoints one - reporter to keep the record.” - -And then, tasks of the office: - - “The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning Board - in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning Board - have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in - advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks - with the competent departments, etc. - - “On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the office - sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central Planning - Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that the - deadlines fixed are complied with. - - “The members of the office keep the members of the Central - Planning Board informed between the sessions.” - -The minutes of these meetings which have been submitted to this Tribunal -show that these proceedings were recorded and transcribed with -characteristic German detail and accuracy. We need only refer to the -charts and tables, and the remarks quoted in the transcripts. Of the 59 -meetings fully covered by these official reports, 41 were prepared and -signed by Ministerialrat Steffler, who was personally responsible for -the accuracy and completeness of these reports. - -Without the Central Planning Board the slave labor program could not -have functioned. - - _THE JAEGERSTAB._ - -Here we have the defendant in immediate contact with the slave labor -program at its peak. By the testimony of the defendant, it was he who -conceived and instigated the formation of the Jaegerstab. Speer and the -defendant constituted its leadership. Speer’s participation was nominal -and it was the defendant who directed its activities and acted as its -chairman. Speer was ill during part of the Jaegerstab’s existence and -has stated to the Court that he did not preside at a meeting. - -The Jaegerstab assumed control over fighter production when the -exploitation of foreign forced labor in air armament had already reached -unparalleled heights. On 16 February 1944, the defendant had told his -colleagues in the Central Planning Board that “our best new engine is -made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of war.” On 25 March, he told his -engineers that soon the percentage of foreign personnel in the aircraft -industry would reach 90 percent. Reich Leader SS Himmler, reporting to -Goering on 9 March 1944 on the employment of concentration camp -personnel in the aircraft industry, stated that nearly 36,000 prisoners -were employed and that an increase to 90,000 was expected. The formation -of the Jaegerstab is partly explainable in terms of the battle to -increase the manpower resources available for fighter production. - -The Jaegerstab was assigned top priority. Projects for the recruitment -and commitment of manpower were discussed by the Jaegerstab. The -evidence presented before the Tribunal has shown that questions of -manpower were time and time again referred to the defendant. We have -seen him agreeing to use his prestige and influence upon Sauckel in -efforts to obtain new workers for aircraft production. When manpower in -sufficient numbers was not forthcoming through normal channels, the -Jaegerstab did not shrink from other methods of obtaining its labor. -When necessary the Jaegerstab recruited its own labor, either directly -or by engineering “snatching” expeditions for the seizure of manpower -arriving on transports from the East. - -The defendant’s frank admission to his subordinates that “international -law cannot be observed here” characterizes best his own participation in -the activities of the Jaegerstab. Where, as was the case with France, -transfers of production facilities were concerned, the defendant -advocated the stripping of the country and the deportation of its people -as prisoners of war. When the discussion turned to PW’s, the defendant -was quick to suggest their transfer to places under air attack. When the -transportation of Italian civilian conscripts directly recruited by the -Jaegerstab for service in Germany was in question, it was the defendant -who advocated the shooting of those who attempted to escape. - -The Jaegerstab was no mere discussion group. As an agency with absolute -authority over fighter production, the Jaegerstab acted by orders and -directives. The Jaegerstab fixed hours of labor and conditions of work. -It was the Jaegerstab, for example, which established the 72-hour work -week in the aircraft industry. - -In addition to its jurisdiction over fighter production, the Jaegerstab -was charged with the program for the decentralization of the German -aircraft industry, both to above ground bombproof installations and to -subterranean locations. Much of the labor employed in both phases of the -project was concentration camp labor. The defendant must have known this -fact. - -One phase, the transfer to new installations underground, was under the -immediate supervision of SS Gruppenfuehrer Heinz Kammler. Kammler was a -member of the Jaegerstab. Where, as was the case in some instances, -labor was not forthcoming in sufficient quantity, Kammler informed the -Jaegerstab of his intention to take large numbers of persons into -protective custody for use on his projects. Members of the Jaegerstab -knew that manpower shortages on the construction projects were at least -in part due to the high death rate. The conditions of employment on the -projects have not been substantially disputed. The Jaegerstab was well -informed of these conditions. While on trips with the Jaegerstab, -Kammler visited these projects and his fellow members of the Jaegerstab -were well advised as to the manner in which workers employed on them -were treated. Where it was necessary to hang thirty people merely as an -example to others, Kammler reported this fact to the Jaegerstab. - -A second phase of the program, the transfer of fighter production to -bombproof factories above ground, was carried out for the Jaegerstab by -Stobbe-Dethleffsen and later Xaver Dorsch. While Stobbe-Dethleffsen and -Dorsch were immediately in charge, it was the Jaegerstab which received -the funds and raw materials necessary for the carrying out of this -project. When sufficient progress had not been made under -Stobbe-Dethleffsen, the Jaegerstab demanded that Dorsch carry out this -program. The defendant was a leader in the planning which preceded -Dorsch’s appointment. - -By the testimony of Dorsch, Milch was one of a small group which worked -out with Goering the details of the project, including the question of -manpower. Dorsch was represented on the Jaegerstab by Schlempp, and -later Knipping, deputies designated for this particular purpose. -Schlempp informed the Jaegerstab on the progress of the work, both -orally and in writing. Dorsch received manpower from the Jaegerstab. -This was the immediate concern of Schmelter. - -Early in April 1944 the defendant represented the Jaegerstab at -conferences with Hitler where the decision was first taken to carry out -deportations. Shortly thereafter, the defendant received written -confirmation of the results of this conference, as did Himmler, who was -to procure the workers. Progress reports were made and delivery dates -agreed upon. Then came the disappointing news that the first transports -arriving at Auschwitz consisted primarily of old men, women, and -children. Later on there were reports as to the successful allocation of -this personnel. The testimony of Dorsch shows that these Jews were used -on the construction projects, that the conditions under which they lived -were intolerable, and that the death rate on the project was excessive. - -In closing this phase of the case, it is submitted that the defendant -never resigned from the Jaegerstab. While it is true that the defendant -at Goering’s behest was removed from certain offices in the Air Ministry -in the summer of 1944, he retained his membership in the Jaegerstab -until its dissolution, the prosecution contends. - -As Generalluftzeugmeister the defendant had complete control over -aircraft production. In this field his authority was unlimited. In -particular it has been shown that the defendant requisitioned labor for -the aircraft industry with knowledge of the brutal and inhumane -techniques employed in recruiting these laborers, and that he gave -directives for the criminal treatment of these laborers at the centers -of production. - -There is evidence that the defendant presented the labor demands of the -aircraft industry to Sauckel. The Tribunal will recall that in his -affidavit Sauckel stated that it was the defendant who produced the -manpower figures for aviation. In view of the position occupied by -Sauckel in the slave labor program, this statement is of special -importance. - -The statement of Sauckel is in agreement with the statements of Hermann -Goering, the defendant’s superior in the Luftwaffe. In his interrogation -the former Reich Marshal stated that the defendant was in charge of the -division for labor employment in the Air Ministry and that the industry -demands for labor in air armament were made by the defendant. - -Even the defendant’s collaborator Albert Speer testified to the same -effect when he stated: - - “The requests of the air armament industry for laborers were - presented by Milch and he did not permit anyone to take this - right away from him until March 1944.” - -The defendant as Generalluftzeugmeister was acquainted with the methods -employed in recruiting this manpower. In fact, many of the practices -indulged in by Sauckel were formulated at conferences at which the -defendant was in attendance. The Tribunal will recall that the defendant -was present at a conference in which Goering announced his plan to use -the Luftwaffe in the recruitment drive to capture laborers in Holland. -The Tribunal’s attention is also drawn to the Generalluftzeugmeister -meeting of 25 January 1944 in which methods for the more expeditious -deportation of young Czechs for work in the Luftwaffe were discussed. - -The defendant also knew that prisoners of war and concentration camp -personnel were included in the manpower he was requisitioning and -distributing to the aircraft industry. We have seen him trying to -increase their numbers in the industry under his control, and we have -seen him ordering and abetting the inhumane treatment of this labor. - -As chief of aircraft production, the defendant regulated the treatment -of foreign forced labor in the German aircraft industry. The defendant -fixed hours of labor and conditions of work and by directives to his -subordinates set basic policies for the handling of this labor within -the industry. - -Where foreign workers refused to work, the defendant ordered that they -be shot. When these wretched slaves attempted to revolt, the defendant -directed that some of their numbers be killed, regardless of personal -guilt or innocence. In the case of prisoners of war who attempted to -escape, the defendant ordered that they be shot. - -When the “contracts” of workers under his control expired, the defendant -ordered their compulsory extension, and when workers attempted to change -jobs, he advocated that they be put in concentration camps. - -In the case of Italians who refused to work, the defendant ordered that -they be beaten and so informed his chief, Goering. And where Frenchmen -refused to work in French factories under his control, the defendant -stated that he would deport them by force and bring them to Germany or -to the East. Similar policies were applied by the defendant in the case -of Polish workers. - -No more need be said about the Generalluftzeugmeister. The Tribunal has -seen the documents containing the minutes of the meetings. The documents -dealing with this phase of the case are particularly revealing in -showing the fanaticism of the defendant and the enthusiasm with which he -recommended ruthless treatment of the hapless victims of German -occupation policies. - -We will now restate the pattern originally presented in terms of the -proof brought forward at the trial in order to ascertain to what extent -the defendant’s culpability has been established with reference to the -medical phase. - -First, the body of the crime. The prosecution contends that in violation -of the laws of war and all the laws of humanity criminal high-altitude -and freezing experiments were carried on by Luftwaffe physicians. - -The testimony of Dr. Erich Hippke, the Medical Inspector of the -Luftwaffe, is of interest on this subject. Hippke stated that Dr. -Rascher, a Luftwaffe physician at the time, came to Hippke with a -proposal to use prisoners as high-altitude experimental subjects in May -1941. - -Hippke was in a receptive frame of mind, for it was essential that the -scope of these experiments be widened and new human subjects were -needed. The researchers working on the tests had developed a certain -immunity so that results of self-experimentation did not give a true -picture of the reactions. - -With the aid of Himmler and the SS, the Luftwaffe was able to proceed -with the experiments which were allegedly necessary in the interests of -German military aviation medical knowledge. But lest one be inclined to -believe that these pressure experiments were considered as minor -nuisances to the subjects concerned, with no real dangers, note the -words of Dr. Hippke: - - “I asked him,” speaking of Rascher, “how he would be able to - obtain such persons for experimentation, and he justified - himself by saying that he had connections with the SS who had - charge of such penal prisoners. There were such penal prisoners - in Dachau and he would be in a position to obtain them for these - purposes. I myself, because of my inner personal feelings on the - matter, was very much against these experiments and could not - make up my mind whether I should approve such experimentation.” - -From the very beginning of the plan to conduct these experiments, Dr. -Hippke had strong mental reservations concerning the moral principles -involved in the task which the Luftwaffe doctors were about to -undertake. During the coming year Hippke weighed the problem, and it was -with some misgiving that he finally allowed his doctors to begin the -experiments, saying to them: “Please, children, go carefully.” - -But, tragically enough, his “children” did not go carefully. Instead, -they ran amuck with their scientific apparatus and tests. The pressure -experiments which were supposed to have been helpful to fliers of the -Luftwaffe degenerated into so-called “X-experiments”, which meant -“execution” experiments. - -Seventy to eighty persons were murdered during the spring and summer of -1942 when the pressure experiments were carried on at Dachau. - -During the subsequent freezing experiments a comparable number of -concentration camp inmates forfeited their lives to the sadistic Dr. -Rascher and his Luftwaffe associates. - -Dr. Romberg himself admits having seen three persons die in the -low-pressure chamber and concedes that at least nine other deaths may -well have occurred when he was absent from his post at Dachau. - -Wolfram Sievers,[145] the manager of the Ahnenerbe, the SS Research -Institute, witnessed the death of an experimental subject in the -freezing tank. - -There is adequate evidence that the low-pressure and freezing -experiments were carried out by Luftwaffe physicians for the benefit of -the Luftwaffe. There has been no valid denial of the fact that the -defendant was the Luftwaffe official responsible for the deaths and -cruelties suffered in these twin torture chambers, the pressure chamber -and the freezing tank. - -Now, let us examine in more detail the second basic charge of the -prosecution, namely, that the defendant was officially connected with -these experiments which violated the laws of war and humanity. - -We have the “Wolffy” letter of 20 May 1942 in which the defendant tells -Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff of the SS that “the altitude experiments -carried out by the SS and the Luftwaffe at Dachau have been finished.” -In this same letter Milch announces that experiments in connection with -perils on the high seas would be important; that the necessary -arrangements have been made and, since the low-pressure chamber is no -longer needed, it must be moved from Dachau. Thus the defendant has -entered the picture and established his official connection with the -high-altitude experiments and the low-temperature experiments, which -proved to be considerably more than mere harmless chilling tests. - -If, as the defendant contends, he was not officially responsible for -these Luftwaffe medical experiments, then it should follow that other -persons connected with them would not take cognizance of the defendant -in this matter. The contention is ridiculous. - -The witness Wolff had the following to say regarding a meeting he had -with Milch in August or September 1942: - - “Thereafter, we had discussed our official questions. I inquired - about how he was, and if everything between the Luftwaffe and - the SS was all right. During that occasion we also spoke about - these experiments very shortly, if at all, and we spoke of the - invaluable help which the SS was giving us by providing these - voluntary inmates, which was helping us with our medical - material which could be used at the front.” - -It is to be noted that they talked about the experiments and Wolff asked -how the Luftwaffe SS relations were. It is submitted that this -demonstrates that Wolff regarded the defendant as the top man in the -Luftwaffe Medical Experiments Program, as indeed he was. - -Then there are the two letters addressed to Milch by Himmler and Wolff, -substantially alike in content; Himmler’s, dated November 1942, in which -he cites the opposition that exists among “Christian medical circles” to -conducting experiments on helpless, involuntary concentration camp -inmates. He refers to the narrow-mindedness of such medical men, which -“will take at least another ten years” to remove. But this -narrow-mindedness did not trouble the consciences of Himmler or the -defendant Milch. Decidedly not. In the words of the Reich Leader SS: “We -two should not get angry about these difficulties.” - -The prosecution submits that Himmler would not have written a letter in -this tenor unless he was certain that his good friend Milch would be in -complete agreement with his views. - -And how did Himmler regard Milch in connection with the experiments? As -a casual onlooker, with a purely academic interest in the results -obtained? No, Himmler knew that Milch possessed the over-all command, -the ultimate authority in the Luftwaffe; that the Inspector General of -the Luftwaffe was the man to refer to whenever a question arose as to -the disposition of the pressure chamber or the status of Dr. Rascher. -Witness Himmler’s request in his letter: - - “I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in the reserve, - from the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen SS. I - would then assume the sole responsibility for having these - experiments made in this field and would put the results, which - we in the SS need only for the frost injuries in the East, - entirely at the disposal of the air force.” - -The logical corollary to this statement is inescapable. _If_ Rascher was -not transferred to the SS and remained with the air force, the -responsibility would not be Himmler’s alone. And we must remember that -Rascher did not leave his Luftwaffe post until the year 1943 _after_ the -experimental atrocities had been largely completed. Then where did this -responsibility rest? Himmler had no doubts; it was on the shoulders of -the defendant. - -Nor did Karl Wolff, Himmler’s right-hand man, have any doubts as to the -responsible person in the Luftwaffe, with reference to the medical -experiments. He, too, wrote to Milch requesting that Rascher be released -from the Luftwaffe and transferred to the SS. Here was a man, who, by -his own testimony, “had a good comradely relationship” with the -defendant. On the direct examination, Wolff testified regarding his -connection with Milch: - - “Q. In your position during the war did you have any official - dealings with Milch? - - “A. Yes. - - “Q. In what connection? - - “A. During peacetime—that is, from 1933 on, until 1939—there - was a personal cooperation between Milch and me. _All - difficulties between the Luftwaffe and the SS were handled at - personal conferences in a very comradely way. This usage also - took place during the war._” - -It is because of the situation above described, that the prosecution has -called Wolff the liaison man between Himmler and the SS on the one hand, -and the defendant and the Luftwaffe, on the other. - -The testimony and affidavit of Walter Neff, the Dachau prisoner who -later became a block leader in Dachau, is of interest. This man saw -Rascher often. Was Milch’s name mentioned by Rascher in connection with -the medical experiments? It was. In his affidavit, which he did not -repudiate when testifying before this Court, Neff said: - - “The name of Field Marshal _Milch_ was frequently mentioned in - Dachau. Every time I asked Dr. Romberg how long the cars and the - low-pressure chambers would remain in Dachau, he assured me that - _Milch_ would attend to everything. Dr. Rascher said to me that - he had communicated with Milch personally and that the cars - would remain in Dachau as long as he specified.” - -Dr. Siegfried Ruff,[146] an important figure in the medical experiments -program, head of the research section of the DVL, recognized the -defendant Milch as the supreme authority in the experimental program. In -his affidavit Ruff said: - - “The entire medical research for aviation was under General Dr. - Erich Hippke, in his capacity as Chief of the Medical Service, - until 1944, and subsequently under Professor Dr. Schroeder. As - Chief of the Medical Service, General Hippke was immediately - subordinate to Field Marshal Milch * * *. The chain of command - for these experiments was Milch—Hippke—Ruff—Romberg.” - -Again there is the chart drawn up by Dr. Oskar Schroeder,[147] outlining -the official Luftwaffe channels through which orders flowed from Milch -to Hippke, and from Hippke to the various doctors engaged in the actual -process of experimentation. Schroeder thus knew definitely that Milch -was the Luftwaffe Chief in the medical experiments program. He later -succeeded Hippke as Medical Inspector. Consequently, his chart is -entitled to material weight in the proof offered by the prosecution. - -Rudolf Brandt,[148] adjutant to Himmler, often had occasion to deal with -correspondence between the Luftwaffe and the SS, regarding the -experiments. In referring to Himmler’s request that Milch order Dr. -Rascher to be transferred to the SS, Brandt wrote a letter to Wolfram -Sievers, of the Ahnenerbe Society, stating— - - “I assume that the _Field Marshal will of himself give the - necessary orders_, and then confine himself to sending a brief - answer to the Reich Leader SS.” - -And Sievers writing to Brandt about the use of the low-pressure chamber -says— - - “The putting at our disposal of the low-pressure chamber, - however, will be possible then _only if the Reich Leader SS - writes in person to Field Marshal Milch concerning this_.” - -These two men, Sievers and Brandt, were not uninformed of the course of -the medical experiments nor of the competent personnel in the Luftwaffe -and SS in this matter. On the contrary, Sievers admitted witnessing the -death of an experimental subject in the freezing tank, and the -subsequent autopsy, while Rudolf Brandt stated in his affidavit— - - “Field Marshal E. Milch and Professor Hippke, Inspector of the - Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, were fully informed about the - low-pressure experiments. Actually these experiments could not - have been conducted without the knowledge and approval of these - men, as they were conducted for the benefit of the Luftwaffe and - the experimenting persons were mostly Luftwaffe physicians.” - -In the eyes of other persons, the defendant was the dominant force -behind the Luftwaffe participation in the Medical Experiments Program. -The defense has brought forward no adequate proof to show that they were -mistaken. It is the conviction of the prosecution that no such proof -exists. - -The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, -was thoroughly familiar with the organization which was his brain child, -the Luftwaffe, and the way it functioned. What importance did Milch’s -position have in Goering’s mind? - -His affidavit reads— - - “Included among the responsibilities of the Office of the - Inspector General was the conduct of all research and - experiments and of all matters pertaining to health and - sanitation inspection * * *. - - * * * * * - - “That Generaloberstabsarzt Erich Hippke was the Sanitation - Inspector of the Luftwaffe during the period from 1941 through - 1944; that the Office of the Sanitation Inspector was directly - responsible for the conduct of all research and medical - experiments; that the Office of the Sanitation Inspector, of - which Generaloberstabsarzt Erich Hippke was the head, was - directly subordinate to the Inspector General, former Field - Marshal Milch, and that former Field Marshal Milch was - responsible for all action taken by Generaloberstabsarzt Hippke, - or by the Office of the Sanitation Inspector or its - subordinates.” - -It has been established that criminal experiments, high-altitude and -freezing, were carried on at Dachau by Luftwaffe physicians, working -under the orders and supervision of competent Luftwaffe authorities. - -We have shown that all Luftwaffe personnel connected with, or knowing -about these experiments, from those closest to the place where the -experiments were conducted—Dr. Rascher, and Walter Neff—to those high -up in the positions of command—Goering and Schroeder—looked to Milch -as the ultimate authority in the Medical Experiments Program. An -investigation of the attitudes and convictions of the SS officials -concerned in this program discloses the same picture. - -Could all these men have been mistaken? Were they writing to and -referring to the wrong man when they contacted the defendant? To put -forward such a proposition is to deny the facts. There was no error, the -facts are indisputable. - -The defendant was and is officially responsible for the Medical -Experiments Program of the Luftwaffe. - -Lastly, we come to the question of the defendant’s knowledge of the -experiments which were being carried out at Dachau for the Luftwaffe. - -Throughout direct examination by his defense counsel, the defendant has -consistently denied receiving reports authored by Rascher or in any -other way being informed of the criminal nature of those experiments, -until the time of this trial. - -However, he was very much interested in altitude experiments as such. -The following excerpt is from his testimony under questioning by Dr. -Bergold: - - “Q. Witness, how far were you interested in these high-altitude - experiments in question as GL? - - “A. We were interested in the real altitude tests as I know it - exactly, because I want to state this figure as 13,500 meters, - and we added 500 meters in order to get a square figure. - However, we knew that this last 500 meters, which I have - mentioned, we were not too interested in that. We were only - interested in the first place in cabin planes, too, after a - certain test had been carried out on 388-cabin suits, whether it - did not succeed or fail, because a person could not move - properly the way those suits were, due to low pressure up there - in the air is felt much more than here on the ground.” - -The Tribunal’s attention is directed to this figure of 14,000 meters, -which is approximately ten miles. Milch wanted that altitude simulated -in the pressure chamber and the human reactions studied. - -It was on 20 May 1942 that Milch wrote his letter to Wolff. Here he said -that Hippke had reported to him that the altitude experiments carried -out by the SS and Luftwaffe at Dachau were finished. Mention was made of -Rascher’s availability for the forthcoming experiments dealing with sea -perils. And Milch stated that the low-pressure chamber could no longer -remain at Dachau. In this one letter, the defendant demonstrates his -knowledge that the SS and the Luftwaffe were conducting, and had -completed, altitude experiments at Dachau and that Dr. Rascher was -involved. - -There is the letter of 4 June 1942 to Hippke, wherein the defendant -exhibits his authority in regard to the low-pressure chamber and the -tasks of Dr. Rascher. - -On 25 August 1942, Himmler wrote to the defendant enclosing the report -on the high-altitude experiments. Moreover, he asked Milch to receive -Drs. Rascher and Romberg for a lecture and presentation of the film on -the experiments. Himmler suggested that Milch refer the matter to the -Reich Marshal “because of its importance”. - -This last statement should dispel any possible doubts as to the -attention accorded these experiments by official German military -circles. In fact, the defendant himself admitted discussing the -experiments with Goering on 13 September 1942. The defendant spoke of -Himmler’s interest in the program, and the apprehension felt by the -Medical Inspector Hippke, although “he did tell me that everything was -all right.” The disposal of the pressure chamber was settled in this -talk with Goering. - -The defendant has said that the experiments, reports, and other aspects -of the matter were not known to him, partly because he had no time for -this, and partly because he had no technical knowledge of the subject. -He would have this Court believe that the experimental program was a -minor matter—one that the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe would not -pay close attention to. Yet we have seen that it was important enough so -that Himmler was frequently corresponding with the defendant or others -on the subject. It was important enough for the defendant to bring the -matter to Goering’s attention, even to the details of the disposition of -the low-pressure chamber. - -On 31 August 1942, the defendant wrote to Himmler, acknowledging receipt -of the report on altitude experiments, and telling Himmler that he was -“informed about the current experiments”. - -While on the stand the defendant attempted to explain this letter by -referring to the usage of German Ministries, where the form “I” means -the Ministry as such. But he admitted that he had written the closing -sentences of this letter “I remain yours, as ever, etc.” Here he did not -deny that “I” was used in its ordinary sense. It is neither logical nor -capable of belief that in the same letter to Himmler, defendant would -use the word “I” in two different senses. - -It was also on 31 August 1942 that Hippke discussed the experiments with -the defendant, expressing _doubts_ and _misgivings_. In reply to Milch’s -question, Hippke told him that these doubts had not been substantiated. - -Thus it can be seen, from Milch’s testimony itself, that a cloud of -suspicion and evil hovered over the entire Medical Experiments Program. - -It is useless, indeed futile, to punish the perpetrators of criminal -acts on the one hand, and to ignore those in high positions who have -made possible the commission of the crimes. The defendant has belabored -the term “duty” in the course of his testimony. He has spoken of his -solemn oath to Hitler and to the German people. It would seem that it -was incumbent upon the defendant to acquaint himself with the activities -of his subordinates, at least to the extent that he should have known -that people were being murdered in experiments, which from the evidence, -were useless as far as the advancement of the knowledge of aviation -medicine is concerned. - -The present case is not without judicial precedent. A close analogy can -be drawn between it and a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of -the United States, _in re Yamashita_ [U. S. Reports, Vol. 327, October -term 1945, Nos. 61 and 672]. The procedural and jurisdictional questions -therein decided are of no moment to us now, but the facts of the -Yamashita case are similar to those of the Milch case, and the opinion -rendered by the Court is particularly in point in the matter of -responsibility for senior officers. - -General Yamashita was the Commanding General of the 14th Army Group of -the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines. - -Upon surrendering to United States Forces, he was indicted and tried as -a war criminal before a Military Tribunal on the following -charge—“while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United -States of America and its Allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to -discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members -of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other -high crimes against people of the United States and of its Allies and -dependencies, particularly the Philippines, and he * * * thereby -violated the laws of war.” - -The Court summed up the issue as follows: - - “The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army - commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within - his power to control the troops under his command for the - prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law - of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile - territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be - charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take - such measures when violations result.” - -The Court cited Articles 1 and 43 of the Fourth Hague Convention of -1907, Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, and Article 26 of the -Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929. It then stated— - - “These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time - specified was Military Governor of the Philippines, as well as - commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take - such measures as were within his power, and appropriate in the - circumstances, to protect prisoners of war and the civilian - population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore - been recognized and its breach penalized by our own military - tribunals.” - -The Court thereupon denied the petition for certiorari and leave to file -petitions, for writs of habeas corpus, and prohibition. - -In the case of the medical experiments, we have a much less complex -situation. There is no question of a senior officer in an occupied -country, rather we are faced with a simple direct chain of command -problem: Milch—Foerster—Hippke. Had Milch given the order, the -experiments would have been terminated, but no order of termination was -given—people were murdered and Rascher remained in the Luftwaffe until -he was transferred to the SS in March 1943. The defendant had an -affirmative duty to know what was going on, and an affirmative duty to -act so as to stop the experiments. That he was ignorant of the true -state of affairs is unbelievable in view of the letters and the -testimony of those who were below him. Field marshals are not made as -are noncommissioned officers. The road is a long one in any army from -the position of private to the lofty peak of a field marshal. The -defendant would have you believe that his powers were similar to those -of a private first class. Yet we have seen him, high in the councils, a -confidant of Hitler, one who could disagree with Goering, whose deputy -he was on occasion, a man who was so thoroughly skilled a soldier that -he seriously requested an assignment as a division commander, although -his service had been in the air force for a decade prior to the request. -If the defendant was not the responsible officer in connection with the -medical experiments, then the scourge of the Wehrmacht has not touched -the continent of Europe. There is no one who knows better than the -defendant the principle of responsibility in any army. By holding the -office which he held, he had the duty to control the activities of those -who were his subordinates, to insure that they conducted themselves as -soldiers and not as murderers. He has failed woefully in the task. - -We have concluded now our remarks regarding the criminal activities of -the defendant in his various capacities with respect to the slave labor -program and the medical experiments. It remains only for us to deal -briefly with the defendant’s participation in the murder of two Russian -escapees, to discuss his defense of irresponsibility because of a bad -temper, to discuss the use of PW’s, and to touch upon the testimony of -some of the witnesses who appeared in his behalf, and the record of the -meeting of 23 May 1939. - -The defendant has maintained that he knew nothing about the shooting of -the two Russian officers who attempted to escape in February 1944. We -have his own statement, made at a time when the general situation, from -the Wehrmacht’s point of view, was acute but not forlorn. The -International Military Tribunal has stated in its judgment concerning -Fritz Sauckel,[149] speaking of a statement made by Sauckel at a Central -Planning Board meeting, “Although he now claims that the statement is -not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the -evidence presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was -substantially accurate.” The word “circumstances” as there used refers -to a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944. Milch made -his statement at the prior meeting held on 16 February 1944 (53d). The -letters submitted by the defense in connection with this episode are -interesting. The first and second from Schmidtke on 10 January, and from -Gangolf on 13 January, refer to a similar incident other than that with -which we are here concerned. The third letter from Winterstein on 12 -January says nothing about the deaths. The affidavit of Prell, other -than stating that the deaths occurred on a Saturday, is of no value. The -witness Barthelmess, who made an affidavit though a resident of -Nuernberg, was not called. The affidavits of Klein and Popp were -offered; each is in a prison camp in the American Zone, yet neither was -called. The letter of Janko recites the facts in a context suggestive of -the words used by the defendant when he described the incident in the -53d meeting of the Central Planning Board on 16 February 1944. Here, -too, it is submitted that the circumstances under which the statement -was made leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate. The -defendant boasted of his prowess as a commander who ordered executions -when he would impress those who curried his favor at the Central -Planning Board meetings, but now he says he had no authority to give -orders and if he had given them, they would not have been obeyed. - -The defendant has offered, as a plausible reason for the employment of -Russian, French, and Italian prisoners of war, the fact that various -historical events made it unnecessary to abide by the terms of the -convention concerning prisoners of war. The witness von Neurath -testified that Russia had renounced the conventions in question, and -hence Germany could renounce them as to Russia. As for France, it is -contended that the alleged government headed by Pierre Laval had -concluded an arrangement with the Reich which made it legal to employ -prisoners of war in tasks forbidden by the Conventions. A similar reason -is advanced for the use of Italian prisoners, the concluding of an -arrangement between the Reich and Mussolini. The International Military -Tribunal made a finding with respect to this matter.[150] - - “The argument in defense of the charge with regard to the murder - and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, that the U.S.S.R. - was not a party to the Geneva Convention, is quite without - foundation. On 15 September 1941 Admiral Canaris protested - against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of - war, signed by General Reinecke on 8 September 1941.” - -I might add that Admiral Canaris was a member of the German Navy. -Resuming the quotation— - - “He”—Canaris—“then stated, ‘The Geneva Convention for the - treatment of prisoners of war is not binding in the relationship - between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Therefore only the principles - of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of - war apply. Since the 18th century these have gradually been - established along the lines that war captivity is neither - revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only - purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further - participation in the war. This principle was developed in - accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary - to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people * * *. - The decrees for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war - enclosed are based on a fundamentally different viewpoint.’ - - “This protest, which correctly stated the legal position, was - ignored”. - -The defendant was a soldier of some experience, he knew it was improper, -even criminal, to have the Russian prisoners work in the Luftwaffe -factories, but he paid no attention to the breach of this duty of the -soldier. The manner in which the Reich bludgeoned a treaty from the -French is too well known to warrant discussion. It cannot be contended -with any seriousness that the French prisoners of war, who were -negotiated into slavery by a puppet government, were voluntary employees -of the Germans. Indeed the witness Le Friec has testified that when he -was taken to work in the airplane factory, he was told that he would -“work on baby carriages”. The position of the defendant with reference -to Italian prisoners of war and their illegal employment is still more -absurd, if that is possible. The Wehrmacht had moved into Italy early in -the war, and in 1943, when the Badoglio government concluded an -armistice with the Allies, the Wehrmacht continued to occupy the -northern part of Italy as an occupying power. They allegedly made a -treaty with the by then tottering shadow of the former sawdust Cæsar and -proceeded to bring the Italian prisoners of war to the Reich to work. -Here again the soldiery had been sold into bondage by their former -chief. The record shows that the Russian, French, and Italian prisoners -of war were used to work in airplane factories. Whether they made the -fighter plane, Me 109, or the jet fighter, Me 262, or the transport -plane, Ju 52, is of little moment. In the total warfare in which the -Reich was engaged, there is one certainty, that nothing was being -constructed which was not part of the war armament program. - -The International Military Tribunal stated in this connection—[151] - - “Many of the prisoners of war were assigned to work directly - related to military operations, in violation of Article 31 of - the Geneva Convention. They were put to work in munitions - factories and even made to load bombers, to carry ammunition and - to dig trenches, often under the most hazardous conditions. This - condition applied particularly to Soviet prisoners of war. On 16 - February 1943, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, * * * - Milch said: ‘We have made a request for an order that a certain - percentage of men in the Ack-Ack artillery must be Russians; - 50,000 will be taken altogether. Thirty thousand are already - employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing, that the Russians - must work the guns’”. - -That every aircraft factory in the Reich had antiaircraft batteries to -protect it goes without saying. Who would know better than the defendant -that such use was made of the Soviet prisoners of war? Further, this -type of artillery was a part of the Luftwaffe and not a separate branch -in the ground forces, as it is in the U.S. Army. The witness Foerster -has testified that Soviet prisoners of war worked at the gun positions. -If the number two man in the German air force could not have done -anything toward arranging that the prisoners of war did not work in the -factories, or work the guns, then no one in the Wehrmacht could have -done anything about the situation. - -We have heard much of the defendant’s violent temper and the resulting -statements which, witnesses assert, were never taken seriously by those -who heard them. The explanations offered by the defense are as frivolous -as the alleged outbursts were frequent. It would have been difficult, if -not impossible, for one who occupied the positions held by the -defendant, to accomplish anything if his subordinates had to sift all of -the strong statements he made, in an effort to determine which of them -were seriously said. Further, his strong statements about the -procurement and treatment of laborers are closely aligned with the grim -reality as we have seen it. We submit that this man of violent temper -believed in, and consciously advocated, the ruthless measures he -recommended, and that his subordinates, to the best of their ability, -complied with his recommendations. It is not reasonable to assume that -one with his power could have made statements, of the kind of which we -have heard here, and that he would then rely on the good offices of -those who were around him to insure that nothing was done as a result of -these statements. The Reich was not a country of innocent victims of one -tyrant, but rather it was composed of a series of tyrants, each like the -master tyrant, each with his own group of subordinates, who carried out -the wishes and whims of their respective chiefs. If all men who held -positions of authority in the Reich are to be believed when they say -that they were personally opposed to criminal excesses, then we have the -fantastic conclusion that these crimes were committed in the face of -influential and unanimous opposition. - -The witnesses produced by the defense left a little to be desired. -Without indulging in exhaustive detail, a few statements made by some -are worth comment. - -The witness Koenig said that he didn’t know Himmler was head of the SS -until 1945. - -The witness von Brauchitsch did not know families were broken up and -sent to concentration camps. It was this man, the aid to Goering, who -passed on the Terboven letter of May 1942 to the defendant. The Court -will recall that the letter told of the attempted escape and the -resulting concentration camp detention of the Norwegians. It was the -defendant who said that an attempt to escape by a prisoner of war is an -honorable thing. Would not a similar effort on the part of some -Norwegians merit something less than a concentration camp? Brauchitsch -had said a little earlier that he did not know that foreigners were in -concentration camps. - -The witness Felmy has stated that some Yugoslav partisans were sent to -Germany as laborers. - -The witness Schniewind, who was present at the conference of 23 May -1939, did not under any circumstances gain the impression that -aggression was announced. - -The witness Vorwald, a subordinate of the defendant and hence his -concern for these proceedings, may be assumed as being something short -of disinterested, was thoroughly glib and exceptionally agreeable. He -even agreed with the statement, on cross-examination, that the forces of -the Reich were no longer in Africa in 1943. It is a matter of historical -record that the invasion of that Continent began in November 1942 and -that the campaign was concluded in the spring of the following year. - -The witness Koerner, still laboring under the spell of the former -leaders, stated that he believed Goering to be the last great man of the -Renaissance. - -The last witness of whom we shall speak is Karl Wolff. In his affidavit -he spoke of meetings between Himmler and Milch over coffee and cigars. -He spoke of the great cultural works of the SS. Was he speaking of -Dachau and Mauthausen? With some vehemence, he insisted that he had -deported only 1,050 Jews from all of Italy. He knew nothing of Dachau -that led him to believe that anything unusual was happening there; -although he did say that, in his visit there in 1942, the place was so -clean that one could have eaten from the floor. - -These represent a fair cross section of the witnesses, all of whom had -roles of varying importance in the tragedy with which we are here -concerned. Even as the defendant contends that he knew nothing of what -went on, so do they echo the same refrain. - -Much time has been spent in attempting to discredit the Schmundt record -of the 23 May 1939 meeting. The Court is familiar with the findings -which have been made by the International Military Tribunal on this -subject. There has been no additional light thrown on the matter by the -evidence here presented to indicate that the Schmundt record is anything -other than a correct record of the events which transpired at the -meeting. - -We wish to discuss now in conclusion one document offered by the -prosecution. This we have saved until the last because we believe that -of all the evidence presented by the prosecution it is most typical of -the defendant as a man and as a Nazi. We refer to the minutes of the -conference of air force engineers and others which was presided over and -was addressed by the defendant on 25 March 1944. This document, like so -many others in this case, was initialed by the defendant. - -The defendant stated that, as of the date of the conference, “We have in -our employ today approximately 60 percent foreigners * * *.” - -He continued, “The ratio is gradually approaching 90 percent foreigners, -with 10 percent German managers.” - -These are statements by a man who said he did not know about the extent -to which foreign labor was used in his own industry, let alone in -Germany. He stated that— - - “The Fuehrer order provides clearly that the fighter plane - program, which the Jaegerstab is starting, has priority over all - other fields of armament * * *.” - -He showed knowledge of the production of tanks and infantry munitions. -He spoke of having the air force production “to an extent safely -underground” in four months’ time. It is here that he stated that he was -head of the Jaegerstab and that Saur was his deputy and Chief of Staff. -Touching on his conferences with the various plant officials, he -stated— - - “On the spot the individual gentlemen are then told—supported - by the combined authority of the State, the Wehrmacht, and the - Party, that is Saur and me, Speer is unfortunately still on sick - leave, otherwise he would also be present—what it is all - about.” - -He commented on labor— - - “Thus, all pertinent questions are dealt with in the conferences - about the commitment of labor and all competent men, who have - anything to do with the commitment of labor, meet, especially - the president of the competent provincial labor office. Thus it - is determined on the spot, in the individual spheres, what the - factory lacks.” - -This is the man who has constantly maintained that he had nothing to do -with labor. One can readily imagine a session between the Luftwaffe -field marshal and a labor office chief. - -We have heard the defendant deny and re-deny any knowledge of the slave -labor program as such, let alone the extent to which it went. It is our -contention that anybody who walked the streets of Germany could not have -failed to have become aware of the activities which were being carried -on by Sauckel and his henchmen. - -He makes an interesting reference to bureaucracy: - - “It is an error to believe that civilian offices are more - bureaucratic than military offices. On the basis of my - continuous and extensive experience, I can assure you exactly - the opposite is true.” - -This from one who would have the Tribunal believe that his staff and -officers were one big happy family who ran things in a rather casual -catch-as-catch-can fashion. - -Speaking of the arrival of laborers, he said— - - “In brief, the people arrive there and are put to work there. If - any doubts exist as to whether a request is justified—for the - people are not requested by numbers, but as electricians, - blacksmiths, fitters, turners, as unskilled laborers, as - foreigners—then this is settled. If the result shows that the - request for people is not justified, then the matter is referred - to a commission and this commission examines the facts within 48 - hours. If it becomes apparent that dirty dealings are going on, - my special court martial is called into play, and it hands down - a quick decision.” - -This from a man who has stated that he had no power to give orders. He -stated further, “the normal work week in our industry is 72 hours.” The -witness Krysiak testified that they worked 84 hours at the factory where -the Mauthausen inmates were employed. - -Speaking of the difficulties that resulted from the hoarding of spare -parts by the various foremen, he said— - - “Now it is your task to teach these people some sense and to put - the entire system of hoarding on a sensible basis. I therefore - ask you, as the senior authorities in the field: teach that to - these people by force. There is no sense in writing letters. - Such letters are not read. They would not understand them - anyhow.” - -The wish of a field marshal is as an order, and he advocated the use of -force on his own people. The extent to which he urged that they go was -expressed a few lines further on when he stated— - - “Whoever hoards supplies must be punished immediately. By - punishment I also mean shooting. For if these people are told - what is at issue here, and they still try to hide parts of their - supplies or to cover them up, that is dirty dealing and a crime - against Germany. I want to say that very clearly and I want to - say it in very sincere words, so that you yourselves will - realize that we are dealing here with a question which is of - decisive importance for Germany’s well-being, that we are not - dealing with an ordinary point of discussion but with a question - which decides about the life and death of Germany.” - -He advocated killing Germans, not slackers but hoarders. He consciously -used strong language, yet he would have it believed that he never spoke -harshly except in a rage and that nothing ever came from his outbursts. -He indicated knowledge of the overall figures on the breakdown of -working hours. - - “In considering the figures one has to know that 52 percent of - the total man-hours are spent in equipping a plane and only 48 - percent in building the aircraft frame and engine.” - -He has said that he was powerless to do anything about requests from -industry, yet he stated— - - “If I want something from industry, then industry comes and - says, ‘Yes, I have those and those requests.’ Only then can I do - what you want.” - -He again speaks of the death penalty when he says— - - “Gentlemen, in this connection I may call your attention to - another important point. If I visit an office and find out that - something is being hidden there, then I ask for the death - penalty for such a crime today. That is fraud. That is sabotage - of the German armament industry.” - -Can it be seriously contended that these words were regarded by the -listeners as mere outbursts? - -Next we have another illuminating passage on his attitude toward -prisoners of war. - - “Then there is still the human factor. We often had considerable - difficulty with the human factor. The fluctuation there is very - considerable. The quota of the Luftwaffe in the distribution of - manpower was considerably lowered. The foreigners run away. They - do not keep any contract. There are difficulties with Frenchmen, - Italians, Dutch. The prisoners of war are partly unruly and - fresh. The people are also supposed to be carrying on sabotage. - These elements cannot be made more efficient by small means. - They are just not handled strictly enough. If a decent foreman - would sock one of those unruly guys because the fellow won’t - work, the situation would soon change. International law cannot - be observed here. I have asserted myself very strongly and, with - the help of Saur, I have represented the point of view very - strongly that the prisoners, with the exception of the English - and the Americans, should be taken away from the military - authorities. The soldiers are not in a position, as experience - has shown, to cope with these fellows who know all the answers. - I shall take very strict measures here and shall put such a - prisoner of war before my court martial. If he has committed - sabotage or refused to work, I will have him hanged right in his - own factory. I am convinced that that will not be without - effect.” - -These words are strangely reminiscent of his speech at the 53d meeting -of the Central Planning Board. He knew he had advocated and participated -in flagrant violations of international law and here he went on record -on this subject. - -We see the defendant making a “big request” of the Quartermaster General -and calling for “energetic action” by the chief of supply. This was a -meeting of considerable moment and these statements did not go unheeded. - -He spoke of the laborers. - - “* * * We in the Luftwaffe armament industry have Russians, - French prisoners of war, Dutch, and members of 32 other nations. - The obtaining of interpreters alone presents a big difficulty - there.” - -Then he adds— - - “We, the Quartermaster General and Generalluftzeugmeister, have - already agreed that we are to balance the personnel also. Above - all it is necessary that the member of the troops be treated in - exactly the same way as the industrial worker.” - -We have a strong statement concerning the feelings of the German worker. -He said— - - “By unjust treatment the German worker means that the treatment - is not the same for all. That is what makes the German worker - indignant. He wants everyone to be treated the same way. He - wants justice and does not want to be ill-treated in words or - any other way. He cannot stand it and he is right in not being - able to stand it.” - -The defendant advocated that the German worker be carefully handled. The -Tribunal has heard from the witnesses Ferrier, Le Friec, and Krysiak how -the foreign workers were handled. - -He outlined the working program for the Easter week end— - - “Finally I ask that the troops receive the fundamental order to - work on Good Friday, the Saturday before Easter, and on Easter - Monday in the same way as the people in the factories. The - soldiers just do not have to go on furlough either. They must be - told why.” - -Are these the words of a man who is without authority to issue orders -concerning the troops? - -He acknowledged his employment of Russian prisoners of war and advocated -that shirkers among the factory laborers be whipped back to their jobs. -He said— - - “I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all - the rabble that we have among the foreign workers there is of - course a lot of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is, - the Russian prisoners of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and - illness. The incidence of sickness of one and a half to two - percent which we have had up to now has at least doubled, and in - some factories it has been increased to eight, nine, and ten - percent. That is, of course, done by previous agreement. There - the official physicians must undertake an examination and if the - physicians, who have to be very strict, find out that it is not - true, then we return the fellows to work by means of the whip. - Then the whip serves as cure.” - -He again spoke of orders that have been given. - - “If the factory knows: Now we are going to be attacked, and it - has a few trench shelters but does not have a bombproof shelter - or the like, then the people simply ran away from the factory - automatically at each raid after the first one, and they could - usually not be caught the next day either. That applies - particularly to the foreigners. We have therefore now issued the - following order, and have equipped the superiors accordingly - with weapons and pistols: As soon as a factory which has already - been attacked a few times can count on the raid’s being aimed at - that particular factory again, then the personnel leave the - factory, but in closed groups by shops, under the leadership of - the man in charge of the shop, and, to the extent that they are - German personnel, they leave singing military songs.” - -Are superiors armed with weapons and pistols to lead contented German -workers away from a factory in case of an air-raid? Little wonder that -the foreigners who had been brought in like chattels ran away when the -opportunity presented itself. Were these workers who were fleeing, -voluntary workers? - -Commenting on the gravity of the task of fighter production, and the -importance of the months of April and May 1944, he said— - - “That will be decided in six to eight weeks. If we succeed in - this, then we will once again have time to carry out all the - other tasks and jobs of this war and can also achieve greater - successes in other fields.” - -Were the “other fields” tasks to be accomplished in the sowing of seeds -of the Reich’s culture? - -The defendant has said that he knew nothing about the living conditions -of the foreigners. It is obvious that he knew something, for he said— - - “I also ask you to be of considerable assistance in the question - of lodging in connection with the question of the relationship - between our military personnel at the airfields and the workers. - If we bring the people over to work, we also have to provide - them with places to live. As far as foreigners are concerned, - this has to be done in some suitable way. They cannot be put - together with our people, just like that. But they should not be - so far away from the airfield that one cannot get them to work - at all.” - -No, don’t let them live with the native workers, but be sure that they -live close enough to the factory so that they can put in their 72 hours -a week! - -The importance of the fighter program is emphasized when he said— - - “There are no laws of bureaucracy, there are no regulations, - there is nothing at all as important as the task of winning the - war.” - -The defendant could not agree with anything that Hitler stood for after -March 1943. He was trying to get out, but here he speaks of Hitler and -his henchmen—men who, he said, were leading Germany to certain -catastrophe: - - “It is quite surprising how the population has endured this - thing so far and how it always gets on its feet again when it is - led in the proper way by true leaders who, thank God, are - present among the people through the Party and the rest of the - leadership. But you must not forget, gentlemen, war nerves have - reached a point which cause us in the leadership group worry.” - -He has said that he was not a wholehearted Nazi, but here he referred to -himself as one of the true leaders and this at a time when the hands on -the clock tolling the hours of the Reich were approaching twelve. Yet he -would have you believe that he was a minor man. - -He did not confine his speaking efforts solely to the Luftwaffe; he was -one of the leaders, and as such it was natural that he should address -the armament feeder industry. On that subject he said— - - “What I am telling you today was told the other day to the - entire armament feeder industry—that includes the blacksmiths, - foundries, crankshaft workers of the iron producing industry, - etc. They were likewise exhorted to produce the maximum. In the - same way the Gauleitungen, all of the provincial offices, - wherever we were, were addressed by us to that effect. But - everyone considers that if he does not do his duty, we do not - ask whether there is a law, we ask only that he is the - responsible one, and that we will seize him no matter who he - is.” - -His first peroration is indicative of his attitude. - - “Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down who - blocks your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask - whether he is allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For - us, there is nothing but this one task. We are fanatics in this - sphere. We do not even consider letting anything at all distract - us from that task. No order exists which could prevent me from - fulfilling this task. Nor shall I ever be given such an order.” - -Yes, the defendant was a fanatic. Too, he was one who could cover up. It -was a willful man who could say that. - -There is an interesting statement concerning the number of employees of -the Luftwaffe. The defendant set it at 1.8 million. This is somewhat in -excess of the .5 million figure that one witness mentioned. - -It has been insisted that he had nothing to do with labor, it has been -insisted that he could give no orders, yet in his second peroration to -the same speech, he said— - - “We have given orders that will make you laugh. Some labor - control office or other suddenly declared that the Jaegerstab - was not entitled, according to paragraph so-and-so, to establish - a 72-hour workweek; it was not valid. I said: The gentleman is - herewith informed, if he should say such a thing once more, he - will be picked up; I have excellent cellars in this house. Then - the opposition disappears immediately. But you have to count on - such things, and the difficulty for you is that, in order to get - through all the junk, one should clean out, first of all, a - whole lot of little pigsties. Something will come out of this - whole affair with us, yet. Whoever of my technical people from - the Ministry does not earn his keep with the Jaegerstab now, and - does not cooperate, I guarantee that he will never appear again - in this Ministry, in the machine where I give the orders.” - -Is this the man who said he could not have people sent to concentration -camps? The witness Krysiak was “picked up” for having said in 1940 that -Germany would lose the war. He was arrested by the Gestapo as the result -of a private conversation. It is unbelievable that a field marshal could -not, and did not, exercise the same power. - -Today is the third anniversary of the speech of 25 March 1944 made by -the defendant. His closing remarks on that day detail decisively the -philosophy of the then field marshal of the Luftwaffe. Those assembled -had been listening to their chief since midmorning. The hour was late. -The hands of the clock were past twelve. Germany was in the fifth year -of war. The defendant was concluding his speech. He said— - - “Gentlemen, I know, not every subordinate can say: for me the - law no longer exists, but he has to have someone who covers up - for him. Not out of cowardice, but if you act according to the - spirit of the old field service regulation, ‘Abstaining from - doing something hurts us more than erring in the choice of the - means’, and if, moreover, you keep in touch and immediately - clarify difficult points so that something can be done, then we - are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the - law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany; - either we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these - slipshod methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer - to fall, while I am doing something that is against the rules - but that is right and sensible, and be called to account for it, - and, if you like, hanged, rather than be hanged because Papa - Stalin is here in Berlin or the Englishmen. I have no desire for - that. I would rather die in a different way. But I think we can - accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth year of war—I - repeat: The decision will come during the next six weeks. Heil - Hitler!” - -The time is at hand for another decision, a decision which will follow -the dictates of sound reason. The record which will be made by this -Tribunal and its judgment will be one that shall give courage to -peaceful free men everywhere. Indeed, the defendant is fortunate that -the decision in the present case is in the hands of those who do believe -that the law exists and will continue to exist. There is no place for -passion or for prejudice in the ceaseless tasks, the seeking of truth -and the establishing of justice. - ------ - -[143] Mr. Clark Denney delivered the closing statement before the -Tribunal on 25 March 1947, Tr. pp. 2436-2488. - -[144] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 306, Nuremberg, 1947. - -[145] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See -Vol. I. - -[146] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See -Vol. I. - -[147] Same as preceeding footnote. - -[148] Same as preceeding footnote. - -[149] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 321, Nuremberg, 1947. - -[150] Ibid., p. 232. - -[151] Ibid., p. 246. - - - - - B. Closing Statement of the Defense[152] - -DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal. In my opening -statement I drew a picture of the defendant Milch which differs -considerably from the description given by the prosecution. It is my -hope that in the long course of producing evidence I have given proof -that my conception is the full truth. - -According to the testimony of the witness Richter, the affidavit of the -witness von Mueller and according to the defendant Milch’s own -testimony, nobody can doubt that Milch has never been a good National -Socialist. His love for peace and his longing for a final understanding -between the nations of Europe, especially between Belgium, France, -England, and Germany, became completely obvious. No one who believes in -justice would refuse to believe him if he states that he regarded the -war as a misfortune. He was also one of the few intelligent men to admit -Germany’s defeat in the First World War. There was no proof supplied -that in any way prior to 1933 he supported any armaments. His testimony -and military affidavit from von Mueller have shown that under his -management the Luftwaffe was always a peaceful instrument of -communication among the nations. It is to be regretted that the -examination of foreign politicians, such as Van Zeeland, Pierre Cot, and -Delbos, were not permitted, because only then the personality of Milch -would have been shown in its true light. He must have been a peaceful -and just man; otherwise, all these statesmen would not have had -confidence in him. Even the witness delegate Messersmith, whose -affidavit, Document 1760-PS, was introduced in the International -Military Tribunal proceedings, affirmed that Milch condemned the -coercive methods of the Nazis. He was different from the other Party -members, so that after 1937 he lost Goering’s confidence. At that time -he asked to be allowed to retire but in spite of his threat of suicide, -he did not obtain that permission. - -Such a man of such a past must be believed when he testified that even -in 1939 he had no knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive intentions. Milch had -misgivings about Hitler because he regarded the measures taken against -Czechoslovakia as a breach of peace, and he was sufficiently intelligent -to see that Britain would no longer tolerate such violations. Hitler was -dishonest with him and always put before him his intentions for peace, -even forbidding him the manufacture of bombs. The defendant never -requested the manufacture of bombs because he intended to lead a war of -offense, but only because, understanding the international situation, he -was convinced that England would fight against the Nazi regime. - -Up to that time, your Honor, nobody can find any inconsistency in the -defendant’s outlook. It was no offense if he requested a Wehrmacht for -his country in view of the world situation, and therefore he favored a -reasonable rearmament. As long as all nations were peace-minded and -maintained armies, Germany had the right to maintain armed forces as -well. I beg you to remember that the defendant demanded from his -superiors that rearmament should be effected in a slow and reasonable -manner and that he had differences with them on account of this. - -It was not for nothing, your Honor, I repeat that. Only for one to keep -all these things in mind will it be possible to judge whether or not the -defendant’s statement regarding the conference of 23 May 1939 is -correct. A man who loves peace and works for peace was present at that -conference and states today, or testified that the speech in question -did not contain any mention of aggressive war against Poland or any -other country. He even testified in this courtroom that this speech did -not have the contents as it is laid down in the Schmundt protocol. - -I realize that the International Military Tribunal came to the -conclusion that the Schmundt protocol is correct. All defendants and -witnesses who were heard at that time declared that the contents of the -speech were not of so aggressive a nature as it is laid down in the -minutes. The defense counsel made a mistake at that time of not calling -all the witnesses which I requested. Nobody went to the trouble of -critically examining the text of the record. I can understand why the -IMT reached a different conclusion, having heard only the defendants’ -general objection, which remained unsubstantiated in detail. Nowhere is -it yet permissible in law to maintain the verdict of a previous court -when new and better evidence has been submitted. - -The witnesses Warlimont, Schniewind, Engel, and Raeder stated that -several passages of the Schmundt record contained a number of false -assertions regarding Hitler’s words. Warlimont testified that he was not -present, although he is listed as among those present. Milch’s testimony -made it absolutely definite that Goering was not present. If there were -only so few persons present and there were mistakes made concerning the -presence of persons, the record must have been made up a long time after -the event, otherwise no faults of that kind would have been possible. -Schniewind testified that a number of points contained in the Schmundt -record were never discussed at that time at all. He had the opinion that -many ideas laid down in the record were borne out at a later period, -that is to say, 1940. These ideas concerned, for example, the use which -could be made of war production after the defeat of France, the -importance of aircraft carriers for convoys, the collaboration of Italy, -and the break-through of the Maginot Line by this force, about Japan, -and last but not least, the so-called Fuehrer Decree. By the statement -of Felmy it is proved forever that the so-called Fuehrer order was given -only on 12 December 1940. Even Raeder stated that the principles of the -Fuehrer order were laid down at another occasion and that they were -accordingly carried out afterwards. This other occasion was given by the -statement of Felmy. Also Raeder did not hear anything about Japan; he -considered it impossible that Italy and the break-through of the Maginot -Line were discussed and he also states that nobody mentioned a better -production of cruisers. He also testified that in that meeting a -two-front war was not mentioned because he, as an officer, would have -noticed that. Furthermore, he testified that Belgium and Holland were -not referred to and that after the speech Goering did not open a debate. -Even though the witness was not present at all times, it is rather -strange that he should not have heard mention of any of the very points -not heard by the other witnesses. The defendant Milch gave you the -precise details of those points of the speech which were not mentioned -at the time, and he was even in a position to tell you when these -various points were first conceived. - -Who, assuming responsibility for justice, can still seriously maintain -the findings of the IMT now that these precise statements have shown us -the errors of the Schmundt record? A record containing so many grave -mistakes is no longer of probative value and can never be made the basis -for any judgment. I am convinced that after this trial the historians of -the whole world will regard the Schmundt record as the product of a -later period, i.e., between the fall of 1940 and the spring of 1941 and -that they will regard it as the result of time, drawn up to make Hitler, -then regarded as the victor, seem possessed of a prophetic gift which in -reality he never had. - -The conference did take place on 23 May 1939; that is true. Its real -topics, however, can no longer be stated on the basis of the Schmundt -record. Thus, the statements made in the first Nuernberg trial gain a -different and greater significance. Never again, therefore, will it be -possible for anyone to say that on that occasion Hitler preached war and -the enslavement of Europeans. - -There is yet another argument possible against this record, which, it is -alleged, also contains the plan for slave labor. Document EC-194, -Exhibit 8, and 016-PS, Exhibit 13, submitted by the prosecution, show in -all clarity that the use of European peoples in German armament works -was a measure forced by the emergencies of the war and that the idea was -born and realized only by the military difficulties resulting from the -war with Russia. - -With clean hands and a pure heart, Milch entered the war in August 1939 -having previously advised Goering to fly to Britain to prevent the war. -He himself became the victim of Hitler’s deception, and he himself -believed that the war had been forced upon Hitler. Who can disregard -justice to such an extent as to reproach Milch with having held that -belief? It is his misfortune, but not his guilt, to have been deflected -from the truth by misleading propaganda. Who would so misinterpret -patriotism, heretofore regarded as one of man’s noblest instincts, as to -reproach Milch for having done in 1939 his duty as a soldier? - -He never prepared any aggressive wars. In every case he was informed -shortly before the event, and nothing is more typical of the opinion his -superiors held of him than the fact that he chanced to hear about the -preparations for the war against Russia through a subordinate, who had -been told of Hitler’s plan before the field marshal was told. The first -Nuernberg trial has already shown that Milch saw Goering at once in an -effort to prevent that war. Goering himself admitted this. Milch’s good -intentions were of no avail because Goering turned him down. As Milch’s -superior officer, he even went so far as to forbid Milch to see Hitler -and to tell him that he, Goering, would prevent Milch from being -admitted to Hitler’s presence. - -One of your Honors, in putting questions to the defendant, aimed to show -that it might be regarded as incriminating to the defendant that he did -not resign in 1941 or at least in 1943. Your Honors, only if one has -lived in Germany these last years is it possible truly to judge that -problem. As I said in my opening speech, one can judge the man only -against his background, through his upbringing, from which usually -nobody can escape no matter in what country he lives. Milch was brought -up as a soldier. He absorbed ideas which for centuries were regarded as -true and inviolate laws. It is no guilt for him not to have freed -himself from them. I have said this once before. - -At that time nobody in Germany was in a position to protest against -certain events, against certain aims of the Party. All that one could do -was to criticize things within one’s own immediate circle and tell one’s -intimate collaborators how to improve matters. If in Germany anybody had -attempted at any time to express criticism publicly, either by word or -by publicly resigning, nobody would have been the wiser for it. This -system was so ruthless and its stranglehold over public opinion so great -that it would and could suppress anything. - -You need only remember that during the first IMT trial it was shown that -von Papen’s criticism in his Marburg speech was completely withheld from -the German public. Had Milch done anything, nobody would have heard -about it, and his action would have been useless, perhaps senseless, as -nothing would have been changed for the better. Your Honors may not know -that six to eight generals, including General von Falkenhausen, once -Commander in Chief in Belgium, and Colonel General Halder, one of -Germany’s highest and best leaders, were thrown into concentration camps -because they had deviated from Hitler’s line. This is not connected with -20 July 1944. Nobody in Germany knew about this. Pictures of General -Count Sponeck were sold as of a hero two years after this man had -vanished into a concentration camp. Such were the lies and the -deceptions of Goebbels’ propaganda. We have learned since the end of the -war that prior to 20 July 1944, there were 50 to 60 generals in Moabit -prison, without anyone in Germany knowing anything about that. You will -understand the full falsehood of propaganda when you recall the base -distortions by which the dismissals of Generals von Blomberg and von -Fritsch were announced to the German public. - -Believe me, your Honors, protests in Germany were not possible at that -time. The only result would have been the futile death of the protesting -person. If Milch had attempted to fly abroad, his whole family—such -were the detestable methods of those in power—would have been put to -death on the basis of what was known as family responsibility. - -Milch cannot be reproached with not having refused service and -allegiance. No soldier could do this. Should a member of the -Anglo-American Air Forces suddenly have refused to go out on an -operation which would bring death to innocent women and children, he -would not have been regarded as a hero. He would have been put before a -court martial. - -That Milch did not participate in an attempt on Hitler’s life, who would -accuse him of that? Although he was an energetic man, the defendant was, -because of several concussions of the brain which he suffered, inclined -to terrifying fits of rage, or ranting speeches, but the evidence has -shown that in his heart of hearts he was kind and soft. He would -ameliorate sentences already passed, and as the witness Richter -testified, he compensated for a fine, which he inflicted himself, by -secretly passing into the family of the punished man a very large sum of -money, larger than the fine itself. The witness Vorwald expressly stated -that basically Milch was a man soft of heart, who conducted himself -*self soft, who only in a rage caused by disease and worry utters harsh -words never followed by action, is not capable of murder. Thus, no just -man will charge him with not liquidating Hitler, and Milch did what in -his conscience he felt to be possible and necessary. He had the courage -of telling the dictator to his face what he thought of the situation. He -demanded that Hitler desist from his plans, dismiss the most important -men, such as Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, give up the supreme -command, and establish a cabinet of equal powers, and he finally desired -that peace should be brought about. - -Your Honors, it would be easy to say that as a field marshal he did not -thereby endanger himself. The statement of the next witness Krysiak, the -fate of the generals which I mentioned to you, show what was done in -Germany to men who did such things, but the defendant went one step -further. He succeeded in inducing Goering also to demand the end of the -dictatorship and the instituting of a Reich cabinet. Your Honors, this -means that this defendant thereby risked his life. He could not foresee -that nothing would happen to him. That nothing did happen to him was not -due to his rank, but to Hitler’s opinion that this man was not yet -dispensable. Everybody can only be sentenced according to his -potentialities. Your Honors must not compare conditions in your free and -noble country to those in Germany. Only the German world as it was -should be the basis of your judgment here. It is not true to say that -Milch gave his continued support to the objectionable aims of the Party. -He continued to do his duty because, as he testified, he wished to -prevent the worst from happening to his people, the total destruction of -the cities and of Germany’s culture. It was his constant hope to -organize the defense in such manner as to prevent bombing warfare from -taking its full effect, that same bombing warfare which is the scourge -of mankind, whatever one may think of its military value. Would it be -for us to judge him on the fact that he did not obtain his aim because -of the stupidity and failings of his superiors? Milch furthermore -testified before you that by an improved defense he hoped to achieve -better peace terms for his people. I can assure your Honors that since -1941 Goebbels’ propaganda told the German people time and again of the -horrible terms the enemy would impose on them in the event of peace. -That included an item to the effect that the whole of the German male -population would be castrated should Germany lose the war so that the -German people would perish. Who has the courage to say it is despicable -for a man of battle to organize a defensive system under the news impact -of such items in order to obtain better peace terms? - -It would be a distortion to say that Milch thus believed Hitler’s aim of -destroying Europe, for he knew that the war was lost. He was intelligent -enough to see that with the lost war the end of Hitler’s ideology would -come. It was not the Party he wanted to serve when he hoped for less -severe peace terms with a better defense, but a lost war that would not -mean the loss of the legal rights of a whole nation as is the case -unhappily today. Only he who comprehends and understands all these -things can appreciate Milch’s actions and judge them fairly. And later, -when he saw that his objective of saving the German people from the -worst would fail, Milch withdrew from the regime. He could not resign on -his own. That, for a soldier in Germany, was an impossibility. He did -not choose to act dishonorably, which no one can expect from a decent -man. In Germany soldiers are removed from their offices only by their -superiors. Thus, as he put it himself, Milch could only organize his own -elimination from office by gradually transferring his tasks to Speer’s -Ministry. As his superiors thereupon regarded him as superfluous and -were glad to be rid of this man, Milch was finally free. Then began the -scheme on the part of his superiors to liquidate him. Such was the -position of Milch, the man, and such by and large were his motives. For -him to have acted in this and no other way is not dishonorable, and only -he can cast the first stone who never in his born days gave in to public -opinion in defiance of his better judgment, who has never considered his -superiors, and who proved himself to be above his upbringing, and had -the courage of fighting for his convictions even with the most brutal -methods. - -Before dealing with the details of the indictment I should like to make -these basic points. The prosecution created the impression that under -the conspiracy count it would hold Milch responsible for everything in -totality that was done in connection with labor assignments and -experiments within the confines of the Luftwaffe, nay, within the -confines of the German government departments. This is not admissible. -The indictment may be referred to Control Council Law No. 10. Nothing is -mentioned there that conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity or war -crimes constitutes a punishable offense. Only conspiracy against peace -is punishable. The way the law is formulated, particularly count 2 of -Article 2, makes it clear beyond doubt that activities listed therein -only concern participation but no independent types of crime. Where -there is an independent crime then also in the case of war crimes and -crimes against humanity there would have to be a provision similar in -count 1-A, Article 2 of the Control Council law where a crime is defined -as “participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the purpose of -committing one of the crimes above set forth.” In this connection the -verdict of the IMT must also be considered. At the end of the sixth part -of the verdict it states:[153] “Count one, however, charges not only the -conspiracy to commit aggressive war, but also to commit war crimes and -crimes against humanity,” but the Charter does not define as a separate -crime any conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war. -Article 6 of the Charter provides: “Leaders, organizers, instigators, -and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a -common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are -responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such -plan.” In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and -separate crime to those already listed. The words are designed to -establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common plan. -The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in count 1, that the -defendants conspired to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, -and will consider only the common plan to prepare, initiate, and wage -aggressive war. And under figure 8, the IMT states further:[154] “As -heretofore stated, the Charter does not define as a separate crime any -conspiracy except the one set out in Article 6(a) dealing with crimes -against peace.” The verdict was so formulated because the Charter was -unclear at this point. As above stated, the Control Council law contains -no such provisions, so much the less because in this case conspiracy -does not constitute a separate crime. The provision set forth in Article -2, paragraph 2, No. 6, “whoever was connected with this planning or -execution”, is only a form of individual defense and cannot be put on a -par with the concept of the common plan or conspiracy. Article 2 defines -clearly the type of crime referred to in paragraph 1, namely (1) the -individual crime of violation of peace; (2) conspiracy against peace; -(3) individual war crimes; (4) individual crimes against humanity; and -finally, the form of participation in paragraph 2. Therefore, it is -rendered that a so-called conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes -against humanity is not a punishable offense. - -It has to be examined therefore whether Milch made himself guilty of any -individual type of participation. It would have to be shown that either -as a principal or accessory he participated in a crime or that he -especially ordered or initiated it. It would have to be proved that he -gave his approval for a definite crime. That approval, however, cannot -refer to a general approbation but can only be considered as -participation in crime if, by his approval, he strengthened and -stiffened the criminal will of the perpetrators. It must therefore be -made clear that he knew of the individual crimes and that he intended to -put them into action by means of his approval. Even in that case his -subsequent approval would not suffice; since still nowhere in the world -is anyone punished because of an inner or moral attitude. Finally, it -must be examined whether Milch was connected with the planning or -commission of such crimes. Here again it must be understood, of course, -that this connection must be capable of causing the crime, and that -Milch knew about the connection and therefore the crime. The question of -membership in any organization or association which was connected with -the execution of crimes requires special examination. It is clear that -mere membership, as such, in any organization wherein any member may at -one time have committed a punishable act cannot make every other member -of that organization punishable. Otherwise a monstrous situation would -arise where the commander in chief of a large army was punishable if any -member of that army committed a war crime. Where in this world in all -time has it happened that in such a huge organization as wartime armies’ -soldiers did not at one time or another commit punishable acts? This is -inevitable and it occurs in all armies. It can therefore only be a -question here whether the organization or the association of which the -defendant was a member had as its particular purpose the commission of -war crimes or crimes against humanity. - -Letter (_f_) of Article 2, paragraph 2, must be considered here. Since -Milch is not charged with a crime against peace, it would also have to -be especially proved that he participated in the common plan of -conspiracy for the commission of crimes against the peace. That he held -high office cannot of its own make him punishable. This is also evident -from the Tribunal of the IMT who acquitted three persons who held -equally high office in Germany. - -Bearing in mind these points of view, one has to examine the individual -counts of the indictment. In answer to the prosecution’s charge that -Milch in February 1944 had ordered two Russian officers to be shot, -Exhibits Milch 40 to 44, and the testimony of the witness Vorwald have -proven that the said officers were shot on the basis of an expressed -order by Hitler who received, through political channels, the report of -the incident earlier than Milch. Exhibits Milch 40 to 44 and the -testimony of Vorwald have made it clear that Milch, first of all, had no -possibility of issuing such an order, and secondly, that he did not -cause its being ordered, and thirdly, that he only gained knowledge of -the incident after the officers had been shot. - -The witness Vorwald was in a position to testify that Milch even angrily -protested against such an order. - -The passage in the record of the 53d meeting of the Central Planning -Board of 16 February 1944 contained in Defense Exhibit 11, can therefore -not be made the basis for a judgment. Whoever, knowing the German -language, reads the text critically must realize that the utterances of -Milch recorded therein are contradictory in themselves and, therefore, -cannot possibly contain the real statements made by Milch. They are -contradictory to the true course of events; they are contradictory to -Milch’s real authority, and finally, they are contradictory to the inner -attitude of the defendant who himself angrily described this act as a -crime. - -It is significant for the question of the probative value of all -verbatim records submitted to consider that such recording of the true -events is found here. Such records containing such mistakes cannot be -made the basis for a judgment. If we assume, however, that Milch really -made these utterances which are so wrong, then this passage would remove -all doubt that Milch during moments of excitement was no longer master -of his thoughts and words and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for -them. It would be a serious offense against justice, however, if -judgment was to be pronounced on the basis of such stenographic notes -taken by an unknown person who may have been in error. - -Milch is furthermore accused of having abetted, participated in, and -been connected with cruel and inhuman experiments carried out on -concentration camp inmates at Dachau. I believe that here, too, evidence -has shown that Milch is innocent. It has been proved by the clear, -although long-winded, deposition of the witness Hippke that the -defendant had heard for the first time on 31 August 1942 that human -experiments were being carried out on others than the volunteering -members of the Luftwaffe; that is, at a moment when the high-altitude -experiments were already completed and when the freezing experiments -were about to be completed. - -In this connection I recall that the final report on freezing -experiments was available in print already on 10 October 1942, so that -these experiments too must have been completed by a considerably earlier -date. On 31 August 1942, the defendant learned merely from Hippke that -human experiments had been carried out on criminals who had been -sentenced to death and who had volunteered to obtain a pardon. He was -told expressly that nothing had happened so far during these -experiments. It is obvious that experiments as such do not in themselves -constitute an offense against humanity, whether or not they are in use -in some foreign countries. At any rate much evidence has already been -submitted by the defense in the medical trial, proving that, also in -democratic states of the world, experiments have been carried out and -are being carried out on volunteering criminals, experiments which -constitute a danger to the life and health of the experimental subject. - -The prosecutor has submitted in evidence his last exhibit, Document -1971-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 161, showing irrefutably that Himmler too -had ordered that only men sentenced to death are to be used for these -experiments. Hippke did not even misinform Milch. That, besides the -experiments which were of importance to the Luftwaffe, Himmler had also -started secret experiments is shown from this very Exhibit 161 because -therein Himmler directs Rascher to continue these special experiments on -which he had reported to him and even to carry out revival experiments. - -Both witnesses Ruff and Romberg have testified unanimously that nothing -has happened during these experiments. Death casualties had occurred -during Rascher’s own experiments which he carried out on Himmler’s -behalf. Only the aim of these experiments remained unclear to the -witness, which is now being clarified by Exhibit 161, but Milch had no -knowledge of all this. He fully believed what Hippke told him, nor did -he ever have any cause to distrust Hippke and he could not distrust him -more as he knew that high-altitude experiments had already previously -been carried out on Luftwaffe personnel of his own air force without any -danger being involved. Not even Hippke has had any knowledge of -cruelties and death casualties. How much the less can be proved that the -defendant could have had any knowledge. It does not say anything against -the defendant that he had signed already before 31 August 1942 some -letters which had been submitted to him by his offices. Nobody has been -able to state that Milch had dictated these letters at all. It could not -even be proved that he had seen or read the letters from the SS to which -these letters refer. It is impossible for a man who has such a burden of -work and such a large sphere of tasks as the defendant to take care of -every trifling matter in his office, that these letters—which to -anybody who has no knowledge of the underlying facts appear harmless and -unimportant—could also not arouse the defendant’s suspicion. Should he -be charged with responsibility for them then, this would be a -responsibility which could not be borne by anybody. This would mean to -overestimate human working capacity. It is the very idea of any great -organization to relieve the chiefs or the heads of attentions to details -in order to make them free for the main tasks. If such a man were to be -asked to take care of everything, then the organization would be -unsuccessful and no man in the world could form a great work comprising -many people, and no man in the world would be willing to head such an -organization if the chief of the organization should be held responsible -for everything that his subordinate agencies commit. Everybody has the -right generally to trust his subordinates as long as he has no reason to -distrust them. - -Hippke’s descriptions were unimpeachable and gave no reason for -misgivings. His tenure of office at that time was irreproachable so that -Milch had not to distrust Hippke’s activities and all the less so -because already at an earlier date human experiments had been carried -out by the Luftwaffe in a manner above reproach. Milch has testified to -the effect that he had not read the report on high-altitude experiments. -Evidence has shown that he has not seen the film nor could he have cause -for this film to be shown, only if he would have stayed in Berlin, but -he was not even in Berlin on that day; therefore, he could not become -suspicious from what occurred. Likewise Milch never received the report -on freezing experiments nor did he ever get a final report on this -matter. - -Finally, Milch had no reason to distrust the fact that the SS -participated in the experiments. He knew that Hippke was part of it and -was therefore entitled to believe that everything was in order. -Therefore, Milch was neither a principal in nor an accessory to, nor has -he ordered or instigated these experiments. He has never given his -consent to the crimes committed because he had no knowledge whatsoever -of them nor was he connected with their planning or their execution, nor -was he a member of any organization aiming at the commission of such -crimes. It is not the aim of the Luftwaffe to carry out such criminal -experiments, and with the DVL he had nothing to do at all. It is -irrelevant that at that time Rascher was a member of the Luftwaffe. -Exhibit 161 proves that Rascher received the orders to execute the -crimes as a member of the SS from Himmler himself and also carried them -out in that capacity. Finally, it must be said that the Wolff letter of -November 1942 was only written after the crimes were committed. It has -not been proved that Milch ever saw this letter. He was not in Berlin -when the letter arrived. That he has testified. The letter was sent to -the Medical Inspectorate which only answered it in 1943 as Hippke has -testified. Also, the fact that Rascher was transferred to the SS had -nothing to do with the defendant. That was a matter settled outside of -his competency. The personnel chief of the Luftwaffe was at no time -subordinated to him, and it must also be taken into consideration that, -according to the evidence, Milch had no knowledge of Rascher’s having -committed any crimes. One cannot charge Milch with the fact that Rascher -referred to him. The testimony of Neff and Defense Exhibit 56, the -affidavit of Punzengruber, have shown to this Tribunal that Rascher was -a confirmed liar whose statements have no probative value and, -therefore, I believe that Milch in this matter too has shown to this -Tribunal his complete innocence. - -Before I go into the charges against Milch for his participation in the -so-called slave labor program, I must make a few fundamental statements. -I shall begin by examining the question as to what extent the Hague -Convention on land warfare and the Geneva Convention of 1929 were valid -for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war. By the statements of -witness von Neurath, it has been confirmed that the U.S.S.R. in 1919 -specifically withdrew from the Hague Convention on land warfare as well -as the former Geneva Convention. Jurists will not dispute the fact that -a formal withdrawal from agreements is of greater importance in the -relations between states than the act of joining such a convention. Even -if one were of the opinion that the Hague Convention on land warfare and -the Geneva Convention represented merely the codification of already -existing international law, so that the state that did not join the -conventions would also be bound to this already existing international -law in all details, even in such a case the expressly stated withdrawal -from such a convention must mean also a withdrawal from the natural -international law. If this were not the case, the withdrawal from such -conventions would be an act without meaning which such intelligent -politicians as those found in the U.S.S.R. would never undertake. Nor is -this conception of mine contradicted by the expert opinion offered in -the first Nuernberg trial (_Canaris Doc. No. EC-338_)[155] because this -expert opinion is only concerned with the order of Hitler and Keitel -regarding the killing and cruel treatment of prisoners. It is, of -course, clear that inhumane acts do not become permissible because of -withdrawal from conventions. What we must examine here, however, is -purely the question whether or not, and for what activities, such -prisoners of war may be used. Detailed regulations of international law, -which in themselves do not contain atrocities, can in my opinion be -nullified by expressly withdrawing from a convention codifying existing -international law. Finally, we wish to draw attention to Article 82, -paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1929 which contains the -following regulation: “If in wartime one of the belligerents is not a -member of the convention, the regulations of this convention remain -valid, nevertheless, for the belligerents who have signed the -convention.” This does not mean that the signatories are bound to the -Geneva Convention also with regard to the treatment of soldiers of a -nonsignatory power, but only with regard to soldiers of the signatories -who are at war. Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention, -therefore, states that with regard to the relations of nonsignatories -the convention is not valid. The regulation was made so that it should -not be thought that if a nonsignatory participated in the war the Geneva -Convention would not apply to that war. - -That my opinion was shared by the U.S.S.R. becomes clear beyond doubt -from Defense Exhibit 49 presented by me, which contains the decision of -the Council of the Peoples Commissioners of the U.S.S.R. of 1 July 1941. -This decision does not mention any limitation with regard to the use of -prisoners of war for labor except for the regulations under number 25. -According to this, prisoners of war may not be used as workers in the -battle zone nor for the personal needs of the administrations, or by -other prisoners of war (orderly services). Defense Exhibit 51, -concerning employment of German women prisoners of war in Russia, also -reveals the same conception of the U.S.S.R. - -The objections that not Russia’s conception but that of the United -States of America matters here is not justified. Existing regulations -between two states can only be judged on the legal relations valid for -those two states. If both states regulate a given question in agreement -with conclusive acts in the same way, that regulation becomes -international law valid for the relations of those two states and must -be taken into consideration by all other states. It is the right of -sovereign states to regulate their relations as they wish. Other states -have no right to interfere in the right of sovereignty and they must -acquiesce in the legal conception existing between those two states -regarding any issue concerning their citizens. Therefore, legal opinions -of another state must not be taken as a basis for the judging of actions -which occurred between the nationals of these two states. - -As in Milch’s sphere of competency Russian prisoners of war were used -neither at the front nor as orderlies, he cannot be found guilty so far -as the treatment of Russian prisoners of war is concerned. - -All this also applies to the treatment of the Russian civilian -population whose rights could have been cared for by the Hague -Convention for land warfare alone. Here, too, Russia’s express -withdrawal from the convention is of great importance. - -In my opinion it cannot be argued that Germany attacked Russia and that, -for the reason, employment of the civilian population would be illegal -even if this were not illegal in itself. That alone would mean that -Germany would be bound to the regulations and that Russia was not. From -the point of view of international law, this is an impossible situation. -For two belligerent states, there cannot be a different international -law. - -Moreover, the validity of the regulations laid down in the Hague -Convention for land warfare can be cancelled by a special factor which -precludes lawlessness. In all codes of law of the civilized world, the -law of so-called emergency situations exists. This conception of law -must also be applied to international law. That Germany was in an -emergency situation in the sense that the use of the civilian population -for labor in the occupied territories was only caused by the emergency -situation, I showed in detail a little while ago. Modern war means total -war and as such has suspended, in several points, international law as -it existed up to now. It is uncontested that according to the Hague -Convention for land warfare actions of combat against the civilian -population are forbidden. Modern air warfare, having as its aim total -annihilation of armament and production of the enemy, brought with it to -a great extent warfare against the civilian population without any of -the belligerents regarding such combat actions as forbidden according to -the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. This also applies to the total -blockade of a country which aims at starving the population of that -country. These comprehensive ways of waging war which hit all classes of -the population permit, in my opinion, to a state which is at war, -especially on account of the fact that its civilian population is -brought into the strife, to use for its purposes labor from occupied -countries so as to maintain its production and armament. - -Concerning the relations of the other nations involved in the war, there -is no doubt that for the above the Hague Convention on Land Warfare and -the Geneva Convention of 1929 are valid. But it is just as clear that it -is left to the nations to change and abolish these regulations by -special agreements between one another. A good example here is the -Armistice Treaty signed in 1944 between the Russian and Romanian -governments according to which Romania had to pledge itself to put at -the disposal of Russia a large number of people for reconstruction -purposes. Complying with this agreement, in January 1945 many thousand -members of the Romanian state were deported to Russia by compulsion and -against their will. This case shows what, in such matters, may be legal -and valid. Moreover, that agreement was made under some force of -bayonets, as in all history is usually the case with every treaty -between a conquered and conquering state. The Defense Exhibit 47 proves -that in the case of Germany the Control Council (_see sec. VI, number 19 -of the Proclamation No._ _2_) imposed on the German authorities even -without a treaty, but simply on unilateral orders, the same obligation, -i.e., to put at disposal labor for personal services inside and outside -Germany. That such orders could naturally only be fulfilled by the -German authorities by means of a labor service law will not be contested -by anybody. - -These one-sided orders given by the victor to the vanquished, whether -they be issued on the basis of an armistice brought about by force of -arms or on the basis of command or law following the unconditional -surrender of a state, are not contrary to law. - -It should, therefore, be stated that the rules of the Hague Land Warfare -regulations can be suspended between two states. I have given proof for -the fact that there were between Germany and France agreements whereby -the French population had to make themselves available for work in -Germany, first, by volunteering, and later, on the basis of a law for -compulsory labor issued by the French Government. No restrictions were -laid down to what extent and for what purpose these people were to be -employed. - -The objection has been raised that the Vichy Government was a government -of traitors, but it was that government which concluded the armistice -with Germany, and throughout the war all Frenchmen, including those in -de Gaulle’s camp, would raise passionate protests when they thought that -one of its articles had been violated. Thus, they all acknowledged that -an armistice could be concluded and was concluded. Once you acknowledge -the existence of an armistice agreement, you cannot, logically or -legally, deny the legality of the government which has concluded the -armistice. You must eat your cake as it is and you must not pick out the -plums alone. - -As for the situation in Holland and Belgium, both those countries -surrendered unconditionally. According to international law Germany was, -therefore, in a position in its dealings with the authorities of these -countries to regulate the labor commitments of the civilian population -unilaterally in the same manner as this has now been handled in regard -to the German population by the Control Council. - -As far as Poland is concerned, that country, on the basis of the -partitioning agreement between Russia and Germany, had lost its -sovereignty. That such partitioning agreements can abrogate the -existence of a state has already been historically proved by the former -partitioning agreements of the bordering countries in regard to the -Polish state. Moreover, the agreements concluded between the victorious -nations after this war have abrogated the sovereignty of the German -state over very large areas in the East and thus have created new -sovereignty for the population of these territories. Germany released -the Polish prisoners of war and could at any time issue legal labor -directives as regards the Polish civilian population since the latter -were under German sovereignty. - -So far as the Italian prisoners of war are concerned, the evidence has -shown that the Mussolini Government, which at the time was the covenant -government in that part of Italy not occupied by the allied forces, made -them available for work in the armament industry, especially after -Germany had to manufacture armaments for Mussolini’s Italy. Here it -should also be mentioned that Milch’s opinion that Italian prisoners of -war who fled from a transport should be shot does not mean a cruelty. -All countries of the world have prisoners shot who attempt to escape as -proved by me in Defense Exhibit 26. So far as the civilian population of -other southeastern states are concerned, they were only recruited and -employed as free workers based on approval by the legally existing -governments of these countries. - -In addition, it is interesting to point out that the agreement between -France and Germany, according to which France was supposed to allocate -French civilians for the labor commitment in exchange for the release of -prisoners of war, had a parallel in the discussion of the question -regarding the fate of German prisoners of war still in allied countries. -In France, in particular, the request has been made to make possible the -release of German prisoners of war by making available German civilians -as workers in place of the prisoners of war. This, too, is evidence to -the effect that such an agreement is not contrary to international law. - -That, your Honors, is the legal position as I must present it. - -In regard to the question of guilt, a special point has still to be -considered. All legal theories consider that the defendant is not liable -for punishment if after careful consideration and careful inquiries he -has gained the conviction that his action was permissible. It has been -shown that in Germany prisoners of war and foreign civilians were being -employed within the war production even at the time when Milch had not -yet taken over the office of the GL (Generalluftzeugmeister—Air -Ordnance Master General). In other words, he was already confronted with -the situation, the exploitation of which he is being reproached for -today. - -The testimony of the witness Vorwald and that of the defendant himself -showed that Milch made inquiries from the competent authority as to -whether the employment of prisoners of war and foreign civilians which -he planned to use was admissible under the existing regulations. He has -testified here that he received an affirmative answer. Furthermore, he -testified that the admissibility of the utilization of foreign civilian -workers was discussed soon after the First World War in a large staff -committee of the German Reichstag. The chairman of that staff committee -was Prof. Dr. Schuecking, a legal authority of repute, who had become -known throughout the world as a passionate champion of pacifism and -democracy. This committee, as the defendant gathered from the -discussions held at the time, could not and did not find that employment -of foreign civilian workers in armament industry was inadmissible. - -Impressed by his earlier experience, the defendant had the right to -believe the information given to him by his superior office that -employment of foreign manpower and of prisoners of war was admissible. -Moreover, this information was not issued without reason. The reasons -given for it were rather in accordance with the reasons which I have -described in detail above. How should Milch, who is not a legal expert, -who as a layman did not understand anything about applicable -international law, how could he form a different opinion? It is the -right of every citizen to believe the legal information supplied by his -superior and the concomitant authorities, for no one can impose upon a -citizen the duty to undertake on his own independently an examination of -the legal questions involved. In a modern state this would result in an -untenable situation whereby every one of the citizens would acquire his -own conception of law. Differing opinions abroad Milch was not in a -position to hear since he was not allowed to read foreign newspapers nor -listen to foreign broadcasts, nor did he do so. - -He acted in good faith, and that has to be considered in his favor -today, the more since he knew and may well have assumed that these -measures were only temporary and were forced by the necessities of war. - -[At this point the following discussion took place:] - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is it a principle of the German law that ignorance -of the law is an excuse for violating it? - -DR. BERGOLD: It is a principle inasmuch as if somebody has been misled -by his superiors on the significance of the law. Everybody must inquire -what the law is, but if his superior authorities give him certain -information, he can rely on that. - -Q. Suppose a person is advised by his own counsel as to the law, and -counsel is wrong, does that excuse the client? - -A. The client’s lawyer is not sufficient. The authority must be a -government official. - -Q. Well, suppose a high government official, a man in high authority who -was not a lawyer, advised his subordinate as to his legal rights and -duties, and that advice was wrong? - -A. That would mean that there would be an excusable error, an excusable -legal error. - -Q. If, for example, Goering, who was a person in high authority, advised -Milch that he had the legal right to go out and shoot a person, would -that be justification for Milch’s doing so, legally? - -A. No. Because as to the question of whether you can commit murder or -not everybody knows about that; but the point as to whether the -employment of foreigners was admissible under international law is a -very tricky legal point, and there, of course, there is a difference. - -Q. You mean that every one is supposed to know that he cannot shoot a -man. - -A. Yes. Everybody knows that. - -Q. But everyone is not supposed to know that he can force a man to -unwilling labor? - -A, No. He is not obliged to know that. That is why Milch applied to -receive this information about international law. - -Q. You make a distinction between homicide and slavery? - -A. Yes. I make a difference not, perhaps, as in this exact example, but -I make a difference between the natural knowledge of law, which -everybody has, and special questions and special knowledge not shared by -everybody in the state. The point whether you can kill or steal is -common knowledge, but the question whether international law permits the -employment is not something which everybody knows. This question is one -which only specialists and legal experts can decide, and if any man -concerned tries to obtain information as to whether it is permissible, -and obtains that information from a specialist of a governmental -department who says, yes, then it does not become permissible in itself, -but we have what is known as an excusable legal error. - -Q. Would you take the same position as to enforced civilian labor? - -A. Yes, on the whole question whether anyone can employ foreign workers -or prisoners of war. - -Q. I would like to get this straightened out. - -A. There are a number of other difficult legal points which I need not -go into here. This is certainly an example of what occupies us here. - -Q. That is true. I want to get your position perfectly clear. I think it -is— - -A. Let’s take, for example, the question whether, in any foreign country -which is occupied, the occupier may issue occupation money; let’s assume -that this is punishable according to some international regulation which -is difficult to interpret and which a layman is not in a position to -know. Now, if the Reich Bank, as expert, told the governor of the -occupied country that it was permissible, then the chief of this -occupied country, the military authority, would have an erroneous -opinion for which he could not be held guilty. - -Q. Now, that theory of law becomes a very uncertain guide, does it not? -It depends upon interpretation of not the lawyers, nor the professors, -but of high government officials; they make the law. - -A. No. My client inquired of the competent offices, not of Goering, but -of the competent offices, namely the legal departments. In all the -ministries there were legal departments, also in the Reich Air Ministry -and in the Wehrmacht itself. They employed specially trained experts. I -draw your attention to— - -Q. Just a minute. Then the head legal experts make the law as far as the -defendant is concerned? - -A. No, no, he does not make the law but he tries to, and that is, of -course, the legal error that— - -Q. He makes the law by which the defendant may govern himself? - -A. Yes, for this special case, as long as he does not hear an opinion to -the contrary, let’s assume. - -Q. Oh, what happens after he does hear the opinion to the contrary, then -which law does he abide by? - -A. In that case he can act no longer at all. If he acts, he acts on what -is known from the Roman law as “eventual dolus”, an evil intention, in -case he comes up against the law. I assume that the term “eventual -dolus” is known to your country, too. - -Q. Supposing that he gets two conflicting opinions from the legal -ministry, or one of the legal advisers in a high place tells him he may -do a thing, and another in an equally high place says he may not, how -does that solve the dilemma? - -A. In that case he must not commit the act, because his attention has -been drawn to the difference in the legal opinions, and that is where we -have the “eventual dolus”. If he does not depend on it, and does it on -his own risk, then in that risk he committed a wrong. - -Q. I am frank to say that this is a new and startling legal theory. Did -you understand that? - -A. Yes. I understood. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Well, we have your position. - -[Dr. Bergold continues.] - -His good faith, however, was reinforced by the fact that all the -measures against English and American prisoners of war, which are being -objected to, were not carried out. That the reasons expressly stated for -this were that no agreement except a change in the regulations had been -conveyed normally to the British and American prisoners of war. Whoever -has the least psychological insight will understand that the observing -of the Geneva Convention principles towards those two countries must -have made the deviation from them in respect to other countries appear -to the defendant as authorized, all the more as this deviation had been -based on presence of other agreements, or the lack of other protective -measures. - -As far as the question of actual recruiting and using of manpower is -concerned, a differentiation must be made between recruiting, bringing -foreign laborers to the country, and their treatment on the whole on the -one hand, and on the other hand their use within Germany in the labor -assignment. - -May it please the Tribunal, the case in chief, and the submitted -documents of the prosecution, especially the Exhibits No. 13, 14, 14-A, -15, 15-A, and 17 eliminated any doubt as to the fact that Sauckel alone -was competent for the recruiting of foreign laborers and their transport -to Germany and for the treatment of the foreign workers, and that Hitler -over and over again confirmed against the attacks of Speer that he was -the only competent man. Not one single document has been submitted which -would show that Milch participated in the recruiting, transfer to -Germany, and treatment of the workers. The witnesses Speer, Koerner, -Richter, Hertel, Eschenauer, Pendele, Vorwald, as well as Milch himself, -have testified under oath that neither they nor the defendant knew -anything about all the abuses which have become evident in the sphere of -Sauckel’s work. - -I call your attention to Document 407-II-PS, Defense Exhibit 3, which -reveals how Sauckel always and everywhere emphasized that he took care -of the foreign workers to the best of his ability. In this exhibit he -makes the assertion that foreign workers have never in the history of -the world been treated as well as they were treated by him in this most -severe of all wars. The testimony of the witness Schmelter and of Milch -has shown that Sauckel had made the same declarations and told the same -lies to them also. There is no need for any further statement to the -effect that the recruitment and even the forced transport of the workers -into the Reich on the basis of an order could have been carried out in -an absolutely humane manner and that all these atrocities, murders, and -tortures which took place need not have occurred. Such actions are not -of necessity connected with such events. The fact that in the East and -in France, parts of the population were called up and drafted by classes -by means of labor service decrees could not and did not have to make -Milch suspicious. Forced drafting of people occurs in all countries -which have a compulsory military service or labor service. Examples of -the latter are Germany and Bulgaria. The latter state had ordered -service according to each group before the Hitler regime existed, and -how could Milch, after all, have found out about the inhuman acts in the -recruitment and transport into the Reich and the treatment within the -Reich? Obviously, only if he had observed such incidents himself or if -complaints reached him through his subordinates or through these foreign -workers themselves. - -Milch testifies here in a creditable manner that during the entire -course of the war he had never observed such conditions. During all -these years he made his trips by plane and, in some exceptional cases, -by special train; that in this way he could naturally not observe such -facts is quite clear. The witnesses have confirmed that they never -reported abuses to him. The only things he heard were isolated -complaints that the food was inadequate at times or that there was a -lack of clothing and shoes. In themselves, these were conditions which -resulted at the time from the wartime emergency and applied also to the -German civilian population. All of the above-mentioned witnesses and -Milch have, however, confirmed that Milch on his own part immediately -ordered that the conditions should be remedied. - -These incidents, however, cannot be called inhuman acts or atrocities, -cannot be called crimes. The witnesses Pendele, Hertel, and Vorwald, as -well as the defendant himself, have testified that the foreign workers -never brought any complaints to the defendant. They all expressed their -happiness. It may be that they shied away from complaining to Milch. -That, however, was not Milch’s fault. He had the right to believe the -assurances of the persons he questioned, the more so because his -conversations with them were carried out in the friendliest, even the -most cheerful manner. - -Now, how could Milch have found out about these incidents? I have -already mentioned that he could not obtain knowledge about that from -foreign reports, because he did not receive such reports. Thus, it -should be established that Milch was not responsible, first, for the -directive for the so-called slave labor; secondly, the recruitment of -manpower; third, the inhuman acts perpetrated in connection with this, -the transport to Germany, and the crimes connected therewith, and -finally, fifth, the treatment of foreign workers in Germany and the -atrocities committed in connection therewith. - -He knew nothing at all about them. He did not commit these crimes; -neither as a principal nor as an accomplice. He neither ordered such -crimes nor instigated them. He did not take a consenting part in them -either. On the contrary, he always eliminated minor abuses and -constantly saw to it that the conditions of the foreign workers were -ameliorated by special gifts. He was in no way connected in a causative -manner with the planning or execution of these crimes, and here I refer -you to my earlier legal statement, for he would have had to know about -them, that such atrocities, murders, and other inhuman acts occurred in -connection with the recruitment, transfer to Germany, and treatment -within Germany if he is to be held responsible for them. Neither did he -belong to the organization which was connected with the recruiting, -transport, and treatment, namely, the Organization Sauckel. If at all, -he could be charged only with the utilization of foreign workers. - -No just man who values that name can, by virtue of knowledge -subsequently acquired, condemn the actions which a defendant committed -at an earlier time in ignorance of what later became known. Today the -whole world is full of the horrors which have been brought to light. It -is not true, however, that these horrors were desired by the supreme -leadership. That Sauckel acted independently here and that he alone -bears the guilt is shown by Defense Exhibit 3, in which Sauckel lied to -Hitler, saying that workers had never been treated so well as by him. - -I do not wish to defend Hitler. As a German, I myself have every reason -to raise the most bitter and serious charges against the man whose -account of guilt can never be paid up, but here it must be said that -Hitler could hardly have included the commission of atrocities and -murders in his plan for the foreign workers, for if that had been the -case, Sauckel would not have had to lie as he did. Then he would not -have had to pretend to his lord and master that he was treating the -foreign workers so well. Such lies, such deceit, are practiced only by -the subordinate who is aware that he has violated instructions and that -he can be punished by his superior. - -Document R-124, Defense Exhibit 32 shows clearly that in two cases -Sauckel acted against Hitler’s instructions in committing his crimes. -Therefore, even Sauckel’s labor organization was not created for the -purpose of committing atrocities, murders, and other inhumane acts. -Sauckel and a number of his subordinates made themselves guilty on their -own accounts, and as guilty persons they strove to keep secret and to -cover up their crimes. That the defendant cannot be responsible for -these secret acts is hardly to be doubted. - -I realize that in answer the prosecution will remind me of all the -documents with severe statements by Milch which have been submitted to -the Tribunal. This is a serious count of the indictment, but one can -achieve clarity on the complex of questions thus brought up only if one -considers whether Milch made these severe statements only against -foreign workers and prisoners of war or whether they were simply a part -of his nature. - -The witnesses Richter, Foerster, Hertel, Eschenauer, Pendele, and -Vorwald have confirmed that Milch in his tantrums threatened even his -German subordinates, his best workers, with hanging and shooting, and -here in this room several men have appeared on the witness stand whom -the defendant shot or hanged in words. This clearly shows that the -defendant was not one-sidedly filled with hatred of the members of -foreign nations; besides, this was hardly to be expected in the -character of a man who for years energetically worked for peaceful -collaboration with other peoples and who despised the racial doctrine -and the idea of the “master race”. Rather, it makes it clear that he -threw out such wild expressions only when he was excited, so that his -subordinates acquired the habit of laying bets on the number of people -who would be shot, when they knew that exciting matters were up for -discussion. I read a number of passages to you from the notorious speech -before the quartermasters and fleet engineers, in which he raged against -those present and against himself in the same terms as he used against -the foreigners. And in other documents submitted by the prosecution, one -can find such expressions used against Germans, against members of the -leading class of the German people, and against German workers. All this -proves that an unfortunate inclination of Milch is here expressed for -which, like a sick person, he cannot be held responsible, especially -since he never carried out the punishments which he threatened. All the -witnesses whom I have called to the stand from Milch’s entourage have -testified that he used such terms only in tantrums. These tantrums -occurred frequently, and always when he had met with major difficulties -in the way of his work to save Germany from complete destruction. He was -a sick man. He suffered several very serious accidents, all with severe -brain concussions. It is an old experience of medicine that such people -are easily excitable, and you must not forget how much this man had on -his mind. He was a clairvoyant. He knew that the war was lost for -Germany. He realized what horrors Germany was doomed to through the -increasingly violent air war. He knew what help was possible in the -distress of his people, and he had to stand helplessly by while his -short-sighted and perhaps malevolent superiors frustrated, hampered, and -prohibited all his precautions. In such severe physical distress, even a -healthy man would become so irritable that he would be subjected to -violent outbursts of anger. How much more violent would these outbursts -be in the case of the sick defendant. His distressed soul housed in a -suffering body, helplessly exposed to its worries, reacted in this way -to relieve the tension. - -Many witnesses, in particular the witness Vorwald, have told you that -when such excitement occurred the defendant even changed physically, -that the back of his neck became red and swollen and that afterwards he -no longer knew what he said while he was in such a state. That this -testimony, especially that of the witness Vorwald is true, is shown with -actual certainty by the incidents between the defendant and Goering on -the occasion of the report on the crimes committed by Terboven in Norway -on the civilian population, and Document R-134, Exhibit 159 of the -prosecution. The prosecution without justification bitterly reproached -the defendant for failure to protest against this monstrosity. The -defendant in his defense was not able to answer that he had done so. -Vorwald has testified that this process took place in connection with an -outburst of anger about precisely that incident, and because the -testimony of Vorwald that the defendant did not remember afterwards what -had happened during his period of excitement is true, the defendant was -not able to carry out a full answer in his own defense because of his -excitement. He did not remember. Your Honors, it is clear you have -achieved deep insight into the souls of men. Therefore, surely you are -able to judge that this incident has revealed the truth of what the -defendant and his witnesses have told you. Otherwise he would be able to -cite his protest as a defense against the charge of the prosecution. - -Now, I assume that the prosecution will object that these fits of rage -occurred much too frequently and that they are therefore not a -pathological symptom but a normal expression of his character. Your -Honors, this can be disputed by a very simple consideration. The -so-called GL (Generalluftzeugmeister—Air Ordnance Master General) -meetings took place twice a week. That means that from the time when the -defendant took office there were a total of about 160 meetings. In -addition, there were 60 meetings of the Central Planning Board. Finally -there were about 30 Jaegerstab meetings, altogether about 250 meetings -in which the defendant participated. The meetings lasted many hours. -According to my concept the average number of pages of verbatim -transcript of the GL was about 200 for a single meeting, or about -30,000-32,000 pages for the GL alone. If one includes the transcripts of -other meetings then one comes to figure approximately at least of about -35,000 pages for all the transcripts at a conservative estimate. This is -an enormous figure from all these many meetings. From all these many, -many pages of transcript, the prosecutor has been able to submit only a -very few pages with only very occasional extravagant statements. -Therefore, the question is asked whether this was the normal tone of the -defendant. It is also significant that in the meetings of the GL, such -outbursts occur much more frequently than in the transcripts of the -Jaegerstab or the transcripts of the Central Planning Board. In the GL -meetings the defendant was in his own realm among us “parson’s -daughters”, as the witness Vorwald said. Such outbursts naturally -occurred there more often because according to experience a human being -can let himself go more easily among his most intimate friends than -among his subordinates. Nevertheless the outbursts remained isolated. - -How curious is it that the emotional disturbances of the defendant -occurred repeatedly in connection with the same subjects of discussion, -for example, in the question of the work done by the French industry, -the French people, the question of so-called slackers, or the discussion -of threatening and inciting remarks made by foreigners. Sometimes -several outbursts occurred at brief intervals, one after the other. Why, -your Honors? Because the matters that excited the defendant were not -settled. But this leads us to the question of whether the defendant -followed up these wild words with deeds. He never did. Just consider, -for example, the question of slackers or the question of the work done -by the French industry, the French people. These apparently so -malevolent orders issued in anger were not carried out. These stones -were repeatedly laid in the path of the defendant. Here, your Honors, I -ask you to penetrate into the depth of the circumstances with the -understanding that characterizes a legal person. The defendant -repeatedly became excited, for example, over the so-called slackers, -Germans unwilling to work whom he considered to be traitors. Each time -he issued strict orders, expressed wild threats, but would it not have -been the most natural thing for this excitable man on all these -occasions, which followed one on the heels of the other, to shout at his -subordinates and to reproach them, to ask them why the orders which he -had given and supported before in anger and which he had advanced -repeatedly had not long since been carried out? Would that not have been -the most natural and the first thing that he would have done in his -anger if he had really expected and wanted his wild orders carried out? -Your Honors, look at it from the human point of view. Revive all the -experiences of your long and no doubt rich lives and examine with me -whether I am not right in what I say. - -I challenge my learned opponent to show me in all these instances, which -are really appalling, one single expression indicating that the -defendant objected to the failure to carry out his earlier threatening -orders. Not a single word can be found and here, your Honors, the truth -becomes so obvious that no intelligent man can ignore it. It sounded -incredible in the mouth of the witnesses when they said again and again -that no such orders were carried out. It has been put to the defendant -that it is improbable that a field marshal did not expect his orders to -be carried out and that all his subordinates did not immediately rush to -carry out his orders, but the man who is sitting before you told the -truth in spite of all appearances to the contrary, for if he as a field -marshal had expected his orders issued in anger to be carried out then -he would surely at one time or another have expressed dissatisfaction -because they had not been carried out. But he did nothing except to get -angry from his sickness and his anxiety about his people. It is clear -not only from the Terboven case that he actually knew nothing about what -he had screamed out and that he never seriously pressed home his -demands. The Court has questioned him repeatedly about these -expressions. He always supplied that he did not remember them and he did -not believe that he had said so. He has often had to tell you that what -he shouted was wrong if he had actually said it. That too seemed -incredible at first, but as this man afterwards no longer knew what he -said in these attacks then he cannot testify about them. It is also -clear that a man in such a fit speaks many untruths and one cannot -assert that he lied deliberately. The man, as I say today, has told you -the truth as far as he can know it to the best of his knowledge and -belief. These transcripts cannot convict him of untrustworthiness. -Moreover, in many cases the transcripts are no doubt full of mistakes, -distortions, and errors. I have shown you a number of passages which -must be wrong. I have shown you transcripts such as NOKW-359, Exhibit -75, which speak of Milch’s presence and statements although on that day -he could not have been present in the Jaegerstab. This is also true of -some records of ostensible GL meetings. I have also proved that other -transcripts make no logical sense in German and that several statements -must have been run together there. Today, of course, no one can say -whether these various statements were all made by the defendant. Many -witnesses which I have examined on this matter, for example, to name but -a few, Richter, Pendele, Hertel, Speer, and Vorwald, have testified that -the transcripts contained many errors and that they were never -corrected, that they were sometimes even intentionally distorted when -the defendant attacked his superiors. Such passages were either left out -or changed in such a way that the attacks on the person in question were -no longer recognizable. But who would seriously consider it permissible -to use such faulty transcripts as evidence? - -All the witnesses from the entourage of the defendant have told you -finally that in these Central Planning Board, as well as in the -Jaegerstab and GL meetings, that in addition to transcripts reproducing -the individual speeches and opinions so-called records of results were -drawn up which contained only the really important decisions, orders, -and regulations. They alone were valid for the subordinates. Those -concerned acted according to them alone. It is noteworthy that the -prosecution has not submitted a single one of those records of results -containing any inhuman orders issued by the defendant. I beg of you, -your Honors, not only to give severe consideration to the weaknesses of -the defense, I beg you to draw your severe conclusions from the -weaknesses of the prosecution as well. The fact that no incriminating -records of results have been submitted proves once more that these -threats were never carried out. - -Your Honors, in disturbed times other men, too, sometimes say things -which cannot be taken seriously. Men can be charged only according to -their deeds, not according to their chatter. If you have access to -Churchill’s speech made in his first excitement after Dunkirk, you can -see what violations of international law he recommended to the civilian -population of England when he called upon them to prevent a German -airborne landing. But he never actually issued any such orders, and so -no one will try him for that. When the late General Patton said at one -time that he intended to continue to collaborate with such of the German -Nazis as were specialists, some excited American newspaper ran this -headline: “Patton Should Be Shot.” Who would be so stupid as to call -these newspapers inhuman? No one in the world; no one takes such excited -words seriously. No one can say that these outbursts of anger meant that -Milch approved the atrocities which occurred elsewhere in Germany. - -The affidavits of Kruedener, Defense Exhibit 37, Lotte Mueller, Defense -Exhibit 38, the testimony of witnesses Koenig, Vorwald, Pendele, have -all shown that this man always and everywhere tried to help people in -distress. He, who ostensibly wanted to force the foreign workers and -concentration camp inmates to work by means of starving them, had the -concentration camp inmates supplied with food from his estate near -Rechlin in order to improve their diet. Thus, in his actions, he did the -opposite of what he shouted in his anger. But one could raise a very -serious charge to the effect that Milch by his thoughtless manner of -speaking incited the elements throughout the country which committed -such misdeeds. But this again, your Honors, is untrue. You have not -heard one single example here of anyone having acted according to -Milch’s words and having referred to having done so. These displays of -fury only occurred among people who knew Milch and knew that he could -not be taken seriously in such moments. All witnesses have stated for -you that these fits only became known to the circle of intimates. - -I lived in Germany throughout the war. Although the sins of the -high-ranking leaders of the Reich were eagerly discussed among the -people, I never heard one word about Milch’s fits of rage. In reply to -my question the witness Vorwald stated convincingly that nobody spoke -about these incidents to other persons because they did not wish to -expose their superior to whom they were attached. His loyal followers -surrounding him with a cordon of silence. Nothing could be more -understandable, and every decent person who respects his superior will -and must act in the same manner, for, in spite of his occasional -fierceness, Milch was popular with his subordinates. The witnesses -Richter, Hertel, Pendele and Vorwald, among others, testified before you -that Milch was highly esteemed. Richter actually called him the best and -fairest superior whom he had ever met in all his life. Here, your -Honors, in this praise Milch’s true nature appears before our eyes. - -I believe, therefore, to be justified in saying that one cannot and must -not judge Milch by his wild talk. To infer guilt from that would mean to -pass a judgment which could never be upheld before justice. Nobody may -be judged by empty phrases. I would like to tell you a true story here -which occurred in Germany during the discussions about a new, more -stringent National Socialist penal code. At that time the Party took the -point of view that criminal intent in itself was punishable, and thus, -during a meeting of the Penal Law Commission in connection with the -question of the meaning of murder, a long debate developed as to whether -a person who intended to bring about the death of an enemy by prayer was -to be punished by death for murder. The majority of Party members -concurred with this mad opinion on the punishment of criminal intent. -The sensible ones protested against it for a long time. When the debate -was nearing its end, Dr. Guertner, the Reich Minister of Justice at the -time, a clear-sighted man, rose and with one single sentence made reason -prevail. These were his words: “Gentlemen, I do not understand you. All -my life a corpse has been part of a murder.” The narrow-minded Party -doctrinaires had to give in to the scornful laughter that followed these -words. And in that way I should like here to think of Milch’s wild talk -and exclaim, “Where is the corpse?” - -In my opinion the only remaining question which needs serious discussion -is merely that of the employment of foreign workers, of PW’s, and of -concentration camp inmates. To begin with, it must be mentioned that the -prosecution in its opening speech maintained that Milch more than -anybody else in Germany was occupied with the employment of forced labor -in Germany. That statement, however, is in no way correct. That, at -least, has been clarified by the evidence beyond all doubt, it seems to -me. There can be no doubt that Sauckel and Speer had considerably more -to do with so-called forced labor than Milch, quite apart from Hitler -and Goering themselves. - -It is necessary to visualize clearly the scope of Milch’s sphere of -activities and of his authority. Your Honors, even if you were only to -check the three part Defense Exhibit 55 which I submitted, even to a -superficial scrutiny only, you would realize immediately that Speer -alone had a great deal more to do with this work than Milch. Speer was -in charge of all armaments for the army and navy which, measured in -human beings, by far exceeded the Luftwaffe, and alone exceeded the -volume of the Luftwaffe armament many times, in particular as Milch only -dealt with the construction of airplanes and as all equipment for the -crews, in fact were part of the army equipment. Furthermore, Speer was -in charge of all other productions in the German Reich. Finally, after -the establishment of the Jaegerstab, Speer was also placed in charge of -all armaments for the Luftwaffe. This Defense Exhibit 55, to which the -defendant has sworn and which is based on the prosecution’s own Exhibit -58, reveals a much greater and more comprehensive scope of Speer’s -organization. It was he, who as the central authority, not only -controlled an apparatus with considerably more tasks, he alone also had -at his disposal the executive authorities in the country, who dealt with -all matters which had to be taken, whereas Milch had no executive organs -at his disposal. He had, therefore, no executive powers whatsoever. -Speer alone was in charge of the powerful main committees, the main -industrial rings, in which the captains of industry exerted their -influence and power. - -He was also in charge of the armament commissions and armament officials -of the armament inspectorates and armament detachments in the defense -districts. And lastly, the Gau plenipotentiaries and provincial economic -offices in the whole country listened to him. He was with Hitler almost -every week, and therefore, he possessed much more influence to which -Sauckel’s power— - - [At this point, the following discussion took place:] - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: May I ask you what was Koerner’s special interest? - -DR. BERGOLD: I am not speaking about Central Planning Board here. I am -only speaking about the GL. - -Q. I know, but in the Central Planning Board what particular field was -Koerner interested in—the navy? - -A. Koerner? No. He was mainly in charge of agriculture. He testified to -that effect. - -PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Very well. - -[Dr. Bergold continues.] - -Speer was with Hitler almost once a week and had therefore much more -influence to which Sauckel’s power set the only limit. The man, Milch, -never possessed such a machine. The GL was nothing but a technical -agency in the Reich Air Ministry which generally, as the witnesses -Vorwald and Hertel confirmed, was told by the General Staff of the -Luftwaffe what was to be constructed. If Milch had really been the -powerful man as the prosecution describes him, it would have been -possible for him to carry out his plan for Germany’s air defense. But -the achievement of this goal for which this man worked with unbelievable -effort and with all energy was denied to him simply because he was only -in charge of a technical office which could not make any decisions -whatsoever. Hitler, Goering, and the General Staff of the Luftwaffe -decided what this man had to construct and what plans he was to carry -out. He carried them out within the framework of the task with which he -was entrusted, always being suspended in the middle, without ground -under his feet, without the direct authority to give orders to industry, -without influence on the supply of manpower and materials; he could only -get influence through the Central Planning Board, and there too the -fundamental decisions were made by Hitler, by the latter himself, on the -advice of Speer. It is not necessary for me to name all the witnesses. -All his collaborators have testified to that effect. - -May it please the Tribunal, if you examine the statements made by Hertel -and Vorwald, you will gather from them beyond any doubt that the GL had -nothing to do at all with the question of labor, with the recruiting, -transportation, and assignment of workers. The GL, and this cannot -possibly be doubted by anyone after hearing all these witnesses and -especially after Milch’s testimony, had merely to make the blueprints -for airplanes and the construction necessary for this purpose, and then -to place the orders with the completely independent industry, following -in all this the instructions of the General Staff and the orders given -by Hitler and Goering. All witnesses from the GL have confirmed before -you that the GL had nothing to do at all with the labor question; that -he did not request one single worker or exert any influence on Sauckel. -It is true that requests for labor passed, for statistical reasons as -well as for control purposes, through the GL office. But it is important -to remember and never to forget that industry submitted its real labor -requests throughout the country to the labor exchange offices which were -Sauckel’s agencies and to the armament inspectorates and armament -detachments which were Speer’s agencies. - -Vorwald and the defendant himself have shown you with unmistakable -clearness that the only thing which the GL had to do with these requests -was merely that he examined these requests of industry concerning the -material point as well as the labor point, and that he then reported to -the Speer Ministry whether and in how far the requests of industry were -exaggerated and false and if the GL considered fewer material and less -manpower to be adequate. - -Now, what does such an activity actually mean? Surely not, as the -prosecution submits, the enslavement of new workers, but exactly the -contrary; namely their reduction. If the GL had not exercised this -activity, Sauckel would have got much larger requests from industry and -he would have procured this labor by means of more forceful methods than -he actually did. That industry had to request workers in order to carry -out its tasks assigned by Hitler, Goering, and the General Staff of the -Luftwaffe, who were the authorities who decided on the extent of the -construction program of air armaments, was however not caused by the GL. -He was nothing else but an executive organ in the chain of command from -Hitler, Goering, and the General Staff. He was merely the technical -agency which had to make the blueprints and constructions, and then, -after approval by higher authorities, had to submit them to industry for -the undertaking of the orders. - -This, your Honors, is the recital of the evidence produced on the -activity of the GL, and the only thing which the GL did in the framework -of this activity was to reduce to the lowest level the requests for -labor made by industry, for the many reasons that he was sufficiently -expert to look through the exaggerated requests of industry which could -never get enough workers. It is significant that the GL minutes which -have been submitted nowhere reveal a discussion of real manpower -guidance, but, at the utmost, that once a few questions were discussed -for information purposes. It is furthermore highly significant that -among the entire organizations of the GL there were no offices for labor -assignment and labor research as was the case in the Armament Ministry -of Speer (_see Defense Exhibit 55_), but merely for statistics of the -personnel. There is nothing to clarify the real situation better than -this fact. - -Has the fact that industry, which had to carry out Hitler’s construction -program, employed foreign workers, prisoners of war, concentration camp -inmates, been caused by the defendant? Industry had employed these -people before the beginning of Milch’s tenure; it employed them because -Hitler had ordered through Sauckel that industry had to employ these -people—not in order to obtain slave labor for slave labor’s sake—but -only for the reason to be able to throw still more Germans into the -greedy jaws of the fiendish war and thus surely causing disaster for -Germans as well as for other peoples. - -As far as the GL is concerned—the least reproach can be cast upon -Milch, of all the reproaches that can be cast upon him. It only consists -in that he passed orders on to the air armament industry (and where did -this not occur during the war?), and that he saw to it that no -exaggerated requests for material and manpower were made. - -The prosecution has proved nothing which could contradict these -statements. But Milch has—and this, too, has been proved—not only -curtailed exaggerated labor requests of industry by means of his -statistics, thus preventing the increase of foreign labor, but in -addition to that, as was stated by the witnesses Brauchitsch, Pendele, -Hertel, Vorwald, and others, he always endeavored seriously and -successfully to maintain the German workers in the factories; and in -doing so he even saved German workers who should have been drafted, at -least to the amount of 70,000 for the air armament factories, keeping -thus on a lower level further requests for foreign workers and their -assignment. A man who, as the prosecution means, is keen on slave labor -does not act in that way. - -Finally, there is another point to be mentioned in this connection. The -International Military Tribunal—which, by the way, states expressly in -its verdict against Sauckel that there is no doubt of Sauckel having had -the over-all responsibility for the slave labor program—that Tribunal -stated in its verdict against Speer that it has to be considered as a -mitigating circumstance in his favor, that by setting up protected -factories Speer had kept many workers in their homelands. Your Honors -will remember the depositions of Hertel, Vorwald, and Milch, of which it -results that as early as 1941 Milch, first together with Udet and later -on alone, had factories working in France on the basis of a free -agreement with the French plants in order to employ French workers in -their home country. These agreements were, as has been testified to by -Foerster, completely free, because in 1941 the industry of that part of -France which at that time had not yet been occupied had concluded them. -Therefore, Milch was the inventor of the idea to have labor employed on -the spot in foreign countries. It was not only in France that he, being -the first, carried that out. You have heard that this occurred also in -Holland and in Hungary. Now, if the International Military Tribunal -counted this circumstance as a mitigating one for Speer, it must all the -more be credited to the defendant who acted that way not merely from -1943 onward, as did Speer according to his own statement in this trial, -but already as early as 1941, and was the first to do so. In this -instance again the defendant proved to be a man who endeavored to -mitigate as much as possible the difficulties which had arisen from the -prevailing emergency. That much as far as the defendant’s activity as GL -is concerned. - -When I come to consider in how far Milch’s activity on the Central -Planning Board could be charged against him, I am aware that some of the -minutes of the Central Planning Board could, in themselves, be -interpreted as a charge against Milch. But if your Honors consider that -out of sixty meetings of the Central Planning Board the prosecution -could only list fifteen meetings in which labor questions were -discussed—this being done in some instances in a perfunctory and casual -way—it results from this fact already that the Central Planning Board, -as to its aim, was not charged with the guiding of manpower, which at -that time was the focal point of many schemes in all countries and, -above all, in Germany. - -In this trial there was much argument between the prosecution and the -defense as to the significance and the essence of the Central Planning -Board until, eventually, with the help of the key Document NOKW-245, -Prosecution Exhibit 157, the argument was decided. There it says -literally, “Speer and I (that is, Milch) are of the opinion that he -(Sauckel) has to be incorporated somehow in the Central Planning Board -in order to get the labor assignment, as well as the material, into our -hands. At the present time we have no possibility to steer it.” These -words were voiced on 23 February 1943 after the Central Planning Board -had been in existence for already one year. These words were not voiced -at that time for the purpose of _ex post facto_ whitewashing, but they -expressed the complete truth and have characterized the situation in -quite simple and clear words for always and unmistakably. No decree has -been submitted, nor order of Hitler has been proved, to show that this -situation was changed. At no time, indeed at no time, was Sauckel a -member of the Central Planning Board. If the prosecution wants to -consider the wish Milch uttered at that occasion as incriminating, they -are at liberty to do so. However, this is not a punishable deed, and -nobody can tell what amount of good Milch could have done if he had -factually been in charge of the labor assignment. His other deeds -account for the assumption that he would certainly have stopped abuses -and would have mitigated all that was necessary as far as possible. The -members of this trial would not believe, at first, in the depositions of -all the witnesses who have been heard here, including Koerner, stating -that the Central Planning Board dealt with labor questions merely for -reasons of information. The wording of the speeches seemed to contradict -it. But, your Honors, the witnesses have also testified before you that -the speeches could only be understood if they are read. Prosecution -Exhibit 157 has put an end to all such doubts. Whoever wants to -pronounce here the verdict with all the necessary seriousness cannot -bypass this document. Nobody can contend any longer that the defendant -has not told you the full truth. Therefore, his statement under oath is -to be believed, which agrees with Speer’s statement in that the -so-called labor assignment meetings were held with Sauckel always with -the sole aim to obtain from Sauckel, who had reported so many false -figures and was not scrupulous about telling the truth, eventually and -for once, clear figures. Likewise, Document NOKW-195, Prosecution -Exhibit 143, the report on the meeting of 28 October 1943, held at -Goering’s place, shows a constant struggle with Sauckel in order to -obtain true figures because Hitler would not believe that Sauckel’s -figures were completely false. It has been proved that factually both -Speer and Milch have been reproached because they did not fulfill the -program made by Hitler, although many millions of workers had allegedly -been at their disposal. Alone for air armament, according to Goering’s -calculation based on Sauckel’s figures, five million workers should have -been available—whereas the entire air armament employed a much lower -total of people. As Hitler was a dangerous man and his reproaches could -have disagreeable consequences, Speer and Milch cannot be blamed for -wanting to get this subject clear; consequently, if they discussed this -problem in detail—especially during the 53d and 54th meetings of the -Central Planning Board—this has nothing to do at all with labor -procurement. That these meetings have not been summoned by Milch—that -they have been summoned by Speer and his ministry—has been proved. -Milch presided over these meetings only because Speer was ill. But he -only carried through the order of his friend Speer. But even these -discussions do not alter the fact that the Central Planning Board as -such had nothing to do with labor procurement. These very discussions -were of a purely informative nature. By them the Central Planning Board -did not obtain any influence on the carrying out of labor procurement -nor on its distribution. How characteristic it is, however, for the -personality of Milch that he used even this discussion about Sauckel’s -figures in order to reduce the millions of new workers whom Hitler had -ordered in January 1944 to quite a considerable extent. - -In all the discussions submitted there is nowhere a word to be found, -either to the effect that Milch had requested workers for his air -armament. If the need for workers was under discussion, then always -only, as the defendant himself confirmed, in regard to the basic -industries—that is, mining and the iron industry and in regard to -agriculture. It was always a question, as the records show, of the -commitment of prisoners of war. But even according to the Geneva -Convention prisoners of war may be employed in mining, in the production -of iron, and in agriculture. These places of work are not actual -armament industries. - -That Milch did not have anything to do with the commitment of Russians -in antiaircraft defense, which was not under him at all; that, on the -contrary, he even opposed it, and that that part of the minutes of the -33d meeting of the Central Planning Board must be incorrect here, too, -has been stated by the witnesses Hertel, Koenig, as well as others -equally incontestably. It has now been proved that this order was issued -by the OKW directly via Goering. - -Thus Milch, in his capacity as member of the Central Planning Board, was -neither perpetrator of, nor accomplice in, crimes; nor did the Central -Planning Board have as its purpose the commission of such crimes. Its -sole purpose was the distribution of raw materials—an activity which is -not prohibited under any conditions. - -The third activity of Milch which could bring him in connection with the -so-called slave labor was the activity on the Jaegerstab. Were one to -view this membership in the Jaegerstab from the point of view of the -prosecution, one could perhaps maintain the previously formed opinion -that this activity was limited to the increased use of slave labor. The -testimony of Speer, Vorwald, and Milch, however, have shown that the -Jaegerstab had two main aims, namely, first, to raise the production of -fighter planes and, secondly, to facilitate Milch’s resignation from his -office by transferring the entire air armament industry to the ministry -of Speer. - -Formerly, to be sure, Milch was one of the chairmen of this Jaegerstab, -but the witnesses—among them Schmelter, Hertel, Eschenauer and -Vorwald—have testified that the actual chairman of this Jaegerstab was -Saur. Milch very soon withdrew from the Jaegerstab; in March 1944 he -still participated in fifteen meetings, in April only eight, in May only -five, and in June only two. Nothing proves the veracity of the testimony -of the defendant more than the quite obvious decrease in his -participation. If one considers the fact that the Jaegerstab held its -meetings daily one realizes how rapidly the decrease in the activity of -the defendant was. If one considers furthermore that he was not always -present at the meetings at all, that he did not hear most of the details -of the discussions at these meetings, one can say with certainty that he -was really not the man who had the biggest influence in the Jaegerstab, -and who performed the practical work there. The expression “breakfast -director”, which the witness Dorsch applied to the defendant, -characterizes the situation excellently. The Jaegerstab was concerned -with labor questions only insofar as it guided the so-called transfer of -workers who were already working in industry, in the event changes in -production occurred, especially effecting, as far as possible, their -transfer from closed down bomber factories to fighter plane factories. -However, in this connection it is almost exclusively a question of -so-called skilled workers, as the witness Schmelter, a specialist in -this field, has confirmed. In this process no new workers of any kind -were introduced into industry. The witness Schmelter, however, finally -expressly confirmed that no real influence was exerted on Sauckel and -his offices. Wishes regarding the transfer were merely referred to the -Organization Sauckel. This fact in particular was emphasized in the -statement of Schmelter with all the clarity desirable. - -Thus, it has been proved in regard to this committee, too, that it had -nothing to do with the bringing of workers into Germany from abroad, nor -dealt with their redistribution. Thus, it was also not the purpose of -the Jaegerstab to decide labor questions. Finally, it has thus been -clarified that the ministry of Speer was the office which handled labor -questions, insofar as it was necessary in the framework of the -transfers. On the basis of the submitted documents, it seems at first as -though the Jaegerstab had initiated and carried out the building of -underground factories or of concrete protected factories above ground. -The witnesses Speer, Hertel, Eschenauer, Koenig, Pendele, as well as -Milch, himself, however, all clearly and decisively confirmed that these -constructions were ordered directly by Hitler and Goering, and that the -defendant had opposed these orders because he considered them senseless. -It has furthermore been declared that Hitler himself, handled the needs -of workers for these undesirable constructions. The Jaegerstab was -connected with these constructions, according to all the testimony, only -to the extent that it had to examine which ones of the fighter plane -factories had to be installed in them. In this connection it must be -remembered that a number of these constructions were also allocated for -armament factories of the Wehrmacht. Thus, Milch also cannot be charged -with any responsibility in this count. He was neither formally nor -actually in a position to prevent Hitler’s and Goering’s orders. - -Nor had Milch anything to do with the allocation of Hungarian Jews to -these factories, quite apart from the fact that it has been made clear -that these Jews were allocated only in the summer of 1944, which was -stated by the last prosecution witness, Krysiak, that is, at a time when -Milch had withdrawn from his office for some time. It has been proved -that Hitler issued relevant orders here and that the Jaegerstab trip to -Hungary was entirely unconnected with this matter because it was -undertaken solely for the purpose of a conference with the legal -Hungarian government. These consultations were merely concerned with -agreements regarding aircraft production by the Hungarian industry in -the large caves near the Danube. Not one single document has shown that -Milch either agreed to or welcomed the employment of Hungarian Jews. - -To sum up, I may say then that even within the Jaegerstab Milch was -neither a principal nor an abetter in the crimes listed in the -indictment. I might add that it was not the purpose of the Jaegerstab to -carry out such crimes. In any case he was by no means the leading man on -that board. It has been found with certainty beyond all doubt that the -Jaegerstab served the purpose of helping the defendant to withdraw from -office. - -Mention must also be made of the question of concentration camp inmates -working. Before going into details, I should like to make a few basic -remarks. From all the trials in which I acted as counsel, from the -questions asked in this courtroom, from various discussions I have had -with citizens of your country, I have, your Honors, attained the -certainty that in your circles no one believes in the truthfulness of -the defendants’ and all other witnesses’ statements, namely that the -average German knew nothing about the happenings in the concentration -camps and that the defendant did not know of the existence of such -camps, with the exception of Dachau and Oranienburg. As most Germans -certify to this and as all witnesses swear to this under oath, it is -first of all difficult to understand why such statements are not -believed. It can only be explained by the fact that the citizens of your -country have been so much influenced by press propaganda and the newly -discovered facts that they put more trust in the reports of their -newspapers than in the assurances of the citizens of a country which is -now known throughout the world as the place of origin of many -atrocities. - -But should such prejudice which does not originate from [one’s] own and -actual experience influence the judgment? I believe and always have -believed that it is one of the essential laws of justice to base one’s -judgment strictly on facts which have become evident during a trial. It -is a proven fact that in Germany no one was allowed to write about -concentration camps; that the rules of secrecy which had been imposed by -the dictatorial regime had to be kept very strictly; and that even the -German authorities in case of their violating these rules of secrecy, -were threatened with death, as I have proved by the submission of -Defense Exhibit 36. - -From the statement of the witness Roeder, who, incidentally, explained -that the defendant had neither the power of passing a death sentence nor -of sending people to concentration camps, you have learned that the -concentration camp inmates spoke to nobody about their condition. Even -the prosecution witness Krysiak has told you that the prisoners did not -dare to lodge complaints to anybody. How could the Germans generally -learn about conditions in concentration camps? Milch, too, could not and -did not learn about them, as he has told you, for the secrecy was kept -even among the highest authorities. May the propaganda of your country -insist on the contrary as much as it likes, what I have stated here -still remains true, and I can certify it myself. - -I myself who during the time of the so-called Third Reich often enough -defended men who were accused because of their political views, I, who -was watched by the Gestapo, who was attacked in the public newspapers of -Nuernberg and especially was mentioned with name in the notorious -“Stuermer” on account of my defense of unhappy Jews, I, too, didn’t -learn anything about these camps, although clients came to me after -their release from the concentration camp Dachau. I always asked them -and I always received the answer that they had nothing special to -report. It was, of course, no pleasant life, but they reported that it -was not so bad. - -I would ask you, your Honors, to consider how we could have learned of -these conditions. - -May I remind you in this connection that deeds have been committed in -the east of the former German territory, in the Sudeten-German border -territories of Czechoslovakia, and other countries, deeds which, even if -one imagines them at their worst, remain far behind the truth. About -these atrocities the international press has kept silent although one -day history will speak and one will learn about them with horror. I have -refused to give proof of the events which were brought about by your -armies after the collapse. I could have mentioned many deeds which can -be called nothing but grave infringements against the Geneva Convention. -I could have given you a picture of how in the prisoners’ camps in the -early days hundreds of German prisoners died of starvation. I am not -accusing anyone. Shortcomings of organization and of human nature but -not express orders and rules account for it. - -I only mention this, your Honors, in order to point out that you did not -learn about this and that it is only our unhappy and wretched people who -know about it. But we who have had the bitter experience of the power of -propaganda and of the force of secrecy know that ignorance of such -matters can be excused and believed. Therefore, no one may say from the -outset that all the unanimous statements by witnesses and the -declarations of Milch are to be disbelieved. They have been sworn to; -and the verdict must take them into consideration. - -According to these it is certain that Milch only knew of the employment -of concentration camp inmates in the Heinkel plant in Oranienburg and -that he was of the opinion that these were German criminals and German -political prisoners, of whose mistreatment, however, he had no -knowledge. The use of prisoners and convicts is not a crime against -humanity. This, however, should not have to be mentioned. In all -countries in the world it is customary for prisoners to be obliged to -work. In Germany this was even regulated by law to such an extent that -the prisoners who were condemned to prison, that is, not to the -penitentiary, also had to work. For a prisoner to have to work is not an -atrocity. An atrocity can be seen only if the prisoner has to do this -work under conditions which injure his health or which are inhuman. - -But Milch did not know that the food, the housing, and the treatment of -the prisoners were inhuman. One would have to prove such knowledge -before one could punish him for it. You have heard, on the contrary, -that he always did everything possible when he heard of individual cases -of abuse. He even tried to help, as the Kruedener affidavit, Defense -Exhibit 37, proves, in a case where he was not competent. As the -testimony of Kruedener revealed this was a case of inadequate -accommodations. Moreover, as the witness Koenig has testified, he -instituted an improvement in the food given the prisoners at Rechlin on -his own initiative, and he generally saw to it that workers got better -rations. - -But that does not mean that he knew that those prisoners were starving. -It was unfortunately so that because of the total blockade of Germany by -the Allied forces the food available to the civilian population of -Germany was very poor. I myself had only had the minimum ration card; -and I could tell you a long story about how difficult it was to work on -such rations. Milch, however, obtained better food for everyone working -under him for armament. It was he who was the first to obtain extra -rations for his air armament industry because the workers worked -overtime. As a number of records of the Central Planning Board and the -Jaegerstab show, he obtained additional rations for the prisoners of war -and, for example, sent the Russians into agriculture so that they might -get better food there and be padded a little. He had an office set up in -the Jaegerstab in order to obtain additional food and clothing for the -workers, as the witness Schmelter has testified. - -The improvement in the food of the inmates of Rechlin concentration camp -was part of these measures. If he did this through his estate, it was -because he had no influence with the administration of the concentration -camps in respect of the issue of additional ration cards. - -It would not correspond with justice if he was pronounced punishable for -the employment of concentration camp inmates under these conditions. The -compulsory labor of prisoners has always been lawful in Germany even -before the Third Reich. He knew nothing of cruelties and atrocities or -inhuman treatment. Therefore, his consent to these cannot be proved. - -If I may summarize then, I believe that my opening statement for the -defense had correctly revealed that Milch was not a slave holder, -moreover that he never aspired to be one, that he was of the opinion -that the employment of such workers was permitted, and finally that he -had done everything to keep down the employment of foreign workers as -much as possible and to make it as humane as possible. At any rate the -prosecution’s description of him is in no way accurate, and could only -originate from a misunderstanding of the man, his speeches, and of his -background. Sauckel and Speer had far greater responsibility in this -connection. It was they who had real influence, and not Milch, but even -in the case of Speer who was higher than Milch in his position, the -International Military Tribunal has granted extenuating circumstances in -connection with the manpower issue. I am convinced that Milch thought -employing such labor was permissible, and that he did everything in his -power to keep such employment to the lowest level and as human as -possible. - -I am conscious of the fact that the verdict of the International -Military Tribunal is a great obstacle for me, and nevertheless the -Tribunal was merely composed of human beings, and it had passed judgment -under particularly difficult circumstances, and in composition it opened -the door to politics into the courtroom. I do not need to remind you -that in the English speaking countries, several verdicts of the Tribunal -were subjected to very serious criticism. I myself here attacked one -point of this verdict with better witnesses and better evidence, that -with regard to slave labor, for example, the International Military -Tribunal based itself upon a wrong assumption. Nobody stated there that -the U.S.S.R. had called off the Hague Convention of Land Warfare. I -checked up on those features of defense, and I found that all the time -it was only talk that the U.S.S.R. had not become a partner of the -convention. The statement of von Neurath revealed that notice of -withdrawal was expressly given. - -Here we not only pronounce penalty verdicts or judgment, but also -political judgments, whether we want to or not. Especially in politics -there is always some fluctuation. Every day new facts turn up, which -throw different light upon things. The distance of time which always -grows greater and greater and separates us from the irritating events of -the past allows an ever clearer judgment. The man who returns from -battle is always confused. The more he becomes calm the more he admits -justice towards his enemy. - -Honorable Judges of this Tribunal, when you judge please don’t forget -the whole personality of Milch. He always concerned himself as a good -and noble man, and I am not only convinced of that as his counsel but -also as a human being. The world would have a different outlook if his -superiors had listened to his advice, which was intended to serve the -people of this world, and the common will of the people, and peace. In -his heart he always took the side of the fighter who fought for united -Europe, which now has been joined also by his former enemy number one, -Churchill. May this statement of Milch which has thrown new light upon -things serve this aim. Poor and tortured Europe needs an enduring peace. -May his statements also open the eyes of those among the German people -who still cannot give up their misconceptions of many years, and show -them what crime has been committed against them. - -But you, Honorable Judges, must recognize from the attitude of the -defendant Milch that he never became unfaithful to himself, and even if -he had been perhaps under the spell of erroneous conception, he has -always wanted the best for his and other people. - -I have profound confidence in you, Honorable Judges, that you, equally -detached from your own people, will find an independent, true and -righteous judgment that corresponds to the truth. I shall consider it as -an honor for my person if I have contributed to this through my -painstaking labor. - ------ - -[152] Defense Counsel Dr. Friedrich Bergold delivered the closing -statement before the Tribunal on 25 March 1947, Tr. pp. 2377-2435. - -[153] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 226. - -[154] Ibid., p. 253. - -[155] Memorandum of 15 September 1941 from Canaris to Keitel concerning -an OKW order regulating the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, -contained in _Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression_, vol. VII, p. 411, U.S. -Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946. - - - - - VI. FINAL STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT, - 25 MARCH 1947[156] - - -DEFENDANT ERHARD MILCH: Since I became a soldier in 1910 my work has -been devoted to my German people. In the First World War I was at the -front from the first to the last day. Then with others I built up the -German air lines, and when in 1933 the government asked me to enter the -Air Ministry, despite many misgivings, I could not refuse to take up -that task because it was pointed out to me that I could not turn a deaf -ear to this call of the German people. - -I have remained faithful to the idea which I conceived at the time of -the air lines, that all nations must collaborate, particularly the -European nations. Pressed together in a small area, and whenever -possible, mostly outside my actual sphere of work, I dedicated myself to -that task. I was opposed to war because my experiences from the First -World War showed me that the living standard of any people would not be -improved by war, and on the contrary everybody would be grievously -harmed. - -It was for me a matter of course, even in the late great war, the -planning of which was unknown to me, to do my duty in my post. My full -effort was dedicated to the air defense of the German homeland. This I -conceived to be the only possibility to obtain bearable peace terms. -Even though I had nothing to do with the employment of workers, -including foreign workers, I considered it to be my duty to make precise -investigations into the admissibility of work by foreigners, -investigations which were answered in the affirmative; I also made -efforts to keep the numbers as low as possible and to see to it they -would work in protected factories in foreign countries. - -I always made efforts to improve the living conditions of all types of -workers. - -My statements made to the best of my knowledge and conscience to this -Tribunal were directed to the world at large, and above all to the -German people, in order to show that only by peaceful understanding of -the nations among each other could life and civilization be secured in -future and that understanding was not only necessary but also possible -if good will prevails. But I also wanted to show my fellow Germans quite -clearly that an autocratic government which is not controlled must end -in disaster. - -My personal fate is of no consequence in this connection. I am -interested only in one thing—that the German people should, as soon as -possible, be relieved of their untold suffering and should join the -community of nations as an equal partner. - ------ - -[156] Tr. pp. 2489-90. - - - - - VII. JUDGMENT - - - A. Opinion and Judgment of the United States - Military Tribunal II[157] - -The indictment in this case contains three counts, which may be -summarized as follows: - - _Count One_: War crimes, involving murder, slave labor, - deportation of civilian population for slave labor, cruel and - inhuman treatment of foreign laborers, and the use of prisoners - of war in war operations by force and compulsion. - - _Count Two_: War crimes, involving murder, subjecting - involuntary victims to low-pressure and freezing experiments - resulting in torture and death. - - _Count Three_: Crimes against humanity, involving murder and the - same unlawful acts specified in counts one and two against - German nationals and nationals of other countries. - -For reasons of its own, the Tribunal will first consider counts two and -one, in that order, followed by consideration of count three. - - COUNT TWO - -More in detail, this count alleges that the defendant was a principal -in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in and was -connected with, plans and enterprises involving medical experiments -without the subjects’ consent, in the course of which experiments, the -defendant, with others, perpetrated murders, brutalities, cruelties, -tortures, and other inhuman acts. The so-called medical experiments -consisted of placing the subject in an airtight chamber in which the air -pressure is mechanically reduced so that it is comparable with the -pressure to which an aviator is subjected at high altitudes, and in -experimenting upon the effect of extreme dry and wet cold upon the human -body. For these experiments inmates of the concentration camp at Dachau -were selected. These inmates presented a motley group of prisoners of -war, dissenters from the philosophy of the National Socialist Party, -Jews, both from Germany and the eastern countries, rebellious or -indifferent factory workers, displaced civilians from eastern occupied -countries, and an undefined group known as “asocial or undesirable -persons.” - -In approaching a judicial solution of the questions involved in this -phase of the case, it may be well to set down seriatim the controlling -legal questions to be answered by an analysis of the proof. - - (1) Were low-pressure and freezing experiments carried on at - Dachau? - - (2) Were they of a character to inflict torture and death on the - subjects? (The answer to these two questions may be said to - involve the establishment of the _corpus delicti_.) - - (3) Did the defendant personally participate in them? - - (4) Were they conducted under his direction or command? - - (5) Were they conducted with prior knowledge on his part that - they might be excessive or inhuman? - - (6) Did he have the power of opportunity to prevent or stop - them? - - (7) If so, did he fail to act, thereby becoming _particeps - criminis_ and accessory to them? - -The periods during which these experiments were conducted become -extremely significant in determining the responsibility of the -defendant. The evidence is uncontradicted that the low-pressure -experiments were inaugurated in March 1942, and were concluded by the -end of June 1942. The cold water experiments extended from August to -October 1942, and the freezing experiments from February to April 1943. -During all of these periods the defendant was Under State Secretary of -the Reich Air Ministry, Inspector General and Second in Command under -Goering of the Luftwaffe, to which post he was appointed 19 November -1941. In these various capacities, certain military duties devolved upon -him, especially as Inspector General. For example, he was ordered by -Hitler to take an air squadron to Norway on a purely military -expedition, and during the siege of Stalingrad, early in 1943, he was -ordered by Hitler to attempt to transport into Stalingrad by air food -and supplies for the beleaguered German Army. His high military standing -is indicated by the fact that he was one of the twelve field marshals of -the German armed forces. The major part of his duties, however, revolved -around the production of aircraft for the Luftwaffe. He was primarily a -production man, charged with the duty of keeping military airplanes -supplied in sufficient quantity to the air arm of Germany’s military -machine. This naturally involved the procurement in large quantities of -the two essential ingredients of production—labor and raw material—and -an over-all supervision of any efforts having to do with that arm. One -of the defendant’s immediate subordinates was Professor Hippke, who held -the post of Inspector of the Medical Services of the Luftwaffe. Hippke -was a physician, and had supervision of all matters involving the health -and physical welfare of the personnel of the Luftwaffe. - -The low-pressure experiments at Dachau were conducted by three -physicians, Dr. Romberg, Dr. Ruff, and Dr. Rascher. It is quite apparent -from the evidence that Dr. Rascher, who was attached to the Luftwaffe -but made frantic efforts to have himself transferred to the SS, was -principally responsible for the nature of the experiments. Dr. Ruff and -Dr. Romberg were also attached to the Luftwaffe and were, therefore, -remotely under the command and control of the defendant, but the -evidence is persuasive that, although they were interested in and helped -conduct the experiments up to a certain point, the excesses which -resulted in torture and death are attributable to Dr. Rascher. It is -quite apparent that the actual activities of these three physicians were -far removed from the immediate scrutiny of the defendant even though -their activities were conducted within the orbit of the Luftwaffe, over -which the defendant had command. - -Approaching now the determinative questions listed above, some progress -can quickly be made in arriving at judicially satisfactory answers. - - (1) As to the first question, the evidence is overwhelming and - not contradicted that experiments involving the effect of low - air pressure and freezing on live human beings were conducted at - Dachau from March through June 1942. - - (2) Approaching the second question, it is claimed by the - defendant that only legitimate scientific experiments were - conducted which did not involve pain or torture and could not - ordinarily be expected to result in death. It is remotely - possible that so long as the experiments were under the guidance - of Dr. Ruff and Dr. Romberg some consideration was given to the - possible effect upon the subjects of the experiments. But it is - indisputable that the experiments conducted by Dr. Rascher - involved torture and suffering in the extreme and in many cases - resulted in death. Under the specific guidance of Dr. Rascher, - the air pressure was reduced to a point which no flier would - ever be required to undergo (14,000 meters). The photographs of - the subjects undergoing these experiments indicate extreme agony - and leave no doubt that any victim who was fortunate enough to - survive had undergone a harrowing experience. The Tribunal does - not hesitate to find that these experiments, performed under the - specious guise of science, were barbarous and inhuman. It has - been urged by the defendant that the only persons used as - subjects of these experiments were habitual criminals who had - been sentenced to death and who were given the dubious option of - offering themselves for the experiments and receiving as a - reward, if they survived, a commutation of the death sentence to - life imprisonment. This claim scarcely merits serious - consideration. A number of witnesses stated that they had a - vague understanding that this was the case, but the record is - entirely barren of any credible testimony which could possibly - justify such a finding of fact. - - (3) The prosecution does not claim (and there is no evidence) - that the defendant personally participated in the conduct of - these experiments. - - (4) There is no evidence that the defendant instituted the - experiments or that they were conducted or continued under his - specific direction or command. It may perhaps be claimed that - the low-pressure chamber, which was the property of the - Luftwaffe, was sent to Dachau at the direction of the defendant, - but even if this were true it could not be inferred from that - fact alone that he thereby promulgated the inhuman and criminal - experiments which followed. The low-pressure chamber was - susceptible of legitimate use and, perhaps, had Dr. Rascher not - injected himself into the proceedings, it would have been - confined to that use. - - (5) Assuming that the defendant was aware that experiments of - some character were to be launched, it cannot be said that the - evidence shows any knowledge on his part that unwilling subjects - would be forced to submit to them or that the experiments would - be painful and dangerous to human life. It is quite apparent - from an over-all survey of the proof that the defendant - concerned himself very little with the details of these - experiments. It was quite natural that this should be so. His - most pressing problems involved the procurement of labor and - materials for the manufacture of airplanes. His position - involved vast responsibilities covering a wide industrial field, - and there were certainly countless subordinate fields within the - Luftwaffe of which he had only cursory knowledge. The Tribunal - is convinced that these experiments, which fell naturally and - almost exclusively within one of his subordinate departments, - engaged the attention of the defendant only perfunctorily, if at - all. - - (6) Did the defendant have the power or opportunity to prevent - or stop the experiments? It cannot be gainsaid that he had the - authority to either prevent or stop them insofar as they were - being conducted under the auspices of the Luftwaffe. It seems - extremely probable, however, that, in spite of him, they would - have continued under Himmler and the SS. But certainly he had no - opportunity to prevent or stop them, unless it can be found that - he had guilty knowledge of them, a fact which has already been - determined in the negative. As early as 20 May 1942, the - defendant wrote to Wolff, Himmler’s Adjutant, stating: - - “* * * our medical inspector [Dr. Hippke] reports to me that the - altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Luftwaffe at - Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments - seems essentially unreasonable * * * - - “The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these - low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another - place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.” - - Certainly the defendant did not have the opportunity to prevent - or stop the experiments if he had been told and was convinced - that they had terminated on 20 May 1942, and there is no reason - to believe that he did not rely upon Dr. Hippke’s report as to - their termination. Considerable emphasis is laid upon the - testimony that a motion picture of the experiments was brought - to Berlin and exhibited in the Air Ministry Building, where the - defendant had his office. It may even be said that the picture - was brought to Berlin for the defendant’s edification. But it - appears that he was not present when it was shown and that, in - any event, the showing was long after the experiments were - concluded, at which time the defendant certainly could do - nothing toward preventing them or stopping them. - - (7) In view of the above findings, it is obvious that the - defendant never became _particeps criminis_ and accessory in the - low-pressure experiments set forth in the second count of the - indictment. - - As to the other experiments, involving subjecting human beings - to extreme low temperatures both in the open air and in water, - the responsibility of the defendant is even less apparent than - in the case of the low-pressure experiments. The same letter of - 20 May 1942 to Wolff does indicate that the defendant was aware - of the proposed sea-water experiments. In it he says— - - “* * * the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in - regard to perils at high seas, would be important. These have - been prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; - Oberstabsarzt Weltz will be charged with the execution and - Stabsarzt Rascher will be made available until further order in - addition to his duties within the medical corps of the - Luftwaffe. A change of these measures does not appear necessary, - and an enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at - this time.” - -It is true that Rascher wrote interminable reports as to the results of -these experiments, but there is no proof that they ever reached the -defendant. On the contrary, they were addressed to Himmler and to Rudolf -Brandt, his adjutant. At the Nuernberg conference in November 1943, -which was held after all experiments had been finished, reports were -made which even to a mildly curious lay person might have indicated that -the experiments had been tinged with excesses and fatalities. But two -facts are striking. First, the defendant was not present at the -conference and only received a report of it later; and, second, the -experiments were at that time all over. - -It must be constantly borne in mind that this is an American court of -justice, applying the ancient and fundamental concepts of Anglo-Saxon -jurisprudence which have sunk their roots into the English common law -and have been stoutly defended in the United States since its birth. One -of the principal purposes of these trials is to inculcate into the -thinking of the German people an appreciation of, and respect for, the -principles of law which have become the backbone of the democratic -process. We must bend every effort toward suggesting to the people of -every nation that laws must be used for the protection of people and -that every citizen shall forever have the right to a fair hearing before -an impartial tribunal, before which all men stand equal. We must never -falter in maintaining, by practice as well as by preachment, the -sanctity of what we have come to know as due process of law, civil and -criminal, municipal and international. If the level of civilization is -to be raised throughout the world, this must be the first step. Any -other road leads but to tyranny and chaos. This Tribunal, before all -others, must act in recognition of these self-evident principles. If it -fails, its whole purpose is frustrated and this trial becomes a mockery. -At the very foundation of these juridical concepts lie two important -postulates (1) every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent, -and (2) that presumption abides with him until guilt has been -established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. - -Unless the court which hears the proof is convinced of guilt to the -point of moral certainty, the presumption of innocence must continue to -protect the accused. If the facts as drawn from the evidence are equally -consistent with guilt and innocence, they must be resolved on the side -of innocence. Under American law neither life nor liberty is to be -lightly taken away, and, unless at the conclusion of the proof there is -an abiding conviction of guilt in the mind of the court which sits in -judgment, the accused may not be damnified. - -Paying reverent attention to these sacred principles, it is the judgment -of the Tribunal that the defendant is not guilty of the charges embraced -in count two of the indictment. - - COUNT ONE - -Count one of the indictment charges the defendant with the commission of -specified war crimes, as defined by Article II of Control Council Law -No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, -took a consenting part in and was connected with, plans and enterprises -involving slave labor and deportation to slave labor, resulting in the -enslavement, torture and murder of civilians of foreign countries. The -indictment further charges that he similarly participated in the use of -prisoners of war in war operations and work having a direct relation to -war operations, resulting in inhuman treatment and death to captured -members of the armed forces opposed to Germany. The indictment alleges -that these acts were in violation of international law and the -recognized principles of civilized warfare and in specific violation of -numerous treaties and conventions to which Germany was a party. - -It is claimed by the prosecution that the defendant’s responsibility for -these alleged crimes arises from his activities in three capacities (1) -as Aircraft Master General (Generalluftzeugmeister); (2) member of the -Central Planning Board; and (3) chief of the Jaegerstab. The Central -Planning Board was established by a decree of the Fuehrer, dated 29 -October 1943. That decree fitted the task of production of material -goods of every kind into the framework of the Four Year Plan and charged -the Central Planning Board with the procurement and distribution of -material of every description. The Board consisted of Reich Minister -Speer, Under Secretary Koerner, and the defendant. On 1 March 1944, the -Jaegerstab was established, consisting of Speer, Saur (a subordinate of -Speer), and the defendant. The Jaegerstab concerned itself exclusively -with the material needs of the Luftwaffe, and was headed, naturally, by -the defendant. It became apparent that neither of these two bodies could -adequately deal with the problems of production without constantly -dealing with the question of labor supply. Meetings of the Central -Planning Board were held at least weekly and the minutes of those -meetings which were offered in evidence show a constant and unremitting -concern with the problem of labor. Fritz Sauckel was in supreme command -of the procurement of labor for the entire war effort, and his conduct -in carrying out his task has been vividly portrayed in the judgment of -the International Military Tribunal:[158] - - “* * * As local supplies of raw materials and local industrial - capacity became inadequate to meet the German requirements, the - system of deporting laborers to Germany was put into force. By - the middle of April 1940 compulsory deportation of laborers to - Germany had been ordered in the General Government; and a - similar procedure was followed in other eastern territories as - they were occupied. A description of this compulsory deportation - from Poland was given by Himmler. In an address to SS officers - he recalled how in weather 40 degrees below zero they had to - ‘haul away thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands.’ - On a later occasion Himmler stated: - - “‘Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from exhaustion - while digging an antitank ditch interests me only insofar as the - antitank ditch for Germany is finished * * *. We must realize - that we have 6-7 million foreigners in Germany * * *. They are - none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures at the - merest trifles.’ - - “During the first two years of the German occupation of France, - Belgium, Holland, and Norway, however, an attempt was made to - obtain the necessary workers on a voluntary basis. How - unsuccessful this was may be seen from the report of the meeting - of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944. The - representative of the defendant Speer, one Koehrl [Kehrl], - speaking of the situation in France said: ‘During all this time - a great number of Frenchmen were recruited, and voluntarily went - to Germany.’ - - “He was interrupted by the defendant Sauckel: ‘Not only - voluntary, some were recruited forcibly.’ - - “To which Koehrl [Kehrl] replied: ‘The calling up started after - the recruitment no longer yielded enough results.’ - - “To which the defendant Sauckel replied: ‘Out of the five - million workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came - voluntarily.’ And Koehrl [Kehrl] rejoined: ‘Let us forget for - the moment whether or not some slight pressure was used. - Formally, at least, they were volunteers.’ - - “Committees were set up to encourage recruiting, and a vigorous - propaganda campaign was begun to induce workers to volunteer for - service in Germany. This propaganda campaign included, for - example, the promise that a prisoner of war would be returned - for every laborer who volunteered to go to Germany. In some - cases it was supplemented by withdrawing the ration cards of - laborers who refused to go to Germany, or by discharging them - from their jobs and denying them unemployment benefit or an - opportunity to work elsewhere. In some cases workers and their - families were threatened with reprisals by the police if they - refused to go to Germany. It was on 21 March 1942 that the - defendant Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary-General for the - Utilization of Labor, with authority over ‘all available - manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad, and of - prisoners of war’. - - “The defendant Sauckel was directly under the defendant Goering - as Commissioner of the Four Year Plan, and a Goering decree of - 27 March 1942 transferred all his authority over manpower to - Sauckel. Sauckel’s instructions, too, were that foreign labor - should be recruited on a voluntary basis, but also provided that - ‘where, however, in the occupied territories, the appeal for - volunteers does not suffice, obligatory service and drafting - must under all circumstances be resorted to.’ Rules requiring - labor service in Germany were published in all the occupied - territories. The number of laborers to be supplied was fixed by - Sauckel, and the local authorities were instructed to meet these - requirements by conscription if necessary * * *. - - “* * * the evidence before the Tribunal establishes the fact - that the conscription of labor was accomplished in many cases by - drastic and violent methods. The ‘mistakes and blunders’ were on - a very great scale. Manhunts took place in the streets, at - motion picture houses, even at churches and at night in private - houses. Houses were sometimes burnt down, and the families taken - as hostages, practices which were described by the defendant - Rosenberg as having their origin ‘in the blackest periods of the - slave trade.’ The methods used in obtaining forced labor from - the Ukraine appear from an order issued to SD officers which - stated: - - “‘It will not be possible always to refrain from using force * * - *. When searching villages, especially when it has been - necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be - put at the disposal of the commissioner by force * * *. As a - rule no more children will be shot * * *. If we limit harsh - measures through the above orders for the time being it is only - done for the following reason * * *. The most important thing is - the recruitment of workers.’ - - “The resources and needs of the occupied countries were - completely disregarded in carrying out this policy. The - treatment of the laborers was governed by Sauckel’s instructions - of 20 April 1942 to the effect that— - - ‘All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as - to exploit them to the highest possible extent, at the lowest - conceivable degree of expenditure.’ - - “The evidence showed that workers destined for the Reich were - sent under guard to Germany, often packed in trains without - adequate heat, food, clothing, or sanitary facilities. The - evidence further showed that the treatment of the laborers in - Germany in many cases was brutal and degrading * * *. They were - subject to constant supervision by the Gestapo and the SS, and - if they attempted to leave their jobs they were sent to - correction camps or concentration camps. The concentration camps - were also used to increase the supply of labor. Concentration - camp commanders were ordered to work their prisoners to the - limits of their physical power. During the latter stages of the - war the concentration camps were so productive in certain types - of work that the Gestapo was actually instructed to arrest - certain classes of laborers so that they could be used in this - way. Allied prisoners of war were also regarded as a possible - source of labor. Pressure was exercised on noncommissioned - officers to force them to consent to work, by transferring to - disciplinary camps those who did not consent. Many of the - prisoners of war were assigned to work directly related to - military operations, in violation of Article 31 of the Geneva - Convention. They were put to work in munition factories and even - made to load bombers, to carry ammunition and to dig trenches, - often under the most hazardous conditions. This condition - applied particularly to the Soviet prisoners of war. On 16 - February 1943, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, at - which the defendants Sauckel and Speer were present, Milch said: - - “‘We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage - of men in the ack-ack artillery must be Russians; 50,000 will be - taken altogether, 30,000 are already employed as gunners. This - is an amusing thing, that Russians must work the guns.’” - -And on 4 October 1943, at Poznan, Himmler, speaking of the Russian -prisoners, captured in the early days of the war, said: - - “‘At that time we did not value the mass of humanity as we value - it today, as raw material, as labor. What, after all, thinking - in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now - deplorable by reason of the loss of labor, is that the prisoners - died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and - hunger.’ - - “The general policy underlying the mobilization of slave labor - was stated by Sauckel on 20 April 1942. He said: - - “‘The aim of this new gigantic labor mobilization is to use all - the rich and tremendous sources conquered and secured for us by - our fighting armed forces, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, - for the armament of the armed forces, and also for the nutrition - of the homeland. The raw materials, as well as the fertility of - the conquered territories and their human labor power, are to be - used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and - her allies * * *. All prisoners of war from the territories of - the West, as well as the East, actually in Germany, must be - completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition - industries * * *. Consequently it is an immediate necessity to - use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the - fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary - amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately - institute conscription or forced labor * * *. The complete - employment of all prisoners of war, as well as the use of a - gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, - has become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the - mobilization of the labor program in this war.’” - -Continuing with the quotation from the IMT decision:[159] - - “* * * As the dominant member of the Central Planning Board, - which had supreme authority for the scheduling of German - production and the allocation and development of raw materials, - Speer took the position that the Board had authority to instruct - Sauckel to provide laborers for industries under its control and - succeeded in sustaining this position over the objection of - Sauckel. The practice was developed under which Speer - transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number of - workers needed. Sauckel obtained the labor and allocated it to - the various industries in accordance with instructions supplied - by Speer. - - “Speer knew when he made his demands on Sauckel that they would - be supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion. He - participated in conferences involving the extension of the slave - labor program for the purpose of satisfying his demands. He was - present at a conference held during 10-12 August 1942 with - Hitler and Sauckel at which it was agreed that Sauckel should - bring laborers by force from occupied territories where this was - necessary to satisfy the labor needs of the industries under - Speer’s control. Speer also attended a conference in Hitler’s - headquarters on 4 January 1944, at which the decision was made - that Sauckel should obtain ‘at least 4 million new workers from - occupied territories’ in order to satisfy the demands for labor - made by Speer, although Sauckel indicated that he could do this - only with help from Himmler. - - “Sauckel continually informed Speer and his representatives that - foreign laborers were being obtained by force. At a meeting of 1 - March 1944, Speer’s deputy questioned Sauckel very closely about - his failure to live up to the obligation to supply four million - workers from occupied territories. In some cases Speer demanded - laborers from specific foreign countries. Thus, at the - conference 10-12 August 1942, Sauckel was instructed to supply - Speer with ‘a further million Russian laborers for the German - armament industry up to and including October 1942.’ At a - meeting of the Central Planning Board on 22 April 1943, Speer - discussed plans to obtain Russian laborers for use in the coal - mines, and flatly vetoed the suggestion that this labor deficit - should be made up by German labor. - - “Speer has argued that he advocated the reorganization of the - labor program to place a greater emphasis on utilization of - German labor in war production in Germany and on the use of - labor in occupied countries in local production of consumer - goods formerly produced in Germany. Speer took steps in this - direction by establishing the so-called ‘blocked industries’ in - the occupied territories which were used to produce goods to be - shipped to Germany. Employees of these industries were immune - from deportation to Germany as slave laborers and any worker who - had been ordered to go to Germany could avoid deportation if he - went to work for a blocked industry. This system, although, - somewhat less inhumane than deportation to Germany, was still - illegal. The system of blocked industries played only a small - part in the over-all slave labor program, although Speer urged - its cooperation with the slave labor program, knowing the way in - which it was actually being administered. In an official sense, - he was its principal beneficiary and he constantly urged its - extension. - - “Speer was also directly involved in the utilization of forced - labor as Chief of the Organization Todt. The Organization Todt - functioned principally in the occupied areas on such projects as - the Atlantic Wall and the construction of military highways, and - Speer has admitted that he relied on compulsory service to keep - it adequately staffed. He also used concentration camp labor in - the industries under his control. He originally arranged to tap - this source of labor for use in small out-of-the-way factories; - and later, fearful of Himmler’s jurisdictional ambitions, - attempted to use as few concentration camp workers as possible. - - “Speer was also involved in the use of prisoners of war in - armament industries but contends that he utilized Soviet - prisoners of war only in industries covered by the Geneva - Convention. - - “Speer’s position was such that he was not directly concerned - with the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor - program, although he was aware of its existence. For example, at - meetings of the Central Planning Board he was informed that his - demands for labor were so large as to necessitate violent - methods in recruiting. At a meeting of the Central Planning - Board on 30 October 1942, Speer voiced his opinion that many - slave laborers who claimed to be sick were malingerers and - stated: ‘There is nothing to be said against SS and police - taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into - concentration camps.’” - -Under the provisions of Article X of Ordinance No. 7, these -determinations of fact by the International Military Tribunal are -binding upon this Tribunal “in the absence of substantial new evidence -to the contrary.” Any new evidence which was presented was in no way -contradictory of the findings of the International Military Tribunal, -but, on the contrary, ratified and affirmed them. - -The next question to be answered is whether or not the defendant Milch -in this case knew that foreign slave labor and prisoners of war were -being procured by Sauckel and used in the aircraft industry, which the -defendant controlled. The defendant’s own words, as gleaned from the -minutes of the Central Planning Board and from his own testimony, -conclusively answer this question in the affirmative. He testified that -he knew that prisoners of war were employed in the airplane factory at -Regensburg and that some twenty thousand Russian prisoners of war were -used to man antiaircraft guns protecting the various plants. He stated -further that he saw this type of war prisoners manning 8.8 and 10.5 -[centimeter] antiaircraft guns at airplane factories in Luftgau 7 near -Munich. Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary for Labor, sat in on at least -fifteen meetings of the Central Planning Board, over which the defendant -presided, and discussed at great length and in elaborate detail the -problems involved in procuring sufficient foreign laborers for the -German war effort. He frankly disclosed the cruel and barbarous methods -used in forcing civilians of the eastern countries into the Reich for -war work. He related the difficulties and resistance which confronted -him and the methods which he used and proposed to use in forcibly -rounding up and transporting foreign workers. The advisability of using -prisoners of war and inmates of concentration camps in the Luftwaffe was -frankly discussed, with the defendant offering advice and suggestions as -to the most effective methods to be used. In the face of this -overwhelming evidence, disclosing page after page of discussion between -Speer, Sauckel, and the defendant in which the defendant urged more -severe and coercive methods of procuring foreign labor from the East, it -would violate all reason to conclude that he had no knowledge of the -source of this labor or of the methods used in procuring it. His voice -is constantly heard, pleading for more laborers from this source and -clamoring for a larger share in Sauckel’s labor pool. Hildebrand and -Sagemeier for the coal mines, Rohland for the foundries, Kehrl for the -coal and iron industries, Bruch and Becht for the rubber industry, Speer -for the armament industry, and Milch for the aircraft industry—all -these and others joined in a pagan chorus, in which the harmony was -frequently strained, but all singing the same song, “We need laborers, -men and women. We don’t care where you get them, but give us more.” - -At the 54th meeting of the Central Planning Board, Sauckel stated in the -defendant’s presence: - - “* * * Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole - batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as - was done in olden times for ‘shanghaiing’, went hunting for men - and made them drunk by using liquor as well as words, in order - to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover I charged some able men - with founding a special labor supply executive of our own, and - this they did by training and arming, with the help of the - Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, a number of natives, but I still - have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of these - men. * * *. - - “* * * I and my assistants in fact have sometimes seen things - happen in France that I was forced to ask, is there no respect - any more in France for the German lieutenant with his 10 men? * - * * We Germans must make an example of one case, and, by reason - of this law, if necessary put Prefect or Burgomaster against the - wall, if he does not comply with the rules; otherwise no - Frenchman at all will be dispatched to Germany.” - -The defendant contributed to the discussion by saying: - - “* * * As soon as you arrive the men run away to protect - themselves from being sent to Germany * * *. The men even then - will be whisked away unless quite another authority and power is - on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. * * * I can - find no remedy but that the army should assert itself - ruthlessly.” - -As indicating that the defendant was not indifferent to the problem, at -the same meeting, in referring to procuring labor from Italy, he offered -the following suggestion: - - “We could take under German administration the entire food - supply for the Italians and tell them: only he gets any food who - either works in a protected factory (that is, a factory in Italy - manufacturing German war material) or goes to Germany.” - -Later in the same conference, the defendant made another contribution to -the solution of the problem of foreign labor, saying: - - “Now during the transfer it is necessary to see that the people - really do arrive and do not run away before or during the - transfer. If a transport has left a town and has not arrived, - 500 to 600 persons from this place must be arrested and sent to - Germany as prisoners of war. Such a thing is then talked about - everywhere. If actions like this and other similar ones are - carried out often, they would exert a certain pressure. The - whole thing would be made easier, if we had control of food.” - -At the 53d meeting of the Central Planning Board (16 February 1944), the -defendant stated: - - “Our best new engine is made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of - war and the other 12 percent by German men and women.” - -Instances could be multiplied in which the defendant not only listened -to stories of enforced labor from eastern civilians and other prisoners -of war and thereby became aware of the methods used in procuring such -labor, but in which he himself urged more stringent and coercive means -to supplement the dwindling supply of labor in the Luftwaffe. As -Germany’s plight became more desperate, her loss of military personnel -presented an alarming dilemma, resulting in the defection of thousands -of workmen to the armed forces. This resulted in a shifting of the -dilemma to industry, and spurs were put to the labor procurement -officers to fill the widening gap in the industrial labor ranks. Every -branch of war industry constantly clamored for replacements and each -vied with the others for a greater quota from the labor pool. Confronted -by the desperate situation, the labor procurement officers, headed by -the implacable Sauckel, cast aside all restraint and set out -systematically to herd into the Reich any human being who could -contribute to Germany’s war effort. Under Sauckel’s whip, no means -however harsh were overlooked, and no person however exempt was spared. - -The defense on this count is ingenious but unconvincing. As to the use -of prisoners of war, the defendant testified that he had been advised by -some unidentified person high in the National Socialist Councils that it -was not unlawful to employ prisoners of war in war industries. The -defendant was an old and experienced soldier, and his testimony revealed -that he was well acquainted with the provisions of the Geneva and Hague -Treaties on this subject, which are plain and unequivocal. In the face -of this knowledge, the advice which he claims to have received should -have raised grave suspicions in his mind. Presenting an entirely -different aspect to his defense, he testifies that many of the Russian -prisoners of war volunteered to serve in the war industries and -apparently enjoyed the opportunity of manufacturing munitions to be used -against their fellow countrymen and their allies. Other Russian -prisoners of war, he states, were discharged as such and immediately -enrolled as civilian workers. The photographs introduced in evidence, -however, show that they still retained their Russian army uniforms, -which makes their status as civilians suspect. Be that as it may, it -does not adequately answer the charge that hundreds of thousands of -Polish prisoners of war were cast into concentration camps and parceled -out to the various war factories, nor the further fact that thousands of -French prisoners of war were compelled to labor under the most harrowing -conditions for the Luftwaffe. - -As to the French civilian workers who were employed at war work in -Germany after the conquest of France, it is the contention of the -defendant that these workers were supplied by the French Government -under a solemn agreement with the Reich. It is claimed with a straight -face that the Vichy Government, headed by Laval, entered into an -international compact with the German Government to supply French -laborers for work in Germany. This contention entirely overlooks the -fact that the Vichy Government was a mere puppet set up under German -domination, which, in full collaboration with Germany, took its orders -from Berlin. The position of the defendant seems to be that, if any -force or coercion was used on French citizens, it was exerted by their -own government, but this position entirely overlooks the fact that the -transports which brought Frenchmen to Germany were manned by German -armed guards and that upon their arrival they were kept under military -guard provided by the Wehrmacht or the SS. - -It was sought to disguise the harsh realities of the German foreign -labor policy by the use of specious legal and economic terms, and to -make such policy appear as the exercise of conventional labor relations -and labor law. The fiction of a “labor contract” was frequently resorted -to, especially in the operations of the Todt Organization, which implied -that foreign workers were given a free choice to work or not to work for -Germany military industry. This, of course, was purely fictitious, as is -shown by the fact that thousands of these “contract workers” jumped from -the trains transporting them to Germany and fled into the woods. Does -anyone believe that the vast hordes of Slavic Jews who labored in -Germany’s war industries were accorded the rights of contracting -parties? They were slaves, nothing less—kidnapped, regimented, herded -under armed guards, and worked until they died from disease, hunger, and -exhaustion. The idea of any Jew being a party to a contract with Germans -was unthinkable to the National Socialists. Jews were considered as -outcasts and were completely at the mercy of their oppressors. -Exploitation was merely a convenient and profitable means of -extermination, to the end that, “when this war ends, there will be no -more Jews in Europe”. As to non-Jewish foreign labor, with few -exceptions they were deprived of the basic civil rights of free men; -they were deprived of the right to move freely or to choose their place -of residence; to live in a household with their families; to rear and -educate their children; to marry; to visit public places of their own -choosing; to negotiate, either individually or through representatives -of their own choice, the conditions of their own employment; to organize -in trade unions; to exercise free speech or other free expression of -opinion; to gather in peaceful assembly; and they were frequently -deprived of the right to worship according to their own conscience. All -these are the sign-marks of slavery, not free employment under contract. - -The German nation, before the ascendancy of the NSDAP, had repeatedly -recognized the rights of civilians in occupied countries. At the Hague -Peace Conference of 1907, an amendment was submitted by the German -delegate, Major General von Guendell, which read: - - “A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of - the adverse party to take part in the operations of war directed - against their country, even when they have been in his service - before the commencement of the war.” - -The German manual for war on land (Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, Edition -1902) stated: - - “The inhabitants of an invaded territory are persons endowed - with rights * * * subject to certain restrictions * * * but who - otherwise may live free from vexations and, as in time of peace, - under the protection of the laws.” - -During the First World War, an order of the German Supreme Command (3 -October 1916) provided for the deportation of Belgian vagrants and -idlers to Germany for work, but specified that such labor was not to be -used in connection with operations of war. The order resulted in such a -storm of protest that it was at once abandoned by the German -authorities. - -It cannot be contended, of course, that foreign workers were entitled to -comforts or luxuries which were not accorded German workers. It is also -recognized that, especially during the latter part of the war there was -a universal shortage of food and fuel throughout the Reich and in the -discomforts arising therefrom foreign workers were bound to share. But -it is an undoubted fact that the foreign workers were subjected to -cruelties and torture and the deprivation of decent human rights merely -because they were aliens. This was not true in isolated instances, but -was universal and was the working out of the German attitude toward -those whom it considered inferior peoples. If any decent human -consideration was shown these workers, it was merely to maintain their -productivity and did not stem from any humanitarian considerations. - -The Tribunal therefore finds the defendant guilty of the war crimes -charged in count one of the indictment, to wit, that he was a principal -in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in and was -connected with, plans and enterprises involving slave labor and -deportation to slave labor of the civilian populations of countries and -territories occupied by the German armed forces, and in the enslavement, -deportation, ill-treatment and terrorization of such persons; and -further that the defendant was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, -abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with, plans and -enterprises involving the use of prisoners of war in war operations and -work having a direct relation to war operations. - - COUNT THREE - -Count three of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes against -humanity committed against “German nationals and nationals of other -countries.” Sufficient proof was not adduced as to such offenses against -German nationals to justify an adjudication of guilt on that ground. As -to such crimes against nationals of other countries, the evidence shows -that a large number of Hungarian Jews and other nationals of Hungary and -Romania, which countries were occupied by Germany but were not -belligerents, were subjected to the same tortures and deportations as -were the nationals of Poland and Russia. In count one of the indictment -these acts are charged as war crimes and have heretofore been considered -by the Tribunal under that count in this judgment. In the judgment of -the International Military Tribunal (_Vol. I, Trial of the Major War -Criminals, p. 254_), the court stated— - - “From the beginning of the war in 1939, war crimes were - committed on a vast scale which were also crimes against - humanity.” - -This is a finding of law and an interpretation of Control Council Law -No. 10, with which this Tribunal is in full accord. - -Our conclusion is that the same unlawful acts of violence which -constituted war crimes under count one of the indictment also constitute -crimes against humanity as alleged in count three of the indictment. -Having determined the defendant to be guilty of war crimes under count -one, it follows, of necessity, that he is also guilty of the separate -offense of crime against humanity, as alleged in count three, and this -Tribunal so determines. - -In exculpation, the defendant states that he was a German soldier and -that whatever was done by him or with his knowledge or consent was done -in pursuance of a national military policy promulgated by Hitler and in -obedience to military orders. He protests that, no matter how violently -he disagreed with the methods used by the German Reich in the furthering -of its policy of aggressive war, he was helpless to extricate himself -and had no alternative except to stay with the venture to the bitter -end. It is true that withdrawal may involve risks and dangers, but these -are incidental to the original affiliation with the unlawful scheme. He -who elects to participate in a venture which may result in failure must -make his election to abandon the enterprise if it is not to his liking -or to stay as a participant, and win or lose according to the outcome. - -Much significance must be attached to the meeting of 23 May 1939, at -which the defendant was admittedly present and in which Hitler spoke at -great length as to his plans for the subjugation of friendly minor -nations and the ultimate conquest of Europe. A purported record of the -events at this meeting has been introduced in evidence and has been -found to be reliable and accurate by the International Military -Tribunal. The defendant has throughout insisted that this record is -spurious and was made by Schmundt long after the occasion which it -records. Of course, it was never anticipated that this record, which was -marked “Top Secret, To be Transmitted by Officer Only,” would ever be -captured and its contents become known. It is not surprising that those -who sat and listened to the astounding program of the Fuehrer now wish -that they had been absent. It cannot be denied that there was a meeting -of some kind which the defendant attended and at which the Fuehrer -spoke, and further that it was held a few short months before the actual -invasion of Poland, as forecast in the report of the meeting. The -Schmundt paper does not pretend to be a verbatim report of Hitler’s -exact words, but certainly all of the diabolical plans which it reveals -were not manufactured by Schmundt out of thin air, attributed to Hitler, -and then marked “Top Secret”. Even if Hitler said only a small part of -what is attributed to him by Schmundt, there was enough said to advise -and warn a man of the defendant’s intelligence and experience that -mischief was afoot. Every sentence shrieks of war. The record hints at -nothing else, and, if all references to conquest and war and world -domination are eliminated, Hitler did not speak at all. At this early -date, the defendant must be charged with knowledge that a war of -aggression, to be ruthlessly pursued, was planned. This, then, was the -time for him to have made his decision—the decision which confronts -every man daily—to be honorable or dishonorable. Life consists quite -generally in making such decisions. As an old soldier, schooled in the -code of war and well aware of the principles to which an honorable -soldier must adhere, he sat complacently and listened to a proposed -program which violated national honor, personal integrity and the moral -code of an honest soldier. He made his choice and elected to ride with -the tyrant. - -When the defendant joined the National Socialist Party in 1933, Germany -was in the throes of dire economic and political distress and was -burdened by a myriad of political parties, each with its separate -program and all functioning at cross-purposes. The defendant elected to -affiliate with the NSDAP because, he testified, he believed it offered -the most likely agency for bringing order out of chaos. But very soon he -must have realized that he had joined a band of villains whose program -contemplated every crime in the calendar. The Nazi code was not a -secret. It was published and proclaimed by the Party leaders in long -harangues to the people; decrees and directives were broadcast; the -infamous Streicher was spreading anti-Jewish obscenities throughout the -Reich in “Der Stuermer”; Roehm and a large number of the SA were -murdered by Hitler’s orders; hundreds of German citizens were cast into -concentration camps for “political re-education,” without hearing or -opportunity for defense; the iniquitous Gestapo stormed through the -land, with power over life and liberty which could not be questioned; in -public view Jews were beaten and killed, their synagogues burned and -their stores destroyed. The Party proclaimed its objectives from the -house-tops and verified them by open public conduct throughout the -Reich. The significant fact which must not be overlooked is that all -these things happened _before_ the war was launched, at a time when -there was no claim upon the loyalty of the defendant as a soldier to -protect his homeland at war. He protests that he never subscribed to the -master race philosophy, but 18 years before he joined the Party in 1933, -its precepts and demands had been proclaimed, among which was Point 4— - - “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the - race can only be one who is of German blood, without - consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of - the race.” - -The humblest citizens of Germany knew that the iniquitous doctrines of -the Party were being implemented by ruthless acts of persecution and -terrorism which occurred in public view. Thousands of obscure German -citizens were only too well aware that they were living under the -scrutiny of an army of spies and saw their friends and relatives -summarily dispatched to concentration camps for the slightest suspicion -of dissidence. The defendant did not live in a vacuum. He was not blind -nor deaf. Long before 1939, long before his military loyalty was called -into play, long before the door of withdrawal was closed, he could have -seen the bloody handwriting on the wall, for murder and enslavement of -his own countrymen was there written in blazing symbols. But he had -taken on the crimson mantle of the Party, with all its ghastly -implication, and he wore it with glory and profit to himself to the end. -Others with more courage and higher principles and with more loyalty to -the ancient German ideals rebelled and withdrew from the brutal -crew—von Clausewitz, Yorck von Wartenburg, Schlegelberger, Schmitt, -Eltz von Ruebenach, Tesmer. These men in high positions had the -character to repudiate great evil, and if in so doing they took risks -and made sacrifices, nevertheless, they made their choice to stand with -decency and justice and honor. The defendant had his opportunity to join -those who refused to do the evil bidding of an evil master, but he cast -it aside and his professed repentance now comes too late. - -What a sordid picture of a civilized nation—the nation of Goethe and -Heine, of Beethoven and Schubert, even of Bismarck and von -Hindenburg—fawning and cringing at the feet of a small man with -delusions of grandeur. Even when madness crept in to intensify his -frenzy and fear of defeat put spurs to his ferocity, they still said, -“We are his people. He is our immaculate leader.” Men of large -capacities, even of genius, prostituted their talents before a puny -renegade who used them impiously and paid off his puppets with medals -and pelf. But the strutting menials stayed with him. So long as success -was on the horizon, they bowed and scraped and sought to outdo each -other in supine adulation. They tell us now, “Hitler was wrong.” But -they never told him that. Right or wrong, their only concern was, “Can -he win the war? And what will it mean for me?” They heard him proclaim -as early as November 1937, “The question for Germany is where the -greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest possible cost,” -and they nodded and shouted, “Heil Hitler,” and maneuvered to get closer -to him. Before the invasion of Poland, they heard this bloodthirsty -tyrant say, “In starting and making a war, not the right is what -matters, but victory.” And this defendant, as part of the unholy array, -rolled up his sleeves and said, “Let me help. Give me men and more men, -no matter where you get them.” - -In a civilized state which recognizes the sanctity of human lives and -human rights, no man—no group of men—should be endowed with -omnipotence. The history of human relations, from Herod to Hitler, has -repeatedly demonstrated this to be true. Omnipotence is only for God. Be -a man ever so wise, ever so benevolent, ever so trustworthy, there still -exists in him the frailty, the fallibility, the susceptibility to -temptation that is inherent in every man. If the only protection against -the tyranny of an autocrat is his own self-restraint, that is not -enough, for power feeds on power, and the temptation to stretch -authority to its limit is irresistible. - -What, then, of the responsibility of those who bask in the reflected -radiance of omnipotence, who get their sustenance from it and who -arrogantly carry out its mandates and crush any resistance to it? Are -they not the hands and limbs of the monster, carrying out the orders of -the head? Surely, they cannot be allowed to detach themselves from the -corpus by saying, “These arms and legs are innocent—only the head is -guilty?” - -In an authoritarian state, the head becomes the supreme authority for -woe as well as weal. Those who subscribe to such a state submit to that -principle. If they abjectly place all the power in the hands of one man, -with no right reserved to check or limit or repudiate, they must accept -the bitter with the sweet. This is especially true of those in high -places in the state—those who choose to enjoy the honor, the emoluments -and the power of such high stations. By accepting such attractive and -lucrative posts under a head whose power they know to be unlimited, they -ratify in advance his every act, good or bad. They cannot say at the -beginning, “The Fuehrer’s decisions are final; we will have no voice in -them; it is not for us to reason why; his will is law,” and then, when -the Fuehrer decrees aggressive war or barbarous inhumanities or broken -covenants, to attempt to exculpate themselves by saying, “Oh, we were -never in favor of _those_ things.” - -One cannot escape the conviction that, had the war terminated in victory -for Germany, all of the acts of Hitler, including those related to the -charges in this indictment, would have been hailed as strokes of genius, -and that this defendant would now be elbowing his way into the front row -of those claiming to have successfully and victoriously carried out -Hitler’s orders and policies—in fact, claiming co-authorship in many. -But with Germany defeated and Hitler dead, it becomes naively convenient -to take refuge in the flimsy claim that no one except Hitler was in -favor of the invasion of Poland and Russia and France and the rape of -Holland and Belgium and Norway and Denmark. - -The defendant insists that he knew nothing of the atrocities and -violence which were cumulating day by day throughout Europe. Being a -good German, he says, he supinely obeyed the decree which forbade -listening to foreign broadcasts or reading foreign periodicals. He -surrendered to a political philosophy which outlawed the ordinary means -of knowledge and which prevented the formation of rationalized opinion -or judgment. No one might read or listen or talk except in predetermined -channels. Ignorance was prescribed by law. The first weapon of tyranny -is to keep its victims in darkness. The Germans were an intelligent, -cultured people; they were not ignorant serfs. What a travesty to say -that a people which has produced some of the greatest intellects in -human history is not fit to be told the truth. - -Desperate and discouraged peoples, distraught with the crushing problems -of hunger and insecurity, have always cried out for a miracle worker to -lead them out of the wilderness. Then is the golden opportunity for the -mountebank with bland promises and soothing phrases to provide a -poisonous panacea for their distress. In their desperation they fail to -realize that despotism has a way of beginning with benevolence and ends -by being merely despotic. Masquerading in the mantle of a messiah, the -wily opportunist lulls them into subscribing to some glib Fuehrerprinzip -which means, “Ask no questions; leave everything to me.” And when the -debacle comes, they realize that they _have_ left everything to -him—honor, dignity, self-respect, liberty, even life itself—and they -end up degraded, ashamed, impoverished, and hopeless. But have they -ended up wiser? The universal fear today is that in their desperation -they will repeat the vicious process by saying, “Last time we picked the -wrong man. Let us seek a new messiah. He will save us.” The lessons of -one generation are quickly forgotten by the next, but the inexorable -laws of nature are immutable. The tragic fruits of tyranny and -intolerance will always be the moral decay of peoples and the -degradation of human dignity. - -Over the heavy gates which shut in the hapless victims at Dachau is a -legend reading, “Work will set you free.” The toil of slaves cannot set -them free; it only serves to further enslave them. Some day an -enlightened German people will storm those gates and all others like -them and recast them into an image of Truth—an imperishable figure with -eyes open and unbandaged. So long as Truth stands free and untarnished, -no future Hitler will ever arise to deceive and degrade the German -nation. Then there will never be another Dachau. - - [Signed] ROBERT M. TOMS - PRESIDING JUDGE - FITZROY D. PHILLIPS - JUDGE - MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO - JUDGE - SENTENCE - -This Tribunal takes no pleasures in performing the duty which confronts -it, but the deliberate enslavement of millions must not go unexpiated. -The barbarous acts which have been revealed here originated in the lust -and ambition of comparatively few men, but all Germans are paying and -will pay for the degradation of their souls and the debasement of the -German honor, caused by following the false prophets who led them to -disaster. - -It would be a travesty on justice to permit those false leaders, -including this defendant, to escape responsibility for the deception and -betrayal of their people. It would be even a greater injustice to view -with complacence the mass graves of millions of men, women, and children -whose only crime was that they stood in Hitler’s way. Retribution for -such crimes against humanity must be swift and certain. Future would-be -dictators and their subservient satellites must know what follows their -defilement of international law and of every type of decency and fair -dealing with their fellow men. Civilization will be satisfied with -nothing less. - -It is the sentence of this Tribunal that the defendant Erhard Milch be -confined to the Rebdorf Prison for the remainder of his natural life. - ------ - -[157] Concurring opinions were filed by Judge Musmanno, see pp. 797-859, -and by Judge Phillips, see pp. 860-878. - -[158] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, pp. 243-47, Nuremberg, -1947. - -[159] Ibid., pp. 381-83. - - - - - B. Concurring Opinion by Judge Michael A. Musmanno - -The defendant is Erhard Milch, Field Marshal in the German Luftwaffe, -Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, State Secretary in the Air Ministry, -Generalluftzeugmeister, representative of the Wehrmacht on the Central -Planning Board, Chief of the Jaegerstab and member of the Nazi Party. He -stands indicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in -Control Council Law No. 10, enacted by Allied Control Council on 20 -December 1945. - -The indictment contains three counts which may be briefly summarized as -follows: - - COUNT ONE - -Erhard Milch is charged with having knowingly committed war crimes as -principal and accessory in enterprises involving slave labor and having -also willingly and knowingly participated in enterprises involving the -use of prisoners of war in war operations contrary to international -convention and the laws and customs of war. - - COUNT TWO - -The defendant is accused of having knowingly and willfully participated -in enterprises involving fatal medical experiments upon subjects without -their consent. - - COUNT THREE - -In the third count the defendant is charged with responsibility for -slave labor and fatal medical experiments, in the same manner as -indicated in the first two counts, except that here the alleged victims -are declared to be German nationals and nationals of other countries. - -The defendant has entered a general denial of Not Guilty to all counts. -To the charges of slave labor he has answered in effect— - - 1. That the term slave labor is a misnomer and that all foreign - workmen in Germany during the war were there of their own free - will. - - 2. That if they did not come voluntarily they were treated - humanely, considerately, and were not subjected to any - ill-treatment either in transportation or while actively - employed for the Reich. - - 3. That if ill-treatment, fatal or otherwise, of foreign workmen - occurred, the defendant was in no way responsible for such - ill-treatment. - -To the charges of responsibility for fatal medical experiments inflicted -on involuntary subjects, the defendant replies substantially— - - 1. That the high-altitude and freezing experiments were not - painful to the subjects, nor did any illegal deaths result - therefrom. - - 2. That if fatalities did occur, they were suffered by those - already condemned to death, or were caused by persons over whom - the defendant had no control. - - 3. That in any event, Milch was in no way officially connected - with the illegal and fatal experiments. - - I. SLAVE LABOR - (a) Methods of Recruitment - -The defense has affirmatively asserted that there was no slave labor in -Germany during the war, or that if it did exist, its scope was -negligible. The Tribunal finds that this assertion is not supported by -the testimony in the case. It concludes, on the contrary, from the -evidence presented at this trial that the German Reich during World War -II did actively and plenarily employ slave labor. It further is of the -opinion that the Third Reich used and abused slave labor to an extent -and in a manner hitherto unknown in either modern or ancient history. -The exploitation of human beings by Germany during the years of the war -must take its place, in point of cruelty and inhumaneness, with the most -iniquitous slave practices of the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, -Assyrians, and Persians. The building of the Pyramids, the Hanging -Gardens of Babylon, and other ancient landmarks under whip and lash have -their modern counterpart in the German building of the Western Wall, the -Gothic Line, military fortifications, concentration camps, and munitions -factories. The guilt of the German Reich is greater than that of the -ancient empires because in that area of antiquity the immorality of -human bondage was not universally accepted, whereas in 1939 no country -in the sisterhood of civilized nations had failed to condemn and outlaw -involuntary servitude in its every form. - -It is submitted in behalf of the defendant that foreign workers came to -Germany of their own will. It is true that in the early stages of the -European conflict, Germany offered such inducements in foreign countries -as to persuade numbers of their subjects voluntarily to proceed to that -country for remunerative employment. In those first days of Blitzkrieg -when nation after nation fell helplessly under the invincible Nazi war -machine, workers accepted employment in Germany not only because of -promises made, but because exterior evidence to their bewildered minds -seemed to portend that soon the frontiers of Germany would be -coterminous with the boundaries of Europe itself. Thus, but small choice -remained to them; whether they worked at home or in Germany the master -was destined to be the same. - -However, when the subjugated peoples perceived at Stalingrad that the -unbeatable German army could be beaten, when they heard the roar of -American propellers in the sky and the clank of British tanks returned -once more to the battle, a light of hope gleamed that it might not be -true, as Hitler had said, that his rule and order were to endure a -thousand years, and then these people refused the coin and currency of -the German Reich. From then on the feet of foreign workers were not -turned willingly toward Germany. And in the face of this defiance, -Sauckel, German Plenipotentiary for Labor, declared, “Should we not -succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis, -we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.” -(_T-58._)[160] - -There is no adding machine tape to which one can turn to determine the -exact total number of foreign workers impressed into German industry, -but Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for Labor, declared, “Out of -5,000,000 workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came -voluntarily.” (_T-149._) Heinrich Himmler placed the number of foreign -workers at from 6,000,000 to 7,000,000. (_IMT 243_)[161]. - -On 9 November 1941, Hitler declared in a speech— - - “The territory which now works for us contains more than - 250,000,000 men, but the territory which works indirectly for us - includes now more than 350,000,000. In the measure in which it - concerns German territory, the domain which we have taken under - our administration, it is not doubtful that we shall succeed in - harnessing the very last man to this work.” - -Hitler was never quite able to achieve the fullness of this ambitious -program, but it was not due to any relinquishment of efforts in that -direction by himself or his criminal coadjutors. Of course, this program -was in direct violation of Article 52 of the Hague Convention which -declares— - - “Requisition in kind and services shall not be demanded from - municipalities or inhabitants, except for the needs of the army - of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of - the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the - inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military - operations against their own country.” - -In the very initial stages of the German invasions, the officiating -agents phrased their demands for labor in language which gave the -recruitment an aspect of voluntary action on the part of the workers. -Thus, when the German forces entered Lithuania, male and female farm -workers were called upon by the military administration to sign up for -six months’ employment on large estates, but after the signatures were -obtained the promises were not kept. (_T-97._) And it was not long until -all pretense at voluntary recruitment was abandoned and then -Lithuanians, ordered to official agencies “only for registration”, were -held there and taken away under military guards to the local barracks -where they had neither the opportunity to bid their families good-by nor -to put their most personal affairs in order. (_T-97-98._) - -There were other pacific methods to “persuade” foreign workers into -employment for the Reich. Thus, Governor General Frank of Poland -recommended that one way to force Polish workers into Germany was to -withhold their unemployment insurance. (_T-112._) - -However, these genteel methods in Poland soon gave way to means more -direct. Recruitment now degenerated into a fierce manhunt with -unsuspecting victims being seized on the streets, in railroad stations, -from their homes, even in churches. (_T-83._) - - “Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized anywhere and - at any time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, - and being brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives - knows what has happened to him; only weeks or months later, one - or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.” (_T-83._) - -In Ukrainia skilled workers whose names had been furnished to the police -by corrupted village elders were “dragged from their beds at night to be -locked up in cellars until shipped.” (_T-67._) As neither the male nor -the female workers were given time to gather up their belongings they -often arrived at the collecting center without shoes or other adequate -clothing for the long and torturing journey ahead. (_T-67._) - -A directive applying to recruitment in White Ruthenia declared— - - “All permissible means shall be used to obtain manpower from - White Ruthenia. Do not hesitate to apply extraordinary - measures.” (_T-91._) - -In the same directive “the recruiters” are told, “Everything you do for -Germany is right, everything else is wrong.” (_T-93._) So wide-sweeping -was this recruitment drive waged by the SS and police in one area of -White Ruthenia that 115,000 hectares of farm land became useless because -the whole population had been removed. (_T-93._) - -Goering bluntly declared in a speech at the Reich Ministry of Air on 7 -November 1941, in connection with the Four Year Plan that Poles, -Dutchmen, etc., were to be taken, “if necessary as prisoners of war and -employ them as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained. -Strong action.” * * * “Foreigners not to be treated like German -workers.” (_T-53._) - -One Leyser in making a report to Rosenberg on the situation in his -district of Zhitomir gives the answer to the assertion of voluntary -labor when he says— - - “It is certain that a recruitment of labor, in the sense of the - word, can hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a - matter of actual conscription by force. The population has been - stirred up to a large extent and views the transports to the - Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from the former - exile to Siberia during the Czarist and Bolshevist system.” - (_T-94._) - -A report on recruitment measures taken in Holland reveals— - - “All Jewish Netherlanders, whom the Germans could lay their - hands on, with the exception of a small group of exempted - persons, were brought together here; hospitals, old age homes, - institutions for the blind and other disabled persons were - emptied in order to concentrate the inmates in Westerbork for - deportation. Even the inmates of lunatic asylums did not escape - deportation.” (_T-125._) - -On the subject of workers from the Netherlands, Goering said on 28 -October 1943, in the presence of the defendant— - - “After that has been done once, one has to modify the system for - the second blow. Then the Dutch people will be no longer out in - the streets on Sunday for pleasure promenades * * *. First, all - the people must be brought together in a pen. Then they will be - asked individually who works where. Then the men will be - selected accordingly.” (_T-2094._) - -And on the subject of foreign exchange at that same meeting, Goering -contributed this bit of wisdom in finance— - - “All we need to do is to fix the rate of exchange * * * today - the German mark equals 20 francs, tomorrow 23, then 27, then 40, - and so forth, up to one million, or one billion. We have had all - that. The same holds true for the guilder. One cigarette now - costs in Holland 1.50 guilders; formerly it cost 10 cents. I - merely have to say, 1.50 guilders equal 10 pfennigs or one mark - equals 15 guilders.” (_T-2095._) - -It may be well to note at once that all quotations from the transcript -represent excerpts from records and documents located in the official -files of the German Reich. The evidence advanced by the prosecution in -this case was almost exclusively documentary. Thus, if any observation -in this opinion seems overly emphatic and appears to go beyond the -restraint usually found in judicial pronouncements, it will still fall -short of the force of language employed in some of the original reports -made by German officials to their own superiors at the time of the -events described. A top secret memorandum on conditions in occupied -Russian territory declared— - - “It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of - thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our - camps * * *. We now experience the grotesque picture of having - to recruit millions of laborers from the occupied eastern - territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like - flies, in order to fill the gaps that are formed within Germany. - Now the food question no longer existed. In the prevailing - limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity, _recruiting methods were - used which probably had their origin only in the blackest - periods of the slave trade_.” (_T-121._) - -Even Rosenberg acknowledged the severity and harshness of the -recruitment program and protested, not, to be sure, on humanitarian -grounds, but because “endangered persons prefer to escape their fate” by -going over to guerilla bands. (_T-78._) - -The fury with which the manhunt for workers was prosecuted reached such -extremes that in many instances villages were burned down as -“retribution for failure to comply with the demand for the appropriation -of labor forces directed to the communities.” (_T-80._) - -And it was not only where large numbers were demanded that savage -reprisals occurred. In a little village where 25 workers had been -ordered but none reported, the German militia set fire to the houses of -those who had fled. Then— - - “The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to - extinguish the flames, beaten and arrested, so that seven - homesteads burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited other - houses. The people fell on their knees and kissed their hands, - but the policemen beat them with rubber truncheons.” - (_T-80-81._) - -All because the mighty Reich needed 25 men to throw into its vast -workshop of millions turning out the steel teeth of war. - -In the same instance the German militia continued into other villages -and where they did not find the workers they seized the parents. “The -workers who had not appeared until then were shot.” Then, in the report -we are quoting from, appears the damning phrase which shows more than -anything else to what a low ebb the dignity of man had been reduced and -degraded by the German Reich. “_They are now catching humans like the -dog catchers used to catch dogs._” (_T-81._) The report closes on a -statement which must needs bring a blush of shame to the cheek of every -member of the civilized human race— - - “People from many villages went on a certain day to a pilgrimage - to the monastery Potschaew. They were all arrested, locked in, - and will be sent to work. Among them there are lame, blind, and - aged people.” (_T-81._) - -It has been asserted that the defendant and others holding high office -cannot and should not be held responsible for the acts of subordinate -officers in far away places, and of whose activities they could have no -knowledge. But these smaller officers were only putting into effect the -policies publicly declared over and over by the chieftains. Thus, when a -certain Koch spoke in Kiev and declared— - - “I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come - to spread bliss. I have come to help the Fuehrer. The population - must work, work, and work again * * * for some people are - getting excited that the population may not get enough to eat. - The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember what - our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad * * *. We definitely - did not come here to give out manna; we have come here to create - the basis for Victory.” (_T-86._) - -He was only repeating what had been said by Hitler, Himmler, Goering, -and Milch, in varying forms. The defendant claims that he did not -literally mean the blood and thunder declarations admittedly authored by -him, and that phase of the case will be discussed in detail later. But -underlings who heard these wild, inflammatory utterances did not know -that Milch was only barking, if in fact we are to assume that his -ferocious words were only purposeless growlings. The men in the field -did not stop at words, because they were in a position to act and did -act—directly on the people. Koch was not voicing a concept original -with him when he said in that same speech— - - “We are a master race which must remember that the lowliest - German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more - valuable than the population here.” (_T-86._) - -Unfortunately, however, his utterances were not confined to rhetoric, -but being in a position to put them into flesh and blood effect, he did -so. - -Quotations from documents furnishing further proof of involuntary -foreign labor in Germany are too numerous to repeat in the judgment. -Reference, however, will be made to but one more before proceeding to -the next item for discussion. In the recruitment of 1 million workers -demanded in the Ukraine, SS Major Christensen, in charge of operations, -declared that whatever harsh treatment was required should be -controlled. He thus orders that in arresting communist functionaries it -is no longer necessary to arrest all the close relatives of a member of -the communist party. He decrees further that in searching for workers -“when it becomes necessary to burn down a village, the whole population -will be put at the disposal of the commissioner by force.” (_T-129._) - -This is regarded as a concession, and then comes what must be classified -as the most heart-rending utterance which has come out of this war— - - “_As a rule, no more children will be shot._” - -Not an out-and-out prohibition against shooting children; not that more -care should be exercised in the handling of children; but only a -general, vague suggestion that this SS battalion of murderers must not -fire at children on sight just as one might mow down sparrows or -rabbits. However, if the situation requires, then of course, children -will be shot with everybody else, for the order goes on to say, “Slavs -will interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness.” “The most -important thing,” the directive concludes, “is the recruitment of -workers.” (_T-129-130._) - - (b) Treatment of Workers - -On 20 April 1942, Fritz Sauckel announced his labor mobilization program -which contained the one supremely cruel proposition regarding treatment -of foreign workers— - - “All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way - as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest - conceivable degree of expenditure.” (_T-58._) - -After the announcement of this inhuman decree of maximum work with -minimum sustenance, Sauckel followed with— - - “It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from - cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if - he has proved himself the most bestial and most implacable - adversary, and to treat him correctly and humanly, even when we - expect useful work of him.” (_T-58-59._) - -It can be imagined with what kindness an underling of Sauckel’s would -treat a worker whom Sauckel has already characterized as a “bestial and -most implacable adversary”. - -As a result of the minimum sustenance directive it is not difficult to -understand the report of a Dr. Hupe who stated— - - “During the last few days we have established that the food for - the Russians employed here is so miserable that the people are - getting weaker from day to day. Investigations showed that - single Russians are not able to place a piece of metal for - turning into position, for instance, because of lack of physical - strength. The same conditions exist at all places of work where - Russians are employed.” (_T-55._) - -Wilhelm Jager, senior camp director at the Krupp Works, reported that -diet prescribed for eastern workers was 1,000 calories less per day than -the minimum prescribed for any Germans. Further, that while German heavy -workers received 5,000 calories a day, eastern workers in comparable -jobs received only 2,000 calories. Such meat as was allowed the foreign -workers was that which had been “rejected by the veterinary, such as -horse meat or tuberculin infested”. (_T-103._) The clothing allowed the -eastern workers was likewise entirely inadequate. They had no overcoats -and, because of the shortage of shoes, many were forced to go to work -barefoot even in winter. In the work camps tuberculosis was widespread -among the eastern workers, caused by bad housing, insufficient and poor -food, overwork and insufficient rest— - - “These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice, - the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas, - bugs, and other vermin tortured the inhabitants of these camps. - As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all - eastern workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage - of food also caused many cases of Hunher-Oedem, Nephritis, and - Shighakruse.” (_T-103._) - -These conditions became infinitely worse, of course, during the time of -air raids— - - “The French prisoner-of-war camp in Nogerratstrasse had been - destroyed in an air raid attack and its inhabitants were kept - for nearly half a year in dog kennels, urinals, and in old - baking houses. The dog kennels were three feet high, nine feet - long, and six feet wide. Five men slept in each of them. The - prisoners had to crawl into these kennels on all fours.” - (_T-105._) - -A Dr. Stinnesbeck reports on 12 June 1944— - - “The PW camp at Nogerratstrasse was in most deplorable - condition. The people live in ashcans, doghouses, old baking - stoves, and self-made huts.” (_T-106._) - -Visiting camp Humboldtstrasse, Dr. Stinnesbeck found 600 Jewish women -who worked at the Krupp factory. They suffered from festering wounds and -other diseases. They had no shoes and went about in their bare feet! - - “The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with holes for - their arms and head. Their hair was shorn. The camp was - surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS guards.” - (_T-106._) - -Concentration camp inmates were made to work, to which there can be no -objection on the grounds of inhumanity. In fact, some useful toil is -preferable to idleness in prison. But camp commanders were instructed -that the “employment must be, in the true meaning of the word, -exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance.” -(_T-61._) - - “There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends on - the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of - work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone.” - (_T-62._) - -Certain “antisocial elements” were by special order “to be worked to -death”. In the literal Gestapo language “death” was never used -rhetorically or figuratively. Those who were to be killed through work -were listed as “under protective arrest”. This included Jews, gypsies, -Russians, and Ukrainians; Poles with more than three-year sentences; -Czechs and Germans with more than eight-year sentences. (_T-63._) - -In these work camps frequently children of tender age were forced to -toil. - - “An indication of the awful conditions this may lead to is given - by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers, camp for - eastern workers ‘Waldlust’, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz, there are - cases of eight-year old, delicate and undernourished children - put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment.” - (_T-99._) - -Those who were imported for farm work fared no better than their factory -brothers. A directive issued by the Ministry of Finance and Economy at -Baden on the control of Polish farm workers in Stuttgart and Baden -directed that farm workers were to be quartered in stables, and the -employer was urged that “no remorse should restrict such action.” -(_T-47._) “Fundamentally”, this extraordinary document proclaims, “farm -workers of Polish nationality no longer have the right to complain, and -thus no complaints may be accepted any more by any official agency.” -(_T-46._) - -To deprive a human being of the right to complain is in effect to -classify him lower than an animal because even a beast of burden is -privileged to announce his objections to harsh and cruel treatment. Nor -were the Polish workers permitted the consolation and comfort in -adversity which religion affords. “The visiting of churches, regardless -of faith, is strictly prohibited.” The edict of the Ministry of Finance -said further that this prohibition against attendance at churches even -excluded the visiting of churches when no service was in progress. The -visiting of theatres, motion picture shows, or other cultural -entertainment also was prohibited. (_T-46._) - - “Gathering of farm workers of Polish nationality after work is - prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or in - the living quarters of the Poles. The use of railroads, buses, - or other public conveyances by farm workers of Polish - nationality is prohibited.” (_T-47._) - -The difference between slave labor of this type and outright slavery is -a margin faint and indistinguishable. There was no limit to the hours of -work, and the employer was invested with the right, bestially inherent -in the proprietorship of slave owners, to inflict corporal punishment on -the worker “_if_ instruction and good words failed”. Nor was there any -one to determine whether good words had failed because the “employer may -not be held accountable in any such cases by an official agency.” -(_T-47._) - -Heinrich Himmler took a very active part in the slave labor program. -Concerning commitment of manpower from the East, he laid down strict -rules which, if violated, brought severe punishment. He decreed that— - - “In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at - the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the - state police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they - will be treated, as a rule, only with strict measure, that is - with transfer to a concentration camp or with special - treatment.” (_T-53._) - -We learn further on in the directive that the “special treatment” so -casually referred to as if it were some slight deprivation of comfort or -convenience means nothing less than hanging! - - “Special treatment is hanging. Hanging should not take place in - the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the - manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory should - attend the special treatment; at that time they are to be warned - about the circumstances which led to this special treatment.” - (_T-53._) - -If workers sought to escape, search measures were to be decreed locally, -and when caught the fugitive must receive special treatment. (_T-54._) - -Heinrich Himmler was one of the most relentless pursuers of slave labor, -as, of course, he was the most notorious executant of all that was -inhuman, indecent, cruel, and vulgar in the entire Nazi program. Himmler -does not defy description, he invites it. He stands out in the whole -hideous camp of Hitler barbarians as the most savage of them all. A -fiend in human shape, a monster in the clothing of man; there is no wild -beast, bound only by jungle code, which, in point of honor, was not his -superior; there is no slimy, maggoty larva, wriggling in the stagnancy -and stench of the foulest cesspool which could be regarded his inferior. -His creed was murder, his religion massacre, his belief kidnapping, his -faith treachery, and his dogma oppression in every form. Only one thing -mattered and that was German blood— - - “What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest me in - the slightest. What the nation can offer in the way of good - blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping - their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations - live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only insofar - as we need them as slaves for our Kultur; otherwise, it is of no - interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from - exhaustion while digging an antitank ditch interests me only - insofar as the antitank ditch for Germany is finished * * *. - When somebody comes to me and says, ‘I cannot dig the antitank - ditch with women and children, it is inhuman, for it would kill - them,’ then I have to say, ‘You are a murderer of your own blood - because if the antitank ditch is not dug, German soldiers will - die, and they are sons of German mothers. They are our own - blood.’ That is what I want to instill into this SS and what I - believe I have instilled into them as one of the most sacred - laws of the future. Our concern, our duty, is our people and our - blood. It is for them that we must provide and plan, work and - fight, nothing else. We can be indifferent to everything else.” - (_T-145._) - -When hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners of war died from -exhaustion and hunger, his regret was not that they died, but that it -was deplorable “by reason of the loss of labor.” (_T-144._) - -The defense in this case denied that foreign workers and prisoners of -war were maltreated, and produced some evidence to dispute the -prosecution’s contentions in this regard, we quote from the affidavit of -one Albin Schirmer, a resident of Nuernberg— - - “From the year 1929 onwards, I was employed by the Hercules - Works, Ltd. at Nuernberg (Nuernberger Herkuleswerke G.m.b.H.), - and worked there in the capacity of foreman throughout the war. - The necessary workers were requested by the firm from the Labor - Office. The Labor Office allocated French prisoners of war, free - French, and Czech workers to the firm. The free foreign workers, - who also cooperated in executing the commissions of the - Luftwaffe, were treated in every respect in exactly the same way - as the German workers. Some lived in furnished rooms. Some lived - in a camp as it was cheaper there. Working hours, wages, ration - cards, and the supplementary ration cards for workers, whose - hours were long, were the same as for any German. Equally, - freedom of movement during leisure hours, permission to attend - theaters, churches, and cinemas, the protection of the Labor - Front and of strength-through-joy, permission to visit public - houses and German families were available to free foreign - workers as well as to German workers. Intercourse with German - girls was also permitted to free foreign workers. This, however, - did not apply to prisoners of war. The sanitary installations of - the firm were good, and were available for the use of foreign - workers, as well as of the German workers. The prisoners of war - had fixed times for taking showers whereas the free foreign - workers had their showers at the same time as the Germans. The - free French workers were allowed free postal communication with - France, and they also went there on leave. I know of only two - cases in which free French workers did not return from their - leave in France. - - Many French prisoners of war volunteered as free workers, in - order to be eligible for the resultant advantages. Even the - prisoners of war had beer sent to them every day. - - During air raids, the free foreign workers played their part - with devotion, a thing which they would certainly not have done - if they had not considered that they were well-treated. - - After the arrival of the American troops most of the French - workers said good-by to me in a friendly fashion, shaking hands - with me, and wishing me luck. The female workers from the - Ukraine too liked it here according to their statements.” - -Why should one doubt that in the vast German workshop which employed a -score of millions, here and there some foreign workers were not abused -but in the long run fared well? It would need to be someone wearing -spectacles of pitch and groping in a Cimmerian night of prejudice and -pique to assert that the German people are incapable of hospitality and -generosity. The very fact that there were concentration camps in the -land attests to the fact that not everybody accepted Hitler’s and -Himmler’s crackpot master race ideology. However, even accepting Albin -Schirmer’s affidavit at face value, it is but one little flower in a -jungle of evidence establishing that only a very few foreign workers -were so fortunate as to be showered with the care and comforts and -allowed to revel and luxuriate in the liberties vouchsafed those who -were so lucky as to be employed in the Hercules Works, Limited, at -Nuernberg. - -As against this idyllic picture of happiness in a powder plant or -strength-through-joy in Nuernberg, there is recalled the image of the -last witness at this trial. He also was a German, Joseph Krysiak, and he -too worked in a war factory. In December 1940, he remarked in a -conversation to some friends that if America entered the European -conflict, Germany could not win. The ubiquitous Gestapo learned of his -observation and he was committed to a concentration camp, from which he -went daily to work at the Me [ssersmitt] 109 plant at Gusen I. His -living conditions were a trifle less felicitous than those described by -Schirmer. Krysiak worked twelve hours a day, he had coffee for -breakfast, watery soup for lunch, and at night seven men shared a loaf -of bread. If he did not reach the quota of work assigned him for the -day, he was beaten. Later he was sent to another factory, and of working -conditions there he said— - - “We were working at Saint George, Gusen II, for twelve hours. - Also, the transport to and from work and back to this camp - occupied two to three hours as well, so that these people - altogether had only four to five hours sleep under the worst - imaginable conditions. Four people had to sleep in one bed. - - “Q. Did you work seven days a week? - - “A. Yes, and the day and night shift, and Sundays, too.” - (_T-2366._) - -When asked what effect these conditions had on the health of the -workers, he replied— - - “The most dreadful effect, the majority died in Mauthausen and - Gusen II. It was a rule no one was released, but transports - which were filled were where detainees would die.” - -And as to his own particular condition, he stated— - - “All I can say now is that I suffer from TB and I am medically - being treated, and this is what those five years did to me. - - “Q. What was your condition before going to the concentration - camp? - - “A. I was active in sports, and I was a long distance runner. I - can say my lungs were not blemished at all.” - -The shattering of this man’s health is perhaps only a small part of the -disaster which has befallen him. From the witness stand he gave the -impression of one who had been spiritually crushed by his five years’ -ordeal. His voice faltered, his shoulders drooped, his eyes looked out -into distance. He was alive, but something within him had perished. -Perhaps he reflected on the tragedy that this awful thing which had -happened to him had been inflicted by his own countrymen, not for -opposing his country but for speaking a truth which, if listened to, -could have averted not only his own ruin but the misery of millions of -his brethren. - - II. PRISONERS OF WAR - -Article 31 of the Geneva Convention provides— - - “Work done by prisoners of war shall have no direct connection - with the operations of the war. In particular it is forbidden to - employ prisoners in the manufacture or transport of arms or - munitions of any kind, or on the transport of material destined - for the combatant units.” - -The Hague Convention of 1907, Article 6 provides— - - “The State may utilize the labor of prisoners of war according - to their rank and aptitude, officers excepted. The tasks shall - not be excessive and shall have no connection with the - operations of the war.” (_T-155._) - -These prohibitions on the use of prisoners of war were flagrantly -violated by the Germans in World War II. On 7 November 1941, Hermann -Goering, speaking at the meeting in the Reich Ministry of Air, already -referred to, declared that “it would be ideal if entire factories could -be manned by Russian prisoners of war.” (_T-52._) Then, insofar as -feeding these prisoners was concerned the notes of the speech report: -“Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Supply their own food (cats, -horses, etc.).” (_T-52._) - -On 20 April 1942, Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for Labor -Mobilization, proclaimed that— - - “All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well - as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely - incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries.” - (_T-58._) - -On 26 August 1941, the Reich Labor Ministry directed the presidents of -the Regional Labor Offices as follows: - - “Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be - taken from among the French prisoners of war not yet employed in - armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament - industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting - therefrom will be filled by Soviet prisoners of war. The - transfer of the above-named French prisoners of war can be - utilized only in quite large concentrated groups under the - well-known tougher employment conditions.” (_T-49-50._) - -In a discussion with Sauckel, the defendant, and others on the subject -of manpower available for the armament industry, Goering stated on 28 -October 1943, that out of 2,200,000 in armament production, 770,000 were -prisoners of war. (_T-2093._) - -On 14 April 1943, Sauckel reported to Hitler that “1,622,829 prisoners -of war are employed in the German economy.” (_T-90._) - -Noting that the utilization of prisoners of war in the war program was a -very profitable enterprise for the Reich, Goering regretted that any had -ever been released. However, it was a mistake easily rectified. - - “I should like to see that the prisoners of war who have been - released, Norwegians and so forth, be taken again. Insofar as - officers are concerned, this has been done to a certain extent. - It was the greatest nonsense ever committed by us and for which - nobody thanks us. We have made prisoners of entire armies and we - let them go again. We do not get anything from Norway.” - (_T-2096._) - -At a Jaegerstab meeting on 19 June 1944, it developed that 300 American -prisoners of war were assigned to work at the Dornier airplane factory -at Oberpfaffenhofen, but with good Yankee obstinacy, knowing their -rights, they refused to work. Lange, of the Speer Ministry, complaining -about this said— - - “They simply sat down, drank coffee, and ate corned beef, and - could not be persuaded to work in spite of threats of shooting. - Now, the question has been asked if we should not start a - shooting action.” (_T-2102._) - -And the only reason they were not shot is that the Fuehrer feared -reprisals. - - III. PARTICIPATION OF MILCH IN THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM - -It was not contended by the prosecution at the trial that the defendant -was aware, nor would it have been physically possible for him to have -had knowledge, of all the excesses, inhumanities, and illegalities -encompassed in the far-flung slave labor program which spread its -cruelties into practically every part of Europe. However, its very -bigness and the great production power which it generated in every -department of the German war plant negates the defendant’s position that -he was utterly ignorant of its existence. This opinion has gone to some -length in pointing out the numbers involved in the compulsory work -program, and the heinousness of some of its operations, and has quoted -from official decrees promulgated in its unfoldment, not only for the -purpose of demonstrating the basis for condemning the whole illegal -enterprise, but also for the purpose of laying the foundation for -consideration of Milch’s responsibility in this phase of German war -guilt. - -On 23 May 1939, Hitler outlined his plans for war to his fourteen most -trusted and important military chieftains. Milch attended that then -secret, and now notorious, conference. Hitler there said, “The -population of non-German areas will perform no military service and will -be available as source of labor.” (_T-37._) This statement is taken from -the memorandum made by adjutant Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt, who was -present and preserved a drastically condensed record of the speech for -the Reich files. The accuracy of the Schmundt record was attacked in the -IMT trial and came under fire here. The defendant goes so far as to -conjecture that the Schmundt statement was prepared months, perhaps even -a year, after Hitler’s speech, and was intended to demonstrate Hitler’s -uncanny and possibly supernatural powers of prophecy by the undeniably -sure method of writing up the prophecy subsequent to the happening of -the event predicted. The memorandum obviously is not definitely precise -because it consists of only ten pages whereas the speech lasted four and -one-half hours. As the memorandum manifestly cannot be complete, neither -can human recollection (unaided by notes) be infallible. Milch, who made -no notes at all, testified that labor was not mentioned in the speech, -but Admiral Schniewind, also present, and who testified in court, stated -that he did not exclude the possibility that labor was discussed. -(_T-1326._) - -In any event, whether Hitler did or did not mention labor in his -utterances of that day is not so important as it is that Milch was -present when Hitler made crystal clear his intentions to attack Poland, -and, if it became necessary or expedient, to fight other countries as -well, with the inevitable subjugation of the conquered peoples. Slave -labor was an inescapable concomitant of the type of total war Hitler -intended to wage, and the character of which Milch could not fail to -appreciate. - -As a field marshal in the German Reich, Milch could not ignore the -existence of Sauckel’s proclamation on 20 April 1942 that “the raw -materials as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and -their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to -the profit of Germany and her allies.” (_T-57._) - -But in the evaluation of Milch’s criminal responsibility for Germany’s -use of slave labor something more is needed in a court of law than -presumptions of his assumed general knowledge of what was taking place. -It must be established that he, himself, participated in the slave labor -enterprises, or knowing that such illegal practices were being -committed, he, having the power to do so, made no effort to curb or halt -them. The prosecution contends that the defendant, as a member of the -Central Planning Board and of the Jaegerstab, and as -Generalluftzeugmeister (Aircraft Master General), was thoroughly -cognizant of Sauckel’s program and that he, Milch, actively participated -in slave labor practices. - - (a) Central Planning Board - -The Central Planning Board was made up of three members, Speer, Milch, -and Koerner, each having equal authority, although, as it developed, -Speer and Milch dominated the proceedings. The function of the Central -Planning Board in the main was the distribution and allocation of raw -materials necessary for the entire conduct of the German war economy, -the planning of intended construction or enlargement, and the -systematization of transportation industry independent of the shortage -of raw materials. During the war this Board had 60 meetings and much -time was given to consideration of the manpower problem confronting the -various departments in the huge German war workshop. Sauckel often -appeared before the Central Planning Board to report on the foreign -labor situation. Various other officials came before the Board to -express their needs in connection with foreign workers. Milch often -presided at these meetings. He was absent on several occasions but all -quotations from the minutes of the Central Planning Board meetings, -cited in this opinion, are from meetings where he was present, and he is -therefore chargeable with knowledge of their contents. - -Wehrmacht representatives were often in attendance at the Central -Planning Board meetings, and on 25 July 1944, Field Marshal von Kluge, -Commander in Chief West, issued an order on labor recruitment— - - “As the only limitation, the Fuehrer has ordered that no - forcible means shall be employed against the population in the - actual combat area as long as it shows itself prepared to assist - the German Armed Forces. However, recruiting of volunteers from - among refugees from the combat zone is to be carried out - vigorously. Moreover, every means is justified to seize as much - labor as possible, apart from the powers granted to the armed - forces.” (_T-271._) - -It will be noted that the Fuehrer orders that forcible means shall not -be used if the population assists. This is comparable to saying that the -armed robber is thoroughly peaceful in his intentions because he will -not shoot if the victim surrenders his valuables voluntarily. - -The proof in this case that foreign workers were brought into Germany -against their will generally does not come from them, but almost -exclusively from their abductors. At one of the meetings of the Central -Planning Board, Mr. Timm, representing the Plenipotentiary General for -Labor, reports that they are encountering resistance to recruitment— - - “In all countries we have to change over more or less to - registering the men by age groups and to conscripting them in - age groups. They do appear for registering as such, but as soon - as transport is available, they do not come back so that the - dispatch of the men has become more or less a question for the - police. Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is - extraordinarily serious. It is well known that vehement battles - occurred just because of these actions.” (_T-197-198._) - -The word “recruitment” will be used in this opinion not in its literal -sense of voluntary enlistment, but in the broad sense of both voluntary -and involuntary gathering up of workers. - -It is the contention of the defense that Milch had nothing to do with -the actual recruitment. It is, of course, true that he did not go into -France, Italy, Hungary, Russia, and other countries, to physically rope -the workers and drag them into Germany, but is the guilt any less if one -sits back in his office and signs the order which casts the uncoiling -rope for the far-reaching lasso? - -Goering, in an interrogation conducted 6 September 1946, stated that -after the death of Udet it was Milch, as Chief of Supply for the air -forces, who put forward the needs of the Luftwaffe for workers. The -requests were forwarded to Speer, and Speer would ask Sauckel for the -workers for the entire armament branch. Sauckel, on 24 September 1946, -made a very important declaration in an affidavit on the part Milch -played in the matter of obtaining workers— - - “Milch produced the figures for aviation. The same was done by - Speer in his sphere of activity. Speer and Milch, however, also - exerted influence on the allocation of workers. How far this - came within their capacity as members of the Central Planning - Board I cannot say; in any case they did this in their - ministerial capacity.” (_T-281._) - -Thus, if Milch knew how workers were actually being recruited, how they -were being transported, and to what they were being transported, he -cannot claim exoneration in the assertion that he did not take them in -hand personally. And, if this knowledge is established, then he, when he -asked for workers, was, in effect, consigning foreign workers to the -suffering and torture of which he had cognizance. Behind each -requisition for foreign labor there shone the inevitable backdrop of the -lurid scenes of labor camps with their “special treatment,” disease, -vermin, starvation, whipping, illness, and death. - -On 8 April 1943, Milch wrote Sauckel and Goering, announcing that in -certain sections he had proclaimed an 84-hour week in the air force -industry. (_T-196._) The defendant has explained that this applied only -to those engaged in guard work. Witness Krysiak testified that he worked -84 hours a week. - -At the 1 March 1944 meeting of the Central Planning Board, Sauckel -particularly addressed himself to Milch who was presiding, and said— - - “Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of - French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was done - in olden times for ‘shanghaiing’, went hunting men and made them - drunk by using liquor as well as words, in order to dispatch - them to Germany.” (_T-228._) - -As evidence that he was encountering difficulty in obtaining foreign -workers, Sauckel pointed out that several dozen of his very able labor -executive officers were shot. (_T-228._) In France he wrung from Laval -the concession “that the death penalty be threatened for officials who -tried to sabotage the labor supply.” And then he adds that “if the -Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans must -make an example of one case, and by reason of this law, if necessary put -Prefect or Burgomaster against the wall.” (_T-232._) - -It is a long speech which Sauckel makes, and then Milch replies, -analyzing in his turn the foreign labor question. He complains bitterly -that more men have not been called up from France— - - “Four whole age groups have grown up in France; men between 18 - and 23 years of age, who are therefore at that age when young - people moved by patriotism or seduced by other people are ready - to do anything which satisfies their personal hatred against - us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have been - called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they - present the greatest danger which threatens us in case of - invasion.” (_T-236._) - - “If one had shown the mailed fist and a clear executive - intention, a churchyard peace would reign in the rear of the - front at the moment the uproar starts. This I have emphasized so - frequently, but still nothing is happening, I am afraid.” - (_T-237._) - -When Sauckel complains about the trouble he is having in getting workers -from Italy, Milch recommends— - - “We could take under German administration the entire food - supply for the Italians and tell them, only he gets any food who - either works in a protected factory or goes to Germany.” - (_T-240-241._) - -When on another occasion one Kehrl declared that it would be difficult -to control the food situation in France because food was delivered by -parcel post, Milch made the extraordinary pronouncement, “I personally -as military commander would confiscate all goods sent by parcel post.” -(_T-295._) - -The Tribunal has not been shown any statement wherein the defendant -advocated that foreign workers be induced to come to Germany by offering -them good wages, good working conditions, pensions, security, and the -usual attractions held out to prospective employees. When he speaks on -the importation of foreign workers it is invariably in an aggressive and -domineering manner. At the 54th meeting of the Central Planning Board, -held on 1 March 1944, he explained that force had to be exercised -because there was nothing to attract the workers to Germany since they -believed that Germany would soon be defeated, and furthermore they were -attached to their families and their own countries. A very cogent -observation indeed. - -Speaking on the French situation, he said— - - “Even if Bichelonne and Laval have the best intentions there - will be resistance from the mayors, the gendarmes, and the - prefects, just because these people are afraid that firstly, - they will be called to account afterwards for this affair, and - secondly, because of their national point of view, which makes - them say, ‘We must not work for the enemy of our country.’ - Therefore I would like to have an authority in our - administration which would force these people to do it, because - then the French could say, ‘If you force us, we will do it, but - voluntarily we will not do it.’ The same applies to Italy.” - (_T-292-293._) - -Once the transportation of workers got under way it was not always -certain that they would all arrive. Aside from the unsanitary conditions -under which they travelled, frequently without food and in the -wintertime without heat, many in desperation escaped. To offset these -defections en route, Milch recommended— - - “If a transport has left a town and has not arrived, 500 to 600 - persons from this place must be arrested and sent to Germany as - prisoners of war.” (_T-294._) - -The defense has asserted many times that the foreign workers were not -all treated as badly as the prosecution’s evidence might indicate. It is -unquestionably true that not all foreign workers were starved and -tortured, because if this were so they could not have worked at all, and -the German war machine would have ground to a stop long before the -spring of 1945. Thus, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement -made at one of the Central Planning Board meetings— - - “The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be - raised by a premium system. For this purpose, the ban on pay - restrictions is to be lifted and the manager be allowed to - distribute among the workmen, according to his duty and - discretion, RM 1 per head per day as premium for particular - services rendered. Furthermore, care will be taken, that workmen - can exchange these premiums, which will be paid out in camp - money for goods. It is intended to put at their disposal various - provisions—beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items - for daily use, etc.” (_T-219._) - -If the defendant has much to explain in this case it is principally -because of declarations made by himself. On 16 February 1944 at a -meeting of the Central Planning Board, he announced that the armament -industry employed foreign workmen to the extent of 40 percent, and that -in maximum production the foreign workers prevailed to the extent of 95 -percent and higher. He said further that the Germans’ best new engine -was made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of war and the other 12 percent -by German men and women. “Only 6 to 8 German men are working on this -machine. The rest are Ukrainian women who have beaten all the records of -trained workers.” And yet, despite this apparently creditable -performance on the part of foreign workers, he complains bitterly— - - “The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s - trustworthy hands who will make them work all right. This is - very important for educating people and has also a deterrent - effect on such others who would likewise feel inclined to - shirk.” (_T-223._) - -When Milch recommends entrusting anyone to Himmler’s “trustworthy -hands”, the world well knows how bloody and homicidal those hands were. - -The charges of maltreatment of foreign workers leveled against Milch -could be taken almost literally from his own words— - - “It is, therefore, not possible to exploit fully all the - foreigners unless we compel them by piece work or we have the - possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not - doing their bit. But, if the foreman lays hands on a prisoner of - war or smacks him there is at once a terrible row, the man is - put into prison, etc. There are sufficient officials in Germany - who think it their most important duty to stand up for human - rights instead of war production. I am also for human rights. - But if a Frenchman says, ‘You fellows will all be hanged and the - chief of the factory will be beheaded first,’ and if then the - chief says, ‘I am going to hit him’, then he is in a mess. He is - not protected. I have told my engineers, ‘I am going to punish - you if you don’t hit such a man; the more you do in this respect - the more I shall praise you. I shall see to it that nothing - happens to you.’ This is not yet sufficiently known. I cannot - talk to all factory leaders. I should like to see the man who - stays my arm because I can settle accounts with everybody who - stays my arm. If the little factory leader does that he is put - into a concentration camp and runs the risk of losing the - prisoners of war. In one case two Russian officers took off with - an airplane but crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged - at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the - SS. I expressed the wish to leave them hanged in the factory for - the others to see.” (_T-223-224._) - -On the stand Milch denied that he had anything to do with the fate of -the two Russian prisoners of war mentioned above. He further claimed -that his reference to this episode was made at another meeting (a GL -meeting), and that possibly the two stenographers got their notes -confused. The defense also introduced affidavits to the effect that -Milch was in no way implicated in this happening and that if the two -Russians were executed, the execution was performed by shooting and not -by hanging. It is probably true that Milch did not order the hanging of -these men, but did author the remarks attributed to him because they are -in keeping with his many other admitted and proved statements. - -Did Milch know that prisoners of war were being used in violation of -international convention, and the laws and customs of war? - -On 6 March 1944, Milch, Speer, General Bodenschatz, and Colonel von -Below conferred with Hitler. Hitler was informed of the Reich Marshal’s -wishes for the further utilization of the production power of prisoners -of war, by giving the direction of the Stalags to the SS. The Fuehrer -considered the proposal good, and asked Colonel von Below to arrange -matters accordingly. (_R-124, p. 168._) - -At the 42d meeting of the Central Planning Board, held on 23 June 1943, -the intensive discussion on labor needs seemed to settle on the use of -Russian prisoners of war as the solution to the problem. It was -recommended that the Fuehrer be advised that 200,000 Russian prisoners -of war, fit for the heaviest work, should be made available from the -Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the intermediary of the Chiefs of the -Army Groups (_T-218._) - -However, Milch’s participation in the illegal use of prisoners of war is -not confined to his knowledge that it was being done. At the meeting on -30 October 1942, Sauckel suggested that as soon as the army took -prisoners in operational territories they should be immediately turned -over to him as Plenipotentiary for Labor. Instead of objecting to this -procedure as contrary to international law, Milch added— - - “The correct thing to do would be to have all Stalags - transferred to you by order of the Fuehrer. The Wehrmacht takes - prisoners and as soon as it relinquishes them, the first - delivery goes to your organization. Then everything will be in - order.” (_T-176._) - -Nothing can be more precise and definitive in international law than -that prisoners of war may not be compelled to fight against their own -country. But Milch treats this matter rather lightly at one of the -meetings of the Central Planning Board— - - “We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage - of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be Russians. Fifty - thousand will be taken altogether; 30,000 are already employed - as gunners. This is an amusing thing that Russians must work the - guns.” (_T-192._) - -On this statement the defendant has various explanations. One, that the -German word which has been translated into “amusing”, should really have -been rendered “mad”. Thus, it is a mad thing to make Russian prisoners -work guns against their own allies. In support of this interpretation -Milch argues that since he needed these prisoners in his armament -program, he could not have approved their use as gunners. He then also -denies that they were in fact used as gunners, and if they were, he was -not responsible for the deed. But other witnesses called by the defense -clearly established that the Russian prisoners were stationed at the -guns, either for servicing the pieces, hauling ammunition to them, or -actually firing them. It is clear that the Russian prisoners were -utilized at the guns and that this type of use of prisoners of war -represents an extreme violation of the laws and customs of war. - -It has been argued by the defense that since Russia had denounced -adherence to the Geneva Convention, Germany was not compelled to treat -Russian prisoners with the limitations laid down in that convention. -German Admiral Canaris on 15 September 1941, in a memorandum of counsel -to the German High Command, declared that despite Russia’s attitude on -the Geneva Convention her prisoners were yet entitled to immunities -guaranteed under the rules and customs of war— - - “The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war is - not binding in the relationship between Germany and the U.S.S.R. - Therefore, only the principles of general international law on - the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century - these have gradually been established along the lines that war - captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely - protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the - prisoners of war from further participation in the war. This - principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all - armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or - injure helpless people * * *. The decrees for the treatment of - Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are based on a fundamentally - different viewpoint.” (_IMT 222._) - -Admiral Canaris’ position was entirely correct and in accordance with -accepted international law. In the episode of the Russian gunners -adverted to by Milch, he could not help but know the physical facts and -could not escape being aware that such use of prisoners of war violated -international law. His responsibility here is unequivocal. - -On 25 March 1944, the defendant complained that prisoners of war were -not being treated with sufficient severity— - - “If a decent foreman would sock one of those unruly guys because - the fellow won’t work, then the situation would soon change. - _International law cannot be observed here._ I have asserted - myself very strongly, and with the help of Saur I have - represented the point of view very strongly that the prisoners, - with the exception of the English and the Americans, should be - taken away from the military authorities. The soldiers are not - in a position, as experience has shown, to cope with these - fellows who know all the answers. I shall take very strict - measures here and shall put such a prisoner of war before my - court martial. If he has committed sabotage or refused to work, - I will have him hanged, right in his own factory. I am convinced - that that will not be without effect.” (_T-249._) - -When a German field marshal, speaking to men subordinate in rank, -declares that “international law cannot be observed here”, it can only -mean to those under his command that in the execution of their duties, -international law should go overboard and, thus being unlimited in their -treatment of prisoners of war, the rights of the prisoners of war must -sink also. - -Defense counsel insists that Milch had, as a matter of fact, a mild and -lenient disposition. Testimony was introduced to show that on several -occasions when he sat on courts martial, his judgments were tempered -with mercy. Note will be taken of this occasional yielding of an -apparently implacable and unyielding spirit, but one must also remark -the incongruity that one who, in his references to foreign workers and -prisoners of war, had constant harshness on his lips, could have -possessed in his make-up no harshness at all. In one of his speeches he -complains because the workers collapsed, and that they receive a -furlough of three or four days every eight weeks. This he calls “dirty -business of the first order, and treason to the country!” (_T-249._) - -Then he adds— - - “I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all - the rabble that we have among the foreign workers, there is of - course a lot of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is, - the Russian prisoners of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and - illness. The incidence of sickness of one and a half to two - percent which we have had up to now has at least doubled and in - some factories it has been increased to eight, nine, and ten - percent. That is, of course, done by previous agreement. There - the official physicians, who have to be very strict, find out - that it is not true, and then we return the fellows to work by - means of the whip. Then the whip serves as a cure.” (_T-250._) - -Recommending the employment of so merciless an instrument as a whip can -hardly be regarded as evidence of a mild disposition. Then he says— - - “Let everyone consider that if he does not do his duty, we do - not ask whether there is a law; we ask only whether he is the - responsible one and then we will seize him no matter who he is * - * *. Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down - who blocks your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask - whether he is allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For - us, there is nothing but this one task. We are fanatics in this - sphere. We do not even consider letting anything at all distract - us from that task. No order exists which could prevent me from - fulfilling this task.” (_T-251._) - -Then comes the outburst which is an out and out defiance of all law— - - “Gentlemen, I know that not every subordinate can say, ‘For me, - the law no longer exists,’ but he has to have someone who covers - up for him, not out of cowardice. But if you act according to - the spirit of the old field service regulation, ‘Abstaining from - doing something hurts us more than erring in the choice of the - means,’ and if, moreover, you keep in touch and immediately - clarify difficult points, so that something can be done, then we - are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the - law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany. - Either we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these - slipshod methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer - to fall while I am doing something that is against the rules but - that is right and sensible, and be called to account for it, and - if you like, hanged, rather than be hanged because Papa Stalin - is here in Berlin, or the Englishmen. I have no desire for that. - I would rather die in a different way. But I think we can - accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth year of war. I - repeat, the decision will come during the next six weeks!” - (_T-251-252._) - - (b) Jaegerstab - -We now come to a consideration of the Jaegerstab, formed on 1 March -1944, for the purpose of increasing production of fighter aircraft to -meet the incessant and ever increasingly effective bomber attacks of the -Americans and British which had seriously damaged the entire airplane -industry in Germany. Every airplane factory with the accessory workshops -had been hit at least three times. The Jaegerstab became essentially a -concentration of experts drawn from various ministries. Its programs -envisaged a decentralization of plane factories by transferring them in -part to above-surface localities and in part to subterranean localities. -Milch and Speer were joint chiefs of the Jaegerstab, and Karl Adolph -[Otto] Saur functioned as Chief of Staff. SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler -had supervision of the construction program. So far as this trial is -concerned, we are interested in the work of the Jaegerstab only to the -extent that it involves employment of foreign labor and prisoners of -war. Did the Jaegerstab employ labor prohibited under international law, -and if so, can Milch be held responsible for such illegal use? - -In order to resolve this question we must review the documents submitted -in evidence. - -On 6-7 April 1944, Milch and Saur reported to Hitler on the -achievements, up to that time, of the Jaegerstab and discussed with him -the plans for further construction on a second work project. Hitler -declared that he desired this project be set up in the Protectorate and, -at this point, the minutes read, “If it should prove impossible there -too to get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer, himself, will -contact the Reichsfuehrer SS and will give an order that the required -100,000 men are to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary.” -(_T-318._) Here Milch is put directly on notice that forced labor is -being contemplated. - -Fritz Schmelter, director of the Central Department for Employment and -Distribution of Labor, and because of that a member of the Jaegerstab, -declared in an affidavit on 9 December 1946, that Kammler utilized -concentration camp prisoners placed at his disposal by the SS in order -to carry out his share of the Jaegerstab construction program. Also, -that Xaver Dorsch of the Todt Organization used foreign workers, part of -whom were Hungarian Jews, to accomplish his part of the Jaegerstab -construction program. Then Schmelter states, “Milch, as one of the two -responsible chiefs of the Jaegerstab, personally directed, ordered or -approved decisions made in the interests of Jaegerstab undertakings.” -(_T-322._) - -On 13 November 1946, Saur, Chief of Staff of the Jaegerstab, declared in -an interrogation that in the decentralization program Kammler divided 30 -factories into 700 individual workshops, and that the workers used in -the project were concentration camp prisoners. (_T-323._) - -Speer, in an interrogation made shortly after his capture, declared that -Hungarian Jews were used in the building program. (_T-325._) - -At one of the Jaegerstab meetings, presided over by Milch, -Stobbe-Dethleffsen, in discussing the matter of labor needed for the -Jaegerstab program, requests a few German key personnel to supervise the -concentration camp inmates “with the other _subjugated people_.” -(_T-328._) - -At a Jaegerstab meeting on 6 March 1944, a Sturmbannfuehrer of the SS -declared he had 5,000 prisoners in readiness for work, but needed 750 -guard personnel. To this statement Milch commented, “We must distribute -our German people as key personnel. That is, out of three construction -companies we can probably make ten complete ones by introducing 70 -percent foreigners.” (_T-331._) - -At a meeting on 2 May 1944, Kammler, in Milch’s presence declares he had -30 men hanged— - - “As usual it is because the people have noticed that they are no - longer treated severely enough. I had 30 people hanged as a - special measure. Since they were hanged, everything has been to - some extent in order again. It is the same old story, whenever - people notice that they are not being treated so severely as - before, they take all sorts of liberties. It is not surprising - that a normal soldier, standing guard on people who were - previously always harmless, does not suspect anything of the - kind. They are not, however, harmless people.” (_T-333-34._) - -The minutes of the meeting do not indicate that Milch in any way -protested Kammler’s deeds and utterance, although at the trial he -doubted that Kammler had actually hanged 30 people as he had stated. - -Although Milch was not present at the meeting on 25 May 1944 of the -Jaegerstab, he approved the minutes of that meeting which revealed a -discussion among Schmelter (labor expert for Jaegerstab), Schlempp -(deputy of Jaegerstab) and Lange, in charge of machinery for Jaegerstab. - -Schmelter said— - - “The Hungarian Jews are expected now, and they will require some - kind of key personnel. Altogether I need about 250,000 - construction workers for the large bunkers and for Schlett’s - installations.” (_T-334._) - -To this Lange remarked— - - “You can get them all in Hungary. There are still Jews running - about Budapest.” (_T-334._) - -It is to be noted that Lange uses phraseology that one would employ in -speaking of dogs or other animals. There are still dogs running around -Budapest. There are still Jews running about Budapest. - -At the meeting on 26 May 1944, Schmelter reported that two transports of -Hungarian Jews had arrived at the SS in Auschwitz, but that they -consisted primarily of children, women, and old men. Kammler then -declared that he had conscripted his own men by taking 50,000 people -into protective custody. - -Schlempp, in outlining Dorsch’s needs for labor, states— - - “Dorsch said yesterday that he wanted to bring 100,000 Jews from - Hungary, 500,000 Italians,[162] 10,000 men from bomb damage - repair, also 1,000 from Waldbrohl; then he wanted to get - something from Greiser’s zone by negotiation, then 4,000 Italian - officers, 10,000 men from south Russia, and 20,000 from north - Russia. That would be 220,000 altogether.” (_T-335-36._) - -As early as 20 March 1944, we find Chief of Staff Saur asking Milch to -inform Sauckel that the group mobilization in Hungary must be placed -primarily at the disposal of the Jaegerstab. “Large, heavy labor -companies must be formed. The people have to be treated like the -prisoners. Otherwise it won’t work.” (_T-342._) - -In the face of all these uncontradicted documents and stenographic -records of meetings, it would be fatuous for anyone to say that Milch -was unaware that forced labor and prisoners of war were being used in -the Jaegerstab construction program. - -However, there is more than this passive evidence. Milch, himself, -contributes the positive evidence of his full knowledge of and -unrestrained participation in the Jaegerstab slave labor activities. - -On 25 April 1944, he said— - - “It will only work if we put these workers into barracks. We - cannot exactly treat them as prisoners. It must appear - otherwise, but it must be so in practice. * * * I am personally - convinced after talking to the Fuehrer that he will agree as - soon as it is made reasonable. The people should not be able to - mingle with the population and to conspire. Nor should they be - allowed to run around free, so that they can cross the frontier - every day. Both practices must be stopped. * * * I am of the - opinion that that must be done at once. It’s all the same to me - if individual people do object. Protest does not interest me at - all, whether from the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs or from - our side. Kleber, would you be so good as to take care of this?” - - KLEBER: “As far as prisoners of war are concerned I can take - care of it, but not where it concerns the air force. That must - be handled separately.” - - MILCH: “Naturally. This must be handled by us. There was, in - fact, another proposal but we do not want it. Otherwise someone - else will come complaining.” - - KLEBER: “I should like to transfer the prisoners further off to - Brunswick.” - - MILCH: “I think it is an excellent idea for the prisoners to go - there if Brunswick continues to be attacked.” (_T-356-57._) - -Article 9 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 provides— - - “No prisoner of war may be sent to an area where he would be - exposed to the fire of the fighting zone.” - -At the 4 May 1944 meeting, Saur reported that the Jaegerstab itself, -independent of Sauckel, had organized an expedition for the procuring of -workers in Italy. On 5 May 1944, Schmelter reported that the Jaegerstab -transport from Italy had been delayed because of the lack of guards, -whereupon the defendant said— - - “Is there someone at the escort detachment headquarters in Italy - responsible for seeing that people do not get out and run away - during the journey? That is what the escorting personnel is - there for. Someone of standing? Dr. Wendt is responsible for the - whole undertaking. I am of the opinion that, if anyone jumps - out, he should be shot; otherwise a thousand will get on and - only twenty will arrive there. The gendarmerie and all military - posts must look out for those who abscond on the journey. They - will be arrested at once and will appear before a court - martial.” (_T-349-50._) - -At a conference held on 22 February 1944, one Rautenbach says— - - “That refers to Wernigerode. In Solingen we had the best results - with Frenchmen and the worst with Italians, meaning the Italian - workers and not the prisoners of war. For that reason we do not - employ any Italians here in Wernigerode. They are only 50 to 60 - percent efficient.” (_T-2180._) - -And the defendant then remarks— - - “Could not the following be done; give the Italians in principle - only half of their food rations, letting them earn the other - half when they do their work well?” (_T-2181._) - -It is obvious that, as one of the chiefs of the Jaegerstab, the -defendant actively, willingly, and knowingly countenanced, ordered, and -participated in slave labor practices and the use of prisoners of war in -activities prohibited by international law. Aside from his other -statements, the one made on 13 June 1944, where he advocates the -exportation from France of machinery and men would, in itself, be enough -to convict him of such participation. - - “We must write off these areas in France completely, and above - all the factories which are situated further into the country - towards the south and west. For when the invasion begins, the - guarding neither of a stretch of land, nor of a line will be - possible, nor will anything function because of sabotage * * *. - No Frenchman will work when the invasion begins. I am of the - opinion that the French should be brought over again by force, - as prisoners.” - - SAUR: “I should prefer to do it sooner.” - - LANGE: “We have machines there too, in particular the presses.” - - MILCH: “Everything must come out; machines and men.” (_T-358._) - -The Jaegerstab functioned from 1 March 1944 to 1 August 1944 and then it -expanded into the Ruestungsstab. When the Jaegerstab concluded its -efforts a report was made to the Fuehrer, which declared that Jaegerstab -had, in spite of air attacks, doubled its aircraft production. -(_T-360._) - - (c) Generalluftzeugmeister - -In his capacity as Generalluftzeugmeister, Milch held periodical -meetings and conferences in connection with the Luftwaffe armament -production. Labor, its procurement, disposition, and treatment, was -inevitably a subject for frequent discussion, and in these discussions -Milch portrayed himself an intransigent, implacable taskmaster, -uninhibited neither by law nor custom, and unrestrained by moderation or -regard for the helpless vanquished. - -At one of these meetings on 5 May 1942, presided over by the defendant, -one Fridag reported— - - “The French become worse and worse. I threw out 80 of them who - will be sent to concentration camps in Russia. They refused to - work. The French say at 4 o’clock: ‘I won’t work another hour’, - and you cannot make them work another hour. This happened four - weeks ago all of a sudden when the first bombing attack on Paris - took place, while before that the French were the best people.” - (_T-2106._) - -The fact that the bombardment of the beloved Paris of these Frenchmen -would naturally emotionally disturb them was not weighed or considered -by the defendant in spite of the fact that Frydag had reported that -prior to the bombardment they had been excellent workers. Implacable and -unyielding as some story book pagan god, the defendant turns to von -Gablenz, Chief of the Planning Office, and declares— - - “I demand if the people refuse to work they immediately be - placed against the wall and shot before all the other workers.” - (_T-2107._) - -Further— - - “I ask you to get in touch with the Reich Fuehrer SS [Himmler] - and to ask him to discuss the matter with the Fuehrer. Now is - the right time; unless we do something effective now, the others - will become bothersome. I ask that their being sent to - concentration camps be taken into consideration too. I will tell - you afterwards how you should act in such a matter.” (_T-2107._) - -Later, on 7 July 1942, he indicated a willingness to try more peaceable -methods, but if they did not succeed, then— - - “I intend to fill the new Heinkel Plant in the East entirely - with Frenchmen brought down there by force. If they don’t work - in France, they may work as prisoners in Poland. After all, we - have to remember that it is we and not the French who have won - the war.” (_T-2116._) - -On 28 July 1942 we find him again complaining about French production— - - “At the present time we receive six to nine planes from the - French. I could well imagine that they would get out 45 for - themselves. I shall close up the shop with a single stroke and - have the workers and the machines come to Germany. If it does - not work on a voluntary basis, then we do it by compulsory - contracts. Perhaps I shall first give them a week to think it - over. It is a fact that, on the whole, these people work in - silent opposition. One cannot blame them for it either, it is - true, but they should not have started the war.” (_T-2117._) - -In this outburst we discover two strange utterances. One, “compulsory -contracts”, and the other the statement that the French started the war. -Since the word “contract” means a willing agreement between two or more -people, a “compulsory contract” is, of course, meaningless because one -cannot be forced into a contract. If there is any compulsion, then the -operation becomes a matter of outright coercion. With regard to the -French starting the war, the defendant had the grace to state during the -trial that he now knows that France did not initiate hostilities, -although he believed to the contrary at the time. - -The defendant has declared repeatedly that he had no connection with, or -even knowledge of, concentration camps. He only visited one of them -(Dachau) in 1935. At the end of the war he was aware of the existence of -but two concentration camps, although 200 were flourishing in all their -ghastliness at the time. Yet despite this blissful ignorance of -concentration camps the phrase rippled easily from his tongue. At the -same meeting above-mentioned he stated that if two certain individuals, -Schneider and Bergen, “make difficulties” he would put them into a -concentration camp for the duration of the war (_T-2118._) - -When one Petersen, on 30 November 1942, spoke of obtaining 500 men from -a concentration camp, Milch said, “For this purpose we should come to an -agreement with Himmler.” (_T-2148._) - -On 27 April 1943, when one Stahms indicated that concentration camp -inmates are almost 3,000 strong, Milch declares that against a -withdrawal of 3,000 foreign workers from the Luftwaffe industry, he -attached importance to the assignment of these 3,000 concentration camp -inmates to the Luftwaffe. (_NOKW-413._) - -At the GL meeting of 4 August 1942, someone reported that the French -might strike in the event of a British attack. This provoked Milch into -the thunderous outburst— - - “In such a case I would ask to be appointed military commander - myself. I would band the workers together and have fifty percent - of them shot; I would then publish this fact and compel the - other fifty percent to work by beating if necessary. If they - don’t work, then they, too, will be shot. I would get the - necessary replacement somehow. But I hope the military commander - will do his duty. I’m not worried about it. The word ‘strike’ - must never be used. For us there is only ‘living or dying’ but - not ‘striking’. That goes for the educated man as well as for - the worker, for the German as well as for the foreigner. The - word ‘strike’ means death for the man who uses it.” - (_T-2121-2122._) - -On this quotation in court the following colloquy occurred between a -member of the Tribunal and the witness [Milch]: - - JUDGE MUSMANNO: Curiosity consumes me as to what would happen if - an officer inferior in rank to yourself took you at your word - and actually executed a number of these workers or prisoners of - war. Would that officer then be punished? - - THE WITNESS: No one was there who would have been in a position - to do so. Apart from that, all those who were under my orders - knew me and my way of handling things. They knew exactly that I - didn’t mean it the way I said it, and apart from that they - always laughed about my remarks when I used such strong words. - - JUDGE MUSMANNO: In other words, the comment of a field marshal - in a matter of this seriousness was really of no value? - - THE WITNESS: Because the people knew that I got excited very - easily about certain things, and these incidents here have been - selected and submitted of course. From every one of these - meetings, which took place twice a month, there was a - report—about this thick—and perhaps, at some time or another, - sometimes once, sometimes twice, due to the many reports which I - received, there was a certain outburst, and then I would lose my - temper as we soldiers used to. However, I didn’t intend to do - anything about it and I spoke to those under my orders once in a - while. They pointed out to me that I used such strong words, and - they knew exactly that this was not meant seriously. They knew - exactly that no such order had been given and that I myself - would never cause anybody to be punished, not even when it would - have been justified, for the very simple reason that I did not - have the power to give punishments. (_T-2124-2125._) - -Then Judge Phillips inquired— - - JUDGE PHILLIPS: Well, now, whether you meant it or not, you - would say these things, and by so doing you counselled and - advised others under you at a meeting which you presided over to - do such things. Whether you meant it or not, you did that, - didn’t you? - - THE WITNESS: No. I never gave the order by using these words, - because my people spoke with me, and after all they knew from my - words that I never meant it earnestly. - - JUDGE PHILLIPS: Didn’t you say, ‘I would band the workers - together and have fifty percent of them shot? I would then - publish this fact and compel the other fifty percent to work by - beating if necessary.’ Did you say that or not? - - THE WITNESS: I do not remember to have said that. However, three - days ago I believe I said that I never knew afterwards when I - had such outbursts of rage because I had that rush of blood to - my skull due to that injury I had, and I couldn’t remember what - I said at that particular moment. I just burst out in rage. - (_T-2125-2126._) - -The defendant has constantly denied that he was a moving factor in the -foreign workers program. But at the GL meeting on 18 August 1942, we -find him asking for a complete report on the labor question, how it has -developed, what nationalities are involved, how great is the -fluctuation— - - “What real requests we now have to make in the different sectors - in order to cover the needs for specialists and for skilled and - unskilled labor, how many of them are foreigners, etc. What - happens to those who leave the industry? Are they compelled to - work elsewhere? Are they, _as I proposed, under control in the - camps supervised by the SS_ and considered as being in mild - concentration camps or are these gentlemen allowed to remain - outside and do as they please?” (_T-2127._) - -When questioned as to the significance of “mild” concentration camps, he -explained that these were camps to which people were sent for a short -time for “education”. - -Complaining about “antisocial elements” who “moved from one factory to -another,” Milch rejected the suggestion that the armed forces should -take care of these people in camps. This could not be done because “they -have not been condemned and in no way violated the existing laws.” - - “That is why Himmler should get these people into his clutches - because he can treat them _outside the law_.” (_T-2134._) - -At the GL meeting on 19 October 1943, the defendant spoke on the subject -of a possible foreign workers’ uprising. He said that he had discussed -this eventuality with Himmler, and that he, Milch, had already given -orders to the Chief AW[163] and to the training stations to get military -training in this field. - - “If for instance in the locality X, an uprising is started, then - a sergeant with a few men, or else a lieutenant with 30 men is - to turn up in the plant, and first of all shoot into the crowd - with a machine gun. What he should do after is to shoot down as - many people as possible in cases of revolt. I have given orders - to that effect even if our foreign workers are involved. But - first of all he must succeed in getting them all laid out flat - on the ground. And then every tenth man is to be singled out and - shot, while the others are lined up and see it. If our machines - are being wrecked, etc., then such measures have to be applied. - I said to Himmler: ‘I’ll go along with you in your efforts.’” - (_T-2153._) - -Milch denied at the trial that he had talked to Himmler about this -matter and endeavored to argue incorrectness in the minutes. But the -weakness of his attempted exculpation here lies in the fact that he -could well have argued the necessity for drastic action in such an -emergency, without excesses of course. In fact, he had explained, “If -our planes are destroyed in the workshops, an energetic measure should -be taken.” But in the desire to extricate himself completely from the -situation, he challenges the record, he refutes the Himmler conference, -and then adds the usual explanation that he was excited at the time. - -At a GL conference on 2 March 1943, the defendant was commenting on the -fact that foreign workers were becoming hostile. - - “On principle I have to be informed of every case of - swinishness. I do not understand at all why Germany should put - up with it when Poles and Frenchmen explain to the - people—today, indeed, you are still sitting in this work; but - later we shall be the owners; and if you treat us properly we - shall see to it then that you are shot dead immediately and not - tortured first. In all these matters energetic interference must - be made. I am of the opinion that there should be only two types - of punishment in such cases; firstly, concentration camps for - foreigners, and secondly, capital punishment. If a certain - number of such hostile elements are removed and the others are - informed, they will then work better. Their love for us - certainly won’t become any greater; but neither will their hate, - for it is already strong enough. In this respect, too, energetic - interference must be made and in no case must the works put up - with it. The best method is to give one blow with a sledge - hammer to the person concerned; and I shall treat with - distinction every man who does something like that whenever he - hears such stupid nonsense. We are living in total war; and the - workers must be told that they don’t have to put up with - anything.” (_T-2169._) - -When the above was read to the defendant in court, he stated that he did -not recall the utterance and explained, “that once again it is my -well-known rage. I simply let go.” However, upon further -cross-examination he seemed to recall what it was all about and said, -“Yes, and I was enraged here through the report which had been submitted -to me as to the fact that our people were being threatened with death. -That enraged me considerably; and I blew up.” This is an interesting -observation. This man, from whose lips death threats fell like acorns -from an oak, asks that all his fulminations be ignored. Although he sat -on the victors’ bench at the time, yet because a worker who had been -dragged from his home hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of miles away, -blurted from the depth of his misery, that if he got the opportunity he -would kill his captor, the captor felt morally justified in recommending -the use of a sledge hammer on the head of the defenseless captive. The -sledge hammer blow was to be delivered not for a deed committed, but -merely for the use of words. To fortify this point, defense introduced -an affidavit which declared that the servant girl in the Milch household -repeated certain statements as to what her people (she was a Ukrainian) -would do in the event they became victorious. On this subject they were -so sensitive that even the gossip and chatter of a maid servant threw -fear into their hearts, but it is solemnly averred in court that the -imprecations of a field marshal were always ignored. - -At the same meeting above indicated the defendant said— - - “But in the abstract, I see no difficulties in the way of - getting 100,000 or 200,000 French workers to Germany, nor do I - see any difficulties in the way of keeping them in order. If a - case of sabotage occurs in one area, every tenth man in the area - will be shot. Then such acts of sabotage would cease of - themselves. The western peoples are very much afraid of death, - while it is quite different matter with the Russians.” - (_T-2172._) - -In explanation of this remark the defendant said that he did not recall -making it. “That was still part of my madness.” - -On 4 November 1943, Milch conferred with Goering at the Junkers Works at -Dessau. Discussing the Italian workers, the defendant said— - - “We have to let certain plants go on working in Italy, such as - ball bearings, steel castings, and others, and we cannot take - the people from there. The same applies to the technical sphere. - The people there are working for us. All depends on our policy - toward the Italians. I have ordered that they can be beaten up - if they do not work. I have also given permission that Italians - caught sabotaging be sentenced to death. If this measure is not - desired by the higher authorities, which seems to be the case, - we are powerless. Then the Italians in the Reich will not be of - any use to us.” Further, “We could count on millions all - together, if we let them starve if they do not work!” - (_T-2193-2194._) - -The defendant denies that he ever gave the order specifically mentioned -here, and since he was talking to Goering, he places himself in the -position of having lied to his superior officer, something of which, -considering his vehement professions of soldier’s loyalty to military -hierarchy, it would never be expected he could be guilty. - -On the subject of French prisoners of war, the defendant said— - - “Don’t forget that not even 1,000,000 Frenchmen are here as PW’s - while we have 7 to 8 million soldiers. Therefore, the French are - still in a very favorable position. But they must realize that - they will be brought to Germany all together if they don’t work - hard enough at home.” (_T-2198._) - -As Vichy was working hand in glove with Berlin at the time, the -defendant contends that coercion was not involved since it was the -French Government who had issued the orders for this movement. - -Addressing himself on another occasion to the subject of French workers, -the defendant stated, “There is no good will in France, and you can -really not expect it from these fellows. But we will force them to work -by not feeding them.” Goering then said, “I can do this here much -better.” And Milch replied, “That will get us nowhere. We shall then -have to shut down the plants in France.” (_NOKW-245._) - -At the GL meeting of 27 May 1942, von Gablenz reported, “Yesterday, the -first[164] has exploded in France, at the Arado plant, an explosive, a -float, but no damage has been done.” Milch commented, “What measures -have been taken in consequence? I want to have a report on what has been -done—How many people have been shot and how many hanged. If that guy -cannot be found today, fifty men should be selected and if I were you I -would hang three or four of them whether they are guilty or not. It is -the only way!” (_NOKW-407._) - - IV. MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS - (a) High-Altitude Tests - -On 15 May 1941, Dr. Rascher, medical officer in the Luftwaffe and member -of the SS stationed at Munich, wrote Heinrich Himmler asking that -Himmler furnish to him two or three professional criminals to be used as -subjects in high-altitude experiments. He stated that tests had been -made with monkeys, but since their reactions differed from those of -human beings, he preferred to work with live men, it being understood -that these individuals could, of course, die in the experiment. Himmler -replied through his adjutant, Rudolf Brandt, that he would gladly make -prisoners available for such high-altitude research, and authorized that -the experiments be carried out by Dr. Rascher, a Dr. Kottenhoff, and Dr. -G. A. Weltz, who was Chief of the Institute for Aviation Medicine in -Munich. - -In March 1942, with a low-pressure chamber furnished by the Luftwaffe, -the experiments began at Dachau. The apparatus used for these tests was -simply a wood and metal cabinet in which air pressure could be increased -and decreased, the purpose of the tests being to ascertain the subject’s -capacity and ability to take large amounts of pure oxygen, and to -observe his reaction to a gradual decrease of oxygen approaching -infinity. In this manner high-altitude atmospheric pressure would be -simulated, and from the results the experimenters were to be able to -determine methods and means of maintaining and saving lives among -aviators compelled to rise to extreme altitudes, and at times because of -war hazards obliged to parachute to the earth. The subjects for these -experiments were to be individuals already sentenced to death. - -Stated in strictly academic fashion, one could without too much -difficulty be persuaded that these experiments were not entirely -irrational or inhuman. The subjects were to die anyway, and if in dying -they could furnish scientific data not obtainable otherwise, data which -would save the lives of others, the project would not seem as criminally -homicidal as it might appear when stated bluntly that experimenters -would kill experimentees. - -Whether the project was criminal and inhumane depends upon answers to -the inevitable questions: - - 1. Were the prisoners actually condemned to death previously? - 2. If so, for what reasons were they condemned to capital punishment? - 3. Were the experiments painful to the subjects? - 4. What scientific benefits resulted from the experiments? - -If any prisoner used in the experiments was condemned to death merely -for opposing the Nazi Regime without actually having committed any -physical crime, it does not answer the criminal charge to say that the -subject was already doomed to die, because by using that argument the -experimenter or his SS superior could easily take any concentration camp -inmate and, by merely pointing a finger at him, condemn him to death. -Obviously in such a case the slayer could not, after the death, plead -innocence on the grounds that the victim was to die anyway. Exculpation -from the charge of criminal homicide can possibly be based only upon -bona fide proof that the subject had committed murder or any other -legally recognized capital offense; and, not even then, unless the -sentencing Tribunal with authority granted by the State in the -constitution of the Court, declared that the execution would be -accomplished by means of a low-pressure chamber. - -It has been asserted by the defense in this case that pardons were -promised the subjects of these experiments in the event they survived. -But the whole record reveals but one such shadowy case. It was also -stated by one of the witnesses for the defense (General Wolff of the SS) -that the subjects of these experiments were men who, because of their -criminal records, had been denied the honor of fighting for the -Fatherland, but that by submitting to these experiments they would be -allowed, if they survived, to join combat forces at the front. General -Wolff furnished no names or specific instances in this connection, nor -does it appear that he, at any time, was in attendance upon the -experiments at Dachau. - -Dr. Romberg, under indictment for these same and kindred offenses, said -on 1 November 1946, that he personally witnessed the death of three of -Dr. Rascher’s subjects, and that he knows that other experimental -subjects were killed while he was not present. He estimated that the -fatalities totaled between five and ten. He was silent on the character -of the victims. - -Rudolf Brandt, who is currently on trial in Tribunal I, declared in an -affidavit dated 30 August 1946, that Rascher wrote Himmler asking for -concentration camp subjects for his high-altitude experiments. -“Volunteers could not very well be expected, as the experiments could be -fatal under the circumstances.” (_T-475._) Also “many experiments ended -with the death of the experimental subject.” (_T-477._) - -Brandt declared further that after Rascher submitted a report on his -first experiments, Himmler ordered him to continue the experiments and -authorized the commutation to life imprisonment of those subjects, -previously condemned to death, who survived the experiments. However, -Poles and Russians were excluded from this declared clemency. For -Himmler, to be a Russian or a Pole or a Jew was an offense that could be -expiated only with death. Both Romberg and Brandt are interested -witnesses since they are defendants in another trial on similar charges. -The testimony of one Anton Pacheleff, however, is not burdened with this -possible defect as he is not answering to any charges. An Austrian -patent lawyer, he was an inmate of Dachau, and while his testimony must -still be carefully scrutinized, it does not need to be evaluated on the -basis that the affiant has something to gain in exaggerating the nature, -extent, and effect of the medical experiments. He declared under oath -that Dr. Rascher chose the victims for his researches from the -punishment company at Dachau, a group made up of political prisoners -marked for extermination. “A few convicts were among the political -prisoners, having been placed there merely to depress the morale of the -political prisoners, and so a few convicts were killed along with the -others.” (_T-408._) - -The most complete account of this entire operation was contributed by -Walter Neff, an Austrian who had been committed to Dachau because, prior -to the Anschluss, he had testified in an Austrian court against certain -Nazi terrorists. Only by coincidence were the experiments enacted in a -ward to which he had been assigned as an untrained nurse, and thus he -became an unofficial observer. He testified that from 180 to 200 -concentration camp inmates were subjected to the high-altitude -experiments, and of these, 10 were volunteers. Of all these subjects -only one man was ever released, and that was an individual called -Zopota. - -It was Neff’s conclusion that over a period of three months from 70 to -80 persons were killed in the high-altitude experiments. He declared -further that approximately 40 of the persons killed were persons not -previously condemned to death. One man, according to Neff, was -deliberately killed in the low-pressure chamber by Dr. Rascher so that -he could perform an autopsy on him after his death at the atmospheric -pressure of 10,000 meters altitude. During one autopsy it was discovered -after the breast had been opened that the heart was still beating. “This -experiment,” Neff said, “caused many cases of death because many more -experiments were made in order to see how long the heart of a man could -beat thus autopsied.” (_T-419._) - -In this connection, reference must be made to one of the most cruel and -fiendish decrees scratched by the claw of Himmler on the horror-filled -parchment of his diabolic ingenuity. On 13 April 1942 he wrote Dr. -Rascher, “these experiments should above all be evaluated for the -purpose of seeing whether it is not possible, through this long -functioning of the heart, to bring such people back to life. Should such -an experiment of bringing back to life succeed, then it is understood -that the person condemned to death will be commuted to lifelong -imprisonment in a concentration camp.” (_1971-B-PS._) Thus, if the -lifeless and mutilated body of one of these tortured victims of -cold-blooded homicide should be made to function again, its owner would -receive from the benevolent Heinrich Himmler the assurance of the -luxuries of a lifelong imprisonment in an SS concentration camp! - -But this is not the end of the hilarious game of these two death-head -players, as they toss human life back and forth. On 20 October 1942, -Rascher queries Himmler’s adjutant on this subject. He desires to know -if, amongst the mythical survivors of his lethal experiments, there -should be any Poles or Russians, whether they were also to receive the -boon of lifelong imprisonment in a concentration camp. Incidentally, -Rascher adds, the only ones he has experimented with have been Poles and -Russians. And the reply comes back from Himmler’s adjutant that Dr. -Rascher, “please,” is to be informed that “the decree of the -Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler concerning pardoning (they called it -pardoning!) of experimental subjects does not apply to Poles and -Russians.” (!!!) - -The manner in which some of the victims were selected is material fit -for an Edgar Allen Poe story or a horror magazine. One day after 16 -Russian prisoners had been used as experiments, two Jews were scheduled -to be killed. Curious as to the identity of the two scheduled for -extermination, Neff watched the first victim being placed in the -experimental chamber. Something in the man’s features forcibly brought -to his mind the image of the prison tailor. Hurrying to the tailor shop -he learned that indeed it was the tailor, and that he had not been -condemned to death, but that an SS-man, one Endres, had placed him among -the list of those scheduled to be killed because this tailor had refused -to make a civilian suit for Endres! - -Neff further testified that at one time the chamber became damaged, but -after being repaired more deaths occurred, and on the last day Rascher -killed five persons. (_T-421._) - -On 16 April 1942, Rascher wrote Himmler describing an experiment which -he repeated four times “with the same results.” - - “When Wagner, the last VP (experimental subject) had stopped - breathing, I let him come back to life by increasing pressure. - Since the VP was assigned for a terminal (‘Terminal’ meaning - ‘death-resulting’ in this case) experiment, since a repeated - experiment held no prospect for new results, and since I had not - been in possession of your letter at that time, I subsequently - started another experiment through which VP Wagner did not live. - Also in this case the results obtained by electrocardiographic - registration (Herzstromabschreibung) were extraordinary.” - (_T-431-32._) - -Here Rascher, in a macabre demonstration worthy of his record, repeated -an experiment four times knowing what the result would be, and then -finally killed the subject because he had been marked for extermination -anyway. - - (b) Were the Experiments Painful to the Subjects - -The defense contends that the experiments, even though often fatal, were -not accompanied with actual pain to the subjects, and therefore the -experiments could not be characterized cruel or inhuman. Anton Pacheleff -often stood by the apparatus during the experiments and looked through -the observation window of the chamber. He testified— - - “I have personally seen through the observation window of the - chamber when a prisoner inside would stand a vacuum until his - lungs ruptured. Some experiments gave men such pressure in their - heads that they would go mad, and pull out their hair in an - effort to relieve the pressure. They would tear their heads and - face with their fingers and fingernails in an attempt to maim - themselves in their madness. They would beat the walls with - their hands and head, and scream in an effort to relieve - pressure on their eardrums. These cases of extreme vacuums - generally ended in the death of the subject. An extreme - experiment was so certain to result in death that in many - instances the chamber was used for routine execution purposes - rather than an experiment.” (_T-409._) - -One report made up by Doctors Ruff, Romberg, and Rascher graphically -described the reactions of the subject as he fell from a height of -47,000 feet. Some of the more unusual reactions are noted: - - 47,200 ft. Lets the mask fall, severe altitude sickness, spasmodic - (klonische) convulsions. - 45,580 ft. Opisthotonus. - 44,950 ft. Suspended in opisthotonus. - 44,920 ft. Arms stretched stiffly forward; sits up like a dog, - legs spread stiffly apart. - 43,310 ft. Agonal convulsive breathing. - 40,030 ft. Dyspnea, hangs limp. - 23,620 ft. Uncoordinated movements with the extremities. - 19,690 ft. Clonic convulsions, groaning. - 18,080 ft. Yells aloud. - 9,520 ft. Still yells, convulses arms and legs, head sinks - forward. - 6,560 ft. Yells spasmodically, grimaces, bites his tongue, does - not respond to speech, gives the impression of - someone who is completely out of his mind. - 5 minutes (after reaching ground level) Reacts for the first time - to vocal stimulation. - 11 minutes Holds his head turned convulsively to the right; tries - repeatedly to answer the first question concerning - his birth date. - 28 minutes Sees nothing; runs against open window sash upon which - the sun is shining, so that large lump is formed on - his forehead; says “Excuse me, please.” No expression - of pain. - 37 minutes Reacts to pain stimuli. - 75 minutes Still disoriented in time; retrogressive amnesia over - three days. - 24 hours Normal condition again attained; has no recollection of - the experiment itself. (_T-455-56._) - - (c) Results Achieved - -On 11 May 1942, Rascher made his first report to Himmler on the -high-altitude experiments— - - “As practical result of the more than 200 experiments conducted - at Dachau the following can be assumed. Flying in altitudes - higher than 12 kilometers without pressure-cabin or - pressure-suit is impossible even while breathing pure oxygen. If - the airplane pressure machine is damaged at altitudes of 13 - kilometers and higher the crew will not be able to bail out of - the damaged plane themselves since at that height the bends - appear rather suddenly. It must be requested that the crew - should be removed automatically from the plane, for instance, by - catapulting the seats by means of compressed air. Descending - with opened parachute without oxygen would cause severe injuries - due to the lack of oxygen besides causing severe freezing; - consciousness would not be regained until the ground was - reached. Therefore, the following is to be requested: (1) A - parachute with barometrically controlled opening. (2) A portable - oxygen apparatus for the jump. For the following experiments - Jewish professional criminals who had committed ‘Rassenschande’ - (race pollution) were used; the question of the formation of - embolism was investigated in ten cases. Some of the VP’s died - during a continued high-altitude experiment; for instance, after - one-half hour at a height of 12 kilometers. * * * To find out - whether the severe psychical and physical effects, as mentioned - under No. 3, are due to the formation of embolism, the following - was done: After relative recuperation from such a parachute - descending test had taken place, however before regaining of - consciousness, some VP’s were kept under water until they died. - * * * One VP was made to breathe pure oxygen for two and - one-half hours before the experiment started. After six minutes - at a height of 20 kilometers he died and at dissection also - showed ample air embolism as was the case in all other - experiments.” (_T-384-385._) - -Dr. Romberg declared in an interrogation conducted on 29 October 1946, -that he and other doctors had conducted experiments on themselves -reaching altitudes of 17,000 meters (17 kilometers). Beyond that, he -said, death was probable. This seems to contradict the report made by -Rascher, above referred to, in which he speaks of the impossibility of -flight at 12 kilometers (12,000 meters). - -But the whole fallacy of the experiments and their sheer futility are -revealed in a letter which Dr. Hippke, Chief of the Medical Section of -the Luftwaffe, wrote to Himmler under date of 8 October 1942— - - “It is true that no conclusions as to the practice of - parachuting can be drawn for the time being, as a very important - factor, viz., cold, has so far not yet been taken into - consideration; it places an extraordinary excess burden on the - entire body and its vital movements, so that the results in - actual practice will very likely prove to be far more - unfavorable than in the present experiments.” (_T-404._) - -If it was impossible perfectly to simulate flying conditions in the -low-pressure chamber—and this, if they were scientists at all worthy of -the name, they should have known and must have known—then the tests -were only the wildest kind of experimenting. And if the experimenting -was done with human lives, as it was, the recklessness and the wanton -handling of these human lives, resulting from 60 to 70 times in death, -can only be characterized by what it was,—murder. - - (d) Freezing Experiments - -On 20 May 1942, [Field] Marshal Milch wrote General Wolff recommending -experiments “in regard to perils at high seas.” (_T-393._) As German -aviators from time to time were being forced to parachute into the North -Seas, and consequently being subject to extreme cold for extended -periods of time, the purpose of the freezing experiments was to -ascertain the most effective way of rewarming such aviators and thereby -saving their lives. (_T-480._) - -The cold water experiments were performed between August and October -1942; the dry-cold experiments from February to April 1943. Walter Neff, -already identified, described the experimental basin as being made of -wood, two meters long, two meters high, and 50 centimeters above the -floor. He stated that 280 to 300 prisoners were used in the tests, many -of them undergoing as high as three experiments, and that out of the -number indicated 80 to 90 died. The selection of the subjects was left -to the political department of the camp after Rascher had made requests -for a certain number. The eventual victims were made up of political -prisoners, foreigners, prisoners of war, and inmates condemned to death. -According to Neff, none of the subjects were volunteers. (_T-423._) - -The experiment was conducted in the following manner. The basin was -filled with water and then ice was added until the temperature measured -3° [centigrade]. Now the subject, either naked or dressed in a flying -suit, was forced into the freezing liquid. When two certain doctors, -Holzloehner and Finke, were performing the experiment, the subjects had -narcotics administered to them, but when Rascher took over he refused -narcotics because he maintained that “you cannot find the exact -condition of the blood, and that you would exclude the willpower of the -subject if he was under an anaesthetic.” When the subject was -experimented on in a conscious state, a much longer time elapsed before -the so-called freezing narcosis set in. (_T-424._) - -Neff, describing the operation, declared that the “sinking down of the -temperature until 32° [centigrade] was a terrible plight for the -experimental subject.” At 32° the subject lost consciousness, but these -persons “were frozen down to 25° body temperature.” When Rascher was -handling the experiments “a large number of the persons involved were -kept in the water so long a time until they were dead.” (_T-425._) - -Many others died during the reviving or during the re-warming procedure. -The utterly heartless and fiendish manner in which some of the -experiments were conducted can be gathered from the graphic description -by Neff of the episode of the two Russians— - - “It was the worst experiment which was ever carried out. From - the bunker two Russian officers were carried out. We were - forbidden to speak to them. They arrived in the afternoon at - approximately 4 o’clock. Rascher had them undressed and they had - to go into the basin in a naked state. Hour after hour passed - and when usually after a short time, 60 minutes, the freezing - would have set in, these two Russians were still conscious even - after two hours. All of our appeals to Rascher, asking him to - give them an injection was without purpose. Approximately in the - third hour one Russian said to the other: ‘Comrade, tell that - officer that he may shoot us.’ Then the other one replied, - ‘Don’t expect any mercy from this Fascist dog.’ And how can one - imagine that we inmates also had to be witnesses of such a death - and could do nothing against it, then you can really estimate - how terrible it is to be condemned to work in such an - experimental station. After these words, which were translated - to the Germans by a young Pole in a somewhat different form, - Rascher went back into his office. The young Pole immediately - tried to give them an anaesthetic with chloroform, but Rascher - returned immediately. He threatened us with a pistol, and he - said, ‘Don’t dare interfere and approach these victims.’ The - experiment lasted at least five hours until death set in. Both - corpses were sent to Munich for autopsy in the Schwabisches - Hospital there. Q. Witness, how long did it normally take to - kill a person in these freezing experiments? A. The length of - the experiment varied according to the individual case. It - always varied according to whether the subject was clothed or - unclothed. If his physical construction was weak and if in - addition to that he was naked, death often set in already after - 80 minutes. But there were a number of cases where the - experimental subject lived up to three hours and remained that - way in the water until finally death set in.” (_T-426._) - -On 20 September 1942, Rascher made an intermediary report on these -experiments— - - “The experimental subjects (VP’s) were placed in the water - dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer - combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of - rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were - carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5° to 12° - [centigrade]. In one experimental series, the occiput, the brain - stem, protruded above the water, while in another series, the - brain stem and back of the head were submerged in water * * *. - Fatalities occurred only when the brain stem and back of the - head were also chilled. Autopsies of such fatal cases always - revealed large amounts of free blood, up to one-half liter, in - the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed extreme dilation - of the right chamber. As soon as the temperature in these - experiments reached 28° the experimental subjects died - invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation. The - above-discussed autopsy findings conclusively proved the - importance of a warming protective device for the occiput when - designing the planned protective clothing of foam type.” - (_T-398-399._) - -The sheer monstrousness of this type of experiment reveals itself in the -last sentence of the report which states with the flourish of a great -scientific discovery that if the back of the head, the occiput is to be -submerged in freezing water, there should be a warm, protective device -to cover the occiput. If one is to have his feet in icy water, he should -wear warm, waterproof boots. If he is to dip his head in the icy water, -then his head should also be protected! This, then, is the weighty -conclusion of so-called scientists sacrificing human lives for an -observation that is obvious to a ten-year-old child. - - “During attempts to save severely chilled persons (Unterkuehlte) - it was shown that rapid re-warming was in all cases preferable - to slow re-warming, because after removed from the cold water, - the body temperature continued to sink rapidly. I think that for - this reason, we can dispense with the attempt to save intensely - chilled subjects by means of animal heat. Rewarming by animal - warmth, animal bodies or women’s bodies, would be too slow. As - auxiliary measures for the prevention of intense chilling, - improvements in the clothing of aviators come alone into - consideration. The foam suit with suitable neck protector which - is being prepared by the German Institution for Textile Research - (Deutsches Textilforschungsinstitut), Muenchen-Gladbach, - deserves first priority in this connection. The experiments have - shown that pharmaceutical measures are probably necessary if the - flier _is still alive_ at the time of rescue.” (_T-399-400._) - -Here other amazing, fantastic discoveries were made. - - 1. That something should be done at once to re-warm a body that - has been floating about in icy water. - - 2. That aviator suits be made up with suitable neck protectors. - - 3. And that if the flier is still alive when rescued, medicine - should be prescribed for him. If dead, no pharmaceutical - measures are recommended! - -In the year 1942, in the name of science, in the name of progress, men -trained in medicine calmly and deliberately froze the blood in the -arteries and veins of human beings to the point of death to proclaim -warm clothing for low temperatures and re-warming and medicine for those -who have succumbed to coldness. - -Dr. Becker-Freyseng, who participated in some of the experiments, -declared that as a result of the freezing experiments conducted at -Dachau, they gave orders to flight surgeons that the warm bath method -was to be used in reviving aviators who had been chilled. And thus -another milestone was reached in science; namely, that warmth revived -and comforted these who had been chilled. (_T-470._) - -On 22 September 1942, Himmler acknowledged Rascher’s report, but Himmler -who was carrion and obscenity incarnate, ordered that further subjects -be frozen, and that re-warming and revival be attempted by the use of -naked women. For this purpose Rascher obtained four gypsy women, and the -experiments began. The subjects were, in accordance with usual -procedure, forced into water in which ice cakes floated and were -retained in the freezing compound until unconscious. Then each frozen -victim was put to bed with two naked women, and the three were covered -with blankets. In still other experiments the unconscious subject was -placed in bed with only one woman. From all this revolting and macabre -performance, the scientific deduction was reached that the re-warming -process was better achieved by one woman than two because with one -single partner “personal inhibitions are removed and the woman nestles -up to the chilled victim more intimately.” This was the great scientific -revelation achieved from an obscene spectacle which could have seemed -more like the superstitious drum-beating rites of barbarians on some -forgotten savage, jungle-infested isle, than the work of educated -doctors in the year 1942. Nor was this type of experiment without its -fatalities. Of one subject, the report stated, “This person died with -symptoms suggesting cerebral hemorrhage as was confirmed by the -subsequent autopsy.” The Nazi scientists, after this experiment, did -however, achieve greatness in stating that this type of re-warming was -recommended only when women were available and other types of re-warming -facilities were not available, except in the “case of small children who -are best re-warmed by their mothers with the aid of hot-water bottles.” -(!) - -In a final report to Himmler on the super-cooling experiments at Dachau, -the ghastly experimenters, after having killed scores of subjects, came -to the conclusion that they did not know whether rescued persons should -be re-warmed quickly or slowly— - - “It was not clear, for example, whether those who had been - rescued should be warmed quickly or slowly. According to the - current instructions for treating frozen people, a slow - warming-up seemed to be indicated. Certain theoretical - considerations could be adduced for a slow warming. Well-founded - suggestions were missing for a promising medicinal therapy.” - -The uncertainty is blamed on the “absence of well-founded suggestions -concerning the cause of death by cold in human beings.” (_T-433._) - -And now, in order to clarify this question, they decided to go back to -animal experiments which would suggest that after all their -experimenting and killing of human beings, they are no closer to any -scientific discovery than when they started. (_T-433._) - -However, they still continued the experiments with human beings in -another manner. This was the dry-cold process, an operation carried out -during the period January-March 1943. The _modus operandi_ of this -experiment was to place the subject outdoors at night in a nude state, -cover him with a linen sheet, and then pour cold water over him hourly. -After several operations of this character, Rascher complained that it -was a mistake to cover the subjects even with a linen sheet. He must be -utterly naked, otherwise “the air cannot get at the person.” And from -then on the subjects suffered their torture without covering of any -kind. Even if it could be assumed that the test could have the slightest -modicum of value, it is not understood why the subject had to be utterly -naked. As the purpose of the experiment, it is presumed, was to -ascertain the reaction of a soldier’s body to a frozen state, there is -no reason why the subject could not wear some clothes, if only the -merest undergarment, because it is scarcely conceivable that a soldier -or aviator would be without some clothing on his back. On this subject, -Neff testified— - - “The next experiment was a mass experiment when the prisoners - were also put outside naked at night. The temperature of one of - them was measured with a galvanometer, the others with a - thermometer. Rascher was present during approximately eighteen - to twenty experiments of that type, but I can not remember - exactly how many deaths occurred and if deaths occurred in - connection with these experiments. I would like to say with - certain reservations that approximately three deaths occurred - during that period.” (_T-429._) - -On the character of the subjects Neff stated— - - “Of the experimental subjects subjected to air-cooling - experiments, none were people who were sentenced to death. They - were prisoners of various nationalities. There were also German - political prisoners and ‘green’ prisoners. - - “Q. And these prisoners had not volunteered, had they? - - “A. No.” (_T-429._) - - V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS - (a) Responsibility of Milch as to Count One of Indictment - -Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, promulgated by the Allied -Control Council, representing the nations of the United States, Great -Britain, France, and Russia, proclaims the ill-treatment or deportation -to slave labor of civilian populations of occupied territories, or the -ill-treatment of prisoners of war, to be war crimes, punishable by -death, imprisonment, or other penalties. - -It is sufficient for this Tribunal to cite Control Council Law No. 10 as -authority for its action in this case. Since, however, the Control -Council came into being after the ending of the war, and since the laws -which it published necessarily also followed the termination of -hostilities, it has been argued by defense counsel that it does not -comport with justice and reason that a defendant should be condemned for -an act which, prior to its commission, was not accepted in international -law as a crime. From the day of surrender Germany has been without a -government of its own, and as the Allied powers are exercising -quasi-sovereign jurisdiction in practically all phases of German -relations, both internal and external, the very circumstances of -Germany’s present political situation not only justifies but demands -that the Control Council establish government in its three fundamental -phases; namely, the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative. -Otherwise chaos would fling Germany into even a more precipitous abyss -than the one into which she has fallen, and the supreme and perhaps -irreparable disaster, arrested by Allied intervention, would be upon -her. - -Yet it can be argued and it has been argued that despite the imperative -need of an occupational force with its almost unlimited jurisdiction, -such an occupying force simply represents the authority of victor over -vanquished. In the discharge of its duties under the law which created -it, this Tribunal is not called upon to answer the arguments just -indicated, but a respect for the opinion of mankind invites a listing of -the reasons which establish the justice of the procedure here invoked -and the reasons which must invest its judgment with the solemnity and -solidity of accepted international law. - -In the first place, it is not Control Council Law No. 10 which makes -abuse of civilian populations an international crime, nor even the -decision of the International Military Tribunal, which in turn derived -its power from the London Charter which had as its antecedent the Moscow -Declaration of 1943. International law is not a body of codes and -statutes, but the gradual expression, case by case, of the moral -judgments of the civilized world, and no international law textbook of -the last century ever sanctioned the deportation of a civilian -population for labor. Although under Article 52 of the Hague -Regulations, the inhabitants of occupied countries may be used for the -needs of the occupying army, such civilians may be utilized only in -proportion to the resources of the country, and they may not under any -circumstances be required to take part in military operations against -their own country. L. Oppenheim’s Treatise on International Law (Vol. -II, Sixth Edition, page 345) states flatly that there is no right to -deport inhabitants to the country of the occupant for the purpose of -compelling them to work there. - -It is submitted, however, that though this is the law and so recognized, -total warfare, as it raged in World War II, suspended, if it did not -outrightly abrogate, all these rules heretofore respected and esteemed -as binding on civilized nations. In this respect defense counsel argues -that “modern warfare, having as its aim total annihilation of the armed -production of the enemy, brought with it to a great extent warfare -against the civilian population,” and he cites total blockade as an -illustration of his thesis. It is true that total blockade affects the -entire blockaded population, as indeed air raids strike at the most -helpless and harmless of the enemy’s civilians. The writer of this -opinion was witness many times to the death and mutilation of -inhabitants, including women, children, and old men, in Luftwaffe air -raids aimed at legitimate war targets. German civilians also paid with -their lives for living in their own country. And thus, it would seem in -principle, that if civilians may legitimately be killed through military -action, though noncombatant, they may certainly be made to work. But it -does not follow that because military necessity unintentionally -victimizes a civilian population, political domination may strip them of -their civil rights and subject them to intentional torture and possible -death. With all its horror modern war still “is not a condition of -anarchy and lawlessness between the belligerents, but a contention in -many respects regulated, restricted, and modified by law.” (Oppenheim, -ibid., 421.) - -Though the adversaries descend into the pit of bloody combat, there is -always open to them the means of re-ascending to the level of nonhostile -negotiations. The matter of temporary truces for recovering the dead and -succoring the wounded, the making of arrangements through international -relief organizations for the treatment of prisoners, the granting of -safe passage through the lines of persons mutually agreed upon by the -parties, all are instances which refute the logical development of -defense counsel’s argument that total warfare justifies the abandonment -of every restriction and authorizes the combatants to use all manners -and means to win the conflict. - -And no one was in a better position to understand this than the -defendant. He had participated as a soldier in the First World War; he -had, following the war, entered distinguished private enterprise; he had -travelled extensively and was induced by none other than Hitler himself -to enter the Air Ministry long before the outbreak of World War II -because of his talents and abilities. It is idle for defense counsel to -say that Milch “was never a good National Socialist.” If joining a -political party, accepting its benefits and preferments, rising to -supreme heights in grade and distinction, offering never-flagging -loyalty to the Fuehrer, even in the face of a declared acknowledgment -that the Fuehrer was leading Germany to disaster, if this does not make -one a full-fledged National Socialist, then nothing does. - -Milch did not simply passively ignore international law, he actively -expressed a knowledgeable contempt for it. We have seen how he declared -at one of the Central Planning Board meetings that “International law -cannot be observed here.” - -Defense counsel made much of the point that the German people did not -want war, and the defendant himself described how when the first tanks -moved through the streets of Berlin, the inhabitants of that city were -silent and worried. But it is not clear how this observation advances -the innocence of the defendant. If anything it adds to his moral guilt -because the evidence reveals only too well that to the fullest extent of -his energies he prosecuted a war which he states was against the will -and interests of his people. The indictment has not charged him with -waging aggressive war, but in view of his participation in the 23 May -1939 conference when Hitler outlined quite clearly his aggressive -intentions, and in view of his (Milch’s) never tiring efforts in the -war’s various phases—at the front, in the air, in production, in -inspection—it cannot be said that to his trained mind the war had the -aspects of a defensive and not an aggressive conflict. Although Milch -has here repudiated belief in the master race theory, yet we know that -he went through a formal procedure to establish the absence of Jewish -blood in his veins. This procedure even took the embarrassing turn of -statements concerning his parentage. In doing this, Milch could not help -but know that the Jews were being persecuted by the political party to -which he voluntarily belonged. Nor will the Tribunal believe his -declaration that he knew of only two concentration camps in all of -occupied Europe. For the Tribunal to acknowledge this statement would be -to declare Milch weak-minded if not _non compos mentis_. Milch, was -constantly threatening workers with the concentration camp. These -threats he attributes to excessive anger as he does all his outbursts, -to which we have already called attention. - -Milch would have the Tribunal believe that his violent language was -never intended to produce results. He explained that his declaration -that Italian prisoners of war attempting to escape should be shot does -not constitute cruelty because, in the words of his counsel, “all -countries have prisoners shot who attempt to escape.” This contradicts -another statement made in court wherein he lauded prisoners who sought -to regain their freedom. When confronted with inconsistencies of this -character, the defendant invariably sought refuge in the statement that -he was never taken seriously in his threats to shoot, hang, or whip. He -informs us that he never used a whip, that everybody knew he -exaggerated, that nobody took him seriously, and that he did not have -full control of himself. But Erhard Milch was not the village idiot. He -carried a field marshal’s baton, and the lifting of that baton compelled -obedience no matter how idiotic might be the demand. Further, Milch’s -imprecations were not simple interjections; they frequently carried the -appearance of orders already given or about to be issued. He may never -have actually penned a death warrant or called out the SD with its -murder squads, but is it so certain that underlings beyond his -cognizance did not carry into effect his sometimes very clear directions -on punishments to be inflicted? - -Violent language is not as innocuous as Milch would have the present -world believe. Even if it should be true that his immediate circle -laughed at his fulminations, as was testified, there is no assurance -that others laughed. A field marshal’s fraternizations are necessarily -limited. There were not many who had the privilege to stand beside him, -as did General Vorwald, and philosophically muse; “Now his neck is -getting red again.” There were necessarily hundreds in the course of six -years of war who, attending his various meetings, were not informed that -his fire and brimstone were froth. Vorwald can laugh at a field marshal -and a field marshal can laugh at a Hitler, but the comedy ceases there. -Milch has ridiculed Hitler’s speeches and pointed out that certain -portions of the Fuehrer’s orations were known as the “Adam and Eve” -section. He indicated further that many of Hitler’s thunderings were -mere bluff, but who can say today that he was bluffing? - -Hitler’s most potent force for evil was language. With all that he has -to answer for at the bar of history, it can be doubted that there exists -proof that he with his own hands killed any man or even the proverbial -fly. Hitler’s armory was language. It was Hitler’s language which -mesmerized the German nation. Every one has said so. He had no other -abilities. He was no soldier. All the generals were agreed on that. He -could not ride a horse, he could not drive a car, he could not build a -fence. He could hang paper and he could talk, and the German people -regarded that talk as substance. And on the phosphorescent sea of his -wildly undulating phrases they launched the ship of their well-being -with the tragic result that fragments and splinters of that ship now -piteously stare at one from every nook and corner of this once -prosperous and happy land. - -The greatest individual force of destruction in Germany for nearly 20 -years was _Mein Kampf_. And yet _Mein Kampf_ was simply language. To the -knowledge of the writer of this opinion, _Mein Kampf_ was never used as -a missile or fired as a projectile, but is there a German sincerely -interested in the welfare of his country today who doubts that its words -were bullets, its phrases bombs, and its pages poison which, falling -into the wells of the nation, corroded the thinking of the innocent and -goaded into action the ambitions of the wicked? - -As the record shows, Milch incessantly threatened the wildest excesses, -he orally directed them, and he reported to his chief on one occasion -that he had put certain ones into effect. In spite of his present -disavowal, there is nothing in the transcript to indicate that he -repudiated his threats at the time of utterance. The defense has -repeatedly attacked the accuracy of the minutes of the Central Planning -Board, the GL, and the Jaegerstab. All these documents were taken from -the official files of the Reich Air Ministry. Furthermore, the -defendant’s constant efforts on the stand to modify the far-reaching -implications of his speeches concede the general correctness of the -remarks attributed to him. Thus, making due allowance for stenographic -errors, the defendant stands out through the pages of these reports as a -resolute, persevering, determined worker, unyielding and loyal to his -cause, which was the cause of the Fuehrer. - -It can be believed that Erhard Milch was not seeking personal enrichment -and a luxurious living, which was so obviously the nefarious and -principal goal of his chief, the super-pilferer Hermann Goering. Milch -was seeking victory for Germany, for which he held an understandable -affection, but his intelligence, training, and experience in the affairs -of the world told him inescapably that Germany was waging an aggressive -and culpable war. Milch gave of his talents and energies to the winning -of a war criminally begun and lawlessly prosecuted, which, had it ended -in victory for the aggressors would have resulted in the heartless -subjugation of countless millions of innocent and helpless people. The -defendant has recounted his worries and anguish and has explained that -this mental torment provoked many of his unbridled utterances, but what -was the cause of this bitterness and mortification? Not that Europe had -become a slaughterhouse, not that blood ran like water, not that the -four Horsemen of the Apocalypse were galloping over the continent -hurling famine, pestilence, and death into every city, village, and -hamlet. Milch’s torment and soul-sickness were not that the human race -and human dignity were being debased and degraded as they had never been -before since man knew shame. It was not for all this that Milch’s heart -was breaking. His consternation, his panic was that Germany was losing -the war! - -He said, “I had to walk into defeat with open eyes.” (_T-1948._) Also, -“I could see what was coming and I could not help my people.” And in his -bitterness he increased the fury of his verbal lashes over the backs of -the foreign workers, he redoubled his efforts for more importations and -screamed for more production. He knew, as far back as November 1941, -that the war was lost; this knowledge was confirmed after Stalingrad, -and every vestige of doubt as to the eventual result was shattered by -the clouds of bombers over Germany every day. He knew that Hitler was -leading Germany over the brink to ruin, and yet he called for more and -more production to make the disaster all the more noteworthy. He was -having difficulties with Goering, Hitler did not want him any more, and -yet he stoked the fires of his wrath to an even higher degree of -vengeance against the workers because they would not turn out more -production for the war, every continuing day of which brought only -greater misery to his people. The argument does not ring true. Milch may -have believed Germany might lose the war but he certainly made every -effort to have it end victoriously. This in itself is honorable for a -soldier, but he allowed himself to use means and methods which the code -of a soldier does not authorize or countenance, and therein he fell. - -He has related several accidents which may have affected his health. He -cracked-up two or three times with his plane and he suffered an -automobile mishap as well. It is suggested, although not vigorously -pressed, that all this may explain his towering wraths and lightning -fury. But the plea in this case is not “Not Guilty because of Insanity.” -Nowhere is it advanced that the defendant is not now, nor that at any -time throughout the war was not, in the fullest possession of his mental -faculties. If a temporary aberration is being suggested, it is -remarkable that these deviations from the norm occurred only when he was -urging the maximum and severest employment of forced labor and menacing -with the direst punishment those who did not fulfill to the extreme the -commitments of this illegal enterprise. If Milch was at any time -deprived of his reasoning faculties, his temporary unbalance had method -in it. - -The Tribunal finds Erhard Milch guilty on count one of the indictment. - - (b) Count Two - -In considering Milch’s responsibility under count two, we will need to -enumerate and weigh each reference to him in the testimony in this -connection. The high-altitude experiments began in March and lasted -until June 1942. Cold-water experiments were conducted during the period -from the middle of August until October 1942. The dry-cold experiments -lasted from February through April 1943. During this time Milch was -Inspector General of the Air Forces, State Secretary in the Air -Ministry, and Generalluftzeugmeister. As Inspector General he was in -charge of the office which authorized research and medical experiments -conducted in behalf of the Air Forces. General Hippke, physician in -charge of the Luftwaffe Medical Department, was directly subordinate to -the defendant. As Generalluftzeugmeister, Milch was head of air -ordnance. Milch had charge of the development of technical experiments -for the Luftwaffe. - -All medical institutes and Luftwaffe medical men were subordinate to the -Medical Inspectorate Chief, Dr. Hippke. The DVL[165] was subordinate to -Hippke’s office in technical matters. Dr. Rascher conducted his -experiments at Dachau. He was temporarily assigned to the SS, but -retained his status as a Luftwaffe physician, rising from a second -lieutenant to a captain in the Luftwaffe. During the period of the -experimentations, Rascher was under the command of the Luftwaffe. - -On 20 May 1942, Milch wrote a letter to General Wolff, stating that his -medical inspector had reported to him that the high-altitude experiments -conducted by the SS and the Luftwaffe had been finished, and he did not -recommend that they should be continued. He did, however, authorize -experiments “of some other kind in regard to perils at high seas.” On 4 -June 1942, Milch authorized Hippke the continued use of the low-pressure -chamber. On 20 July 1942, Rascher sent Brandt a report on the -high-altitude experiments and the accompanying letter stated that it is -Himmler’s desire that the report should be sent to Milch. On 25 August -1942, Himmler sent Milch a copy of the report and asked that he receive -Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg for a lecture and a showing of the film made -of the experiment. - -On 31 August 1942, Milch wrote Himmler acknowledging the report and -promising to receive the two gentlemen for the lecture and showing of -the film. On 23 August 1942, Sievers wrote Brandt discussing a revival -of the high-altitude experiments and stating that a report was to have -been made to Milch, but that the report was not made. On 3 October 1942, -Rascher wrote Brandt that the report to Milch, planned for September, -could not be made because Milch was not present. On 27 November 1942, -Wolff wrote Milch a long letter pointing out the need and the great -value of the experiments with human beings, stating that Himmler “has -accepted the responsibility for supplying death-deserving, asocial -persons, and criminals from the concentration camps for these -experiments.” He asks Milch to assign Rascher to the SS so that he can -continue with the experiments directly under Himmler’s orders. “In any -case, these experiments must not be stopped. We owe that to our men.” - -Dr. Romberg stated in an affidavit that Milch “was familiar with these -experiments.” Neff testified that “Milch’s name was mentioned in -connection with the high-altitude experiments.” Sievers, Director of the -Research and Teaching Association, stated that “Milch must have known -about the experiments of Dr. Rascher.” Dr. Ruff stated that to his -knowledge Milch was informed of these tests either by Hippke or by the -SS. Dr. Becker-Freyseng said that Dr. Kalk told him he had seen Rascher -in Milch’s office. - -When the film was shown in Milch’s office on 11 September 1942, Milch -was not present. Wolfgang Lutz testified that Milch had negotiated -directly with Himmler regarding the execution of such experiments -without consulting the Medical Inspectorate. Rudolf Brandt stated that -Milch was fully informed about the low-pressure experiments. As late as -January 1943, Milch had not replied to the letter sent him by Wolff, -asking for the assignment of Rascher to the SS. - -This, in brief, constitutes the case against Erhard Milch in connection -with the medical experiments. In order to find Milch guilty on this -count of the indictment, it must be established that— - - 1. Milch had knowledge of the experiments. - 2. That, having knowledge, he knew they were criminal in scope and - execution. - 3. That he had this knowledge in time to act to prevent the - experiments. - 4. That he had the power to prevent them. - -In pressing this count against the defendant, the prosecution has the -burden, as it has the burden in every count, to prove the guilt of the -defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin our deliberations with the -cardinal rule that the defendant is presumed to be innocent. Glancing at -the evidence as a whole, it is a facile matter to say that the defendant -must have known of the experiments; that, with so much smoke, there must -be fire. But in addition to smoke, there must be light. - -The proof against Milch on this count is entirely circumstantial, and -before we can find him guilty we must conclude that every hypothesis -resulting from the circumstances is consistent with guilt and -inconsistent with innocence. One can easily reach the hypothesis of -guilt from the documents and testimony but that hypothesis in many of -its phases is also consistent with innocence. Thus, applying the rule of -evidence just cited, the test of guilt fails. - -So far as chronology is concerned, Milch does not come into the picture -of the experiments until 20 May 1942 with a letter in which he states -that his medical inspector informed him that the high-altitude -experiments had been completed. Obviously if they were completed there -was nothing he could do to prevent them. Nor did the medical inspector -or anyone else testify that Milch was informed of the precise nature of -the experiments. Further, there is no evidence that Milch ever received -any reports at all on the freezing experiments. - -No one ever suggested that Milch attended the operations at Dachau or -that he ever gave an order that human beings were to be used to the -point of death. - -If we can imagine the pieces of evidence on this count as irregularly -shaped blocks of wood floating on water, we find these blocks -occasionally coming together and dovetailing into a pattern of guilt, -but then we find them separating and just as often forming the pattern -of innocence. No man should be convicted on evidence that does not -remain fixed and immovable in granitic solidity. Guilt cannot be founded -on a set of facts from which arguments are equally convincing as to -guilt and as to innocence. Remarks such as “the defendant must have -known,” or “to the best of my knowledge he knew,” and other similar -inconclusive conjectures frequently used in this part of the case are -not the kind of links which are imperatively needed to make up a chain -strong enough to sustain the weight of a conviction. - -The defendant is found not guilty on the second count of the indictment. - -Though Milch is acquitted of complicity and participation in the medical -experiments, we have nonetheless commented on those experiments at -length. We have done this because otherwise the reference to Milch’s -acquittal standing alone might convey impression that the experiments -themselves were not criminal. The Tribunal holds that the _corpus -delicti_ was established and a crime was committed, even though Milch is -not guilty of it. - - (c) Count Three - -The third count of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes -against humanity (slave labor and fatal medical experiments) committed -on German nationals and nationals of other countries. As we have found -him not guilty on count two, we necessarily also find him not guilty of -the crime of fatal medical experiments in count three. We have, however, -adjudicated him guilty on count one, and since the evidence establishes -that nationals of other countries were also victims of slave labor under -his control, we thus find Erhard Milch guilty on that part of the third -count which covers the nationals of other countries. Sufficient proof -was not submitted as to slave labor offenses against German nationals to -justify an adjudication of guilt on that ground. - -Thus, in recapitulation, we find the defendant guilty on count one, not -guilty on count two, not guilty on count three insofar as it appertains -to German nationals and guilty wherein it refers to “nationals of other -countries.” In reaching these conclusions, we inescapably ascertain that -Erhard Milch was a full-fledged member of the National Socialist Party -of Germany. Further, that he adhered to the doctrines of this Party -which, with the almost cataclysmic force of planetary violence, achieved -more destruction than has been known since man stood upright on the -shores of history. The conclusion is also unavoidable that it was -individuals like Milch that made the Hitler plan of war and subjugation -possible. Hitler was but one man and it was only because he had -brilliant and able coadjutors that he could develop a war machine which -achieved the incredible and fantastic record of smashing Poland in 18 -days, striking France to her knees in 2 months, driving England from the -continent in 6 weeks, overrunning Holland and Belgium in a few days, -vanquishing Norway in several weeks, and Denmark overnight. - -In those days of spectacular triumph, Milch had no complaint against -Hitler. But it was precisely then that Hitler was working his greatest -harm to Germany because it was inevitable that the people he had -temporarily crushed would rise again and not rest until the evil power -responsible for their suffering was destroyed. If Milch had entertained -the loyalty to his people which he now professes, then was the time to -withdraw from a program which was wreaking a devastation so universal -that no country, including Germany, could escape. - -The defendant stated from the witness stand he could not withdraw -because he owed fealty to Hitler and to the German people. His loyalty -to Hitler was loyalty to a man who he now states had marked him for -liquidation, and so far as allegiance to the German people is concerned, -they can feel no gratitude for an allegiance which increased their ruin, -magnified their misery, and pushed them only deeper into the pit of -despair. The Germans could do without a devotion of that kind. - -The defendant apparently gained the impression in our questioning of him -that some heroic sacrifice was expected on his part. We never intended, -nor was it suggested, that he should take any action which could result -in the forfeiture of his life. But he did himself volunteer from the -witness stand that on two occasions he was ready to tell Hitler the -truth even if it should mean his execution. If he was prepared to -sacrifice his life on so futile a gesture, he could have taken some -action which involved less hazard. He could thus, at least to that -extent, have contributed to honesty and justice by refraining from -threatening with death and whipping those who did not give of their last -ounce of energy in the production of ordnance whose muzzles would -eventually be turned on Germany itself. - -In his last statement in court Milch declared that he was indifferent to -his fate but he was interested in seeing Germany relieved of her -suffering and re-admitted to the community of nations as an equal -partner. We do not believe that any intelligent person can be -indifferent to his fate, although one can summon sufficient spiritual -fortitude to rise above an immediate regret. With regard to Milch’s wish -for the German people, he has definitely performed one service in -pulling aside the curtain to disclose to them the stupidities, the -vanities, and the arrogances of their leaders which brought about their -present state. The record of this case will particularly, of course, -expose Milch’s own errors and his transgressions against international -law, the laws and customs of war, the moral code of humanity and even -commandments 4 and 7 of the 10 commandments of the German soldier. - -The purpose of these postwar trials obviously is not vengeance. The -object aimed at (as in the criminal jurisprudence of all civilized -nations) is the ascertainment of truth. When guilt is established, the -penalty imposed is to serve as a deterrent to all others who might be -similarly minded. Albert Speer, convicted in the first trial, stated -here in this courtroom that had trials such as these followed the First -World War, the Second World War might have been averted. Erhard Milch -may obtain some comfort from the realization that by the publication of -the evidence of this trial he is definitely contributing to the -education and well-being of Germany’s future, as indeed a precise -contribution is being made to the cause of world justice itself. - -Over 155,000 Americans made the supreme sacrifice in Germany in this -war. These lads gave their lives for this ideal of world justice and -world peace. America sought no territorial aggrandizement or material -advantage. The American flag in this courtroom ensured to the defendant -all the guarantees of the United States Constitution as to a fair trial. -No person within the continental limits of the United States itself -could have wished for a fuller opportunity to demonstrate his innocence -of the charges brought against him. - -America and her Allies bestowed upon Germany what no desire can achieve -and what no money can buy. The Allied nations gave the blood of their -youth to water the roots of the tree of liberty and tolerance which had -withered in the twelve-year drought of National Socialism. It is to -reveal who were responsible and what was responsible for the desiccation -of that tree and to proclaim to the world the inevitable consequences to -others who degrade the soil with the pollution and prussic acid of -oppression that these trials have been established. The present trial is -one chapter in the book which will forever condemn _Mein Kampf_ and -offer to the new German nation a volume of proved fact, whose every page -will tell of the sorrow awaiting any people which permit any man or men -to hoist deceit above truth, power above justice, oppression above -tolerance, war above peace and man above God. - - [Signed] MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO - JUDGE MILITARY TRIBUNAL II - ------ - -[160] The reference “T” is to the page of the mimeographed transcript. - -[161] “IMT” refers to Trial of the Major War Criminals before the -International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, Nuremberg, Germany, 1947. - -[162] Original German document read 50,000 but, due to clerical error, -translation of document which was submitted in Court read 500,000. -Incorrectness is obvious by total figure of 220,000 in last sentence. - -[163] Chef Ansbildungawesen (Chief of Training). - -[164] A word is missing here in the German original. - -[165] Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fuer Luftfahrt (German Institute for -Aviation Research). In this case, the reference is to the Medical -Section of the Institute. - - - - - C. Concurring Opinion by Judge Fitzroy D. Phillips - -This Tribunal has been duly organized and is now existing under the -authority of Ordnance No. 7 pursuant to the powers of the Military -Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation within Germany -expressly conferred therein and further pursuant to the powers conferred -upon the zone commander by Control Council Law No. 10 and Articles 10 -and 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to -the London agreement of 8 August 1945, and by authority of Executive -Order No. 9819 signed and issued by Harry S. Truman, President of the -United States of America, the pertinent parts of said order as follows: - - “By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and - the statutes, and as President of the United States and - Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it - is ordered as follows: - - “1. I hereby designate Fitzroy Donald Phillips, Judge of a - Superior Court in the State of North Carolina; Robert Morrell - Toms, Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Detroit, - Michigan; and Captain Michael A. Musmanno (S), USNR, 086622, as - the members, and John Joshua Speight as the alternate member of - one of the several military tribunals established by the - Military Governor for the United States Zone of Occupation - within Germany pursuant to the quadripartite agreement of the - Control Council for Germany, enacted December 20, 1945, as - Control Council Law No. 10, and pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 - of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which - Tribunal was established by the Government of the United States - of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, - the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and - Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet - Socialist Republics, for the trial and punishment of major war - criminals of the European Axis. Such members and alternate - member may, at the direction of the Military Governor of the - United States Zone of Occupation, serve on any of the several - military tribunals above mentioned.” - -and as such Tribunal, has jurisdiction to try and determine this case. - -Subsequent to the organization of said Tribunal, Telford Taylor, -Brigadier General, United States Army, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, -prepared and caused to be prepared a bill of indictment charging the -defendant, Erhard Milch, with certain war crimes and crimes against -humanity as will appear more specifically hereinafter in this judgment -and on 14 November 1946 caused said bill of indictment to be duly served -upon the defendant, Erhard Milch, by the Marshal for the United States -Military Tribunals according to the provisions of law. - -Thereafter said bill of indictment was made returnable and said cause -set for trial before United States Military Tribunal No. II. Whereupon, -Dr. I. Friedrich Bergold of the Nuernberg, Germany, bar was duly -appointed as counsel for the defendant and accepted such appointment. - -On 20 December 1946, at 9:30 a.m. in the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, -Germany, the defendant, Erhard Milch, being present in court and -represented by his counsel, Dr. I. Friedrich Bergold, and the United -States of America being represented by Telford Taylor, Brigadier -General, United States Army, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, and -Honorable Clark Denney of counsel, the Tribunal duly arraigned the -defendant upon the charges contained in the bill of indictment against -him, and the defendant when called upon to plead to the bill of -indictment entered a plea of Not Guilty. Whereupon the Tribunal set the -date of 2 January 1947, for the trial of said case and adjourned until -said time. - -On 2 January 1947, United States Military Tribunal No. II met in the -Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, Germany, and commenced the trial of this -case. - -The bill of indictment charging the defendant, Erhard Milch, with -certain and specific war crimes and crimes against humanity is -summarized as follows: - -_Count One_: War crimes involving murder, slave labor, deportation of -civilian populations for slave labor, cruel and inhuman treatment of -foreign laborers, and the use of prisoners of war in war operations by -force and compulsion. - -_Count Two_: War crimes involving murder, subjecting involuntary victims -to low-pressure and freezing experiments, resulting in torture and -death. - -_Count Three_: Crimes against humanity, involving murder and the same -unlawful acts specified in counts one and two against German nationals -and nationals of other countries. - -The trial was conducted in two languages in the main, English and -German, and in English, German, and French when French witnesses were -testifying. - -The hearing of evidence and the arguments of counsel concluded on 25 -March 1947. - -The prosecution offered three witnesses who gave evidence orally and 161 -written exhibits, several exhibits containing many documents. The -defense offered 27 witnesses who gave evidence orally and the defendant -also testified in his own behalf, and in addition to oral evidence the -defendant offered 51 written exhibits. The exhibits as offered by both -the prosecution and defense contained documents, photographs, -affidavits, interrogatories, letters, maps, charts, and other written -evidence. - -A complete stenographic record of everything said and done in court has -been made as well as an electrical recording of all the proceedings. - -Copies of all the documents and written evidence offered by the -prosecution have been supplied to the defense in the German language. -The applications made by the defendant for the production of witnesses -and documents were passed upon by the Tribunal and orders made in -pursuance thereof. The Tribunal, after examination, granted all of the -defense applications which in their opinion were relevant to the defense -of the defendant and denied a few that the Tribunal found not to be -relevant. Facilities were provided for obtaining those witnesses and -documents granted through the Office of the Secretary General of the -Tribunal. - -Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on behalf of the -prosecution was documentary evidence captured by the Allied armies in -German army headquarters, government buildings, and elsewhere, and some -of said documents were captured in the private files of the defendant -himself. The case therefore against the defendant rests in a large -measure on the documents thus obtained. The documents offered against -the defendant on the part of the prosecution were in a large measure of -his own making or those that were made in the organizations of which he -was a member and largely under his control, and the authenticity of -which has not been challenged except in a few cases and in those he -challenged them mainly on the correctness of the transcript and not upon -the subject matter as a whole. The evidence, oral and written, together -with exhibits and documents contain approximately 3,000 pages which -constitutes the record in this case. - -The trial was conducted generally along the lines as are usually -followed in trial courts of the United States except as to the rules of -evidence, and as to those the Tribunal was not bound by technical rules -of evidence and admitted any and all evidence which it deemed to have -probative value and in strict compliance with the provisions of Article -VII of Ordnance No. 7. - -The Tribunal has kept in mind throughout the entire trial that this was -a Tribunal established for the purpose of trying major war criminals and -in this particular case a fallen military field marshal of a conquered -nation, and that he was entitled to the Anglo-Saxon and English common -law presumption that he was innocent until his guilt was established -beyond a reasonable doubt. - -Article II of Control Council No. 10 is as follows: - - “ARTICLE II - - “1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: - - “(_a_) _Crimes against Peace._ Initiation of invasions of other - countries and wars of aggression in violation of international - laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, - preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war - in violation of international treaties, agreements or - assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for - the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. - - “(_b_) _War Crimes._ Atrocities or offenses against persons or - property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, - including but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or - deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian - population from occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of - prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, - plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of - cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by - military necessity. - - “(_c_) _Crimes against Humanity._ Atrocities and offenses, - including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, - deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts - committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on - political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in - violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated. - - “(_d_) Membership in categories of a criminal group or - organization declared criminal by the International Military - Tribunal. - - “2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in - which he acted is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in - paragraph 1 of this Article, if he (_a_) was a principal or - (_b_) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or - ordered or abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part - therein or (_d_) was connected with plans or enterprises - involving its commission or (_e_) was a member of any - organization or group connected with the commission of any such - crime or (_f_) with reference to paragraph 1 (_a_), if he held a - high political, civil or military (including General Staff) - position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or - satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or - economic life of any such country. - - “3. Any person found guilty of any of the crimes above-mentioned - may upon conviction be punished as shall be determined by the - Tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of one or more - of the following: - - “(_a_) Death. - - “(_b_) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without - hard labor. - - “(_c_) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, in - lieu thereof. - - “(_d_) Forfeiture of property. - - “(_e_) Restitution of property wrongfully acquired. - - “(_f_) Deprivation of some or all civil rights. - - “Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of - which is ordered by the Tribunal shall be delivered to the - Control Council for Germany, which shall decide on its disposal. - - “4. (_a_) The official position of any person, whether as Head - of State or as a responsible official in a Government - Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or - entitle him to mitigation of punishment. - - “(_b_) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of - his Government or of a superior does not free him from - responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation. - - “5. In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, - the accused shall not be entitled to the benefits of any statute - of limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 - July 1945, nor shall any immunity, pardon, or amnesty granted - under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar to trial or - punishment.” - -The defendant stands indicted for the violation particularly of the -provisions of section _b_, which defines war crimes, and for the -violation of the provisions of section _c_, which defines crimes against -humanity, and for the violations of certain provisions of international -conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 46, and 52 of the -Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, and 31 of the -Prisoner-of-War Convention, Geneva, 1929, the laws and customs of war, -the general provisions of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws -of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in -which such crimes were committed, and further as particularly defined in -Article II of the Control Council Law No. 10. - -The first count in the bill of indictment has been designated by the -prosecution as “Slave Labor,” the second count as “Medical Experiments” -and the third count as “Slave Labor and Medical Experiments upon German -Nationals.” The pertinent rules of law that are applicable in this case -will now be considered, and we shall consider briefly some salient -precepts and prohibitions of international law up to and including the -provisions of Control Council Law No. 10. - -The prosecution has offered evidence which tended to show that much of -the labor which supplied Germany with the tools of absolute and total -war was extracted from people who had been uprooted from their homes in -occupied territories and imported to Germany against their will and -often under the most trying and difficult circumstances. Displacement of -groups of persons from one country to another is the proper concern of -international law in as far as it affects the community of nations. -International law has enunciated certain conditions under which the fact -of deportation of civilians from one nation to another during times of -war becomes a crime. If the transfer is carried out without a legal -title, as in the case where people are deported from a country occupied -by an invader while the occupied enemy still has an army in the field -and is still resisting, the deportation is contrary to international -law. The rationale of this rule lies in the supposition that the -occupying power has temporarily prevented the rightful sovereign from -exercising its power over its citizens. Articles 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, and -56, Hague Regulations, which limit the rights of the belligerent -occupant, do not expressly specify as crime the deportation of civilians -from an occupied territory. Article 52 states the following provisions -and conditions under which services may be demanded from the inhabitants -of occupied countries: - - 1. They must be for the needs of the army of occupation. - - 2. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country. - - 3. They must be of such a nature as not to involve the - inhabitants in the obligation to take part in military - operations against their own country. - -Insofar as this section limits the conscription of labor to that -required for the needs of the army of occupation, it is manifestly clear -that the use of labor from occupied territories outside of the area of -occupation is forbidden by the Hague Regulations. - -The second condition under which deportation becomes a crime occurs when -the purpose of the displacement is illegal, such as deportation for the -purpose of compelling the deportees to manufacture weapons for use -against their homeland or to be assimilated in the working economy of -the occupying country. The defense as contained in this case is that -persons were deported from France into Germany legally and for a lawful -purpose by contending that such deportations were authorized by -agreements and contracts between Nazi and Vichy French authorities. The -Tribunal holds that this defense is both technically and substantially -deficient. The Tribunal takes judicial notice of the fact that after the -capitulation of France and the subsequent occupation of French territory -by the German army, a puppet government was established in France and -located at Vichy. This government was established at the instance of the -German Army and was controlled by its officials according to the -dictates and demands of the occupying army and a contract made by the -German Reich with such a government as was established in France -amounted to in truth and in fact a contract that on its face was null -and void. The Vichy Government, until the Allies regained control of the -French Republic, amounted to no more than a tool of the German Reich. It -will be borne in mind that at no time during the Vichy regime a peace -treaty had been signed between the French Republic and the German Reich -but merely a cessation of hostilities and an armistice prevailed, and -that French resistance had at no time ceased and that France at all -times still had an army in the field resisting the German Reich. - -The third and final condition, under which deportation becomes illegal, -occurs whenever generally recognized standards of decency and humanity -are disregarded. This flows from the established principle of law that -an otherwise permissible act becomes a crime when carried out in a -criminal manner. A close study of the pertinent parts of Control Council -Law No. 10 strengthens the conclusions of the foregoing statements that -deportation of the population is criminal whenever there is no title in -the deporting authority or whenever the purpose of the displacement is -illegal or whenever the deportation is characterized by inhumane or -illegal methods. - -Article II (1) (_c_) of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies certain -crimes against humanity. Among those is listed the deportation of any -civilian population. The general language of this sub-section as applied -to deportation indicates that Control Council Law No. 10 has -unconditionally contended as a crime against humanity every instance of -the deportation of civilians. Article II (1) (_b_) names deportation to -slave labor as a war crime. Article II (1) (_c_) states that the -enslavement of any civilian population is a crime against humanity. Thus -Law No. 10 treats as separate crimes and different types of crime -“deportation to slave labor” and “enslavement.” The Tribunal holds that -the deportation, the transportation, the retention, the unlawful use, -and the inhumane treatment of civilian populations by an occupying power -are crimes against humanity. - -The Hague and Geneva Conventions codify the precepts of the law and -usages of all civilized nations. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention -provides that labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct -relation to war operations. Thus the convention forbids (1) the use of -prisoners of war in manufacture or transportation of arms or ammunitions -of any kind; and (2) the use for transporting of matériel intended for -combat units. The Hague Regulations contain comparable provisions. The -essence of the crime is the misuse of prisoners of war derived from the -kind of work to which they are assigned, in other words, to work -directly connected with the war effort. The Tribunal holds as a matter -of law that it is illegal to use prisoners of war in armament factories -and factories engaged in the manufacture of airplanes for use in the war -effort. - -Now, considering the basic charges and the law governing the charge -against the defendant in which it alleges his responsibility for and -participation in the medical experiment program, the fundamental crime -with which the defendant is charged in this connection is murder. Also -involved are various atrocities, tortures, offenses against the person, -and other inhumane acts. The provisions of Control Council Law No. 10, -which are applicable to this charge, to wit, Article II, are “_b._ War -crimes” and “_c._ Crimes against humanity.” The bill of indictment -charges: - - “A. War crimes, namely violations of the laws and customs of war - as to medical experiments performed involuntarily upon persons, - some of whom were prisoners of war and citizens of countries who - were at war with the German Reich, and other deported citizens - from other countries who were at war with the German Reich - involving the commission of murders, tortures, and other - inhumane acts. - - “B. Crimes against humanity, namely medical experiments - performed upon involuntary German nationals and nationals of - other countries in the course of which brutalities, murders, and - other inhumane acts were committed.” - -The prosecution contends that the defendant Milch did not personally -participate in or personally direct, counsel, or initiate such medical -experiments but that the same was done by members of his command and -that he was personally responsible for their conduct by virtue of the -authority that he held over his subordinates. - -In this connection in the recent case before the United States Supreme -Court in re Yamashita, the opinion of which was handed down by the -Supreme Court of the United States at the October term, 1945, of said -Court, some of the pertinent holdings in this case are as follows: - - “It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops - whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of - their commander would almost certainly result in violations - which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its - purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war - from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an - invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable - measures for their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes - that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the - operations of war by commanders who are to some extent - responsible for their subordinates. - - “This is recognized by the annex to Fourth Hague Convention of - 1907, respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Article I - lays down the condition which an armed force must fulfill in - order to be accorded the rights of lawful belligerents, that it - must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates. - - “These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time - specified, was Military Governor of the Philippines, as well as - commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take - such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the - circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian - population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore - been recognized, and its breach is penalized by our own military - tribunals. - - “* * * It is plain that the charge on which petitioner was tried - charged him with a breach of his duty to control the operations - of the members of his command, by permitting them to commit the - specified atrocities. This was enough to require the commission - to hear evidence tending to establish the culpable failure of - the petitioner to perform the duty imposed on him by the law of - war and to pass upon its sufficiency to establish guilt.” - -I am of the opinion and find as a fact from the evidence in this case -that the defendant Milch between the years 1939 and 1945 was State -Secretary in the Air Ministry, Inspector General of the Air Force, -Deputy to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, a member of the Nazi -Party. The defendant Milch was also Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, 1940 -to 1945; Air Quartermaster General, 1941 to 1944; member of the Central -Planning Board, 1942 to 1945; and Chief of the Jaegerstab, 1944 to 1945. - -After hearing the evidence of both the prosecution and defense, and -after having heard the arguments of counsel, and after having fully -considered all of the evidence, the following facts are concluded: - - COUNT NO. I - _SLAVE LABOR_ - -That the defendant, Erhard Milch, was born in Germany on 30 March 1892, -that he was a member of the Air Force of the German Army in World War I -and was a contemporary in said air force with Goering, Udet, and others; -that after the termination of World War I he returned to Germany, had a -business and later was connected with the manufacture of civilian -airplanes. - -Prior to the outbreak of World War II he became a member of the Nazi -Party and materially aided in the rebuilding of the air force of the -German Reich. Shortly prior to the outbreak of World War II he visited -various countries as a personal emissary of the Fuehrer, Hitler; to -France, England, Holland, Italy and other countries in an effort to -establish so-called permanent peace between the German Reich and these -nations. That on 23 May 1939, the defendant attended a conference for -the purpose of planning World War II with the following present: Hitler, -Goering, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col. Gen. Keitel, Gen. Halder, Gen. -Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewind, Col. (GSC.) Jeschonnek, Col. -Warlimont, Lieut. Col. Schmundt, Captain Engel, Lieut. Commander -Albrecht, and Captain v. Below. At the time of this meeting the -defendant held a high position in the German Army, to wit, the rank of -colonel general.[166] - -At this meeting the Fuehrer, Hitler, gave his plan of aggressive war, -and in this plan was included the attack of Poland at the first suitable -opportunity; what the struggle would be like; the question of a short or -long war; England’s weakness; the consequences of such a war; the -unrestricted use of all resources available; the plan of attack; and the -working principles of an entire and complete program. Aggressive war was -planned and initiated at this meeting, and the defendant was one of the -high-ranking officers who counseled and approved of the plan. - -After the outbreak of the war and the subsequent attack on Poland, the -defendant actively participated in the prosecution of aggressive war -until after the capitulation and fall of France. From that time on he -did not participate as a combat officer but was used in the general -economy for the prosecution of war in Germany, and particularly as to -the building and maintenance of the Luftwaffe. Later he was elevated to -the rank of field marshal in the Luftwaffe and was second in command -only to Goering. - -The defendant was a member of the Central Planning Board which was -established and organized in April 1942, and said organization served as -a means of consolidating in a single agency all controls over German war -production. The Central Planning Board held regular meetings, and the -defendant presided over and was present at a majority of such meetings. -The Central Planning Board at each meeting kept full minutes, and a -great number of said minutes have been submitted to the Tribunal and -reflect the fact that the defendant had a dominant role in the meetings -of said board. The scope and authority of the Central Planning Board is -contained in the minutes of a meeting held on 27 April 1942, and the -duties and responsibilities of the board, according to said minutes, -were announced as follows: - - “The Central Planning in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich - Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942) is a task for - leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters. - It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of - its directives. The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous - institutions difficult to control but always on individuals and - fully responsible persons who are free in the selection of their - work methods and their collaboration as far as there are no - directives issued by the Central Planning.” - -On 20 October 1942, the statutes of the Central Planning Board were -published and distributed, a portion of which are as follows: - - “The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the - Reich Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals - only with the decision of basic questions. Professional - questions remain the task of the competent departments, which in - their field remain responsible within the framework of the - decisions made by the Central Planning Board.” - -The Central Planning Board was superior to “the highest Reich authority, -the Reich protector, the Governor General, and the executive authorities -in the occupied countries.” - -The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning -Board “had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and -the allocation and development of raw materials.” The International -Tribunal found further in its opinion, in the case of United States vs. -Goering and others, “that the Central Planning Board requisitioned labor -from Sauckel with full knowledge that the demands could be supplied only -by foreign forced labor and that the board determined the basic -allocation of this labor within the German war economy.” The -International Military Tribunal found further in its opinion the -following: - - “In the fall of 1943 Funk (who was then indicted before said - Tribunal in regard to deportation and the use of foreign forced - labor in the German Reich) was a member of the Central Planning - Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for - German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually - by deportation from occupied territories * * * but Funk was - aware that the board of which he was a member was demanding the - importation of slave laborers, and allocating them to the - various industries under his control.” - -The prosecution offered evidence which tended to show that Albert Speer -was the Plenipotentiary for Armament and was the nominal head of the -Central Planning Board and that the defendant was a member of said board -and was, by the order of Hitler, assigned to assist Speer as the head of -said board. During much of the time of the existence of said board Speer -was ill and unable to attend the meetings and look after the duties of -the board and during this time the defendant was the acting head of said -board and presided over its meetings as chairman. - -Fritz Sauckel was Plenipotentiary for Labor and was directly responsible -for the procurement and allocation of labor to the various war -industries. However, the Tribunal finds as a fact that although Sauckel -had the primary duty of procuring and allocating labor, the Central -Planning Board on many occasions, as the minutes of the meetings of said -board show, called Milch into conference with the members of the Central -Planning Board and in such conferences labor was assigned and allocated -by the Central Planning Board and Sauckel. The minutes of the Central -Planning Board, as introduced by the prosecution, show that the members -of the Central Planning Board knew and discussed the fact that labor was -being deported from occupied countries against their will and were being -used in various factories manufacturing armaments, airplanes, and other -articles essential and necessary to the war effort, that such foreign -workers were being forcibly taken from their homes without knowledge of -their destination, and by force and against their will, crowded into box -cars without food or water or toilet facilities, transported great -distances, and forced to work in factories manufacturing war materials -and other necessary items for the prosecution of the war as slave -laborers. - -I find as a fact that the defendant Milch had knowledge of the way and -manner in which such labor was procured and the work that they were -forced to do, and that he aided, abetted, counseled, advised, and -assisted in the deportation, allocation, and work of said slave -laborers. - -The documents and reports of the meetings as offered by the prosecution -are too voluminous to incorporate herein, but said records clearly show -that the defendant was one of the authorized agents who dealt with the -procurement, deportation, and work of thousands and thousands of slave -laborers from occupied countries. - - _JAEGERSTAB_ - -I find as a fact that it was the defendant who conceived and instigated -the formation of the Jaegerstab, and that the defendant directed its -activities and acted as its chairman. The Jaegerstab assumed control -over fighter production and exploited foreign forced labor in the -armament industry and directed the use of the same. The Jaegerstab was -assigned top priority for their projects, for the recruitment and -commitment of manpower in the air armament industry. From the meetings -of said board as offered in evidence by the prosecution, the question of -manpower was time and time again referred to by the defendant. When -other methods of obtaining its labor was not forthcoming, the Jaegerstab -recruited its own labor either directly or by engineering snatching -expeditions for the seizure of manpower arriving on transports from the -East. - -At one of the meetings of the Jaegerstab, Prosecution Exhibit 54, page -28, the defendant made this statement to his subordinates, that -“international law cannot be observed here.” When the question of -Italian civilian labor was being discussed at a meeting of the -Jaegerstab, the defendant made the statement and advocated the shooting -of those who attempted to escape in transit. - -I find as a fact that the Jaegerstab was not a mere discussion group but -was an agency with absolute authority over fighter production and acted -by orders and directives, fixed hours of labor and conditions of work, -and on one occasion fixed the established hours of work per week in the -aircraft industry at seventy-two hours. - -Much of the labor employed by the Jaegerstab in aircraft production and -in the air armament industry was from concentration camp inmates and -foreign forced labor. The defendant was well acquainted with the -procurement and allocation of this labor. - -I find as a fact, from the evidence offered in the case, that after the -arrival of forced slave labor from occupied countries they were poorly -fed, poorly clothed, were forced to work an excessive amount of hours -each week, and that their general condition and treatment as a result of -such forced labor resulted in the death of a great many and the -permanent disability of others, both in body and in mind. - - _GENERALLUFTZEUGMEISTER_ - -I find as a fact from the evidence offered in the case, that the -defendant, as Generalluftzeugmeister, had complete control of aircraft -production and that he requisitioned labor for the aircraft industry -with knowledge of the brutal and inhuman techniques in recruiting these -laborers; and that he gave directives for the criminal treatment of the -same in the centers of production. Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for -Labor, stated that it was “Milch who produced manpower figures for -aviation.” Albert Speer testified as follows: “The requests of the air -armament industry for laborers were presented by Milch, and he did not -permit anyone to take this right away from him until March 1944.” - -I find as a fact from the evidence offered on the part of the -prosecution, that prisoners of war were included in the manpower that -the defendant was requisitioning and distributing to the aircraft -industry with full knowledge that they were prisoners of war. As chief -of aircraft production, the defendant regulated the treatment of foreign -forced labor in the German aircraft industry, fixed hours of labor and -conditions of work, and by directives to his subordinates formulated the -basic policy for the handling of such labor within the industry. - -The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to show that the -defendant advocated the most extreme measures in dealing with foreign -forced labor, inhuman measures which violated every recognized principle -of decency. When foreign forced laborers refused to work, the defendant -ordered that they be shot. When they attempted to revolt the defendant -directed that some of their numbers be killed, regardless of their -personal guilt or innocence. In the case of prisoners of war who -attempted to escape, the defendant ordered that these prisoners be shot -and later hanged in the factory for all to see. On one occasion the -defendant made the following statement, Prosecution Exhibit 145: - - “The other day I talked to Himmler about it, and I told him that - his main task should be to see to the production of German - industry in case of internal uprisings of the foreign workers. I - said that consequently a well established method should exist, - and I have already given orders to the Chief A. W.[167] and to - the training stations to get military training in this field. - If, for instance, in the Locality X an uprising is started, then - a sergeant with a few men, or else a lieutenant with thirty men - has to turn up in the plant, and first of all shoot into the - crowd with a machine gun. What he should do after is to shoot - down as many people as possible in case of revolt. I have given - orders to that effect, and even if our own foreign workers are - involved—and then every tenth man is to be singled out and shot - while the others are lined up and see him.” - -On another occasion, Prosecution Exhibit 148, when the defendant was -speaking of the treatment of foreign workers, he made the following -statement. - - “In all these matters energetic interference must be made. I am - of the opinion that there should be only two types of punishment - in such cases; firstly, a concentration camp for foreigners, and - secondly, capital punishment.” - -The prosecution offered a great number of documents containing -statements made by the defendant in regard to orders and threats of -violence, for mistreatment and punishment, tortures, killings, and -hangings of foreign workers. Space is too short to quote in this -judgment all of such pertinent documents. - -Although the defendant denied making a number of these statements -appearing in the documents, he admitted the authenticity and utterances -of many, with the excuse that he was a man of very violent temper, who, -when worried from overwork, was not wholly responsible for many -utterances made by him. He protested further that he did not actually -mean nor intend for orders given in such fits of temper to be carried -out, but they were simply the result of uncontrolled anger, and -understood by his associates and subordinates to have been uttered in -such vein. In further extenuation he declared that head injuries -resulting from two serious accidents were largely responsible for such -uncontrollable temper. - -I have given due consideration to the explanation given by the defendant -and am compelled to reject it. If but only a few of such remarks could -be attributed to the defendant, his protestations might be given some -credence; but when statements such as appear in the documents have been -persistently made over long periods of time, at many places and under -such varying conditions, the only logical conclusion that can be reached -is that they reflect the true and considered attitude of the defendant -toward the Nazi foreign labor policy and its victims and are not mere -aberrations brought on by fits of uncontrollable anger. I find as a -fact, therefore, that the true attitude of the defendant toward foreign -laborers and prisoners of war is that reflected in the documents of the -prosecution and was not the result of uncontrollable fits of temper. I -find, further, that the defendant ordered, advised, counselled, and -procured inhumane and illegal treatment of foreign workers resulting in -permanent injury and death to many. - - COUNT NO. 2 - _MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS_ - -The prosecution contends that in violation of the laws of war and of -crimes against humanity, high-altitude and freezing experiments were -carried out by the Luftwaffe physicians at Dachau, and that said -physicians who conducted such experiments were under the command of and -subordinate to the defendant Milch. - -I am of the opinion from the evidence offered on the part of the -prosecution that illegal and inhuman medical experiments were conducted -at Dachau by Luftwaffe physicians who were under the command and -subordinate to the defendant Milch and from which a great number of -deaths ensued to concentration camp inmates and that great pain and -suffering and permanent disability resulted to many others. I find as a -fact from the evidence offered on the part of the prosecution that Dr. -Erich Hippke was the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe and was the -direct subordinate of the defendant Milch; that Hippke gave authority -and ordered Dr. Rascher, a Luftwaffe physician, in the early spring of -1941 to use concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war as -high-altitude experimental subjects for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. I -further find, as a fact, that the witness Hippke at no time communicated -this information to the defendant Milch, nor has the prosecution offered -any direct evidence to the effect that the defendant Milch knew that -such experiments had been conducted until after their completion. All of -the testimony and the evidence, both for the prosecution and the -defense, is to the effect that the defendant Milch did not have such -knowledge of the high-altitude or low-pressure experiments which were -carried out and completed by Luftwaffe physicians at Dachau until after -the completion of such experiments. The evidence offered as to the -knowledge or responsibility of the defendant Milch was not of such a -nature as to show guilty knowledge on his part of said experiments. - -As to the cooling or freezing experiments performed at concentration -camp, Dachau, for which the defendant is charged with responsibility, I -find as a fact that the defendant ordered experiments to be conducted at -the camp for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. In a letter from Milch to -Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff of the SS, dated 20 May 1942, the following is -stated: - - “In reference to your telegram of 12 May our medical inspector - reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the - SS and Luftwaffe at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation - of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However, - the carrying out of experiments of some other kind in regard to - perils at high sea would be important. These have been prepared - in immediate agreement with the proper offices. Oberstabsarzt - Weltz will be charged with the execution and Stabsarzt Rascher - will be made available until further order in addition to his - duties with the medical corps of the Luftwaffe. A change of - these measures does not appear necessary and an enlargement of - the task is not considered pressing at this time.” - -Further evidence makes it manifestly plain that subsequent to the -receipt of the letter of Wolff, officers of the Luftwaffe, under the -command and subordinate to the defendant, conducted medical experiments -on concentration camp inmates at Dachau, against their will, by placing -such experimental subjects in tanks of water of freezing temperatures, -and requiring them to remain there for long periods of time while -certain medical data concerning such subjects was gathered; and that as -a result of such experiments, many of the human subjects died or were -gravely injured. - -The defendant admits giving orders for the conduct of experiments within -the scope of the authority conferred by the letter, but contends that he -did not know of, or contemplate, that the experiments would be conducted -in an illegal manner or would result in the injury or death of any -person. The defendant further asserts that he did not know or have any -reason to believe that the experiments were conducted in such manner -until after they had been completed. He therefore insists that he was -and is not responsible for the unlawful manner in which the experiments -were actually conducted by the Luftwaffe officers, and that he is not -guilty of any crime as a result thereof. - -The Tribunal, in its majority opinion, has fully considered the decision -of the United States Supreme Court in the judgment in re Yamashita, and -has found that said decision is not controlling in the case at bar. In -weighing the evidence, the Tribunal was mindful of the fact that the -defendant gave the order and directed his subordinates to carry on such -experiments, and that thereafter he failed and neglected to take such -measures as were reasonably within his power to protect such subjects -from inhumane treatment and deaths as a result of such experiments. -Notwithstanding these facts, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the -evidence fails to disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant -had any knowledge that the experiments would be conducted in an unlawful -manner and that permanent injury, inhumane treatment or deaths would -result therefrom. - -Therefore, the Tribunal found that the defendant did not have such -knowledge as would amount to participation or responsibility on his part -and therefore found the defendant not guilty on charges contained in -count 2. - - CONCLUSIONS - -(1) I concur in the opinion of the Tribunal that war crimes and crimes -against humanity were committed by the defendant, including deportation, -enslavement, and mistreatment of millions of persons; and that as a -result thereof and in furtherance of such treatment, murders, -brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts -were committed in a large scale measure upon citizens of occupied -countries, prisoners of war, Jews, and other nationals. I agree further -that the defendant was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, -and took a consenting part therein. I also agree that for such acts and -conduct on the part of the defendant, he is guilty of charges contained -in count number one of the indictment. - -The evidence produced during the trial upon the charges contained in -this count showed conclusively that countless millions of persons were -unlawfully deported, enslaved, and murdered. Especially were the Jews -mistreated, tortured and murdered merely because they were Jews and -their extermination desired. History discloses the fact that as early as -the year 1349 in the city of Nuernberg, and within sight of where this -opinion is being written, the citizens of Nuernberg drove the Jews from -their city, confiscated their property, and erected a market place on -the site of the Ghetto and the Liebfrauenkirche in place of the -Synagogue. The hatred of the Aryan German for the Jew seems to have been -constant during the many intervening years. History will record such -conduct as a blot upon the name of the present German generation for -many years to come. - -(2) The Tribunal found the defendant not guilty of the charges contained -in count number two, and I concur in such finding. - -Under the American concept of liberty, as brought to us by our -Anglo-Saxon heritage and the English Common Law, every person accused of -crime is presumed to be innocent until proof of his guilt is established -by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows -him throughout the trial and until he is found guilty beyond a -reasonable doubt. In applying this God-given principle of liberty, one -eminent American jurist uttered the following words: - - “After considering and weighing all of the evidence you then - find that your minds are disturbed, your convictions - tempest-tossed, and your judgment, like the dove of the deluge, - finds no place to rest; the law says you must acquit.” - -The defendant was given the full benefit of these great and lasting -rules of law and has received at the hands of the Tribunal a fair and -impartial trial in full accord with the American concepts of justice -under the law. - -(3) Count three of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes -against “German nationals and nationals of other countries.” I am of the -opinion that sufficient evidence was not produced by the prosecution to -justify an adjudication by the Tribunal of guilt as to German nationals -alone. However, as to such crimes against nationals of other countries, -the Tribunal has heretofore considered such charges and has made an -adjudication concerning the same in count number one of the indictment. -The conclusion of the Tribunal is that the same unlawful acts of -violence which constituted war crimes under count one of the indictment -also constitute crimes against humanity as alleged in count three of the -indictment. Therefore, the Tribunal found the defendant guilty of crimes -against humanity under count three, with which finding I concur. - -In weighing the evidence, the Tribunal simulated the ancient customs of -using the seed of the oriental carob tree to balance the scales of -justice. The defendant should not now complain. - -Therefore, for the reasons stated, I am in full agreement with the -judgment of the Tribunal and concur therein. - - Respectfully submitted this the 15th day of April, 1947 - [Signed] FITZROY D. PHILLIPS - Fitzroy D. Phillips - Judge, Military Tribunal No. II - ------ - -[166] See Table of Comparative Ranks, p. 331. - -[167] Chef Ausbildungswesen (Chief of Training). - - - - - VIII. PETITIONS - - - A. Extract from Petition for Clemency to Military - Governor of United States Zone of Occupation - - Nuernberg, 2 May 1947 - -To the Military Governor - - PETITION - - of - - Attorney-at-law Dr. Friedrich Bergold, - Nuernberg, Prinzregenten-Ufer 7/III, - Defense Counsel, Military Court II - - Nuernberg - - in Case II against the defendant - Erhard Milch, General Field Marshal, - at present in the Court Prison, Nuernberg, - to modify the sentence of the Military Court II - - Nuernberg - - on 16/17 April 1947. - - * * * * * - - A - -The sentence passed on counts I and III contains actual inaccuracies, -which are inconsistent with the recorded evidence. Obviously, these -errors have had an influence on the sentence as far as the award of -punishment is concerned. A correction of these errors would necessarily -lead to a less severe sentence. - -1. The statements on page 3 of the judgment that Milch since 19 November -1941 was the second highest commander of the Luftwaffe is not in -agreement with the evidence. The witnesses have testified that from -1938-1941 Milch held only one of the four highest commanding posts under -Goering, and since 1941 two of the four highest Luftwaffe commanding -posts. Only in regard to seniority he was the oldest officer of these -four highest commands. This is important because evidence has been given -for the fact that the general staff of the Luftwaffe had the -responsibility for the armament program of the Luftwaffe. - -2. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Central Planning -Board had been created by a decree of the Fuehrer of 29 October 1943. It -has been proved by the statement of Speer that the decree of 29 October -1943 was a decree issued by Speer a long time after the creation of the -Central Planning Board and without authorization of the defendant Milch. -Since this decree was issued by Speer for his sphere of administration -only, no conclusion can be drawn therefrom against the defendant. - -3. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Court finds that -the Central Planning Board handled the labor problem as such. Exhibit -151 of the prosecution proved the opposite. The witnesses who have been -heard have confirmed that the Central Planning Board handled the labor -problem only for information purposes for the distribution and -production of raw materials and in order to clarify the untrue -statements of Sauckel. This Exhibit 151 constitutes essential new -evidence which is of greatest importance in regard to the verdict of the -International Military Tribunal. - -4. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the defendant had -admitted having seen Russian prisoners of war at service at 8.8 and 10.5 -cm. antiaircraft guns in aircraft factories in Luftgau 7. The witness -Vorwald made this statement on the basis of his own observation. - -It has been proved that Milch had nothing to do with the allocation of -Russians to the antiaircraft artillery (flak), and that he declared -himself against it. - -5. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Milch said that -Russian prisoners of war had volunteered for work in war plants. What he -did state—and this was in agreement with the witnesses Vorwald and -Foerster—was that Russian prisoners of war had volunteered for service -at the antiaircraft artillery (flak), with the reservation that they -would not be used for combatting Russian airplanes. This condition was -fulfilled. Thus, there is no question of an inadmissible use of -prisoners of war for war service. - -6. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Sauckel, the -Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, participated in at least 15 -sessions of the Central Planning Board. Only 15 minutes concerning the -sessions [minutes of 15 sessions] of the Central Planning Board have -been submitted. These minutes prove that Sauckel was not present at most -of these sessions. - -7. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the defendant was -informed about the methods employed and the cruelties on the occasion of -the recruiting and utilization of foreign workers. All witnesses who -have been heard have stated the opposite. It is therefore not -permissible to assume without the basis of exact proof that Milch was -informed about these matters. The Court concludes from the fact that -foreign workers and prisoners of war had been used that Milch must -necessarily have recognized that the methods must have been cruel. Speer -has stated explicitly that the cruel methods were not necessary and -that, therefore, they were an error. But if they were not necessary then -the conclusion drawn from them without any explicit proof was not -permissible. - -8. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that 100,000 Polish -prisoners of war were deported to concentration camps. The opposite has -been proved, viz., that Polish prisoners of war, in accordance with the -agreement between Russia and Germany were released from captivity and -employed as civilians. - -9. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Romanian nationals -were subjected to deportation. Not one single piece of evidence for that -has been submitted. Romania was mentioned by the defense only in -connection with the armistice agreement between Russia and Romania. - -10. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Milch used -Hungarian Jews. It is proved by the evidence that this did not happen -before the summer of 1944 when Milch had resigned from his positions. - -11. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Schmundt -minutes must be correct, for the reason that if any allusion to a war -had been omitted, Hitler would not have spoken at all. It has been -proven that Hitler spoke merely theoretically about the world situation -in case there should be a war at some time. He did not mention that he -wanted to foment aggressive wars. - - B - -The judgment states that the defendant recommended more drastic and more -cruel measures in regard to the recruiting and utilization of workers. -(Page 18 of the judgment.) - -This is in discrepancy with the recorded evidence. - -Here the defense does not argue about the separate reasons given by -Judge Michael A. Musmanno, since these reasons do not constitute the -official judgment. These reasons also contain factual errors and even -use material which has not been discussed during the trial. - -These separate reasons, however, make it possible to draw a conclusion -in regard to the sentence of the judgment which states that the -defendant recommended more drastic and more cruel measures. - -It has been proved through the evidence that utterances to that effect -were made by the defendant only in smaller circles and while he was in a -state of excitement. It has been proved that no action was ever taken in -conformity with these utterances. It has been proved that the defendant -never asked for action pursuant to such utterances. It has been proved -that he did not have any executive power in regard to any measures -whatsoever. It has finally been proved that the record concerning such -utterances must in part be incorrect. - -Therefore, it has not been proved that the defendant approved such -cruelties or demanded them in earnest. - - C - -The objection must be raised that the Military Tribunal did not clarify -at all the legal questions which were raised by the defense in -connection with the fact that the Russian Government has explicitly -renounced the Hague Convention concerning Land Warfare and the previous -Geneva Conventions. Since the Decree Number 7 of the Military Government -for Germany provides, in Article XV, that reasons have to be given for -the sentence, the Tribunal would have had to state its position in -regard to these questions. This also constitutes a defectiveness of the -verdict and this defect may possibly have had an influence on the award -of the punishment. - - D - -The Military Tribunal has extensively referred on page 14 and 15 to the -verdict of the International Military Tribunal against Speer. The -Tribunal has therefore made the reasons of the International Military -Tribunal its own to a large extent. - -But consequently the Military Tribunal would have had to examine the -problem of extenuating circumstances. The defense has already pointed -out that the fact that he organized protected factories constituted for -Speer an extenuating circumstance. During the trial it has been clearly -proved that Milch was the first who already in 1941 organized protected -factories, and that he was, therefore, the inventor of this kind of -employment. - -The problem of extenuating circumstances involves further the -examination of the question, whether Milch had more to do with the -utilization of foreign workers and prisoners of war than Speer. This -examination was omitted. Exhibit Milch 55 and also all the evidence -proved that Speer’s participation in the utilization of foreign workers -and prisoners of war was considerably more extensive. - -If the Tribunal had examined the extenuating circumstances, then the -result would undoubtedly have been that the defendant would have been -allowed extenuating circumstances on a large scale. Due to the fact that -the responsibility of Speer was greater than that of Milch, Milch should -not have received a more severe sentence than Speer. - -Consideration should also have been given to the fact that it was proved -that Milch continually advocated restrictions in the employment of -foreign workers and of prisoners of war, and that he did indeed succeed -in achieving such restrictions. - -Finally, consideration should also have been given to the fact that -Milch withdrew from his positions as early as spring and summer 1944, -and that he had nothing to do with the extraordinary aggravation of all -conditions which took place toward the end of the war. - -This weighs more than what Speer did—the nonexecution of some insane -orders which Hitler issued at the end of the war in 1945. - -This consideration too should have led the Tribunal to a much less -severe sentence. The fact that this was not taken into consideration is -therefore made a part of this petition. - - (Signed) DR. BERGOLD - - - - - B. Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States - for Writ of Habeas Corpus - -Erhard Milch, -Petitioner _vs._ United States of America - - Nuernberg, 2 May 1947 - -IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - -Application for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - - Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - -I, the undersigned Erhard Milch, have been charged in Case No. II before -the Military Court No. II Nuernberg of illegally, deliberately, and -intentionally having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, -as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 Article II, viz. the following: - -_Count One of the Indictment._ War crimes, including murder, slave -labor, deportation of the civilian population for slave labor, cruel and -inhuman treatment of foreign workers, and the employment of prisoners of -war by force and duress in actions connected with warfare. - -_Count Two of the Indictment._ War crimes, including murder, whereby -involuntary victims were exposed to sub-pressure and cold, experiments -resulting in torture and death. - -_Count Three of the Indictment._ Crimes against humanity, including -murder and the unlawful acts listed in counts one and two of the -indictment, committed against Germans and foreigners. - - (page 2 of original) - -I have been acquitted on count II of the indictment and found guilty by -the sentence passed by the Military Court II on 16/17 April 1947 in -respect of counts I and III of the indictment, and am condemned -therefore to lifelong imprisonment. - -I hereby make application for the sentence of the Military Court II -passed on 16/17 April 1947 to be completely quashed, as being -inadmissible according to Articles 63 and 64 of the Geneva Convention of -1929. - - _Substantiation_ - -Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany concerning the -constitution and competency of certain military courts, constitutes a -violation of Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, insofar as -Decree No. 7 is applied to prisoners of war as well, and in its Article -II appoints special courts for passing sentences on prisoners of war. -Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 lays down, “Sentence against -a prisoner of war may only be passed by the same courts and according to -the same procedure as a sentence against persons belonging to the -fighting forces of the country where he is a prisoner”. A field marshal -is equal to a five-star general of the United States of America. The -present Court consisted of three judges, of which not one has the -military rank which I have. It therefore does not correspond to the -court which, according to the laws of the United States of America, -could pass sentence on a five-star general. The authority of the present -Court is, however, expressly recognized by me. - -Furthermore, Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany -constitutes a violation in Article XV of Article 64 of the Geneva -Convention of 1929, because Article XV declares the sentence of the -court in finding the defendant guilty, to be final and incontestable. -Article 64 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 stipulates that prisoners of -war must be allowed to employ the same legal means against a verdict as -are granted to members of the fighting forces - -(page 3 of original) - -of the country where they are detained. - -The rules laid down by the Geneva Convention of 1929 represent -compulsory international law of a universal character and cannot be -altered either by a signatory power alone or by an agreement between -several signatory powers, but only by the consent of all signatory -powers. In no case may they be altered by a decree of Military -Government, not even by a decree of the Control Council. The rights of a -prisoner of war, which are based upon the regulations of the Geneva -Convention of 1929, can neither be waived nor cancelled. - -The violation of the regulations of the Geneva Convention has now come -about with the passing of sentence and the now existing restrictions -placed in the way of contesting the verdict, not already by the trial as -such. - -I am still a prisoner of war. I have not been released from captivity. I -am therefore still under the protection of the Geneva Convention, the -same as before. - -The violation of the Geneva Convention is all the more serious, in that -I am still a prisoner of war of the British. True, the defense counsel -was told at the beginning of the trial in reply to an express question, -that my transfer to the jurisdiction of the United States of America was -already effected, but it was not proved until the conclusion of the -passing of sentence. That should have been absolutely necessary. - -After the serving of the indictment and the beginning of the actual -trial, an attempt was made on 4 January 1947 to gain my veiled consent -to my release without saying anything, whereby I was asked to accept -release money. On the receipt, however, I expressly noted, “Without -recognizing my release”. I declared that release by American officers -was not - -(page 4 of original) - -permissible at that moment and moreover a German field marshal could not -be released in any case under existing German law. - -After this explanation on my part, the American major conducting the -proceedings revealed to me that another separate release proceeding -would have to be carried out against me then. - -Thereby it is clear that I am still a prisoner of war today. At any -rate, I was when the trial begun and therefore in accordance with -Article 60 of the Geneva Convention the protecting power for German -prisoners of war, viz., Switzerland, should have been informed of the -proceedings. This too constitutes a violation of the Geneva Convention -of 1929. If the public prosecution authorities, however, were to refer -to the fact that I was released after the trial had begun, then they -should be confronted with the assertion that such a release is invalid. -It would represent nothing but an evasion of the regulations of the -Geneva Convention of 1929. I was not set at large for a single day. But -that is demanded by a release from captivity as a prisoner of war. A -release from captivity as a prisoner of war while maintaining captivity -would be a release in fraudem legis. - -Therefore the sentence constitutes a violation of international law. At -the same time this violation is also a violation of the Habeas Corpus -Act. None, under whatever pretext, may be deprived of the rights of -legal proceedings and of a legal judge. - -I therefore request the Supreme Court in Washington to examine whether -the Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany may be applied in -my case, and whether, with due regard to the regulations of Article -60-65 of the Geneva Convention, the present Military Court II - -(page 5 of original) - -Nuernberg was in a position to pass sentence on me. - -Furthermore I enclose a copy of my petition to the Governor-General -[Military Governor of U. S. Zone of Occupation]. - - [Signed] ERHARD MILCH - - [Note: Another petition with the same text was submitted to the - United States Supreme Court by Dr. Bergold, Defense Counsel.] - - - - - IX. AFFIRMATION OF SENTENCE BY THE - MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE UNITED - STATES ZONE OF OCCUPATION - - - Military Tribunal II, Case No. 2 - -In the Case of - -The United States of America - - _vs._ - -Erhard Milch, Defendant - - _Order with Respect to Sentence_ - -In the case of the United States of America against Erhard Milch, tried -by United States Military Tribunal II, Case 2, Nuernberg, Germany, the -defendant on 17 April 1947 was sentenced by the Tribunal to be -transported to the Rebdorf Prison and there confined for the remainder -of his natural life. A petition to modify the sentence, filed on behalf -of the defendant by Dr. Friedrich Bergold, his defense counsel, has been -referred to me pursuant to delegation by the Military Governor under the -provisions of Article XXIII of Military Government Ordinance No. 7 and -paragraph 6_b_ of Regulation No. 1 under said Ordinance. I have duly -considered the petition and the record of the trial, and in accordance -with Article XVII of said Ordinance and paragraph 6_b_ of said -Regulation it is hereby ordered that— - -The sentence imposed by Military Tribunal II, upon Erhard Milch be, and -hereby is, in all respects affirmed. - - [Signed] FRANK A. KEATING - FRANK A. KEATING - Major General USA - Deputy Military Governor - 17 June 1947 - - - - - X. ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME - COURT, 20 OCTOBER 1947, DENYING - WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - - -Present: Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Reed, -Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy, Mr. -Justice Jackson, Mr. Justice Rutledge, and Mr. Justice Burton. - - - -No. 50, Misc. Erhard Milch, petitioner, _vs._ The United States of -America. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus -is denied. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy, -and Mr. Justice Rutledge are of the opinion that the petition should be -set for hearing on the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. -Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this -application. - - - - - APPENDIX - - - - - List of Witnesses in Case 2 - - - [NOTE.—With the exception of Constantin von Neurath, Erich - Raeder, and Albert Speer, all witnesses in this case appeared - before the Tribunal. Prosecution witnesses are designated by the - letter “P,” defense witnesses by the letter “D”, Tribunal - witness by the letter “T”. The name not preceded by any - designation represents the defendant testifying in his own - behalf. Extracts from testimony in this Case are listed in the - index of documents and testimonies.] - - Name │ Date of Testimony │ Pages - │ │ (mimeographed - │ │ transcript) -D ALEXANDER, Dr. Leo │14 Feb 47 │1074-1092 -D BECKER-FREYSENG, Hermann │14 Feb 47 │1061-1066 -D BRANDT, Rudolf │24 Feb 47 │1330-1354 -D BRAUCHITSCH, Berndt von │20 Feb 47 │1271-1289 -D DORSCH, Xaver │24 Feb 47 │1361-1379 -D ENGEL, Gerhard │24 Feb 47 │1355-1361 -D ESCHENAUER, Artur │13 Feb 47 │980-996 -D FELMY, Helmut │20 Feb 47 │1290-1296 -P FERRIER, Roland │5, 6 Mar 47 │1481-1548 -D FOERSTER, Helmut │12 Feb 47 │915-938 -D HERTEL, Walter │12 Feb 47 │944-979 -D HIPPKE, Erich │7, 11 Feb 47 │759-870 -D KOENIG, Max │17 Feb 47 │1189-1204 -D KOERNER, Paul │5 Feb 47 │652-710 -P KRYSIAK, Joseph │21 Mar 47 │2362-2376 -P LE FRIEC, Paul │6 Mar 47 │1550-1584 -T LICHTENSTEIN, Walter │3 Mar 47 │1428-1432 - MILCH, Erhard │11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18,│1696-2276 - │ 19, 20 Mar 47 │ -D NEFF, Walter │12 Feb 47 │939-943 -D NEURATH, Constantin von │19 Feb 47 │1440-1443 -D PENDELE, Max │18 Feb 47 │1205-1227 -D RAEDER, Erich │4 Mar 47 │1434-1439 -D REINECKE, Hermann │20 Mar 47 │2277-2287 -D RICHTER, Karl Eitel │11 Feb 47 │871-900 -D ROEDER, Manfred │3 Mar 47 │1381-1403 -D ROMBERG, Hans Wolfgang │14 Feb 47 │1021A-1050 -D RUFF, Siegfried │14, 17 Feb 47 │1092-1122 -D SCHMELTER, Fritz │6, 7 Feb 47 │717-759 -D SCHNIEWIND, Otto │24 Feb 47 │1307-1329 -D SCHROEDER, Oskar │ │(withdrawn) -D SIEVERS, Wolfram │14 Feb 47 │1050-1057 -D SPEER, Albert │17, 19 Feb 47 │1136-1186; 1445-1457 -D VORWALD, Wolfgang │10, 11, 20, 21 Mar 47 │1586-1696; 2287-2340 -D WARLIMONT, Walter │20 Feb 47 │1296-1299 -D WELTZ, Georg August │14 Feb 47 │1066-1072 -D WOLFF, Karl │18 Feb 47 │1228-1268 - - - - - INDEX OF DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY - - -Document No. Exhibit No. Description Page -EC-68 Pros. Ex. 6 Letter from the Ministry of Finance 389 - and Economics of Baden, 6 March - 1941, containing directives - regarding the treatment of Polish - farm workers. -EC-194 Pros. Ex. 8 Memorandum of Keitel, 31 October 1941, 393 - concerning the use of PW’s in the - armament industry. -F-824 Pros. Ex. 57 Order of Field Marshal von Kluge 542 - regarding compulsory recruitment of - labor in the West, 25 July 1944. -L-61 Pros. Ex. 20 Letter from Sauckel to the presidents 413 - of Labor Offices, 26 November 1942, - concerning deportation and - employment of Poles and Jews. -L-79 Pros. Ex. 3 Extract from minutes of Fuehrer 387 - conference, 23 May 1939. -NI-1098 Pros. Ex. 63 Extracts from affidavit of Fritz 456 - Sauckel, 22 September 1946, - regarding the jurisdiction of the - Central Planning Board. -NO-219 Pros. Ex. 83 Letter from Dr. Rudolf Brandt to Dr. 626 - Rascher, 27 April 1942, concerning - medical experiment report for - Himmler and Milch. -NO-261 Pros. Ex. 89 Letter from Milch to Dr. Hippke, 4 626 - June 1942, concerning availability - of low pressure air chamber for - experiments. -NO-262 Pros. Ex. 119 Letter from Dr. Hippke to SS 631 - Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, 6 March - 1943, concerning Rascher’s transfer - to the Waffen SS. -NOKW-017 Pros. Ex. 54 Extracts from the minutes of the 527 - conference with Air Force Engineers - and Chief Quartermasters under - chairmanship of Milch, 25 March - 1944. -NOKW-041 Pros. Ex. 113 Sworn statement by Hermann Goering, 27 625 - September 1946, concerning Milch’s - position as Inspector General of the - Luftwaffe. -NOKW-180 Pros. Ex. 155 Extracts from stenographic notes on 613 - the conference at the Reich - Marshal’s on Thursday, 4 November - 1943, 11 o’clock at the Junkers - Plant in Dessau. -NOKW-195 Pros. Ex. 143 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 608 - conference with Goering, 28 October - 1943. -NOKW-245 Pros. Ex. 157 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 606 - conference with Goering, 22 February - 1943, regarding plans for airplane - construction. -NOKW-247 Pros. Ex. 61 Appointment of Field Marshal Milch as 540 - Goering’s plenipotentiary for the - intensification of air force - armament in June 1944. -NOKW-261 Pros. Ex. 70 Chart of the organization of the 535 - Jaegerstab drawn by Saur with letter - of transmittal to prosecution staff, - 14 November 1946. -NOKW-266 Pros. Ex. 76 Affidavit of Fritz Schmelter, 19 559 - November 1946, concerning the - organization of the Jaegerstab. -NOKW-269 Pros. Ex. 59 A short curriculum vitae of Field 633 - Marshal Erhard Milch. -NOKW-286 Pros. Ex. 144 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 605 - GL-Conference, 1 September 1942. -NOKW-287 Pros. Ex. 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 April 499 - 1943, concerning the protection of - industry. -NOKW-311 Pros. Ex. 62 Extract from interrogation of Hermann 597 - Goering on 6 September 1946, - regarding Milch’s position as - Generalluftzeugmeister (GL). -NOKW-320 Pros. Ex. 73 Extract from interrogation of Karl 558 - Otto Saur on 13 November 1946, - concerning the use of concentration - camp prisoners in Jaegerstab - construction. -NOKW-334 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 550 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 25 April - 1944. -NOKW-334 Def. Ex. 16 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 564 - the Jaegerstab Conference, 25 April - 1944. -NOKW-336 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 555 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on 26 May - 1944. -NOKW-336 Def. Ex. 23 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 566 - of the Jaegerstab Conference on - Friday, 26 May 1944, at 10:00 - o’clock. -NOKW-337 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 544 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 6 March - 1944. -NOKW-337 Def. Ex. 12 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 561 - of the Jaegerstab Conference on 6 - March 1944 in the Reich Air - Ministry. -NOKW-338 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 545 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on Friday, 17 - March 1944. -NOKW-338 Def. Ex. 13 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 562 - of the Jaegerstab Conference - presided over by Field Marshal Milch - on Friday, 17 March 1944, 1100 - hours, in the Reich Air Ministry. -NOKW-346 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 546 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference under - chairmanship of Field Marshal Milch - on Monday, 20 March 1944. -NOKW-359 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 557 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on 27 June - 1944. -NOKW-361 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 554 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference during the 6th - journey of the “Hubertus - Undertaking” from 8-10 May 1944. -NOKW-362 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 552 - stenographic minutes of Jaegerstab - Conference on the occasion of the - 5th trip of the “Hubertus - Undertaking”, 2 and 3 May 1944. -NOKW-365 Def. Ex. 15 Extract from the stenographic minutes 563 - of the Jaegerstab Conference, 12 - April 1944. -NOKW-388 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 547 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 28 March - 1944. -NOKW-390 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 553 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference of 4 May 1944. -NOKW-406 Pros. Ex. 138 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 599 - the GL-Conference, 7 July 1942. -NOKW-407 Pros. Ex. 137 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 599 - GL-Conference, 27 May 1942. -NOKW-408 Pros. Ex. 139 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 600 - GL-Conference, 28 July 1942. -NOKW-409 Pros. Ex. 140 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 601 - GL-Conference, 4 August 1942. -NOKW-412 Pros. Ex. 141 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 602 - GL-Conference, 18 August 1942. -NOKW-416 Pros. Ex. 142 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 602 - GL-Conference, 26 August 1942. -NOKW-418 Pros. Ex. 136 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 598 - GL-Conference, 5 May 1942. -NOKW-442 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 554 - stenographic minutes of the - Jaegerstab Conference on 5 May 1944. -NOKW-442 Def. Ex. 21 Extract from the stenographic minutes 565 - of the Jaegerstab Conference, 5 May - 1944. -NOKW-449 Pros. Ex. 148 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 607 - GL-Conference, 2 March 1943. -016-PS Pros. Ex. 13 Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 24 405 - April 1942, and extracts from report - on Sauckel’s labor mobilization - program, 20 April 1942. -084-PS Pros. Ex. 16-A Extracts from interdepartmental report 408 - of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern - Territories, 30 September 1942, - concerning the status of Eastern - laborers. -204-PS Pros. Ex. 39 Extracts from memorandum of a 424 - conference, 18 February 1944, - concerning the release of indigenous - labor for purposes of the Reich. -208-PS Pros. Ex. 55 Report by Sauckel, 7 July 1944, on the 428 - accomplishments of labor - mobilization in the first half of - 1944. -265-PS Pros. Ex. 35 Extracts from report by Leyser to 423 - Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on - conditions in the district Zhitomir. -294-PS Pros. Ex. 19-A Extracts from top secret memorandum, 411 - signed by Braeutigam, 25 October - 1942, concerning effects of slave - labor program. -407-II-PS Def. Ex. 3 Report from Sauckel to Hitler, 10 439 - March 1943, concerning difficulties - originating from the draft of - manpower in former Soviet - territories. -407-V-PS Pros. Ex. 30 Extracts from letter from Sauckel to 418 - Hitler, 14 April 1943, concerning - labor questions. -407-IX-PS Pros. Ex. 33 Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 3 June 420 - 1943, concerning foreign labor - situation. -1063-D-PS Pros. Ex. 21 Extract from order of Mueller, 17 415 - December 1942, concerning prisoners - qualified for work to be sent to - concentration camps. -1206-PS Pros. Ex. 9 Outlines of directives of Goering 395 - regarding the employment of PW’s in - the armament industry, 7 November - 1941. -1510-PS Pros. Ex. 58 Extracts from decree of 16 September 450 - 1943, defining the duties of the - Planning Office of the Central - Planning Board. -1526-PS Pros. Ex. 25 Extracts from letter from 416 - German-appointed Ukrainian main - committee to Frank, February 1943. -1584-III-PS Pros. Ex. 71 Correspondence between Himmler and 537 - Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning - the use of concentration camp - prisoners in the aircraft industry. -1607-A-PS Pros. Ex. 115 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 25 628 - August 1942, concerning Dr. - Rascher’s report on high-altitude - experiments. -1607-B-PS Pros. Ex. 115 Letter from Dr. Rascher to Dr. Brandt, 627 - 20 July 1942, concerning report on - high-altitude experiments. -1617-PS Pros. Ex. 111 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 13 629 - November 1942, concerning Rascher’s - transfer to the Waffen SS. -3000-PS Pros. Ex. 34 Extracts from report rendered to 422 - Riecke, Ministerialdirektor in the - Ministry of Agriculture, 28 June - 1943, on experiences in political - and economic problems in the East. -3005-PS Pros. Ex. 7 Extracts from letter from the Reich 392 - Labor Ministry to presidents of - Regional Labor Offices, 26 August - 1941, concerning the use of French - and Russian PW’s. -3040-PS Pros. Ex. 10 Extracts from secret order of Himmler, 399 - 20 February 1942, concerning the - commitment and treatment of manpower - from the East. -3721-PS Pros. Ex. 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452 - September 1945, regarding the - jurisdiction of the Central Planning - Board. -3819-PS Pros. Ex. 56 Minutes of a conference on 11 July 430 - 1944 attended by Milch, concerning - the labor problem. -R-103 Pros. Ex. 40 Extracts from a letter from the 426 - (German-appointed) Polish main - committee to the General Government - of Poland on the conditions of - Polish workers in Germany, 17 May - 1944. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Stenographic record of the first 447 - conference of the Central Planning - Board on 27 April 1942. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from report on the eleventh 457 - conference of the Central Planning - Board, 22 July 1942. -R-124 Def. Ex. 5 Extract from the stenographic report 509 - of the eleventh conference of the - Central Planning Board, 22 July - 1942. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from report on the 459 - seventeenth conference of the - Central Planning Board, 28 October - 1942. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 461 - twenty-first conference of Central - Planning Board, 30 October 1942. -R-124 Def. Ex. 6 Extract from the stenographic minutes 510 - of the twenty-second conference of - the Central Planning Board, 2 - November 1942. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Extracts from stenographic minutes of 465 - the twenty-third conference of the - Central Planning Board, 3 November - 1942. -R-124 Def. Ex. 7 Extract from the stenographic minutes 510 - of the thirty-second conference of - the Central Planning Board, 12 - February 1943. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 467 - the thirty-third conference of the - Central Planning Board, 16 February - 1943. -R-124 Def. Ex. 8 Extract from the stenographic minutes 511 - of the thirty-third conference of - the Central Planning Board, 16 - February 1943. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 471 - the thirty-sixth conference of the - Central Planning Board, 22 April - 1943. -R-124 Def. Ex. 9 Extract from stenographic minutes of 516 - the thirty-ninth conference of the - Central Planning Board, 23 April - 1943. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Report of the forty-second conference 475 - of the Central Planning Board, 23 - June 1943. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 478 - the fifty-third conference of the - Central Planning Board, 16 February - 1944. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Report on the fifty-third conference 479 - of the Central Planning Board, 16 - February 1944. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from the stenographic minutes 484 - of the fifty-fourth conference of - the Central Planning Board, 1 March - 1944. -R-124 Def. Ex. 31 Extracts from the stenographic minutes 517 - of the fifty-fourth conference of - the Central Planning Board, 1 March - 1944. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498 - fifty-sixth conference of the - Central Planning Board, 4 April - 1944. -R-124 Def. Ex. 1 Extract from report on Fuehrer 438 - conference attended by Milch on 19 - February 1942. -R-124 Def. Ex. 32 Extract from the Fuehrer conference 438 - minutes, 21 and 22 April 1942. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 transmitting 448 - the statutes of the Central Planning - Board. -R-124 Def. Ex. 2 Extract from the Fuehrer conference 439 - minutes of 3, 4, 5 January 1943. -R-124 Def. Ex. 33 Extract from report on Fuehrer 441 - conference of 30 May 1943. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 124 Speer’s minutes of a conference with 501 - Hitler on 8 July 1943. -R-124 Def. Ex. 4 Extract from report of Fuehrer 442 - conference of 11-12 September 1943. -R-124 Def. Ex. 34 Extract from Fuehrer conference of 1-4 443 - January 1944, concerning Speer’s - report on the French labor - situation. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extract from the report by Saur of the 502 - conference with the Fuehrer, 5 March - 1944. -R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-E Extracts from the minutes of 539 - discussions between Saur and the - Fuehrer, 6 and 7 April 1944. -Speer Ex. 34 Def. Ex. 17 Order of Hitler, 21 April 1944, 560 - delegating to Dorsch authority for - Jaegerstab constructions. - - TESTIMONIES - -Excerpts from the testimony of defendant _Milch_ 635 -Extracts of testimony of defense witness Fritz _Schmelter_ 567 -Extracts of testimony of defense witness Xaver _Dorsch_ 583 -Extracts from testimony of defense witness Max _Koenig_ 615 -Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert _Speer_ 502 -before Commission on 19 February 1947 - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. American spelling occurs throughout the document. Multiple -occurrences of the following spellings which differ and are found -throughout this volume are as follows: - - border line borderline - front line front-line - Jewish Bolshevik Jewish-Bolshevik - Fraeulein Frau - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in -the trial(s). This volume had no German, Polish, Russian or other -eastern European diacritics, only French diacritics. 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