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diff --git a/old/54823-0.txt b/old/54823-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 776a1d4..0000000 --- a/old/54823-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15712 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Campaign of Sedan, by George Hooper - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: The Campaign of Sedan - The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870 - - -Author: George Hooper - - - -Release Date: June 1, 2017 [eBook #54823] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN*** - - -E-text prepared by Brian Coe, David Tipple, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made -available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original maps. - See 54823-h.htm or 54823-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/54823/54823-h/54823-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/54823/54823-h.zip) - - - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - https://archive.org/details/campaignofsedand00hoop - - -Transcriber's note: - - Underscores are used for italic markup; the three words that - end this sentence _are in italics_. - - Equals signs are used for bold-face markup; the three words - that end this sentence =are in bold face=. - - The symbols ^{} are used to represent a superscript; for - example, “3 squared” would be printed as “3^{2}”. - - Text printed in the source in small capitals has been changed - to upper-case. - - - - - -Bohn’S Standard Library - -THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN - - - -“The policy of your Government will bring you to Jena,” said M. de -Moustier to Herr von Bismarck during the Crimean War. “Why not to -Waterloo?” was the prompt and prophetic reply. - -Wo Kraft und Muth in deutscher Seele flammen. - - -THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN - -The Downfall of the Second Empire -August–September 1870 - -by - -GEORGE HOOPER - -Author of “Waterloo: the Downfall of the First Napoleon: a History of -the Campaign of 1815,” etc. - -With Map and Plans - - - - - - -[Illustration] - -London -George Bell And Sons -1909 - -Chiswick Press: Charles Whittingham and Co. -Tooks Court, Chancery Lane, London. - - - - - PREFACE. - - -When it was decided to publish a new and cheaper edition of Mr. George -Hooper’s “Sedan,” the question arose whether anything should be added -to it. My father had intended, should a new edition be called for, to -revise and correct the work, and to furnish it with an index. After due -consideration it has been decided to make no additions to the book, -except the index, which has been carefully compiled. A few errors that -had crept into the text of the original edition have been corrected; -but in other respects the volume remains as it was left by its author. - - WYNNARD HOOPER. - -SOUTH KENSINGTON, - _October, 1897_. - - - - - PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. - - -The War of 1870–71 was opened by a campaign of thirty days, complete in -itself, and the author must plead the dramatic unity of the great event -as a reason for treating it in a separate form. Although the foundation -of those ulterior successes which enabled the Germans to proclaim the -King of Prussia Emperor in Germany, and to do so in the palace of Louis -XIV., yet, from an historical point of view, the astonishing series -of battles and marches which ended in the Investment of Metz, and the -Capitulation of Sedan may be regarded as standing apart, because they -carried with them the Downfall of the Second Empire. The Campaign of -Sedan, in this respect, is the supplement of the Campaign of Waterloo; -but, of course, there is no resemblance between Napoleon III. and -Napoleon I., nor in the political and military conditions and results -of the two catastrophes. - -The materials at the disposal of any author who ventures to narrate -the campaign are abundant and yet incomplete. The History of the War -prepared by the German Staff is minute even to weariness, but it must -always stand as the authentic foundation of every narrative. Unreadable -to the general public, it is invaluable to the soldier-student, and -to all who wish to know what the German Army is like, and how it -wages war. It need scarcely be said that the Staff narrative is the -basis of this book, which is an endeavour to present its essence -in a succinct and readable form. Unhappily, the French accounts are -wanting in precision, so that it is difficult to comprehend how they -fought their battles, and impossible to ascertain accurately what was -their numerical strength at any moment. The deficiency is serious, -because it mars the completeness of the story, and frustrates every -attempt to do them full justice. For, if the Army, as an Army, was -wasted by incapable commanders, the soldiers fought well and did -nothing to derogate from their old renown. They had to encounter -better commanders, more numerous and better soldiers, and they were -beaten, but they were not disgraced. The whole lesson of the war is -lost, if the fact is ignored that the German Army, from top to bottom, -was superior in every way to that of Napoleon III., as well as more -numerous; and that what made it superior was the spirit of Duty, using -the word in its highest sense, which animated the host, from the King, -who was its shining exemplar, to the private who was proud to rival his -King. - -The contrast, which this war exhibited, between the French and German -methods of making and using an Army is so violent, that it becomes -painful, and imparts an air of one-sidedness to the narrative. But the -facts must be stated, although the bare statement suggests partiality -in the narrator. I have, nevertheless, tried to be impartial, and -in doing my best, I have found it impossible to read the abounding -evidence of Imperial neglect, rashness and indecision, without feeling -pity for the soldiers and the nation which had to bear the penalties. -The French Army has been remodelled and increased enormously; the -secular quarrel between Germany and France is still open; and some day -it may be seen whether the Republicans, out of the same materials, -have been able to create an Army such as the Imperialists failed to -produce. Whether they have succeeded or not, it may be fervently hoped -that the deep impression which the examples of thoroughness, revealed -by the wars of 1866 and 1870, made on our own country will never be -effaced; and that the public will insist that our small Army, in every -part, shall be as good as that which crossed the French frontier in -1870, and triumphed in the Campaign of Sedan. - - KENSINGTON, _April 6th, 1887_. - - - - - CONTENTS. - - - PAGE - - INTRODUCTION 1 - - - CHAPTER I. - - THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. - - French Demands for the Rhine—Luxemburg—An Interlude of - Peace—The Salzburg Interview—The Emperor seeks Allies—The - Hohenzollern Candidature—The French Government and the Chamber 17 - - - CHAPTER II. - - THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. - - German Mobilization—French Mobilization—War Methods Contrasted 56 - - - CHAPTER III. - - STAGE THUNDER. - - The Combat at Saarbrück—Preparing to go Forward—Positions on - August 4—The Moral and Political Forces 72 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - INVASION IN EARNEST. - - The Combat on the Lauter—French Position on the Saar—German - Position on the Saar 84 - - - CHAPTER V. - - TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. - - 1. Woerth—The Battle Begins—Attack on Woerth—Attack on - the French Right—Attack on Elsasshausen—MacMahon Orders - a Retreat—The Close of the Battle. 2. Spicheren—The - Battle-field—The Germans Begin the Fight—The Red Hill - Stormed—Progress of the Action—Frossard Retires 96 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - VACILLATION IN METZ. - - The Emperor Resigns his Command—The German Advance—The German - Cavalry at Work—The Germans March on the Moselle 131 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. - - The French Propose to Move—The Battle of Colombey-Nouilly—Von - Golz Dashes In—The End of the Battle—The French Retreat—The - Germans Cross the Moselle—The Cavalry Beyond the Moselle—Orders - for the Flank March—The Emperor Quits the Army 145 - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. - - Vionville-Mars la Tour—The Vionville Battlefield—The - French are Surprised—The Third Corps Strikes In—Arrival - of Bazaine—Bredow’s Brilliant Charge—The Fight becomes - Stationary—Arrival of the Tenth Corps—The Great Cavalry - Combat—End of the Battle 167 - - - CHAPTER IX. - - PRESSED BACK ON METZ. - - Marshal Bazaine—The Battlefield of Gravelotte—The German - Plans—The Battle of Gravelotte—Prince Frederick Charles at - the Front—Steinmetz Attacks the French Left—Operations by the - German Left Wing—General Frossard Repels a Fresh Attack—The - Last Fights near St. Hubert—The Prussian Guard on the Centre - and Left—The Capture of St. Privat 188 - - - CHAPTER X. - - THE STATE OF THE GAME, AND THE NEW MOVES. - - The King Marches Westward—The Cavalry Operations—The Emperor at - Chalons and Reims—MacMahon retires to Reims—The Chalons Army - Directed on the Meuse 228 - - - THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. - - The Cavalry Discover the Enemy—Movements of the French—The - Marshal Resolves, Hesitates, and Yields—Movements of the - Germans—Effects of MacMahon’s Counter-orders—German and French - Operations on the 29th—The Combat at Nouart—The State of - Affairs at Sundown—The Battle of Beaumont—The Surprise of the - Fifth Corps—The Flight to Mouzon 244 - - - CHAPTER XII. - - METZ AND STRASBURG. - - The Battle of Noisseville 276 - - - CHAPTER XIII. - - SEDAN. - - German Decision—Confusion in the French Camp—The Movements - of the Germans—The Battlefield of Sedan—The Battle of - Sedan—MacMahon’s Wound and its Consequences—Progress of the - Battle on the Givonne—The March on St. Menges—The Eleventh and - Fifth Corps Engage—The Condition of the French Army—The French - Cavalry Charge—General de Wimpffen’s Counter stroke—The Emperor - and his Generals—King William and his Warriors—How the Generals - Rated Each Other—The Generals Meet at Donchery—Napoleon III. - Surrenders—The French Generals Submit—The End 285 - - - APPENDICES. - - I. The German Field Armies—II. The French Army—III. The - Protocol of Capitulation—IV. A List of the Principal Works - Consulted for the Campaign of Sedan 339 - - INDEX 359 - - - MAP AND PLANS. - - - I. BATTLE OF WOERTH. - - II. BATTLE OF SPICHEREN. - - III. BATTLE OF COLOMBEY-NOUILLY. - - IV. BATTLE OF VIONVILLE-MARS LA TOUR. - - V. BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. - - VI. BATTLE OF SEDAN. - - VII. GENERAL MAP. - - - - - THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. - - - INTRODUCTION. - - -In July, 1870, fifty-five years after the Allied Armies, who had -marched from the decisive field of Waterloo, entered Paris, a young -diplomatist, Baron Wimpfen, started from the French capital, for -Berlin. He was the bearer of a Declaration of War, from the Emperor -Napoleon III., to William I., King of Prussia; and the fatal message -was delivered to the French Chargé d’Affaires, M. le Sourd, and by -him to the Prussian Government on the 19th of July. Thus, once again, -a Napoleon, at the head of a French Empire, was destined to try his -strength against the principal German Power beyond the Rhine. - -Yet, under what different conditions! The Emperor was not now the -Napoleon who surrounded the Austrians at Ulm, broke down the combined -forces of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz, and extorted a peace which -set him free to overthrow, at Jena and Auerstadt, the fine army left by -Frederick the Great, and allowed to crystallize by his weak successors. -Nor did the late Emperor find in his front a divided Germany, and -the mere survival of a great military organization. He found a -united people, and an army surpassing in completeness, as it did in -armaments—the victors of Prague, Rosbach, and Leuthen. The Germany -known to the Congress of Vienna had disappeared—the deformed had been -transformed. The little seed of unity, sown early in the century, had -grown into a forest tree. The spirit of Arndt had run through the -whole Teutonic nation, which, after the turmoil of 1848 had subsided, -and the heavy hand of Russia had been taken off by the Crimean War, -found a leader in the strongly-organized kingdom of Prussia. When the -weak and hesitating will of Frederick William IV. ceased, first, by -the operation of a painful disease, and then by extinction, to disturb -the course of his country’s fortune, Prussia, in a few years, became -practically a new Power. King William I., who crowned himself with his -own hands at Königsberg, began his task, as a ruler, in a grave and -earnest spirit, holding that kingship was not only a business, but a -trust, and taking as his watchwords, Work and Duty. No monarch in any -age, no private man, ever laboured more assiduously and conscientiously -at his _métier_, to use the word of Joseph II., than the King of -Prussia. He became Regent in 1858, when Napoleon III. was engaged in -preparing for his Italian campaign against the House of Austria. French -policy, with varying watchwords, had run that road for centuries; and, -during the summer of 1859, it was the good fortune of the Emperor to -win a series of victories which brought his army to the Mincio, and -before the once famous Quadrilateral. The German Bund had taken no -part in the fray, but the rapid successes of the French aroused some -apprehensions in Berlin, and there went forth an order to mobilize -a part of the army, which means to put each corps on a war-footing, -and to assemble a force in Rhenish Prussia. Whatever share that -demonstration may have had in producing the sudden arrangement between -the rival Emperors, who made peace over their cigarettes and coffee -at Villafranca, the experiment tried by the Berlin War Office had one -important result—it brought to light serious defects in the system then -practised, and revealed the relative weakness of the Prussian army. -From that moment, the Regent, who soon became King by the death of his -brother, began the work of reforming the military system. For this -step, at least from a Prussian standpoint, there was good reason; since -the kingdom, although it was based on a strong and compact nucleus, -was, as a whole, made up of scattered fragments lying between great -military Powers, and therefore could not hope to subsist without a -formidable army. The relative weakness of Prussia had, indeed, been -burnt into the souls of Prussian statesmen; and King William, on his -accession, determined that as far as in him lay, that grave defect -should be cured. A keen observer, a good judge of character and -capacity, his experience of men and things, which was large, enabled -him at once to select fit instruments. He picked out three persons, two -soldiers and a statesman, and severe ordeals in after years justified -his choice. He appointed General von Roon, Minister of War, and no man -in modern times has shown greater qualities in the organization of an -army. He placed General von Moltke at the head of the General Staff, -which that able man soon converted into the best equipped and the -most effective body of its kind known to history. It rapidly became, -what it now is, the brain of the army, alike in quarters and in the -field. Finally, after some meditation, he called Herr Otto von Bismarck -from the diplomatic service, which had revealed his rare and peculiar -qualities, and made this Pomeranian squire his chief political adviser, -and the manager of his delicate and weighty State affairs. - -Thenceforth, the long-gathering strength of Prussia, the foundations -of which were bedded deep in the history of its people, began to assume -a form and a direction which great events revealed to astonished and -incredulous Europe. The experiment undertaken by the King and his chief -councillors was rendered less difficult by that effect of the Crimean -War which so materially lessened the influence of Russia in Germany. -The intimate and friendly relations subsisting between the two Courts -remained unbroken, and to its preservation in fair weather and foul, -Prussia owed, to a large extent, the favourable conditions surrounding -the application and development of her policy. It seemed as necessary -to Prussian, as it now does to German interests, that the Russian -Government should be, at least, benevolently neutral; and probably -the art of keeping it so was profoundly studied by Herr von Bismarck -when he filled the post of Ambassador to the Court of St. Petersburg. -The large military reforms designed by the King and his advisers -aroused an uncompromising opposition in the native Parliament, which -was only overcome by the firmness with which King William supported -his outspoken and audacious Minister. The victory was secured by -methods which were called, and were, unconstitutional. The control -of the Chamber over the Budget was placed in abeyance, by a clever -interpretation of the fundamental law. It was held that if the Deputies -could not agree with the Government respecting the estimates of the -current year, the law which they had sanctioned in the preceding year -still remained valid. Thus the taxes were collected, appropriated and -expended, just the same as if the Chamber had not virtually “stopped -the supplies” in order to defeat the measures which were intended to -give the army stability, numbers, efficiency and cohesion. The whole -transaction ran counter to English maxims and customs; but it should be -remembered that Parliamentary Government, and especially government by -party, were never, and are not even now established in Berlin. The net -result of the contest was the renovation and the strengthening of the -National Army to an extent which, while it did not exceed, perhaps, the -expectations of those who laboriously wrought it out, left some Powers -of Europe ignorant, and others incredulous respecting its value. - -Not that the military institutions of Prussia, dating back from the -“new model,” devised during the stress of the Napoleonic Wars, had -been fundamentally altered. Nothing was done except to increase the -numbers, close up and oil the machinery, render its working prompt -and easy by prudent decentralization, give it a powerful brain in the -General Staff, and impart to the whole system a living energy. The -art of war, if the phrase may be allowed, was, in accordance with -venerable traditions rooted in the Hohenzollern House, taken up as a -serious business; and that deep sense of its importance which prevailed -at the fountain head, was made to permeate the entire frame. That -is the real distinguishing characteristic of the Prussian, now the -German army, as contrasted with the spirit in which similar labours -were undertaken by some other Powers. The task was a heavy one, but -the three men who set about it were equal to the task. King William, -with a large intelligence, a severe yet kindly temper, and a thorough -knowledge of his work, threw himself heart and soul into the business, -and brought to bear upon its conduct that essential condition of -success, the “master’s eye.” General von Roon framed or sanctioned -the administrative measures which were needed to create an almost -self-acting and cohesive organism, which could be set in motion by a -telegram, as an engineer starts a complicated piece of machinery by -touching a lever. Von Moltke, as chief of the General Staff, supplied -the directing intellect, and established a complete apparatus for -the collection and classification of knowledge, bearing upon military -affairs, which might be applied wherever needed. These men, working -with “unhasting, unresting” diligence, founded a school of war, not -based on “the law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not,” but -upon the vital principle that a good army should possess in itself -such a power of adaptation, as will make it always abreast with the -latest genuine discoveries in tactics, arms, material appliances, -and discipline. Also the army was treated as a great school in which -officers and men alike were teaching and learning from dawn to sunset, -throughout the allotted period of service. The principal trio had other -and able helpers, but they were the main springs moving and guiding the -marvellous product of constant labour applied by rare capacity. - -The ultimate, although not the immediate, effect of the French -successes at Magenta and Solferino, was the creation of an Italian -kingdom, which included within its boundaries, Naples, Sicily, the -States of the Church, except Rome, and of course the Duchies on -the right bank of the Po. The price of compliance, exacted by the -Emperor Napoleon, whose plans had been thwarted, was the cession to -him of Nice and Savoy. Venice and the territory beyond the Mincio -remained Austrian for several years. While the map of Italy was in -course of reconstruction, the political conflict in Berlin raged on -with unintermitted violence. Simultaneously the Austrian Emperor was -induced to assert his claims to predominance in Germany, but the -plans laid, in 1863, were blighted by the prompt refusal of William I. -to take any share in them. It was the first symptom of reviving -hostility between the two Powers, although a little later, on the -death of the King of Denmark, they were found, side by side in arms, -to assert the claims of the German Bund upon Holstein, Schleswig and -Lauenburg, and avert the occupation of those countries by the troops -of Saxony and other minor States alone. The campaign which ensued -brought the “new model of the” Prussian army to the test of actual -experiment. But the brave adversaries they had to encounter, if stout -in heart, were weak in numbers; and Europe did not set much store by -the victories then achieved by Prussia. The public and the Governments -were intently occupied with the Secession War in the United States of -America, and the astounding expedition to Mexico, which was designed -to place an Austrian Archduke on “the throne of the Montezumas,” -under illustrious French patronage. Thus the quality of the troops, -the great influence of the famous “needle-gun,” the character of the -staff, and the excellent administrative services escaped the notice -of all, save the observant few. The political aspects of the dispute -were keenly discussed. Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell were, at one -moment, disposed to fight for the Treaty of 1851; but the Danish King -committed grave blunders; Russia stood aloof, the Emperor Napoleon -III. distinctly refused to enter the lists, and the House of Commons -was decidedly averse to war. Here it should be noted that the French -Emperor, meditating on the value to him of the rival Powers in Germany, -had determined to stand well with both. He hoped to please Austria by -making the brother of Francis Joseph Emperor of Mexico, and to keep -open the possibilities of an alliance with Prussia, by throwing no -obstacles in her way on the Eider. - -Then began the great strife between the two Governments which had -wrested the Elbe Duchies from the Dane. When the short war ended, -certain divisions from each army were posted in the conquered country, -and the rivalry which animated the two Courts was carried on by -diplomats and statesmen. Prussian policy, since the days of -Frederick II., had leaned always towards, if not an alliance with -Russia, yet the maintenance of a solid understanding with that growing -Power. Herr von Bismarck, who was a deep student in the history of his -own country, and who had always nourished large ideas, kept steadily -on the well-trodden path, but imparted to his methods a boldness, an -inventiveness, and an energy most unusual in Prussian statescraft. -The Polish insurrection of 1864 gave him an opportunity which he did -not neglect, and while the poor patriots were assisted from the side -of Galicia, on the Posen frontier they were ruthlessly repressed, the -Russian and Prussian troops making common cause, and crossing the -frontier whenever that step seemed needful. The ill-fated Poles, of -course, were defeated; Prussia had recorded a fresh claim upon the -benevolent neutrality of Russia, while Austrian “ingratitude,” never -forgiven in St. Petersburg, took a deeper tinge in the eyes of the -Czar. The Prussian Government had not long to wait for their reward. -During the summer of 1865, the abiding quarrel between Vienna and -Berlin, respecting the future status of the conquered or restored -Duchies, nearly came to an open rupture. Neither side, however, was -ready for a blow, and the “Convention of Gastein,” which Bismarck, -in a letter to his wife, defined as a mode of “pasting together the -cracks in the building,” was devised to gain time. The Prussian army, -still incomplete from the royal and the military point of view, had -been augmented after the Danish war, and the new levies of horse and -artillery had not acquired the requisite instruction. So the summer and -autumn of 1865 wore away, revealing the spectacle of King William and -Herr von Bismarck battling fiercely with the Parliament, and not so -clearly displaying Von Moltke and Von Roon labouring hourly to bring -the machine intrusted to their charge up to the highest attainable -efficiency. There were other reasons for delay. As it was more than -probable that the South Germans, and possible that the King of Hanover -would not rank themselves with Prussia, but go with Austria and the -Bund, an ally was wanted who would divide the forces of the largest -Power. That ally was found in the newly united kingdom of Italy. - -But before the Italian envoy astonished the diplomatic world by his -apparition at Berlin, in March, the controversy between Austria and -Prussia had gone on rapidly, step by step, nearer towards a rupture. -Count Mensdorff, on behalf of the Emperor Francis Joseph, set up a -claim to full liberty of action in the Duchy of Holstein, and began -openly to favour the pretentions of the Duke Frederick of Augustenburg -to the Ducal Chair. That position was vigorously contested by Herr von -Bismarck, who put an opposite construction on the Treaty, which created -what was called the “condominium.” The consequence was a frequent and -animated exchange of despatches, containing such “arguments” as seemed -proper to the occasion. Into the merits of this dispute it is needless -to enter now, since the whole drift of the verbal struggle shows that -while Prussia was intent on providing a solid ground on which to fight -out a long-standing quarrel—“inevitable,” said Von Moltke, “sooner or -later,”—Austria was by no means inclined to shrink from a test directly -applied to her position in Germany. Whatever line she had taken her -rival would have discovered, or tried to discover, an opposing course; -but, it so happened, that, whether by chance or miscalculation, Count -Mensdorff, the Austrian Foreign Minister, managed his case so as to -give advantages to his abler antagonist. In the last days of February -a great council was held in Berlin. Not only the King and his chief -Minister, but General von Moltke and General von Manteuffel, from -Schleswig, took part in its deliberations. It was the turning point -in the grave debate, so far as Prussian action was concerned; for -the decision then adopted unanimously, was, that Prussia could not -honourably recede, but must go forward, even at the risk of war. No -order was given to prepare for that result, because the organization -of the army was complete, and moreover, because “the King was very -adverse to an offensive war.” Nevertheless, from that moment such an -issue of the dispute became certain to occur at an early day. Yet -neither party wished to fight over the Duchies; each felt that the -cause was too paltry. The Austrians, therefore, extended the field, -by appealing to the Bund, a move which gave Herr von Bismarck the -advantage he so eagerly sought. He answered it by resolving to push, in -his own sense, the cause of federal reform. Learning this determination -early in March, M. Benedetti observed to Herr von Bismarck that it -would insure peace. “Yes,” answered the Minister President,—“for -three months,” a very accurate forecast by a prophet who could fulfil -his own prediction, and who desired to fight the adversary promptly, -lest a reconciliation should be effected between Vienna and Pesth, -and Hungary, from a source of weakness, should thus become a tower of -strength. - -A few days later, March 14th, General Govone, from Florence, arrived -in Berlin. His advent had been preceded by attempts, on the part of -Bismarck, to discover how the French would look on a Prusso-Italian -alliance. The subject was delicate, and even after the General’s -arrival, it was officially stated that he had come, exclusively, to -study the progress in small arms and artillery! The pretence was soon -abandoned, and the negotiations were avowed; but the conclusion of a -treaty was delayed for some days, because no specific date could be -fixed on for the outbreak of war, Prussia having determined, at least -to make it appear, that she was not the aggressor. At length a form of -words was devised, which satisfied both Powers, stipulating that Italy -was to share in the war, providing it began within “three months,” and -the Convention was signed on the 8th of April. Not, however, before it -had been well ascertained that France had really helped on the Prussian -alliance and desired to see war ensue, although, avowedly, she did not -interfere, giving out that she stood neuter, and that the understanding -which might be ultimately come to between France and Prussia would be -determined by the march of events, the extension of the war, and the -questions to which it might give rise. This language foreshadowed the -policy which the Emperor, if not M. Drouyn de Lhuys desired to follow; -and as Russia, recently obliged in the Polish troubles, was friendly, -if not allied, Herr von Bismarck was convinced that no foreign power -would array itself on the side of Austria, unless the campaign were -prolonged. - -Henceforth, the aim of each disputant was to secure a vantage-ground -in Germany. Austria had partially collected troops in Bohemia and -Moravia, and had secretly stipulated with several States to call out -four Federal corps d’armée; while Prussia, who could wait, being always -ready, had only carried her preparations forward to a certain extent. -M. von Beust, the Saxon Minister, then intervened with a proposal -that the Diet should name arbiters, whose decision should be final; -a suggestion instantly rejected by the principals in the quarrel. -The Emperor Napoleon III., towards the end of May, when Prussian -mobilization had practicably been completed in eight corps, produced -his specific—the characteristic proposal that a Conference should be -held in Paris to study the means of maintaining the peace. Prussia -accepted the offer, but Austria put an end to the hopes of Napoleon, -by stipulating that no arrangement should be discussed which would -augment the territory or power of any party of the Conference, and in -addition that the Pope should be invited to share in any deliberations -on “the Italian Question.” These pretensions, by excluding, what -everyone wanted, the cession of Venetia to Italy, decided the fate -of the Conference. “They desire war at Vienna,” said Von Bismarck to -Count Benedetti. “These conditions have been conjured up solely for the -purpose of giving the States in South Germany time to complete their -military preparations.” And when the news came officially from Paris -that the Austrian answer had killed the project, the Minister President -shouted in the French Ambassador’s presence “Vive le Roi!” The solution -was war. The Prussian army, for once, had been mobilized by slow -degrees. More than a month elapsed between the first precautionary -and the final steps, but by the 12th of May the entire active army -had been summoned to arms. The Conference project was a last attempt, -made, indeed, after all hope of arresting the conflict had vanished, -alike in Vienna and Berlin; and it was followed by events in Holstein, -which put an end to the period of suspense, and formed a prelude to the -war. Practically, but without actual fighting, General von Manteuffel -compelled the Austrian brigade, under Field-Marshal von Glablenz, to -retreat swiftly over the Elbe. The pretext for this strong measure was -the fact that Austria, by her sole will, had summoned the Estates to -meet at Itzehöe, and had thus infringed the rights of King William! -Thereupon Austria requested the Diet at Frankfort to call out all -the Federal Corps; and her demand was complied with, on the 14th of -June, by a majority of nine to six. The Prussian delegate protested, -and withdrew, leaving Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemburg, the two -Hesses, and several minor States, in open combination against Prussia. -But the same stroke which isolated the latter, also destroyed the -German Bund, invented by the kings and statesmen of 1815, to preserve -internal tranquillity, and safeguard the Fatherland against France. -The arrangement implied the co-operation of two Powers; one purely -German, yet subordinate; the other parcel German, and mainly consisting -of divers peoples outside Germany; and it fell to pieces at a blow, -because the time had arrived when one of the two must attain supremacy. -Side by side with the secular dynastic conflict arose in the nation -that longing for unity which could only be accomplished by a thoroughly -German Power. - -That Power was Prussia, trained for the task by the steadfast labours -of two hundred years. The army she had formed did its work swiftly. -Pouring through Saxony and over the Silesian Mountains, the King and -his son, July 3rd, crushed the Austrians, on the memorable field of -Sadowa, near Königgrätz. The Hanoverian troops, after winning the -fight at Langensalza, had been obliged to surrender, and in South -Germany the army employed to overcome the Confederates was equally -victorious. On the 22nd of July, so swiftly had the main body moved, -the Prussians were in front of Vienna and Presburg on the Danube. -Four days afterwards, the Emperor Napoleon having struck in with an -offer of mediation, which was accepted, the preliminaries of a peace -were signed at Nikolsburg, on the 26th of July, and the final treaty -was settled and ratified at Prague, on the 23rd of August, long after -King William and his formidable Minister were once more in Berlin. -By this instrument, Austria was excluded from Germany; a Northern -Confederation, reaching to the Main, was founded; Hanover, the Elbe -Duchies, Hesse-Cassel, and other territories, were annexed to Prussia; -and a formal statement was inserted, declaring that Napoleon III., to -whom Austria had ceded Venetia, had acquired it in order to hand over -the city and Terra Firma, as far as the Isonzo, to Victor Emmanuel, -when the peace should be re-established. Prussia thus became the -acknowledged head of Germany, at least as far as the Main; and the -national longing for complete unity was about to be gratified in a much -shorter time than seemed probable in 1866. - -Naturally, the astonishing successes won by Prussian arms against the -Federal Corps, as well as the Austrians, compelled the South German -States to sue for peace, and accept public treaties, which, while -leaving them independent, brought them all, more or less, within the -limits of a common German federation. But something more important was -accomplished at Nikolsburg. Herr von der Pfordten, the Bavarian Prime -Minister, repaired thither towards the end of July, and Bismarck was -in possession of information, including a certain French document, -which enabled him to state the German case in a manner so convincing -and terrifying, that the Bavarian agreed to sign a secret treaty, -bringing the army within the Prussian system, and stipulating that, in -case of war, it should pass at once under the command of King William. -That which Von der Pfordten conceded the Ministers of Wurtemburg and -Hesse Darmstadt could not refuse, and thus provision was made, on -the morrow of Sadowa, for that concentration of armed Germany which -overwhelmed France in 1870–71. So that, although nothing formally -constituting a United Germany had been done, Prussia, by securing the -control of all her forces, and knowing that a strong and deeply-rooted -public sentiment would support her, was satisfied that, providing -time could be gained in which to arm, instruct and discipline upon -the Prussian model the South Germans and the troops raised from the -annexed provinces, she would be more than a match for France. South -Germany, indeed, had long known her relative helplessness against the -French. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that the real peril -was more perceptible to the soldiers and statesmen than to the people, -many of whom were strongly imbued with democratic ideas of the French -type. Yet, although they hungered for what they understood as liberty -and independence, they were still German, and did not fail to see that -their cherished desires could not be gratified either under French -patronage or French prefects. The soldiers and statesmen had early -perceived the full secret of South German dependence. The Archduke -Charles, who had great knowledge and harsh experience to guide him, -pointed out that the French posts on the Rhine had placed the country -south of the Main at the mercy of France. “As long as the Rhine -frontier from Huningen to Lauterbourg remains in her hands,” wrote -a Prussian staff-officer at a later period, “Germany is open on the -Rhine frontier to an invasion directed upon the Southern States.” No -stronger testimony to the sense, if not to the reality of insecurity -could be adduced, than the remarkable fact that, even so far back as -the Crimean War, the then King of Wurtemberg, in conversation with Herr -von Bismarck, set forth, significantly, the feelings, the hopes and the -dread of South Germany. “Give us Strassburg,” he said, “and we will -unite to encounter any eventuality . . . . for until that city shall -become German, it will always stand in the way of Southern Germany, -devoting herself unreservedly to German unity and to a German national -policy.” Hence it will be seen that, beyond the Main, there were -traditional, yet very real fears of French invasion; and that these -apprehensions had no small share in facilitating the acceptance of -the secret military treaties, and in shaping the course of subsequent -events. - -Thus much it seems needful to state, in order that some portion of the -earlier transactions which had a great influence in bringing on the -war of 1870, may be recalled to the reader’s mind. The short, sharp -and decisive duel fought between Austria and Prussia for leadership in -Germany, created a profound impression throughout Europe. Austria was -irritated as well as humbled; Russia, although the Czar remained more -than friendly, was not without apprehensions; but the French ruler and -his ministers were astounded, indignant and bewildered. The telegram, -which reported the Battle of Sadowa, wrenched a “cry of agony” from the -Court of the Tuileries, whose policy had been based on the conjecture -or belief that Prussia would be defeated, and would call for help. The -calculation was, that Napoleon III. would step in as arbiter, and that -while he moderated the demands of Austria, he would be able to extort -territorial concessions from Prussia as the reward of his patronage. -M. Drouyn de Lhuys would have had his master strike in, at once, and -cross the Rhine, or occupy the Palatinate; but the Emperor was not then -in the mood for heroic enterprises; he feared that his army was not -“ready,” and, besides, he still thought that by arrangement he could -obtain some sort of “compensation” from Prussia, at the expense of -Germany. But all he did was to pose as mediator at Nikolsburg; and Herr -von Bismarck, who had done his utmost to keep him in a dubious frame of -mind, regarded it as “fortunate” that he did not boldly thrust himself -into the quarrel. The “golden opportunity” slid by; M. Drouyn de Lhuys -resigned; and Imperial France acquiesced, publicly, in the political -and territorial arrangements which, for the first time, during the -lapse of centuries, laid broad and deep the foundations of German -Unity, and, as a consequence, rendered inevitable a France-German War. - - - - - CHAPTER I. - - THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. - - -The Treaty of Prague, the secret military conventions signed at -Nikolsburg, the ascendancy secured by Von Bismarck, now elevated to -the dignity of a Count, together with the complete removal of alien -Powers from Italy, wrought a radical change in the political relations -of the European States. Excluded from Germany, although including -powerful German elements, the dominions of Austria still extended -to the verge of Venetia and the Lombard plains; but as the Prussian -statesman had already hinted, her future lay Eastward, and her centre -of gravity had been removed to Buda-Pesth. In the South German Courts, -no doubt, there was a bias towards Vienna, and a dislike of Prussia; -yet both the leaning and the repugnance were counterbalanced by a -deeper dread of France rooted in the people by the vivid memories of -repeated and cruel invasions. Russia, somewhat alarmed by the rapid -success of King William, had been soothed by diplomatic reassurances, -the tenour of which is not positively known, although a series of -subsequent events more than justified the inference made at that time, -that promises, bearing on the Czar’s Eastern designs, were tendered -and accepted as a valuable consideration for the coveted boon of -benevolent neutrality, if not something more substantial. Like Russia, -France had lost nothing by the campaign of 1866; her territories were -intact; her ruler had mediated between Austria and Prussia; and he had -the honour of protecting the Pope, who, as a spiritual and temporal -Prince, was still in possession of Rome and restricted territorial -domains. But the Napoleonic Court, and many who looked upon its head -as a usurper, experienced, on the morrow of Sadowa, and in a greater -degree after the preface to a peace had been signed at Nikolsburg, -a sensation of diminished magnitude, a consciousness of lessened -prestige, and a painful impression that their political, perhaps even -their military place in Europe, as the heirs of Richelieu, -Louis XIV., and Napoleon, had been suddenly occupied by a Power which -they had taught themselves to contemn as an inferior. Until the summer -of 1866 the Emperor Napoleon fancied that he was strong enough to play -with the Prussian Minister a game of diplomatic finesse; indeed, he -seems to have thought that the Pomeranian gentleman would be an easy -prey; but having thus put it to the proof, he did not concur in the -maxim that it is as pleasant to be cheated as to cheat, especially -when the result is chiefly due to complaisant self-deception. On the -other hand, Herr von Bismarck had no longer any delusions concerning -Louis Napoleon. If, at an early period, when the English Radicals were -considering whether the new Emperor was “stupid,” a proposition they -had taken for granted theretofore, he had over-estimated the capacity -of the self-styled “parvenu,” later experience had reduced the estimate -to just proportions, and had produced a correct judgment upon the -character of one who, down to the last, was always taken for more than -he was worth. If any one knew him well, it was probably his cousin, -the Duc de Morny, and M. St. Marc Girardin has preserved a sentence -which is an illuminative commentary upon so many curious transactions -during the Second Empire. “The greatest difficulty with the Emperor,” -said De Morny, “is to remove from his mind a fixed idea, and to give -him a steadfast will.” His fixed ideas were not always compatible -one with another. He professed great devotion to the “principle of -nationalities;” yet he desired to carry the French frontiers as far as -the Rhine, adding further German populations and Flemish towns whose -inhabitants are not French to those acquired by Louis XIV. He wished -for peace, no doubt, when he said that the Empire was synonymous with -that word, but he also hungered for the fruits of war; and, knowing -that his internal position and his external projects required, to -uphold the one and realize the other, a strong and complete army, he -had neither the wit to construct a trustworthy instrument, nor the -ceaseless industry needed to make the most of an inferior product, nor -that absolute independence of the party whose audacity gave him his -crown, which would have enabled him to select, in all cases, the best -officers for the higher and highest commands. Before, and during the -war of 1866, he wavered between two lines of policy, hoping to combine -the advantages of both; and when it was over he demanded compensation -for his “services” as an alarmed spectator, although he had made no -bargain for payment, but had stood inactive because he conjectured that -it would be the more profitable course. - - - _French demands for the Rhine._ - -In making that calculation he erred profoundly. M. Benedetti, the -French Ambassador to the Court of Berlin, was instructed as early as -the first week in August, 1866, to claim the left bank of the Rhine -as far as, and including the important fortress of Mainz. “Knowing -the temper of the Minister-President,” and knowing also, as he had -repeatedly told his Government, that all Germany would resist any -proposal to cede the least portion of territory, he first sent in a -copy of M. Drouyn de Lhuys’ despatch, and afterwards called on the -Minister. Prince von Bismarck, in 1871, published in the official -newspapers his account of the famous interview, which shows that -Benedetti, as he had pledged himself to do, resolutely pressed the -large demand. He was told that it meant war, and that he had “better -go to Paris to prevent a rupture.” Unmoved, he replied that he would -return home, “but only to maintain a proposition the abandonment of -which would imperil the dynasty.” “The parting words” of the Prussian -statesman to Count Benedetti, as nearly as they could be remembered by -the man who spoke them, were calculated to suggest grave reflections. -“Please to call His Majesty’s attention to this,” said Herr von -Bismarck. “Should a war arise out of this complication, it might be -a war attended by a revolutionary crisis. In such a case the German -dynasties are likely to prove more solid than that of the Emperor -Napoleon.” It was a menace and a prophetic warning, which touched -a sensitive fibre in the heart of the French ruler, who, after a -conversation with Count Benedetti, wrote, on the 12th of August, a -remarkable letter to M. de Lavalette, who became the _ad interim_ -successor of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Expressing his fears lest “the -journals” should taunt him with the refusal of his demand for the -Rhine provinces, he directed that the report should be contradicted, -flatly; and he added, “the true interest of France is not to obtain an -insignificant increase of territory, but to aid Germany in constituting -herself after a fashion which will be most favourable to our interests -and those of Europe.” Neither Dodona nor Delphos could have been more -oracular. Alarmed as he was, he did not altogether recede from his -position, but occupied it in a different way. On the 16th of August a -fresh set of proposals was forwarded to Count Benedetti, comprising a -regular scale of concessions—the frontiers of 1814 and the annexation -of Belgium, or Luxemburg and Belgium, or the Duchy with Belgium, -without Antwerp, which was to be “declared a free city.” The last-named -device was designed “to obviate the intervention of England” when the -projected act of violence was committed. “The _minimum_ we require,” -wrote the French Government to M. Benedetti, “is an ostensible treaty -which gives us Luxemburg, and a secret treaty which, stipulating for -an offensive and defensive alliance, leaves us the chance of annexing -Belgium at the right moment, Prussia engaging to assist us, by force -of arms, if necessary, in carrying out this purpose.” If Herr von -Bismarck asked what he should gain by such a treaty, the answer was -to be that he would secure a powerful ally, and that “he was only -desired to consent to the cession of what does not belong to him.” The -official papers on which these statements are founded were discovered -and acquired by the Germans in Cerçay, M. Rouher’s château, during -the war of 1870; neither their authenticity nor the construction put -on them have ever been contested; and they show, plainly, what was -the kind of projects nourished by the French Court in 1866–67. The -precise manner in which Count von Bismarck actually dealt with them -has not been revealed, but he kept a rough copy of the project drawn -up by Benedetti, which was handed to him by the French Ambassador in -1867, and the boxes of papers found at Cerçay gave him the draft treaty -itself annotated by the Emperor. Practically, the secret negotiation -dropped, was not renewed for several months, and was only “resumed, -subsequently, at various times,” without producing any other result -than that of letting Bismarck know the plans which were conceived in -Paris, and inducing him to keep the Napoleonic Government in play. -There can be no doubt on one point. The Prussian statesman did, at -various periods, probably at Biarritz in 1865, when he captivated -Prosper Merimée, and afterwards, while refusing point-blank to cede an -inch of German soil, ask his interested auditors why they could not -indemnify themselves by seizing Belgium. But a grim smile of irony must -have lighted up his face when he pointed to a prey which would not -have to be ceded, but caught and overpowered by main strength. He was -tempting, probing, playing with the Frenchman, employing what he called -the “dilatory” method, because he wanted time to equip the new and -still imperfect Germany; and, considering their own dark schemes, can -it be said that they deserved better treatment? - -Having direct knowledge of the steps taken by France in August, 1866, -the earliest recorded formal attempt to procure secret treaties on the -basis of territorial concessions, with what searching comment must -Bismarck have read the astonishing diplomatic circular, signed by M. -de Lavalette, and sent out on the 2nd of September, at the very time -when the dark proceedings just briefly sketched were in full swing! It -was a despatch framed for public consumption, and intended to present -the Imperial policy in a broad, generous, and philosophic light, -having no relation to the course which, either then or afterwards, -the French ruler followed. Louis Napoleon told the whole world that -France could not pursue “an ambiguous policy,” at the moment when -he was meditating the forcible acquisition of Belgium. The Emperor -painted himself as one who rejoiced in the change effected by the -war, perhaps because it shattered the treaties of 1815. Prussia, he -said, had insured the independence of Germany; and France need not see -in that fact any shadow cast over herself. “Proud of her admirable -unity, and indestructible nationality, she cannot oppose or condemn -the work of fusion going on in Germany.” By imitating, she took a step -nearer to, not farther from, France; and the Imperial philosopher -professed not to see why public opinion “should recognize adversaries, -instead of allies, in those nations which—enfranchised from a past -inimical to us—are summoned to new life.” But there was consolation -for those alarmed patriots who could read between the lines. Petty -states, they were assured, tended to disappear and give place to large -agglomerations; the Imperial Government had always understood that -annexations should only bring together kindred populations; and France, -especially, could desire only such additions as would not affect her -internal cohesiveness—sentences which, like finger-posts, pointed -to the acquisition of Belgium. The war of 1866, it was admitted, -showed the necessity of perfecting the organization of the army; yet -smooth things were predicted by the Imperial soothsayer, for, on the -whole, the horizon, in September, as scanned from Paris, seemed to -be clear of menacing possibilities, and a lasting peace was secure! -The despatch was, in fact, prepared and administered as a powerful -anodyne. By keeping the French moderately quiet, it suited the purposes -of Bismarck, who, well aware of the uneasiness which it covered, felt -quite equal to the task of coping with each fresh attempt to obtain -“compensation” as it might arise. Perhaps Louis Napoleon was sincere -when he dictated this interesting State paper, for it is not devoid of -some “fixed ideas” which he cherished; yet probably it may take rank -as a curious example of the subtle tactics which he often applied to -deceive himself, as well as to cajole his people and his neighbours. At -all events, his will, if he willed peace, did not endure for he soon -sanctioned and set in motion renewed projects, for he intended to push -forward the boundary posts of France. - - - _Luxemburg._ - -As he found Prussia polite yet intractable, and prompt to use plain -language, if concessions were demanded, the Emperor Napoleon formed, -or was advised to form, an ingenious plan whereby he hoped to secure -Luxemburg. He entered into secret negotiations with Holland for the -purchase of the Duchy. The Queen of Holland, a Princess of the House of -Würtemburg, was a keen partizan of France. She it was, who, in July, -1866, uttered a cry of warning which reached the Tuileries. “It is the -dynasty,” she wrote, “which is menaced by a powerful Germany and a -powerful Italy, and the dynasty will have to suffer the consequences. -When Venetia was ceded, you should have succoured Austria, marched on -the Rhine, and imposed your own conditions. To permit the destruction -of Austria is more than a crime, it is a blunder.” Perhaps the notion -that Luxemburg could be acquired by purchase came from this zealous, -clear-sighted, and outspoken lady. Wherever it may have originated, -the scheme was hotly pursued, negotiations were opened at the Hague, -the usual Napoleonic operations were actually begun to obtain a -plébiscite from the Duchy. Count von Bismarck was discreetly sounded -by M. Benedetti, with the usual indefinite result, and the consent of -the King of Holland was obtained without much difficulty. At the same -time there was a strong current of opposition in the Dutch Government, -and Prince Henry, the Governor of Luxemburg, made no secret of his -hostility. The King himself was subject to recurring tremors caused by -his reflections on the possible action of the Prussian Court; and his -alarms were only mitigated or allayed from time to time by assurances -based, in reality, on M. Benedetti’s “impressions” that the Chancellor -was not unfavourable to the plan of cession. The truth is that -M. Benedetti did not accurately perceive the position which Bismarck -had taken up from the outset. It might be thus expressed: “Luxemburg -belongs to the King of Holland. It is his to keep or give away. If you -want the Duchy, why don’t you take it, and with it the consequences, -which it is for you to forecast.” The French Court and its Ministers -still laboured under the belief that they could manage the Berlin -Government, and they put their own interpretation on the vague, perhaps -tempting language of the Chancellor. At a certain moment, the fear, -always lurking in the King of Holland’s breast, gained the mastery, -and he caused the secret to be disclosed to the public. “He would do -nothing without the consent of the King of Prussia;” and by revealing -the negotiations he forced on a decision. The incident which terrified -the King of Holland was, no doubt, startling. M. Thiers had made a -strong anti-German speech in the Chamber, and M. Rouher had developed -his theory of the “trois tronçons,” or triple division of Germany. -The Chancellor, who had acquired full knowledge of French pretensions -from French Ministers, answered both statesmen by printing, in the -foreground of the “Official Gazette,” the treaty which gave King -William the control of the Bavarian army, in case of war. That fact -also produced a decisive effect upon the Dutch monarch, who saw in this -characteristic indirect retort to the French parliamentary display -a menace specially directed against himself. Hence the revelation -sufficed to thwart the bargain, then so far finished that signatures -were alone wanting to render it binding. The German people fired up -at the bare mention of such a proposal as the cession of a German -province. M. de Moustier, vexed and taken aback, called on Bismarck -to restrain the passions of his countrymen, and vainly urged the Dutch -monarch to sign the treaties. On the morning of the day when he was to -be questioned in the Reichstag, Bismarck asked Benedetti whether he -would authorize the Minister to state in the Chamber that the treaties -had been signed at the Hague. The Ambassador could not give the -required authority, seeing that although the King, under conditions, -had pledged his word to the Emperor, the formal act had not been done, -because Prussia had not answered the appeal for consent from the Hague. -On April 1, 1867, while Napoleon was opening the Exhibition in Paris, -Herr von Bennigsen put his famous question respecting the current -rumours about a treaty of cession. If the French were not prepared for -the fierce outburst of Teutonic fervour, still less could they relish -the question put by Herr von Bennigsen and the answer which it drew -from the Chancellor. The former described the Duchy as an “ancient -province of the collective Fatherland,” and the latter, while “taking -into account the French nation’s susceptibilities,” and giving a brief -history of the position in which Luxemburg stood towards Germany, made -his meaning clear to the French Court. “The confederate Governments,” -he said, “are of opinion that no foreign power will interfere with -the indisputable rights of German States and German populations. They -hope to be able to vindicate and protect those rights by peaceful -negotiations, without prejudicing the friendly relations which Germany -has hitherto entertained with her neighbours.” Napoleon and his -advisers were not likely to misconstrue language which, although it -lacked the directness of Von Bennigsen’s sentences, obviously meant -that the French scheme could not be worked out. Indeed, a few days -earlier, the Chancellor had used a significant phrase. Answering a -question in the Chamber, he said:—“If the previous speaker can manage -to induce the Grand Duke (of Luxemburg) to come into the North German -Federation, he will be able to say that he has called an European -question into existence; what more, Time alone can show.” The phrase -could hardly have escaped the notice of M. de Moustier, and coupled -with the second reply, already quoted, gave rise to indignation not -unmixed with alarm. At first the Emperor seemed determined not to -recede, and he took counsel with his generals, who could not give him -encouragement, because they knew that the Government was absolutely -without the means of making even a respectable defence against an -invasion. The period of suspense at the Tuileries did not endure -long. Shortly after the scene in the Reichstag, the Prussian Minister -at the Hague brought the matter to a crisis by a message which he -delivered to the Dutch Government. The King of the Netherlands, he is -reported to have said, can act as he pleases, but he is responsible -for what he may do. If he had believed that the meditated cession -was a guarantee of peace, it was the Minister’s duty to destroy the -illusion. “My Government,” he added, “advises him in the most formal -manner, not to give up Luxemburg to France.” The blow was fatal; the -King of course, took the advice to heart, and such a stroke was all -the more deeply felt in Paris because there the Emperor, who had -considered the end gained, now knew from Marshal Niel that it would -be madness to provoke a war. Yet, unless a loophole of escape could -be found, war was imminent. M. de Moustier discovered a safe and -dignified line of retreat. The Chancellor had referred to the treaty -of 1839 which governed the status of Luxemburg; M. de Moustier took -him at his word, and virtually brought the dispute within the purview -of Europe, by formally demanding that the Prussian garrison should -be withdrawn. He held that since the German forces were practically -centred in the hands of Prussia, Luxemburg, no longer a mere defensive -post, had become a menace to France. In this contention there was much -truth, seeing that the new Confederation of the North, and its allies -in the South, constituted a political and military entity far more -formidable and mobile than the old Bund. When the Chancellor refused -a demand, which his adversaries assert he was at one time prepared -to grant, the French Government, declaring that they had no wish -for other than friendly relations with Berlin, appealed to Europe. -The dispute ended in a compromise arranged as usual beforehand, and -settled at a conference held in London. The garrison was withdrawn, -the fortifications were to be razed, and the Duchy, like Belgium, was -thenceforth to be neutral ground, covered by a collective guarantee of -the Powers; but it still remained within the German Zollverein. - -There were at work several influences which largely operated to -determine a peaceful issue. The French possessed no real army, and -the Emperor had only just begun to think about the needful military -organization on a new model; he had, besides, on hand an international -Exhibition, by which he set great store; and in addition a summons to -withdraw a garrison did not provide a _casus belli_ certain to secure -the support of public opinion. Nor did the Prussian Government consider -the moment opportune, or the question raised a suitable ground on -which to determine the inveterate cause of quarrel between France and -Germany. Upon this subject Dr. Busch has recorded some characteristic -observations made by the Chancellor, at Versailles, in 1870. “I -remember,” he said, “when I was at the Paris Exhibition of 1867, I -thought to myself ‘how would it have been by now, if we had fought out -the Luxemburg quarrel? Should I be in Paris, or the French in Berlin?’ -We were not nearly as strong then as we are now. The Hanoverians and -Hessians of that day could not have supplied us with so many good -soldiers as to-day. As for the Schleswig-Holsteiners, who have lately -been fighting like lions, they had no army at all. The Saxon army was -broken up, and had to be entirely reconstructed. And there was but -little to be expected from the South Germans. What splendid fellows the -Würtembergers are now, quite magnificent! but in 1866 no soldier could -help laughing at them, as they marched into Frankfort like a civic -guard. Nor was all well with the Baden forces; the Grand Duke has done -a great deal for them since then. Doubtless public opinion throughout -Germany was with us, if we had chosen to make war about Luxemburg. But -that would not have made up for all those shortcomings.” It is plain, -from this retrospective comment, which comes in aid of other evidence, -that the great conflict, deferred to 1870, was nearly brought about in -1867, and that France was saved from utter rout, at that early period, -by the operation of a set of influences over which neither of the -principal actors had full control. The Franco-Dutch negotiation was -the last attempt which the Emperor Napoleon made to obtain territory -by direct or furtive diplomatic processes. In the early stages of the -risky business he had full confidence in his own ascendancy, not to say -“preponderance” in European councils. He was rudely undeceived. Herr -von Bismarck had tempted him with all kinds of suggestions, but the -Emperor himself, his Ministers and Ambassadors had been content to take -the “impressions,” which they derived from confidential conversations, -for definite, binding promises. One French agent correctly described -the fact when he said that “Herr von Bismarck is ready, not to offer -us compensations, but to allow us to take them;” he might have added, -“if we can and at our own risk.” There is no published evidence that -the Prussian statesman ever offered to cede Luxemburg, or sanction -the annexation of Belgium, or preclude himself from adopting, at -any conjuncture, the line which appeared most accordant with German -interests. On the contrary, long after the interviews at Biarritz and -in Paris, and the battle of Sadowa, Napoleon III., to use his own -terms, wanted, at least, “une certitude relative” that the Prussian -Government would not interpose any obstacle in the way of French -“aggrandizement” in the North. He asked, not for words, but an act -which he could never obtain; and the Luxemburg incident proved to -him conclusively that nothing could be gained by making demands on -the Court of Prussia. In 1867 and afterwards in November, 1870, -according to Dr. Busch, Bismarck described with his usual frankness the -hesitation of the Emperor. He had not understood his advantages, in -1866, when he might have done a good business, although not on German -soil, was the earlier commentary. The later was more illuminative. -“In the summer of 1866,” said Bismarck, “Napoleon had not the pluck -to do what was the right thing from his point of view. He ought—well, -he ought to have taken possession of the subject of Benedetti’s -proposal [Belgium], when we were marching against the Austrians, and -have held it in pawn for whatever might happen. At that time we could -not stop him and it was not likely that England would attack him—at -least he might have waited to see.” On this it may be observed that -the influence of Lord Cowley and Lord Clarendon would probably have -sufficed to turn him from such a plan had it entered into the Emperor’s -mind; and had he delivered the blow, in defiance of their protests, -or without consulting them, England, at that time, would have been -enraged at the treachery, and would have certainly occupied Antwerp. -The Emperor was a man who caressed audacious projects which he had not -always the nerve and courage to carry out. What is more astonishing, he -did not or could not provide the means essential to the accomplishment -of his desires. Thus the precedent afforded by his conduct in 1866 was -followed in 1867, and in each case the result was the same—vexatious -failure. - - - _An Interlude of Peace._ - -The war-clouds sank below the horizon, the Paris Exhibition was duly -opened, sovereigns and princes, statesmen and generals, journeyed to -the French capital, and the Court of the Tuileries gave itself up to -amusement, gaiety, and dissipation, neglecting nothing which could give -pleasure to its illustrious guests. It was the last hour of splendour, -the sunset of the Empire. Yet the brilliant scenes, which followed each -other day by day, were even then flecked with dark shades. If politics -were evaded or ignored in the palace, they were not absent from the -highways. Polish hatred found vent in the attempt of Berezowski to slay -the unfortunate Emperor Alexander II., and M. Floquet shouted in his -ear as he passed through the Courts of Justice, “Vive la Pologne!” The -crime and the insult augured ill for the future of that Franco-Russian -alliance which Charles X. endeavoured to establish and certain French -statesmen have always sighed for. M. Hansen records a sharp observation -made by Prince Gortchakoff during the Polish insurrection which the -Western Powers regarded with friendly eyes. The Vice-Chancellor held -that France and Russia were natural allies, because their interests -were the same. “If the Emperor Napoleon will not admit it,” he roughly -said, “so much the worse for him. Governments vanish, nations remain.” -Still, in 1867, he did not find the nation more favourable than the -Government had been in 1864. Twenty years later, although Russia had -become less unpopular, at least with the politicians, and a yearning -for a Russian alliance had gathered strength, the ultras proved how -little they understood some conditions essential to its gratification -by clamoring for the pardon and liberation of Berezowski! The Prussian -King and Queen were not exposed to any outrage, and the Parisians gazed -with curiosity upon Bismarck and Moltke, whom they admired, and had -not yet learned to detest; but the sparkling and joyful assemblies, -although the actors, on both sides, were doubtless sincere at the -time, nevertheless suggests a famous incident in the French Revolution -which figures on historical pages as “le baiser de l’amourette.” And -underneath the shining surface were concealed gnawing anxieties and -fears. The Emperor Napoleon had dreamed that he could found a Mexican -empire, and he had induced the Austrian Archduke Maximilian to accept -at his hands an Imperial crown. The enterprise, which was pushed on by -French troops, not only failed, but irritated England, who had been -deceived, and offended the United States, whose Government, victors in -a civil war, would not tolerate the establishment of the “Latin race” -in the centre of the huge continent. Not only had it become necessary -to recall the troops, but to bear a still deeper misfortune—if the -word may be applied to the consequences of a reckless and unscrupulous -adventure. It was while opening the Exhibition that the earliest hints -reached the Emperor of an event which dealt him a heavy blow; and, -on the eve of the day fixed for the distribution of prizes to the -competitors he had assembled, came the confirmation of the dreaded -intelligence, whispered weeks before. The gallant Archduke and Emperor -Maximilian, who had fallen into the hands of the triumphant and -implacable Mexicans, had been tried and shot, a deed which his French -patron was powerless to avenge. - - - _The Salzburg Interview._ - -The tragedy of Quaretaro reacted upon European politics, and -incidentally emphasized afresh the perennial antagonism between France -and Germany. Still smarting from the wounds of 1866, Austria hungered -for an ally, and the Saxon Count von Beust, whom the Emperor Francis -Joseph had made his Chancellor, was eager to try one more fall with -Count von Bismarck. Swayed by political reasons, the Austrian Emperor -not only did not resent the death of his brother, but was even willing -to welcome as his guest Louis Napoleon, who had so successfully seduced -the Archduke by dangling before him the bait of an Imperial crown. The -French Emperor and his Empress, therefore, travelled in state through -South Germany to Salzburg, where they met their Austrian hosts. The -occasion was, nominally, one of condolence and mourning, and the vain -regrets on both sides were doubtless genuine. Yet it so chanced that -the days spent in the lovely scenery of Salzburg were given up to gay -mirth and feasting—not to sorrow and gloom; and that the irrepressible -spirit of politics intruded on the brilliant company gathered round -an open grave. Both emperors felt aggrieved; one by the loss of his -high estate in Germany and his Italian provinces, the other because -his demand for the Rhenish territory had been rejected, and he had not -been allowed to take Belgium or buy Luxemburg. The common enemy was -Prussia, who had worsted Austria in battle, and France in diplomacy -and at Salzburg, perhaps earlier, the ground plans were sketched for -an edifice which the architects trusted might be built up sufficiently -large and strong to contain, at least, two allies. The sketch was -vague, yet it was definite enough at least to reveal the designs of the -draughtsmen; and the Emperors returned home still in jubilation. - -Perhaps the Emperor Napoleon suffered some pangs of disappointment. -“Austria was his last card,” says M. Rothan, who, from the French -standpoint, has so keenly studied the period preceding the war of -1870. He wanted an offensive and defensive alliance, which Austria -would not accord, Count von Beust fearing that so grave a fact would -never escape the lynx-eyes of Bismarck, who, when it came to his -knowledge, would not fail to provoke a war before either ally had -fully, or even partially, completed his military preparations, then -so much in arrear. Not only were they backward in 1867, but Austria, -at all events, was still unprovided in 1870. The Archduke Albrecht, -who visited Paris during the month of February of that year, impressed -the fact on the Emperor Napoleon. “The story runs,” says M. Rothan, -“that, after having quitted the study of his Majesty, the Archduke -returned, and; through the half-opened door, exclaimed, ’sire, above -all things do not forget, whatever may happen, that we shall not be in -a fit state to fall into line before a year.’” Hence, it may well be -that the Austrian Chancellor was even then determined, in case of a -conflict, to shape his policy in accordance with the first victories; -and that the meditations of the Emperor Napoleon, as he re-crossed the -Rhine, were tinged with bitter reflections on his political isolation. -A little later, when he knew that Bismarck had discovered the drift -of the conversation at Salzburg, his anxieties must have become more -poignant. That Chancellor, who had secured afresh the goodwill of -Russia, and beheld with satisfaction the effect of the Imperial display -on Germany, enlarged, in a circular despatch, on the proof thus once -more afforded that German national feeling could not endure “the mere -notion” of “foreign tutelage” where the interests of the Fatherland -were concerned. Germany had a right to mould her own fortunes and -frame her own constitution. So that, as Von Buest had foreseen, the -dreaded Chancellor had promptly turned to account even the colloquies -of Salzburg. “France, with one hand,” he said, “presents us with -soothing notes, and with the other permits us to see the point of her -sword.” There was no open quarrel between the two antagonists, but each -suspected and closely watched the other. M. Rothan, himself a vigilant -and zealous official, furnishes an amusing example. In November, 1866, -he learned from “a Foreign minister accredited to a South German -Court,” what was to him the appalling fact that the Imperial work -of mediation at Nikolsburg had been counteracted, “even before it -had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Prague.” He referred to the now -famous military treaties. M. de X―, his informant, he says, obtained -his knowledge of the secret by a sort of inquisitorial method, “a la -façon d’un juge d’instruction,” that is, he affirmed the existence -of the documents, and thus extorted confessions, express or implied. -“The Bavarian Foreign Minister,” he said, blushed; “the Minister of -Würtemberg was confused; the Minister of Baden did not deny it, and -the Minister of Hesse avowed everything.” Further, M. de X― asserted -that, when it was no longer necessary to keep France in good humour, -Prussia would enforce the clauses which gave her supreme command, and -would bring the Southern armies into harmony with her own organization. -Apparently, this authentic information did not obtain a ready belief -in the autumn of 1866; but it alarmed and disturbed the French Court, -and the public confirmation of the unwelcome report, less than a year -afterwards, visible to all men in the actual re-organization of the -Southern armies, together with the failure to purchase Luxemburg, still -further increased the suspicion, deepened the alarm, and aroused the -indignation of the Emperor at the slights inflicted on France, who, as -the “predominant” Continental power and the “vanguard of civilization,” -always considered that she ought to have her own way. - - - _The Emperor seeks Allies._ - -In the beginning of 1868 the principal parties were engaged in -preparing for a conflict which each considered to be inevitable; -and the other Powers, great and small, more or less concerned, were -agitated by hopes and fears. Russia desired to recover her freedom -of movement in the East, and especially to throw off what Prince -Gortchakoff called his “robe de Nessus,” the clause in the treaty -of Paris which declared the Euxine to be a neutral sea. Austria -aimed at the restoration of her authority in Germany, and was not -yet convinced that her path lay eastward. Italy had many longings, -but her pressing necessity was to seat herself in the capital of the -Cæsars and the Popes, once again occupied by the French, who had -re-entered the Papal States to expel the Garibaldians. It was in the -skirmish at Mentana that the new breech-loading rifle, the Chassepot, -“wrought miracles,” according to General de Failly, and established -its superiority over the “needle gun.” Holland, Belgium, and even -Switzerland were troubled by the uncertain prospect which the Imperial -theory of “large agglomerations” had laid bare; Spain was in the -throes of a revolutionary convulsion; and England—she had just mended -her constitution, and had begun to look on Continental politics with -relative indifference, except in so far as they affected the fortunes -of “parties,” and might be used strategically as a means of gaining -or holding fast the possession of power. Yet so strained were the -relations of France and Prussia that General von Moltke actually -framed, in the spring of 1868, the plan of campaign which he literally -carried out in 1870—a fact implying that even then he considered -that his Government was sufficiently prepared to encounter the new -and imperfectly developed scheme of army organization and armament -originally devised by the Emperor and Marshal Niel, and modified -to satisfy the objections and suspicions raised in a deferential -Senate and an obliging Chamber of Deputies. For while the Opposition -distrusted the Emperor, the whole body shrank from the sacrifices -which Cæsar and his Minister of War considered necessary to the safety -of the State from a defensive, and absolutely indispensable from an -offensive point of view. The prime actors in the drama expressed a love -of peace, perhaps with equal sincerity: but as Germany thirsted for -unity, all the more because France, true to her traditional policy, -forbad it, the love so loudly avowed could not be gratified unless -Germany submitted, or France ceased to dictate. “I did not share the -opinion of those politicians,” said Bismarck in July, 1870, “who -advised me not to do all I could to avoid war with France because it -was inevitable. Nobody,” he added, “can exactly foresee the purposes -of Divine Providence in the future; and I regard even a victorious -war as an evil from which statesmanship should strive to preserve -nations. I could not exclude from my calculations the possibility that -chances might accrue in France’s constitution and policy which might -avert the necessity of war from two great neighbour races—a hope in -connection with which every postponement of a rupture was so much to -the good.” The language is a little obscure, but the meaning will be -grasped when it is remembered that his remark on the “chances” referred -to the probable grant of increased freedom to the French Parliament, -which he thought would fetter the Court and thwart the politicians. -That forecast was not justified by the event, since it was the -partially-liberated Chamber and the Liberal Ministry which so hastily -sanctioned the declaration of war. The truth is, however, that each -rival nationality inherited the liabilities contracted in the past. The -French had been accustomed for more than two hundred years to meddle -directly in Germany and find there allies, either against Austria, -Prussia, or England; and the habit of centuries had been more than -confirmed by the colossal raids, victories, and annexations of -Napoleon I. A Germany which should escape from French control and -reverse, by its own energetic action the policy of Henri IV., -Richelieu, Louis XIV., his degenerate grandson, Louis XV, and of the -great Napoleon himself, was an affront to French pride, and could not -be patiently endured. The opposing forces which had grown up were so -strong that the wit of man was unable to keep them asunder; and all the -control over the issue left to kings and statesmen was restricted to -the fabrication of means wherewith to deliver or sustain the shock, and -the choice of the hour, if such choice were allowed. - -To that end the adversaries had, indeed, applied themselves after the -last French failure to obtain any material compensation, not even what -M. Rouher called such a rag of territory as Luxemburg. Thenceforth, -keeping an eye on Prussia, the French Government sought to gain over -Austria and Italy, and form a defensive alliance which, at the fitting -moment, might be converted into an offensive alliance strong enough to -prevent the accomplishment of German unity, win campaigns, and enable -each confederate to grasp the reward which he desired. Carried on -during more than two years, the negotiations never got beyond a kind -of vague preliminary understanding which signified the willingness of -the three Courts to reach a definite, formal treaty if they could. -But obstacles always arose when the vital questions lying at the -root of the business had to be solved. Italy demanded and Austria -was willing that she should have Rome. To that France steadfastly -demurred, even down to the last moment, as will presently be seen. -Austria also, besides being unready, in a military sense, was visited -by the chronic fear that, if she plunged into war against Germany, -Russia would at once break into her provinces from Lithuania and the -Polish Quadrilateral, and settle the heavy account opened when Prince -Schwarzenberg displayed his “immense ingratitude” during the Crimean -war. Nor was the Court of Vienna exempt from apprehensions growing out -of the possible, even probable conduct of half-reconciled Hungary. -Count von Beust also deluded himself with the notion that the Prussian -treaties with the South German States were mere “rags of paper,” and -nourished the fond belief, except when he had a lucid interval, that -the South German people would not fight for the Fatherland. Waiting on -Providence, the would-be confederates, at the same time, counted on -the fortune of war, arguing that France was certain to win at first, -and that one victory under the tricolour would bring the inchoate -alliance instantly to maturity, and the armies it controlled into the -field. Based on such conjectural foundations, and opposed by such solid -obstacles, the grand design was doomed to fail; indeed it never got -nearer to completion than an exchange of letters by the Sovereigns; -grounded on the very eve, and went to pieces on the day of battle. - -Diverted from Luxemburg, the French Government did not relax its -efforts to pave the way for the annexation of Belgium. During the -spring and summer of 1869 a successful effort was made to secure -political, commercial, and strategic advantages by obtaining a certain -control over the Belgian railways, notably the line which runs -from Luxemburg to Liège, and thence to the North Sea ports. These -proceedings, of course, did not escape notice at Berlin, where the ends -in view were perfectly appreciated; but they form only a petty incident -in the great struggle, and can only be mentioned with brevity in order -to indicate its growth. It may be stated here that, in 1873, the German -Chancellor reversed the process, and secured for his Government the -control of the Luxemburg lines. Another railway question which cropped -up in May, 1870, was the famous railway which, by means of an ingenious -tunnel within the Alps near St. Gothard, placed Germany in direct -communication with Italy through neutral territory. Count von Bismarck -openly said it was a Prussian interest, and the Northern Confederation -paid a part of the cost, which aroused indignation in France. At one -moment it seemed possible that this enterprise would serve as a _casus -belli_; but the French Government, after careful deliberation, decided, -in June, 1870, that they could not reasonably oppose the project, -although it certainly was regarded at the Foreign Office in Paris as -a further proof of German antagonism, and a sort of bribe tendered to -Italy. Since the beginning of the year France had been in the enjoyment -of certain Liberal concessions made by the Emperor, and confirmed, in -May, by the famous “plébiscite,” which gave him a majority of more -than five millions. Now, although the Emperor’s reflections on this -triumphant result of an appeal to universal suffrage were embittered -by the knowledge that large numbers of soldiers had helped to swell -the million and a half of Frenchmen who voted “No,” still the Foreign -Minister and his agents, according to M. Ollivier, were so elated -that they exclaimed with pride, “Henceforth, all negotiations are -easy to the Government,” since the world thoroughly understood that, -for France, peace would never mean “complaisance or effacement.” Yet -Prince Napoleon, in his brief sketch of these critical months, says -plainly that the Government concerned itself less with foreseeing the -political complications which might lead up to war, than with the best -mode of proceeding when war arrived. So true is this, that a General -was sent to Vienna to discuss the bases of a campaign with the Austrian -War Office. But in the spring of 1870 fortune seemed to smile on -official France; and on the last day of June M. Ollivier, instructed -by the Foreign Minister, considered himself authorized to boast before -the admiring Deputies that the peace of Europe had never been less -in danger than it was at the moment when he delivered his optimistic -declaration. In England, also, the Foreign Secretary could not discern -“a cloud in the sky.” - - - _The Hohenzollern Candidature._ - -One week later, not only M. Ollivier and Lord Granville, but Europe, -nay, the whole world, saw plainly enough the signs and portents -of discord and convulsion. On the 3rd of July the Duc de Gramont -learned from the French Minister at Madrid that Prince Leopold of -Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, with his own full consent, had been selected -as a candidate for the vacant throne of Spain, and that, at no -distant date, the Cortes would be formally requested to elect him. -The French Government quivered with indignation, and the political -atmosphere of Paris became hot with rage. Not that the former were -unfamiliar with the suggestion. It had been made in 1869, considered, -and apparently abandoned. Indeed, the Emperor himself had, at one -time, when he failed to obtain the Rhenish provinces, proposed that -they should be formed into a State to be ruled by the King of Saxony, -and at another, that the Sovereign should be the Hereditary Prince -of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen; the very Prince put forward by Marshal -Prim. He had been grievously hampered and perplexed in the choice of -a Sovereign of Spain by some Powers, especially by France; but now -the Imperial Government turned the whole tide of its resentment, not -upon Madrid, but Berlin, which, it was assumed, aimed at establishing -an enemy to France beyond the Pyrenees. Explanations were demanded -directly from the Prussian Government, but M. Le Sourd, the chargé -d’affaires, could extract no other answer than this—that the Prussian -Government knew nothing about the matter. The Duc de Gramont, who -had succeeded Lavalette, in May, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, -regarded the statement as a subterfuge, and forthwith determined to -fasten on the King a responsibility which he could not fasten on the -Government. The Duc de Gramont was not a wise counsellor; he was deep -in negotiations having for their object an offensive and defensive -alliance against Prussia, and he was hardly less moved by a noisy -external opinion than by his own political passions. He ordered M. -Benedetti, who had only just sought repose at Wildbad, to betake -himself at once to Ems, whither King William, according to custom, -had repaired to drink the waters. The French Ambassador reached the -pleasant village on the Lahn late at night on the 8th of July, and the -next day began a series of interviews with the King, which take rank -among the most curious examples of diplomacy recorded in history. - -Before the ambassador could commence his singular task, an event -had occurred in Paris which seemed to render a war unavoidable. The -politicians of the French capital had become feverish with excitement. -Not only did a species of delirium afflict the immediate advisers of -the Emperor, but the band of expectants, who, more ardent Imperialists -than he was, still believed that nothing could withstand the French -army; while the opposition, loving France not less, but what they -called liberty more, were eager to take advantage of an incident which -seemed likely to throw discredit on the Bonapartes. Wisdom would have -prevented, but party tactics demanded a movement in the Chamber which -took the innocent-looking form of an inquiry. The Government dreaded, -yet could not evade, the ordeal, and M. Cochery put his question on the -6th of July. Had the Duc de Gramont been a clever Minister, or had he -represented a Government strongly rooted in the national respect and -affection, he would have been able to deliver a colourless response, if -he could not have based a refusal to answer upon public grounds. The -truth is, he was carried off his feet by the sudden storm which raged -through the journals and society, and it may be surmised that, even -then, despite the plébiscite, fears for the stability of the dynasty -had no small share in determining his conduct. Yet, it must be stated, -that he was only one of the Council of Ministers who sanctioned the use -of language which read, and still reads, like an indirect declaration -of war. After expressing sympathy with Spain, and asserting, what -was not true, that the Imperial Government had observed a strict -neutrality with regard to the several candidates for the crown, he -struck a note of defiance: “We do not believe,” he exclaimed, “that -respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliges us to endure -that a foreign State, by placing one of its princes on the throne of -Charles V., should be able to derange, to our injury, the balance of -power in Europe, and to imperil the interests and honour of France.” -The pacific sentences uttered by M. Ollivier on this memorable occasion -were forgotten; the trumpet-blast of the Duc de Gramont rang through -the world, and still rings in the memory. Prussia was not named by -the Minister, but everyone beyond the Rhine knew who was meant by -the “German people,” and a “foreign Power;” while, as Benedetti has -stated in a private despatch to Gramont, the King deeply felt it as a -“provocation.” - -Not the least impressive characteristic of these proceedings is the -hot haste in which they hurried along. M. Benedetti neither in that -respect nor in the swiftness and doggedness which he imparted to the -negotiations, is to blame. The impulse and the orders came from Paris; -he somewhat tempered the first, but he obeyed the second with zeal, -and, without overstepping the limits of propriety in the form, he -did not spare the King in the substance of his demands. Nor, in the -first instance, were they other than those permitted by diplomatic -precedent; afterwards they certainly exceeded these limits. The first -was that the King himself should press Prince Leopold to withdraw his -consent: indeed, direct him so to do. The answer was that, as King, he -had nothing to do with the business; that as head of the Hohenzollern -family he had been consulted, and had not encouraged or opposed the -wish of the Prince to accept the proffered crown; that he would still -leave him entire freedom to act as he pleased, but that his Majesty -would communicate with Prince Antoine, the father of Prince Leopold, -and learn his opinion. With this reply, unable to resist the plea for -delay, the ambassador had perforce to be content. Not so the Imperial -Government. The Duc de Gramont sent telegram on telegram to Ems, urging -Benedetti to transmit an explicit answer from the King, saying that -he had ordered Prince Leopold to give up the project, and alleging, -as a reason for haste, that the French could not wait longer, since -Prussia might anticipate them by calling out the army. The ambassador, -to check this hurry, prudently warned his principals, saying, that -if they ostentatiously prepared for war, then the calamity would be -inevitable. “If the King,” wrote De Gramont, on the 10th of July, -“will not advise the Prince to renounce his design—well, it is war -at once, and in a few days we shall be on the Rhine.” And so on from -hour to hour. A little wearied, perhaps, by the pertinacity of the -ambassador, and nettled by the attempt to fix on him the responsibility -for the Spanish scheme, the King at length said that he looked every -moment for an answer from Sigmaringen, which he would transmit without -delay. It is impossible, in a few sentences, to give the least idea -of the terrier-like obstinacy displayed by M. Benedetti in attacking -the King. Indeed, it grew to be almost a persecution, so thoroughly -did he obey his importunate instructions. At length the King was able -to say that Prince Antoine’s answer would arrive on the 13th, and the -ambassador felt sure of a qualified success, inasmuch as he would -obtain the Prince’s renunciation, sanctioned by King William. But, -while he was writing his despatch, a new source of vexation sprang up -in Paris—the Spanish Ambassador, Señor Olozaga, announced to the Duc -de Gramont the fact that Prince Antoine, on behalf of his son, had -notified at Madrid the withdrawal of his pretensions to the crown. It -was reasonably assumed that, having attained the object ostensibly -sought, the French Government would be well content with a diplomatic -victory so decisive, and would allow M. Benedetti to rest once more at -Wildbad. He himself held stoutly that the “satisfaction” accorded to -the wounded interests and honour of France was not insufficient. The -Emperor and the Duc de Gramont thought otherwise, because, as yet, no -positive defeat had been inflicted, personally, upon King William. The -Foreign Minister, therefore, obeying precise instructions from St. -Cloud, directed Benedetti to see the King at once, and demand from him -a plain declaration that he would not, at any future time, sanction -any similar proposal coming from Prince Leopold. The Duc de Gramont’s -mind was so constructed that, at least a year afterwards, he did not -regard this demand as an ultimatum! Yet how could the King, and still -more Bismarck, take it in any other light? Early on the 13th the -King, who saw the ambassador in the public garden, advanced to meet -him, and it was there that he refused, point blank, Louis Napoleon’s -preposterous and uncalled-for request, saying that he neither could nor -would bind himself in an engagement without limit of time, and applying -to every case; but that he should reserve his right to act according -to circumstances. King William brought this interview to a speedy -close, and M. Benedetti saw him no more except at the railway station -when he started for Coblenz. Persistency had reached and stepped over -the limits of the endurable, and King William could not do more than -send an aide-de-camp with a courteous message, giving M. Benedetti -authority to say officially that Prince Leopold’s recent resolution -had his Majesty’s approval. During the day the ambassador repeated, -unsuccessfully, his request for another audience; and this dramatic -episode ended on the 13th with the departure of the King, who had -pushed courtesy to its utmost bounds. - -During that eventful 13th of July Count Bismarck, recently arrived in -Berlin from Pomerania, had seen and had spoken to Lord Augustus Loftus -in language which plainly showed how steadfastly he kept his grip on -the real question, which was that France sought to gain an advantage -over “Prussia,” as some kind of compensation for Königgrätz. The Duc -de Gramont also conversed with Lord Lyons in Paris, and induced him to -set in motion Lord Granville, from whose ingenious brain came forth a -plausible compromise wholly unsuitable to the exigency, and promptly -rejected at Berlin, but having an air of fairness which made it look -well in the pages of a Blue Book. It was a last effort on the part of -diplomacy, and served well enough to represent statesmanship as it -was understood by the Cabinet to which Lord Granville belonged. On -the evening of that day Count Bismarck entertained at dinner General -von Moltke and General von Roon; and the host read aloud to them a -telegram from Ems, giving an account of what had occurred, and the -royal authority to make the story public. “Both Generals,” writes Dr. -Moritz Busch, “regarded the situation as still peaceful. The Chancellor -observed—that would depend a good deal upon the tone and contents of -the publication he had just been authorized to make. In the presence of -his two guests he then put together some extracts from the telegram, -which were forthwith despatched to all the Prussian Legations abroad, -and to the Berlin newspapers in the following form:—‘Telegram from -Ems, July 13th, 1870. When the intelligence of the Hereditary Prince -of Hohenzollern’s renunciation was communicated by the Spanish to -the French Government, the French Ambassador demanded of His Majesty -the King, at Ems, that the latter should authorize him to telegraph -to Paris that His Majesty would pledge himself for all time to come -never again to give his consent, should the Hohenzollerns hark back to -their candidature. Upon this His Majesty refused to receive the French -Ambassador again, and sent the aide-de-camp in attendance to tell him -that His Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the Ambassador.’” - - * * * * * - -Substantially, it was the grotesque pile of misrepresentation -built up on this blunt telegram—M. Benedetti read it next morning -in the “Cologne Gazette,” and took no exception whatever to the -brief and exact narrative it contained—which set the Parisians on -fire. Travestied in many ways by calculating politicians, as well as -gossips, the message became a “Note,” or a “despatch,” imputing the -extreme of intentional rudeness to King William, and imposing the -depth of humiliation, publicly inflicted, upon France through her -representative, who, all the time, was not only unconscious of any -insult, but emphatic in his acknowledgments of the King’s courtesy, -kindness, and patience. Probably Count Bismarck wrote his telegram for -Germany, but its effect in satisfying the Fatherland, was not greater -than its influence upon the fiery French, who never read the text until -months afterwards, and in July, 1870, were set a-flame by the distorted -versions freely supplied by rumour’s forked tongue. - - - _The French Government and the Chamber._ - -War was now plainly inevitable, yet the decisive word still rested -with the Imperial Government. In Paris there were two currents running -strongly in opposite ways, and, for a moment, it seemed possible that -the tide which made for peace would overpower the surging stream which -drove onwards towards war. More than one-half the Ministry believed, -and some, M. Ollivier for one, said that the retreat of Prince Leopold, -with the consent of the King, a great diplomatic victory for France, -was enough, and had, indeed, brought the quarrel to an end. At midday, -on the 13th, M. Robert Mitchell, meeting M. Paul de Cassagnac, said, -“I have just left Ollivier, and, thank God, peace is secured.” “My -father,” was the reply, “has just quitted the Emperor; war is resolved -on.” The statement was not then exact, but it may be accepted as a -forecast. For, in truth, it was only at noon the next day that the -Ministers assembled in council at the Tuileries to answer the momentous -question which so profoundly agitated their minds. They sat six -hours; they were divided in opinion; yet, although Marshal Lebœuf was -authorized to call out the reserves—he had threatened to resign unless -that were done—the Ministers separated with the understanding that a -peaceful line of action should be adopted, based on a demand for a -Congress of the Powers to sanction the principle that no member of any -reigning house should accept a foreign throne. The Duc de Gramont’s -brief account of this notable Council shows that the hankering after -war was powerful therein; since he says that “the Government decided, -not without hesitation, but influenced by a love of peace, to propose -this pacific solution.” But all, or some of the Ministers, and still -more the Emperor, stood in dread of two things: they were alarmed lest -the “dynasty” should be injured by a course which bore the semblance -of a forced retreat, and they could not rely with confidence on the -sober opinion of the Chambers. The Court war-party operated upon the -Senators and Deputies through M. Clément Duvernois, a schemer, and M. -Jérôme David, by birth and training a fanatical Bonapartist, the second -accentuating the questions of the first, and giving to his own language -a substance which made retreat almost impossible. Both these men had -a double object. They intended to extort a declaration of war and, at -the same time, expel Emile Ollivier, together with what they called the -Parliamentary element, from the Ministry. The energetic, aggressive -and relentless group were really the mouthpieces of the Emperor and -Empress, and in a less degree of M. Rouher, who had been deposed by the -new Imperial constitution, and of the Duc de Gramont, who all through -the business desired to secure a prolongation of peace, solely because -it would give him time to ripen the projects of alliance with Austria -and Italy, and also to make war, lest “la Prusse,” aware of his design, -should choose her own hour for battle. It so chanced that Marshal -Lebœuf, after despatching the orders calling out the reserves, received -a note from the Emperor, which, he says, seemed to suggest a regret -at the decision adopted by the Council; and thinking, innocent man, -that some constitutional scruples had sprung up in the Imperial mind, -the Marshal begged that the Ministers might be summoned once more. -That night they met again, talked for an hour, and had nearly resolved -that the mobilization of the army should be deferred, when papers were -placed in the hands of the Duc de Gramont. The exact contents of these -documents have not been described, but they seemed to have contained -some report of language held by Count Bismarck which exasperated the -war party; and, in an instant, the Council resolved on war. That same -night, M. Robert Mitchell, walking in the garden of the Foreign Office, -asked M. Ollivier why he did not resign? The Minister gave a host of -plausible reasons having no real weight; adding these prophetic words: -“Whatever happens, I am sacrificed; for the war will sweep away the -régime to which I have attached my name. If we are beaten, God protect -France! If we are victorious, God protect our Liberties!” - -So that, having a clear perception of the future, this Minister, -at least, met the Chambers on the morrow. The exciting events of -the past week, imperfectly understood and carelessly or purposely -misrepresented, had aroused a tempest of passion in Paris and France, -which, by its violence and uproar, overpowered, but could not wholly -silence, the voices of sagacity and sober judgment. The Senate was -unanimous for war. In the Chamber the Opposition waged courageously -a desperate contest, so desperate from the outset, that even M. -Thiers, perhaps because he told unpleasant truths, could not command -an unbroken hearing, while M. Gambetta only secured one by making a -rare display of forensic tact, basing himself on Parliamentary ground, -and tempering his appeal for “more light” with evidences of his -indisputable patriotism. The Duc de Gramont favoured the Senators with -a version of the facts, which was neither complete nor candid. M. Emile -Ollivier allowed an unhappy phrase to escape from his lips—he went -into the war “_à cœur leger_.” A committee was appointed to inspect -the diplomatic documents on which the Court relied; it was easily -satisfied, and late in the night, sustained by a large majority, the -policy of the Government was amply sanctioned. - -Perhaps a sentence spoken by M. Guyot Montpayroux best illustrates -the predominant feeling. “Prussia,” he said, “has forgotten the -France of Jena, and the fact must be recalled to her memory.” Thus -was war declared by these infuriated legislators on the night of -July 15th. M. Thiers, who desired a war with Prussia “at the proper -time,” has left on record his judgment that the hour then selected -was “detestably ill-chosen.” Yet even he and M. Gambetta were both -anxious that “satisfaction” should be obtained for Sadowa; while -the thought which animated the Court is admirably expressed in the -phrase imputed to the Empress who, pointing to the Prince Imperial, -said, “This child will never reign unless we repair the misfortunes -of Sadowa.” Such was the ceaseless refrain. The word haunted French -imaginations incessantly, and it was the pivot on which the Imperial -policy revolved, and it exercised a spell scarcely less powerful and -disastrous upon Monarchists like M. Thiers, and Republicans like -Gambetta and Jules Favre. Still, it may be said that France was -divided in opinion. Consulted through the Prefects, only sixteen -departments were for war; no fewer than thirty-four were adverse, and -the remainder could not be said to hold with the one or the other. -Nor should it be overlooked that these estimates of popular feeling -were transmitted by functionaries who have always a wish to please -the superior Powers. Germany, on the other hand, was united as it had -never been since 1813. King William was applauded everywhere. When he -reached Berlin on the evening of the 15th, he was met at the railway -station by the Crown Prince, Count von Bismarck, General von Moltke, -and General von Roon. There the decision was formally taken to accept -the challenge, the fact was repeated to the crowd who had assembled, -and whose shouts were loud, deep, and prolonged; and that same night -went forth the brief telegraphic orders which from one centre touched -a thousand springs, and called into instant being an army, perfectly -organized, equipped, trained and supplied. So that when Baron Wimpfen, -a secretary of legation, entered Berlin on the 19th of July, and handed -to M. Le Sourd the French declaration of war—the sole official document -on the subject received by Prussia, as Von Moltke bluntly remarks—that -work had already begun which finished in little more than a fortnight, -enabled the King to break into France at the head of more than three -hundred thousand soldiers. - -Only one word more need be said on this subject—the causes of the -war. Clearing away the diplomatic mist which hides the realities, -the student will discover two deadly opposites; on one side the -determination of France to insist on a right of meddling with internal -German affairs, and even of prescribing the form or forms which the -national aggregate should assume; on the other, the fixed resolve of -the German people that the French should no longer dictate or pretend -to dictate beyond the Rhine, that an end should be put to the policy -of seeking political profits by fomenting the spirit of discord in -the petty German Courts; and that, if possible, by dint of “Kraft -und Muth,” Germany should secure palpable safeguards against French -invasions, and resume possession of the strongholds and dependent -territories which were acquired, in times of adversity and disunion, -by Louis XIV. Thus, the causes of war were deeply rooted in essential -facts. The moment to be chosen, if it can be said to have been chosen, -was for statesmen to decide. The Imperial Government, down to the last -hour, sought to form a combination adverse to Prussia, intending to -wage war at its own time. Prussia refused to be made the victim of a -triple alliance, and taking a fair advantage of the imperious conduct -of the French Court, seized the golden opportunity, promptly answered -the declaration of war, and struck down the French Empire before its -hesitating and unprepared allies could move a finger to avert a defeat -which neither attempted, nor dared attempt to repair. Austria, the -unready, stood in fear of Russia: Italy, the ambitious, demanded the -right to enter Rome. “We can grant nothing of the kind,” said the -over-confident Duc de Gramont, so late as July 30. “If Italy will not -march,” he exclaimed, “let her sit still.” Abundant evidence exists -to prove that war between France and Germany was solely a question of -time, and Prussia cannot be blamed justly for selecting or seizing the -hour most suitable to her and least suitable to her adversaries. The -Duc de Gramont asserts that neither the Emperor nor the Government nor -France, desired war—certainly not just then; but they intended to make -war at a time and under conditions chosen by themselves. He admits that -it was the duty of the Imperial Government to evade a war, but also -prepare for a war as much as possible; and, failing to do the former, -he further confessed many months afterwards, that too much confidence -in the army and in its untested military virtues, and the dazzling -splendour of a glorious past dragged France, its Government and its -representatives, into an unequal struggle. “We believed ourselves too -strong to stoop,” he says, “and we knew not how to resist the system of -provocations so ably combined and directed by the Cabinet of Berlin.” -A frank confession, especially from the pen of a statesman who was -himself endeavouring to combine a system of alliances, and who was -anticipated by the Power against whom his plans were directed. -M. Prevost Paradol, who in a moment of weakness had accepted from the -Emperor the post of Minister at Washington, saw more clearly into the -future than the Duc de Gramont and some of his colleagues. On the very -afternoon of the day when the unhappy journalist killed himself, he saw -a countryman, the Comte d’Hérisson, and his language to the young man -showed how deeply he was moved, and with what sagacity he estimated -the near future. In his opinion, expressed on the 10th of July, war -was even then certain, because not only “la Prusse” desired war, but -because, as he said, “The Empire requires war, wishes for it, and -will wage it.” The young Frenchmen to whom he spoke made light of the -peril, and said he should like to travel in Germany, and study in the -libraries of her conquered cities. But the Minister checked his natural -exultation, saying, “You will not go to Germany, you will be crushed -in France. Believe me, I know the Prussians. We have nothing whatever -that is needed to strive with them. We have neither generals, men, -nor _matériel_. We shall be ground to powder. _Nous serons broyés._ -Before six months are over there will be a Revolution in France, and -the Empire will be at an end.” Mourning over the error he made in -laying down his sharp critical pen to put on a diplomatic uniform, -and maddened by the retrospect and prospect, Paradol, a few hours -after uttering his predictions, escaped from unendurable misery by a -pistol-shot. It was like an omen of the coming catastrophe. - - - - - CHAPTER II. - - THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. - - - _German Mobilization._ - -The great contest, thus precipitated by the formal defiance which Baron -Wimpfen bore from Paris to Berlin, excited deep emotion all over the -world. The hour had at length struck which was to usher in the deadly -struggle between France and Germany. Long foreseen, the dread shock, -like all grave calamities, came nevertheless as a surprise, even upon -reflective minds. Statesmen and soldiers who looked on, while they -shared in the natural feelings aroused by so tremendous a drama, were -also the privileged witnesses of two instructive experiments on a -grand scale—the processes whereby mighty armies are brought into the -field, and the methods by means of which they are conducted to defeat -or victory. The German plan of forming an Army was new in regard to -the extent and completeness with which it had been carried out. How -would it work when put to the ultimate test? Dating only from 1867, the -French scheme of organization, a halting Gallic adaptation of Prussian -principles, modified by French traditions, and still further by the -political exigencies besetting an Imperial dynasty, having little -root in the nation, besides being new and rickety, was in an early -stage of development; it may be said to have been adolescent, not -mature. No greater contrast was ever presented by two parallel series -of human actions than that supplied by the irregular, confused, and -uncertain working of the Imperial arrangement of forming an Army and -setting it in motion for active service, and the smoothness, celerity, -and punctuality which marked the German “mobilization.” The reason -is—first, that the system on which the German Army was built up from -the foundations was sound in every part, and that the plan which had -been designed for the purpose of placing a maximum force under arms in -a given time, originally comprehensive, had been corrected from day -to day, and brought down to the last moment. For example, whenever a -branch or section of a railway line was opened for traffic, the entire -series of time-tables, if need be, were so altered as to include -the new facility for transport. The labour and attention bestowed -on this vital condition was also expended methodically upon all the -others down to the most minute detail. Thus, the German staff maps of -France, especially east of Paris, actually laid down roads which in -July, 1870, had not yet been marked upon any map issued by the French -War Office. The central departments, in Berlin, exercised a wide and -searching supervision; but they did not meddle with the local military -authorities who, having large discretionary powers, no sooner received -a brief and simple order than they set to work and produced, at a fixed -time, the result desired. - -When King William arrived in Berlin, on the evening of July 15, the -orders already prepared by General von Moltke received at once the -royal sanction, and were transmitted without delay to the officers -commanding the several Army Corps. Their special work, in case of need, -had been accurately defined; and thus, by regular stages, the Corps -gradually, but swiftly, was developed into its full proportions, and -ready, as a finished product, to start for the frontier. The reserves -and, if needed, the landwehr men filled out the battalions, squadrons, -and batteries to the fixed strength; and as they found in the local -depôts arms, clothing, and equipments, no time was lost. Horses were -bought, called in, or requisitioned, and transport was obtained. As -all the wants of a complete Corps had been ascertained and provided -beforehand, so they came when demanded. At the critical moment the -supreme directing head, relieved altogether from the distracting duty -of settling questions of detail, had ample time to consider the broad -and absorbing business problems which should and did occupy the days -and nights of a leader of armies. The composition of the North German -troops, that is, those under the immediate control of King William, -occasioned no anxiety; and there was only a brief period of doubt in -Bavaria, where a strong minority had not so much French and Austrian -sympathies, as inveterate Prussian antipathies. They were promptly -suppressed by the popular voice and the loyalty of the King. Hesse, -Würtemberg, and Baden responded so heartily to the calls of patriotism -that in more than one locality the landwehr battalions far exceeded -their normal numerical strength, that is, more men than were summoned -presented themselves at the depôts. The whole operation of bringing a -great Army from a peace to a war footing, in absolute readiness, within -the short period of eighteen days, to meet an adversary on his own -soil, was conducted with unparalleled order and quickness. The business -done included, of course, the transport of men, guns, horses, carriage, -by railway chiefly, from all parts of the country to the Rhine and the -Moselle; and the astonishing fact is that plans devised and adopted -long beforehand should have been executed to the letter, and that more -than three hundred thousand combatants—artillery, horse, infantry, -in complete fighting trim, backed up by enormous trains—should have -been brought to specified places on specified days, almost exactly in -fulfilment of a scheme reasoned out and drawn up two years before. The -French abruptly declared war; the challenge was accepted; the orders -went forth, and “thereupon united Germany stood to arms,” to use -the words of Marshal von Moltke. It is a proud boast, but one amply -justified by indisputable facts. - - - _French Mobilization._ - -How differently was the precious time employed on the other side of -the Rhine. When the Imperial Government rushed headlong into war, they -actually possessed only one formed Corps d’Armée, the 2nd, stationed in -the camp of Chalons, and commanded by General Frossard. Yet even this -solitary body was, as he confesses, wanting in essential equipments -when it was hurriedly transported to St. Avold, not far from Saarlouis, -on the Rhenish Prussian frontier. Not only had all the other Corps to -be made out of garrison troops, but the entire staff had to be provided -in haste. Marshal Niel, an able soldier, and the Emperor, had studied, -at least, some of Baron Stoffel’s famous reports on the German Army, -and had endeavoured to profit by them; but the Marshal died, the Corps -Législatif was intractable, favouritism ruled in the Court, the Emperor -suffered from a wearing internal disease, and the tone of the Army was -one not instinct with the spirit of self-sacrificing obedience. In -time it is possible that the glaring defects of the Imperial military -mechanism might have been removed, and possible, also, that the _moral_ -and discipline of the officers and men might have been raised. Barely -probable, since Marshal Lebœuf believed that the Army was in a state -of perfect readiness, not merely to defend France, but to dash over -the Rhine into South Germany. His illusion was only destroyed when the -fatal test was applied. Nominally, the French Army was formidable in -numbers; but not being based on the territorial system, which includes -all the men liable to service in one Corps, whether they are with the -colours or in the reserve, and also forms the supplementary landwehr -into local divisions, the French War Office could not rapidly raise the -regiments to the normal strength. For a sufficient reason. A peasant -residing in Provence might be summoned to join a regiment quartered in -Brittany, or a workman employed in Bordeaux called up to the Pas de -Calais. When he arrived he might find that the regiment had marched to -Alsace or Lorraine. During the first fortnight after the declaration of -war thousands of reserve men were travelling to and fro over France in -search of their comrades. Another evil was that some Corps in course -of formation were split into fragments separated from each other by -many score miles. Nearly the whole series of Corps, numbered from One -to Seven, were imperfectly supplied with a soldier’s needments; and -what is more astonishing, the frontier arsenals and depôts were sadly -deficient in supplies, so that constant applications were made to Paris -for the commonest necessaries. There were no departmental or even -provincial storehouses, but the materials essential for war were piled -up in three or four places, such as Paris and Versailles, Vernon and -Chateauroux. In short, the Minister of War, who said and believed that -he was supremely ready, found that, in fact, he was compelled almost -to improvise a fighting Army in the face of an enemy who, in perfect -order, was advancing with the measured, compact, and irresistible force -of a tidal wave. - -The plan followed was exactly the reverse of the German method. -East of the Rhine no Corps was moved to the frontier, until it was -complete in every respect, except the second line of trains; and -consequently, from the outset, it had a maximum force prepared for -battle. There were some slight exceptions to the rule, but they were -imposed by circumstances, served a real purpose, and disappeared when -the momentary emergency they were adapted to meet had been satisfied. -West of the Rhine, not one solitary Corps took its assigned place in -a perfect state for action. All the battalions of infantry, and of -course the regiments, were hundreds short of their proper strength. -Before a shot had been fired, General de Failly, at Bitsche, was -obliged to send a demand for coin to pay the troops, adding notes -won’t pass—“les billets n’ont point cours.” General Frossard, at St. -Avoid, reported that enormous packages of useless maps had been sent -him—maps of Germany—and that he had not a single map of the French -frontier. Neither Strasburg, Metz, Toul, Verdun, Thionville, nor -Mézières, possessed stores of articles—such as food, equipments, and -carriage—which were imperatively required. The Intendants, recently -appointed to special posts, besieged the War Office in Paris, to -relieve them from their embarrassments—they had nothing on the spot. -The complaints were not idle. As early as the 26th of July, the troops -about Metz were living on the reserve of biscuits; there were sent -only thirty-eight additional bakers to Metz for 120,000 men, and even -these few practitioners were sadly in want of ovens. “I observe that -the Army stands in need of biscuit and bread,” said the Emperor to the -Minister of War at the same date. “Could not bread be made in Paris, -and sent to Metz?” Marshal Lebœuf, a day later, took note of the fact -that the detachments which came up to the front, sometimes reserve men, -sometimes battalions, arrived without ammunition and camp equipments. -Soldiers, functionaries, carts, ovens, provisions, horses, munitions, -harness, all had to be sought at the eleventh hour. These facts are -recorded in the despairing telegrams sent from the front to the War -Office. The very Marshal who had described France as “archiprête,” in -a transcendent state of readiness for war, announced by telegram, on -the 28th of July, the lamentable fact that he could not move forward -for want of biscuit—“Je manque de biscuit pour marcher en avant.” The -7th Corps was to have been formed at Belfort, but its divisions could -never be assembled. General Michel, on the 21st of July, sent to Paris -this characteristic telegram: “Have arrived at Belfort,” he wrote: -“can’t find my brigade; can’t find the General of Division. What shall -I do? Don’t know where my regiments are”—a document probably unique in -military records. Hardly a week later, that is on the 27th, Marshal -Lebœuf became anxious respecting the organization of this same Corps, -and put, through Paris, some curious questions to General Félix Douay, -its commander. “How far have you got on with your formations? Where are -your divisions?” The next day General Douay arrived at Belfort, having -been assured in Paris by his superiors that the place was “abundantly -provided” with what he would require. After the War, Prince Georges -Bibesco, a Roumanian in the French Army, attached to the 7th Corps, -published an excellent volume on the campaign, and in its pages he -describes the “cruel deception” which awaited Douay. He writes that, -for the most part, the troops, had “neither tents, cooking pots, nor -flannel belts; neither medical nor veterinary canteens, nor medicines, -nor forges, nor pickets for the horses—they were without hospital -attendants, workmen, and train. As to the magazines of Belfort—they -were empty.” In the land of centralization General Douay was obliged -to send a staff and several men to Paris, with instructions to explain -matters at the War Office, and not leave the capital without bringing -the articles demanded with them. Other examples are needless. It would -be almost impossible to understand how it came to pass that the French -were plunged into war, in July, 1870, did we not know that the military -institutions had been neglected, that the rulers relied on old renown, -the “glorious past” of the Duc de Gramont, and that the few men who -forced the quarrel to a fatal head, knew nothing of the wants of an -army, and still less of the necessities and risks of war. - - - _War Methods Contrasted._ - -As the story is unfolded, it will be seen that the same marked -contrast between the principles and methods adopted and practised -by the great rivals prevailed throughout. The German Army rested on -solid foundations; the work of mobilization was conducted in strict -accordance with the rules of business; allowing for the constant -presence of a certain amount of error, inseparable from human actions, -it may be said that “nothing was left to chance.” The French Army was -loosely put together; it contained uncertain elements; was not easily -collected, and never in formed bodies; it was without large as well -as small essentials; it “lacked finish.” And similar defects became -rapidly manifest in the Imperial plan for the conduct of the war. Here -the contrast is flagrant. The Emperor Napoleon, who had lived much -with soldiers, who had been present at great military operations, and -had studied many campaigns, could not be destitute of what the French -call “le flair militaire.” He had, also, some inkling of the political -side of warfare; and in July, 1870, he saw that much would depend -upon his ability to make a dash into South Germany, because, if he -were successful, even for a brief time, Prussia might be deprived of -South German help, and Austria might enter the field. There was no -certainty about the calculation, indeed, it was almost pure conjecture; -seeing that Count von Beust and the Archduke Albert had both warned -him that, “above all things,” they needed time, and that the former -had become frightened at the prospect of Hungarian defection, and a -Russian onfall. Yet it was on this shadowy basis that he moved to -the frontier the largest available mass of incomplete and suddenly -organized batteries, squadrons and battalions. He and his advisers -were possessed with a feverish desire to be first in the field; and -the Corps were assembled near Metz, Strasburg, and Belfort, with what -was called a reserve at Chalons, on the chance that the left might -be made to join the right in Alsace, and that the whole, except the -reserve which was to move up from Chalons, could be pushed over the -Rhine at Maxau, opposite Carlesruhe, and led with conquering speed into -the country south of the Main. Before he joined the head-quarters at -Metz, on the 28th of July, the Emperor may have suspected, but on his -arrival he assuredly found that the plan, if ever feasible, had long -passed out of the range of practical warfare. He reaped nothing but the -disadvantages which spring from grossly defective preparation, and “raw -haste half-sister to delay.” He knew that he was commander-in-chief of -a relatively weak and ill-found Army, and he acquired the certainty at -Metz, that, unless he were conspicuously victorious, neither Austria -nor Italy would move a man. - -His mighty antagonist, on the other hand, was advancing to the -encounter with such large resources, and so thoroughly equipped, -that no fewer than three Army Corps were left behind, because even -the admirably man managed and numerous German railway lines were -not able to carry them at once to the banks of the Rhine. Moreover, -General von Moltke, the Chief of the Great Staff, had, in 1868–69, -carefully reasoned out plans, which were designed to meet each probable -contingency, either a march of the French through Belgium, an early -irruption into the Rhenish provinces, or the identical scheme upon -which the Emperor founded his hopes; while, if the French allowed -the Germans to begin offensive operations on French soil, then the -method of conducting the invasion, originally adopted, would come into -play. The memorandum on this great subject, the essential portions of -which have been published by its author, Von Moltke, is, for breadth, -profundity, and insight, one of the most instructive to be found in -the records of war. This is not the place to deal with its general or -detailed arguments. For present purposes, it is sufficient to set forth -the main operative idea. The contention was, that an army assembled on -the Rhine between Rastadt and Mainz, and on the Moselle below Treves, -would be able to operate successfully, either on the right bank of -the main stream, against the flank of a French Army, which sought to -invade South Germany; or, with equal facility, concentrate on the left -bank, and march in three great masses through the country between the -Rhine and Moselle, upon the French frontier. Should the French make -a precipitate dash into the German country towards Mainz, then the -Corps collected near that fortress would meet them in front, and those -on the Moselle would threaten their communications or assail them in -flank. The soundness of the reasoning is indisputable; its application -would depend upon the prompt concentration of the Armies, and that had -been rendered certain by careful and rigorously enforced preparations. -The great Prussian strategist had calculated the move of troops and -railway trains to a day; so that he knew exactly what number of men and -guns, within a given area, he could count upon at successive periods -of time; and, of course, he was well aware that the actual use to be -made of them, after the moment of contact, could not be foreseen with -precision, but must be adapted to circumstances. But he foresaw and -prepared for the contingency which did arrive. “If,” he said, “the -French desired to make the most of their railways, in order to hasten -the assembly of all their forces,” they would be obliged to disembark, -or as we now say, “detrain” them, “at Metz and Strasburg, that is, in -two principal groups separated from each other by the Vosges.” And then -he went on to point out how, assembled on the Rhine and Moselle, the -German Army would occupy what is called the “interior lines” between -them, and “could turn against the one or the other, or even attack both -at once, if it were strong enough.” - -The grounds for these conclusions, succinctly stated, were the -conformation of the frontier, an angle flanked at each side by the -neutral states of Switzerland and Luxemburg, restricting the space -within which operations could be carried on; the possession of both -banks of the Rhine below Lauterbourg; the superior facility of -mobilization secured by the Germans, not only as regards the rapid -transition of Corps from a peace to a war footing, but by the skilful -use of six railway lines running to the Rhine and the Moselle; and, -finally, the fact that, fronting south between those rivers, the -advancing German Army would be directed against an adversary whose -line of retreat, at least so far as railways were concerned, diverged, -in each case, to a flank of any probable front of battle. The railway -from Strasburg to Nancy traversed the Vosges at Saverne; the railway -from Metz to Nancy on one side, and Thionville on the other, followed -the valley of the Moselle; and as the important connecting branch from -Metz to Verdun had not been constructed, it follows that the French -Army in Lorraine had no direct railway line of retreat and supply. The -railway from Metz to Strasburg, which crossed the Vosges by the defile -of Bitsche and emerged in the Rhine valley at Hagenau, was, of course, -nearly parallel to the German front, except for a short distance west -of Bening. The frontier went eastward from Sierck, on the Moselle to -Lauterbourg on the Rhine, and thence southerly to Basle. The hill range -of the Vosges, starting from the Ballon d’Alsace, overlooking the Gap -of Belfort, runs parallel to the river, and extends in a northerly -direction beyond the French boundary, thrusting an irregular mass of -uplands deep into the Palatinate, ending in the isolated Donnersberg. -It follows that the main roads out of, as well as into, France were to -the east and west of this chain, and it should be observed that the -transverse passes were more numerous south than north of Bitsche, and -that, practically, while detachments could move along the secluded -valleys, there was no road available for large bodies and trains -through the massive block of mountain and forest which occupies so -considerable a space of the Palatinate. Thus, an army moving from Mainz -upon Metz would turn the obstacle on the westward by Kaiserslautern -and Landstuhl; while if Strasburg were the goal, it would march up -the Rhine valley by Landau, and through the once famous Lines of -the Lauter. If two armies, as really happened in 1870, advanced -simultaneously on both roads, the connection between them is maintained -by occupying Pirmasens, which is the central point on a country road -running from Landau to Deux Ponts, and another going south-east to -Wissembourg. - -The influence of this mountain range upon the offensive and defensive -operations of the rival armies will be readily understood. The French -could only unite to meet their opponents in the Prussian provinces at -or north of Kaiserslautern; while the Germans, assuming that their -adversaries assembled forces in Alsace, as well as in Lorraine, would -not be in direct communication until their left wing had moved through -the hill-passes and had emerged in the country between the Sarre and -Meurthe. - -It has been seen that the available French troops, including several -native and national regiments from Algeria, had been hurried to the -frontier in an imperfect state of organization and equipment. There -were nominally seven Corps d’Armée and the Guard; but of these, two, -the 6th and 7th, were never united in the face of the enemy. Marshal -Canrobert, commanding the 6th, was only able to bring a portion of -his Corps from Chalons to Metz; and General Douay, the chief of the -7th, had one division at Lyons, and another at Colmar, whence it was -sent on to join the 1st Corps assembling under Marshal MacMahon near -Strasburg. The principal body, consisting of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th -Corps, ultimately joined by the greater part of the 6th, and the Guard -were posted near and north of Metz; while the 5th occupied positions on -the Saar, and formed a sort of link, or weak centre, between the right -and left wings. Nothing indicated cohesion in this array, which, as we -have shown, was adopted on the vain hypothesis that there would be time -to concentrate in Alsace for the purpose of anticipating the Germans -and crossing the Rhine at Maxau. - -No such error was made on the other side. The German troops were -divided into three armies. The First Army, consisting of the 7th and -8th Corps, under the veteran General von Steinmetz, formed the right -wing, and moved southward on both banks of the Moselle. The Second -Army, composed of the Guard, the 3rd, 4th, and 10th Corps, commanded -by Prince Frederick Charles, was the central body, having in rear the -9th and 12th Corps as a reserve. They were destined to march on the -great roads leading from Manheim and Mainz upon Kaiserslautern. The -Third Army, or left wing, under the Crown Prince, was made up of the -5th and 11th and the two Bavarian Corps, together with a Würtemberg and -a Baden Division. Each Army had one or more divisions of cavalry, and, -of course, the due proportion of guns. By the 31st of July, the whole -of these troops, except the Baden and the Würtemberg Divisions, were on -the west of the Rhine, with foreposts on the Saar, below Saarbrück, in -the mountains at Pirmasens, and on the roads to the Lauter; the great -mass of troops being close to the Rhine. The advantages, in point of -concentration, were already secured by the German Staff; the First Army -alone, one-half at Treves, and the other strung out between the Moselle -and the Nahe, was in apparent danger; yet little apprehension was felt -on that score, because the country through which it moved was highly -defensible—its right was covered by neutral Luxemburg, and part of the -Second Army was sufficiently forward to protect the left. - -A week earlier, there had been, indeed, a slight perturbation -in Berlin, where the head-quarters still remained. By unceasing -observation, a careful collation of reports, a diligent use of French -newspapers, the King’s Staff had arrived at a tolerably accurate -estimate of the strength, positions, and internal state of the French -Corps. They were cognizant of the prevailing disorder, and were well -aware that not one Corps had received its full complement of reserve -men. Arguing that the enemy would not have foregone the advantages of -mobilization unless he had in view some considerable object, such as an -irruption into the Palatinate, the Staff modified the original plan, -as it affected the Second Army, and, on the 23rd of July, directed the -Corps of which it was composed to quit the railway trains transporting -them on, and not beyond, the Rhine. This was purely a measure of -precaution, the contingency of which had been foreseen; yet one which -was needless, as the French had already learned that they could not -take the offensive in any direction. No other changes were made, and -the only result of this modification was that the soldiers had to march -further than they would have marched, and they probably benefited by -the exercise. During this period, the bridge at Kehl had been broken, -the boats and ferries removed from the Rhine from Lauterbourg to Basle, -the railway pontoon bridge at Maxau protected, a measure suggested -by the presence of river gunboats at Strasburg, and an unremitting -watch had been kept on the land frontier by small detachments of horse -and foot. Not the least surprising fact is that no attempt was made -by the French to destroy the bridges over the Saar at Saarbrück, or -penetrate far beyond that river on its upper course. On the other -hand, parties of German horse and foot made several incursions between -Sierck and Bitsche, and one small party rode as far as into Alsace at -Niederbronn. It was not until the end of the month that large bodies of -cavalry were sent to the front to begin a career demonstrating afresh, -if a demonstration is needed, the inestimable services which can be -performed by that indispensable arm. The German Army had been placed -in the field in little more than a fortnight, although the 1st and -6th Corps were still _en route_ from the far North. The Crown Prince -reached Spires on the 30th, and the next day, the King, with the Great -Staff, left Berlin for Mainz. He had restored the “Order of the Iron -Cross,” and had warmly expressed his gratitude for the unexampled -spirit manifested by the whole German nation, “reconciled and united -as it had never been before.” Germany might find therein, he said, “a -guarantee that the war would bring her a durable peace, and that the -seed of blood would yield a blessed harvest of liberty and unity.” - -Here it may be stated that a French squadron had appeared off the coast -of Denmark on the 28th of July, but only to disappear with greater -promptitude, thereby relieving the timid from any apprehension of a -descent. Large German forces were set free to face westward, and in -a brief space, not only the French marines and sailors, but the ship -guns were vehemently required to fight in severe battles and defend the -capital of France. - - - - - CHAPTER III. - - STAGE THUNDER. - - - _The Combat at Saarbrück._ - -King William did not reach Mainz until the forenoon of the 2nd of -August; and it is characteristically remarked in the official history -of the War, that the journey from Berlin had been relatively slow, -because it was necessary to fit the six supplementary trains bearing -the great head-quarters into the series of military trains in such a -way as would not retard the transport of troops. It is a small fact, -but an apt illustration of the preference uniformly given to essentials -in the Prussian arrangements for war. Soon after the Staff had arrived -in the “Deutsche Haus,” lent by the Grand Duke, whose son, Prince -Louis, the husband of the British Princess Alice, commanded the Hessian -Division, unexpected information greeted them. Telegrams reported first -that a serious action was in progress at Saarbrück, and later that the -Prussian troops had withdrawn from the town. - -This was the famous combat, known at the time as the _Baptême de feu_ -of the unfortunate Prince Imperial. The Emperor Napoleon entered -Metz on the 28th of July, and took the command of the “Army of the -Rhine.” Until that moment, the seven _corps d’armée_ in the field were -under the orders of Marshal Bazaine, who received his instructions -from Paris through Marshal Lebœuf. They were to act strictly on the -defensive, advice which may be said to have been needless, since, -as we have shown, not one of the corps was in a condition to march -and fight. When the Emperor appeared on the scene, no great change -for the better had taken place, and there was still a dearth of real -information respecting the strength and position of the enemy, while -the reports brought in contained an enormous percentage of error. -Nevertheless, there was a vague feeling at head-quarters that something -must be done to satisfy a public opinion which thought that the -French armies should have been already beyond the Rhine; and on the -30th of July Marshal Bazaine received orders to cross the Saar and -occupy Saarbrück. The task was to be intrusted to General Frossard, -supported by troops on the right and left, drawn from the Corps of -De Failly and Bazaine. Yet this modest operation dwindled down, when -discussed in a sort of Council of War held the next day at Forbach, -into a simple cannonade, and the occupation of the heights on the left -bank! The Emperor was told that his project could not be executed, -and resigning himself, as he always did, to the inevitable, he warned -MacMahon that no movement should be made on his side before the lapse -of eight days. The ostentatious movement on Saarbrück was to be made -on the 2nd of August. Now, at that date, the place was occupied by -fractions of the 8th German Corps, posted on both banks of the river -above and below the town. They consisted of four battalions of foot, -several squadrons of horse, and one battery, and the nearest immediate -support was some miles to the rear, near Lebach. Colonel von Pestel -had held the position from the outset of the war, and was allowed to -remain, at his own request, although a considerable army stood in -his front at no great distance, that is, the three leading corps -of the Army of the Rhine. But on the 2nd Count von Gneisenau was in -command of the German outposts, and had orders, if pressed, to retire -upon Lebach, but he stood fast, and even assumed the offensive, in -order to ascertain exactly what the pressure might be, and test the -intentions of the adversary. Against him, in the forenoon, advanced -Frossard in the centre, Bazaine on the right, and De Failly, who had -crossed the river at Saareguemines, on his left. It was a wonderful -spectacle. The Emperor and the Prince Imperial were present on the -hills to behold so vast an array moving out in parade order, to fight -a sham battle with real shot and shell, against a dozen companies and -six guns. It is not necessary to enter into a detail of this combat; -it is sufficient to say that the Prussians held on to the left bank -until they were obliged, after an hour’s fighting, to retire before -the development of several brigades. Finally, when a French battery on -the Reppertsberg had opened fire on the bridges and the town, Count -von Gneisenau withdrew his troops, first to a place near the town, -and afterwards to a position further in the rear. At other points on -the river the French had failed to pass, but in the evening they sent -parties into Saarbrück, then unoccupied. The French in this skirmish -lost eighty-six, and the Prussians, eighty-three officers and men -killed and wounded. It was the first occasion on which the soldiers of -Napoleon III. had an opportunity of testing the qualities of the German -Army, and they found that their secular adversaries, disciplined on a -different model, and broken to new tactics, were as hardy, active, and -formidable as those of Frederick the Great. - -After this striking example of stage thunder, there was a pause—the -French did not pursue the retreating companies of the 40th and 69th, -hold the town, or even destroy the bridges. Indeed, General Frossard, -in his pamphlet, explains that although so few were visible, there -must have been large numbers of the 8th Prussian Corps near at hand, -and insists that they were held back because the adversary did not wish -to show his strength; so that the result actually had an unfavourable -influence on the French—it inspired in them a feeling of apprehension. -They dreaded the unknown. Without exact, and with what was worse, -misleading information, the Marshals and Generals were bewildered by -every adverse strong patrol, which boldly marched up and even looked -into their camps; and out of these scouting parties they constructed -full corps ready to pounce upon them. No master mind at head-quarters -filled them with confidence, or gave a firm direction to their -soldiers. At a very early period, even in the highest ranks, arose -a querulous dread of “Prussian spies,” and a belief that the hills -and woods concealed countless foes. The apprehensions had no solid -foundation, since the First Army was not nearer the Saar than Losheim -and Wadern, and the only troops in the immediate front of General -Frossard were those composing Gneisenau’s weak detachment, which -retired some miles on the road to Lebach. Yet the feeble operation of -August the 2nd induced the Great Staff to concentrate the First Army at -Tholey, that is nearer to the main line of march of the Second Army, -and on the left flank of the probable French advance. None took place, -and thenceforward the swift and measured development of the German -movement southwards went steadily onwards. - - - _Preparing to go forward._ - -After reviewing the general position of the opposing armies, the German -head-quarters fixed on the 4th of August as the day on which offensive -operations should be begun. It was known in a sufficiently authentic -way, that there were between Metz and the Saar, four French Corps and -the Guard, the Left being at Bouzonville, south of Saarlouis, and the -Right at Bitsche; that the 1st Corps was south of Hagenau, in Alsace, -and that the two remaining Corps were still incomplete, one being at -Chalons, the other at Belfort. It was, therefore, determined that the -Prussian Crown Prince should cross the Lauter on the 4th, while Prince -Charles and General von Steinmetz, at a later date, should move upon -Saarbrück, and grapple with the main Imperial Army as soon as they -could bring the foe to battle. Practically, the skirmish on the 2nd -put everyone on the alert. Acting, as was usual in the German Army on -their own discretion, yet still in the spirit of their instructions, -the divisional and Corps commanders at once sprang forward to support -Gneisenau; so that on the 3rd, the front lines of the First Army were -nearer to the enemy than had been prescribed, and General von Steinmetz -came up from Treves to Losheim. - -During this period, the Second Army had continued its movement upon -Kaiserslautern, and its cavalry had already established a connection -with the First Army. It was not the intention of General von Moltke, -who really spoke with the voice of His Majesty, that the Saar should be -crossed until a later day. He seems to have been under the impression -that the French might still assume the offensive; he therefore held -back the somewhat impetuous Steinmetz, and so ordered the movements -that both armies should take up positions between Tholey and -Kaiserslautern, which would enable them to act in concert. Thus, on the -3rd, the vast array between the Rhine and the Moselle, was in motion, -left in front, in other words, the Prussian Crown Prince was the most -forward, while the centre and right were drawn together, preparatory to -an advance in a compact form. The French, it was noted with surprise, -had not only refrained from breaking the substantial bridges over the -Saar, but had left untouched the telegraph wires and stations on both -banks of the stream, so that, says the official narrative, the Staff at -Mainz were kept constantly informed by telegrams of the enemy’s doings -and bearing near Saarbrück. Such negligence would not be credited were -it not thus authentically recorded by the General who found it so -profitable. - -By the 4th of August, the entire front of the Armies advancing towards -the Saar was covered by several regiments of cavalry, actively engaged -on and near the river, especially at Saarbrück, in closely watching -the French, and sending information to the rear. There was not a point -between Pirmasens and Saarlouis which escaped the notice of these -vigilant and tireless horsemen. Behind them came the masses of the -First and Second Armies, which latter, on the 4th, had passed “the -wooded zone of Kaiserslautern,” and had approached so closely to the -First, that a species of controversy for precedence arose between -Prince Charles and General von Steinmetz. Fearful of being thrust -into the second line, the eager old soldier wanted to push forward on -Saarbrück, and reap the laurels of the first battle, or, at all events, -keep his place at the head of the advance. General von Moltke, who had -his own plans of ulterior action, which were not those of Steinmetz, -in order to settle the dispute, drew what he supposed would be an -effective line of demarcation between the two Armies. He also added the -1st Corps, which had come up from Pomerania, to the First Army; the -2nd, 10th and 12th to the Second, and the 6th to the Third Army. While -directing the Crown Prince to cross the Lauter on the 4th, General von -Moltke did not intend to pass the Saar until the 9th, and then to act -with the whole force assembled on that side. In fact, rapidly as the -business of mobilization, the transit by railway, and the collection of -trains for so vast a body of men, horses, and guns, had been performed, -the work was not in all respects quite complete, nor had the soldiers -been able, good marchers as they were, to cover the ground between them -and the adversary, before the date assigned. - -Yet Von Moltke proposed, and Von Steinmetz disposed, although he is -acquitted by his chief of any deliberate intention to act prematurely. -The latter, obliged to make room for Prince Charles, gave directions -which brought his two leading Corps within reach of the Saar and his -advanced guards close to Völkingen and Saarbrück in actual contact -with the French outposts; and that disposition led to a considerable -battle on the 6th, a collision not anticipated at the head-quarters in -Mainz. It is, however, pointedly declared that at the moment when he -thrust himself forward Steinmetz did not know what were the plans which -had been formed in that exalted region, to be carried out or modified -according to events, and therefore withheld from him. The broad scheme -was that the Third Army should, after crossing the Vosges, march on -Haney, and that the First should form the pivot on which the Second -Army would wheel in turning the French position on the line of the -Moselle. Practically that was done in the end, and it was facilitated, -perhaps, by the two battles fought on the 6th of August, which -shattered the French, and obliged them to act, not as they might have -wished, but as they were compelled. - - - _Positions on August 4._ - -For the sake of clearness, the positions occupied by the rival -Armies on the morning of the 4th may be succinctly described. The -French stood thus: On the right, two divisions of the 5th Corps, one -at Saareguemines, the other at Grossbliedersdorf; in what may be -called the centre, three divisions of the 2nd Corps, on and over the -frontier immediately south of Saarbrück; three divisions of the 3rd -Corps echelonned on the high-road from Forbach to St. Avold, with -one division at Boucheporn; on the left, three divisions of the 4th -Corps, one at Ham, a second at Teterchen, and a third at Bouzonville. -The guard were in rear of the left at Les Etangs. The position of -the cavalry it is difficult to determine, but they were not where -they should have been—feeling for and watching the enemy. Nor is it -easy to ascertain the numerical strength of the French Army at any -given moment, because the reserves and battalions, as they could be -spared from garrisons, were constantly arriving; but on the 4th there -were about 150,000 men and 500 guns in front of Metz. That fortress, -however, like all the other strong places on or near the frontier, such -as Toul, Verdun, Thionville, and Belfort, had no garrison proper, or -one quite inadequate to its requirements. - -The German Armies on the 4th were posted in this order: The Crown -Prince’s was behind the Klingbach, south of Landau, assembled at dawn -for the march which carried it over the frontier; the Second, or -Central Army, under Prince Charles, was in line of march through the -Haardt Wald by Kaiserslautern, the advanced guard of the 4th Corps -being at Homburg, and that of the 3rd at Neunkirchen; while the Guard, -the 10th, 12th, and 9th were still north or east of Kaiserslautern, -which they passed the next day. The First Army, held back by orders -from the Great Staff, was cantonned between Neunkirchen, Tholey, and -Lebach. In front of the whole line, from Saarlouis to Saareguemines, -were several brigades of cavalry, from which parties, both strong and -weak, were sent out constantly to discover and report on the positions -and doings of the enemy. The three Armies, as far as can be estimated -from the official figures, brought into the field at the outset of -the campaign, say the 4th of August, the First, 83,000 men and 270 -guns; the Second, 200,000 men and 630 guns; and the Third, 170,000 -men and 576 guns, an overwhelming array compared with that mustered -by the adversary. These totals include only the active Army. The -aggregate from which they were drawn amounted to the enormous sum of -1,183,389 men and 250,373 horses, which, of course, includes garrisons, -depôts, and landwehr in course of formation. It has been laid down on -indisputable authority that the number available for active operations, -namely, that which can be put into the field, is, in all cases, as it -was in this, less than half the nominal effective. The proportion of -mobilized, to what may be called immobilized, troops in the French Army -was for the moment, at all events, necessarily somewhat lower than in -the German, because the Imperial military system, as we have already -explained, was so clumsy, as well as so incomplete. - - - _The Moral and Political Forces._ - -One other fact may be usefully noticed, because it had a considerable -influence on the campaign. It is this—the moral force, represented -by public opinion in politics, and in the Armies by what the French -call the _moral_, which has nothing to do with morals, but means -cheerfulness, good will, confidence—had passed wholly over to the -German side. Public opinion, which ran in a strong and steady current, -condemned the declaration of war, although a certain superstitious -belief in the invincibility of French soldiers, at least when opposed -to Germans, still prevailed, even among military men who ought to -have been better informed and less under the sway of prejudice. While -Germany was united and hearty, and willingly obeyed an executive -which no one questioned, while Saxony and Hanover, Würtemberg and -Bavaria vied in patriotic ardour with Pomerania and Brandenburg; there -was no such complete and consentaneous feeling in France; and there -was, on the one hand, a powerful, ambitious, and indignant group of -Imperialists, who thirsted for the possession of office, which they -strove to snatch from Emile Ollivier and his semi-Liberal colleagues, -and on the other, outside all the Imperialist sections, the repressed, -enraged, and sturdy republicans of Paris who, it is not too much to -say, waited for the first decisive defeat of the Imperial Armies to -overturn an arbitrary system of government which they detested on -account of its treacherous origin, and dreaded, as well as despised, -while they writhed beneath its power. Jérôme David and Clement -Duvernois were resolved to expel the so-called constitutionalists; -and Gambetta, Favre, and their friends were equally determined, if an -opportunity occurred, to destroy the Empire, root and branch. There -were no such elements of weakness beyond the Rhine. - -Nor, as we shall see, did the conduct of the Empress Eugénie, in her -capacity as Regent, supply strength to the Government or impart wisdom -to its councils. She had one dominant idea—the preservation of the -dynasty—and aided by a willing instrument, the Comte de Palikao, she -was the prime agent in the work of depriving the French nation of the -best and last chance of saving Paris from investment and capitulation. -If the political conditions were adverse to the Imperialists in respect -of unity and moral force, they were not less so when estimated from a -military standpoint. The French Army we will not say lost courage, but -confidence, from the moment when it was brought to a standstill. The -soldiers knew quite as well as the generals why, on the 4th of August, -the larger host, under an Emperor Napoleon, was pottering to and fro, -driven hither and thither by orders and counter-orders, in the country -north of Metz, and why the smaller, commanded by Marshal the Duke of -Magenta, was still south of the Lauter. They knew also, from daily -experience, how imperfect the Armies were, because the weakness of -the battalions, the scarcity of provisions, the defects of equipment, -the lack of camp utensils were things which could not be hidden. They -were also inactive and unable to develop the power which springs up -in a French Army when engaged in successful offensive operations; -they deteriorated hourly in _morale_. The Germans gained confidence -at every step they took towards the frontier, not only because they -were animated by a formidable patriotic spirit and were eager for -battle with their ancient foes, but because each battery, squadron, -and battalion had its full complement of men, because they put trust -in their royal chief and his illustrious assistant, and because they -were intensely proud of an almost perfect war-apparatus, in which each -officer and soldier was able, so solid yet elastic was the system of -training, to harmonize obedience to orders with, when the need arose, -discretionary independent action. So that as the huge but perfectly -articulated masses of the German Armies moved swiftly and steadily to -the frontier behind which the adversary awaited them, they bore along -in their breasts that priceless belief in themselves and their cause -which had so often carried troops to victory, even when they were few -and their foes were many. The contrast is painfully distressing; but it -is also profoundly instructive, because when closely scrutinized it -reveals the open secrets which show, not only how empires are lost and -won, but what severe duties a great self-respecting people must perform -to obtain securities for the right of cementing and preserving National -Independence. - - - - - CHAPTER IV. - - INVASION IN EARNEST. - - -The first blow struck in the war—for the parade at Saarbrück does not -deserve the name of a blow—was delivered on the Lauter by the Crown -Prince. The French Army in Alsace, commanded by Marshal MacMahon, had -been collected at Strasburg from the garrisons in the Eastern region. -At first it consisted of the 1st Corps, which included four infantry -divisions, troops of the Line, to which were added, before the end of -July, three regiments of Zouaves, and three of native Algerians, which -were distributed among the French infantry brigades. There were three -brigades of cavalry, ninety-six guns, and twenty-four mitrailleuses, -the Emperor’s pet arm. The Divisional Commanders were Ducrot, Abel -Douay, Raoult, and Lartigue; and the horsemen were under the orders -of Duhesme. The 7th Corps, nominally at Belfort, under Félix Douay, -actually distributed in several places, one division being at Lyons, -another at Colmar, was also within the command of MacMahon; so that, -on the 4th of August, he was at the head of two Corps, one of which -was many miles distant from his head-quarters. He had, however, moved -forward with Ducrot and Raoult to Reichshofen and Lartigue to Hagenau, -while Abel Douay was pushed still further northward at Wissembourg, -which he reached on the 3rd, but with a portion only of his troops. -In fact, at that date, the army of MacMahon was strung out between -the Lauter and Lyons, and even the portion which may be described as -concentrated, consisted of fragments posted or on the march between -Wissembourg and Hagenau. That very morning, the 1st Division of the 7th -Corps started by railway from Colmar to join the Marshal. It was upon -this scattered array that the Crown Prince was advancing. MacMahon, who -had intended to assume the offensive himself on the 7th of August, did -not know how near and how compact was the host of his foes. Abel Douay, -established on the Lauter, was obliged to part with several battalions -to keep up his communications, through Lembach, with the main body. He -sent out a party on the evening of the 3rd, and early on the 4th, yet -each returned bearing back the same report—they had seen and learned -nothing of the enemy. Indeed, it would be difficult to find a single -instance in which the researches of the French were thrust far enough -to touch the Germans, all their reconnoitring excursions being carried -on in a routine and perfunctory manner. Nevertheless, they had a strong -force of cavalry in Alsace as well as Lorraine; but it was mostly in -the rear, rarely much, never far in front. On the other hand, the Baden -horsemen had looked, unseen themselves, into the French cavalry camp at -Selz, and the scouts on the hills had signalled the successive arrival -of battalions and artillery at Wissembourg. It must be stated, however, -that the Germans did not know, precisely, until they came in contact -with them, what forces were in, or were within reach of Wissembourg. - -The object of the German forward movement was two-fold—if MacMahon had -crossed the Vosges to join the Emperor, Strasburg was to be invested, -and the rest of the Third Army was to pass through the hills to the -Saar and effect a junction with the Second. If the Marshal were -still east of the hills, then he was to be assailed wherever found. -Consequently, the whole Army was set in motion, but it was by a gift -of fortune, who, however, rarely favours the imprudent, that they were -enabled to defeat the division exposed to their onset. At four and six -in the morning, the Corps moved out on a broad front stretching from -the hills to the Rhine. Bothmer’s Bavarians, on the right, marched -direct on Wissembourg, followed by the other divisions of the Bavarian -Army. Next in order, to the left, came the 5th Corps, which was -directed upon Altenstadt; the 11th, which pushed through the Bien Wald; -and the Badeners, whose object was Lauterbourg; while the remainder of -the Army was still far to the rear. - - - _The Combat on the Lauter._ - -Wissembourg, a picturesque old town, standing upon the Lauter at a -point where it enters the plain, is defended by walls not armed with -guns, and surrounded by deep ditches filled from the stream, one arm -of which curves through the place. There were three gates. Under the -archway of the northern, named after the town of Hagenau, passed the -great road from Strasburg, which, turning to the eastward, quitted -the ramparts by the gate of Landau. The western gate, a mere entrance -cut through the wall, having in advance a small lunette, received the -road from Pirmasens. It took its name from the fort of Bitsche, but -the track from that place came down the folded hills by the Col du -Pigeonnier, or Dove-cote Neck, and joined the Strasburg highway just -outside the Hagenau gate. Beyond the walls were factories, pottery -fields, and mills; above and below were the once famous Lines of the -Lauter thrown up on, and following the right bank of the stream -through the forest to Lauterbourg; while on the foot-hills were vines, -which do not add to the beauty of any scene, and hop-gardens; and here -and there the usual rows of stiff trees bordering, yet not shading, -the roads. Distant about a mile or so to the eastward is a spur of the -Vosges, the Geisberg, thrust into the plain, falling steeply towards -it, and crowned by a substantial château, seated above terraces -difficult of access. From this elevation were visible, spread out like -a map, the woodlands stretching towards the Rhine, the roads to the -east and south, and the town, with its railway station, now silent, -near the gate of Landau. - -As Abel Douay had only available about eight thousand troops, he -could not defend the approaches through the Bien Wald, or prevent a -turning movement round his right flank. Still, had he not been under -a delusion respecting the proximity of the enemy, he could and would -have destroyed the few bridges over the Lauter, and so disposed his -troops as not to be surprised. But his scouts had reported that the -foe was not near, and thus, when the Bavarian advance appeared on the -hills at eight o’clock and opened fire from a battery, the French -soldiers were engaged in the ordinary routine of camp labours. Startled -by the guns, they ran to their arms with alacrity; but an encounter -begun under such conditions is always disadvantageous to the assailed. -General Douay, an able soldier, came to a rapid decision. He placed two -battalions in the town, another with a battery at the railway station, -and posted the rest and twelve guns on the slopes of the Geisberg. -The walls and ditches of the town, the railway buildings, and part of -the Lauter Lines, brought the Bavarians to a stand, and the combat of -small arms and artillery on this point continued amid the vineyards -and hop-grounds, while the German centre and Left were swinging round -through the forest. The operation occupied considerable time, as two -hours passed by, from the firing of the first gun, before the leading -battalions of the 5th Corps were brought into play. At length, they -came into action against the railway station, and as the 11th Corps had -also developed an attack on the Geisberg from the east, it was evident -that the combat could not last long. The combined efforts of the -Bavarians and the Prussians, after severe fighting and some loss, drove -the French out of the station, and captured the town, together with a -battalion of the French regiment of the Line, the 74th, which was cut -off, and forced to surrender. The assailants had penetrated by the -gates after they had been broken in by artillery, and thus the town was -won. It was really the strong pivot of the defence, and its resistance -delayed the onset upon the Geisberg for some time. In the meantime, -General Abel Douay had been killed by the explosion of the ammunition -attached to a mitrailleuse battery; and the command had devolved upon -General Pellé. - -The whole stress of the action now fell upon the Geisberg and its -castle. The height was steep, the building pierced for musketry and -strong enough to resist anything but cannon-shot. The front was -approached by successive terraces, and there was a hop-garden near -by on the Altenstadt road. The main body of the French and all their -artillery, except one disabled gun which had been captured after a -sharp fight, were on the hills to the south, threatened every moment -on their right flank by the development of the 11th Corps which had -entered the area of battle. The little garrison in the castle made a -stout resistance, slew many of the assailants, who swarmed upon all -sides, and compelled the more daring among them to seek shelter at -the foot of the walls. Then the Germans with great labour brought up -in succession four batteries, by whose fire alone they could hope to -master the obstinate defenders who had manned even the tiled roof with -riflemen. Surrounded, threatened with the weight of twenty-four guns, -and seeing their comrades outside in full retreat, the garrison which -had done its uttermost, surrendered as prisoners of war. They were two -hundred, had killed and wounded enemies amounting to three-fourths of -their own number, and had seriously injured General von Kirchbach, -the commander of the 5th Corps. When the castle had fallen the French -retired altogether. Making only one show of resistance they disappeared -among the hills, and what is remarkable were not pursued, for the Crown -Prince riding up, halted all the troops and even the cavalry who were -in full career on the track of the enemy. The Germans lost in killed -and wounded no fewer than 1,550 officers and men; but the French loss -is not exactly known. They left behind, however, nearly a thousand -unwounded prisoners, their camp, and one gun. - -It may fairly be said of this combat, especially considering they were -surprised and greatly outnumbered, that the French sustained their old -renown as fighting men and that the first defeat, although severe, -reflected no discredit on the soldiers of the 1st Corps. By no chance -could they have successfully withstood the well-combined and powerful -onsets of their more numerous adversaries. Nevertheless, the death -of Douay, the defeat, and the disorganization of the division had a -profound moral effect, keenly felt at Metz and more keenly in Hagenau -and Reichshofen. Marshal MacMahon called for instant aid from the 7th -Corps; and the Emperor, moved by the news, decided to send him the -5th Corps, which General de Failly was at once ordered to assemble at -Bitsche and then move up the great road to Reichshofen. In the German -head-quarters and camps, on the contrary, there was rejoicing and that -natural accession of confidence in the breasts of the soldiers now -pressing towards the Saar which springs up in fuller vigour than ever -when they learn that their common standard has floated victoriously -over the first foughten field. The First and Second Armies were still -distant from the rocky steeps and thick woods where they also were -to gain the day; but the Third Army, which, by the way, was a fair -representative of South and North Germany, had actually crossed the -frontier, had penetrated into Alsace, through woods and field-works and -over streams renowned in story, and had inflicted a sharp defeat upon -the Gallic troops, whose rulers had challenged the Teutons to wager of -battle. - -It is admitted that, on the evening of August 4th, the Germans had lost -touch of the adversary. The reason was that the 4th Cavalry Division, -which had been ordered up by the Crown Prince early in the day, had -found the roads blocked by an Infantry Corps, and the vexatious delay -prevented the horsemen from reaching the front before nightfall. So -difficult is it to move dense masses of men, horses, and guns, in -accurate succession through a closed country, along cross-roads and -field-lanes. The few squadrons at hand were not strong enough to -pursue on the several roads which radiate from Wissembourg, and the -defect could not be remedied until the next day. It was known that -the fugitives could not have followed the southern roads, yet there -were hostile troops in that direction, and it was surmised that they -must have retreated into the highlands by the western track, yet they -might have traversed another way, lying under the foot of the hills. -On the 5th of August, the cavalry, starting out at daylight, soon -gathered up accurate information. General von Bernhardi, with a brigade -of Uhlans, rode forward on the highway, into the Hagenau forest, -where he was stopped by a broken bridge guarded by infantry; but he -heard the noise of trains, the whistling of engines, and, of course, -inferred the movement of troops; while on the east, nearer the Rhine, -the squadrons sent in that direction were turned back both by infantry -and barricaded roads. Towards the west, a squadron of Uhlans crossed -the Sauer at Gunstett, a place we shall soon meet again; while Colonel -Schauroth’s Hussars found the bridge at Woerth broken, were fired on -by guns and riflemen, and saw large bodies in motion on the heights -beyond the stream. Hence it was inferred that the army of MacMahon was -in position about Reichshofen, an inference confirmed by the reports -from the Bavarians who had marched on Lembach, from the 5th Corps whose -leading columns attained Preuschdorf, with outposts towards Woerth, and -from the Badeners on the left, who found the enemy retiring westward. -At night, the Crown Prince’s Army had not wholly crossed the frontier. -In front, were Hartmann’s Bavarians at Lembach, the 5th Corps before -Woerth, the 11th, on the railway as far as Surburg; the Badeners -on their left rear behind the Selz; Von der Tann’s Bavarians at -Ingolsheim, and the head-quarters and 4th Cavalry Division at Soultz, -otherwise Sulz. The 6th Corps—having one division at Landau, formed a -reserve. MacMahon’s troops, except Conseil-Dumesnil’s division of the -7th Corps, near Hagenau, were all in position between Morsbronn and -Neehwiller behind the Sulz and the Sauer, a continuous line of water -which separated the rival outposts. The Emperor had placed the 5th -Corps at the disposal of MacMahon, yet he finally detained one-half of -Lapasset’s division at Saareguemines, and drew it to himself; while -that of Guyot de Lespart was sent, on the 6th, towards Niederbronn, -and Goze’s, not wholly assembled at Bitsche on the 5th, remained with -General de Failly, who, at no moment in the campaign—such was his -ill-fortune—had his entire Corps under his orders. - - - _French Position on the Saar._ - -We may now revert to the positions occupied by the rivals on both -banks of the Saar, in order to complete the survey of an extensive -series of operations which stretched without a break, in a military -sense, from the Rhine opposite Rastadt, towards the confluence of -the Saar and Moselle. If the German Head-Quarter Staff at Mainz, -considering how well it was served, and what pains were taken to -acquire information, remained in some doubt as to the positions and -projects of the Imperialists, at Metz, ill-served and hesitating, all -was bewilderment and conjecture. Neither the Emperor Napoleon, nor his -chief adviser Marshal Lebœuf, seemed capable of grasping the situation -now rapidly becoming perilous to them; they had, indeed, fallen under -an influence which tells so adversely on inferior minds—dread of the -adversary’s combinations; and, perplexed by the scraps of intelligence -sent in from the front, they adopted no decisive resolution, but waited -helplessly on events. No serious attempt was made to concentrate the -Army in a good position where it could fight, or manœuvre, or retreat, -although, as General Frossard and Marshal Bazaine both state such a -central defensive position had been actually studied and marked out, -in 1867. Whether the occupation of the country between Saareguemines -and Œtingen would have produced a favourable effect on the campaign or -not, it would have prevented the Army from being crushed in detail, -and have given another turn to the war. But there was no firmness nor -insight at Metz. The orders issued by the Emperor look like the work -of an amateur who had read much of war, but who possessed neither the -instincts of the born soldier, nor the indefatigable industry and -business-like skill of a man who, thrust into an unwonted employment, -compelling him to face hard realities, endeavours to cope with them by -a steady and intelligent application of the principles of common sense. - -On the morning of the 4th, the Emperor did no more than shift his left -wing a little nearer to his centre, by bringing General de Ladmirault -into closer contact with Marshal Bazaine, leaving Frossard in front -of Saarbrück, and directing De Failly to assemble two divisions at -Bitsche, and report to Marshal MacMahon. The notion prevailing in -the Imperial head-quarters was, that the Germans designed to march -upon Nancy, which was not their plan at all, and that the 7th Corps, -reported to be on the march from Treves, might make an offensive -movement to protect Saarlouis, forgetting, as Frossard observes, that -their rule was concentration and not isolated operations; and that -the railroad from Saarbrück afforded the only serious inlet into -Lorraine. In the evening the news of Abel Douay’s defeat and “wound,” -not death, reached Metz, and created alarm, but did not cause any -serious modification of the Imperial plans. The next day the Emperor, -still retaining the supreme direction of the Army, and keeping the -Guard to himself, formally handed over the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps to -Marshal Bazaine, “for military operations only;” and the 1st, 5th, -partly at Bitsche, and 7th, mainly at Belfort, to Marshal MacMahon. -The incomplete 6th Corps, under Marshal Canrobert, had not yet moved -out from the camp at Chalons. Thus, there were practically two Corps -remote from the decisive points, and one in an intermediate position, -so handled by the Imperial Commander as to be useless. Not only was -the force called out for war scattered over an extensive area, but—and -the fact should be borne in mind—the fortresses were without proper -and effective garrisons, and, what was equally important, they had no -adequate stores of provisions, arms, and munitions; while the great -works at Metz itself, upon which such reliance had been placed, were -far from being in a defensive condition. Early on the 5th, in answer to -a suggestion from Frossard, who was always urging concentration, the -Emperor directed him, yet not until the 6th, to fix his head-quarters -at Forbach, and draw his divisions round about in such a manner -that, when ordered, he might remove his head-quarters to St. Avold; -instructions which left him in doubt, and inspired him with anxiety. -During the evening, however, acting on his own discretion, he thought -it fit to place his troops in fresh positions, somewhat to the rear -on the uplands of Spicheren, with one division, upon higher ground in -the rear, yet that step, though an improvement, did not remove his -apprehension respecting his left flank, which had been weakened by the -withdrawal of Montaudon’s division of the 3rd Corps to Saareguemines. -General Frossard has been much censured, but he was a man of real -ability, and almost the only general who, from first to last, always -took the precaution of covering his front with field works. - - - _German Position on the Saar._ - -We have indicated, in the preceding chapter, the stages attained by the -First and Second German Armies on the 4th; and have now only to repeat, -for the sake of clearness, a summary of their array on the evening of -the 5th. The several Corps of the Second were still moving up towards -the Saar. The 4th Corps was at Einöd and Homburg, the Guard near -Landstuhl; the 9th about Kaiserslautern, and the 12th a march to the -rear. Further westward, the 10th halted at Cusel, and the 3rd was in -its front, between St. Wendel and Neunkirchen. The First Army remained -in the villages where it was located on the 4th, that is the 7th and -8th between Lebach and Steinweiler, with one division of the incomplete -First Corps at Birkenfeld. On the evening of that day, however, General -Steinmetz issued an order of movement for the next, which carried -the leading columns of the 7th and 8th close to Saarbrück, and, as -a consequence, brought on the battle of Spicheren, the narrative of -which sanguinary and spirited fight will fall into its natural place -later on. As the main current of the campaign flowed Metzward, it will -be convenient to recount, first, the operations of the Crown Prince’s -Army, which though in a measure subsidiary, produced more telling and -decisive effects upon the fortunes of the French, than the engagement -which broke down their foremost line of battle on the Saar. - - - - - CHAPTER V. - - TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. - - 1.—_Woerth._ - - -Alike in Alsace and Lorraine, the actions which made the 6th of August -a date so memorable in this swiftly moving war were undesigned on the -part of the assailant and unexpected on the part of the assailed. In -other words, as General von Moltke did not intend to throw the force -of his right and centre against the main body of the Imperialists -until all the Corps were closer to the frontier and to each other, so -the Crown Prince proposed to employ the day in changing front from -the south to the west and then direct his serried lines upon the -front and flanks of MacMahon’s Army, which he confidently expected -to find in position behind the Sulz and the Sauer, covering the road -to Bitsche. The despatches of the French Marshal also show that he -counted on a day’s respite, since his orders to De Failly were that -the two divisions commanded by that ill-used officer were to march on -the 6th to join the 1st Corps, so that they might be in line to fight -a battle on the following day. But De Failly, harassed by fluctuating -orders from Metz, shifted hither and thither, now to the right, now to -the left, and never permitted to keep his Corps in hand, was unable -to do more than start one division on the road to Reichshofen, while -he assembled the other at Bitsche, and left one-half the third on -the Saar to share the misfortunes of Napoleon and Bazaine. No such -hesitation and infirmity of purpose characterized the conduct of the -German commanders. They had well-defined plans, indeed, and issued -clear and precise orders, yet both the one and the other were so -framed that they could be modified to deal with unexpected incidents, -and adapted at once to the actually ascertained circumstances of the -moment, which is the very essence of war. The spirit of the German -training gives a large discretion to superior officers, who are taught -to apply the rules issued for their guidance to the military situation -which, in the field, is certain to vary from day to day, or even from -hour to hour. Moreover, a German general who attacks is certain to -receive the ready support of comrades who may be near, while those more -remote, who hear the sound of battle or receive a request for help, at -once hasten forward, reporting the fact to, without awaiting orders -from, superior authority. Nothing testifies more effectively to the -soundness of the higher education in the Prussian military system than -the fact that it is possible not only to confer these large powers on -subordinates, but to encourage the use of them. At the same time it -must be acknowledged that, in any army where the officers do not make -the study of war their daily and hourly business, and where the best -of the best are not selected for command and staff duty, the latitude -enjoyed by the Germans could not be granted, because its capricious and -unintelligent use would lead to needless bloodshed, the frustration of -great designs, and perhaps shameful defeat. - -It has been already stated that both commanders had intended to assume -the offensive and fight a battle on the 7th, the Crown Prince proposing -to bring up the greater part of his Army and envelop the French, -and Marshal MacMahon, who thought he was dealing with the heads of -columns, having drawn up a plan to attack the Germans in front with the -1st and turn their right flank with the 5th Corps. Had he known how -strong and how compact was the array of his opponent he never could -have framed a scheme which would have transferred to the enemy all the -advantages possessed by himself. The contingency of a forward movement -on his part had been foreseen and guarded against, and the precautions -adopted on the evening of the 5th would have become far more formidable -had the next day passed by without a battle. But those very protective -measures, as will be seen, tended to precipitate a conflict by bringing -the troops into contact on the front and left flank of the French -position. Marshal MacMahon had selected and occupied exceptionally -strong ground. He posted his divisions on a high plateau west of -the Sauer and the Sulz, between Neehwiller and Eberbach, having -Froeschwiller as a kind of redoubt in the centre, and the wooded slopes -of the hills running steeply down to the brooks in his front. The -left wing, where General Ducrot commanded, was thrown back to guard -the passages through the woodlands, which led down the right bank of -the Sulz from Mattstal into the position. The centre fronted Woerth, -which was not occupied, and the right, without leaning on any special -protective obstacle, was in the woods and villages south-east of -Elsasshausen, with reserves in the rear which, says the German official -narrative, together with the open country, were a sufficient guard -against a direct flank attack, an opinion not justified by the result. -The Sauer was deep, the bridges had been broken, and the ascents on -the French side were prolonged, except on one point, and swept by -musketry and cannon. Among the vines and copses, in the villages -and farmsteads, everywhere protected by open ground, over which an -assailant must pass, stood the French Army—Ducrot on the left, facing -north-west, Raoult in the centre, Lartigue on the right, having behind -him Conseil-Dumesnil’s division of the 7th Corps. Pellé, who succeeded -Abel Douay, was in reserve; and the cavalry were partly in rear of the -right, and partly behind the centre. The official German history speaks -of the position as especially strong, regards the mass of troops seated -there, put down at forty-five thousand men, as amply sufficient for a -vigorous defence, and contends that the defect of numbers was balanced -by a respectable artillery and the superiority of the Chassepot over -the far-famed needle-gun. A Bavarian soldier-author, Captain Hugo -Helvig, however, says that the ground held by the French had all the -disadvantages of so-called “unassailable” positions—it had no issues to -the front, consequently the defenders could not become the assailants; -its right was “in the air” and its left “rested on that most doubtful -of all supports to wings—a wood.” Thus the Bavarian captain differs -from the General Staff. The fact seems to be that the position was so -formidable that it could only be carried by onsets on both flanks, -which, of course, implies that the assailant must have the control of -superior numbers. Another point to be noted is that the great road to -Bitsche was a prolongation of the front and in rear of the left, and -that, as happened, in case of a severe defeat, the temptation would -be all powerful to retreat by cross roads on Saverne, that is, away -from instead of towards the main body of the Imperial Army. Marshal -MacMahon had hoped to be the assailant, but he held that if the German -Army continued its march southward beyond Hagenau, he would have to -retreat, a movement the Crown Prince was not likely to make, since the -orders from the King’s head-quarters were to seek out and fight the -enemy wherever he might be found, a rule which governed all the German -operations up to the fatal day of Sedan. - -Early on the morning of the 6th, the German columns were approaching, -from the north and the east, the strong position just described. -Hartmann’s Bavarians, after marching westward through the Hochwald -to Mattstal, had turned south, down the Sulzbach. The 5th Corps, in -position overnight at Preuschdorf, had, of course, strong advanced -posts between Goersdorf and Dieffenbach, while von der Tann’s -Bavarians were on the march from Ingolsheim, also through the lower -Hochwald road, by Lampertsloch upon Goersdorf and the Sauer. Further -to the left, the 11th Corps and Von Werder’s combined divisions were -wheeling up to the right, so as to extend the line on the outer flank -of the 5th Corps. The Hochwald rose five or six hundred feet above -the battlefield. Like most uplands, it was intersected by vales and -country roads, and nearly every hollow had its beck which flowed into -the principal stream. This was the Sauer. Rising in hills beyond -Lembach, it ran in a southerly direction along the whole German front, -receiving the Sulz at Woerth, and dividing into two streams opposite -Gunstett. These greater and lesser brooks, though spanned by few -bridges, were well supplied with mills, which always facilitate the -passage of streams. Large villages, also, filled up the valley bottoms -here and there, and the country abounded in cultivation. Through this -peopled and industrious region the main roads ran from north to south, -generally speaking, the road and railway from Bitsche to Hagenau, -and on to Strasburg, passing in rear of MacMahon’s position close to -Niederbronn and Reichshofen, and another highway to Hagenau, a common -centre for roads in these parts, descended from Lembach, and, after -crossing, followed the right bank of the Sauer. Thus there were plenty -of communications in all directions, despite the elevated, wooded and -broken character of a district, wherein all arms could move freely, -except cavalry. - - - _The Battle Begins._ - -The action was brought on by the eagerness of each side to discover -the strength and intentions of the other. In this way, General von -Walther, at daybreak, riding towards the Sauer, hearing noises in the -French camp, which he construed to mean preparations for a retreat, -ordered out a battery and some infantry, to test the accuracy of -his observations. The guns cannonaded Woerth, and the skirmishers, -finding the town unoccupied, but the bridge broken, forded the stream, -and advanced far enough to draw fire from the French foot and four -batteries. The Prussian guns, though fewer, displayed that superiority -over the French which they maintained throughout, and the observant -officers above Woerth knew, by the arrival of the ambulance men on -the opposite hills, that their shells had told upon the enemy. The -skirmish ceased after an hour had passed, but it served to show that -the French were still in position. Opposite Gunstett there stood a -Bruch-Mühle, or mill in the marsh, and in this place the Germans had -posted a company, supported by another in the vines. Their purpose was -to protect the left flank of the 5th Corps, and keep up a connection -with the 11th, then on the march. The French sent forward, twice, -bodies of skirmishers against the mill, supporting them the second time -by artillery, and setting the mill on fire; but on neither occasion -did they press the attack, and the Germans retained a point of passage -which proved useful later in the day. - -These affairs at Woerth and Gunstett ceased about eight o’clock, but -the cannonade at the former, echoing among the hills to the north, -brought the Bavarians down the Sulz at a sharp pace, and thus into -contact with Ducrot’s division. For General Hartmann, on the highlands, -could see the great camp about Froeschwiller, and, directing his -4th Division on that place, and ordering up the reserve artillery -from Mattstal, the General led his men quickly down the valley. An -ineffective exchange of cannon-shots at long range ensued; but as the -Bavarians emerged into the open, they came within reach of the French -artillery. Nevertheless they persisted, until quitting the wood, they -were overwhelmed by the Chassepot and fell back. A stiff conflict now -arose on a front between Neehwiller and the Saw Mill on the Sulz, and -even on the left bank of this stream, down which the leading columns -of a Bavarian brigade had made their way. In short, Hartmann’s zealous -soldiers, working forward impetuously, had fairly fastened on to the -French left wing, striking it on the flank which formed an angle to the -main line of battle, and holding it firmly on the ground. The French, -however, had no thought of retiring, and besides, at that moment, they -had the vantage. When the combat had lasted two hours, General von -Hartmann received an order directing him to break it off, and he began -at once his preparations to withdraw. The task was not easy, and before -it was far advanced a request arrived from the Commander of the 5th -Corps for support, as he was about to assail the heights above Woerth. -It was heartily complied with, all the more readily, as the roar of a -fierce cannonade to the south swept up the valley; but as the Bavarians -had begun to withdraw, some time elapsed before the engagement on this -side could be strenuously renewed. - - - _Attack on Woerth._ - -We have already said that the Crown Prince, not having all his Corps -in compact order, did not intend to fight a battle until the next day. -But what befell was this. The officer at the head of the staff of the -5th Corps reached the front after the reconnaissance on Woerth was -over. Just as he rode up, the smoke of Hartmann’s guns was visible on -one side, and the noise of the skirmishers at Gunstett on the other. In -order to prevent the French from overwhelming either, it was agreed, -there and then, to renew the contest, and shortly after nine o’clock -the artillery of the 5th Corps, ranged on the heights, opened fire. At -the same time, a portion of the 11th Corps, hearing the guns, had moved -up rapidly towards Gunstett, and three of their batteries were soon in -line. Thus, the Bavarians rushed into battle in order to support the -5th Corps, this body resumed the combat to sustain the Bavarians, and -the advanced guard of the 11th fell on promptly, because the 5th seemed -in peril. The Prussian artillery soon quelled, not the ardour, but the -fire of the French gunners; and then the infantry, both in the centre -and on the left, went steadily into action, passing through Woerth, -and beginning to creep up the opposite heights. They made no way, and -many men fell, while further down the stream, opposite Spachbach and -Gunstett, part of the troops which had gone eagerly towards the woods, -were smitten severely, and driven back headlong over the river. Still -some clung to the hollow ways, Woerth was always held fast, and when -the foot recoiled before the telling Chassepot, the eighty-four pieces -in battery lent their aid, averted serious pursuit, and flung a shower -of shells into the woods. It was at this period that the defect of the -French position became apparent. If the hardy Gauls could repel an -onset, they could not, in turn, deliver a counter stroke, because the -advantages of the defensive would pass, in that case, to the adversary. -But the Germans across the Sauer, who still held their ground, had -much to endure, and were only saved by the arrival of fresh troops, -and by seeking every available shelter from the incessant rifle fire. -In the meantime, the 11th Corps was marching to the sound of the guns. -General von Bose, its commander, had reached Gunstett in the forenoon, -and, seeing how matters stood, had called up his nearest division, had -ordered the other to advance on the left, and had informed Von Werder -that an action had begun, in consequence whereof the Badeners and -Würtembergers were also directed on the Sauer. - -It was about one o’clock when the Crown Prince rode up to the front -and took command. He had ridden out from Soultz at noon, because he -plainly heard the sounds of conflict, and on his road had been met by -an officer from Von Kirchbach, bearing a report which informed the -Commander-in-Chief that it was no longer possible to stop the fray. At -the time he arrived, the advanced brigade of Von der Tann’s Bavarians -had thrust itself into the gap between Preuschdorf and Goersdorf, and -had brought three batteries into action, but the remainder of the -Corps were still in the rear. The Crown Prince thus found his front -line engaged without any reserve close at hand, and that no progress -had been made either on the centre or the wings; but he knew that the -latter would be quickly reinforced, and that the former, sustained by -two hundred guns, constituted an ample guarantee against an offensive -movement. No better opportunity of grappling with a relatively weak -enemy was likely to occur, and it was to be feared that if the chance -were offered, he would escape from a dangerous situation by skilfully -extricating his Army. The Crown Prince, therefore, determined to -strike home, yet qualifying his boldness with caution, he still wished -to delay the attack in front and flank until the troops on the march -could reach the battlefield. No such postponement was practicable, -even if desirable, because the fighting Commander of the 5th Corps had -already, before the advice came to hand, flung his foremost brigades -over the Sauer. So the action was destined to be fought out, from -beginning to end, on places extemporized by subordinate officers; but -they were adapted to the actual facts, and in accordance with the -main idea which was sketched by the Chief. It may be said, indeed, -that the battle of Woerth was brought on, worked out, and completed -by the Corps commanders; and the cheerful readiness with which they -supported each other, furnished indisputable testimony to the soundness -of their training, the excellence of the bodies they commanded, and -the formidable character, as well as the suppleness of the military -institutions, which, if not founded, had been carried so near to -perfection by Von Roon, Von Moltke and the King. - -Begun in the early morning by a series of skirmishes on the river -front, the action had developed into a battle at mid-day. The resolute -Von Kirchbach, acting on his own responsibility, had thrown the entire -5th Corps into the fight; yet so strong was the position occupied by -the defenders, that a successful issue depended upon the rapidity -and energy with which the assaults on both flanks were conducted by -brigades and divisions only then entering one after the other upon -a fiercely contested field. At mid-day, the French line of battle -had been nowhere broken or imperilled. Hartmann’s Bavarians on one -side had been checked; the advance brigade of the 11th Corps, on the -other, had been driven back over the Sauer, and Lartigue’s troops -were actually pressing upon the bridges near the mill in the marsh, -which, however, they could not pass. The enormous line of German guns -restrained and punished the French infantry, when not engaged in -silencing the inferior artillery of the defender. But no impression -had been made upon the wooded heights filled with the soldiers of -Ducrot, upon Raoult’s men in the centre above Woerth, or on Lartigue’s -troops, who, backed by Conseil-Dumesnil, stood fast about Morsbronn, -Eberbach, and Elsasshausen. So it was at noon, when the hardihood of -Von Kirchbach forced on a decisive issue. Passing his men through, and -on both sides of Woerth, he began a series of sustained attacks upon -Raoult, who stiffly contested every foot of woodland, and even repelled -the assailants, who, nevertheless, fighting with perseverance, and -undismayed by the slaughter, gradually gained a little ground on both -sides of the road to Froeschwiller. By comparatively slow degrees, -they crept up the slopes, and established a front of battle; but the -regiments, battalions, companies, were all mixed together, and, as -the officers fell fast, the men had often to depend upon themselves. -While these alternately advancing, receding, and yet again advancing -troops were grappling with the centre, Hartmann renewed his onsets, -part of Von der Tann’s Corps dashed over the Sauer, filling up the gap -in the line, and joining his right to Hartmann’s left; and the leading -brigades of a fresh division of the 11th Corps, moving steadily and -swiftly over the river below Gunstett, backed by all the cannon which -the nature of the ground permitted the gunners to use, assailed the -French right with measured and sustained fury, and, indeed, decided the -battle. - - - _Attack on the French right._ - -The French were posted in great force on their right—where they had -two divisions, one in rear of the other, between the Sauer and the -Eberbach, having in support a powerful brigade of horsemen, Cuirassiers -and Lancers, under General Michel. The infantry, as a rule, faced to -the eastward; while the attacking columns not only fronted to the -westward, but also to the north-west; in other words, they fastened -on the front from Spachbach, struck diagonally at the outer flank -from Morsbronn, and even swept round towards the rear. The area of -the combat on this part of the field was included on an oblong space -bounded on the west by the Eberbach, and on the east by the Sauer, -having Morsbronn at the south-eastern angle and outside the French -lines; Albrechtshaüser, a large farmstead, a little to the north of the -former, and opposite Gunstett; and beyond that point to the north-west -the undulating wooded uplands, called the Niederwald, whence the -ground slightly fell towards Elsasshausen, and rose again to a greater -height at Froeschwiller, the centre and redoubt of the position. As -the 22nd Division of the 11th Corps came up from Dürrenbach, they -broke obliquely into this oblong, the direction of their attack -mainly following the cross road through the forest from Morsbronn to -Elsasshausen, while their comrades pierced the woods to the north of -the great farmstead. No difficulty was encountered in expelling the -handful of French from the village, but at the farm the Germans had -a sharper combat, which they won by a converging movement, yet the -defenders had time to retire into the forest. Thus two useful supports -were secured, almost perpendicular to the French flank, and the -pathways leading towards Reichshofen were uncovered. General Lartigue -at once discerned the peril, and, in order that he might obtain time -to throw back his right, he directed General Michel to charge the left -flank of the Germans before they could recover from the confusion -consequent on a rapid and irregular advance through the villages, -outbuildings, and hopfields, and array a less broken front. - -The French cavalry appear to have considered that their main function -was restricted to combats in great battles. The traditions handed -down from the days of Kellerman and Murat and Lasalle survived in all -their freshness, and the belief prevailed that a charge of French -horseman, pushed home, would ride over any infantry, even in serried -formation. They had disdained to reckon with the breech-loader in the -hands of cool, well-disciplined opponents; and as their chance of -acting on their convictions had come, so they were ready and willing -to prove how strong and genuine was their faith in the headlong -valour of resolute cavaliers. Instead of using one regiment, Michel -employed both, and a portion of the 6th lancers as well. He started -forth from his position near Eberbach, his horsemen formed in echelon -from the right, the 8th Cuirassiers leading in column of squadrons, -followed by the 9th and the Lancers. Unluckily for them, they had to -traverse ground unsuitable for cavalry. Here groups of trees, there -stumps, and again deep drains, disjointed the close formations, and -when they emerged into better galloping ground, indeed before they had -quitted the obstructions, these gallant fellows were exposed to the -deadly fire of the needle-gun. Nevertheless, with fiery courage, the -Cuirassiers dashed upon the scattered German infantry, who, until the -cavalry approached, had been under a hail of shot from the Chassepots -in the Niederwald. Yet the Teutons did not quail, form square, or run -into groups—they stood stolidly in line, hurled out a volley at three -hundred yards, and then smote the oncoming horsemen with unintermitted -fire. The field was soon strewn with dead and wounded men and horses; -yet the survivors rushed on, and sought safety by riding round the -German line or through the village, where they were brought to bay, -and captured by the score. Each regiment, as it rode hardily into the -fray, met with a similar fate, and even the fugitives who got into the -rear were encountered by a Prussian Hussar regiment, and still further -scattered, so that very few ever wandered back into the French lines. -As a charge Michel’s valiant onset was fruitless; yet the sacrifice -of so many brave horsemen secured a great object—it enabled General -Lartigue to throw back his right, rearrange his defensive line in the -woods, and renew the contest by a series of violent counter-attacks. - -A furious outburst of the French infantry from the south-west angle -of the Niederwald overpowered the German infantry, and drove them -completely out of the farmstead so recently won. Yet the victors could -not hold the place, because the batteries north of Gunstett at once -struck and arrested them with a heavy fire, which gave time for fresh -troops to move rapidly into line, restore the combat, and once more -press back the dashing French infantry into the wood. On this point -the fighting was rough and sustained, for the French charged again and -again, and did not give way until the Germans on their right, forcing -their way through the wood, had crowned a summit which turned the line. -The sturdy adversary, who yielded slowly, was now within the forest, -and the German troops on the left had come up to Eberbach, capturing -MacMahon’s baggage, thus developing a connected front from stream to -stream across the great woodland. In short, nearly all the 11th Corps -was solidly arrayed, and in resistless motion upon the exposed flank -of MacMahon’s position, while part of the Würtembergers, with some -horse, were stretching forward beyond the Eberbach, and heading for -Reichshofen itself. The Germans, indeed, had gained the north-western -border of the woodland, and General von Bose had ordered the one-half -of his guns and his reserve of foot to cross the Sauer, and push the -battle home. His right was now in connection with the left of the -5th Corps, which had continued its obstinate and sanguinary conflict -with Raoult’s division on both sides of the road from Woerth to -Froeschwiller, without mastering much ground. As the Bavarians were -equally held at bay by the French left, the issue of the battle plainly -depended on the vigorous and unfaltering energies of the 11th Corps. - - - _Attack on Elsasshausen._ - -That fine body had been in action for two hours and a half, and, -despite a long march on to the field, was still fresh, its too -impetuous advanced brigade, alone, having been roughly handled, and -thrust back earlier in the day. The task now before them was the -capture of Elsasshausen, which would open the road to Froeschwiller, -take off the pressure from the 5th Corps, place Ducrot’s steadfast -infantry in peril, and enable the whole available mass of German troops -to close in upon the outnumbered remnant of MacMahon’s devoted Army. -For these brave men, although obliged to give ground, were fighting in -a manner worthy of their old renown, now dashing forward in vehement -onslaughts, again striking heavy blows when overpowered and thrust -back. Lartigue’s and some of Raoult’s troops stood on the right and -left of Elsasshausen, supported by batteries on the higher ground, -and two cavalry brigades in a hollow near the Eberbach. The foremost -infantry occupied a copse which was separated from the main forest by -a little glade, and this defensive wooded post had, so far, brought -the extreme right of the 11th Corps to a stand. About half-past two, -the centre and left had come up to the north-western edge of the -Niederwald, and thus the French in the copse had fresh foes on their -hands. They replied by a bold attack upon the adversary, whose front -lines of skirmishers were immediately driven in. The gallant effort -carried the assailants into the great wood, but not far; for behind the -flying skirmishers, on both sides of the road, were troops which had -more or less maintained a compact formation. Instead of yielding before -the French advance, the German infantry, accepting the challenge, came -steadily forward along the whole front, bore down the skirmishers, -dispersed the supporting battalion, and, following the enemy with -unfaltering steps, crossed the glade, and drove him into, and out of, -the copse-wood, which had hitherto been an impassable obstacle. As the -entire line rushed forward, they arrived at the skirt of the wood, and, -coming at once under the fire of the French guns on the heights, and -the infantry in Elsasshausen, they suffered severe losses. Then their -own artillery drove up and went into action, setting the village on -fire, yet not dismaying its garrison. The tension was so great, and the -men fell so fast, that General von Bose resolved to risk a close attack -upon an enemy whose position was critical, and whose endurance had been -put to so exhausting a strain. - -Thereupon, at the welcome signal, the bands of disordered foot -soldiers—for nearly every atom of regular formation had long -disappeared—dashed, with loud shouts, into the French position, -carrying the village at a bound, and, pushing up the hillsides, -took two guns and five mitrailleuses. The troops of the 11th had -now crossed the deep road running south-westward from Woerth, had -effected a junction with groups of several regiments belonging to -the 5th, which formed a sort of spray upon the inner flank; and had -besides, as already noted, extended south-westward towards the road -to Reichshofen. Once more the French strove, if not to retrieve a lost -battle, at least to insure time for retreat. They fell upon the Germans -along the whole line, making great gaps in its extent, and driving -the adversary into the forest; but here, again, the artillery saved -the foot, and, by its daring and effective fire, restored the battle, -giving the much-tried infantry time to rally, and return upon their -tracks. The Germans had barely time to recover from the confusion into -which they had been thrown by a furious onset, than the four Cuirassier -regiments, commanded by General Bonnemains, were seen preparing to -charge. Unluckily for these stout horsemen, the tract over which they -had to gallop was seamed with deep ditches, and barred by rows of low -trees, so that not only could no compact formation be maintained, but -the cavaliers were not, in some instances, able to reach their foes, -who were well sheltered among the vine-stocks, and behind the walls -of the hop-gardens. Moreover, the German infantry were assisted by -batteries of guns, which were able to begin with shells, and end with -grape-shot. The cavalry did all they could to close; but their efforts -were fruitless, and the enormous loss they endured may be fairly -regarded as a sacrifice willingly made to gain time for the now hardly -bested army to retire. - - - _MacMahon Orders a Retreat._ - -Indeed, the hour when a decision must be taken had struck, and -MacMahon, who had cleverly fought his battle, did not hesitate. He -determined to hold Froeschwiller as long as he could to cover the -retreat, and then fly to Saverne. For, although neither Hartmann -nor Von der Tann, despite their desperate onsets, had been able to -shake or dismay Ducrot, still, he was well aware that Raoult’s and -Lartigue’s divisions had been driven back upon Froeschwiller, and he -could see from the heights one fresh column of Bavarians moving towards -Neehwiller, on his left, and another descending from the Hochwald to -join the throng on the right bank of the Sulz. Moreover, two brigades -of Würtembergers had come up to support the 11th Corps, and one part -of them, with horsemen and guns, threatened Reichshofen, a Bavarian -brigade, as we have said, was heading for Niederbronn. In addition, -some of Ducrot’s intrenchments were carried by a Prussian Regiment on -the right of the 5th Corps, and it was evident that the fierce struggle -for Froeschwiller would be the last and final act of the tragedy. Yet, -so slowly did the French recede, that an hour or more was consumed in -expelling them from their last stronghold; and except on that point, -their does not seem to have been any serious fighting. The reason was -that the place was held to facilitate the withdrawal of such troops as -could gain the line of retreat, and although the disaster was great, it -would have been greater had not Raoult, who was wounded and captured in -the village, done his uttermost to withstand the concentric rush of his -triumphant enemies. - - - _The Close of the Battle._ - -No specific and detailed account, apparently, exists, of this last -desperate stand. But it is plain that, as the French centre and right -yielded before Von Kirchbach and especially Von Bose, as the impetuous -infantry onsets were fruitless, as the cavalry had been destroyed and -the French guns could not bear up against the accurate and constant -fire of their opponents, so the Germans swept onwards and almost -encircled their foes. When Ducrot began to retire, the Bavarians -sprang forward up the steeps and through the woods, which had held -them so long at bay; the stout and much-tried 5th Corps pushed onward, -and the 11th, already on the outskirts of Froeschwiller and extending -beyond it, broke into its south-eastern and southern defences; so that -portions of all the troops engaged in this sanguinary battle swarmed -in, at last, upon the devoted band who hopelessly, yet nobly, clung -to the final barrier. How bravely and steadfastly they fought may be -inferred from the losses inflicted upon the Germans, whose officers, -foremost among the confused crowd of mingled regiments and companies, -were heavily punished, whose rank and file went down in scores. Even -after the day had been decided, the French in Froeschwiller still -resisted, and the combats there did not cease until five o’clock. But -in the open the German flanking columns had done great execution on -the line of retreat. A mixed body of Prussian and Würtemberg cavalry -had ridden up on the extreme left, one Bavarian brigade had moved -through Neehwiller upon Niederbronn, and another had marched through -Froeschwiller upon Reichshofen. The horsemen kept the fugitives in -motion and captured _matériel_; the first mentioned Bavarian brigade -struck the division of General Guyot de Lespart, which had reached -Niederbronn from Bitsche; and the second bore down on Reichshofen. -The succouring division had arrived only in time to share the common -calamity, for assailed by the Bavarians and embarrassed by the flocks -of fugitives, one-half retreated with them upon Saverne, and the other -hastily retraced its steps to Bitsche, marching through the summer -night. The battle had been so destructive and the pursuit so sharp -that the wrecks of MacMahon’s shattered host hardly halted by day or -night until they had traversed the country roads leading upon Saverne, -whence they could gain the western side of the Vosges. Nor did all his -wearied soldiers follow this path of safety. Many fled through Hagenau -to Strasburg, more retreated with the brigade of Abbatucci to Bitsche, -and nine thousand two hundred officers and men remained behind as -prisoners of war. The Marshal’s Army was utterly ruined, Strasburg was -uncovered, the defiles of the Vosges, except that of Phalsbourg, were -open to the invader who, in addition to the mass of prisoners, seized -on the field, in some cases after a brilliant combat, twenty-eight -guns, five mitrailleuses, one eagle, four flags, and much _matériel_ of -war. The actual French loss in killed and wounded during the fight did -not exceed six thousand; while the victors, as assailants, had no fewer -than 489 officers and 10,153 men killed and wounded. It was a heavy -penalty, and represents the cost of a decisive battle when forced on by -the initiative of Corps commanders before the entire force available -for such an engagement could be marched up within striking distance of -a confident and expectant foe. - -One other consequence of an unforeseen engagement was that the 5th -Division of cavalry, which would have been so useful towards the -close of the day, was unable to enter the field until nightfall. The -Crown Prince and General Blumenthal, not having the exact information -which might have been supplied by horsemen who rode at the heels of -the fugitives, remained in doubt as to the line or lines of retreat -which they followed. It was not until the next day that reports were -sent in which suggested rather than described whither the French Army -had gone. Prince Albrecht, who led the cavalry, had hastened forward -to Ingweiler, on the road to Saverne, but he notified that, though a -considerable body had fled by this route, the larger part had retired -towards Bitsche. Later on the 7th he entered Steinburg, where he -was in contact with the enemy, but, as infantry were seen, he was -apprehensive of a night attack from Saverne, and judged it expedient -to fall back upon Buchswiller. The division had ridden more than forty -miles in a difficult country during the day. From the north-west -came information that the patrols of the 6th Corps had been met at -Dambach, and that the French were not visible anywhere. The explanation -of this fact is that one division of the 6th, directed on Bitsche, -had, in anticipation of orders, pushed troops into the hills, and -had thus touched the right of the main body. The reason why neither -MacMahon nor De Failly were discovered was that the Marshal had fallen -back to Sarrebourg, and that the General had hurried to join him by -Petite-Pierre; and thus contact with the enemy was lost by the Germans -because the defiles of the Vosges were left without defenders. - - - 2.—_Spicheren._ - -As the critical hours drew nearer when the capacity of the Emperor -Napoleon and Marshal Lebœuf, applied to the conduct of a great war, -was to be put to the severest test, so their hesitation increased -and their inherent unfitness for the heavy task became more and more -apparent. Marshal Bazaine had been intrusted with the command of -three corps “for military operations only,” yet the supreme control -was retained in Metz, and the Corps commanders looked more steadily -in that direction than they did towards the Marshal’s head-quarters -at St. Avold. Along the whole front, at every point, an attack by the -enemy was apprehended. General de Ladmirault was convinced that the -7th Prussian Corps would strive to turn his left; Marshal Bazaine was -disturbed by the fear that the same body of troops would come upon him -from Saarlouis; General Frossard felt so uncomfortable in the angle -or curve on the Saar, which he occupied, that he vehemently desired -to see the Army concentrated in the position of Cadenbronn, a few -miles to the rear of Spicheren; General Montaudon, who had a division -at Sarreguemines, was certain that the enemy intended to swoop down -upon him; and General de Failly was in daily alarm lest the Prussians -should advance upon the gap of Rohrbach. At Metz all these conflicting -surmises weighed upon, we might almost say collectively governed the -Emperor and the Marshal, who issued, recalled, qualified, and again -issued perplexing orders. It is true that, owing to the supineness of -the cavalry, and the indifference of the peasantry on the border, they -were without any authentic information; but if that had been supplied -it is very doubtful whether they would have been able to profit by it; -and they were evidently unable to reason out a sound plan which would -give them the best chances of thwarting the adversary’s designs or of -facing them on the best terms. The sole idea which prevailed was that -every line should be protected; and thus, on the 5th, the Guard was at -Courcelles; Bazaine’s four divisions, hitherto echeloned on the line -from St. Avold to Forbach, were strung out on a country road between -St. Avold and Sarreguemines; De Ladmirault, who had been ordered to -approach the Marshal, misled by the apparition of Prussian patrols, -gave only a partial effect to the order; while Frossard, on the evening -of that day, instead of the next morning, made those movements to the -rear which attracted the notice of his opponents and drew them upon -him. At dawn on the 6th, “the Army of the Rhine” was posted over a -wide space in loosely-connected groups; yet, despite all the errors -committed, there were still three divisions sufficiently near the 2nd -Corps on the Spicheren heights to have converted the coming defeat into -a brilliant victory. That great opportunity was lost, because the -soldierly spirit and the warlike training, in which the French were -deficient, were displayed to such an astonishing degree by the Germans -whom they had so unwisely despised. - -The watchful cavalry on the right bank of the Saar had noted at once -the retrograde movement which General Frossard effected on the evening -of the 5th, and the German leaders were led to infer from the tenour of -the reports sent in, that the whole French line was being shifted to -the rear, which was not a correct inference at that moment. Yet it was -true and obvious that Frossard had withdrawn from the hills in close -proximity to Saarbrück. In order to ascertain, if possible, how far -and in what degree the French had retired, small parties of horsemen -crossed the river soon after daylight, and rode, not only along the -direct route to Forbach until they were stopped by cannon fire, but -swept round the left flank, and even looked into the rear, observed -the French camps, and alarmed both Marshal Bazaine and General de -Ladmirault. Above Sarreguemines they tried to break up the railway, -and did destroy the telegraph; and thus, by appearing on all sides, -these enterprising mounted men filled the adversary with apprehensions, -and supplied their own Generals with sound intelligence. Some -information, less inaccurate than usual, must have reached the Imperial -head-quarters at Metz, seeing that a telegram sent thence, between four -and five in the morning, warned Frossard that he might be seriously -attacked in the course of the day; but it does not appear that the same -caution was transmitted to Bazaine, with or without instructions to -support his comrade. It is a nice question whether the general conduct -of the war suffered the greater damage from the active interference or -the negligence of the Emperor and his staff. - -While the cavalry were keeping the French well in view, the leading -columns of the 7th and 8th Corps were moving up towards the Saar, -and one division of the Third was equally on the alert. General von -Rheinbaben had already ridden over the unbroken bridges, had posted -some squadrons on the lower ground, and had drawn a sharp fire from -the French guns. The German staff were astonished when they learned -that the bridges had not been injured. The reason was soon apparent. -The Emperor still cherished the illusion that he might be able to -assume the offensive, a course he had prepared for by collecting -large magazines at Forbach and Sarreguemines on the very edge of the -frontier; and his dreams were now to be dispelled by the rude touch of -the zealous and masterful armies whose active outposts were now over -the Saar. - - - _The Battle-field._ - -The ground occupied by the 2nd Corps was an undulating upland lying -between the great road to Metz and the river, which, running in a -northerly direction from the spurs of the Vosges, turns somewhat -abruptly to the west a couple of miles above Saarbrück on its way -to the Moselle. The heights of Spicheren, partly wooded and partly -bare, fall sharply to the stream in the front and on the eastern -flank, while on the west lies the hollow through which the highway and -the railroad have been constructed. The foremost spur of the mass, -separated by a valley from the Spicheren hills, is a narrow rocky -eminence, which Frossard names the Spur, and the Germans call the -Rotheberg, or Red Hill, because its cliffs were so bright in colour, -and shone out conspicuously from afar. On the French right of this -rugged cliff were dense woods, and on the left the vale, having beyond -it more woods, and towards Forbach, farms, houses and factories. -The upper or southern end was almost closed by the large village -of Stiring-Wendel, inhabited by workers in iron, and having on the -outskirts those unseemly mounds of slag with which this useful industry -defaces the aspect of nature. The village stands between the road -and railway, and as the heights rise abruptly on each side, all the -approaches, except those through the woods on the west and north-west, -were commanded by the guns and infantry on the slopes. It should be -noted that west of the neck which connected the red horse-shoe shaped -hill with the central heights in front of Spicheren village, there -is a deep, irregular, transversal valley, which proved useful to the -defence. General Frossard placed Laveaucoupet’s division upon the -Spicheren hills, in two lines, and occupied the Red Hill, which he -had intrenched, with a battalion of Chasseurs. In rear of all stood -Bataille’s division at Œtingen. On the left front, Jolivet’s brigade of -Vergé’s division occupied Stiring, and Valazé’s was placed to the west -of Forbach, looking down the road to Saarlouis. As Frossard dreaded -an attack from that side, especially as the road up the valley from -Rosseln turned the position, his engineer-general threw up a long -intrenchment, barring the route. It was in this order that the 2nd -Corps stood when some daring German horsemen trotted up the high road -to feel for it, while others, on the west, pressed so far forward that -they discerned the camps at St. Avold. Below the front of the position, -and just outside Saarbrück, the foot-hills, Reppertsberg, Galgenberg, -Winterberg, and so on, and the hollows among them were unoccupied by -the French, and it was into and upon these that Rheinbaben pushed with -his cavalry and guns, which, from the Parade ground, exchanged shots -with the French pieces established on the Red Hill or Spur. - - - _The Germans begin the Fight._ - -On the German side, the determination to lay hands upon, and arrest -what was supposed to be a retreating enemy, was identical and -simultaneous; and it is the spontaneous activity of every officer -and soldier within reach, to share in the conflict which is the -characteristic of the day’s operations. General Kameke, commanding the -14th Division, 7th Corps, when on the march, heard that Frossard had -drawn back, and, asking whether he might cross the river, was told -to act on his own judgment; so he pressed southward. General Goeben, -chief of the 8th Corps, had ridden out to judge for himself, and -finding his comrades of the 7th ready to advance, offered his support. -General von Alvensleben, commanding the 3rd Corps, a singularly alert -and ready officer, ordered up his 5th Division, commanded by General -von Stülpnagel, but before the order arrived, General Doering, who had -been early to the outposts, had anticipated the command, because he -thought that Kameke might be overweighted. General von Schwerin, later -in the day, collected his brigade at St. Ingbert, and sent a part of -them forward by rail. In like manner General von Barnekoff, commanding -the 16th Division, 8th Corps, hearing the sound of artillery, had -anticipated the desire of Goeben, and by mid-day his advanced guard, -under Colonel von Rex, was close upon the scene of action. General von -Zastrow, who had permitted Kameke to do what he thought fit, applied -to Von Steinmetz for leave to push forward the whole 7th Corps, and -the fiery veteran at once complied, saying, “The enemy ought to be -punished for his negligence,” a characteristic yet not necessarily a -wise speech, as the business of a General is not to chastise even the -negligent, unless it serves the main purpose of the operations in -hand. Thus we see that the mere noise of battle attracted the Germans -from all quarters; and hence it happened that the fronts of the two -armies, then in line of march, hastened into a fight by degrees—in -detachments, so to speak—which would have produced a heavy reverse had -all the French brigade and divisional commanders who were within hail, -been as prompt, persistent and zealous as their impetuous opponents. - -Until near noontide, there had been merely a bickering of outposts, -chiefly on the north-western side; and it was only when the 14th -Division crossed the river and moved up the foothills, that the action -really began. At this time it was still supposed that the battalions, -batteries, and sections of horsemen visible were a rear-guard, covering -what is now called the “entrainment” of troops at Forbach; for the -greater part of Laveaucoupet’s soldiers were below the crests, and in -the forest-land, while Jolivet’s brigade made no great show in and -about the village of Stiring. Kameke’s young soldiers went eagerly and -joyously into their first battle. They consisted of six battalions, led -by General von François, and were soon extended from the Metz road on -the German right, to the wooded ascents east of the Red Hill, which, -in reality, became the main object of attack. The plan followed was -the favourite tactical movement, so often practised with success—a -direct onset on the enemy’s front, and an advance on both flanks. These -operations were supported by the fire of three batteries, which soon -obliged the French gunners on the Red Spur to recede. An extraordinary -and almost indescribable infantry combat now began over a wide space, -sustained by the battalions of the 14th Division fighting by companies. -On one side they endeavoured to approach Stiring; in the centre they -were a long time huddled together under the craigs of the Rotheberg; -further to the left they dashed into the Giffert Wald, and emerged -into comparatively open ground, only to find themselves shattered by -a heavy fire, and obliged to seek cover. For the battalions engaged -soon discovered that, instead of a rear-guard, they had to encounter -half a _corps d’armée_; and, although reinforcements were rapidly -approaching, yet, as the afternoon wore on, it became evident that -the assailants could only maintain their footing by displaying great -obstinacy, and enduring bitter losses. After two hours’ hard fighting -five fresh battalions, belonging to Von Woyna’s brigade of Kameke’s -division came into action on the right, and sought to operate on the -French left flank, some following the railway, others pressing into -the thick woods on the west. The density of the copses threw the lines -into confusion, so that the companies were blended, and, as guidance -was almost impossible, trust had to be reposed in the soldierly -instincts and training alike of officers and men, and on the genuine -comradeship so conspicuous throughout all ranks of the Prussian Army. -Practically, at this moment, the French, although beset on all sides -by their enterprising foes, had a distinct advantage, for they smote -the venturesome columns as they emerged here and there, and it may be -said that, between three and four o’clock, the German artillery on the -Galgenberg and Folster Höhe, held the French in check, and averted -an irresistible offensive movement. Yet the German infantry were -tenacious; when pressed back they collected afresh in groups, and went -on again; and General Frossard was so impressed by the audacity of his -foes, that he brought up Bataille’s division from Œtingen, and directed -Valazé to quit the hill above Forbach, and reinforce the defenders of -Stiring. Indeed, threatened on both flanks, the whole of the 2nd Corps -was gradually drawn into the fray, and its commander, though somewhat -late, appealed for aid to Marshal Bazaine, who himself did not feel -secure at St. Avold. - - - _The Red Hill Stormed._ - -Shortly after three o’clock, General von François, obeying the orders -of his chief, Von Kameke, resolved to storm the Red Hill. The German -leader was under the impression that the French were yielding on all -sides, which was not strictly correct, for the fresh troops were just -coming into action, and the Germans were superior, alone, in the range -and accuracy of their superb artillery. The gallant François, sword in -hand, leading the Fusilier battalion of the 74th Regiment, climbed the -steep, springing from ledge to ledge, and dashed over the crest, and -drove the surprised French chasseurs out of the foremost intrenchment, -and fastened themselves firmly on the hill. The Chasseurs, who had -retired into a second line of defences, poured in a murderous fire; -General von François, heading a fresh onset, fell pierced by five -bullets, yet lived long enough to feel that his Fusiliers and a company -of the 39th, which had clambered up on the left, had gained a foothold -they were certain to maintain. There were many brilliant acts of -heroism on that day, but the storming of the Red Hill stands out as the -finest example of soldiership and daring. Nor less so the stubbornness -with which the stormers stood fast; especially as the French, at that -moment, had thrown a body of troops against the German left, so strong -and aggressive, that the valiant companies in the Giffert Wald were -swept clean out of the wood. - -Fortunately, at the same time, the advanced guards of the 5th and -16th Divisions, already referred to, had crossed the Saar. General -von Goeben, who had also arrived, took command, and formed a strong -resolution. He decided that, as the battle had reached a critical -stage, it would be unwise to keep reserves; so he flung everything -to hand into the fight, on the ground that the essential thing was -to impart new life to a combat which had become indecisive, if not -adverse to the assailant. Accordingly, the artillery was brought up -to a strength of six batteries, and one part of the fresh troops was -sent to reinforce the left, and another towards the Red Hill. Shortly -afterwards, Von Goeben had to relinquish the command to his senior, -Von Zastrow, the commander of the 7th Corps; but the chief business -of the principal leaders consisted in pushing up reinforcements as -they arrived; the forward fighting being directed by the Generals and -Colonels in actual contact with the enemy. - - - _Progress of the Action._ - -For two hours, that is, between four and six o’clock, the front of -battle swagged to and fro, for the French fought valiantly, and, by -repeated forward rushes, compelled their pertinacious assailants to -give, or repelled their energetic attempts to gain, ground. A German -company would dash out from cover, and thrust the defenders to the -rear; then, smitten in front and flank, it would recede, followed by -the French, who, taken in flank by the opportune advent of a hostile -group, would retreat to the woods, or the friendly shelter of a -depression in the soil. Nevertheless, in the centre, and on their own -left, the Germans made some progress. A battalion of the 5th Division -mastered the defence in the Pfaffen Wald on the French right; a group -of companies crowned the highest point in the Giffert Wald; and the new -arrivals, drawn alike from the 8th and the 3rd Corps, pushed up the -ravine on the east, and the slopes on the west of the Red Hill, until -their combined fire and frequent rushes forced the French out of their -second line of intrenchments on the neck of high land which connected -the Red Hill with the heights of Spicheren. The French strove fiercely, -again and again, to recover the vantage ground, yet could not prevail; -but their comrades below, in the south-west corner of the Giffert Wald, -stoutly held on, so that the fight in this quarter became stationary, -as neither side could make any progress. - -On the German right, during the same interval of time, there had been -sharper alternations of fortune. Here the French held strong positions, -not only in the village of Stiring-Wendel, but on the hillsides above -it, and especially on the tongue of upland called the Forbacher Berg. -The assailant had succeeded in taking and keeping the farmsteads on the -railway, the “Brême d’or” and the “Baraque Mouton,” but the efforts of -General von Woyna to operate on the French left had been so roughly -encountered that he drew back his troops to a point far down the -valley. In fact, General Frossard had strengthened Vergé, who held fast -to Stiring, by Valazé’s brigade, and General Bataille had also sent -half his division to support his comrade. The consequence was that the -German projects were frustrated; while, on the other hand, their heavy -batteries on the Folster Höhe had such an ascendancy that the French -could not secure any advantage by moving down the vale. - -Yet they were not, as yet, worsted in the combat at any point, save on -the salient of the Red Hill. Upon that eminence the German commanders -now determined to send both cavalry and guns. The horsemen, however, -could gain no footing, either by riding up the hillsides, or following -the zigzags of the Spicheren road, which ascends the eastern face -of the promontory. The artillery had better fortune. First one gun, -and then another, was welcomed by the shouts of the much-tried and -steadfast defenders; eight pieces first succeeded in overcoming all -obstacles; finally, four other guns, completing the two batteries, -came into action, and their fire was efficacious in restraining the -ardour of the French, and rendering the position absolutely secure from -assault. But they suffered great losses, which were inflicted not only -by the powerful batteries on the opposite height, but by the Chassepot -fire from the front and the Giffert Wald. The German commanders had -discovered by a harsh experience that the battle could not be won -either by an offensive movement from the centre, or flanking operations -on the left, because the neck of highland south of the Red Hill was too -strongly held, while the deep valley interposed between the forests and -the Spicheren Downs brought the flanking battalions to a halt, under -cover. It was then determined to employ the latest arrivals, the troops -of the 5th Division, in an effort to storm the Forbacher Berg from -the Metz road valley, and at the same time to renew a front and flank -attack upon Stiring-Wendel. - -Here we may note two facts which are apt illustrations of that -efficiency, the fruit of wise forethought, which prevailed in the -German host. One is that a battery, attached to the 1st Corps, arrived -on the Saar, by railway, direct from Königsberg, on the confines of -East Prussia, and, driving up, actually went into position, and opened -fire from the Folster Höhe. It was the first light battery commanded by -Captain Schmidt, whose exploit was, then, at least, without parallel. -The other is that the 2nd battalion of the 53rd Regiment, starting at -six in the morning from Wadern, actually marched, part of the time -as artillery escort, nearly twenty-eight miles in thirteen hours, -and, towards sunset, stood in array on the field of battle. The like -goodwill and energy were displayed by all the troops; but this example -of zeal and endurance deserves special record. - - - _Frossard Retires._ - -The final and decisive encounters on this sanguinary field were -delivered on the western fronts. Four battalions were directed along or -near the Metz road upon the heights above Stiring, while the troops on -the extreme German right, which, it will be remembered, had suffered -a reverse, resumed their march upon the village. These simultaneous -onsets were all the more effective, because the French commander was -alarmed by the advance guard of the 13th Division, which, having -moved up from Rosseln, was now near to Forbach itself. He had become -apprehensive of being turned on both flanks, for Laveaucoupet was, at -that moment, engaged in a desperate, although a partially successful -strife against the Germans in the Giffert Wald. The flank attack on -the Forbacher Berg, skilfully conducted, drove back the adversary, -yet could not be carried far, because he was still strong and it was -growing dusk. In like manner, Stiring itself was only captured in part. -On the other hand, so vehement a rush was made upon the Giffert Wald -that the French once more penetrated its coverts. Practically, however, -the battle had been decided. General Frossard, receiving no support -from Bazaine’s divisions, greatly disturbed by the news that the head -of a hostile column was close to Forbach, unable to oust the Germans -from the Red Hill or effectively repel their onsets on the Metz road -had, half an hour before a footing on the Forbacher Berg was won, given -orders for a retreat upon Sarreguemines, so that the furious outburst -of French valour in the Giffert Wald was only the expiring flash of a -finely-sustained engagement, and the forerunner of a retrograde night -march. - -Indeed, General Frossard is entitled to any credit which may accrue -from the stoutness with which he held his main position until -nightfall. He himself assigns the march of Von Golz from Rosseln upon -Forbach as the reason for his retreat. Having been obliged to leave -the heights north-west of Forbach practically undefended, in order -to support Vergé in Stiring-Wendel, he lost, or thought he had lost, -control over the high road and railway to Metz, and felt bound to -retire eccentrically upon Sarreguemines, a movement which it is not -easy to comprehend. It is true that the guns of Von Golz, firing from -the hills above Forbach, drove back a train bringing reinforcements -from St. Avold, but a couple of miles to the rear was Metman’s entire -division; and it was from and not towards this succour that the main -body of the French took their way. The most astonishing fact connected -with this battle is that during the whole day three of Bazaine’s -divisions were each within about nine miles of the battlefield. It -was not the Marshal’s fault that not one assisted the commander of -the 2nd Corps. Each had been directed to do so, but none succeeded. -General Montaudon did, indeed, move out from Sarreguemines, but halted -after covering a few miles. General de Castagny, as soon as he heard -the guns, and without waiting for orders, marched his division from -Puttelange; but, unluckily for him, the sound led him into the hills, -where the dense woods and vales obstructed the passage of the sound. -Hearing nothing he returned to Puttelange, but no sooner had he got -there than the roar of artillery, more intense than ever, smote his -ear. The ready veteran at once set out afresh, this time following the -route which would have brought him into the heart of the Spicheren -position. He was too late; night came on apace, the distant tumult died -down, he endeavoured to communicate with Frossard, but his messenger -only found Metman, who, coming on from Marienthal, had halted at -Bening, and did not move upon Forbach until nearly dark. Thus were -three strong divisions wasted, and a force which would have given -the French victory, spent the day in wandering to and fro or in weak -hesitation. General de Castagny was the only officer who really did -his utmost to support the 2nd Corps; for Metman awaited orders, and -they came too late. During the night, or early in the morning, they -all, except De Castagny, who was called up to St. Avold, assembled near -Puttelange, wearied and disgusted with their fruitless exertions; and -there they were joined by the 2nd Corps. - -The Germans bivouacked on the field. They had had in action -twenty-seven battalions and ten batteries, and the day’s irregular -and confused fighting had cost them in killed and wounded a loss of -no fewer than 223 officers and 4,648 men; while the French lost 249 -officers and 3,829 men, including more than two thousand prisoners. -The great disproportion is due to the fact that the Germans were the -assailants and that throughout the day and on all points they fought -the battle with relatively small groups, parts of the 7th, 8th, and 3rd -Corps, which arrived in succession on the scene. That the victory was -not more complete must be ascribed to the improvised character of the -conflict. Both Woerth and Spicheren were accidental combats due to the -initiative of subordinate officers, a practice which has its dangers; -but the success attained in each case is a striking proof that the -discipline and training of all ranks in the German Army had created a -living organism which could be trusted to work by itself. - - - - - CHAPTER VI. - - VACILLATION IN METZ. - - -Two such staggering and unexpected blows filled the civil population -with terror, the aspiring soldiers at head-quarters with anger, and -the Imperial Commander-in-Chief with dismay. Disorder, consternation, -and amazement reigned in Metz. And no wonder. From Alsace came the -appalling news that the 1st Corps had been hopelessly shattered and -that the Marshal was already fleeing for safety, by day and night, -through the passes of the Vosges. Strasburg reported the arrival of -fugitives and the absence of a garrison. “We have scarcely any troops,” -wrote the Prefect; “at most from fifteen hundred to two thousand men.” -The chief official at Epinal asked for power to organize the defence of -the Vosges at the moment when the passes were thronged with MacMahon’s -hurrying troops. It was known that General Frossard had been defeated -and that he was in full retreat, but during twenty-four hours no direct -intelligence came to hand from him. That De Failly, left unsupported -at Bitsche, would retire at once was assumed, but the orders directing -his movements did not reach him until, after a severe night march, he -had halted a moment at Lutzelstein, or, as the French call the fort, -La Petite Pierre. From Verdun and Thionville arrived vehement demands -for arms and provisions; and from the front towards the Saar no -report that was not alarming. Turning to the south-east, the Imperial -head-quarters did not know exactly where Douay’s 7th Corps was; and in -an agony of apprehension ordered the General, if he could, to throw a -division into Strasburg, and “with the two others” cover Belfort. When -the telegram was sent one of these had been heavily engaged at Woerth, -and the other was at Lyons not yet formed! The anxiety of the Emperor -and his assistants was embittered by the knowledge that not one strong -place on the Rhine had a sufficient garrison; and that the rout of -MacMahon had not only flung wide open the portals of Lorraine, but had -made the reduction of ill-provided Strasburg a question of weeks or -days. So heedlessly had the Ollivier Ministry, the Emperor and Empress -rushed into war, at a time when even the fortifications of Metz were -glaringly incomplete, when the storehouses of the frontier fortresses -were ill-supplied, when arms and uniforms were not or could not be -furnished to the Mobiles; when, in short, nothing could be put between -the Germans and Paris except the troops hastily collected in Alsace -and Lorraine—now a host in part shattered, in part disordered, and the -whole without resolute and clear-sighted direction. - -Prince Louis Napoleon, sitting passively on his horse in the -barrack-yard of Strasburg, in 1836, was defined by a caustic historian -as a “literary man” whose characteristic was a “faltering boldness.” -The phrases apply to the Emperor in Metz. It may be said that he could -use the language employed by soldiers, that he had some military -judgment, but that, when called on, he could not deal at all with the -things which are the essence of the profession he loved to adopt. -After a lapse of more than thirty years, he found himself, not alone -in a barrack-yard facing an “indignant Colonel,” but at the head of a -great, yet scattered and roughly handled Army, with formidable enemies -pressing upon his front, and equally formidable enemies pouring through -the rugged hill paths upon his vulnerable flank, and threatening the -sole railway which led direct through Chalons to Paris. He was now a -man, old for his years, and a painful disease made a seat on horseback -almost intolerable. He could not, like his uncle in his prime, ride -sixty miles a day, sleep an hour or two, and mount again if needful. He -was an invalid and a dreamer, who had, against his fluctuating will, -undertaken a task much too vast for his powers. The contemptuous words -applied to him by Mr. Kinglake seem harsh, still, in very truth, they -exactly describe Louis Napoleon as he was at Strasburg in 1836, and as -he sat meditatively at Metz in 1870. Yet, be it understood, he never at -any period of his career was wanting in coolness and physical courage, -though what Napier has finely called “springing valour” had no place in -his temperament. He was scared by the suddenness of the shock and the -rapidity of events, and he was bewildered because he was incapable of -grasping, co-ordinating, or understanding the thick-coming realities -presented by war on a grand scale; and stood always too much in awe of -the unknown. He could not “make up his mind,” and in the higher ranks -of the French Army there was not one man who could force him to make -it up and stand fast by his resolution. But, inferior as they were -when measured by a high standard, it is probable that any one of the -Corps Commanders, clothed with Imperial power, would have conducted the -campaign far better than the Emperor. Another disadvantage which beset -him was a moral consequence inseparable from his adventurous career. -He could not add a cubit to his military stature; but he need not have -“waded through slaughter to a throne.” In Paris before he started -for the frontier, in Metz on the morning of August 7th, he must have -felt, as the Empress also felt, that his was a dynasty which could -not stand before the shock of defeat in battle. He had, therefore, to -consider every hour, not so much what was the best course of action -from the soldier’s standpoint, as how any course, advance, retreat or -inaction, would affect the political situation in Paris. Count von -Bismarck’s haughty message through M. Benedetti in 1866, if Benedetti -faithfully delivered it, must have come back to the Emperor’s memory -in 1870. Remind the Emperor, said Bismarck, that a war might bring -on a revolutionary crisis; and add, that “in such a case, the German -dynasties are likely to prove more solid than that of the Emperor -Napoleon.” It was a consciousness of the weak foundations of his power, -breeding an ever-present dread alike in the capital and the camp, -which, making him ponder when he should act, falter when he should be -bold, imparted to his resolutions the instability of the wind. - -It is on record that the first impulse of the Emperor and his intimate -advisers was to retreat forthwith over the Moselle and the Meuse. -General de Ladmirault was ordered to fall back on Metz; the Guard had -to take the same direction; Bazaine, who had responsibility without -power, was requested to protect the retirement of Frossard, who, -driven off the direct, was marching along the more easterly road to -Metz, through Gros Tenquin and Faulquemont, which the Germans call -Falconberg; De Failly was required, if he could, to move on Nancy. -MacMahon, it was hoped, would gather up his fragments, and transport -them to Chalons, where Canrobert was to stand fast, and draw back to -that place one of his divisions which had reached Nancy. Paris was -placarded with the Emperor’s famous despatch; and the Parisians read -aloud the ominous sentences which heralded the fall of an Empire. -“Marshal MacMahon,” said the Emperor, “has lost a battle on the Sauer. -General Frossard has been obliged to retire. The retreat is conducted -in good order.” And then followed the tell-tale phrase, used by -Napoleon I. himself on a similar occasion—“_Tout peut se rétablir_,” -all, perhaps, may come right again. But so inconstant was the Imperial -will, that the hasty resolve to fly into Champagne faded out almost -as soon as it was formed; for the next day the dominant opinion was -that it would be better to remain on the right bank of the Moselle. -MacMahon and De Failly accordingly got counter orders, indicating -Nancy as a point of concentration, and based on a feeble notion that -they could both be drawn to Metz; while once again Canrobert was told -to bring the infantry of the 6th Corps up to the same place by rail. -Orders and counter orders then showered down on De Failly—thus, he was -and he was not to move on Toul—but the enemy’s movements dictated the -future course of a General rendered as powerless as his superiors were -vacillating; and finally both the Marshal and his luckless subordinate, -as well as Douay’s 7th Corps, made their way deviously to the camp of -Chalons. - - _The Emperor resigns his command._ - -When the Emperor suddenly revoked the order to retire upon Chalons, -he was influenced partly by military, but chiefly by political -considerations. Remonstrances were heard in the camps, remonstrances -arrived from Paris, and the combined effect of these open -manifestations produced an order to establish the Army in position -behind the French Nied, a stream which, rising to the southward, -flows parallel to the Moselle, and, after receiving the German Nied, -runs into the Saar below Saarlouis. The weather had been wet and -tempestuous; the retiring troops, exhausted by night marches and want -of food, struggled onward, yet showed signs of “demoralization;” in -other words, were out of heart, and insubordinate. Frossard’s men, who -had passed the prescribed line before receiving the new instructions, -had to retrace their steps; and Decaen, now in command of the 3rd -Corps, begged for rest on behalf of his divisions. Yet the three Corps -and the Guard occupied, on the 10th, the new position which, selected -by Marshal Lebœuf, extended from Pange to Les Etangs. It was intended -to fight a battle on that ground, and the men were set to work on -intrenchments, some of which were completed before another change -occurred in the directing mind. The position was found to be defective; -and, on the 11th, the entire Army, abandoning its wasted labours, moved -back upon the outworks of Metz itself, almost within range of its guns. -Thus had three precious days been spent in wandering to and fro at -a time when the military situation required that the Army should be -transferred to the left bank of the Moselle, and placed in full command -of the route to Chalons, even if it were not compelled to fall back -further than the left bank of the Meuse. One explanation, drawn by the -official writers of the German Staff history, from French admissions, -is that, instead of Metz protecting the Army, the Army was required to -protect Metz, seeing that the forts were not in a state to hold out -against a siege of fifteen days! The Imperial Commander had not even -yet quite made up his mind; but, late on the 12th, finding the burden -too severe, and the clamour of public opinion too great, he appointed -Marshal Bazaine Commander-in-Chief of “the Army of the Rhine.” It was -a _damnosa hæreditas_; for the campaign was virtually lost during ten -days of weakness and vacillation, and especially by the want of a -prompt decision between the 7th and the 10th of August, while there was -yet time. - -As we have said, the main reason was political. The eager aspirants for -power, and the friends of the Empress in Paris, ousted the Ollivier -Ministry on the 9th, and the new combination, with the Comte de Palikao -at its head, felt that they could not retain office, that the “dynasty” -even could not survive unless the Emperor and the Army fought and won. -Everything must be risked to give the dynasty a chance. The Regency -and the Camp fell under the influence of hostile public opinion, -which had already begun to associate the name of Napoleon, not only -with the reverses endured, but the utter want of preparation for war, -now painfully evident to the multitude as well as to the initiated. -Yet so menacing and terrible did the actual facts become that even -the Emperor could not resist them, and, in handing over the command -to Bazaine on the 13th, he ordered that unfortunate, if ambitious, -officer to transfer the Army with the utmost speed to the left bank of -the Moselle, place Laveaucoupet’s Division in Metz, and gain Verdun -as quickly as possible. It was too late, as we shall see; for the -Prussians were ready to grasp at the skirts of a retreating Army, and -once more thwart the plans of its leaders. In order to track the course -of events to this point, the narrative must revert to the morrow of -Spicheren. - - - _The German Advance._ - -On the morning of the 7th of August, some French troops were still in -Forbach, and Montaudon’s Division had not departed from Sarreguemines. -The fronts of the two invading armies were hardly over the frontier, -and the chiefs had not yet learned the full extent of the double -shock inflicted on the adversary. A thick fog enveloped the Spicheren -battlefield, and clung to the adjacent hills and woods, and through the -mist the patrols had to feel their way. No serious resistance could be -offered by the French detachments at any point; Forbach, together with -its immense stores, was occupied at an early hour; while, so soon as -the vigilant cavalry saw the rear-guard of Montaudon quit the place, -they rode into Sarreguemines. Patrols were pushed out along the roads -towards Metz, but no advance was made, partly because the respective -Corps composing both the German Armies were still on the march, and -partly because the Staff, mistaken respecting the route followed by -MacMahon, had ordered several movements with the object of intercepting -and destroying his broken divisions. The consequence was that the -leading columns stood fast while the Corps to the rear and left were -brought up to and beyond the Saar. MacMahon and De Failly, as we have -seen, were hurrying southward, and thus Von Moltke’s precautions -proved needless. During the 8th, the cavalry, despatched far and wide, -between St. Avold and the Upper Saar, found foes near the former, who -at once retired, but none on the course of the river. The next day, -the horsemen, still more active, sent in reports which satisfied the -cautious Chief of the Staff that the French had really fallen back on -Metz, yet inspired him with some doubts respecting their intentions. -He thought it possible that they might assume the offensive in the -hope of surprising and routing part of the German Armies—a project -actually discussed by the Emperor and Bazaine, but soon thrown aside. -Von Moltke, however, determined to guard against that design, kept his -several Corps within supporting distance; and, on the 10th, began a -great movement forward. The First Army, in the post of danger, was -to serve as a pivot upon which the Second, effecting a wheel to the -right, swung inwards towards the Moselle above Metz. Von Steinmetz, -much to his disgust, had to halt about Carling, with his supports -towards Teterchen and Boulay, and the 9th Corps in support at Forbach. -On his left, the Second Army was advancing in echelon on roads between -Harskirchen, near Saar Union, where the 4th Corps touched the outposts -of the Crown Prince’s Army, and Faulquemont, where the 3rd Corps -stood on the railway, having on its left the 10th about Hellimer, and -the Guard at Gueblange. The 12th was still on the Saar, and the 2nd, -awaiting its last battalions, in Rhenish Prussia. Thus the two Armies -stood on the 11th, covered by brigades of cavalry, whose operations, -better than anything else, illustrate the audacious, yet elastic and -painstaking, methods employed by the Germans in war. - - - _The German Cavalry at Work._ - -Never before had the principle that cavalry are the eyes and ears of -an army been more extensively applied. We have already seen these -well-trained horsemen watching the line of the Saar, and even looking -into the rear of the French camps; we shall now see them literally -infesting the country between the Saar and the Moselle without let -or hindrance from the French cavaliers. After Spicheren, the German -cavalry divisions were distributed along the front of the Corps in -motion; and the hardy reiters were soon many miles ahead of the -infantry, some penetrating up the easy western slopes of the Vosges, -where they found no enemies, others riding towards Nancy and the points -of passage over the river below that town; and others again hovering -pertinaciously on the rear of the backward moving French Corps, -picking up stragglers, capturing prisoners, interrogating officials, -and inspecting, from coigns of vantage, the camps and positions of the -enemy. In this way they learned that the Emperor had visited Bazaine -at Faulquemont; that the greater part of the French were Metzward, -and that on the left towards the hills there were none to be seen. -The cavalry divisions rode out long distances, detaching flanking -parties and pushing patrols to the front, so that the whole range of -country between the right and left of the Infantry Corps was thoroughly -searched by these indefatigable and daring explorers. Thus, a troop -of Uhlans, starting from Faulquemont, rode as far as the woods near -Berlize, and keeping well under cover, yet quite close to the enemy, -took note of his positions at and beyond Pange, saw large bodies -moving from Metz to take ground behind the Nied, and learned that -reinforcements, the leading brigades of the Canrobert’s Corps, in fact, -had arrived at Metz. Another patrol of lancers, moving on the St. Avold -road, confirmed the report that the French had occupied the Nied line; -while, on the opposite flank, a Hussar patrol found no enemy about -Château Salins, but laid hands on the bearer of important despatches. -On the 11th, the screen of inquisitive horsemen became thicker and more -venturesome, trotting up to the river Seille itself at Nomény, on the -road to Pont à Mousson. The mounted men of the First Army had hitherto -been held back, but now the two divisions, passing forth on the flanks, -approached and examined the left of the French line. One troop arrived -near Les Etangs just in time to see De Ladmirault’s Corps folding up -their tents, and soon beheld the French march off towards Metz; indeed -the deep columns were moving in that direction from the left bank of -the Nied. The Uhlans followed De Ladmirault through Les Etangs until -they saw him go into position at Bellecroix close to the place. In like -manner, other Uhlans, operating further up the stream, found the camps -and intrenchments abandoned, so that it became certain, on the evening -of the 11th, that the French Army had been drawn back under the guns of -Metz. The next day the activity of the cavaliers increased, and they -pressed forward until they were in contact with the French outposts, -and were able to observe the whole new position between Queleu and -Bellecroix, working up on the left to a point within three miles of -Metz, and proving that as far as the right bank above the town, the -country was unoccupied. On the 12th, Uhlans had ridden into Nancy, on -one side, and, on the other, a body of Cuirassiers actually found the -gates of Thionville open, captured a _garde mobile_ belonging to the -garrison, and brought off a Prussian reserve man who had been detained -in the town. At Dieulouard a patrol crossed the Moselle on a bridge -just constructed by the French, and were only driven from the railway, -which they had begun to destroy, by infantry—the last detachments of -Canrobert’s Corps allowed to get through by train from Chalons. A -daring attempt was made upon Pont à Mousson by some Hussars; but here -General Margueritte, sent with his Chasseurs d’Afrique from Metz, drove -back the invaders, killing a great number. These examples will suffice -to give some idea of the admirable use which the Germans made of their -cavalry, to conceal their movements, harass the enemy, and, above all, -gain priceless information, while the adversary, whose horse were idle, -could obtain none. The dash made by Margueritte to relieve Pont à -Mousson is the one solitary instance of alertness shown by the French, -and even he and his troopers were withdrawn, leaving the river line -above Metz wholly unprotected, and the bridges unbroken! - - - _The Germans March on the Moselle._ - -From these wide-ranging enterprises, conducted by keen and resolute -soldiers, the Great Staff obtained nearly as minute a knowledge of -the French proceedings as they possessed themselves, and were enabled -to direct the march of the German Armies with firmness and precision. -Their great object was to secure the unguarded line of the Moselle by -seizing, as rapidly as possible, all the points of passage above Metz, -and the only doubt entertained at head-quarters was suggested by the -apprehension that the energy displayed by the cavalry might attract -attention to these undefended spots. Accordingly, while the First Army, -again, was ordered to protect the right of the Second, by advancing on -the Nied, taking up ground between Pange and Les Etangs, the Second was -to move upon the Seille, and endeavour to secure the bridges at Pont à -Mousson, Dieulouard and other places, sending the cavalry once more in -force over the stream. Von Moltke’s calculation was that if the French -attacked Von Steinmetz, Prince Charles could form up and threaten their -flank; if they tried to operate against the Second Army by ascending -the Moselle, Von Steinmetz could then assail them in line of march, as -they must cross his front; while if passing through Metz they moved up -the left bank, Prince Charles could effect a junction with the Crown -Prince, and Von Steinmetz could cross the Moselle and attack the French -rear. The combination was strong, but the Emperor, as we have stated, -had then no idea of assuming the offensive in any direction, his only -anxiety being to seek a temporary shelter behind the Meuse. - -Throughout the 13th, the German Corps, horse and foot, sprang forward, -displaying that alacrity and hardihood which had marked their conduct -from the outset of the war. The Dragoon brigade of the Guard swooped -down upon Dieulouard, and finally sundered the direct railway -communication between Chalons and Metz. Two other cavalry brigades, -forming the 5th Division, entered Pont à Mousson early in the morning, -and were followed by half the 10th Corps from Delme. In order to -hide, as far as possible, the movements of the Second Army, an entire -division of cavalry, the 6th, was employed; one brigade extending from -Courcelles sur Nied, to Borny on the Moselle, and the other posted -at Verny supporting the front line, and linked itself by patrols to -the 5th at Pont à Mousson. The 1st Division of Cavalry, during the -forenoon, crossed the Nied at Pange, and occupied the villages to the -right and left, so that a continuous line of mounted men stretched -from the Nied to the Moselle. Behind this barrier, the several Corps -toiled forward in full security. At the close of the day, however, only -one-half the 10th Corps was over the Moselle, the other moiety being -one march to the rear; the head of the 3rd Corps stood at Buchy; the -9th at Herny; the 12th at Chemery; the 2nd, now complete, at St. Avold; -the Guard at Lémoncourt, and the 4th at Chateau Salins. - -By this time, the Third Army, except the 6th Corps, and the Baden -Division which had been directed upon Strasburg, had made its way -through the defiles of the Vosges, had emerged into the valley of the -Upper Saar, and was, therefore, in direct communication with the Second -Army; so that the German host occupied a wide region extending from -Sarrebourg to villages in front of Metz; yet at the vital points the -Corps stood near enough to support each other should it be necessary -to assemble on a field of battle. The passage of the Vosges had been -obstructed only by nature and the forts of Bitsche and Phalsbourg. -These were turned, and the hardships of cross roads and restricted -supplies had been overcome. The divisions trickled through the valleys -on a broad front, gathering up as they touched the Saar and the country -of lakes about Fenestrange. As Phalsbourg did not command the railway, -that important highway fell into the hands of the Germans. The tunnels -in the Zorn valley west of Saverne had not been destroyed, and the -whole line was complete, yet it could not be used for the transport -of troops and stores until a later period. On the 13th, when the -First Army was closing in on the French outside Metz, and the Second -heading for the Moselle, the Third quitted the Upper Saar, and, once -more expanding, approached on a broad front the valley of the Meurthe. -During the next day, when their comrades were hotly engaged with the -enemy, they reached the banks of that stream, and their forward cavalry -rode into the streets of Lunéville and Nancy, the old capital of -Lorraine. At this critical moment, Marshal MacMahon was hastening to -Chalons; De Failly, after having been ordered hither and thither from -hour to hour, had received final orders—he was to join the Marshal; but -Douay’s 7th Corps, although Dumont’s Division had arrived, increasing -the total to about 20,000 men and 90 guns, had not yet been, and was -not for three days, directed from Belfort upon the great camp in the -plains of Champagne. - - - - - CHAPTER VII. - - VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. - - -Weary of his task, weakened in body by a painful malady, depressed in -mind by a series of disasters, and worried by advice from Paris, the -Emperor Napoleon, on the evening of the 12th of August, transferred -to Marshal Bazaine the burden which he could no longer bear. Whatever -may have been his other aptitudes, he was not born to command Armies -in the field nor had he that power of selection which may enable an -inferior to choose and clothe with his authority a superior man. Had a -Radetzky, instead of an Emperor, commanded the Austrian Army in 1859 -it is probable that the stability of the “dynasty” would have been -tried by defeat and the unity of Italy deferred until a later day. -Whether the Emperor Napoleon recognized his incompetence, or whether, -as he often did, he yielded to pressure, matters little except to the -students of character. He nominally gave up the command, yet retained -a certain indefinite control, and he placed at the head of his Army -a Marshal who, although the senior in rank to the recently promoted -Marshal Lebœuf, the late Chief of the Staff, was still the junior of -Marshal Canrobert; both, fortunately, were loyal men, and the latter -ready to serve under his junior. Yet it is doubtful whether Bazaine -ever exercised that moral ascendency which is essential at all times, -and never more so than at a crisis when the fate of Armies depends -not only on wise direction, but prompt and willing obedience. The -Marshal, appointed on the 12th, did not take up his command until the -next day, and then he was required to remedy in less than twenty-four -hours the deep-seated mischief produced by a fortnight of terrible -blundering. His special task was to transport the Army over the -Moselle. Four days earlier that might have been done without a shot -being fired, because even if the German horse had come up to look on -they must have been idle spectators as their infantry comrades were -far in the rear. The fatal error was committed when the Emperor did -not overrule all opposition, and, adhering with unswerving firmness to -his first thought, neither halt, ponder, nor rest until the Moselle -flowed between him and his foes. The military position on the morning -of the 7th dictated that step; his adversaries believed or surmised -that he would take it, because it was the right step to take. Nor can -we doubt that, as Commander-in-Chief, Louis Napoleon, who had a little -of “le flair militaire,” saw at once the proper course, but that, as -Emperor, he dared not, on reflection, run the risk. It was a false -calculation, even from a political standpoint, because, so long as he -was in the field with, or at the head of an Army, his republican and -monarchical enemies would not have moved, and time would have been -gained. By retiring promptly over the Moselle, and leaving Metz to -defend itself, he might have been defeated in battle or manœuvred back -upon Paris; but there would have been no Sedan and no Metz, and even -the Parisians would have hesitated to plunge headlong into civil war -when a French Army was still afoot, and a formidable host of invaders, -pressing on its weaker array, was “trampling the sacred soil.” The fate -of the campaign about Metz was, then, really decided when the Emperor -did not avail himself of the days of grace, beat down all opposition, -and compel his Marshals and Generals to march their troops over the -Moselle. Neither Bazaine nor any one officer present with the Army is -entitled to be called a great captain; but whatever he was, the blame -of failure does not rest on him alone; it must be shared, in a far -greater degree, by those who preceded him in command. It is necessary -to insist on this fact, because one of the most valuable lessons taught -by the campaign would be lost were the capital error committed by -the Imperial Staff, when the order for retreat was countermanded and -five days were wasted in abortive operations, not described with the -emphasis it deserves. Campaigns have been lost as much by postponed -retreats as by rash advances; and it was the ill-fortune of the French -Generals in August, 1870, to present egregious examples of both forms -of fatal error. - - - _The French Propose to Move._ - -When Marshal Bazaine took over the command, on the morning of the -13th, he was required to do in haste what his superiors might have -done at leisure. The prolonged indecision of the Imperial mind, held -in suspense down to the last moment and against its better judgment, -between the alternative of attack or retreat, was disastrous; no -margin was allowed for error of design, error in execution, and—the -unforeseen. The Emperor had ordered Coffinières, the Governor of Metz, -to build as many bridges as he could above and below the place, and -the General declares, what no one disputes, that he did construct from -twelve to fifteen bridges, which provided seven lines of march over -the stream. He also mined the permanent bridges above the fortress, so -that on the 12th facilities for crossing abounded, and the means of -destruction were prepared. Then came in the unforeseen. Rain had fallen -heavily, and consequently the Moselle rose, flowed over the trestle -bridges, damaged the rafts, disconnected the pontoons with the banks, -and spread far and wide over the approaches. In short, the increase -in the volume of water was so great and unusual, if not unparalleled, -that the calamity was attributed to the Germans—they must, it was said, -have destroyed the sluices near Marsal and have allowed the lake water -of that region free access to the Moselle—as if they did not wish to -cross the river themselves! Be the cause what it might, there was the -obstruction; so that the first information received by the Marshal -was that the retreat, which he had been ordered to execute, could not -begin until the next day, except by Canrobert’s 6th Corps, which was -near permanent bridges. Consequently, the Army remained another day -on the right bank. The Corps were in position between forts Queleu -and St. Julien, Frossard on the right, Decaen in the centre, and De -Ladmirault on the left, the Guard being in rear of the centre behind -Borny, where Marshal Bazaine had set up his head-quarters. Practically -the line was a curve extending from the Seille to the banks of Moselle -below Metz; and the defensive obstacles were a watercourse with steep -banks, patches of dense woods, two châteaus, or country houses, which -were readily made defensible, and of course the villages and farms -scattered over the pleasant fields. The main body of the Army was -covered throughout its front by outposts thrown forward towards the -Metz-Saarbrück railway on the right, beyond the brook in the centre, -and about Vremy, Nouilly, and Servigny on the left. So they stood all -day, some of them aware that the Germans were dangerously near; more -who were anxious to get over the river; and yet others who would have -staked everything upon the risk of a battle, so intolerable is suspense -to men of ardent and excitable temperaments. The night passed over -quickly, and on the 14th, yet not until a late hour in the forenoon, -the Corps began to file off to the rear. Canrobert was already across; -Frossard sent his guns and horsemen over the town bridges, while his -infantry splashed through the meadows and over the partially submerged -temporary constructions; and leaving Grenier’s division to cover -his retreat, De Ladmirault set out for the left bank over the Isle -Chambière. The Marshal at Borny, with his old Corps, now under Decaen, -and having the Guard in support, remained to protect the extensive and -perilous movement to the rear in the face of a watchful and intrepid -enemy. - -Released on the evening of the 12th from the imperative orders which -held him fast, and directed to move forward upon the French Nied, -General von Steinmetz advanced the next day with characteristic -alacrity. Two Corps, the 7th and the 1st, were posted on a short line -between Pange and Les Etangs, the 8th being held back at Varize on -the German Nied, and the two cavalry divisions being thrown round the -flanks, General von Golz, who commanded the twenty-sixth brigade, -took the bold step of transferring it to the left, or French, bank -of the stream, and he thus came into contact with the outposts of -Decaen’s 3rd Corps. Nevertheless, along the whole line, on the evening -of the 13th and morning of the 14th, each side maintained a strictly -observant attitude, and held aloof from hostile action; the French -because they wished to glide off unassailed, the Germans because -their Commander-in-Chief desired to secure a solid footing for the -Second Army on the left bank of the Moselle before the French retired. -Watched as these were by keen-sighted horsemen, they could not stir -without being seen; and so soon as the state of the Moselle permitted -a movement to the rear, the fact was reported to the German chiefs. -A Hussar party notified, about eleven, that Frossard’s outposts were -falling back; a little later that the tents were down; and then that -columns of all arms were retiring. So it was in the centre and on the -left; Decaen’s Corps remained, but two divisions of De Ladmirault’s -Corps, it was noted, were no longer on the ground they had held in the -morning. General von Manteuffel, inferring that De Ladmirault might -have gone to join in an attack upon the 7th Corps, at once put two -divisions under arms, a fortunate precaution, though suggested by an -erroneous inference. In front of the 7th Corps, the facts admitted of -no misinterpretation. The enemy was plainly in retreat, and General von -Golz felt that it was his duty to interrupt the process. Therefore, -about half-past three, notifying his intention to the Divisional -Commanders of his Corps, and requesting support from the 1st, a request -promptly granted, Von Golz sprang forward to attack the French, in full -reliance upon the readiness and energy with which his superiors and -comrades would follow him into the fray. His bold resolve did stop the -retreat, and his onset brought on, late in the afternoon, - - - _The Battle of Colombey-Nouilly._ - -The scene of this sharp but severe conflict was the gentle uplands -immediately to the eastward of Metz, and a little more than cannon-shot -beyond the forts which forbid access to that side of the place. The -village of Borny, indeed, is nearly on a line with the Fort des Bordes, -and no point of the area within which the action raged is more than -three miles from the fortifications. The ground slopes upward from -the Moselle, rising into undulating hills, the summits of which are -two or three hundred feet above the bed of the stream. Near to Metz -these elevations are clothed with copses devoid of underwood, the great -patches of verdure extending on a curve from Grimont close to the -Moselle, as far as the right bank of the Seille. To the northward are -more woods just outside the battlefield, the area of which was, from -north to south, included between them and the railway to Saarbrück. A -little to the north of this line, near Ars-Laquenexy, a village on the -road from Sarreguemines, were the sources of a rivulet which flowed -northward along the whole front of the French position, receiving on -its way brooks which trickle down the hollows in the hills to the -eastward. The heights east of the stream were bare of wood, and the -most prominent objects were the village and church tower of St. Barbe -on the crown of a rounded hill to the north-east. From this elevated -hamlet another brook rose, and found its way along the bed of a gully -to Lauvalliers, where all the watercourses united, and, under the -name of La Vallières, ran thence to the Moselle. The French troops, -four divisions of Decaen’s Corps, were posted in the woods, and on -the heights above the first-mentioned rivulet from the neighbourhood -of Ars-Laquenexy to the point where all the streamlets joined. The -outposts were in Mercy le Haut, sometimes called Mercy les Metz, in the -woods facing Ars-Laquenexy, in the Château D’Aubigny and Montoy, beyond -the brook, in Colombey, a village on the south bank, and in Nouilly, -a large village in the St. Barbe ravine. Beyond the confluence of the -hill streams stood a division of De Ladmirault’s Corps upon the high -ground east of Mey, and it was this body which had its outguards in -Nouilly. Although it was divided by the brook Vallières on the left, -the French position was strong, chiefly because the approaches were -through defiles, over open ground, or up steep banks, but also because -the woods afforded shelter to the infantry of the defenders. Three -great roads intersected the field—one from Pange, through Colombey, to -Borny, a second from Saarbrück, which, after passing La Planchette, -ran, at Bellecroix, into the third, which came from Saarlouis, and -passed through Lauvalliers, entering Metz near the fort called Les -Bordes. The Germans, early in the morning, were on the hills to the -eastward, the 1st Corps being beyond St. Barbe, and the 7th near, -and west of, Pange, with outposts well forward, and both cavalry and -infantry in practical contact with the enemy, into whose position they -looked from all sides. - - - _Von Golz Dashes In._ - -It was the spectacle of a departing and decreasing host which made the -eager Von Golz, without awaiting permission, dash impetuously forward -with his brigade. So energetic was the onset that the French were at -once driven out of the Château d’Aubigny, Montoy, and La Planchette. -The usual tactics were applied, the companies working together, turning -a flank where the front was too strong, and following up a success -until the weight of fire brought them to a halt, or even thrust them -back. The batteries attached to the brigade came at once into action -and persisted, though they were hard hit by the French. But the -advance of Von Golz was not to be arrested, and the impetus of his -first movement forward carried part of the brigade over the ravine and -watercourse, and into the village and inclosures of Colombey. That -point, however, was the limit of his progress, for the French developed -strong lines of skirmishers in the woods, and although they were -unable to expel the audacious intruders, these were obliged to expend -all their energy upon holding what they had won. On the right, that is -to the north of Colombey, the assailants were brought to a stand on the -eastern edge of the ravine, and at this early stage the farms, gardens -and houses of Colombey formed a salient offensive angle exposed to the -brunt of the French fire from the side of Borny. - -At the first indication of a combat, General von Manteuffel, two of -whose divisions were already under arms, sent their advance guards down -the hills and through the hollow ways from St. Barbe; joined his line -of battle on to the right of Von Golz and fell smartly on the outpost -of Grenier’s division which De Ladmirault had left about Mey to cover -his retrograde march upon the Moselle. The noise of combat, also, and -the appeals sent in from the daring brigadier, put the rest of the 7th -Corps in motion, so that the 14th as well as the 13th Division sprang -to arms and approached the fight. General von Zastrow, however, did not -quite approve of the temerity of his subordinate; but seeing that the -Corps was committed to an engagement, he permitted General von Glümer -to use the twenty-sixth brigade on the right and General von Woyna to -employ the twenty-eighth on the left while he held the twenty-seventh -in reserve. In like manner, the French turned fiercely on their -adversaries. Canrobert and Frossard were over the Moselle, but Decaen’s -four divisions were speedily arrayed; the Guard behind them fell in and -marched Brincourt’s brigade towards the Seille to protect Montaudon’s -right; and De Ladmirault instantly counter-marched his two divisions, -moving De Lorencez towards the north-east, hoping to turn the right -of Manteuffel, and ordering De Cissey, who had partially crossed the -Moselle, to reinforce Grenier at Mey. About five o’clock, then, in -consequence of the hardihood of a brigadier, a furious action raged -along the whole French front, towards which comrades were hurriedly -retracing their steps, and upon which adversaries were hastening -forward with equal ardour. - -The rapid development of an attack, which had in it some elements of a -surprise, alike unwelcome and unexpected, and the tenacity with which -a few battalions clung steadfastly to the advantage gained, astonished -but did not disconcert the French, who frankly answered the challenge -of their foes. Nevertheless, the opening movements of the 1st Corps -were as successful as those of Von Golz. The artillery, always foremost -in this campaign, going straight and swiftly to the front, soon had -batteries in position, protected by cavalry, while behind them on the -roads from Saarlouis and Saarbrück the infantry were quickly moving up. -The leading battalions of the 1st Division poured through and round -Noisseville and Nouilly, pressing back the French skirmishers and, -following them fast, actually stormed the barricaded village of Mey, -directly under Grenier’s main position in the wooded hill above. The -2nd Division directed upon Montoy, Lauvalliers and the mills at the -confluence of the streams, fell on with alacrity; but the resistance -was so keen that although they soon wrested the eastern, they suffered -great loss and were once promptly repulsed by the defenders, when -attempting to master the western bank. Yet, aided by the fire of -batteries concentrated south of the St. Barbe ravine, these persistent -troops ultimately crowned the ascent, and established the front of -battle on the French side of the brook throughout its length. From -one point, however, the French could not be dislodged. There was a -cross road leading from Colombey to Bellecroix. It was a hollow way, -bordered by trees two or three deep, and having in front, by way of -salient, a little fir wood. This position effectually frustrated every -effort of the Germans either to debouch from Colombey or push forward -towards Bellecroix. Naturally strong and valiantly held, it was not -carried until nearly seven o’clock, and then only by the repeated -onsets of the twenty-fifth brigade which Von Zastrow, about half-past -five, had permitted to take a share in an engagement which he did not -like, but which he was bound to sustain. Thus was Von Golz succoured -and partially relieved from the heavy pressure put on him; a pressure -further mitigated by the advance of the twenty-eighth brigade, 7th -Corps, on his left, and the capture of the wood of Borny. Still further -to the left the 18th Division of the 9th Corps, which had marched up -from Buchy on hearing the cannonade, and some cavalry appeared on the -field towards dark and thus added to the disquietude of Montaudon on -the French right who, however, held fast to his main position above -Grigy. - -The action on the French right and centre may fairly be regarded as an -indecisive combat, although the front occupied in the morning had been -driven inwards, and the daring assailant had won some ground. On the -French left the combat had been equally fierce, but less favourable -to the defenders. General de Ladmirault, indeed, when obliged to turn -and succour his comrade and subordinate, Grenier, had at once resolved -to assume the offensive. It was a timely determination, for Grenier’s -troops had been pushed back and shaken, and, if left without aid, they -would have been driven under the guns of St. Julien. But the approach -of De Cissey, and the threatening direction imparted to De Lorencez, -at once altered the aspect of affairs: for De Cissey struck in with -vigour, and the German troops which had entered Mey retreated fast -upon Nouilly; then General von Manteuffel, hastening the march of his -brigades which were still on the way to the field formed his line -to the north-west, between Servigny, Nouilly, and the mills at the -confluence of the brooks, with a reserve at Servigny. As the guns, like -the troops, arrived successively, they were arrayed on the new line, -and, before De Ladmirault could develop his flank attack effectively, -the 1st Corps had ninety guns in position between Lauvalliers and Poix, -which enabled them to bar any infantry advance upon St. Barbe. The -effect of this disposition was to frustrate the aggressive designs of -De Ladmirault, but he is entitled to the credit of having saved his -exposed division, and also of having made the only movement during -the day which had the semblance of a real endeavour to strike for -victory against a foe whose troops and artillery were plainly coming -up in detachments along the whole line. Nor can it be denied that his -vehement onset drove back the Germans, and recovered a large extent -of ground up to the skirts of Nouilly and the water mills. Moreover, -it gave great assistance to Aymard’s Division of Decaen’s Corps, and -enabled it, at one moment, to scatter the companies operating in the -angle formed by the streams, and drive them headlong over the ravine -upon Lauvalliers. But the advent of German battalions, and the action -of the guns, finally restored the combat, and as the twilight deepened -into darkness the German right once more gained the ascendency, and the -French divisions retired to their bivouacs nearer to Metz. - -Long after the sun had set, portions of the 1st Corps still arrived on -the scene; but then the battle was over. General de Ladmirault, three -years afterwards, naturally proud of his conduct, insisted that the -French had won the day. The German accounts, however, place the fact -beyond dispute, since they show that the leading troops of the 1st -Corps did reach Vautoux, Mey, and Villers l’Orme, which proves that -the adversary must have retired towards Bellecroix and the banks of -the Moselle. No doubt the Germans were wisely drawn back, at a late -hour, and on that ground the French put in a claim to the victory. For -General Steinmetz had ridden on to the field just as the contest was -coming to an end. He was angry because a battle had been fought, and -apprehensive lest a counter-attack in force should be made at dawn; -so he ordered the 1st and 7th Corps to retire upon the positions they -occupied on the 13th. Nevertheless, Von Zastrow, who did not receive -the order, insisted that his Corps should bivouac under arms on the -battlefield, so that the wounded might be collected, and the honour of -the Army vindicated. - - -_The End of the Battle._ - -In this action the French lost not quite four thousand, and the Germans -nearly five thousand men; on both sides more than two hundred officers -had been killed or wounded, General Decaen, commanding the 3rd Corps, -mortally, while Bazaine and Castagny were slightly hurt. The French -had actually on the field, including the Guard in reserve, with one -brigade in the front line, three Corps d’Armée; for, though Lorencez -did not press far forward, still the whole force under De Ladmirault -was present, and in action. The Germans brought up successively two -Corps and one Division, but a large portion of the 1st could not reach -the scene of actual fighting until dark. It is impossible to ascertain -exactly, and difficult to estimate the numbers engaged; but one fact -is manifest—that the German assailants were numerically inferior, -especially during the first two hours; that the disproportion was only -lessened between six and seven; and that, at no time, were the French -fewer in number. Marshal Bazaine emphatically states, in his report to -the Emperor, that he held his position without employing the Guard, -which is true, but it is not less true that the whole front of his -line was driven in; and that he stood at the close within the range of -the heavy guns in the forts. The French fought well, but they fought -a defensive battle, and that is why they exacted from the assailant -a much heavier penalty than he inflicted on them. The retreat of the -Imperialists was delayed; but in the Great Head-quarter Staff serious -misgivings began to spring up, and a fear lest the habit of bringing on -improvised battles might not become a real source of danger. An able -and enterprising General in command of the French at Spicheren and -Borny would have read a severe lesson to German advance-guards, and -would have made them pay for their temerity. - -Not until a late hour did the news of the battle reach the king, who -had established his head-quarters at Herny, on the railway. Prince -Frederick Charles, at Pont à Mousson, was only informed of the event -the next morning. His Army, the Second, had been engaged in marching -up to and towards the Moselle, and at eventide the several Corps -halted at these points. The 4th Corps was over the Seille, and not far -from Custines and Marbache, places just below the confluence of the -Meurthe and Moselle; the Guard had one division a little lower down -at Dieulouard; the 10th Corps, entire, was at Pont à Mousson, with a -brigade to the westward; the 3rd, the 9th, and the 12th, were facing -the Moselle between Pont à Mousson and the left of the First Army, -prepared either to frustrate a French advance up the right bank—a -possible movement always present to the mind of Von Moltke—or cross the -river. The 2nd Corps had come up to Falquemont; and a Reserve Landwehr -Division, under General Kummer, was being organized at Saarlouis. To -complete the survey, it should be added that Gneisenau’s Brigade, sent -to surprise Thionville, an enterprise which failed, was returning -to rejoin the First Army; and that on the evening of the 14th, the -foremost troops of the Crown Prince’s Army were some squadrons of -cavalry in Nancy, and an infantry brigade in Lunéville. - - -_The French Retreat._ - -Throughout the night the wearied French divisions, which had been -either engaged in combat or standing under arms, filed over the -Moselle, and the Emperor took up his quarters at Longeville, outside -the town. Marshal Bazaine’s order, dated the 13th, directed the whole -Army on the road to Gravelotte, whence one portion was to continue -by Mars la Tour, and the other turn off to the right and march on -Conflans. The rigorous construction of the Marshal’s order yields -that interpretation, but he contended, at his trial, that he merely -indicated the general lines of retreat upon Verdun, and that the Staff -and Corps Commanders should have used any and every road or track -which would have served the main purpose. There are, or at least were, -in 1870, only two roads out of Metz available for the march of heavy -columns of troops of all arms and large trains—the excellent highway -to Gravelotte, which is a long defile, and the road through Woippy, -turning the uplands on the north. All the intermediate lanes or -cross-roads are rugged and narrow, and only one, that passing by Lessy, -has or had any pretension to the character of an inferior village -road. Guns and carts can move along and up them in Indian file, but -not easily if numerous, and nowhere at a good pace. Thus, even, on the -14th, the Corps of Frossard and Canrobert, who both started late, found -the Gravelotte road so encumbered by trains that they could only make -their way slowly, and did not arrive at Rozerieulles until after dark. -The Emperor was still at Longeville, anxiously awaiting the issue of -the fight which revived all his apprehensions. Metz was excited and -alarmed, and the streets were crowded during the afternoon and evening, -with passing soldiers, guns, baggage waggons and provision carts. Night -brought no rest, for the Guard and the 3rd Corps came hastily over the -river, and were densely packed inside the town and outside the ramparts -in the space between the walls and Mount St. Quentin; while General de -Ladmirault was engaged until morning in passing his divisions across -the Isle Chambière, and Metman had also strayed from Bellecroix to that -side of the town. - -Marshal Bazaine had quitted Borny at dusk. He rode through Metz “with -difficulty,” and made his way to the Imperial head-quarters. Here -Napoleon, who was in bed, welcomed him with his usual kindness, and -when the Marshal explained his fears lest the Germans should cut in -on his line of retreat, and referring to his wound, begged to be -superseded, the Emperor, he writes, “touching my bruised shoulder -and the fractured epaulette, gracefully said, ‘It will be nothing, -an affair of a few days, and you have just broken the charm.’” -Apparently, Napoleon still clung to the belief that the allies he had -sought would come to his aid. “I await an answer from the Emperor of -Austria and the King of Italy,” he said; “compromise nothing by too -much precipitation, and, above all things, avoid fresh reverses.” He -counted on one sovereign whom he had defeated in battle, and another -whom he had helped to enlarge his kingdom, and he counted in vain, -partly because he was unsuccessful, but chiefly because the national -political interests of both countries prevailed over the gratitude felt -by Victor Emmanuel, and the desire to turn the tables on the House of -Hohenzollern which was still strong in the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine. - -“You will drag us out of this hornet’s nest, Marshal, won’t you?” -exclaimed an officer, as Bazaine quitted the Imperial quarters. It was -a task beyond his strength. When day dawned a thick fog shrouded the -valley of the Moselle, and before the camp at Longeville was astir, a -shell from the opposite bank burst near a tent, “cut a Colonel in two,” -to use the soldatesque language of Marshal Canrobert, “carried off the -leg of a battalion commander, and wounded two officers standing near a -drummer.” The lucky shot came from a patrol of German cavalry, which -had ridden forward as far as the railway station, unopposed, and its -commander, observing a camp at Longeville, had brought his guns into -action, and proved, once again, that the hornets were abroad and making -a bold use of their offensive weapons. A battery hastily ran out, and -the heavy metal of St. Quentin drove off the intruders; but they had -learned that the foe was over the river before they retired. Soon -afterwards, by Bazaine’s order, a mine was fired, and one section of -the railway bridge was destroyed. - -Then the retreat was continued. Finding the road obstructed by an -endless stream of carts and waggons, Marshal Lebœuf turned aside, and -struggling on, amid transport vehicles, threaded his way by Lessy and -Chatel St. Germain to Vernéville, where about seven in the evening he -had assembled the tired infantry Divisions of Castagny and Montaudon; -but his cavalry and reserve artillery did not reach the bivouac until -night; while Aymard’s Division was forced to halt in the defile, and -Metman was at Sansonnet in the Moselle valley. Frossard, followed by -Canrobert, had marched during the day as far as Rezonville, where both -halted; and the Guard with the Emperor and Prince Imperial attained -Gravelotte. General de Ladmirault did not stir at all on the 15th, -he put a strict construction on Bazaine’s orders, and affected also -to be uncertain whether he was to continue his retreat or not. But -he had allowed Lorencez to press through the town and thrust himself -into the Lessy defile, where his troops, unable to get on, had to pass -the night. These disjointed and irregular movements testify to the -confusion of a hurried retreat, to the flurry which had got the upper -hand, and to the absence of anything like a firm control over troops -and generals. How could it be otherwise? The Emperor still commanded, -or was believed to command, and it is plain that at no time did the -Marshal secure prompt and cheerful obedience, or inspire confidence, -always essential to success, and never more so than when an Army has -to be extricated from what the Imperial Guardsman graphically called a -“hornet’s nest.” - - - _The Germans cross the Moselle._ - -Far otherwise had the hours been employed by the German host. Early in -the morning King William had ridden from Herny to the heights above the -battlefield, and there the Head-quarter Staff, from actual observation, -were able to form a correct judgment on the actual state of affairs. -At first they took precautionary measures against a possible counter -attack, and it was not until eleven o’clock that, evidence sufficient -to convince Von Moltke having come in, decisive steps were taken. All -the Corps of the Second Army were directed upon or over the Moselle, -the 1st Corps was moved to Courcelles-Chaussy; and the 7th was posted -at Courcelles sur Nied to guard the railway line and the depôts; and -the 8th was on its left, echeloned on the Lunéville road. At nightfall -the 3rd Corps had crossed the Moselle between Pagny and Novéant, -where they found the bridge intact; the 10th had one division at Pont -à Mousson and one westward at Thiaucourt; the Guard was at Dieulouard, -and the 4th Corps astride the river at Marbache-Custines. The 2nd Corps -had come up to Han sur Nied. The Crown Prince’s advanced troops were at -Haney, St. Nicholas on the Meurthe, and Bayon on the Upper Moselle. - - - _The Cavalry beyond the Moselle._ - -But the most interesting and effective operations were those carried -out by the 5th Cavalry Division, commanded by General von Rheinbaben. -They had traversed the Moselle on the 14th, and were directed to gain -the Verdun road in order to ascertain the exact whereabouts of the -French. At the same time the 3rd Cavalry Division attached to the First -Army was instructed to pass the river below Metz and push out towards -Briey; but the French had removed all the boats, no crossing could be -effected, and the division was employed elsewhere. No such obstacles -arrested the 5th Division. It consisted of three strong brigades under -Von Redern, Von Barby, and Von Bredow, in all thirty-six squadrons, and -was accompanied by two batteries of horse artillery. Leaving Barby at -Thiaucourt to await the arrival of Bredow coming up from the Moselle, -Redern marched through the fog at four in the morning to La Chausée, -whence he detached two squadrons towards the Verdun road. During their -absence Von Redern, riding on towards Xonville, discovered and was -fired on by a body of French cavalry on the hills about Puxieux. These -were French dragoons detached from De Forton’s division, then _en -route_ for Mars la Tour, and they were reinforced from the main body as -soon as the vedettes had opened fire. The French, led by Prince Murat, -ascended the hill, and soon after the Germans had brought a battery to -bear Murat withdrew his men, followed by Von Redern. On crowning the -ridge De Forton’s division was plainly seen moving in the valley, or -halting near Mars la Tour, supported by twelve guns. Von Redern, who -did not think it prudent to attack, retired until a fold of the hills -gave him protection. Here he was joined by two squadrons of hussars, -which had approached Rezonville, captured nine prisoners, and when -pursued had got deftly away. The sound of the cannon had attracted the -rest of the brigade, and Von Redern again moved towards Mars la Tour, -and again drew off without a fight. But by this time the cannonade had -called up both Barby and Bredow, so that there were soon thirty-four -squadrons and two batteries on the ground. The French General, De -Forton, who believed erroneously that German infantry occupied Puxieux, -was of opinion that he had fought a successful skirmish; yet instead -of closing with enemies who were actually close to the line of retreat -upon Verdun, he fell back as far as Vionville, and went into camp. -Three French divisions of horse in the van of the retiring Army allowed -a German division to sit down within a short distance of the Verdun -road and many miles from all infantry support. On the other hand, a -squadron of Uhlans pushed almost to Conflans, and stumbling on Du -Barail’s division, was smartly punished; but a captain of hussars, -during the evening, rode towards Rezonville and halted close enough -to see Frossard’s fantassins cooking their suppers. Meantime, the -Prussian Guard Cavalry, moving north-west from Dieulouard, had placed -its advanced brigade at Thiaucourt; and a squadron of Guard Uhlans -had audaciously summoned the Governor of Toul to surrender. No such -memorable examples of activity can be found in the record of the -French cavalry, which had forgotten the traditions of Napoleon the -Great. - - - _Orders for the Flank March._ - -That evening General von Moltke issued a set of memorable instructions -to General von Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles. The First Army -was to leave a corps at Courcelles sur Nied, and place the others at -Arry and Pommérieux, between the Seille and the Moselle. “It is only by -a vigorous offensive movement of the Second Army,” wrote Von Moltke, -“upon the routes from Metz to Verdun by Fresne and Etain that we can -reap the fruits of the victory obtained yesterday. The commander of -the Second Army is intrusted with this operation which he will conduct -according to his own judgment and with the means at his disposal, that -is, all the Corps of his Army.” It was further announced that the King -would transfer his head-quarters to Pont à Mousson in the afternoon -of the 16th. Preparations were thus made to place the whole force on -the left bank of the Moselle, except the 1st Corps, the 3rd Division -of Cavalry, and the 2nd which was still two marches from the river. In -this way Von Moltke hoped to keep the whip hand of his opponents, and -cut them off from the shelter they sought beyond the Meuse. - - - _The Emperor Quits the Army._ - -Before narrating the battle which the French style Rezonville and -the Germans Vionville-Mars la Tour, we may turn to the Imperial -head-quarters at Gravelotte at dawn on the 16th, because the scene -presents so vivid a contrast to that in the German camp. When Marshal -Bazaine saw the Emperor on the preceding evening walking meditatively -up and down before his quarters, he was surprised by the question, -“Must I go?” The Marshal frankly admitted that he had not been informed -respecting the situation in front, and asked him to wait. “The answer,” -writes Bazaine, appeared to please him, and turning to his suite he -said, loud enough to be heard by all, “Gentlemen, we will remain, but -keep the baggage packed.” The troops, sad and depressed, continued to -defile before the inn; no shout, no vivat was evoked by the sight of -the sovereign and his son. Yet that night the Emperor had made up his -mind. In the morning he summoned Bazaine, who found him in his carriage -with the Prince Imperial and Prince Napoleon. The baggage had already -gone on in the night, and the lancers and dragoons of the Guard, -commanded by General de France, were in the saddle ready to serve as -an escort. Bazaine rode to the side of the carriage, and the Emperor -said, “I have resolved to leave for Verdun and Chalons. Put yourself -on the route for Verdun as soon as you can. The gendarmerie have -already quitted Briey in consequence of the arrival of the Prussians”—a -singularly erroneous statement, but one showing how ill-informed the -head-quarters were from first to last. The Emperor then drove off from -Gravelotte by the road to Conflans, through the wooded ways which were -so soon to be the scene of a sanguinary encounter. Three hours after he -started Von Redern’s guns opened suddenly on the French cavalry camp -near Vionville, and began, by a stroke of surprise, the most remarkable -and best-fought battle of the campaign. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. - - - _Vionville—Mars la Tour._ - -That feebleness and hesitation which had been so conspicuous on the -side of the French from the outset of the campaign were not likely -to cease when dangers and difficulties increased with every passing -hour. The Emperor, while he commanded, had been incapable of taking, -not merely a bold, but any resolution, and the mental qualities of -Marshal Bazaine were not sufficiently far above the average to enable -him to remedy the mischievous effects of the long course of erroneous -conduct to the heritage of which he succeeded. Moreover, neither -Bazaine nor any other French commander, despite recent experiences, -had formed a correct estimate of German energy and enterprise. Least -of all could they believe that a single Corps and two divisions of -cavalry would venture to plant themselves across the road to Verdun. -The evil consequences were increased by the inactivity of the cavalry, -and the bad, unsoldierlike habit of making perfunctory reconnaisances -carried only a mile or so to the front and on the flanks. Marshal -Bazaine’s phrase—“les reconnaissances doivent se faire _comme -d’habitude_”—reveals the whole secret. At Wissembourg, on the 4th of -August, General Abel Douay’s horsemen returned from a short excursion -and reported that no enemy was near; and at eight in the morning of -the 16th, General Frossard was informed by the patrols which had come -in that there was no adversary in force on his front. The German horse -were near at hand, yet De Forton’s cavaliers had not felt out as far -as their bivouac. Marshal Bazaine’s original intention was that the -two corps ordered to follow the Mars la Tour road should start at four -o’clock; and Frossard had his men out in readiness to move at that hour -when a fresh order postponed the march until the afternoon. During -the night Marshal Lebœuf, alarmed at the absence of two divisions and -at the continued sojourn of De Ladmirault in the Moselle valley, had -suggested that it would be better to stand fast until the several Corps -had been once more brought within supporting distance; and Marshal -Bazaine had readily yielded to the suggestion. Still no measures were -taken to ascertain whether foes were approaching or not, and the -soldiers, horse and foot, took up their ordinary camp duties as they -would have done had they been at Chalons in time of peace. The actual -situation, if they had known it, required that every horse, man and gun -should have been in motion at dawn, yet they all lingered; and it may -be said that neither superiors nor subordinates were alive to the peril -in which they stood—not of defeat, still less rout, the odds available -against German enterprise were too great,—but of a blow which would -make them reel and, perhaps, turn them aside from the paths to the -Meuse. - - - _The Vionville Battlefield._ - -The road from Gravelotte to Verdun passes by the villages of -Rezonville, Vionville and Mars la Tour through a generally open and -undulating country. The ground slopes irregularly and gently upward -on all sides from the highway; the villages on the route are in the -hollows or shallow valleys. North and south of Rezonville a ridge -separated two ravines, the larger, on the east, formed by the Jurée -brook, had its origin north of Gravelotte, the smaller on the west, -came down also from the northern uplands, and parallel to its bed -ran the principal road from Gorze to Rezonville. At the southern -declivity of the ridge, and extending eastward as far as the Moselle, -were a series of forest—the Bois de Vionville, Bois St. Arnould, the -Bois des Ognons, the Bois des Chevaux. To the west and south-west of -Rezonville the country was generally open; but there was a clump of -trees shading a pool near Vionville, and, north of the high road, were -larger patches of woods, named after the village of Tronville. North -also of the highway, and within the French lines, woodlands covered the -hill sides towards St. Marcel, the hamlet of Villers aux Bois being -seated on the highest ground. Along this upper plateau are traces of a -Roman road, running due west, the ancient route from Verdun to Metz; -traces visible also in the fields nearer to the fortress. The French -occupied the higher stretches on the eastern and north-eastern edge of -this irregularly undulating and wooded region. General Frossard was -posted on the left of the line in front of Rezonville; Canrobert on the -heights towards St Marcel; Lebœuf had his troops about Vernéville, the -Guard stood at, and in rear of Gravelotte, and the careless cavalry -brigades under de Forton and Valabrègues had set up their camps west -of Vionville, and thence kept a listless watch towards the heights and -hollows, west and south-west, just in their immediate front. - - - _The French are Surprised._ - -Suddenly, about nine o’clock, they were struck by shells fired from a -battery which seemed to have sprung out of a rounded hill a few hundred -yards to the west of Vionville. The missiles fell among the tents and -burst about a squadron filing up in watering order to the tree-shaded -pool. In quick succession three additional batteries appeared on the -crest and opening fire added to the confusion below. Murat’s dragoons -broke and fled and, accompanied by the baggage train, horses, carts, -men, galloped and ran off towards Rezonville; and De Gramont’s -troopers, further to the rear, mounted and retired in good order up the -northern slopes, halting on the right of the 6th Corps. The batteries, -six in number, then moved up to a height closer in to Vionville and -smote the infantry camps. They were promptly answered by the guns of -Frossard’s Corps, while his brigades stood to their arms, formed up and -sprang forward with alacrity. About the same time, a solitary German -battery, visible to the south, fired a few rounds into the French left -and then withdrew over the crest unable to bear the storm of Chassepot -bullets which were poured from the aroused and irritated infantry. - -The collision, so unwelcome to the French, had been brought about -in this wise. Prince Frederick Charles had ordered the 3rd and 10th -Corps and the 6th Division of Cavalry to start early in the morning -and strike the Verdun road west of Rezonville. As General von -Voights-Rhetz, commanding the 10th, intended to move upon St. Hilaire, -beyond Mars la Tour, he instructed Von Rheinbaben to reconnoitre in the -direction of Rezonville, increased his horse artillery, and supported -him with an infantry detachment from Thiaucourt. About the same time -that the 10th Corps advanced its foremost brigades from Thiaucourt, -and the rest from Pont à Mousson, the 3rd Corps and the 6th Division -of Cavalry also made for the hills west and south of Vionville, the -right division proceeding by Gorze, and the left, by Buxières, towards -Tronville. Thus these two Corps were moving on two parallel curves, the -3rd being next to the enemy, and the 10th on the outer and larger arc. -The Prince and his Generals did not anticipate a battle, but they all -hoped to fall in with and punish a rear-guard, or, by striking far to -the westward, intercept and compel the French Army to halt and fight -before it reached the Meuse. It was Rheinbaben’s abrupt and thorough -home-thrust which revealed the fact that the French had not passed -Rezonville, or, at least, that a large part of the Army was near that -village. His advance-guard, three squadrons and a battery, had moved -within musket-shot of De Forton’s camp “without encountering a single -patrol;” and, taking advantage of such supineness, his artillery, -hastening forward, created the panic near Vionville, which has already -been described. Frossard’s Corps, which always behaved well, speedily -took up defensive positions. Bataille occupied Vionville and Flavigny, -and the high ground above the villages; Vergé prolonged the line -to the left, and placed one brigade facing south to front the Bois -de Vionville, and connect the array with Lapasset’s brigade on the -ridge which, from the north, overlooked the Bois St. Arnould and the -ravine leading to Gorze. The 6th Corps, encamped north of the main -road, continued the line on that side, and rapidly developed a front -facing south-west between the highway and the Roman road. The sound -of the cannonade was heard as far off as Jarny and Conflans, startled -Lebœuf at Vernéville, and aroused the Marshal, busy in his quarters at -Gravelotte. - - - _The Third Corps strikes in._ - -Rheinbaben’s bold horsemen and gunners had done their work; they had -gained for the oncoming infantry that species of moral advantage which -always accrues from a surprise. As they fell back to more sheltered -positions behind the swelling hills, the right wing of the 3rd Corps, -under Stülpnagel, entered the field from the south; the left wing, -directed by the fiery Alvensleben himself, came down into the arena -from the south-west, and several batteries, urged on by Von Bulow, -dashed up and formed the centre of the assailants. Indeed, the guns -were in action before the infantry could march over the distance -between their starting points and the outward spray of the French -line of battle; so that for an appreciable interval the groups of -batteries had to depend upon themselves. Yet not for long. Stülpnagel’s -battalions plunged into the dense woods on the right, and waged a close -combat with the skirmishers of Jolivet’s brigade, who were slow to -give ground. Beyond the thickets, the left wing of the division drove -Valazé’s skirmishers from an eminence, the highest in those parts, and -a battery was speedily in action on its bare summit. By degrees, as -they came up, the battalions of the 10th Brigade went forward on the -left, or western, flank of the height, where the contest, conducted -with vigour on both sides, eddied to and fro, until the German onset, -repeated and sustained, gained the mastery, and cleared the slopes so -effectually that five other batteries, driving up the hill as fast as -they could clear the defile, took ground on its top, and gave support -to the companies in the wood and on the open down. About an hour was -consumed in this desperate work, made all the more arduous because the -German infantry pushed eagerly into the fight, not in compact masses, -but one battalion after another as each struggled up to the front. -Major-General Doering was killed, and many officers went down in -this sanguinary strife: one battalion which dashed forward to resist -a French attack at a critical moment lost every officer. But as it -retired, broken and wasted, the French were smitten in turn by its -comrades, forced to give way, and the position was, at this heavy cost, -secured. For the troops engaged in the forest had now attained the -northern edge of the Bois de Vionville, the batteries on the lofty hill -were safe, and Stülpnagel’s Division was solidly established upon the -most commanding uplands in that part of the field. - -To their left rear was the 6th Cavalry Division; but between them and -the fields west of Vionville were no infantry, only lines of guns, -protected by a few squadrons of horse. For the 6th Infantry Division, -coming on from Buxièries, had gradually wheeled to the right until they -faced to the east, the 11th Brigade crossing the high road, north of -Tronville, the 12th moving upon Vionville; so that they formed a line -of attack directed upon Bataille’s division which held Vionville and -Flavigny, having on its right, beyond the Verdun road, the division of -Lafont de Villiers belonging to Canrobert’s Corps. While Stülpnagel was -striving to obtain a grip of the woods and heights on the French left, -Buddenbrock, the other divisional commander, acting under the eyes of -his chief, threw the weight of his division upon the two villages which -covered what was then the French centre. Vionville was first carried -by the usual turning movement, and its capture was followed by the -outburst of a still more murderous conflict. The French had brought -up more and heavier pieces, and these poured a crushing fire into the -village. The Germans answered by continuing the attack on the French -infantry. Yet so confused was the engagement on the bare hill side, -so completely was it a “soldiers’ battle,” such was the swaying to and -fro of the mingled companies which, crushed and mangled, yet welded -themselves together and pressed on, that, once more, the official -German historian renounces the task of minute description. But the -effect of the hurly-burly was soon manifest—Bataille’s entire division, -unable to endure the torment, and seeing its General fall wounded, -went about and retired; Valazé’s brigade, “taken in flank,” says -Frossard, by a German battery, and losing its gallant commander, also -marched off through Rezonville; and the nearest brigade of Canrobert’s -Corps likewise receded, either under pressure or weakened in purpose -by example. The Germans paid a great price for the immense advantage -secured; but as Flavigny fell into their hands, as the left of -Stülpnagel’s Division joined in its capture, and as the front of battle -was now no longer an arc but its chord, the prize was well worth its -cost. The sole reinforcements which had arrived to aid the 3rd Corps, -were two detachments, parts of the same brigade, and pertaining to the -10th which, on their way to join that Corps then moving westward, had -turned aside, attracted by the magnetism of the cannonade. How much of -the success obtained was due to the valour, devotion, and endurance of -the artillery may be gathered from the French narratives. No troops -could have fought with greater hardihood and dash—not fleeting, but -sustained—than the infantry of the 3rd Corps, all Prussians from the -Mark of Brandenburg. But they had their equals among the dauntless -gunners, deserving to be called “_tirailleurs d’artillerie_,” who -literally used their batteries as battalions, dragging them up to the -very outward edges of the fight, often within rifle-shot, and when -pressed, retiring some scores of paces, then halting and opening at -short range upon their pursuers. The line, composed of groups of -batteries, especially in the forenoon, was the backbone of the battle. - - - _Arrival of Bazaine._ - -Just as Frossard’s infantry, yielding to the vehement pressure, -retreated behind Rezonville, Marshal Bazaine appeared on the scene, -and rode into the thick of the contest. At Frossard’s request he -directed a Lancer regiment, supported by the cuirassiers of the Guard, -to charge and check the pursuers. The Lancers went forth with great -spirit, but soon swerved aside, broken by the infantry fire. The -Guard horsemen, however, led by General du Preuil, rode home upon -the eager and disordered companies who were marching to the east of -the flaming village of Flavigny. But these foot soldiers, reserving -their fire until the mailed cavaliers were within two hundred and -fifty yards, plied them with shot so steadily that the squadrons -swerved to the right and left, only to fall under the bullets from -the rear ranks which had faced about. “The cuirassiers,” says General -du Preuil, “were broken by the enemy’s infantry, which received them -with a murderous fire. After the charge, the wreck of the regiment -rallied at Rezonville, having left behind on the field 22 officers, -24 _sous officiers_, about 200 men and 250 horses. When the regiment -was re-organized, instead of 115 mounted men per squadron, there were -only 62!” Colonel von Rauch had close to Flavigny two Hussar regiments; -with one he pressed on the flying cuirassiers, and with the other -charged the French infantry struggling rearward. Bazaine had just -brought up, and was posting a battery of the Imperial Guard, when the -Hussars charged down upon him, taking the battery in front and flank. -It was here that the Marshal was surrounded, separated for a moment -from his staff, and obliged, as he himself says, to “draw his sword.” -Two squadrons of his escort came to his relief, and a rifle battalion -opened upon the Prussian horse, who had to retreat, leaving behind the -battery which they had temporarily seized. General Alvensleben had -ordered up the 6th Division of Cavalry, but when they arrived, Bazaine -had brought forward the Grenadier Division of the Guard to replace -the 2nd Corps in the front line, for Jolivet’s brigade, on the French -left, had also retired to the high ground in its rear. The 6th formed -up to the south of Flavigny and advanced, but they could not make any -impression upon the re-invigorated enemy, and they drew back, having -lost many officers and men. “This demonstration, apparently without any -result,” says the official German account, “was still useful, since it -provided the artillery with an opportunity so vehemently desired of -pressing up nearer to the front.” In fact, the lines of the artillery -were now between the edge of the wood of Vionville and Flavigny, and to -the right, left, and front of Vionville itself—a distinct approximation -towards the French infantry and guns; so that there were changes on -both sides, with the difference that the French brought up fresh -troops, while the same German guns, horsemen and infantry continued the -struggle. - -The crisis of the battle had now arrived; for General von Alvensleben, -in order to diminish the violent pressure on his left, which was -beyond the Verdun road, had been obliged to thrust his sole reserve -of infantry into the deadly encounter. Colonel Lehmann, commanding a -detachment of the 10th Corps, consisting of three battalions and a -half, had come up to the outskirts of the field in the forenoon, and -he was directed to take post near Tronville. When, in consequence -of the reverse inflicted on Frossard, Bazaine arrayed the Guard in -front of Rezonville and Canrobert put his reserve brigades into line -on their right, and both established their reserve artillery on the -heights to the north and east, Alvensleben sent forward Lehmann’s -battalions, which, with great difficulty, managed to keep their ground -in the copses of Tronville beyond the Verdun road. It was about two -o’clock in the afternoon and the German leader had no reserves, every -foot soldier and gun was engaged, while the greater part of the 10th -Corps was still remote from the field. Luckily for him, the reports -of the fugitive peasantry and the steady advance of the German right -through the southern woods, aroused in the mind of Bazaine a fear that -he might be turned on his left, a fear shared by at least one of his -subordinates. He, therefore, caused the Guard Voltigeurs to form front -to the south in the Bois des Ognons, so as to watch the ravines, down -one of which the Mance flowed to Ars, and in the bed of the other the -Jurée ran to Novéant. Lapasset, who barred the road from Gorze, was -reinforced by a regiment of Grenadiers, and Montaudon’s division of the -3rd Corps was taken from Lebœuf and placed near Malmaison, a little -to the north of Gravelotte. Thus the French line, instead of standing -north and south, faced generally to the south-west, between the Bois -des Ognons and the high ground north of the copses of Tronville. At -this time Lebœuf, with one division and a half—for Metman had not yet -joined him—was moving south-west from Vernéville, and De Ladmirault’s -divisions—for he had quitted the Moselle valley in the morning—were -only just showing their leading troops towards Doncourt. Nevertheless, -Canrobert, who had developed a strong line of guns as well as infantry -on the right of Picard’s Grenadiers, both on the face and flank of -the German left, determined to attempt the recapture of Vionville and -Flavigny. He was led to do so by a belief that the partial cessation of -the German fire indicated exhaustion, and, aided by the whole of his -artillery, he certainly delivered a formidable onset carried up to the -very outskirts of the two villages. It was then that Alvensleben called -upon the cavalry to charge, solely with the object of gaining time and -relieving the wearied foot, and hardly-treated gunners. - - - _Bredow’s Brilliant Charge._ - -Bredow’s heavy brigade, the 7th Cuirassiers of Magdeburg, and the 16th -Uhlans of Altmark, eight squadrons, from which two were withdrawn -on the march to watch the Tronville Copses, was selected to assail -Canrobert’s destructive batteries and stinging infantry. Von Bredow -drew out his two regiments, led them into the shallow but protecting -hollow on the north of Vionville, and, without pausing, wheeled into -line on the move, so that the array of sabres and lances fronted nearly -eastward. Then breaking into a headlong gallop the troopers rushed -like a torrent over and through the infantry on their broad track and -into the batteries, near the Roman Road, which for the moment they -disorganized. But now the French horse swarmed forward on all sides, -and the survivors of Von Bredow’s heroic men, having cheerfully made -the heavy sacrifice demanded from them, turned about to retreat through -the French infantry, punished as they rode back by De Forton, Gramont, -Murat and Valabrègue who brought up three thousand dragoons, chasseurs -and cuirassiers against the remains of the devoted brigade. Von Bredow -sought safety behind Flavigny, whither Von Redern had ridden up with -a regiment of hussars, but he did not attack because the hostile -cavalry halted in their pursuit. The charge had cost the Magdeburgers -and Altmarkers 14 officers and 363 men, nearly one-half the strength -with which they started on their astonishing ride; but the glorious -remnant had the proud satisfaction of knowing that the two regiments -had put an end to offensive attacks from the side of Rezonville, that -their infantry comrades of the Brandenburg Corps had received effectual -succour in time of need, and that the steadfast artillery had gained -precious moments which they used to prepare for fresh exertions. - - - _The Fight becomes Stationary._ - -During the next three hours, and, indeed, to the end of the day, the -combat on the German right and centre remained stationary, varied by -desperate attempts to win ground from the Imperial Grenadiers which -cost many lives and achieved no marked success. Seven fresh batteries, -however, came successively into action, so that about four o’clock, the -German line of guns, between the wood of Vionville and Flavigny had -been increased to more than a hundred pieces and their fire effectually -stayed the French from advancing. Some portions of the 7th, 8th and -9th Corps, which had struggled up from the Moselle valley during the -sultry afternoon, entered the woods, were pushed up the ravine road -from Gorze, or were thrown forward in front of the big battery which -was the mainstay of the left wing. Prince Frederick Charles himself -arrived about four o’clock. He had ridden straight from Pont à Mousson -on learning that a serious engagement was afoot, and as he cantered up -to the front he was heartily welcomed by the men of the 3rd Corps which -he had commanded for ten years. - - - _Arrival of the Tenth Corps._ - -Surveying the scene from the lofty upland above the wood for a time, -he rode off to another eminence near Flavigny, because the stress -of battle was then on the left wing, where the rest of the 10th -Corps, so long absent from the field, had appeared just in time to -encounter the fresh troops which had been led forward by Marshal Lebœuf -and General de Ladmirault. When Von Bredow’s Brigade rode against -Canrobert’s Corps, Von Barby’s horse were sent to guard the extreme -left against a surprise from the masses of French troops gathering -on the Doncourt hills. They pushed far northward, and sustained a -cannonade from the enemy, who soon forced them to retreat; for Lebœuf, -with Aymard’s Division—Bazaine had now called for Nayral’s as well as -Montaudon’s—moved down towards the Tronville thickets, and Ladmirault, -whose infantry had at length reached him from the Moselle valley, sent -Grenier forward in line with Aymard. These two divisions, driving the -horsemen back towards Tronville, at once assailed the woodlands, so -often named, and combining their attack with that of Tixier, whose -division formed the right of Canrobert’s Corps, they expelled the -German infantry from the northern section of the wood. Lehmann’s -Hanoverians and the wreck of the Brandenburgers gave ground slowly, -but, after an hour’s severe bush-fighting, the left of the 3rd Corps -was obliged to yield, and nothing restrained the advancing French -infantry save the terribly effective fire of the German gunners, upon -whom the brunt of the battle fell. As the most forward German guns were -retired south of the highway, Grenier sent three batteries over the -ravine, and fortune seemed, for the first time, to favour the Imperial -soldiers. But, at this trying moment, the 20th Division of the 10th -Corps—the men had already marched that day twenty-seven miles—appeared -on the heights of Tronville. General von Kraatz, its commander, -brought with him eight battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries, -an opportune reinforcement, which had been led thither because the -summons, given by faint reverberations of a heavy cannonade, heard at -Thiaucourt, had been clenched by the arrival of a note written on the -field of battle. - -The artillery, as usual, took the lead, hastening to the field across -country, and, before the infantry could advance twenty-four guns in -action north of Tronville, checked the French skirmishers, and obliged -Grenier’s batteries to recross the ravine. Then the foot went into the -wood, and soon chased the French from all the copses except a patch on -the north. At this time, General de Ladmirault, who had been joined by -heavy masses of cavalry, had on the heights, near the farm of Greyère, -abundance of artillery and De Cissey’s Division. On his right ran a -deep and steep ravine towards Mars la Tour; he was about to cross this -obstacle, and had, in fact, entered the hollow, intending to sweep -down upon the German left, when he became aware that a strong hostile -body was approaching from the west. It was General von Schwarzkoppen, -commanding a division of the 10th Corps. He brought on to the field the -38th brigade, diminished, however, by detachments to five battalions, -two companies of pioneers, twelve guns, and six squadrons of Dragoons -of the Guard. General de Ladmirault’s proceedings had been closely -watched by some German horse, and his advance-guard of Chasseurs -d’Afrique had been driven out of Mars la Tour by the Dragoons of the -Guard. Seeing the oncoming enemy, he hastily recrossed the ravine, and -placed De Cissey and his artillery in position to resist any attack. -The intelligence that an enemy had shown himself on the west had run -along the French line, and had induced Grenier and Lebœuf to suspend -their apparently prosperous onset, thus diminishing the pressure upon -Von Kraatz in the Tronville wood, and also on the artillery, which -had been so long engaged near Vionville. General Schwarzkoppen had, -during the day, marched to St. Hilaire on his way to the fords of -the Meuse; but, hearing the cannonade, he halted, sent out patrols, -and finally moved off towards the battle, guided by columns of dust, -clouds of smoke, and the deep-toned muttering of the rival guns. -When he reached Mars la Tours, Voights-Rhetz, the Corps Commander, -rode up. Both he and Prince Frederick Charles, who watched the fight -from a hill above Flavigny, were under the delusion that the French -right could be taken in flank by an attack from Mars la Tour; and -Von Wedell, who commanded the newly-arrived brigade, was ordered to -fall on. But, for once, the German Staff did not show their far-famed -skill; for they did not reconnoitre the ground, nor had they observed -the formidable array of De Cissey’s brigades. Von Wedell’s men dashed -forward with alacrity, but found in their path a deep hollow, which -covered the French front, as well as flank, on that side. Nevertheless, -the battalions, in two lines, hurried down one bank and up the other, -and then met an entire French Division. A brief and bloody fight at -close quarters—the opposing lines were separated in some places by -only fifty yards—ensued; but so continuous and deadly was the French -fire that the sturdy Westphalians had to yield. Their dead and dying -covered the summit, and filled the hollow way; two-thirds of the 16th -Regiment were left on the field, and the whole brigade, shattered into -a shapeless crowd of fugitives, hurried to the rear. Then forward to -their succour came bounding the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, Colonel von -Auerswald at their head, spurring headlong to the front through the -disordered crowd, taking the hedges and ditches in their stride, and -galloping furiously into the midst of the pursuing French, who had -leaped forward from the right of Grenier’s Division. It was a hopeless -charge—a ride to certain death—but the readiness of the Dragoons saved -the right of the brigade; yet at great cost, for they left dead on the -field their brave Colonel, a Major, and three Captains. Nine officers -in all, and seventeen men were killed; four officers and sixty men were -wounded; while one officer and five men were captured. Two of Count -Bismarck’s sons, privates in this regiment, rode in the charge; the -eldest, Herbert, was shot in the thigh, the youngest, Wilhelm, a stout -trooper, lifted a wounded comrade on to his horse, and carried him off -the field. The charge of the Dragoons enabled the broken battalions to -draw off towards Tronville, but the guns in position still held on near -Mars le Tour, west of which, towards Ville sur Yron, a horse battery -and a squadron of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard were engaged in a -smart skirmish with a body of Chasseurs d’Afrique. This encounter was -followed shortly afterwards by - - - _The great Cavalry Combat._ - -Ladmirault had sent six regiments of horse over the gully on his -right—Legrand’s Hussars and Dragoons, Du Barail’s solitary regiment of -Chasseurs d’Afrique, and the superb brigade of Lancers and Dragoons -of the Guards commanded by General de France. On the other side Von -Barby’s brigade had approached Mars la Tour during the fatal attack -upon De Ladmirault’s infantry, and soon after it was joined by two -squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, the 10th Hussars, and the 16th -Dragoons. Sweeping round to the north of the village, Barby formed -up his troopers in the narrow space between the Yron and the Greyère -ravine, while Legrand and his comrades showed their compact masses -to the north. The French regiments were placed in echelon, Legrand’s -Hussars, led by General Montaigu, on the left, Gondrecourt’s Dragoons -on his right rear, and next the Guard Lancers and Dragoons. The -Chasseurs d’Afrique were behind all. The first shock fell upon the 13th -Dragoons which, having taken ground to the right, had only time to -wheel partially into line before Montaigu’s Hussars rode through the -squadron’s intervals, and it would have fared ill with the Prussians -had not Colonel von Weise plunged in with the 10th Hussars and overset -the French. Von Barby on the left, at the head of the 16th Uhlans -and 19th Dragoons, met the French Guard Cavalry in full shock, and -then ensued a furious confused fight upon the whole line. Each side -endeavoured to fall upon a flank, and the squadrons swayed to and fro -amid a huge cloud of dust. Suddenly, a squadron of Prussian Guard -Dragoons, returning from a patrol, came riding across country from the -west and struck the flank of the French Guards. Du Barail’s Chasseurs -d’Afrique and Gondrecourt’s Dragoons dashed into the _melée_, but the -Westphalian Cuirassiers drove like a wedge into the opposing ranks, -and the 16th Dragoons fell upon and smote them in flank and rear. -Legrand was killed, Montaigu wounded and a prisoner, and the French -cavalry, wheeling about, rode out of the fight, throwing into disorder -a brigade of Chasseurs, which had been sent by General de Clérambault -to cover the retreat. The Gallic horse had brilliantly sustained -their reputation, yet they were overmatched by the Teutons, who also -lost three commanding officers. But Von Barby was able to reform his -victorious squadrons on the plateau and withdraw them at leisure, -watched, but not pursued, by a squadron of Dragoons belonging to De -Clérambault’s division. General Ladmirault surveyed the field from the -heights of Bruville, and came to the conclusion that no more could be -accomplished by the French right wing. He had only two divisions, his -cavalry had been defeated, and he “discovered” between Tronville and -Vionville “an entire Corps d’Armée.” So he rested and bivouacked on -the hills about the Greyère farm. The forces of his next neighbour on -the left, Lebœuf, had been reduced to Aymard’s division, for Marshal -Bazaine had called away Nayral to support Montaudon near Rezonville; -indeed, at one moment he had abstracted one of Aymard’s brigades, but, -yielding to Lebœuf’s remonstrances, he sent it back. - - - _End of the Battle._ - -It was now past seven o’clock, and both sides were exhausted by -the tremendous strain which they had borne so long; yet the battle -continued until darkness had settled over the woods and villages and -fields. For Barnekow’s division and a Hessian brigade had entered the -woodlands and pressed forward on the Gorze road, creating new alarm -in the mind of Bazaine, who throughout the day was governed by his -belief that the Germans intended to turn his left and cut him off from -Metz. So that when Colonel von Rex pushed boldly up the ravine against -Lapasset and his flankers opened fire from the edge of the Bois des -Ognons, the French Commander drew still more troops to that flank. -Between Rezonville and the ridges near Gravelotte he had, by eventide, -placed the whole of the Guard, Frossard’s Corps, Lapasset’s brigade, -and one-half of Lebœuf’s Corps. Fearing the storming columns which ever -and anon surged outward from the woods towards the commanding heights -south of Rezonville, Bourbaki brought up fifty-four guns and arrayed -them in one long battery. The closing hours of the day witnessed a -stupendous artillery contest, which was carried on even when the -flashes of flame alone revealed the positions of the opposing pieces. -The thick smoke increased the obscurity, and yet within the gloom -bodies of German infantry, and even of horse, sallied from the woods or -vales and vainly strove to reach the coveted crests or storm in upon -Rezonville itself. At the very last moment a violent cannonade burst -forth on both sides, yet to this day neither knows why it arose, where -it began, or what it was to effect. At length the tired hosts were -quiet; the strife of twelve hours ended. The German line of outposts -that night ran from the Bois des Ognons along the Bois St. Arnould, -then to the east of Flavigny and Vionville through the Tronville -Copses; and after the moon rose upon the ghastly field the cavalry rode -forth and placed strong guards as far westward as Mars la Tour and -the Yron. The French slept on the ground they held, the heights south -of Rezonville, that village itself, and the ridges which overlook the -highway to Verdun as far as Bruville and Greyère. It had been a day of -awful carnage, for the French had lost, in killed and wounded, nearly -17,000, and the Germans 16,000 men. - -It is impossible to state exactly the numbers present on the -field—probably, 125,000 French to 77,000 Germans. The latter brought -up two complete Corps, the 3rd and 10th, two divisions of cavalry, -the 5th and 6th—these sustained the shock and bore the chief loss—a -brigade of the 8th Corps, the 11th Regiment from the 9th, and four -Hessian regiments of that corps under Prince Louis, the husband of the -British Princess Alice. They also had, in action or reserve, 246 guns. -The French mustered the Imperial Guard, the 2nd Corps, three divisions -and one regiment of the 6th Corps, three divisions of the 3rd, and two -of the 4th Corps, five divisions of cavalry, and 390 guns; so that -on the 16th, they were, at all times, numerically superior in every -arm. When Alvensleben came into action a little after ten o’clock with -the 3rd Corps and two divisions of cavalry—perhaps 33,000 men—they -had in their front the 2nd and 6th Corps, the Guard, and the Reserve -Cavalry—not less than 72,000, the guns on the French side being always -superior in number. The 3rd Corps, less one division, was at ten -o’clock only three miles from the field; these and half the 4th Corps -arrived in the afternoon, adding more than 50,000 men to the total, -while the Germans could only bring up the 10th, and parts of the 8th -and 9th, fewer than 40,000, some of them marching into line late in the -evening. The French Marshal, who fought a defensive battle, did not use -his great strength during the forenoon, or in the afternoon when his -right wing had wheeled up to the front. The result was an “indecisive -action”—the phrase is used by the official German historian—and that -it was indecisive must be attributed, at least in part, to the fact -that Marshal Bazaine, nor he alone, stood in constant dread of an -overwhelming inroad of “Prussians” on his left, with intent to cut him -off from Metz and thrust him, unprovided with munitions of all kinds, -on to the Briey–Longuyon road. But it may be inferred from the mode in -which the battle was fought by the French commanders, from the first -shot to the last, that the Germans had obtained a moral ascendency -over the leaders and the led, and that such an ascendency had a great -influence upon the tactics, as well as the strategy, of Marshal Bazaine -and his subordinates in command. Nothing supports the correctness of -this inference more strongly than the fact that an Army of 120,000 men -considered a great success had been achieved when it had resisted the -onsets of less than two-thirds of its numbers, and had been driven from -its line of retreat! - - - - - CHAPTER IX. - - PRESSED BACK ON METZ - - -Darkness had set in, and the last shot had been fired, when Marshal -Bazaine rode back to his head-quarters at Gravelotte. There he became -impressed with the scarcity—“penury”—of munitions and provisions; there -he acknowledged to the Emperor that the direct road to Verdun had been -closed, and that he might be obliged to retreat by the north; and there -he wrote the order which was to move his entire Army the next day -nearer to Metz. The troops began their retrograde march as early as -four o’clock, by which hour Prince Frederick Charles was up on the hill -above Flavigny, intently watching his antagonists. Rezonville was still -occupied by infantry, a cavalry division was drawn up between that -village and Vernéville until late in the forenoon, and the marches of -troops to and fro kept the cautious German Commanders, for some time, -in a state of uncertainty. - -It has now to be shown how they had employed the 16th outside the area -of the conflict, where the several Corps stood in the evening, and by -what means the Great Staff, on the 17th, acquired the knowledge that -the “Army of the Rhine” had retired upon the line of hills immediately -to the westward of Metz. - -The movement of troops comes first under notice. On the extreme left -the 4th Corps having crossed the Moselle at Marbache, had pushed -forward in a south-westerly direction, part of the Corps making a -dashing but fruitless attempt to intimidate the garrison of Toul, -so important because it barred the railway to Chalons, and at the -end of the day was still under orders to march upon the Meuse. The -Guard, preceded by its cavalry, advanced from Dieulouard to several -points half-way between the Moselle and the Meuse, the right being at -Bernecourt and the left about Beaumont. The 12th Corps, Saxons, crossed -the Moselle at Pont à Mousson, and had one division there and one about -Regnièville en Haye. The 2nd Corps, still approaching the Moselle by -forced marches, had attained villages east of the Seille. It will be -readily understood that, as the 4th and 2nd Corps were so far distant -from the centre of action west of Metz, they could hardly be moved up -in time to share in the impending struggle; and they, therefore, for -the present, may be omitted from the narrative. It was otherwise with -the remaining Corps, and it was the aim of the Great Staff to bring -them all up to the Verdun road. - -From the very earliest moment, General von Moltke held the opinion -that the full consequences of the action on the 14th could only be -secured by vigorous operations on the left bank of the Moselle; and as -the reports came in from the front on the 16th, that sound judgment -was more than confirmed. The Royal head-quarters were transferred in -the forenoon to Pont à Mousson, whither King William repaired; and Von -Moltke, who had preceded the King, found information which led the -general to the conclusion that a new chapter in the campaign had been -opened. Accordingly, he desired to push up to the front the largest -possible number of troops, so that he might, if such a design were -feasible, have ample means wherewith to shoulder off the French to the -northward, and sever their communications with Chalons. At this stage, -the idea of shutting them up in Metz had not yet been conceived. The -7th, 8th and 9th were ordered to hasten forward on the road towards -Vionville, and some part of them, as we have seen, were engaged on the -16th. Extra bridges were erected on the Moselle, the roads were cleared -of all impediments, and the results rewarded the foresight, energy and -goodwill displayed by officers and men. The 12th Corps was eighteen, -and the Guard twenty-two miles from the battlefield, but so keen and -intelligent were their commanders, that, inferring from the information -they received what would be required of them, they stood prepared to -execute any order as soon as it arrived. The former body, indeed, -marched off northward in the night, and sent word of the fact to the -Guard, which led the commander to assemble the divisions on the instant -and stand ready to step forth. So that when the formal orders were -brought, the Guard started at five in the morning, when the Saxons were -already on the road. The 8th Corps, or rather its remaining division, -were on the way at dawn, preceded by the 9th, and followed by the 7th -from its cantonments on the left bank of the Seille. Thus the whole -available portions of the Second and First Armies were in motion, to -sustain the 3rd and 10th, if they were attacked on the 17th; to act, as -circumstances required, if the French abandoned the battlefield. - -Prince Frederick Charles, who had slept at Gorze, took horse at dawn, -and reached his watch-tower on the hill south-west of Flavigny at -half-past four o’clock, early enough to distinguish by the increasing -light the French line of outposts between Bruville and Rezonville. -About six o’clock the King joined the Prince, and at the same time the -9th Corps took post near the right wing of the 3rd. What the staff had -now to determine was whether the French intended to retire or attack, -and if they retired whither they went. Patrols, busy on all sides, gave -in contradictory or rather discordant reports, which for some time -left it doubtful whether the retreat was not actually being carried -out by Conflans on the Briey road; but by degrees the head-quarters -arrived at the conclusion that the French would not attack, that they -had not withdrawn far, and that the task of grappling with them must -be deferred until the next day. Soon after noon, when General Metman, -acting as rear guard, quitted Rezonville, there were on or near the -field no fewer than seven German Corps and three divisions of cavalry; -so that had the French renewed the battle for the Verdun road, even -early in the morning, they would have found it a severe task to make -their way at least along the southern or Mars la Tour high road. About -eight in the morning General von Moltke had dictated an order on the -height near Flavigny, in obedience to which the 7th Corps marched by -Borny and Ars upon Gravelotte, following the Mance brook, and occupying -the woods on the right and left; while the 8th, already in part on -the field, ascended the watercourse and ravine which gives access -to Rezonville. The object of the double movement was to accelerate -the retreat of the French from these places. It was not accomplished -without some wood-fighting, but about half-past three General Metman -withdrew his flankers, and glided out of sight beyond the ridge near -Point du Jour. But the firing had alarmed Von Moltke, who, dreading -lest the fiery Steinmetz should bring on a general or even partial -engagement, sent him positive orders to stop the combat. The veteran, -however, pressed forward himself with Von Zastrow, Von Kameke and their -staff officers. Emerging from the woods into the open, they beheld -across the deep ravine the French camps on the opposite plateau, and -even discerned the works thrown up by the careful Frossard to cover -his guns and infantry. A mitrailleuse at once opened fire on the group -of horsemen, and drove them away, but not before they had seen enough -to prove, when combined with the cavalry reports from the north-west -flank, that the French Army was encamped on the heights to the west of -Metz, and had not attempted to withdraw by any of the still open roads -towards Mézières or Chalons. Therefore, the German armies halted, and -the Generals had a little leisure to frame a plan of operations for the -18th. - - - _Marshal Bazaine._ - -Human ingenuity has imputed various motives to the French Marshal, some -of them being discreditable to his loyalty, all based on a low estimate -of his character as a man, and capacity as a soldier. His own account -is that he did not persevere in trying to effect his retreat, either by -force or skill, partly because the Army was not well supplied with food -and munitions, and partly, as is apparent from his evidence and books, -because he had formed a military theory which he proposed to work out -near Metz to the disadvantage of the enemy. He held that he had a -strong post on the flank of the German communications, and that, if he -could make his adversaries waste their troops in repeated attacks upon -“inexpugnable” positions, he might be able to resume the offensive when -the Army at Chalons should take the field. Secretly, we suspect, he had -become imbued with a belief or apprehension that what the French call -the _moral_ of the Army had been seriously impaired; that their staying -power in action was not what it should have been, and that they could -not be trusted to perform so delicate an operation as a long flank -march within reach of a foe exalted by victory, aided by a powerful -and audacious cavalry, and an infantry capable of marching twenty miles -a day, and enjoying the advantage of greatly superior numbers. As -usual, the motives of Bazaine were “mixed,” but there does not seem any -good reason to believe that he was selfishly disloyal to the Emperor, -faithless to France, or insensible to the charms of “glory.” His chief -defect was that he did not possess sufficient military competence to -command a large Army—a defect he shared with his comrades of high -rank; and his misfortune was that he succeeded to an inheritance of -accumulated error entailing severe penalties, from the infliction of -which only a rare genius, like that of the First Napoleon, could have -saved himself and his Army. - -Active warfare had now continued for a fortnight, and at sundown on the -17th of August the “Army of the Rhine” found itself obliged to form -front facing, not Berlin, but Paris; while the formidable Armies of -King William, with their backs to the French capital, turned their eyes -towards the Rhine. - - - _The Battlefield of Gravelotte._ - -Whatever may have been his motives, Marshal Bazaine directed his Army -to retire upon a position of exceptional strength on the heights to the -westward of Metz, which look towards the wooded ravine of the Mance -brook throughout its course, and beyond its source over the undulating -plain in the direction of the river Orne. This ridge of upland abuts on -the Moselle near Ars, is covered at its broad southern end by the Bois -de Vaux, is intersected by the great highway from Metz to Verdun, which -is carried along a depression where the wood terminates, and over the -shoulder above Gravelotte. North of the road the high ground, with a -westerly bias, runs as far as Amanvillers, and thus trending slightly -eastward, ascends to St. Privat la Montagne and Roncourt, and back to -the Moselle bottom lands below Metz. The left of the position, opposite -the Bois de Vaux, is curved outwards, its shape being indicated by -the high road, which, after bending round and creeping up the hill -as far as Point du Jour, turns abruptly to the west, and crosses the -Mance upon a causeway east of Gravelotte. This bulwark, occupied -by Frossard’s Corps, from near Point du Jour to St. Ruffine in the -lowlands, was made more formidable by shelter-trenches, field works, -and gunpits. The two houses at Point du Jour were pierced for musketry, -and the immense quarries in the hill-side, at the elbow of the ridge -facing the Mance, were filled with troops. The only mode of reaching -the front was either up the narrow causeway by St. Hubert, or across -the deep ravine. Behind this strong front the ground sloped inwards, -so that the troops and reserves could be, and were, screened from view -as well as from fire. In the bottom stood the village of Rozérieulles; -and above, the eminences on which the engineers had planted the forts -of St. Quentin and Plappeville. The hollow through which the highway -ran was bordered with vineyards, and near to Metz villages and houses -clustered thickly astride of the road. On the right of Frossard were -the four divisions forming the Corps of Lebœuf, extending as far as -the farm of La Folie, opposite Vernéville. Here the ground was high -and open, yet also sloping to the rear as well as the front, and its -chief strength lay in the strongly-built farmsteads of St. Hubert, -seated on the roadside just above Gravelotte, in those of Moscow and -Leipzig, standing on the bare hill-side; and in the Bois de Genivaux, -a thick wood, which filled the upper part of the Mance ravine. Beyond -the 3rd Corps lay the 4th, under De Ladmirault, having its left in -the farm and château of Montigny le Grange, and its right at, and a -little north of, Amanvillers, a considerable village, planted in a -depression at a point where one of the roads from Metz quits the deep -defile of Chatel St. Germain, and bends suddenly westward to join, -at Habonville, the road to Briey. The track of the railway, then -unfinished, ascends this wooded gully, and winds on to the open ground -at Amanvillers. The country in front of the ridge, from that place to -Roncourt, is an extensive open descent, which has been compared to -the glacis of a fortress, at the foot of which stand the villages of -Habonville, St. Ail, and St. Marie aux Chênes. On the southern edge of -this succession of bare fields is the Bois de la Cusse, which was not, -strictly speaking, a continuous wood, but a sort of common irregularly -strewed with copses; and on the north were the valley of the Orne and -the woods bordering its meandering course. The 6th Corps, Canrobert’s, -occupied and guarded the right flank, having an outpost in St. Marie, -and detachments in the villages beyond Roncourt; but placing its main -reliance on St. Privat, which, looked at from the west, stood on the -sky line, and, being nearly surrounded by garden walls, had the aspect -of a little fortress. The Imperial Guard, considered as a reserve, was -drawn up in front of the fort of Plappeville, on the east side of the -deep ravine of St. Germain. The fort of St. Quentin looked well over, -and protected the whole of the French left, and served especially as a -support to Lapasset’s Brigade at St. Ruffine, which faced south. Here -the edge of the position touched the suburbs of Metz, and was within -cannon-shot of the right bank of the Moselle, opposite Jussy. - -It will be seen that the battlefield may be divided into two portions, -differing from each other in their external aspects. The bold curved -ridge held by Frossard rose between two and three hundred feet above -the bed of the Mance, having in rear ground still higher, and was -backed by the mass upon which stands Fort St. Quentin. It was, indeed, -a natural redoubt open to the rear, covered along its front by the -steep sides of a deep ravine, and accessible only by the viaduct built -over the brook, a solid embankment, except where a vaulted opening -allowed the stream to pass. On the French side of the bridge was the -strong farmstead of St. Hubert, well walled towards the assailant; and -further north the thick woods of Genivaux, which ran near to and beyond -the farm of Leipzig; so that while a deep gully protected Frossard, -Lebœuf had defensive outposts in the wood, which he intrenched in a -series of recessed field works, and in the stout farm buildings, which -stormers could only reach by passing up gentle acclivities, every -yard whereof could be swept by fire. The right half of the line was -different in every respect from the left—for there was no wood, and the -whole front, from Amanvillers to Roncourt was, for practical purposes, -though not so steep, as free from obstacles as the slope of the South -Downs. The left and centre were supplied with artificial defences, but -the right, which did not rest on any natural support, and might be -turned, was not fortified by field works, because Marshal Canrobert’s -intrenching tools had been, perforce, left behind at Chalons. The -great defects of this “inexpugnable” position were that it had bad -lateral communications, no good lines of retreat, and a weak right -flank. Marshal Bazaine, who misjudged the formidable strength of his -left wing, and gave his opponent the credit of contemplating an attack -on that side, had taken post in Fort Plappeville, where he placed the -reserves, and whence he could not see the right, which it does not -appear that he had ever examined. The penalty for so grave an error was -the loss of the battle. - - - _The German Plans._ - -Before starting from the hill over Flavigny for Pont à Mousson on -the afternoon of the 17th, General von Moltke had issued an order to -Prince Frederick Charles and Von Steinmetz, indicating the operations -which were to begin the next morning. Their purport was that while -the 7th Corps stood fast, and the 8th leant towards the right of the -Second Army, the Corps composing it should move forward, left in front, -facing north. It was a general direction, intended to place the troops -in such an array as would enable them to strike and stop the French, -if they still sought to reach Chalons by the northern roads, or by a -right wheel bring the whole German force to bear upon the enemy if he -were found in position before Metz. By six o’clock on the morning of -the 18th, King William and his staff were once more on the height near -Flavigny, soon after which time the whole Army was in movement, and a -sputter of musketry had begun on the extreme right between Frossard’s -foreposts and those of the 7th Corps in the woods. The 8th had come -up near to Rezonville; the 9th was moving between that village and -St. Marcel; the Guard was passing Mars la Tour; and the 12th was on -the road to Jarny. Behind, in second line, were the 10th and 3rd, the -5th and 6th divisions of cavalry being attached to the latter Corps -respectively; while the 2nd Corps, which had bivouacked at Pont à -Mousson, had started on another forced march, in order, should there -be a battle, to enter the field before dark. The morning wore away, -and, except on the right where his left was visible and his skirmishers -active, no evidence of the enemy’s presence could be found. The Saxon -cavalry division, scouting northward and westward, lighted only on -stragglers and patrols; the horsemen and staff officers out in front -of the other Corps watching as well as they could the movements of -the French, sent in divergent statements, leaving it doubtful where -their main body was, and what it was doing or intended to do. Great -uncertainty, in short, prevailed until after ten o’clock, and even -then General von Moltke and the staff were under the impression that -the French right was near Montigny la Grange; but, believing that the -adversary would fight, an order went forth at 10.30 a.m., which finally -brought the German Armies into line facing eastward. Meantime Prince -Frederick Charles had, by degrees, also arrived at the conclusion that -the French would accept battle, and, at half-past ten, he likewise -instructed General von Manstein to move towards La Folie and begin an -attack with his artillery, provided the enemy’s right was not beyond -Amanvillers. Immediately afterwards, while Von Moltke still believed -that the flank he wished to turn was at the last-named village, the -Prince acquired certain information, from a Hessian cavalry patrol, -that the French right rested on St. Privat la Montagne. By such slow -degrees was the long-sought flank discovered. Orders were then given -directing the 12th and the Guard to wheel to the right and move on -St. Marie aux Chênes and Habonville; but before they could come into -line, Manstein’s guns were heard, and Von Moltke became apprehensive -lest the exciting sounds of conflict would carry away the impetuous -Steinmetz, lest the First Army, always so eager for battle, might -strike in prematurely and injure a combination which depended so much -upon a simultaneous onset. Accordingly, the rein upon that General -was tightened, and he was told that he might use artillery, yet not -do more with his infantry than attract the notice of the enemy and -keep his attention on the strain. But so thoroughly were the chiefs -of the German Corps imbued with the same principles of conduct, that -the Prince Royal of Saxony and Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had -already, in anticipation, prepared to play the part which was to be -assigned them. Having learned, from their own scouting parties, where -the French right stood, and having heard the guns at Vernéville, they -had both wheeled their divisions to the eastward, and pushed out their -advance Guards. Thus they were ready to march at the moment when the -order arrived; in fact, the order was in course of execution before it -reached the officers to whom it had been addressed. Meantime, acting -on the first instructions from the Prince, drawn up when he believed -the right rested on Amanvillers, General von Manstein, a little before -noon, had begun - - - _The Battle of Gravelotte._ - -At this moment, it should be noted, the French camps on the right -centre and right did not know that an enemy was within a long mile -of their bivouacs. The usual patrols had been sent out and had -returned—even scouts selected by the local officials for their -knowledge of the country—to report that they had not seen anybody. -Marshal Canrobert, in his evidence on the Bazaine court-martial, -expressly testifies to the fact, and adds that the first intimation -he received came from the boom of hostile guns on his left front. The -troops of Ladmirault’s Corps, encamped on both sides of Amanvillers, -were peacefully engaged in cooking their noontide meal, when General -von Manstein, who seems to have been endowed with some of the -impetuosity of his namesake, who figured in the wars of Frederick II., -riding ahead of his corps, caught sight of the quiescent camp. The -temptation could not be withstood. From the hills near Vernéville he -could not see the troops at St. Privat, but he had been informed by -the Hessian Cavalry that the French were there. He had been formally -enjoined to attack if the enemy’s right was near La Folie; it was -much to the north of that farm; yet Manstein, unable to neglect the -opportunity of startling a negligent camp by an outburst of fire, sent -the solitary battery which had accompanied him into instant action -from a rising ground east of Vernéville. The first shot was fired at -a quarter to twelve, and its successors roused the French line from -St. Privat to the centre, for Frossard and Lebœuf seemed to have -been on the alert. General von Blumenthal, with the leading infantry -battalions, was at that time moving on the farm of Chantrenne, and -he was stopped by the lively musketry salute which greeted his men. -Manstein, seeing that his guns were too distant from their living -targets, now ordered the battery forward, and it was soon joined, -first by the divisional then by the corps artillery; the whole finally -forming a long line of fifty-four pieces, each battery having, as it -dashed up, wheeled to the right and opened fire. The movement was a -grave error, for the long rounded hill on which the batteries stood -faced south-east, offered no shelter except on its low right shoulder, -and the guns were exposed to a fire from the front, the flank, and -even from the left rear. Two batteries were slewed round to the left, -but that did not remedy the original mistake. There were no infantry -at hand to keep down the fire of the French foot, which, lurking in -the hollows, sent a hail of bullets among the guns. Committed to this -false position, the superb German artillerymen did their utmost to make -it good; but no heroism could avail against its cruel disadvantages. -General Blumenthal, indeed, had carried the Chantrenne farm, but the -enemy, at the first shot, had thrown a garrison into another homestead -named Champenois, whence the chassepots smote the front of the -batteries. The Hessians, also, had developed a powerful attack through -the Bois de la Cusse towards the railway embankment and Amanvillers, -thus taking off some of the severe pressure from the devoted gunners. -But the French infantry crept nigher and nigher; under the rush of -shells, shrapnel, and bullets, officers, men, and horses fell fast and -faster. By concentrating their aim the Germans crushed one or silenced -another battery; by using shell they sometimes scattered oncoming -infantry; still the penalty of haste and a wrong direction had to be -paid. The left battery, disabled, was caught in the tempest and borne -down by a rush of French foot. Two pieces were dragged away by hardy -men and wounded horses; two were left on the field; and two were -captured. Yet this astonishing artillery, though horribly shattered, -continued to hold its ground. It was saved, at a later moment, from a -persevering attack on its vulnerable flank by the steady onset of an -infantry battalion, which lost nearly half its strength in succouring -the guns. Then, for the position was really untenable, all the -batteries, except three on the right, where there was a little shelter, -at length drew reluctantly, in succession, out of the shambles and went -rearward to refit. It was half-past two; they had been more than two -hours in the jaws of death, and had lost no fewer than 210 officers and -men and 370 horses. So audaciously, if sometimes unwisely, was this -grand arm employed in battle that no one need be astonished to learn -how Canrobert, who loved a picturesque phrase, called his dreaded and -admired opponents, “_tirailleurs d’artillerie_.” - - - _Prince Frederick Charles at the Front._ - -Manstein, who was to have attacked the French right, had dashed -somewhat impetuously against the right centre, and for some two hours -his Corps sustained the brunt of the engagement, for the Guards and the -Saxons were still on the march, the first heading for Vernéville and -Habonville, the second on St. Marie aux Chênes, into which Canrobert -had hurried three battalions. North of the artillery, whose bloody -adventure has been described, the Hessian division, under Prince -Louis, posted astride of the railway embankment, which, running from -Amanvillers to Habonville, cut the line of troops at right angles, held -the copses of the Bois de la Cusse, and, supported by thirty guns, -formed the backbone of the German attack in that exposed quarter. -Further south, the other half of the 9th Corps, the 18th Division, had -its reserves near Vernéville, with troops established in Chantrenne -and L’Envie; but they could make no way, because the French were -solidly planted in Champenois, in the Bois de Genivaux, in a spinney -projecting to the westward of La Folie, in that farm and on the higher -ground above. About half-past two the contest in the centre had become -defensive on the part of the 9th Corps, and the energies of the leaders -and the troops alike were taxed to retain the ground already occupied -and extricate the artillery. Prince Frederick Charles, on learning just -before noon, from the cavalry reports, where the French right actually -stood, became anxious when he heard at St. Marcel the uproar of a hot -artillery engagement, and he rode off at once towards the sound and -smoke which rose in clouds above the woods. On reaching Habonville he -was able to survey the conflict, and also discern, in outline, the -enemy’s position at St. Privat. The great head-quarters were still -imperfectly informed, yet they wished to restrain precipitate action -and prevent a home-thrusting central attack until strong bodies could -be launched against the French right. The Prince, however, saw that -the combat could not be broken off, and he set himself to make all -secure by placing a brigade of the Guard, as a reserve, to assist the -9th Corps, which was all that Manstein requested, and by ordering up -four batteries from the 3rd Corps, the infantry masses of which were -not far from Vernéville. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had preceded the -Guard Corps, and as soon as General Pape, commanding the 1st infantry -division, arrived with the advanced guard it was arranged that his four -batteries should go into action to the south-west of Habonville, that -is on the left of the much-tried Hessians, and cover the march of the -Guard towards St. Marie. The spot first selected for the guns was found -defective, and the batteries, at a gallop, took up new ground further -to the left, to the south-west of St. Ail. Thereupon, that village was -occupied by the Guard; Prince Augustus sent for the corps artillery, -and soon nine batteries were arrayed between the two villages, on a -diagonal line pointing to the north-west, that is, so disposed as to -bring to bear a heavy fire on St. Privat, a succour which gave further -relief to the gunners of the 9th Corps. For not only Canrobert’s -cannon, but his infantry, lurking in the shallow valleys along the -front, now directed their shells and bullets upon the Guard batteries. -Although the French did not attempt any heavy stroke, they were -active and enterprising, and kept their swarms of skirmishers within -a thousand yards of the guns, but, as the official historian remarks, -over and over again, beyond the range of the needle-gun. Before three -o’clock the Guard Corps was up, and the 12th, or rather half of it, had -approached near St. Marie. Such was the condition of the battle on that -side; and it is now necessary to describe the daring operations of the -First Army, on the German right wing. - - - _Steinmetz Attacks the French Left._ - -It will be remembered that the 7th and 8th Corps, commanded by Von -Steinmetz, upon whom it was necessary to keep a tight hand, had been -brought up to the south and west of Gravelotte, the left of the 8th -touching Manstein’s right. The 7th provided the outposts which lined -the fringe and salient of the Bois de Vaux, and these troops were -engaged in an intermittent and bickering contest with the French -infantry thrown out upon that flank. The 1st Division of Cavalry, from -the right bank, crossing the Moselle at Borny, rode up about noon -as a support, and General von Fransecky, preceding the 2nd Corps, -assured the King, whom he found near Flavigny, that one division would -arrive in time to form a reserve for the First Army. Von Steinmetz, -on a height near Gravelotte, nervously observed the French, sent in -repeated information that they were moving off, and evidently desired -to adopt the tactics which he had applied on two previous occasions. -He was ordered to be still, and when the guns spoke at Vernéville, -Von Moltke, knowing their effect upon the veteran warrior, intimated -afresh that he must stand expectant yet awhile. Permission was given, -as already mentioned, to use his guns; but when the despatch was handed -to Steinmetz he had already opened fire with the batteries of the 7th -Corps, arrayed to the south, and of the 8th to the north of Gravelotte; -and the infantry had been moved eastward to the edge of the region -just clear of the French fire. The troops in the Bois de Vaux were -reinforced, the mill of the Mance and the gully itself were occupied, -and an ample force was posted above the ravine to protect the line of -guns. - -The expectant attitude, always distasteful to Von Steinmetz, was not, -and in the nature of things could not be long maintained by the First -Army. The generals on the spot knew more accurately what had occurred -in the centre than the Great Staff when the order to look on was -written. General von Goeben, knowing how deeply Manstein had committed -the 9th Corps, felt bound to attack in order that he might detain and -provide employment for the French left. From a point near Gravelotte -he could see the masses of troops held in reserve by Lebœuf and -Frossard, and, with the ready assent of his immediate chief he pushed -forth columns from both his divisions. On the south of the high road -the soldiers disappeared in the deep gully of the Mance, their path -marked by puffs of smoke as they drove back the French skirmishers, and -reappeared climbing the opposite slope leading to the huge quarries -below Point du Jour; but here, struck and repelled by the defenders, -they vanished again into the depths, where they held on to the gravel -pits in the bottom. Nearer the high road, one battalion wedged itself -in to the quarries close to St. Hubert; while beyond the highway, the -Germans dashed through the wood, established themselves on its eastern -border above and about the farmstead, and stormed the stone parapets -set up by the French foreposts at the confluence of the two streamlets -which form the Mance. Farther they could not go, because Lebœuf’s men -stiffly held the eastern patch of woodland, while the open ground -towards the Moscow farm was swept by musketry fire from the deep banks -in the cross-roads, from the shelter trenches above, and from the -loopholed buildings of the farm. But the attack on the Bois de Genivaux -aided the men of the 9th Corps, who, from Chantrenne, had entered its -northern border, and compelled the defenders of the lines in front of -Moscow to turn upon the new assailants. Then the companies which had -gathered about St. Hubert became engaged in a destructive contest, for -the walls were high and well garnished, and the northern point of -attack was more or less commanded by the higher ground towards Moscow. -On the south front, however, there proved to be more chances of success. - -Relying, perhaps, on Frossard’s infantry and guns, the discharges from -which commanded the high road, the garrison had forgotten to barricade -the gates, doors, and windows; and when the place had been cannonaded -by the southern line of guns, the assailants, who had suffered great -loss with unflinching hardihood, came on with an irresistible rush, -and carried the farm by storm. The feat was accomplished about three -o’clock; and the work done gave a solid support to the German right -wing. At this time, the German guns, so well fought, having taken -more forward positions, had mastered the French artillery, which sank -into comparative silence. There were seventy-eight pieces in action -on the south of the high road, and fifty-four on the north, and their -superiority is admitted and recorded by Frossard himself, who saw his -batteries idle or withdrawn, his reserves smitten, and its defenders -literally burnt out of the farm buildings at Point du Jour. Yet the -French left was not shaken, it was hardly touched, by a vehement attack -which had given the Germans a better defensive position, indeed, but -still one only on the verge of Frossard’s stronghold, and affording no -facilities for a rush against the fortified lines occupied by the 3rd -French Corps, in the thickets of Genivaux and on the brow of the bare -hills. - -The capture of St. Hubert was nearly coincident with that stage in the -heady fight before Vernéville which saw the Hessians embattled on the -Bois de la Cusse, the exposed artillery of the 9th Corps in retreat -from a false position, and the opportune appearance of the Guard about -Habonville and of the Saxons to the north-west of St. Marie. In front -of their main line the French held the latter village, were well -forward in the hollows west of Amanvillers, stood fast in the farms of -La Folie, Leipsic, Moscow, Champenois, and that portion of the Bois -de Genivaux which covered the eastern arm of the Mance. The fight had -raged for more than three hours, and they had only lost possession of -the L’Envie and Chantrenne, places distant from their front, and St. -Hubert, which, no doubt, was a dangerous-looking salient within a few -hundred yards of the well-defended ridge where the high road turned at -right angles towards the blazing farm of Point du Jour. From end to -end, therefore, and it was between seven and eight miles in length, -measured by an air-line, the whole of Bazaine’s formidable position was -intact. The Imperial Guard, the effective reserve, still stood on the -heights east of Chatel St. Germain, behind the left, and six miles from -the right where the battle was to be decided. - - - _Operations by the German Left Wing._ - -The two Corps, forming the left wing of the German Army, had been -guided far more by the reports brought in by daring cavalry scouts, -than by the orders received either from Prince Frederick Charles or Von -Moltke, because these latter were necessarily less well-informed than -the Corps commanders who were the first to receive the information. -Yet the latter, of course, while taking their own line conformed to -the governing idea, which was that the French right flank, wherever it -was, should be turned. Moving eastward from Jarny, with the 12th Corps -the Crown Prince of Saxony learned before two o’clock, that Roncourt -was the extreme northern limit of Canrobert’s Corps, and he, therefore, -varied a head-quarter’s order to march upon St. Marie, by directing -one division, the 23rd, under Prince George, to march down the right -bank of the Orne, through Auboué, and turn to the right upon Roncourt. -One brigade of the 24th Division he directed on St. Marie, keeping the -other back as a support. About the same time the whole of the Guard, -except one brigade detached to back up the 9th Corps, had formed up -near Habonville, and their batteries, as we have seen, had taken up -a position which enabled them to smite St. Privat. When, therefore, -General Pape had moved up the Guards by the ravine west of St. Marie -he found the Saxons ready to co-operate with him in driving out the -French battalions occupying the pretty village which has the air of a -small rural town. It sits at the foot of the long bare incline leading -down from St. Privat, traversed by a straight road bordered, as usual, -by tall scraggy trees; and nestling amid gardens and walled inclosures -shines out a cheerful white spot in the diversified landscape. From -this point, St. Privat looms dark and large on the hill-top, larger and -darker looking than it really is. To the southward of that village, -beyond a dip, down and up which the cottages creep, stands the -farmstead of Jerusalem, and further south the ground rolls away towards -Amanvillers. More than a mile of open country separates St. Privat -from St. Marie, affording no lurking places to either side, except -such as can be found in the gentle swelling and falling of the fields; -indeed, to the casual observer the smoothness of the surface seems -broken only by the poplars on the highway. West of St. Marie there is -a shallow ravine, and beyond it copses, and south, as we know towards -Vernéville, more copses, ruddy brown farmsteads, and white villages. -At this moment the battle-smoke puffed out, curled, rose in fantastic -clouds, or rolled along the ground, upon the hill-sides and above -the thickets and barns; about St. Marie, however, the air as yet was -untainted by the sulphurous mists of combat so rank a mile away, but -the garrison stood painfully expectant of the coming fray. For though -the Guards were hidden the Saxon brigade to the north-west was visible, -and the skirmishers driven from St. Ail, told how the “Prussians” were -mustering for the onset. - -Suddenly lines of skirmishers appear, gun after gun drives up, the -Saxon artillery reinforcing the pieces which the Guard can spare, -until three distinct lines of batteries are formed and open on the -village. The German Generals, who judged the place to be stronger and -more strongly garrisoned than it was, had brought to bear overwhelming -forces—probably also to save time; so that, after enduring a hot -cannonade from seventy-eight guns, the French battalions, who had -borne the bombardment and had spent abundance of ammunition in return, -did not await the shock of the storming columns sent against them, -but fled by the eastern outlet to their main body. The Guard and the -Saxons, who had come on with ringing hurrahs, swept into the place -on all sides; some prisoners were taken, but the greater mass of the -defenders and the French battery which had kept up a flank fire on the -approach to the south face of the village, got safely up the hill. -When they were inside St. Marie the assailants were able to see that -“the adversary had done nothing to increase, by artificial means, the -defensive value of a post, naturally strong; and had even neglected to -barricade the roads and paths by which it is entered.” The truth is -that the occupation of St. Marie by the French was an after thought, -and that although defensible in itself the place was far too remote -from the main French line of battle to be supported; and the garrison, -which no doubt, in a different temper, might have died fighting in the -streets and houses, yielded when they felt the hail of shells and saw -the impending storm-cloud of infantry ready to burst upon them. The -defenders hastened towards Roncourt and St. Privat, losing men from -the fire of their exulting enemies, who followed on the eastern side -until stopped by the chassepot and the guns on the hills. Thus a point -of support was secured in that quarter, about half-past three, but no -advance could be made until the artillery had prepared the way, and the -turning column had made further progress in its march. - -Nevertheless, the Saxon troops on the north of St. Marie and some who -had been engaged in its capture, carried away by their ardour and -the sight of a retreating foe, pursued so far and were so promptly -reinforced that a fierce infantry fight ensued. For a French brigade, -led by General Péchot, dashed out of their lines, struck roughly on the -front and turned the left flank of the Saxons who, being obstinate, -held the slightly uneven meadow lands with great difficulty and much -loss. Although they were aided by their own batteries and those of the -Guard which had been moved forward on the front between St. Ail and -Habonville, and whose fire smote diagonally the French columns rushing -out of Roncourt and St. Privat, yet the Saxons were overmatched; and, -after much labour, as they were nearly all spread out in skirmishing -order, General Nehrdorff, who comprehended the situation, and saw -the waste of effort, gradually drew them back to the original line. -The French counter attack, swift and sharp, was well sustained, and -the bold Saxons paid a heavy price for their temerity. While this -combat was in progress, the Crown Prince of Saxony from a height in -front of Auboué, gazing intently towards Roncourt, made an important -discovery—he saw troops in movement to the north of that village, and, -in fact, Canrobert’s outposts extended nearly to the Orne. Thus, after -a long search, yet not before four o’clock, the extreme right of the -French Army was at length found, and thereupon the turning column of -horse, foot, and guns, one-half Prince George’s division, was ordered -to take a still wider sweep northward ere it wheeled in upon the -French rear. As it marched stealthily on its way, the Saxon artillery -developed a long line of batteries pointing towards Roncourt, protected -by Craushaar’s brigade, which made a lodgment in the western block of -a deep wooded ravine on the left of the guns, and stood ready to dash -forward when their comrades emerged from the villages and copses behind -the French right. In the centre the troops of the 9th Corps had stormed -and occupied the farm of Champenois, had tried again, without success, -to win the eastern tracts of the Bois de Genivaux, and, supported by -106 guns, had maintained a sanguinary contest with Lebœuf’s steady -brigades, ensconced over against them in the farms, thickets, and -hollow ways. About five o’clock the fury of the battle diminished for a -moment, in the centre, on the left, and even on the right, where, down -to that hour, it had raged with a spirit and vigour which must now be -described. - - - _General Frossard Repels a fresh Attack._ - -The enormous defensive strength of the position held by General -Frossard’s Corps does not seem to have been thoroughly understood by -anyone except that accomplished engineer. Marshal Bazaine did not -perceive its value, for he was perpetually afraid that the Germans -would break in upon it, either from the Bois de Vaux or by the high -road, and his apprehensions or prejudices were confirmed when a column -of troops was seen to be ascending the river-road from Ars towards -Jussy, near St. Ruffine. General von Steinmetz, on the other hand, -who had peered out from every available height between the Bois des -Ognons and Gravelotte, although each attack which he had directed had -been repelled, thought he discerned symptoms of weakness and even of -retreat. The truth is that Frossard’s men were well hidden, not less -by the natural features of the ground than by the trenches which he -had dug and the breastworks which he had thrown up. If his batteries -were silent or withdrawn it was because, although overpowered in the -gun fight, they were yet still able to arrest the onsets of infantry; -and if the French fantassins were invisible, it was because they were -lying down or arrayed on the reverse of the ridge. The hot-tempered -General of the First Army, however, surmised, after the capture of St. -Hubert, that troops had been detached to aid the distant right, or that -a moment had come when, if pressed home by an attack of all arms, Point -du Jour could be carried and the French driven headlong into Metz. -Under the influence of this delusion he rode up to General von Goeben, -who was watching the battle near Gravelotte. Captain Seton, an Indian -officer who was present, noticed the violent gestures and rapid talk -of Steinmetz because they offered so strong a contrast to the steady -coolness of the younger warrior. At that moment he was expounding -opinions and issuing orders which brought on one of the most brilliant -and destructive episodes in the battle. Goeben had already sent forward -Gneisenau’s brigade, partly on and partly north of the road, but they -were needed to feed the combat, support the weakened and scattered -companies, and secure St. Hubert. - -What Steinmetz now designed was a home-thrust on the French position; -and, accordingly, he ordered several batteries of the 7th Corps and -Von Hartmann’s cavalry division to cross the Gravelotte defile and -plant themselves on the gentle acclivities to the south of the road. -Now the highway runs first through a cutting, is then carried on an -embankment, and only near St. Hubert are the gentle southern slopes -above the gully accessible to horses and guns. But this narrow track -swarmed with troops, into the midst of which came the cavalry and -artillery. The infantry gave way and four batteries arrived on the -opposite side of the defile, followed by the 9th Uhlans. But so -deadly was the storm of shot which burst from the French position—for -cannon, mitrailleuse, and chassepot went instantly to work—that two of -the batteries were at once driven into the ravine below. The Uhlans -actually rode out into the open, took up a position, and remained -until it was plain to all that the lives of men and horses were being -uselessly sacrificed. The other regiments, “well peppered,” had already -gone “threes about” before clearing the defile, and the Uhlans, who -were dropping fast, rode back, as well as they could, to Gravelotte -or the sheltering woods. A more extravagant movement has rarely been -attempted in war, or one less justified by the evident facts of the -situation as well as by the deadly results. Yet two batteries actually -remained, one, under Captain Hasse, in the open, about seven hundred -yards from the French lines of musketry; the other, commanded by -Captain Gnügge, covered in front by the low wall of the St. Hubert -garden, but lending a flank to the adversary at the top of the road. -Captain Hasse and his gunners were stubborn men; they fought their -battery for two hours, in fact, until nearly all the men and horses -were down. Even then Hasse would not retire, and one of his superiors -was obliged to hurry up fresh teams and forcibly drag the guns away. -But the battery under the wall held on, and did good service by firing -on the French about the Moscow farm. - -The failure of these mistaken attacks and the retreat of guns and -horsemen seems to have shaken the constant German infantry, for they -gave ground everywhere but at St. Hubert, and the French came on with -such vigour that General Steinmetz himself and his staff were under -a heavy fire. Fortunately three fresh battalions plunged into the -combat; but they could not do more than sustain it; for every attempt -made to approach the French, either towards the Moscow farm or Point -du Jour, met with a speedy repulse. Indeed, down to five o’clock, -the point of time at which we have arrived, along the whole line, no -progress whatever had been made by the German right wing, which held -on to St. Hubert, the ravine of the Mance, and the western portion of -the Bois de Genivaux, but could not show a rifle or bayonet beyond in -any direction. It was only the powerful German artillery which still -remained the superb masters of the field, so far as their action was -concerned. - -It was at this time that King William and his staff, which included -Prince Bismarck, rode up to the high ground above Malmaison, where he -established his head-quarters in the field, and whence, until nearly -dark, he watched the battle. Over against him, concerned respecting his -left, and ignorant of the state of the battle on his right, was Marshal -Bazaine, in the fort of Plappeville, whither he had returned from St. -Quentin, which commanded a wide view to the south and south-west. -He says that he gave General Bourbaki discretion to use the Guard -wherever it might be wanted. But that officer knew little more than -the Commander-in-Chief. An hour or two earlier, taking with him the -Grenadier Division of the Guard, he had started towards the north, -following a hilly road east of the St. Germain ravine. He had seen the -immense mountain of white smoke which towered up in the north-west, but -the current of air, hardly a wind, apparently blew from the south-east, -since at Plappeville he could not hear the roar of the guns, and the -view was so obstructed that he could not obtain even a glimpse of the -country about St. Privat. He had to leave behind him the Voltigeurs and -Chasseurs of the Guard, who were partly in reserve and partly posted to -support Lebœuf, who called up one regiment from Brincourt’s brigade. -Bazaine had also sent some guns to support Lapasset in his contest with -the troops which Von Golz had marched up from Ars to the woodlands and -vineyards opposite St. Ruffine. The French at this stage were still in -good spirits. If Lebœuf was a little anxious behind his farmsteads, his -woods, and skilfully-disposed re-entering echelons of shelter trenches; -Frossard, who soon after relieved his front ranks from the reserve, -was content; and De Ladmirault, as was usual with him, believed that -he might be almost considered victorious, and only required a few -battalions of the Guard to insure his success. The ammunition on both -sides was running out here and there; indeed, Canrobert declares that -he was compelled to borrow from De Ladmirault; still there was enough -to last out the day. Over the seven or eight miles of flame and smoke -and tumult, for a brief interval, came what may be called a lull -compared with the deafening tempest of sounds which smote on the ear -when the rival combatants raged most fiercely. - - - _The last Fights near St. Hubert._ - -For some time longer the German right wing did little more than defend -its somewhat irregular line of front. The 2nd Corps, which had been -marching every day since it quitted the Saar, had attained Rezonville, -and King William placed it under the orders of Von Steinmetz. As the -minutes flew by, the head-quarter staff on the hill near Malmaison were -impressed by a fact and an appearance—the increase of the vivacity -and volume of fire towards the north—where the Guard had begun its -onset on St. Privat—and the symptoms of wavering which seemed, and -only seemed, to be visible on the French left. The King, therefore, -sanctioned a fresh and formidable advance upon Frossard’s brigades by -all the troops which Von Steinmetz could spare for the enterprise. -But the main object of Von Moltke, we infer, was to prevent, by -striking hard, the despatch of any assistance to Canrobert, and thus -assist, by a resolute advance, upon one wing, the decisive movement -then approaching its critical stage on the other. The 2nd Corps was, -therefore, brought up to Gravelotte, and all the available troops -of the 7th and 8th were held in readiness to assail, once more, the -enemies beyond the Mance. - -But the French, who, though wearied, were still undaunted, anticipating -their foes, became the assailants. Their silent guns spoke out in -thunder, the heights were shrouded in a canopy of smoke, and the bolts -hurled from the batteries fell like hail on the woods, and sent such -an iron shower as far forward as the hill-top where the King and his -great men stood, that Von Roon prevailed on the King to ride further -back. The lively French skirmishers dashed forth into the open, strove -hard to reach St. Hubert, drove the German foreposts headlong down -the steeps into the Mance gully, filled the high road with a rushing, -clamorous crowd of fugitives, and even caused terror and commotion in -the rear of Gravelotte, so vehement and unexpected was the stroke. -Fortunately for the Germans, the principal bodies of troops in St. -Hubert and the woods were unshaken, and their rapid fire, as well as -the responses sent from the artillery, checked the violent outfall. -Then, as the sun was getting low, the fresh German brigades struck in. -The men of the 7th Corps went down into and over the Mance valley, -and stormed up the eastern bank. The 2nd Corps, eager to win, pressed -along the highway, with their drums and trumpets sounding the change, -or moved on the south side. They passed onward in a tumult, and boldly -tried to grapple with the strong lines of the defence. Not only their -commander, Fransecky, and Steinmetz, but Von Moltke himself rode into -the defile to witness and direct this huge and uproarious column of -attack. But neither their numbers, and they were many, nor their -valour, which was great, nor the unfaltering devotion of their officers -could resist the smashing fire of cannon and mitrailleuse and chassepot -which the French brought to bear upon them. Some daring spirits pressed -close up towards the ditches and breastworks, a few clung to the banks -and bushes on the brow of the slope near Point du Jour. A dense mass -collected near St. Hubert, where Fransecky and Steinmetz, in the thick -of the throng, saw the bands who had hurried to the front break off, -turn and hasten rearward, while fresh troops still pressed upward -through the confused crowds of fugitives. So for some time, in the -twilight, the strange fight went on. As it grew darker, the outlines -of Lebœuf’s cleverly-designed shelter trenches near the Moscow farm -were drawn in lines of musketry fire, and gradually nothing, save the -flashes of guns and rifles, could be seen in the gloom. At length, -when friend could not be distinguished from foe, when no breach -could be made in the French line, which, except the outpost of St. -Hubert, remained what it had been in the morning, the Generals placed -strong guards on their front, and stood prepared to renew the battle -with the dawn. General Frossard, who had engaged all his reserves, -was proud of his achievement, and not less of the foresight he -displayed in providing artificial cover for his men. That had made the -position, from the Great Quarries to the farm and copse of La Folie, -impregnable, and renders it all the more difficult to comprehend how -Marshal Bazaine could have shown such manifest distrust of the fastness -which protected his left wing. The attack on St. Ruffine by Von Golz -was merely a diversion shrewdly designed to increase the Marshal’s -alarms, and its relative success shows how correctly Von Moltke -estimated his adversary’s abilities as a soldier. He reaped an ample -reward, since long before the last shot was fired in the neighbourhood -of St. Hubert, the French had been worsted at the other and distant -extremity of the vast field of battle. - - - _The Prussian Guard on the Centre and Left._ - -It may be said, indeed, that not one, but several battles were fought -on the 18th of August, in the long space between the Bois de Vaux and -the Forest of Moyœuvre. They were inter-dependent, because one mass of -combatants held fast another, and the essence of the German plan was -that three-fourths of the French Army should be nailed to the positions -they had taken up, while the remainder were crushed by the pressure of -superior forces. The original design of Von Moltke was framed on the -supposition that the French right stood near Amanvillers, and that he -would be able to fling upon an exposed flank two Corps d’Armée. Before -the error was discovered, several hours had been consumed; the Guard -had been obliged to prolong the front fighting line; only a part of -the Saxon Corps could be spared to engage in the turning movement, -and the ground which they had to traverse grew longer and longer as -the day waxed shorter. The extent of country over which the various -armies operated, and the smoke which obscured the view, prevented a -correct appreciation of the situation of affairs at a given moment, -and the German commanders were liable to be deceived, and were -deceived by appearances. The knowledge that so brief an interval of -daylight remained, and an anxiety to make the most of precious moments, -quickened the tendency to decisive action, and thus brought about the -rash and premature attack which was so destructive, and nearly proved -so fatal to the Prussian Guard. - -Their magnificent divisions of Infantry, it will be remembered, stood -between St. Ail and St. Marie, except one brigade which had been -annexed to the 9th Corps. It was intended that they should remain -quiescent until the Saxon column broke out upon the French right in the -direction of Roncourt, and for a brief interval of time, after five -o’clock, the action in the centre as well as on the left was confined -to a deliberate cannonade. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, who was then -near St. Ail gazing alternatively on the ebb and flow of Manstein’s -battle in the Bois de la Cusse and towards the Bois de Genivaux, and -on the aspect of the field about St. Privat, thought he saw French -troops moving south from Roncourt. Combining this impression with the -fact that, as we have already stated, a long line of Saxon guns had -been arrayed due north of St. Marie, he rapidly formed the opinion -that the turning column was on the point of striking the enemy, and -that the moment had come when the Guard should be employed. He was -also somewhat affected by the condition of the combat in the centre, -and, perhaps, as much by the waning day which left so narrow a margin -of time for decisive activity. He appealed to Prince Frederick Charles -and easily converted the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army to -his views. So the order went forth that the Guard should attack, -and having set Budritzki’s division in motion from St. Ail, Prince -Augustus rode to St. Marie. There General von Pape revealed to him -his misconception—the turning column was not even then in sight, and -unless preceded by bombardment from all the batteries, a front attack -on St. Privat, Pape said, would have but a slight chance of success. -Why, then, was it delivered? Because the other division of the Guard -was actually at that moment under fire and losing men by scores on the -open slope. It was a bitter moment for Prince Augustus, whose error -was to cost the Guard losses which are counted by thousands. Moreover, -General Manstein, seeing Budritzki in motion, and De Cissey, whose -division formed De Ladmirault’s right, wheeling up diagonally on the -flanks of the new foe, determined to despatch his Brigade of Guards, -the 3rd, straight upon Amanvillers, to resume the offensive with his -Hessians, and support, by all the means he possessed, the daring onset -initiated on his immediate left. Practically, therefore, although other -troops were engaged at different points on the front of the 9th Corps, -the battle on the northern half of the field was thenceforth fought out -by the Saxons and the Guard. - -The character of the unequal combat was the same from end to end of -the line—superb, because it proved the steadfast valour of Prussia’s -chosen infantry; awful, because the bare fields in the track of the -onslaught were soon literally strewed with thousands of dead and -wounded. The charge of the 3rd Brigade towards Amanvillers was pushed -with such unwavering velocity that, although the ranks were thinned -at every stride, the hardy survivors, spread out in skirmishing -order, carried their front to the brow of a hill within half a mile -of Amanvillers. There they were stopped by the fire which smote them -in front and flank. Yet there they stayed undaunted, and maintained a -steady contest with antagonists who, if they tried to dash forward, -could not reach the unyielding line of the 3rd Brigade. On their left -the Hessians moved up on both sides of the railroad cutting, and -finally captured a house built for the watchman at a level crossing. -Comrades of the 9th Corps, from the Bois de la Cusse, soldiers who had -been toiling for many hours, essayed to reach the Guard, but they had -not strength enough left, and retired when they suddenly discerned, -above Amanvillers, two regiments of Grenadiers—it was Bourbaki who -had led Picard’s battalions on to the plateau, but who, distrusting -appearances visible about and beyond St. Privat, feared to plunge into -the fight at Amanvillers. Looking out from his hill, Bourbaki may have -seen the devoted march of Budritzki’s troops up the gentle slope in -front of St. Ail; for these, what was left of them, were closing on the -spur which lies south-west of St. Privat, and stretching out as far as -the high road to St. Marie, a long dark streak of fire and smoke and -the broad fields behind them black with the dying and dead. For the -constant Guards, undismayed, the remnant of a splendid division, not -only persevered and won the little rounded hill, but rooted themselves -under its shelving terraces, while the left companies, next the high -road, found shelter in its ditches. They had suffered most when beyond -the effective range of the needle-gun, in the belt where the chassepot -had rained balls as thick as hail. They could now retort the fire, and -at least keep their opponents at bay. These battalions, like those of -the 3rd Brigade, had dared all the deadly perils of the open ground; -they had bought a relative success at a heavy price, and were resolved -to retain what they had won, their line of fire extending from the high -road to the rounded eminence, or long hillock, south-west of Jerusalem. -Three batteries had driven up to aid the infantry; the main body of the -Guard Artillery had advanced eastward; and the Hessians and 3rd Brigade -prolonged the front of combat to the south. - -During part of the period thus occupied General Pape, holding one -brigade in reserve at St. Marie, attacked with the other on the north -of the high road. Starting at a quarter to six o’clock, this body -of Guardsmen crossed the road facing north, and then wheeling in -succession to the right, went obstinately forward. The French fire, -from the outset, was close and deadly; officers of all ranks fell fast; -companies were reduced to straggling groups or scattered files; the -whole line was soon dispersed here and there; but they still pressed -on. One moiety trended to the right another to the left, and General -von Pape, watchful, active, and fortunate, for he was not hit, led -fresh battalions to fill up the gaping intervals. Soon after the -foremost bands had got within seven hundred yards of St. Privat, where, -in places, at least, the slope afforded shelter, the reinforcements -arrived; and it may be said that thenceforth a continuous, yet thin -line, curved inwards at the northern end, and fringed with smoke and -fire, stretched irregularly over the vast glacis-like declivities from -opposite Amanvillers to the outskirts of Roncourt, where the Saxons -prolonged the ragged and shapeless, but redoubtable array. Against this -mere thread of riflemen, not even when they were weakest, the French -directed no bold attack, perhaps because they had no reserves and stood -in respectful awe of the hostile artillery which drew nearer and nearer -as the evening wore on, until the black batteries formed a second line -to the intrepid infantry. - -It was about seven o’clock. St. Privat was in flames, the black and -tawny smoke of the burning village, boiling upwards, stood out against -the obscured sky in strong contrast to the swelling clouds of white -vapour, through which leaped incessant sparkles from hundreds of -rifles, and the broader flashes of the cannon. At no preceding period -of this dreadful day had the battle raged with such intensity; for -now along the whole front of eight miles there was a deafening roar -and crash and tumult, and a murky atmosphere concealing the ghastly -sights which make these fields of carnage so appalling to the lively -imagination, which seeks in vain to realize its multitude and variety -of horror. Yet there was an element of grandeur and sublimity in the -exhibition of courage, constancy and fortitude upon such a stupendous -scale. “It is a good thing that war is so terrible,” said General -Robert Lee, “otherwise we should become too fond of it.” Here, among -these woods and villages of Lorraine, war showed in abundance its -attractive and repulsive forms. - - - _The Capture of St. Privat._ - -Marshal Canrobert had discerned the approaching Saxons, who were now -marching from the north upon Roncourt, Montois, and Malancourt. He felt -that his right had been turned, and looked in vain for the expected -succour. Bazaine, he says, had promised to send a division of the -Guard. Bourbaki, astounded by the spectacle which met his eyes, when he -emerged from the wooded defiles west of Saulny, had, as we have seen, -allowed himself to be attracted, for a moment, towards De Ladmirault, -had then retraced his steps, and had taken a position to cover the high -road to Woippy, the so-called northern road from Metz which goes to -Briey. He had with him, according to his own statement, three or four -thousand Grenadiers and some artillery; but he did not arrive in time -to frustrate the Saxons and Prussian Guards. The Marshal, a little -after seven, or even before, felt that he could not stand. He complains -of failing ammunition, declares that the German artillery had obtained -a complete mastery over his guns, and that his flank was turned. “At -this moment,” he says in his own picturesque fashion, “a valiant -officer, who has since been killed before Paris, and who was called -Péchot, arrived at St. Privat [from Roncourt] with the 9th battalion of -Chasseurs, the 6th and 12th of the Line. He dashed forward to stop the -enemy; but, as the enemy flung at us masses of iron, and did not come -himself, as it was shells which came instead, we could not hold on. -Péchot warned me, and we were obliged to retire. We did so by moving in -echelon from the centre, and, in good order, I emphasize the phrase, -we gained the heights beside the wood of Saulny.” The German Staff -acknowledge that the rearward movement was admirably done; but the -succinct narrative vouchsafed by the Marshal to the Court which tried -Bazaine, gives only a vague glimpse of the closing scene. - -When the “valiant Péchot” retired from Roncourt before the Saxon -inroad, he skilfully put his brigade into the forest of Jaumont, on -the right rear of the original line. Colonel Montluisant, the gallant -artilleryman, having received a welcome supply of ammunition, sent up -from St. Quentin by the order of Bazaine, posting his batteries in -lines one above the other on the terraces near the wood of Saulny, -opened a sustained fire to cover the retreat. Bourbaki, although -Canrobert did not know it at the time, such was the confusion and -so thick was the air, had moved his batteries and Grenadiers near -enough at dusk to bring both musketry and cannon-shot to bear upon the -Germans. In St. Privat, glowing like a furnace, and as the darkness -became deeper, shedding a wild light upon the scene, there were still -stout and obstinate soldiers who either would not, or could not, follow -the retiring brigades. Upon these devoted troops, as the sun went down -behind the dark border of woods beyond the valley of the Orne, the -much-tried Prussian Guards and the leg-weary Saxons threw themselves -with all their remaining vigour; and in rear of them, yet far down the -slope, stepped one Division of the 10th Corps. The guns reinforced -had again been dragged forward, some overwhelming St. Privat, others -pounding Montluisant, or facing south-east, and smiting the French -about Amanvillers. Then, with loud hurrahs, the assailants broke into -St. Privat, pursued the defenders amid the burning houses, captured -two thousand prisoners, who were unable to escape from the buildings, -and developed their lines in the twilight on the plateau beyond. The -capture of St. Privat enabled the German artillery to press on once -more, each battery striving to gain the foremost place. For Canrobert’s -retreat exposed the right flank of De Ladmirault’s Corps, and, under a -scathing fire, he was obliged to throw it back, protected by Bourbaki -on the hill, and supported by a brigade promptly despatched towards -that side by Lebœuf, who, all through the eddying fight, showed a fine -tactical sense and great decision. How far the Germans were able to -push their advantage it is difficult to say, since General Gondrecourt, -who was near the place, maintains that some of De Ladmirault’s soldiers -remained through the night in Amanvillers; whereas the Germans assert -that they broke into part of the village. Be that as it may, Montigny -la Grange, La Folie, and the posts thence to Point du Jour, for -certain, were held by the French until the morning. Marshal Lebœuf has -stated that he summoned his Generals in the evening, and said to them: -“The two Corps on our right, crushed by superior forces, have been -obliged to retire. We have behind us,” he added, “one of the defiles -through which they (‘cette troupe’) may retreat. If we give back a step -the Army is lost. The position, doubtless, is difficult, but we will -remain.” He declares that the attack continued until midnight, and that -not one of his men budged a foot, which is true; but Canrobert’s men -did fly in disorder to Woippy, and De Ladmirault confessed that there -was “some disorder” in his Corps, and that what remained of them in -the wood of Saulny stood to their arms all night. The General states -his case in an extraordinary manner. “Night,” he says, “surprised us -in this situation, having gained the battle, but not having been able -to maintain our positions.” What he meant to assert was that he, De -Ladmirault had won the battle, but that the defeat of Canrobert had -obliged him to retire. The truth was that some troops remained in -Montigny la Grange, but that the rest, or nearly all of them, where -huddled together in the wood of Saulny, whence they retreated at dawn. - -During the night each Corps commander received from Marshal Bazaine an -order to occupy certain positions under the guns of Metz. Canrobert, -De Ladmirault, and the Guard, marched in the night, or very early in -the morning, to the places assigned them; Lebœuf began his movement at -dawn, but Frossard kept outposts on his front line long after daylight. -During the forenoon, however, the Army of the Rhine had gained the -shelter of a fortified town, which they were not able to quit until -they marched off to Germany as prisoners of war. - -The effective strength of the German Armies present on the field of -Gravelotte was 203,402 men, and 726 guns; it would not be easy to -calculate how many were actually engaged in the fight, but the forces -held in reserve were considerable. The number on the French side has -been put as low as 120,000, and as high as 150,000 men, and probably -about 530 guns. The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded was -20,159, and 493 missing. The French loss is set down at 7,853 killed -and wounded and 4,419 prisoners, many of whom were wounded men. The -disproportion is tremendous, and shows once again that, armed with the -breechloader, the defender is able to kill and injure nearly two to -one. There were killed or mortally wounded in the German ranks no fewer -than 5,237 officers and men, while the aggregate for the French is only -1,144. The loss of officers and men in the Prussian Guards, nearly all -inflicted in half an hour before St. Privat, reached the dreadful total -of 2,440 killed or mortally injured, and of wounded 5,511! - - - - - CHAPTER X. - - THE STATE OF THE GAME, AND THE NEW MOVES. - - -The huge, stubborn, vehement and bloody conflict waged in the rural -tract between the northern edges of the Bois de Vaux and the Forest -of Jaumont, which the French Marshal called the “Defence of the Lines -of Amanvillers,” the French Army, “the Battle of St. Privat,” and the -Germans the battle of “Gravelotte-St. Privat,” established the mastery -of the latter over “the Army of the Rhine.” Marshal Bazaine had not -proved strong enough to extricate the Army he was suddenly appointed -to command from the false position in which it had been placed by the -errors and hesitations of the Emperor and Marshal Lebœuf. He had not -been able to retrieve the time wasted between the 7th and 13th of -August, by imparting, after that period, energy and swiftness to the -movements of his troops, or, if he possessed the ability, of which -there is no sign, he did not put it forth. Certain words imputed to -General Changarnier, correctly or otherwise, hit the blot exactly. -“Bazaine,” the General is represented as saying, “was incapable of -commanding so large an Army. He was completely bewildered by its great -numbers. He did not know how to move his men. He could not operate with -the forces under his orders.” So simple an explanation did not, of -course, satisfy those who could only account for a stupendous calamity -by accusing the Marshal of treason. But on the 19th of August, the -Emperor was still on the throne, and whatever thoughts may have passed -through the mind of Bazaine after Sedan, it is inconceivable that he -wilfully sacrificed the Army before that event. He was misinformed, -he could not grasp the situation, he formed conjectures, without any -solid basis, and acted on them; he was oppressed by the comparative -want of provisions and munitions; and, above all, he could not resist -the magnetism exerted by a stronghold like Metz, a magnetism which is -likely to prove fatal to other weak captains who will have to handle -armies, counted by hundreds of thousands, in the vicinity of extensive -fortified camps. The consequences of the battles of Colombey, Vionville -and Gravelotte are sufficiently accounted for by a recognition of -the errors which, from the outset, placed the Army of the Rhine in -a position whence it could have been extricated by a Napoleon or a -Frederick, but not by a Bazaine; and only quenchless wrath, born of -defeat, or “preternatural suspicion,” too rife in the French Army, -could seek an explanation in personal ambition or treason. The war -was begun without the preparation of adequate means; the operations -projected were based on miscalculations, political and military; the -Generals were selected by favour; and when the collision of Armies -took place, the French were outnumbered, out-marched, out-fought, and -out-generalled. Bazaine was no more a traitor than Prince Charles of -Lorraine in Prague, the King of Saxony in Pirna, or even poor Mack in -Ulm. He was a brave soldier, and an excellent corps commander, but -he was very far from ranking among those captains, and, according to -the first Napoleon, they are few, who have the faculty and knowledge -required to command 300,000 men. Upon his subsequent conduct, being -beyond its scope, this history has nothing to say; moreover, it would -acquire a volume to illuminate that dreadful labyrinth, the “Procès -Bazaine.” All we require to note is that, as a result of a series -of errors, the whole of which did not fall to the Marshal’s share, -one French Army had been routed and driven headlong to Chalons, and -another, the larger and better, had been worsted in combat and forced -to seek shelter within the fortified area of Metz. - -The German leaders forthwith resolved, and acted on the resolve, to -take the largest advantage of success. When the broadening day showed -that the French were encamped under the guns of the forts, and that -they did not betray the faintest symptom of fighting for egress on any -side, the place was deliberately invested. On the 18th, the cavalry had -cut the telegraph between Metz and Thionville, and partially injured -the railway between Thionville and Longuyon; and the French had hardly -repaired the wire on the 19th before it was again severed. Soon the -blockade was so far completed that only adventurous scouts were able -at rare intervals to work their way through the German lines. As early -as the forenoon of the 19th, the King had decided to form what came -to be called the “Army of the Meuse” out of the Corps which were not -needed to uphold the investment of Metz, and thus place himself in a -condition to assail the French Army collecting at Chalons. The new -organization was composed of the Guard, the 4th and the 12th Corps, -and the 5th and 6th Divisions of Cavalry; and this formidable force -was put under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, who had shown -himself to be an able soldier. Consequently, there remained behind to -invest Bazaine, seven Corps d’Armée and a Division of Reserved under -General von Kummer, which had marched up from Saarlouis, and was then -actually before Metz on the right bank of the Moselle east of and below -the town. The main strength, six Corps, were posted on the left or -western bank, and the supreme command was intrusted to Prince Frederick -Charles. Not a moment was lost in distributing the troops so that they -could support each other, and in sealing up the avenues of access to -the place. A bridge over the Moselle, covered by a tête de pont was -constructed above and below Metz; defensive positions were selected -and intrenched, and throughout the whole circuit, in suitable places, -heavy solid works, as well as lighter obstructions, were begun. If the -enemy tried to reach Thionville by the left bank he was to find an -organized defensive position in his path, and the troops beyond the -Moselle were to assail his right flank. If he endeavoured to pass on -the other shore, similar means would be applied to bar his way. Field -works would arrest his attack, and his left flank in that case would -be struck. Egress to the west was to be opposed by abbatis, trenches -and other obstacles. Remilly, then the terminus of the railway, and -the site of a great magazine, was to be specially guarded; but if any -“eccentric” movement were attempted on the eastern area, the Generals -were to evade an engagement with superior forces. It is not necessary -to enter more minutely into the blockade of Metz, which henceforth -becomes subordinate to the main story. We have followed, so far, the -fortunes or misfortunes of the Army now surrounded by vigilant, skilful -and valiant foes; but the active interest of the campaign lies in other -fields, and bears us along to an undreamed-of and astounding end. - - - _The King Marches Westward._ - -One Army had been literally imprisoned, another remained at large, -and behind it were the vast resources of France. Three Marshals were -cooped up in the cage on the Moselle; one, MacMahon, and the Emperor -were still in the field; and upon the forces with them it was resolved -to advance at once, because prudence required that they should be -shattered before they could be completely organized, and while the -moral effect of the resounding blows struck in Alsace and Lorraine -had lost none of its terrible power. Therefore the King and General -von Moltke started on the morrow of victory to march on Paris through -the plains of Champagne. The newly-constituted Army of the Meuse, -on the 20th, was in line between Commercy and Briey, moving towards -Verdun on a broad front, with the cavalry so well forward that on the -22nd the Guard Uhlans were over the Meuse. At the same time the Crown -Prince of Prussia, who had continued his march from the Meurthe and -Upper Moselle, was astride the Meuse between Void and Gondrecourt, -with infantry in front at Ligny and a cavalry patrol as far forward -as Vitry. His columns had passed by roads south of Toul, from the -Moselle valley on to the Ornain, and as Toul refused to surrender when, -a little later, it was bombarded by field guns, a small detachment -was left to invest it until captured French garrison guns could be -hauled up from Marsal. On the 23rd the Meuse Army was up to the right -bank of the river, and the whole of the Third had entered the basin -of the Ornain. Both Armies advanced the next day further westward -and continued the movement on the 25th—a critical day on which they -attained positions it becomes necessary to note more minutely. The 12th -Corps, having failed on the 24th to carry Verdun by a coup de main, -halted at Dombasle on the 25th, with its cavalry at Clermont in Argonne -and Sainte-Menehould. The Guard was on the Aisne at Triaucourt, the 4th -near by at Laheycourt, the Second Bavarians on their left front, at -Possesse, the 5th Corps near Heiltz l’Evêque, the Würtemberg Division -at Sermaize on the Ornain, the 11th Corps close to Vitry on the Marne, -the 6th Corps at Vassy on the Blaise, and the First Bavarians at Bar le -Duc, whither the King had come on the 24th, by way of Commercy, from -Pont à Mousson. Thus the whole force was marching direct on Chalons, -left in front; that is, the Third Army, as a rule, was a march in -advance of the Saxon Crown Prince. - - - _The Cavalry Operations._ - -During the period occupied in reaching these towns and villages the -cavalry had been actively employed scouting far in advance and on the -flanks; and what they did forms the most interesting and instructive -portion of the story. As early as the 17th a troop of Hussars captured -a French courrier at Commercy, and from his despatches learned that -the Cavalry of Canrobert’s Corps had been left behind at Chalons, that -Paris was being placed in a state of defence, that all men between 25 -and 35 had been called under arms, and that a 12th and 13th Corps were -to be formed. Another patrol was able to ascertain that at least part -of De Failly’s troops had retreated by Charmes, and that other hostile -bodies had gone by Vaudemont and Neufchateau; they were hurrying to -the railway station at the latter place and at Chaumont. At Ménil sur -Saulx, on the 18th, the indefatigable horsemen seized many letters, and -a telegram from M. Chevreau, Minister of the Interior, stating that the -Emperor had reached Chalons on the 17th—he really arrived there on the -evening of the 16th, having driven from Gravelotte in the morning—and -that “considerable forces” were being collected in the famous camp -on the dusty and windy plains of Champagne. Thus, day after day, the -mounted parties preceded the infantry, spreading far and wide on all -sides, so that as early as the 19th some Hussars actually rode within -sight of French infantry retreating from St. Dizier, and on the 21st -captured men belonging to the 5th Corps near Vitry. The next day the -2nd Cavalry Division rode out from four-and-twenty to six-and-thirty -miles, entering, among other places, Chaumont, where, from the station -books, they learned that De Failly’s infantry had gone on, three days -only before, in twenty trains, while Brahaut’s Cavalry followed the -road. On the 23rd the 4th Division of Cavalry had passed St. Dizier and -ridden into the villages to the east of Chalons itself. Thence Dragoons -were sent forward and these picked up information to the effect that -the French Army had quitted the great camp. Reports to this effect -had already reached head-quarters, and had moved Von Moltke to tell -General von Blumenthal, the Crown Prince’s chief of the staff, that -it would be most desirable to have prompt information showing whither -the enemy had gone. The 4th Cavalry Division, which, on the 24th, was -at Chalons camp, now abandoned, burnt, and desolate, pushed a party -towards Reims, and there found that the French Army had departed in -an easterly direction. Before this vital information arrived at the -great head-quarters the King and Von Moltke had determined that the two -Armies should, at least for the time, still move westward on the lines -appointed; and on the evening of the 25th, therefore, they occupied the -positions already described. But at this moment the Army of MacMahon -stood halted at Rhetel, Attigny, and Vouziers, within two marches of -the Meuse, between Stenay and Sedan! - -In order to learn why they were there we must turn to the camp at -Chalons, which had been the scene of dramatic events, fluctuating -councils, and fatal decisions, the fitting forerunners of an -unparalleled disaster. - - - _The Emperor at Chalons and Reims._ - -Immediately after the first defeats befell the French Armies on the -frontier, General Montauban, Comte de Palikao, summoned by the Empress, -found himself abruptly made the head of a Government. He took, of -course, the post of Minister of War. The Empress had been Regent from -the day when the Emperor quitted Paris, and she exercised, or appeared -to do so, a great influence on the course of events. The first act of -the new Minister was to collect the materials out of which might be -formed a fresh Army, a task in the execution of which he displayed -considerable energy. The rapid march of the invader had intercepted, as -we have related, one infantry division of Canrobert’s Corps, all his -cavalry “except a squadron,” as he pathetically exclaimed, and more -than half of his artillery. These remained in the camp of Chalons, -and the Army formed was composed of these men, the 12th Corps, one -division of which consisted of Marine Infantry; then the 1st and 5th -Corps, which had come at racing speed from Alsace; and finally of the -7th from Belfort, which reached Chalons by way of Paris. There were -in addition two regiments of Chasseurs d’Afrique, and subsequently a -third—Margueritte’s gallant brigade. General Lebrun estimates that the -aggregates, including non-combatants, amounted to about 130,000 men. -It will be duly noted that this Army came almost from the four winds, -driven thither by the terrible pressure of defeat, and that many of the -new troops were recruits, without discipline or training. They were -collected together on an open plain, and had barely assembled before -the vivacious German cavalry were reported to be and, though in small -force, were close at hand. When the Emperor arrived on the night of the -16th, by far the greater part of the troops were still distant; some -speeding on their way from Chaumont and Joinville, others travelling -from Belfort, and some from Cherbourg and Paris. They dropped into -the camp in succession after the 17th, and we may note that the 7th -Corps never entered Chalons at all, but was sent on to Reims, which it -reached on the 21st. Out of this assembly of soldiers Marshal MacMahon -had to organize an Army. Moreover, the intendants, charged with the -duty of supplying the troops, had only just come up. To increase the -confusion many thousand Mobiles, who had been at an early date sent -thither from Paris, behaved so badly—some reports of their ape-like -tricks are almost incredible—that they were speedily returned to the -capital, although the Emperor and Marshal Canrobert, who had commanded -them, would have preferred, the former for political reasons, that they -should be distributed in the northern garrison towns. Nothing more -need be said of the Army of Chalons except that, although it contained -some admirable troops, none finer than the Marines, whose only fault -was that they could not march, yet that it was unfit to engage in any -adventure whatever, especially one so perilous and toilsome as that -into which it was soon plunged. - -Weary, perturbed, broken in health and spirits, yet outwardly serene, -Napoleon III. slept on the night of the 16th in the pavilion of the -camp, which he had often visited when it was orderly and brilliant, -which he now revisited as a fugitive, passing silently, almost -furtively, through its disorder and gloom. With him was Prince Jerome -Napoleon, who saw the fortunes of his house, like Balzac’s _peau -de chagrin_, shrinking visibly day by day, and whose fertile mind -was alive with expedients to avert the fatal hour. He resented the -bigotry of the Empress, who would not surrender Rome as a bribe to the -Italian Court; he was pondering over and, indeed, openly suggesting -the abdication of the Emperor. Sleeping also in that pavilion was the -youth, Louis, who is barely mentioned in the French accounts after the -2nd of August; whose public life began in the tumult of a national -catastrophe and ended so tragically among the savage Zulus. - -Daylight brought no respite to the Emperor. He saw around him silent -and unsympathetic throngs of soldiers bearing the marks of defeat and -rout, and it is said that he was even jeered by the Parisian Mobiles, -who had previously shouted in the ears of the astonished Canrobert, “À -Paris! À Paris!” instead of “À Berlin!” - -Then came from the capital General Trochu, who had been appointed to -command the newly-formed 12th Corps, and was destined, in case of -accident, to succeed MacMahon. In conversing with the Emperor the -General developed a plan of action, which astonished yet did not -altogether displease his Majesty. Succinctly stated it was this: That -the Emperor and the Army should return to Paris, and that General -Trochu should be named Governor of the capital. The Emperor, as usual, -listened, doubted, demurred, yet did not refuse to contemplate a scheme -which promised to place him, once more, at the head of affairs, but he -gave no decision. Marshal MacMahon was summoned; he was to command the -Army which, according to the plan, was to be organized near Paris; and -when consulted he spoke favourably of Trochu as a man and a soldier, -and readily accepted the command of the Army. Prince Napoleon, so -soon to set out for Florence, if he did not suggest, supported the -nomination of Trochu, on the ground that a revolution might break out -at any moment in Paris, and that the General was the man to put it -down. It was during the prolonged debate on these perplexing questions -that some one said—“the Emperor neither commands the Army nor governs -the State;” whether the words dropped from the lips of Napoleon III. -or his cousin, Marshal MacMahon, who was present, could not remember; -but whoever uttered them they were true. There was a subsidiary and -much-disputed question—what should be done with the noisy Mobiles, -who so eagerly desired to re-enter Paris? In the end it was agreed -that, although the Emperor, for political, and MacMahon, for military -reasons, desired to give them a taste of much needed discipline in -the northern fortresses, these obstreperous battalions should be -sent to the capital. Thus it came about that Marshal MacMahon took -command of the Army and that Trochu became Governor of Paris. The new -Governor, with his letter of nomination in his pocket, set out on his -return journey; but while he went slowly by rail, M. Pietri, using the -telegraph, informed the Empress of what had been done, and alarmed her -and the Minister of War by reporting the intelligence that the Emperor -and the Army were to move on the capital. Thereupon, two hours before -the luckless Trochu set foot in Paris, Palikao had sent a remonstrance -by telegram, dated 10.27 p.m. on the 17th. “The Empress,” he said, “has -communicated to me the letter in which the Emperor announces that he -wishes to move the Army from Chalons to Paris—I implore the Emperor -to give up this idea, which will look like a desertion of the Army -of Metz.” If there was a “letter” Napoleon must have written it on -the 16th, during his journey, which is not likely; but the document -referred to was, no doubt, Pietri’s telegram to the Empress. Some -answer must have been sent from the pavilion at Chalons, after Trochu -departed, for when he saw M. Chevreau, at midnight, the Minister said -promptly—“The Emperor will not return”; and when the General exhibited -his proclamation to the Empress, beginning with “Preceded by the -Emperor,” she instantly exclaimed, “You cannot state that, because it -is not a fact; the Emperor will not come.” Thus the Trochu plan was -frustrated; yet the remarkable thing is that the Emperor had not made -up his shifting mind; for on the 18th, as Marshal MacMahon affirms, -Napoleon intimated his intention to start the next day. Still we find a -telegram from him to Palikao, dated the “18th, 9 h. 4 m.,” presumably -in the morning, in which he says, “I give in to your opinion,” so -that his resolutions fluctuated from hour to hour. A most singular -historical figure, at this juncture, is the once-potent Napoleon III. -Virtually exiled from his capital, and not permitted, if he wished, to -command his troops, he was condemned to “assist,” as the French say, at -the capture of armies, the downfall of his dynasty, and the wreck of a -nation. - -These lugubrious debates, held almost within sight of the battlefield -of Valmy, went on from day to day. “What should be done with the Army?” -was the question which trod on the heels of “What shall be done with -the Emperor?” or rather both were discussed together. On the 18th -came a despatch from Bazaine, stating that the Marshal had fought a -battle two days before, that he had “held his positions,” yet that -he was obliged to fall back nearer to Metz in order that he might -replenish his supplies for men and guns. This message had crossed one -from MacMahon announcing his appointment, conveying the important -information that he was still under the orders of Bazaine, and asking -for instructions. The answer came the next evening, and it expressly -declared that, being too remote from Chalons, Bazaine left the Marshal -free to act as he thought fit. That telegram, it was the last which -came direct by wire from Metz, raised the great military question. -Palikao had already begun to insist that Metz should be relieved. The -Marshal admits that he was undecided for the moment; for if he started -for the Meuse Paris would be uncovered, and the sole remaining French -Army put in great peril; whereas, if he did not march eastward and -Bazaine did march west, then the latter might be lost. In his anguish -of mind, not knowing that the wire had been cut, he appealed, by -telegram, to Bazaine for his opinion. At the same time, on the 20th, -he forwarded a message to Palikao, which stated the case most clearly. -His information, and it was in substance correct, led him to believe -that the roads through Briey, Verdun, and St. Mihiel were intercepted -by the Germans; and he added that his intention was to halt until -he learned whether Bazaine had moved by the north or the south—the -idea that he might be shut up closely in Metz had not then matured in -MacMahon’s mind. In the meantime he saw plainly the dangers to which -he was exposed by remaining on the plain of Chalons; and, therefore, -on the 21st moved the whole Army to Reims, a long march, which tried -the inexperienced troops, and filled the country roads with hundreds of -stragglers. - - - _MacMahon Retires to Reims._ - -That very morning M. Rouher, inspired by a desire to talk with his old -master, arrived at Chalons, and proceeded with the soldiers to their -new destination. In the evening, at the Imperial quarters, MacMahon -was summoned to consider afresh the oft-debated questions of the hour. -M. Rouher explained to the Marshal his views, which were, in reality, -those of Palikao, for the President of the Senate was oppressed -with the feeling that Bazaine must be relieved. But at this moment -MacMahon was firmly resolved to march on Paris, and, possessing exact -information, he stated his case, on the occasion, with great force and -clearness. He was bound to assume, he said, that Bazaine was surrounded -in Metz by 200,000 men; that in front of Metz, towards Verdun, stood -the Saxon Crown Prince with 80,000 men; that the Prussian Crown Prince -was near Vitry at the head of 150,000 men; and consequently that if he -risked a march eastward into the midst of these armies, “I should,” he -continued, “find myself in a most difficult position, and experience -a disaster which I desire to avoid.” A most just estimate, formed on -reports which were defective upon one point only—the Prussian Crown -Prince was still about Ligny, but his cavalry, as will be remembered, -had looked in upon Vitry. Moreover, the Marshal adhered to his opinion -that the Army of Chalons should be preserved, because it would furnish -the groundwork for an organized force 300,000 strong. M. Rouher, who -acquiesced, then suggested that the Emperor should issue a proclamation -explaining the reasons why the Army of Chalons moved on Paris; which, -being done, Rouher went his way, and MacMahon drew up the order of -march towards the capital. - - - _The Chalons Army directed on the Meuse._ - -The morning of the 22nd was spent in preparation, but, before the final -orders were issued, the Emperor received the fatal despatch, dated Ban -Saint Martin [Metz], August 19, which Marshal Bazaine had been able -to send through the German lines. After a brief description of the -battle of Gravelotte, which ended, he said, in a change of front by -the 6th and 4th Corps, the right thrown back, to ward off a turning -movement, and reporting that he had drawn in the whole Army upon a -curved line, from Longeville to Sansonnet, behind the forts, he stated -that the troops were wearied by incessant combats, and needed rest for -two or three days “The King of Prussia, with M. de Moltke,” he went -on “were this morning at Rezonville, and everything goes to show that -the Prussian Army is about to feel up to (va tâter) the fortress of -Metz. I count always upon taking a northern direction, and turning, -by Montmédy, into the road from Sainte-Menehould to Chalons, if it is -not too strongly occupied. In the contrary case, I shall continue upon -Sedan, and even upon Mézières, to reach Chalons.” The Emperor sent this -despatch to MacMahon, who inferred from it that Bazaine was about to -start, and that, after crossing the Meuse at Stenay, he should find him -in the neighbourhood of Montmédy. He, therefore, withheld the orders -directing the Army on Paris, and issued those which turned its face -to the East. Further, he transmitted a telegram addressed to Bazaine, -stating that, in two days, his Army would be on the Aisne, whence, in -order to bring succour, he would operate according to circumstances. -Soon afterwards a despatch arrived from Palikao, saying that the -“gravest consequences” would follow in Paris were no attempt made to -help Bazaine; but the Marshal had already taken his decision, though -with a dubious mind, because he knew better than the Comte de Palikao, -who was extremely ill-informed, what dangers would beset his path, and -how slight was the chance that the Army inclosed in Metz would be able -to burst through the investing lines. The Emperor remained in a passive -condition; he did not approve, he did not oppose; but he shared, as a -sort of interested spectator, in a venture determined by the operation -of political motives, and devoid of a sound military basis. - -For the moment, at least, Marshal MacMahon remained steadfast to his -latest resolution; and on the 23rd the French Army moved out from its -camp near Reims. It was not directed on the Verdun road, because the -Commander-in-chief was well aware that if he was to gain Stenay, that -goal could only be attained by evading the Saxon Prince’s Army, which -would necessitate a flank march on routes farther north. The first -day’s journey was short, for the Army halted on the river Suippe, -facing north-east, with a cavalry division in front towards Grand Pré. -At this early stage provisions were so scarce that Ducrot, commanding -the 1st Corps, and Lebrun, who had the 12th, complained to the Marshal, -who advised them to do as he did when retreating from Reichshofen—live -upon the inhabitants. Yet the stress was severe, the country incapable -of furnishing sufficient supplies, and MacMahon, yielding to the -pressure, believed that the better course would be to follow the -railway. He, therefore, moved next day to Rhetel with the 12th and -5th, while the 1st halted at Juniville, and the 7th near Vouziers, -Margueritte’s flanking cavalry remaining hard by on the left bank of -the Aisne. A short march on the 25th brought all the Corps astride the -river, between Rhetel and Vouziers, with cavalry outposts at Le Chesne -and Grand Pré. The movement had begun badly; but before following -this Army farther on its devious path, we must return to the German -head-quarters at Bar le Duc, where, at length, it had become known that -the French were not retreating on Paris, but were advancing towards the -Meuse! - - - - - CHAPTER XI. - - THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. - - -It has long been a well-authenticated fact that MacMahon’s march -eastward from Reims took the German head-quarter staff by surprise. The -reason was that they could not believe in the probability of a movement -which, from their point of view, had no defence on military grounds. -So that Marshal MacMahon with a fair, and General von Moltke with full -knowledge of the facts, really arrived at identical conclusions when -they surveyed the situation with what we may call cold scientific eyes. -The influences which governed the Marshal’s decision could not be known -at Bar le Duc on the 25th of August; but it was none the less apparent -to the cautious Von Moltke that his adversary had committed a great -error. The German was surprised, he was even somewhat embarrassed, but -he never lost his presence of mind, and he was not unprepared. - -Indeed, the subject had been discussed already by himself and his -colleagues. As early as the 23rd, Prince Frederick Charles intercepted -a letter from an officer of high rank belonging to the Metz Army. -The writer expressed a confident hope that succour would soon arrive -from Chalons. Thereupon the Saxon Prince was directed to keep a sharp -look-out towards Reims, and break the railway between Thionville -and Longuyon in more places than one. The next day, at Ligny, the -Great Staff met and conferred with the Crown Prince. It was then -that Quartermaster-General von Podbielski was the first to suggest -that if a march from Reims towards Bazaine was barely admissible on -military grounds, it might be explained by political considerations, -and consequently, the General thought, the German Armies should close -to their right. The reason was not deemed sufficient, and the Armies -went on as pre-arranged. Not until eleven in the evening of the 24th -did the wary Von Moltke consider that he had accumulated information -sufficient to justify a tentative change of plans. He learned from -his own cavalry patrols that Chalons had been deserted; from a Paris -newspaper, captured on the 24th, that MacMahon was at Reims with -150,000 men; and finally he got a telegram, dated Paris, the 23rd, and -received at Bar le Duc viâ London. “The Army of MacMahon,” it said, “is -concentrated at Reims. With it are the Emperor Napoleon and the Prince. -MacMahon seeks to effect a junction with Bazaine.” Still Von Moltke -doubted. The straight line to Metz was barred, would the enemy venture -to face the risks involved in a circuitous march close to the Belgian -frontier? If he did the German Armies must plunge into the Argonne; -but at present the General decided that enough would be done were the -Army turned to the north-west, and were a keen watch kept upon its -own right by sending the cavalry, if possible, as far as Vouziers and -Buzancy. Such were the morning orders. Here it may be noted that Von -Moltke spent the afternoon in framing a plan, solely for himself, based -on the shrewd assumption that MacMahon might have quitted Reims on the -23rd, and might be over the Aisne already. If he moved on continuously -he could not be caught on the left bank of the Meuse. Therefore Von -Moltke drew out tables of marches which, had they all been performed, -as they easily might have been, would have concentrated, in full time, -150,000 men at Damvillers, east of the Meuse, and within easy reach of -the Army blockading Metz. Two corps, from that force, were also called -on to co-operate. They did move out as far as Etain and Briey, but -not being wanted they soon returned to their cantonments on the Orne -and the Yron. Thus the plan was not carried out, but it was prepared, -indeed, served as a basis, during the next two days, and was ready for -execution; and it reveals, once more, the astonishing foresight and -solid ingenuity which watched with sleepless eyes over the conduct of -the German Armies. - -After he had finished the scheme by means of which he intended to -thwart MacMahon, in any case, fresh intelligence arrived—newspaper -articles and speeches in the Chamber which declared that the French -people would be covered with shame were the Army of the Rhine not -relieved; and above all a telegram from London, based on a paragraph in -“Le Temps,” of August 23rd, stating that MacMahon, although by such a -movement he would uncover the road to Paris, had suddenly determined to -help Bazaine, and that he had already quitted Reims, but that the news -from Montmédy did not mention the arrival of French troops, meaning -troops from Metz, in that region. Von Moltke was not deeply impressed -by the articles and speeches, although he begun to give some weight to -Podbielski’s shrewd remark; but the positive statement in the telegram -did move him, and he and the Quartermaster-General hastened to lay -the matter before the King. The result was that those definite orders -were issued which produced the great right wheel and sent the whole -force towards the north. Nevertheless, the strategist still insists -that, on the evening of the 25th, he had no information which gave sure -indications of the enemy’s whereabouts. - - - _The Cavalry Discover the Enemy._ - -These were soon forthcoming. The cavalry, set in motion at dawn, over -a wide space and far in advance of the new direction, were not long -in regaining touch of MacMahon’s Army. For the horsemen rode out -quickly, and speedily searched the country side from Dun on the Meuse -to the heart of the camp at Chalons, accumulating in their excursions -information almost sufficient to convince the circumspect Von Moltke. -This sudden display of activity and daring is a splendid spectacle. -The wind howled through the woods and swept the bare tracks, and heavy -storms of rain deluged the country from Bar le Duc to Rhetel, but the -swift march of these superb reiters was neither stayed by the blast, -the dripping woods, nor the saturated cross-roads. No hardships, no -obstacles slackened their speed, and large were the fruits of their -energy, endurance, and astuteness. Here we may observe, and it is a -remarkable fact, that hitherto the Saxon leader’s cavalry had been -directed only towards the west. The horsemen of the Third Army had -ridden within sight of Reims and on the south, or left flank, had -approached closely to the Aube. Those attached to the Saxon Prince’s -command had felt out to their immediate front and towards the Prussian -Crown Prince’s left, but had not examined the districts to their right -front. A cavalry regiment had made a tiring forced march towards -Stenay, but not a trooper was directed on Grand Pré, or on Varennes, -until the 25th. Yet there were French horse on Grand Pré on the 24th, -and it is evident that had only one division been despatched towards -and through Varennes immediately after the Saxon Prince’s troops had -crossed the Meuse, above and below Verdun, the presence of MacMahon’s -Army on the Aisne must have been discovered, and the report handed in -at head-quarters on the morning, or at latest the afternoon, of the -25th. That would have been done had General von Schlotheim, the chief -of the staff with the Meuse Army, been as careful to reconnoitre the -country on his right as Von Blumenthal was to send out horsemen to the -flank as well as the front of the westward moving host. It was not -done, and the error of judgment involved the loss of four-and-twenty -hours. - -The error was promptly and amply repaired. While each corps in the -mighty Army, having wheeled to the right, was tramping north in the -driving rain through the muddy forest roads to gain the distant -bivouacs assigned them, the cavalry divisions had come up with, -watched, touched, astonished, and bewildered the French, making the -26th of August a memorable day in their camps. - -Near the Meuse the ubiquitous patrols discovered troops at Buzancy; -upon the central road which runs beside the Aire, the foremost squadron -saw infantry and cavalry in Grand Pré; upon the Aisne, two adventurous -parties pressing up close to the flank and rear of Vouziers, were able -to observe and report the presence of large bodies of all arms encamped -to the east of the town, and to specify the positions which they held. -No attempt was made to attack, and there was no firing except a sputter -of carbine-shots discharged by a French at a German patrol which had -approached the left bank of the Aire near Grand Pré. The whole line of -horsemen, from the Meuse to the Aisne, was in constant communication, -and their scouting parties, eager to see and not be seen, found their -designs favoured by the abounding woods and the undulations of the -land. Thus, in one day, a thick fringe of lynx-eyed cavalry was thrust -in close proximity to the adversary many miles in front of the German -Corps, plodding their arduous way along the plashy tracks and by-ways -of the Argonne. - - - _Movements of the French._ - -No such bold and prudent use was made of the French cavalry by Marshal -MacMahon, whom we left with his Army still lingering near the Aisne. -The misgivings which oppressed him at Reims did not diminish during -his halt at Rhetel; and they deepened as he moved towards the Meuse. -But no doubts, based on the absence of intelligence from or concerning -Bazaine and the difficulty of supplying the Army, will account for the -misuse which he made of his cavalry. The danger he had to dread lurked -in the region to the south, yet after the 24th the duty of covering the -exposed right flank and of gleaning exact information was imposed upon -the brigade attached to the 7th Corps. For Margueritte’s division of -Chasseurs d’Afrique was, on the 25th, suddenly drawn from the right and -sent forward to Le Chesne in front of the centre pointing towards Sedan -or Stenay; while Bonnemain’s division of heavy cavalry moved slowly -close in rear of the 1st Corps, where it was useless. The incidents -of the memorable 26th, when even minutes were priceless, quickly -demonstrated the gravity of the error. On that day, at the close of a -brief march, the 12th Corps stood at Tourteron, the 5th at Le Chesne, -the 1st at Semuy, and the 7th a little east of Vouziers. Margueritte -moved on to Oches, and Bonnemain’s was at Attigny, on the left bank of -the Aisne. - -Now Douay, who commanded the 7th Corps, had become anxious, for he was -on the outward flank. He sought some security by sending a brigade, -under General Bordas, to Buzancy and Grand Pré, and his strongest -regiment of Hussars to scout along the two rivers which unite at -Senuc. The Hussar patrols came in contact with the German, and it was -one of them which emptied its carbines at the hostile and inquisitive -dragoons of the 5th Cavalry Division. Retiring hastily on Grand Pré -the French Hussars handed in reports which so impressed General Bordas -that he at once contemplated a retreat on Buzancy, and forwarded the -alarming message to his Corps Commander. General Douay instantly -inferred that the dreaded German Army was not distant, and, ordering -Bordas to retreat on Vouziers, he sent the baggage and provisions to -the rear, and drew up his divisions in line of battle, at the junction -of the roads from Grand Pré and Buzancy. Just before sunset a horseman -rode up with a message that, after all, Bordas had not retired from -the village which he occupied, though he believed the road to Vouziers -was intercepted, and that the enemy might be upon him at any moment. -The remedy applied was to send forth General Dumont with a brigade -to bring him in. While Dumont marched in the darkness Douay and his -staff passed the night at a bivouac fire listening eagerly to every -sound, and starting up when the step of a wayfarer or the clink of -a horseshoe fell on their ears. About three in the morning of the -27th Dumont brought in Bordas and his brigade, together with a few -Germans who, pressing too far forward at eventide, had been captured. -Nor did the effect produced by the enterprising German cavalry end -here. General Douay had sent in to MacMahon a report of the exciting -incidents; and with the morning light came the information that the -Marshal had directed the whole Army to draw near and support the 7th -Corps. So it fell out that the mere appearance of the German cavalry -had arrested the French. But at the same time their leaders were also -told by fugitive country folk—nothing definite could be extracted from -the prisoners taken at Grand Pré—that the Prussian Crown Prince was -at Sainte-Menehould, and that another army—whence derived, in what -strength, or by whom commanded they could not imagine—was advancing -from Varennes. - - - _The Marshal Resolves, Hesitates, and Yields._ - -We now touch on the moment when the decision was adopted which impelled -the French Army on its final marches towards defeat and captivity; -a decision mainly due to the extreme pressure exerted by the Comte -de Palikao and the Regency. Marshal MacMahon had transferred his -head-quarters to Le Chesne-Populeux, a village on the canal which -connects the Aisne and the Meuse. The 12th Corps was there, with the -5th in its front at Brieulles sur Bar; the 7th, as before, at Vouziers, -and the 1st in its rear at Yoncq; Margueritte’s horse at Beaumont, and -Bonnemain’s still about Attigny. The information placed before the -Marshal by the inhabitants and his own officers seemed to justify those -apprehensions which he had so strongly expressed at Reims, and he began -to feel again that he was marching towards that “disaster which he -wished to avoid.” In the midst of a prolonged survey of the position, -he was summoned by the Emperor who, having received some authentic -information, declared that the Prussian Crown Prince had turned from -the road to Paris and was then advancing northwards. With Napoleon III. -MacMahon remained for a long time, and came back to his head-quarters -resolved to retreat upon Mézières. Indeed, he issued orders on the -spot, directing all the Corps to retire behind the canal the next day, -and take post at Chagny, Vendresse, and Poix. Then, at half-past eight -in the evening of the 27th, he dictated to Colonel Stoffel a telegram -designed for the Minister, in which he said that there was one -hostile Army on the right bank of the Meuse and another marching upon -the Ardennes. “I have no news of Bazaine,” he went on. “If I advance -to meet him I shall be attacked in front by a part of the First and -Second German Armies, which, favoured by the woods, can conceal a force -superior to mine, and at the same time attacked by the Prussian Crown -Prince cutting off my line of retreat. I approach Mézières to-morrow, -whence I shall continue my retreat, guided by events, towards the -west.” Colonel Stoffel relates that, just as he was about to carry the -telegram to Colonel d’Abzac, with orders to forward it at once, General -Faure, chief of the staff, came in; and MacMahon, seizing the telegram, -said, “Here is a despatch which I have written to the Minister.” -Faure read, and begged the Marshal not to send it, for, said he, “You -will get an answer from Paris, which, perhaps, will prevent you from -carrying out your new plans. You can transmit it to-morrow, when we are -already on the road to Mézières.” The Marshal answered, “Send it,” and -it was sent. - -The reply, so shrewdly foreseen by General Faure, was handed to the -Marshal about half-past one on the morning of the 28th. It was dated, -“Paris, August 27, 11 p.m.,” addressed to “the Emperor,” and began -with these tell-tale words, “If you abandon Bazaine,” wrote the Comte -de Palikao, “‘la revolution est dans Paris,’ or Paris will revolt, and -you will be attacked yourself by all the enemy’s forces.” He asserted -that Paris could defend herself, that the Army must reach Bazaine; that -the Prussian Crown Prince, aware of the danger to which his Army and -that which blockaded Metz, was exposed by MacMahon’s turning movement, -had changed front to the north. “You are at least six-and-thirty, -perhaps eight-and-forty, hours in advance of him,” the Minister -continued. “You have before you only a part of the forces blockading -Metz, which, seeing you retire from Chalons to Reims, stretched out -towards the Argonne. Your movement on Reims deceived them. Everybody -here feels the necessity of extricating Bazaine, and the anxiety with -which your course is followed is extreme.” The Marshal’s will broke -down under this strain. He could not bear the thought that men might -in future point to him as one who deserted a brother Marshal. Against -his better judgment he revoked the orders already issued, enjoining a -retreat upon Mézières, and put all his Corps in motion for the banks -of the Meuse. To complete the narrative of this decisive event, it -may here be said that, on the 28th, at Stonne, as the Marshal himself -has admitted, the Emperor made a last desperate appeal against the -change of plan. Another despatch from Palikao, dated half-past one in -the morning of the 28th, this time addressed to the Marshal, had come -to hand at Stonne. “In the name of the Council of Ministers and the -Privy Council,” it said, “I request you [‘je vous demande’] to succour -Bazaine—profiting by the thirty hours’ advance which you have over the -Crown Prince of Prussia. I direct Vinoy’s Corps on Reims.” - -It is probable that the purport, or a copy of this telegram, was sent -to the Emperor, for he twice, through his own officers, reminded -the Marshal that the despatches of a Minister were not orders, and -that he was free to act as he thought expedient, and implored him to -reflect maturely before he gave up his intention to retreat. So much -must be said for Napoleon III.—that, at Metz, on the morrow of Woerth -and Spicheren, and at Stonne, when the toils were fast closing round -him, his military judgment was prompt and correct. But the Marshal -had decided; and the prayers of an Emperor did not avail against the -gloomy forecasts, the impassioned language, and the formal request or -demand of a Minister of War whose telegrams exhibit the depth of his -ignorance concerning the actual situation. It is not surprising that -he was ill-informed, seeing how difficult it was for officers on the -spot, German as well as French, to obtain exact knowledge; but it is -amazing that an experienced soldier and Minister of War should not be -aware of his own incompetence to direct, from his closet in Paris, an -army in the field. Palikao combined the qualities of the Dutch Deputy -with those of the Aulic Councillor; and the troops of Marshal MacMahon -tramped on to meet their approaching ruin. The positions they attained -on the 28th will be more conveniently specified later on; for it is -time to follow, once more, the footsteps of the hardy and far-marching -Germans, who were now across the direct path of MacMahon’s Army. - - - _Movements of the Germans._ - -How, by long and laborious marches, the tough foot soldiers, almost -treading on the heels of their mounted comrades, gained ground on the -adversary must now be succinctly narrated. On the 26th, the 12th Corps -reached Varennes, and the Saxon Prince established his head-quarters -at Clermont in Argonne. The Guard went on to Dombasle, and the 4th -Corps to a point beyond Fleury. Such were the marches of the Army of -the Meuse. In the Third Army, the Bavarians made a wet and weary night -march in the wake of the 4th Corps, attaining Triaucourt and Erize la -Petite; but for the moment, the 5th, the 6th, and the Würtembergers -stood fast. The reason for this apparent hesitation was that Von Moltke -was not yet quite convinced. King William remained at Bar le Duc all -the forenoon. Thither came the Crown Prince and General von Blumenthal -from Ligny, and, at a council held in the great head-quarters, both -of them declared unequivocally in favour of the northern march, -urging that it would be wiser to delay the movement on Paris than run -the risks of a battle in the north unless it could be fought by all -the forces which could be got together. These opinions prevailed, -and it was decided that the Bavarians should start at once, and that -the next day the other Corps of the Third Army should proceed to -Sainte-Menehould and Vavray. General von Blumenthal, indeed, had formed -a strong judgment on the situation. A few hours after the consultation -at head-quarters, writes Dr. William Russell in his “Diary,” “taking me -into a room in which was a table covered with a large map on a scale -of an inch to a mile, he (Blumenthal) said, ‘These French are lost, -you see. We know they are there, and there, and there—and Mahon’s -whole Army. _Where_ can they go to? Poor foolish fellows! They must go -to Belgium, or fight _there_ and be lost;’ and he put his finger on -the map between Mézières and Carignan.” It is a remarkable fact that -General Longstreet judging only from the telegrams which reached the -United States about this time, arrived at the same conclusion. - -King William, during the afternoon, journeyed to Clermont; while -the Crown Prince drove to Revigny les Vaches, which he made his -head-quarters until the 28th. Before losing sight of Bar le Duc, we -may quote from Dr. Russell’s pages one other sentence, which affords -a brief glimpse of the great political leader in this war. In the -forenoon on the 26th, the graphic Diarist “saw Count Bismarck standing -in a doorway out of the rain whiffing a prodigious cigar, seemingly -intent on watching the bubbles which passed along the watercourse by -the side of the street;” but probably with his thoughts far away from -the evanescent symbols of men’s lives. He had entered the town with -the King on the 24th, and feared that the royal staff would linger -there for several days, “as in Capua;” yet, in a few hours, this -playful censor of delay was speeding North, like the Armies, to play a -conspicuous part in a sublime tragedy at Sedan. - -In his quarters at Clermont, General von Moltke still disposed of the -Meuse Army and the Bavarians in a manner which would enable him to -effect, if necessary, that concentration at Damvillers which we saw -him meditating and devising on the afternoon of the 25th, at Bar le -Duc. Thus, on the 27th, the Guard, which came up to Monfaucon, and the -4th Corps to Germonville, were each directed to throw bridges over the -Meuse, so that there should be four points of passage in case of need. -The Bavarians followed from the rear as far as Dombasle and Nixéville, -and the other Corps of the Third Army turned frankly northward, the -5th pushing its advance-guard to Sainte-Menehould. At the same time -the Saxon Corps had crossed the Meuse at Dun and established a brigade -firmly in Stenay. The cavalry had been as active and as useful as -ever. They had covered the march of the Saxon Corps by occupying Grand -Pré, Nouart, and Buzancy, coming into contact with the French at the -last-named village. General de Failly, who, early in the morning, had -moved to Bar, observed hostile cavaliers beyond the stream, and sent -Brahaut’s brigade to drive them off and seize prisoners. That brought -on a smart skirmish, during which De Failly received orders to retreat -on Brieulles; but Brahaut was driven from Buzancy by the fire of a -horse battery; and the unlucky French General made no prisoners. There -was no other rencontre during the day, but the German cavalry on all -sides rode up close to the enemy’s posts and kept the leaders well -informed. From the reports sent in, Von Moltke inferred that there -had been a pause in the French movements; at all events, that none of -their troops had crossed the Meuse; and, as he knew that the Saxons -were in Dun and Stenay, he thought himself, at length, justified in -believing it possible that he might strike MacMahon on the left bank. -Consequently, he abandoned the Damvillers plan, and sent back to -Metz the two Corps which had been detached from the blockading army. -Therefore, while the Saxons stood fast, for one day, the Bavarians were -directed to march, on the 28th, upon Varennes and Vienne le Chateau; -the Guard upon Banthéville; and the 4th Corps on Montfaucon—the general -direction for all the Corps being Vouziers, Buzancy, and Beaumont. -During that day these orders were fulfilled, each Corps duly attaining -its specified destination; the Guard and 4th Corps, before they -started, taking up the bridges thrown over the Meuse. Four divisions -of cavalry were out prying, through the mist, into every movement of -the 5th and 7th French Corps, whose left flank, it was ascertained, -was absolutely unguarded, so that the German horse looked on, and, in -some cases, were misled by the astonishing confusion displayed by the -enemy’s vacillating motions. - - - _Effects of MacMahon’s Counter-Orders._ - -The fatal decision adopted at Le Chesne on the night of the 27th -brought disorder and disaster upon the French Army. The wise resolve -to retreat on Mézières, strangely as the statement may sound, had -rekindled the fading spirits of the French soldiers. As soon as the -fact was communicated to them they sprung with alacrity to perform -the task of preparation. The officer who bore the order to the 7th -Corps started from Le Chesne at six o’clock, and by nine at night the -baggage, the provision transport, the engineers’ park, were actually in -motion for Chagny, through the long defile which leads to Le Chesne. -The cavalry were despatched to watch the flanks, and the infantry in -silence and darkness glided towards their first halting place, Quatre -Champs. “Everyman,” says Prince Bibesco, who was an eye-witness, -“marched with a firm step. All seemed to have forgotten the cold, the -rain, and the anxiety of the preceding days.” They drank in hope with -the refreshing air, and then their hopes were suddenly extinguished; -for as they were near Quatre Champs, at half-past five in the morning, -an aide-de-camp from MacMahon rode up to General Douay and told him the -latest decision—the Army was to move upon the Meuse. - -The orders brought by the ill-omened messenger were that the 7th -Corps, that very day, should move to Nouart, which it was not destined -to reach; the 5th Beauclair, which it could not attain; that the -12th should gain La Besace, and the 1st Le Chesne, both of which -marches were duly performed. Bonnemains’ heavy brigade of horse was -sent to Les Grands Armoises, and Margueritte’s towards Mouzon, but -afterwards to Sommauthe. The 7th Corps, fearing greatly for its -baggage train, already far away, set out again and only reached -Boult-aux-Bois, the men on short rations, the horses without a feed -of oats. The same troubles beset the other corps which had despatched -their trains northward. But the largest share of ill-fortune befell -De Failly. He was ordered to march by way of Buzancy upon Nouart and -Beauclair—indeed, to get as far forward as he could on the road to -Stenay. The Marshal knew it was occupied, for he told De Failly to -expect a sharp resistance before he could carry it. But when within -sight of Harricourt and Bar his adventures began. He discerned hostile -cavalry in his path; they were vigilant Uhlans of the Guard. De Failly -halted; the cavalry increased, became enterprising, and some shots -were exchanged; but in the end the French General, finding that he -could not rely upon the support of Douay, who was resting his wearied -men at Boult-aux-Bois, and believing that the direct road to Nouart -was commanded by the enemy, he turned aside and, through narrow muddy -lanes, made his way by Sommauthe to Belval and Bois les Dames, the -last division not arriving at the camp until eight in the evening. -Nevertheless, his appearance at and south of Bois les Dames so imposed -on the German cavalry scouts that they retired from Nouart in the -afternoon. The movements and halts of both French corps had been -observed, and when night fell the Germans at Bayonville saw the French -bivouac fires beyond Buzancy and in the direction of Stenay. At this -time there were no hostile German infantry west of the Meuse nearer -than Banthéville; for the troops on the flank of the French, from -Vouziers to Dun, were wholly horsemen. No more valuable demonstration -of the priceless value of cavalry was ever made than that afforded -by the Teutons during this campaign. They were more than the “eyes -and ears of the Army;” they were an impenetrable screen concealing -from view the force and the movements of the adversary, who was still -engaged in pushing up his troops in the hope of compelling the French -to fight a decisive battle on the 30th. That hope, entertained by Von -Moltke on the 28th, was not fulfilled, because, at the last moment, -MacMahon turned his Army from Stenay upon Mouzon. On that day the King -moved on to Varennes, and the Prince, his son, to Sainte-Menehould. - - - _German and French Operations on the 29th._ - -The position of affairs on the evening of the 28th was somewhat -perplexing, because the earlier reports sent in to head-quarters -indicated, what was the fact for a brief interval, that the French were -retiring northward. But no sooner had orders been issued to fit that -state of things than certain information came to hand which showed that -the Meuse was again their immediate objective; and it was then that, by -abstaining from provocation, Von Moltke judged it possible to move up -troops sufficient to fight with advantage on the 30th, somewhere west -of Stenay. The Saxon Prince, acting within the discretionary limits -allowed him, decided to cross the Meuse with the 12th Corps, and bring -up the Guard and 4th to Buzancy and Nouart, but to evade a battle, and -content himself with the fulfilling the task of obtaining intelligence. -The orders were issued, and, while they were in execution, one body of -cavalry tracked the 7th Corps during its painful march to Oches and -St. Pierremont, and saw the divisions settling down in their bivouacs; -and another made prize of Le Capitaine Marquis de Grouchy bearing -despatches from MacMahon to De Failly. This was an important capture, -for it not only deprived the unfortunate General of vital orders, but -it placed in the hands of Von Moltke the arrangements which the Marshal -had drawn up to guide the motions of his Corps. Out of this mishap grew -a fresh misfortune for the French. - -Marshal MacMahon, on the morning of the 28th, framed his plans on the -supposition that he would be able to pass the Meuse at Stenay, and kept -the heads of his columns pointing south-west; but learning at a later -period that the Saxons were posted at that place in force—his reports -said 15,000 men—he was again, at midnight, obliged to change his -scheme, and he resolved to pass the river at Mouzon and Remilly. He, -therefore, sent out orders directing the 12th Corps and Margueritte’s -cavalry to Mouzon, for, having no pontoon train, he was compelled -to seek permanent bridges; the 1st Corps and Bonnemains’ horse to -Raucourt; the 7th to La Besace, which, as we have seen, they did not -reach, but halted at Oches and St. Pierremont; and the 5th to Beaumont, -which place they entered after weary marches and a sharp action. These -were the orders for the day which, with other useful documents, were -found in the pockets of De Grouchy. No special interest pertains to -the march of the 1st Corps. The 12th found its way safely to Mouzon, -crossed the river, and occupied the heights on the right bank, while -General Margueritte despatched some of his Chasseurs on the Stenay -road. What then happened? The Chasseurs returned and reported that -they had seen no enemy, although at that moment Stenay was held by the -enemy’s horse and foot. “They committed,” writes General Lebrun, then -commanding the 12th Corps, “the fault which in former wars was made a -ground of reproach against the French cavalry.” When in sight of Stenay -they saw no Germans and turned back instead of pushing on to and beyond -the town, or trying to do so; and the corps commander justly regards -this laxity as a grave fault. So Lebrun, resting at Mouzon, could learn -nothing, either from spies or his famous Chasseurs, respecting an enemy -then within a few miles. The irony of the situation was complete when, -a little later, the Zieten Hussars from Stenay rode up to Margueritte’s -vedettes, and found him although he could not find them. In that -fashion the French made war in 1870. General de Failly and his 5th -Corps were more severely treated, for their ill-luck and misdirection -brought upon them - - - _The Combat at Nouart._ - -Acting on verbal instructions, given on the night of the 28th, at -Belval, by a staff officer from the head-quarters at Stonne, De -Failly set out the next morning towards Beaufort and Beauclair, two -villages a few miles south-west of Stenay. He did not know, as we do, -that the Marshal had changed his plans, and that the officer bearing -the countermanding order had fallen into the hands of a German patrol. -The French General did not break up his camp and quit Belval until ten -o’clock in the morning, which gave the Saxons, who had been brought -over the Meuse from Dun, plenty of time to watch his movements. Indeed, -he could see them, troops of all arms, on the heights of Nouart, -moving, as he judged, in an easterly direction, which was an error, -possibly arising from some turn in the road, for the whole 12th Corps -were over the Meuse between Dun and Nouart. General de Failly disposed -his troops in two columns, one of which marched towards Beaufort by -country roads; the other, with the General, consisting of Guyot de -Lespart’s division and two regiments of Brahaut’s cavalry, made for -Beauclair. Their road lay through the valley of the Wiseppe, a sluggish -stream meandering through a marshy bottom land and passing Beaufort -on its way to the Meuse. The route through Nouart was barred by the -Germans, and when the leading French squadrons, crossing the valley -to gain the main road, began to ascend the slopes, they suddenly came -under a smart fire from infantry and guns. The French Hussars flitted -fast back across the meadows, and De Failly at once stopped the march -of both columns, putting his infantry and guns in position, and resting -them principally upon two small villages. Then ensued, about noon, an -indecisive but vexatious combat, for the Germans did not intend to -attack in force, but simply harass and delay the 5th Corps; and De -Failly, uncertain respecting the numbers which might be hidden by the -woods, dared not retort, especially as he was remote from the French -Army and without support from any other corps. So, for several hours, -the fight went on. The object of the Saxons, who descended into the -valley, was simply to detain the French, and, although the assailants -traversed the brook and the high road, pushing forward a few companies -and supporting them by an artillery fire from the heights, they did not -come to close quarters. General de Failly was of opinion that he had -repelled an attack, and that the enemy did not renew it because the -French were so strongly posted; but the truth is that Prince George -of Saxony not only held back his superior force because he had been -enjoined to abstain from a serious engagement, but was himself misled -by erroneous reports respecting the state of affairs towards Stenay. -Soon after four o’clock De Failly also drew off; he had then just -received a duplicate of the order directing him upon Beaumont. He sadly -deplores the mischance, and pathetically relates how all his wearied -troops reached Beaumont “during the night,” except the rear-guard, -which did not enter the camp until five o’clock on the morning of the -30th. - - - _The State of Affairs at Sundown._ - -Thus, for the French, terminated another day of error and loss, which -left three Corps still on the left bank of the Meuse. When the sun went -down, the German horse were close to every one of them except the 12th, -which, it will be remembered, was on the right bank near Mouzon. The -active cavalry moved in the rear of the 1st Corps, seizing prisoners at -Voncq, riding up to Le Chesne, and keeping watch through the night upon -the wearied 7th Corps, as it sought repose in the camps of Oches and -St. Pierremont. The German Infantry Corps, meantime, had been closing -up for the final onslaught. The 12th Corps was in and about Nouart, -covered by outposts and patrols, which stretched away to Stenay. The -Guard was at Buzancy, the 4th Corps at Remonville; the 5th Corps was at -Grand Pré, with the Würtembergers near at hand; the Bavarians had come -up to Sommerance and its neighbourhood on both banks of the Aisne; the -11th Corps stood at Monthois on the left, while the 6th Corps was in -the rear at Vienne le Chateau. The head-quarters of King William were -set up in Grand Pré, under the old gloomy castle, the Prussian Prince -was near by at the little village of Senuc, and the Saxon Prince at -Bayonville. Thus, in three days, the whole Army had drawn together, -facing north, and was ready, at a signal, to spring forward and grapple -with the enemy who had committed himself so rashly to a flank march in -the face of the most redoubtable generals, and the best instructed, -disciplined and rapidly-marching troops in Europe. - -Examining attentively the reports which reached him from all points of -the extensive curve upon which the cavalry were so active, and poring -over the map, General von Moltke at length formed a definite judgment -on the position as it appeared to him through this medium. He inferred -that the Army of Chalons was marching in a north-west direction towards -the Meuse; that its principal forces were then probably between Le -Chesne and Beaumont, with strong rear guards to the south; and the -practical result of his cogitations was that the German Armies should -move upon the line Le Chesne-Beaumont in such a way as might enable -them to attack the enemy before he reached the Meuse. Therefore, the -Saxon Prince’s Army, except the Guard, which was to become the reserve, -was to march early on Beaumont, two Corps of the Third Army were to -support the Saxon onset, but the left of that Army was to march on Le -Chesne. As a matter of fact, the French, in part at least, were nearer -the Meuse than Von Moltke supposed, for the 12th Corps was on the right -bank, and the 1st at Raucourt; while the 7th was at Oches, the 5th at -Beaumont, and there were no troops at Le Chesne except stragglers. -MacMahon took in the situation; he was resolved to pass the river -“coûte que coûte”: and his chance of doing so, even then, depended -on the rapidity with which his troops could march. The 5th Corps was -struck and routed the next day, but the French Army did succeed in -effecting a passage over the stream. - - - _The Battle of Beaumont._ - -The German Armies had now fairly entered the Ardennes, formerly the -northern district of the old province of Champagne. It is a land of -vast woods which crowd one upon another between the Bar and the Meuse. -Looking from some smooth hill-top, the landscape, in summer, wears -the aspect of a boundless forest, the dark furrowed lines of shadow -alone indicating the hollows, gullies, ravines, and defiles. Here and -there may be seen a church or château, or a glimpse may be caught of -a road bordered by tall trees. The woods are so dense that infantry, -still less guns and horsemen, cannot work through them, or move at all, -except upon the high roads, lanes and tracks, worn by the villagers and -farm people. Marshy brooks lurk under the green covert, and rivulets -burrow their way through steep banks. Yet there are open spaces in the -maze of verdure, farmsteads and fields, and rounded heights whence the -tourist may contemplate the extensive panorama. It is not a country -which lends itself easily to military operations, but one more suitable -to the sportsman than the soldier. The boar of the Ardennes is still -famous and it is on record that a certain Herr von Bismarck, once upon -a time, hunted the wolf through the snow in the very region where he -was hunting the French in August, 1870. - -It was amidst these thickets, dingles, and almost pathless wilds that -the French had to retreat and the Germans to pursue. We have seen that -General de Failly’s Corps was struggling all night to reach what they -hoped would be a comparative haven of rest at Beaumont, a bourgade -upon the high road from Le Chesne to Stenay, planted down in a hollow, -surrounded by gardens, and having in its centre a fine church visible -from afar. Here he pitched his tents, so that his tired soldiers might -recover from the fatigues they had endured in useless marches; and he -thought, in his simple way, that he might safely defer his march until -the afternoon. Yet Marshal MacMahon had visited the camp early in the -morning, and if he used language to De Failly, as he probably did, -similar to that which he employed at Oches, it should have quickened -the General’s movements and saved him from defeat. For, after visiting -Beaumont, MacMahon, much concerned for the 7th as well as the 5th -Corps, rode into the camp at Oches. The trains had entered the defile -leading to Stonne, some hours earlier, preceded and escorted by the -brigades of Conseil Dumesnil’s Division, and the 2nd Division was just -about to start, leaving the 3rd as a rear-guard. “You will have 60,000 -men upon your hands, this evening,” he said, “if you do not succeed in -getting beyond the Meuse.” Urging Douay to get rid of his heavy convoy, -and “coûte que coûte,” cross the river, he indicated Villers below -Mouzon as the point of passage, and rode away. The misfortunes of the -7th Corps, also much tried, will be related later; but it may be said -that they did not reach Mouzon, for their outlet from the toils proved -to be the southern gate of Sedan! - - - _The Surprise of the 5th Corps._ - -Inspired by the hope of closing with the enemy, the German Armies were -astir at dawn, and soon long columns of men and guns were tramping -steadily northward; but, for the present the narrative is concerned -only with the Saxon 12th, the Prussian 4th, and Von der Tann’s -Bavarians. These troops advanced through the forests, the Saxons -near the Meuse, the 4th in the centre by Nouart and Belval, and the -Bavarians, from their distant bivouac at Sommerance, upon and beyond -Sommauthe. Now it was originally designed that the two Corps, on the -right and centre, should attack simultaneously, and to insure this, -each column, on arriving at the skirts of the forest, was directed -to halt under cover until it had ascertained that the others on each -flank had also gained the edge of the woods. But it turned out that the -Saxons, from the start, were delayed by various obstacles which impeded -not only the artillery, but the infantry. The leading division of the -4th Corps met with fewer obstructions on its route through Belval, and -thus arrived first on the scene of action. On the line of march in the -forest, intelligence was picked up which quickened its motions, and a -squadron sent forward confirmed the statement that the French about -Beaumont reposed in thoughtless security. The Corps Commander, Von -Alvensleben I.,—for there were two who bore the name in this Army,—an -officer ever ready to go forward, was present with the advance-guard -of the division, and not likely to hold it back. So the soldiers -advanced in silence. On approaching the open country, the Hussars in -the front glided out of sight, and a company of Jägers crept towards -the selvage of the wood, and, from a hillock near a farm, they saw, -only six hundred paces distant, a French camp, and beyond other camps. -The cavalry horses were picketed, the artillery teams had not returned -from seeking water, the soldiers were either resting or employed on the -routine work of a camp. What should be done? Here was an absolutely -unguarded Army Corps, ignorant that an enemy was within short musket -range. The divisional commander had orders to await the arrival of -lateral columns, but he felt that the Frenchmen might discover his -unwelcome presence at any moment. He had only a brigade on the ground, -yet the temptation to seize an opportunity so unexpected, was almost -irresistible. He, therefore, decided to attack as soon as his brigade -could deploy, and his batteries plant themselves in a favourable -place. Suddenly the men in the French camp were all in motion. General -von Alvensleben inferred that the proximity of his troops had been -perceived, whereas the activity displayed, as we learn from De Failly, -was caused by an order to fall in before starting for Mouzon. Without -waiting, however, until the battalions in rear could reach the ground, -Alvensleben opened fire, and the shells bursting in their camp, gave -the first warning to the French that their redoubtable adversaries were -upon them. General de Failly says that the grand-guards had not had -time to signal the enemy’s presence, and that his own information led -him to believe that the Germans had marched upon Stenay. The verdict of -Marshal MacMahon upon his subordinate is that “General de Failly was -surprised in his bivouac by the troops of the Saxon Crown Prince.” - -The French soon recovered from their disorder, swarms of skirmishers -rushed out towards the assailants, some batteries went rapidly into -action; and the combined fire of shells and bullets wrought havoc -among the Prussian gunners and the infantry, hitting even those on -the line of march. They did not yield to the pressure; and when the -French delivered a determined attack it was repelled by volleys and -independent firing. Then the French got several batteries into position -on the hill side north of Beaumont; the Germans were reinforced by the -arrival of guns and foot, for the other division of the Corps came up -and at once deployed on the right of its comrades. At this time, a -little after one o’clock, the Saxons on the right, next the Meuse, and -the Bavarians on the left, who had been marching since five o’clock in -the morning, had also begun to take part in the fight. King William -and his vast Staff, posted on a hill off the road from Buzancy, and -his son, on a similar elevation near Oches, were closely watching the -battle, discernible thence in its general smoky features, at least by -the King. - -General de Failly had no desire to fight a regular engagement. His aim -was to put his troops in order and offer as much resistance as might be -required to cover his retreat upon Mouzon, distant only six miles. He, -therefore, relied on his line of guns above the village, and they were -effective, for some time; but he showed great apprehension lest his -left, or Meuse flank, should be turned. Seeing the German lines develop -and grow stronger, in men and guns, feeling the new power brought -to bear by the Saxons, who, cramped for want of room, were pressed -close to the river, and, hearing the Bavarian guns on his right, he -made one more vigorous effort to arrest the 4th Corps. Thick lines of -skirmishers, followed by supports in close order, dashed forward with -such valour and impetuosity that they drove in the covering infantry -and charged to within fifty paces of the guns. The danger was great, -but the Germans rapidly flung everything near into the contest, -gained the mastery, compelled the gallant Frenchmen to wheel about, -followed them promptly, captured the southern camp, and then poured -into Beaumont itself upon all sides. But the chassepot had told, and -the Germans paid heavily, as they always did and were ready to do, for -their persistent courage and well-tempered audacity. With the town fell -the other camps; and then, for a time, the infantry combat ceased. But -the artillery advanced, as usual, and engaged in a long duel with the -powerful line of batteries established by the French to facilitate the -retreat of their infantry and arrest pursuit. Although not able to -stand up against 150 guns, they did not retire until their infantry -had got into another position between the Yoncq brook and the Meuse. -Then the batteries cleverly withdrew in succession, and before the 4th -Corps could advance, De Failly’s troops disappeared in the woods, and -were seen no more until they were reached beyond the hills and thrust -headlong into Mouzon. - -While the 4th Corps was pulling itself together after the onset, De -Failly had been compelled by the impenetrable wood of Givodeau to -divide his forces, the left and the reserve artillery following the -main route to Mouzon took post above Villemontrey, close to the Meuse, -and derived support from guns and infantry which Lebrun had put into -position on the high land in an elbow of the river on the right bank. -The right wing hurried round the western side of the Givodeau thickets, -and found a post upon a plateau beyond. In the meantime, General Lebrun -had ordered two brigades of infantry, commanded by Cambriels and -Villeneuve, and a cavalry division, to cross the river at Mouzon, but -Marshal MacMahon, riding up, ordered back Cambriels, and all the horse -except two regiments of cuirassiers. Those we shall presently meet -again. The German right wing vainly endeavoured to drive De Failly from -Villemontrey, and, after repeated attempts and much loss, desisted from -the enterprise; but kept a strong force at hand and a large number of -guns in action. - -Meantime a singular incident had occurred to the west of Beaumont. -Just as the Bavarians were about to join in the attack on the camps -by throwing themselves on the French flank, they were fired on from -a farm called La Thibaudine and a hamlet named Warniforêt. They -were astonished because the presence of an enemy there was not even -suspected. The enemy was also astonished and still more frightened. -The combat was caused by a French brigade, which had wandered from its -line of march. It seems that the advance brigade of Conseil Dumesnil’s -division preceding the transport of the 7th Corps, a series of wagons, -nine miles in length, had been ordered by MacMahon, who met them, to -move by Yoncq instead of La Besace, and that, when the rear brigade -came up to the point of divergence, the marker left to give information -having disappeared, these unfortunate troops went forward on the great -road to Beaumont. A staff officer arrived just as the action began, -and he was leading the errant troops back, when the Bavarians emerged -in view. The conflict which ensued was sharp, but it delayed the 7th -Corps and ended in the rout of the French, who fled as best they could -through Yoncq towards Mouzon. About this time Douay was at Stonne; -the Uhlans of the Guard had followed him step by step, and bringing a -horse battery to bear on his rear guard, had induced General Dumont to -halt, deploy the brigade, and in his turn open fire; but General Douay -promptly appeared and stopped the action, having made up his mind that -the pressing duty of the hour was to get over the Meuse in accordance -with the Marshal’s desire. So the 7th, after some hesitation, retired -upon Raucourt, hoping thence to gain Villers below Mouzon; yet, being -pursued by the Bavarians, they were overtaken and attacked outside -Raucourt, and, hearing that the bridge was broken, they turned, some -upon Remilly, and others through Torcy into Sedan itself. - - - _The Flight to Mouzon._ - -When the left wing of the 4th Corps, pressing towards the defile of -the Yoncq and the slopes above it, sought to discover the French on -that side, they were at first sharply punished; but, following on, they -came up and closed with their adversaries. One brigade of Bavarians had -been sent to the 4th Corps and moved on the left flank of the toilsome -advance. For the ground was difficult, the obstacles numerous, and the -French, though shattered and dispirited, still displayed a fighting -front. But at length, late in the afternoon, the Germans mastered a -hill-top whence adverse artillery had fired upon the assailants; and -then these fairly entered the plain before Mouzon. Here, however, the -French occupied an isolated hill, called Le Mont de Brune, close to -and almost overhanging the Faubourg of Mouzon, from which its summit -is less than a mile distant. Unluckily for them they formed front -facing eastward, apparently anticipating an attack on that side; but -the Germans promptly turned the flank from the south and south-west, -and drove the defenders down the steep slopes towards Mouzon, capturing -ten guns. The victorious forward movement brought the leading companies -in front of Villeneuve’s brigade and the Cuirassiers in the plain. The -Germans halted, and opened a steady fire, when suddenly they beheld -the 5th Cuirassiers coming down on their left flank and rear. Captain -Helmuth, who commanded the three companies exposed to this ordeal, -made the left company face about in time, and then forbidding his men -to form rallying squares or groups, ordered them to stand fast as they -were, and only open fire when he gave the signal. The gallant French -horsemen, as was their wont, rode straight upon the infantry; but -the independent firing opened on them at point blank range, broke the -impetus and crushed in the head of the charging squadrons. Colonel -Contenson fell mortally wounded within fifteen paces of the infantry -line; and, although some fiery spirits dashed into their ranks, and one -engaged in single combat with Captain Helmuth until he fell pierced by -ball and bayonet, yet the whole mass of cavalry was routed with immense -loss, and driven into the Meuse. - -For, by this time, the wreck of De Failly’s Corps was in full retreat -on all sides, and troops, artillery, transport trains, and stragglers, -were crowding on towards the bridge. When his right was turned by -the movement upon the Brune hill, and still further by the march of -the Bavarian brigade upon Pourron, De Failly quitted his post at -Villemontrey, which enabled the right division of the 4th Corps, the -Saxon regiments fighting by its side, and the artillery to push on -by the main road to Mouzon. After the first surprise of the Beaumont -camp, the French had mainly stood, here and there, to facilitate -their retreat, and the contest, which went on all the afternoon -among the woods and hills and ravines, was really a running fight. -The Germans had pursued with relentless pertinacity. Their soldiers -had been marching all day, but they seemed to be tireless, for they -never halted until the fugitives were over the Meuse, or the darkness -forbade further motion. De Failly had been surprised and thrust in -disorder over the river, and when the evening closed the Germans were -in possession of the faubourg of Mouzon, and of the bridge at its -western end. The 7th Corps, cut off from Villers, had moved, in a state -bordering on panic, upon Remilly; but there they found Bonnemains’ -cuirassiers, the tail of a division belonging to the 1st Corps, and -a baggage column. The Meuse had been dammed to fill the ditches of -Sedan, and not only were the fords rendered useless, but the swelling -stream was unusually high. Douay, halted at seven o’clock, became -impatient after dark, and at ten rode down to the bridge. He found -the cuirassiers engaged in passing over the feeble construction. “The -horses,” writes Prince Bibesco, “affrighted, because they could not see -the shaking planks hidden by the water, and shifting under their steps, -moved with hesitation, their necks extended, their ears erect. Sitting -upright, shrouded in their large white cloaks, the cuirassiers marched -on silently, and appeared to be borne on the stream. Two fires, one at -each end of the bridge, flung a ghastly light on men and horses, and, -flickering on the helmets, imparted a fantastic aspect to this weird -spectacle.” At length the white horsemen passed over; but when the turn -of the artillery came the horses were still more recalcitrant, and the -passage was so slow that, at two in the morning of the 31st, only three -batteries and two regiments of foot had passed the Meuse. Douay then -learned that the Marshal had ordered all the Army to assemble at Sedan, -and he moved the rest of his Corps over the bridge at Torcy. These few -details will give some idea of the terrible disorder which prevailed -throughout the French Army. - -On the evening of the 30th the Germans were upon the Meuse. The 4th -Corps was before Mouzon; one Bavarian Corps at Raucourt, the other at -Sommauthe; the 5th and 11th Corps about La Besace and Stonne; the 12th -was near the Meuse in front of Beaumont, and the Guard just behind -them; the Würtembergers were at Verrières, and the 6th Corps well -out to the west at Vouziers. On this flank also were the 5th and 6th -Cavalry Divisions threatening and watching the French communications; -while the 12th Cavalry Division was astride the Meuse at Pouilly, -and one of its squadrons, evading and passing through Margueritte’s -vedettes, had discovered and reported the presence of French troops on -the Chiers near Carignan, and the movement of trains on the railway -towards Sedan. - -So ended this ominous day. The Army of the Meuse had lost 3,500 men in -killed and wounded, but they had routed one French Corps, and fractions -of two others, and they had captured forty-two guns. The French loss -is set down at 1,800 killed and wounded, but the Germans aver that, -included among the 3,000 acknowledged to be missing, there were 2,000 -who bore no wounds. - - - - - CHAPTER XII. - - METZ AND STRASBURG. - - -At the very moment when the Army of Chalons, instead of marching -on its way to Montmédy, found its Corps huddled together at Sedan, -between the river and the Belgian frontier, some information of the -movement undertaken by MacMahon, who yielded his better judgment to -the importunate entreaties (les instances) of Palikao, reached Marshal -Bazaine in Metz. He had already, on the 26th of August, collected a -large mass of troops upon the right bank, in order to break out towards -Thionville; but the rain poured down all day in torrents, and, after -a consultation at the Farm of Grimont with his Marshals and Generals, -whose opinions were adverse to the sortie projected, he issued an order -directing the Army to resume its former quarters. But, on the 29th, a -messenger who had crept through the German lines, handed to the Marshal -a despatch from the officer commanding in Thionville, Colonel Turnier, -stating that General Ducrot, with the 1st Corps, should be “to-day, -the 27th,” at Stenay on the left of the Army, General Douay on his -right being on the Meuse. Bazaine seems to have had doubts respecting -the authenticity of this missive, the handwriting of which his staff -did not recognize; but the next morning, about eleven, an agent of -his own came in from Verdun. He was the bearer of a telegram from the -Emperor—it was really the message drawn up by MacMahon on the 22nd -of August, copied, apparently, in cipher, by Napoleon, and intrusted -to Bazaine’s emissary. The despatch, which had no date, stated that -the sender would march towards Montmédy, and when on the Aisne, would -act according to circumstances, in order to succour the Metz Army. -Regarding the second document, though antecedent in point of time, as -a confirmation of the first which he had received, Marshal Bazaine, on -the 30th, issued the orders which, the following day, led to - - - _The Battle of Noisseville._ - -His plan, succinctly described, was to break through the line of -investment on the right bank of the Moselle by directing three Corps, -the 3rd, 4th, and 6th, principally upon St. Barbe, and he hoped, if -successful, to march them forward upon Kedange, while the Guard and -the 2nd Corps followed the track by the river. He estimates the force -which was available for battle at 100,000 men, but he probably had -more; at any rate, the delays which had occurred on the 14th of August, -and were in part repeated on the 31st, shows how arduous is the task -of issuing with such masses from a fortified town and position astride -of a river. The weather was not favourable, for the continuous rain -had soaked the ground, and at dawn a thick fog, which hung about for -several hours, impeded the operations. The Germans had been more than -usually on the alert since the abortive attempt on the 26th, and had -thought it expedient to include Noisseville within the line of defence. -The noise and preparations in Metz did not escape their notice, but -the dense mist concealed much from their searching gaze. Yet they saw -and heard enough, both on the eastern and western fronts of Metz, to -warrant a belief that a resolute onset was impending. As the fog bank -rolled away, the batteries and the massing of troops became visible, -and General von Manteuffel transmitted the results of his careful -observations to Von Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles, both of -whom made instant arrangements to support the 1st Corps and the other -troops on the right bank. The forenoon passed by, and, except some -slight skirmishes and a brief artillery duel, no action ensued. About -midday the French sat down to cook, and the smoke from their fires rose -in clouds, indicated their position, but hid them from view; at the -same time, although the sun was shining, the culinary haze concealed -the workmen engaged in throwing up shelter for the heavy guns drawn -from the forts; and the German leaders arrived at the conclusion that -the onslaught would be deferred until the next day; their soldiers also -fell to cooking, and some fractions recrossed the Moselle to join their -main body; but their attention to the phenomena before them was not -relaxed. - -Yet the afternoon began to wear away. It was not until half-past two -that Marshal Bazaine gave that signal for attack which was nevertheless -not obeyed until another hour and a half had been consumed. The -signal was a salvo from the battery of heavy guns placed behind -the field works hastily thrown up in front of Fort St. Julien. The -battlefield of the 31st was one with which we were made acquainted -when Von Golz took upon himself to arrest the retreat of the French -over the Moselle on the 14th of August. It extended from Mercy les -Metz by Colombey, Noisseville, and Failly to Malroy on the Moselle. -The French assailants, therefore, had to cross the ravines east of -Borny and work up both banks of the Vallières brook which, rising near -St. Barbe, enters the Moselle opposite the Isle Chambière. The 6th -Corps, Canrobert’s, was to attack by the river road towards Malroy; De -Ladmirault, with the 4th, was to move by Failly and Vrémy to outflank -St. Barbe on its right, while the left of that position was to be -carried by Lebœuf’s 3rd Corps; and Frossard, with the 2nd, was to -follow and cover the right flank of Lebœuf. The Guard, the cavalry, and -reserve artillery were to stand between Fort St. Julien and the Bois -de Grimont, and all the baggage was to be ready in the Isle Chambière. -The Germans were prepared to meet such an attack, but, as we have said, -they had come to believe that it would be deferred. - -Suddenly, about four o’clock, the dead silence was broken by a salvo -from the heavy guns, followed by the fire of De Ladmirault’s batteries. -Then the action began along the whole front, the Germans at once -developing a powerful line of fifty guns about Servigny and Poix, far -in advance of the main line of defence, and bringing other pieces to -bear from different points. Nevertheless, favoured by the broken ground -and resolute to win, the French infantry persistently advanced until -about six o’clock they had driven in all the foreposts, and had gained -possession on their right of Noisseville, the garrison of which village -they curiously complain held out longer than they were entitled to do. -The capture of Noisseville facilitated the principal attacks which were -directed upon Servigny and Poix, villages which served as redoubts -guarding the avenues to St. Barbe, the culminating point in the region. -At the same time the French right had pushed well forward towards -Retonfay, the object being to protect the flank of the 3rd Corps, now -in motion upon the central posts of the German line. Here the contest -was severe, and in the end the great line of guns which had held De -Ladmirault at bay so long, unable to bear the musketry fire in front -and flank, was compelled to withdraw behind the villages. But, although -the French infantry came up boldly on both flanks, as well as in front, -they were unable to overcome the sturdy defenders, in whose possession -the villages remained at dark. The French left under Canrobert had made -repeated attacks upon Failly, which met with no success, and he halted -at Chieulles and Vany: so that the movement near the Meuse had secured -but little ground. At dark the French had not done more than occupy a -line extending from Canrobert’s right in front of Villers l’Orme to -Noisseville, and thence by Flanville to Château d’Aubigny. By this -time General von Manteuffel had been reinforced by two brigades of -Landwehr, and the 25th Division, under Prince Louis of Hesse, which had -crossed the Moselle, and considerably strengthened his right wing. Then -occurred a remarkable incident. General Aymard, about nine o’clock, -creeping silently up to Servigny, flung forward his division, and, -without firing a shot, burst in upon the surprised Germans, engaged in -preparing the defences, and carried the place. Astonished and enraged, -General von Gayl immediately gathered up a force, and breaking, in his -turn, upon the enemy, drove him out and recovered possession before ten -o’clock. Aymard’s is an example of a night attack well performed; but -the weak defence of what had been skilfully won, was not so creditable -to the French. - -During the night General Manstein, with the other half of the 9th -Corps, crossed the Moselle, halted in rear of the German right wing, -and thus enabled the Hessian Division to take post behind St. Barbe. -A dense fog again filled the valley at dawn, but at an early hour -General von Manteuffel, holding his ground in the centre and on the -right, brought his batteries to bear upon Noisseville and promptly -assumed the offensive. The place was strongly occupied and stoutly -defended. Although the Germans broke in for a moment they were -speedily expelled, and several hours elapsed before the village fell -into their hands. But throughout the day, except towards Rupigny and -Failly, the French stood on the defensive. For the Germans arrayed 114 -guns on the hills, crushed the adverse artillery, and prevented the -French infantry from making any combined attack. The position on their -right was soon rendered less safe by the arrival of a brigade of the -7th Corps which, coming up from Laquenexy, drove the French out of -Flanville. This demonstration on the right of Marshal Lebœuf’s line, -together with the terrible fire of the German artillery, induced him, -about eleven o’clock, to draw back the whole of his troops and allow -his adversary once more to occupy Noisseville. On the French left, -Marshal Canrobert’s soldiers had been forced back upon Chieulles, and -the attacks upon Failly had wholly failed. Prince Frederick Charles -who, at Malancourt, had heard the opening cannonade at Sedan on the -morning of the 1st, took up his post of observation on a hill towards -the Moselle before eight o’clock, and provided for the arrival of -strong reinforcements, should they be needed, from the left bank, -but only the 10th Corps passed the Moselle and was stationed between -Argancy and Antilly. The retreat of Marshal Lebœuf had been followed by -that of the other corps, and a little after noon the French Army was -marching back to the camps and bivouacs whence it had advanced on the -31st. The great sortie had signally failed in opening a road through -the investing lines. The French had 3,547 officers and men killed -and wounded, including in the latter category four Generals, one of -whom, Manèque, mortally. The German loss was 2,976 killed and wounded. -Marshal Bazaine estimates the number he put in the field at 100,000; -the German authorities say they began the fight with 40,800 men and 138 -guns; and at the end of the encounter had over the Moselle 73,800 men -and 290 guns. - -Marshal Bazaine and his troops re-entered their prison on the -afternoon of the day when the white flag was hoisted on the Citadel of -Sedan; and with his and their subsequent misfortunes we have nothing -more to do in this work. Neither is it our business to consider whether -by marching up instead of down the right bank he could have escaped -with some portion of his Army safe and sound to the South of France. -That he did his uttermost to push through on the 31st is the contention -of the German staff, but it is doubtful whether on the second day -the same spirit prevailed. All the knotty questions suggested by the -military situation about Metz and elsewhere at the end of August could -only be adequately discussed by entering upon a history of transactions -with which we have no present concern. The essential fact is that the -French Marshals tried to break the barrier and failed at a moment -when even their success could not have prevented the capitulation at -Sedan. The attempt demonstrated the immense advantages of a carefully -prepared defensive position combined with a readiness to use artillery -in the front line from the first, and an equal readiness to become -the assailant whenever a useful opportunity occurred. But to the mind -of this writer the moral of the Metz episode in the great war is the -danger attending these large intrenched camps, which will certainly -exert in the future, as they have in the past, an irresistible -attraction upon inferior commanders, and will task the intellect, -and the ingenuity and the firmness of the greatest to put them to a -proper use. Neither Bazaine nor any colleague in superior command -could be described as a man of genius, and to such soldiers, while war -is conducted on a vast scale and armies in the field are numbered by -the hundred thousand, places like Metz will not cease to become traps -in which frustrated or beaten armies will be caught and captured, -sometimes, it may be, by force or stratagem; usually by stress of -famine. Meantime the issue of the war will be decided, as it always -has been, by the belligerent who is able to keep the field. - -Although huge Armies had penetrated so swiftly into France on the -morrow of the frontier victories, there were still, besides the -fortress of Metz, which was in an exceptional case, several other -strongholds which stood out defiant upon the main lines of the German -communications. They were Verdun, Toul, Bitsche, Phalsburg, Strasburg, -and, at a later stage, Belfort. Each of these, except the last-named, -required to be, and were, watched or invested by troops drawn from -the active Armies or the reserves in Germany; but they had little or -no influence upon the colossal events which decided the issue of what -we have called the Campaign of Sedan. Strasburg alone was a cause of -any anxiety, because the Germans were eager to obtain possession of -a fortress the fall of which would give them undisputed command of -the Rhine, and become of great value in the event of unlooked-for and -improbable reverses. General von Werder, with the Baden Division, -after the battle of Woerth, had been sent to invest the town, and he -arrived before it on the 11th. It is not intended to relate in these -pages the siege of Strasburg, which properly belongs to the story -of the Franco-German war as a whole. The point to note is that the -regular siege was preceded by a useless bombardment. The engineer -desired to proceed in the orthodox way; the chief of the staff wished -to try the more violent method. He insisted that a bombardment would -terrify the inhabitants, and make them exert such a pressure on the -Governor, General Uhrich, a gallant veteran, as would compel him -to surrender. The dispute was determined by an appeal to the Great -Head-quarters, then at Pont à Mousson, and General von Moltke, who -desired that the place should be taken in the shortest possible time, -and that the 40,000 men before it might be available for other -operations, decided in favour of the bombardment. The consequence -was that dreadful sufferings were inflicted upon the inhabitants of -Strasburg, and terrible devastation brought upon the town, but that the -cruelty did not attain the end in view; and that the wise engineer was -permitted to apply his method at a moment when, had his advice been -adopted, the besieging Army would have been near the success which -was ultimately attained. The bombardment of Strasburg was not only an -error regarded from a military point of view, it was a great political -blunder; for who can doubt that the agonies endured in the last days -of August, 1870, and the resentment created by the awful destruction -of life and property, have materially helped to render inveterate that -hostility to German rule which even now reigns in Strasburg as strong -as ever. Strasburg would have been captured, probably at an earlier -date, had there been no bombardment, humanity would have been spared -a heartrending spectacle, and Germany would have profited by showing -some deference towards the feelings and some regard for the lives of -the people whose town it was intended to restore to the Reich, and over -whom she had determined to rule. It was only on the 26th, when the -King had just turned northward from the Ornain to hunt after MacMahon, -that Von Werder, finding Uhrich resolute, decided to proceed by way -of a regular siege. After the end of the month the fortress ceased to -be, in any sense, a danger to the German Armies, which, whether closed -around Metz or marching westward through France, could afford to await, -with calmness, the certain surrender of Strasburg, an end which might -have been attained just as quickly had the wisdom of King William’s -statesmen been called in to sustain the sound judgment of General -Schulz, the accomplished Engineer. - - - - - CHAPTER XIII. - - SEDAN. - - - _German Decision._ - -While Strasburg was enduring the agonies of a siege and bombardment, -and the “Army of the Rhine,” already oppressed by “la question des -vivres,” was chafing in its restricted camps under the cannon of Metz; -while Paris was quivering with excitement and barely restrained from -bursting into open revolt, the victorious German host was closing -steadily, yet swiftly, round the distracted and misguided Army of -Chalons. It was pressed in so closely on the Belgian frontier that, -during the afternoon of the 30th, before De Failly had been driven -over the Meuse, Count Bismarck sent a formal communication to the -German Minister at Brussels, in which he expressed a hope that, should -MacMahon lead his soldiers across the boundary, the Belgian authorities -would immediately deprive them of their arms. At night, in his quarters -at Buzancy, King William sanctioned a decisive order to his son and -the Saxon Prince. The troops were to march at dawn, attack the enemy -wherever he could be found on the left and right bank of the Meuse, -in order that he might be crushed up as much as possible between the -river and the Belgian border. The Saxon Prince was to operate beyond -the Meuse, with two Corps; the Prussian Prince on the front and left; -movements designed to bar the road to Montmédy, prevent any attempt to -recross the river, and, eventually, to interpose the German left wing -between the French and Mézières. “Should the adversary enter Belgium -and not be immediately disarmed, he is to be followed at once without -waiting for fresh orders.” These were not the final instructions which -led to the investment of an Army, but they prepared the way towards, -and foreshadowed the accomplishment of that astonishing result. - - - _Confusion in the French Camp._ - -Marshal MacMahon, perplexed, but not dismayed, by the events of the -30th, remained for some time in doubt. “I do not know what I shall do,” -said the Marshal early in the evening to Ducrot’s aide-de-camp. “In -any case, the Emperor should at once start for Sedan.” At that time -the Emperor was in the camp of Ducrot, who, instructed to protect the -retreat of the Army either by Douzy or by Carignan, that is, towards -Sedan or Montmédy, had divided his Corps between those two places. -At a later period, when darkness had set in, MacMahon, seated at a -bivouac fire, on the heights above Mouzon, sent for General Lebrun, and -directed him to retreat, at once, upon Sedan, not by the highway, which -was crowded with fugitives and wagons, but by cross roads leading upon -Douzy. “We have had a bad time,” said the Marshal, “but the situation -is not hopeless. At the most, the German Army before us cannot exceed -in numbers sixty or seventy thousand men. If they attack us, so much -the better; we shall be able, doubtless, to fling them into the Meuse.” -The Marshal, who never spared himself, and seemed to live without -sleep, rode back to Sedan, and Lebrun, stumbling along devious tracks, -in the darkness, and apparently in dubious military array, fearing -all the time that he might be attacked, entered Douzy at eight in -the morning, and did not reach Bazeilles, his destination, until ten -o’clock. - -Meantime Ducrot, embarrassed by the presence of the Emperor, awaited -anxiously, at Carignan, the final orders of MacMahon. He respectfully -urged His Majesty to depart by train for Sedan, but the Emperor -refused—“he wished to be with the Corps which covered the retreat.” -He was astonished and incredulous when the rout before Mouzon was -described. “It is impossible,” he repeatedly exclaimed, “our positions -were magnificent!” In the night he vanished from Carignan; and it was -only some hours after he had gone that Ducrot was informed of his -departure by train. The General then, in concert with Margueritte, -whose cavalry were on the Chiers, resolved to retreat in the morning, -without waiting longer for orders, and to move upon Illy, because he -assumed that MacMahon would certainly direct the Army on Mézières. He -was mistaken. On reaching Villers-Cernay, about four in the afternoon -of the 31st, Ducrot learned that he was to retire upon Sedan, and -not upon Mézières, “whither I have not any intention of going,” said -the Marshal’s despatch. In fact, the two Divisions of the 1st Corps, -left at Douzy on the 30th, had been already ordered to retire on the -Givonne. Lebrun, whom we saw follow in their wake, after his painful -night march, did not destroy the bridge over the Chiers; so that, -when he was passing Francheval, Ducrot actually saw the enemy—they -were Saxon horsemen—issuing from the village, and cutting in upon the -baggage and transport trains. - -On that memorable 30th, when the Emperor informed the Empress by -telegram, from Carignan, that there had been an “engagement of no -great importance,” an officer destined to be conspicuous, dropped in -upon the Army; it was De Wimpffen. He has been defined by General -Lebrun, who was with him at St. Cyr, as a man of firm will, and “an -unlimited confidence in his own capacity.” Indeed, he had come to -restore victory. When he passed through Paris, the Comte de Palikao -was good enough to tell him—so he writes, although Palikao “thinks” he -could not have so expressed himself—that MacMahon chimed in too easily -with the suggestions of the Emperor, which was not the fact; that -His Majesty was in a false position, and that he caused the greatest -embarrassment. “Send me to the Army,” said De Wimpffen, “I shall impart -the needed boldness and decision.” So he was sent to supersede De -Failly in command of the 5th Corps, carrying in his pocket a letter -which authorized him to succeed MacMahon in command of the Army, should -any accident befall the Marshal. It was this audacious personage who -supervened on the 30th, and to his horror, found the Army he might have -to guide and govern, falling to pieces under his eyes. He met troops in -flight from Mouzon; they were frightened, famished, and could hardly -be persuaded that the “Prussians” were not at their heels. As evidence -of the reigning disorder, De Wimpffen says that he collected on the -30th, three regiments belonging to the 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, some -squadrons of De Failly’s cavalry, and several hundreds of men belonging -to the 1st Corps, who obeyed a non-combatant officer. The General led -them during the night to Sedan. A like confusion prevailed on all -sides, as the soldiers, hungry and thoroughly wearied, fell asleep as -they dropped on the ground in their dreary bivouacs. - -The Emperor entered Sedan about midnight. The Marshal urged him to -embark afresh in the train, and seek security in Mézières, where -General Vinoy was expected, and where he did, indeed, arrive that night -with the advance guard of one division of the 13th Corps. The Emperor -refused to quit Sedan, but the Prince Imperial had been sent away. The -movement of Vinoy was delayed several hours, because a train running to -Avesnes, and bearing the young Prince, “his baggage, his escort, and -his suite,” barred the way to Mézières. - -When morning dawned upon the discomfited Army, Marshal MacMahon had -not ceased to ponder. As he said before the Parliamentary Commission -of Inquiry in 1872, he had no intention of fighting a battle at Sedan, -but he wished to supply the Army afresh with provisions and munitions; -and he spent part of the day in considering what he should do on the -morrow, and in watching from the citadel the march of his foes. There -were, he believed, a million rations in Sedan, but eight hundred -thousand of these were stored in wagons at the station, and as shells -reached them from beyond the Meuse, the station-master sent away the -train to Mézières. With it went a company of engineers, instructed -to blow up the bridge at Donchery; but frightened by the shells, the -driver halted long enough to drop the engineers, and then hastily fled -with the powder and tools. The Marshal did not hear of the mishap until -ten o’clock at night, and when another company of engineers reached the -bridge, they found it in possession of the enemy! Early in the morning, -before that event occurred, Captain des Sesmaisons, carrying a message -from Vinoy, entered Sedan, after having been fired on by a German -battery established near Frenois. He saw the Emperor in the hotel of -the Sub-Prefect, delivered his message, and received a despatch from -His Majesty directing Vinoy to concentrate his troops in Mézières. -Anxious that the Captain should return in safety, the Emperor gave him -a horse, and traced on a map the road he should take, observing that -the Army would retire by that route the next day; that the road would -be open and safe, as it was new, had not been marked on the map, and -was unknown to the enemy. But we learn from the German Staff history, -that this recently opened road, although not laid down on the French, -was duly figured in the German map, a contrast between diligence and -negligence not easily paralleled. The Captain saw MacMahon, who then, -nearly midday, seemed resolved to march on Mézières, and believed that -he could crush any opposition. - -At this moment General Douay arrived, and gave a new turn to his -thoughts. Douay had surveyed the position in front of his camp with -an anxious eye, and had noted that, unless reinforced, he could not -hold the cardinal point—the Calvaire d’Illy. He got additional troops -in the end. “But,” said the Marshal, who seemed to share Douay’s -apprehensions, “I do not want to shut myself up in lines; I wish to -be free to manœuvre.” “M. le Maréchal, to-morrow the enemy will not -leave you the time,” was the General’s answer. According to Captain -des Sesmaisons, it was Douay’s comments on the position which made -the Marshal modify his judgment, and think of fighting where he stood -rather than of retreating on Mézières. The Captain rode back to his -General, and carried with him a gloomy account of the condition and -outlook of the Army of Chalons. No troops were sent forth to watch -the Meuse below Sedan and communicate with Vinoy. Later in the day, -an old soldier who lived in the neighbourhood, sought out General -Douay and told him that the enemy was preparing to pass the Meuse at -Donchery—a fact, it might be thought, which could not escape the notice -of the watchers in Sedan—and then it was that the General occupied the -position between Floing and Illy, and began to throw up intrenchments -as cover for men and guns. He had not done so hitherto, because his -soldiers, thoroughly exhausted by incessant marches, sleepless nights, -want of food, and rear-guard combats, needed some rest. Enough has been -said to indicate the lamentable weakness of mind at head-quarters, and -the dire confusion prevailing throughout the limited area between the -Belgian frontier and the Meuse, within which the French soldiers were -now potentially inclosed. It is time to show a different example of the -practice of war. - - - _The Movements of the Germans._ - -The decision adopted by the Great Head-quarters at Buzancy were, as -usual, anticipated, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Meuse Army, -before the formal orders reached him, had directed the Guard and the -12th Corps to cross the river, by the bridge at Pouilly, constructed -on the 30th, and a new one made at Létanne soon after daybreak on the -31st. The Saxon cavalry commander, indeed, taking with him a squadron -at dawn, rode down the right bank, then shrouded in fog, as far as -Mouzon, entered the town with four lancers, and crossed the bridge to -the faubourg. Thereupon a Prussian battalion instantly passed over and -took possession of the town. This adventurous squadron had actually -captured prisoners and many wagons loaded with provisions. When the -two divisions of cavalry, preceding the infantry advance, rode towards -Douzy and Carignan, they struck the tail of Lebrun’s Corps, and fired -into the distant columns which Ducrot, on the other side of the Chiers, -was leading by the hill roads to Francheval. In fact, by noon the -Guard horsemen were masters of Carignan and such provision stores as -the French had not time to destroy; and the Saxons, passing through -Douzy, had fallen upon a convoy on the right bank. The fire of infantry -forced them back upon the town, but they held that and the unbroken -bridge until the advance guard of the 12th came up in the afternoon -and established themselves in the place. The Prussian Guard meanwhile, -after a long march, had reached, with its leading battalions, Porru -aux Bois and Francheval, the main body halting between Sachy and -Missincourt, and the cavalry remaining in the rear. Thus, the Saxon -Prince’s Army had secured all the bridges over the Chiers and the -important passage at Mouzon, where the 4th Corps stood on both banks of -the Meuse. The outposts formed a chain from the right bank of the river -in front of Douzy, through Francheval to the Belgian frontier, at that -point only nine miles from the Chiers, and sixteen from the Meuse. This -narrow belt of territory was thus barred against French enterprise; -the road to Montmédy and Metz was definitely closed. The Saxon Prince -did not push farther westward, because he knew that the Great Staff -had planned a passage of the Meuse below Sedan for the next day, and, -therefore, he did not wish to alarm the French. Enough had been done -and his troops needed rest, especially the Guard, the whole of which -had marched during the day upwards of thirty miles, and the advance -guards more. No wonder the French were astounded at the “prodigious -marches” made by Germans, whom they had considered to be incapable of -such energy and endurance. Some share of the French disasters must be -attributed to that fatal form of error—contempt for the enemy. - -Not less success attended the operations of the Prussian Crown Prince, -whose business it was to secure possession of the left bank of the -Meuse, and, if practicable, bring batteries to bear upon the French -troops. We have already described the effect produced by the horse -artillery batteries established under the protection of the cavalry -at Frenois upon the railway officials who sent off the provision -trains, and upon the drivers who ran away with the powder and tools -required to destroy the bridge at Donchery. Behind the cavalry the -whole Army was soon in motion. The Würtembergers marched from Verrières -to the neighbourhood of Flize, where they became engaged with Vinoy’s -outposts, and induced them to burn the bridge over the Meuse. The 11th -Corps moved upon Donchery, and, during the afternoon, not only secured -the important bridge at that place, but constructed a second. The 5th -Corps stood close in rear of the 11th, and the Second Bavarians halted -at Raucourt. On the extreme left the 6th Corps, covering the rear, -went to Attigny, Semoy, and Amagne; the 5th Division of Cavalry was -at Tourteron, and the 6th at Poix, both scouting over the railway to -Reims, and one breaking the line at Faux. - -The 1st Bavarian Corps, which led the infantry advance upon the Meuse, -moved early from Raucourt upon Remilly and Aillicourt. They had only -started at eight o’clock, yet their guns were in position opposite -Bazeilles before the last division of Lebrun’s Corps, marching from -Douzy, could gain the village. The guns opened at very long range, and -Lebrun, who was on the watch, was so impressed that he ordered the -division to turn back and enter the position by Daigny, where there was -a bridge over the Givonne. The French drew out their guns, which led -Von der Tann to reinforce his own, so that there was soon a powerful -line of batteries in action, and some houses in Bazeilles broke out -into flames. Then the Bavarian infantry brigades arrived to support the -advance guard, and the French threw out infantry to annoy the hostile -gunners. Presently a sharp-eyed artilleryman observed that barrels -of powder had been brought down to the railway bridge, apparently -with intent to blow it up. Thereupon General von Stephan directed a -Jäger battalion to frustrate this design; and just as the French were -lowering some barrels under the furthest arch, the Jägers, dashing on -to the bridge, fell upon the working party, drove it off, and poured -the powder into the Meuse. In this daring fashion was the railway -viaduct saved from destruction under the noses of the 12th Corps. Von -der Tann, having the fear of Von Moltke before his eyes, desired to -save the bridge but not engage beyond the stream. The Jägers, however, -who, in the judgment of their comrades, held a post of peril, were -promptly supported, and the forward spirit gaining the upper hand, the -little troop, driving in the French skirmishers, actually held for some -time the fringe of Bazeilles; but not being supported by the General, -who refused to disobey orders and bring on a premature engagement, -the hardy adventurers had to retire with loss, to the right bank. Yet -they secured the bridge from destruction, and to this day, apparently, -General Lebrun cannot understand how it came to pass that MacMahon’s -orders were not executed. The French say that the powder was spoilt and -that no fresh supply could be got from Sedan; but no effort is made to -explain why, when the Bavarians threw a pontoon bridge over the Meuse, -just above the railway crossing, Lebrun’s people did nothing to prevent -it. The truth is that they could not prevent one bridge from being -preserved, and the other from being built. - -The gain on the day’s resolute operations, therefore, was the -acquisition of three permanent bridges over the Meuse, two above and -one below Sedan; the seizure of all the passages across the Chiers; -and the concentration of both Armies upon the right and left banks of -the river within striking distance of the French troops packed up in a -narrow area about Sedan. The Crown Prince brought his head-quarters to -Chémery, and the King went through that place on his way to Vendresse. -At Chémery, “a brief conference was held between the Generals Von -Moltke, Von Podbielski, and Von Blumenthal, relative to the general -state of the campaign and the next steps which should be taken.” It was -a notable meeting, and few words, indeed, were required to indicate -the finishing touches of an enterprise, so unexpectedly imposed on -them, and so resolutely carried out by these skilful, far-seeing, and -audacious captains. They had come to the conclusion that the French -had before them only one of two courses—they must either retreat -bodily into Belgium, or sacrifice the greater part of their Army in an -endeavour with the remainder to reach Paris by way of Mézières. There -was a third—to remain and be caught—but a finis so triumphant was not -foreseen by the trio of warriors who met in the village of Chémery. - - - _The Battlefield of Sedan._ - -The battlefield of Sedan may be described as the space lying within -the angle formed by the Meuse, and its little affluent, the Givonne, -which flows in a southerly direction from the hills near the Belgian -frontier. After passing Bazeilles and its bright meadows, the greater -river meanders towards the north-west, making, a little below Sedan, a -deep loop inclosing the narrow peninsula of Iges on three sides, and -then running westward by Donchery, Dom le Mesnil and Flize to Mézières. -From the northern end of the loop to the Givonne, the ground is a -rugged, undulating upland, attaining its maximum of height a little -south of the Calvaire d’Illy, at a point where the Bois de la Garenne -begins to clothe the steep slopes on the south and east. Lower still -is a deep defile, called the Fond de Givonne, through which, turning -the wood, runs the highway from Sedan to Bouillon, a town on the Semoy -in Belgium. The eastern face of the position, therefore, was the line -of the Givonne, a belt of cottages, gardens, factories and villages; -the southern and south-western was the fortress and the Meuse; the -north-western front was on the hills between Floing and Illy, and the -lowlands on the loop of the Meuse. The interval between Illy and the -Givonne was, at first, neglected because the French held that no troops -could work through the dense forest and broken ground. The issues from -this man-trap were the narrow band of territory between the head of the -Meuse loop and the wooded Belgian frontier; the high road to Bouillon; -the routes eastward to Carignan up the Chiers, and the gate of Torcy on -the south. They were all difficult, and in the nature of defiles which -can only be traversed slowly, even in time of peace, by large bodies of -men, horses, guns and wagons. - -Within this remarkable inclosure the French Army sat down on the 31st -of August. The 12th and the 1st Corps, Lebrun’s and Ducrot’s, held the -line of the Givonne, looking east and south-east, because Lebrun had -to guard the Meuse at Bazeilles. The 5th Corps, now under De Wimpffen, -was partly in the “old camp,” close under the fortress, and partly -behind the 7th, which, as we have said, occupied the rolling heights -between Floing and Illy with a strong outpost in St. Menges, at the -head of the Meuse loop on the road which led to Mézières through Vrigne -aux Bois—the road supposed to be unknown to the Germans, because it -was not laid down on the French maps. The cavalry posted in rear of -the 7th were the divisions of Margueritte, Bonnemains and Amiel, while -Michel was behind Ducrot’s left at the village of Givonne. The sun -set, and the night passed, yet Marshal MacMahon expressed no decision. -Believing that the enemy’s numerical strength had been exaggerated, -or that he could break out in any direction when he pleased, or -trusting to fortune and the opportunities which might offer during the -conflict, perhaps imagining that Von Moltke would grant him another -day, the Marshal became the sport of circumstance which had escaped -his control. “The truth is,” he said to the Parliamentary Commission, -“that I did not reckon on fighting a battle on the ground we occupied. -I knew already that we had no provisions, and that the place was -barely supplied with munitions, but I did not yet know on which side I -ought, on the morrow (the 1st) to effect my retreat.” The unfaltering -adversary had no such doubts, and his firm purpose brought on not only -the Battle, but the Investment of Sedan. For the information which -reached the Great Head-quarters during the evening of the 31st, induced -Von Moltke to quicken the operations. He inferred that no attempt would -be made by the French to break out by Carignan; that they might try to -reach Mézières or pass into Belgium; and as he was eager to frustrate -their escape by any route, he instructed the Prussian Crown Prince -to set his Corps in motion during the night. The Prince immediately -issued the needful orders, and directed Von der Tann to attack with -his Bavarians at dawn, without awaiting the arrival of the 12th Corps, -so that Lebrun in Bazeilles being held fast, the attention of the -French might be attracted towards that side. The Saxon Prince, being -duly informed, entered with characteristic spirit and daring into the -plan, and not only determined to be early on the scene of action with -the 12th and the Guard, but to push the latter well forward, so as -to anticipate the French should they endeavour to gain the Belgian -border. Thus a common motive animated the German chiefs who, in taking -firm steps to gain a decisive result, were so well seconded by their -tireless and intrepid soldiers. - - - _The Battle of Sedan._ - -A thick white mist filled the valley of the Meuse on the morning of -the 1st of September, 1870, so thick that Von der Tann’s Bavarians, -marching towards the railway bridge and the pontoons above it, could -not see many steps ahead, as in two columns they moved at four o’clock -in careful silence through the dense and clammy atmosphere. At that -very time General Lebrun, whose anxieties kept him awake, started up, -and rushing forth, made the first bugler he encountered sound the call, -which roused the wearied troops sleeping on the hills between Bazeilles -and Balan. Yet it would seem that, outside the former village, no -adequate watch was kept, for when the leading Bavarians emerged from -the fog, they gained at once possession of several houses, and even -entered the principal street without firing a shot. It was only when -the enemy were within the place, that the gallant Marine Infantry, -posted in the houses and behind barricades, abruptly arrested the -intruders by opening a smart fire. Then began a sanguinary contest for -the possession of Bazeilles, which raged during many hours; a series -of street fights in which the inhabitants took an active part; combats -ebbing and flowing through and round the market-place, the church, -the larger mansions, and the pretty park of Monvillers, washed and -beautified by the stream of the Givonne. Without a detailed plan, the -incidents of this terrible episode in the battle, are unintelligible. -Vassoigne and Martin des Pallières, before the latter was wounded -on the 31st, had devised a plan of resistance worthy of the gallant -division they led, and it may be said that the defence of Bazeilles -was the most creditable feat of arms performed by the French on that -dreadful day. During the earlier hours, indeed, they kept the upper -hand, driving the Bavarians out of the village on all sides, but -being unable to eject them from two stone houses abutting on the chief -street. The Bavarian batteries beyond the Meuse could not open fire -until six o’clock, because the fog had shut out the view, which even -then was indistinct. About this time General Lebrun, who was quickly on -the scene, had called reinforcements from the 1st and 5th Corps; but -then the Saxons had come up opposite La Moncelle, where one battery, -firing at long range, astonished Lebrun, who saw that the shells from -his own guns fell short, or burst in the air. When the 12th assailed -La Moncelle fresh Bavarian columns had crossed the Meuse, and the -fierce conflict which began in Bazeilles, had extended to the park -of Monvillers, where the French fought steadily. After four hours -strenuous battle, no marked progress had been made in this quarter, -where three Bavarian brigades had fallen almost wholly into skirmishing -order, scattered amidst the houses and lanes of the villages, and some -part of the park on the left bank of the Givonne. Von der Tann bringing -over another brigade and the reserve artillery from the left bank of -the Meuse, called up a division of the 4th Corps which he held back as -a reserve. During the course of this stubborn combat, the Saxon Corps -had seized La Moncelle, and had brought ten batteries to bear on that -village and Daigny, their left flank being prolonged by two Bavarian -batteries. The accuracy of their fire still further astonished General -Lebrun, who confesses that he had never seen such artillery. He and his -staff, six or eight persons, were on an eminence above La Moncelle. -“The shells,” he writes, “cut off one branch after another, from the -tree at the foot of which I stood holding my horse;” and he goes on -to say that in quick succession, one officer was killed, two mortally -wounded, and two men who bore his fanion were hit. He was as much -impressed by the “avalanche de fer” as Marshal Canrobert himself. The -infantry in Bazeilles resisted superbly, but the French General was -none the less amazed by the terrible fire of the German guns. Between -eight and nine the wave of battle was flowing up the Givonne, for the -Guard were now approaching from Villers-Cernay. - - - _MacMahon’s Wound and its Consequences._ - -Meanwhile, inside the French lines, the drama had deepened, for the -Commander-in-Chief had been wounded. Marshal MacMahon has related how, -before daybreak, fearing lest the Germans should have moved troops -over the Meuse at Donchery, he had sent two officers to look into -matters in that quarter, and was awaiting their return when, about five -o’clock, he received a despatch from Lebrun, which made him mount his -ready-saddled horse and ride towards Bazeilles. Arrived there he saw -that the place was well defended, and went to the left intending to -examine the whole line of the Givonne, especially as Margueritte had -sent word that German troops were moving towards Francheval. Halting -above La Moncelle, not far from Lebrun, the Marshal has stated that -while he was gazing intently upon the heights in front of the Bois -Chevalier, and could not see anything, he was struck by the fragment of -a shell. At first he thought that he was only bruised, but that being -obliged to dismount from his horse, which was also wounded, he fainted -for a moment, and then found that his wound was severe. Unable to bear -up any longer he gave over the command of the Army to General Ducrot, -and was carried to Sedan. That officer did not hear of the event until -seven or later; it is impossible to fix precisely the moment when the -Marshal was hit, nor when Ducrot learned his destiny, the evidence is -so contradictory; but sometime between seven and eight Ducrot took -the reins. His first act was to order a retreat on Mézières; Lebrun -begged him to reflect and he did, but soon afterwards became positive. -“There is not a moment to lose,” he cried; and it was arranged that the -retreat should be made in echelons, beginning from the right of the -12th Corps. Neither General knew the real facts of the situation, nor -guessed even how vast were the numbers of the enemy. - -The retreat began; it attracted the notice of Napoleon III., who had -ridden on to the field above Balan; and it roused De Wimpffen. He -carried in his pocket an order from Palikao authorizing him to succeed -MacMahon, if the Marshal were killed or disabled. He had kept the -fact secret; after the Marshal fell he still hesitated to use his -letter, but not long. The combat about Bazeilles was well sustained; -the cavalry had been out a little way beyond St. Menges and, as usual, -after a perfunctory search, had “seen nothing,” the attack on the -Givonne even was not fully developed. General de Wimpffen, perhaps from -mixed motives, resolved to interfere and show his old comrades how a -man who really knew war could extricate a French Army from perils in -which it had been placed by weakness and incompetence. He certainly -thought himself a great man, and he roughly stopped the retreat. -Ducrot was indignant, but he obeyed. Lebrun was not more favourably -affected by De Wimpffen’s loud voice and overbearing manner. “I will -not have a movement upon Mézières,” he exclaimed. “If the Army is to -retreat, it shall be on Carignan and not on Mézières.” It should again -be observed that the new Commander-in-Chief was quite as ignorant of -the facts as his predecessors, and even when he wrote his book many -months afterwards had not learned from sources open to all the world -how many men stood at that moment between him and Carignan, nor was he -at all acquainted with the difficult country through which he would -have to move. Ducrot’s plan, which would have placed the Army between -the Meuse below Sedan and the forest on the frontier, leaving a clear -sweep for the guns of the fortress, was far more sensible than that of -his imperious rival. Still, to have a chance of success, it should have -been begun early in the morning, when the 5th and 11th German Corps -were struggling towards the woods; even then it would have probably -failed, but there would have been no capitulation of Sedan. General de -Wimpffen, although he did not know it, was actually playing into the -hand of Von Moltke, who desired above all things that the French Corps -on the Givonne should remain there, because he knew, so great were -his means, so firm his resolution, and so admirable as marchers and -fighters were his soldiers, that the gain of a few hours would enable -him to surround the Army of Chalons. - -How far the retreat from the front line was carried, when it was -stayed, and in what degree it injured the defence, cannot possibly be -gleaned from the French narratives, which are all vague and imperfect -in regard to time and place. We know that the Germans did not carry -Bazeilles until nearly eleven o’clock, and then only by dint of turning -movements executed by the Saxons and fresh Bavarian troops from the -direction of La Moncelle. General Ducrot, in his account, places his -stormy interview with De Wimpffen at a little after nine; and he says -that when it ended he spurred in haste towards his divisions—Pellé’s -and L’Hériller’s—and made them descend a part of the positions which -they had climbed a few instants before. Lebrun is equally vague. He -says in one place that when De Wimpffen came up his first brigades -had “partly” crossed the Fond de Givonne, and in another, that the -Marine Infantry had abandoned Bazeilles, which they had not done -before nine o’clock. General de Wimpffen’s recollections are still more -confused and his chronology unintelligible; so that it is impossible -to ascertain precisely what happened beyond the Givonne after Ducrot -ordered and his successor countermanded the retreat. If we take the -German accounts, and try to measure the influence of the much-debated -retreat by the resistance which the assailants encountered, we may -doubt whether it had much greater influence on the issue than that -which grew out of the impaired confidence of the troops in their -antagonistic and jealous commanders. Nevertheless, it is probable that -the swaying to and fro in the French line between Bazeilles and the -village of Givonne, after nine o’clock, did, in some degree, favour -the assailants, and render the acquisition of Bazeilles as well as -the passage of the brook less difficult and bloody. In any case, the -intervention of De Wimpffen can only be regarded as a misfortune for -the gallant French Army, which can hardly find consolation in the fact -that within four-and-twenty hours he was obliged to sign with his name -the capitulation of Sedan. - -This needful explanation and comment serves to illustrate the disorder, -the infirmity of purpose, and the rivalries which existed in the French -camp; and we may well agree with Marshal MacMahon when he says that the -blow which obliged him to relinquish the command was a grievous event. -Doubtless he would have taken a decided course had he not been wounded, -and would have marched, if he could, with all his forces, either on -Mézières or Carignan; and besides, he says, there was Belgium near at -hand. He would not have tried to do all three at once. It is only an -Army, well compacted and educated from the bottom to the top which can, -without serious detriment, bear three successive commanders in three -hours. - - - _Progress of the Battle on the Givonne._ - -While the French generals, almost in the presence of the helpless -Emperor, were using high words and thwarting each other’s plans, the -German onset had proceeded on all sides with unabated vigour. But, -about nine o’clock, or a little earlier, the French dashed forward so -impetuously that the foremost German troops on the Givonne as far as -Daigny, had to give ground; and the batteries were so vexed by musketry -fire that they also fell back on some points. In fact Lebrun’s left and -Ducrot’s right came on with great spirit, and shook, but did not arrest -long the hostile line. It was not until this period that the French in -Daigny pushed a brigade on to the left bank of the Givonne and occupied -ground which, by the confession of their staff officers, had never been -reconnoitred. They brought over a battery, and General Lartigue rode -with them. The brunt of the onslaught, falling upon the Saxon infantry -immediately in front, these were hard bested; but reinforcements -arriving on either hand closed in upon the enemy’s flanks, and, not -only was he routed from the field, but, being swiftly pursued, his -battery was captured, and the Saxons following the French into Daigny -wrested from them the village, the bridge, and the opposite bank of the -brook. General Lartigue’s horse was killed by a shell, and he narrowly -escaped capture, and was then, or shortly afterwards, wounded. His -chief of the staff, Colonel d’Andigné, hit twice, dropped in a field of -beet-root. Shells from his own side fell near him, and he was grateful -to them because they drove away a pig which came and sniffed at his -wounds. Saxon soldiers gave him wine and lumps of sugar, but one of -them stole his watch and cross; in the end he was tenderly carried to -an ambulance. Some of the Zouaves engaged in this combat about Daigny, -cut off from the main body of fugitives, turned northward, entered the -woods, and reached Paris after traversing the Belgian border. - -The Germans owed their quick success at Daigny to the fact that -Lartigue was not supported, and to the fortunate advent, at a critical -moment, of the leading troops of the Second Saxon Division, the whole -of the 12th Corps being now on the ground, engaged or in reserve. It -need scarcely be remarked that the batteries, as usual, preceded the -bulk of the infantry, for it was the Saxon guns which extorted the -admiration of Lebrun. The attack, which had been made from his side, -upon the Saxons and Bavarians about La Moncelle, was equally brilliant -at the outset, for, as we have stated, the German batteries were driven -back by the close musketry, and the French were advancing impetuously, -when a Saxon regiment and part of a Bavarian brigade striking into the -fight, stopped the French and drove them across the rivulet. Then the -artillery returned; soon there were ninety-six guns in action; and the -infantry pressing on, restored the battle. But in Bazeilles itself the -Marines had gained ground, and fresh troops had to be poured into the -village or upon its outskirts to sustain the assailants, who were still -held at bay by the stout defenders. Yet the final stroke at the village -was delivered shortly after this check. The troops in Monvillers -and La Moncelle simultaneously swept forward from the orchards, and -osier-beds, and gardens, until they emerged on the heights beyond, and -showed a front which threatened the road from Bazeilles to Balan. - -The French stronghold in the place was a large villa on the north, -which had resisted all day; but now the freshly arrived Bavarians -penetrated into the garden and turned the building on one side; while -the Saxons grouped in the park of Monvillers, cutting a path through -the hedges with their billhooks, appeared on the other. The French -then retreated; but the splendid defence of the whole position had -inflicted a heavy loss on the adversary. - -In Bazeilles itself a conflict continued between the armed inhabitants -and the Bavarians, and soon after the whole village was in flames. -Whether it was set on fire purposely or not is to this day a matter -of bitter controversy; but it stands on record that only thirty-nine -lay persons met their deaths, during this long contest, from fire or -sword. It was not the interest of the Germans to create a furnace -across a line of road; and one effect of the conflagration was that the -German pioneers, unable to quench it, were compelled to open a line of -communication with the troops on the fighting line outside the burning -village. - -The French retired and reformed between the Fond de Givonne and Balan, -whence their line ran northward, no longer in the valley, but along the -uplands to the Calvaire d’Illy; for the Prussian Guard, issuing from -Villers-Cernay and Francheval, had thrust the French out of the village -of Givonne, and, long before Bazeilles was finally mastered, had -established powerful lines of guns which harassed the French troops in -the Bois de la Garenne. In fact, by nine o’clock, there were six guard -batteries in action, and two hours afterwards the number was increased -to fourteen. Givonne was seized a little later, and infantry support -afforded to the right of the 12th Corps; but Prince Augustus, in -conformity with his instructions, held the main body of the Guard ready -to march towards Fleigneux, effect a junction with the Third Army, and -bar the road to Bouillon. From an eminence a little east of Givonne and -just south of La Viré farm, whereon eighteen guns stood, the Prince, -looking westward about nine o’clock, saw the smoke of that combat -near St. Menges, which he knew marked the formidable intervention of -the 5th and 11th Corps, whose operations in the forenoon must now be -succinctly described. - - - _The March on St. Menges._ - -It will be remembered that, on receiving a pressing order from Von -Moltke, the Prussian Crown Prince directed the two Corps just named and -the Würtemberg division to move out in the dark and occupy the Mézières -road in order to intercept the French should they endeavour to retire -upon that town. They promptly obeyed. The Würtembergers crossed the -Meuse on a bridge of their own making, at Dom le Mesnil; the 5th and -11th at Donchery by the permanent bridge and two improvised passages. -The object of the two Corps was to occupy the nearest villages on the -Mézières road, Vrigne aux Bois and Vivier au Court, both which were -attained about half-past seven, when the contest was fierce on the -Givonne. Here the generals commanding, Von Kirchbach and Von Gersdorf, -received that despatch from the Prussian Crown Prince which directed -them to march on St. Menges and Fleigneux, for at head-quarters -a strong hope had now arisen that the Army of Chalons could be -surrounded. The 11th moved on the right, next the Meuse, the 5th on -the left; but the roads were few between the river and the forest—one -column lost its way, and both Corps at the head of the Loop had to use -the same road. No French scouts were out along this important line of -communication. Margueritte’s horsemen had patrolled a short distance, -about six, but neither saw nor heard of the approaching columns; nor -until the German Hussars, leading the erring column ascending the Meuse -from Montimont, had got close to St. Menges, were they discovered by a -French patrol sent out at the suggestion of De Wimpffen. - - - _The 11th and 5th Corps engage._ - -The shots exchanged by the hostile cavaliers aroused the French -infantry in St. Menges; but they offered no resistance when the nearest -German battalion attacked the village, which was immediately occupied. -Two companies, prolonging the movement, effected a lodgment in Floing -and could not be expelled; while three batteries, escorted by the -Hussars, dashed upon the ridge south of St. Menges, partly protected -by a copse, and opened fire on the French. It was this initial combat -which attracted the notice of Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, who looked -with interest, from his hill above the Givonne, upon the white battle -smoke which curled up beyond the heights of Illy. Shortly afterwards -seven additional batteries issued from the defile and formed in -succession on the hill—the same which had filled General Douay with -anxiety the day before—and some infantry battalions followed; but the -body of the 11th Corps was only just clearing the pass, and the 5th -was still behind. In order to protect the batteries, infantry supports -were advanced on either flank and in front towards the Illy brook. -General Margueritte, on the Calvaire d’Illy had watched this unwelcomed -development of artillery. Seeing the infantry spread out below, he -thought that his horse might ride them down and then disable the line -of batteries, which seemed to be without adequate support. Accordingly, -by his order, General de Galliffet led forth three regiments of -Chasseurs d’Afrique and two squadrons of Lancers against the intrusive -foot and audacious gunners. But he never got near the batteries. -Swooping down the slope upon the infantry below him, his men and horses -soon fell fast, and although they swept through the skirmishers, they -were crushed by the fire of the supports and the guns on the hill and -the squads of infantry on either side. They endeavoured to ride in -upon the flanks, but their bravery was displayed in vain, for nothing -could live under the fire which smote them, and they rode back, -frustrated, to the shelter of their own lines. The cavalry outburst -had been repelled by a few companies of foot on an open hill-side. So -puissant is the breech-loader in the hands of cool infantry soldiers. -But the French foot took up the game, and the chassepot, deftly plied, -forced the forward German skirmishers to fall back on the villages and -hills. - -Gradually the two Corps arrived on the scene. Before eleven o’clock -the artillery of the 5th, preceding its infantry, went into line on a -second ridge to the westward, and soon twenty-four batteries—that is, -144 guns—were pouring an “avalanche de fer” into the French position, -and crossing their fire with that of the Guard batteries, which -showered their shells into the right rear of Douay’s men from the -heights beyond the Givonne. About this time, also, as reinforcements -came up to Fleigneux, the companies there moved westward towards Olly; -captured, on their way, eight guns, many horses, much munition, and -above a hundred officers and men, who seemed intent on escaping over -the frontier, and finally entered Olly, where soon afterwards they -were gratified by the arrival of a squadron of Prussian Hussars of -the Guard. Thus was the circle completed which placed the two Armies -in communication. In front of the right wing the two companies which -at the outset obtained a lodgment in Floing, were at length supported -and relieved. As the infantry from the wooded region north of the -Meuse Loop arrived, they took the place of the battalions near the -guns, and these then went forward upon Floing, one after the other, -and by degrees got possession of the village. But the French delivered -a counterstroke so well pushed that the defenders of Floing could -not keep them back, and they were only thrust out by the timely -intervention of three fresh battalions from St. Menges. The French -retired towards the heights of Cazal, and for some time stopped the -further advance of their foes. - -The battle was now practically won; for the Germans held Balan as well -as Bazeilles, supported by one-half the 2nd Bavarian Corps brought up -to aid the 1st; one division of the 4th Corps was deep in the fight, -and the other in reserve, close at hand; the line of the Givonne, from -end to end, was occupied on both banks; the Guard Cavalry, after vainly -trying to charge up the Calvaire d’Illy, were behind the 5th Corps; -south of the Meuse a Bavarian division faced the fortress; and to the -west the Würtembergers interposed between Vinoy’s troops in Mézières -and Sedan. Above all, a little after one o’clock, there were no fewer -than 426 guns hailing shells upon the unfortunate French, who were -almost piled one upon another in an area which did not measure two -miles either in depth or breadth. It stands on record that there were -in full action twenty-six batteries on the North, twenty-four on the -East, ten to the West of La Moncelle, and eleven on the South between -Wadelincourt and Villette—an array of force enough to crush out all -resistance; but the conflict still continued, for no one had authority -sufficient to stop the awful carnage. - - - _The Condition of the French Army._ - -The main interest of the drama henceforth centres in the despairing -efforts of the French to avert the catastrophe of Sedan. Early in -the morning the Emperor Napoleon mounted his horse and rode out with -his own staff to witness the battle. On his way towards Bazeilles he -met and spoke to the wounded Marshal, who was being carried to the -hospital in Sedan. Then the Emperor rode towards the hills above La -Moncelle, and for several hours he lingered on the field, well under -fire, for two officers were wounded near him; but he had no influence -whatever on the battle. Soon after taking command, De Wimpffen, riding -out of the Fond de Givonne, came plump upon Napoleon as he watched -the fight near Balan. “All goes well, Sire,” said the General; “we -are gaining ground;” and when His Majesty remarked that the left, -meaning the front towards St. Menges, was threatened, the General -replied, “We shall first pitch the Bavarians into the Meuse, and then, -with all our forces, fall upon the new foe.” They parted, the Emperor -returning to Sedan, whence he did not emerge again that day, and the -General careering towards the fight. Then followed a sharp dispute -between De Wimpffen and Ducrot, in the presence of Lebrun, ending in -the order to stop the so-called retreat which had scarcely begun. It -is impossible to reconcile the conflicting accounts of these officers; -but De Wimpffen’s own words show that, at the time, he did not attach -great importance to the attack on Douay, for to that General he wrote, -“I believe in a demonstration upon your Corps, especially designed -to hinder you from sending help to the 1st and 12th Corps,” and he -asked him to aid Lebrun. Then he went himself to the position held by -Douay, in order to expedite the despatch of reinforcements. “Come and -see for yourself,” said Douay, on reaching the heights. “I saw quite -a hostile Army extending afar,” writes De Wimpffen, “and a formidable -artillery—the big batteries of the 5th and 11th Corps—firing with -a precision which, under other circumstances,” he adds, “I should -have been the first to admire.” Prince Bibesco says that De Wimpffen -promised to send troops from the 1st Corps to occupy the Calvaire -d’Illy, and then went away. As he was riding back, in that state of -emotion which the French describe by the phrase, “le cœur navré,” he -encountered Ducrot. “The events which I predicted,” said the latter, -“have happened sooner than I expected. The enemy is attacking the -Calvaire d’Illy. Douay is greatly shaken. Moments are precious. Hurry -up reinforcements if you would keep that position.” “Well,” retorted -De Wimpffen, still believing that he had only Bavarians to deal with, -“look after that yourself. Collect what troops you can and hold the -ground while I attend to the 12th Corps.” Thereupon Ducrot ordered -up guns and infantry; while then, or shortly afterwards, De Wimpffen -called for troops from Douay, who, believing the Calvaire was or would -be occupied by Ducrot’s people, sent off three brigades, and put his -last division in front line. Apparently the cross currents of wandering -battalions met in the wood of Garenne; and it is not easy to see how -any advantages were obtained by the shifting to and fro which went on. -Ducrot was anxious to defend the Illy plateau; De Wimpffen desired to -break out towards Carignan. He fondled the idea at one o’clock, when -neither object could possibly be attained; but if there had been a -chance left, the conflict between the two Generals would have sufficed -to destroy it. - -That “Army” which De Wimpffen saw from the north-western heights came -on in irresistible waves. The French infantry could not endure the -thick and ceaseless hail of shells from the terrible batteries. The -French artillery, brave and devoted, vainly went into action, for the -converging fire from the hostile hills blew up the tumbrils, sometimes -two at once, killed and wounded the gunners, and swept away the horses. -Ducrot’s reinforcements, despite his forward bearing and animated -language, melted away into the woods, and the last battalions and the -last two batteries led up by Douay were speedily forced to retire. The -Germans, already in the village of Illy, advanced to the Calvaire, -while the troops of the 11th Corps sallied out of Floing, deployed on -both sides, and soon the interval between the two villages was full of -hostile troops. General Ducrot pictures himself, and doubtless truly, -as using every effort by word and example to rally and hold fast the -foot; but they could not be held; they slipped off and vanished under -the trees. At this time the only strong body of French was Liébert’s -division above the terraced hill which leads up to Cazal, and the -cavalry of Margueritte and Bonnemains lurking in the hollows and under -the cover of trees. To these men Ducrot appealed, and his appeal was -nobly answered. - - - _The French Cavalry Charge._ - -General Margueritte commanded five regiments of horse, principally -Chasseurs d’Afrique. At the request of Ducrot he promptly moved out -from cover, and prepared to charge; but wishing to reconnoitre the -ground, he rode in advance, and was hit in the head by a bullet which -traversed his face. Mortally wounded, he gave the command to De -Galliffet, and rode off, supported by two men, and grasping the saddle -with both hands, “the star of his arm,” as Colonel Bonie poetically -calls him. Then De Galliffet performed his task, and rode straight -into the intrusive enemy. For half an hour, on the hill sides south -of Floing, and even the lowlands bordering the Meuse, the dashing -French horsemen dauntlessly struck at their foes. The German infantry -scattered in lines of skirmishers, were just attaining the crest of -the eminence, when the cavalry dashed upon them. They broke through -the skirmishers, but fell in heaps under the fire of the compact -bodies of supports. Failing to crush a front, they essayed the flanks -and even the rear, and nothing dismayed, sought again and again to -ride over the stubborn adversary, who, relying on his rifle, would not -budge. The more distant infantry and the guns, when occasion served, -smote these devoted cavaliers. Sometimes the Germans met them in line, -at others they formed groups, or squares as the French call them, and -occasionally they fought back to back. One body of horse rode into a -battery, and was only repelled by the fire of a company of infantry. -Another dashed through a village on the banks of the river, and -although they were harried by infantry, and turned aside and followed -by some Prussian hussars, several rode far down the river, and created -some disorder in the German trains. There were many charges, all driven -home as far at least as the infantry fire would permit, more than one -carrying the furious riders up to the outskirts of Floing. But, in -the end, the unequal contests everywhere had the same result—bloody -defeat for the horseman, who matched himself, his lance or sword and -steed against the breech-loader held by steady hands in front of keen -eyes. Yet it is not surprising that these daring charges excited the -ungrudging admiration and deep sympathy of friend and foe. They did not -arrest the march of the German infantry, or turn the tide of battle, or -even infuse new courage into the French soldiers, who were exposed to -trials which few, if any, troops could bear. But they showed, plainly -enough, that the “furia francese” survived in the cavalry of France, -and that, if the mounted men refused or disdained to perform more -useful work by scouting afar and covering the front of armies, they -could still charge with unabated heroism on the field of battle. They -were dispersed, and they left behind heaps of dead and dying—one-half -their strength resting on the scene of their daring. Three Generals, -Margueritte, Girard and Tilliard, were killed, and Salignac-Fenelon -was wounded. The Germans say that their own losses were small, but -that among the Jägers a comparatively large number of men were wounded -by the sword. These notable exploits were done about two o’clock or -a little later; and, with slight exceptions, they mark the end of -desperately offensive resistance on the part of the French. - -During the next hour the Germans pressed their adversaries close up to -Sedan. “When the cavalry had been driven back in disorder,” says Ducrot -in his sweeping style, “the last bodies of infantry which had stood -firm broke and fled. Then on the right and left, with loud hurrahs, -which mingled with the roar of cannon and musketry, the Prussian lines -advanced.” The statement is too superlative. The cavalry in squads, -wandered, no doubt, from ravine to ravine, seeking an asylum, or tried -to enter the fortress. The remains of several brigades were piled up -in the wood of Garenne, and exposed to an incessant shell fire. But -Liébert’s division stoutly defended Cazal, and gave back, foot by foot, -until they also were under the ramparts. Towards four o’clock the -converging German columns, despite frantic onsets from bands of French -infantry, especially on the Givonne front, had thrust these over the -deep hollow way, and the victors were only halted when they came within -range of the garrison guns. - - - _General de Wimpffen’s Counterstroke._ - -Throughout the battle General de Wimpffen cherished the idea that it -would be feasible to crush “the Bavarians” and retreat on Carignan. At -one o’clock he sent a despatch to General Douay, telling the General -to cover his retreat in that direction. Douay received it an hour -afterwards, and he then replied that “with only three brigades, without -artillery, and almost without munitions,” the utmost he could do would -be to retreat in order from the field. That was near the moment when -Liébert began to fall back, fighting stiffly, from Cazal. At a quarter -past one De Wimpffen wrote a letter to the Emperor saying that “rather -than be made prisoner in Sedan,” he would force the line in his front. -“Let your Majesty,” he said, “place himself in the midst of his troops; -they will hold themselves bound in honour to fray out a passage.” His -Majesty took no notice of this appeal, and De Wimpffen waited in vain -for a reply; but he spent the time in an endeavour to dash in the -barrier in his front, direct an attack on the Givonne, which failed; -and to organize an onset on Balan, which partly succeeded. He went -into Sedan and brought out troops, and gathered up all he could from -the errant fragments of a broken Army. With these he fell fiercely and -unexpectedly upon the Bavarians in Balan; refused to suspend the fight -when ordered by the Emperor to open negotiations with the enemy; and by -degrees became master of all the village except one house. But he could -not emerge and continue his onslaught, for the hostile artillery began -to play on the village; reinforcements were brought up, arrangements -were made to frustrate the ulterior aim of the French and recover the -lost ground. Against a resolute advance the infantry led by De Wimpffen -could not stand, and possession of the village was regained just as the -white flag went up over the nearest gate of Sedan. Suddenly the firing -ceased on both sides. Although respectfully described by the Germans, -General de Wimpffen’s last charge is scoffed at by Ducrot and Lebrun, -whom he had enraged by declaring both guilty of disobedience. Lebrun, -who was an eye-witness as well as a gallant actor in the forlorn hope, -says that they had not gone a quarter of a mile before the column -broke and took refuge in the nearest houses. Looking back, De Wimpffen -is reported by his comrade to have said, “I see we are not followed -and that there is nothing more to do. Order the troops to retreat -on Sedan.” The battle had, at length, come to an end. The German -infantry, both near Cazal and Balan were within a short distance of -the fortifications; in the centre they stood south of the Warren Wood; -to the eastward long lines of guns crowned the heights on both banks -of the Givonne; on the south, the gate of Torcy was beset, and behind -all the foremost lines were ample reserves, horse as well as foot, -which had never fired a shot. The number of batteries had increased -during the afternoon, for the Würtemberg artillery was called over the -Meuse and set in array at the bend of the river above Donchery. Even -the high-tempered, if imperious, De Wimpffen was obliged to admit that -through this dread circle, neither for him nor any other, was there -an outlet. The agony had been prolonged, but enough had been done to -satisfy the “honour” of the most obstinate and punctilious of generals. -The wearied, wasted, famished, and unnerved French troops were thankful -for the impressive stillness and unwonted rest which came abruptly with -the declining sun, even though it set the seal on a horrible disaster. - - - _The Emperor and his Generals._ - -Had Napoleon III. retained that Imperial authority which he had been -supposed to possess, the slaughter might have been stayed some hours -before. For early in the afternoon he became convinced that the Army -could not be extricated, and that the time had come when it would -be well to treat. His experiences, as a superfluous attendant on the -battle-field, were dolorous. The first object which met his gaze was -the wounded Marshal. The depressing incident may have called up visions -of Italian triumphs; and, reflecting on the painful contrast, he may -have remembered what he said after returning from the sanguinary -victory of Solferino—that no more would he willingly lead great Armies -to war; for the sight of its horrors had touched the chord of sympathy -with human suffering which had always readily vibrated in his heart. -During several hours he watched the tempest lower and break in fury; -he saw and felt its effects, for two officers were shot at his side; -wherever he looked the clouds of encircling battle smoke rose in the -clear sunshine; and when he rode back into Sedan the terrible shells -were bursting in the ditches, and even on the bridge which he traversed -to gain his quarters. As the day wore on his gloomy meditations took a -more definite shape; he wished to stop the conflict, and he seems to -have thought first that an armistice might be obtained, and then that -the King of Prussia, if personally besought, would grant the Army easy -terms; for the idea of a capitulation had grown up and hardened in his -mind. - -At his instigation, no officer has come forward to claim the honour, -some one hoisted a white flag. As soon as he heard of it, General -Faure, Marshal MacMahon’s Chief of the Staff, ascended the citadel -and cut down a signal so irritating to his feelings; but no one told -the Emperor that his solitary, independent, and Imperial action, -since he joined the Army of Chalons as a fugitive, had been thus -irreverently contemned. “Why does this useless struggle still go on?” -he said to General Lebrun, who entered his presence some time before -three o’clock. “Too much blood has been shed. An hour ago I directed -the white flag to be hoisted in order to demand an armistice.” -The General politely explained that other forms were necessary—the -Commander-in-Chief must sign a letter and send a proper officer, a -trumpeter, and a man bearing a white flag, to the chief of the enemy. -Lebrun drew out such a form, and started forth. Faure, who had just -pulled down the white flag, would not look at it; De Wimpffen, seeing -Lebrun ride up followed by a horseman who carried a rag on a pole, -shouted out, “I will not have a capitulation; drop that flag; I shall -go on fighting;” and then ensued their adventures about Balan, which -have been described. When Lebrun had gone, Ducrot, and subsequently -Douay, visited the Emperor. Ducrot found the interior of the fortress -in a state which he qualifies as “indescribable.” “The streets, the -squares, the gates were choked up with carts, carriages, guns, the -impedimenta and debris of a routed Army. Bands of soldiers, without -arms or knapsacks, streamed in every moment, and hurried into the -houses and churches. At the gates many were trodden to death.” Those -who preserved some remains of vigour exhaled their wrath in curses, -and shouted “We have been betrayed, sold by traitors and cowards.” The -Emperor still wondered why the action went on, and rejected Ducrot’s -suggestion of a sortie at night as futile. He wished to stop the -slaughter; but he could not prevail on Ducrot to sign any letter. Douay -at first appeared disposed to accept the burden, but De Failly or -Lebrun induced him to revoke his consent by remarking that it entailed -the duty of fixing his name to a capitulation. General de Wimpffen sent -in his resignation, which, as the Emperor could not induce one of the -other generals to take his place, was absolutely refused. The shells -were bursting in the garden of the Sub-Prefecture, in the hospitals, -the streets, and among the houses, some of which were set on fire. In -these dire straits the Emperor at length resolved that the white flag -should be again unfurled, and should, this time, remain aloft in the -sunshine. Meantime, as evident signs indicating a desire to negotiate -had appeared at various points, and as the white flag surmounted -the citadel, the King directed Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf -and Captain von Winterfeld to summon the place to capitulate. When -Bronsart intimated to the Commandant of Torcy that he bore a summons -to the Commander-in-Chief, he was conducted to the Sub-Prefecture, -“where,” says the official narrative, “he found himself face to face -with the Emperor Napoleon, whose presence in Sedan until that moment -had been unknown at the German head-quarters.” The arrival of the -Prussian officer seems to have occurred just as the Emperor finished -writing a letter to the King destined to become famous. But he answered -Bronsart’s request that an officer fully empowered to treat should be -sent to the German head-quarters, by remarking that General de Wimpffen -commanded the Army. Thereupon, Colonel Bronsart departed, bearing a -weighty piece of intelligence indeed, but no effective reply; and soon -afterwards General Reille, intrusted with the Imperial letter, rode -out of the gate of Torcy and ascended the hill whence the King had -witnessed the battle. - - -_King William and his Warriors._ - -An eminence, selected by the Staff because it commanded an extensive -view, rises a little south of Frenois—the site has been marked on the -map with a small pyramid—and upon this, about seven o’clock, just -as the fog was lifting, King William took his stand. When the mists -vanished, the sun poured his dazzling splendour over the landscape, -and the air was so lucid that everything could be seen distinctly -through a powerful field-glass. “The sun shone out in full power,” -says Prince Bibesco. “The sun was exceedingly powerful,” writes Dr. -Russell. “The day had become so clear”—he is writing of the same period -as the Prince—“that through a good glass the movements of individual -men were plainly discernible.” And, a little earlier, he says, “on the -hills, through wood and garden,” he was looking towards the Givonne, -“and in the valleys, bayonets glistened, and arms twinkled and flashed -like a streamlet in moonlight.” And so it continued to the end. “The -hills of the battlefield,” writes Dr. Moritz Busch, “the gorge in -its midst, the villages, the houses and the towers of the fortress, -the suburb of Torcy, the ruined [railway] bridge to the left in the -distance, shone bright in the evening glow, and their details became -clearer every minute, as if one were looking through stronger and -stronger spectacles.” Through such a rich and transparent atmosphere -the King gazed from his height upon the city wherein Turenne was born, -in September, 1611, and on the battle which has made the little town -on the Meuse, which Vauban fortified, still more memorable. A glimpse -of the group on the hill is fortunately afforded by Dr. Russell, whose -keen eyes on a battlefield seem to overlook nothing. “Of the King, who -was dressed in his ordinary uniform, tightly buttoned and strapped,” it -is noted that he “spoke but little, pulled his moustache frequently, -and addressed a word to Von Moltke, Roon, or Podbielski,” who looked -frequently through a large telescope mounted on a tripod. “Moltke,” he -goes on, and the touch is characteristic, “when not looking through -the glass or at the map, stood in a curious musing attitude, with his -right hand to the side of his face, the elbow resting on the left -hand crossed towards his hip.” A picture of Von Moltke, which, taken -with what another observer calls his “refined and wrinkled face,” -deserves to live in the memory. Count Bismarck, we are told, “in his -white cuirassier flat cap with the yellow band and uniform, stood -rather apart, smoking a good deal, and chatting occasionally with a -short, thick-set, soldierly-looking man in the undress uniform of a -United States’ Lieutenant-General.” It was Sheridan. And near these -were many less famous personages, but representative of “all Germany,” -as one writer puts it. On another hill a little further west, whither -Dr. Russell transferred himself, was a second and notable group, which -he sketches. “The Crown Prince with his arms folded, and his flat -cap, uniform frock, and jack boots; Blumenthal so spruce and trim; -half-a-dozen princes and many aides-de-camp” were all sharply and -well-defined on the sky-line. Thus these two groups, “from morn to -dewy eve,” looked down, on, and into a scene which nature and man had -combined to make at once beautiful and sublime. - -It was towards the King’s hill that General Reille turned when he rode -out of the Torcy gate. Walking his horse up the steep, he dismounted, -and taking off his cap, presented a letter to his Majesty. King -William, breaking the Imperial seal, read these phrases, which, if -somewhat dramatic, are striking in their brevity:—[1] - -Monsieur mon Frère, - -N’ayant pu mourir au milieu de mes troupes, il ne me reste qu’ à -remettre mon epée entre les mains de Votre Majesté. - -Je suis de Votre Majesté, - -le bon Frère, - -NAPOLÉON. Sédan, le 1^{er} Septembre, 1870. - -Only one half hour earlier had Colonel Bronsart brought the startling -information that the Emperor was in Sedan! The King conferred with -his son, who had been hastily summoned, and with others of his trusty -servants, all deeply moved by complex emotions at the grandeur of their -victory. What should be done? The Emperor spoke for himself only, and -his surrender would not settle the great issue. It was necessary to -obtain something definite, and the result of a short conference was -that Count Hatzfeldt, instructed by the Chancellor, retired to draft a -reply. “After some minutes he brought it,” writes Dr. Busch, “and the -King wrote it out, sitting on one chair, while the seat of a second was -held up by Major von Alten, who knelt on one knee and supported the -chair on the other.” The King’s letter, brief and business-like, began -and ended with the customary royal forms, and ran as follows: - -“Regretting the circumstances in which we meet, I accept your Majesty’s -sword, and beg that you will be good enough to name an officer -furnished with full powers to treat for the capitulation of the Army -which has fought so bravely under your orders. On my side I have -designated General von Moltke for that purpose.” - -General Reille returned to his master, and as he rode down the hill -the astounding purport of his visit flew from lip to lip through the -exulting Army which now hoped that, after this colossal success, the -days of ceaseless marching and fighting would soon end. As a contrast -to this natural outburst of joy and hope we may note the provident -Moltke, who was always resolved to “mak siker.” His general order, -issued at once, suspending hostilities during the night, declared that -they would begin again in the morning should the negotiations produce -no result. In that case, he said, the signal for battle would be the -reopening of fire by the batteries on the heights east of Frénois. The -return of peace, so fervently desired by the Army, was still far off in -the distance when the tired victors bivouacked in quiet, and dreamed of -home through the short summer night. - -[Footnote 1: “Not having been able to die in the midst of my troops, -nothing remains for me but to place my sword in the hands of your -Majesty.”] - - - _How the Generals Rated each other._ - -While General Reille, who performed his part with so much modesty and -dignity, rode back over the Meuse, the Emperor still awaited, in the -Sub-Prefecture, the advent of General de Wimpffen, who was fretting -and fuming at the Golden Cross within the walls. According to his own -confession he had become convinced that the refusal of his sovereign to -head a sally from Balan had delivered over the Army to the mercy of the -Germans, and violent despair had taken possession of his soul. For had -not the Comte de Palikao sent him to overbear Napoleon III. and the set -who surrounded him, and had he not failed to bend the monarch to his -will? Twice, he repeats, with pride, “I obstinately refused to obey” -the Emperor’s invitation to treat with the enemy; and because Napoleon -III. had authoritatively interfered with his command he sent in that -letter of resignation which the Emperor refused to accept. At first he -seemed inclined to resist as well as resent the conduct of his master, -who had presumed to consult others and, by hoisting the white flag, to -take, as the General haughtily says, “a decision contrary to my will.” -Let the Emperor sign the capitulation. Such were the first thoughts -of a man whose temper was imperious, but whose better nature was not -insensible to reason. He quelled his wrath and threw off his despair, -moved, as he says, by the feeling that in defending the interests of -the Army he would be rendering a last service to his brave companions -in arms, and to his country. So he went from the Golden Cross to the -Sub-Prefecture. Still angry, he loudly asserted as soon as he entered -the room that he had been vanquished in battle because, addressing the -Emperor, “your Generals refused to obey me.” Thereupon Ducrot started -up, exclaiming, “Do you mean me? Your orders were only too well obeyed, -and your mad presumption has brought on this frightful disaster.” “If I -am incapable,” retorted De Wimpffen, “all the more reason why I should -not retain the command.” “You took it this morning,” shouted Ducrot, -also a violent man, “when you thought it would bring honour and profit. -You cannot lay it down now. You alone must bear (endosser) the shame of -the capitulation.” “Le General Ducrot était très exalté,” he says in -his narrative, and he calls on his brother officers who were present -to testify that he used these brave words, which, in substance, appear -in De Wimpffen’s account; but the latter adds that he threw back the -accusation, saying, “I took the command to evade a defeat which your -movement would have precipitated;” and that he requested General Ducrot -to leave the room, as he had not come to confer with him! What the -quiet and well-mannered Emperor thought of his two fiery and blustering -Generals is nowhere stated. The calm language in the pamphlet -attributed to Napoleon III., which shows, nevertheless, how deeply he -was vexed by De Wimpffen’s selfish wish to shirk his responsibilities -at such a moment, takes no note of the quarrel, and simply tells us how -“the General understood that, having commanded during the battle, his -duty obliged him not to desert his post in circumstances so critical.” -Thus, when General Reille returned with King William’s letter, he found -De Wimpffen in a reasonable frame of mind and ready to perform, with -courage and address, the hard task of obtaining the best terms he could -for the French Army from the placidly stern Von Moltke, in whose heart -there were no soft places when business had to be done. - - - _The Generals Meet at Donchery._ - -Late on the evening of September 1st a momentous session was held -in Donchery, the little town which commands a bridge over the Meuse -below Sedan. On one side of a square table covered with red baize sat -General von Moltke, having on his right hand the Quartermaster-General -von Podbielski, according to one account, and Von Blumenthal according -to another, and behind them several officers, while Count von -Nostitz stood near the hearth to take notes. Opposite to Von Moltke -sat De Wimpffen alone; while in rear, “almost in the shade,” were -General Faure, Count Castelnau, and other Frenchmen, among whom was -a Cuirassier Captain d’Orcet, who had observant eyes and a retentive -memory. Then there ensued a brief silence, for Von Moltke looked -straight before him and said nothing, while De Wimpffen, oppressed by -the number present, hesitated to engage in a debate “with the two men -admitted to be the most capable of our age, each in his kind.” But he -soon plucked up courage, and frankly accepted the conditions of the -combat. What terms, he asked, would the King of Prussia grant to a -valiant Army which, could he have had his will, would have continued -to fight? “They are very simple,” answered Von Moltke. “The entire -Army, with arms and baggage, must surrender as prisoners of war.” “Very -hard,” replied the Frenchman. “We merit better treatment. Could you not -be satisfied with the fortress and the artillery, and allow the Army to -retire with arms, flags and baggage, on condition of serving no more -against Germany during the war?” No. “Moltke,” said Bismarck recounting -the interview, “coldly persisted in his demand,” or as the attentive -D’Orcet puts it, “Von Moltke was pitiless.” Then De Wimpffen tried to -soften his grim adversary by painting his own position. He had just -come from the depths of the African desert; he had an irreproachable -military reputation; he had taken command in the midst of a battle, and -found himself obliged to set his name to a disastrous capitulation. -“Can you not,” he said, “sympathize with an officer in such a plight, -and soften, for me, the bitterness of my situation by granting more -honourable conditions?” He painted in moving terms his own sad case, -and described what he might have done; but seeing that his personal -pleadings were unheeded, he took a tone of defiance, less likely to -prevail. “If you will not give better terms,” he went on, “I shall -appeal to the honour of the Army, and break out, or, at least, defend -Sedan.” Then the German General struck in with emphasis, “I regret that -I cannot do what you ask,” he said; “but as to making a sortie, that -is just as impossible as the defence of Sedan. You have some excellent -troops, but the greater part of your infantry is demoralized. To-day, -during the battle, we captured more than twenty thousand unwounded -prisoners. You have only eighty thousand men left. My troops and guns -around the town would smash yours before they could make a movement; -and as to defending Sedan, you have not provisions for eight-and-forty -hours, nor ammunition which would suffice for that period.” Then, says -De Wimpffen, he entered into details respecting our situation, which, -“unfortunately, were too true,” and he offered to permit an officer to -verify his statements, an offer which the Frenchman did not then accept. - -Beaten off the military ground, De Wimpffen sought refuge in politics. -“It is your interest, from a political standpoint, to grant us -honourable conditions,” he said. “France is generous and chivalric, -responsive to generosity, and grateful for consideration. A peace, -based on conditions which would flatter the amour-propre of the Army, -and diminish the bitterness of defeat, would be durable; whereas -rigorous measures would awaken bad passions, and, perhaps, bring on an -endless war between France and Prussia.” The new ground broken called -up Bismarck, “because the matter seemed to belong to my province,” -he observed when telling the story; and he was very outspoken as -usual. “I said to him that we might build on the gratitude of a -prince, but certainly not on the gratitude of a people—least of all -on the gratitude of the French. That in France neither institutions -nor circumstances were enduring; that governments and dynasties were -constantly changing, and the one need not carry out what the other had -bound itself to do. That if the Emperor had been firm on his throne, -his gratitude for our granting good conditions might have been counted -upon; but that as things stood it would be folly if we did not make -full use of our success. That the French were a nation full of envy -and jealousy, that they had been much mortified by our success at -Königgratz, and could not forgive it, though it in nowise damaged them. -How, then, should any magnanimity on our side move them not to bear -us a grudge for Sedan.” This Wimpffen would not admit. “France,” he -said, “had much changed latterly; it had learned under the Empire to -think more of the interests of peace than of the glory of war. France -was ready to proclaim the fraternity of nations; and more of the same -kind.” Captain d’Orcet reports that, in addition, Bismarck denied that -France had changed, and that to curb her mania for glory, to punish -her pride, her aggressive and ambitious character, it was imperative -that there should be a glacis between France and Germany. “We must have -territory, fortresses and frontiers which will shelter us for ever -from an attack on her part.” Further remonstrances from De Wimpffen -only drew down fresh showers of rough speech very trying to bear, and -when Bismarck said “We cannot change our conditions,” De Wimpffen -exclaimed, “Very well; it is equally impossible for me to sign such a -capitulation, and we shall renew the battle.” - -Here Count Castelnau interposed meekly to say, on behalf of the -Emperor, that he had surrendered, personally, in the hope that his -self-sacrifice would induce the King to grant the Army honourable -terms. “Is that all?” Bismarck inquired. “Yes,” said the Frenchman. -“But what is the sword surrendered,” asked the Chancellor; “is it -his own sword, or the sword of France?” “It is only the sword of -the Emperor,” was Castelnau’s reply. “Well, there is no use talking -about other conditions,” said Von Moltke, sharply, while a look of -contentment and gratification passed over his face, according to -Bismarck; one “almost joyful,” writes the keen Captain d’Orcet. “After -the last words of Von Moltke,” he continues, “De Wimpffen exclaimed, -‘We shall renew the battle.’ ‘The truce,’ retorted the German General, -‘expires to-morrow morning at four o’clock. At four, precisely, I shall -open fire.’ We were all standing. After Von Moltke’s words no one spoke -a syllable. The silence was icy.” But then Bismarck intervened to sooth -excited feelings, and called on his soldier comrade to show, once -more, how impossible resistance had become. The group sat down again -at the red baize-covered table, and Von Moltke began his demonstration -afresh. “Ah,” said De Wimpffen, “your positions are not so strong as -you would have us believe them to be.” “You do not know the topography -of the country about Sedan,” was Von Moltke’s true and crushing answer. -“Here is a bizarre detail which illustrates the presumptuous and -inconsequent character of your people,” he went on, now thoroughly -aroused. “When the war began you supplied your officers with maps of -Germany at a time when they could not study the geography of their own -country for want of French maps. I tell you that our positions are not -only very strong, they are inexpugnable.” It was then that De Wimpffen, -unable to reply, wished to accept the offer made, but not accepted at -an earlier period, and to send an officer to verify these assertions. -“You will send nobody,” exclaimed the iron General. “It is useless, -and you can believe my word. Besides, you have not long to reflect. -It is now midnight; the truce ends at four o’clock, and I will grant -no delay.” Driven to his last ditch, De Wimpffen pleaded that he must -consult his fellow-Generals, and he could not obtain their opinions -by four o’clock. Once more the diplomatic peacemaker intervened, and -Von Moltke agreed to fix the final limit at nine. “He gave way at -last,” says Bismarck, “when I showed him that it could do no harm.” -The conference so dramatic broke up, and each one went his way; but, -says the German official narrative, “as it was not doubtful that the -hostile Army, completely beaten and nearly surrounded, would be obliged -to submit to the clauses already indicated, the Great Head-quarter -Staff was occupied, that very night, in drawing up the text of the -capitulation” a significant and practical comment, showing what stuff -there was behind the severe language which, at the midnight meeting, -fell from the Chief of that able and sleepless body of chosen men. - - - _Napoleon III. Surrenders._ - -General de Wimpffen went straight from the military conference to the -wearied Emperor who had gone to bed. But he received his visitor, -who told him that the proposed conditions were hard, and that -the sole chance of mitigation lay in the efforts of His Majesty. -“General,” said the Emperor, “I shall start at five o’clock for the -German head-quarters, and I shall see whether the King will be more -favourable;” for he seems to have become possessed of an idea that -King William would personally treat with him. The Emperor kept his -word. Believing that he would be permitted to return to Sedan, he -drove forth without bidding farewell to any of his troops; but, as -the drawbridge of Torcy was lowered and he passed over, the Zouaves -on duty shouted “Vive l’Empereur!” This cry was “the last adieu which -fell on his ears” as we read in the narrative given to the world -on his behalf. He drove in a droshki towards Donchery, preceded by -General Reille who, before six o’clock, awoke Count Bismarck from his -slumbers, and warned him that the Emperor desired to speak with him. “I -went with him directly,” said Bismarck, in a conversation reported by -Busch; “and got on my horse, all dusty and dirty as I was, in an old -cap and my great waterproof boots, to ride to Sedan where I supposed -him to be.” But he met him on the high road near Frénois, “sitting -in a two-horse carriage.” Beside him was the Prince de la Moskowa, -and on horseback Castlenau and Reille. “I gave the military salute,” -says Bismarck. “He took his cap off and the officers did the same; -whereupon I took off mine, although it was contrary to rule. He said, -‘Couvrez-vous, donc.’ I behaved to him just as if in St. Cloud, and -asked his commands.” Naturally, he wanted to see the King, but that -could not be allowed. Then Bismarck placed his quarters in Donchery at -the Emperor’s disposal, but he, thinking, as we know, that he would -return to the Sub-Prefecture, declined the courtesy, and preferred -to rest in a house by the wayside. The cottage of a Belgian weaver -unexpectedly became famous; a one-storied house, painted yellow, with -white shutters and venetian blinds. He and the Chancellor entered the -house, and went up to the first floor where there was “a little room -with one window. It was the best in the house, but had only one deal -table and two rush-bottomed chairs,” In that lowly abode they talked -together of many things for three-quarters of an hour, among others -about the origin of the war which, it seems, neither desired, the -Emperor asserting, Bismarck reports that “he had been driven into it -by the pressure of public opinion,” a very inadequate representation -of the curious incidents which preceded the fatal decision. But when -the Emperor began to ask for more favourable terms, he was told that, -on a military question, Von Moltke alone could speak. On the other -hand Bismarck’s request to know who now had authority to make peace -was met by a reference to “the Government in Paris;” so that no -progress was made. Then “we must stand to our demands with regard to -the Army of Sedan,” said Bismarck. General von Moltke was summoned, -and “Napoleon III. demanded that nothing should be decided before he -had seen the King, for he hoped to obtained from His Majesty some -favourable concessions for the Army.” The German official narrative of -the war states that the Emperor expressed a wish that the Army might be -permitted to enter Belgium, but that, of course, the Chief of the Staff -could not accept the proposal. General von Moltke forthwith set out for -Vendresse where the King was, to report progress. He met His Majesty on -the road, and there “the King fully approved the proposed conditions -of capitulation, and declared that he would not see the Emperor until -the terms prescribed had been accepted;” a decision which gratified the -Chancellor as well as the Chief of the Staff. “I did not wish them to -come together,” observed the Count, “until we had settled the matter -of the capitulation;” sparing the feelings of both and leaving the -business to the hard military men. - -The Emperor lingered about in the garden of the weaver’s cottage; he -seems to have desired fresh air after his unpleasant talk with the -Chancellor. Dr. Moritz Busch, who had hurried to the spot, has left -a characteristic description of the Emperor. He saw there “a little -thick-set man,” wearing jauntily a red cap with a gold border, a -black paletôt lined with red, red trousers, and white kid gloves, -“The look in his light grey eyes was somewhat soft and dreamy, like -that of people who have lived hard. His whole appearance,” says the -irreverent Busch, “was a little unsoldierlike. The man looked too -soft, I might say too shabby, for the uniform he wore,” phrases which -suggest a lack of sympathy with adversity, and severe physical as -well as mental suffering. But imagination can realize a picture of -the fallen potentate, whose dynasty, crashing down, drew so much with -it, as he was seen by the cynical German, talking to his officers, or -to the burly Chancellor, or walking alone up and down a potato field -in flower, with his white-gloved hands behind his back, smoking a -cigarette; “betrayed by fortune” or fate, as he believed, but pursued, -as others might say, by the natural consequences of his marvellous -adventures, and of a strange neglect of the one source of strength -on which he relied, the Army. He had failed in the business upon the -conduct of which he prided himself; he was a bankrupt Emperor. - - - _The French Generals Submit._ - -While one scene in the stupendous drama was performed at the weaver’s -cottage, another was acted or endured in Sedan, where De Wimpffen had -summoned the generals to consider the dreadful terms of capitulation. -He has given his own account of the incident; but the fullest report -is supplied by Lebrun. There were present at this council of war more -than thirty generals. With tearful eyes and a voice broken by sobs, the -unhappy and most ill-starred De Wimpffen described his interview and -conflict with Von Moltke and Bismarck, and its dire result—the Army -to surrender as prisoners of war, the officers alone to retain their -arms, and by way of mitigating the rigour of these conditions, full -permission to return home would be given to any officer, provided he -would engage in writing and on honour not to serve again during the -war. The generals, save one or two, and these finally acquiesced, felt -that the conditions could not be refused; but they were indignant at -the clause suggesting that the officers might escape the captivity -which would befall their soldiers, provided they would engage to -become mere spectators of the invasion of their country. In the midst -of these mournful deliberations Captain von Zingler, a messenger from -Von Moltke, entered, and the scene became still more exciting. “I am -instructed,” he said, “to remind you how urgent it is that you should -come to a decision. At ten o’clock, precisely, if you have not come to -a resolution, the German batteries will fire on Sedan. It is now nine, -and I shall have barely time to carry your answer to head-quarters.” To -this sharp summons De Wimpffen answered that he could not decide until -he knew the result of the interview between the Emperor and the King. -“That interview,” said the stern Captain, “will not in any way affect -the military operations, which can only be determined by the generals -who have full power to resume or stop the strife.” It was, indeed, as -Lebrun remarked, useless to argue with a Captain, charged to state a -fact; and at the General’s suggestion De Wimpffen agreed to accompany -Captain von Zingler to the German head-quarters. - -These were, for the occasion, the Château de Bellevue, where the -Emperor himself had been induced to take up his abode, and about eleven -o’clock, in a room under the Imperial chamber, De Wimpffen put his name -at the foot of the document drawn up, during the night, by the German -Staff. Then he sought out the Emperor, and, greatly moved, told him -that “all was finished.” His Majesty, he writes, “with tears in his -eyes, approached me, pressed my hand, and embraced me;” and “my sad and -painful duty having been accomplished, I remounted my horse and rode -back to Sedan, ‘la mort dans l’âme.’” - -So soon as the convention was signed, the King arrived, accompanied -by the Crown Prince. Three years before, as the Emperor reminds us in -the writing attributed to him, the King had been his guest in Paris, -where all the sovereigns of Europe had come to behold the marvels of -the famous Exhibition. “Now,” so runs the lamentation, “betrayed by -fortune, Napoleon III. had lost all, and had placed in the hands of -his conqueror the sole thing left him—his liberty.” And he goes on -to say, in general terms, that the King deeply sympathized with his -misfortunes, but nevertheless could not grant better conditions to -the Army. “He told the Emperor that the castle of Wilhelmshöhe had -been selected as his residence; the Crown Prince then entered and -cordially shook hands with Napoleon; and at the end of a quarter of an -hour the King withdrew. The Emperor was permitted to send a telegram -in cipher to the Empress, to tell her what had happened, and urge her -to negotiate a peace.” Such is the bald record of this impressive -event. The telegram, which reached the Empress at four o’clock on the -afternoon of the 3rd, was in these words: “The Army is defeated and -captive; I myself am a prisoner.” - -For one day more the fallen sovereign rested at Bellevue to meditate -on the caprices of fortune or the decrees of fate. But that day, at -the head of a splendid company of princes and generals, King William, -crossing the bridge of Donchery, rode throughout the whole vast extent -of the German lines, to greet his hardy warriors and be greeted by them -on the very scene of their victories. And well they deserved regal -gratitude, for together with their comrades who surrounded Metz, by -dint of long swift marches and steadfast valour, they had overcome two -great Armies in thirty days. - -During the battle of Sedan, the Germans lost in killed and wounded -8,924 officers and men. On the other hand, the French lost 3,000 -killed, 14,000 wounded, and 21,000 captured in the battle. The number -of prisoners by capitulation was 83,000, while 3,000 were disarmed in -Belgium, and a few hundreds, more or less, made their way by devious -routes near and over the frontier, to Mézières, Rocroi, and other -places in France. In addition, were taken one eagle and two flags, 419 -field guns and mitrailleuses, 139 garrison guns, many wagons, muskets, -and horses. On the day after the surrender, the French soldiers, having -stacked their arms in Sedan, marched into the peninsula formed by the -deep loop of the Meuse—“le Camp de Misère” as they called it—and were -sent thence in successive batches, numbered by thousands, to Germany. -Such was the astonishing end of the Army of Chalons, which had been -impelled to its woful doom by the Comte de Palikao and the Paris -politicians. Directed by General Vinoy, who was an able soldier, the -troops brought to Mézières, escaped by rapid and clever marches from -the German cavalry and the 6th Corps, and formed the nucleus of the -improvised Army which afterwards defended the capital. - - - _The End._ - -On the 3rd of September the Emperor Napoleon III. departed from -Bellevue on his journey to the Castle of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel. The -morning was wet and gloomy, and a thunderstorm was gathering among the -hills of the Ardennes. The Imperial baggage-train had been permitted -to leave Sedan, and was drawn up on the road ready to start. Columns -of prisoners also were moving out of the fortress and marching towards -the peninsula formed by the Meuse. It was a lugubrious scene, and -the superstitious might remark that as the sun shone resplendently -on the German victory, so his light was obscured when the captive -Emperor drove through the muddy streets of Donchery and thence to the -northward, wrapped in the sombre mist and thickly falling rain. And -as he journeyed, disconsolately, in the forenoon, upon the road to -Bouillon, orders went forth from the German head-quarters, where time -was never lost, directing the conquering generals to leave the 11th and -one Bavarian Corps on guard over Sedan and the thousands of unhappy -prisoners, and resume, with all the rest, that march on the capital of -France which had been so abruptly interrupted only eight days before. -So the victors and the vanquished went their different ways. - -The Emperor travelled without haste, and on the evening of the 4th he -slept at Verviers. The next morning he learned, in common with all -Europe, indeed all the civilized world, that the fires which seethe -under the bright surface of society in Paris had once more burst -through the thin crust of use and wont, and that the dynasty of the -Bonapartes had been utterly overthrown at a blow to make way for the -Republic. Like intelligence reached the King of Prussia, also, at his -head-quarters, which, on the 5th, were already in Reims. The contrast -is painful. The King saw his hopes of an early peace destroyed; but -his was a solidly planted throne and he was the leader of irresistible -armies. The Emperor knew that his fond dream of founding an Imperial -House had been dispelled in an hour by a blast of national wrath; -and, being a kindly man, his agony was the keener because, as he -pathetically says, “he was separated from his son, and knew not what -fate had befallen the Empress.” Racked by such sad reflections, at -the very time when his wife was escaping to England, Louis Napoleon -Bonaparte went, by railway, from Verviers to Wilhelmshöhe. There, -during a luxurious captivity of six months, he had ample leisure to -meditate on the causes which led to the catastrophe of Sedan and the -surrender of Metz; and to ascertain, if he could, why, after a second -trial, ending in the third entry of hostile troops into Paris, the -French nation had lost its belief in the saving qualities of a family -bearing a name which, if associated with undying “glory,” has also -become indissolubly linked with bitter memories of lost provinces and -gigantic military disasters. - - - - - APPENDICES. - - - I. - - THE GERMAN FIELD ARMIES. - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, KING WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA; Chief of the Staff, -General Baron von Moltke; Quartermaster, General Podbielski; -Inspector-General of Artillery, General von Hindersin. - -Present with the Great Head Quarters were the Minister of War, General -von Roon; and the Federal Chancellor and Minister President, General -Count von Bismarck-Schönhausen. - - - FIRST ARMY. - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Steinmetz; Chief of the Staff, Gen. von -Sperling; Chief Quartermaster, Col. Count von Wartensleben. - - - _First Corps._[2] - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Baron von Manteuffel; Chief of the -Staff, Lieut.-Col. von der Burg. 1st Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Bentheim; -1st Brig., Major-Gen. von Gayl; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von -Falkenstein. 2nd Div., Major-Gen. von Pritzelwitz; 3rd Brig., -Major-Gen. von Memerty; 4th Brig., Major-Gen. von Zglintski; Commander -of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Bergemann. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. - -[Footnote 2: This Corps did not arrive until August 5.] - - - _Seventh Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Zastrow; Chief of the Staff, Col. von -Unger. 13th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Glümer; 25th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron -von Osten-Sacken; 26th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Golz. 14th Div., -Lieut.-General von Kameke; 27th Brig., Major-Gen. von François; 28th -Brig., Major-Gen. von Woyna; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von -Zimmermann. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Eighth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Goeben; Chief of the Staff, Col. -von Witzendorff. 15th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Weltzien; 29th Brig., -Major-Gen. von Wedell; 30th Brig., Major-Gen. von Strubberg. 16th Div., -Lieut.-Gen. Barnekow; 31st, Major-Gen. Count Neidhard von Gneisenau; -32nd, Col von Rex; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von Kameke. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _First Cavalry Division._ - -COMMANDER, Lieut.-General von Hartmann. Brigadiers: 1st Brig., -Major-Gen. von Lüderitz; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Baumgarth (each was -composed of one Cuirassier and two Uhlan regiments, and accompanied by -a Horse Artillery Battery). - -Strength: 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses, and 6 guns. - - -_Third Cavalry Division._ - -COMMANDER, Lieut.-Gen. Count von der Gröben. Brigadiers: 6th Brig., -Major-Gen. von Mirus (one Cuirassier and one Uhlan regiment); 7th -Brig., Major-Gen. Count von Dohna (two Uhlan regiments). - -Strength: 16 squadrons, 2,400 horses, 1 Horse Artillery battery, 6 guns. - - _Strength of First Army._ - - Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns. - 1st Corps 25 8 14 84 - 7th Corps 25 8 15 90 - 8th Corps 25 8 14 84 - 1st Cav. Div. 24 1 6 - 3rd Cav. Div. 16 1 6 - -- -- -- --- - Total 75 64 45 270 - - - THE SECOND ARMY. - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, H.R.H. Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia; Chief -of Staff, Major-Gen. von Stiehle; Chief Quartermaster, Colonel von -Hertzberg; Commander of Artillery, Lieut.-Gen. von Colomier. - - - _The Guard Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Prince Augustus of Würtemberg; Chief of the Staff, -Major-Gen. von Dannenberg. 1st Div., Major-Gen. von Pape; 1st Brig., -Major-Gen. von Kessel; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Medem. 2nd Div., -Lieut.-Gen. von Budritzki; 3rd Brig., Colonel Knappe von Knappstädt; -4th Brig., Major-Gen. von Berger; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. -Kraft, Prince of Hohenlohe Ingelfingen. - -CAVALRY DIVISION:—Commander, Major-Gen. Count von der Golz; 1st Brig., -Major-Gen. Count von Brandenburg I. (Life Guards and Cuirassiers); 2nd -Brig., Lieut.-Gen. Prince Albert of Prussia (two Uhlan regiments); 3rd -Brig., Lieut.-Gen. Count von Brandenburg II. (two Dragoon regiments). - -Strength of Corps: 29 battalions, 29,000 men; 32 squadrons, 4,800 -horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Second Corps._[3] - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Fransecky; Chief of the Staff, Colonel -von Wichmann; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Kleist. 3rd Div., -Major-Gen. von Hartmann; 5th Brig., Major-Gen. von Koblinski; 6th -Brig., Colonel von der Decken. 4th Div., Lieut.-Gen. Hann von Weihern; -7th Brig., Major-Gen. du Trossel; 8th Brig., Major-Gen. von Kettler. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Artillery. - -[Footnote 3: Came up to the front at the battle of Gravelotte.] - - - _Third Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Alvensleben II.; Chief of the -Staff, Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. -von Bülow. 5th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Stülpnagel; 9th Brig., Major-Gen. -von Döring; 10th Brig., Major-Gen. von Schwerin. 6th Div., Lieut.-Gen. -Baron von Buddenbrock; 11th Brig., Major-Gen. von Rothmaler; 12th -Brig., Colonel von Bismarck. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Fourth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Alvensleben I.; Chief of the Staff, -Colonel von Thile; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Scherbening. -7th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schwarzhoff; 13th Brig., Major-Gen. von -Worries; 14th Brig., Major-Gen. von Zychlinski. 8th Div., Lieut.-Gen. -von Schöler; 15th Brig., Major-Gen. von Kessler; 16th Brig., Colonel -von Scheffler. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Ninth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Manstein; Chief of the Staff, Major -Bronsart von Schellendorf; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von -Puttkammer. 18th Div., Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Wrangel; 35th Brig., -Major-Gen. von Blumenthal; 36th Brig., Major-Gen. von Below. The -Hessian Division (25th): Commander, Lieut.-Gen. H.R.H. Prince Louis -of Hesse; 49th Brig., Major-Gen. von Wittich; 50th Brig., Colonel von -Lyncker. - -Strength of Corps: 23 battalions, 23,000 men; 12 squadrons, 1,800 -horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Tenth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Voigts-Rhetz; Chief of the Staff, -Lieut.-Col. von Caprivi; Commander of Artillery, Colonel Baron von der -Becke. 19th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schwarzkoppen; 37th Brig., Colonel -von Lehmann; 38th Brig., Major-Gen. von Wedell. 20th Div., Major-Gen. -Kraatz Koschlau; 39th Brig., Major-Gen. von Woyna; 40th Brig., -Major-Gen. von Diringshofen. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Twelfth (Royal Saxon) Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Saxony; Chief of -the Staff, Colonel von Zezschwitz; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. -Köhler. 1st Div., Prince George of Saxony; 1st Brig., Major-Gen. von -Craushaar; 2nd Brig., Colonel von Montbé. 2nd Div., Major-Gen. Nehrhoff -von Holderberg; 3rd Brig., Major-Gen. von Leonhardi; 4th Brig., Colonel -von Schulz. [N.B. The Infantry Divisions were also numbered 23 and -24, and the brigades 45, 46, 47, and 48, to fit them into the general -system.] - -Strength of Corps: 29 battalions, 29,000 men; 24 squadrons, 3,600 -horses; 16 batteries, 96 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. [The Cavalry -formed the 12th Division, commanded by the Count of Lippe; Brigadiers, -Major-Gen. Krug von Nidda and Major-Gen. Seufft von Pilsach.] - - - _The Fifth Cavalry Division._ - -COMMANDER, Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Rheinbaben; 11th Brig., Major-Gen. von -Barby (a Cuirassier, a Uhlan, and a Dragoon regiment); 12th Brig., -Major-Gen. von Bredow (similarly formed); 13th Brig., Major-Gen. von -Redern (three Hussar regiments). - -Strength of Division: 36 squadrons, 5,400 horses; 2 batteries, 12 guns, -Horse Artillery. - - - _The Sixth Cavalry Division._ - -COMMANDER, Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin; 14th Brig., Major-Gen. -Baron von Diepenbroick-Grüter (a Cuirassier and two Uhlan regiments); -15th Brig., Major-Gen. von Rauch (two Hussar regiments). - -Strength of Division: 20 squadrons, 3,000 horses; and 1 Horse Artillery -battery, 6 guns. - - - _Strength of Second Army._ - - Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns. - Guard 29 32 15 90 - 2nd Corps 25 8 14 84 - 3rd Corps 25 8 14 84 - 4th Corps 25 8 14 84 - 9th Corps 23 12 15 90 - 10th Corps 25 8 14 84 - 12th Corps 29 24 16 96 - 5th Cav. Div 36 2 12 - 6th Cav. Div 20 1 6 - --- --- --- --- - Total. 181 156 105 630 - - - THE THIRD ARMY. - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Prussia; Chief of the -Staff, Lieut.-Gen. von Blumenthal; Chief Quartermaster, Colonel von -Gottberg; Commander of Artillery, Lieut.-Gen. Herkt. - - - _Fifth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Kirchbach; Chief of the Staff, -Colonel von der Esch; Commander of the Artillery, Colonel Gaede. 9th -Div., Major-Gen. von Sandrart; 17th Brig., Colonel von Bothmer; 18th -Brig., Major-Gen. von Voigts-Rhetz. 10th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schmidt; -19th Brig., Colonel von Henning auf Schönhoff; 20th Brig., Major-Gen. -Walther von Montbary. - -Strength of Corps; 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Sixth Corps._[4] - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Tümpling; Chief of the Staff, Colonel -von Salviati; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von Ramm. 11th Div., -Lieut.-Gen. von Gordon; 21st Brig., Major-Gen. von Malachowski; 22nd -Brig., Major-Gen. von Eckartsberg. 12th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Hoffmann; -23rd Brig., Major-Gen. Gündel; 24th Brig., Major-Gen. von Fabeck. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses, 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. - -[Footnote 4: This Corps did not cross the frontier until the 6th of -August.] - - - _Eleventh Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Bose; Chief of the Staff, -Major-Gen. Stein von Kaminski; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. -Hausmann. 21st Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schachtmeyer; 41st Brig., Colonel -von Koblinski; 42nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Thile. 22nd Div., Lieut.-Gen. -von Gersdorff; 43rd Brig., Colonel von Konski; 44th Brig., Major-Gen. -von Schkopp. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200 -horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. - - - _First Bavarian Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von der Tann-Rathsamhausen; Chief of the -Staff, Lieut.-Col. von Heinleth; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von -Malaisé. 1st Div., Lieut.-Gen von Stephan; 1st Brig., Major-Gen. Dietl; -2nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Orff. 2nd Div., Major-Gen. Schumaker; 3rd -Brig., Colonel Heyle; 4th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von der Tann. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 20 squadrons, 3,000 -horses (Cuirassiers and Light Horse); 16 batteries, 96 guns; 3 -companies of Pioneers. - - - _Second Bavarian Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Ritter von Hartmann; Chief of the Staff, -Colonel Baron von Horn; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. Lutz. 3rd -Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Walther; 5th Brig., Major-Gen. von Schleich; 6th -Brig., Colonel Borries von Wissel. 4th Div., Lieut.-Gen. Count von -Bothmer; 7th Brig., Major-Gen. von Thiereck; 8th Brig., Major-Gen. -Maillinger. - -Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 20 squadrons, 3,000 -horses (Cuirassier, Uhlan, Light Horse); 16 batteries, 96 guns; 3 -companies of Pioneers. - - - _The Würtemberg Division._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Obernitz; Chief of the Staff, -Colonel von Bock; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von Sick; 1st Brig., -Major-Gen. von Reitstenstein; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Starkloff; 3rd -Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Hügel. - -Strength of Division: 15 battalions, 15,000 men; 10 squadrons, 1,500 -horses; 9 batteries, 54 guns; 2 companies of Pioneers. - - - _Baden Division._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Beyer; Chief of the Staff, -Lieut.-Col. von Leszczynski; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von -Freydorf; 1st Brig., Lieut.-Gen. du Jarrhs, Baron von la Roche; 2nd -Brig., Major-Gen. Keller. - -Strength of Division: 13 battalions, 13,000 men; 12 squadrons, 1,800 -horses; 9 batteries, 54 guns; 1 Pioneer company. - - - _Second Cavalry Division._[5] - -COMMANDER, Lieut.-Gen. Count Stolberg-Wernigerode; 3rd Brig., -Major-Gen. von Colomb (two regiments, Cuirassier and Uhlan); 4th Brig., -Major-Gen. Baron von Barnekow (two regiments of Hussars); 5th Brig., -Major-Gen. von Baumbach (two regiments of Hussars). - -Strength: 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses; 2 Horse Artillery batteries, 12 -guns. - -[Footnote 5: This Division came up after the 4th of August.] - - - _Fourth Cavalry Division._ - -COMMANDER, General H.R.H. Prince Albrecht of Prussia, senior; 8th -Brig., Major-Gen. von Hontheim (two regiments, Cuirassier and Uhlan); -9th Brig., Major-Gen. von Bernhardi (two Uhlan regiments); 10th Brig., -Major-Gen. von Krosigk (two regiments, Hussar and Dragoon). - -Strength: 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses; 2 Horse Artillery batteries, 12 -guns. - - - STRENGTH OF THIRD ARMY. - - Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns. - 5th Corps 25 8 14 84 - 6th Corps 25 8 14 84 - 11th Corps 25 8 14 84 - 1st Bavarian 25 20 16 96 - 2nd Bavarian 25 20 16 96 - Würtemberg Div. 15 10 9 54 - Baden Div 13 12 9 54 - 2nd Cav. Div. 24 2 12 - 4th Cav. Div. 24 2 12 - --- --- -- --- - Total 153 134 96 576 - - - TOTAL OF THE THREE ARMIES. - - Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns. - First Army 75 64 45 270 - Second Army 181 156 105 630 - Third Army 153 134 96 576 - --- --- --- ----- - Grand Total 409 354 246 1,476 - - -By the end of August the 17th Division of Infantry and the 2nd Division -of Landwehr, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, in addition -to the 3rd Reserve Division already on the spot under General Kunsmor, -were brought up to take part in the investment of Metz. The troops -sent forward to reinforce the Baden Division before Strasburg were the -Landwehr Division of the Guard, the 1st Reserve Division, and the 1st -brigade of reserve cavalry. During August, counting all ranks, sick or -well, and including every species of non-combatant, the mean strength -of the Armies in the field was 780,723 men, and 213,159 horses. - - - II - - THE FRENCH ARMY. - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III.; “Major-General” or Chief -of the Staff, Marshal Lebœuf, assisted by General Lebrun and General -Jarras; Commander of Artillery, General Soleille; of Engineers, General -Coffinières de Nordeck. - - - IMPERIAL GUARD. - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Bourbaki; Chief of the Staff, General -d’Auvergne; Commander of Artillery, General Pé d’Arros; Divisional -Commanders: 1st Div. (Voltigeurs), General Deligny; Brigadiers: -1st Brig., General Brincourt; 2nd Brig., General Garnier. 2nd -Div. (Grenadiers), General Picard; Brigadiers: 1st Brig., General -Jeanningros; 2nd Brig., General le Poitevin de Lacroix. - -Strength of Corps: 24 battalions; 24 squadrons—(Desvaux’s Div. of three -brigades, commanded by Halna du Fretay, De France, and Du Preuil, -consisting of Guides, Chasseurs, Lancers, Dragoons, Cuirassiers, and -Carbineers)—60 guns, and 12 mitrailleuses; 2 companies of Engineers. - - - _First Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Marshal MacMahon, Duke of Magenta; Chief of the -Staff, Gen. Colson; Commander of Artillery, Gen. Forgeot. Divisional -Commanders: 1st Div., Gen. Ducrot; 1st Brig., Gen. Wolff; 2nd Brig., -Gen. de Postis du Houlbec. 2nd Div., Gen. Abel Douay; 1st Brig., Gen. -Pelletier de Montmarie; 2nd Brig., Gen. Pellé. 3rd Div., Gen. Raoult; -1st Brig., Gen. l’Hériller; 2nd Brig., Gen. Lefebvre. 4th Div., Gen. -Lartigue; 1st Brig., Lieut.-Gen. Fraboulet de Kerléadec; 2nd Brig., -Gen. Lacretelle. - -Strength of Corps: 52 battalions—45 deducting the regiments left in -Strasburg; 28 squadrons—Duhesme’s brigade of Cuirassiers, Hussars, -Chasseurs, Lancers, and Dragoons—96 guns and 24 mitrailleuses; 5½ -companies of Engineers. - - - _Second Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Frossard; Chief of the Staff, Gen. Saget; -Commander of Artillery, Gen. Gagneur, 1st Div., Gen. Vergé; 1st -Brig., Gen. Letellier Valazé; 2nd Brig., Gen. Jolivet. 2nd Div., Gen. -Bataille; 1st Brig., Gen. Pouget; 2nd Brig., Gen. Fauvart-Bastoul. 3rd -Div., Gen. de Laveaucoupet; 1st Brig., Gen. Doëns; 2nd Brig., Gen. -Micheler. - -Strength of Corps: 39 battalions; 16 squadrons—(Valabrègue’s Division, -4 regiments of Chasseurs and Dragoons)—72 guns, 18 mitrailleuses; 5 -companies of Engineers. - - - _Third Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Marshal Bazaine; Chief of the Staff, Gen. Manèque; -Commander of Artillery, Gen. de Rochebouët. 1st Div., Gen. Montaudon; -1st Brig., Gen. Baron Aymard; 2nd Brig., Gen. Clinchant. 2nd Div., -Gen. de Castagny; 1st Brig., Gen. Nayral; 2nd Brig., Gen. Duplessis. -3rd Div., Gen. Metman; 1st Brig., Gen. de Potier; 2nd Brig., Gen. -Arnaudeau. 4th Div., Gen. Decaen; 1st Brig., Gen. de Brauer; 2nd Brig., -Gen. Sanglé-Ferrière. - -Strength of Corps: 52 battalions; 28 squadrons—(De Clérambault’s Div., -3 regiments of Chasseurs, 4 of Dragoons, organized in 3 brigades)—96 -guns, 24 mitrailleuses and 5½ companies of Engineers. - - - _Fourth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General de Ladmirault; Chief of the Staff, Gen. -Osmont: Commander of Artillery, Gen. Lafaille. 1st Div., Gen. Courtot -de Cissey; 1st Brig., Gen. Count Brayer; 2nd Brig., Gen. de Golberg. -2nd Div., Gen. Grenier; 1st Brig., Gen. Bellecourt; 2nd Brig., Gen. -Pradier; 3rd Div., Gen. Count de Lorencez; 1st Brig., Gen. Count Pajol; -2nd Brig., Gen. Berger. - -Strength of Corps: 39 battalions; 16 squadrons—(Legrand’s Div., 1 -brigade of Hussars and 1 of Dragoons)—72 guns, 18 mitrailleuses; 4 -companies of Engineers. - - - _Fifth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General de Failly; Chief of the Staff, Gen. -Besson; Commander of Artillery, Gen. Liédot. 1st Div., Gen. Goze; 1st -Brig., Gen. Sauron; 2nd Brig., Gen. Nicolas-Nicolas. 2nd Div., Gen. -de l’Abadie d’Aydrein; 1st Brig., Gen. Lapasset; 2nd Brig., Gen. de -Maussion. 3rd Div., Gen. Guyot de Lespart; 1st Brig., Gen. Abbatucci; -2nd Brig., Gen. de Fontanges. - -Strength of Corps: 39 battalions; 16 squadrons—(Brahaut’s Div., -brigade of Hussars and Chasseurs, and one of Lancers)—72 guns, 18 -mitrailleuses; 4 companies of Engineers. - - - _Sixth Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Marshal Canrobert; Chief of the Staff, Gen. -Henri; Commander of Artillery, Gen. Labastie. 1st Div., Gen. Tixier; -1st Brig., Gen. Péchot; 2nd Brig., Gen. Le Roy de Dais. 2nd Div., -Gen. Bisson; 1st Brig., Gen. Archinard; 2nd Brig., Gen. Maurice. 3rd -Div., Gen. Lafont de Villers; 1st Brig., Gen. Becquet de Sonnay; 2nd -Brig., Gen. Colin. 4th Div., Gen. Levassor-Sorval; 1st Brig., Gen. de -Marguenat; 2nd Brig., Gen. Comte de Chanaleilles. - -Strength of Corps: 49 battalions; 24 squadrons—(Div. of -Salignac-Fénelon, three brigades Lancers, Hussars, Chasseurs, and -Cuirassiers)—114 guns, 6 mitrailleuses, and 5 companies of Engineers. -[Only 40 battalions and 36 guns were able to reach Metz.] - - - _Seventh Corps._ - -COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Félix Douay; Chief of the Staff, Gen. -Renson; Commander of Artillery, Gen. de Liégeard. 1st Div., Gen. -Conseil Dumesnil; 1st Brig., Gen. Nicolaï; 2nd Brig., Gen. Maire. 2nd -Div., Gen. Liébert; 1st Brig., Gen. Guiomar; 2nd Brig., Gen. de la -Bastide. 3rd Div., Gen. Dumont; 1st Brig., Gen. Bordas; 2nd Brig., Gen. -Bittard des Portes. - -Strength of Corps: 38 battalions; 20 squadrons—(Amiel’s Div., five -regiments, in two brigades, Lancers, Hussars, and Dragoons)—72 guns, 18 -mitrailleuses, and 4 companies of Engineers. [One cavalry brigade of -two regiments never joined the 7th Corps.] - - - _Reserve Cavalry._ - -1st Div., Gen. du Barail; 1st Brig., Gen. Margueritte; 2nd Brig., Gen. -de Lajaille; 16 squadrons, Chasseurs d’Afrique, and 12 guns. [Three -regiments reached Metz on the 10th of August, and the 4th at Mouzon on -the Meuse.] - -2nd Div., Gen. Viscomte de Bonnemains; 1st Brig., Gen. Girard; 2nd -Brig., Gen. de Brauer; 16 squadrons, all Cuirassiers. - -3rd Div., Gen. de Forton; 1st Brig., Gen. Prince Murat; 2nd Brig., -Gen. de Gramont; 16 squadrons—(one brigade of Dragoons, the other -Cuirassiers)—and 12 guns. - -Artillery Reserve: Gen. Canu, 126 guns, 6 mitrailleuses, and 3 -companies of Engineers. - - - STRENGTH OF ARMY. - - Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns. Mitrailleuses. - Guard 24 24 12 60 12 - 1st Corps 52 28 20 96 24 - 2nd Corps 39 16 15 72 18 - 3rd Corps 52 28 20 96 24 - 4th Corps 39 16 15 72 18 - 5th Corps 39 16 15 72 18 - 6th Corps 49 24 20 114 6 - 7th Corps 38 20 15 72 18 - Reserve Cav. 48 6 30 6 - Reserve Art. 16 96 - --- --- --- --- --- - 332 220 154 780 144 - - -It is not possible to do more than guess at the numerical strength of -the French Corps, and consequently of the French Army; so great is the -variation in the strength of battalions and squadrons. The infantry of -the several Corps was continually augmented by the arrival of reserves, -so that, the losses at Spicheren notwithstanding, the 2nd Corps was -stronger by more than 2,000 men, five days after the battle, than it -was on the morning of the 6th; Marshal Lebœuf told the Parliamentary -Commission that, on the 1st of August, according to the “states” sent -in to the head-quarters, the effective of the Army of the Rhine, -including all the Corps in the field, was 243,171 men. But “the real -effective,” he adds, “was greatly superior.” For by the 1st of August, -no fewer than “278,882 men had been sent to the Army of the Rhine,” and -subsequently, until the 14th, “numerous detachments.” It is plain that -no precise information can be obtained, but it seems probable that the -strength was always greater than that reported at the time. Similar -uncertainty prevails respecting the effective strength of the “Army of -Chalons.” The only authentic figures extant are those supplied by the -German account of the capitulation, from which the original strength, -increased by additions on the line of march, may be inferred. - - - III. - - THE PROTOCOL OF CAPITULATION. - -Between the undersigned, the Chief of the Staff of His Majesty the -King of Prussia, commanding in chief the German Army, and the General, -commanding in chief the French Army, each having received full powers -from their Majesties, King William and the Emperor Napoleon, the -following Convention has been concluded: - -_Article 1._—The French Army, placed under the orders of General de -Wimpffen, finding itself actually surrounded in Sedan by superior -forces, is prisoner of war. - -_Article 2._—Having regard to the brave defence of this Army, an -exception is made for all the generals and officers, as well as for the -functionaries, having the rank of officer, who shall give their word of -honour, in writing, not to bear arms against Germany, and not to act -in any other manner against her interests until the end of the present -war. The officers and functionaries who may accept these conditions, -shall preserve their arms and personal property. - -_Article 3._—All other arms, as well as the _matériel_ of the Army, -consisting of flags (eagles and standards), cannons, horses, military -chests, army equipages, munitions, etc., shall be surrendered at Sedan -to a Military Commission, appointed by the French Commander-in-Chief, -to be given over immediately to the German Commissioner. - -_Article 4._—The fortress of Sedan shall be immediately placed in its -actual state, and, at the latest, by the evening of September 2, at the -disposal of His Majesty the King of Prussia. - -_Article 5._—The officers who shall not have subscribed the engagement -mentioned in Article 2, and the men, after having been disarmed, -shall be ranked in regiments and conducted in good order into the -peninsula formed by the Meuse near Iges. The groups thus constituted -shall be handed over to the German Commissioners by the officers, who -will immediately give over the command to the sous-officers. This -arrangement will begin on the 2nd of September and should be finished -on the 3rd. - -_Article 6._—The military medical men, without exception, will remain -behind to take care of the wounded. - -Done at Frénois, September 2, 1870. - - (Signed) VON MOLTKE. - - DE WIMPFFEN. - - - IV. - - A LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. - -Der Deutsch-Französische Krieg, 1870–71. Redigirt von der -Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des Grossen Generalstabes. - -The German Artillery. Captain Hoffbauer. - -Operations of the First Army. Major A. von Schell. - -Operations of the Bavarian Army. Captain H. Helvig. - -Tactical Deductions from the War 1870-71. Captain A. von Boguslawski. - -Our Chancellor; Sketches for a Historical Picture. By Moritz Busch. - -Bismarck and the Franco-German War, 1870-71. By Dr. Moritz Busch. - -My Diary during the last Great War. By W. H. Russell. - -L’Armée du Rhin. Par le Maréchal Bazaine. - -Episodes de la Guerre de 1870 et le Blocus de Metz. Par l’Ex-Maréchal -Bazaine. - -Affaire de la Capitulation de Metz. Procès Bazaine. - -Metz, Campagne et Négociations. Par un Officier supérieur de l’Armée du -Rhin. - -Journal d’un Officier de l’Armée du Rhin. Par Ch. Fay. - -Œuvres Posthumes autographes inédits de Napoleon III. Collected and -published by the Comte de la Chapelle. - -Sedan. Par le Général de Wimpffen. - -La Journée de Sedan. Par le Général Ducrot. - -Guerre de 1870. Bazeilles-Sedan. Par le Général Lebrun. - -Campagne de 1870. Belfort, Reims, Sedan, Le 7^{e} Corps de l’Armée du -Rhin. Par le Prince Georges Bibesco. - -Journal d’un Officier d’Ordonnance, Juillet 1870—Février 1871. Par le -Comte d’Hérisson. - -Campagne de 1870. La Cavalerie Française. Par le Lieut.-Col. Bonie. - -Campagne de 1870–71. Siége de Paris. Operations du 13^{e} Corps et de -la Troisième Armée. Par le Général Vinoy. - -Documents Relatifs au Siége de Strasbourg. Publiés par le Général -Uhrich. - -Un Ministère de la Guerre de vingt quatre jours. Par le Général Cousin -de Montauban Comte de Palikao. - -Enquête Parlementaire sur les Acts du Gouvernement de la Défense -Nationale. - -Papiers et Correspondances de la Famille Impériale. - -Ma Mission en Prusse. Par le Comte Benedetti. - -France et la Prusse avant la Guerre. Par le Duc de Gramont. - -_The Times_, October 25, 1871. Translation of Prince Bismarck’s Reply -to Count Benedetti’s “Mission en Prusse.” - -La Politique Française en 1866. Par G. Rothan. - -L’Affaire du Luxembourg: le prélude de la Guerre de 1870. Par G. Rothan. - -Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie. Quinze Ans à l’Etranger. 1864–1879. Par -Jules Hansen. - -Revue des Deux Mondes. Avril, 1878; and 1886–7. - -Papers presented to Parliament Respecting the War between France and -Germany, 1870. - - - - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF WOERTH, ABOUT NOON. Plan I. - -_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_] - - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF SPICHEREN, 3.30. P.M. Plan II. - -_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_] - - -[Illustration: COLOMBEY-NOUILLY, 5. P.M. Plan III. - -_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_] - - -[Illustration: VIONVILLE-MARS LA TOUR, ABOUT 4 P.M. Plan IV. - -_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons._] - - -[Illustration: GRAVELOTTE, 2.45 P.M. Plan V - -_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons._] - - -[Illustration: SEDAN, ABOUT 10 A.M. Plan VI. - -_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_] - -[Illustration: GENERAL MAP OF WAR-FIELD. _Weller & Graham L^{td}. -Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_] - - - - - INDEX - - - Abbatucci’s brigade at Woerth, 115. - - Abzac, Colonel d’, 252. - - Aillicourt, 293. - - Aire, river, 248. - - Aisne, river, 232, 242, 248, 249, 264, 277; - the Guard on the, at Triaucourt, 232; - canal, Meuse and, 251. - - Albrecht, Archduke of Austria, 34, 64. - - Albrecht of Prussia, Prince, 115. - - Albrechtshaüser, farm (Woerth), 107. - - Algeria, regiments from, 68. - - Algerians, native, 84. - - Alsace, 68; - small German party enters, 70; - 84, 90; - and Lorraine, 96; - effect of blows struck in, 232; - 235. - - Alten, Major von, 323. - - Alvensleben I., General von, 267, 268. - - Alvensleben II., Lieut.-General von, at Spicheren, 121; - “the fiery” directs attack (Vionville), 172, 176–178, 186, 187. - - Amanvillers (Gravelotte battle), French position, 193, 195, 196; - 198, 199, 201, 207, 208, 218, 220–225, 228; - gallant charge of 3rd Brigade at, 220; - railway from, to Habonville, 202. - - Amagne, 293. - - Amiel’s, General, Cavalry at Sedan, 296. - - Andigné, Colonel d’, 304, 305. - - Ardennes, the German Armies in the, 265–273. - - Argancy and Antilly, German reinforcements at, 281. - - Argonne, the, 245. - - Army of Chalons, the, composition of, 235, 236, 241; - position of, 276, 285, 290, 307; - its end, 336. - - Army, French, condition of, at beginning of war, 59, 60, 61, 62; - after Saarbrück, 76; - movements towards the Meuse, 257–261; - returns to Metz camps, losses at Noisseville, 281; - disorder in retreat on Sedan, 273–274, 286–287; - position of, in Sedan, 296, 297; - confused accounts of retreat, 302; - three Commanders of, in three hours, 303; - condition of, 310; - surrenders, 336. - - Army, German, turned north-west, 245; - facing north, 264, 267; - pursues in running fight, 273. - - Army, German, First, as pivot, 138; - also, 142, 144, 165. - - Army, German, Second, and First, all available men in motion, 190. - - Army, German, Third, Bavarians of, at Triaucourt, 254; - movements of, 255, 256. - - Army, MacMahon’s, between Rhetel and Vouziers, 243. - - Army of the Meuse (German), composition of, 230; - moving, 232, 233; - movements of, 254, 255, 256; - positions and losses, 274, 275. - - Army, Prussian, reform, 4, 5, 6. - - Army of the Rhine (French), positions at Spicheren, 117; - retired westward of Metz, 188; - facing Paris, 193; - retires to Metz, 226, 228; - reasons for defeat of, 229; - in Metz, 285. - - Arndt, the spirit of, 2. - - Arry, village, 165. - - Ars, village on the Moselle, 177, 191, 193, 215; - road from, to Jussy, troops on, 211. - - Ars-Laquenexy, village, 151. - - Artillery, duel at Beaumont, 270; - clever withdrawal of Failly’s, 270; - French and German, 312, 313; - German, at Noisseville, 281; - effect of, 299; - German, grand but disastrous conduct of, 201; - Steinmetz’s attack with, 212, 213. - - Attigny on the Aisne, 234, 249, 251, 293. - - Aube, river, 247. - - Auboué, 208, 210. - - Auerswald, Colonel von, 182, 183. - - Austria, and the Italian question, 12; - refuses Conference, 12; - crushed by Prussia, excluded from Germany, 13; - irritated as well as humbled, 16; - requests Diet to call out Federal Corps, 12. - - Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph, and Schleswig-Holstein, 6, 7, 9; - meets Napoleon III. at Salzburg, 33, 34; - Napoleon III. appeals to, 160. - - Aymard, General, 280. - - Aymard’s division of Decaen’s Corps at Colombey, 156, 161; - at Vionville, 180. - - - Balan, 298, 305, 306; - and Bazeilles, Germans hold, 310; - the Emperor watching fight near, 311; - Wimpffen’s effort at, 316, 317, 324. - - Ban St. Martin (Metz), Bazaine’s fatal despatch from, 241. - - Banthéville, 257; - Guards at, 259. - - Bar le Duc, King at, 25th Aug., 233; - German head-quarters, 243, 247; - council at, 254, 255, 256. - - Baraque Mouton, farmstead, Germans take, 126. - - Barby, General von, 163, 164; - at Mars la Tour, 180, 183, 184. - - Barail, Du, at Conflans, 164; - at Mars la Tour, 183, 184. - - Barnekow, General von, 121, 185. - - Basle, 70. - - Bataille, General, at Spicheren, 120, 123, 126; - at Vionville, 171, 173, 174. - - Bavarians in Bazeilles, 298, 299. - - Bayon on the Upper Moselle, 163. - - Bayonville, 259, 264. - - Bazaine, Marshal, ordered to occupy Saarbrück, 72, 73, 74, 92, 93; - at Spicheren, 116; - fears being turned, 118, 124; - has three divisions within nine miles, 129; - to protect Frossard, 134, 138, 140; - promoted over six Marshals, 145, 146; - takes command, 147; - head-quarters at Borny, 148; - unable to retreat over Moselle, protects retreat, 149; - slightly hurt at Colombey-Nouilly, 157; - retreat of Army, 159–168; - roused by cannonade, 171; - at Vionville, 175, 176, 177, 180, 185; - at Gravelotte, 188; - motives examined, 192; - military theory, 193; - retires to strong position, 193; - misjudgment of, 196; - battle of Gravelotte and retreat on Metz, 199–227; - incapable of retrieving previous errors, 228; - suspicions against, not justified, 229, 230; - leaves MacMahon free to act, 239; - anxiety to relieve, 240; - his fatal despatch, 241, 242, 252, 253; - in Metz, 276–278, 281, 282. - - Bazeilles, village, 287; - terrible combats in, 293–306. - - Beaumont, 251, 257; - 5th Corps at, 261; - Failly reaches, 263–266; - Failly surprised at, 267–271; - retreat with running fight, 273; - Germans in front of, 274. - - Beauclair, village, 258, 262. - - Beaufort, 262. - - Belgian frontier, the, 245; - French Army pressed against, 285, 292, 295, 296, 297. - - Belgium, French, and Prussian proposals, 22; - French to be followed into, if not disarmed, 286, 297. - - Belfort, 62, 64, 84, 93, 235, 236; - fortress untaken, Sept. 1st, 283. - - Bellecroix, 141, 152, 160. - - Belval, 261, 262, 267. - - Benedetti, M. de, French Ambassador, and Bismarck, 10, 12, 19, 20, 21; - goes to Ems, 42; - interviews with King, 44–48. - - Bennigsen, Herr von, asks question about Luxemburg, 26. - - Berlin, 1, 2, 3; - political conflict in, 6, 8; - Council in, 9, 12; - King and Bismarck return to, 13; - King reaches, 52; - head-quarters still at, 69. - - Bernecourt, 189. - - Beust, Count von, Saxon Minister, makes proposals, 11; - as Austrian Chancellor, 33. - - Bibesco, Prince Georges, cited, 62; - about Douay, 258; - Cuirassiers on flooded bridge, 274, 311; - description of Sedan, 321. - - Bismarck, Count Otto von, chosen to advise the King, 3; - experience at St. Petersburg, 4; - dealings with Prussian Parliament, 4; - and Polish Insurrection, 1864, 8; - Convention of Gastein, 8; - and Parliament, 8; - and Austrian protection, 9; - and Benedetti, 10; - Nikolsburg, secret military treaties with S. German States, 14, 15; - foundation of German Unity, 16; - view of Napoleon III., 17, 18; - and Benedetti’s demand for left bank of Rhine, 20, 21; - and Belgium, 22; - and Luxemburg, 25; - prints Bavarian secret treaty, 25; - answers Bennigsen, 26; - retrospect on Luxemburg question, 29, 30; - with Moltke in Paris, 1867, 32; - utilizes Salzburg meeting to rouse German feeling, 34, 35; - desires to avoid war, 37; - publishes account of Ems meeting, 47; - meets King William at railway, 52; - saying to Benedetti on Napoleon’s dynasty, 134; - on King’s staff at Malmaison, 214; - seen by Dr. Russell at Bar le Duc, 255, 256; - former hunting in Ardennes, 266; - sends to German Minister at Brussels, 285; - described by Russell, 322; - influence on terms of settlement, 327–330; - meeting with Emperor, 331, 332. - - Bismarck, Counts Herbert and William, 183. - - Bitsche, fortress, commanding pass in the Vosges, 67, 70, 76, 93, 96, - 97, 99, 114, 115, 116, 143; - still untaken Sept. 1st, 283. - - Blumenthal, General von, at Woerth battle, 115, 234, 248; - carries Chantrenne farm, 200; - at Bar le Duc, in favour of northern march, 254, 255; - forecasts French fate, 255; - at conference of Chémery, 295; - with Crown Prince at Sedan, 322, 326. - - Bois Chevalier, 300. - - Bois les Dames, De Failly goes to, 259. - - Bois de la Cusse, 195; - Hessians attack through, 202, 206; - fighting in, 219, 221. - - Bois de la Garenne, 295, 306; - wandering battalions in, 312. - - Bois de Genivaux, French in, 194, 196; - German attack on, 205; - French in, 206, 207, 211, 214. - - Bois des Ognons (Vionville), 177, 185. - - Bois de Vaux, 193, 194, 204; - attack from feared, 211, 218; - and forest of Jaumont, tract between, 228. - - Bois de Vionville, 169, 171, 173. - - Bois St. Arnould, 169, 171. - - Bonie, Colonel, 313. - - Bonnemain’s, General de, cavalry charge at Woerth, 112; - cavalry at Sedan, 296; - appeal to, by Ducrot, 313. - - Bonnemain’s brigade to Les Grands Armoises, 258; - to Raucourt, 261. - - Bonnemain’s division, 249, 251; - Cuirassiers crossing Meuse, 274. - - Bordas, General, 249. - - Bordes, Fort des (Metz), 150; 152. - - Borny, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155, 158, 160, 191. - - Bose, General von, 104; - at Woerth, 110, 111, 113. - - Boucheporn, 79. - - Boulay, 139. - - Boult-aux-Bois, 258, 259. - - Bouillon, road to, northern exit from Sedan, 296, 306. - - Bourbaki, General de, at Vionville, 185; - at Gravelotte, 214, 221, 223, 224, 225. - - Bouzonville, 79. - - Brahaut’s, General de, Cavalry, 234, 256, 262. - - Brandenburg, Infantry at Vionville, 174, 179. - - Bredow, General von, 163, 164; - at Vionville, his brilliant Cavalry charge, 178; - his brigade, 180. - - Brême d’or, farmhouse, Germans take, 126. - - Brieulles sur Bar, 251, 256. - - Briey, 166, 187; - road to, 195; - Germans on roads by, 240, 246. - - Brincourt, General, brigade of Guards at Colombey, 153; - brigade, 215. - - Bruch-Mühle, 101, 102. - - Bruville, 184; - French position after Vionville, 186; - outposts, 190. - - Buchy, 143, 155. - - Buddenbrock, General von, captures Vionville, 173. - - Budritzky’s troops, 221. - - Bülow, General von, with batteries at Vionville, 172. - - Busch, Dr. Moritz, cited, on Sedan, 321, 323; - on Bismarck and the Emperor, 331, 333. - - Buzancy, 245; - French in, 248, 249, 250; - German and French Cavalry skirmish, 256, 257, 259, 260, 264; - King William and staff watch Beaumont fight from, 269; - German head-quarters, 291. - - Buxières, village, 171, 173. - - - Cadenbronn, 117. - - Cambriels, infantry commander at Beaumont, - ordered back by MacMahon, 270. - - Camp de Misère, le, in the loop of Meuse, 336. - - Canrobert, Marshal, 68, 93; - at Chalons, 134, 135, 145; - on the Moselle, 148; - over Moselle, 149, 153; - halted at Rezonville, 161; - position before Vionville, 169; - his brigade recedes, 174; - recapture of Vionville and Flavigny, 177; - intrenching tools left at Chalons, 196; - evidence on patrols, Bazaine trial, 199; - his phrase about German “_tirailleurs d’artillerie_,” 201; - his cannon and infantry, 203; - extreme French right, 207; - outposts discovered, 210; - borrows from Ladmirault, 215; - looks for help from Bazaine, 223, 224; - retreat, 225; - to Metz, 226; - commands _Mobiles_, 236, 237, 278; - at Noisseville, 280, 281, 300. - - Canrobert’s Corps, 141; - at Vionville, 180; - 6th Corps, 195; - Cavalry, 233, 235. - - Capitulation of Sedan, the text drawn up by - Head-Quarter Staff (German), 330. - - Carignan, road to, eastern way out of Sedan, 296, 297; - Emperor vanishes from, 287; - Guard cavalry take, 291, 301, 303; - Wimpffen proposes to retreat on, 315. - - Carling, Steinmetz at, 139. - - Castagny, General de, misled (Spicheren), 129; - did his best but was too late, 130; - slightly hurt at Colombey-Nouilly, 157; - at Vernéville, 161. - - Castelnau, Count, at Donchery, 326; - interposes, 329; - with Emperor, 331. - - Causes of the war, summary of, 52, 53, 54. - - Cavalry combat at Mars la Tour, 183, 184. - - Cavalry, French, its traditions, charge at Woerth, 108; - movements of, 249; - positions at Sedan, 296; - charge at Sedan, 313, 314, 315. - - Cavalry, German, over the Saar, 118; - at work, 139, 140, 141; - watchfulness of, 150; - activity beyond Moselle, 163, 164, 165; - movements, 247, 248, 250, 256, 257; - value of cavalry, 259; - close on French rear, 263; - operations of, 233, 234, 291. - - Cazal, 310; - defended by Liébert, 315, 316; - Germans in, 317. - - Cerçay, M. Router’s château of, papers found in, 21. - - Chagny, 251, 257. - - Chalons, reserve at, 64; - Canrobert still at, 93, 134, 135; - MacMahon and subordinates retire on, 136, 141, 143, 144; - railway to, 189; - roads towards, 192; - French Army driven to, 230, 232, 233; - camp at, 234, 235, 236; - new army, dangers of, 240, 244, 245; - camp, 247; - army of, 264. - - Chamber, the French, sanctions war, 15; - speeches in, 246. - - Chambière, Isle, 160, 278, 279. - - Champenois, farm, garrisoned, 200, 202, 207; - stormed and taken, 211. - - Changarnier, General, remarks on Bazaine’s reported words, 228. - - Chantrenne, farm, musketry from, carried, 200; - Germans in, 202, 205, 207. - - Charles, Prince Frederick, of Prussia, commanding Second Army, 69; - change of orders, 70; - on the march, 78, 79; - 158, 165; - at Vionville, 170, 171; - arrives from Pont à Mousson, 179, 180; - and Voigts-Rhetz at Flavigny, 182; - 188, 190; - general order issued to, 197; - instructs Manstein, 198; - rides to sound of battle at Gravelotte, 202, 203, 207, 219; - in command of investing Army, 231; - intercepts letter, 244; - 278, 281. - - Charles of Lorraine, Prince, in Prague, 229. - - Charmes, 233. - - Chassepot rifle, effect at Mentana, 36. - - Château d’Aubigny, 151, 152, 280. - - Château de Bellevue, German head-quarters, Emperor at, - Capitulation signed at, 335. - - Château Salins, 140, 143. - - Châtel St. Germain, 161; - deep defile, 195; - Guard at, 207. - - Chaumont, 233; - railway station books, 234, 236. - - Chémery, village, 143; - conference of Moltke and Generals, 295. - - Chevreau, M. de, Minister of Interior, 233, 238. - - Chieulles and Vany, 280, 281. - - Chiers, the, 275, 287; - bridges on, 292; - passage over, 294. - - Cissey, General de, at Colombey, 153, 155; - Vionville, 181; - brigades, 182; - Gravelotte, 220. - - Clérambault, General de, at Vionville, 184. - - Clermont in Argonne, 232, 254. - - Cochery, M., 43. - - Coffinières, General, Governor of Metz, 147, 148. - - Cologne Gazette, Ems telegram published in, 47, 48. - - Colombey, village, 150–157, 278. - - Colombey-Nouilly, battle of, 150, 152–159; - with Vionville, and Gravelotte, battles, consequences of, 229. - - Commercy, 232; - important French despatches captured, 233. - - Conference project, Napoleon’s, 11, 12. - - Conflans, 159, 164, 166, 191. - - Conseil-Dumesnil, General, at Woerth, 99; - his men, 106; - his division, 266, 271. - - Contenson, Colonel, killed in charge at Mouzon, 273. - - Convention of Gastein, defined by Bismarck, 8. - - Courcelles, 117; - Chaussy, 162; - Sur Nied, 162, 165. - - Craushaar’s brigade, 211. - - Crimean War, effect on relations of Russia and Prussia, 2. - - Crown Prince of Prussia, Frederick William, commands Third Army, 69; - at Spires, 70; - leads advance, 76, 77; - at the Klingbach, 79; - on the Lauter, 84; - attacks Wissembourg, 86; - checks pursuit, 89; - position after, 91; - before Woerth, 96, 99; - August 6th, 103, 104, 115; - 139, 159, 232, 241; - his Cavalry near the Aube, 247; - at Bar le Duc, 254, 255; - to Ste. Menehould, 259; - ordered to attack at Sedan, 285; - his operations, 292; - at Chémery, 294, 295, 297; - directs troops to Mézières road, 307; - his officers described by Russell, 322; - conference with King, 323. - - Custines, village, 158. - - Czar of Russia, the, more than friendly, 16; - his Eastern designs, 17. - - - Daigny, bridge at, over Givonne, 293; - Germans fall back at, 304; - succeed at, 305. - - Damvillers, 246, 256; - plan of abandoned, 257. - - David, M. Jérôme, 49, 81. - - Decaen, General, commanding 3rd Corps, 136; - at French Centre, 148–151; - his four divisions at Colombey, 153; - mortally wounded, 157. - - Declaration of War, 1, 52. - - Delme, 143. - - Despatches, important French, captured, 233. - - Diet of Frankfort, 12. - - Dieulouard, 141, 142, 143, 158, 163, 164, 189. - - Doering, Major-General von, at Spicheren, 121; - killed at Vionville, 173. - - Dombasle, 232, 254, 256. - - Dom le Mesnil, 295, 307. - - Donchery, failure to blow up bridge at, 289; - Germans prepare to pass Meuse at, 290, 293, 295, 300; - bridge, 307; - meeting of generals at, scene, 326, 327–330, 331, 336. - - Doncourt, 177; - hills, 180. - - Douay, General Abel, divisional commander, 84, 85; - killed at Wissembourg, 86, 87, 88. - - Douay, General Félix, Chief of 7th Corps, 68, 131, 144; - movements of, 249, 250; - ordered to move on the Meuse, 258; - to cross it, “_coúte que coúte_,” 271, 274, 276; - occupies Floing and Illy, 290; - shelled, 308, 309; - Wimpffen and, 311, 312, 313, 316; - and the Capitulation, 319. - - Douzy, village, Ducrot’s corps at, 286, 287; - Saxons pass, 291; - and hold bridge, 292. - - Drouyn de Lhuys, M., Foreign Minister, 16‒20. - - Ducrot, General, divisional commander, 84; - at Woerth, 98, 99, 106, 110; - begins to retire, 113; - complains of scarcity, 243; - 276; - Emperor in camp of, 286; - urges Emperor to go to Sedan, 287; - fired into, 291; - holds the Givonne, 296; - takes command of Army, 300; - superseded by Wimpffen, 301, 302; - operations, 303, 304; - disputes, 311, 312; - appeal to cavalry, 313, 315, 316; - his description of interior of Sedan, 319; - altercation with Wimpffen, 316, 317, 325. - - Dumont, General, division commander of Douay’s corps, 144; - sent after Bordas, 250; - at Beaumont, 271. - - Dun, on the Meuse, 247, 257, 259, 262. - - Dürrenbach, 107. - - Duvernois, Clement, 49, 81. - - - Eberbach, village, 98, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110; - stream, 107, 110. - - Elbe Duchies, the, taken from the Dane, 7. - - Elsasshausen, French right, 98, 106, 107; - German attack on, 110, 111; - set on fire, 112. - - Emperor. _See_ Napoleon. - - Empress of the French, Eugénie, fatal conduct in politics, 81; - made Regent, 137, 235–239; - Napoleon’s telegram, 335. - - England, irritated by Mexican adventure, 32. - - Epinal, 131. - - Erize la Petite, 254. - - Etain, 165, 246. - - - Failly, de, General, commander of 5th Corps, 61, 73; - at Saarbrück, 74, 92; - fluctuating, 96, 97; - joins MacMahon after Woerth, 116; - Spicheren, 117; - halts, 131; - to Nancy, 134; - counter-ordered, 135, 138, 144; - troops, 233; - in twenty trains, 234; - movements, 256, 258, 259; - MacMahon’s despatches to, captured, 260, 261; - action at Nouart, 262, 263; - in the Ardennes, 266; - camp at Beaumont attacked, 268; - repels attack and retires, 269, 270, 273; - 285, 288. - - Failly, village, 278, 279, 280, 281. - - Faulquemont, 139; - Emperor visited by Bazaine at, 140. - - Faure, General, 252, 319; - at Donchery, 326. - - Favre, M. Jules, 52, 81. - - Fenestrange, 144. - - Flanville, 280, 281. - - Flavigny (Vionville), 171, 173; - taken by Germans, 174, 176. - - Fleigneux, 306, 307, 309. - - Flize, Würtembergers engage Vinoy’s outposts at, 293, 295. - - Floing, north-west face of French position, at Sedan, 290, 296; - Germans in, 308, 309, 313. - - Forbach, 79, 94, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123; - 128, 129, 130, 137, 138, 139. - - Forbacherberg, 126, 127. - - Forton, General de, 163; - falls back on Vionville, 164, 168, 169; - want of patrols, 171; - returns cavalry charge, 178. - - France, General de, 166, 183. - - François, General von, at Spicheren, 122, 124. - - Fransecky, General von, at Gravelotte, 204, 217. - - Francheval, 287, 291, 300, 306. - - Frederick II., the Great, his Manstein, 199; - compared, 229. - - Frederick William IV., 2. - - French Court, the, projects of, 21. - - French, the, propose to move, 147; - unable to cross Moselle, 148, 149; - retreat after Colombey, 159; - surprised by artillery (Vionville), 170; - advance, 214; - counter-stroke at Floing, 310. - - French prisoners sent to Germany, 336. - - French Generals, examples of two fatal errors, 147; - meeting to consider Capitulation, 324, 325. - - Frénois, German battery in, fires on Vinoy, 289; - batteries at, alarm French railway officials, 292; - batteries on, to give signal to renew, 323, 324. - - Fresne, 165. - - Froeschwiller, MacMahon’s position, 98, 102, 106, 107; - road to, 110; 112; - Raoult wounded at, 113; - captured, 114. - - Frossard, General, at Saarbrück, 73, 74, 75; - takes position at Forbach, 93, 94; - on the Saar, 116–118; - disposition of troops, 120; - impressed, 123, 126; - retires, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134; - crosses Moselle, 148, 149, 153; - at Rezonville, 161; - failure of patrols, 168; - at Vionville, 169; - retreat, 175, 176; - field-works, 192, 195, 196; - outposts begin, Gravelotte, 197, 200; - strong position, 206–217; - reserves, 226; - at Noisseville, 279. - - Frossard’s Corps, 159, 170, 171, 185, 194. - - Furia Francese, 314. - - - Galgenberg, the (Spicheren), 120. - - Galliffet, General de, charges at St. Menges, 308, 309; - charges with Chasseurs d’Afrique, 313. - - Gambetta, M., speaks against war, 51, 81. - - Garenne, the, 315. - - Gayl, General von, turns Aymard out of Servigny, 280. - - German military system considered—its risks, 97; - mobilization—Prussian, 56, 57; - S. German, 58. - - Germans, movements of about Sedan, 290–295, 310. - - German unity, foundation of, 14, 16. - - General Staff, the Prussian, brain of the Army, 5. - - Germonville, 256. - - Gersdorf, Lieut.-Gen. von, 307. - - George of Saxony, Prince, sent down the Orne, 208; - ordered to sweep round French right, 211. - - Giffert Wald, the (Spicheren), 123–129. - - Girard, General, killed in cavalry charge, 315. - - Girardin, M. St. Marc, estimate of Napoleon, 18. - - Givodeau, Wood of, 270. - - Givonne, the stream, 287, 293, 295; - held by Lebrun’s and Ducrot’s corps, 296; - battle on the, 298–304; - in German hands, 310, 315–317. - - Givonne, Fond de, and village, 295, 306–311. - - Glablenz, Austrian Field-Marshal in Holstein, 12. - - Glümer, Lieut.-General von, at Colombey, 153. - - Gneisenau, Major-Gen. von, 74, 75, 76; - his brigade failed to surprise Thionville, 158, 159; - his brigade sent on by Goeben, 212. - - Gnügge, Captain, his battery at St. Hubert, 213. - - Goeben, General von, at Spicheren, supports Kameke, 121; - takes command, sends in reserves, 125; - at Gravelotte, attacks to employ French left, 205; - Steinmetz talks to, 212. - - Goersdorf, 104. - - Golz, Major-General Baron von, 129; - attacks French retreat, and begins Colombey-Nouilly battle, 150; - without orders, 152, 154, 155; - 215, 218, 278. - - Gondrecourt, General, 184, 225; - village, 232. - - Gortschakoff, Prince, and the Treaty of Paris, 36. - - Gorze, village, 169, 171, 177, 179, 185, 190. - - Gothard, St., railway, a menace to France, 40. - - Govone, General, Italian envoy to Berlin, 10, 11. - - Goze, General, 91. - - Gramont, Duc de, Minister for Foreign Affairs, - sends Benedetti to Ems, 42; - speech in Chamber, 43; - presses demands, 45; - 46, 53, 54. - - Gramont, General de, 170, 178. - - Grand Pré, village, 243, 247, 248, 249, 250, 256, 264. - - Granville, Lord, attempts at compromise, 47. - - Gravelotte, French Army directed towards, 159; - 169, 171, 177, 191; - battle-field described, 193, 194, 195; - French position, 196, 199; - 204, 206; - German position, 206; - Goeben and Steinmetz at, 212; - darkness ends fight at St. Hubert, 217; - course of battle, 218–223; - numbers and losses on both sides, 226, 227; - 229. - - Gravelotte, Bazaine’s account of, 241. - - Gravelotte, defile, road across, 212, 213. - - Gravelotte, road from, to Verdun, 168, 169; - road out of Metz, 159. - - Gravelotte battle, various names for, 228. - - Great Staff, German, leaves Berlin with King, 70; - at Mainz, 77; - 142, 188; - surprised at MacMahon’s eastward march, 244. - - Grenier, General, his division, 149; - at Colombey, 153, 154; - at Vionville, 180, 181. - - Greyère, farm, 181, 185, 186. - - Grigy, 155. - - Grimont, farm, 151; - Bazaine consults generals at, 277. - - Grimont, Bois de, 279. - - Grouchy, Le Capitaine Marquis de, despatches captured, 260. - - Grossbliedersdorf, 79. - - Guard, French, 215. - - Guard, Prussian, and Saxon at Gravelotte, 209–227. - - Guard, losses at St. Privat, 227. - - Gueblange, 139. - - Gunstett, Uhlans cross Sauer at, 91; - (Woerth), 100, 103, 106, 107, 109. - - - Habonville, 195, 202, 203, 206; - Guard at, 208, 210. - - Hagenau, 84, 85, 89, 100, 115. - - Ham, 79. - - Hanover, King of, with Austria and the Bund, 9, 13. - - Han sur Nied, 163. - - Hapsburg-Lorraine, House of, 161. - - Harricourt, 258. - - Harskirchen, 139. - - Hartmann, General Ritter von, at Woerth, 100, 102, 105, 106, 112; - cavalry, 212. - - Hasse, Captain, Battery at St Hubert, 213. - - Hatzfeldt, Count, 323. - - Heiltz l’Evêque, 232. - - Hellimer, 139. - - Helmuth, Captain, 272, 273. - - Helvig, Captain Hugo, on French position, 99. - - Henry, Prince, Governor of Luxemburg, 24. - - Herny, 143; - King and Staff at, 162. - - Hesse Darmstadt, included in the Prussian military system, 14. - - Hesse, Prince Louis of, Lieut.-General commanding - Hessian division, 72; - at Vionville, 186; - holds Bois de la Cusse, 202; - at Noisseville, 280. - - Hesse, Grand Duke of, 72. - - Hessians at Amanvillers, 220, 221. - - Hochwald, 100, 113. - - Hohenzollern, Candidature of Prince Leopold of, - for the crown of Spain, 41, 42; - withdrawn, 45. - - Holland, King of, discloses the designs on Luxemburg, 25. - - Holstein-Schleswig, 7. - - Hungary and Austria, 10. - - House of Belgian weaver, meeting of Napoleon and Bismarck, 332. - - House of Commons, English, averse to war, 7. - - - Iges, peninsula on the Meuse, 295. - - Illy, village, 287, 308, 312, 313. - - Illy, Calvaire d’, 290; - French position, 295, 296, 306, 308, 310, 312; - Germans reach, 313. - - Ingweiler, 115. - - Investment of Bazaine, troops for, 230. - - Iron Cross, The Order of the, restored, 70. - - Isle Chambière, Ladmirault crossing at, 160. - - Italian Kingdom created, 6. - - Italy, Victor Emmanuel, King of, Napoleon appeals to, 160. - - - Jägers save railway viaduct, 294. - - Jarny and Conflans, sounds of battle, 171; - road to, 197, 207. - - Jaumont, Péchot retires to forest of, 224. - - Jerusalem, farm, 208. - - Joinville, 236. - - Jolivet’s brigade, 120; - at Spicheren, 122; - at Vionville, 172, 176. - - Juniville, 243. - - Jurée, brook, 169, 177. - - Jussy, village on Moselle, 195. - - - Kaiserslautern, 68, 76, 77, 79, 95. - - Kameke, Lieut.-General von, at Spicheren, 121, 122, 124; - with Steinmetz, 191, 192. - - Kedange, 277. - - Kehl, bridge of, broken, 70. - - Kirchbach, General von, 104, 105, 106, 113; - at Sedan, 307. - - Kinglake, Mr., character of Napoleon, 133. - - Kraatz, General von, at Vionville, 180, 181. - - Kummer, General von, Landwehr reserve, 158, 230. - - - La Besace, village, 258, 261, 271, 274. - - Ladmirault, General de, 93; - at Spicheren, 116–118, 134; - at Colombey, 148–162; - at Vionville, 180, 181, 184, 185; - at Gravelotte, 194, 215, 223; - at Noisseville, 278, 279. - - Ladmirault’s Corps, 140, 177, 183, 199, 225, 226. - - La Folie, farm, 194, 198, 200, 202, 207, 217, 225. - - Lafont de Villiers, General, 173. - - Laheycourt, 232. - - Landstuhl, 95. - - Langensalza, Battle of, 13. - - La Moncelle, Saxons seize, 299, 300, 302; - brilliant French attack, 305; - Emperor near, 311. - - Lapasset, General, at Saarguemines, 91; - brigade at Vionville, 171, 177, 185; - at St. Ruffine, 195; - contest with Golz, 215. - - La Planchette, farm, 152. - - Laquenexy, 281. - - Lartigue, General, 84, 99; - at Woerth, 105–113; - at Sedan, 304, 305. - - La Thibaudine, farm, 271. - - Lauter, and Lauterbourg, lines of, 76, 77; - 86, 87. - - Lauvalliers, 151, 152, 154, 156. - - La Vallières, stream, 151. - - Laveaucoupet, General, at Spicheren, 120, 122, 128; - to be placed in Metz and Verdun, 137. - - La Viré farm, Prince Augustus at, 306. - - Lebach, 73, 75, 79, 95. - - Lebœuf, Marshal, Chief of the Staff, 49–50, 59–62; - at Metz, 92, 116; - unfitness for command, 117; - 136, 145, 161; - at Vionville, 169, 171, 177, 180, 181; - at Gravelotte, 205, 211, 215, 217, 225, 226; - 228; - withdrawn from Noisseville, 279, 281. - - Lebœuf’s Corps, 185, 194, 196. - - Lebrun, General, 235, 243, 261, 270; - retreat on Sedan, 286, 287, 288–294; - at Bazeilles, 296–299, 301, 302; - at Givonne, 304, 311; - condemns Wimpffen’s efforts, 316, 317; - arrangements for Capitulation, 318, 319. - - Lebrun’s Corps, 291, 293. - - Le Chesne-Populeux, 243, 249; - MacMahon, head-quarters, 251, 257, 258; - 263, 266. - - Lee, General Robert, his saying on war, 223. - - Legrand, General, at Mars la Tour, 183, 184. - - Lehmann, Colonel, at Tronville, 176, 177. - - Leipzig, farm, 194, 196, 207. - - Lémoncourt, 143. - - Le Mont de Brune, 272, 273. - - L’Envie, farm, 202, 207. - - Lespart, General Guyot de, 91; - at Woerth, 141, 262. - - Les Etangs, 140, 142, 149. - - Lessy, cross roads by, 159, 161. - - Létanne, bridge constructed at, 291. - - “Le Temps,” paragraph in, 246. - - L’Hériller and Pellé’s Division, 302. - - Liébert, General, 313, 315, 316. - - Ligny, 232; - Great Staff and Crown Prince at, 245. - - Loftus, Lord Augustus, 46. - - Longeville, 241; - camp, 161. - - Longuyon, 230. - - Longstreet, General (United States), 255. - - Lorencez, General de, at Colombey-Nouilly, 153, 155, 157, 162. - - Lunéville, 144, 159, 162. - - Luxemburg, negotiations, and question, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28. - - Lavalette, Napoleon’s letter to, 20. - - - Mack, General, at Ulm, 229. - - MacMahon, Marshal, assembling 1st Corps near Strasburg, 68; - scattered condition of command, 84, 85; - at Reichshofen, 89–99; - at Woerth, 109, 112, 114; - back on Sarrebourg, 116; - ordered to Chalons, 134, 135, 138, 144; - still at large, 231; - at Rhetel, 234; - at Chalons, 236, 237; - receives command of army, 238; - moves army to Reims, 240; - on the Aisne, 248; - turns from Stenay to Mouzon, 259; - will pass the Meuse, 265; - near Beaumont, 270, 271, 276, 284; - 285; - directs retreat on Sedan, 286, 287; - relations to the Emperor, 288; - account of conduct, 297; - wounded, gives up command, 300; - wound a great misfortune, 303. - - Magdeburg and Altmark regiments, losses, 178, 179. - - Mainz, 65, 67, 69, 72, 77, 92. - - Malancourt, 223, 281. - - Malmaison, 177. - - Malroy on Moselle, 278. - - Manèque, General, mortally wounded at Noisseville, 281. - - Mance, brook, 177, 191, 193, 194, 195; - gully, 205; - eastern, 207; - ravine, 214, 216, 217. - - Manstein, General von, at Gravelotte, 198–204, 219, 220; - crosses Moselle, 280. - - Manteuffel, General Baron von, at Berlin Council, 10; - makes Austrians retreat beyond Elbe, 12; - precaution, 150; - joins in at Colombey-Nouilly, 153, 155; - at Noisseville, 278, 280. - - Marbache, 158; - -Custines, 163, 189. - - Margueritte, General, 141, 235, 243, 249, 251, 258, 260, - 261, 275, 287; - his cavalry, 296, 300, 307; - on the Calvaire d’Illy, 308, 309; - mortally wounded, 313. - - Marines, French, in Bazeilles, 298, 305. - - Marsal, 148, 232. - - Marshals of France, three caged in Metz, 231. - _See_ Bazaine, Canrobert, Lebœuf. - - Mars la Tour, French Army directed on, 159, 163, 164; - road from Gravelotte to Verdun passes, 168; - battle of Vionville, 170; - ravine, 181; - German Cavalry at, 183; - German guns hold on near, 183; - cavalry at, 186; - Germans occupy, 191, 197. - - Mattstal, 98, 100, 102. - - Maxau on the Rhine, 64. - - Ménil sur Saulx, letters seized by German cavalry at, 233. - - Mensdorff, Count, Austrian Foreign Minister, 9. - - Mercy le Haut, or Mercy les Metz, 151, 278. - - Metman, General, at Spicheren, 129, 130; - 60, 161; - at Vionville, 177; - leaves Rezonville, 191. - - Metz, 68, 76, 79, 82, 92, 93; - defences incomplete, 94; - disorder and consternation in, 131–135; - entire army moves back on, 136; - (Colombey battle), 151, 152; - excitement in, 159; - Bazaine’s army moves nearer to, 188; - shutting up in, not thought of, 190; - Bazaine’s theory about, 192; - French Army by, 193, 195, 197; - Steinmetz’s mistaken hope of driving French into, 212; - magnetism of stronghold like, 229, 230; - blockade of, 231, 239, 241, 242, 244–246; - two corps sent back to, 257; - army, 277; - military situation about, 282; - fortress, 283, 336. - - Metz, road from, to Strasburg, 67; - from Mainz to, 67; - road at Spicheren, 128; - railway, 129; - roads out of, 159; - road to, 194; - and Montmédy road closed, 292. - - Meurthe, valley of the, 144, 158, 232. - - Meuse, the, 134, 136, 171, 189, 232; - MacMahon near, 234; - crossing at Stenay, 242, 246; - Verdun, 248, 249; - MacMahon’s army ordered to, 253; - Germans on, 256, 257, 260, 262; - French Corps on left bank, 263, 270, 271, 273; - dammed to fill Sedan ditches, 274; - 280, 285, 286, 289; - passage at Mouzon held by Saxon Crown Prince, 292; - pontoon over, 294; 295; - loop of, 296; - roads near, 307. - - Mexico expedition, 7. - - Mey, village (Colombey-Nouilly), 151–156. - - Mézières, route for Chalons, 242; - MacMahon to retreat on, 251–253, 255, 257; - French to be cut off from, 286; - retreat to, given up, 290, 295, 297, 301, 303; - road, 307. - - Michel, General, unique telegram, 62; - at Woerth, 107, 108; - charges of his Cuirassiers, 109; - cavalry, 296. - - Mitchell, M. Robert, 48, 50. - - _Mobiles_, unfurnished with munitions, 132; - bad behaviour of, returned to Paris, 236; - reasons for, 238. - - Mobilization, French, 59; - defects and difficulties, 60–63. - - Mobilization, German, 2, 3, 57, 58, 59. - - Moltke, General Baron von, Chief of the Staff, 3; - his work, 5, 6; - at Berlin Council, 10; - in 1868 frames plan of campaign in France, 37; - remark on declaration of war, 52; - plans, 65, 66; - disposition after Saarbrück, 76–78; - intentions before Woerth,96; - caution, 138; - 142; - prepared for French on right bank, 158; - directs Second Army on Moselle, 162; - memorable instructions, 165; - judgment confirmed, 189, 190; - at Flavigny, 191; - orders on 17th, 197, 198; - keeps back Steinmetz at Gravelotte, 204; - 207; - his main object, 216; - himself directs attack, 217; - original design of battle, 218; - estimate of Bazaine, 218; - starts for Paris, 232, 234; - Bazaine’s despatch, 242; - arrangements to meet French move, 244–246, 254, 256, 257, - 259, 260, 264; - sanctions bombardment of Strasburg, 283, 284; - 294; - at Conference of Chémery, 295; - quickens operations, 297; - 302, 307; - with the King, looking on Sedan, described by Russell, 321; - designated by King, suspends hostilities, 323; - meets the French Generals at Donchery, 325–330; - goes to King at Vendresse, 332. - - Montaigu, General, wounded and prisoner, 184. - - Montauban, General. _See_ Palikao, Comte de. - - Montaudon, General, 94; - at Spicheren, 117, 129; - 137; - at Colombey, 153, 155; - at Vionville, 177; - near Rezonville, 185. - - Montfaucon, 256, 257. - - Monthois, 264. - - Montigny la Grange, 195, 198; - held by French, 225, 226. - - Montimont, 307. - - Montluisant, Colonel, 224, 225. - - Montmédy, 242, 246, 276, 277, 286. - - Montois, 223. - - Montoy, 151, 152, 154. - - Montpayroux, M. Guyot de, illustrates French feeling, 51. - - Monvillers Park, Bazeilles, 298; - combats in, 299, 305, 306. - - Morsbronn, 106, 107. - - Moscow, farm, French position, 194, 205, 206, 207, 213; - every attempt on, repulsed, 214; - Lebœuf in, 217. - - Moselle, river, 92, 134, 135, 136, 139, 141; - German advance on, 142; - Borny on, 143, 144; - French get over, 146, 147; - in flood, 148, 149; - Colombey, 150, 151, 153; - possible French advance up right bank, 158; - retreat on, 159; - fog on, 161; - Second Army sent over, 162, 163, 169; - valley, 179; - crossed at Marbache, 189, 190; - near Ars, 193; - below Metz, 194; - crossed at Borny, 204; - Germans on left bank of, 230, 231, 278, 280, 281. - - Mouzon, 260, 261, 263, 269, 270, 272; - Cuirassiers charge at, 273; - Germans at, 274; - MacMahon at, 286; - rout at, described to Emperor, 287; - Germans take, 291. - - Moyœuvre, forest of, 218. - - Murat, Prince, followed by Redern, 164; - his dragoons bolt, 170. - - - Nancy, 134, 139; - Uhlans ride into, 141, 144, 159, 163. - - Napoleon I., the Great, cavalry traditions of, 165; - his genius required, 193; - on competence of captains for large command, 229. - - Napoleon III., Louis, declares war on Prussia, 1; - his policy and position in Europe previous to the war, 2–20; - attempt on Luxemburg, 22, 23; - Russian alliance, Paris exhibition, 31; - death of Maximilian, 32; - at Salzburg, 33, 34; - suspects military treaties, 35; - seeks allies, 36; - fears for the dynasty, 49; - resolves on war, 50; - declares war, 52; - head-quarters at Metz, 64, 72; - takes command, 73; - Saarbrück, 74; - incapacity at Metz, 82, 92, 93; - Spicheren, 116, 117; - confusion, 132; - character unaltered from 1836, 133, 134; - despatch to Paris, 135; - resigns command, 136; - 138, 140, 145; - fails to press retreat over Moselle, 146, 147; - at Longeville, 159; - appeal to Austria and Italy, 160; - at and after Gravelotte, 161, 162, 166, 167; - and Lebœuf, 228; - 229, 231; - at Chalons and Reims, 235–242; - interview with MacMahon, 251; - military judgment correct, 253; - in Ducrot’s camp, 286, 287; - refuses to retire to Sedan, yet goes, 287; - enters Sedan, 288; - refuses to leave, 289; - and Des Sesmaisons, 290; - notices retreat, 301; - rides out early to see battle, sees MacMahon - and goes under fire, 311; - and Wimpffen, 316; - and his generals, 317, 318; - hopes to appeal to the King, 318; - Capitulation arranged with generals, 319, 320; - letter to King, 322; - awaiting reply, 324; - Wimpffen quarrels before him, 325; - he surrenders, leaves Sedan, meets Bismarck, 331–333; - meets King and Crown Prince, telegraphs to Empress, 335; - departs for Wilhelmshöhe, hears of Paris Revolution, 337; - reflections, 338. - - Napoleon, Louis, Prince Imperial, baptism of fire, 73, 74; - with Emperor, 161, 166; - at Chalons, 237; - sent off, 239. - - Napoleon, Prince Jérôme, 41; - with Emperor at Chalons, 236; - supports Trochu, suggests abdication, 237. - - Needle gun, the, 7. - - Neehwiller, 98, 113, 114. - - Nehrdorff, General, withdraws Saxons, 210. - - Neufchâteau, 233. - - Neunkirchen, 79. - - Nice and Savoy ceded to France, 6. - - Nied, the French, 135; - German, 136; - 140, 142, 143. - - Niederbronn, 70; - (Woerth), 113, 114. - - Niederwald, the, 107, 108, 109, 111. - - Nikolsburg, Treaty of, 13, 14, 16. - - Noisseville, 154, 155, 156; - battle of, 277–279; - Manteuffel attacks, 280; - contest for, 281. - - Nomény, 140. - - Nostitz, Count, at Donchery meeting, 326. - - Nouart, 256, 258–264, 267. - - Nouilly, 148, 151, 156. - - Novéant, 163, 177. - - - Oches, 249, 260, 261, 263, 265; - MacMahon at, 266; - Crown Prince at, 269. - - Ollivier, M. Emile, pacific remarks, 43; - thinks quarrel ended, 48; - political position, prophetic words, 50; - goes to war “_à cœur leger_,” 51; - 81; - Ministry turned out, 137. - - Olly, Germans occupy, 309. - - Olozaga, Spanish Ambassador, 45. - - Orcet, Captain d’, and Donchery meeting, 326, 327, 328. - - Ornain, the river, 232, 284. - - Orne, the river, 193, 195, 208; - cantonments on, 246. - - Operations, German and French, August 29th, 259, 260, 261. - - - Palatinate, the, possible irruption into, 70. - - Pagny, 163. - - Palikao, Comte de, General, Montauban, 81, 137; - made by Empress Minister of War, 235; - collects new army, 235; - telegram to, from Emperor, 239; - views, 240, 242; - responsible for disaster, 251; - insists on help for Bazaine, 252, 253; - utter ignorance of situation, 254, 276; - and Wimpffen, 288, 324, 336. - - Pallières, General Martin des, 298. - - Pange, French position, 136, 140, 142, 143, 149, 152. - - Pape, Major-General von, 203; - Guard prepared to attack St. Marie, 208, 209; - at St. Marie, 219, 220; - his Guards’ attack on St. Privat, 222. - - Paradol, Prévost, view of the war, and suicide, 54, 55. - - Paris, remonstrances from, 135; - and Parisians, 146; - army of the Rhine facing, 193; - placed in state of defence, 233; - fears of uncovering, 240; - newspaper informs Moltke, 245; - road to, 246; - orders from, to MacMahon, 252, 253; - ready for revolution, 285; - Wimpffen at, 287. - - Parliament, Prussian, opposition to army reform, 4. - - Péchot, General, falls on Saxons, 210; - “valiant officer” attempts to stop enemy, 224. - - Pellé, General, takes command on Douay’s death, 88; - at Woerth, 99. - - Pestel, Colonel von, at Saarbrück, 73. - - Pfaffenwald, the, 125. - - Pfordten, von der, Bavarian Minister, signs secret treaty, 14. - - Phalsbourg, 115, 143, 144; - French fortress untaken, 283. - - Pietri, M., telegraphs to Empress, 238. - - Pirmasens, 69, 77, 86. - - Plappeville, fort, 194; - Guard at, 195; - guns not heard at, 214, 215. - - Podbielski, General von, 245, 246; - at conference of Cheméry, 295; - with King William, 321; - at Donchery meeting, 326. - - Point du Jour farm, 191, 194; - quarries below, 205; - burnt, 206, 207; - Steinmetz hopes to capture, 212; - repulses attack, 214; - attempts to storm, 217. - - Poix, 156; - German guns at, 279, 293. - - Pommérieux, 165. - - Pont à Mousson, 141, 142, 143; - Prince Frederick Charles at, 158; - 163, 171; - Royal head-quarters, 189; - Moltke starts for, 197; - Moltke at, 283. - - Porru au Bois, Prussian Guard in, 292. - - Possesse, 232. - - Pouilly, Germans at, 275; - bridge constructed, 291. - - Preuil, General du, at Vionville, 175. - - Preuschdorf, 104. - - Provisions, French scarcity of, 243. - - Prussia, King of. _See_ William I. - - Prussian Army, now German, characteristics of, 5, 6; - victories in Denmark with needle-gun, 7; - augmented, 8; - mobilizing, 11, 12; - enters Austria, fights Sadowa, 13. - - Prusso-Italian Alliance, 10. - - Puttelange, Castagny marches to, 129; - French generals assemble at, 130. - - Puxieux, 163, 164. - - - Quarries of Amanvillers and St. Hubert, 192, 205, 217, 218. - - Quatre Champs, 258. - - Queleu, Fort, Metz, 141, 148. - - - Railway, questions of control, Belgian, Luxemburg, - and St. Gothard, 39, 40. - - Rastadt, 65, 92. - - Rations, in Sedan, sent away by mistake, 289. - - Rauch, Colonel von, at Flavigny, Hussars capture battery - and surround Bazaine, 175. - - Raucourt, 271; - Douay retires on, 265; - attacked, 274; - 293. - - Raoult, General, 99, 106, 110, 113. - - Reconnaisances, French, inadequate, 167. - - Redern, General von, before Metz, 163; - follows Murat, 164; - at Flavigny, 178. - - Red Hill, Rotheberg, or Spur at Spicheren, 119, 120, 122; - storming of, 124, 125, 126, 127; - Spicheren road up, 128. - - Reichshofen, 84, 96; - and Niederbronn, 100, 109, 112, 113, 114. - - Reille, General, 320, 325, 331. - - Reims, 234, 242, 244, 245, 246; - 3rd Army Cavalry in sight of, 247; - 249, 251. - - Remilly, 231, 260; - disordered French retreat to, 272, 273; - 293. - - Remonville, 264. - - Reppertsberg, Spicheren, 120. - - Revigny les Vaches, Crown Prince’s head-quarters, 255. - - Rex, Colonel von, at Spicheren, 121; - in Bois des Ognons, 185. - - Rezonville, 164; - road from Gravelotte to Verdun through, 168, 169; - (Vionville battle), 170, 171, 177, 179, 186; - 188, 190, 191, 197; - 2nd Corps at, 215, 242. - - Rheinbaben, Lieut.-General Baron von, at Spicheren, 119, 120; - effective operations on Verdun road, 163; - at Vionville, 170; - begins battle with battery, 171; - his work done, 172. - - Retonfay, 279. - - Rhetel, MacMahon’s army at, 243, 249. - - Rhine, the, and Moselle, 65; - bridges and ferries destroyed, 70; - 76. - - Roman road, Vionville, 169, 171. - - Roncourt, high ground, French position, 194; - open descent to, 195; - limit of French right, 207, 208, 210, 211; - Saxons at, 222, 223, 224. - - Roon, General von, made War Minister, 3; - administrative measures, 5, 6; - causes King to retire out of fire, 216; - with King, 321. - - Rosseln, Von Golz marches from, 129. - - Rouher, M., 38, 49; - goes to Emperor at Chalons, 240; - suggests proclamation, 241. - - Rozérieulles village, 160; - French reserves in, 194. - - Rupigny, 281. - - Russell, Dr. William, diary cited, description of Bismarck at - Bar le Duc, 255; - of Sedan and the King, 321; - of Crown Prince, 322. - - Russell, Lord, Danish question, 7. - - Russia, 2, 4, 8, 11, 16. - - - Saar, 76; - French positions on, 92; - German, 95, 118, 119; - French, 136; - 138, 139; - upper, 143, 144. - - Saarbourg, 116. - - Saarbrück, 70; - affair at, 73, 77, 118, 119; - road, 152. - - Saarlouis, 77, 136; - road from, 152, 158, 230. - - Sachy, guard at, 292. - - Sadowa, battle of, 13, 14, 16. - - St. Ail, 195; - German batteries at, 203; - 209, 210; - and St. Marie, Prussian Infantry Guard, 219, 221. - - St. Avold, 79, 94, 117, 120; - Bazaine at, 124, 129; - Castagny called to, 130; - 138, 140, 143. - - St. Barbe, village and church tower, 151, 152, 153; - ravine, 154, 156; - 277, 278, 279, 280. - - St. Dizier, 234. - - St. Germain, ravine, 214. - - St. Hilaire, 170, 182. - - St. Hubert, farm, above Gravelotte, narrow causeway by, 194; - strong, 196; - contest at, 205, 206, 207, 212; - slopes near, 213; - Germans hold, 214; - last fights, 215, 216; - in twilight, 217, 218. - - St. Julien, fort, 148; - 278, 279. - - St. Marcel, 169. - - St. Marie aux Chênes, Canrobert occupies, 195; - German Guard advance on, 198, 202, 203; - held by French, 206, 207; - described, 208; - attack on road through, 209; - abandoned, 209; - Saxon guns north of, 219; - high road to, 221; - General Pape at, sends out Guard, 222. - - St. Menehould, 232, 242, 251. - - St. Menges, 296, 301, 306; - Germans occupy, 307, 308; - and push on, 309, 310, 311. - - St. Mihiel, 240. - - St. Privat la Montagne, _see_ Gravelotte, 194–225. - - St. Quentin, Mount, fort, 160, 161, 194, 195; - highest point of position, 196; - 214. - - St. Ruffine, 211, 215, 218. - - Salignac-Fenelon, General, 315. - - Salzburg, meeting of Austrian and French Emperors at, 33. - - Sansonnet, 161. - - Sarreguemines, Montaudon at, 117; - 118, 119; - retreat on, 128, 129; - 137, 138. - - Sauer, stream, and Sulz, 100, 107. - - Saulny, 223; - wood of, 224, 226. - - Saverne, 99, 112; - retreat on, 114, 115, 116; - railway tunnels west of, 144. - - Saxon 12th Corps, 267; - at Beaumont fight, 269. - - Saxon horse cut off Lebrun’s baggage, 287. - - Saxon infantry at St. Marie, 210. - - Saxons in Daigny, 304, 305. - - Saxony, King of, in Pirna, cited, 229. - - Saxony, Prince Royal of (Crown Prince), at Gravelotte, 198; - at Auboué, 207, 210; - in command of Army of the Meuse, 230, 241; - 244; - at Clermont in Argonne, 254; - to cross Meuse, 260; - early march to Beaumont, 264; - to attack, 285; - anticipates orders, 291; - secures Chiers bridges, 292, 297. - - Saxony, Prince George of, 207, 208; - holds French, 263. - - Schellendorf, Colonel Bronsart von, 320. - - Schlotheim, General von, 248. - - Schmidt, Captain, artillery feat, 127. - - Schultz, General, engineer, 284. - - Schwarzkoppen, General von, 181, 182. - - Schwerin, General von, 121. - - Sedan, 146, 234; - Bazaine suggests retreat on, 242, 249; - 256, 266; - occupation of, 272, 274–276; - 281, 286–289, 294; - battle-field described, 295, 297; - battle of, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303; - Emperor returns to, 311; - final efforts, 316; - end of battle, 317; - condition of interior, 319; - losses on both sides, 336. - - Seille, river, reached by patrols, 140; - 142, 148, 151, 158, 189. - - Selz, 85. - - Semuy, 249. - - Senuc, 250; 264. - - Sermaize, 232. - - Servigny, 148, 155, 279, 280. - - Sesmaisons, Captain, 289, 290. - - Seton, Captain, remarks on Steinmetz, 212. - - Sheridan, General, U.S., 322. - - Sierck, 70. - - Solferino, effect of French success, 6; - Napoleon’s saying after, 318. - - Sommauthe, Bavarians in, 274. - - Sommerance, 264. - - Sourd, M. le, presents Declaration of War, 1, 52. - - Spachbach, 103, 107. - - Spicheren, Frossard takes post at, 94; - 117; - French position, 116, 117, 118; - battle-field, 119, 120; - battle, 121–130, 137; - temerity of German advance guard, 158. - - Spires, 70. - - Steinmetz, General von, commanding First Army, 68, 76–78, 95; - characteristic speech of, 121; - begins Spicheren battle, 122, 139, 142; - advances, 149, 157; - instructions from Moltke, 165, 191, 192, 197, 198; - at Gravelotte, 204; 211–217, 278. - - Steinburg, Woerth, 115. - - Stenay, on the Meuse, MacMahon hopes to cross at, 242, 243; - 247, 256, 264, 268. - - Stephan, General von, 294. - - Stiring-Wendel, village (Spicheren), 120–124, 127–129. - - Stoffel, Colonel, 251, 252. - - Stonne, Emperor at, 253, 262; - defiles leading to, 266; - Germans in, 274. - - Strasburg, 66, 67, 131, 132, 143, 283; - bombardment, 284; - siege, 285. - - Stülpnagel, General von, at Spicheren, 121; - at Vionville, 172, 173, 174. - - Suippe, river, 243. - - Sulz and Sauer, 96, 98. - - - Tann-Rathsamhausen, General von der, his Bavarian troops, - 91, 100, 104; - at Beaumont fight, 267, 269, 271; - fires on Bazeilles, 293, 294; - 297–299. - - Teterchen, 139. - - Thiaucourt, 163, 164; - cannonade heard at, 181. - - Thiers, M., speech against war, 51. - - Thionville, 131; - German cuirassiers at, 141; - 230, 231, 245, 276. - - Tholey, 75, 76, 79. - - Tilliard, General, 315. - - _Tirailleurs d’artillerie_, 174; - Canrobert’s phrase, 201. - - Tixier’s, General, division, Vionville, 180. - - Torcy, 272, 274, 296, 317. - - Toul, town and fortress, 135; - governor of, summoned by Uhlans, 164, 189; - siege of, 232, 283. - - Tourteron, 249, 293. - - Turenne, Vicomte de, born at Sedan, 321. - - Turnier, Colonel, 276. - - Treves, 65, 76, 93. - - Triaucourt, 232, 254. - - Trochu, General, proposition to Emperor, 237; - governor of Paris, 238, 239. - - Tronville, village and woods, 169, 171, 173, 176, 177, 180–185. - - - Uhrich, General, governor of Strasburg, 283, 284. - - Uhlans, 140, 141, 213, 232. - - - Valabrègue, General, 169, 178. - - Valazé, General, at Spicheren, 120, 123; - at Vionville, 172, 174. - - Vallières, brook, 278. - - Valmy, battle-field, 239. - - Varennes, 247, 254, 257. - - Varize, 149. - - Vassy, 233. - - Vassoigne, General, 298. - - Vauban, fortified Sedan, 321. - - Vaudemont, 233. - - Vautoux, 156. - - Verdun, 131, 159; - road, 164, 165, 170, 176, 188–199, 193; - Germans moving towards, 232; - 240, 241, 242; - Napoleon’s despatch from, 276, 277; - fortress untaken, 283. - - Vergé, General, holds Stiring, 126, 129; - at Vionville, 171. - - Vernéville, 161, 169, 177, 188, 199–208. - - Verrières, Würtembergers at, 274, 293. - - Verviers, Emperor at, 337. - - Victor Emmanuel. _See_ Italy, King of. - - Vienne le Château, 257, 264. - - Villette, 310. - - Villemontrey, 270, 273. - - Villeneuve, General, 270, 272. - - Villers au Bois, 169. - - Villers-Cernay, 287, 300, 306. - - Villers below Mouzon, 266, 271, 273. - - Villers l’Orme, 156, 280. - - Ville sur Yron, 183. - - Vinoy, General, 253, 289, 290; - and troops escape, 293; 336. - - Vionville, 164; 166; - -Mars la Tour battle, 167–187; - road towards, after battle, 190, 229. - - Vitry, 232, 233; - cavalry capture stray French, 234, 241. - - Void, 232. - - Voigts-Rhetz, General von, commander of 10th Corps, - comes up at Mars la Tour, 170, 182. - - Völkingen, outposts in contact, 78. - - Voncq, Germans take prisoners at, 263. - - Vosges, mountains, 66, 67; - defiles of, open, 115, 116; - 131, 143. - - Vouziers, MacMahon’s army at, 234, 243, 245, 248, 250, 257, 259. - - Vrémy, 148, 279. - - Vrigne au Bois, 307. - - - Wadern, remarkable march from, 127. - - Wadelincourt, 310. - - Walther, General von, begins attack at Woerth, 101. - - Warniforêt, hamlet, 271. - - Warren Wood, or Bois de la Garenne, 317. - - Wedell, General von, at Vionville, 182. - - Weise, Colonel von, 184. - - Werder, General von, at Woerth, 100, 104; - bombards Strasburg, 283, 284. - - William I., King of Prussia, Regent in 1858, work and plans, 2, 3; - military reform, 3, 4, 5; - council in Berlin, 9, 10; - Hohenzollern candidature, Benedetti at Ems, 42–45; - leaves Ems, 46; - mobilization, 52; - restores Order of Iron Cross, 70; - characteristic journey to Mainz, 72; - headquarters at Herny, 158, 165; - at Pont à Mousson, 189; - joins Prince Frederick Charles, 190; - his armies facing the Rhine, 193; - on Flavigny heights, 197, 204; - watches fight from Malmaison, 214; - sanctions advance on Frossard, 215, 216; - starts for Paris, 231, 232, 234; - 242; - consulted, issues orders for grand right wheel, 246; - Bar le Duc, 254; - at Clermont, 255; - Varennes, 259; - Grand Pré, 264; - and staff on hill near Buzancy, 269; - 284; - orders to Crown Prince and Saxon Crown Prince, 285; - at Sedan, 320, 321, 322, 323, 332; - meets Napoleon, 335; - greets troops, 336; - hears of Paris Revolution, 338. - - Winterfeld, Captain von, 320. - - Wimpffen, General de, 1, 52; - arrives at Sedan, 288, 296; - takes command, 301, 302, 303, 307, 311, 312, 315–317; - conduct during negotiations and Capitulation, 319, 325–335. - - Wiseppe, stream, 262. - - Wissembourg, 84, 85; - battle, 86–90; - 167; - road from Landau to, by Pirmasens, 67. - - Woerth, bridge broken, 91; - French position, 96; - battle, 101–114; - consequences, 115, 116. - - Woippy, road out of Metz to, 159, 223. - - Woyna, General von, at Spicheren, 123, 126; - at Colombey, 153. - - Würtemberg, Prince Augustus of, at Gravelotte, 199, 203; - sends in Guard, 219, 220; - at Givonne, 306, 308. - - Würtemberg joins Prussian military system, 14. - - Würtembergers, 254, 264. - - - Xonville, 163. - - - Yron, river, 183, 186. - - Yoncq, 271, 272. - - - Zastrow, General von, at Spicheren, 121, 125; - at Colombey, 153, 155, 157, 191, 192. - - Zieten hussars, 261. - - Zingler, Captain von, 334. - - Zouaves escaped to Paris, 304. - - - - - [Illustration] - - CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO. - - TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON. - - - - - AN - - ALPHABETICAL LIST - - OF BOOKS CONTAINED IN - - BOHN’S LIBRARIES. - - - _Detailed Catalogue, arranged according to the various - Libraries, will be sent on application._ - - - - - =ADDISON’S Works.= With the Notes of Bishop Hurd, Portrait, and 8 - Plates of Medals and Coins. 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