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diff --git a/old/54680-0.txt b/old/54680-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a7f4ec7..0000000 --- a/old/54680-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4072 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Peacemakers--Blessed and Otherwise, by Ida M. Tarbell - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Peacemakers--Blessed and Otherwise - Observations, Reflections and Irritations at an International Conference - -Author: Ida M. Tarbell - -Release Date: May 7, 2017 [EBook #54680] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PEACEMAKERS--BLESSED AND OTHERWISE *** - - - - -Produced by Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - PEACEMAKERS—BLESSED AND OTHERWISE - - _Observations, Reflections and Irritations at an International - Conference_ - - - - - BY - - IDA M. TARBELL - - FATHER ABRAHAM - IN LINCOLN’S CHAIR - HE KNEW LINCOLN - THE WAYS OF WOMAN - THE RISING OF THE TIDE - NEW IDEALS IN BUSINESS - LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN - HE KNEW LINCOLN, AND OTHER BILLY BROWN STORIES - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - PEACEMAKERS—BLESSED AND OTHERWISE - _Observations, Reflections and Irritations at an International - Conference_ - - - BY - IDA M. TARBELL - - - New York - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - 1922 - - _All rights reserved_ - - - - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - - COPYRIGHT, 1922, - - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - Set up and printed. Published April, 1922. - - - Press of - J. J. Little & Ives Company - New York, U. S. A. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - FOREWORD - - -This book does not pretend to be a history or even an adequate review of -the work of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, nor does it -pretend to be the writer’s full appraisement of that work. It is what -its sub-title suggests, a collection of observations, rejections and -irritations. These were set down each week of the first two months of -the Conference and were published practically as they stand here by the -McClure Syndicate. - - I. M. T. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. PRE-CONFERENCE REFLECTIONS 1 - - II. ARMISTICE DAY 29 - - III. NOVEMBER 12, 1921 41 - - IV. THE FRENCH AT THE CONFERENCE 60 - - V. THE PARIS SHRINE OF OUR LADY OF HATES 83 - - VI. WHY DID HE DO IT? 99 - - VII. DRAMATIC DIPLOMACY 114 - - VIII. THE MOODS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 137 - - IX. PUT YOURSELF IN THEIR PLACES 160 - - X. CHINA AT THE CONFERENCE 186 - - XI. THE MEASURE OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 206 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - PEACEMAKERS—BLESSED AND OTHERWISE - - _Observations, Reflections and Irritations - at an International Conference_ - - - - - CHAPTER I - PRE-CONFERENCE REFLECTIONS - - -When one attempts to set down, with any degree of candor, his -impressions of a great gathering like the Conference on the Limitation -of Armament, he will find himself swayed from amusement to irritation, -from hope to despair, from an interest in the great end to an interest -in the game as it is being played. My hopes and interests and -irritations over the Washington Conference began weeks before it was -called. What could it do? All around me men and women were saying, “It -will end war,” and possibly—so deep was the demand in them that war be -ended—believing what they said. It has always been one of the singular -delusions of people with high hopes that if nations disarmed there could -be no wars. Take the gun away from the child and he will never hurt -himself. If it were so easy! - -Their confidence alarmed the authors of the Conference. They did not -mean disarmament, but limitation of armament. Moreover it was not even a -Conference _for_ but one _on_ limitation. This was equivalent to saying -that there were other matters involved in cutting down arms—the causes -that had brought them into being in the first place, the belief that -only in them was security, and that if you were to do away with them you -must find a substitute, and a way to make this substitute continually -effective. That is, there were several problems for the Conference to -solve if they were to put a limit to armaments, and they were not easy -problems. But those who kept their eyes on disarmament, pure and simple, -refused to face them. - -Along with the many who believed the coming Conference could say the -magic word were not a few—the sophisticated, who from the start said: -“Well, of course, you don’t expect anything to come out of it.” Or, “Are -you not rather naïve to suppose that they will do anything?” And -generally the comment was followed by “Of course nothing came from -Paris.” - -This superior attitude—sometimes vanity, sometimes disillusionment, -sometimes resentment at trying any new form of international dealing—was -quite useless to combat. You had an endless task of course if you -attacked them on the point of nothing coming out of Paris when you -believed profoundly that a great deal of good, as well as much evil, had -come out of Paris, and that the good is bound to increase and the evil -to diminish as time goes on. - -Very singular, the way that people dismiss the treaty of Versailles, -drop it out of count as a thing so bungling and evil that it is bound to -eventuate only in wars, bound to be soon upset. The poor human beings -that made the treaty of Versailles lacked omniscience, to be sure, and -they certainly strained their “fourteen points,” but it will be noted -that not a few of the arrangements that they made are working fairly -well. - -Moreover, what the Superior forget is that that treaty had an instrument -put into it intended for its own correction. The Covenant of the League -of Nations is a part of the treaty of Versailles and it says very -specifically that if at any time in the future any treaty—if that means -anything it must include the treaty of Versailles—becomes -“inapplicable,” works disturbance between the nations instead of peace, -the League may consider it. - -The belief in political magic on one side and doubt of all new political -ventures on the other, made the preliminary days of the Washington -Conference hard for the simple-minded observer, prepared to hope for the -best and to take no satisfaction in the worst, not to ask more than the -conferring powers thought they could safely undertake, to believe that -the negotiators would be as honest as we can expect men to be, and that -within the serious limits that are always on negotiators, would do their -best. - -One had to ask himself, however, what substantial reasons, if any, he -had that the Conference would be able to do the things that it had set -down as its business. This business was very concisely laid down in an -agenda, divided into two parts and running as follows: - - _Limitation of Armaments_: - - (1) Limitation of naval armaments under which shall be discussed - the following: - - (A) Basis of limitation - - (B) Extent - - (C) Fulfillment - - (D) Rules for control of new agencies of warfare - - (E) Limitation of land armaments. - - _Far Eastern Questions_: - - (1) Questions relating to China - - First. Principles to be applied - - Second. Application - - Subjects: - - (A) Territorial integrity - - (B) Administrative integrity - - (C) Open door - - (D) Concessions, monopolies, preferential privileges - - (E) Development of railways, including plans relative to the - Chinese Eastern Railway - - (F) Preferential railway rates - - (G) Status of existing commitments. - - _Siberia_: - - Sub-headings the same as those under China. - - _Mandated Islands_: - - Sub-headings the same as those under China with railway sections - eliminated. - -What reasons were there for thinking that the nations—England, France, -Italy, China, Japan, Belgium, Holland, Portugal—could, with the United -States, handle these problems of the Pacific in such a way that they -would be able to cut their armaments, and, cutting them, find a -satisfactory substitute. There were several reasons. - -A first, and an important one, was that the difficulties to be adjusted -were, as defined, confined to one side only of the earth’s surface -which, if huge, is nevertheless fairly simple, being mostly water. It -was the problems of the Pacific Ocean that they prepared to handle. -These problems are comparatively definite—the kind of thing that you can -get down on paper with something like precision. They had one great -advantage, and that is that in the main they did not involve a past -running into the dim distance. England has held Hongkong for only about -eighty years. We, the United States, have had port privileges in China -only since 1844. France first got a stronghold in Cochin China in 1862, -and her protectorate over Annam is less than forty years old. It was -only twenty-five years ago that the war between Japan and China over -Korea began; the complications in eastern Russia are still younger. So -are those in Shantung, Yap, the Philippine Islands. That is, the chief -bones of contention in the Conference were freshly picked. In most of -the cases there were men still living who helped in the picking. - -It was the same when it came to concessions. The question of the -ownership and administration of railroads and mines—they belong to our -age. We can put our fingers on their beginnings, trace with some -certainty what has happened, find the intriguers, the bribe givers and -takers, the law breaker, if such there have been. In the case of most of -the concessions we can get our hands upon the very men involved in -securing them and in carrying on their development. - -How different from the problems of Europe, running as they do through -century after century, involving as they do successions of invasions, of -settlements, of conquests, of incessant infiltration of different races, -and the consequent mingling of social, political, industrial and -religious notions. The quarrels of Europe are as old as its -civilization, their bases are lost in the past. Without minimizing at -all the difficulty of the questions on the agenda of the Conference, -they did have the advantage of being of recent date. - -There was encouragement in the relations of the conferees. These were -not enemy nations, fresh from wars, meeting to make treaties. They were -nations that for five years had been allies, and from the life-and-death -necessity of coöperation had gained a certain solidarity. True, their -machinery of coöperation was pretty well shot up. The frictions of peace -are harder on international machinery than the shells of war. The former -racks it to pieces; the latter solidifies it. Nevertheless, the nations -that were coming to the Conference were on terms of fairly friendly -acquaintance, an acquaintance which had stood a tremendous test. - -These nations had all committed themselves solemnly to certain definite -ideals, laid down by the United States of America. True, their ideals -were badly battered, and as a government we were in the anomalous -position of temporarily abandoning them after having committed our -friends to them. However, they still stood on their feet, these ideals. - -It could be counted as an advantage that the associations of the years -of the War had made the men who would represent the different nations at -the Conference fairly well acquainted with one another. Whatever -disappointments there might be in the delegations we could depend upon -it that the men chosen would be tried men. They were pretty sure to be -men of trustworthy character, with records of respectable achievement, -men like Root and Hughes and Underwood in our own delegation. They would -not come unknown to each other or unknown to the nations involved. It -would be a simple matter for us, the public, to become acquainted with -their records. If by any unhappy chance there should be among them a -political intriguer, that, too, would be known. - -These were all good reasons for expecting that the Conference might do -something of what it started out for. How much of it it would do and how -permanent that which it did would be would depend in no small degree -upon the attitude of mind of this country, whether the backing that we -gave the Conference was one of emotionalism or intelligence. We were -starting out with a will to succeed; we were going to spend our first -day praying for success. It would be well if we injected into those -prayers a supplication for self-control, clearness of judgment, and -willingness to use our minds as well as our hearts in the struggles that -were sure to come. - -Alarms went along with these hopes. There were certain very definite -things that might get in the way of the success of the Conference—things -that often frustrate the best intentions of men, still they were matters -over which the public and the press would have at least a certain -control, if they took a high and intelligent view of their own -responsibility. - -First, there were the scapegoats. There are bound to be periods in all -human undertakings when the way is obscure, when failure threatens, when -it is obvious that certain things on which we have set our hearts are -unobtainable. Irritation and discouragement always characterize these -periods. It is here that we fall back on a scapegoat. An international -conference usually picks one or more before it gets through—a nation -which everybody combines to call obstinate, unreasonable, greedy, a -spoke in the wheel. Then comes a hue and cry, a union of forces—not to -persuade but to overwhelm the recalcitrant, to displace it, drive it out -of court. The spirit of adjustment, and of accommodation which is of the -very essence of success in an undertaking like the Conference on the -Limitation of Armaments is always imperiled and frequently ruined by -fixing on a scapegoat. Would this happen at Washington? - -Of course the nation on which irritation and suspicion were concentrated -might be in the wrong. It might be deep in evil intrigue. It might be -shockingly greedy. But it was a member of the Conference and the problem -must be worked out _with_ it. You work nothing out with scapegoats. -Abraham Lincoln once laid down a principle of statesmanship which -applies. “_Honest statesmanship_,” he said, “_is the employment of -individual meanness for the public good_.” - -It takes brains, humor, self-control to put any such rule as this in -force. If unhappily the Conference did not furnish a sufficient amount -of these ingredients, would the press and public make good the deficit? -They are always in a strategic position where they can insist that -everybody must be considered innocent until he is proved guilty, that -nothing be built on suspicion, everything on facts. Something very -important for them to remember if they insisted was that these facts had -a history, that they were not isolated but related to a series of -preceding events. For instance, there was the high hand that Japan had -played with China. We must admit it. But in doing so we must not forget -that it was only about sixty years ago that the very nations with whom -Japan was now to meet in council in Washington had gathered with their -fleets in one of her ports and used their guns to teach her the beauties -of Christian civilization. She had decided to learn their lessons. She -has wonderful imitative powers. She had _followed_ them into China, and -if she had played a higher hand there than any of them—and there might -be a question as to that—it should be remembered that she had only sixty -years in which to learn the degree of greed that can safely be practiced -in our modern civilization. We must consider that possibly she had not -had sufficient time to learn to temper exploitation with civilized -discretion. - -No scapegoats. No hues and cries. And certainly no partisanship. Was it -possible for the United States to hold a truly national parley, one in -which party ambitions and antipathies did not influence the -negotiations? We had had within three years a terrible lesson of the -lengths to which men’s partisanship will go in wrecking even the peace -of the world. Would we repeat that crime? It was an ugly question, and -be as optimistic as I would I hated to face it. - -There was another danger on the face of things—crudeness of opinion. We -love to be thought wise. There are thousands of us who in the -pre-Conference days were getting out our maps to find out where Yap lay -or the points between which the Eastern Chinese railroad ran, who would -be tempted sooner or later to become violent partisans of, we will say: -Yap for America—Shantung for China—Vladivostok for the Far Eastern -Republic. There was danger in obstinate views based on little knowledge -or much knowledge of a single factor. - -And there were the sacrifices. Were we going to accept beforehand that -if we were to have the limitation of armament which we desired—we, the -United States might have to sacrifice some definite thing—a piece of -soil, a concession, a naval base in the Pacific—and that nothing more -fatal to the success of the Conference could be than for us to set our -teeth and say: “We must have this”—quite as fatal as setting our teeth -and saying: “This or that nation must do this.” - -But my chief irritation in these pre-Conference days lay with the -agenda. It was illogical to place limitation of armament at the head of -the program. That was an effect—not a cause. It looked like an attempt -to make reduction of taxes more important than settlement of -difficulties. Was the Conference to be merely a kind of glorified -international committee on tax reduction? Not that I meant to -underestimate the relief that would bring. - -Suppose the Conference should say: We will reduce at once—by the -simplest, most direct method—cut down fifty per cent. of our -appropriations—for five years and before the term is ended meet again -and make a new contract. - -What a restoration of the world’s hope would follow! How quickly the -mind sprang to what such a decision would bring to wretched, jobless -peoples—the useful work, the schools, the money for more bread, better -shelter, leisure for play. How much of the resentment at the huge sums -now going into warships, cannon, naval bases, war colleges, would -evaporate. - -The mere announcement would soothe and revive. Labor bitterly resents -the thought that it may be again asked to spend its energies in the -creation of that which destroys men instead of that which makes for -their health and happiness. - -“Get them to plowing again, to popping corn by their own firesides, and -you can’t get them to shoulder a musket again for fifty years,” Lincoln -said of the soldiers that the approaching end of the Civil War would -release. As a matter of fact—suppression of the Indians aside—it was -only thirty-three years when they were at it again, but there was no -great heart in the enterprise; they still preferred their “plows and -popcorn,” and the experience of the Great War had only intensified that -feeling. - -Cut down armament now merely for sake of reducing taxation and you would -give the world’s love of peace a chance to grow—and that was something. -But it was something which must be qualified. - -The history of man’s conduct shows that however much he desires his -peaceful life, the moment what he conceives to be his country’s -interest—which he looks at as his interest—is threatened, he will throw -his tools of peace into the corner and seize those of war. It does not -matter whether he is prepared or not. Men always have and, unless we can -find something beside force to appeal to in a pinch, always will do just -as they did at Lexington, as the peasants of Belgium did at the rumor of -the advance of the Germans—seize any antiquated kicking musket or -blunderbuss they can lay their hands on and attack. - -There was another significant possibility to limitation, on which the -lovers of peace rightfully counted—certainly believers in war do not -overlook it—and that was the chance that the enforced breathing spell -would give for improving and developing peace machinery. It would give a -fresh chance to preach the new methods, arouse faith in them, stir -governments to greater interest in them and less in arms. - -It was a possibility—but to offset it experience shows that with the -passing of the threat of war, interest in pacific schemes is generally -left to a few tireless and little considered groups of non-official -people. Active interest inside governments dies out. The great peace -suggestions and ventures of the world have been born of wars fought -rather than of wars that might be fought. The breathing spell long -continued might end in a general rusting and neglect of the very methods -for preventing wars which peace lovers are now pushing. - -What it all amounted to was that the most drastic limitation was no sure -guarantee against future war. Take away a man’s gun and it is no -guarantee that he will not strike if aroused. You must get at the -man—enlarge his respect for order, his contempt for violence, change his -notion of procedure in disputes, establish his control. It takes more -than “gun toting” to make a dangerous citizen, more than relieving him -of his gun to make a safe one. - -If the Conference only cut down the number of guns the nations were -carrying, it would have done little to insure permanent peace. The -President’s conference on unemployment which held its sessions just -before the Conference on the Limitation of Armament spent considerable -time in considering what the industry of the country might do to prevent -industrial crises. Among the principles it laid down was one quite as -applicable to international as to business affairs. - -“_The time to act is before a crisis has become inevitable._” - -That was the real reason for the existence of the coming Conference—to -act before the jealousies and misunderstandings around the Pacific had -gone so far that there was no solution _but_ war. Let us suppose that in -1913 say, England, France, Germany, Austria and Russia had held a -conference over an agenda parallel to the one now laid down for the -Washington Conference—one that not only considered limiting their armies -and navies but boldly and openly attacked the fears, the jealousies, the -needs, and the ambitions of them all—might it not have been possible -that they would have found a way other than war? Are governments -incapable in the last analysis of settling difficulties save by force -and exhaustion, or are they made impotent by the idea that no machinery -and methods for handling international affairs are possible save the -ones which have so often landed their peoples in the ditch? - -In his farewell words to this country at the end of his recent visit, -the late Viscount Bryce remarked that anybody could frighten himself -with a possibility but the course of prudence was to watch it and -estimate the likelihood that it would ever enter into the sphere of -probability. - -It is just here that governments have fallen down worst. They might -watch the war possibilities, but they have refused or not been able to -evaluate them. They seemed to have felt usually that closing their eyes -to them or at least refusing to admit them was the only proper -diplomatic attitude. - -As a rule, it has been the non-responsible outsider that has exploited -war possibilities. Sometimes this has been done from the highest -motives, with knowledge and restraint. More often it has been done on -half-knowledge and with reckless indifference to results. There are -always a number of people around with access to the public ear who love -to handle explosives—never quite happy unless their imaginations are -busy with wars and revolutions. There are others possessed by the pride -of prophecy—their vanity is demonstrating the inevitable strife in the -situation. They are the makers of war scares—the breeders and feeders of -war passions. Sometimes war possibilities are the materials for skillful -national propaganda—the agent of one nation working on a second to -convince it of the hostile intent of a third. - -It is the governments concerned that should be handling this sort of -stuff and handling it in such a way that they would cut under the -malicious and the wanton, get at the real truth and get at it in time -and get it out to the world. - -One of the chief reasons for some sort of active association of nations -is that there should be a permanent central agency always working over -war possibilities, estimating them, heading them off. - -Present diplomacy does not do it. Could the coming Conference find a way -for just this service in the Pacific situation? - -How could the public be sure the Conference was really seeking these -ends? Only by openness and frankness. Could one really expect that? No -one of sense and even a very little knowledge of how men achieve -results, whether in statecraft or in business, would think for a moment -that the Conference must sit daily in open session with a public -listening to all that it said. There was only one practical way of -handling the agenda. The Conference must form itself into groups, each -charged with a subject on which it was to arrive at some kind of -understanding. The report must be presented at the Conference. But when -this was done there should be free, open discussion. - -To handle the plenary sessions of the present Conference as they were -handled in Paris in 1919 would be a tragic mistake. These plenary -conferences were splendidly set scenes. No one who looked on the -gathering at which the Covenant of the League of Nations was presented -would ever forget it. Nor would he forget how the gloved-and-iron hand -of Clemenceau never for a moment released its grip; how effectively, for -example, the incipient revolt against the mandate system aimed at making -nations the protectors and not the exploiters of the German territories -to be disposed of was soft-pedaled. Nor would he ever forget certain -sinister faces in the great picture that chilled at their birth the high -hopes which the Conference championed. - -Free discussion, running, if you please, over days at this juncture, -might have insured an easier, straighter road for the treaty of -Versailles and particularly for the League of Nations. - -Frankness would be the greatest ally of all who looked on the great -mission of the coming Conference as preventing the Pacific crisis from -ever ending in war. Frankness would break the war bubbles that the -irresponsible were blowing so gayly. It would be the surest preventive -of the fanatical and partisan drives which are almost certain to develop -if there was unnecessary secrecy. Naturally, those on the outside would -look on a failure to take the public in as proof that sinister forces -were at work in the Conference, that dark things were brewing which must -be kept out of sight. - -As a matter of fact, one look inside would probably show a group of worn -and anxious gentlemen honestly doing their best to find something on -which they could agree with a reasonable hope that the countries that -had sent them to Washington would accept their decisions. After one good -look the public might change suspicion to sympathy. - -There was always the argument from the conventionally minded that “it -isn’t done,” that diplomacy must be secret. John Hay didn’t think so. He -told his friend Henry Adams in the course of his efforts to establish -the “open door” in China that he got on by being “honest and naïf!” - -The point in this policy at which most people, in and out of the present -Conference, would stick is that word “naïf.” They would prefer to be -thought dishonest rather than simple-minded. However, if everybody who -had a part in the gathering could be as simple-minded as he was in fact, -would pretend to know no more than he did in truth and would be as -honest as it was in his nature to be, there would be a good chance of -keeping Mr. Hay’s door in China open. And if that could be done along -with the other things it implied, the Conference would have actually -contributed to the chances of more permanent peace in the world and -could cut down its armaments, because it had less need of them, not -merely because it wanted temporarily to reduce taxation. - - - - - CHAPTER II - ARMISTICE DAY - - -It was the Unknown Soldier Boy that put an end to the doubt, the -faultfinding, the cynicism that was in the air of Washington as the day -for the opening of the Conference approached. It all became vanity, -pettiness, beside that bier with its attending thousands of mourning -people. - -They carried the body to the capitol where for a day it lay in state. -Busy with my attempts to learn something of what it was all about, it -was not until late in the afternoon that I thought of the ceremony on -the hill, and made my way there for my daily walk. It had been a soft, -sunny day, the air full of gray haze. Everything around the great -plaza—the Capitol, the library, the trees, the marble Senate and House -buildings right and left—was tender in its outline. There were no -crowds, but as I looked I saw massed four abreast from the entrance door -to the rotunda, down along terraces of steps, across the plaza as far as -I could see, a slowly moving black mass, kept in perfect line by -soldiers standing at intervals. I made my way across. Where was its end? -I went to find it. - -I walked the width of the great plaza and turned down the Avenue. As far -as I could see the people were massed—one block, two blocks, three -blocks, four—and from every direction you could see men and women -hurrying to fall in line. I had had no idea of joining that line, of -passing through that rotunda. My only notion was to take a glimpse of -the crowd. But to have gone on, to have been no part of something which -came upon me as tremendous in its feeling and meaning, would have been a -withdrawal from my kind of which I think I should always have been -ashamed. And so I fell in. - -The mass moved slowly, but very steadily. The one strongest impression -was of its quietness. Nobody talked. Nobody seemed to want to talk. If a -question was asked, the reply was low. We moved on block after -block—turned the corner—now we faced the Capitol—amazingly beautiful, -proud and strong in the dim light. I never had so deep a feeling that it -was something that belonged to me, guarded me, meant something to me, -than as I moved slowly with that great mass toward the bier. The -sentinels stood rigid, as solemn and as quiet as the people. The only -murmur that one heard was now and then a low singing, “Nearer My God to -Thee.” How it began, who suggested it, I do not know; but through all -that slow walk, the only thing that I heard was women’s voices, now -behind me, now before me, humming that air. It took a full -three-quarters of an hour to reach the door and pass into the rotunda. -It took strong self-control not to kneel by the bier. They told me that -there were women, bereft mothers, to whom the appeal was too -much—mothers of missing boys. This might have been hers. Could she pass? -The guards lifted them very gently, and in quiet the great crowd moved -forward. I fancy there were thousands that passed that place that day -that will have always before their eyes that great dim circle with bank -upon bank of flowers, from all over the earth—flowers from kings and -queens and governments, from great leaders of armies, from those who -labor, from the mothers of men, and hundreds upon hundreds from those -who went out with the dead but came back. The only sound that came to us -as we passed was the clear voice of a boy, one of a group, once -soldiers. They came with a wreath. They carried a flag. The leader was -saying his farewell to their buddy. - -A hundred thousand or more men and women made this pilgrimage. A hundred -thousand and many more packed the streets of Washington the next day -when the bier was carried from the Capitol to the grave at Arlington. - -The attending ceremony was one of the most perfect things of the kind -ever planned. It had the supreme merit of restraint. Every form of the -country’s service had a place—not too many—a few—but they were always of -the choicest—from the President of the United States down to the last -marine, the best we had were chosen to follow the unknown boy. - -There was an immense sincerity to it all. They felt it—the vast, -inexpressible sorrow of the war. And no one felt it more than the -President of the United States. What he said at Arlington, what he was -to say the next day at the opening of the Conference, showed that with -all his heart and all his mind the man hated the thing that had brought -this sorrow to the country, and that he meant to do his part to put an -end to it. - -The ceremony was for the dead sacrifice, but the feature of it which -went deepest to the heart and brought from the massed crowds their one -instinctive burst of sympathy and greeting was the passing, almost at -the end of the procession, of the War’s living sacrifice—Woodrow Wilson. - -The people had stood in silence, reverently baring their heads as the -bier of the soldier passed, followed by all the official greatness of -the moment—the President of the United States, his cabinet, the Supreme -Court, the House, the Senate, Pershing, Foch. And then, quite -unexpectedly, a carriage came into view—two figures in it—a white-faced -man, a brave woman. Unconscious of what they were doing, the crowd broke -into a muffled murmur—“Wilson!” The cry flowed down the long avenue—a -surprised, spontaneous recognition. It was as if they said: “You—you of -all living men belong here. It was you who called the boy we are -honoring—you who put into his eye that wonderful light—the light that a -great French surgeon declared made him different as a soldier from the -boys of any other nation.” - -“I don’t know what it is,” he said, “whether it is God, the Monroe -Doctrine or President Wilson, but the American soldier has a light in -his eye that is not like anything that I have ever seen in men.” Woodrow -Wilson, under God, had put it there. His place was with the soldier. The -crowd knew it, and told him so by their unconscious outburst. - -His carriage left the procession at the White House. Later the crowd -followed it. All the afternoon of Armistice Day men and women gathered -before his home. All told there were thousands of them. They waited, -hoping for his greeting. And when he gave it, briefly, they cheered and -cheered. But they did not go away. It was dark before that crowd had -dispersed. - -But this expression of love and loyalty and interest in Woodrow Wilson -is no new thing in Washington. For months now, on Sundays and holidays, -men, women and children have been walking to his home, standing in -groups before it, speaking together in hushed tones as if something -solemn and ennobling stirred in them. Curiosity? No. Men chatter and -jibe and jostle in curiosity. These people are silent—gentle—orderly. -You will see them before the theater, too, when it is known that he is -within, quietly waiting for him to come out—one hundred, two hundred, -five hundred—even a thousand sometimes, it is said. They cheer him as he -passes—and there are chokes in their voices—and always tenderness. Let -it be known that he is in his seat in a theater, and the house will rise -in homage. Let his face be thrown on a screen, and it will receive a -greeting that the face of no other living American will receive. It -requires explanation. - -The people at least recognized him as belonging to the Conference. And, -as a matter of fact, the Conference never was able to escape him. Again -and again, he appeared at the table. The noblest words that were said -were but echoes of what he had been saying through the long struggle. -The President’s great slogan—Less of armaments and none of war—was but -another way of putting the thing for which he had given all but his last -breath. The best they were to do—their limitation of armaments, their -substitute to make it possible, were but following in the path that he -had cut. The difficulties and hindrances which they were to meet and -which were to hamper both program and final settlements were but the -difficulties and hindrances which he had met and which hampered his work -at Paris. From the start to the finish of the Conference on the -Limitation of Armament, the onlooker recognized both the spirit and the -hand of Woodrow Wilson as the crowd recognized him on Armistice Day. - -There was another figure in the memorial procession which deeply touched -the crowd and which stayed on, uninvited. She came with the dead soldier -boy. She stood by him night and day as he lay in state, followed him to -the grave in which they laid him away at Arlington, a symbol of the -nation’s grief over all its missing sons. She did not go with the -crowds. She took her place at the door of the Conference, and there, day -by day, her solemn voice was heard. - -“I am the mother of men. Never before have I lifted my voice in your -councils. I have been silent because I trusted you. But to-day I speak -because I doubt you. I have the right to speak, for without me mankind -would end. I bear you with pain, such as you cannot know. I rear you -with sacrifice, such as you cannot understand. I am the world’s -perpetual soldier, facing death that life may be. I do not recoil from -my great task. God laid it on me. I have accepted it always. I give my -youth that the world may have sons, and I glory in my harvest. - -“But I bear sons for fruitful lives of labor and peace and happiness. -And what have you done with my work? To-day I mourn the loss of more -than ten million dead, more than twenty million wounded, more than six -million imprisoned and missing. This is the fruit of what you call your -Great War. - -“It is I who must face death to replace these dead and maimed boys. I -shall do it. But no longer shall I give them to you unquestioning as I -have in the past, for I have come to doubt you. You have told me that -you used my sons for your honor and my protection, but I have begun to -read your books, to listen to your deliberations, to study your -maneuvers; I have learned that it is not always your honor and my -protection that drives you to war. Again and again it is your own love -of glory, of power, of wealth; your hate and contempt for those that are -not of your race, your color, your point of view. You cannot longer have -my sons for such ends. I ask you to remold your souls, to make effective -that brotherhood of man of which you talk, to learn to work together, -white and black and brown and yellow, as becomes the sons of the same -mother. - -“I shall never leave your councils again. My daughters shall sit beside -you voicing my command—you shall have done with war.” - - - - - CHAPTER III - NOVEMBER 12, 1921 - - -We shall have to leave November 12, 1921, the opening day of the -Conference on the Limitation of Armament, to History for a final -appraisement. Arthur Balfour told Mr. Hughes after he had had time to -gather himself together from the shock of the American program that in -his judgment a new anniversary had been added to the Reconstruction -Movement. “If the 11th of November,” said Mr. Balfour, “in the minds of -the allied and associated powers, in the minds perhaps not less of all -the neutrals—if that is a date imprinted on grateful hearts, I think -November 12 will also prove to be an anniversary welcomed and thought of -in a grateful spirit by those who in the future shall look back upon the -arduous struggle now being made by the civilized nations of the world, -not merely to restore pre-war conditions, but to see that war conditions -shall never again exist.” - -Whatever place it may turn out that November 12 shall hold on the -calendar of great national days, this thing is sure; it will always be -remembered for the shock it gave Old School Diplomacy. That institution -really received a heavier bombardment than War, the real objective of -the Conference. The shelling reached its very vitals, while it only -touched the surface of War’s armor. - -Diplomacy has always had her vested interests. They have seemed -permanent, impregnable. What made November 12, 1921, portentous was its -invasion of these vested interests. Take that first and most important -one—Secrecy. When Secretary Hughes followed the opening speech of -welcome and of idealism made by President Harding, not with another -speech of more welcome and more idealism, as diplomacy prescribes for -such occasions, but with the boldest and most detailed program of what -the United States had in mind for the meeting, Diplomacy’s most sacred -interest was for the moment overthrown. To be sure, what Secretary -Hughes did was made possible by John Hay’s long struggle to educate his -own countrymen to the idea of open diplomacy; by what President Wilson -tried to do at the Paris conference. Mr. Wilson won the people of the -world to his principle, but his colleagues contrived to block him in the -second stage of the Paris game. Mr. Hughes, building on that experience, -did not wait for consultation with his colleagues. On his own, in a -fashion so unexpected that it was almost brutal, he threw not only the -program of the United States on the table, but that which the United -States expected of two—two only, please notice—of the eight nations she -had invited in, Great Britain and Japan. - -His proposals came one after another exactly like shells from a Big -Bertha!—“It is now proposed that for a period of ten years there should -be no further construction of capital ships.” One after another the -program of destruction followed. - - The United States:—to scrap all capital ships now under construction - along with fifteen old battleships, in all a tonnage of 845,740 - tons; - - Great Britain:—to stop her four new Hoods and scrap nineteen capital - ships, a tonnage of 583,375 tons; - - Japan:—abandon her program of ships not laid down, and scrap enough - of existing ones, new and old, to make a tonnage of 448,928 tons. - -I once saw a huge bull felled by a sledge hammer in the hands of a -powerful Czecho-Slovac farm hand. When Mr. Hughes began hurling one -after another his revolutionary propositions the scene kept flashing -before my eyes, the heavy thud of the blow on the beast’s head falling -on my ears. I felt almost as if I were being hit myself, and I confess -to no little feeling of regret that Mr. Hughes should be putting his -proposals so bluntly. “It is proposed that Great Britain shall,” etc. -“It is proposed that Japan shall,” etc. Would it have been less -effective as a proposal and would it not have been really more -acceptable as a form if he had said—“We shall propose to Great Britain -to consider so and so.” But, after all, when you are firing Big Berthas -it is not the amenities that you consider. - -Mr. Balfour and Sir Auckland Geddes, sitting where I could look them -full in the face, had just the faintest expression of “seeing things.” I -would not have been surprised if they had raised their hands in that -instinctive gesture one makes when he does “see things” that are not -there. The Japanese took it without a flicker of an eyelash—neither the -delegates at the table nor the rows of attachés and secretaries moved, -glanced at one another, changed expression. So far as their faces were -concerned Mr. Hughes might have been continuing the Harding -welcome—instead of calling publicly on them for a sacrifice -unprecedented and undreamed of. - -The program was so big—its presentation was so impressive (Mr. Hughes -looked seven feet tall that day and his voice was the voice of the man -who years ago arraigned the Insurance Companies) that one regretted that -there were omissions so obvious as to force attention. There was a -singular one in the otherwise admirable historical introduction Mr. -Hughes made to his program. He reviewed there the efforts of the first -and second Hague Conferences to bring about disarmament—explained the -failure—and jumped from 1907 to 1921 as if in 1919, at the Paris Peace -Conference, man’s most valiant effort to bring about disarmament had not -been made. He failed to notice the fact that to this effort scores of -peoples had subscribed, including _all_ of the nations represented at -the council table; that these nations had been working for two years in -the League of Nations, under circumstances of indescribable world -confusion and disorganization, to gather the information and prepare a -practical plan not only to limit the world’s arms but to regulate for -good and all private traffic in armaments. Before Mr. Hughes sat M. -Viviani of France who had been serving on the Commission charged with -this business. Before him, too, was man after man fresh from the -discussions of the second annual Assembly of the League. Disarmament and -many other matters pertaining to world peace had been before them. They -came confident that they had done something of value at Geneva however -small it might be compared with the immense work still to be done. -Arthur Balfour of England, Viviani of France, Wellington Koo of China, -Senator Schanzer of Italy, Sastri of India, Van Karnebeck of -Holland—were among those that heard Mr. Hughes jump their honest -efforts, beginning in 1919, to bring the armaments of the world to a -police basis. It must have bewildered them a little—but they are -gentlemen who are forced by their profession to take hints quickly—they -understood that as far as the American Conference on Limitation of -Armament was concerned, the League of Nations was not to exist. From -that day, if you wanted information on the League from any one of them -you had to catch him in private, and he usually made sure nobody was -listening before he enlightened you as to his opinions, which invariably -were “not for publication.” - -One could not but wonder if Mr. Balfour had this omission in mind when -at a later session he said in speaking of Mr. Hughes’ review of past -disarmament efforts that “some fragments” had been laid before the -Conference. What Mr. Hughes really did in ignoring the work for -disarmament carried on at Paris and Geneva in the last three years was -to call attention to it. - -After all, was it not petty to be irritated when something so bold and -real had been initiated? Was it not yielding to the desire to “rub in” -the omission as bad—or worse—than the omission? As a matter of fact, the -thing going on at the moment was so staggering that one had no time for -more than a momentary irritation. Mr. Hughes swept his house on November -12—swept it off its feet. If secret diplomacy was given by him such a -blow as it never had received before, diplomatic etiquette was torn to -pieces by the Senate and the House of the United States, each of which -had a section of the gallery to itself. Possibly their action was due to -a little jealousy. They are accustomed to holding the center of the -deliberative stage in Washington, and they always have, possibly always -will resent a little the coming of an outside deliberative body which -for the time being the public regards as more interesting than -themselves. They made it plain from the start that they were not awed. -The House of Representatives particularly was a joy to see if it did -make a shocking exhibition of itself. It looked as if it were at a ball -game and conducted itself in the same way. It hung over the gallery, -lolled in its seats, and when the President struck his great note, the -words which ought to become a slogan of the country—“Less of Armament -and None of War”—it rose to its feet and cheered as if there had been a -home run. - -Having once broke out in unrestrained cheers, they gave again and again -what William Allen White called “the yelp of democracy.” Even after the -program was over and the remaining formalities customary on such -occasions were about at an end, they took things into their own hands -and finished their attack on diplomatic etiquette by calling for Briand -as they might have called for Babe Ruth. “It isn’t done, you know,” I -heard one young Britisher say after it was over. But it had been done, -and the chances are that there will be more of it in the future. - -If this day does work out to be portentous in history, as it possibly -may, the time will come when every country will hang great historical -pictures of the scene in its public galleries. We should have one, -whatever its fate. And I hope the artist that does it will not fail to -give full value to the Congress that cracked the proprieties. Let him -take his picture from the further left side of the auditorium. In this -way he can bring in the House of Representatives. He can afford to leave -out the diplomatic gallery, as he would have to do from this position. -The diplomatic gallery counted less than any other group in the -gathering. - -Secrecy and etiquette were not the only vested interests attacked on -November 12, 1921. There was a third that received a blow—lighter to be -sure, but a blow all the same and a significant one. The exclusive -vested right of man to the field of diplomacy was challenged. Not by -giving a woman a seat at the table, but by introducing her on the floor, -in an official capacity, a new official capacity, rather problematical -as yet as to its outcome—a capacity which if it ranks lower than that of -delegate is still counted higher than that of expert, since it brings -the privilege of the floor. - -Behind the American delegation facing the hall and inside the sacred -space devoted to the principals of the Congress, sat a group of some -twenty-one persons, the representatives of a new experiment in -diplomacy—a slice of the public brought in to act as a link between the -American delegates and the public. Four of these delegates were -women—well-chosen women. They are the diplomatic pioneers of the United -States. - -Who were those people, why were they there? I heard more than one -puzzled foreign attaché ask. When you explained that this was an -advisory body, openly recognized by the government, they continued, “But -why are women included?” They understood the women in the diplomatic -gallery, the women in the boxes. It was a great ceremony. It was quite -within established diplomatic procedure that the ladies of the official -world should smile upon such an occasion. - -They understood the few women scattered among the scores of men in the -press galleries—but women on the floor as part of the Conference? What -did that mean? It meant, dear sirs, simply this, that man’s exclusive, -vested interest in diplomacy had been invaded—its masculinity attacked -like its secrecy and propriety. What would come of the invasion no one -could tell. - -It is doubtful if ever a program has received heartier acclaim from this -country than that of Mr. Hughes. It stirred by its boldness, its -breadth. “Scrap!” Whoever had said that word seriously in all the long -discussion of disarmament. Ten years!—the longest the most sanguine had -suggested was five. It caught the imagination—had the ring of -possibility in it. It might be putting the cart before the horse, as I -had been complaining, but it made it practically certain that the horse -would be acquired even if you had to pay a good round sum for him, so -desirable had the cart been made. - -And then the way the nations addressed picked it up! Three days later -their formal acceptances were made. For England, Arthur Balfour accepted -in principle, declaring as he did so: - -“It is easy to estimate in dollars or in pounds, shillings and pence the -saving to the taxpayer of each of the nations concerned which the -adoption of this scheme will give. It is easy to show that the relief is -great. It is easy to show that indirectly it will, as I hope and -believe, greatly stimulate industry, national and international, and do -much to diminish the difficulties under which every civilized government -is at this time laboring. All that can be weighed, measured, counted; -all that is a matter of figures. But there is something in this scheme -which is above and beyond numerical calculation. There is something -which goes to the root, which is concerned with the highest -international morality. - -“This scheme, after all—what does it do? It makes idealism a practical -proposition. It takes hold of the dream which reformers, poets, -publicists, even potentates, as we heard the other day, have from time -to time put before mankind as the goal to which human endeavor should -aspire.” - -“Japan,” declared Admiral Baron Kato, “deeply appreciates the sincerity -of purpose evident in the plan of the American Government for the -limitation of armaments. She is satisfied that the proposed plan will -materially relieve the nations of wasteful expenditures and cannot fail -to make for the peace of the world. - -“She cannot remain unmoved by the high aims which have actuated the -American project. Gladly accepting, therefore, the proposal in -principle, Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping -reduction in her naval armament.” - -Italy, through Senator Schanzer, greeted the proposal as “The first -effective step toward giving the world a release of such nature as to -enable it to start the work of its economic reconstruction.” - -France—her Premier, Briand, spoke for her—slid over the naval program. -France, he said, had already entered on the right way—the way Mr. Hughes -had indicated; her real interest was elsewhere. “I rather turn,” said M. -Briand, “to another side of the problem to which Mr. Balfour has -alluded, and I thank him for this. Is it only a question here of -economy? Is it only a question of estimates and budgets? If it were so, -if that were the only purpose you have in view, it will be really -unworthy of the great nation that has called us here. - -“So the main question, the crucial question, which is to be discussed -here, is to know if the peoples of the world will be at last able to -come to an understanding in order to avoid the atrocities of war. And -then, gentlemen, when it comes on the agenda, as it will inevitably -come, to the question of land armament, a question particularly delicate -for France, as you are all aware, we have no intention to eschew this. -We shall answer your appeal, fully conscious that this is a question of -grave and serious nature for us.” - -What more was there to do? England, Japan and the United States had -accepted “in principle” a program for the limitation of navies, much -more drastic than the majority of people had dreamed possible. To be -sure the details were still to be worked out, but that seemed easy. Had -not the Conference finished its work? There were people that said so. -No. Mr. Hughes had simply awakened the country to what was possible if -the reasons for armament could be removed. - -So far as we, the United States, were concerned, these reasons were -fourfold: - - (1) Our Pacific possessions. Until we felt reasonably sure that they - were safe from possible attack by Japan, we must keep our navy and - strengthen our fortifications. - - (2) The England-Japan pact. We suspected it. It might be a threat. - So long as it existed could we wisely limit our navy? - - (3) Our Open Door policy in China. We meant to stand by that. It had - been invaded by Japan in the Great War; could we reaffirm it now and - secure assurances we trusted that there would be no further - encroachments? If not, could we limit our armament? - - (4) Our policy of the integrity of nations—China and Russia. We had - announced a “moral trusteeship” over both. No more carving up. Let - them work it out for themselves. How were we going to back up that - policy? - -That is, we had possessions and policies for which we were responsible. -Could we protect them without armament? That depended, in our judgment, -upon England and Japan. Would they be willing to make agreements and -concessions which would convince us that they were willing to respect -our possessions and accept our policies in the Pacific? - -If so, what assurances could we give them in return that would convince -them that we meant to respect their possessions and policies? How could -we prove to them that they need not fear us? - -It was within the first month of the Conference that the answers to -these questions were worked out “in principle” again. - - - - - CHAPTER IV - THE FRENCH AT THE CONFERENCE - - -The morale of an international conference is easily shaken in the -public’s mind. Seeming delay will do it. Those who look on feel that -whatever is to be done must be done quickly, that things must go in -leaps. They mistrust days of plain hard work—work which yields no -headlines. It must be, they repeat, because the negotiators have fallen -on evil times, are intriguing, bargaining. - -Two days after Mr. Hughes had laid out his plan for ship reduction, and -it had been accepted in principle and turned over to the naval -committee, I heard an eager, suspicious young journalist ask Lord Lee -who, at the end of eight hours of committee work—grilling business -always—was conducting a press conference, if they were really “doing -anything.” His tone showed that he doubted it, that in his judgment they -must be loafing, deceiving the public; that if they were not, why, by -this time the program ought to be ready for his newspaper. Lord Lee was -very tired, but he had not lost his sense of humor. He made a patient -answer. But one understood that there had already begun in Washington -that which one saw and heard so much two years and a half before in -Paris—a feeling that taking time to work out problems was a suspicious -performance. - -The calm of steady effort on the part of the Conference was brief. Mr. -Hughes in closing the second plenary session where his naval program had -been so generously accepted “in principle,” had said “I express the wish -of the Conference that at an opportune time M. Briand will enjoy the -opportunity of presenting to the Conference most fully the views of -France with regard to the subject of land armaments which we must -discuss.” Mr. Hughes kept that promise, fixing November 21, nine days -after the opening, as the “opportune time.” - -The Conference went into M. Briand’s open session serene, confident, -self-complacent. It came out excited, scared, ruffled to the very bottom -of its soul. In an hour one-third of Mr. Hughes’ agenda had been swept -away. Could this have been avoided? I am inclined to think that it would -have been if there had been a larger sympathy, a better understanding of -the French and their present psychology. If we are to carry on the world -coöperatively, as seems inevitable, we must have a much fuller knowledge -of one another’s ways and prejudices and ambitions than was shown at the -outset of the Washington Conference. - -Back of the commotion that M. Briand stirred up on November 21 lay the -idiosyncrasies and experiences of France. To understand at all the -crisis, for so it was called, one must understand something of -France—that she is a land which through the centuries has held herself -apart as something special, the élite of the nations. The people of no -country in the civilized world are so satisfied with themselves and -their aim. There are no people that find life at home more precious, -guard it so carefully, none who care so little about other lands, and it -might be said, know so little of other lands. - -It is only within the last twenty years that the Frenchman has come to -be anything of a traveler. To-day, in many parts of France, the young -man or young woman who comes to America has the same prestige on -returning that thirty years ago the person in towns outside of the -Atlantic border had in his town when he returned from a trip abroad. I -was living in Paris in the early 90’s when Alphonse Daudet made a trip -to England. It was a public event. Peary discovered the pole with hardly -less newspaper talk. - -Now this country, so wrapt up in itself and the carrying out of its -notions of life—among the most precious notions in my judgment that -mankind have—finds itself for a long period really the center of the -world’s interests. It makes a superhuman effort, is valiant beyond -words, practically the whole civilized world rallies to its help. It -comes off victorious, and when it gathers itself together and begins to -examine its condition it finds the ghastly wounds of a devastated -region; the work of centuries so shattered that it will take centuries -to restore the fertility, beauty, interest. It finds itself with an -appalling debt; with a population depleted at the point most vital to a -nation, in its young men, threatening the oncoming generation. It sees -its enemy beaten, to be sure, but with its land practically unimpaired. - -France not only had her condition in her mind, she had all her -past:—reminiscences of invasions, from Attila on. Old obsessions, old -policies revived:—the belief that she would never have safety except in -a weak Central Europe—a doctrine she had repudiated—broke out. - -She came to the peace table in Paris under an accepted program which -said: Reparations, but no indemnities. And her bitterness so overwhelmed -her that she forgot the principle pledge and demanded indemnities in -full. She forgot her pledge to annex nothing and called for the Rhine -Border. Every effort to reason with her, to persuade her not to ask the -impossible of her beaten enemy, she interpreted as lack of sympathy, and -pointed to her devastated region, her debts, her shrunken population. -She accused of injustice those who felt that mercy is the great wisdom. -Justice became her great cry. Intent on herself, her dreadful woes, her -determination to have the last pound, she magnified her perils, saw -combinations against her, and went about in Europe trying to arm other -peoples, to build up a pro-France party. Any effort to persuade her that -the spirit which underlay the Versailles Treaty was pro-humanity and not -pro-French embittered and antagonized her. She resented the English -effort to bring some kind of order into the Continent. She resented the -conclusion of the world—slow enough though it was—to let Russia work out -her own destiny. - -No lover of France has any right to overlook or encourage this attitude. -It is the most dangerous course she could take. She is building up -anti-French antagonisms in beaten Europe, and she is alienating -countries that want to bring the world onto a new basis of Good Will and -who believe it can be done. - -When M. Briand came to the Washington peace table, he left behind him a -country in this abnormal mood—her thoughts centered on herself—her -needs, her dangers. M. Briand knew well enough that she would not see -the program that Mr. Hughes had thrown out as it was intended—a -tremendously bold suggestion for world peace—a call to the sacrifice -that each country must make if order was to be restored, the awful -losses of recent years repaired. M. Briand knew that what France -expected him to get at Washington was recognition, sympathy, guarantees. -The last thing that she wanted brought back was a request to join in a -program of sacrifice. - -Moreover, M. Briand came to the Conference at considerable peril to -himself. He was Premier, and in this office he had been doing as much as -he seems to have thought possible to hold down the military trend of the -country. His policy had been fought for a year by a strong party, intent -on demonstrating that France was the most powerful nation on the -continent of Europe, that it was her right and her ambition to hold -first place there. M. Briand’s friends thought that he should not come -to the United States. But, as he publicly said, he wanted to come in -order to persuade the Conference that France was not as military in -spirit as much of the world seemed to believe, that she did want peace, -that her refusals to disarm came from the fact that she was still -threatened by both Germany and Russia and must either have arms or -guarantees. - -M. Briand knew the line of argument that the Hughes program would awaken -in France. This argument was admirably set forth early in the Conference -by the semi-official _Le Temps_: - - “I. Under a régime of limited armaments such as that of which Mr. - Hughes has defined the basis, each state has the right to possess - force proportioned to the dangers to which, in the opinion of all - the contracting powers, it may reasonably believe itself to be - exposed. - - “II. When powers agree among themselves to limit their armaments - they oblige themselves by that very fact even though tacitly aiding - that one of themselves which should find itself at grips with a - danger which its limited armaments would not allow it to subdue. - - “III. It is not possible to have a contractual limitation of - armament without there being at the same time among all the - contractants a joint and several obligation of mutual aid.” - -It is not unfair, I think, to say that when M. Briand came to speak to -the Washington Conference on November 21, he was not thinking of the -peace of the world; he was thinking of the needs and ambitions of -France. Moreover, his mood was not the most conciliatory in the world. -His pride and his pride for his country had been deeply wounded on the -opening day of the Conference. He had found himself on that occasion set -at one side. To be sure, he and his colleagues were given a position at -the right of the American delegates, Great Britain being at the left; -but when Mr. Hughes presented his naval program, France did not figure -in it, except incidentally. The whole discussion was centered on Great -Britain, Japan and the United States. France and Italy were set aside -with the casual remark that it was not thought necessary to discuss -their tonnage allowance at that time. - -Did Mr. Hughes lack tact and understanding when he confined his opening -speech to three nations? I think that the after events point that way. -To have invited eight nations and to have spoken to but two at the start -was a good deal like inviting eight guests to a dining table and talking -to but two of them through the meal. The oversight, if that’s the proper -word for it, was forgotten, if noticed by any one in the really -tremendous thing that Mr. Hughes did. The trouble is that there is -almost always one among a number of neglected guests that does feel and -does not forget it. - -The opening week of the Conference kept France in about the same -position that she had on the opening day. She was not yet a principal, -and another point—and one that is hard on the French—they saw here what -they began to see in Paris in 1919 and so openly resented there—that -English is taking the place of French as the language of diplomacy. -There is no mistake about this, and I don’t wonder that all Frenchmen -resent it. At the opening day every delegate, except M. Briand, spoke in -English; the French translations which followed each speech were made -purely out of compliment to the French delegation. M. Briand is one of -not a few in France who will take no pains, whatever their contracts, to -learn a word of English. For the last two years he has been constantly -in conference with Lloyd George, he has had most of that time the -remarkable interpreter, M. Carmlynck, at his side. I have heard M. -Carmlynck say that in all this time M. Briand has not learned a word of -English, although Lloyd George, who at the start understood no French at -all, is now able to follow closely the arguments in French, and even -will at times correct or question the phrasing of the translation into -English. - -The French are not a race that conceal their feelings. An Englishman, an -American, is apt to accuse anybody who does not cover up disappointment, -resentment, of being a poor sport. France’s chief contempt for the -Anglo-Saxon is that he is not out and out with everything; that he has -reticences and reserves, conceals his dislikes, his vices, his emotions. -The French showed at Washington from the start that they were -disappointed. They did not mix freely; they did not use the ample -offices prepared for them in the Annex to the Pan-American Building, -where the delegates sat, although every other nation was making more or -less use of these quarters. They insisted on conducting all their press -meetings in French alone, although every other nation, when it put up -somebody who did not speak English, provided a translator. The result -was that the French press gatherings were sparsely attended. - -And then came M. Briand’s speech, which caused the first Conference -crisis. For days after that speech was made, I listened to people remake -it, giving their idea of how he might have used the same matter and -carried his audience with him, giving them the impression of a -courageous people, as they really are, intent not only on the -restoration of their tormented and suffering land but willing to do -their part to restore the rest of the world. Instead, M. Briand gave an -impression of a land in panic, its mind centered on possible dangers -from a conquered enemy. It was _France Sanglante_ that he held in -upraised arms before the Conference, a bleeding France at whom ravening -German and Russian wolves were snapping and threatening. All his -powerful oratory, his wealth of emotional gesture, upraised arms, tossed -black locks, rolling head, tortured features—all these M. Briand brought -into play in his efforts to arouse the Conference to share the fears of -France. He could not do it. He was talking to people as well informed as -himself on the actual facts of Europe, but people who are not -interpreting those facts in the way that the French do. He was talking -to people who view the situation of the present world as one to be -corrected only by hard, steady sacrifice and work in a spirit of good -will and mercy. Unhappily he gave them the impression that France -thought only of herself and of what the world should do for her to pay -her for her terrible sacrifices. In his picture of bleeding France he -did not include bleeding Belgium, Italy, England, Canada, Australia, New -Zealand, all of whom sat at the table and all of whom had suffered -losses and are staggering under debts, if not equal, at least comparable -to those of France. - -It was a mistake of emphasis, that brilliant journalist Simeon Strunsky -said. He pointed out that the thing really relevant in M. Briand’s -speech was practically concealed from the public, that France had -disarmament plans on hand which soon would reduce her army one half and -her term of military service from three years to eighteen months. M. -Briand’s tragic picture of the danger of France so obscured this -statement, so vitally important to the work of the Conference, that not -a few people contended that no such statement was ever made. One has -only to look at the text of the address to see that it was there, though -so out of proportion to the bulk of the speech that it failed of its -effect. - -The speech was disastrous. “I was never so heartsick in my life,” I -heard one of the greatest and most important men in Washington say after -it was over. Mr. Wells, that ardent advocate of the brotherhood of man, -knocked his doctrine all to smithereens by accusing France of wanting -arms to turn against England. Lord Curzon, as militant as Mr. Wells, -made a most unguarded speech for a man in his position. - -France, sore and sensitive, cried aloud that the United States and Great -Britain were trying to isolate her. Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour had, to -be sure, made consoling speeches after M. Briand’s outburst, but they -were rather the efforts of serene elderly friends trying to calm the -panic of a frightened child, and their effect was rather to aggravate -France’s determination to assert herself, to prove herself the equal, by -arms, if necessary, of any nation in the world, England included. - -The irritation of that day spread over the world. The Conference was -“wrecked,” cried the lovers of gloom and chaos. Washington buzzed with -gossip of wrangling between even the heads of delegations. There was a -rumor spread of a sharp quarrel between Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes on -the way the discussions in the committees were to be handled. It was -said that Mr. Hughes wanted everything that was voiced put down; that -Mr. Balfour thought a digest of the discussions would be sufficient. -This rumor was followed by the story of an ugly scene in committee -between the French Premier, Briand, and the Italian Senator Schanzer -over the morals of the Italian army. - -Now, luckily the Conference was admirably arranged to scotch vicious -rumors. There never has been a great international gathering in which -the press had as real an opportunity to learn what was going on. Every -morning there was given out at press headquarters a list of delegates -who at fixed hours would receive the press. This morning bulletin ran -something like this: - - 11:00 A.M. Lord Lee - 11:30 Ambassador Schanzer - 3:00 P.M. Lord Riddle - 3:30 Secretary Hughes - 4:00 The President of the United States (twice a week) - 5:30 Admiral Kato - 6:00 Mr. Balfour - -and so on. Every day from six to eight opportunities were given to -correspondents to question principals of the Conference. How much they -got depended upon how much they carried—how able they were to ask -questions—how sound their judgment was of the answers they received—how -honest their intent in interpreting. When ugly rumors such as those -which disturbed the second week of the Conference’s life occurred, this -method of treating the press was of real advantage to the powers -concerned. It was a joy to see the way Secretary Hughes, for instance, -handled the rumors at this moment. - -It was always a joy to see Mr. Hughes when he was righteously indignant, -and he certainly was so on the afternoon of November 25. He lunged at -once at the report of the break between himself and Mr. Balfour. The -statement had no basis but the imagination of the writer. It was unjust -to Mr. Balfour, who had been coöperative from the start. To put him of -all men at the Conference in a position of opposing the United States -was most unfair. There had been no clashes in committees, no quarrels. -There had, of course, been differences in points of view, candid -statements, free explanations, but any one with common sense knew that -such exchange of views must take place. It was a fine, generous, -convincing answer to the ugly rumors, and the beauty of it was that you -believed Mr. Hughes. You knew that he was not lying to you. I believe -this to have been the general conviction of the newspaper men. He -convinced them and they were all for him. This was a real achievement -for any man, for the press craft are hard to convince and quick to -suspect. Many of them have been for years in the thick of public -affairs, watching men go up and down; seeing heroes made and unmade; the -incorruptible prove corruptible. One wonders sometimes not that they -have so little faith, but that they have any. They believed Mr. Hughes. -When he denied the rumors his word was accepted. But the rumors were -out, and had been cabled abroad and were already doing their ugly work -there—fighting right and left like mad dogs. There was even riot and -bloodshed in Italy over the report that Briand had spoken lightly of -their army. - -It looked for the moment as if an atmosphere was gathering around the -Washington Conference similar to that in which the Paris Conference had -done its work. Indeed, already the observer who had been in Paris in -1919, had been more than once startled with the way the two conferences -were beginning to parallel each other. Just what happened in Paris had -already happened here—a wonderful first stage in which a noble program -had been given out—a program to which all the world had responded with -joy and hope. Then came a second stage in which the delegates attempted -to make their noble ideas realities. It was in this transition period -that the first convulsions of public and press began. They saw that, as -a matter of fact, the Conference had no magic to practice, that it was -nothing but the same old hard effort to work out by conferring, by -bargaining, by compromise, the best that they could get. And they saw, -too, that most of this work was going on behind closed doors. The moment -that the Washington Conference attempted to get down to cases there was -the same burst of remonstrance, suspicion, accusation that we saw in -Paris. “Secret diplomacy.” Then came rumors of quarrels. If it was -secret, must it not have been because there were things that they did -not want known outside—breaks in their good will? The rumors of quarrels -were spread with relish, and often malice. Dislike of this or that -nation flared up, mistrust of this or that man. Washington air was -saturated with impatience, suspicion, intrigue. Was the Conference to -gather about it the same storm of wicked passions that had been so -strong in Paris, doing their best to wreck the work, and frustrating -some of the noblest attempts. That dreadful “outside” of the Paris -Conference, created by the unreason, hate, vanity and ambitions of men, -seemed about to be duplicated. I had never set down my impressions of -the Paris atmosphere at the time of the Peace Conference; I would do it -now, that I might have it to compare with what seemed to me was about to -develop in Washington. - - - - - CHAPTER V - THE PARIS SHRINE OF OUR LADY OF HATES - - -Men and women who have been spectators of great human tussles are -generally possessed by a desire to tell what they saw, thought and felt -during its progress, and until they have relieved themselves of this -obsession they are uneasy, as from a duty undone. Until one carries for -a time such an obsession as this he cannot realize the patness of the -vulgar expression getting a thing “off one’s chest.” It lies there, -literally a load. He may have a notion—and his delay is probably due to -that—that he will only be adding another folio to a more or less -pestiferous collection; that, as a matter of fact, he will not, and -cannot, communicate anything that others have not already communicated. -All he can do is to say, “So I saw it; so it seemed to me.” - -For three years I had carried around a few impressions of the Paris -Conference of 1919. I had meant to keep them to myself—they were so -ungracious. Summed up they amounted to a melancholy conclusion that in -times of stress, public and press, unrestrained, make a bedlam in which -steady constructive effort, if not frustrated utterly, is sure to be -hindered and distorted. Taken as a whole the _milieu_ in which the Paris -Conference operated, furnished the most perfect example the world has -ever seen of the arrogance of the one who calls himself liberal, of the -irresponsibility of him who calls himself radical, of the unutterable -stupidity of him who calls himself conservative, of the universal habit -of saving your face by crying down what others are attempting to do, and -of the limitations which the laws of human nature and human society put -upon the collective efforts of human beings. - -From the day that the Conference opened you had the impression of each -man—I am talking here only of the man on the outside—being for himself -in what was plainly and admittedly the world’s most gigantic effort to -sink this each man in the whole. It was the insistence of the individual -and his way of thinking, so long held in check by the terrific -necessities of the war, that caused the first doubts of the undertaking -to one who struggled to keep a disinterested outlook. Take the idealists -who had accepted the great formula for world peace laid down; they -regarded it as something accomplished because for the moment it stood -out as the clear desire of the world, and were heedless and contemptuous -of the wisest words that were uttered at the start, the words of Georges -Clemenceau, who, at the first session, told the delegates of all the -nations of the world that if this daring thing, which he doubted but to -which he consented, went through it meant sacrifice for everybody. But -your idealist had not come for sacrifice. He had come to put into -operation his particular formula for a perfect world. - -With every day the numbers in Paris grew who had come to help—to get a -hearing—to help in the group at the top—to be heard by principals. They -failed. Disappointment, wounded vanity, the sense that they were -somebody, had something to contribute, stirred them to resentment. They -would serve, and they were rejected. There was, to be sure, one thing -that those who resented this apparent unconsciousness of their -importance by those charged with the conduct of things might have -done—one surely useful thing, and that was, casting an eye about and -seeing the multitude of problems that shrieked for solution, master one, -little as it might be:—the case of Teschen, of the Banat of Tamesvar, -the history of a boundary, the need of a coal mine here or there—and -working, really working, on this particular problem, produce some sound -presentation, something that men could not get around. The whole -bubbling pot of trouble called for such cooling drops of real, carefully -considered work. - -But this demanded self-direction, poise, a willingness to make a very -small contribution, to have no pretense of being called into council, to -trust to the gods and your own knowledge of what really counts in -solving complications. It called for going aside, of not pretending to -be on the inside. Minds were too troubled, vanity was too keen. You -eased your mind and poulticed your vanity by talk—talk at dinner tables, -over restaurant coffee, over tea—and talk in endless articles. - -One of the banes of the Paris Peace Conference was that there were so -many men and women on the field under contract to write, to produce so -many words every day or every week. There was no contract that these -words should add something to the knowledge of the many things about -which it was so necessary for men and women to learn—no contract that -they should contribute by ever so little to the great need of control on -every side, that they should comfort, soften hates, stimulate common -sense. Writers covered up their ignorance of things doing by prophecies, -by shrieks of despair, by poses of intimacy with the great, by -elaborately spun-out theories. And they built up superstitions. They -created things—absolutely created superstitions that may never be -dispelled from the minds of those who read them back home. - -There was the superstition of the mysterious four who, without advice, -without use of the vast machinery of expert knowledge that had been -called into existence, without consideration of political prejudice, of -ancient hates and struggles, carved up countries, made artificial -boundaries, and did it with a nicely calculated sense of revenge, hate, -self-advantage. This “Big-Four” came in popular minds to be a -hydra-headed tyrant—more irresponsible, brutal, and cynical than any -czar of Russia or Machiavelli of the Middle Ages. - -And it was a creation that left out of consideration facts that were -there for everybody to read if they were willing to work. It was a -Putois they created. Who was Putois? Read your Anatole France, or if -Crainquebille is not at hand, read Joseph Conrad’s review. - -The malevolence of those not charged with the conduct of affairs against -those so charged grew thicker and thicker as the days went on. Gossip -became more and more unrestrained. It was the only refuge of the numbers -who had no definite business in the scene but who had come to -watch—often with the idea in their minds that they might be able to -contribute some definite, salutary, stimulating something, often again -with a very definite idea that they might be able to pull down this or -that person having some actual inside hold. - -There were those who set themselves with calculation to destroy the -prestige of the President of the United States; not to destroy it by -sound criticism of his point of view, by the presentation of a larger -aspect of things than his, but to do it by a calculated meanness of -mind. In the general and frightful disorder left by the war, everything -begged that men should sink their littleness and show bigness, if there -was any in them, or if not leave the scene, in order at least, by their -absence, there might be so much less of littleness of mind around. But -these men—and women—stayed on. They sat at the tables of the Ritz and -smacked their lips over a nasty piece of scandal, born of -mischief-making partisans in far distant places; the meanness of the -“outs” against the leader of the “ins.” And there were always those to -listen and to spread. - -In the greatness of the calamity that had overwhelmed the world, it -would seem that men should have gone beyond the point not only of this -wanton mischief but beyond the point of sneering. A sneer in the face of -this vast destruction of mankind was like a sneer at an angry Jehovah. -But men everywhere sneered at the attempts at order, at justice. And, -curiously enough, it was those who labeled themselves liberal, humane, -that sneered most. - -There was a despairing consciousness at times that in every heart some -unextinguishable hatred was nourished. There were the hatreds against -those who did not believe with you. You began to see growing in Paris -among Americans what we have seen growing here at home since the war—the -revival of that old, old hate of England. What hope is there of the -world, one felt sometimes like asking, when some man or woman who -literally had given his life to good works or good causes poured a vial -of vitriol on the English nation? It took you back to the Civil War, and -the delivery up to England, by the wisdom of Abraham Lincoln, of the -Confederate commissioners. Owen Lovejoy, lifelong friend of human -freedom, enemy of human slavery, rose in the Congress of the United -States then and swore, so that all the country heard, his own undying -hatred of England. - -What was the world problem, after all, but to extinguish hatred? - -Unless that hymn of hate could be silenced, what hope was there of -peace, order, or the forms of order? And yet the advocates of peace fed -the fires in their own hearts and did their best to enkindle them in -others. - -And it was not alone American hatred of England, French hatred of -Germany, or English hatred of Germany that you heard of, but new hates. -They ran about like fire maniacs, pouring oil on old factional, national -and international troubles,—the Egyptian against the English, the Greek -against the Turk—the Pole against the Russian. - -There used to stand in Brittany one of those frank, realistic shrines -that the Gallic—honest with the ways of his own heart—so often sets up, -a statue to Notre Dame des Haines-Our Lady of the Hates. A mob from all -over the earth flocked to Paris, carrying under their arms big or little -replicas of Notre Dame des Haines—intent on rearing them at the doors of -the Conference. - -Savage instincts came to the top, and no contradiction, in all this sea -of contradiction, stared at you more hatefully than that of announced -pacifists lending all their efforts to a May Day riot, almost panting to -see blood run, and perching themselves on possible vantage points, to -cheer on any possible disorder at a time when tormented authorities had -ordered the public to stay indoors, and had taken taxis and omnibuses -from the streets. They wanted the protest of blood against what? As -nearly as one could see, it was against the only organized widespread -effort then making in the tormented world to bring the peace and justice -which they had made it their professional business to preach. - -A despairing fact was that individuals and groups, whose profession in -life it had been to be auxiliaries of peace and order, became -auxiliaries of war and disorder. There was one way of counteracting -their power, and that was using them, putting it up to them as Mr. -Lincoln put it up to Horace Greeley in 1864. - -To put it up to them in the way of the Niagara Conference—that was the -real wisdom, the real wisdom of the leader always toward protesting -groups—let them try their hand. Possibly they can pull it through, -contribute something which he and those of his type cannot do. But in -this avalanche of demands—causes, old and new; injustices running back -to the Flood; with a hundred unsolvable problems for every hour—how -place all this pestiferous mob that knew how to do it? It was to bale -out the Seine with a teaspoon—a vaster river than the Potomac and a -smaller teaspoon. - -And the trying came so often to naught. There was Prinkipo—modeled on -the real idealist’s formula, sound enough for a limited scene, with a -limited cast—“get together around a table and talk it over.” - -But the table? How find it in this still seething land over so much of -which the lava was still hot and uncrossable, with so many craters where -at every instant new eruptions threatened. They tried it—went into the -sea for their table, at a spot of which some of those who chose it had -never heard, and to which one at least objected—soundly enough—because -the name sounded so like the name of a comic opera. - -And the table selected, how get contestants there? In this Europe they -were remaking, such was the physical, military and political hampering -that there was no spot to which it was certain that everybody could -reach. And, as in the Prinkipo case, you ran up against things more -unyielding than armies or parties—that hardening of will, that deadening -of the spirit of coöperation which is one of the most terrible works of -revolutions—something happening to men who have all their lives been -good men, devoted to the end of human happiness, freezing them until -they will no longer work with other men to bring order and peace to a -tormented land for which they have always slaved. - -To sit at a table and hear a great noble, white-bearded advocate of -human rights, turned to bitterness and scorn of those who have ruined -his plan of doing things but who, for the moment, are in the saddle, -carrying out their own violent, fanatic way, refuse to even meet at the -Prinkipo table the representative of those advocates of violence in -order to attempt to somehow soften their madness—you know then that you -have reached a human limit, a limit to the human being’s capacity to -face those who disagree and those whom he despises though in that -meeting there may be a remote, though ever so remote, chance to stay a -murderous hand and soften a murderous spirit. - -It was not only such curious impressions of the limitations of the human -mind one received, but of the human heart as well. It seemed as if it -were not big enough—even in the case of those whose profession it is to -be humane—not big enough to cover anything but some special group whose -cause they espoused. There were many disheartening exhibits of this -limitation. One that will always stick in my mind as one of the most -hideous was the tears of a great humanitarian over the German prisoner -in France—a prisoner at that time receiving the same rations and even -better shelter and more clothes than most French refugees, and an -absolute setting of lips and hardness of eyes at the mention of children -and women in the caves of Lens, the shattered ruins of Peronne—it was -not humanity but an espoused group of humanity that stirred his -sympathy. - -Limits to human endurance, human capacity, human kindness, human -foresight—that was what every day of the Peace Conference cried louder -and louder into your ear. - - - - - CHAPTER VI - WHY DID HE DO IT? - - -But Washington was not to parallel Paris. The uproar caused by M. -Briand’s speech died away in an amazingly short time—so far as -Washington was concerned. The violence and indiscretions of the press to -which so much of the disturbance on the other side of the Atlantic was -due was not followed up. Those that had been responsible were all of -them, I think, a little ashamed, though Mr. Wells obstinately came back -once or twice to tell what he thought of the French. Explanations -quieted the Italians. M. Briand had never used the offensive word -attributed to him, it had been but a mistake of the cables—and a serious -mistake, it should be said, too, of the journalist that had cabled it -without verification. On all sides lectures were read to the -correspondents. Go on this way and they could easily wreck the whole -thing. Go on this way and peace never at any time could be made in the -world. Any effort of man could be easily upset if passionate judgments -and unconfirmed suspicions were to be sent broadcast through the -newspapers. People believe what they read, unhappily, and have little or -no way of verifying. There was much of this reproving talk going on and -some of those who handled it most vigorously belonged to the Washington -press. It had its effect at once. - -Then, too, it was hard to be continuously violent and suspicious in -Washington. The lovely days, the wide streets, the freedom from the -turmoil of business and industry, the very absence of exciting night -life—all tended to calm the spirit. How different from Paris in 1919! -There one lived in a city encircled by vast hospitals where thousands -upon thousands of shattered men tossed on their beds of pain. Soldiers -of all nations swarmed everywhere. In many streets of the city the shops -were still sealed up. On all sides one found great staring gaps—the -wounds of the city made by the shells of Big Bertha or the nightly -visits of airplanes. Everywhere you went you saw still the signs -“_Abri_” (shelter), vividly recalling the long years in which no man -safely went out without knowing that there was a refuge near by. The -streets at night were still dark, and those within still tightened their -shutters and drew close their curtains, unable to believe that light was -no longer a danger. - -You rode in battered taxicabs over streets that were rough from long -inattention. In every house you entered the marks of war still remained. -Nothing had been mended or repaired in Paris for five years. A heating -apparatus out of order, it stayed out of order. A window broken, it -stayed broken. A hinge off, it stayed off. Carpets and furniture went -uncleaned. And in the homes of the rich where there had been beautiful -pictures, empty frames hung on the wall, the canvas having been cut out -and sent to some place of safety. There was no color. All Paris was in -black. Even in the windows of the shops you saw nothing but black. Your -dressmaker and milliner had no heart to work in colors, it still to them -was bad taste. It was only the influx and the demand of the visiting -foreigners, who multiplied as the Conference went on, that brought back -colors to the shop windows. - -What a contrast to all this was Washington in the fall of 1921, with its -gayety and lavishness, its incessant round of lunches and teas and -dinners, its over-weighted tables, unbelievable in their abundance to -the visiting strangers, so long—and still—on stricter rations. You could -not be tragic long in Washington. - -Then there was Mr. Hughes’ steady hand. He laughed daily at his press -conferences at the insinuations and solemnity of the questioning press -correspondents. Everything was going on swimmingly, he asserted. -“Excellent progress.” The naval committee was at work, the Far Eastern -committee had begun its sessions, the agenda would be followed step by -step, but one thing at a time would be attempted; when they had finished -what they were at now they would take up the next step, and not before. -It was certainly steadying, if not exciting. It gave confidence, if not -headlines. All of this quieted the storm, but it was left to the -President of the United States to sweep it entirely from the Conference -sky, though whether he did it intentionally or accidentally is still, I -think, an unanswered question. - -Why did President Harding, without warning, inject an Association of -Nations into the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, on the last -day of its second week of life? The Conference had a definite agenda. -Mr. Hughes, its chairman, was following it with the rigor of a good -schoolmaster. That agenda made no mention of a conference, association -or league of nations. So far as it was concerned, the world war is made -up of nine nations. And here came the President of the United States and -casually announced that before the work was completed it should include -an association of all the nations of the earth. - -Why did he do it? Did he want to divert public attention from the -dangerous irritations of the moment? We do not yet know enough of the -workings of Mr. Harding’s mind to be able to say whether he would, like -Napoleon III, gild a dome when there was squally public weather. All we -do really know about the President, so far, is his genuinely beneficent -intent. Is he canny enough to know that the public is as easily diverted -as a child and capable of attempting the trick when things are getting a -bit out of hand? - -Whether this is true or not, he certainly put an end to the ticklish -situation in which the Conference found itself in Thanksgiving week. -Everybody fell to discussing the proposition. Was the Conference really -to end up in an Association of Nations? Did this mean that the United -States would suggest to the delegates gathered at the Conference—all of -them members of the League of Nations—that they scrap that institution? -There had been much speculation in Geneva before the Washington -Conference was called as to whether the intention was to force the -League out of existence. So great was the anxiety of more than one -European country to be in any congregation in which the United States -figured, that it was pretty generally agreed that if such a proposition -should be made it would be assented to. Was this Mr. Harding’s first -feeler then toward substituting something of his own for the League? But -this was only a speculation. Nobody could get from any official source -any confirmation that Mr. Harding had anything definite in mind. And yet -they were not unwilling to accept the notion that he had inadvertently -thrown out so important a suggestion. - -There were those who had an unamiable explanation. We are all human, -they said. We must remember that this has ceased to be Mr. Harding’s -conference. His fine sentiments on Armistice Day on the opening of the -Conference had been greeted with loud acclaim the world over. But after -he had opened the Conference he left the hall. Secretary Hughes -appeared, and it was Secretary Hughes who stirred the world. From that -time on, the Secretary had been the one man quoted. We have had great -secretaries—Mr. Root, for instance, who never allowed his shadow to fall -across that of the President of the United States. When Mr. Roosevelt -was President, Mr. Root prepared some very remarkable state papers, but -they always began “The President instructs me to say.” Mr. Hughes has -been speaking for himself. It is quite possible, said these -interpreters, that the President thinks the time has come to let the -public know that, after all, it is he who occupies the White House. - -I am quite sure that if this had been true, we should have had other -evidence of it as time went on, but none came. Mr. Harding knew well -enough that a successful Conference was in the long run his triumph. He -knew well enough that the only man who could give him this success was -Secretary Hughes. Possibly the wisest thing that Mr. Harding has yet -done as President has been to let the members of his cabinet do their -own work. Jealousy is not, I am sure, an explanation of Mr. Harding’s -sudden introduction of an Association of Nations into the Conference on -the Limitation of Armament. Was it to be found in M. Briand’s speech? - -M. Briand did not convince his audience, as we have seen. That is, he -did not bring it to the point at which he was aiming. But one thing that -he did do was to bring into sharp relief the fact that land and naval -armaments cannot be handled separately. They dovetail in the game of -war, are mutually defensive and offensive; to cut the navy of a nation -whose main defense is ships, without considering the relation of that -cut to the size of the armies of those nations in which armies are the -chief defense, is to leave an unbalanced situation. - -A second realization went along with this, and that was that the -scrapping and cutting by nine nations must be done with an eye to the -actual or potential naval armaments of the other forty-five or so -nations of the earth. Senator Schanzer had already suggested this in his -speech made on November 15, accepting in principle for Italy the naval -program. “I think it rather difficult,” he said, “to separate the -question of Italian and French naval armament limitation from the -general question of naval armaments of the world.” - -M. Briand’s speech made one realize how France and Italy must consider -possible continental alliances of powers that were not represented at -this Conference; must consider a possible Russian crusade to convert the -world by force to its gospel. And if France and Italy must, or thought -they must, secure themselves against these possibilities, could England -weaken herself disproportionately? When you began to consider the -question of armament in terms of the world and not simply of nine -nations, you could not if you were candid find any peaceful solution but -by bringing everybody in—Germany, Turkey, Russia. Now it may be, though -we do not know Mr. Harding well enough yet to say, that the logic of the -experiences that the Conference had been through up to date laid hold of -him and he said it like a man—“there is but one way out, and that is by -One Big Union.” - -Of course there is another explanation of why he did it and I rather -think it may be the true one, after all. The President may have been -hearing from the country. One thing that we do know about him is that he -is a man who with almost religious care listens to the voices that come -up to him from the people. And it was no secret that a multitude of -them, strong and weak, had been calling to him in the weeks -preceding—“conference,” “association,” “league,” “some method of -carrying on in which everybody can join,” “in no other way can we hope -for permanent peace.” It may be that Mr. Harding had heard so much of -this that he felt he must reply. And if this was true, he did wisely. - -We may lay it down as one of the great facts of the present -international state of mind, that the world is intent on some sort of an -association of nations. It is not set, so far as one can determine, on -any particular covenant, though of course there is one to which some -fifty nations of the world have subscribed and in which for some two -years now they have been doing increasingly practical work in adjusting -difficulties between nations. The very fact that the League of Nations -lives—the divers ways in which its adventures in world unionism come to -us—only makes the idea of association stronger in the minds of the -peoples of the earth. - -The Conference might limit armaments, naval and land, in the nine -nations that were here gathered. It might make settlements of the Far -Eastern questions, but there still would remain the rest of the world. -It is a part of things. The world is one. It has come to a consciousness -of its oneness. Nothing can dull that consciousness, stop the -determination to realize it. Not Mr. Borah, not Mr. Lodge. Somehow we -have got to learn to come together and stay together. Walt Whitman once -said of Abraham Lincoln’s passion for the Union that unionism had become -“a new virtue” with him,—a virtue like honesty, goodness, truthfulness. -There is no manner of doubt that in the minds of this world unionism is -coming to be regarded as a virtue; that the demand for its realization -as the only road to world peace is becoming more and more universal. - -Mr. Harding may have seen this. He may have gone over in his mind the -steps that in the last twenty-five years—not to go back farther—the -world has taken toward this—the steps at the Hague, the various peace -conferences, the greatest of all experiments now making at Geneva—and he -may have seen that he could no longer deny the demand of this people -that he take another step toward the realization of this great hope. -Whatever the reason, however, of his unexpected suggestion, it served -the excellent purpose of turning the mind of the public to the fact that -however complete the work of the Conference might be there would still -be more to do if the world was to remain at peace. - -In the meantime the Conference itself was going steadily ahead. -Everybody seemed cheerful. Everybody was cheerful. If the Conference had -rocked on its base for a moment, it had come back to its position; and -it was obvious enough, too, from all that one heard and saw, that there -was going soon to be something definite and important to announce as a -result of the work that was going on. - - - - - CHAPTER VII - DRAMATIC DIPLOMACY - - -Who was the dramatist of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament? -Mr. Hughes? I would never have believed it. I could never have conceived -of his deliberately staging his diplomatic achievements with an -appreciation of the time, the place and the world at large which was -really amazing. It did not need Mr. Balfour’s delicate and humorous -understanding to point out to those who were present at the opening on -November 12 that the dramatic quality of Mr. Hughes’ great speech -rivaled, if it did not outstrip, its splendid matter. But who would have -believed that he would repeat himself? Yet he did it. Just four weeks -from his first great coup he pulled off another that had every element -of drama which characterized the first—and it had more—strains of -genuine emotion and one scene of biting satire. (Not for a moment, -however, do I believe that Mr. Hughes intended _that_.) - -The surprise of the opening day of the Conference, November 12, lay in -the unexpectedness of what Mr. Hughes had to say. The first surprise, of -December 10, lay in the fact that there was to be a full session. It was -not until nearly midnight of the 9th that it was announced. A few diners -lingering late heard of it. The press of course was informed. But to -most of us the news came when we opened our morning paper over our -coffee—a full headline across the top of the page— - - PLENARY SESSION TO-DAY - -Of course we realized that it was going to be a big day. For days there -had been hidden in the mists about the Conference something which those -who were able to penetrate near to the center of things declared to be a -treaty. Watching this treaty emerge was like watching a ship come out of -a thick fog. There were warning signals, faint at first, but growing -more and more distinct—the Anglo-Japanese pact was dying. If the United -States wished it, it should go; and it was certain that the United -States had for a long time wished it,—also Australia and other parts of -the British Empire. Then we began to hear more and more from another -direction—signals that had been sounded at intervals for weeks before -the Conference convened. Japan was uneasy about the naval bases in the -Pacific. She would like to have them dismantled. As one listened one -began to understand that Mr. Hughes’ program of naval limitation would -stay where it was until something had been done about both the -Anglo-Japanese Pact and the Islands of the Pacific. - -The logic of the situation began to be clear. The fair-minded began to -ask themselves, “Well, now, after all, how can we expect Japan to strip -herself of ships, if she must, as seems to be inevitable, give up her -understanding with England? How can we expect her to weaken her defenses -and take no exception to the fortifications in the waters near her? She -is the member of this Conference that is being asked to sacrifice until -it hurts, and the only one. Is it fair to ask her to sacrifice without -guarantees? Is there any way out but a treaty—a treaty in which we -join?” - -Moreover, if you ask her to sacrifice without a guarantee, will she do -it? Not Japan. Thus it became more and more clear that the success of -the naval program depended on some kind of a pact which would satisfy -Japan that she could agree to what Mr. Hughes had asked and still have -no reason to feel herself in danger. - -The first definite black-faced, full-width-of-the-page headline came, as -I remember, on December 5—“Four Power Entente to Replace Anglo-Japanese -Alliance.” The morning after this bold announcement it was not quite so -sure. The newspapers were keeping a line of retreat open. As they now -put it: “Discussions of the proposals have reached a well-advanced -stage,” none of the governments concerned had given final approval. -There was enough that was sure, however, to give the wicked a chance to -jeer at approaching “entangling alliances.” - -By Friday, December 9, the most careful journals were saying, on what -they declared to be the best sort of authority, that the United States -was going into a pact with Japan and England and France, guaranteeing -various things. There was considerable diversity in the assertions about -what it guaranteed. Washington said nothing. The news came from all of -the capitals of the powers concerned, except our own. It was evidently -very hard for Washington to say “treaty.” - -There was much entertaining gossip running around as to how Tokyo and -London and Paris had been able to give the press the news of what was -going to be done, while Washington was silent. One story was that a -clever Japanese journalist had managed to get a glimpse of the document -in preparation and had cabled what he had been able to make out of its -contents to Tokyo; that from there it had gone to Paris and London and -finally came here. That was one story. Another was a rather thin version -of that old, old device of writers of diplomatic fiction—a lively and -lovely lady lunches with an elderly diplomat, who, to win her favor, -reveals the secret that is in the air. That evening she dines with a -young journalist whom she naturally (and necessarily for the purpose of -the plot) much prefers, and to prove her devotion she tells him what her -elder suitor has revealed. Threadbare as the formula is, it was honored -the week that the treaty was coming out of the fog by at least one -important newspaper. - -Mr. Hughes seems to have concluded by the end of Friday, the 9th, that -unless he acted quickly his reputation for dramatic diplomacy might be -shaken, and so the hasty summons, the thrill at the breakfast table, the -quick readjustments of plans, the rush to make sure that your -credentials were all right and your ticket waiting you. - -From the beginning of the Conference, sun and air were in league with -those who were staging it with such a sense of dramatic values. Never -was there a morning of lovelier tenderness than that on which they -carried the Unknown Soldier to his grave; Mr. Hughes’ big gun was fired -under a perfect morning sky—it was only when we came out that things had -grown stern and the clouds were dark, as if to give us a sense that a -serious thing had been done that morning and it was well to get down to -work, if it was to be made good. - -The morning of December 10 there was frost on all the Washington roof -tops, the sky was clear, there was an air that put a spring in your -heels and it was a joy to hurry down with the crowd to get your ticket; -it put you in mood for something exciting, helped enormously the keen -anticipation that stirred the town. - -The scene in the Conference was what it had been at the three previous -open sessions: each delegate in his place, the advisory board banked -behind them, the boxes overflowing with ladies, the press in their usual -seats, the House gallery even more amusing than on the opening day. It -was quite full, for somehow the House had obtained permission to bring -its family along, and there were many ladies sprinkled through the -gallery. They made it more animated but not a whit more dignified in its -behavior. - -And then, on the tick of the hour, Mr. Hughes arose. What an orderly -mind! A mind that must know where it is headed, how it is going to get -there, the exact point it has reached at the given moment! He must know -himself, and he never fails, when he presents his case, to make sure -that you know. Again and again in his talks to the press he would -carefully point out to the correspondents who were given to jumping to -the future, running back to the past, wanting to know this or that that -was not on the agenda by any stretch of the imagination, just what “the -muttons” were in this particular Conference. “The agenda is our chart, -here is where we have arrived to-day. We are moving in this or that -direction. I shall have nothing to say about what we find when we arrive -until we are there, then you shall know everything.” That is, Mr. Hughes -did his utmost to keep the mind of press and public concentrated on the -actual problem under his hand. He started the Plenary Conference of -December 10 in the same fashion. - -The session, he said, was to be devoted to that part of the agenda which -concerned itself with the Pacific and Far Eastern questions. The -committee charged with these questions had taken up first a -consideration of China; certain conclusions in regard to China already -given out to the public had been reached. It was the business of the -full Conference, however, to assent to these conclusions. In turn, Mr. -Hughes reviewed them, and in turn the Conference assented to them: - - (1) The four resolutions which will go down in history as the Root - resolutions; they are, as Mr. Hughes pointed out eloquently, a - charter given China by the eight powers at this Conference, - protecting her sovereignty and independence and guaranteeing that no - one hereafter shall seek within China special advantages at the - expense of the rights of others. - - (2) The agreement between powers not to conclude between themselves - any treaty affecting China without previously notifying China and - giving her an opportunity to participate. - - (3) A pledge given by all the members of the Conference not to enter - into any treaty or understanding either with one another or with any - power which would infringe the principles laid down in the Root - resolutions. - -This business done, Mr. Hughes sprang the second surprise of the day: - - “I shall now ask Senator Lodge to make a communication to the - Conference with respect to a matter which is not strictly within the - agenda, but which should be made known to the Conference at this - first opportunity.” - -It was the treaty that had been lurking so long behind the fog. A simple -enough treaty in form, brief, only 196 words, but how portentous for us, -the United States. Those few words bind us to Great Britain, the French -Republic, the Empire of Japan in a contract to respect one another’s -rights in relation to all insular possessions and dominions in the -region of the Pacific Ocean. We agree to settle quarrels, if any there -should be, by conference, when it cannot be done by diplomacy. We agree -also if the rights of any one of the four associates are threatened from -the outside “to communicate with one another fully and frankly as to the -most efficient measures to be taken jointly and separately to meet the -exigencies of the particular situation.” - -Article X of the League of Nations! I pinched myself to be sure I was -not asleep. Swift glances right and left reassured me, for I could see -sly little smiles—and some looks of disgust—on near-by faces. And then I -fixed my eyes on the American delegation. They were taking it like -gentlemen, though it did seem to me that Mr. Hughes was not sitting -quite so straight and looking quite so proud as usual. Article X read by -Henry Cabot Lodge! Was the dramatist for the Conference for the -Limitation of Armament also a great satirist? Surely you must search far -in American history to find another scene so full of irony. - -Mr. Lodge read the treaty through in his fine, clear voice; digested it -in a few simple words; followed it with a nice little literary talk on -the romance that hangs over the isles of the Pacific, which we were -protecting from all future aggressors; said some hard things about war, -quite justified—but I was incapacitated for appreciating his eloquence, -for all I could see was the United States climbing into the League of -Nations through the pantry window, while Senator Lodge held up the sash. - -But it was a fine climb for the United States! - -In the week thus opened there followed more agreements, more -settlements,—all necessary to round out the Four Power Pact. These were -presented to the public not in open sessions of the Conference but -through the press in what might be called private rehearsals. Standing -at one end of the long audience room, opening from his own office in the -State Department, a hundred or more newspaper folk of various -nationalities, pressing close to him, Secretary Hughes read on Monday -afternoon, December 12, the text of an arrangement with Japan concerning -Yap, an arrangement hanging since last June and now settled and settled -rightly by a fair give and take on both sides. - -He followed this by reading the written consent of the United States to -another chunk of the League of Nations. What it amounted to was that the -United States agreed to the mandate given Japan by the Versailles Treaty -over the islands in the Pacific north of the equator, late the property -of Germany. The United States also accepted all the terms of the mandate -as laid down by the League of Nations. Excellent terms they are, too. We -are even to get a copy of the annual report of her stewardship which -Japan, like all other League mandatories, is obliged to make, showing -that she is really developing and not exploiting the territory which she -is being allowed to administer. This was a good deal for one day! - -What did it mean? Why, most important of all, that the delegates of the -United States had seen that limitation of armament means sacrifice. It -was unwillingness to sacrifice that had prevented the disarmament -proposed at Paris. - -England must have her navy; her security required it. - -France and Italy must have their armies; their security required it. - -Each one of the little new nations that one would have supposed to have -been so fed up on war that they never again would have been willing to -spend a dollar on a soldier, must have their armies; their security -required it. - -Japan must have her army, her navy, her war loot; her security required -it. - -That is, no one of the allied nations was ready to make a sacrifice to -carry out the plank of disarmament they had adopted. They insisted on -applying the plank to the enemy they had beaten, but not to themselves. -This was not in any large degree because of greed or revenge, it was -because of fear—fear of the vanquished. There was utter lack of -confidence in the plan of peaceful international coöperation which they -had written into their program. Force alone spelt security in their -minds. They had no sense of safety in a mere covenant, though all the -nations of the world did commit themselves to its provisions. - -It has been our boast that we alone asked nothing at Paris. But was this -true? When it came to working out the code which the world had acclaimed -as the true path to permanent peace, we refused to accept the one point -on which all the rest hung; that for an association of nations looking -to the continuous peaceful handling of international difficulties. Such -an association we saw would invade our isolation and that isolation we -have come to believe to be our chief security. That is, in essence, the -United States was no more willing to make a sacrifice for permanent -peace than were the distracted and disheveled nations of Europe. We and -they all held on to the particular device which we had come by national -experience to believe essential to safety—England her navy, France her -army, Japan her army and her navy, we our freedom from entangling -alliances. - -The Four Power Pact proved that we were willing to sacrifice something -of our isolation—just how much the future would have to show. But would -we be willing to sacrifice anything of our naval program? There had been -rumors of changes asked by both England and Japan. The ugliest gesture -seen in Washington in the early days of the Conference had greeted these -rumors. We were not going to tolerate tampering with the great work. It -must be accepted as it was laid down, and if it was not, we would build -the biggest navy on earth; we had the money; moreover we would call our -foreign loans and then we’d see! - -Various rumors of objections to the naval program, now that it had gone -to the committee for detailed examination, were said to have been made. -There was a disturbing rumor that England wanted the submarine banished -from the navies of the world, and that we flatly refused to consider a -request which could not but be welcome to the mass of the country, -anxious to see not only capital ships scrapped, as had been proposed on -the opening day, but auxiliary craft of all sorts. The chief irritation, -however, had been over Japan’s strenuous objection to doing away with -the greatest of her ships—indeed, the greatest ship afloat, the _Mutsu_. -It was just what we might have expected of Japan; her acceptation of the -program at the opening of the Conference was a pretense. She was going -to object at every point. What the public was still not realizing in -regard to the _Mutsu_ was that to Japan it had become a tremendous, -almost sacred, symbol. It was a ship designed entirely by the Japanese -naval architects, built of materials prepared by Japanese workmen, named -for a beloved emperor. The delegation feared to consent to her -destruction. So much national pride had been aroused by the great ship -that to consent to her destruction might ruin the whole naval program -with Japan. - -It was hard for Americans to understand any such feeling as this. We -have little or no sentiment about any ship, big or little. They mean -nothing to us but taxes. We don’t depend upon battleships for safety as -an island nation does. There is Japan, a little land all told, Formosa -and Korea included, not as large as the state of Texas, with a sea front -of over 18,000 miles. Ships mean food, contacts, security to her. When -we asked her to sacrifice them we must remember that we were asking much -more of her than we were of ourselves though our ratio might have been -larger. We must remember the world is not ruled simply by tons of -material. Symbols weigh more with nations than tonnage. We could give up -our ships without a sigh; but when Japan scrapped hers, something of her -heart went with the scrapping. - -So far as the _Mutsu_ was concerned, the answer came three days after -the agreement over Yap and the Caroline Islands had been made public. On -the 15th of December, at six o’clock in the evening, Mr. Hughes staged -one of his private rehearsals for the press. It was the decision as to -the capital-ship ratio which had been so long expected and which had -been settled on the basis that had been proposed on November 12—5–5–3. -But, while the ratio had been kept, the details had been changed. Great -Britain and the United States had had the good will and the wisdom to -recognize that Japan’s feeling about the _Mutsu_ was genuine. - -One has only to read the revised agreement to understand what pains the -two countries took to readjust the calculations of the United States in -such a way that the desired ratio would be preserved and Japan’s pride -and sentiment saved. When nations come to the point that they are -willing to try to understand and to consider one another’s feelings as -well as one another’s force, there is some hope for the peace of the -world. - -There was no gainsaying the fact that the great triumph of this dramatic -week was Japan’s. It was a legitimate triumph, honestly won. She -understood what she gained. As the session of December 10 broke up, one -of the ablest members of her delegation—a bitter critic of what had been -doing—came out from the Conference hall with tears in his eyes, though -they do say that no Japanese knows how to shed tears. “It is the -greatest day in the history of the new world,” he said. And that was -true,—if Japan would now be as generous toward the rights and -aspirations of her great neighbor China as she had been tenacious of her -own safety and dignity. The world had recognized her power and her -diplomatic skill. Would she now win its confidence in her moral -integrity? - -But if December 10 was the beginning of Japan’s week of triumph, it was -Mr. Balfour’s day. He made a little speech which will stick long in the -minds of those who heard it. - -“It so happens,” said Mr. Balfour, “that I was at the head of the -British administration which twenty years ago brought the great -Anglo-Japanese Alliance into existence. It so happens that I was at the -head of the British Administration which brought into existence an -entente between the British Empire and France, and through all my life I -have been a constant, ardent and persistent advocate of intimate and -friendly relations between the two great branches of the -English-speaking race. - -“You may well conceive, therefore, how deep is my satisfaction when I -see all these four powers putting their signatures to a treaty which I -believe will for all time insure perfect harmony of coöperation between -them in the great region with which the treaty deals.” - -That little speech gave one a clearer sense of what through all these -years Arthur Balfour has been doing than anything that ever has before -come to me. There is something supremely brave about a man of such fine -understanding, such humorous and distinguished cynicism, standing by -through all of the disillusions, disgust, deceptions, forced evil -choices of public life, never quitting whatever the temptation. For -forty years now Arthur Balfour has stood by. He is, I believe, 73 years -old. He has never had so much reason in all his long political career to -believe that the good will of men can be mobilized for the world’s -service. - -It was a great week, noble in its undertaking, dramatic in its planning, -the just triumph of a people who know what they want and are willing to -wait to get it. And for us, America, it was a week of brave deeds. We -were coming to our senses, realizing that we are of the world, and if we -are to enjoy its fruits, we must bear our share of its burdens; that if -we would have peace, the surest way is to use our strength and our good -will to guarantee it. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - THE MOODS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE - - -If we are to succeed in repairing this battered world through the medium -of the International Conference, then plainly it is the business of us -all to try to understand the methods, the conduct and particularly the -moods of this instrument of peace. It is as temperamental as a stock -exchange. The Washington Conference began with a period of tremendous -exultation. Mr. Hughes’ great naval program lifted the world. For ten -days this mood prevailed. Then came the French in the person of their -Prime Minister, Briand, and in an hour he had the temple of peace -rocking on its base. - -It was very interesting to see how the men who made up the Conference -went steadily ahead from ten to six every day—and sometimes longer—in -spite of the excitement M. Briand had stirred up. It was a fine example -of the stabilizing effect of a daily task regularly followed. They went -on for four weeks and then again stirred the world to enthusiasm by -their Four Power Pact; their removal of the Yap irritation; their -consent to the Japanese mandate in the Pacific; their acceptance of the -Five-Five-Three naval ratio. At one swoop the war with Japan that a part -of the American public has so sedulously cultivated for a good term of -years was wiped off the map—unless the United States Senate prefer to -restore it to its position. - -However, the naval program was not a fact accomplished until France and -Italy had consented to a ratio. That was the next step, and Mr. Hughes -seemed to have turned to it with the utmost confidence—1.75 was the -ratio he had fixed on as proper; then suddenly, without any warning, the -soaring stock of the Conference dropped way below par. A British -journalist, with more love of sensation than the honor of his -profession, announced that the French had told the naval committee that -France wanted to build ten 35,000 ton ships. The effect of those numbers -suddenly thrown on a table where the figuring for weeks had been down, -not up, was more nearly to throw the Conference delegates off their feet -than anything that had happened to date. There was no questioning their -dismay, for while Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes refused, as it was proper -for them to do, to discuss the matter, while the French likewise kept -their mouths shut, and complained that they had been betrayed, Mr. -Hughes showed his excitement by a long cablegram, appealing to M. -Briand, over the head of the then acting chief of the French delegation, -M. Sarraut. Outside the Conference an excited world declared the whole -thing was wrecked and that France had wrecked it. - -Could this unhappy incident have been avoided? If the Conference had -shown a more sympathetic understanding of the way France is feeling -to-day, if there had been the realization which we certainly should -expect of the effect of calling her into a gathering of this kind and -then letting her Premier sit for a week with practically no attention, -it probably would have been. When M. Briand was leaving the Conference -on the opening day an American journalist asked him what he thought of -it. The American way, he said, “à la Américaine.” And then he went on to -remark that when the time came France would do like Mr. Hughes and talk -in the American way. Weeks went on and France had no chance to talk in -anybody’s way about her naval ratio. Everybody else but herself seems to -have taken it for granted that 1.75 was to be her proportion. When her -turn finally came, however, she began to hurl capital ships at Mr. -Hughes’ program—ten of them, 35,000 tons each. The figures looked -appalling, preposterous—they produced, as I have said, almost a panic. -Now, obviously, the panic would have been avoided, as far as the public -is concerned, if the matter had been kept in committee where it belonged -and where the French intended to keep it. Given to the public, it -stirred up anger on both sides of the water, whipped up suspicion, set -all the busybodies at inventing far-fetched explanations and reading -sinister meanings into the French proposal. - -There was little trouble when Mr. Hughes appealed to M. Briand in -getting the capital-ship ratio dropped back to the 1.75 first suggested. -But along with this concession in the matter of capital ships went the -decision that France would not limit her submarines and auxiliary craft. -She wanted unlimited submarines for defense—defense against whom? It -must be us, said England. She wanted auxiliary craft for the protection -of scattered colonies. Here she took her position and here she remained. -Mr. Hughes’ naval program leaves the number of submarines and light -craft a nation builds at its discretion. Too bad—could it have been -avoided? - -One thing seems quite certain, that Mr. Hughes missed a tremendous -opportunity in not boldly declaring in his original program that as for -the United States, it was done with submarines. We did that at Paris in -1919. The head of our delegation, President Wilson, and his naval -advisers agreed that in the disarmament pledged by the League of Nations -the submarine was one weapon which could and should be put entirely out -of existence. Its record of cowardice and plain murder no one could -defend. The treaty of Versailles forbade the Germans to construct -submarines for any purpose, and it certainly was the farthest from the -thought of the majority of those who made that treaty that they were -laying down one rule for Germany and another for themselves. The idea -there was to disarm and to begin with Germany. - -Why the American delegation should not have followed that policy here in -regard to the submarine is not clear. But when it was not done in the -opening program, it is still less understandable why they did not seize -the British suggestion when it was made by Mr. Balfour. The British had -the American program for naval reduction flung into their faces without -warning, and they picked it up like wonderful sports, as did the -Japanese. But when Mr. Balfour notified the Conference that he should -propose complete abolition of the submarine, there was no such response. -There were not a few of us who had an uncomfortable chill over the -Washington Conference when our government failed promptly to follow the -British in this policy, failed to say, “Yes, we are with you, it’s -beastly business this submarine warfare—one thing we can do away with. -We will join you in outlawing it.” But this was not done, and because it -was not done, coupled with France’s determination to seize every chance -that came along to secure recognition for herself, to enforce her -argument that she must be prepared to defend herself, since nobody in -the world seemed prepared to give her the guarantees which she thought -necessary, if she were to disarm, the submarine came in to trouble Mr. -Hughes’ program, and, incidentally, to spoil the Conference’s holiday -week. - -The regret was the greater because the arguments that Lord Lee and Mr. -Balfour had put up for the abolition of the submarine were so weighty -and conclusive that if they could have been presented at the start, or -at least earlier in the negotiations, there seems to be little doubt -that they would not have won over the Conference. These arguments have -the backing of Great Britain’s experience with submarines, the most -serious and extensive experience that any nation has yet had with this -particular weapon. Lord Lee and Mr. Balfour had the facts to show that -the German submarine fleet was able to accomplish relatively little in -the Great War in the way of legitimate naval warfare. It left the -British Grand Fleet untouched. In spite of all its efforts, it did not -prevent the British taking fifteen million troops across the English -Channel, and the Americans two million across the Atlantic. It was of -little use to the British in guarding their coast line, which, as Lord -Lee pointed out, was almost as great as the combined coast line of the -four other powers in the discussion. What the German submarine fleet did -do, however, was to destroy some twelve million tons of mercantile -shipping and murder twenty thousand non-combatants—men, women and -children. The counter defense against the submarine has been so -developed, Lord Lee claimed, that an attacking fleet could be equipped -to resist any number of them. That is, the methods of detecting, -locating and destroying submarines have greatly outstripped their -offensive power. - -One of the strong arguments for the abolition of the submarine is the -fact that it is possible to abolish it by general consent. Its case is -very different from that of poison gas, which is a by-product of -essential industries. You do not need to set out to find poison gasses; -they come to you in the natural course of chemical research, and they do -not have to be manufactured until you are forced to do it for defense. -Moreover, they have the enormous advantage of not looking like war. They -are disgusting, hateful things against which man instinctively revolts. -They do not tempt the adventurous, as the submarine does. - -Although the French particularly, through Admiral le Bon and M. Sarraut, -did their utmost to combat the British position, their arguments had -little weight in comparison with the British. The entire discussion -which ran more than a week and which was given out day by day -practically in full to the press only emphasized my feeling that the -French, in insisting on a fleet of submarines all out of proportion to -that contemplated in the original American program, were actuated more -by a desire to assert themselves in this council of nations, to -demonstrate that it is not safe to overlook their susceptibilities, than -from any desire to have submarines for defense. If the representatives -of the United States are to work successfully with other nations in -international conferences, they must learn that diplomats can no more -afford to overlook the feelings of other nations than an engineer can -afford to overlook the susceptibilities of the iron and steel which he -employs. France’s acute sensitiveness, her black imaginations, may -irritate Americans who know nothing of invaded and devastated territory, -who have not had to sit through five long years with the sound of -bursting shells continually in their ears; but if they have not the -imagination and the sympathy to tell them what the results of such an -experience are, then let them accept the judgment of physicians and -realize that in whatever negotiations they have with the French people -at this time, their shell-shocked minds and souls must be taken into -account. - -Mr. Hughes lost a second great opportunity in the submarine matter. A -few days before Christmas, when it became obvious that the submarine was -in danger of destroying the American delegation’s plans for a glorious -Christmas present to the nation, Mr. Balfour asked for an open session -in which to discuss the matter. For some reason not at all clear, Mr. -Hughes did not consent. Our Secretary of State proved himself a superior -dramatist at the Conference, but in this instance a poor psychologist! -If there was to be no holiday, as had become clear, then an open session -with a chance to hear Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, M. Sarraut, Admiral le Bon, -Senator Schanzer, in the free discussion of a matter in which the whole -country was tremendously interested—such an open session would have been -a Christmas present in itself, and it would have done much to have -cleared up the thick atmosphere. - -In these conferences the atmosphere easily becomes heavy with suspicion. -The sight of a group of eminent gentlemen of various nationalities -shutting themselves up morning after morning, for hours, considering -matters which concern the peace and happiness of the world, if too long -continued, stirs up resentment in the best of us. If you are an -impersonal, detached, philosophical, fairly well-informed person, it is -not difficult for you to visualize what those gentlemen are doing; if -you take the trouble you can even build up in your mind what they are -saying. Suppose it is a question of the ratio of capital ships. You know -that they are listening to disputes over tonnage and the way it has been -computed, are studying long arrays of figures, matters dull in -themselves and requiring the closest attention. Most of us would not -remain a half hour, unless we were compelled to when such discussions -were going on. But if you are a suspicious person, if you have been -trained in the cynical school of sensational journalism, to look for -mischief and intrigue—and often it must be confessed finding it—you have -dark thoughts about the gentlemen. - -The only way in which such suspicions can be cleared up—or better, -prevented,—is by frequent open sessions and much freer discussion at -those sessions than we had at the Conference for Limitation of Armament. -Some of the Americans prominent in the Conference have in the last two -years frequently criticized the secrecy with which the Paris Conference -was conducted but there was very little difference in the procedure from -that in Paris. The work there as here was done in committees. There as -here there were daily communications to the press. They were more -satisfactory here, fuller, but that was made possible by the fact that -the situation here was far less complicated and by the rigor with which -Mr. Hughes kept one thing at a time on the table. As for the press -conferences, in Paris as here they were held daily by the Americans and -frequently by all of the other delegations. Nobody in Paris, of course, -was so satisfactory to the press as Mr. Hughes. His candor, his good -humor, his out-and-out, man-to-man conduct of his daily meeting cannot -be too highly praised. He has set a pace for this sort of thing very -hard to follow. There was no American in Paris in a position to do for -the press what Mr. Hughes did in Washington. President Wilson had not -the time. The other members of the delegation were not in Mr. Hughes’ -position. Nobody else in our delegation here would have had the -authority, even if he had had the ability, to do what Mr. Hughes did. -The difference here and in Paris was mainly a difference of -situation—the difference between an infinitely difficult and complicated -situation and a comparatively well defined and definite one. - -Mr. Hughes himself was partly responsible for the resentment that the -press felt at the failure to follow Mr. Balfour’s suggestion and conduct -the submarine discussion in the open. Any one who took the pains to read -the text of these discussions as they were printed in the leading -journals of the country, can see how well adapted they were to a public -meeting. There was nothing in them that would jeopardize any nation; -there was much in them that would have been illuminated, its impression -intensified, if it could have been heard instead of read. Mr. Hughes in -his talk of these discussions to the correspondents was actually -tantalizing. When he walked briskly into his press conference at the end -of a long committee discussion and told a hundred and more men and women -gathered around him what an intellectual treat it had been, of how Mr. -Balfour had been in his best form, of how lively the exchange had been -between French and English, his snapping eyes, his appreciative voice, -his glow of enthusiasm, were actually antagonizing. He overlooked -entirely the fact that he was making more than one in the assembly say: -Selfish man, don’t you suppose that we would have enjoyed seeing and -hearing Mr. Balfour in his best form? Is there anything at this -Conference that we would have liked so much, except of course hearing -you? Do you think we are going to be satisfied with your promise that we -shall have full reports of all that was said? - -I know very well that it is not considered good form to use the words -League of Nations in connection with the Conference on the Limitation of -Armament, and no offense is intended—but if one is really interested in -trying to decide just how much publicity is wise in such a conference as -this, any experience of other similar bodies should be considered, and -after all it cannot be denied that the assembly of the League of Nations -is a similar body to this, the chief difference being that it includes -some fifty nations instead of nine. At the second meeting of the -assembly of the League last fall, lasting four and a half weeks, there -were 33 plenary conferences. One cannot say that the matters under -consideration there were less delicate and dangerous than in Washington. -They were even more inflamed at the moment, including such open -irruptions as the boundary dispute between Jugo-Slavia and Albania. - -It was not only Mr. Hughes’ naval program that was seeing heavy weather; -the Four Power Pact was in trouble. The President did not agree with the -American delegation that the mainland of Japan was covered by the -treaty. For my part I had never questioned that when this Four Power -Pact talked about insular dominions as well as insular possessions it -meant what it said, and that Nippon as well as Australia and New Zealand -was included. Moreover, Mr. Hughes had repeatedly told the press that -was the intention. There seems, however, to have been doubts in some -minds, and when finally twelve days after the Pact itself was submitted -and accepted by the full Conference, an insistent journalist presented -Mr. Harding at his biweekly press meeting with a written question. (The -President was now requiring all questions at these gatherings to be -submitted in writing.) He remarked in his casual manner, “No, the Japan -mainland is not included in the treaty.” To be sure he took it back that -night in a public document, but here was food for the trouble makers—a -disagreement in the cabinet! All of those who, while loudly declaring -themselves advocates of peace, were doing their utmost to belittle the -efforts of the responsible, to magnify differences in interpretation, to -fan partisan jealousies, to read in intrigue and deceit and concealment -where there was usually nothing worse than blundering or stupidity, -declared with satisfaction or despair that the Conference was now surely -wrecked. Joined to the cry of anguish that was rising over the failure -to limit the submarine and auxiliary craft, the chorus was dismal -enough. - -Little by little, however, events shut off the pessimists. For instance, -one of the “intrigues” that had been brought to light was that Japan and -France had combined on the submarine issue, and were lining up in the -Conference against England and America. But Japan destroyed that fine -morsel, declaring formally that she felt it would be a misfortune if the -Conference failed to come to an agreement on limitation; that she -supported the original American proposal of November 12 in regard to -auxiliary craft and hoped that agreement would be reached on that basis. - -She followed this quieting information by an announcement that she did -not consider it consistent with her dignity as one of the four powers to -accept any special protection, and that she therefore asked that the -Four Power treaty be amended so as to exclude her mainland. - -Even the submarine became less threatening as the discussion went on. If -it was not to be limited in number, it was in field of action—so far as -a rule of war could limit. If auxiliary craft were to be built according -to the “needs” of each nation, their tonnage was not to run over 10,000 -tons each and their guns were to be but eight inch. Add this to the -ratio in capital ships now fixed—5–5–3—1.75—1.75—and to a ten years’ -naval holiday, and you had a solid something. - -One grew philosophical again and reflected how childish it was to -suppose that a Conference of this importance could be carried on without -sharp differences of opinion, without those periods which we call -“deadlocks,” without the flaring up at times of century-old feuds, such -as that between Great Britain and France. All of these things, we told -ourselves, were part of the problem of working out new understandings, -and to overemphasize them or willfully to exploit them in order to -increase ill will and obstruct a progress which was necessarily slow and -difficult, was work fit only for the irresponsible and the malicious. - -The naval program was certain of adoption. There were details still -unsettled, but it seemed safe to assume that if the patience and good -will of the delegates stood the strain, these details would be -satisfactorily arranged; but, as from the start, the final success of -the Conference depended upon removing the fears that England, Japan and -the United States had of one another, of our securing reasonable -assurance that our policies of the open door in China and of moral -trusteeship for Russia and China were adopted. We had proposed a pact -and it had been accepted; principles regarding China and they had been -accepted; but this was by no means all of the Far Eastern problem. By -Christmas we were at the heart of it—the hostile relations of China and -Japan, and whether it was possible to help them to peacefully adjust -these relations. - - - - - CHAPTER IX - PUT YOURSELF IN THEIR PLACES - - -A shrewd, reflective and cynical doorman with whom I sometimes discussed -affairs of state in Washington, confided to me on one of the busy days -just before the opening of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament -that in his judgment there was a peck of trouble about to be turned -loose on the American Government. - -“Take them Japs and Chinamen,” he said, “they’re coming with bags of -problems, and they’re going to dump them on us to sort and solve! And to -think we brought it on ourselves!” - -There were people nearer to the administration than this anxious -observer who said the same thing. “The Far East is a veritable Pandora’s -box, and why did we open it?” - -I don’t remember ever to have seen in Washington, even in war times, so -many responsible people who gave me the impression of wanting to hold -their heads to keep them from splitting. - -Of one thing there was no doubt—if the troubles that were to be loosed -on the Conference were as serious as these serious observers feared, it -was better that they be _out_ than _in_ the box, for they were of a -nature that, confined, would be sure to explode, but give them time and -they might dissolve under the healing touch of light, sun and air. - -But why were there people close to things in Washington aghast at the -program of the Conference, people who two months before had looked -forward to it with confidence and even exultation? No doubt this was -explained partly by the realization that cutting down armaments did not -necessarily mean long-continued peace; that there must be settlements. -When they looked over the problems to be settled, attempted to put -themselves in the place of the people concerned, find solutions through -agreements which did not require force behind them, they were appalled -at the difficulties in the way. - -Put the problems which disturbed them into their simplest terms:—Japan -could not get enough food on her six big and her 600 little islands for -her 60,000,000 people. She was spilling over into China and its -dependencies—not merely as a settler, content to till the soil, to work -the mines, to sell in the market place, but as an aggressive conqueror, -aspiring to military and political control as well as economic -opportunity. - -China—that is, Young China, the founder of the Republic—said she would -not have it, that she must govern and administer her own, and we, -China’s friend, were backing the integrity she demanded. But Japan was -“in China”—“in” as was Great Britain and France. She had an army and -navy to back her pretensions and she could very well say—and did—“Why -should Great Britain and France be allowed to hold their political and -military control in Hongkong and in Tonkin, raise and train troops, not -of their own people but of natives, collect taxes, run post offices, and -we be forbidden? If they do these things, and they do, why should Japan -not have equal privileges?” - -Young China answered this pertinent inquiry: “It was Old China that -arranged those things. You are dealing now with a new China, one that -does not intend to barter its inheritance, that proposes to rule its -own; a China that will no longer submit to having a carving knife -applied to its heart. - -“What Old China did we inherited and must make the best of, but it is -our duty to see that no nation on earth ever again takes from us what we -do not willingly give. You must abandon your effort to direct our -policies, administer our railroads, keep your troops on our soil.” - -What frightened my doorkeeper, who got his views from the press, and the -press that got its views from a hundred conflicting sources, was how -peacefully Japan’s right to food for her people and China’s right to her -own were to be squared. Could the one inalienable right be fitted into -the other inalienable right by other means than force? Of course there -were many places on the earth beside China where Japan might expand, but -search as they would these anxious observers did not find any available -spot except in Asia. - -One of the chief occupations of these friends of mine in Washington as -the peace conference opened was trying to find some territory from which -Japan could get her food; something the Conference could “give” her; -something that would satisfy her. As things now are such a search must -start with the provision that there is nothing for Japan on the Western -Hemisphere. Obviously there is no place for her in Europe. Australia -will not have her; we will not have her. - -“If it were a question of war or restricted immigration,” I asked a -Californian in the course of the Far Eastern discussion, “which would -you choose?” The look of surprise at the question answered me—“War.” I -received the same reply from a Canadian—from an American labor -leader—and they were all “pacifists”! - -The narrower the confines were drawn around Japan, the more hysterical -observers grew in their search, the more they insisted the Conference -must “give” Japan something. “Give it Eastern Siberia!” But what right -did the Conference have to deal with any part of Siberia? The United -States had finally settled her attitude to this suggestion by declaring -that she would not consider any partitioning of Russian territory. She -refused to countenance the carving up of Russia as she did the further -carving up of China. She refused even to recognize the government that -was now struggling to plant itself in Eastern Siberia. It was Russia’s -problem to take care of the Far Eastern Republic. She must be free, as -China must be free, to work out her own destiny. - -Then “give” Japan Manchuria! She already had important recognized rights -in Southern Manchuria, rights that came from old wars; the territory -borders on Korea which Japan holds and governs, and undoubtedly the -Conference would not dispute her claim to Korea, since that claim stands -on about the same kind of a bottom as England’s claim to Hongkong and -France’s to Tonkin. It was the fruit of the nation’s dealing with Old -China. This being so and Japan having her established hold in Southern -Manchuria and having made a remarkable record, give her the country. - -But here came Young China again. “Manchuria is ours,” she said. “We will -not recognize the rights that Japan claims through her treaty made in -1915. It really was a treaty with Old China, still alive in our -Republic. It was wrested from us by cunning and bribery. There are -twenty million Chinese in Manchuria. They have made that province grow -more rapidly in wealth in recent years than any other part of the land. -They are converting the wilderness, raising such a crop of soy beans as -no other part of the earth has ever seen. We propose to stand by our -people. We cannot give Manchuria to Japan, nor can we give her Mongolia. -Here, too, our people are good, patient, hardy settlers, peacefully -converting the wilderness. True, there are great tracts still untouched, -but remember that we have surplus millions, and it is here that we -expect them to expand.” - -What set my doorman and many serious onlookers to holding their heads -was that they could not find a place to _put_ Japan; that is, a place to -which she would not have to fight her way. - -But what are they doing in the search of the earth for something to -“give” her? Was it anything but following the old formula that has -always gone with wars? Was war anything but a necessary corollary to -this way of dealing with the earth’s surface? No nation or group of -nations ever has or will give away without its consent the property of -another nation without sowing trouble for the future. - -Races must settle their own destinies. Japan must settle her food -problem by war or by peace, and whether it was to be by the one or by -the other depended largely upon Young China. What did Young China think -about it? Not a hasty, violent Young China, expecting to convert its -great masses in an hour to the Republican form of government that came -into being ten years ago, but a moderate Young China, that has stayed at -home, that knows its people, that is conscious of the length of time, -the patience, the sacrifices, the pain that adapting the mind of China -to a new order requires. - -What did this moderate Young China think about the relation of Japan to -itself? I looked him up and asked. - -He made it quite clear that the Republic had come to stay. He did not -attempt to minimize its difficulties. He did claim, however, that -whatever the surface indications, the whole Yangtze Valley, which is the -very heart of the country, is committed to the Republic, and is -coöperating with it. He gave a hundred indications of how from this -great central artery running east and west democratic influences are -surely and steadily spreading north and south. He showed how in the -northern provinces the progress was slowest, most difficult, because -here conservatism was strongest, most corrupt. He pointed out how Old -China is concentrating in the Peking government all its cunning, its -wisdom, its appeal to the old thing, but he claimed, and unquestionably -believed, that Young China was going to be too much for it. He went over -the southern provinces and showed how in all of them, except Canton, -there was a steadily improving coöperation with the Peking government. - -Moderate Young China thinks Canton is wrong in its haste. He does not -believe that the people can assimilate the new ideas as rapidly as -Canton claims. He believes that its hurry to make over a great country -is one of the most dangerous factors in the nation’s present problem. To -sustain, guard, and develop the struggling Peking government is his -program. - -“We are quarreling, to be sure,” moderate Young China said, “but it is -_our_ quarrel. We are like brothers who have fallen to beating one -another—let a neighbor interfere and both turn on him. China will turn -on any nation or nations that attempt to coerce her. She alone can work -out her difficulties. She can work out best her disputes with Japan, and -if let alone, will do so.” - -“Of course,” continued Young China, “Japan must resign control of -Shantung, and particularly of the Shantung railroad. Look at the map and -you will understand why. If Japan controls the Shantung railroad she can -at any moment cut our main rail communication between Peking and -Shanghai, destroy the main artery of our circulatory system. She can do -more than that. By that control she will be able to cut off the two -arteries across the mainland, the Yellow River and the Yangtze. No -government in its senses could permit that. - -“Nor can we consent to her political and military control, either, in -Shantung or Manchuria. But that does not mean, as some people pretend, -that we want to drive Japan from our country. No intelligent Chinaman -does. We need the Japanese to help us open and develop our resources, to -buy our raw material; and Japan needs our market in which to sell. We -are willing she should have the fullest economic privileges if she will -cease to interfere with our policies and will withdraw her troops. - -“If she will coöperate with us on an economic basis purely and simply -Young China will welcome Japan and there are liberal Japanese that will -do that. It is only Military Japan, believing in progress by force, that -threatens us.” - -“How are you going to carry out your program? How enforce it?” - -“The economic boycott,” he said. “It has been successful so far. We’ll -neither buy of Japan nor sell to her until she gives up her -pretensions.” - -There is something tremendous in the idea of that great passive three -hundred and twenty-five million or more, the greatest single market on -earth, and Japan’s natural market, passing by on the other side, leaving -the goods untouched on docks and warehouses—but they do it. There are -children of China who will refuse a toy to-day if told it was made in -Japan, will go hungry rather than eat Japanese food, so they told me, -these ardent young Chinamen. - -“But if Japan insists on her demands, turns her navy on you?” I asked. - -“Ah, then,” said trustful Young China, “our great friend the United -States will take a hand. She will not permit Japan to force us.” - -This confidence in America’s friendship was China’s strongest card at -the peace table. For over sixty years we have been her avowed -protector—ever since in 1858 we signed the quaintly worded compact: -“They (the United States and China) shall not insult or oppress each -other for any trifling cause so as to produce an estrangement between -them, and if any other nation should act unjustly or oppressively, the -United States will exert their good offices on being informed of the -case to bring about an amicable arrangement of the question, thus -showing their friendly feeling.” - -Faith in the protection of the United States has worked its way far -inland, to the very sources of the Yellow and the Yangtze rivers. I am -told that many Chinamen in those distant places who never have looked on -a white face will point to the Stars and Stripes and say “our friend.” - -According to moderate Young China’s view of the case, the work of the -Conference on the Limitation of Armament was to persuade Japan that her -real economic progress lay in giving up the political and military -privileges in China which she believes are fairly hers, as spoils of the -late war, and to accept full opportunities of “peaceful -penetration”—persuade if possible, force if not! - -There was no question of where sympathy lay at the opening of the -Conference—it was with moderate Young China. Sympathy for her and -suspicion for Japan—this showed in a catlike watchfulness of Japan’s -every move, particularly by the newspaper correspondents. - -As a rule, newspaper people are instinctively suspicious. It seems -sometimes to be the pride of the profession, and a smart -characterization of a suspicion has almost the value of a scoop. There -was an instance at the opening of the Conference, just after the naval -program was announced, when Ambassador Shidehara fell ill of intestinal -trouble. It had been announced that Japan could make no reply to the -naval program until she had communicated with Tokyo, and somebody -remarked brilliantly that the Baron’s illness was probably a “congestion -of the cables.” As a matter of fact it turned out that the poor Baron -was seriously ill, but the phrase stuck. - -At the first press conference given by Admiral Baron Kato there was -another evidence of this instinct. An interpreter translated the -questions of the correspondent to the Admiral who replied in his native -tongue, a delightfully musical voice; you could hardly believe you did -not understand him, so understandable did his words sound. Once or twice -Baron Kato did not wait for the interpreter to repeat the English -question to him, but gave his answer at once in Japanese. -Instantaneously there ran around the big circle of men the signal “He -understands English.” Any one who has had any experience with a foreign -language knows that often one does understand, but cannot speak; -moreover, one understands when the question is simple but cannot follow -it when involved. The point is simply here, that the moment Baron Kato -showed he understood any English, the guards of the men were up. He was -a Jap and must be watched. That is, Japan came to the Washington -Conference handicapped by the suspicion of the American press and -public, while China came strong in our good will. - -Was there anything to be said for Japan? I had believed so a long time, -but felt that my impressions were treasonable, so contrary were they to -the expressed judgment of practically all of my liberal and radical -friends—many of them knew vastly more than I did about the Far East—and -to the feeling of the general public as I caught it in the press and in -conversation. My treason consisted in thinking that although, as a -matter of fact, Japan had been doing a variety of outrageous things, if -you compared her operations with those of most of us, there was little -reason to make a scapegoat of her. I have been impressed often in the -last three years that there were a good many people trying to help China -by crying down Japan—a practice that has played a mischievous part in -history. I felt that we were not giving Japan the fair deal we should, -even if we had no other object than aiding China. The books I read, the -observers from the Far East with whom I talked, almost invariably were -partisan in their attack. They liked one and did not like the other. -Everything that one did was understandable and excusable; everything -that the other did was oppressive and inexcusable. - -The Japanese had not been long at the Washington Conference, however, -before their stock began to rise. The delegation was the most diligent, -serious, modest body at the Conference, and so very grateful for every -kind word! The contrast between the Chinese and Japanese delegations was -striking. Nothing more modernized in manner and appearance, democratized -in speech, gathered in Washington than the Chinese. They looked, talked, -acted like the most sophisticated and delightful of cultivated -Europeans. They understood and practiced every social amenity—suave, at -home, frank, gay—I have never encountered anything more socially -superior than some of the young Chinese. The two delegations were -perfectly characterized by a woman friend of mine familiar with both -peoples—“The Chinese look down on everybody; the Japanese look up to -everybody.” That was the impression. But when it came to diplomacy, the -Chinaman was the aristocrat begging favors, the Japanese the plebeian -fighting for his rights. - -The Japanese seemed to have felt that possibly there might be some -intent on the part of their Western brothers to throw them out of China -and go in themselves. We cannot blame Japan for such a thought if we -review her experience with the West in the last twenty-five years. She -was forced into Korea, after China had agreed with her to jointly -suppress disorders if they broke out and both of them to withdraw when -there was no longer need for their work. It was China’s refusal to abide -by the treaty of 1885 that led Japan into war and that brought her, as a -result of that war, Formosa, the Pescadores, Liaotung, with Port Arthur -and Dalny. We all remember—that is, those of us living then—how only a -few days after the treaty with China which gave Japan these territories -the Czar stepped in and told Japan that he would “give her a new proof -of his sincere friendship” by taking over Liaotung. There was nothing -for Japan to do but accept the offer. - -Pretty nearly all Europe at once proceeded, as everybody remembers, to -give China and Japan further “proofs of sincere friendship.” Germany -took over Kiaochow; England, Weihaiwei; France, Kwang chowwan. This is -only a little over twenty years ago. - -It was Russia’s obvious effort to get Japan out of Korea that caused the -Russo-Japanese war, a war which amazed the world by its result, put -Japan on the map, very possibly turned her head a bit. She had been -studying the West, and the remarkable thing about this country which we -call imitative, in studying it she had learned not only its power but -its weakness. She had accepted its militarism at its full face value, -but she had quickly put her finger on the weak spots in the militarism -of different nations. She had seen how corruption, bribery, -self-indulgence had weakened the militarism of Russia; she saw how the -half-heartedness of France and England in war weakened them, how -liberalism and pacifism undermined militarism; she saw how Germany had -the pure science and undivided devotion, and she took Germany as her -model. And then in 1914 her great chance came. She did exactly what the -Prussian would have done if he had been in her place. She joined the -strong, her great ally, England, against Germany, for Germany had -possessions in China which Japan coveted. She out-Prussianized Prussia -in the demands she made upon the corrupt and unstable Peking crowd. -There is no shadow of defense for the twenty-one demands, except the -defense that she was applying the lessons that she had learned from -Russia, from Germany—lessons which she had seen applied, in a modified -form, it is true, but still in a form by England and by the United -States in the Philippines. - -I could never forget all this in Paris. Japan came to the Conference -peace table with her treaties—read them in that invaluable compilation -of treaties which John McMurray has made and the Carnegie Peace -Foundation published. England there sets down her approval; France sets -down her approval; they promise the German rights in Shantung to Japan -when the treaty shall be made; they promise her the Caroline Islands and -the other island possessions of Germany north of the equator. This is -all written down in the books, and this was what faced President Wilson -when the matter of Shantung was taken up. What were England and France -to do? England had gone into a war and we had followed her, largely, so -we both claimed, because a treaty had been regarded as a scrap of paper. -Were you now to treat other treaties as scraps of paper? - -Italy would not have it so. She held France and England to their war -promises. And when President Wilson balked, she left the peace table. - -One of the things that interested me most in Paris was that Japan never -left the peace table. She was apparently willing to trade anything to -get that recognition of racial equality denied her, so far as one can -make out, because she is so able, not at all because she is an inferior. -She hung on, and by the sheer strength of her position, her refusal, -whatever she got or did not get to quit the game, came out with a -recognition, partial at least, of what may be correctly called her -nefarious demands. - -And then she found herself with a whole world jumping on her back. She -had played the Western game and the West despised her. I could not help -feeling in Paris that Japan must have been bewildered a little by the -contradictions of the Occident she had tried so faithfully to follow. -She saw the doctrine of force she had accepted grappling with the gospel -of the brotherhood of man. There are many who think that the brotherhood -got the worst of it in Paris. That gospel was driven into the world as -never before there. More people were committed to it than ever before. -More people realized that it is a power that you must count with in the -affairs of nations as well as of individuals. More people accepted it -and tried to get together to make it a practical reality. Japan herself -bowed before the power of this spirit before she left Paris. She never -gave up more because of it than she felt she must, but she gave up -rather than quit the game. She was learning. She has been learning ever -since. She has never stayed away from any international attempt to bring -order to the world. She has had a bevy of her people at every meeting of -the League of Nations. She has taken an active part in the work of all -of its commissions. In 1919 Japan had eighty-seven delegates at the -International Labor Conference held in Washington, and those delegates -accepted the radical program there adopted. Japan means to understand -the Occident; and she is making the same valiant attempt to ally herself -with the best of the Occident that before the war she made to ally -herself with the worst. - -What we have to remember is that Japan is, like all nations to a degree, -a dual nation; there are two Japans—the one clinging to the old -militaristic, autocratic notion of government, the other struggling to -understand and realize the meaning of a united, coöperating world in -which each man and each nation shall have a chance at peaceful, -prosperous living. - - - - - CHAPTER X - CHINA AT THE CONFERENCE - - -The most difficult problems with which the Conference for the Limitation -of Armament had to deal were those centering about China. We wanted -China to have her own. We wanted her to be let alone, to run her -government to suit herself, to be free from exploitation, duress, -intrigues. As a people we wanted this very much. We came as near being -sentimental over China as one nation can be over another. We like the -Chinese as a people. We would like to see them as sanitary as they are -friendly, as honest as they are industrious, as free from their own -vices as they are from most of ours. - -We are more sentimental about them because our own dealings with them -have been on the whole so fair. We are proud of the position we have -taken as a nation toward China and we would like to keep up our record, -justifying the Chinese conviction that we are a disinterested and -reliable friend. Our dealings have been decent—the policy of the Open -Door, the return of a large share of the Boxer indemnity, the protest -that we made in 1915 when we learned of the outrageous twenty-one -demands that Japan had forced from the Peking government: we have prided -ourselves on these things, and when at Paris in 1919 President Wilson -consented to the transfer of the German rights in Shantung to Japan, -there was a chorus of disapproval, and we came to this Conference -resolved that Shantung should be restored to China; moreover, that a -long list of interferences with her freedom of administration should -cease. The disappointment came in finding that what China wanted, and we -wanted her to have, was much more difficult to realize than we had -appreciated, and that in a majority of cases, probably the worst thing -that could happen would be to have her full requests granted. - -The primary difficulty in China’s getting what she wanted was that she -has no stable government, nothing upon which she can depend and with -which the nations can deal with any assurance that the engagements that -are entered into will be faithfully carried out. The Conference began -with an exhibit of disorganization in the Peking government which was -most unfortunate—the failure to pay a loan due us at that moment. -Moreover, it soon became a matter of common knowledge at the Conference -that the Peking government was failing to meet all sorts of financial -obligations at home as well as abroad, that it was not paying the -salaries of its officials, its school-teachers. There were delegates in -Washington who, it was claimed, had had no funds from their government -for many months. A greater part of the moneys collected seemed to go -into the pockets of the military chiefs of the provinces, whose leading -occupation was to make life and property unsafe for the rich and to -prevent political conditions becoming settled. - -All of this had an important relation to these demands that the Chinese -delegation presented to the Conference. Take the matter of tariff -autonomy—nothing shows better China’s position. She does not and has not -for many years controlled her customs. They are fixed by treaty with the -powers and collected by them. They have been netting her recently but 3½ -per cent. on her importations. Moreover, there have been vexatious -discriminations and special taxes which have been both unfair and -humiliating. China came to the Conference begging for freedom from all -these restrictions. She wanted a tariff autonomy like other nations, and -on the face of it what more reasonable request? And yet, after a very -thorough inquiry by a sub-committee of the Conference, headed by -Secretary Underwood, control of her tariff was denied her. To be sure, -some of the worst of the discriminations were cleared up. She was given -a rate which would immediately raise her revenue by some $17,000,000, -and the promise of other changes in the near future which would increase -the amount to something like $156,000,000. It looks small enough! - -But why should China’s tariffs remain in the hands of foreigners? Why -should she not be allowed to collect more than an effective 5 per cent. -on her importations, while her exportations to this country, for -instance, are weighted with tariffs all the way from 20 to 100 per -cent.? Why, simply because the committee, after a long study made, as it -declares and as there is no reason to doubt, in a spirit of sympathy and -friendliness, believed that tariff autonomy would be a bad thing for -China herself. When the committee presented its report, Senator -Underwood said: “I am sure this sub-committee and the committee to which -I am now addressing myself would gladly do much more for China if -conditions in China were such that the outside powers felt they could do -so with justice to China herself. I do not think there was any doubt in -the minds of the sub-committee on this question that, if China at -present had the unlimited control of levying taxes at the customs house, -in view of the unsettled conditions now existing in China, it would -probably work in the end to China’s detriment and to the injury of the -world.” - -So far as tariff autonomy was concerned, this judgment had to be -accepted. It did not, however, answer the question why China should be -able to collect but 5 per cent. on the machinery we send her, and we -collect 35 to 50 per cent. on her silks. That is, it does not seem that -if the powers believe that it is for the good of China that her duties -should be kept at this low rate they would feel, as a matter of -fairness, that they should grant reciprocity and collect no more on her -goods than she is allowed to collect on theirs. - -When you come to the question of extra-territoriality, by which is meant -the establishment and conduct of judicial courts by foreigners in China, -a humiliating condition that dates back almost to the beginning of her -treaty relations with other countries, you find her own delegates asking -no more than that the powers coöperate with China in taking initial -steps toward improving and eventually abolishing the existing system. - -There is no real solution of most of the problems which the Chinese -delegation pleaded so eloquently and persistently in Washington to have -solved, except the establishment within the country of a stable, -representative government. That is, if the fine young Chinese that -represented their country want to see their program carried out, they -must go back to China and work within the country to secure order, -education, development of their people along modern lines. There were -too many Chinese at the Washington Conference who had spent the greater -part of their lives in Europe and America and who were actually -unfamiliar with home conditions. - -A stable Chinese Republic depends, then, upon long, faithful efforts at -reconstruction as well as upon freeing China from foreign encroachments. -Not a few people came to the Conference believing that the only problem -was to expel the Japanese from Shantung and force her to withdraw her -twenty-one demands. If China had had a strong, united government in the -past there would have been no Japanese now in Shantung, and no -twenty-one demands. Shantung is a spoil of war and under the old code by -which the world has acquired power and possessions “belonged” to Japan. -That is, her claim to it was as valid as the claim of many nations, -ourselves included, to certain territories which we hold without -dispute. Japan pointed out that she had spent blood and treasure for -Shantung, and this is true. And always when in the past men spent blood -and treasure, the world has sanctioned their performance. Japan’s right -to Shantung was questioned now because of the new code we are trying to -put in force. That is, men are trying to prove that it shall be no -longer by blood and treasure that we progress, but by good will, fair -dealing, superior efficiency of mind and hand. The practical question -now seems to be, When is this new code to begin to operate? In 1922, as -Japan wished, or with the first entrance of the foreigner into China, as -radical Chinese wished? And if it is to be adopted, is it to apply only -to China? The code that would sweep Japan entirely out of China would -also sweep us out of the Philippines and Haiti; England out of India and -Egypt. There are strong young nationalist parties to-day in the -Philippines and in Haiti, in India and in Egypt, using the same -arguments that the Chinese delegation used in Washington, that the -foreigners shall go; and in all of these countries as in China to-day, -the reason given by the protecting or invading power, as you choose to -regard it, that they stay, is that their going would be the worst thing -in the world that could happen to the country. - -In the case of Shantung and the twenty-one demands, the solution was -going to depend upon how far Japan realized that these “valid” claims of -hers—that is, valid under the old code—were handicaps and not advantages -to her. How far she realized that by attempting to keep them in force -she was going to cripple her own real advancement in China, increase and -prolong the boycott of her goods, and incur the ill will of other -nations, particularly of this nation. - -It became clear early in the Washington Conference that we were not -going to help China’s case, or encourage Japan in generous dealing by -continuing to cultivate mistrust and hatred of the Japanese. A -systematic effort to make one nation hate another belongs to the old way -of doing things. Indeed, it has been one of the chief methods by which -we have thought to progress in the world. You built up distrust, -dislike, suspicion, until you had created an enemy in the minds of the -mass of the people so hateful that it became an almost religious duty to -overthrow it. We have had this sort of thing going on in this country in -regard to Japan for years, a calculated, nation-wide, extremely able -effort to make the American people fear and despise the Japanese, to -bring them to a point where they would gladly, as a relief to their -feelings, undertake a war against Japan. I do not know that a sterner -rebuke to the American public—the sterner because unconscious—could have -been given than the remarks of Prince Tokugawa in one of his little -talks before he sailed for home. He was telling how surprised as well as -grateful the Japanese had been at American hospitality, “Because,” he -said, “when we came we feared that the Americans were so hostile to us -that it might be impossible for us to go with safety on the streets.” - -Those who know the Orient best all agree that its future peace, and -therefore the future peace of the world, depends largely upon Japan. She -is the one strong, stable, unified nation in the East. She has, it is -true, a powerful militaristic party, but opposed to that is a great -liberal group. Prince Tokugawa, who played so fine a part in his -delegation during the Conference, is a man who has taken keen interest -in labor questions, education of the people, the development of -industry, and has thrown all his great interest against the military -spirit. It is said by those who know much of Japan’s interior workings -that the Empress herself is convinced that either the empire must have a -democratic leadership, a constitutional monarchy with a responsible -cabinet, an army and navy under civil control, or that it will be -overthrown, and that the reason that the young Crown Prince was sent on -his visit to England was that he might have a look at a democratic -monarchy. There are many Japanese saying openly in the press and in -public assemblies that the future of Japan depends upon an entire change -of policy, that the hard dealings in Korea, the wresting of the -twenty-one demands from Peking, the methods in Shantung have all been a -mistake, that Japan must deny them, correct the wrongs done under them -if she is to have the sympathy and enjoy the coöperation of the outside -world. It is most important that the people of the United States -particularly should understand these liberal leanings in Japan, should -give them all the support within their power. - -There was much irritation at different times in Washington because the -Japanese delegation insisted on holding up the march of negotiations -until it could hear from Tokyo, and between Tokyo and poor cable -connections the answers were slow in coming. The delegation always -insisted on waiting, however, and in this it was wise. It could go no -further safely than the government at home would back it. If it -attempted to do so, it would mean the final repudiation of the measures -to which it had agreed. Certainly Americans should have understood this. -It might take time for the Japanese to stop at every point in the -negotiations to consult their government, but it was a much safer method -in the long run than making such haste that a situation could arise such -as that between our own delegation and the President of the United -States—the difference in the interpretation of the Four Power Pact, a -difference which no doubt arose from a failure to see that the busy -President did have in his head just what the meaning of the short and -simple document really was. It sometimes pays to make haste slowly. - -If the Japanese were cautious in their dealings, haggled over details, -were slow to make concessions which it was likely they intended all the -time to make, gave up nothing until they were sure they would be backed -by the home government, it might be exasperating but it was not -necessarily a proof of intrigue or of a lack of sympathy with the larger -purposes of the Conference. In spite of these methods so irritating to -people whose only thought is to put things through in the shortest time -possible, the Japanese made a better impression on the Conference than -the Chinese, for the simple reason that the one were workers, the other -talkers. More than once in the course of the negotiations it was -necessary to recall the Chinese’s attention to the fact that what was -under discussion was not theories, but conditions. All one’s sympathies -were with the talkers, and all one’s practical sense with the workers. - -The nations in adopting the principles that they did in regard to China, -in insuring her a protecting ring within which they promise to see that -she has the chance to develop and maintain effective and stable -government, and to give all nations an equal opportunity of carrying on -commerce and industry with her, are attempting something that has never -before been done in this world—they are insuring a great weak, divided -nation its chance. Never again under the protection adopted, if the -promises made are kept, can anybody chip off a piece of Chinese -territory, secure a monopoly of her resources; never again can there be -in China a Shantung, a Twenty-one demands, a Port Arthur. The pacts and -principles adopted establish over China that “moral trusteeship” of -which Mr. Hughes talks. They put upon all nations agreeing and -particularly upon this nation the obligation to see that this moral -trusteeship is something more than a phrase. - -Although the immediate results to China are not as sweeping and generous -as many of her friends desire and many believe would have been possible -and wise, they are substantial. She will control her own post offices -beginning with January, 1923; the correction of the humiliating -extra-territoriality is being undertaken; foreign troops will be -withdrawn; a beginning at least toward tariff autonomy has been made. No -future concessions and agreements will be made by China to other powers -except under an international board of review, the office of which will -be to see that no terms unjust to China or discriminatory in the favor -of any particular outside nation are made. This leaves old commitments -where they are, but it is fair to suppose, if the board does its duty, -that any manifest injustice or flagrant discrimination now existing can -and will be eventually cured. - -The Shantung question has been settled—settled in the way that President -Wilson believed at Paris that it finally would be settled—by Japan’s -withdrawing. The real bone of contention between the two countries—the -Tsingtau-Tsinanfu railway—will go back entirely to China within a few -years—five at the shortest, fifteen at the longest—upon terms of payment -and of management which, if painful to both countries—Japan feeling that -she is giving up too much, China that she is getting too little—yet -seemed reasonable and the best that could be done by the American and -British delegation. - -With the withdrawal of Japan from Shantung, will go England’s from -Weihaiwei, and probably a little later, France’s from Kwangchow-wan. - -As for the twenty-one demands, Japan so thoroughly realized the -discredit they had brought her in the eyes of the liberal world that she -began the discussion upon them by voluntarily withdrawing one whole -section, that which compelled China to employ Japanese advisers in the -military, financial and political departments of her government. She -also declared her intention to give up her preferential rights in -Southern Manchuria and to open to the international consortium the -railway loans in Manchuria and Mongolia which she has been holding as -her exclusive possession. This is going a long way to clear up the -difficulties under the commitments. With this start and with intelligent -international supervision, it ought to be possible in a reasonable time -to free China entirely from whatever is oppressive in the twenty-one -demands. - -It is a beginning. If Young China will take hold vigorously now there is -reason to believe that the thongs about her feet will in time be cut. -She has work, long, slow work, before her, but she is assured sympathy -and protection in carrying it on. That is a vastly more important result -than to have been granted all the demands of her eager young democrats -and left alone in the world. - -It is the old, old story—nations must climb step by step—they have no -wings. - - - - - CHAPTER XI - THE MEASURE OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE - - -How are we to measure the Washington Conference? There are people who -think it should be by the things that it did not undertake to do. The -Conference was indicted in Washington in January by a league of people -of considerable ability who declared that it had not lessened the chance -of war by a fraction of one per cent. The reason they gave for this -verdict was that it had not taken up the causes of India, Korea, the Far -Eastern Republic, Persia, the Philippines, Haiti, the “Republic of Mt. -Lebanon.” - -It is certain that the world is going to have no quiet until these -troubled countries are satisfied. But they are not the only problems to -be solved. Mr. Hughes named a considerable number on his agenda. Is an -international conference to be declared a farce because it selects one -set of problems instead of another, and believes it more practical to -give exclusive attention to one side of the globe than to the entire -surface? You could not persuade Mr. Hughes and his colleagues that any -other policy than that of one thing at a time would contribute a -“fraction of one per cent.” to the peace of the earth. They believe the -block system is the only practical one for setting the world aright. -They lay it out something like this: - -“Let us clean up the Pacific, then we can disarm. Having disarmed, we -can lend a hand in the next most distressed and troublesome -block—France, Central Europe, Russia. Having helped set them straight, -one at a time, then possibly we may consider an association of -nations—but not now.” So convinced was Mr. Hughes of the soundness of -his system that he threw out one of the chief subjects on his agenda—the -limitation of land armament—when he discovered he must leave his -block—the Pacific—and pass into Europe if it was considered. - -The only system a man can successfully handle is that in which he has -faith,—the only fair way to judge what he does is by what he undertakes -to do—not what you would like him to undertake. Measured by the method -it adopted and the limitations it set for itself, how does the -Conference come out? - -I began my observations on the Conference with a quarrel with the -agenda. Putting the problem of the limitation of armament before the -settlement of the difficulties or threats of difficulties in the -Pacific, which were keeping the countries concerned in arms, looked -illogical. It proved good psychology. The naval program stirred the -imagination of the country, became at once something tremendously -desirable—a real move toward peace. When England and Japan at once -agreed it became possible and practical. If they agreed, why, then—it -must be—the difficulties could be settled which many had doubted. The -Conference thus at the start gained what it needed most, popular faith -that it meant to do a concrete, tangible thing. The proposition that -England, the United States, Japan, France and Italy should adopt a naval -ratio of 5–5–3, 1.75—1.25 and agree not to build for ten years was a -big, substantial, stirring fact. To have them accept, as they did, -strengthened the faith of the world. It was the first time big powers -had ever said “scrap,” had ever been actually eager for a naval holiday. - -The fact that neither the submarine nor the auxiliary craft are to be -limited in tonnage, as the original program proposed, if disappointing, -still does not upset the achievement. The submarine comes out of the -Conference unlimited in number but crippled in its field of action. -Merchant ships are forbidden it on penalty of piracy. That will not in -the thick of war prevent merchant ships being destroyed but it will take -the heart out of the business. Outlawry helps if it does not prohibit. -There is compensation also in the failure in regard to the tonnage of -auxiliary craft, for at least their size is limited—to 10,000 tons—and -their guns to 8 inches, and that is a fairly satisfactory substitute for -the original proposal. - -In spite of the changes, cutting and trimming, the naval program remains -something which the country wants, something which it feels to be a blow -at war as well as a relief to its tax burdens. - -If the naval program could stand on its own feet, it alone would make -the Conference a brilliant success, but it cannot. It was no sooner -raised to its feet than its makers had to rush in with props. The first -was a policy in regard to China. The reason was clear enough. Unless the -nations at the Conference could agree among themselves on a method of -assisting in the development of China which would prevent any one of -them taking an unfair advantage of the others, there were sure to be -quarrels sooner or later and they would need their ships. Unless they -could fix on a policy under which not only they each had a fair chance -but nations outside—not at the Conference, but likely in the future to -desire to invest in China—were not discriminated against, they would -need their ships. They would surely need them, too, one of these days, -if they did not satisfy China that what they agreed upon was as good for -her as for them. - -Mr. Root hurried in with his four principles. Mr. Hughes outlined his -Nine Power Pact, which was to assent to the principles and the practical -applications of them which were to be worked out. - -But the naval program had to have another prop before it could proceed. -It was not worth the paper it was written on unless England and Japan -agreed to it. They agreed in principle at the start, but in practice -they could and would not until they were sure that the nation that was -asking them to disarm wanted peace in the Pacific badly enough to join -them in a league to assure it by coöperation. Before they scrapped their -ships they wanted to know whether their present boundaries and rights -were to be respected by their colleagues—whether if one of them suffered -aggression from without the others were to remain indifferent or were -willing to pledge at least moral support. The Four Power Pact was the -prop desired. England, the United States, France and Japan agree in it -to face the future in the Pacific together. Pull out this prop and your -program for scrapping ships and a naval holiday falls flat—as flat as -the disarmament of France has fallen and for the same reason. If this -Conference for the Limitation of Armament does nothing more than to make -the American public understand better what has been at the bottom of the -conduct of France since the Armistice, it will have been worth all it -cost. - -France has held up the peace of Europe, delayed its reconstruction, -lessened her own chances of reparation, alienated her best friends by -her persistent militarism. Go back to the peace treaty of 1919 when -disarmament was one of the fundamental principles adopted by the allied -nations. From the start France’s argument in regard to disarmament was -that for her it was impossible unless England and the United States -would guarantee her against aggression from Germany—if they would do -that she would disarm. In order to get disarmament, Mr. Wilson and Lloyd -George agreed to protect France against _unprovoked_ attacks. Our Senate -refused to ratify the agreement. - -Having no guarantees, France kept her arms. Keeping her arms, the -military spirit spread, the military group grew stronger. How strong -recent events have shown. - -One-third of the agenda of the Washington Conference—that in regard to -land disarmament—had to be scrapped ten days after the opening because a -reduction of land armament still meant to France a guarantee, the same -kind of a guarantee in principle that a little later we gave to Japan in -order to make it possible for her to agree with Great Britain and -ourselves on the naval program. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the -Conference on the Limitation of Armament is its demonstration that -disarmament means a union of the nations that disarm, that in no other -way, the world being what it is, can it be accomplished. - -Along with this demonstration has gone another, frequently repeated, -that this union to which you are to pin your faith instead of ships and -armies, if it is to be permanent, must be all inclusive. - -Again and again the Conference ran up against the difficulty that -although all the nations represented in Washington might make agreements -to cut down their capital ships, limit their auxiliary craft to 10,000 -tons and their guns to 8 inches, put the mark of pirate on a submarine -that attacked a merchant vessel, forbid chemical warfare, limit the -number of air-craft ships—any one or all of these restrictions might -overnight be frustrated by one nation or a group of nations outside of -the alliance, entering on an ambitious and aggressive campaign of naval -construction. That is, this fine program for the limitation of -armament—almost certain to be carried out if the Four Power Pact in -regard to the waters of the Pacific and the Nine Power Pact in regard to -the protection of China are ratified by the different governments—still -may be destroyed overnight by some part of the world not included in -this union for peace. So obvious is this that the naval pact includes an -agreement that in case any one of the signing nations finds itself in a -dangerous position in regard to an aggressive neighbor, it shall have -the right to withdraw. Every step that has been taken in the Washington -Conference leads inevitably to the conclusion that it is all or none—if -the work is to stand. - -The difficulty in the way of most people and most nations accepting this -conclusion is that they do not believe any such union of all nations -practical. They cannot see men of all races working together, settling -only by agreement the misunderstandings that inevitably come up. - -If the Conference on the Limitation of Armament has demonstrated the -necessity of world coöperation if we are to have peace, it has also -demonstrated its practicability. Mr. Hughes started off by calling on -the two nations which the people of this country have for a long time -regarded with the most suspicion—the two nations against which we have -conducted a persistent campaign of ill will—England and Japan. Yet for -three months the delegations of these two nations worked with ours in -the utmost friendliness. Again and again I heard Mr. Hughes declare that -nobody could have been more coöperative, as he expressed it, than the -delegates from England and Japan. It was obvious that those countries -were quite as eager as ourselves to work out agreements that would -enable them to declare a naval holiday. All those initial suspicions -that we had of England and Japan and that England and Japan had of us -did not prevent the delegates of the three countries from coming to -conclusions on matters on which they had differed. What it seems to -prove is that you can get peace by friendly negotiation, that a -coöperation of nations is not a dream, that it is a reality. - -What more amazing and convincing proof of this than the fact that China -and Japan did, by conference, agree on Shantung? Who would have believed -it possible? What made it possible was the faith and the wisdom of Mr. -Hughes and Mr. Balfour, their determination that the Chinese and -Japanese should learn to work together. “Talk it over” was their -instruction. “The Shantung question can only be settled peaceably by -yourselves.” It was one of the wisest, one of the most significant -decisions of the Washington Conference. Day after day the Chinese and -Japanese held conversations—not conferences. They talked, they -quarreled. Day after day they went home in wrath and disgust, refusing -suggested compromises, pleading the danger of losing their heads if they -consented. If the Chinese delegates offered Peking anything less than an -immediate and completely free Shantung, they could never again pass the -border of China. If the Japanese gave up even what they had promised to -give up, their lives would not be worth a song in Tokyo. Yet, day by -day, Japan was giving in a little, China becoming a little more -coöperative. Mr. Harding, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour stayed on the -outside, genial but determined friends—determined that these two Eastern -neighbors should begin now to settle their disagreements. More than -once, China came to them: “Make Japan be good, great friends. You know -Shantung is ours. Make her be good.” - -Patience won the day. It took thirty-eight “conversations,” interminable -cables, breaks, returns, the constant counsel of Mr. Balfour and Mr. -Hughes—“Steady now, steady. Don’t give it up. You must do it -yourselves”—to bring a final agreement between the two nations. But in -the end they did settle the Shantung difficulty. It was a tremendous -victory for the new international method of handling quarrels. - -How reasonable it is that it should be so. It is a direct attack on a -difficulty not a roundabout one by correspondence through ambassadors. -Face to face, you examine the basis of suspicion. You ask, Is this true -or not? Are you doing so-and-so or not? Do you aim to do so-and-so? Thus -the actual situation, not the imagined one, is arrived at. It becomes -the actual property of a group of negotiators sitting at the same table; -and when the actuality is before them all, being turned over and -examined by them all, adjustment is almost certain _if there is good -will_. And here you come to the crux of the whole matter—you get no -adjustment unless the negotiators are working in a spirit of good will. - -When I first set out to observe the Washington Conference I looked up a -man unusually wise and experienced in international affairs, one who for -many years has been collecting, arranging and explaining the diplomatic -adventures of men and of nations so that each coming generation might -have, if it would, the materials from which to find out what men had -already done in making peace and, if it were wise enough, why they so -often had failed. I was in search of just the material of which he of -all men knew most. “What shall I read first?” I asked him. His instant -reply was, “Æsop’s Fables. That should be the textbook of the -Conference. Read Æsop,” he said, “to see what they can do, and follow -with Don Quixote to see what they cannot do. - -“But there is one book more important than all for the Conference—the -Gospels. But not King James’ version. That is a great and wonderful -translation, but it has done some harm in the world by not always giving -true values to great truths. It promises peace on earth and good will to -men. But that is not what was promised. Peace was promised to men of -good will. The success of the Conference will depend upon the degree to -which men of good will are able to prevail over those of ill will.” - -This is the way it turned out in Washington. At every stage it was good -will which carried the undertaking forward. What will happen now in the -various countries to which the pacts of the Conference go will depend -upon the spirit of the peoples to which they are submitted, whether it -be malicious or charitable. Will there be good will enough in Japan to -make such rearrangements of her claims in China that Chinese bitterness -and suspicion will be removed? Will there be enough good will in China -to coöperate when these rearrangements are made? Will there be enough in -the United States to accept the pledges of mutual support which must be -made if the nations concerned are to limit their armaments? Have we -enough faith in men to accept the only possible alternative in the -present world to unlimited armament, and that is, a union of peoples -pledged to face misunderstandings at their beginning, to separate them -into their elements, and to bring all the force of collective judgment -and intelligence to adjustment? - -It may be that the United States does not yet sufficiently understand -that the principle of unionism which is its strength is a world -principle, that one primary cause of wars in this world is isolation, -with its necessity of being suspicious, on guard, ready to strike—like a -rattlesnake. Æsop is a guide here, with his fable of the bundle of -sticks—sticks easy to break if separated, unbreakable when bound -together. - -It may be that the Senate of the United States will refuse to back this -pact of good will which is just as essential to carrying out the program -of limitation of naval armament as a guarantee to France against -unprovoked aggression was two years ago (and is still) to European -disarmament. But, refuse it or not, the day will come—and nothing has -ever demonstrated it more clearly than the Washington Conference,—when -we are going to understand that the world can only remain in peace -through a union which is a practical application of the brotherhood of -man, not a limited brotherhood of man, such as Mr. Wells preached in his -final comment on the Arms Parley, but one including all men. - -Mr. Wells’ idea of a brotherhood of nations is—or was!—one that includes -not every state of the world but “the peoples who speak English, French, -German, Spanish, Italian and Japanese, with such states as Holland and -Norway and Bohemia, great in quality if not great in power—sympathetic -in training and tradition.” He would admit only people of like ideals, -exclude Russia, India, China. Could there be a surer way to throw Russia -and India and China into an alliance against this so-called “Brotherhood -of Man”? Is there a surer way to awaken an ambition for liberty, to -spread ideals than to share what you have with those that seem to -you—and yet never in all respects are—backward nations? Is there any -brotherhood of man worthy the name which does not include all men? - -However we may feel about it as a nation to-day, though we may ruin the -present program for limitation of armament by rejection of its -underlying pacts, the day will surely come when we shall realize and -admit the fullest international association and coöperation. It is the -one real asset humanity has carried from this war—the sense of the -oneness of the world, the impossibility of order and progress and peace -except as each is allowed to develop its individuality, in a free -continuing union of all. - -Eventually the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament will -be judged by what it contributes to this union of nations, exactly as -all its predecessors will be judged. The Washington Conference is but -one in a long chain of international undertakings looking to peace. It -is built on the experience of many different men, of many different -countries, running back literally for centuries. Its immediate -predecessor was the Hague Conferences and tribunal and the Paris -Conference with its resultant League of Nations. So far the League of -Nations is at once the most idealistic and the most practical scheme men -have yet framed, the broadest in its scope and the most democratic in -its spirit. It may prove that humanity is as yet too backward to grasp -and realize its intent and its possibilities. It may make too great a -demand on their faith, their charity, their love; but nothing can -destroy the great fact that it has been undertaken by fifty-one nations, -that it is alive and at work. That fact will stand as a hope and a guide -to the future. - -The present Conference has boldly and nobly attempted to do in a limited -field something of what the Paris Conference attempted to do for the -whole world. The limitation of armament it proposes rests, like world -disarmament, on unionism, standing together. Unionism requires faith; -have we enough of it? It requires, too, men of good will. Have we enough -of them? In the final analysis, it is with them that “peace on earth” -rests. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES - - - 1. Changed ‘one or twice’ to ‘once or twice’ on p. 99. - 2. Silently corrected typographical errors. - 3. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed. - 4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Peacemakers--Blessed and Otherwise, by -Ida M. 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