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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. 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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Translator: Douglas Ainslie - -Release Date: April 28, 2017 [EBook #54618] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AESTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Internet Archive. - - - - - -ÆSTHETIC - -_As science of expression and general linguistic_ - -BY - -BENEDETTO CROCE - -_translated, from the Italian by_ DOUGLAS AINSLIE - -THE NOONDAY PRESS - -_A division of_ - -FARRAR, STRAUS, AND COMPANY - -1920 - - - - -THE - -ÆSTHETIC - -IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR TO THE MEMORY OF HIS PARENTS - -PASQUALE AND LUISA SIPARI - -AND OF HIS SISTER - -MARIA - - - - -CONTENTS - -EXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION xix - -NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR xxv - -AUTHOR'S PREFACE xxvii - - -I - -THEORY OF ÆSTHETIC - -I - -INTUITION AND EXPRESSION - -Intuitive knowledge--Its independence with respect to intellectual -knowledge--Intuition and perception--Intuition and the concepts -of space and time--Intuition and sensation--Intuition and -association--Intuition and representation--Intuition and -expression--Illusion as to their difference--Identity of intuition and -expression - -II - -INTUITION AND ART - -Corollaries and explanations--Identity of art and intuitive -knowledge--No specific difference--No difference of intensity--The -difference is extensive and empirical--Artistic genius--Content and -form in Æsthetic--Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the -artistic illusion--Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling, -not a theoretical fact--Æsthetic appearance, and feeling--Criticism of -the theory of æsthetic senses--Unity and indivisibility of the work of -art--Art as liberator - -III - -ART AND PHILOSOPHY - -Inseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge--Criticism -of the negations of this thesis--Art and science--Content and form: -another meaning--Prose and poetry--The relation of first and second -degree--Non-existence of other forms of cognition--Historicity--Its -identity with and difference from art--Historical criticism--Historical -scepticism--Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural -sciences, and their limits--The phenomenon and the noumenon - -IV - -HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN ÆSTHETIC - -Criticism of the probable and of naturalism--Criticism of ideas in -art, of theses in art, and of the typical--Criticism of the symbol -and of the allegory--Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary -kinds--Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art--Empirical -sense of the divisions of kinds - -V - -ANALOGOUS ERRORS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY AND IN LOGIC - -Criticism of the philosophy of History--Æsthetic intrusions into -Logic--Logic in its essence--Distinction between logical and -non-logical judgements--Syllogistic--Logical falsehood and æsthetic -truth--Reformed logic--Note to the fourth Italian edition - -VI - -THE THEORETIC ACTIVITY AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY - -The will--The will as an ulterior stage in respect to -knowledge--Objections and explanations--Criticism of practical -judgements or judgements of value--Exclusion of the practical from the -æsthetic--Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice -of content--Practical innocence of art--Independence of art--Criticism -of the saying: the style is the man--Criticism of the concept of -sincerity in art - -VII - -ANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL - -The two forms of the practical activity--The economically -useful--Distinction between the useful and the technical--Distinction -of the useful from the egoistic--Economic will and moral will--Pure -economicity--The economic side of morality--The merely economical and -the error of the morally indifferent--Criticism of utilitarianism and -the reform of Ethics and of Economics--Phenomenon and noumenon in -practical activity - -VIII - -EXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS - -The system of the spirit--The forms of genius--Non-existence of a -fifth form of activity--Law; sociability--Religion--Metaphysic--Mental -imagination and the intuitive intellect--Mystical Æsthetic--Mortality -and immortality of art - -IX - -INDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR DEGREES AND CRITICISM OF -RHETORIC - -The characters of art--Non-existence of modes of -expression--Impossibility of translations--Criticism of the rhetorical -categories--Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories--Their use as -synonyms of the æsthetic fact--Their use to indicate various æsthetic -imperfections--Their use in a sense transcending æsthetic, in the -service of science--Rhetoric in the schools--The resemblances of -expressions--The relative possibility of translations - -X - -ÆSTHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY - -Various significations of the word feeling--Feeling as activity ---Identification of feeling with economic activity--Criticism -of hedonism--Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity ---Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings--Value -and disvalue: the contraries and their union--The beautiful as the -value of expression, or expression without qualification--The ugly, -and the elements of beauty which compose it--Illusion that there exist -expressions neither beautiful nor ugly--True æsthetic feelings and -concomitant and accidental feelings--Criticism of apparent feelings - -XI - -CRITICISM OF ÆSTHETIC HEDONISM - -Criticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher -senses--Criticism of the theory of play--Criticism of the theory of -sexuality and of triumph--Criticism of the Æsthetic of the sympathetic: -meaning in it of content and form--Æsthetic hedonism and moralism--The -rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of art--Criticism -of pure beauty - -XII - -THE ÆSTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-ÆSTHETIC CONCEPTS - -Pseudo-æsthetic concepts, and the Æsthetic of the -sympathetic--Criticism of the theory of the ugly in art and -of the overcoming of it--Pseudo-æsthetic concepts belong to -Psychology--Impossibility of rigorous definitions of them--Examples: -definitions of the sublime, of the comic, of the humorous--Relation -between these concepts and æsthetic concepts - -XIII - -THE "PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL" IN NATURE AND IN ART - -Æsthetic activity and physical concepts--Expression in the æsthetic -sense, and expression in the naturalistic sense--Representations and -memory--The production of aids to memory--Physical beauty--Content and -form: another meaning--Natural beauty and artificial beauty--Mixed -beauty--Writings--Free and non-free beauty--Criticism of non-free -beauty--Stimulants of production - -XIV - -ERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND ÆSTHETIC - -Criticism of æsthetic associationism--Criticism of æsthetic -Physics--Criticism of the theory of the beauty of the human -body--Criticism of the beauty of geometrical figures--Criticism of -another aspect of the imitation of nature--Criticism of the theory of -the elementary forms of the beautiful--Criticism of the search for the -objective conditions of the beautiful--The astrology of Æsthetic - -XV - -THE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS - -The practical activity of externalization--The technique of -externalization--Technical theories of the different arts--Criticism of -æsthetic theories of particular arts--Criticism of the classification -of the arts--Criticism of the theory of the union of the arts--Relation -of the activity of externalization to utility and morality - -XVI - -TASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART - -Æsthetic judgement: its identity with æsthetic -reproduction--Impossibility of divergences--Identity of taste -and genius--Analogy with other activities--Criticism of æsthetic -absolutism (intellectualism) and relativism--Criticism of relative -relativism--Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and -of psychic disposition--Criticism of the distinction of signs into -natural and conventional--The surmounting of variety--Restorations and -historical interpretation - -XVII - -THE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND OF ART - -Historical criticism in literature and art: its importance--Literary -and artistic history: its distinction from historical criticism and -from the æsthetic judgement--The method of artistic and literary -history--Criticism of the problem of the origin of art--The criterion -of progress and history--Non-existence of a single line of progress -in artistic and literary history--Errors committed against this law-- -Other meanings of the word "progress" in relation to Æsthetic - -XVIII - -CONCLUSION: IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND ÆSTHETIC - -Summary of the study--Identity of Linguistic with Æsthetic--Æsthetic -formulation of linguistic problems--Nature of language--Origin -of language and its development--Relation between Grammar and -Logic--Grammatical kinds or parts of speech--The individuality of -speech and the classification of languages--Impossibility of a -normative Grammar--Didactic organisms--Elementary linguistic facts, or -roots--Æsthetic judgement and the model language--Conclusion - - -II - -HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC - -I - -ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN GRÆCO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY - -Point of view of this History of Æsthetic--Mistaken tendencies, and -attempts towards an Æsthetic, in Græco-Roman antiquity--Origin of the -æsthetic problem in Greece--Plato's rigoristic negation--Æsthetic -hedonism and moralism--Mystical æsthetic in antiquity--Investigations -as to the Beautiful--Distinction between the theory of Art and the -theory of the Beautiful--Fusion of the two by Plotinus--The scientific -tendency: Aristotle--The concepts of imitation and of imagination after -Aristotle: Philostratus--Speculations on language - -II - -ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE - -Middle Ages. Mysticism: Ideas on the Beautiful--The pedagogic theory -of art in the Middle Ages--Hints of an Æsthetic in scholastic -philosophy--Renaissance: Philography and philosophical and empirical -inquiries concerning the Beautiful--The pedagogic theory of art and -the Poetics of Aristotle--The "Poetics of the Renaissance"--Dispute -concerning the universal and the probable in art--G. Fracastoro--L. -Castelvetro--Piccolomini and Pinciano--Fr. Patrizzi (Patricius) - -III - -FERMENTS OF THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY - -New words and new observations in the seventeenth -century--Wit--Taste--Various meanings of the word taste--Fancy or -imagination--Feeling--Tendency to unite these terms--Difficulties -and contradictions in their definition--Wit and intellect--Taste -and intellectual judgement--The "_je ne sais quoi_"--Imagination -and sensationalism: the corrective of imagination--Feeling and -sensationalism - -IV - -ÆSTHETIC IDEAS OF THE CARTESIAN AND LEIBNITIAN SCHOOLS, AND THE -"ÆSTHETIC" OF BAUMGARTEN - -Cartesianism and imagination--Crousaz and André--The English: -Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the Scottish School--Leibniz: -"_petites perceptions_" and confused knowledge--Intellectualism of -Leibniz--Speculations on language--J. C. Wolff--Demand for an organon -of inferior knowledge--Alexander Baumgarten: his "Æsthetic"--Æsthetic -as science of sensory consciousness--Criticism of judgements passed on -Baumgarten--Intellectualism of Baumgarten--New names and old meanings - -V - -GIAMBATTISTA VICO - -Vico as inventor of æsthetic science--Poetry and philosophy: -imagination and intellect--Poetry and history--Poetry and -language--Inductive and formalistic logic--Vico opposed to all -former theories of poetry--Vico's judgements of the grammarians and -linguists who preceded him--Influence of seventeenth-century writers on -Vico--Æsthetic in the _Scienza Nuova_--Vico's mistakes--Progress still -to be achieved - -VI - -MINOR ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY - -The influence of Vico--Italian writers: A. Conti--Quadrio and -Zanotti--M. Cesarotti--Bettinelli and Pagano--German disciples of -Baumgarten: G. F. Meier--Confusions of Meier--M. Mendelssohn and other -followers of Baumgarten--Vogue of Æsthetic--Eberhard and Eschenburg--J. -G. Sulzer--K. H. Heydenreich--J. G. Herder--Philosophy of language - -VII - -OTHER ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE SAME PERIOD - -Other writers of the eighteenth century: Batteux--The English: -W. Hogarth--E. Burke--H. Home--Eclecticism and sensationalism: -E. Platner--Fr. Hemsterhuis--Neo-Platonism and mysticism: -Winckelmann--Beauty and lack of significance--Winckelmann's -contradictions and compromises--A. R. Mengs--G. E. Lessing--Theorists -of ideal Beauty--G. Spalletti and the characteristic--Beauty and the -characteristic: Hirt, Meyer, Goethe - -VIII - -IMMANUEL KANT - -I. Kant--Kant and Vico--Identity of the concept of Art in Kant -and Baumgarten--Kant's "Lectures"--Art in the _Critique of -Judgment_--Imagination in Kant's system--The forms of intuition and the -Transcendental Æsthetic--Theory of Beauty distinguished by Kant from -that of Art--Mystical features in Kant's theory of Beauty - -IX - -THE ÆSTHETIC OF IDEALISM: SCHILLER, SCHELLING, SOLGER, HEGEL - -The _Critique of Judgment_ and metaphysical idealism--F. -Schiller--Relations between Schiller and Kant--The æsthetic sphere as -the sphere of Play--Æsthetic education--Vagueness and lack of precision -in Schiller's Æsthetic--Schiller's caution and the rashness of the -Romanticists--Ideas on Art: J. P. Richter--Romantic Æsthetic and -idealistic Æsthetic--J. G. Fichte--Irony: Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis--F. -Schelling--Beauty and character--Art and Philosophy--Ideas and the -gods: Art and mythology--K. W. Solger--Fancy and imagination--Art, -practice and religion--G. W. F. Hegel--Art in the sphere of absolute -spirit--Beauty as sensible appearance of the Idea--Æsthetic in -metaphysical idealism and Baumgartenism--Mortality and decay of art in -Hegel's system - -X - -SCHOPENHAUER AND HERBART - -Æsthetic mysticism in the opponents of idealism--A. Schopenhauer--Ideas -as the object of art--Æsthetic catharsis--Signs of a better theory in -Schopenhauer--J. F. Herbart--Pure Beauty and relations of form--Art as -sum of content and form--Herbart and Kantian thought - -XI - -FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER - -Æsthetic of content and Æsthetic of form: meaning of the -contrast--Friedrich Schleiermacher--Wrong judgements concerning -him--Schleiermacher contrasted with his predecessors--Place assigned -to Æsthetic in his Ethics--Æsthetic activity as immanent and -individual--Artistic truth and intellectual truth--Difference of -artistic consciousness from feeling and religion--Dreams and art: -inspiration and deliberation--Art and the typical--Independence of -art--Art and language--Schleiermacher's defects--Schleiermacher's -services to Æsthetic - -XII - -THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: HUMBOLDT AND STEINTHAL - -Progress of Linguistic--Linguistic speculation at the beginning -of the nineteenth century--Wilhelm von Humboldt: relics of -intellectualism--Language as activity: internal form--Language and -art in Humboldt--II. Steinthal: the linguistic function independent -of the logical--Identity of the problems of the origin and the nature -of language--Steinthal's mistaken ideas on art: his failure to unite -Linguistic and Æsthetic - -XIII - -MINOR GERMAN ÆSTHETICIANS - -Minor æstheticians in the metaphysical school--Krause, Trahndorff, -Weisse and others--Fried. Theodor Vischer--Other tendencies--Theory -of the Beautiful in nature, and that of the Modifications of -Beauty--Development of the first theory: Herder--Schelling, Solger, -Hegel--Schleiermacher--Alexander von Humboldt--Vischer's "Æsthetic -Physics"--The theory of the Modifications of Beauty: from antiquity -to the eighteenth century--Kant and the post-Kantians--Culmination -of the development--Double form of the theory: the overcoming of the -ugly: Solger, Weisse and others--Passage from abstract to concrete: -Vischer--The "legend of Sir Purebeauty" - -XIV - -ÆSTHETIC IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND ITALY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE -NINETEENTH CENTURY - -Æsthetic movement in France: Cousin, Jouffroy--English Æsthetic-- -Italian Æsthetic--Rosmini and Gioberti--Italian Romantics. Dependence -of art - -XV - -FRANCESCO DE SANCTIS - -F. de Sanctis: development of his thought--Influence of -Hegelism--Unconscious criticism of Hegelism--Criticisms of German -Æsthetic--Final rebellion against metaphysical Æsthetic--De Sanctis' -own theory--The concept of form--De Sanctis as art-critic--De Sanctis -as philosopher - -XVI - -ÆSTHETIC OF THE EPIGONI - -Revival of Herbartian Æsthetic--Robert Zimmermann--Vischer _versus_ -Zimmermann--Hermann Lotze--Efforts to reconcile Æsthetic of -form and Æsthetic of content--K. Köstlin--Æsthetic of content. -M. Schasler--Eduard von Hartmann--Hartmann and the theory of -modifications--Metaphysical Æsthetic in France: C. Levêque--In -England: J. Ruskin--Æsthetic in Italy--Antonio Tari and his -lectures--Æsthesigraphy - -XVII - -ÆSTHETIC POSITIVISM AND NATURALISM - -Positivism and evolutionism--Æsthetic of H. Spencer--Physiologists of -Æsthetic: Grant Allen, Helmholtz and others--Method of the natural -sciences in Æsthetic--H. Taine's Æsthetic--Taine's metaphysic and -moralism--G. T. Fechner: inductive Æsthetic--Experiments--Trivial -nature of his ideas on Beauty and Art--Ernst Grosse: speculative -Æsthetic and the Science of Art--Sociological Æsthetic--Proudhon--J. M. -Guyau--M. Nordau--Naturalism: C. Lombroso--Decline of linguistic--Signs -of revival: H. Paul--The linguistic of Wundt - -XVIII - -ÆSTHETIC PSYCHOLOGISM AND OTHER RECENT TENDENCIES - -Neo-criticism and empiricism--Kirchmann--Metaphysic translated into -Psychology: Vischer--Siebeck--M. Diez--Psychological tendency. -Teodor Lipps--K. Groos--The modifications of the Beautiful in Groos and -Lipps--E. Véron and the double form of Æsthetic--L. Tolstoy--F. Nietzsche ---An æsthetician of Music: E. Hanslick--Hanslick's concept of form ---Æstheticians of the figurative arts: C. Fiedler--Intuition and -expression--Narrow limits of these theories--H. Bergson--Attempts -to return to Baumgarten: C. Hermann--Eclecticism: B. Bosanquet ---Æsthetic of expression: present state - -XIX - -HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOME PARTICULAR DOCTRINES - -Result of the history of Æsthetic--History of science and history of -the scientific criticism of particular errors - -I. RHETORIC: OR THE THEORY OF ORNATE FORM. - -Rhetoric in the ancient sense--Criticism from moral point of -view--Accumulation without system--Its fortunes in the Middle Ages -and Renaissance--Criticisms by Vives, Ramus and Patrizzi--Survival -into modern times--Modern signification of Rhetoric: theory of -literary form--Concept of ornament--Classes of ornament--The -concept of the Fitting--The theory of ornament in the Middle -Ages and Renaissance--_Reductio ad absurdum_ in the seventeenth -century--Polemic concerning the theory of ornament--Du Marsais and -metaphor--Psychological interpretation--Romanticism and Rhetoric: -present day - -II. HISTORY OF ARTISTIC AND LITERARY KINDS - -The kinds in antiquity: Aristotle--In the Middle Ages and -Renaissance--The doctrine of the three unities--Poetics of the kinds -and rules: Scaliger--Lessing--Compromises and extensions--Rebellion -against rules in general--G. Bruno, Guarini--Spanish critics--G. -B. Marino--G. V. Gravina--Fr. Montani--Critics of the eighteenth -century--Romanticism and the "strict kinds": Berchet, V. Hugo--Their -persistence in philosophical theories--Fr. Schelling--E. von -Hartmann--The kinds in the schools - -III. THE THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTS - -The limits of the arts in Lessing--Arts of space and arts of -time--Limits and classifications of the arts in later philosophy: -Herder and Kant--Schelling, Solger--Schopenhauer, Herbart--Weisse, -Zeising, Vischer--M. Schasler--E. v. Hartmann--The supreme art: -Richard Wagner--Lotze's attack on classifications--Contradictions in -Lotze--Doubts in Schleiermacher - -IV. OTHER PARTICULAR DOCTRINES - -The Æsthetic theory of natural beauty--The theory of æsthetic -senses--The theory of kinds of style--The theory of grammatical forms -or parts of speech--Theory of æsthetic criticism--Distinction between -taste and genius--Concept of artistic and literary history--Conclusion - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX - -INDEX - - - - -EXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ENGLISH EDITION, 1909 - - -I can lay no claim to having discovered an America, but I do claim to -have discovered a Columbus. His name is Benedetto Croce, and he dwells -on the shores of the Mediterranean, at Naples, city of the antique -Parthenope. - -It was at Naples, in the winter of 1907, that I first saw the -Philosopher of Æsthetic. Benedetto Croce, although born in the Abruzzi, -Province of Aquila (1866), is essentially a Neapolitan, and rarely -remains long absent from the city, on the shore of that magical sea -where once Ulysses sailed, and where sometimes yet (near Amalfi) we -may hear the Syrens sing their song. But more wonderful than the song -of any Syren seems to me the Theory of Æsthetic as the Science of -Expression, and that is why I have overcome the obstacles that stood -between me and the giving of this theory, which in my belief is the -truth, to the English-speaking world. - -. . . . . . . . . . - -The solution of the problem of Æsthetic is not in the gift of the Muses. - -This Philosophy of the Spirit is symptomatic of the happy reaction of -the twentieth century against the crude materialism of the second half -of the nineteenth. It is the spirit which gives to the work of art its -value, not this or that method of arrangement, this or that tint or -cadence, which can always be copied by skilful plagiarists: not so -the _spirit_ of the creator. In England we hear too much of (natural) -science, which has usurped the very name of Philosophy. The natural -sciences are very well in their place, but discoveries such as aviation -are of infinitely less importance to the race than the smallest -addition to the philosophy of the spirit. Empirical science, with the -collusion of positivism, has stolen the cloak of philosophy and must be -made to give it back. - -. . . . . . . . . . - -Yet though severe, the editor of _La Critica_ is uncompromisingly just, -and would never allow personal dislike or jealousy, or any extrinsic -consideration, to stand in the way of fair treatment to the writer -concerned. Many superficial English critics might benefit considerably -by attention to this quality in one who is in other respects also so -immeasurably their superior. A good instance of this impartiality is -his critique of Schopenhauer, with whose system he is in complete -disagreement, yet affords him full credit for what of truth is -contained in his voluminous writings. - -. . . . . . . . . . - -This thoroughness it is which gives such importance to the literary -and philosophical criticisms of _La Critica._ Croce's method is always -historical, and his object in approaching any work of art is to -classify the spirit of its author, as expressed in that work. There -are, he maintains, but two things to be considered in criticizing a -book. These are, _firstly,_ what is its _peculiarity,_ in what way is -it singular, how is it differentiated from other works? _Secondly,_ -what is its degree of _purity_?--That is, to what extent has its author -kept himself free from all considerations alien to the perfection of -the work as an expression, as a lyrical intuition? With the answering -of these questions Croce is satisfied. He does not care to know if the -author keep a motor-car, like Mæterlinck; or prefer to walk on Putney -Heath, like Swinburne. This amounts to saying that all works of art -must be judged by their own standard. How far has the author succeeded -in doing what he intended? - -. . . . . . . . . . - -As regards Croce's general philosophical position, it is important to -understand that he is _not_ a Hegelian, in the sense of being a close -follower of that philosopher. One of his last works is that in which -he deals in a masterly manner with the philosophy of Hegel. The title -may be translated, "What is living and what is dead of the philosophy -of Hegel." Here he explains to us the Hegelian system more clearly -than that wondrous edifice was ever before explained, and we realize -at the same time that Croce is quite as independent of Hegel as of -Kant, of Vico as of Spinoza. Of course he has made use of the best of -Hegel, just as every thinker makes use of his predecessors and is in -his turn made use of by those that follow him. But it is incorrect -to accuse of Hegelianism the author of an anti-hegelian _Æsthetic,_ -of a _Logic_ where Hegel is only half accepted, and of a _Philosophy -of the Practical_ which contains hardly a trace of Hegel. I give an -instance. If the great conquest of Hegel be the dialectic of opposites, -his great mistake lies in the confusion of opposites with things -which are distinct but not opposite. If, says Croce, we take as an -example the application of the Hegelian triad that formulates becoming -(affirmation, negation and synthesis), we find it applicable for those -opposites which are true and false, good and evil, being and not-being, -but _not applicable_ to things which are distinct but not opposite, -such as art and philosophy, beauty and truth, the useful and the moral. -These confusions led Hegel to talk of the death of art, to conceive as -possible a Philosophy of History, and to the application of the natural -sciences to the absurd task of constructing a Philosophy of Nature. -Croce has cleared away these difficulties by showing that if from the -meeting of opposites must arise a superior synthesis, such a synthesis -cannot arise from things which are distinct _but not opposite,_ since -the former are connected together as superior and inferior, and the -inferior can exist without the superior, but _not vice versa._ Thus we -see how philosophy cannot exist without art, while art, occupying the -lower place, can and does exist without philosophy. This brief example -reveals Croce's independence in dealing with Hegelian problems. - -I know of no philosopher more generous than Croce in praise and -elucidation of other workers in the same field, past and present. For -instance, and apart from Hegel, _Kant_ has to thank him for drawing -attention to the marvellous excellence of the _Critique of Judgment,_ -generally neglected in favour of the Critiques of _Pure Reason and of -Practical Judgment_; _Baumgarten_ for drawing the attention of the -world to his obscure name and for reprinting his Latin thesis in which -the word _Æsthetic_ occurs for the first time; and _Schleiermacher_ for -the tributes paid to his neglected genius in the History of Æsthetic. -_La Critica,_ too, is full of generous appreciation of contemporaries -by Croce and by that profound thinker, Gentile. - -. . . . . . . . . . - -There can be no doubt of the great value of Croce's work as an -_educative influence,_ and if we are to judge of a philosophical system -by its action on others, then we must place the _Philosophy of the -Spirit_ very high. It may be said with perfect truth that since the -death of the poet Carducci there has been no influence in Italy to -compare with that of Benedetto Croce. - -. . . . . . . . . . - -Of the popularity that his system and teaching have already attained -we may judge by the fact that the _Æsthetic,_ despite the difficulty of -the subject, is already in its third edition in Italy, where, owing to -its influence, philosophy sells better than fiction; while the French -and Germans, not to mention the Czechs, have long had translations -of the earlier editions. His _Logic_ is on the point of appearing -in its second edition, and I have no doubt that the _Philosophy of -the Practical_ will eventually equal these works in popularity. _The -importance and value of Italian thought have been too long neglected -in Great Britain._ Where, as in Benedetto Croce, we get the clarity -of vision of the Latin, joined to the thoroughness and erudition of -the best German tradition, we have a combination of rare power and -effectiveness, which can by no means be neglected. - -The philosopher feels that he has a great mission, which is nothing -less than the leading back of thought to belief in the spirit, deserted -by so many for crude empiricism and positivism. His view of philosophy -is that it sums up all the higher human activities, including religion, -and that in proper hands it is able to solve any problem. But there is -no finality about problems: the solution of one leads to the posing -of another, and so on. Man is the maker of life, and his spirit ever -proceeds from a lower to a higher perfection. - -. . . . . . . . . . - -I believe that Croce will one day be recognized as one of the very -few great teachers of humanity. At present he is not appreciated at -nearly his full value. One rises from a study of his philosophy with -a sense of having been all the time as it were in personal touch with -the truth, which is very far from the case after the perusal of certain -other philosophies. - -Secure in his strength, Croce will often introduce a joke or some -amusing illustration from contemporary life, in the midst of a most -profound and serious argument. This spirit of mirth is a sign of -superiority. He who is not sure of himself can spare no energy for -the making of mirth. Croce loves to laugh at his enemies and with -his friends. So the philosopher of Naples sits by the blue gulf -and explains the universe to those who have ears to hear. "One can -philosophize anywhere," he says--but he remains significantly at Naples. - -Thus I conclude these brief remarks upon the author of the _Æsthetic,_ -confident that those who give time and attention to its study will be -grateful for having placed in their hands this pearl of great price -from the diadem of the antique Parthenope. - -DOUGLAS AINSLIE. - -THE ATHENÆUM, PALL MALL, _May_ 1909. - - - - -NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR - - -TO THE SECOND ENGLISH EDITION - -This second edition of the _Æsthetic_ will be found to contain the -complete translation of the historical portion, which I was obliged to -summarize in the first edition. I have made a number of alterations and -some additions to the theoretical portion, following closely the fourth -(definitive) Italian edition, and in so doing have received much advice -and assistance of value from Mrs. Salusbury, to whom I beg to tender -my best thanks. I trust that this new edition will enable all those -desirous of studying the work to get into direct touch with the thought -of the author. - -THE ATHENÆUM, PALL MALL, S.W., - -_November_ 1920. - - - - -AUTHOR'S PREFACE - - -This volume is composed of a theoretical and of a historical part, -which form two independent but complementary books. - -The nucleus of the theoretical part is a memoir, bearing the title -_Fundamental Theses of an Æsthetic as Science of Expression and General -Linguistic,_ which was read at the Accademia Pontaniana of Naples -during the sessions of February 18 and May 6, 1900, and printed in vol. -xxx. of its _Acts._ The author has added few substantial variations, -but not a few additions and amplifications in rewriting it, also -following a somewhat different sequence with a view to rendering the -exposition more plain and easy. The first five chapters only of the -historical portion were inserted in the Neapolitan review _Flegrea_ -(April 1901), under the title _Giambattista Vico, First Discoverer of -Æsthetic Science,_ and these also reappear amplified and brought into -harmony with the rest. - -The author has dwelt, especially in the theoretical part, upon general -questions which are side-issues in respect to the theme that he has -treated. But this will not seem a digression to those who remember -that, strictly speaking, there are no particular philosophical -sciences, standing by themselves. Philosophy is unity, and when we -treat of Æsthetic or of Logic or of Ethics, we treat always of the -whole of philosophy, although illustrating for didactic purposes only -one side of that inseparable unity. In like manner, owing to this -intimate connexion of all the parts of philosophy, the uncertainty and -misunderstanding as to the æsthetic activity, the representative and -productive imagination, this firstborn of the spiritual activities, -mainstay of the others, generates everywhere else misunderstandings, -uncertainties and errors: in Psychology as in Logic, in History as -in the Philosophy of Practice. If language is the first spiritual -manifestation, and if the æsthetic form is language itself, taken in -all its true scientific extension, it is hopeless to try to understand -clearly the later and more complicated phases of the life of the -spirit, when their first and simplest moment is ill known, mutilated -and disfigured. From the explanation of the æsthetic activity is also -to be expected the correction of several concepts and the solution -of certain philosophic problems which generally seem to be almost -desperate. Such is precisely the spirit animating the present work. And -if the present attempt and the historical illustrations which accompany -it may be of use in winning friends to these studies, by levelling -obstacles and indicating paths to be followed; if this happen, -especially here in Italy, whose æsthetic traditions (as has been -demonstrated in its place) are very noble, the author will consider -that he has gained his end, and one of his keenest desires will have -been satisfied. - -NAPLES, _December_ 1901. - -In addition to a careful literary revision, (in which, as well as in -the revision of the notes, I have received valuable help from my friend -Fausto Nicolini) I have in this third edition made certain alterations -of theory, especially in Chapters X. and XI. of Part I., suggested by -further reflexion and self-criticism. - -But I have refrained from introducing corrections or additions of such -a kind as to alter the original plan of the book, which was, or was -meant to be, a complete but brief æsthetic theory set in the framework -of a general sketch of a Philosophy of the Spirit. - -The reader who desires a complete statement of the general or -collateral doctrines or a more particular exposition of the other parts -of philosophy (_e.g._ the lyrical nature of art) is now referred to the -volumes on _Logic_ and the _Philosophy of Practice,_ which together -with the present work compose the _Philosophy of the Spirit_ which in -the author's opinion exhausts the entire field of Philosophy. The three -volumes were not conceived and written simultaneously; if they had -been, some details would have been differently arranged. When I wrote -the first I had no idea of giving it, as I have now done, two such -companions; and I therefore designed it to be, as I say, complete in -itself. In the second place, the present state of the study of Æsthetic -made it desirable to append to the theoretical exposition a somewhat -full history of the science, whereas for the other parts of Philosophy -I was able to restrict myself to brief historical notes merely designed -to show how, from my point of view, such a history would best be -composed. Lastly, there are many things which now, after a systematic -exposition of the various philosophical sciences, I see in closer -connexions and in a clearer, or at least a different, light; a certain -hesitation and even some doctrinal errors visible here and there in the -_Æsthetic,_ especially where subjects foreign to Æsthetic itself are -being treated, would now no longer be justified. For all these reasons -the three volumes, in spite of their substantial unity of spirit and of -aim, have each its own physiognomy, and show marks of the different -periods of life at which they were written, so as to group themselves, -and to demand interpretation, as a progressive series according to -their dates of publication. - -With what may be called the minor problems of Æsthetic, and the -objections which have been or might be brought against my theory, I -have dealt and am continuing to deal in special essays, of which I -shall shortly publish a first collection which will form a kind of -explanatory and polemical appendix to the present volume. - -_November_ 1907. - -In revising this book once more for a fourth edition, I take the -opportunity of announcing that the supplementary volume of essays -promised above was published in 1910 under the title _Problems of -Æsthetic and Contributions to the History of Æsthetic in Italy._ - -B. C. - -_May_ 1911. - - - - -THEORY OF ÆSTHETIC - - - - -I - - -INTUITION AND EXPRESSION - - -[Sidenote: _Intuitive knowledge._] - -Knowledge has two forms: it is either _intuitive_ knowledge or -_logical_ knowledge; knowledge obtained through the _imagination_ -or knowledge obtained through the _intellect_; knowledge of the -_individual_ or knowledge of the _universal_; of _individual things_ or -of the _relations_ between them: it is, in fact, productive either of -_images_ or of _concepts._ - -In ordinary life, constant appeal is made to intuitive knowledge. It is -said that we cannot give definitions of certain truths; that they are -not demonstrable by syllogisms; that they must be learnt intuitively. -The politician finds fault with the abstract reasoner, who possesses no -lively intuition of actual conditions; the educational theorist insists -upon the necessity of developing the intuitive faculty in the pupil -before everything else; the critic in judging a work of art makes it -a point of honour to set aside theory and abstractions, and to judge -it by direct intuition; the practical man professes to live rather by -intuition than by reason. - -But this ample acknowledgment granted to intuitive knowledge -in ordinary life, does not correspond to an equal and adequate -acknowledgment in the field of theory and of philosophy. There exists a -very ancient science of intellectual knowledge, admitted by all without -discussion, namely, Logic; but a science of intuitive knowledge is -timidly and with difficulty asserted by but a few. Logical knowledge -has appropriated the lion's share; and if she does not slay and devour -her companion outright, yet yields to her but grudgingly the humble -place of maid-servant or doorkeeper.--What can intuitive knowledge be -without the light of intellectual knowledge? It is a servant without -a master; and though a master find a servant useful, the master is a -necessity to the servant, since he enables him to gain his livelihood. -Intuition is blind; intellect lends her eyes. - -[Sidenote: _Its independence with respect to intellectual knowledge._] - -Now, the first point to be firmly fixed in the mind is that intuitive -knowledge has no need of a master, nor to lean upon any one; she does -not need to borrow the eyes of others, for she has excellent eyes -of her own. Doubtless it is possible to find concepts mingled with -intuitions. But in many other intuitions there is no trace of such -a mixture, which proves that it is not necessary. The impression of -a moonlight scene by a painter; the outline of a country drawn by a -cartographer; a musical motive, tender or energetic; the words of -a sighing lyric, or those with which we ask, command and lament in -ordinary life, may well all be intuitive facts without a shadow of -intellectual relation. But, think what one may of these instances, -and admitting further the contention that the greater part of the -intuitions of civilized man are impregnated with concepts, there yet -remains to be observed something more important and more conclusive. -Those concepts which are found mingled and fused with the intuitions -are no longer concepts, in so far as they are really mingled and -fused, for they have lost all independence and autonomy. They have -been concepts, but have now become simple elements of intuition. -The philosophical maxims placed in the mouth of a personage of -tragedy or of comedy, perform there the function, not of concepts, -but of characteristics of such personage; in the same way as the -red in a painted face does not there represent the red colour of -the physicists, but is a characteristic element of the portrait. -The whole is that which determines the quality of the parts. A work -of art may be full of philosophical concepts; it may contain them -in greater abundance and they may there be even more profound than -in a philosophical dissertation, which in its turn may be rich to -overflowing with descriptions and intuitions. But notwithstanding all -these concepts the total effect of the work of art is an intuition; -and notwithstanding all those intuitions, the total effect of the -philosophical dissertation is a concept. The _Promessi Sposi_ contains -copious ethical observations and distinctions, but does not for that -reason lose as a whole its character of simple story or intuition. In -like manner the anecdotes and satirical effusions to be found in the -works of a philosopher like Schopenhauer do not deprive those works -of their character of intellectual treatises. The difference between -a scientific work and a work of art, that is, between an intellectual -fact and an intuitive fact, lies in the difference of the total effect -aimed at by their respective authors. This it is that determines and -rules over the several parts of each not these parts separated and -considered abstractly in themselves. - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and perception._] - -But to admit the independence of intuition as regards concept does -not suffice to give a true and precise idea of intuition. Another -error arises among those who recognize this, or who at any rate do not -explicitly make intuition dependent upon the intellect, to obscure -and confuse the real nature of intuition. By intuition is frequently -understood _perception,_ or the knowledge of actual reality, the -apprehension of something as _real._ - -Certainly perception is intuition: the perceptions of the room in -which I am writing, of the ink-bottle and paper that are before me, -of the pen I am using, of the objects that I touch and make use of as -instruments of my person, which, if it write, therefore exists;--these -are all intuitions. But the image that is now passing through my brain -of a me writing in another room, in another town, with different paper, -pen and ink, is also an intuition. This means that the distinction -between reality and non-reality is extraneous, secondary, to the true -nature of intuition. If we imagine a human mind having intuitions -for the first time, it would seem that it could have intuitions of -actual reality only, that is to say, that it could have perceptions -of nothing but the real. But since knowledge of reality is based upon -the distinction between real images and unreal images, and since this -distinction does not at the first moment exist, these intuitions -would in truth not be intuitions either of the real or of the unreal, -not perceptions, but pure intuitions. Where all is real, nothing is -real. The child, with its difficulty of distinguishing true from -false, history from fable, which are all one to childhood, can furnish -us with a sort of very vague and only remotely approximate idea of -this ingenuous state. Intuition is the undifferentiated unity of the -perception of the real and of the simple image of the possible. In our -intuitions we do not oppose ourselves as empirical beings to external -reality, but we simply objectify our impressions, whatever they be. - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and the concepts of space and time._] - -Those, therefore, who look upon intuition as sensation formed and -arranged simply according to the categories of space and time, would -seem to approximate more nearly to the truth. Space and time (they -say) are the forms of intuition; to have an intuition is to place -it in space and in temporal sequence. Intuitive activity would then -consist in this double and concurrent function of spatiality and -temporality. But for these two categories must be repeated what was -said of intellectual distinctions, when found mingled with intuitions. -We have intuitions without space and without time: the colour of a -sky, the colour of a feeling, a cry of pain and an effort of will, -objectified in consciousness: these are intuitions which we possess, -and with their making space and time have nothing to do. In some -intuitions, spatiality may be found without temporality, in others, -_vice versa_; and even where both are found, they are perceived by -later reflexion: they can be fused with the intuition in like manner -with all its other elements: that is, they are in it _materialiter_ -and not _formaliter,_ as ingredients and not as arrangement. Who, -without an act of reflexion which for a moment breaks in upon his -contemplation, can think of space while looking at a drawing or a -view? Who is conscious of temporal sequence while listening to a story -or a piece of music without breaking into it with a similar act of -reflexion? What intuition reveals in a work of art is not space and -time, but _character, individual physiognomy._ The view here maintained -is confirmed in several quarters of modern philosophy. Space and time, -far from being simple and primitive functions, are nowadays conceived -as intellectual constructions of great complexity. And further, even -in some of those who do not altogether deny to space and time the -quality of formative principles, categories and functions, one observes -an effort to unite them and to regard them in a different manner from -that in which these categories are generally conceived. Some limit -intuition to the sole category of spatiality, maintaining that even -time can only be intuited in terms of space. Others abandon the three -dimensions of space as not philosophically necessary, and conceive the -function of spatiality as void of all particular spatial determination. -But what could such a spatial function be, a simple arrangement that -should arrange even time? It represents, surely, all that criticism -and refutation have left standing--the bare demand for the affirmation -of some intuitive activity in general. And is not this activity -truly determined, when one single function is attributed to it, not -spatializing nor temporalizing, but characterizing? Or rather, when it -is conceived as itself a category or function which gives us knowledge -of things in their concreteness and individuality? - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and sensation._] - -Having thus freed intuitive knowledge from any suggestion of -intellectualism and from every later and external addition, we must -now explain it and determine its limits from another side and defend -it from a different kind of invasion and confusion. On the hither side -of the lower limit is sensation, formless matter, which the spirit can -never apprehend in itself as simple matter. This it can only possess -with form and in form, but postulates the notion of it as a mere limit. -Matter, in its abstraction, is mechanism, passivity; it is what the -spirit of man suffers, but does not produce. Without it no human -knowledge or activity is possible; but mere matter produces animality, -whatever is brutal and impulsive in man, not the spiritual dominion, -which is humanity. How often we strive to understand clearly what is -passing within us! We do catch a glimpse of something, but this does -not appear to the mind as objectified and formed. It is in such moments -as these that we best perceive the profound difference between matter -and form. These are not two acts of ours, opposed to one another; but -the one is outside us and assaults and sweeps us off our feet, while -the other inside us tends to absorb and identify itself with that -which is outside. Matter, clothed and conquered by form, produces -concrete form. It is the matter, the content, which differentiates one -of our intuitions from another: the form is constant: it is spiritual -activity, while matter is changeable. Without matter spiritual -activity would not forsake its abstractness to become concrete and -real activity, this or that spiritual content, this or that definite -intuition. - -It is a curious fact, characteristic of our times, that this very form, -this very activity of the spirit, which is essentially ourselves, is -so often ignored or denied. Some confound the spiritual activity of -man with the metaphorical and mythological activity of what is called -nature, which is mechanism and has no resemblance to human activity, -save when we imagine, with Æsop, that "_arbores loquuntur non tantum -ferae._" Some affirm that they have never observed in themselves this -"miraculous" activity, as though there were no difference, or only -one of quantity, between sweating and thinking, feeling cold and the -energy of the will. Others, certainly with greater reason, would -unify activity and mechanism in a more general concept, though they -are specifically distinct. Let us, however, refrain for the moment -from examining if such a final unification be possible, and in what -sense, but admitting that the attempt may be made, it is clear that -to unify two concepts in a third implies to begin with the admission -of a difference between the two first. Here it is this difference that -concerns us and we set it in relief. - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and association._] - -Intuition has sometimes been confused with simple sensation. But since -this confusion ends by being offensive to common sense, it has more -frequently been attenuated or concealed with a phraseology apparently -designed at once to confuse and to distinguish them. Thus, it has -been asserted that intuition is sensation, but not so much simple -sensation as _association_ of sensations. Here a double meaning is -concealed in the word "association." Association is understood, either -as memory, mnemonic association, conscious recollection, and in that -case the claim to unite in memory elements which are not intuited, -distinguished, possessed in some way by the spirit and produced by -consciousness, seems inconceivable: or it is understood as association -of unconscious elements, in which case we remain in the world of -sensation and of nature. But if with certain associationists we speak -of an association which is neither memory nor flux of sensations, but -a _productive_ association (formative, constructive, distinguishing); -then our contention is admitted and only its name is denied to it. -For productive association is no longer association in the sense -of the sensationalists, but _synthesis,_ that is to say, spiritual -activity. Synthesis may be called association; but with the concept of -productivity is already posited the distinction between passivity and -activity, between sensation and intuition. - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and representation._] - -Other psychologists are disposed to distinguish from sensation -something which is sensation no longer, but is not yet intellectual -concept: the _representation_ or _image._ What is the difference -between their representation or image and our intuitive knowledge? -Everything and nothing: for "representation" is a very equivocal word. -If by representation be understood something cut off and standing -out from the psychic basis of the sensations, then representation is -intuition. If, on the other hand, it be conceived as complex sensation -we are back once more in crude sensation, which does not vary in -quality according to its richness or poverty, or according to whether -the organism in which it appears is rudimentary or highly developed -and full of traces of past sensations. Nor is the ambiguity remedied -by defining representation as a psychic product of secondary degree -in relation to sensation, defined as occupying the first place. What -does secondary degree mean here? Does it mean a qualitative, formal -difference? If so, representation is an elaboration of sensation -and therefore intuition. Or does it mean greater complexity and -complication, a quantitative, material difference? In that case -intuition is once more confused with simple sensation. - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and expression._] - -And yet there is a sure method of distinguishing true intuition, true -representation, from that which is inferior to it: the spiritual fact -from the mechanical, passive, natural fact. Every true intuition or -representation is also _expression._ That which does not objectify -itself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation -and mere natural fact. The spirit only intuites in making, forming, -expressing. He who separates intuition from expression never succeeds -in reuniting them. - -Intuitive activity _possesses intuitions to the extent that it -expresses them._ Should this proposition sound paradoxical, that is -partly because, as a general rule, a too restricted meaning is given to -the word "expression." It is generally restricted to what are called -verbal expressions alone. But there exist also non-verbal expressions, -such as those of line, colour and sound, and to all of these must -be extended our affirmation, which embraces therefore every sort of -manifestation of the man, as orator, musician, painter, or anything -else. But be it pictorial, or verbal, or musical, or in whatever other -form it appear, to no intuition can expression in one of its forms be -wanting; it is, in fact, an inseparable part of intuition. How can we -really possess an intuition of a geometrical figure, unless we possess -so accurate an image of it as to be able to trace it immediately upon -paper or on the blackboard? - -How can we really have an intuition of the contour of a region, for -example of the island of Sicily, if we are not able to draw it as -it is in all its meanderings? Every one can experience the internal -illumination which follows upon his success in formulating to -himself his impressions and feelings, but only so far as he is able -to formulate them. Feelings or impressions, then, pass by means of -words from the obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the -contemplative spirit. It is impossible to distinguish intuition from -expression in this cognitive process. The one appears with the other at -the same instant, because they are not two, but one. - -[Sidenote: _Illusion as to their difference._] - -The principal reason which makes our view appear paradoxical as we -maintain it, is the illusion or prejudice that we possess a more -complete intuition of reality than we really do. One often hears people -say that they have many great thoughts in their minds, but that they -are not able to express them. But if they really had them, they would -have coined them into just so many beautiful, sounding words, and thus -have expressed them. If these thoughts seem to vanish or to become few -and meagre in the act of expressing them, the reason is that they did -not exist or really were few and meagre. People think that all of us -ordinary men imagine and intuite countries, figures and scenes like -painters, and bodies like sculptors; save that painters and sculptors -know how to paint and carve such images, while we bear them unexpressed -in our souls. They believe that any one could have imagined a Madonna -of Raphæl; but that Raphæl was Raphæl owing to his technical ability -in putting the Madonna upon canvas. Nothing can be more false than -this view. The world which as a rule we intuite is a small thing. It -consists of little expressions, which gradually become greater and -wider with the increasing spiritual concentration of certain moments. -They are the words we say to ourselves, our silent judgments: "Here -is a man, here is a horse, this is heavy, this is sharp, this pleases -me," etc. It is a medley of light and colour, with no greater pictorial -value than would be expressed by a haphazard splash of colours, from -among which one could barely make out a few special, distinctive -traits. This and nothing else is what we possess in our ordinary life; -this is the basis of our ordinary action. It is the index of a book. -The labels tied to things (it has been said) take the place of the -things themselves. This index and these labels (themselves expressions) -suffice for small needs and small actions. From time to time we pass -from the index to the book, from the label to the thing, or from the -slight to the greater intuitions, and from these to the greatest and -most lofty. This passage is sometimes far from easy. It has been -observed by those who have best studied the psychology of artists that -when, after having given a rapid glance at any one, they attempt to -obtain a real intuition of him, in order, for example, to paint his -portrait, then this ordinary vision, that seemed so precise, so lively, -reveals itself as little better than nothing. What remains is found to -be at the most some superficial trait, which would not even suffice for -a caricature. The person to be painted stands before the artist like a -world to discover. Michæl Angelo said, "One paints, not with the hands, -but with the brain." Leonardo shocked the prior of the Convent of the -Graces by standing for days together gazing at the "Last Supper," -without touching it with the brush. He remarked of this attitude: "The -minds of men of lofty genius are most active in invention when they are -doing the least external work." The painter is a painter, because he -sees what others only feel or catch a glimpse of, but do not see. We -think we see a smile, but in reality we have only a vague impression -of it, we do not perceive all the characteristic traits of which it -is the sum, as the painter discovers them after he has worked upon -them and is thus able to fix them on the canvas. We do not intuitively -possess more even of our intimate friend, who is with us every day -and at all hours, than at most certain traits of physiognomy which -enable us to distinguish him from others. The illusion is less easy as -regards musical expression; because it would seem strange to every -one to say that the composer had added or attached notes to a motive -which was already in the mind of him who is not the composer; as if -Beethoven's Ninth Symphony were not his own intuition and his intuition -the Ninth Symphony. Now, just as one who is deluded as to the amount -of his material wealth is confuted by arithmetic, which states its -exact amount, so he who nourishes delusions as to the wealth of his -own thoughts and images is brought back to reality, when he is obliged -to cross the _Pons Asinorum_ of expression. Let us say to the former, -count; to the latter, speak; or, here is a pencil, draw, express -yourself. - -Each of us, as a matter of fact, has in him a little of the poet, of -the sculptor, of the musician, of the painter, of the prose writer: -but how little, as compared with those who bear those names, just -because they possess the most universal dispositions and energies -of human nature in so lofty a degree! How little too does a painter -possess of the intuitions of a poet! And how little does one painter -possess those of another painter! Nevertheless, that little is all -our actual patrimony of intuitions or representations. Beyond these -are only impressions, sensations, feelings, impulses, emotions, or -whatever else one may term what still falls short of the spirit and is -not assimilated by man; something postulated for the convenience of -exposition, while actually non-existent, since to exist also is a fact -of the spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of intuition and expression._] - -We may thus add this to the various verbal descriptions of intuition, -noted at the beginning: intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge. -Independent and autonomous in respect to intellectual function; -indifferent to later empirical discriminations, to reality and to -unreality, to formations and apperceptions of space and time, which are -also later: intuition or representation is distinguished as _form_ from -what is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation, or from -psychic matter; and this form, this taking possession, is expression. -To intuite is to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing -less) than _to express._ - - - - -II - - -INTUITION AND ART - - -[Sidenote: _Corollaries and explanations._] - -Before proceeding further, it may be well to draw certain consequences -from what has been established and to add some explanations. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of art and intuitive knowledge._] - -We have frankly identified intuitive or expressive knowledge with the -æsthetic or artistic fact, taking works of art as examples of intuitive -knowledge and attributing to them the characteristics of intuition, and -_vice versa._ But our identification is combated by a view held even by -many philosophers, who consider art to be an intuition of an altogether -special sort. "Let us admit" (they say) "that art is intuition; but -intuition is not always art: artistic intuition is a distinct species -differing from intuition in general by something _more_." - -[Sidenote: _No specific difference._] - -But no one has ever been able to indicate of what this something more -consists. It has sometimes been thought that art is not a simple -intuition, but an intuition of an intuition, in the same way as the -concept of science has been defined, not as the ordinary concept, -but as the concept of a concept. Thus man would attain to art by -objectifying, not his sensations, as happens with ordinary intuition, -but intuition itself. But this process of raising to a second power -does not exist; and the comparison of it with the ordinary and -scientific concept does not prove what is intended, for the good -reason that it is not true that the scientific concept is the concept -of a concept. If this comparison proves anything, it proves just the -opposite. The ordinary concept, if it be really a concept and not a -simple representation, is a perfect concept, however poor and limited. -Science substitutes concepts for representations; for those concepts -that are poor and limited it substitutes others, larger and more -comprehensive; it is ever discovering new relations. But its method -does not differ from that by which is formed the smallest universal -in the brain of the humblest of men. What is generally called _par -excellence_ art, collects intuitions that are wider and more complex -than those which we generally experience, but these intuitions are -always of sensations and impressions. - -Art is expression of impressions, not expression of expression. - -[Sidenote: _No difference of intensity._] - -For the same reason, it cannot be asserted that the intuition, which is -generally called artistic, differs from ordinary intuition as intensive -intuition. This would be the case if it were to operate differently on -the same matter. But since the artistic function is extended to wider -fields, yet does not differ in method from ordinary intuition, the -difference between them is not intensive but extensive. The intuition -of the simplest popular love-song, which says the same thing, or very -nearly, as any declaration of love that issues at every moment from the -lips of thousands of ordinary men, may be intensively perfect in its -poor simplicity, although it be extensively so much more limited than -the complex intuition of a love-song by Leopardi. - -[Sidenote: _The difference is extensive and empirical._] - -The whole difference, then, is quantitative, and as such is indifferent -to philosophy, _scientia qualitatum._ Certain men have a greater -aptitude, a more frequent inclination fully to express certain -complex states of the soul. These men are known in ordinary language -as artists. Some very complicated and difficult expressions are not -often achieved, and these are called works of art. The limits of -the expression-intuitions that are called art, as opposed to those -that are vulgarly called non-art, are empirical and impossible to -define. If an epigram be art, why not a simple word? If a story, why -not the news-jottings of the journalist? If a landscape, why not a -topographical sketch? The teacher of philosophy in Molière's comedy was -right: "whenever we speak, we create prose." But there will always be -scholars like Monsieur Jourdain, astonished at having spoken prose for -forty years without knowing it, who will have difficulty in persuading -themselves that when they call their servant John to bring their -slippers, they have spoken nothing less than--prose. - -We must hold firmly to our identification, because among the principal -reasons which have prevented Æsthetic, the science of art, from -revealing the true nature of art, its real roots in human nature, -has been its separation from the general spiritual life, the having -made of it a sort of special function or aristocratic club. No one -is astonished when he learns from physiology that every cell is an -organism and every organism a cell or synthesis of cells. No one is -astonished at finding in a lofty mountain the same chemical elements -that compose a small stone fragment. There is not one physiology of -small animals and one of large animals; nor is there a special chemical -theory of stones as distinct from mountains. In the same way, there is -not a science of lesser intuition as distinct from a science of greater -intuition, nor one of ordinary intuition as distinct from artistic -intuition. There is but one Æsthetic, the science of intuitive or -expressive knowledge, which is the æsthetic or artistic fact. And this -Æsthetic is the true analogue of Logic, which includes, as facts of the -same nature, the formation of the smallest and most ordinary concept -and the most complicated scientific and philosophical system. - -[Sidenote: _Artistic genius._] - -Nor can we admit that the word _genius_ or artistic genius, as -distinct from the non-genius of the ordinary man, possesses more than -a quantitative signification. Great artists are said to reveal us to -ourselves. But how could this be possible, unless there were identity -of nature between their imagination and ours, and unless the difference -were only one of quantity? It were better to change _poeta nascitur_ -into _homo nascitur poeta_: some men are born great poets, some small. -The cult of the genius with all its attendant superstitions has arisen -from this quantitative difference having been taken as a difference of -quality. It has been forgotten that genius is not something that has -fallen from heaven, but humanity itself. The man of genius who poses or -is represented as remote from humanity finds his punishment in becoming -or appearing somewhat ridiculous. Examples of this are the _genius_ of -the romantic period and the _superman_ of our time. - -But it is well to note here, that those who claim unconsciousness as -the chief quality of an artistic genius, hurl him from an eminence -far above humanity to a position far below it. Intuitive or artistic -genius, like every form of human activity, is always conscious; -otherwise it would be blind mechanism. The only thing that can be -wanting to artistic genius is the _reflective_ consciousness, the -superadded consciousness of the historian or critic, which is not -essential to it. - -[Sidenote: _Content and form in Æsthetic._] - -The relation between matter and form, or between _content_ and -_form,_ as is generally said, is one of the most disputed questions -in Æsthetic. Does the æsthetic fact consist of content alone, or of -form alone, or of both together? This question has taken on various -meanings, which we shall mention, each in its place. But when these -words are taken as signifying what we have above defined, and matter is -understood as emotionality not æsthetically elaborated, or impressions, -and form as intellectual activity and expression, then our view cannot -be in doubt. We must, that is to say, reject both the thesis that makes -the æsthetic fact to consist of the content alone (that is, the simple -impressions), and the thesis which makes it to consist of a junction -between form and content, that is, of impressions plus expressions. -In the æsthetic fact, expressive activity is not added to the fact of -the impressions, but these latter are formed and elaborated by it. The -impressions reappear as it were in expression, like water put into a -filter, which reappears the same and yet different on the other side. -The æsthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing but form. - -From this was inferred not that the content is something superfluous -(it is, on the contrary, the necessary point of departure for the -expressive fact); but that _there is no passage_ from the qualities of -the content to those of the form. It has sometimes been thought that -the content, in order to be æsthetic, that is to say, transformable -into form, should possess some determined or determinable qualities. -But were that so, then form and content, expression and impression, -would be the same thing. It is true that the content is that which -is convertible into form, but it has no determinable qualities until -this transformation takes place. We know nothing about it. It does not -become æsthetic content before, but only after it has been actually -transformed. The æsthetic content has also been defined as the -_interesting._ That is not an untrue statement; it is merely void of -meaning. Interesting to what? To the expressive activity? Certainly -the expressive activity would not have raised the content to the -dignity of form, had it not been interested in it. Being interested is -precisely the raising of the content to the dignity of form. But the -word "interesting" has also been employed in another and a illegitimate -sense, which we shall explain further on. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the artistic -illusion._] - -The proposition that art is _imitation of nature_ has also several -meanings. Sometimes truths have been expressed or at least shadowed -forth in these words, sometimes errors have been promulgated. More -frequently, no definite thought has been expressed at all. One of -the scientifically legitimate meanings occurs when "imitation" is -understood as representation or intuition of nature, a form of -knowledge. And when the phrase is used with this intention, and in -order to emphasize the spiritual character of the process, another -proposition becomes legitimate also: namely, that art is the -_idealization_ or _idealizing_ imitation of nature. But if by imitation -of nature be understood that art gives mechanical reproductions, -more or less perfect duplicates of natural objects, in the presence -of which is renewed the same tumult of impressions as that caused -by natural objects, then the proposition is evidently false. The -coloured waxen effigies that imitate the life, before which we stand -astonished in the museums where such things are shown, do not give -æsthetic intuitions. Illusion and hallucination have nothing to do -with the calm domain of artistic intuition. But on the other hand if -an artist paint the interior of a wax-work museum, or if an actor -give a burlesque portrait of a man-statue on the stage, we have work -of the spirit and artistic intuition. Finally, if photography have in -it anything artistic, it will be to the extent that it transmits the -intuition of the photographer, his point of view, the pose and grouping -which he has striven to attain. And if photography be not quite an art, -that is precisely because the element of nature in it remains more or -less unconquered and ineradicable. Do we ever, indeed, feel complete -satisfaction before even the best of photographs? Would not an artist -vary and touch up much or little, remove or add something to all of -them? - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling, not a -theoretical fact. Æsthetic appearance, and feeling._] - -The statements repeated so often, that art is not knowledge, that -it does not tell the truth, that it does not belong to the world of -theory, but to the world of feeling, and so forth, arise from the -failure to realize exactly the theoretic character of simple intuition. -This simple intuition is quite distinct from intellectual knowledge, -as it is distinct from perception of the real; and the statements -quoted above arise from the belief that only intellectual cognition is -knowledge. We have seen that intuition is knowledge, free from concepts -and more simple than the so-called perception of the real. Therefore -art is knowledge, form; it does not belong to the world of feeling or -to psychic matter. The reason why so many æstheticians have so often -insisted that art is _appearance_ (_Schein_), is precisely that they -have felt the necessity of distinguishing it from the more complex fact -of perception, by maintaining its pure intuitiveness. And if for the -same reason it has been claimed that art is _feeling_ the reason is -the same. For if the concept as content of art, and historical reality -as such, be excluded from the sphere of art, there remains no other -content than reality apprehended in all its ingenuousness and immediacy -in the vital impulse, in its _feeling,_ that is to say again, pure -intuition. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of æsthetic senses._] - -The theory of the _æsthetic senses_ has also arisen from the failure to -establish, or from having lost to view, the character of expression as -distinct from impression, of form as distinct from matter. - -This theory can be reduced to the error just indicated of wishing to -find a passage from the qualities of the content to those of the form. -To ask, in fact, what the æsthetic senses are, implies asking what -sensible impressions are able to enter into æsthetic expressions, and -which must of necessity do so. To this we must at once reply, that -all impressions can enter into æsthetic expressions or formations, -but that none are bound to do so of necessity. Dante raised to the -dignity of form not only the "sweet colour of the oriental sapphire" -(visual impressions), but also tactual or thermic impressions, such as -the "dense air" and the "fresh rivulets" which "parch the more" the -throat of the thirsty. The belief that a picture yields only visual -impressions is a curious illusion. The bloom on a cheek, the warmth of -a youthful body, the sweetness and freshness of a fruit, the edge of a -sharp knife, are not these, too, impressions obtainable from a picture? -Are they visual? What would a picture mean to an imaginary man, lacking -all or many of his senses, who should in an instant acquire the organ -of sight alone? The picture we are looking at and believe we see only -with our eyes would seem to his eyes to be little more than an artist's -paint-smeared palette. - -Some who hold firmly to the æsthetic character of certain groups of -impressions (for example, the visual and auditive), and exclude others, -are nevertheless ready to admit that if visual and auditive impressions -enter _directly_ into the æsthetic fact, those of the other senses -also enter into it, but only as _associated._ But this distinction is -altogether arbitrary. Æsthetic expression is synthesis, in which it -is impossible to distinguish direct and indirect. All impressions are -placed by it on a level, in so far as they are æstheticized. A man who -absorbs the subject of a picture or poem does not have it before him as -a series of impressions, some of which have prerogatives and precedence -over the others. He knows nothing as to what has happened prior to -having absorbed it, just as, on the other hand, distinctions made after -reflexion have nothing whatever to do with art as such. - -The theory of the æsthetic senses has also been presented in another -way; as an attempt to establish what physiological organs are necessary -for the æsthetic fact. The physiological organ or apparatus is nothing -but a group of cells, constituted and disposed in a particular manner; -that is to say, it is a merely physical and natural fact or concept. -But expression does not know physiological facts. Expression has its -point of departure in the impressions, and the physiological path -by which these have found their way to the mind is to it altogether -indifferent. One way or another comes to the same thing: it suffices -that they should be impressions. - -It is true that the want of given organs, that is, of certain groups of -cells, prevents the formation of certain impressions (when these are -not otherwise obtained through a kind of organic compensation). The -man born blind cannot intuite and express light. But the impressions -are not conditioned solely by the organ, but also by the stimuli which -operate upon the organ. One who has never had the impression of the sea -will never be able to express it, in the same way as one who has never -had the impression of the life of high society or of the political -arena will never express either. This, however, does not prove the -dependence of the expressive function on the stimulus or on the -organ. It merely repeats what we know already: expression presupposes -impression, and particular expressions particular impressions. For the -rest, every impression excludes other impressions during the moment in -which it dominates; and so does every expression. - -[Sidenote: _Unity and indivisibility of the work of art._] - -Another corollary of the conception of expression as activity is the -_indivisibility_ of the work of art. Every expression is a single -expression. Activity is a fusion of the impressions in an organic -whole. A desire to express this has always prompted the affirmation -that the work of art should have _unity,_ or, what amounts to the same -thing, _unity in variety._ Expression is a synthesis of the various, or -multiple, in the one. - -The fact that we divide a work of art into parts, a poem into scenes, -episodes, similes, sentences, or a picture into single figures and -objects, background, foreground, etc., may seem opposed to this -affirmation. But such division annihilates the work, as dividing the -organism into heart, brain, nerves, muscles and so on, turns the living -being into a corpse. It is true that there exist organisms in which -division gives rise to other living beings, but in such a case we must -conclude, maintaining the analogy between the organism and the work of -art, that in the latter case too there are numerous germs of life each -ready to grow, in a moment, into a single complete expression. - -It may be said that expression sometimes arises from other expressions. -There are simple and there are _compound_ expressions. One must surely -admit some difference between the _eureka,_ with which Archimedes -expressed all his joy at his discovery, and the expressive act (indeed -all the five acts) of a regular tragedy.--Not in the least: expression -always arises directly from impressions. He who conceives a tragedy -puts into a crucible a great quantity, so to say, of impressions: -expressions themselves, conceived on other occasions, are fused -together with the new in a single mass, in the same way as we can -cast into a melting furnace formless pieces of bronze and choicest -statuettes. Those choicest statuettes must be melted just like the -pieces of bronze, before there can be a new statue. The old expressions -must descend again to the level of impressions, in order to be -synthesized in a new single expression. - -[Sidenote: _Art as liberator._] - -By elaborating his impressions, man _frees_ himself from them. By -objectifying them, he removes them from him and makes himself their -superior. The liberating and purifying function of art is another -aspect and another formula of its character as activity. Activity is -the deliverer, just because it drives away passivity. - -This also explains why it is usual to attribute to artists both the -maximum of sensibility or _passion_, and the maximum of insensibility -or Olympian _serenity._ The two characters are compatible, for they do -not refer to the same object. The sensibility or passion relates to -the rich material which the artist absorbs into his psychic organism; -the insensibility or serenity to the form with which he subdues and -dominates the tumult of the sensations and passions. - - - - -III - - -ART AND PHILOSOPHY - - -[Sidenote: _Inseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge._] - -The two forms of knowledge, æsthetic and intellectual or conceptual, -are indeed different, but this does not altogether amount to separation -and disjunction, as of two forces each pulling in its own direction. -If we have shown that the æsthetic form is altogether independent of -the intellectual and suffices to itself without external support, we -have not said that the intellectual can stand without the æsthetic. To -describe the independence as _reciprocal_ would not be true. - -What is knowledge by concepts? It is knowledge of the relations of -things, and things are intuitions. Concepts are not possible without -intuitions, just as intuition is itself impossible without the matter -of impressions. Intuitions are: this river, this lake, this brook, -this rain, this glass of water; the concept is: water, not this or -that appearance and particular example of water, but water in general, -in whatever time or place it be realized; the material of infinite -intuitions, but of one single constant concept. - -But the concept, the universal, if it be no longer intuition in one -respect, is intuition in another respect, and cannot fail of being -intuition. The man who thinks has impressions and emotions, in so far -as he thinks. His impression and emotion will be not love or hate, -not the passion of the man who is not a philosopher, not hate or love -for certain objects and individuals, but _the effort of his thought -itself,_ with the pain and the joy, the love and the hate joined to it. -This effort cannot but assume an intuitive form, in becoming objective -to the spirit. To speak is not to think logically; but to _think -logically_ is also to _speak._ - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the negations of this thesis._] - -That thought cannot exist without speech, is a truth generally -admitted. The negations of this thesis are all founded on equivocations -and errors. - -The first of the equivocations is that of those who observe that one -can likewise think with geometrical figures, algebraical numbers, -ideographic signs, without any word, even pronounced silently and -almost insensibly within one; that there are languages in which the -word, the phonetic sign, expresses nothing, unless the written sign -also be examined, and so on. But when we said "speak," we intended -to employ a synecdoche, by which was to be understood "expression" -in general, for we have already remarked that expression is not only -so-called verbal expression. It may or may not be true that certain -concepts may be thought without phonetic manifestations. But the very -examples adduced to show this also prove that those concepts never -exist without expressions. - -Others point out that animals, or certain animals, think and reason -without speaking. Now as to how, whether, and what animals think, -whether they be rudimentary men, like savages who refuse to be -civilized, rather than physiological machines, as the old spiritualists -maintained, are questions that do not concern us here. When the -philosopher talks of animal, brutal, impulsive, instinctive nature -and the like, he does not base himself on such conjectures as to -dogs or cats, lions or ants; but upon observations of what is called -animal and brutal in man: of the animal side or basis of what we feel -in ourselves. If individual animals, dogs or cats, lions or ants, -possess something of the activity of man, so much the better, or so -much the worse, for them. This means that in respect to them also we -must talk, not of "nature" as a whole, but of its animal basis, as -being perhaps larger and stronger in them than the animal basis of -man. And if we suppose that animals think and form concepts, what kind -of conjecture would justify the assertion that they do so without -corresponding expressions? Analogy with man, knowledge of the spirit, -human psychology, the instrument of all our conjectures as to animal -psychology, would constrain us on the contrary to suppose that if they -think in any way, they also somehow speak. - -Another objection is derived from human psychology, and indeed literary -psychology, to the effect that the concept can exist without the word, -for it is certainly true that we all know books _well thought and -ill written_: that is to say, a thought which remains _beyond_ the -expression, or _notwithstanding_ faulty expression. But when we talk of -books well thought and ill written, we cannot mean anything but that in -such books are parts, pages, periods or propositions well thought and -well written, and other parts (perhaps the least important) ill thought -and ill written, not really thought and so not really expressed. Where -Vico's _Scienza nuova_ is really ill written, it is also ill thought. -If we pass from the consideration of big books to a short sentence, the -error or inaccuracy of such a contention will leap to the eyes. How -could a single sentence be clearly thought and confusedly written? - -All that can be admitted is that sometimes we possess thoughts -(concepts) in an intuitive form, which is an abbreviated or rather -peculiar expression, sufficient for us, but not sufficient to -communicate it easily to any other given person or persons. Hence it -is incorrect to say that we have the thought without the expression; -whereas we should rather say that we have, indeed, the expression, but -in such a form that it is not easy to communicate it to others. This, -however, is a very variable, relative fact. There are always those who -catch our thought on the wing, prefer it in this abbreviated form, -and would be wearied by the greater development of it required by -others. In other words, the thought considered abstractly and logically -will be the same; but æsthetically we are dealing with two different -intuition-expressions, into which different psychological elements -enter. The same argument suffices to destroy, that is, to interpret -correctly, the altogether empirical distinctior between an _internal_ -and an _external_ language. - -[Sidenote: _Art and science._] - -The most lofty manifestations, the summits of intellectual and of -intuitive knowledge shining from afar, are called, as we know, Art and -Science. Art and Science, then, are different and yet linked together; -they meet on one side, which is the æsthetic side. Every scientific -work is also a work of art. The æsthetic side may remain little noticed -when our mind is altogether taken up with the effort to understand the -thought of the man of science and to examine its truth. But it is no -longer unnoticed when we pass from the activity of understanding to -that of contemplation and see that thought either develop itself before -us, limpid, exact, well-shaped, without superfluous or insufficient -words, with appropriate rhythm and intonation; or confused, broken, -embarrassed, tentative. Great thinkers are sometimes called great -writers, while other equally great thinkers remain more or less -fragmentary writers even if their fragments have the scientific value -of harmonious, coherent, and perfect works. - -We pardon thinkers and men of science their literary mediocrity. The -fragments, the flashes, console us for the whole, because it is far -easier to recover the well-arranged composition from the fragmentary -work of genius, to liberate the flame latent in the spark, than to -achieve the discovery of genius. But how can we pardon mediocre -expression in pure artists? "_Mediocribus esse poetis non di, non -homines, non concessere columnae_" The poet or painter who lacks -form, lacks everything, because he lacks _himself._ Poetical material -permeates the souls of all: the expression alone, that is to say, -the form, makes the poet. And here appears the truth of the view -which denies all content to art, just the intellectual concept being -understood as content. In this sense, when we take "content" as equal -to "concept" it is most true, not only that art does not consist of -content, but also that _it has no content._ - -[Sidenote: _Content and form: another meaning. Prose and poetry._] - -The distinction between _poetry and prose_ also cannot be justified, -save as that between art and science. It was seen in antiquity that -such distinction could not be founded on external elements, such as -rhythm and metre, or on rhymed or unrhymed form; that it was, on the -contrary, altogether internal. Poetry is the language of feeling, prose -of the intellect; but since the intellect is also feeling, in its -concreteness and reality, all prose has its poetical side. - -[Sidenote: _The relation of first and second degree._] - -The relation between intuitive knowledge or expression and intellectual -knowledge or concept, between art and science, poetry and prose, cannot -be otherwise defined than by saying that it is one of _double degree._ -The first degree is the expression, the second the concept: the first -can stand without the second, but the second cannot stand without the -first. There is poetry without prose, but not prose without poetry. -Expression, indeed, is the first affirmation of human activity. Poetry -is "the mother tongue of the human race"; the first men "were by nature -sublime poets." We assert this in another way, when we observe that -the passage from soul to spirit, from animal to human activity, is -effected by means of language. And this should be said of intuition -or expression in general. But to us it appears somewhat inaccurate to -define language or expression as an _intermediate_ link between nature -and humanity, as though it were a mixture of both. Where humanity -appears, the other has already disappeared; the man who expresses -himself, certainly emerges from the state of nature, but he really does -emerge: he does not stand half within and half without, as the use of -the phrase "intermediate link" would imply. - -[Sidenote: _Non-existence of other forms of knowledge._] - -The cognitive spirit has no form other than these two. Expression and -concept exhaust it completely. The whole speculative life of man is -spent in passing from one to the other and back again. - -[Sidenote: _Historicity. Its identity with and difference from art._] - -_Historicity_ is incorrectly held to be a third theoretical form. -Historicity is not form, but content: as form, it is nothing but -intuition or æsthetic fact. History does not seek for laws nor form -concepts; it employs neither induction nor deduction; it is directed -_ad narrandum, non ad demonstrandum_; it does not construct universals -and abstractions, but posits intuitions. The this and here, the -_individuum omnimode determinatum,_ is its domain, as it is the domain -of art. History, therefore, is included in the universal concept of art. - -As against this doctrine, in view of the impossibility of conceiving -a third mode of knowledge, objections have been brought forward which -would lead to the affiliation of history to intellectual or scientific -knowledge. The greater portion of these objections is animated by the -prejudice that in refusing to history the character of conceptual -science something of its value and dignity has been taken from it. This -really arises from a false idea of art, conceived not as an essential -theoretic function, but as an amusement, a superfluity, a frivolity. -Without reopening a long debate, which so far as we are concerned -is finally closed, we will mention here one sophism which has been -and still is widely repeated. Its purpose is to show the logical and -scientific nature of history. The sophism consists in admitting that -historical knowledge has for its object the individual; but not the -representation, it is added, but rather the concept of the individual. -From this it is argued that history is also a logical or scientific -form of knowledge. History, in fact, is supposed to work out the -concept of a personage such as Charlemagne or Napoleon; of an epoch, -like the Renaissance or the Reformation; of an event, such as the -French Revolution and the Unification of Italy. This it is held to do -in the same way as Geometry works out the concepts of spatial forms, or -Æsthetic that of expression. But all this is untrue. History cannot do -otherwise than _represent_ Napoleon and Charlemagne, the Renaissance -and the Reformation, the French Revolution and the Unification of Italy -as individual facts with their individual physiognomy: that is, in the -sense in which logicians use the word "represent" when they say that -one cannot have a concept of the individual, but only a representation. -The so-called concept of the individual is always a universal or -general concept, full of characteristics, supremely full, if you like, -but however full it be, incapable of attaining to that individuality to -which historical knowledge, as æsthetic knowledge, alone attains. - -To show how the content of history comes to be distinguished from -that of art in the narrow sense, we must recall what has already -been observed as to the ideal character of the intuition or first -perception, in which all is real and therefore nothing is real. Only -at a later stage does the spirit form the concepts of external and -internal, of what has happened and what is desired, of object and -subject, and the like: only at this later stage, that is, does it -distinguish historical from non-historical intuition, the _real_ from -the _unreal,_ real imagination from pure imagination. Even internal -facts, what is desired and imagined, castles in the air, and countries -of Cockaigne, have their reality, and the soul, too, has its history. -His illusions form part of the biography of every individual as real -facts. But the history of an individual soul is history, because -the distinction between the real and the unreal is always active -in it, even when the illusions themselves are the real. But these -distinctive concepts do not appear in history like the concepts of -science, but rather like those that we have seen dissolved and melted -in the æsthetic intuitions, although in history they stand out in a -manner altogether special to themselves. History does not construct -the concepts of the real and unreal, but makes use of them. History, -in fact, is not the theory of history. Mere conceptual analysis is -of no use in ascertaining whether an event in our lives was real or -imaginary. We must mentally reproduce the intuitions in the most -complete form, as they were at the moment of production. Historicity -is distinguished in the concrete from pure imagination as any one -intuition is distinguished from any other: in memory. - -[Sidenote: _Historical criticism._] - -Where this is not possible, where the delicate and fleeting shades -between the real and unreal intuitions are so slight as to mingle -the one with the other, we must either renounce for the time being at -least the knowledge of what really happened (and this we often do), or -we must fall back upon conjecture, verisimilitude, probability. The -principle of verisimilitude and of probability in fact dominates all -historical criticism. Examination of sources and authorities is devoted -to establishing the most credible evidence. And what is the most -credible evidence, save that of the best observers, that is, of those -who best remember and (be it understood) have not wished to falsify, -nor had interest in falsifying the truth of things? - -[Sidenote: _Historical scepticism._] - -From this it follows that intellectualistic scepticism finds it easy -to deny the certainty of any history, for the certainty of history -differs from that of science. It is the certainty of memory and -of authority, not that of analysis and demonstration. To speak of -historical induction or demonstration is to make a metaphorical use of -these expressions, which bear a quite different meaning in history to -that which they bear in science. The conviction of the historian is the -undemonstrable conviction of the juryman, who has heard the witnesses, -listened attentively to the case, and prayed Heaven to inspire him. -Sometimes, without doubt, he is mistaken, but the mistakes are in a -negligible minority compared with the occasions when he grasps the -truth. That is why good sense is right against the intellectualists in -believing in history, which is not a "fable agreed upon," but what the -individual and humanity remember of their past. We strive to enlarge -and to render as precise as possible this record, which in some places -is dim, in others very clear. We cannot do without it, such as it is, -and taken as a whole it is rich in truth. Only in a spirit of paradox -can one doubt that there ever was a Greece or a Rome, an Alexander or a -Cæsar, a feudal Europe overthrown by a series of revolutions, that on -the 1st of November 1517 the theses of Luther were fixed to the door of -the church at Wittemberg, or that the Bastile was taken by the people -of Paris on the 14th of July 1789. - -"What proof hast thou of all this?" asks the sophist, ironically. -Humanity replies: "I remember it." - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural -sciences, and their limits._] - -The world of what has happened, of the concrete, of historical fact, -is the world called real, natural, including in this definition both -the reality called physical and that called spiritual and human. All -this world is intuition; historical intuition, if it be shown as it -realistically is; imaginary or artistic intuition in the narrow sense, -if presented in the aspect of the possible, that is to say, of the -imaginable. - -Science, true science, which is not intuition but concept, not -individuality but universality, cannot be anything but science of the -spirit, that is, of what reality has of universal: Philosophy. If -natural _sciences_ be spoken of, apart from philosophy, we must observe -that these are not perfect sciences: they are aggregates of cognitions, -arbitrarily abstracted and fixed. The so-called natural sciences -indeed themselves recognize that they are surrounded by limitations, -and these limitations are nothing but historical and intuitive data. -They calculate, measure, establish equalities and uniformities, -create classes and types, formulate laws, show in their own way how -one fact arises out of other facts; but while doing this they are -constantly running into facts known intuitively and historically. -Even geometry now states that it rests altogether on hypotheses, -since threedimensional or Euclidean space is but one of the possible -spaces, selected for purposes of study because more convenient. What -is true in the natural sciences is either philosophy or historical -fact. What of properly naturalistic they contain, is abstraction and -caprice. When the natural sciences wish to become perfect sciences, -they must leave their circle and enter philosophy. They do this when -they posit concepts which are anything but naturalistic, such as those -of the unextended atom, of ether or vibration, of vital force, of -non-intuitional space, and the like. These are true and proper attempts -at philosophy, when they are not mere words void of meaning. The -concepts of natural science are, without doubt, most useful; but one -cannot obtain from them that _system_ which belongs only to the spirit. - -These historical and intuitive data which cannot be eliminated from the -natural sciences furthermore explain not only how, with the advance -of knowledge, what was once believed to be true sinks gradually to -the level of mythological belief and fantastic illusion, but also how -among natural scientists some are to be found who call everything in -their sciences upon which reasoning is founded _mythical facts, verbal -expedients,_ or _conventions._ Natural scientists and mathematicians -who approach the study of the energies of the spirit without -preparation, are apt to carry thither such mental habits and to speak -in philosophy of such and such conventions as "decreed by man." They -make conventions of truth and morality, and a supreme convention of -the Spirit itself! But if there are to be conventions, something must -exist which is no convention, but is itself the author of conventions. -This is the spiritual activity of man. The limitation of the natural -sciences postulates the illimitability of philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _The phenomenon and the noumenon._] - -These explications have firmly established that the pure or fundamental -forms of knowledge are two: the intuition and the concept--Art, and -Science or Philosophy. With these are to be included History, which -is, as it were, the product of intuition placed in contact with the -concept, that is, of art receiving in itself philosophic distinctions, -while remaining concrete and individual. All other forms (natural -sciences and mathematics) are impure, being mingled with extraneous -elements of practical origin. Intuition gives us the world, the -phenomenon; the concept gives us the noumenon, the Spirit. - - - - -IV - - -HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN ÆSTHETIC - - -These relations between intuitive or æsthetic knowledge and the other -fundamental or derivative forms of knowledge having been definitely -established, we are now in a position to reveal the errors of a series -of theories which have been, or are, presented as theories of Æsthetic. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of probability and of naturalism._] - -From the confusion between the demands of art in general and the -particular demands of history has resulted the theory (which has lost -ground to-day, but was once dominant) of the _probable_ as the object -of art. As is generally the case with erroneous propositions, the -meaning of those who employed and employ the concept of probability -has no doubt often been much more reasonable than their definition -of the word. By probability used really to be meant the artistic -_coherence_ of the representation, that is to say, its completeness -and effectiveness, its actual presence. If "probable" be translated -"coherent," a very just meaning will often be found in the discussions, -examples, and judgements of the critics who employ this word. An -improbable personage, an improbable ending to a comedy, are really -badly-drawn personages, badly-arranged endings, happenings without -artistic motive. It has been said with reason that even fairies and -sprites must have probability, that is to say, be really sprites and -fairies, coherent artistic intuitions. Sometimes the word "possible" -has been used instead of "probable." As we have already remarked in -passing, this word possible is synonymous with the imaginable or -intuitible. Everything truly, that is to say coherently, imagined, is -possible. But also, by a good many critics and theorists, the probable -was taken to mean the historically credible, or that historical truth -which is not demonstrable but conjecturable, not true but probable. -This was the character which these theorists sought to impose upon art. -Who does not remember how great a part was played in literary history -by criticism based on probability, for example, censure of _Jerusalem -Delivered,_ based upon the history of the Crusades, or of the Homeric -poems, upon the probable customs of emperors and kings? Sometimes too -the æsthetic reproduction of historical reality has been imposed upon -art. This is another of the erroneous forms taken by the theory of the -_imitation of nature._ Verism and naturalism also have afforded the -spectacle of a confusion of the æsthetic fact with the processes of the -natural sciences, by aiming at some sort of _experimental_ drama or -romance. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of ideas in art, of theses in art and of the -typical._] - -Confusions between the methods of art and those of the philosophic -sciences have been far more frequent. Thus it has often been held to -be the task of art to expound concepts, to unite an intelligible with -a sensible, to represent _ideas_ or _universals_; putting art in the -place of science, that is, confusing the artistic function in general -with the particular case in which it becomes æsthetico-logical. - -The theory of art as supporting _theses,_ of art considered as an -individual representation exemplifying scientific laws, can be proved -false in like manner. The example, as example, stands for the thing -exemplified, and is thus an exposition of the universal, that is to -say, a form of science, more or less popular or vulgarizing. - -The same may be said of the æsthetic theory of the _typical,_ when -by type is understood, as it frequently is, the abstraction or the -concept, and it is affirmed that art should make the _species_ shine -in the _individual._ If individual be here understood by typical, we -have here too a merely verbal variation. To typify would signify, in -this case, to characterize; that is, to determine and to represent -the individual. Don Quixote is a type; but of what is he a type, save -of all Don Quixotes? A type, so to speak, of himself. Certainly he -is not a type of abstract concepts, such as the loss of the sense of -reality, or of the love of glory. An infinite number of personages -can be thought of under these concepts, who are not Don Quixotes. In -other words, we find our own impressions fully determined and realized -in the expression of a poet (for example in a poetical personage). We -call that expression typical, which we might call simply æsthetic. Thus -poetical or artistic universals have sometimes been spoken of, only to -show that the artistic product is altogether spiritual and ideal. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the symbol and of the allegory._] - -Continuing to correct these errors, or to clear up misunderstandings, -we shall also remark that the _symbol_ has sometimes been given as the -essence of art. Now, if the symbol be conceived as inseparable from the -artistic intuition, it is a synonym for the intuition itself, which -always has an ideal character. There is no double bottom to art, but -one only; in art all is symbolical, because all is ideal. But if the -symbol be conceived as separable--if the symbol can be on one side, -and on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the -intellectualist error: the so-called symbol is the exposition of an -abstract concept, an _allegory_; it is science, or art aping science. -But we must also be just toward the allegorical. Sometimes it is -altogether harmless. Given the _Gerusalemme liberata,_ the allegory -was imagined afterwards; given the _A done_ of Marino, the poet of -the lascivious afterwards insinuated that it was written to show how -"immoderate indulgence ends in pain"; given a statue of a beautiful -woman, the sculptor can attach a label to the statue saying that -it represents _Clemency_ or _Goodness._ This allegory that arrives -attached to a finished work _post festum_ does not change the work of -art. What then is it? It is an expression externally _added_ to another -expression. A little page of prose is added to the _Gerusalemme,_ -expressing another thought of the poet; a verse or a strophe is added -to the _Adone,_ expressing what the poet would like to make a part -of his public believe; to the statue nothing but the single word: -_Clemency_ or _Goodness._ - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary kinds._] - -But the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error lies in the -theory of artistic and literary kinds, which still has vogue in -literary treatises and disturbs the critics and the historians of art. -Let us observe its genesis. - -The human mind can pass from the æsthetic to the logical, just because -the former is a first step in respect to the latter. It can destroy -expression, that is, the thought of the individual, by thinking of the -universal. It can gather up expressive facts into logical relations. -We have already shown that this operation becomes in its turn concrete -in an expression, but this does not mean that the first expressions -have not been destroyed. They have yielded their place to the new -æsthetico-logical expressions. When we are on the second step, we have -left the first. - -One who enters a picture-gallery, or who reads a series of poems, -having looked and read, may go further: he may seek out the nature and -the relations of the things there expressed. Thus those pictures and -compositions, each of which is an individual inexpressible in logical -terms, are gradually resolved into universals and abstractions, such -as _costumes, landscapes, portraits, domestic life, battles, animals, -flowers, fruit, seascapes, lakes, deserts; tragic, comic, pathetic, -cruel, lyrical, epic, dramatic, chivalrous, idyllic facts,_ and the -like. They are often also resolved into merely quantitative categories, -such as _miniature, picture, statuette, group, madrigal, ballad, -sonnet, sonnet-sequence, poetry, poem, story, romance,_ and the like. - -When we think the concept _domestic life,_ or _chivalry,_ or _idyll,_ -or _cruelty,_ or one of the quantitative concepts mentioned above, the -individual expressive fact from which we started has been abandoned. -From æsthetes that we were, we have changed into logicians; from -contemplators of expression, into reasoners. Certainly no objection -can be made to such a process. In what other way could science arise, -which, if it have æsthetic expressions presupposed in it, must yet go -beyond them in order to fulfil its function? The logical or scientific -form, as such, excludes the æsthetic form. He who begins to think -scientifically has already ceased to contemplate æsthetically; although -his thought assumes of necessity in its turn an æsthetic form, as has -already been said, and as it would be superfluous to repeat. - -Error begins when we try to deduce the expression from the concept, and -to find in what takes its place the laws of the thing whose place is -taken; when the difference between the second and the first step has -not been observed, and when, in consequence, we declare that we are -standing on the first step, when we are really standing on the second. -This error is known as the _theory of artistic and literary kinds._ - -"What is the _æsthetic_ form of domestic life, of chivalry, of -the idyll, of cruelty, and so forth? How should these contents be -_represented_?" Such is the absurd problem implied in the theory of -artistic and literary classes, when it has been shorn of excrescences -and reduced to a simple formula. It is in this that consists all -search after laws or rules of classes. Domestic life, chivalry, idyll, -cruelty and the like, are not impressions, but concepts. They are not -contents, but logical-æsthetic forms. You cannot express the form, -for it is already itself expression. For what are the words cruelty, -idyll, chivalry, domestic life, and so on, but the expression of those -concepts? - -Even the most refined of such distinctions, which possess the most -philosophic appearance, do not resist criticism; as when works of art -are divided into subjective and objective kinds, into lyric and epic, -into works of feeling and decorative works. In æsthetic analysis it is -impossible to separate subjective from objective, lyric from epic, the -image of feeling from that of things. - -[Sidenote: _Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art._] - -From the theory of artistic and literary kinds derive those erroneous -modes of judgement and of criticism, thanks to which, instead of asking -before a work of art if it be expressive and what it expresses, whether -it speak or stammer or is altogether silent, they ask if it obey the -_laws_ of epic or of tragedy, of historical painting or of landscape. -While making a verbal pretence of agreeing, or yielding a feigned -obedience, artists have, however, really always disregarded these _laws -of the kinds._ Every true work of art has violated some established -kind and upset the ideas of the critics, who have thus been obliged to -broaden the kinds, until finally even the broadened kind has proved too -narrow, owing to the appearance of new works of art, naturally followed -by new scandals, new upsettings and--new broadenings. - -To the same theory are due the prejudices, owing to which at one time -(is it really passed?) people used to lament that Italy had no tragedy -(until one arose who bestowed such a wreath, which alone of adornments -was wanting to her glorious locks), nor France the epic poem (until the -_Henriade,_ which slaked the thirsty throats of the critics). Eulogies -accorded to the inventors of new kinds are connected with these -prejudices, so much so, that in the seventeenth century the invention -of the _mock-heroic_ poem seemed an important event, and the honour of -it was disputed, as though it were the discovery of America. But the -works adorned with this name (the _Secchia rapita_ and the _Scherno -degli Dei_) were still-born, because their authors (a slight drawback) -had nothing new or original to say. Mediocrities racked their brains to -invent new kinds artificially. The _piscatorial_ eclogue was added to -the _pastoral,_ and finally the _military_ eclogue. The _Aminta_ was -dipped and became the _Alceo._ Finally, there have been historians of -art and literature, so much fascinated with these ideas of kinds, that -they claimed to write the history, not of individual and real literary -and artistic works, but of those empty phantoms, their kinds. They have -claimed to portray, not the evolution of the _artistic spirit,_ but the -_evolution of kinds._ - -The philosophical condemnation of artistic and literary kinds is found -in the formulation and demonstration of what artistic activity has -always done and good taste always recognized. What are we to do if good -taste and the real fact, when reduced to formulas, sometimes assume -the air of paradoxes? - -[Sidenote: _Empirical sense of the divisions of kinds._] - -It is not scientifically incorrect to talk of tragedies, comedies, -dramas, romances, pictures of everyday life, battle-pieces, landscapes, -seascapes, poems, versicles, lyrics, and the like, if it be only with -a view to be understood, and to draw attention to certain groups -of works, in general and approximately, to which, for one reason -or another, it is desired to draw attention. To employ _words_ and -_phrases_ is not to establish _laws_ and _definitions._ The mistake -only arises when the weight of a scientific definition is given to a -word, when we ingenuously let ourselves be caught in the meshes of -that phraseology. Pray permit me a comparison. The books in a library -must be arranged in one way or another. This used generally to be done -by a rough classification of subjects (among which the categories of -miscellaneous and eccentric were not wanting); they are now generally -arranged by sizes or by publishers. Who can deny the necessity and -the utility of such arrangements? But what should we say if some one -began seriously to seek out the literary laws of miscellanies and of -eccentricities, of the Aldines or Bodonis, of shelf A or shelf B, -that is to say, of those altogether arbitrary groupings whose sole -object was their practical utility. Yet should any one attempt such -an undertaking, he would be doing neither more nor less than those do -who seek out the _æsthetic laws_ which must in their belief control -literary and artistic kinds. - - - - -V - - -ANALOGOUS ERRORS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY AND IN LOGIC - - -The better to confirm these criticisms, it will be useful to cast a -rapid glance over analogous and opposite errors, due to ignorance as -to the true nature of art and its relation to history and to science. -These errors have injured alike the theory of history and that of -science, Historic (or Historiology) and Logic. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the philosophy of history._] - -Historical intellectualism has opened the way to the many attempts, -made especially during the last two centuries and continued to-day, to -discover _a philosophy of history,_ an _ideal history,_ a _sociology,_ -a _historical psychology,_ or whatever else a science may be called, -whose object is to extract from history concepts and universal laws. -What must these laws, these universals be? Historical laws and -historical concepts? In that case, an elementary acquaintance with -the theory of knowledge suffices to make clear the absurdity of the -attempt. When such expressions as a _historical law,_ a _historical -concept_ are not simply metaphors colloquially employed, they are truly -contradictory terms: the adjective is as unsuitable to the substantive -as in the expressions "qualitative quantity" or "pluralistic monism." -History implies concreteness and individuality, law and concept -mean abstractness and universality. But if the attempt to extract -_historical_ laws and concepts from history be abandoned, and it be -merely desired to draw from it laws and concepts, the attempt is -certainly not frivolous; but the science thus obtained will be, not -a philosophy of history, but rather, according to circumstances, -either philosophy in its various forms of Ethics, Logic, etc., or -empirical science with its infinite divisions and subdivisions. The -search is in fact either for those philosophical concepts which, as -already remarked, are the basis of every historical construction and -differentiate perception from intuition, historical intuition from pure -intuition, history from art; or already formed historical intuitions -are collected and arranged in types and classes, which is exactly the -method of the natural sciences. Great thinkers have sometimes donned -the ill-fitting cloak of the philosophy of history, and notwithstanding -the covering, they have attained philosophical truths of the greatest -magnitude. The cloak discarded, the truth has remained. Modern -sociologists are rather to be blamed, not so much for the illusion -in which they are involved when they talk of an impossible science -of sociology, as for the infecundity which almost always accompanies -their illusion. It matters little that Æsthetic should be called -"sociological Æsthetic," or Logic, "sociological Logic." The grave evil -is that such Æsthetic is an old-fashioned expression of sensationalism, -such Logic verbal and incoherent. The philosophical movement to which -we have referred has however borne two good fruits in relation to -history. First of all, a keener desire has arisen for a theory of -history, that is, a theory of the nature and the limits of history, a -theory which, in conformity with the analysis made above, cannot obtain -satisfaction save in a general science of intuition, in an Æsthetic, in -which the theory of history would form a special chapter, distinguished -by the insertion of universal functions. Furthermore, concrete truths -relating to historical events have often been expressed beneath the -false and presumptuous cloak of a philosophy of history; rules and -warnings have been formulated, empirical no doubt, yet by no means -useless to students and critics. It does not seem possible to deny this -utility even to the most recent of philosophies of history, known as -historical materialism, which has thrown a very vivid light upon many -sides of social life formerly neglected or ill understood. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic intrusions into Logic._] - -The principle of authority, of the _ipse dixit_, is an intrusion -by historicity into the domains of science and philosophy which -has dominated the schools and substitutes for introspection -and philosophical analysis this or that evidence, document, or -authoritative statement, with which history certainly cannot dispense. -But Logic, the science of thought and of intellectual knowledge, has -suffered the most grave and destructive of all disturbances and errors -through an imperfect understanding of the æsthetic fact. How could it -be otherwise, if logical activity come after and contain in itself -æsthetic activity? An inexact Æsthetic must of necessity drag after it -an inexact Logic. - -Whoever opens a logical treatise, from the _Organon_ of Aristotle -to the modern works on the subject, must agree that all contain a -haphazard mixture of verbal facts and facts of thought, of grammatical -forms and of conceptual forms, of Æsthetic and of Logic. Not that -attempts have been wanting to escape from verbal expression and to -seize thought in its true nature. Aristotelian logic itself did not -become mere syllogistic and verbalism without some hesitation and -indecision. The problem proper to logic was often touched upon in -their disputes by the nominalists, realists and conceptualists of the -Middle Ages. With Galileo and with Bacon, the natural sciences gave an -honourable place to induction. Vico combated formalist and mathematical -logic in favour of inventive methods. Kant called attention to the _a -priori_ synthesis. Absolute idealism despised the Aristotelian Logic. -The followers of Herbart, though still loyal to Aristotle, emphasized -those judgements which they called narrative and which have a character -altogether differing from that of other logical judgements. Finally, -the linguists insisted upon the irrationality of the word, in relation -to the concept. But a conscious, sure and radical movement of reform -can find no basis or point of departure, save in the science of -Æsthetic. - -[Sidenote: _Logic in its essence._] - -In a Logic suitably reformed on this basis, this truth must first and -foremost be proclaimed, and all its consequences deduced: the logical -fact, _the only logical fact,_ is _the concept,_ the universal, the -spirit that forms, and in so far as it forms, the universal. And if -by induction be understood, as sometimes it has been, the formation -of universals, and by deduction their verbal development, then it is -clear that true Logic can be nothing but inductive Logic. But since by -the word "deduction" has been more frequently understood the special -processes of mathematics, and the word "induction" those of the natural -sciences, it will be best to avoid both words and say that true Logic -is Logic of the concept. The Logic of the concept, while employing -a method which is both induction and deduction, will employ neither -exclusively, that is, it will employ the speculative method which is -intrinsic to it. - -The concept, the universal, considered abstractly in itself, is -_inexpressible._ No word is proper to it. So true is this, that the -logical concept remains always the same, notwithstanding the variation -of verbal forms. In respect to the concept, expression is a simple -_sign_ or _indication._ There must be an expression, it cannot be -absent; but what it is to be, this or that, is determined by the -historical and psychological conditions of the individual who is -speaking. The quality of the expression is not deducible from the -nature of the concept. There does not exist a true (logical) sense of -words. The true sense of words is that which is conferred upon them on -each occasion by the person forming a concept. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between logical and non-logical judgements._] - -This being so, the only truly logical (that is, æsthetico-logical) -propositions, the only rigorously logical judgements, must be those -whose proper and sole content is the determination of a concept. These -propositions or judgements are _definitions._ Science itself is nothing -but a collection of definitions, unified in a supreme definition; a -system of concepts, or highest concept. - -It is therefore necessary (at least as a preliminary) to exclude -from Logic all those propositions which do not affirm universals. -Narrative judgements, not less than those termed non-enunciative by -Aristotle, such as the expression of desires, are not properly logical -judgements. They are either purely æsthetic propositions or historical -propositions. "Peter is passing; it is raining to-day; I am sleepy; I -want to read": these and an infinity of propositions of the same kind -are nothing but either a mere enclosing in words the impression of -the fact that Peter is passing, of the falling rain, of my organism -inclining to sleep, and of my will directed to reading, or an -existential affirmation concerning those facts. They are expressions of -the real or of the unreal, historical-imaginative or pure-imaginative; -they are certainly not definitions of universals. - -[Sidenote: _Syllogistic._] - -This exclusion cannot meet with great difficulties. It is already -almost an accomplished fact, and the only thing required is to render -it explicit, decisive and coherent. But what is to be done with -all that part of human thought called _syllogistic,_ consisting of -judgements and reasonings based upon concepts? What is syllogistic? -Is it to be looked down upon with contempt, as something useless, as -has so often been done by the humanists in their reaction against -scholasticism, by absolute idealism, by the enthusiastic admiration of -our times for the methods of observation and experiment of the natural -sciences?--Syllogistic, reasonings _forma,_ is not the discovery of -truth; it is the art of expounding, debating, disputing with oneself -and others. Proceeding from concepts already formed, from facts already -observed, and appealing to the persistence of the true or of thought -(such is the meaning of the laws of identity and contradiction), it -infers consequences from those data, that is, it re-states what has -already been discovered. Therefore, if it be an _idem per idem_ from -the point of view of invention, it is most efficacious in teaching and -in exposition. To reduce affirmations to a syllogistic form is a way of -controlling one's own thought and of criticizing the thought of others. -It is easy to laugh at syllogizers, but, if syllogistic has been born -and persists, it must have good reasons of its own. Satire on it can -concern only its abuses, such as the attempt to prove syllogistically -questions of fact, observation and intuition, or the neglect of -profound meditation and unprejudiced investigation of problems, in -favour of syllogistic externality. And if so-called _mathematical -Logic_ can sometimes aid us in our attempt to remember with ease, -rapidly to control the results of our own thought, let us welcome this -form of syllogistic also, anticipated by Leibnitz among others and -again attempted by some in our own days. - -But precisely because syllogistic is the art of exposition and debate, -its theory cannot hold the first place in a philosophical Logic, thus -usurping that belonging to the doctrine of the concept, which is -the central and dominating doctrine, to which everything logical in -syllogistic is reducible, without leaving a residuum (relations of -concepts, subordination, co-ordination, identification and so on). Nor -must it ever be forgotten that concept and (logical) judgement and -syllogism are not in the same line. The first alone is the logical -fact, the second and third are the forms in which the first manifests -itself. These, in so far as they are forms, can only be examined -æsthetically (grammatically), and in so far as they possess logical -content, only by ignoring the forms themselves and passing to the -doctrine of the concept. - -[Sidenote: _Logical falsehood and æsthetic truth._] - -This confirms the truth of the ordinary remark to the effect that -he who reasons ill, also speaks and writes ill, that exact logical -analysis is the basis of good expression. This truth is a tautology, -for to reason well is in fact to express oneself well, because the -expression is the intuitive possession of one's own logical thought. -The principle of contradiction itself is at bottom nothing but -the æsthetic principle of coherence. It may be maintained that it -is possible to write and to speak exceedingly well, as it is also -possible to reason well though starting from erroneous concepts; that -some, though lacking the acuteness that makes a great discoverer, -are nevertheless exceedingly lucid writers; because to write well -depends upon having a clear intuition of one's own thought, even if -it be erroneous; not of its scientific, but of its æsthetic truth, -which indeed is the same thing as writing well. A philosopher like -Schopenhauer can imagine that art is a representation of the Platonic -ideas. This doctrine is scientifically false, yet he may develop this -false knowledge in excellent prose, æsthetically most true. But we -have already replied to these objections, when observing that at that -precise point where a speaker or a writer enunciates an ill-thought -concept, he is at the same time a bad speaker and a bad writer, -although he may afterwards recover himself in the many other parts -of his thought which contain true propositions not connected with -the preceding error, and therefore lucid expressions following upon -confused expressions. - -[Sidenote: _Reformed logic._] - -All researches as to the forms of judgements and of syllogisms, their -conversions and their various relations, which still encumber treatises -on Logic, are therefore destined to diminish, to be transformed, to be -converted into something else. The doctrine of the concept and of the -organism of concepts, of definition, of system, of philosophy and the -various sciences, and the like, will occupy the field and alone will -constitute true and proper Logic. - -Those who first had some suspicion of the intimate connexion between -Æsthetic and Logic and conceived Æsthetic as a _Logic of sensible -knowledge_ were peculiarly addicted to applying logical categories to -the new knowledge, talking of _æsthetic concepts, æsthetic judgements, -æsthetic syllogisms,_ and so on. We who are less superstitious as -regards the permanence of the traditional Logic of the schools, -and better informed as to the nature of Æsthetic, do not recommend -the application of Logic to Æsthetic, but the liberation of Logic -from æsthetic forms. These have given rise to non-existent forms or -categories of Logic, due to the adoption of altogether arbitrary and -ill-considered distinctions. - -Logic thus reformed will still be _formal_ Logic; it will study the -true form or activity of thought, the concept, excluding individual -and particular concepts. The old Logic is ill called formal; it would -be better to call it _verbal_ or _formalistic._ Formal Logic will drive -out formalistic Logic. To attain this object, it will not be necessary -to have recourse, as some have done, to a real or material Logic, -which is no longer a science of thought, but thought itself in action; -not only a Logic, but the whole of Philosophy, in which Logic is also -included. The science of thought (Logic) is that of the concept, as -that of imagination (Æsthetic) is that of expression. The well-being -of both sciences lies in exactly carrying out in every particular the -distinction between the two domains. - -_Note to the Fourth Italian Edition._--The observations contained in -this chapter on Logic, which are not all of them clear or accurate, -should be clarified and corrected by means of the further treatment -of the theme in the second volume of the _Philosophy of the Spirit,_ -dedicated to Logic, where the distinction between logical and -historical propositions is again examined and their synthetic unity -demonstrated. - - - - -VI - - -THE THEORETIC ACTIVITY AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY - - -The intuitive and intellectual forms contain between them, as we have -said, the whole theoretic domain of the spirit. But it is not possible -to know them thoroughly, nor to criticize another series of erroneous -æsthetic theories, without first establishing clearly the relations of -the theoretic spirit with the _practical_ spirit. - -[Sidenote: _The will._] - -The practical form or activity is the _will._ We do not here employ -this word in the sense of some philosophical systems, where the will -is the foundation of the universe, the ground of things and the true -reality. Nor do we employ it in the wide sense of other systems, -which understand by will the energy of the spirit, spirit or activity -in general, making of every act of the human spirit an act of will. -Neither such metaphysical nor such metaphorical meaning is ours. For -us, the will is, as generally understood, that activity of the spirit -which differs from the merely theoretical contemplation of things, -and is productive, not of knowledge, but of actions. Action is really -action, in so far as it is voluntary. It is not necessary to remark -that in the will to do, we include, in the scientific sense, also what -is usually called not-doing: the will to resist, to reject, the will of -a Prometheus, which also is action. - -[Sidenote: _The will as an ulterior stage in respect to knowledge._] - -Man understands things with the theoretical form, with the practical -form he changes them; with the one he appropriates the universe, with -the other he creates it. But the first form is the basis of the second; -and the relation of _double degree,_ which we have already found -existing between æsthetic and logical activity, is repeated between -these two on a larger scale. A knowing independent of the will is -thinkable, at least in a certain sense; will independent of knowing is -unthinkable. Blind will is not will; true will has eyes. - -How can we will, without having before us historical intuitions -(perceptions) of objects, and knowledge of (logical) relations, which -enlightens us as to the nature of those objects? How can we really -will, if we do not know the world which surrounds us or how to change -things by acting upon them? - -[Sidenote: _Objections and explanations._] - -It has been objected that men of action, practical men _par -excellence,_ are the least disposed to contemplate and to theorize: -their energy is not delayed in contemplation, it rushes at once into -will. And conversely, that contemplative men, philosophers, are -often very mediocre in practical matters, weak willed, and therefore -neglected and thrust aside in the tumult of life. It is easy to -see that these distinctions are merely empirical and quantitative. -Certainly, the practical man has no need of a philosophical system in -order to act, but in the spheres where he does act, he starts from -intuitions and concepts which are perfectly clear to him. Otherwise the -most ordinary actions could not be willed. It would not be possible -to will to feed oneself, for instance, without knowledge of the food, -and of the link of cause and effect between certain movements and -certain satisfactions. Rising gradually to the more complex forms -of action, for example to the political, how could we will anything -politically good or bad without knowing the real conditions of society, -and consequently the means and expedients to be adopted? When the -practical man feels himself in the dark about one or more of these -points, or when he is seized with doubt, action either does not begin -or stops. It is then that the theoretical moment, which in the rapid -succession of human actions is hardly noticed and rapidly forgotten, -becomes important and occupies consciousness for a longer time. And -if this moment be prolonged, then the practical man may become a -Hamlet, divided between desire for action and his deficient theoretical -clarity as regards the situation and the means to be employed. And if -he develop a taste for contemplation and discovery, and leave willing -and acting, to a greater or less extent, to others, there is formed in -him the calm disposition of the artist, of the man of science, or of -the philosopher, who in practice are sometimes incompetent or downright -immoral. These observations are all obvious. Their exactitude cannot be -denied. Let us, however, repeat that they are founded on quantitative -distinctions and do not disprove but confirm the fact that an action, -however slight it be, cannot really be an action, that is, an action -that is willed, unless it be preceded by the cognitive activity. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of practical judgements or judgements of value._] - -Some psychologists, on the other hand, place before practical action -an altogether special class of judgements, which they call _practical_ -judgements or _judgements of value._ They say that in order to resolve -on performing an action there must have been a judgement to the -effect: "this action is useful, this action is good." And at first -sight this seems to have the testimony of consciousness on its side. -But closer observation and analysis of greater subtlety reveal that -such judgements follow instead of preceding the affirmation of the -will, and are nothing but the expression of the volition already -exercised. A good or useful action is an action willed. It will always -be impossible to distil a single drop of usefulness or goodness from -the objective study of things. We do not desire things because we know -them to be good or useful; but we know them to be good and useful, -because we desire them. Here too, the rapidity with which the facts -of consciousness follow one another has given rise to an illusion. -Practical action is preceded by knowledge, but not by practical -knowledge, or rather, knowledge of the practical: to obtain this, we -must first have practical action. The third moment, therefore, of -practical judgements, or judgements of value, is altogether imaginary. -It does not come between the two moments or degrees of theory and -practice. For the rest, normative sciences in general, which regulate -or command, discover and indicate values to the practical activity, -do not exist; indeed none exist for any sort of activity, since every -science presupposes that activity to be already realized and developed, -which it afterwards takes as its object. - -[Sidenote: _Exclusion of the practical from the æsthetic._] - -These distinctions established, we must condemn as erroneous every -theory which annexes the æsthetic activity to the practical, or -introduces the laws of the second into the first. That science is -theory and art practice has been many times affirmed. Those who make -this statement, and look upon the æsthetic fact as a practical fact, -do not do so capriciously or because they are groping in the void; but -because they have their eye on something which is really practical. But -the practical which they aim is not Æsthetic, nor within Æsthetic; it -is _outside and beside it_; and although often found united, they are -not united necessarily or by the bond of identity of nature. - -The æsthetic fact is altogether completed in the expressive elaboration -of impressions. When we have achieved the word within us, conceived -definitely and vividly a figure or a statue, or found a musical motive, -expression is born and is complete; there is no need for anything else. -If after this we should open our mouths-_will_ to open them to speak, -or our throats to sing, that is to say, utter by word of mouth and -audible melody what we have completely said or sung to ourselves; or -if we should stretch out_--will_ to stretch out our hands to touch the -notes of the piano, or to take up the brush and chisel, thus making -on a large scale movements which we have already made in little and -rapidly, in a material in which we leave more or less durable traces; -this is all an addition, a fact which obeys quite different laws from -the former, with which we are not concerned for the moment, although -we recognize henceforth that this second movement is a production -of things, a _practical_ fact, or fact of _will_. It is usual to -distinguish the internal from the external work of art: the terminology -seems to us infelicitous, for the work of art (the æsthetic work) is -always _internal_; and what is called _external_ is no longer a work of -art. Others distinguish between _æsthetic_ fact and _artistic_ fact, -meaning by the second the external or practical stage, which may follow -and generally does follow the first. But in this case, it is simply a -question of a linguistic usage, doubtless permissible, though perhaps -not advisable. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice -of content._] - -For the same reasons the search for the _end of art_ is ridiculous, -when it is understood of art as art. And since to fix an end is to -choose, the theory that the content of art must be _selected_ is -another form of the same error. A selection among impressions and -sensations implies that these are already expressions, otherwise how -could a selection be made among the continuous and indistinct? To -choose is to will: to will this and not to will that: and this and that -must be before us, expressed. Practice follows, it does not precede -theory; expression is free inspiration. - -The true artist, in fact, finds himself big with his theme, he knows -not how; he feels the moment of birth drawing near, but he cannot will -it or not will it. If he were to wish to act in opposition to his -inspiration, to make an arbitrary choice, if, born Anacreon, he should -wish to sing of Atreus and of Alcides, his lyre would warn him of -his mistake, sounding only of Venus and of Love, notwithstanding his -efforts to the contrary. - -[Sidenote: _Practical innocence of art._] - -The theme or content cannot, therefore, be practically or morally -charged with epithets of praise or blame. When critics of art remark -that a theme is _badly selected,_ in cases where that observation has -a just foundation, it is a question of blaming, not the selection of -the theme (which would be absurd), but the manner in which the artist -has treated it, the failure of the expression due to the contradictions -which it contains. And when the same critics object to the theme or -content of works which they proclaim to be artistically perfect as -being unworthy of art and blameworthy; if these expressions really are -perfect, there is nothing to be done but to advise the critics to -leave the artists in peace, for they can only derive inspiration from -what has moved their soul. They should rather direct their attention -towards effecting changes in surrounding nature and society, that -such impressions and states of soul should not recur. If ugliness -were to vanish from the world, if universal virtue and felicity were -established there, perhaps artists would no longer represent perverse -or pessimistic feelings, but calm, innocent and joyous feelings, -Arcadians of a real Arcady. But so long as ugliness and turpitude -exist in nature and impose themselves upon the artist, to prevent -the expression of these things also is impossible; and when it has -arisen, _factum infectum fieri nequit._ We speak thus entirely from the -æsthetic point of view, and of pure criticism of art. - -We are not concerned to estimate the damage which the criticism of -"choice" does to artistic production, with the prejudices which it -produces or maintains among the artists themselves, and with the -conflict to which it gives rise between artistic impulse and critical -demands. It is true that sometimes it seems also to do some good, by -aiding artists to discover themselves, that is, their own impressions -and their own inspiration, and to acquire consciousness of the task -which is, as it were, imposed upon them by the historical moment in -which they live, and by their individual temperament. In these cases, -criticism of "choice," while believing that it generates, merely -recognizes and aids the expressions which are already being formed. -It believes itself to be the mother, where, at most, it is only the -midwife. - -[Sidenote: _The independence of art._] - -The impossibility of choice of content completes the theorem of the -_independence of art,_ and is also the only legitimate meaning of the -expression: _art for art's sake._ Art is independent both of science -and of the useful and the moral. There should be no fear lest frivolous -or cold art should thus be justified, since what is truly frivolous -or cold is so because it has not been raised to expression; or in -other words, frivolity and frigidity come always from the form of the -æsthetic treatment, from failure to grasp a content, not from the -material qualities of the content itself. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the saying: the style is the man_] - -The saying: _the style is the man_, can also not be completely -criticized, save by starting from the distinction between the theoretic -and the practical, and from the theoretic character of the æsthetic -activity. Man is not simply knowledge and contemplation: he is will, -which contains the cognitive moment in itself. Hence the saying is -either altogether void, as when it is taken to mean that the style is -the man _qua_ style--is the man, that is, but only so far as he is -expressive activity; or it is erroneous, as when the attempt is made -to deduce what a man has done and willed from what he has seen and -expressed, thereby asserting that there is a logical connexion between -knowing and willing. Many legends in the biographies of artists have -sprung from this erroneous identification, since it seemed impossible -that a man who gives expression to generous feelings should not be a -noble and generous man in practical life; or that the dramatist whose -plays are full of stabbing, should not himself have done a little -stabbing in real life. Artists protest vainly: "_Lasciva est nobis -pagina, vita proba._" They are merely taxed in addition with lying -and hypocrisy. How far more prudent you were, poor women of Verona, -when you founded your belief that Dante had really descended to hell -upon his blackened countenance! Yours was at any rate a historical -conjecture. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the concept of sincerity in art._] - -Finally, _sincerity_ imposed as a duty upon the artist (a law of ethics -also said to be a law of æsthetic) rests upon another double meaning. -For by sincerity may be meant, in the first place, the moral duty not -to deceive one's neighbour; and in that case it is foreign to the -artist. For indeed he deceives no one, since he gives form to what -is already in his soul. He would only deceive if he were to betray -his duty as an artist by failing to execute his task in its essential -nature. If lies and deceit are in his soul, then the form which he -gives to these things cannot be deceit or lies, precisely because it -is æsthetic. If the artist be a charlatan, a liar, or a miscreant, -he purifies his other self by reflecting it in art. If by sincerity -be meant, in the second place, fulness and truth of expression, it is -clear that this second sense has no relation to the ethical concept. -The law, called both ethical and æsthetic, reveals itself here as -nothing but a word used both by Ethics and Æsthetic. - - - - -VII - - -ANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL - - -[Sidenote: _The two forms of the practical activity._] - -The double degree of the theoretical activity, æsthetic and logical, -has an important parallel in the practical activity, which has not yet -been placed in due relief. The practical activity is also divided into -a first and second degree, the second implying the first. The first -practical degree is the simply _useful_ or _economical_ activity; the -second the _moral_ activity. - -Economy is, as it were, the Æsthetic of practical life; Morality its -Logic. - -[Sidenote: _The economically useful._] - -If this has not been clearly seen by philosophers; if the correct -place in the system of the spirit has not been given to the economic -activity, if it has been left to wander about in the prolegomena to -treatises on political economy, often vague and but little developed, -this is due, among other reasons, to the fact that the useful or -economic has been confused, sometimes with the concept of the -_technical,_ sometimes with that of the _egoistical._ - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between the useful and the technical._] - -_Technique_ is certainly not a special activity of the spirit. -Technique is knowledge; or rather, it is knowledge itself in general -which takes this name when it serves as basis, as we have seen it does, -for practical action. Knowledge which is not followed, or is supposed -not to be easily followed by practical action, is called "pure": the -same knowledge, if effectively followed by action, is called "applied"; -if it is supposed that it can be easily followed by a particular -action, it is called "applicable" or "technical." This word, then, -indicates a _situation_ in which knowledge is, or may easily be, not a -special form of knowledge. So true is this, that it would be altogether -impossible to establish whether a given order of knowledge were, -intrinsically, pure or applied. All knowledge, however abstract and -philosophical it may be believed to be, may be a guide to practical -acts; a theoretical error in the ultimate principles of morality may be -reflected and always in some way is reflected in practical life. One -can only speak roughly and unscientifically of certain truths as pure -and of others as applied. - -The same knowledge that is called technical may also be called -_useful._ But the word "_useful_" in conformity with the criticism of -judgements of value made above, is to be understood as used here in -a verbal or metaphorical sense. When we say that water is useful for -putting out fire, the word "useful" is used in a non-scientific sense. -Water thrown on the fire is the cause of its going out: this is the -knowledge that serves for basis to the action, let us say, of firemen. -There is a link, not of nature, but of simple succession, between the -useful action of the person who extinguishes the conflagration and that -knowledge. The technique of the effects of the water is the theoretical -activity which precedes; the only useful thing is the _action_ of the -man who extinguishes the fire. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction of the useful from the egoistic._] - -Some economists identify utility, that is to say, merely economic -action or will, with the _egoistic,_ that is to say, with what is -profitable to the individual, in so far as individual, without regard -to and indeed in complete opposition to the moral law. The egoistic is -the immoral. In this case Economics would be a very strange science, -standing not beside but opposite Ethics, like the devil facing God, or -at least like the _advocatus diaboli_ in the processes of canonization. -Such a conception is altogether inadmissible: the science of immorality -is implied in that of morality, as the science of the false is implied -in Logic, science of the true, and a science of unsuccessful expression -in Æsthetic, science of successful expression. If, then, Economics were -the scientific treatment of egoism, it would be a chapter of Ethics, -or Ethics itself; because every moral determination implies, at the -same time, a negation of its contrary. - -Further, conscience tells us that to conduct oneself economically -is not to conduct oneself egoistically; that even the most morally -scrupulous man must conduct himself usefully (economically), if he -does not wish to act at hazard and consequently in a manner quite the -reverse of moral. If utility were egoism, how could it be the duty of -the altruist to behave like an egoist? - -[Sidenote: _Economic will and moral will._] - -If we are not mistaken, the difficulty is solved in a manner perfectly -analogous to that in which is solved the problem of the relations -between expression and concept, Æsthetic and Logic. - -To will economically is to _will an end;_ to will morally is to _will -the rational end._ But whoever wills and acts morally, cannot but will -and act usefully (economically). How could he will the _rational_ end, -unless he also willed it _as his particular end_? - -[Sidenote: _Pure economicity._] - -The converse is not true; as it is not true in æsthetic science that -the expressive fact must of necessity be linked with the logical fact. -It is possible to will economically without willing morally; and it -is possible to conduct oneself with perfect economic coherence, while -pursuing an end which is objectively irrational (immoral), or, rather, -an end which would be held to be so at a higher grade of consciousness. - -Examples of the economic, without the moral character, are -Machiavelli's hero Cæsar Borgia, or the Iago of Shakespeare. Who can -help admiring their strength of will, although their activity is only -economic, and is developed in opposition to what we hold moral? Who -can help admiring the Ser Ciappelletto of Boccaccio, who pursues and -realizes his ideal of the perfect rascal even on his death-bed, making -the petty and timid little thieves who are present at his burlesque -confession exclaim: "What manner of man is this, whose perversity -neither age, nor infirmity, nor the fear of death which he sees at -hand, nor the fear of God before whose judgement-seat he must stand in -a little while, have been able to remove, nor to make him wish to die -otherwise than as he has lived?" - -[Sidenote: _The economic side of morality._] - -The moral man unites with the pertinacity and fearlessness of a Cæsar -Borgia, of an Iago, or of a Ser Ciappelletto, the good will of the -saint or of the hero. Or, rather, good will would not be will, and -consequently not good, if it did not possess, in addition to the side -which makes it _good,_ also that which makes it _will._ So a logical -thought which does not succeed in expressing itself is not thought, but -at the most a confused presentiment of a thought beyond yet to come. - -It is not correct, then, to conceive of the amoral man as also -anti-economical, or to make of morality an element of coherence in -the acts of life, and therefore of economicity. Nothing prevents us -from conceiving (an hypothesis which is verified at least during -certain periods and moments, if not during whole lifetimes) a man -altogether without moral conscience. In a man thus organized, what -for us is immorality is not so for him, because it is not felt as -such. The consciousness of the contradiction between what is desired -as a rational end and what is pursued egoistically cannot arise -in him. This contradiction is anti-economicity. Immoral conduct -becomes also anti-economical only in the man who possesses moral -conscience. The moral remorse which is the indication of this, is -also economical remorse; that is to say, sorrow at not having known -how to will completely and to attain that moral ideal which was -willed at first, instead of allowing himself to be led astray by the -passions. _Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor._ The _video_ -and the _probo_ are here an initial _volo_ immediately contradicted -and overthrown. In the man without moral sense, we must admit a -remorse that is _merely economic_; like that of a thief or of an -assassin who, when on the point of robbing or of assassinating should -abstain from doing so, not owing to a conversion of his being, but -to nervousness and bewilderment, or even to a momentary awakening of -moral consciousness. When he has come back to himself, such a thief -or assassin will regret and be ashamed of his incoherence; his remorse -will not be due to having done wrong, but to _not_ having done wrong; -it is therefore economic, not moral, since the latter is excluded by -hypothesis. But since a lively moral consciousness is generally found -among the majority of men and its total absence is a rare and perhaps -non-existent monstrosity, it may be admitted that morality, in general, -coincides with economicity in the conduct of life. - -[Sidenote: _The merely economic and the error of the morally -indifferent._] - -There need be no fear lest the parallelism that we support should -introduce afresh into science the category of the _morally -indifferent,_ of that which is in truth action and volition, but is -neither moral nor immoral; the category in short of the _licit_ and -of the _permissible,_ which has always been the cause or reflexion of -ethical corruption, as was the case with Jesuitical morality, which it -dominated. It remains quite certain that indifferent moral actions do -not exist, because moral activity pervades and must pervade every least -volitional movement of man. But far from upsetting the established -parallelism, this confirms it. Are there by any chance intuitions which -science and the intellect do not pervade and analyse, resolving them -into universal concepts, or changing them into historical affirmations? -We have already seen that true science, philosophy, knows no external -limits which bar its way, as happens with the so-called natural -sciences. Science and morality entirely dominate, the one the æsthetic -intuitions, the other the economic volitions of man, although neither -of them can appear in the concrete, save the one in the intuitive, the -other in the economic form. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of utilitarianism and the reform of Ethics and of -Economics._] - -This combined identity and difference of the useful and the moral, of -the economic and the ethical, explains the success at the present time -and formerly of the utilitarian theory of Ethics. Indeed it is easy to -discover and to illustrate a utilitarian side in every moral action; as -it is easy to reveal the æsthetic side in every logical proposition. -The criticism of ethical utilitarianism cannot begin by denying this -truth and seeking out absurd and non-existent examples of _useless_ -moral actions. It must admit the utilitarian side and explain it as -the concrete form of morality, which consists in this, that it is -_inside_ this form. Utilitarians do not see this inside. This is not -the place for the fuller development that such ideas deserve. Ethics -and Economics cannot however fail to be gainers (as we have said of -Logic and Æsthetic) by a more exact determination of the relations that -exist between them. Economic science is now rising to the activistical -concept of the useful, as it attempts to surpass the mathematical -phase in which it is still entangled; a phase which was in its turn -a progress when it superseded historicism, or the confusion of the -theoretical with the historical, and destroyed a number of capricious -distinctions and false economic theories. With this conception, it will -be easy on the one hand to absorb and to verify the semi-philosophical -theories of so-called pure economics, and on the other, by the -introduction of successive complications and additions, to effect a -transition from the philosophical to the empirical or naturalistic -method and thus to embrace the particular theories expounded in the -so-called political or national economy of the schools. - -[Sidenote: _Phenomenon and noumenon in practical activity._] - -As æsthetic intuition knows the phenomenon or nature, and the -philosophic concept the noumenon or spirit; so the economic activity -wills the phenomenon or nature, and the moral activity the noumenon or -spirit. _The spirit which wills itself,_ its true self, the universal -which is in the empirical and finite spirit: that is the formula which -perhaps defines the essence of morality with the least impropriety. -This will for the true self is _absolute freedom._ - - - - -VIII - - -EXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS - - -In this summary sketch that we have given of the entire philosophy of -the spirit in its fundamental moments, the spirit is thus conceived -as consisting of four moments or degrees, disposed in such a way that -the theoretical activity is to the practical as the first theoretical -degree is to the second theoretical, and the first practical degree to -the second practical. The four moments imply one another regressively -by their concreteness. The concept cannot exist without expression, the -useful without both and morality without the three preceding degrees. -If the æsthetic fact is in a certain sense alone independent while -the others are more or less dependent, then the logical is the least -dependent and the moral will the most. Moral intention acts on given -theoretic bases, with which it cannot dispense, unless we are willing -to accept that absurd procedure known to the Jesuits as _direction of -intention,_ in which people pretend to themselves not to know what they -know only too well. - -[Sidenote: _The forms of genius._] - -[Sidenote: _The system of the spirit._] - -If the forms of human activity are four, four also are the forms of -_genius._ Men endowed with genius in art, in science, and in moral -will or heroes, have always been recognized. But the genius of pure -economicity has met with repugnance. It is not altogether without -reason that a category of bad geniuses or of _geniuses of evil_ has -been created. The practical, merely economic genius, which is not -directed to a rational end, cannot but excite an admiration mingled -with alarm. To dispute as to whether the word "genius" should be -applied only to creators of æsthetic expression or also to men of -scientific research and of action would be a mere question of words. To -observe, on the other hand, that "genius," of whatever kind it be, is -always a quantitative conception and an empirical distinction, would be -to repeat what has already been explained as regards artistic genius. - -[Sidenote: _Non-existence of a fifth form of activity. Law; -sociability._] - -A fifth form of spiritual activity does not exist. It would be easy to -show how all the other forms either do not possess the character of -activity, or are verbal variants of the activities already examined, or -are complex and derivative facts, in which the various activities are -mingled, and are filled with particular and contingent contents. - -The _juridical_ fact, for example, considered as what is called -objective law, is derived both from the economic and from the logical -activities. Law is a rule, a formula (whether oral or written matters -little here) in which is fixed an economic relation willed by an -individual or by a community, and this economic side at once unites it -with and distinguishes it from moral activity. Take another example. -Sociology (among the many meanings the word bears in our times) is -sometimes conceived as the study of an original element, which is -called _sociability._ Now what is it that distinguishes sociability, -or the relations which are developed in a meeting of men, and not in a -meeting of sub-human beings, if it be not just the various spiritual -activities which exist among the former and which are supposed not to -exist, or to exist only in a rudimentary degree, among the latter? -Sociability, then, far from being an original, simple, irreducible -conception, is very complex and complicated. A proof of this would -be the impossibility, generally recognized, of enunciating a single -law which could be described as purely sociological. Those that are -improperly so called are shown to be either empirical historical -observations, or spiritual laws, that is to say judgements into which -the conceptions of the spiritual activities are translated, when -they are not simply empty and indeterminate generalities, like the -so-called law of evolution. Sometimes, too, nothing more is understood -by "sociability" than "social rule," and so law; thus confounding -sociology with the science or theory of law itself. Law, sociability, -and similar concepts, are to be dealt with in a mode analogous to that -employed by us in the consideration and analysis of historicity and -technique. - -[Sidenote: _Religion._] - -It may seem that _religious_ activity should be judged otherwise. -But religion is nothing but knowledge, and does not differ from its -other forms and sub-forms. For it is in turn either the expression of -practical aspirations and ideals (religious ideals), or historical -narrative (legend), or conceptual science (dogma). - -It can therefore be maintained with equal truth either that religion -is destroyed by the progress of human knowledge, or that it is always -present there. Their religion was the whole intellectual patrimony of -primitive peoples: our intellectual patrimony is our religion. The -content has been changed, bettered, refined, and it will change and -become better and more refined in the future also; but its form is -always the same. We do not know what use could be made of religion by -those who wish to preserve it side by side with the theoretic activity -of man, with his art, with his criticism and with his philosophy. It -is impossible to preserve an imperfect and inferior kind of knowledge, -such as religion, side by side with what has surpassed and disproved -it. Catholicism, which is always consistent, will not tolerate a -Science, a History, an Ethics, in contradiction to its views and -doctrines. The rationalists are less coherent: they are disposed to -allow a little space in their souls for a religion in contradiction -with their whole theoretic world. - -The religious affectations and weaknesses prevalent among the -rationalists of our time have their origin in the superstitious worship -so recklessly lavished upon the natural sciences. We know ourselves -and their chief representatives admit that these sciences are all -surrounded by _limits._ Science having been wrongly identified with -the so-called natural sciences, it could be foreseen that the remainder -would be sought in religion; that remainder with which the human -spirit cannot dispense. We are therefore indebted to materialism, to -positivism, to naturalism for this unhealthy and often disingenuous -recrudescence of religious exaltation, which belongs to the hospital, -when it does not belong to the politician. - -[Sidenote: _Metaphysic._] - -Philosophy removes from religion all reason for existing, because it -substitutes itself for religion. As the science of the spirit, it -looks upon religion as a phenomenon, a transitory historical fact, a -psychic condition that can be surpassed. Philosophy shares the domain -of knowledge with the natural sciences, with history and with art. -To the first it leaves enumeration, measurement and classification; -to the second, the chronicling of what has individually happened; to -the third, the individually possible. There is nothing left to allot -to religion. For the same reason, philosophy, as the science of the -spirit, cannot be philosophy of the intuitive datum; nor, as has -been seen, _philosophy of history,_ nor _philosophy of nature_; and -therefore there cannot be a philosophical science of what is not form -and universal, but material and particular. This amounts to affirming -the impossibility of _Metaphysic._ - -The methodology or logic of history has supplanted the philosophy -of history; an epistemology of the concepts employed in the natural -sciences succeeded the Philosophy of Nature. What philosophy can -study of history is its mode of construction (intuition, perception, -document, probability, etc.); of the natural sciences the forms of the -concepts which constitute them (space, time, motion, number, types, -classes, etc.). Philosophy as metaphysic in the sense above described -would, on the other hand, claim to compete with history and with the -natural sciences, which alone are legitimate and effective in their -field. Such a challenge could do nothing but reveal the incompetence -of those who made it. In this sense we are _anti-metaphysicans,_ -while declaring ourselves to be _ultra-metaphysicians,_ when the -word is used to claim and to affirm the office of philosophy as -self-consciousness of the spirit, distinguished from the merely -empirical and classificatory office of the natural sciences. - -[Sidenote: _Mental imagination and the intuitive intellect._] - -Metaphysic has been obliged to assert the existence of a specific -spiritual activity producing it, in order to maintain itself side -by side with the sciences of the spirit. This activity, called in -antiquity _mental or superior imagination,_ and more often in modern -times _intuitive intellect or intellectual intuition,_ was held to -unite the characters of imagination and intellect in an altogether -special form. It was supposed to provide the means of passing by -deduction or dialectic from the infinite to the finite, from form to -matter, from the concept to the intuition, from science to history, -acting by a method which was held to penetrate both the universal and -the particular, the abstract and the concrete, intuition and intellect. -A faculty marvellous indeed and most valuable to possess; but we, who -do not possess it, have no means of establishing its existence. - -[Sidenote: _Mystical Æsthetic._] - -Intellectual intuition has sometimes been considered to be the true -æsthetic activity. At others a no less marvellous æsthetic activity -has been placed beside, below, or above it, a faculty altogether -different from simple intuition. The glories of this faculty have been -celebrated, and the production of art attributed to it, or at least -of certain groups of artistic production, arbitrarily chosen. Art, -religion and philosophy have seemed in turn to be one only, or three -distinct faculties of the spirit, sometimes one, sometimes another of -them being supreme in the dignity shared by all. - -It is impossible to enumerate all the various attitudes assumed or -capable of being assumed by this conception of Æsthetic, which we will -call _mystical._ We are here in the kingdom, not of the science of -imagination, but of imagination itself, which creates its world out -of varying elements drawn from impressions and feelings. Suffice it -to mention that this mysterious faculty has been conceived, sometimes -as practical, sometimes as a mean between the theoretic and the -practical, at others again as a theoretic form side by side with -philosophy and religion. - -[Sidenote: _Mortality and immortality of art._] - -The immortality of art has sometimes been deduced from this last -conception, as belonging with its sisters to the sphere of absolute -spirit. At other times, on the other hand, when religion has been -looked upon as mortal and as dissolved in philosophy, then has been -proclaimed the mortality, even the death, actual or at least imminent, -of art. This question has no meaning for us, because, seeing that the -function of art is a necessary degree of the spirit, to ask if art can -be eliminated is the same as to ask if sensation or intelligence can be -eliminated. But Metaphysic, in the above sense, transplanting itself -into an arbitrary world, is not to be criticized in its particulars, -any more than we can criticize the botany of the garden of Alcina or -the navigation of the voyage of Astolfo. Criticism can only exist when -we refuse to join in the game; that is to say, when we reject the very -possibility of Metaphysic, always in the sense above indicated. - -There is therefore no intellectual intuition in philosophy, as there -is no surrogate or equivalent of it in art, or any other mode by which -this imaginary function may be called and represented. There does not -exist (if we may repeat ourselves) a fifth degree, a fifth or supreme -faculty, theoretic or practical-theoretic, imaginative-intellectual, or -intellectual-imaginative, or however otherwise it may be attempted to -conceive such a faculty. - - - - -IX - -INDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR DEGREES AND CRITICISM OF -RHETORIC - - -[Sidenote: _The characters of art._] - -It is customary to give long catalogues of the _characters_ of art. -Having reached this point of the treatise, after having studied -art as spiritual activity, as theoretic activity, and as special -theoretic activity (intuitive), we are able to discover that those -varied and numerous determinations of characters, where they refer -to anything real, do nothing but represent what we have already met -with as genera, species and individuality of the æsthetic form. To the -generic are reducible, as we have already observed, the characters, or -rather, the verbal variants of _unity,_ and of _unity_ in _variety,_ -of _simplicity,_ or _originality,_ and so on; to the specific, -the characters of _truth,_ of _sincerity,_ and the like; to the -individual, the characters of _life,_ of _vivacity,_ of _animation,_ of -_concreteness,_ of _individuality,_ of _characteristicality_. The words -may change again, but they will not contribute anything scientifically -new. The analysis of expression as such is completely effected in the -results expounded above. - -[Sidenote: _Non-existence of modes of expression._] - -It might, on the other hand, be asked at this point if there be _modes_ -or _degrees_ of expression; if, having distinguished two degrees of -activity of the spirit, each of which is subdivided into two other -degrees, one of these, the intuitive-expressive, is not in its turn -subdivided into two or more intuitive modes, into a first, second or -third degree of expression. But this further division is impossible; -a classification of intuition-expressions is certainly permissible, -but is not philosophical: individual expressive facts are so many -individuals, not one of which is interchangeable with another, save -in its common quality of expression. To employ the language of the -schools: expression is a species which cannot function in its turn -as a genus. Impressions or contents vary; every content differs from -every other content, because nothing repeats itself in life; and -the irreducible variety of the forms of expression corresponds to -the continual variation of the contents, the æsthetic synthesis of -impressions. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of translations._] - -A corollary of this is the impossibility of _translations,_ in so -far as they pretend to effect the re-moulding of one expression into -another, like a liquid poured from a vase of a certain shape into a -vase of another shape. We can elaborate logically what we have already -elaborated in æsthetic form only; but we cannot reduce what has already -possessed its æsthetic form to another form also æsthetic. Indeed, -every translation either diminishes and spoils, or it creates a new -expression, by putting the former back into the crucible and mingling -it with the personal impressions of the so-called translator. In the -former case, the expression always remains one, that of the original, -the translation being more or less deficient, that is to say, not -properly expression: in the other case, there would certainly be two -expressions, but with two different contents. "Faithful ugliness or -faithless beauty" is a proverb that well expresses the dilemma with -which every translator is faced. Un-æsthetic translations, such as -those that are word for word, or paraphrastic, are to be looked upon as -simple commentaries upon the original. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the rhetorical categories._] - -The illegitimate division of expressions into various grades is known -in literature by the name of doctrine of _ornament_ or of _rhetorical -categories._ But similar attempts at distinctions in other artistic -groups are not wanting: suffice it to recall the _realistic_ and -_symbolic_ forms, so often mentioned in relation to painting and -sculpture. - -_Realistic_ and _symbolic, objective_ and _subjective, classical_ -and _romantic, simple_ and _ornate, proper_ and _metaphorical,_ the -fourteen forms of metaphor, the figures of _word_ and _sentence, -pleonasm, ellipse, inversion, repetition, synonyms_ and _homonyms,_ -these and all other determinations of modes or degrees of expression -reveal their philosophical nullity when the attempt is made to develop -them in precise definitions, because they either grasp the void or -fall into the absurd. A typical example of this is the very common -definition of metaphor as of _another word used in place of the proper -word._ Now why give oneself this trouble? Why substitute the improper -for the proper word? Why take the worse and longer road when you know -the shorter and better road? Perhaps, as is commonly said, because the -proper word is in certain cases not so _expressive_ as the so-called -improper word or metaphor? But if this be so the metaphor is exactly -the proper word in that case, and the so-called "proper" word, if -it were used, would be _inexpressive_ and therefore most improper. -Similar observations of elementary good sense can be made regarding the -other categories, as, for example, the general one of the _ornate._ -Here for instance it may be asked how an ornament can be joined to -expression. Externally? In that case it is always separated from the -expression. Internally? In that case, either it does not assist the -expression and mars it; or it does form part of it and is not an -ornament, but a constituent element of the expression, indivisible and -indistinguishable in its unity. - -It is needless to say how much harm has been done by rhetorical -distinctions. Rhetoric has often been declaimed against, but although -there has been rebellion against its consequences, its principles -have, at the same time, been carefully preserved (perhaps in order to -show proof of philosophic consistency). In literature the rhetorical -categories have contributed, if not to make dominant, at least to -justify theoretically, that particular kind of _bad writing_ which is -called _fine writing_ or writing according to rhetoric. - -[Sidenote: _Use of these categories as synonyms of the æsthetic fact._] - -The terms above mentioned would never have gone beyond the schools, -where we all of us learned them (only we never found an opportunity -of using them in strictly æsthetic discussions, or at most of doing -so jocosely and with a comic intention), were it not that they can -sometimes be employed in one of the following significations: as -_verbal variants_ of the æsthetic concept; as indications of the -_anti-æsthetic,_ or, finally (and this is their most important use), no -longer in the service of art and æsthetic, but of _science_ and _logic._ - -[Sidenote: _Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories._] - -_First._ Expressions considered directly or positively are -not divisible into classes, but some are successful, others -half-successful, others failures. There are perfect and imperfect, -successful and unsuccessful expressions. The words recorded, and others -of the same sort, may therefore sometimes indicate the successful -expression, and the various forms of the failures. But they do this in -the most inconstant and capricious manner, so much so that the same -word serves sometimes to proclaim the perfect, sometimes to condemn the -imperfect. - -For example, some will say of two pictures--one without inspiration, in -which the author has copied natural objects without intelligence; the -other inspired, but without close relation to existing objects--that -the first is _realistic,_ the second _symbolic._ Others, on the -contrary, utter the word _realistic_ before a picture strongly felt -representing a scene of ordinary life, while they apply that of -_symbolic_ to another picture that is but a cold allegory. It is -evident that in the first case symbolic means artistic and realistic -inartistic, while in the second, realistic is synonymous with artistic -and symbolic with inartistic. What wonder, then, that some hotly -maintain the true art form is the symbolic, and that the realistic is -inartistic; others, that the realistic is artistic and the symbolic -inartistic? We cannot but grant that both are right, since each uses -the same words in such a different sense. - -The great disputes about _classicism_ and _romanticism_ were frequently -based upon such equivocations. Sometimes the former was understood -as the artistically perfect, and the second as lacking balance and -imperfect; at others "classic" meant cold and artificial, "romantic" -pure, warm, powerful, truly expressive. Thus it was always possible -reasonably to take the side of the classic against the romantic, or of -the romantic against the classic. - -The same thing happens as regards the word _style._ Sometimes it is -said that every writer must have style. Here style is synonymous with -form of expression. At others the form of a code of laws or of a -mathematical work is said to be without style. Here the error is again -committed of admitting diverse modes of expression, an ornate and a -naked form, because, if style is form, the code and the mathematical -treatise must also be asserted, strictly speaking, to have each its -style. At other times, one hears the critics blaming some one for -"having too much style" or for "writing a style." Here it is clear -that style signifies, not the form, nor a mode of it, but improper and -pretentious expression, a form of the inartistic. - -[Sidenote: _Their use to indicate various æsthetic imperfections._] - -_Second._ The second not altogether meaningless use of these words -and distinctions is to be found when we hear in the examination of a -literal composition such remarks as these: here is a pleonasm, here an -ellipse, there a metaphor, here again a synonym or an ambiguity. The -meaning is: Here is an error consisting of using a larger number of -words than necessary (pleonasm); here, on the other hand, the error -arises from too few having been used (ellipse), here from the use of -an unsuitable word (metaphor), here of two words which seem to say -two different things, but really say the same thing (synonym); here, -on the contrary, of one word which seems to express the same thing, -whereas it says two different things (ambiguity). This depreciatory -and pathological use of the terms is, however, less common than the -preceding. - -[Sidenote: _Their use in a sense transcending æsthetic, in the -service of science._] - -_Thirdly_ and finally, when rhetorical terminology possesses no -æsthetic signification similar or analogous to those passed in review, -and yet one feels that it is not void of meaning and designates -something that deserves to be noted, this means that it is used in -the service of logic and of science. Granted that a concept used by -a writer in a scientific sense is designated by a definite term, it -is natural that other terms found in use by that writer on which he -incidentally employs himself to signify the same thought, become _in -respect to_ the vocabulary fixed upon by him as true, metaphors, -synecdoches, synonyms, elliptical forms and the like. We ourselves in -the course of this treatise have several times made use of, and intend -again to make use of such language, in order to make clear the sense of -the words we employ, or may find employed. But this proceeding, which -is of value in discussions pertaining to the criticism of science and -philosophy, has none whatever in literary and artistic criticism. There -are words and metaphors proper to science: the same concept may be -psychologically formed in various circumstances and therefore differ in -its intuitional expression. When the scientific terminology of a given -writer has been established and one of these modes fixed as correct, -then all other uses of it become improper or tropical. But in the -æsthetic fact there are none but proper words: the same intuition can -be expressed in one way only, precisely because it is intuition and not -concept. - -[Sidenote: _Rhetoric in the schools._] - -Some, while admitting the æsthetic non-existence of the rhetorical -categories, yet make a reservation as to their utility and the service -they are supposed to render, especially in schools of literature. We -confess that we fail to understand how error and confusion can educate -the mind to logical distinction, or aid the teaching of a science -which they disturb and obscure. Perhaps what is meant is that such -distinctions, as empirical classes, can aid memory and learning, as was -admitted above for literary and artistic kinds. To this there is no -objection. There is certainly another purpose for which the rhetorical -categories should continue to appear in schools: to be criticized -there. The errors of the past must not be forgotten and no more said, -and truths cannot be kept alive save by making them combat errors. -Unless an account of the rhetorical categories be given, accompanied -by a criticism of them, there is a risk of their springing up again, -and it may be said that they are already springing up among certain -philologists as the latest _psychological_ discoveries. - -[Sidenote: _The resemblances of expressions._] - -It might seem that we thus wished to deny all bond of resemblance -between different expressions and works of art. Resemblances -exist, and by means of them, works of art can be arranged in this -or that group. But they are likenesses such as are observed among -individuals, and can never be rendered with abstract determinations. -That is to say, it would be incorrect to apply identification, -subordination, co-ordination and the other relations of concepts to -these resemblances, which consist wholly of what is called a _family -likeness,_ derived from the historical conditions in which the various -works have appeared and from relationship of soul among the artists. - -[Sidenote: _The relative possibility of translations._] - -It is in these resemblances that lies the _relative_ possibility of -translations; not as reproductions of the same original expressions -(which it would be vain to attempt), but as productions of _similar_ -expressions more or less nearly resembling the originals. The -translation called good is an approximation which has original value as -a work of art and can stand by itself. - - - - -X - - -ÆSTHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY - - -[Sidenote: _Various significations of the word feeling._] - -Passing to the study of more complex concepts, where the æsthetic -activity is to be considered in conjunction with other orders of facts, -and showing the mode of their union or complication, we find ourselves -first face to face with the concept of _feeling_ and with those -feelings that are called _æsthetic._ - -The word "feeling" is one of the richest in meanings in philosophic -terminology. We have already had occasion to meet with it once, among -those used to designate the spirit in its passivity, the matter or -content of art, and so as synonym of _impressions._ Once again (and -then the meaning was altogether different), we have met with it as -designating the _non-logical_ and _non-historical_ character of the -æsthetic fact, that is to say, pure intuition, a form of truth which -defines no concept and affirms no fact. - -[Sidenote: _Feeling as activity._] - -But here it is not regarded in either of these two meanings, nor in -the others which have also been conferred upon it to designate other -_cognitive_ forms of the spirit, but only in that where feeling is -understood as a special activity, of non-cognitive nature, having its -two poles, positive and negative, in _pleasure_ and _pain._ - -This activity has always greatly embarrassed philosophers, who have -therefore attempted either to deny it as activity, or to attribute it -to _nature,_ excluding it from the spirit. But both these solutions -bristle with difficulties of such a kind as to prove them finally -unacceptable to any one who examines them with care. For what could -a non-spiritual activity ever be, an _activity of nature,_ when we -have no other knowledge of activity save as spirituality, nor of -spirituality save as activity? Nature is in this case, by definition, -the merely passive, inert, mechanical, material. On the other hand, -the negation of the character of activity to feeling is energetically -disproved by those very poles of pleasure and of pain which appear in -it and manifest activity in its concreteness, or, so to say, quivering. - - -[Sidenote: _Identification of feeling with economic activity._] - -This critical conclusion should place us especially in the greatest -embarrassment, for in the sketch of the system of the spirit given -above we have left no room for the new activity of which we are now -obliged to recognize the existence. But the activity of feeling, if -it is activity, is not new. It has already had its place assigned to -it in the system that we have sketched, where, however, it has been -given another name, _economic_ activity. What is called the activity of -feeling is nothing but that more elementary and fundamental practical -activity which we have distinguished from the ethical activity and made -to consist of the appetition and volition for some individual end, -apart from any moral determination. - -If feeling has been sometimes considered to be an organic or natural -activity, this has happened just because it does not coincide either -with logical, æsthetic or ethical activity. Looked at from the -standpoint of those three (which were the only ones admitted), it -has seemed to lie _outside_ the true and real spirit, spirit in its -aristocracy, and to be almost a determination of nature, or of the -soul in so far as it is nature. From this too results the truth of -another thesis, often maintained, that the æsthetic activity, like the -ethical and intellectual activities, is not feeling. This thesis is -inexpugnable, when feeling has already been understood implicitly and -unconsciously as economic volition. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of hedonism._] - -The view refuted in this thesis is known as _hedonism._ This consists -in reducing all the various forms of the spirit to one, which thus also -loses its own distinctive character and becomes something obscure -and mysterious, like "the night in which all cows are black." Having -brought about this reduction and mutilation, the hedonists naturally do -not succeed in seeing anything else in any activity but pleasure and -pain. They find no substantial difference between the pleasure of art -and that of easy digestion, between the pleasure of a good action and -that of breathing the fresh air with wide-expanded lungs. - -[Sidenote: _Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity._] - -But if the activity of feeling in the sense here defined must not be -substituted for all the other forms of spiritual activity, we have not -said that it cannot _accompany_ them. Indeed it accompanies them of -necessity, because they are all in close relation both with one another -and with the elementary volitional form. Therefore each of them has for -concomitants individual volitions and volitional pleasures and pains, -known as feeling. But we must not confound a concomitant with the -principal fact, and substitute the one for the other. The discovery of -a truth, or the fulfilment of a moral duty, produces in us a joy which -makes vibrate our whole being, which, by attaining the aim of those -forms of spiritual activity, attains at the same time that to which -it was _practically_ tending, as its end. Nevertheless, _economic_ -or _hedonistic_ satisfaction, _ethical_ satisfaction, _æsthetic_ -satisfaction, _intellectual_ satisfaction, though thus united, remain -always distinct. - -A question often asked is thus answered at the same time, one which -has correctly seemed to be a matter of life or death for æsthetic -science, namely, whether feeling and pleasure precede or follow, are -cause or effect of the æsthetic fact. We must widen this question to -include the relation between the various spiritual forms, and answer -it by maintaining that one cannot talk of cause and effect and of a -chronological before and after in the unity of the spirit. - -And once the relation above expounded is established, all necessity for -inquiry as to the nature of æsthetic, moral, intellectual and even what -was sometimes called economic feelings, must disappear. In this last -case, it is clear that it is a question, not of two terms, but of one, -and inquiry as to economic feeling must be the same as that relating to -economic activity. But in the other cases also, we must attend, not to -the substantive, but to the adjective: the æsthetic, moral and logical -character will explain the colouring of the feelings as æsthetic, moral -and intellectual, whereas feeling, studied alone, will never explain -those refractions and colorations. - -[Sidenote: _Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings._] - -A further consequence is, that we no longer need retain the well-known -distinctions between values or feelings _of value,_ and feelings -that are merely hedonistic and _without value_; _disinterested_ -and _interested_ feelings, _objective_ feelings and feelings not -_objective_ but simply _subjective_ feelings of _approbation_ and of -_mere pleasure_ (cf. the distinction of _Gefallen_ and _Vergnügen_ -in German). Those distinctions were used to save the three spiritual -forms, which were recognized as the triad of the _True,_ the _Good_ -and the _Beautiful,_ from confusion with the fourth form, still -unknown, and therefore insidious in its indeterminateness and mother -of scandals. For us this triad has completed its task, because we are -capable of reaching the distinction far more directly, by receiving -also the selfish, subjective, merely pleasurable feelings among the -respectable forms of the spirit; and where formerly antitheses were -conceived (by ourselves and others), between value and feelings, as -between spirituality and naturality, henceforth we see nothing but -differences between value and value. - -[Sidenote: _Value and disvalue: the contraries and their union._] - -As has already been said, feeling or the economic activity presents -itself as divided into two poles, positive and negative, pleasure -and pain, which we can now translate into useful and disuseful (or -hurtful). This bipartition has already been noted above, as a mark of -the activistic character of feeling, and one which is to be found in -all forms of activity. If each of these is _value,_ each has opposed -to it _antivalue_ or _disvalue._ Absence of value is not sufficient to -cause dis value, but activity and passivity must be struggling between -themselves, without the one getting the better of the other; hence -the contradiction and disvalue of the activity that is embarrassed, -impeded, or interrupted. Value is activity that unfolds itself freely: -disvalue is its contrary. - -We will content ourselves with this definition of the two terms, -without entering into the problem of the relation between value and -disvalue, that is, the problem of contraries (that is to say, whether -they are to be thought of dualistically, as two beings or two orders -of beings, like Ormuzd and Ahriman, angels and devils, enemies to one -another; or as a unity, which is also contrariety). This definition -of the two terms will be sufficient for our purpose, which is to make -clear the nature of æsthetic activity, and at this particular point one -of the most obscure and disputed concepts of Æsthetic: the concept of -the _Beautiful._ - -[Sidenote: _The Beautiful as the value of expression, or expression -without qualification._] - -Æsthetic, intellectual, economic and ethical values and disvalues -are variously denominated in current speech: _beautiful, true, good, -useful, expedient, just, right_ and so on--thus designating the free -development of spiritual activity, action, scientific research, -artistic production, when they are successful; _ugly, false, bad, -useless, inexpedient, unjust,_ wrong designating embarrassed activity, -the product that is a failure. In linguistic usage, these denominations -are being continually shifted from one order of facts to another. -_Beautiful,_ for instance, is said not only of a successful expression, -but also of a scientific truth, of an action successfully achieved, -and of a moral action: thus we talk of an _intellectual beauty,_ of a -_beautiful action,_ of a _moral beauty._ The attempt to keep up with -these infinitely varying usages leads into a trackless labyrinth of -verbalism in which many philosophers and students of art have lost -their way. For this reason we have thought it best studiously to avoid -the use of the word "beautiful" to indicate successful expression in -its positive value. But after all the explanations that we have given, -all danger of misunderstanding being now dissipated, and since on the -other hand we cannot fail to recognize that the prevailing tendency, -both in current speech and in philosophy, is to limit the meaning of -the word "beautiful" precisely to the æsthetic value, it seems now both -permissible and advisable to define beauty as _successful expression,_ -or rather, as _expression_ and nothing more, because expression when it -is not successful is not expression. - -[Sidenote: _The ugly, and the elements of beauty which compose it._] - -Consequently, the ugly is unsuccessful expression. The paradox is true, -for works of art that are failures, that the beautiful presents itself -as _unity,_ the ugly as _multiplicity._ Hence we hear of _merits_ in -relation to works of art that are more or less failures, that is to -say, of _those parts of them that are beautiful,_ which is not the case -with perfect works. It is in fact impossible to enumerate the merits or -to point out what parts of the latter are beautiful, because being a -complete fusion they have but one value. Life circulates in the whole -organism: it is not withdrawn into the several parts. - -[Sidenote: _Illusion that there exist expressions neither beautiful nor -ugly._] - -Unsuccessful works may have merit in various degrees, even the -greatest. The beautiful does not possess degrees, for there is no -conceiving a more beautiful, that is, an expressive that is more -expressive, an adequate that is more than adequate. Ugliness, on the -other hand, does possess degrees, from the rather ugly (or almost -beautiful) to the extremely ugly. But if the ugly were _complete,_ -that is to say, without any element of beauty, it would for that very -reason cease to be ugly, because it would be without the contradiction -in which is the reason of its existence. The disvalue would become -non-value; activity would give place to passivity, with which it is not -at war, save when activity is really present to oppose it. - -And because the distinctive consciousness of the beautiful and of the -ugly is based on the conflicts and contradictions in which æsthetic -activity is developed, it is evident that this consciousness becomes -attenuated to the point of disappearing altogether, as we descend from -the more complicated to the more simple and to the simplest instances -of expression. Hence the illusion that there are expressions neither -beautiful nor ugly, those which are obtained without sensible effort -and appear easy and natural being considered such. - -[Sidenote: _True æsthetic feelings and concomitant or accidental -feelings._] - -The whole mystery of the _beautiful_ and the _ugly_ is reduced to -these henceforth most easy definitions. Should any one object that -there exist perfect æsthetic expressions before which no pleasure is -felt, and others, perhaps even failures, which give him the greatest -pleasure, we must recommend him to concentrate his attention in the -æsthetic fact, upon that which is truly æsthetic pleasure. Æsthetic -pleasure is sometimes reinforced or rather complicated by pleasures -arising from extraneous facts, which are only accidentally found united -with it. The poet or any other artist affords an instance of purely -æsthetic pleasure at the moment when he sees (or intuites) his work -for the first time; that is to say, when his impressions take form and -his countenance is irradiated with the divine joy of the creator. On -the other hand, a mixed pleasure is experienced by one who goes to the -theatre, after a day's work, to witness a comedy: when the pleasure of -rest and amusement, or that of laughingly snatching a nail from his -coffin, accompanies the moment of true æsthetic pleasure in the art -of the dramatist and actors. The same may be said of the artist who -looks upon his labour with pleasure when it is finished, experiencing, -in addition to the æsthetic pleasure, that very different one which -arises from the thought of self-complacency satisfied, or even of the -economic gain which will come to him from his work. Instances could be -multiplied. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of apparent feelings._] - -A category of _apparent_ æsthetic feelings has been formed in modern -Æsthetic, not arising from the form, that is to say, from the works of -art as such, but from their content. It has been remarked that artistic -representations arouse pleasure and pain in their infinite shades -of variety. We tremble with anxiety, we rejoice, we fear, we laugh, -we weep, we desire, with the personages of a drama or of a romance, -with the figures in a picture and with the melody of music. But these -feelings are not such as would be aroused by the real fact outside -art; or rather, they are the same in quality, but are quantitatively -an attenuation of real things. Æsthetic and _apparent_ pleasure and -pain show themselves to be light, shallow, mobile. We have no need to -treat here of these _apparent feelings,_ for the good reason that we -have already amply discussed them; indeed, we have hitherto treated -of nothing but them. What are these apparent or manifested feelings, -but feelings objectified, intuited, expressed? And it is natural that -they do not trouble and afflict us as passionately as those of real -life, because those were matter, these are form and activity; those -true and proper feelings, these intuitions and expressions. The formula -of _apparent feelings_ is therefore for us nothing but a tautology, -through which we can run the pen without scruple. - - - - -XI - - -CRITICISM OF ÆSTHETIC HEDONISM - - -As we are opposed to hedonism in general, that is to say, to the theory -based upon the pleasure and pain intrinsic to the economic activity and -accompanying every other form of activity, which, confounding container -and content, fails to recognize any process but the hedonistic; so we -are opposed to æsthetic hedonism in particular, which looks at any rate -upon the æsthetic, if not also upon all other activities, as a simple -fact of feeling, and confounds the pleasurable expression, which is the -beautiful, with the simply pleasurable and all its other species. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher -senses._] - -The æsthetic-hedonistic point of view has been presented in several -forms. One of the most ancient conceives the beautiful as that which -pleases sight and hearing, that is to say, the so-called _higher -senses._ When analysis of æsthetic facts first began, it was, indeed, -difficult to avoid the false belief that a picture and a piece of -music are impressions of sight or hearing and correctly to interpret -the obvious remark that the blind man does not enjoy the picture, nor -the deaf man the music. To show, as we have shown, that the æsthetic -fact does not depend upon the nature of the impressions, but that all -sensible impressions can be raised to æsthetic expression and that -none need of necessity be so raised, is an idea which presents itself -only when all other doctrinal constructions of this problem have been -tried. Any one who holds that the æsthetic fact is something pleasing -to the eyes or to the hearing, has no line of defence against him who -consistently proceeds to identify the beautiful with the pleasurable in -general, and includes in Æsthetic cooking, or (as some positivists have -called it) the viscerally beautiful. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of play._] - -The theory of _play_ is another form of æsthetic hedonism. The concept -of play has sometimes helped towards the realization of the activistic -character of the expressive fact: man (it has been said) is not really -man, save when he begins to play (that is to say, when he frees himself -from natural and mechanical causality and works spiritually); and his -first game is art. But since the word "play" also means that pleasure -which arises from the expenditure of the exuberant energy of the -organism (which is a practical fact), the consequence of this theory -has been that every game has been called an æsthetic fact, or that the -æsthetic function has been called a game, because like science and -everything else, it may form part of a game. Morality alone cannot -ever be caused by the will to play (for it will never consent to such -an origin), but on the contrary itself dominates and regulates the act -itself of playing. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theories of sexuality and of triumph._] - -Finally, some have tried to deduce the pleasure of art from the echo -of that of the sexual organs. And some of the most recent æstheticians -confidently find the genesis of the æsthetic fact in the pleasure of -_conquering_ and in that of _triumphing,_ or, as others add, in the -wish of the male to conquer the female. This theory is seasoned with -much anecdotal erudition, heaven knows of what degree of credibility, -as to the customs of savage peoples. But there was really no need for -such assistance, since in ordinary life one often meets poets who adorn -themselves with their poetry, like cocks raising their crests, or -turkeys spreading out their tails. But any one who does this, in so far -as he does it, is not a poet but a poor fool, in fact, a poor fool of -a cock or turkey, and the desire for the victorious conquest of women -has nothing to do with the fact of art. It would be just as correct to -look upon poetry as _economic,_ because there once were court poets -and salaried poets, and there are poets now who find in the sale of -their verses an aid to life if not a complete living. This deduction -and definition has not failed to attract some zealous neophytes in -historical materialism. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the Æsthetic of the sympathetic. Meaning in it -of content and form._] - -Another less vulgar current of thought considers Æsthetic as the -science of the _sympathetic,_ as that with which we sympathize, -which attracts, rejoices, arouses pleasure and admiration. But the -sympathetic is nothing but the image or representation of what pleases. -And as such it is a complex fact, resulting from a constant element, -the æsthetic element of representation, and a variable element, the -pleasing in its infinite forms, arising from all the various classes of -values. - -In ordinary language, there is sometimes a feeling of repugnance at -calling an expression "beautiful," unless it is an expression of the -sympathetic. Hence the continual conflicts between the point of view -of the æsthetician or art critic and that of the ordinary person, -who cannot succeed in persuading himself that the image of pain and -baseness can be beautiful or at least that it has as much right to be -beautiful as the pleasing and the good. - -The conflict could be put an end to by distinguishing two different -sciences, one of expression and the other of the sympathetic, if the -latter could be the object of a special science; that is to say, if -it were not, as has been shown, a complex and equivocal concept. If -predominance be given to the expressive fact, it enters Æsthetic as -science of expression; if to the pleasurable content, we fall back -to the study of facts essentially hedonistic (utilitarian), however -complicated they may appear. The particular origin of the doctrine -which conceives the relation between form and content as the sum of two -values is also to be sought in the doctrine of the sympathetic. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic hedonism and moralism._] - -In all the doctrines just now discussed, art is considered as a merely -hedonistic thing. But æsthetic hedonism cannot be maintained, save by -uniting it with a general philosophical hedonism, which does not admit -any other form of value. Hardly has this hedonistic conception of art -been received by philosophers who admit one or more spiritual values, -truth or morality, when the following question must necessarily be -asked: What must be done with art? To what use should it be put? Should -a free course be allowed to the pleasures it procures? And if so, to -what extent? The question of the _end of art,_ which in the Æsthetic of -expression is inconceivable, has a clear significance in the Æsthetic -of the Sympathetic and demands a solution. - -[Sidenote: _The rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of -art._] - -Now it is evident that such solution can have but two forms, one -altogether negative, the other of a restrictive nature. The first, -which we shall call _rigoristic_ or _ascetic,_ appears several times, -although not frequently, in the history of ideas. It looks upon art -as an inebriation of the senses and therefore as not only useless but -harmful. According to this theory, then, we must exert all our strength -to liberate the human soul from its disturbing influence. The other -solution, which we shall call _pedagogic_ or _moralistic-utilitarian,_ -admits art, but only in so far as it co-operates with the end of -morality; in so far as it assists with innocent pleasure the work -of him who points the way to the true and the good; in so far as it -anoints the edge of the cup of wisdom and morality with sweet honey. - -It is well to observe that it would be an error to divide this second -view into intellectualistic and moralistic-utilitarian, according as to -whether be assigned to art the end of leading to the true or to what -is practically good. The educational task which is imposed upon it, -precisely because it is an end which is sought after and advised, is no -longer merely a theoretical fact, but a theoretical fact already become -the ground for practical action; it is not, therefore, intellectualism, -but pedagogism and practicism. Nor would it be more exact to subdivide -the pedagogic view into pure utilitarian and moralistic-utilitarian; -because those who admit only the satisfaction of the individual -(the desire of the individual), precisely because they are absolute -hedonists, have no motive for seeking an ulterior justification for -art. - -But to enunciate these theories at the point to which we have attained -is to confute them. We prefer to restrict ourselves to observing that -in the pedagogic theory of art is to be found another of the reasons -why the claim has erroneously been made that the content of art should -be _chosen_ with a view to certain practical effects. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of pure beauty._] - -The thesis that art consists of _pure beauty_ has often been brought -forward against hedonistic and pedagogic Æsthetic, and eagerly taken -up by artists: "Heaven places all our joy in _pure beauty,_ and the -Verse is everything." If by this be understood that art is not to be -confounded with sensual pleasure (utilitarian practicism), nor with -the exercise of morality, then our Æsthetic also must be permitted to -adorn itself with the title of _Æsthetic of pure beauty._ But if (as is -often the case) something mystical and transcendent be meant by this, -something unknown to our poor human world, or something spiritual and -beatific, but not expressive, we must reply that while applauding the -conception of a beauty _free from all that is not the spiritual form of -expression,_ we are unable to conceive a beauty superior to this and -still less that it should be _purified of expression,_ or severed from -itself. - - - - -XII - - -THE ÆSTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-ÆSTHETIC CONCEPTS - - -[Sidenote: _Pseudo-æsthetic concepts, and the æsthetic of the -sympathetic._] - -The doctrine of the sympathetic (very often animated and seconded in -this by the capricious metaphysical and mystical Æsthetic, and by that -blind traditionalism which assumes an intimate connection between -things fortuitously treated together by the same authors in the same -books), has introduced and rendered familiar in systems of Æsthetic a -series of concepts a rapid mention of which suffices to justify our -resolute expulsion of them from our own treatise. - -Their catalogue is long, not to say interminable: _tragic, comic, -sublime, pathetic, moving, sad, ridiculous, melancholy, tragi-comic, -humorous, majestic, dignified, serious, grave, imposing, noble, -decorous, graceful, attractive, piquant, coquettish, idyllic, elegiac, -cheerful, violent, ingenuous, cruel, base, horrible, disgusting, -dreadful, nauseating;_ the fist can be increased at will. - -Since that doctrine took the sympathetic as its special object, it was -naturally unable to neglect any of the varieties of the sympathetic, -any of the mixtures or gradations by means of which, starting from -the sympathetic in its loftiest and most intense manifestation, its -contrary, the antipathetic and repugnant, is finally reached. And -since the sympathetic content was held to be the _beautiful_ and -the antipathetic the _ugly,_ the varieties (tragic, comic, sublime, -pathetic, etc.) constituted for that conception of Æsthetic the shades -and gradations intervening between the beautiful and the ugly. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the ugly in art and of the -overcoming of it._] - -Having enumerated and defined as well as it could, the chief of these -varieties, the Æsthetic of the sympathetic set itself the problem -of the place to be assigned to the _ugly in art._ This problem is -without meaning for us, who do not recognize any ugliness save the -anti-æsthetic or inexpressive, which can never form _part_ of the -æsthetic fact, being, on the contrary, its _antithesis._ But in the -doctrine which we are here criticizing the positing and discussion -of that problem meant neither more nor less than the necessity of -reconciling in some way the false and defective idea of art from which -it started--art reduced to the representation of the pleasurable--with -real art, which occupies a far wider field. Hence the artificial -attempt to settle what examples of the _ugly_ (antipathetic) could be -admitted in artistic representation, and for what reasons, and in what -ways. - -The answer was: that the ugly is admissible, only when it can be -_overcome_; an unconquerable ugliness, such as the _disgusting_ or the -_nauseating,_ being altogether excluded. Further, that the duty of -the ugly, when admitted in art, is to contribute towards heightening -the effect of the beautiful (sympathetic), by producing a series of -contrasts, from which the pleasurable may issue more efficacious and -joy-giving. It is, indeed, a common observation that pleasure is more -vividly felt when preceded by abstinence and suffering. Thus the ugly -in art was looked upon as adapted for the service of the beautiful, a -stimulant and condiment of æsthetic pleasure. - -That special refinement of hedonistic theory which used to be pompously -called the doctrine of the _overcoming of the ugly_ falls with the -Æsthetic of the sympathetic, and with it the enumeration and definition -of the concepts mentioned above, which show themselves to be completely -foreign to Æsthetic. For Æsthetic does not recognize the sympathetic or -the antipathetic or their varieties, but only the spiritual activity of -representation. - -[Sidenote: _Pseudo-æsthetic concepts belong to Psychology._] - -Nevertheless, the important place which, as we have said, those -concepts have hitherto occupied in æsthetic treatises makes it -advisable to supply a rather more complete explanation as to their -nature. What shall be their lot? Excluded from Æsthetic, in what other -part of Philosophy will they be received? - -In truth, nowhere; for all those concepts are without philosophical -value. They are nothing but a series of classes, which can be fashioned -in the most various ways and multiplied at pleasure, to which it is -sought to reduce the infinite complications and shadings of the values -and disvalues of life. Of these classes, some have an especially -positive significance, like the beautiful, the sublime, the majestic, -the solemn, the serious, the weighty, the noble, the elevated; others -a significance chiefly negative, like the ugly, the painful, the -horrible, the dreadful, the tremendous, the monstrous, the insipid, the -extravagant; finally in others a mixed significance prevails, such as -the comic, the tender, the melancholy, the humorous, the tragi-comic. -The complications are infinite, because the individuations are -infinite; hence it is not possible to construct the concepts, save in -the arbitrary and approximate manner proper to the natural sciences, -satisfied with making the best classification they can of that reality -which they can neither exhaust by enumeration, nor understand and -conquer speculatively. And since _Psychology_ is the naturalistic -science which undertakes to construct types and schemes of the -spiritual life of man (a science whose merely empirical and descriptive -character becomes more evident day by day), these concepts do not -belong to Æsthetic, nor to Philosophy in general, but must simply be -handed over to Psychology. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of rigorous definitions of them._] - -The case of those concepts is that of all other psychological -constructions: no rigorous definitions of them are possible; and -consequently they cannot be deduced from one another nor be connected -in a system, though this has often been attempted, with great waste -of time and without obtaining thereby any useful results. Nor can it -be claimed as possible to obtain empirical definitions, universally -acceptable as precise and true in the place of those philosophical -definitions recognized as impossible. For no single definition of a -single fact can be given, but there are innumerable definitions of it, -according to the cases and the purposes for which they are made; and -it is clear that if there were only one which had the value of truth -it would no longer be an empirical, but a rigorous and philosophical -definition. And as a matter of fact whenever one of the terms to which -we have referred has been employed (or indeed any other belonging to -the same class), a new definition of it has been given at the same -time, expressed or understood. Each one of those definitions differed -somehow from the others, in some particular, however minute, and in its -implied reference to some individual fact or other, which thus became a -special object of attention and was raised to the position of a general -type. Thus it is that not one of such definitions satisfies either the -hearer or the constructor of it. For a moment later he finds himself -before a new instance to which he recognizes that his definition is -more or less insufficient, ill-adapted, and in need of retouching. So -we must leave writers and speakers free to define the sublime or the -comic, the tragic or the humorous, on every occasion as they please and -as may suit the end they have in view. And if an empirical definition -of universal validity be demanded, we can but submit this one:--The -sublime (or comic, tragic, humorous, etc.) is _everything_ that is or -shall be so _called_ by those who have employed or shall employ these -_words._ - -[Sidenote: _Examples: definitions of the sublime, the comic, the -humorous._] - -What is the sublime? The unexpected affirmation of an overwhelming -moral force: that is one definition. But the other definition is -equally good, which recognizes the sublime also where the force which -affirms itself is certainly overwhelming, but immoral and destructive. -Both remain vague and lack precision, until applied to a concrete -case, to an example which makes clear what is meant by "overwhelming," -and what by unexpected. They are quantitative concepts, but falsely -quantitative, since there is no way of measuring them; they are at -bottom metaphors, emphatic phrases, or logical tautologies. The -humorous will be laughter amid tears, bitter laughter, the sudden -spring from the comic to the tragic and from the tragic to the comic, -the romantic comic, the opposite of the sublime, war declared against -every attempt at insincerity, compassion ashamed to weep, a laugh, -not at the fact, but at the ideal itself; and what you will beside, -according as it is wished to get a view of the physiognomy of this or -that poet, of this or that poem, which, in its uniqueness, is its own -definition, and though momentary and circumscribed, is alone adequate. -The comic has been defined as the displeasure arising from the -perception of a deformity immediately followed by a greater pleasure -arising from the relaxation of our psychical forces, strained in -expectation of a perception looked upon as important. While listening -to a narrative, which might, for example, be a description of the -magnificently heroic purpose of some individual, we anticipate in -imagination the occurrence of a magnificent and heroic action, and we -prepare for its reception by concentrating our psychic forces. All of -a sudden, however, instead of the magnificent and heroic action, which -the preliminaries and the tone of the narrative had led us to expect, -there is an unexpected change to a small, mean, foolish action, which -does not satisfy to our expectation. We have been deceived, and the -recognition of the deceit brings with it an instant of displeasure. But -this instant is as it were conquered by that which immediately follows: -we are able to relax our strained attention, to free ourselves from -the provision of accumulated psychic energy henceforth superfluous, to -feel ourselves light and well. This is the pleasure of the comic, with -its physiological equivalent of laughter. If the unpleasant fact that -has appeared should painfully affect our interests, there would not -be pleasure, laughter would be at once suffocated, the psychic energy -would be strained and overstrained by other more weighty perceptions. -If on the other hand such more weighty perceptions do not appear, if -the whole loss be limited to a slight deception of our foresight, -then the feeling of our psychic wealth that ensues affords ample -compensation for this very slight disappointment. Such, expressed in -a few words, is one of the most accurate modern definitions of the -comic. It boasts of containing in itself, justified or corrected and -verified, the manifold attempts to define the comic, from Hellenic -antiquity to our own day, from Plato's definition in the _Philebus,_ -and from Aristotle's, which is more explicit, and looks upon the comic -as an _ugliness without pain,_ to that of Hobbes, who replaced it in -the feeling of _individual superiority_; of Kant, who saw in it the -_relaxation of a tension_; or from the other proposals of those for -whom it was _the conflict between great and small, between the finite -and the infinite_ and so on. But on close observation, the analysis -and definition above given, although in appearance most elaborate -and precise, yet enunciates characteristics which are applicable, -not only to the comic, but to every spiritual process; such as the -succession of painful and pleasing moments and the satisfaction -arising from the consciousness of strength and of its free expansion. -The differentiation is here given by quantitative determinations -whose limits cannot be laid down. They therefore remain vague words, -possessing some degree of meaning from their reference to this or that -particular comic fact, and from the psychic disposition of qualities of -the speaker. If such definitions be taken too seriously, there happens -to them what Jean Paul Richter said of all the definitions of the -comic: namely, that their sole merit is _to be themselves comic_ and to -produce in reality the fact which they vainly try to fix logically. And -who will ever logically determine the dividing line between the comic -and the non-comic, between laughter and smiles, between smiling and -gravity, or cut the ever varying continuum into which life melts into -clearly divided parts? - -[Sidenote: _Relation between these concepts and æsthetic concepts._] - -The facts, classified as far as possible in these psychological -concepts, bear no relation to the artistic fact, beyond the general -one, that all of them, in so far as they constitute the material of -life, can become the object of artistic representation; and the other, -an accidental relation, that æsthetic facts also may sometimes enter -the processes described, such as the impression of the sublime aroused -by the work of a Titanic artist, such as Dante or Shakespeare, and of -the comic produced by the attempts of a dauber or scribbler. - -But here too the process is external to the æsthetic fact, to which -is linked only the feeling of æsthetic value and disvalue, of the -beautiful and of the ugly. Dante's Farinata is æsthetically beautiful -and nothing but beautiful: if the force of will of that personage seem -also sublime, or the expression that Dante gives him seem, by reason of -his great genius, sublime in comparison with that of a less energetic -poet, these are things altogether outside æsthetic consideration. We -repeat again that this last pays attention always and only to the -adequateness of the expression, that is to say, to beauty. - - - - -XIII - - -THE "PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL" IN NATURE AND IN ART - - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic activity and physical concepts._] - -Æsthetic activity, distinct from the practical activity, is always -accompanied by it in its manifestations. Hence its utilitarian or -hedonistic side, and the pleasure and pain which are, as it were, the -practical echo of æsthetic value and disvalue, of the beautiful and of -the ugly. But this practical side of the æsthetic activity has in its -turn a _physical_ or _psycho-physical_ accompaniment, which consists of -sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines and colours, and so on. - -Does it _really_ possess this side, or does it only seem to possess it, -through the construction which we put on it in physical science, and -the useful and arbitrary methods which we have already several times -set in relief as proper to the empirical and abstract sciences? Our -reply cannot be doubtful, that is, it must affirm to the second of the -two hypotheses. - -However, it will be better to leave this point in suspense, since it -is not at present necessary to press this line of inquiry further. The -mere mention suffices to secure our speaking (for reasons of simplicity -and adhesion to ordinary language) of the physical element as something -objective and existing, against leading to hasty conclusions as to the -concepts of spirit and nature and their relation. - -[Sidenote: _Expression in the æsthetic sense, and expression in the -naturalistic sense._] - -It is important, on the other hand, to make clear that as the existence -of the hedonistic side in every spiritual activity has given rise -to the confusion between the æsthetic activity and the useful or -pleasurable, so the existence of, or rather the possibility of -constructing, this physical side, has caused the confusion between -_æsthetic_ expression and expression _in a naturalistic sense_; that -is to say, between a spiritual fact and a mechanical and passive fact -(not to say, between a concrete reality and an abstraction or fiction). -In common speech, sometimes it is the words of the poet that are -called _expressions,_ the notes of the musician, or the figures of the -painter; sometimes the blush which generally accompanies the feeling of -shame, the pallor often due to fear, the grinding of the teeth proper -to violent anger, the shining of the eyes and certain movements of the -muscles of the mouth, which manifest cheerfulness. We also say that a -certain degree of heat is the _expression_ of fever, that the falling -of the barometer is the _expression_ of rain, and even that the height -of the exchange _expresses_ the depreciation of the paper currency of a -State, or social discontent the approach of a revolution. One can well -imagine what sort of scientific results would be attained by allowing -oneself to be governed by verbal usage and classing together facts so -widely different. But there is, in fact, an abyss between a man who -is the prey of anger with all its natural manifestations and another -man who expresses it æsthetically; between the appearance, the cries -and contortions of some one grieving at the loss of a dear one and the -words or song with which the same individual portrays his suffering -at another time; between the grimace of emotion and the gesture of -the actor. Darwin's book on the expression of the emotions in man and -animals does not belong to Æsthetic; because there is nothing in common -between the science of spiritual expression and a _Semiotic,_ whether -it be medical, meteorological, political, physiognomic, or chiromantic. - -Expression in the naturalistic sense simply lacks _expression in the -spiritual sense,_ that is to say, the very character of activity and -of spirituality, and therefore the bipartition into the poles of -beauty and of ugliness. It is nothing but a relation between cause -and effect, fixed by the abstract intellect. The complete process -of æsthetic production can be symbolized in four stages, which are: -_a,_ impressions; _b,_ expression or spiritual æsthetic synthesis; -_c,_ hedonistic accompaniment, or pleasure of the beautiful (æsthetic -pleasure); _d,_ translation of the æsthetic fact into physical -phenomena (sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines and colours, -etc.). Any one can see that the capital point, the only one that -is properly speaking æsthetic and truly real, is in _b,_ which is -lacking to the merely naturalistic manifestation or construction also -metaphorically called expression. - -The expressive process is exhausted when these four stages have been -passed through. It begins again with new impressions, a new æsthetic -synthesis, and the accompaniments that belong to it. - -[Sidenote: _Representations and memory._] - -Expressions or representations follow one another, the one drives out -the other. Certainly, this passing away, this being driven out, is -not a perishing, it is not total elimination: nothing that is born -dies with that complete death which would be identical with never -having been born. If all things pass away, nothing can die. Even the -representations that we have forgotten persist somehow in our spirit, -for without this we could not explain acquired habits and capacities. -Indeed the strength of life lies in this apparent forgetting: one -forgets what has been absorbed and what life has superseded. - -But other representations are also powerful elements in the present -processes of our spirit; and it is incumbent upon us not to forget -them, or to be capable of recalling them when they are wanted. The -will is always vigilant in this work of preservation, which aims at -preserving (we may say) the greater, the more fundamental part of all -our riches. But its vigilance does not always suffice. Memory, as we -say, abandons or betrays us in different ways. For this very reason, -the human spirit devises expedients which succour the weakness of -memory and are its _aids._ - -[Sidenote: _The production of aids to memory._] - -How these aids are possible we have been informed from what has been -said. Expressions or representations are _also_ practical facts, which -are also called physical in so far as physics classifies and reduces -them to types. Now it is clear that if we can succeed in making those -practical or physical facts somehow permanent, it will always be -possible (all other conditions remaining equal) on perceiving them to -reproduce in ourselves the already produced expression or intuition. - -If that be called the object or physical stimulus in which the -practical concomitant acts, or (to use physical terms) in which the -movements have been isolated and made in some sort permanent, and -if that object or stimulus be designated by the letter _e_; the -process of reproduction will take place in the following order: _e,_ -the physical stimulus; _d-b,_ perception of physical facts (sounds, -tones, mimetic, combinations of lines and colours, etc.), which is -together the æsthetic synthesis, already produced; _c_, the hedonistic -accompaniment, which is also reproduced. - -And what else are those combinations of words called poetry, prose, -poems, novels, romances, tragedies or comedies, but _physical -stimulants of reproduction_ (the stage _e_); what else are those -combinations of sound called operas, symphonies, sonatas; or -those combinations of lines and colours called pictures, statues, -architecture? The spiritual energy of memory, with the assistance of -the physical facts above mentioned, makes possible the preservation and -the reproduction of the intuitions produced by man. The physiological -organism and with it the memory become weakened; the monuments of art -are destroyed, and lo, all that æsthetic wealth, the fruit of the -labours of many generations, diminishes and rapidly disappears. - -[Sidenote: _Physical beauty._] - -Monuments of art, the stimulants of æsthetic reproduction, are called -_beautiful things_ or _physical beauty._ This combination of words -constitutes a verbal paradox, for the beautiful is not a physical -fact; it does not belong to things, but to the activity of man, to -spiritual energy. But it is now clear through what transferences and -associations, physical things and facts which are simply aids to the -reproduction of the beautiful are finally called elliptically beautiful -things and physical beauty. And now that we have explained this -elliptical usage, we shall ourselves employ it without hesitation. - -[Sidenote: _Content and form: another meaning._] - -The intervention of "physical beauty" serves to explain another meaning -of the words "_content_" and "_form,_" as used by æstheticians. Some -call "content" the internal fact or expression (for us, on the other -hand, form), and "form" the marble, the colours, the rhythm, the sounds -(for us the antithesis of form); thus looking upon the physical fact -as the form, which may or may not be joined to the content. It also -serves to explain another aspect of what is called æsthetic "ugliness." -Somebody who has nothing definite to express may try to conceal his -internal emptiness in a flood of words, in sounding verse, in deafening -polyphony, in painting that dazzles the eye, or by heaping together -great architectural masses which arrest and astonish us without -conveying anything whatever. Ugliness, then, is the capricious, the -charlatanesque; and, in reality, if practical caprice did not intervene -in the theoretic function, there might be absence of beauty, but never -the real presence of something deserving the adjective "ugly." - -[Sidenote: _Natural and artificial beauty._] - -Physical beauty is usually divided into _natural_ and _artificial_ -beauty. Thus we reach one of the facts which have given the greatest -trouble to thinkers: _natural beauty._ These words often designate -facts of merely practical pleasure. Any one who calls a landscape -beautiful where the eye rests upon verdure, where the body moves -briskly and the warm sun envelops and caresses the limbs, does not -speak of anything æsthetic. But it is nevertheless indubitable that -on other occasions the adjective "beautiful," applied to objects and -scenes existing in nature, has a completely æsthetic signification. - -It has been observed that in order to enjoy natural objects -æsthetically, we must abstract from their external and historical -reality, and separate their simple semblance or appearance from -existence; that if we contemplate a landscape with our head between -our legs, so as to cancel our wonted relations with it, the landscape -appears to us to be an ideal spectacle; that nature is beautiful -only for him who contemplates her _with the eye of the artist_; that -zoologists and botanists do not recognize _beautiful_ animals and -flowers; that natural beauty is _discovered_ (and examples of discovery -are the points of view, pointed out by men of taste and imagination, -to which more or less æsthetic travellers and excursionists afterwards -have recourse in pilgrimage, whence a kind of collective _suggestion)_; -that, without the _aid of the imagination,_ no part of nature is -beautiful, and that with such aid the same natural object or fact -is, according to the disposition of the soul, now expressive, now -insignificant, now expressive of one definite thing, now of another, -sad or glad, sublime or ridiculous, sweet or laughable; finally, that -a _natural beauty_ which an artist would not _to some extent correct, -does not exist._ - -All these observations are just, and fully confirm the fact that -natural beauty is simply a _stimulus_ to æsthetic reproduction, -which presupposes previous production. Without the previous æsthetic -intuitions of the imagination, nature cannot awaken any at all. As -regards natural beauty, man is like the mythical Narcissus at the -fountain. Leopardi said that natural beauty is "rare, scattered, and -fugitive": it is imperfect, equivocal, variable. Each refers the -natural fact to the expression in his mind. One artist is thrown into -transports by a smiling landscape, another by a rag-shop, another by -the pretty face of a young girl, another by the squalid countenance -of an old rascal. Perhaps the first will say that the rag-shop and -the ugly face of the old rascal are _repulsive_; the second, that the -smiling landscape and the face of the young girl are _insipid._ They -may dispute for ever; but they will never agree, save when they are -supplied with a sufficient dose of æsthetic knowledge to enable them to -recognize that both are right. _Artificial_ beauty, created by man, -supplies an aid that is far more ductile and efficacious. - -[Sidenote: _Mixed beauty._] - -In addition to these two classes, æstheticians also sometimes talk in -their treatises of a _mixed_ beauty. A mixture of what? Precisely of -natural and artificial. Whoever fixes and externalizes, operates with -natural data which he does not create but combines and transforms. -In this sense, every artificial product is a mixture of nature and -artifice; and there would be no occasion to speak of a mixed beauty, -as of a special category. But it sometimes happens that combinations -already given in nature can be used a great deal more than in others; -as, for instance, when we design a beautiful garden and include in our -design groups of trees or ponds already in place. On other occasions -externalization is limited by the impossibility of producing certain -effects artificially. Thus we can mix colouring matters, but we cannot -create a powerful voice or a face and figure appropriate to this or -that character in a play. We must therefore seek them among already -existing things, and make use of them when found. When, therefore, we -employ a great number of combinations already existing in nature, such -as we should not be able to produce artificially if they did not exist, -the resulting fact is called _mixed_ beauty. - -[Sidenote: _Writings._] - -We must distinguish from artificial beauty those instruments of -reproduction called _writings,_ such as alphabets, musical notes, -hieroglyphics, and all pseudolanguages, from the language of flowers -and flags to the language of patches (so much in vogue in the society -of the eighteenth century). Writings are not physical facts which -arouse directly impressions answering to æsthetic expressions; they -are simple _indications_ of what must be done in order to produce such -physical facts. A series of graphic signs serves to remind us of the -movements which we must execute with our vocal apparatus in order to -emit certain definite sounds. If, through practice, we become able -to hear the words without opening our mouths and (what is much more -difficult) to hear the sounds by running the eye along the stave, all -this does not alter in any way the nature of the writings, which are -altogether different from direct physical beauty. No one calls the -book which contains the _Divine Comedy,_ or the score which contains -_Don Giovanni,_ beautiful in the same sense in which the block of -marble which contains Michæl Angelo's _Moses,_ or the piece of coloured -wood which contains the _Transfiguration,_ is metaphorically called -beautiful. Both serve the reproduction of the beautiful, but the former -by a far longer and more indirect route than the latter. - -[Sidenote: _Free and non-free beauty._] - -Another division of the beautiful, still found in treatises, is that -into _free and not free._ By not-free beauties have been understood -those objects which have to serve a double purpose, extra-æsthetic -and æsthetic (stimulants of intuitions); and since it seems that the -first purpose sets limits and barriers in the way of the second, the -resulting beautiful object has been considered as not-free beauty. - -Architectural works are especially cited; and just for this reason, -architecture has often been excluded from the number of what are called -the fine arts. A temple must above all things be for the use of a -cult; a house must contain all the rooms needed for the convenience -of life, and they must be arranged with a view to this convenience; a -fortress must be a construction capable of resisting the attacks of -given armies and the blows of given instruments of war. It is therefore -concluded that the architect's field is restricted: he may _embellish_ -to some extent the temple, the house, the fortress; but he is bound by -the _object_ of those edifices, and he can only manifest that part of -his vision of beauty which does not impair their extra-æsthetic but -fundamental objects. - -Other examples are taken from what is called art applied to industry. -Plates, glasses, knives, guns and combs can be made beautiful; but it -is held that their beauty must not be pushed so far as to prevent our -eating from the plate, drinking from the glass, cutting with the knife, -firing off the gun, or combing one's hair with the comb. The same is -said of the art of typography: a book should be beautiful, but not to -the extent of being difficult or impossible to read. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of non-free beauty._] - -In respect of all this we must observe in the first place that the -extrinsic purpose is not necessarily, precisely because it is such, -a limit or impediment to the other purpose of being a stimulus to -æsthetic reproduction. It is therefore quite false to maintain that -architecture, for example, is by its nature imperfect and not free, -since it must also obey other practical purposes; in fact, the mere -presence of fine works of architecture is enough to dispel any such -illusion. - -In the second place, not only are the two purposes not necessarily -contradictory, but we must add that the artist always has the means -of preventing this contradiction from arising. How? by simply making -the _destination_ of the object which serves a practical end enter -as material into his æsthetic intuition and externalization. He will -not need to add anything to the object, in order to make it the -instrument of æsthetic intuitions: it will be so, if perfectly adapted -to its practical purpose. Rustic dwellings and palaces, churches and -barracks, swords and ploughs, are beautiful, not in so far as they are -embellished and adorned, but in so far as they express their end. A -garment is only beautiful because it is exactly suitable to a given -person in given conditions. The sword bound to the side of the warrior -Rinaldo by the amorous Armida was not beautiful: "so adorned that it -may seem a useless ornament, not the free instrument of war," or it -was beautiful, if you will, but to the eyes and imagination of the -sorceress, who liked to see her lover equipped in that effeminate way. -The æsthetic activity can always agree with the practical, because -expression is truth. - -It cannot however be denied that æsthetic contemplation sometimes -hinders practical usage. For instance, it is a quite common experience -to find certain new objects seem so well adapted to their purpose, -and therefore so beautiful, that people occasionally feel scruples in -maltreating them by passing from their contemplation to their use. It -was for this reason that King Frederick William of Prussia showed -such repugnance to sending his magnificent grenadiers, so well adapted -to war, into the mud and fire of battle, while his less æsthetic son, -Frederick the Great, obtained from them excellent service. - -[Sidenote: _Stimulants of production._] - -It might be objected to the explanation of the physically beautiful -as a simple aid to the reproduction of the internally beautiful, or -expressions, that the artist creates his expressions by painting or -by sculpturing, by writing or by composing, and that therefore the -physically beautiful, instead of following, sometimes precedes the -æsthetically beautiful. This would be a somewhat superficial mode of -understanding the procedure of the artist, who never in reality makes -a stroke with his brush without having previously seen it with his -imagination; and if he has not yet seen it, he will make the stroke, -not in order to externalize his expression (which does not yet exist), -but as a kind of experiment and in order to have a point of departure -for further meditation and internal concentration. The physical -point of departure is not the physically beautiful instrument of -reproduction, but a means that may be called _pedagogic,_ like retiring -into solitude, or the many other expedients frequently very strange, -adopted by artists and scientists, who vary in these according to their -various idiosyncrasies. The old æsthetician Baumgarten advised poets -seeking inspiration to ride on horseback, to drink wine in moderation, -and (provided they were chaste) to look at beautiful women. - - - - -XIV - - -ERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND ÆSTHETIC - - -We must mention a series of fallacious scientific doctrines which have -arisen from the failure to understand the purely external relation -between the æsthetic fact or artistic vision and the physical fact -or instrument which aids in its reproduction, together with brief -criticisms of them deduced from what has already been said. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of æsthetic associationism._] - -That form of associationism which identifies the æsthetic fact with the -_association_ of two images finds support in such lack of apprehension. -By what path has it been possible to arrive at such an error, so -repugnant to our æsthetic consciousness, which is a consciousness of -perfect unity, never of duality? Precisely because the physical and -æsthetic facts have been considered separately, as two distinct images, -which enter the spirit, the one drawn in by the other, first one and -then the other. A picture has been divided into the image of the -_picture_ and the image of the _meaning_ of the picture; a poem, into -the image of the _words_ and the image of the _meaning_ of the words. -But this dualism of images is non-existent: the physical fact does not -enter the spirit as an image, but causes the reproduction of the image -(the only image, which is the æsthetic fact), in so far as it blindly -stimulates the psychic organism and produces the impression which -answers to the æsthetic expression already produced. - -The efforts of the associationists (the usurpers of to-day in the field -of Æsthetic) to emerge from the difficulty, and to reaffirm in some way -the unity which has been destroyed by their principle of association, -are highly instructive. Some maintain that the image recalled is -unconscious; others, leaving unconsciousness alone, hold that, on the -contrary, it is vague, vaporous, confused, thus reducing the _force_ of -the æsthetic fact to the _weakness_ of bad memory. But the dilemma is -inexorable: either keep association and give up unity, or keep unity -and give up association. No third way out of the difficulty exists. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of æsthetic physics._] - -From the failure to analyse so-called natural beauty thoroughly and to -recognize that it is simply an incident of æsthetic reproduction, and -from having looked upon it, on the contrary, as given in nature, is -derived all that portion of treatises upon Æsthetic entitled _Beauty -of Nature_ or _Æsthetic Physics_; sometimes even subdivided, save -the mark, into æsthetic Mineralogy, Botany and Zoology. We do not -wish to deny that such treatises contain many just observations, and -are sometimes themselves works of art, in so far as they represent -beautifully the imaginings and fancies or impressions of their authors. -But we must affirm it to be scientifically false to ask oneself if -the dog be beautiful and the ornithorhynchus ugly, the lily beautiful -and the artichoke ugly. Indeed, the error is here double. On the one -hand, æsthetic Physics falls back into the equivocation of the theory -of artistic and literary kinds, of attempting to attach æsthetic -determinations to the abstractions of our intellect; on the other, it -fails to recognize, as we said, the true formation of so-called natural -beauty, a formation which excludes even the possibility of the question -as to whether some given individual animal, flower or man be beautiful -or ugly. What is not produced by the æsthetic spirit, or cannot be -referred to it, is neither beautiful nor ugly. The æsthetic process -arises from the ideal connexions in which natural objects are placed. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the beauty of the human body._] - -The double error can be exemplified by the question as to the _Beauty -of the human body,_ upon which whole volumes have been written. Here -we must before everything turn those who discuss this subject from the -abstract toward the concrete, by asking: "What do you mean by the -human body, that of the male, the female, or the hermaphrodite?" Let -us assume that they reply by dividing the inquiry into two distinct -inquiries, as to male and female beauty (there really are writers -who seriously discuss whether man or woman is the more beautiful); -and let us continue: "Masculine or feminine beauty; but of what race -of men--the white, the yellow or the black, or any others that may -exist, according to the division you prefer?" Let us assume that they -limit themselves to the white race, and drive home the argument: "To -what sub-species of the white race?" And when we have restricted them -gradually to one corner of the white world, going, let us say, from -the Italian to the Tuscan, the Siennese, the Porta Camollia quarter, -we will proceed: "Very good; but at what age of the human body, and in -what condition and stage--that of the newborn babe, of the child, of -the boy, of the adolescent, of the man of middle age, and so on? and of -him who is at rest or of him who is at work, or of him who is occupied -like Paul Potter's bull, or the Ganymede of Rembrandt?" - -Having thus arrived, by successive reductions, at the individual -_omnimode determinatum,_ or rather at "this man here," pointed out with -the finger, it will be easy to expose the other error, by recalling -what we have said about the natural fact, which is now beautiful, now -ugly, according to the point of view and to what is passing in the soul -of the artist. If even the Gulf of Naples have its detractors, and if -there be artists who declare it inexpressive, preferring the "gloomy -firs," the "clouds and perpetual north winds," of northern seas; is it -really possible that such relativity does not exist for the human body, -source of the most varied suggestions? - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the beauty of geometrical figures._] - -The question of the _beauty of geometrical figures_ is connected with -æsthetic Physics. But if by geometrical figures be understood the -concepts of geometry (the concepts of the triangle, the square, the -cone), these are neither beautiful nor ugly, just because they are -concepts. If, on the other hand, by such figures be understood bodies -which possess definite geometrical forms, they will be beautiful -or ugly, like every natural fact, according to the ideal connexions -in which they are placed. Some hold that those geometrical figures -are beautiful which point upwards, since they give the suggestion -of firmness and of power. We do not deny that this may be so. But -it must not be denied on the other hand that those also may possess -beauty which give the impression of instability and weakness, where -they represent just the insecure and the feeble; and that in these -last cases the firmness of the straight fine and the lightness of the -cone or of the equilateral triangle would seem to be on the contrary -elements of ugliness. - -Certainly, such questions as to the beauty of nature and the beauty -of geometry, like others analogous as to the historically beautiful -and human beauty, seem less absurd in the Æsthetic of the sympathetic, -which really means by the words "æsthetic beauty" the representation -of the pleasing. But the claim to determine scientifically what are -sympathetic contents and what are irremediably antipathetic is none the -less erroneous, even in the sphere of that doctrine and after laying -down those premises. One can only answer such questions by repeating -with an infinitely long postscript the _Sunt quos_ of the first ode of -the first book of Horace, and the _Havvi chi_ of Leopardi's letter to -Carlo Pepoli. To each man his beautiful (= sympathetic), as to each man -his fair one. Philography is not science. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of another aspect of the imitation of nature._] - -The artist sometimes has naturally existing facts before him, in -producing the artificial instrument, or physically beautiful. These are -called his _models_: bodies, stuffs, flowers and so on. Let us run over -the sketches, studies and notes of artists: Leonardo noted down in his -pocket-book, when he was working on the Last Supper: "Giovannina, weird -face, is at St. Catherine's, at the Hospital; Cristofano di Castiglione -is at the Pietà, he has a fine head; Christ, Giovan Conte, of Cardinal -Mortaro's suite." And so on. From this comes the illusion that the -artist _imitates nature,_ when it would perhaps be more exact to say -that nature imitates the artist, and obeys him. The illusion that -_art imitates nature_ has sometimes found ground and support in this -illusion, as also in its variant, more easily maintained, which makes -of art the _idealizer of nature._ This last theory presents the process -out of its true order, which indeed is not merely upset but actually -inverted; for the artist does not proceed from external reality, in -order to modify it by approximating it to the ideal; he goes from -the impression of external nature to expression, that is to say, his -ideal, and from this passes to the natural fact, which he employs as -instrument of reproduction of the ideal fact. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the elementary forms of the -beautiful._] - -Another consequence of the confusion between the æsthetic fact and the -physical fact is the theory of the _elementary forms of the beautiful._ -If expression, if the beautiful, be indivisible, the physical fact on -the contrary, in which it externalizes itself, can easily be divided -and subdivided: for example, a painted surface, into lines and colours, -groups and curves of lines, kinds of colours, and so on; a poem, into -strophes, verses, feet, syllables; a piece of prose, into chapters, -paragraphs, headings, periods, phrases, words and so on. The parts -thus obtained are not æsthetic facts, but smaller physical facts, -arbitrarily divided. If this path were followed and the confusion -persisted in, we should end by concluding that the true elementary -forms of the beautiful are _atoms._ - -The æsthetic law, several times promulgated, that beauty must -have _bulk,_ could be invoked against the atoms. It cannot be the -imperceptibility of the too small, or the inapprehensibility of the -too large. But a greatness determined by perceptibility, not by -measurement, implies a concept widely different from the mathematical. -Indeed, what is called imperceptible and inapprehensible does not -produce an impression, because it is not a real fact, but a concept: -the demand for bulk in the beautiful is thus reduced to the actual -presence of the physical fact, which serves for the reproduction of the -beautiful. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the search for the objective conditions of the -beautiful._] - -Continuing the search for the _physical laws_ or for the _objective -conditions of the beautiful,_ it has been asked: To what physical facts -does the beautiful correspond? To what the ugly? To what unions of -tones, colours, sizes, mathematically determinable? Such inquiries are -as if in Political Economy one were to seek for the laws of exchange -in the physical nature of the objects exchanged. The persistent -fruitlessness of the attempt should have given rise before long to some -suspicion of its vanity. In our times, especially, necessity for an -_inductive_ Æsthetic has been often proclaimed, of an Æsthetic starting -_from below,_ proceeding like natural science and not jumping to its -conclusions. Inductive? But Æsthetic has always been both inductive and -deductive, like every philosophical science; induction and deduction -cannot be separated, nor can they separately avail to characterize -a true science. But the word "induction" was not pronounced here by -chance. The intention was to imply that the æsthetic fact is really -nothing but a physical fact, to be studied by the methods proper to the -physical and natural sciences. - -With such a presupposition and in such a faith did inductive Æsthetic -or Æsthetic _from below_ (what pride in this modesty!) begin its -labours. It conscientiously began by making a collection of _beautiful -things,_ for example, a great number of envelopes of various shapes and -sizes, and asked which of these give the impression of beauty and which -of ugliness. As was to be expected, the inductive æstheticians speedily -found themselves in a difficulty, for the same objects that appeared -ugly in one aspect appeared beautiful in another. A coarse yellow -envelope, which would be extremely ugly for the purpose of enclosing -a love-letter, is just what is wanted for a writ served by process on -stamped paper, which in its turn would look very bad, or seem at any -rate an irony, enclosed in a square envelope of English paper. Such -considerations of simple common sense should have sufficed to convince -inductive æstheticians that the beautiful has no physical existence, -and cause them to desist from their vain and ridiculous quest. But no: -they had recourse to an expedient, as to which we should hardly like to -say how far it belongs to the strict method of natural science. They -sent their envelopes round and opened a _referendum,_ trying to settle -in what beauty or ugliness consists by the votes of the majority. - -[Sidenote: _The Astrology of Æsthetic._] - -We will not waste time over this subject, lest we should seem to be -turning ourselves into tellers of comic tales rather than expositors of -æsthetic science and of its problems. It is a matter of fact that the -inductive æstheticians have not yet discovered _one single law._ - -He who despairs of doctors is apt to abandon himself to charlatans. -This has befallen those who have believed in the naturalistic laws of -the beautiful. Artists sometimes adopt empirical canons, such as that -of the proportions of the human body, or of the golden section, that -is to say, of a line divided into two parts in such a manner that the -less is to the greater as is the greater to the whole line (_be : ac -= ac : ab_). Such canons easily become their superstitions, and they -attribute to them the success of their works. Thus Michæl Angelo left -as a precept to his disciple Marco del Pino da Siena that "he should -always make a pyramidal serpentine figure multiplied by one two and -three," a precept which did not enable Marco da Siena to emerge from -that mediocrity which we can yet observe in many of his paintings that -exist here in Naples. Others took Michæl Angelo's words as authority -for the precept that serpentine undulating lines were the true _lines -of beauty._ Whole volumes have been composed on these laws of beauty, -on the golden section and on the undulating and serpentine lines. These -should in our opinion be looked upon as the _astrology of Æsthetic._ - - - - -XV - - -THE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS - - -[Sidenote: _The practical activity of externalization._] - -The fact of the production of physical beauty implies, as has already -been remarked, a vigilant will, which persists in not allowing certain -visions, intuitions or representations to be lost. Such a will must be -able to act with the utmost rapidity and as it were instinctively, and -may also need long and laborious deliberations. In any case, thus and -thus only does the practical activity enter into relations with the -æsthetic, that is to say, no longer as its simple accompaniment, but as -a really distinct moment of it. We cannot will or not will our æsthetic -vision: we can however will or not will to externalize it, or rather, -to preserve and communicate to others, or not, the externalization -produced. - -[Sidenote: _The technique of externalization._] - -This volitional fact of externalization is preceded by a complex of -various kinds of knowledge. These are known as _technique,_ like all -knowledge which precedes a practical activity. Thus we talk of an -_artistic technique_ in the same metaphorical and elliptic manner that -we talk of the physically beautiful, that is to say (in more precise -language), _knowledge at the service of the practical activity directed -to producing stimuli to æsthetic reproduction._ In place of employing -so lengthy a phrase, we shall here avail ourselves of ordinary -terminology, whose meaning we now understand. - -The possibility of this technical knowledge, at the service of artistic -reproduction, is what has led minds astray to imagine the existence -of an æsthetic technique of internal expression, which is tantamount -to saying, a doctrine of the _means of internal expression,_ a thing -that is altogether inconceivable. And we know well the reason of its -inconceivability; expression, considered in itself, is a primary -theoretic activity, and as such precedes practice and intellectual -knowledge which illumines practice and is independent alike of both. -It aids for its part to illumine practice, but is not illuminated by -it. Expression does not possess _means,_ because it has not an _end_; -it has intuitions of things, but it does not will and is therefore -unanalysable into the abstract components of volition, means and end. -Sometimes a certain writer is said to have invented a new technique -of fiction or of drama, or a painter is said to have discovered a new -technique of distributing light. The word is used here at hazard; -because the so-called _new technique_ is really _that romance itself, -or that new picture_ itself and nothing else. The distribution of -light belongs to the vision of the picture itself; as the technique -of a dramatist is his dramatic conception itself. On other occasions, -the word "technique" is used to designate certain merits or defects -in a work that is a failure; and it is euphemistically said that the -conception is bad but the technique good, or that the conception is -good but the technique bad. - -On the other hand, when we talk of the different ways of painting -in oils, or of etching, or of sculpturing in alabaster, then the -word "technique" is in its place; but in such a case the adjective -"artistic" is used metaphorically. And if a dramatic technique in the -æsthetic sense be impossible, a theatrical technique of processes of -externalization of certain particular æsthetic works is not impossible. -When, for instance, women were introduced on the stage in Italy in the -second half of the sixteenth century, in place of men dressed as women, -this was a true and real discovery in theatrical technique; such too -was the perfecting in the following century of machines for the rapid -changing of scenery by the impresarios of Venice. - -The collection of technical knowledge at the service of artists -desirous of externalizing their expressions, can be divided into -groups, which may be entitled _theories of the arts._ Thus arises -a theory of Architecture, comprising mechanical laws, information -relating to the weight or resistance of the materials of construction -or of fortification, manuals relating to the method of mixing lime or -stucco; a theory of Sculpture, containing advice as to the instruments -to be used for sculpturing the various sorts of stone, for obtaining -a successful mixture of bronze, for working with the chisel, for -the accurate casting of the clay or plaster model, for keeping clay -damp; a theory of Painting, on the various techniques of tempera, -of oil-painting, of water-colour, of pastel, on the proportions of -the human body, on the laws of perspective; a theory of Oratory, -with precepts as to the method of producing, of exercising and of -strengthening the voice, of attitude in impersonation and gesture; a -theory of Music, on the combinations and fusions of tones and sounds; -and so on. Such collections of precepts abound in all literatures. -And since it is impossible to say what is useful and what useless to -know, books of this sort become very often a sort of encyclopædias or -_catalogues of desiderata._ Vitruvius, in his treatise on Architecture, -claims for the architect a knowledge of letters, of drawing, of -geometry, of arithmetic, of optic, of history, of natural and moral -philosophy, of jurisprudence, of medicine, of astrology, of music, and -so on. Everything is worth knowing: learn the art and have done with it. - -[Sidenote: _Technical theories of the different arts._] - -It should be evident that such empirical collections are not reducible -to science. They are composed of notions, taken from various sciences -and disciplines, and their philosophical and scientific principles -are to be found in the latter. To propose to construct a scientific -theory of the different arts would be to wish to reduce to the single -and homogeneous what is by nature multiple and heterogeneous; to wish -to destroy the existence as a collection of what was put together -precisely to form a collection. Were we to try to give scientific -form to the manuals of the architect, the painter, or the musician, -it is clear that nothing would remain in our hands but the general -principles of Mechanics, Optics, or Acoustics. And if we were to -extract and isolate what may be scattered among them of properly -artistic observations, to make of them a scientific system, then the -sphere of the individual art would be abandoned and that of Æsthetic -entered, for Æsthetic is always general Æsthetic, or rather it cannot -be divided into general and special. This last case (that is, the -attempt to furnish a technique which ends in composing an Æsthetic) -arises when men possessing strong scientific instincts and a natural -tendency to philosophy set themselves to work to produce such theories -and technical manuals. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of æsthetic theories of particular arts_.] - -But the confusion between Physics and Æsthetic has attained to its -highest degree, when æsthetic theories of particular arts are imagined, -to answer such questions as: What are the _limits_ of each art? What -can be represented with colours, and what with sounds? What with simple -monochromatic lines and what with touches of various colours? What with -tones, and what with metres and rhythms? What are the limits between -the figurative and the auditive arts, between painting and sculpture, -poetry and music? - -This, translated into scientific language, is tantamount to asking: -What is the connexion between Acoustics and æsthetic expression? What -between the latter and Optics?--and the like. Now, if _there is no -passage_ from the physical fact to the æsthetic, how could there be -from the æsthetic to particular groups of physical facts, such as the -phenomena of Optics or of Acoustics? - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the classification of the arts._] - -The so-called _arts_ have no æsthetic limits, because, in order to -have them, they would need to have also æsthetic existence in their -particularity; and we have demonstrated the altogether empirical -genesis of those partitions. Consequently, any attempt at an æsthetic -classification of the arts is absurd. If they be without limits, -they are not exactly determinable, and consequently cannot be -philosophically classified. All the books dealing with classifications -and systems of the arts could be burned without any loss whatever. (We -say this with the utmost respect to the writers who have expended -their labours upon them.) - -The impossibility of such systematizations finds something like a proof -in the strange attempts made to carry it out. The first and most common -partition is that into arts of _hearing, sight,_ and _imagination_; -as if eyes, ears, and imagination were on the same level and could be -deduced from the same logical variable as _fundamentum divisionis._ -Others have proposed the division into arts of _space_ and arts of -_time,_ arts of _rest_; and _movement_; as if the concepts of space, -time, rest and motion could determine special æsthetic forms and -possess anything in common with art as such. Finally, others have -amused themselves by dividing them into _classic_ and _romantic,_ -or into _oriental, classic,_ and _romantic,_ thereby conferring the -value of scientific concepts upon simple historical denominations, or -falling into those rhetorical partitions of expressive forms, already -criticized above; or into arts _that can only be seen from one side,_ -like painting, and arts _that can be seen from all sides,_ like -sculpture--and similar extravagances, which hold good neither in heaven -nor on earth. - -The theory of the limits of the arts was perhaps at the time when -it was put forward a beneficial critical reaction against those who -believed in the possibility of remodelling one expression into another, -as the _Iliad_ or _Paradise Lost_ into a series of paintings, and -indeed held a poem to be of greater or lesser value according as it -could or could not be translated into pictures by a painter. But if the -rebellion were reasonable and resulted in victory, this does not mean -that the arguments employed and the systems constructed for the purpose -were sound. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the union of the arts._] - -Another theory which is a corollary to that of the arts and their -limits, falls with them; that of the _union of the arts._ Given -particular arts, distinct and limited, it was asked: Which is the most -_powerful_? Do we not obtain _more powerful_ effects by _uniting_ -several? We know nothing of this: we know only that in each particular -case certain given artistic intuitions have need of definite physical -means for their reproduction and other artistic intuitions of other -means. We can obtain the effect of certain plays by simply reading -them; others need declamation and scenic display: there are some -artistic intuitions which need for their full externalization words, -song, musical instruments, colours, statuary, architecture, actors; -while others are quite complete in a slight outline made with the -pen, or a few strokes of the pencil. But it is false to suppose that -declamation and scenic effects and all the other things together that -we have mentioned are _more powerful_ than a simple reading or a simple -outline of pen or pencil; because each of those facts or groups of -facts has, so to say, a different purpose, and the power of the means -cannot be compared when the purposes are different. - -[Sidenote: _Relation of the activity of externalization to utility and -morality._] - -Finally, it is only from the point of view of a clear and rigorous -distinction between the true and proper æsthetic activity and the -practical activity of externalization that we can solve the complicated -and confused questions as to the relations between _art and utility_ -and _art and morality._ - -We have demonstrated above that art as art is independent both of -utility and of morality, as also of all practical value. Without this -independence, it would not be possible to speak of an intrinsic value -of art, nor indeed to conceive an æsthetic science, which demands the -autonomy of the æsthetic fact as its necessary condition. - -But it would be erroneous to maintain that this independence of the -vision or intuition or _internal expression_ of the artist should -be simply extended to the practical activity of externalization and -communication which may or may not follow the æsthetic fact. If by art -be understood the externalization of art, then utility and morality -have a perfect right to enter into it; that is to say, the right to be -master in one's own house. - -Indeed we do not externalize and fix all the many expressions and -intuitions which we form in our spirit; we do not declare our every -thought in a loud voice, or write it down, or print, or draw, or -paint, or expose it to the public. We _select_ from the crowd of -intuitions which are formed or at least sketched within us; and the -selection is ruled by the criteria of the economic disposition of life -and of its moral direction. Therefore, when we have fixed an intuition, -we have still to decide whether or no we should communicate it to -others, and to whom, and when, and how; all which deliberations come -equally under the utilitarian and ethical criterion. - -Thus we find the concepts of _selection,_ of the _interesting,_ of -_morality,_ of an _educational end,_ of _popularity,_ etc., to some -extent justified, although these can in no way be justified when -imposed upon art as art, and we have ourselves rejected them in pure -Æsthetic. Error always contains an element of truth. He who formulated -those erroneous æsthetic propositions in reality had his eye on -practical facts, which attach themselves externally to the æsthetic -fact and belong to economic and moral fife. - -It is well to advocate yet greater freedom in making known the means -of æsthetic reproduction; we are of the same opinion, and leave -projects for legislation and for legal action against immoral art, -to hypocrites, to the ingenuous and to wasters of time. But the -proclamation of this freedom, and the fixing of its limits, how -wide soever they be, is always the task of morality. And it would -in any case be out of place to invoke that highest principle, that -_fundamentum æsthetices,_ which is the independence of art, to deduce -from it the guiltlessness of the artist who calculates like an -immoral speculator upon the unhealthy tastes of his readers in the -externalization of his imaginings, or the freedom of hawkers to sell -obscene statuettes in the public squares. This last case is the affair -of the police, as the first must be brought before the tribunal of -the moral consciousness. The æsthetic judgement on the work of art -has nothing to do with the morality of the artist as a practical man, -or with the provisions to be taken that the things of art may not be -diverted to evil ends alien to her nature, which is pure theoretic -contemplation. - - - - -XVI - - -TASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART - - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic judgement. Its identity with æsthetic -reproduction._] - -When the entire æsthetic and externalizing process has been completed, -when a beautiful expression has been produced and it has been fixed -in a definite physical material, what is meant by _judging ill To -reproduce it in oneself,_ answer the critics of art, almost with one -voice. Very good. Let us try thoroughly to understand this fact, and -with that object in view, let us represent it schematically. - -The individual A is seeking the expression of an impression which -he feels or anticipates, but has not yet expressed. See him trying -various words and phrases which may give the sought-for expression, -that expression which must exist, but which he does not possess. He -tries the combination _m,_ but rejects it as unsuitable, inexpressive, -incomplete, ugly: he tries the combination _n,_ with a like result. -_He does not see at all, or does not see clearly._ The expression -still eludes him. After other vain attempts, during which he sometimes -approaches, sometimes retreats from the mark at which he aims, all of a -sudden (almost as though formed spontaneously of itself) he forms the -sought-for expression, and _lux facta est._ He enjoys for an instant -æsthetic pleasure or the pleasure of the beautiful. The ugly, with -its correlative displeasure, was the æsthetic activity which had not -succeeded in conquering the obstacle; the beautiful is the expressive -activity which now displays itself triumphant. - -We have taken this example from the domain of speech, as being nearer -and more accessible, and because we all talk, though we do not all draw -or paint. Now if another individual, whom we shall call B, is to judge -that expression and decide whether it be beautiful or ugly, he _must of -necessity place himself at A's point of view,_ and go through the whole -process again, with the help of the physical sign supplied to him by A. -If A has seen clearly, then B (who has placed himself at A's point of -view) will also see clearly and will see this expression as beautiful. -If A has not seen clearly, then B also will not see clearly, and will -find the expression more or less ugly, _just as A did._ - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of divergences._] - -It may be observed that we have not taken into consideration two other -cases: that of A having a clear and B an obscure vision; and that of A -having an obscure and B a clear vision. Strictly speaking, these two -cases are _impossible._ - -Expressive activity, just because it is activity, is not caprice, but -spiritual necessity; it cannot solve a definite æsthetic problem save -in one way, which is the right way. It will be objected to this plain -statement that works which seem beautiful to the artists are afterwards -found to be ugly by the critics; while other works with which the -artists were discontented and held to be imperfect or failures are, on -the contrary, held to be beautiful and perfect by the critics. But in -this case, one of the two is wrong: either the critics or the artists, -sometimes the artists, at other times the critics. Indeed, the producer -of an expression does not always fully realize what is happening in -his soul. Haste, vanity, want of reflexion, theoretic prejudices, -make people say, and others sometimes almost believe, that works of -ours are beautiful, which, if we really looked into ourselves, we -should see to be ugly, as they are in reality. Thus poor Don Quixote, -when he had reattached to his helmet as well as he could the vizor of -cardboard--the vizor that had showed itself to possess but the feeblest -force of resistance at the first encounter,--took good care not to test -it again with a well-delivered sword-thrust, but simply declared and -maintained it to be (says the author) _por celada finisima de encaxe._ -And in other cases, the same reasons, or opposite but analogous -ones, trouble the consciousness of the artist, and cause him to value -badly what he has successfully produced, or to strive to undo! and do -again for the worse what he has done well in artistic spontaneity. -An instance of this is Tasso and his passage from the _Gerusalemme -liberata_ to the _Gerusalemme conquistata._ In the same way, haste, -laziness, want of reflexion, theoretic prejudices, personal sympathies -or animosities, and other motives of a similar sort, sometimes cause -the critics to proclaim ugly what is beautiful, and beautiful what is -ugly. Were they to eliminate such disturbing elements, they would feel -the work of art as it really is, and would not leave it to posterity, -that more diligent and more dispassionate judge, to award the palm, or -to do that justice which they have refused. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of taste and genius._] - -It is clear from the preceding theorem that the activity of judgement -which criticizes and recognizes the beautiful is identical with -what produces it. The only difference lies in the diversity of -circumstances, since in the one case it is a question of æsthetic -production, in the other of reproduction. The activity which judges is -called _taste_; the productive activity is called _genius_: genius and -taste are therefore substantially _identical._ - -The common remark that the critic should possess something of the -genius of the artist and that the artist should possess taste, gives -a glimpse of this identity; or the remark that there exists an active -(productive) and a passive (reproductive) taste. But it is also -negated in other equally common remarks, as when people speak of taste -without genius, or of genius without taste. These last observations -are meaningless, unless they allude to quantitative or psychological -differences, those being called geniuses without taste who produce -works of art, inspired in their chief parts and neglected or defective -in their secondary parts, and men of taste without genius, those -who, while they succeed in obtaining certain isolated or secondary -merits, do not possess sufficient power for a great artistic -synthesis. Analogous explanations can easily be given of other similar -expressions. But to posit a substantial difference between genius and -taste, between artistic production and reproduction, would render both -communication and judgement alike inconceivable. How could we judge -what remained external to us? How could that which is produced by a -given activity be judged by a _different_ activity? The critic may -be a small genius, the artist a great one; the former may have the -strength of ten, the latter of a hundred; the former, in order to reach -a certain height, will have need of the assistance of the other; but -the nature of both must remain the same. To judge Dante, we must raise -ourselves to his level: let it be well understood that empirically we -are not Dante, nor Dante we; but in that moment of contemplation and -judgement, our spirit is one with that of the poet, and in that moment -we and he are one thing. In this identity alone resides the possibility -that our little souls can echo great souls, and grow great with them in -the universality of the spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Analogy with other activities._] - -Let us remark in passing that what has been said of the æsthetic -judgement holds good equally for every other activity and for every -other judgement; and that scientific, economic, and ethical criticism -is effected in a like manner. To limit ourselves to this last, only if -we place ourselves ideally in the same conditions in which he found -himself who took a given resolution, can we form a judgement as to -whether his decision were moral or immoral. An action would otherwise -remain incomprehensible and therefore impossible to judge. A homicide -may be a rascal or a hero: if this be, within limits, indifferent -as regards the defence of society, which condemns both to the same -punishment, it is not indifferent to one who wishes to distinguish and -judge from the moral point of view, and we therefore cannot dispense -with reconstructing the individual psychology of the homicide, in order -to determine the true nature of his deed, not merely in its legal, -but also in its moral aspect. In Ethics, a moral taste or tact is -sometimes mentioned, answering to what is generally called the moral -consciousness, that is to say, to the activity of the good will itself. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of æsthetic absolutism (intellectualism) and -relativism._] - -The explanation above given of æsthetic judgement or reproduction both -agrees with and condemns the absolutists and relativists, those who -affirm and those who deny the absoluteness of taste. - -In affirming that the beautiful can be judged, the absolutists are -right; but the theory on which they found their affirmation is not -tenable, because they conceive of the beautiful, that is, æsthetic -value, as something placed outside the æsthetic activity, as a concept -or a model which an artist realizes in his work, and of which the -critic avails himself afterwards in judging the work itself. These -concepts and models have no existence in art, for when proclaiming -that every art can be judged only in itself and that it has its model -in itself, they implicitly denied the existence of objective models of -beauty, whether these are intellectual concepts, or ideas suspended in -a metaphysical heaven. - -In proclaiming this, their-adversaries, the relativists, are perfectly -right, and effect an advance upon them. However, the initial -rationality of their thesis in its turn becomes converted into a false -theory. Repeating the ancient adage that there is no accounting for -tastes, they believe that æsthetic expression is of the same nature as -the pleasant and the unpleasant, which every one feels in his own way, -and about which there is no dispute. But we know that the pleasant and -the unpleasant are utilitarian, practical facts. Thus the relativists -deny the specific character of the æsthetic fact, and again confound -expression with impression, the theoretic with the practical. - -The true solution lies in rejecting alike relativism or psychologism -and false absolutism; and in recognizing that the criterion of taste is -absolute, but absolute in a different way from that of the intellect, -which expresses itself in ratiocination. The criterion of taste is -absolute, with the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination. Thus any -act of expressive activity, which is so really, is to be recognized -as beautiful, and any fact as ugly in which expressive activity and -passivity are found engaged with one another in an unfinished struggle. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of relative relativism._] - -Between absolutists and relativists is a third class, which may be -called that of the relative relativists. These affirm the existence of -absolute values in other fields, such as Logic and Ethic, but deny it -in the field of Æsthetic. To dispute about science or morals seems to -them to be rational and justifiable, because science depends upon the -universal, common to all men, and morality upon duty, which is also -a law of human nature; but how dispute about art, which depends upon -imagination? Not only, however, is the imaginative activity universal -and no less inherent in human nature than the logical concept and -practical duty; but there is a preliminary objection to the thesis in -question. If the absoluteness of the imagination be denied, we must -also deny intellectual or conceptual truth and implicitly morality. -Does not morality presuppose logical distinctions? How could these be -known, otherwise than in expressions and words, that is to say, in -imaginative form? If the absoluteness of the imagination were removed, -the life of the spirit would tremble to its foundations. One individual -would no longer understand another, nor indeed his own self of a moment -before, which is already another individual considered a moment after. - -[Sidenote: _Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and of -psychic disposition._] - -Nevertheless, variety of judgements is an indubitable fact. Men -disagree as to logical, ethical, and economical valuations; and they -disagree equally or even more as to the æsthetic. If certain reasons -recorded by us above, such as haste, prejudices, passions, etc., may -lessen the importance of this disagreement, they do not on that account -annul it. When speaking of the stimuli of reproduction we have added a -caution, for we said that reproduction takes place, _if all the other -conditions remain equal._ Do they remain equal? Does the hypothesis -correspond to reality? - -It would appear not. In order to reproduce an impression several times -by means of a suitable physical stimulus it is necessary that this -stimulus be not changed, and that the organism remain in the same -psychical conditions as those in which was experienced the impression -that it is desired to reproduce. Now it is a fact that the physical -stimulus is continually changing, and in like manner the psychological -conditions. - -Oil-paintings grow dark, frescoes fade, statues lose noses, hands -and legs, architecture becomes totally or partially a ruin, the -tradition of the execution of a piece of music is lost, the text of a -poem is corrupted by bad copyists or bad printing. These are obvious -instances of I the changes which daily occur in objects or physical -stimuli. As regards psychological conditions, we will not dwell upon -the cases of deafness or blindness, that is to say, upon the loss of -entire orders of psychical impressions; these cases are secondary and -of less importance compared with the fundamental, daily, inevitable -and perpetual changes of the society around us and of the internal -conditions of our individual life. The phonetic manifestations or -words and verses of Dante's _Commedia_ must produce a very different -impression on an Italian citizen engaged in the politics of the -third Rome, from that experienced by a well-informed and intimate -contemporary of the poet. The Madonna of Cimabue is still in the Church -of Santa Maria Novella; but does she speak to the visitor of to-day as -to the Florentines of the thirteenth century? Even though she were not -also darkened by time, must we not suppose that the impression which -she now produces is altogether different from that of former times? And -even in the case of the same individual poet, will a poem composed by -him in youth make the same impression upon him when he re-reads it in -his old age, with psychic conditions altogether changed? - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the distinction of signs into natural and -conventional._] - -It is true that certain æstheticians have attempted a distinction -between stimuli and stimuli, between _natural_ and _conventional_ -signs. The former are held to have a constant effect upon all; the -latter only upon a limited circle. In their belief, signs employed -in painting are natural, those used in poetry conventional. But the -difference between them is at the most only one of degree. It has -often been said that painting is a language understood by all, while -with poetry it is otherwise. Here, for example, Leonardo found one -of the prerogatives of his art, "which hath not need of interpreters -of different tongues as have letters," and it pleases man and beast. -He relates the anecdote of that portrait of the father of a family -"which the little grandchildren were wont to caress while they were -still in swaddling-clothes, and the dogs and cats of the house in like -manner." But other anecdotes, such as those of the savages who took the -portrait of a soldier for a boat, or considered the portrait of a man -on horseback to be furnished with only one leg, are apt to shake one's -faith in the understanding of painting by sucklings, dogs and cats. -Fortunately, no arduous researches are necessary to convince oneself -that pictures, poetry and all works of art only produce effects upon -souls prepared to receive them. Natural signs do not exist; because -all are equally conventional, or, to speak with greater exactness, -_historically conditioned._ - -[Sidenote: _The surmounting of variety._] - -Granting this, how are we to succeed in causing the expression to be -reproduced by means of the physical object? How obtain the same effect, -when the conditions are no longer the same? Would it not, rather, seem -necessary to conclude that expressions cannot be reproduced, despite -the physical instruments made for the purpose, and that what is called -reproduction consists in ever new expressions? Such would indeed be the -conclusion if the varieties of physical and psychical conditions were -intrinsically insurmountable. But since the insuperability has none -of the characteristics of necessity we must on the contrary conclude -that reproduction always occurs when we can replace ourselves in the -conditions in which the stimulus (physical beauty) was produced. - -Not only can we replace ourselves in these conditions as an abstract -possibility, but as a matter of fact we do so continually. Individual -life, which is communion with ourselves (with our past), and social -life, which is communion with our like, would not otherwise be -possible. - -[Sidenote: _Restorations and historical interpretation._] - -As regards the physical object, palæographers and philologists, -who _restore_ to texts their original physiognomy, _restorers_ of -pictures and of statues and other industrious toilers strive precisely -to preserve or to restore to the physical object all its primitive -energy. These efforts are certainly not always successful, or are -not completely successful, for it is never or hardly ever possible -to obtain a restoration complete in its smallest details. But the -insurmountable is here only present accidentally and must not lead us -to overlook the successes which actually are achieved. - -_Historical interpretation_ labours for its part to reintegrate in -us the psychological conditions which have changed in the course of -history. It revives the dead, completes the fragmentary, and enables us -to see a work of art (a physical object) as its author saw it in the -moment of production. - -A condition of this historical labour is tradition, with the help of -which it is possible to collect the scattered rays and concentrate them -in one focus. With the help of memory we surround the physical stimulus -with all the facts among which it arose; and thus we enable it to act -upon us as it acted upon him who produced it. - -Where the tradition is broken, interpretation is arrested; in this -case, the products of the past remain silent for us. Thus the -expressions contained in the Etruscan or Mexican inscriptions are -unattainable; thus we still hear discussions among ethnographers as -to whether certain products of the art of savages are pictures or -writings; thus archæologists and prehistorians are not always able -to establish with certainty whether the figures found on the pottery -of a certain region, and on other instruments employed, are of a -religious or profane nature. But the arrest of interpretation, as that -of restoration, is never a definitely insurmountable barrier; and the -daily discoveries of new historical sources and of new methods of -better exploiting the old, which we may hope to see ever improving, -link up again broken traditions. - -We do not wish to deny that erroneous historical interpretation -sometimes produces what may be called _palimpsests,_ new expressions -imposed upon the ancient, artistic fancies instead of historical -reproductions. The so-called "fascination of the past" depends in part -upon these expressions of ours, which we weave upon the historical. -Thus has been discovered in Greek plastic art the calm and serene -intuition of life of those peoples, who nevertheless felt the universal -sorrow so poignantly; thus "the terror of the year 1000" has recently -been discerned on the faces of the Byzantine saints, a terror which is -a misunderstanding, or an artificial legend invented later by men of -learning. But _historical criticism_ tends precisely to circumscribe -fancies and to establish exactly the point of view from which we must -look. - -By means of the above process we live in communication with other men -of the present and of the past; and we must not conclude because we -sometimes, and indeed often, meet with an unknown or an ill-known, -that therefore, when we believe we are engaged in a dialogue, we are -always speaking a monologue; or that we are unable even to repeat the -monologue which we formerly held with ourselves. - - - - -XVII - - -THE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND ART - - -This brief exposition of the method by which is obtained the -reintegration of the original conditions in which the work of art -was produced, and consequently reproduction and judgement are made -possible, shows how important is the function fulfilled by historical -research in relation to artistic and literary works which is what is -usually called _historical criticism_ or method in literature and art. - -[Sidenote: _Historical criticism in literature and art. Its -importance._] - -Without tradition and historical criticism the enjoyment of all or -nearly all the works of art produced by humanity would be irrevocably -lost: we should be little more than animals, immersed in the present -alone, or in the most recent past. It is fatuous to despise and laugh -at one who reconstitutes an authentic text, explains the sense of -forgotten words and customs, investigates the conditions in which an -artist lived, and accomplishes all those labours which revive the -qualities and the original colouring of works of art. - -Sometimes a depreciatory or negative judgement is passed upon -historical research because of the presumed or proved inability of such -researches, in many cases, to give us a true understanding of works -of art. But it must be observed, in the first place, that historical -research does not only fulfil the task of helping to reproduce and -judge artistic works: the biography of a writer or of an artist, for -example, and the study of the customs of a period, have an interest of -their own, that is to say, extraneous to the history of art, but not to -other forms of historiography. If allusion be made to those researches -which do not appear to have interest of any kind, nor to fulfil any -purpose, it must be replied that the historical student must often -reconcile himself to the useful but inglorious function of a collector -of facts. These facts remain for the time being formless, incoherent -and meaningless, but they are preserves or mines for the historian of -the future and for whosoever may afterwards want them for any purpose. -In the same way in a library, books which nobody asks for are placed -on the shelves and catalogued, because they may be asked for at some -time or other. Certainly, just as an intelligent librarian gives the -preference to the acquisition and cataloguing of those books which he -foresees may be of more or better service, so intelligent students -possess an instinct as to what is or may more probably be of use among -the material of facts which they are examining; while others less -well endowed, less intelligent or more hasty in producing, accumulate -useless rubbish, refuse and sweepings, and lose themselves in details -and petty discussions. But this appertains to the economy of research, -and does not concern us. It concerns at most the master who selects the -subjects, the publisher who pays for the printing, and the critic who -is called upon to praise or to blame the research workers. - -On the other hand, it is clear that historical research directed to -illuminate a work of art does not alone suffice to bring it to birth -in our spirit and place us in a position to judge it, but presupposes -taste, that is to say, an alert and cultivated imagination. The -greatest historical erudition may accompany a gross or otherwise -defective taste, a slow imagination, or, as they say, a cold hard heart -closed to art. Which is the lesser evil, great erudition with defective -taste, or natural taste and much ignorance? The question has often been -asked, and perhaps it will be best to deny that it has any meaning, -because one cannot tell which of two evils is the less, or what exactly -that means. The merely learned man never succeeds in entering into -direct communion with great spirits; he keeps wandering for ever about -the outer courts, the staircases and antechambers of their palaces; but -the gifted ignoramus either passes by masterpieces to him inaccessible, -or instead of understanding works of art as they really are, invents -others with his fancy. Now, the labour of the former may at least serve -to enlighten others; but the genius of the latter remains altogether -sterile in relation to knowledge. How then can we in a certain respect -fail to prefer the conscientious learned man to the inconclusive though -gifted man, who is not really gifted, if he resign himself and in so -far as he resigns himself, to his inconclusiveness? - -[Sidenote: _Literary and artistic history. Its distinction from -historical criticism and from the æsthetic judgement._] - -We must accurately distinguish _the history of art and literature_ -from those historical labours where works of art are used, but for -extraneous purposes (such as biography, civil, religious and political -history, etc.), and also from historical erudition directed to the -preparation of the æsthetic synthesis of reproduction. - -The difference of the first two is obvious. The history of art and -literature has the works of art themselves as its principal subject; -those other labours invoke and interrogate works of art, but only -as witnesses from whom to discover the truth of facts which are not -æsthetic. The second difference to which we have referred may seem less -profound. It is, however, very great. Erudition directed to illuminate -the understanding of works of art aims simply at calling into existence -a certain internal fact, an æsthetic reproduction. Artistic and -literary history, on the other hand, does not appear until after such -reproduction has been obtained. It implies, therefore, a further stage -of labour. - -Like all other history, its object is to record precisely such facts -as have really taken place, in this case artistic and literary facts. -A man who, after having acquired the requisite historical erudition, -reproduces in himself and tastes a work of art, may remain simply -a man of taste, or at the most express his own feeling with an -exclamation of praise or condemnation. This does not suffice for -the making of a historian of literature and art. Something else is -needed, namely, that a new mental operation succeed in him the simple -reproduction. This new operation is in its turn an expression: the -expression of the reproduction; the historical description, exposition -or representation. There is this difference, then, between the man of -taste and the historian: the first merely reproduces in his spirit the -work of art; the second, after having reproduced it, represents it -historically, or applies those categories by which, as we know, history -is differentiated from pure art. Artistic and literary history is -therefore _a historical work of art founded upon one or more works of -art._ - -The name "artistic" or "literary" critic is used in various senses: -sometimes it is applied to the scholar who devotes his services to -literature; sometimes to the historian who reveals the works of art of -the past in their reality; more often to both. By critic is sometimes -understood in a more restricted sense he who judges and describes -contemporary literary works, and by historian, he who treats of those -less recent. These are linguistic uses and empirical distinctions, -which may be neglected; because the true difference lies between -_the scholar, the man of taste_ and _the historian of art._ These -words designate three successive stages of work, each one independent -relatively to the one that follows, but not to that which precedes. As -we have seen, a man may be a mere scholar, and possess little capacity -for understanding works of art; he may even both be learned and possess -taste, yet be unable to portray them by writing a page of artistic and -literary history. But the true and complete historian, while containing -in himself both the scholar and the man of taste as necessary -pre-requisites, must add to their qualities the gift of historical -comprehension and representation. - -[Sidenote: _The method of artistic and literary history._] - -The theory of artistic and literary historical method presents problems -and difficulties, some common to the theory of historical method in -general, others peculiar to it, because derived from the concept of art -itself. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism of the problem of the origin of art._] - -History is commonly divided into human history, natural history, and -the mixture of both. Without! examining here the question of the -solidity of this distinction, it is clear that artistic and literary -history belongs in any case to the first, since it concerns a spiritual -activity, that is to say, an activity proper to man. And since this -activity is its subject, the absurdity of propounding the historical -problem of the _origin_ of _art_ becomes at once evident. We should -note that by this formula many different things have in turn been -included on many different occasions. _Origin_ has often meant _nature_ -or _character_ of the artistic fact, in which case an attempt was -made to deal with a real scientific or philosophic problem, the very -problem in fact which our treatise has attempted to solve. At other -times, by origin has been understood the _ideal genesis,_ the search -for the reason of art, the deduction of the artistic fact from a first -principle containing in itself both spirit and nature. This is also -a philosophical problem, complementary to the preceding, coinciding -indeed with it, although it has sometimes been strangely interpreted -and solved by means of an arbitrary and semi-imaginary metaphysic. -But when the object was to discover further exactly in what way the -artistic function was _historically formed,_ the result has been the -absurdity which we have mentioned. If expression be the first form of -consciousness, how can we look for the historical origin of what is not -a product of nature and is presupposed by human history? How can we -assign a historical genesis to a thing which is a category by means of -which all historical processes and facts are understood? The absurdity -has arisen from the comparison with human institutions, which have been -formed in the course of history, and have disappeared or may disappear -in its course. Between the æsthetic fact and a human institution -(such as monogamic marriage or the fief) there exists a difference -comparable with that between simple and compound bodies in chemistry. -It is impossible to indicate the formation of the former, otherwise -they would not be simple, and if this be discovered, they cease to be -simple and become compound. - -The problem of the origin of art, historically understood, is only -justified when it is proposed to investigate, not the formation of -the artistic category, but where and when art has appeared for the -first time (appeared, that is to say, in a striking manner), at what -point or in what region of the globe and at what point or epoch of its -history; when, that is to say, not the origin of art, but its earliest -or primitive history is the object of research. This problem forms -one with that of the appearance of human civilization on the earth. -Data for its solution are certainly wanting, but there yet remains -the abstract possibility of a solution, and certainly tentative and -hypothetical solutions abound. - -[Sidenote: _The criterion of progress and history._] - -Every representation of human history has the concept of _progress_ as -foundation. But by progress must not be understood the imaginary _law -of progress_ which is supposed to lead the generations of man with -irresistible force to some unknown destiny, according to a providential -plan which we can divine and then understand logically. A supposed law -of this sort is the negation of history itself, of that accidentality, -that empiricity, that contingency, which distinguish concrete fact -from abstraction. And for the same reason, progress has nothing to do -with the so-called law of _evolution,_ which, if it mean that reality -evolves (and it is only reality in so far as it evolves or becomes), -cannot be called a law, and if it be given as a law, becomes identical -with the law of progress in the sense just described. The progress -of which we speak here is nothing but _the very concept of human -activity,_ which, working upon the material supplied to it by nature, -conquers its obstacles and bends it to its own ends. - -Such conception of progress, that is to say, of human activity -applied to a given material, is the _point of view_ of the historian -of humanity. No one but a mere collector of unrelated facts, a mere -antiquary or inconsequent annalist, can put together the smallest -narrative of human doings unless he have a determined point of -view, that is to say, a personal conviction of his own regarding the -facts whose history he has undertaken to relate. No one can start -from the confused and discordant mass of crude facts and arrive at -the historical work of art save by means of this apperception, which -makes it possible to carve a definite representation in that rough and -formless mass. The historian of a practical action should know what is -economy and what is morality; the historian of mathematics, what is -mathematics; the historian of botany, what is botany; the historian -of philosophy, what is philosophy. If he does not really know these -things, he must at least have the illusion of knowing them; otherwise -he will not even be able to delude himself into believing that he is -writing history. - -We cannot here expand the demonstration of the necessity and -inevitability of this subjective criterion in every narrative of human -affairs (which is compatible with the utmost objectivity, impartiality -and scrupulousness in dealing with data of fact and indeed forms a -constitutive element in these virtues), in every narrative of human -doings and happenings. It suffices to read any book of history to -discover at once the point of view of the author, if he be a historian -worthy of the name and know his own business. There are liberal and -reactionary, rationalist and catholic historians, who deal with -political or social history; for the history of philosophy there -are metaphysical, empirical, sceptical, idealist and spiritualist -historians. Purely historical historians do not and cannot exist. -Were Thucydides and Polybius, Livy and Tacitus, Machiavelli and -Guicciardini, Giannone and Voltaire, wholly without moral and political -views; and, in our time, was Guizot or Thiers, Macaulay or Balbo, -Ranke or Mommsen? And in the history of philosophy, from Hegel, who -was the first to raise it to a great height, to Ritter, Zeller, -Cousin, Lewes and our Spaventa, was there one who did not possess his -conception of progress and his criterion of judgement? Is there one -single work of any value on the history of Æsthetic which has not -been written from this or that point of view, with this or that bias -(Hegelian or Herbartian), from a sensationalist or from an eclectic -or some other point of view? If the historian is to escape from the -inevitable necessity of taking a side, he must become a political or -scientific eunuch; and history is not an occupation for eunuchs. Such -would at most be of use in compiling those great tomes of not useless -erudition, _elumbis atque fracta,_ which are called, not without -reason, monkish. - -If, then, a concept of progress, a point of view, a criterion, be -inevitable, the best to be done is not to try and escape from it, -but to obtain the best possible. Every one tends to this end when he -forms his own convictions, seriously and laboriously. Historians who -profess to wish to interrogate the facts without adding anything of -their own to them are not to be trusted. This is at best the result -of ingenuousness and illusion on their part: they will always add -something of their own, if they be truly historians, even without -knowing it, or they will only believe that they have avoided doing -so because they have conveyed it only by hints, which is the most -insinuating, penetrative and effective of methods. - -[Sidenote: _Non-existence of a single line of progress in artistic and -literary history._] - -Artistic and literary history cannot dispense with the criterion of -progress any more easily than other history. We cannot show what a -given work of art is, save by proceeding from a conception of art, in -order to fix the artistic problem which the author of such work of art -had to solve, and by determining whether or no he has solved it, or by -how much and in what way he has failed to do so. But it is important -to note that the criterion of progress assumes a different form in -artistic and literary history to that which it assumes (or is believed -to assume) in the history of science. - -It is customary to represent the whole history of knowledge by one -single line of progress and regress. Science is the universal, and -its problems are arranged in one single vast system or comprehensive -problem. All thinkers labour upon the same problem as to the nature of -reality and of knowledge: contemplative Indians and Greek philosophers, -Christians and Mohammedans, bare heads and turbaned heads, wigged heads -and college-capped heads (as Heine said); and future generations will -weary themselves with it, as ours has done. It would take too long to -inquire here if this be true or not of science. But it is certainly -not true of art; art is intuition, and intuition is individuality, and -individuality does not repeat itself. To conceive of the history of the -artistic production of the human race as developed along a single line -of progress and regress would therefore be altogether erroneous. - -At the most, and working to some extent with generalizations and -abstractions, it may be asserted that the history of æsthetic -productions shows progressive cycles, but each cycle with its own -problem and each progressive only in respect to that problem. When many -are at work in a general way upon the same subject, without succeeding -in giving to it the suitable form, yet drawing always more near to -it, there is said to be progress, and when appears the man who gives -it definite form, the cycle is said to be complete, and progress is -ended. A typical example of this would here be the progress in the -elaboration of the mode of using the subject-matter of chivalry, during -the Italian Renaissance, from Pulci to Ariosto (using this as an -example and excusing excessive simplification). Nothing but repetition -and imitation, diminution or exaggeration, a spoiling of what had -already been done, in short decadence could be the result of employing -that same material after Ariosto. The epigoni of Ariosto prove this. -Progress begins with the beginning of a new cycle. Cervantes, with -his more open and conscious irony, is an instance of this. In what -did the general decadence of Italian literature at the end of the -sixteenth century consist? Simply in having nothing more to say and in -repeating and exaggerating motives already discovered. If the Italians -of this period had even been able to express their own decadence, they -would not have been altogether failures, but would have anticipated -the literary movement of the Risorgimento. Where the matter is not -the same, a progressive cycle does not exist. Shakespeare does not -represent an advance on Dante, nor Goethe upon Shakespeare. Dante, -however, represents an advance on the visionaries of the Middle Ages, -Shakespeare on the Elizabethan dramatists, Goethe, with _Werther_ and -the first part of _Faust,_ on the writers of the _Sturm und Drang_ -period. This mode of presenting the history of poetry and art contains, -however, as we have remarked, something of the abstract, of the merely -practical, and is without strict philosophical value. Not only is the -art of savages not inferior, as art, to that of civilized peoples, -if it be correlative to the impressions of the savage; but every -individual, indeed every moment of the spiritual life of an individual, -has its artistic world; none of these worlds can be compared with any -other in respect of artistic value. - -[Sidenote: _Errors committed against this law._] - -Many have sinned and continue to sin against this special form of the -criterion of progress in artistic and literary history. Some, for -instance, talk of the infancy of Italian art in Giotto, and of its -maturity in Raphæl or in Titian; as though Giotto were not complete -and absolutely perfect, granted the material of feeling with which his -mind was furnished. He was certainly incapable of drawing a figure -like Raphæl, or of colouring it like Titian; but was Raphæl or Titian -capable of creating the _Marriage of Saint Francis with Poverty_ or -the _Death of Saint Francis_? The spirit of Giotto had not felt the -attraction of the body beautiful, which the Renaissance studied and -raised to a place of honour; the spirits of Raphæl and of Titian were -no longer interested in certain movements of ardour and of tenderness -with which the man of the fourteenth century was in love. How, then, -can a comparison be made, where there is no comparative term? - -The celebrated divisions of the history of art into an oriental period, -representing a lack of equilibrium between idea and form, the latter -dominating, a classical representing an equilibrium between idea and -form, a romantic representing a new lack of equilibrium between idea -and form, the former dominating, suffer from the same defect. The same -is true of the division into oriental art, representing imperfection -of form; classical, perfection of form; romantic or modern, perfection -of content and of form. Thus classic and romantic have also received, -among their many other meanings, that of progressive or regressive -periods, in respect to the realization of some alleged artistic ideal -of all humanity. - -[Sidenote: _Other meanings of the word "progress" in respect to -Æsthetic._] - -There is no such thing, then, as an _æsthetic_ progress of humanity. -However, by æsthetic progress is sometimes meant, not what the two -words coupled together really signify, but the ever-increasing -accumulation of our historical knowledge, which makes us able to -sympathize with all the artistic products of all peoples and of all -times, or, as they say, makes our taste more catholic. The difference -appears very great if the eighteenth century, so incapable of escaping -from itself, be compared with our own time, which enjoys alike Greek -and Roman art, now better understood, Byzantine, mediæval, Arabic and -Renaissance art, the art of the Cinquecento, baroque art, and the art -of the eighteenth century. Egyptian, Babylonian, Etruscan, and even -prehistoric art are more profoundly studied every day. Certainly, -the difference between the savage and civilized man does not lie in -the human faculties. The savage has speech, intellect, religion and -morality in common with civilized man, and is a complete man. The only -difference lies in this, that civilized man penetrates and dominates -a larger portion of the universe with his theoretic and practical -activity. We cannot claim to be more spiritually alert than, for -example, the contemporaries of Pericles; but no one can deny that we -are richer than they--rich with their riches and with those of how many -other peoples and generations besides our own? - -By æsthetic progress is also meant, in another sense, which is also -improper, the greater abundance of artistic intuitions and the smaller -number of imperfect or inferior works which one epoch produces in -respect to another. Thus it may be said that there was æsthetic -progress, an artistic awakening in Italy, at the end of the thirteenth -or of the fifteenth century. - -Finally, æsthetic progress is talked of in a third sense, with an eye -to the refinement and complications of soul-states exhibited in the -works of art of the most civilized peoples, as compared with those of -less civilized peoples, barbarians and savages. But in this case the -progress is of the comprehensive psycho-social conditions, not of the -artistic activity, to which the material is indifferent. - -These are the most important points to note concerning the method of -artistic and literary history. - - - - -XVIII - - -CONCLUSION: - - -IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND ÆSTHETIC - - -[Sidenote: _Summary of the study._] - - -A glance over the path traversed will show that we have completed -the entire programme of our treatise. We have studied the nature of -intuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the æsthetic or artistic -fact (I. and II.), and described the other form of knowledge, the -intellectual, and the successive complications of these forms (III.); -it thus became possible for us to criticize all erroneous æsthetic -theories arising from the confusion between the various forms and from -the illicit transference of the characteristics of one form to another -(IV.), noting at the same time the opposite errors to be found in the -theory of intellectual knowledge and of historiography (V.). Passing -on to examine the relations between the æsthetic activity and the -other activities of the spirit, no longer theoretic but practical, we -indicated the true character of the practical activity and the place -which it occupies in respect to the theoretic activity: hence the -criticism of the intrusion into æsthetic theory of practical concepts -(VI.); we have distinguished the two forms of the practical activity, -as economic and ethical (VII.), reaching the conclusion that there are -no other forms of the spirit beyond the four which we have analyzed; -hence (VIII.) the criticism of every mystical or imaginative Æsthetic. -And since there are no other spiritual forms co-ordinate with these, -so there are no original subdivisions of the four established, and -in particular of Æsthetic. From this arises the impossibility of -classes of expressions and the criticism of Rhetoric, that is, of -ornate expression distinct from simple expression, and of other similar -distinctions and subdistinctions (IX.) But by the law of the unity of -the spirit, the æsthetic fact is also a practical fact, and as such, -occasions pleasure and pain. This led us to study f the feelings of -value in general, and those of æsthetic value or of the beautiful in -particular (X.), to criticize æsthetic hedonism in all its various -manifestations and complications (XI.), and to expel from the system -of Æsthetic the long series of psychological concepts which had been -introduced into it (XII.). Proceeding from æsthetic production to the -facts of reproduction, we began by investigating the external fixing -of the æsthetic expression, for the purpose of reproduction. This -is called the physically beautiful, whether natural or artificial -(XIII.). We derived from this distinction the criticism of the errors -which arise from confounding the physical with the æsthetic side of -facts (XIV.). We determined the meaning of artistic technique, or that -technique which is at the service of reproduction, thus criticizing -the divisions, limits and classifications of the individual arts, -and establishing the relations of art, economy and morality (XV.). -Since the existence of physical objects does not suffice to stimulate -æsthetic reproduction to the full, and since, in order to obtain it, -we must recall the conditions in which the stimulus first operated, -we have also studied the function of historical erudition, directed -toward re-establishing the communication between the imagination and -the works of the past, and to serve as the basis of the æsthetic -judgement (XVI.). We have concluded our treatise by showing how the -reproduction thus obtained is afterwards elaborated by the categories -of thought, that is to say, by an examination of the method of literary -and artistic history (XVII.). - -The æsthetic fact has in short been considered both in itself and in -its relations with the other spiritual activities, with the feelings -of pleasure and pain, with what are called physical facts, with -memory and with historical treatment. It has passed before us as -_subject_ until it became _object,_ that is to say, from the moment -of _its birth_ until it becomes gradually changed for the spirit into -_subject-matter of history._ - -Our treatise may appear to be somewhat meagre when externally compared -with the great volumes usually dedicated to Æsthetic. But it will not -seem so when we perceive that those volumes are nine-tenths full of -matter that is not pertinent, such as definitions, psychological or -metaphysical, of pseudo-æsthetic concepts (the sublime, the comic, -the tragic, the humorous, etc.), or of the exposition of the supposed -Zoology, Botany and Mineralogy of Æsthetic, and of universal history -æsthetically judged; that the whole history of concrete art and -literature has also been dragged into those Æsthetics and generally -mangled, and that they contain judgements upon Homer and Dante, Ariosto -and Shakespeare, Beethoven and Rossini, Michæl Angelo and Raphæl. When -all this has been deducted from them, we flatter ourselves that our -treatise will no longer be held to be too meagre, but, on the contrary, -far richer than ordinary treatises, which either omit altogether, or -hardly touch at all, the greater part of the difficult problems proper -to Æsthetic which we have felt it to be our duty to study. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of linguistic and Æsthetic._] - -But although Æsthetic as science of expression has been studied by us -in its every aspect, it remains to justify the sub-title which we have -added to the title of our book, _General Linguistic,_ to state and make -clear the thesis that the science of art and that of language, Æsthetic -and Linguistic, conceived as true sciences, are not two distinct -things, but one thing only. Not that there is a special Linguistic; -but the much-sought-for science of language, general Linguistic, _in -so far as what it contains is reducible to philosophy,_ is nothing -but Æsthetic. Whoever studies general Linguistic, that is to say, -philosophical Linguistic, studies æsthetic problems, and _vice versa. -Philosophy of language and philosophy of art are the same thing._ - -Were Linguistic really a _different_ science from Æsthetic it would -not have for its object expression, which is the essentially æsthetic -fact; that is to say, we must deny that language is expression. But an -emission of sounds which expresses nothing is not language. Language -is sound articulated, circumscribed and organized for the purposes of -expression. If, on the other hand, linguistic were a _special_ science -in respect to Æsthetic, it would necessarily have for its object a -_special class_ of expressions. But the non-existence of classes of -expression is a point which we have already demonstrated. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic formulation of linguistic problems. Nature of -language._] - -The problems which Linguistic tries to solve, and the errors in which -Linguistic has been and is involved, are the same that respectively -occupy and complicate Æsthetic. If it be not always easy, it is on -the other hand always possible to reduce the philosophic questions of -Linguistic to their æsthetic formula. - -The disputes themselves as to the nature of the one find their parallel -in those as to the nature of the other. Thus it has been disputed -whether Linguistic be a historical or a scientific discipline, and, -the scientific having been distinguished from the historical, it -has been asked whether it belong to the order of the natural or of -the psychological sciences, understanding by these latter empirical -Psychology as well as the Sciences of the spirit. The same has happened -with Æsthetic, which some have looked upon as a natural science -(confusing the æsthetic and the physical sense of the word expression). -Others have looked upon it as a psychological science (confusing -expression in its universality with the empirical classification of -expressions). Others again, denying the very possibility of a science -of such a subject, change it into a simple collection of historical -facts; not one of these attaining to the consciousness of Æsthetic as a -science of activity or of value, a science of the spirit. - -Linguistic expression, or speech, has often seemed to be a fact of -_interjection,_ which belongs to the so-called physical expressions -of the feelings, common alike to men and animals. But it was soon -perceived that an abyss yawns between the "Ah!" which is a physical -reflex of pain and a word; as also between that "Ah!" of pain and -the "Ah!" employed as a word. The theory of the interjection being -abandoned (jocosely termed the "Ah! Ah!" theory by German linguists), -the theory of _association_ or _convention_ appeared. This is liable to -the same objection which destroyed æsthetic associationism in general: -speech is unity, not multiplicity of images, and multiplicity does -not explain, but indeed presupposes the expression to be explained. A -variant of linguistic associationism is the imitative, that is to say, -the theory of _onomatopœia,_ which the same philologists deride under -the name of the "bow-wow" theory, from the imitation of the dog's bark, -which, according to the onomatopœists, must have given its name to -the dog. - -The most usual theory of our times as regards language (apart from mere -crass naturalism) consists of a sort of eclecticism or mixture of the -various theories to which we have referred. It is assumed that language -is in part the product of interjections and in part of onomatopœia and -convention. This doctrine is altogether worthy of the philosophical -decadence of the second half of the nineteenth century. - -[Sidenote: _Origin of language and its development._] - -We must here note an error into which have fallen those very -philologists who have best discerned the activistic nature of language, -when they maintain that although language was _originally a spiritual -creation,_ yet that it afterwards increased by _association._ But the -distinction does not hold, for origin in this case cannot mean anything -but nature or character; and if language be spiritual creation, it must -always be creation; if it be association, it must have been so from the -beginning. The error has arisen from having failed to grasp the general -principle of Æsthetic, known to us: that expressions already produced -must descend to the rank of impressions before they can give rise to -new impressions. When we utter new words we generally transform the -old ones, varying or enlarging their meaning; but this process is not -associative, it is _creative,_ although the creation has for material -the impressions, not of the hypothetical primitive man, but of man who -has lived long ages in society, and who has, so to say, stored so many -things in his psychic organism, and among them so much language. - -[Sidenote: _Relation between Grammar and Logic._] - -The question of the distinction between the æsthetic and the -intellectual fact appears in Linguistic as that of the relations -between Grammar and Logic. This problem has been solved in two -partially true ways: the _inseparability_ and the _separability_ of -Logic and Grammar. But the complete solution is this: if the logical -form be inseparable from the grammatical (æsthetic), the grammatical is -separable from the logical. - -[Sidenote: _Grammatical kinds or parts of speech._] - -If we look at a picture which for instance portrays a man walking on a -country road we may say: "This picture represents a fact of _movement,_ -which, if conceived as voluntary, is called _action_; and since every -movement implies a _material object,_ and every action a _being_ that -acts, this picture also represents a _material object_ or _being._ -But this movement takes place in a definite place, which is a piece -of a definite heavenly body (the Earth), and precisely of a piece of -it which is called _terra-firma,_ and more precisely of a part of it -that is wooded and covered with grass, which is called _country,_ -cut naturally or artificially into a form called _road._ Now, there -is only one example of that star, which is called Earth: the earth -is an _individual._ But _terra-firma, country, road_ are genera or -_universals,_ because there are other terra-firmas, other countries, -other roads." And it would be possible to continue for a while with -similar considerations. By substituting a phrase for the picture that -we have imagined, for example one to this effect: "Peter is walking on -a country road," and by making the same remarks, we obtain the concepts -of _verb_ (motion or action), of _noun_ (material object or agent), of -_proper noun,_ of _common noun;_ and so on. - -What have we done in both cases? Neither more nor less than submit to -logical elaboration what first presented itself only æsthetically; -that is to say, we have destroyed the æsthetic for the logical. But -since in general Æsthetic error begins when we wish to return from the -logical to the æsthetic and ask what is the _expression_ of motion, -action, matter, being, of the general, of the individual, etc.; so in -the case of language, error begins when motion or action are called -_verb,_ being or matter, _noun_ or _substantive,_ and when linguistic -categories, or _parts of speech,_ are made of all these, noun and verb -and so on. The theory of the parts of speech is really identical with -that of artistic and literary kinds, already criticized in our Æsthetic. - -It is false to say that the verb or noun is expressed in definite -words, truly distinguishable from others. Expression is an indivisible -whole. Noun and verb do not exist in it, but are abstractions made by -us, destroying the sole linguistic reality, which is the _sentence._ -This last is to be understood, not in the way common to grammars, but -as an organism expressive of a complete meaning, which includes alike -the simplest exclamation and a great poem. This sounds paradoxical, but -is nevertheless the simplest truth. - -And since in Æsthetic the artistic productions of certain peoples -have been looked upon as imperfect, owing to the error above -mentioned, because the supposed kinds have seemed not yet to have -been discriminated, or to be in part wanting; so in Linguistic, the -theory of the parts of speech has caused the analogous error of judging -languages as _formed_ and _unformed,_ according to whether there appear -in them or no some of those supposed parts of speech; for example, the -verb. - -[Sidenote: _The individuality of speech and the classification of -languages._] - -Linguistic also discovered the irreducible individuality of the -æsthetic fact, when it affirmed that the word is what is really -spoken, and that two truly identical words do not exist. Thus were -synonyms and homonyms destroyed, and thus was shown the impossibility -of really translating one word into another, from so-called dialect -into so-called language, or from the so-called mother-tongue into the -so-called foreign tongue. - -But the attempt to classify languages ill agrees with this just view. -Languages have no reality beyond the propositions and complexes of -propositions really written and pronounced by given peoples at definite -periods; that is to say, they have no existence outside the works of -art (whether little or great, oral or written, soon forgotten or long -remembered, does not matter) in which they exist concretely. And what -is the art of a given people but the whole of its artistic products? -What is the character of an art (for example of Greek art or Provençal -literature) but the whole physiognomy of those products? And how can -such a question be answered, save by narrating in its particulars the -history of the literature, that is to say, of the language in its -actuality? - -It may be thought that this argument, although possessing validity -as against many of the usual classifications of languages, yet -is without any as regards that queen of classifications, the -historico-genealogical, that glory of comparative philology. And this -it certainly is; but why? Precisely because that historico-genealogical -method is not a mere classification. He who writes history does not -classify, and the philologists themselves have hastened to say that -languages which can be arranged in historical series (those whose -series have hitherto been traced) are not distinct and separate species -but a single whole of facts in the various phases of its development. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of a normative grammar._] - -Language has sometimes been regarded as a voluntary or arbitrary act. -But at others the impossibility of creating language artificially, by -an act of will, has been clearly seen. "_Tu, Caesar, civitatem dare -potes homini, verbo non potes_" was once said to a Roman Emperor. And -the æsthetic (and therefore theoretic as opposed to practical) nature -of expression supplies the method of discovering the scientific error -which lies in the conception of a (normative) _Grammar_, establishing -the rules of correct speech. Good sense has always rebelled against -this error. An example of such rebellion is the "So much the worse for -grammar" attributed to Monsieur de Voltaire. But the impossibility -of a normative grammar is also recognized by those who teach it, -when they confess that to write well cannot be learned by rules, that -there are no rules without exceptions, and that the study of Grammar -should be conducted practically, by reading and examples, which should -form the literary taste. The scientific reason of this impossibility -lies in the principle that we have demonstrated: that a technique of -the theoretical amounts to a contradiction in terms. And what could -a (normative) grammar be, but precisely a technique of linguistic -expression, that is to say of a theoretic fact? - -[Sidenote: _Didactic organisms._] - -The case in which Grammar is understood merely as an empirical -discipline, that is to say, as a collection of schemes useful for -learning languages, without any claim whatever to philosophic truth, is -quite different. Even the abstractions of the parts of speech are in -this case both admissible and useful. And we must tolerate as merely -didascalic many books entitled "Treatises of Linguistic," where we -generally find a little of everything, from the description of the -vocal apparatus and of the artificial machines (phonographs) which can -imitate it, to summaries of the most important I results obtained by -Indo-European, Semitic, Coptic, Chinese, or other philologies; from -philosophical generalizations as to the origin or nature of language, -to advice on format, calligraphy and the arrangement of notes relating -to philological work. But this mass of notions, here administered in -a fragmentary and incomplete manner about language in its essence, -about language as expression, resolves itself into notions of Æsthetic. -Nothing exists outside _Æsthetic,_ which gives knowledge of the -nature of language, and _empirical Grammar,_ which is a pedagogic -expedient, save the _History of languages_ in their living reality, -that is to say, the history of concrete literary productions, which is -substantially identical with the _History of literature._ - -[Sidenote: _Elementary linguistic facts or roots._] - -The same error of taking the physical for the æsthetic, from which the -search for the _elementary forms_ of the beautiful originates, is made -by those who go in search of _elementary linguistic facts,_ decorating -with that name the divisions of the longer series of physical sounds -into shorter series. Syllables, vowels and consonants, and the series -of syllables called words, all these elements of speech, which give -no definite sense when taken alone, must be called not _facts of -language,_ but mere sounds, or rather sounds abstracted and classified -physically. - -Another error of the same sort is that of _roots,_ to which the most -distinguished philologists now accord but small value. Having confused -physical with linguistic or expressive facts, and considering that the -simple precedes the complex in the order of ideas, they necessarily -ended by thinking that the smallest physical facts indicated the -simplest linguistic facts. Hence the imaginary necessity that the most -ancient primitive languages had a monosyllabic character, and that -historical research must always lead to the discovery of monosyllabic -roots. But (to follow up the imaginary hypothesis) the first expression -that the first man conceived may have had not a phonetic but a mimetic -physical reflex; may have been externalized not in a sound but in -a gesture. And assuming that it was externalized in a sound, there -is no reason to suppose that sound to have been monosyllabic rather -than polysyllabic. Philologists readily blame their own ignorance and -impotence, when they do not always succeed in reducing polysyllabism to -monosyllabism, and rely upon the future to accomplish the reduction. -But their faith is without foundation, and their blame of themselves is -an act of humility arising from an erroneous presumption. - -For the rest, the limits of syllables, as those of words, are -altogether arbitrary, and distinguished somehow or other by empirical -use. Primitive speech, or the speech of uneducated man, is a -_continuum,_ unaccompanied by any consciousness of divisions of the -discourse into words or syllables, imaginary beings created by schools. -No true law of Linguistic can be founded on such divisions. Proof of -this is to be found in the confession of linguists, that there are -no truly phonetic laws of the hiatus, of cacophony, of diæresis or -synæresis, but merely laws of taste and convenience; that is to say, -_æsthetic_ laws. And what are laws of _words_ which are not at the same -time laws of _style_? - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic judgement and the model language._] - -Finally, the search for a _model language,_ or for a method of reducing -linguistic usage to _unity,_ arises from the superstition of a -rationalistic measure of the beautiful, from that concept which we have -called false æsthetic absoluteness. In Italy we call this the question -of the _unity of the language._ - -Language is perpetual creation. What has been linguistically expressed -is not repeated, save by reproduction of what has already been -produced. The ever-new impressions give rise to continuous changes -of sound and meaning, that is, to ever-new expressions. To seek the -model language, then, is to seek the immobility of motion. Everyone -speaks and should speak according to the echoes which things arouse -in his soul, that is, according to his impressions. It is not without -reason that the most convinced supporter of any one of the solutions of -the problem of the unity of language (whether by adopting a standard -Italian approximating to Latin, or to fourteenth-century usage, or -to the Florentine dialect) feels repugnance in applying his theory, -when he is speaking to communicate his thoughts and to make himself -understood. The reason is that he feels that in substituting the Latin, -fourteenth-century Italian, or Florentine word for that of different -origin, but which answers to his natural impressions, he would be -falsifying the genuine form of truth. He would become a vain listener -to himself instead of a speaker, a pedant in place of a serious man, an -actor instead of a sincere person. To write according to a theory is -not really to write: at the most, it is making _literature._ - -The question of the unity of language is always reappearing, because, -stated as it is, it is insoluble, being based upon a false conception -of what language is. Language is not an arsenal of arms already made, -and it is not a _vocabulary,_ a collection of abstractions, or a -cemetery of corpses more or less well embalmed. - -Our dismissal of the question of the model language, or of the unity of -the language, may seem somewhat abrupt, and yet we would not wish to -appear otherwise than respectful towards the long line of literary men -who have debated this question in Italy for centuries. But those ardent -debates were fundamentally concerned with debates of æstheticity, not -of æsthetic science, of literature rather than of literary theory, of -effective speaking and writing, not of linguistic science. Their error -consisted in transforming the manifestation of a need into a scientific -thesis, the desirability, for example, of easier mutual understanding -among a people divided by dialects into the philosophic demand for -a single, ideal language. Such a search was as absurd as that other -search for a _universal language,_ a language possessing the immobility -of the concept and of abstraction. The social need for a better -understanding of one another cannot be satisfied save by the spread of -education becoming general, by the increase of communications, and by -the interchange of thought among men. - -[Sidenote: _Conclusion._] - -These scattered observations must suffice to show that all the -scientific problems of Linguistic are the same as those of Æsthetic, -and that the truths and errors of the one are the truths and errors -of the other. If Linguistic and Æsthetic appear to be two different -sciences, this arises from the fact that people think of the former -as grammar, or as a mixture between philosophy and grammar, that -is, an arbitrary mnemonic schematism or a pedagogic medley, and not -of a rational science and a pure philosophy of speaking. Grammar, -or something not unconnected with grammar, also introduces into the -mind the prejudice that the reality of language lies in isolated and -combinable words, not in living discourse, in the expressive organisms, -rationally indivisible. - -Those linguists or philologists, philosophically endowed, who have -penetrated deepest into the problems of language, find themselves (to -employ a trite but effective simile) like workmen piercing a tunnel: -at a certain point they must hear the voices of their companions, the -philosophers of Æsthetic, who have been at work on the other side. At -a certain stage of scientific elaboration, Linguistic, in so far as it -is philosophy, must merge itself in Æsthetic: and this indeed it does -without leaving a residue. - - - - -II - -HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC - - - - -I - - -ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN GRÆCO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY - - -[Sidenote: _Point of view of this history of Æsthetic._] - -The question whether Æsthetic is to be considered as an ancient or a -modern science has on several occasions been a matter of controversy; -whether, that is to say, it arose for the first time in the eighteenth -century, or had previously arisen in the Græco-Roman world. This is -a question, not only of facts, but of criteria, as is easily to be -understood: whether one answers it in this way or that depends upon -one's idea of that science, an idea afterwards adopted as a standard or -criterion.[1] - -Our view is that Æsthetic is the _science of the expressive_ -(representative or imaginative) _activity._ In our opinion, therefore, -it does not appear until a precise concept is formulated of -imagination, representation or expression, or in whatever other manner -we prefer to name that attitude of the spirit, which is theoretical but -not intellectual, a producer of knowledge, but of the individual, not -of the universal. Outside this point of view, we for our part are not -able to discover anything but deviations and errors. - -These deviations can lead in various directions. Following the -distinctions and terminology of an eminent Italian philosopher[2] in -an analogous case, we shall be inclined to say that they arise either -from _excess_ or from _defect._ The deviation from defect would be -that which denies the existence of a special æsthetic and imaginative -activity, or, which amounts to the same thing, denies its autonomy, -and thus mutilates the reality of the spirit. Deviation by excess is -that which substitutes for it or imposes upon it another activity, -altogether undiscoverable in the experience of the interior life, a -mysterious activity which does not really exist. Both these deviations, -as can be deduced from the theoretical part of this work, take -various forms. The first, that due to defect, may be: (_a_) _purely -hedonistic,_ in so far as it considers and accepts art as a simple fact -of sensuous pleasure; (_b_) _rigoristic-hedonistic,_ in so far as, -looking upon it in the same way, it declares it to be irreconcilable -with the highest life of man; (_c_) _hedonistic-moralistic_ or -_pedagogic,_ in so far as it consents to a compromise, and while still -considering art to be a fact of sense, declares that it need not be -harmful, indeed that it may render some service to morality, provided -always that it is submissive and obedient.[3] The forms of the second -deviation (which we shall call "mystical") are not determinable _a -priori,_ for they belong to feeling and imagination in their infinite -variety and shades of meaning.[4] - -[Sidenote: _Mistaken tendencies, and attempts towards an Æsthetic, in -Græco-Roman antiquity._] - -The Græco-Roman world presents all these fundamental forms of -deviation: pure hedonism, moralism or pedagogism, mysticism, and -together with them the most solemn and celebrated rigoristic negation -of art which has ever been made. It also exhibits attempts at the -theory of expression or pure imagination; but nothing more than -approaches and attempts. Hence, since we must now take sides in the -controversy as to whether Æsthetic is an ancient or modern science, -we cannot but place ourselves upon the side of those who affirm its -modernity. - -A rapid glance at the theories of antiquity will suffice to justify -what we have said. We say rapid, because to enter into minute -particulars, collecting all the scattered observations of ancient -writers upon art, would be to do again what has been done many times -and sometimes very well. Further, those ideas, propositions and -theories have passed into the common patrimony of knowledge, together -with what else remains of the classical world. It is therefore more -advisable here than in any other part of this history merely to -indicate the general lines of development. - -[Sidenote: Origin of the æsthetic problem in Greece.] - -Art, the artistic faculty, only became a philosophical problem in -Greece after the sophistical movement and as a consequence of the -Socratic dialectic. The historians of literature generally point to -the origins of Greek Æsthetic in the first appearance of criticism -and reflection upon poetical works, painting and sculpture; in the -judgements pronounced on the occasion of poetical competitions, in -the observations that were made as to the methods of the different -artists, in the analogies between painting and poetry as expressed in -the sayings attributed to Simonides and Sophocles; or, finally, in the -appearance of that word which served to group together the various -arts and to indicate in a certain way their relationship--the word -mimesis or mimetic (μίμησις)--which oscillates between the meaning of -"imitation" and that of "representation." Others make the origin of -Æsthetic go back to the polemics which were conducted by the first -naturalistic and moralistic philosophers against the tales, fantasies -and morals of poets, and to the interpretations of the hidden meaning -(υπόνοια), or, as the moderns call it, allegory, employed to defend the -good name of Homer and of the other poets; finally, to the _ancient -quarrel_ between philosophy and poetry, as Plato was afterwards to call -it.[5] But, to tell the truth, none of these reflections, observations -and arguments implied a true and proper philosophical discussion of -the nature of art. Nor was the sophistical movement favourable to its -appearance. For although attention was at that time certainly given to -internal psychical facts, yet these were conceived as mere phenomena -of opinion and feeling, of pleasure and pain, of illusion, whim or -caprice. And where there is no true and no false, no good and no evil, -there can be no question of beautiful and ugly, nor of a difference -between the true and the beautiful or between the beautiful and the -good. The most one has in that case is the general problem of the -irrational and the rational, but not that of the nature of art, which -assumes the difference between rational and irrational, material -and spiritual, mere fact and value, to have been already stated and -grasped. If, then, the sophistical period was the necessary antecedent -to the discoveries of Socrates, the æsthetic problem could only arise -after Socrates. And it did indeed arise with Plato, author of the -first, or indeed of the only really great negation of art of which -there remains documentary proof in the history of ideas. - -[Sidenote: _Plato's rigoristic negation._] - -Is art, mimesis, a rational or an irrational fact? Does it belong to -the noble region of the soul, where philosophy and virtue are found, -or does it dwell in that base lower sphere, with sensuality and crude -passionality? This is the question asked by Plato,[6] who thus states -the problem of Æsthetic for the first time. The sophist Gorgias was -able to note, with his sceptical acuteness, that tragic representation -is a deception, which (strangely enough) turns out to the honour -both of him who deceives and of him who is deceived, in which it is -shameful not to know how to deceive oneself and not to let oneself be -deceived.[7] With that remark he could rest content. That was for him -a fact like another. But Plato, the philosopher, was bound to solve -the problem: if it were a deception, then down with tragedy and the -rest of mimetic productions: down with them among the other things to -be despised, among the animal qualities of man. But if it were not -deception, what was it? What place did art occupy among the lofty -activities of philosophy and of good action? - -The answer that he gave is well known. Mimetic does not realize the -ideas, that is to say the truth of things, but reproduces natural or -artificial things, which are pale shadows of them; it is a diminution -of a diminution, a third-hand work. Art, then, does not belong to the -lofty and rational region of the soul (του λογιστικοϋ ἐν ψυχή) but to -the sensual; it is not a strengthening but a corruption of the mind -(λώβη τής διάνοιας); it can serve only sensual pleasure, which troubles -and obscures. For this reason, mimetic, poetry and poets, must be -excluded from the perfect Republic. - -Plato is the most consistent example of those who do not succeed in -discovering any other form of knowledge but the intellectual. It was -correctly observed by him that imitation stops at natural things, -at the image (το φάντασμα), and does not reach the concept, logical -truth (άλήθεια), of which poets and painters are altogether ignorant. -But his error consisted in believing that there is no other form of -truth below the intellectual; that there is nothing but sensuality and -passionality outside or prior to the intellect, that which discovers -the ideas. Certainly, the fine æsthetic sense of Plato did not echo -that depreciatory judgement of art; he himself declared that he would -have been very glad to have been shown how to justify art and to place -it among the forms of the spirit. But since none was able to give him -this assistance, and since art with its _appearance_ that yet lacks -_reality_ was repugnant to his ethical consciousness, and reason -compelled him (ό λόγος ήρει) to banish it and place it with its peers, -he resolutely obeyed his conscience and his reason.[8] - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic hedonism and moralism._] - -Others were not troubled with these scruples, and although art was -always looked upon as a mere thing of pleasure among the later -hedonistic schools of various sorts, among rhetoricians and worldly -people the duty of combating or of abolishing it was not felt. -Nevertheless, this opposite extreme was also not calculated to meet -with the endorsement of public opinion, for the latter, if tender -towards art, is no less tender towards rationality and morality. For -this reason both rationalists and moralists, compelled to recognize -the force of such a condemnation as Plato's, sought for a compromise, -a half measure. Away with the sensual and with art: certainly. But -can we expel the sensual and the pleasurable without more ado? Can -fragile human nature nourish itself exclusively with the strong food of -philosophy and morality? Can we obtain observance of the true and of -the good from the young and from the people, without allowing them at -the same time some amusement? And has not man himself always something -of the child, has he not always something of the people in him, is -he not to be treated with the same precautions? Is there not a risk -that the over-bent bow will break?--These considerations prepared the -way for the justification of art, for they showed that if it were not -rational in itself, it could on the other hand serve a rational end. -Hence the search for the _external end_ of art, which takes the place -of the search for the essence or _internal end_. When art had been -lowered to the level of a simple pleasurable illusion, an inebriation -of the senses, it was necessary to subordinate the practical action -of producing such an illusion and inebriation, like any other action, -to the moral end. Art, being deprived of any dignity of its own, -was obliged to assume a reflected or secondhand dignity. Thus the -moralistic and pedagogic theory was constructed upon a hedonistic -basis. The artist, who, for the pure hedonist, was comparable to -a _hetaira,_ became for the moralist a _pedagogue._ Hetaira and -pedagogue, these are the symbols of the two conceptions of art that -were disseminated in antiquity, and the second was grafted upon the -first. - -Even before Plato's peremptory negation had directed thought to this -way of issue, the literary criticism of Aristophanes was already full -of the pedagogic idea: "What schoolmasters are to children, poets -are to young men" (τοΐς ήβώσιν δὲ ποιηταί), he says in a celebrated -verse[9] But we can find traces of it in Plato himself (in the -dialogues in which he seems to withdraw from the too rigid conclusions -of the _Republic)_ and in Aristotle, both in the _Politics,_ where he -determines the use of music in education, and perhaps in the _Poetics,_ -where he speaks obscurely of a tragical _catharsis_; although as -regards this latter, it is not to be altogether denied that he may -have had a sort of glimpse of the modern idea of the liberating power -of art.[10] Later on, the pedagogic theory takes a form that was much -affected by the Stoics. Strabo develops and defends this at great -length, in the introduction to his geographical work, where he combats -Eratosthenes, who has made poetry consist in mere pleasure without any -notion of teaching. Strabo, on the contrary, maintained the opinion of -the ancients, that it was "a first philosophy (φιλοσοφίαν τινα πρωτήν), -which educated young men for life, and created customs, affections and -actions, by means of pleasure." Therefore, he said, poetry has always -been a part of education; one cannot be a good poet unless one is a -good man (άνδρα άγαθόν). Legislators and founders of cities were the -first to employ fables to admonish and to terrify: then this duty, -which must be performed for women and children and even for adults, -passed to the poets. We caress and dominate the multitude with fiction -and with falsehood.[11] "The poets tell many lies" (πολλά ψεύδονται -άοιδοί) is a hemistich recorded by Plutarch, who describes minutely in -one of his lesser works how the poets should be read to youths.[12] -For him too poetry is a preparation for philosophy; it is a disguised -philosophy, and therefore delights us in the same way as do fish and -meat at feasts, so prepared as not to seem to be fish and meat; it is -philosophy softened with fables, like the vine that grows close to the -mandragora, and produces a wine that is the giver of sweet slumbers. -It is not possible to pass from dense darkness to sunlight; one should -first accustom the eyes to moderate light. Philosophers, in order to -exhort and instruct, take their examples from true things; poets aim -at a like result, when they create fictions and fables.[13] Lucretius, -in Roman literature, gives us the well-known comparison of the boys for -whom the doctors "_prius or as pocula circum Contingunt mellis dulci -flavoque liquore,_" in order to administer the bitter wormwood.[14] -Horace, in certain verses of the Epistle to the Pisones which have -become proverbial (perhaps his source for them was the Greek of -Neoptolemus of Paros?), offers both views (that of art as courtesan and -of art as pedagogue) in his "_Aut prodesse volunt aut deledare poetae -... omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci._"[15] - -Thus looked at, the office of the poet was confounded with that of the -orator, for he too was a practical man aiming at practical effects; -hence there arose discussions as to whether Virgil was to be considered -as a poet or as an orator ("_Virgilius poeta an orator?_"). To both was -assigned the triple end of _delectare, movere, docere_; in any case -this tripartition was very empirical, for we clearly perceive that -the _delectare_ is here a means-and the _docere_ a simple part of the -_movere_: to move in the direction of the good, and therefore, among -other goods, towards that of instruction. In like manner, it was said -of the orator and poet (recording the meretricious basis of their task, -and with a metaphor significant in its _naïveté_) that they were bound -to avail themselves of the _allurements_ (_lenocinium_) of form. - -[Sidenote: _Mystical æsthetic in antiquity._] - -The mystical view, which considers art as a special mode of -self-beatification, of entering into relation with the Absolute, with -the Summum Bonum, with the ultimate root of things, appeared only -in late antiquity, almost at the entrance to the Middle Ages. Its -representative is the founder of the neo-Platonic school, Plotinus. - -It is strange that Plato should be usually selected as the founder -and head of this æsthetic tendency, and that for this very reason to -him should be attributed the honour of being the father of Æsthetic. -But how could he, who had expounded with such great limpidity and -clearness the reasons for which he was not able to accord to art a -high place among the activities of the spirit, be credited with having -accorded to it one of the highest places, equal, if not superior, to -philosophy itself? This misunderstanding has evidently arisen out of -the enthusiastic effusions about the Beautiful that we read in the -_Gorgias,_ the _Philebus,_ the _Phædrus,_ the _Symposium,_ and other -Platonic dialogues. It is well to dissipate it by declaring that the -_Beauty_ of which Plato discourses has nothing to do with art or with -_artistic beauty._ - -[Sidenote: _Investigations as to the Beautiful._] - -The search for the meaning and scientific content of the word -"beautiful" could not but early attract the attention of the subtle -and elegant Greek dialecticians. Indeed, we find Socrates engaged -in discussing this question in one of the discourses that have been -preserved for us by Xenophon; and we find him disposed to stop for -the moment at the conclusion that the beautiful is _that which is -convenient and which answers to the end desired,_ or at the other -conclusion that it is _that which one loves_[16] Plato too examines -this sort of problem and proposes various sorts of solutions or -attempts at solutions of it. He sometimes speaks of a beauty that -dwells not only in bodies, but also in laws, in actions, in the -sciences; sometimes he seems to conjoin and almost to identify it -with the true, the good and the divine; now he returns to the view of -Socrates and confuses it with the useful; now he distinguishes between -a beautiful in itself (καλά καθ' αυτά) and a relatively beautiful (πρός -τι καλά); or he makes true beauty consist in pure pleasure (ήδονη -καθαρά), free from all shadow of pain; or he places it in measure and -proportion (μετριότης καί ξνμμετρία); or talks of colours and sounds -as possessing a beauty in themselves.[17] It was impossible to find -an independent dominion for the beautiful, if the artistic or mimetic -activity were deserted. This explains his wandering among so many -different conceptions, among which it is just possible to say that the -identification of the Beautiful with the Good prevails. Nothing better -describes this uncertainty than the dialogue of the _Hippias maior_ -(which, if it be not Plato's, is Platonic). He here wishes to find -out not what things are beautiful things, but what the beautiful is; -that is to say, what it is that makes beautiful, not only a beautiful -virgin, but also a beautiful mare, a beautiful lyre, a beautiful pot -with two graceful ears of clay. Hippias and Socrates himself propose -in turn the most various solutions; but the latter ends by confuting -them all. "That which makes things beautiful is the gold that is added -to them by way of ornament." No: gold only embellishes where it is -_fitting_ (πρέπων): for instance, a pot should have a wooden rather -than a golden handle. "That is beautiful which cannot seem ugly to any -one." But it is not a question of _seeming_: the question is to define -what the beautiful is, whether it seems so or not. It is the _fitting_ -which makes things seem to be beautiful. But in that case, the fitting -(which makes them _appear,_ not _be)_ is one thing, and the beautiful -another. "The beautiful is what leads to the end, that is to say, the -_useful_ (χρήσιμον)." But if that were so, then evil would also be -beautiful, because the useful leads also to the evil. "The beautiful -is the _helpful,_ that which leads to the good (ωφέλιμον)." But in -this case, the good would not be beautiful nor the beautiful good; for -the cause is not the effect, and the effect is not the cause. "The -beautiful is that which delights the sight and hearing." But this fails -to persuade for three reasons: firstly, because beautiful studies and -laws are beautiful, which have nothing to do with the eye or with the -ear; secondly, because we cannot discover a reason for limiting the -beautiful to those senses, while excluding the pleasure of eating and -smelling, and the extremely vivid pleasures of sex; thirdly, because, -if the foundation of the beautiful were _visibility,_ it would not be -_audibility,_ and if it were audibility it would not be visibility; -hence that which constitutes the beautiful cannot dwell in either -of the two qualities. And the question which has been repeated so -insistently in the course of the dialogue: _what is the beautiful?_ (τί -εστι το καλόν;) remains unanswered.[18] - -Later writers also conducted inquiries into the beautiful, and we -possess the titles of several treatises upon the theme, which have -been lost. Aristotle shows himself changeable and uncertain upon the -point. In the scanty references which he makes to it, he at one time -confounds the beautiful with the good, defining it as that which is -both good and pleasing;[19] at another he notes that the good consists -of action (εν πράξει) and the beautiful also in things that are -immoveable (εν τοΐς άκινήτοις), drawing from this the argument that -mathematics should be studied in order to determine its characters, -order, symmetry and limit;[20] sometimes he places it in bigness and -in order (εν μεγεθει καί τάξει);[21] at others he was led to look upon -it as something apparently indefinable.[22] Antiquity also established -canons of beautiful things, such as that attributed to Polycletus on -the proportions of the human body. And Cicero said of the beauty of -bodies that they were "_quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam -suavitate._"[23] All these affirmations, even when they are not mere -empirical observations, or verbal glosses and substitutions, meet with -unsurmountable obstacles. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between the theory of Art and the theory of the -Beautiful._] - -In any case, not only is the conception of the beautiful, taken as -a whole, identified with art in none of them; but sometimes art and -beauty, mimesis and pleasing or displeasing material of mimesis, are -clearly distinguished. Aristotle notes in his _Poetics_ that it pleases -us to see the most faithful images of things that are repugnant to -us in reality, such, for instance, as the most contemptible forms of -animals, or corpses (τάς εικόνας τάς μάλιστα ήκριβωμενας χαίρομεν -θεωρουντες).[24] Plutarch demonstrates at length that works of art -please us not as beautiful but as _resembling_ (ούχ ως καλόν, άλλ,' -ως ομοιον); he affirms that if the artist beautified things that are -ugly in nature he would be offending against fitness and resemblance -(το πρεπον και το eίκός); and he proclaims the principle that _the -beautiful is one thing and beautiful imitation another_ (oύ yaρ εστι -ταυτό, το καλον και καλως τι μιμεισθαι). Paintings of horrible events -are pleasing, such as _Medea slaying her sons_ by Timomachus, _Orestes -the matricide_ by Theon, and the _Pretended madness of Ulysses_ by -Parrhasius; and if the grunting of a pig, the grating of a machine, -the noise of the winds and the tumult of the sea are unpleasing, they -pleased on the contrary in the case of Parmenon, who imitated the pig -perfectly, and in Theodorus, who was not less expert in rendering the -grating of machines.[25] If the ancients had really wanted to place -the beautiful and art in relation, a secondary and partial connexion -of the two conceptions was to hand in the shape of the category of the -_relatively_ as distinguished from the _absolutely_ beautiful. But -where the word _καλόν_ or _pulchrum_ is applied to artistic productions -in the writings of literary critics, it does not seem to be more than a -linguistic usage, as we find, for instance, in the case of Plutarch's -_beautiful_ imitation, or also in the terminology of the rhetoricians, -who sometimes called elegance and adornment of discourse _beauty_ of -elocution (το τής φράσεως κάλλος). - -[Sidenote: _Fusion of the two by Plotinus._] - -It is only with Plotinus that the two divided territories are united -and _the beautiful and art are fused into a single concept,_ not by -means of a beneficial absorption of the _equivocal_ Platonic conception -of beauty into the _unequivocal_ conception of art, but by absorption -of the clear into the confused, of _imitative art_ in the so-called -_beautiful._ And thus we reach an altogether new view: the beautiful -and art are now both alike melted into a mystical passion and elevation -of the spirit. - -Beauty, observes Plotinus, resides chiefly in things visible; but it -is also to be found in things audible, such as verbal and musical -compositions, and it is not lacking in things supersensible, such as -works, offices, actions, habits, sciences and virtues. What is it -that makes beautiful sensible and supersensible things alike? Not, he -answers, the symmetry of their parts among themselves, and with the -whole (συμμετρία των μερών προς αλληλα και προς το ολον) and their -colour (ενχροια), according to one of the definitions most in vogue, -which we have quoted above in the words of Cicero; because there are -proportions in things ugly, and there are things that are simply -beautiful without any relation of proportion: beauty, then, is one -thing and symmetry another.[26] The beautiful is what we welcome as -akin to our own nature; the ugly is what repels us as our opposite, -and the affinity of beautiful things with our souls that perceive them -has its origin in the Idea, which produces both. That is beautiful -which is _formed_; the ugly is what is _unformed,_ that is to say, -something which is capable of receiving form, but does not receive it -or is not entirely dominated by it. A beautiful body is such, because -of its communion (κοινωνία) with the Divine; beauty is the Divine, the -Idea, shining through; and matter is beautiful, not in itself, but only -when it is illuminated by the Idea. Light and fire, which are nearest -to this state, shed beauty upon visible things, as the most spiritual -among bodies. But the soul must purify itself, in order to perceive the -beautiful, and make the power of the Idea that lies in it efficacious. -Moderation, strength, prudence, and every other virtue, what else are -they, according to the oracle, but _purification_? Thus there opens -another eye in the soul, beside that of sensible beauty, which permits -it to contemplate divine Beauty coincident with the Good, which is the -supreme condition of beatitude.[27] Art enters into such contemplation, -because beauty, in things made by man, comes from the mind. Compare two -blocks of stone, the one placed beside the other: one rough and crude, -the other reduced to the statue of a god or of a man, for example of -a Grace or of a Muse, or of a human being of such a shape, as art has -collected from many particular beauties. The beauty of a block of this -shape does not consist in its being of stone, but in the form that -art has been able to give to it (παρά του ειδους o ενηκεν η τέχνη); -and when the form is fully impressed upon it, the thing of art is more -beautiful than any other natural thing. Hence he who despised the arts -(Plato), because they imitated nature, was wrong; whereas the truth -is, in the first place, that nature itself imitates the idea, and then -that the arts do not simply limit themselves to imitating what the eyes -see, but go back to those reasons or ideas from which nature itself is -derived (ώς ούχ απλώς το όρώμενον μεμούνται, αλλ' άνατρέχουσιν επι τούς -λόγους έξ ων η φύσις). Art therefore does not belong to nature, but -adds beauty where it is wanting in nature: Phidias did not represent -Jove because he had seen him, but such as he would appear if he wished -to reveal himself to mortal eyes.[28] The beauty of natural things -is the archetype existing in the soul, the sole source of natural -beauty.[29] - -[Sidenote: _The scientific tendency. Aristotle._] - -This affirmation of Plotinus and of neo-Platonism is the first -true and proper affirmation of mystical Æsthetic, destined to such -high fortunes in modern times, especially in the first half of the -nineteenth century. But the attempts at a true Æsthetic, excluding -certain luminous but incidental observations to be found even in -Plato: for instance, that the poet should weave fables, not arguments -(μύθους άλλ' ού λόγους),[30] go back to Aristotle and are altogether -independent of his few and feeble speculations as to the beautiful. -Aristotle by no means agreed with the Platonic condemnation; he felt -(as indeed Plato himself had suspected) that such a result could not -be altogether true, and that some aspect of the problem must have been -neglected. When in his turn he attempted to find a solution, he found -himself in more advantageous conditions than his great predecessor, -since he had already overcome the obstacle that arose from the Platonic -doctrine of ideas, a hypostasis of concepts and abstractions. The ideas -were for him simply concepts, and reality presented itself in a far -more lively manner, not as a diminution of ideas, but as a synthesis of -matter and form, it was thus much more easy for him to recognize the -rationality of mimesis in his general philosophical doctrine and to -assign to it its right place; and indeed it seems generally clear to -Aristotle that mimesis, being proper to man by nature, is contemplation -or theoretic activity; although he sometimes seems to forget this (as -when he confuses imitation with the case of boys, who acquire their -first knowledge by following an example[31]), and although his system, -which admits practical sciences and poietic activities (distinguished -from the practical as leaving a material object behind them), disturbed -the firm and constant consideration of artistic mimesis and poetry as -a theoretical activity. But if it is a theoretical activity, by what -characteristic is poetry distinguished both from _scientific_ knowledge -and from _historical_ knowledge? This is the way Aristotle states the -problem concerning the nature of art, and this is the true and only -way of stating it. Even we moderns ask ourselves in what way art is -distinguished from history and from science, and what this artistic -form can be, which has the ideality of science and the concreteness -and individuality of history. Poetry, answers Aristotle, differs from -history, because, while the latter draws things that have happened -(τα γενόμενα), poetry draws things that may possibly happen (οια αν -γένοιτο), and differs from science, because, although it regards the -universal and not the particular (τα καθ' εκαστον) like history, -it does not regard it in the same way as science, but in a certain -measure, which the philosopher indicates by the word _rather_ (μαλλον -τα καθόλου). The point then is to establish the precise meaning of -the _possible,_ the _rather_ and the _historical particular._ But no -sooner does Aristotle attempt to determine the meaning of these words, -than he falls into contradictions and fallacies. That _universal_ of -poetry, which is the _possible,_ seems to identify itself for him with -the probable or the necessary (τα _κατά το είκος η το άναγκαΐον_), -and the particular of history is not explained at all, except by -giving instances: "that which Alcibiades did and what happened to -him."[32] Aristotle, in fact, after having made so good a beginning -in the discovery of the purely imaginative, proper to poetry, remains -half-way, perplexed and uncertain. Thus he sometimes makes the truth -of imitation consist in a certain learning and syllogizing that takes -place when we look at imitations, by which we recognize that "this is -that," that a copy answers to the original;[33] or, worse, he loses the -grains of truth that he has found and forgets that poetry has for its -content the possible, admitting, not only that it may also depict the -_impossible_ (το αδύνατον), and even the _absurd_ (το άτοπον), seeing -that both are _credible_ and that they do not injure the end of art, -but even that we must prefer impossible probabilities to incredible -possibilities.[34] Art, since it has to do even with the impossible -and absurd, will not therefore have in it anything of the rational, -but in accordance with the Platonic theory it will be an imitation of -the appearance in which empty sense indulges itself; that is to say, a -thing of pleasure. Aristotle does not attain to this result, because -he does not attain to any clear and precise result in this part of the -subject, but it is one of the results that can be deduced from what he -has said, or that, at any rate he is not able to exclude. This means -that he did not fulfil his tacitly assumed task, and that although -he re-examined the problem with marvellous acuteness after Plato, he -failed truly to rid himself of the Platonic definition, by substituting -a firmly-established one of his own. - -[Sidenote: _The concepts of imitation and of imagination after A -ristotle. Philostratus._] - -But the field of investigation toward which Aristotle had turned was -generally neglected in antiquity: the very _Poetics_ of Aristotle does -not seem to have been widely known or influential. Ancient psychology -knew fancy or imagination as a faculty midway between sense and -intellect, but always as conservative and reproductive of sensuous -impressions or conveying conceptions to the senses, never properly -as a productive autonomous activity. That faculty was rarely and with -little result placed in relation with the problem of art. Several -historians of Æsthetic attach singular importance to certain passages -in the _Life of Apollonius of Tyana_ by the elder Philostratus, in -which they believe that they discover a correction of the theory of -_mimesis_ and the first affirmation in history of the conception of -_imaginative creation._ Phidias and Praxiteles (says the extract in -question) did not need to go to heaven to see the gods, in order to -be able to depict them in their works, as would have been necessary -according to the theory of imitation. Imagination, without any need -of models, made them able to do what they did: imagination, which is -a wiser agent than simple imitation (φαντασία ... σοφωτόρα μιμήσεως -δημιουργός), and gives form, like the other, not only to what has been -seen, but also to what has never been seen, imagining it on the basis -of existing things and in that way creating Jupiters and Minervas.[35] -However, the imagination of which Philostratus speaks here is not -something different from the Aristotelian mimesis, which, as has been -noted, was concerned not only with real things but also and chiefly -with possible things. And had not Socrates observed (in the dialogue -with the painter Parrhasius, preserved for us by Xenophon) that -painters work by collecting what they need to form their figures from -several bodies (εκ πολλων συνάγοντες τα εξ εκάστου καλλιστα)?[36] And -was not the anecdote of Zeuxis, who was supposed to have taken the -best of five Crotonian maidens in order to paint his Helen, and other -anecdotes of a like sort, sufficiently widespread in antiquity? And -had not Cicero eloquently explained, some years before Philostratus, -how Phidias, when he was carving Jupiter, did not copy anything real, -but kept his looks fixed upon "_species pulcritudinis eximia quaedam,_" -which he had in his soul and which directed his art and his hand?[37] -Nor can it be said that Philostratus opened the way to Plotinus, -for whom the superior or intellectual imagination (νοητή), or eye of -supersensible beauty, when it is not a new designation for beautiful -imitation, is mystical intuition. - -The vagueness of the concept of mimesis reached its apex in those -writers who gave it as a general title to any sort of work that had -nature for its object, employing the Aristotelian phrase to affirm -that "_omnis ars naturae imitatio est,_"[38] or saying, like the -painter Eupompus when he blamed his servile imitators, that "_natura -est imitanda, non artifex._"[39] And those who wished to escape this -vagueness did not know how to do so, save by conceiving the activity of -imitation as the practical producer of duplicates of natural objects, a -prejudice bora in the bosom of the pictorial and plastic arts, against -which Philostratus perhaps intended to argue, in common with the other -advocates of imagination. - -[Sidenote: _Speculations on language._] - -The speculations upon language had a close connexion with those upon -the nature of art begun by the sophists, for whom it became a matter -for wonder that sounds could signify colours or things inaudible; that -is to say, _speech_ presented itself as a _problem._[40] It was then -discussed whether language was by nature (φύσει or by convention νόμω). -By nature was sometimes understood mental necessity, and by convention -what we should call a merely natural fact, psychological mechanism or -sensationalism. In that sense of the terms, language would have been -better called φύσει than νόμω. But at other times the distinction led -to the question whether language answers to objective or logical truth -and to the real relations between things (όρθότης των ονομάτων); and -in this case, those would seem to be nearer the truth who proclaimed -it to be conventional or arbitrary in respect to logical truth: νόμω -or θέσει, and not φύσει Two different questions were consequently -being treated together, and both were confusedly and equivocally -discussed. They find their monument in the obscure _Cratylus_ of -Plato, which seems to fluctuate between different solutions. Nor did -the later affirmation that the word is a sign (σημείον) of the thought -solve anything, for it still remained to be shown in what way the sign -was to be understood, whether φύσει or νόμω. Aristotle, who looked -upon words as imitations (μιμηματα), in the same way as poetry,[41] -made an observation of first-rate importance: in addition to the -_enunciative_ propositions, which express the (logically) true or -false, there are others which do not express either the (logically) -true or false, as for example the expressions of aspirations and of -desires (εύχή), which therefore belong, not to logical exposition, but -to poetical and rhetorical exposition.[42] And in another place we -find him affirming in opposition to Bryson (who had said that a base -thing remained such with whatever word it were designated) that base -things can be expressed both with words that place them beneath the -eye in all their crudity, and with other words which surround them -with a veil.[43] All this might have led to the separation of the -linguistic faculty from the properly logical, and to its consideration -in union with the poetical and artistic faculty; but here too the -attempt stopped half-way. The Aristotelian logic assumed a verbal and -formalistic character, which became more and more accentuated as time -went on and formed an obstacle to the distinction between the two -theoretical forms. Nevertheless, Epicurus asserted that the diversity -of names designating the same thing with various peoples was due, -not to convention and caprice, but to the fact that the impressions -produced by things were different in each one of them.[44] And the -Stoics, although they connected language with thought (διάνοια) and -not with imagination, seem to have had a suspicion of the non-logical -nature of language, for they interposed between thought and sound a -_certain something_ which was indicated in Greek by the word λεκτόν, -and by the words _effatum_ or _dicibile_ in Latin. But we are not sure -what they really meant, and whether that vague concept were intended -by them to distinguish the linguistic representation from the abstract -concept (which would bring them into touch with the modern view), or -the meaning of sound in general.[45] - -We cannot collect any other germ of truth from the ancient writers. -A philosophical Grammar, like a philosophical Poetics, remained -unattainable in antiquity. - - -[1] See above, pp. 128-131. Quotations which give only the name -of the author, or are otherwise abbreviated, refer to historical -or critical works of which the complete title is given in the -Bibliographical Appendix. - -[2] Rosmini, _Nuovo saggio sull' origine delle idee,_ sections iii. and -iv., where theories of knowledge are classified. - -[3] See above, pp. 83-84. - -[4] See above, p. 65. - -[5] _Republic_, x. 607. - -[6] _Republic_, x. 607. - -[7] Plutarch, _De audiendis poetis_, ch. i. - -[8] _Republic_ x. - -[9] _Frogs,_ 1, 1055. - -[10] Plato, _Laws,_ bk. ii.; Aristotle, _Poet._ ch. 14; _Polit,_ bk. -viii. - -[11] Strabo, _Geographica,_ i. ch. 2, §§ 3-9. - -[12] Texts collected in E. Müller, _Gesch. d. Th. d. K._ i. pp. 57-85. - -[13] Plutarch, _De aud. poetis,_ chs. 1-4, 14. - -[14] _De rerum natura,_ i. 935-947. - -[15] _Ad Pisones,_ 333-334. - -[16] _Memorab._ iii. ch. 8; iv. ch. 6. - -[18] _Hippias maior, passim._ - -[19] _Rhet._ i. ch. 9. - -[20] _Metaphys._ xii. ch. 3. - -[21] _Poet._ ch. 7. - -[22] Diog. Lært. v. ch. i, § 20. - -[23] _Tuscul. quæst._ bk. iv. § 13. - -[24] _Poet._ ch. iv. 3. - -[25] _De aud. poetis_, ch. 3. - -[26] _Enneads,_ I. bk. vi. ch. i. - -[27] _Enneads, loc. cit._ chs. 2-9. - -[28] _Enneads,_ V. bk. viii. ch. i. - -[29] _Enneads, loc. cit._ chs. 2-3. - -[30] _Phædrus,_ ch. 4. - -[31] Poet. ch. 4, § 2. - -[32] Poet. ch. 9, §§ 1-4. - -[33] Poet. ch. 4, §§ 4-5. - -[34] Poet. chs. 24-25. - -[35] _Apoll. vita,_ vi. ch. io. - -[36] _Memorab._ iii. ch. io. - -[37] _Orator ad Brutum,_ ch. 2. - -[38] For example, Seneca, _Epist._ 65. - -[39] Pliny, _Nat. Hist._ xxxiv. ch. 19. - -[40] Gorgias in _De Xenoph., Zen. et Gorg._ (in Aristot., ed. Didot), -chs. 5-6. - -[41] _Rhet._ bk. iii. ch. 1. - -[42] _Rhet._ bk. iii. ch. 2. - -[43] _De interp._ ch. 4. - -[44] Diog. Lært. bk. x. § 75. - -[45] Steinthal, _Gesch. d. Sprachw.,_ 2nd ed., i. pp. 288, 293, -296-297. - - - - -II - - -ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE - - -[Sidenote: _Middle Ages, Mysticism, Ideas on the beautiful._] - - -Almost all the developments of ancient Æsthetic were continued by -tradition or reappeared by spontaneous generation in the course of the -Middle Ages. Neo-Platonic mysticism continued, entrusted to the care -of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (_De cœlesti hierarchia, -De ecclesiastica hierarchia, De divinis nominibus,_ etc.), to the -translations of these works made by John Scotus Eriugena, and to the -divulgations of the Spanish Jews (Avicebron). The Christian God took -the place of the Summum Bonum or Idea: God, wisdom, goodness, supreme -beauty, source of beautiful things in nature, which are a ladder to -the contemplation of the Creator. But these speculations continued to -recede further and further from the consideration of art, with which -Plotinus had connected them; and the empty definitions of the beautiful -by Cicero and other ancient writers were often repeated. Saint -Augustine defined beauty in general as unity (_omnis pulchritudinis -forma unitas est,_) and that of the body as _congruentia partium cum -quadam colons suavitate,_ and the old distinction between something -that is beautiful in itself and relative beauty reappeared in a book -of his, which has been lost, entitled _De pulchro et apto;_ the very -name shows that he reasserted the old distinction between the beautiful -in itself and the relatively beautiful, _quoniam apte accommodaretur -alicui._ Elsewhere he notes that an image is called beautiful _si -perfecte implei illud cujus imago est, et coaequatur ei._[1] - -Thomas Aquinas varied but little from him in positing three requisites -for beauty: integrity or perfection, due proportion, and clearness; -following Aristotle, he distinguished the beautiful from the good, -defining the first as that which pleases in the mere contemplation of -it (_pulcrum ... id cujus ipsa apprehensio placet_); he referred to -the beauty that even base things possess if well imitated, and applied -the doctrine of imitation to the beauty of the Second Person of the -Trinity (_in quantum est imago expressa Patris_).[2] If it were wished -to discover references to the hedonistic conception of art, it would -be possible to do this, with a little goodwill, in some of the sayings -of jongleurs and troubadours. Æsthetic rigorism, the total negation -of art for religion or for divine and human science, shows itself in -Tertullian and among certain Fathers of the Church, at the entrance to -the Middle Ages; at their conclusion, in a certain crude scholastic -spirit, for example in Cecco d' Ascoli, who proclaimed against Dante: -"I leave trifles behind me and return to the _true_; fables are always -unpleasing to me," and later, in the reactionary Savonarola. But the -narcotic theory of pedagogic or moralistic art prevailed over every -other. It had contributed to send to sleep the æsthetic doubts and -inquiries of the ancients, and was well suited to a period of relative -decadence of culture. This was all the more the case, seeing that it -accorded well with the moral and religious ideas of the Middle Ages, -and afforded a justification not only for the new art of Christian -inspiration, but also for the surviving works of classical and pagan -art. - -[Sidenote: _The pedagogic theory of art in the Middle Ages._] - -The allegorical interpretation was again a means of salvation for these -last. The _De continentia Virgiliana_ of Fulgentius (sixth century) -is a curious monument to this fact. This work made Virgil compatible -with the Middle Ages and opened his way to that great reputation which -he was destined to attain, as the "gentle sage who knew all things." -Even John of Salisbury says of the Roman poet, that "_sub imagine -fabularum totius philosophiae exprimit veritatem._"[3] The process of -interpretation became fixed in the doctrine of the _four meanings,_ -literal, allegorical, moral and anagogic, which Dante afterwards -transferred to vernacular poetry. It would be easy to accumulate -quotations from mediæval writers, repeating in all keys the theory -that art inculcates the truths of morality and of faith and constrains -hearts to Christian piety, beginning with those well-known verses of -Theodulf: "_In quorum dictis_ (that is to say, in the utterances of the -poets) _quamquam sint frivola multa, Plurima sub falso tegmine vera -latent,_" and so on, until we reach the doctrines and opinions of our -own great men, Dante and Boccaccio. For Dante, poetry "_nihil aliud est -quam fictio rhethorica in musicaque posita._"[4] The poet should have -a "reasoning" in his verses "under a cloak of figure or of rhetorical -colour"; and it would be a shameful thing for him, if, "when asked, -he were not able to divest his words of such a garment, in such a way -as to show that they possessed a true meaning."[5] Readers sometimes -stop at the external vesture alone, and this indeed suffices for -those who, like the vulgar, do not succeed in penetrating the hidden -meaning. Poetry will say to the vulgar, which does not understand "its -argument," what a song of Dante's says at its conclusion, "At least -behold how _beautiful_ I am": if you are not able to obtain instruction -from me, at least enjoy me as a pleasing thing. Many, indeed, "their -beauty more than their goodness will delight," in poems, unless they -are assisted by commentaries in the nature of the _Convivio,_ "a light -which will allow every shade of meaning to reach them."[6] Poetry was -the "gay science," "_un fingimiento_" (as the Spanish poet the Marquis -of Santillana wrote) "_de cosas utiles, cubiertas ó veladas con muy -fermosa cobertura, compuestas, distinguidas é scandidas, por cierto -cuento, pessoé medida._"[7] - -It would not then be correct to say that the Middle Ages simply -identified art with theology and with philosophy. Indeed it sharply -distinguished the one from the other, defining art and poetry, like -Dante, with the words _fictio rhethorica_, "figure" and "rhetorical -colour," "cloak," "beauty," or like Santillana with those of -_fingimiento_ or _fermosa cobertura._ This pleasing falsity was -justified from the practical point of view, very much in the same way -as sexual union and love were justified and sanctified in matrimony. -This did not exclude, indeed it implied, that the perfect state was -certainly celibacy--that is to say, pure science, free from admixture -of art. - -[Sidenote: _Hints of an Æsthetic in scholastic philosophy._] - -The only tendency that had no true and proper representatives was -the sound scientific tendency. The _Poetics_ of Aristotle itself was -hardly known or rather it was ill-known, from the Latin translation -that a German of the name of Hermann made, not earlier than 1256, of -the paraphrase or commentary of Averroes. Perhaps the best of the -mediæval investigations into language is that supplied by Dante's _De -vulgari eloquentia,_ where the word is, however, still looked upon as -a sign ("_rationale signum et sensuale ... natura sensuale quidem, -in quantum sonus est, rationale vero in quantum aliquid significare -videtur ad piacitum_").[8] The study of the expressive, æsthetic, -linguistic faculty would, however, have found an appropriate occasion -and a point of departure in the secular debate between nominalism and -realism, which could not avoid touching to some extent the relations -between the word and the flesh, thought and language. Duns Scotus wrote -a treatise _De modis significandi seu_ (the addition is due perhaps to -the editors) _grammatica speculativa_.[9] Abelard had defined sensation -as _confusa conceptio,_ and _imaginatio_ as a faculty that preserved -sensations; the intellect renders discursive what is intuitive in the -preceding stage, and we have finally the perfection of knowledge in -the intuitive knowledge of the discursive. We find the same importance -attached to intuitive knowledge, perception, of the individual or -_species specialissima,_ in Duns Scotus, together with the progressive -denominations of the different sorts of knowledge as _confusæ, -indistinctæ_ and _distinctæ._ We shall see this terminology reappear, -big with consequences, at the very commencement of modern Æsthetic.[10] - -[Sidenote: _Renaissance. Philography and philosophical and empirical -inquiries concerning the beautiful._] - -It may be said that the literary and artistic doctrines and opinions -of the Middle Ages have, with few exceptions, a value rather for the -history of culture than for the general history of science. The like -observation holds good of the Renaissance, for here, too, the circle of -the ideas of antiquity was not overstepped. Culture increases; original -sources are studied; the ancient writers are translated and commented -upon; many treatises are written and henceforth printed upon poetry -and the arts, grammars, rhetorics, dialogues, and dissertations upon -the beautiful: the proportions have increased, the world has become -bigger; but truly original ideas do not yet show themselves in the -domain of æsthetic science. The mystical tradition is refreshed and -strengthened by the renewed cult of Plato: Marsilio Ficino, Pico della -Mirandola, Cattani, Leon Battista Alberti, in the fifteenth century, -and Pietro Bembo, Mario Equicola, Castiglione, Nobili, Betussi, and -very many others in the following century, wrote upon the Beautiful -and upon Love. Among the most noteworthy productions of the sort, a -crossing of the mediæval and classical currents, is the book of the -_Dialogues of Love_ (1535), composed in Italian by the Spanish Jew -Leo, and translated into all the cultured languages of the time.[11] -The three parts into which it is divided treat of the nature and -essence, of the universality, and of the origin of love; and it is -demonstrated that every beautiful thing is good, but not every good -thing is beautiful; that beauty is a grace which dilates the soul and -moves it to love, and that knowledge of lesser beauties leads to that -of higher spiritual beauties. The author gave the name of "Philography" -to these and similar affirmations and effusions of which the book is -composed. Equicola's[12] work is also interesting, because it contains -historical accounts of those who wrote upon the subject before he did -so himself. The same intuition was versified and sighed forth by the -Petrarchists in their sonnets and ballads, while others, rebellious and -mocking, derided it in comedies, verses in _terza rima_ and parodies of -all sorts. Some mathematicians, reincarnations of Pythagoras, set to -work to determine beauty by exact relations: for instance Leonardo's -friend, Luca Paciolo, in the _De divina proportione_ (1509), in which -he laid down the pretended æsthetic law of the golden section.[13] And -side by side with these new Pythagoreans were those who revived the -canon of Polycletus as to the beauty of the human body, especially -of the female body, such as Firenzuola, Franco, Luigini, and Dolce. -Michæl Angelo fixed an empirical canon for painting in general, when -he stated that the means of giving movement and grace to figures[14] -consisted in the observance of a certain arithmetical relation. Others, -such as Fulvio Pellegrino Morato, investigated the symbolism or meaning -of colours. The Platonists generally placed beauty in the soul, the -Aristotelians rather in the physical qualities. The Averroist, Agostino -Nifo, amid much chatter and many inconclusive remarks, demonstrated -the existence of the beautiful in nature by describing the supremely -beautiful body of Joan of Aragon, Princess of Tagliacozzo, to whom the -book is dedicated.[15] Torquato Tasso, in the "Mintumo,"[16] imitated -the uncertainties of the _Hippias_ of Plato, not without making a free -use of the speculations of Plotinus. A chapter of the _Poetica_ of -Campanella possesses greater importance, where he describes the good as -_signum boni_ and the ugly as _signum mali,_ understanding by good the -three prime forces of Power, Wisdom and Love. Although Campanella was -still tied to the Platonic idea of the beautiful, the conception of a -sign or symbol, here introduced by him, represents progress. By this -means he succeeded in perceiving that material things or external facts -are neither beautiful nor ugly in themselves. "Mandricard called the -wounds in the bodies of his friends the Moors beautiful, for they were -large and gave evidence of the great strength of Roland who dealt them; -Saint Augustine called the gashes and the dislocations in the body of -Saint Vincent beautiful, because they were evidence of his endurance, -but they were on the other hand ugly in so far as they were signs of -the cruelty of the tyrant Dacianus and of his executioners. It is -beautiful to die fighting, said Virgil, for it is the sign of a strong -soul. The pet dog of his mistress will seem beautiful to the lover, and -doctors call even urine and fæces beautiful, when they indicate health. -Everything is both beautiful and ugly" (_quapropter nihil est quod non -sit pulcrum simul et turpe_).[17] In such observations as these we have -not a mere state of mystical exaltation, but to some extent a movement -in the direction of analysis. - -[Sidenote: _The pedagogic theory of art and the Poetics of Aristotle._] - -Nothing better serves to demonstrate that the Renaissance did not pass -beyond the confines of ancient æsthetic thought than the fact that -notwithstanding the renewed acquaintance with the thought of Aristotle, -the pedagogic theory of art not only persisted and triumphed, but was -transplanted bodily into the text of Aristotle, where its interpreters -read it with a certainty that we have to make efforts to achieve. -Certainly, a Robortelli (1548) or a Castelvetro (1570) stopped short -at the simple, purely hedonistic solution, giving simple pleasure as -the end of art: poetry, says Castelvetro, "was discovered solely -for the purpose of delighting and of recreating ... the souls of the -rude multitude and of the common people."[18] And here and there -some were able to free themselves from both the pleasure theory and -that of the didactic end; but the majority, such as Segni, Maggi, -Vettori,[19] were for the _docere delectando._ Scaliger (1561) declared -that mimesis or imitation was "_finis medius ad illum ultimum qui est -docendi cum delectatione,_" and believing himself to be altogether in -agreement with Aristotle as to this, he continued, "_docet affectus -poeta per actiones, ut bonos amplectamur atque imitemur ad agendum, -malos aspernemur ad abstinendum._"[20] Piccolomini (1575) observed -that "It must not be thought that so many excellent poets and artists, -ancient and modern, would have devoted such care and diligence to this -most noble study, had they not known and believed that in so doing -they were aiding human life," and if "they had not thought that we -were to be instructed, directed, and well established by it."[21] The -"truth preserved in soft verses, which attracts and persuades the most -reluctant" (Tasso),[22] with the comparison from Lucretius attached, -is the conception that even Campanella repeats. Poetry is for him -"_Rhetorica quaedam figurata, quasi magica, quae exempla ministrat ad -suadendum bonum et dissuadendum malum delectabiliter iis qui simplici -verum et bonum audire nolunt, aut non possunt aut nesciunt._"[23] Thus -returned the comparison of poetry with oratory; according to Segni -they only differ because the first occupies a more lofty situation: -"for since imitation representing itself in act by means of poetry, in -mighty, chosen words, in metaphors, images, and indeed the whole of -figured speech, which is to be found more in poetry than in the art -of oratory, the metrical qualities that are also required in verse, -the subjects of which it treats, which have something of the great and -delightful, make it appear most beautiful and worthy of being held all -the greater marvel."[24] "Three most noble arts" (wrote Tassoni in -1620, and he repeated common opinion), "History, Poetics, and Oratory, -come under the heading of Politics and depend upon it; the first of -these has reference to the instruction of princes and gentlemen, the -second of the people, the third of those who give counsel in public -trials or defend private ones that come up for judgment."[25] - -According to these views, the tragical catharsis was regarded as -designed in general to demonstrate the instability of fortune, or to -terrify by example, or to proclaim the triumph of justice, or to render -the spectators insensible to the strokes of fortune, owing to their -familiarity with suffering. The pedagogic theory, thus renewed and -sustained by the authority of the ancients, was popularized in France, -Spain, England and Germany, together with all the Italian poetic -doctrines of the Renaissance. The French writers of the period of Louis -XIV. are altogether penetrated with it. "_Cette science agréable qui -mêle la gravité des préceptes avec la douceur du langage_," is what La -Ménardière calls poetry (1640), in the same way as Le Bossu (1675), for -whom "_le premier but du poète est d'instruire_,"[26] as Homer taught, -when he wrote two interesting didactic manuals relating to military and -political events: the _Iliad_ and the _Odyssey._ - -[Sidenote: _The "Poetics of the Renaissance."_] - -This pedagogic theory has therefore been reasonably described by all -the modern critics in concert, as if by antonomasia, as the _Poetics -of the Renaissance._ It must, however, always be understood that it -did not appear for the first time in the fifteenth or sixteenth -century, but that it was prevalent and generally accepted at that -time. It may even be remarked, as has already been acutely done,[27] -that the Renaissance naturally did not distinguish the didactic kind -of poetry from the other kinds, since for it every kind of poetry was -didactic. But the Renaissance was not a real Renaissance, save when -and where it continued the interrupted spiritual work of antiquity, -and in this sense it would perhaps be more just to describe as its -Poetics, or rather, as the important element in its Poetics, not the -repetition of the pedagogic theory of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, -but the resumption, which also took place, of the discussions upon -the possible, the probable (_verisimile_, εικός) of Aristotle, on the -reasons of Plato's condemnation and on the procedure of the artist who -creates by imagining. - -[Sidenote: _Dispute concerning the universal and the probable in art._] - -It is in such discussions that is to be found the true contribution of -that epoch, not to learning, but to the formation of the science of -Æsthetic. The ground was prepared and enriched through the work of the -interpreters and commentators of Aristotle and of the new writers on -Poetics, especially the Italians, and it was also enriched with some -seed that was destined to sprout and to become a vigorous plant in -the future. The study of Plato also contributed not a little to call -attention to the function of the idea, or of the universal, in poetry. -What meaning was to be attached to the statement that poetry should aim -at the universal and history at the particular? What was the meaning of -the proposition that poetry should proceed according to _probability_? -What could that _certain idea_ consist of, which Raphæl said that he -followed in his painting? - -[Sidenote: _Fracastoro._] - -Girolamo Fracastoro was among the first to ask himself this question -seriously, in the dialogue _Naugerius, sive De poetica_ (1555). He -disdainfully rejected the thesis that the end of poetry is pleasure: -far be from us, he exclaimed, so bad an opinion of the poets, who the -ancients said were the inventors of all the good arts. Nor did the -end of instruction seem to him to be acceptable, which is the task, -not of poetry, but of other faculties, such as geography, history, -agronomy, philosophy. The poet's task is to represent or to imitate, -and he differs from the historian, not in the matter, but in the manner -of representation. The others imitate the particular, the poet the -universal: the others are like the painters of portraits, the poet -produces things as he contemplates the universal and most beautiful -idea of them: the others say only what they need to say for their -purposes, the poet that he may say everything beautifully and fully. - -But the beauty of a poem must always be understood as relative to -the class of subject of which it treats; it is the most beautiful -in this class, not the supremely beautiful: one must be careful to -guard against the equivocal or double meaning of this word "beauty" -(_æquivocatio illius verbi_). A poet never utters what is false or -expresses what does not exist, for his words inevitably harmonize in -appearance or signification either with the opinions of men or with the -universal. Nor can we accept the Platonic axiom that the poet has no -knowledge of the things of which he treats; he does know them, but in -his own poet's manner.[28] - -[Sidenote: _L. Castelvetro._] - -While Fracastoro strives to elaborate the important passage in -Aristotle touching the universal of poetry, and though somewhat -vague in his treatment, keeps fairly close to the mark; Castelvetro, -on the contrary, judges the Aristotelian fragment with the freedom -and superior knowledge of the true critic. He recognizes that the -_Poetics_ is merely a notebook recording certain principles and -methods of compiling the art, not the art fully compiled. He remarks, -moreover, not without logical acumen, that Aristotle having adopted -the criterion of probability or of that "which presents an appearance -of historic truth," should have applied his theory in the first -case to history, not to poetry; for history being a "narrative -according to truth of memorable human actions," and poetry a narrative -according to probability of events which might possibly occur, the -second cannot receive "all its radiance" from the first. Nor does it -escape him that Aristotle describes two different things by the one -word "imitation": (_a_) "following the example of another," which is -"acting in exactly the same way as another without knowing the reason -of such action": and (_b_) the imitation "demanded by poetry," which -"does things in a manner totally different from that in which they -have been done hitherto and proposes a new example for imitation." -Nevertheless Castelvetro cannot extricate himself from the confusion -between the imaginary and the historical; for he himself says "the -realm of the former is generally that of certainty," but "the field -of certainty is often crossed with bars of uncertainty just as the -field of uncertainty is often crossed with bars of certainty." Also -what can be said of this curious interpretation of the Aristotelian -theory of pleasure experienced in the imitation of ugly models, that -such pleasure is based on the fact that since an imitation is always -imperfect, it is incapable of exciting the disgust and fear which would -arise from the contemplation of real ugliness? And what of his remark -that the characteristics of painting and poetry are so diverse as to -be in opposition one to the other; imitation of objects giving rise -to great pleasure in the former art and as great displeasure in the -latter? And so on in numberless cases of bold but scarcely felicitous -subtleties.[29] - -[Sidenote: _Piccolomini and Pinciano._] - -In opposition to Robortelli, who asserted the identity of the probable -and the false, Piccolomini held that the probable (_verisimile_) is -inherently neither false nor true, only by accident becoming one or -other.[30] Of the same mind is the Spaniard Alfonso Lopez Pinciano -(1596), who says the scope of poetry "_no es la mentira, que seria -coincider con la sophística, ni la historia que seria tomar la materia -al histórico; y no siendo historia porque toca fabúlas ni mentira -porque toca historia, tiene por objeto el verisimil, que todo lo -abraza. De aqui resulta que es un arte superior á la metaphysica, -porqué comprende mucho mas, y se extiende a lo que es y á lo que no -es._"[31] What may lie behind this notion of probability is still -indefinite and impenetrable. - -[Sidenote: _Fr. Patrizzi_ (_Patricius_).] - -Moved by a wish to place poetry on a foundation other than the -probable, Francesco Patrizzi, the anti-Aristotelian, composed his -_Poetica_ between 1555 and 1586 in refutation of all Aristotle's main -doctrines. Patrizzi notes that the word "imitation" is given many -meanings by the Greek philosopher, who uses it now to denote a single -word, now to describe a tragedy; at times it stands for a figure of -speech, at others for a fiction: whence he draws the logical conclusion -(from which, however, he shrinks alarmed) "that all philosophic and -other kinds of writing and speaking are poetry, since they are made -of words which themselves are imitations." He observes further that, -according to Aristotle, it is impossible to distinguish between poetry -and history (since both are imitations), or to prove that verse is not -essential to poetry, or that history, science and art are unsuitable -material for it; since Aristotle in several passages says that poetry -may comprise "fable, actual occurrences, belief of others, duty, -the best, necessity, the possible, the probable, the credible, the -incredible, the suitable" as well as "all things worldly." After these -objections, some sound, others sophistical, Patrizzi comes to the -conclusion that "there is no truth in the dogma that poetry is wholly -imitation; and even if it be imitation at all, it belongs not to poets -alone, nor is it mere imitation of any kind, but something else not -mentioned by Aristotle nor pointed out by any one else, nor yet borne -into the mind of man. The discovery may possibly be made in course of -time, or some one may hit upon the truth and bring it to light"; but -up to the present "such discovery has not been made."[32] - -Yet these confessions of ignorance, these endeavours, though vain, to -escape from the Aristotelian circle of ideas, and the great literary -controversies of the sixteenth century concerning the concept of poetic -truth and the probable had their use in that they stimulated interest -by directing attention to a mystery still unsolved. Thought had once -more begun to move upon the æsthetic problem, and this time it was not -destined to be broken off or to lose itself. - - -[1] _Confess,_ iv. x. ch. 13; _De Trinitate,_ vi. ch. 10; _Epist._ -3, 18; _De civitate Dei,_ xxii. ch. 19 (in _Opera,_ ed. dei Maurini, -Paris, 1679-1690, vols. i. ii. vii. viii.). - -[2] _Summa theol._ I. 1. xxxix. 8; I. 11. xxvii. I (ed. Migne, i. cols. -794-795; ii. col. 219). - -[3] Comparetti, _Virg. nel medio evo,_ vol. i. _passim._ - -[4] _De vulg. eloq._ (ed. Rajna), bk. ii. ch. 4. - -[5] _Vita nuova,_ ch. 25. - -[6] _Convivio,_ i. 1. - -[7] _Prohemio al Condestable de Portugal,_ 1445-1449 (in _Obras,_ ed. -Amador de los Rios, 1852), § 3. - -[8] _De vulg. eloq._ bk. i. ch. 3. - -[9] Lately reprinted under the editorship of padre M. Fernandez Garcia, -Ad claras Aquas (Quarracchi), 1902. - -[10] Windelband, _Gesch. d. Phil._ ii. pp. 251-270; De Wulf, _Philos, -médiév.,_ Louvain, 1900, pp. 317-320. - -[11] _Dialogi di amore, composti per Leone, medico ...,_ Rome, 1535. - -[12] _Libro di natura e d' amore,_ Venice, 1525 (Ven. 1563). - -[13] _De divina proportione,_ Venice, 1509. - -[14] G. P. Lomazzo, _Trattato dell' arte della pittura, scultura ed -architettura,_ Milan, 1585, i. I, pp. 22-23. - -[15] Aug. Niphi, _De pulcro el amore,_ Rome, 1529. - -[16] _Il Minturno o vero de la belleza_ (in _Dialoghi,_ ed. Guasti, -vol. iii.). - -[17] _Ration. philos._ part iv.; _Poeticor._ (Paris, 1638), art. vii. - -[18] Fr. Robortelli, _In librum Arts, de arte poet, explicationes,_ -Florence, 1548; Lud. Castelvetro, _Poetica d' Aristotele vulgarizzata -ed esposta,_ 1570 (Basle, 1576), part i. particella iv. pp. 29-30. - -[19] Bern. Segni, _Rettor. e poet. trad._ Florence, 1549; Vinc. Madii, -_In Arist.... explanationes,_ 1550; Petri Victorii, _Commentarii,_ -etc., Florence, 1560. - -[20] _Poetica,_ 1561 (ed. 3, 1586), i. I; vii. 3. - -[21] _Annotationi net libro della Poetica,_ Venice, 1575, preface. - -[22] _Gerus. lib._ i. 3. - -[23] _Poetic,_ ch. I, art. 1. - -[24] _Poetica trad_. preface. - -[25] _Pensieri diversi_, bk. x. ch. 18. - -[26] La Ménardière, _Poétique_, Paris, 1640; Le Bossu, _Traité du poème -épique_, Paris, 1675. - -[27] Borinski, _Poet. d. Renaiss._ p. 26. - -[28] Hyeron. Frascatorii _Opera,_ Venetian edition, Giunti, 1574, pp. -112-120. - -[29] _Poet., ed. cit._ i. 1; ii. 1; iii. 7; v. I (pp. 64, 66, 71-72, -208, 580). - -[30] _Annotationi,_ preface. - -[31] _Philosophia antiqua poetica,_ Madrid, 1596 (reprinted Valladolid -1894). - -[32] Francesco Patrici, _Della poetica, la Deca disputata,_ "in -which by history, by reason, by authority of the greatest worthies -of antiquity, is shown the falsity of the most received opinions -concerning Poetry down to our own day." Ferrara, 1586. - - - - -III - - -FERMENTS OF THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY - - -[Sidenote: _New words and new observations in the seventeenth century_] - -Interest in æsthetic investigation increased rapidly in the early years -of the following century, owing either to the popularity acquired by -certain new words or to the novel meanings given to words already -familiar, which emphasized new aspects of artistic production and -criticism, complicating the problem and rendering it thereby more -puzzling and attractive. For example: wit, taste, imagination or fancy, -feeling, and several others, which must be examined rather closely. - -Wit (_ingegno_) differed somewhat from intellect. Free use of the word -arose, if we mistake not, from its convenience in Rhetoric as conceived -by antiquity; that is to say, a suave and facile mode of knowledge, as -opposed to the severity of Dialectic; an "Antistrophe to Dialectic," -which substituted for reasons of actual fact those of probability or -fancy; enthymemes for syllogisms, examples for inductions; so much -so that Zeno the Stoic figured Dialectic with her fist clenched and -Rhetoric with her hand open. The empty style of the decadent Italian -authors in the seventeenth century found its complete justification -in this theory of rhetoric; their prose and verse, Marinesque and -Achillinesque, professed to exhibit not the true but the striking, -subtly conceited, curious or nice. The word wit, _ingegno,_ was now -repeated much more frequently than in the preceding century; wit -was hailed as presiding genius of Rhetoric; its "vivacities" were -lauded to the skies; "_belli ingegni_" was a phrase seized upon by -the French, who rendered it as "_esprit_" or "_beaux esprits_."[1] -One of the most noteworthy commentators on these matters (although -opposed to the literary excesses of the times), Matteo Pellegrini -of Bologna (1650), defines wit as "that part of the soul which in -a certain way practises, aims, and seeks to find and create the -beautiful and the efficacious";[2] he considers the work of "wit" to -be the "conceits" and "subtleties" noted by him in a previous pamphlet -(1639).[3] Emmanuele Tesauro also descants at considerable length -in his _Cannochiale Aristotelico_ (1654) upon wit and subtleties, -not alone "verbal" and "lapidary" conceits, but also "symbolic" and -"figurative" (statues, stories, devices, satires, hieroglyphs, mosaics, -emblems, insignia, sceptres), and even "animated agents" (pantomimes, -play-scenes, masques and dances): all things which may be grouped under -"polite quibbling" or rhetoric as distinct from "dialectic." - -Amongst such treatises, product of their age, one written by the -Spaniard Baltasar Gracian (1642) became celebrated throughout -Europe.[4] Wit became in his hands the strictly inventive or artistic -faculty, "genius"; _génie,_ "genius" were now used as synonyms of -wit, _ingegno_ and _esprit._ In the following century Mario Pagano[5] -wrote: "Wit may be taken as equivalent to the _génie_ of the French, a -word now commonly used in Italy." To return to the seventeenth century, -Bouhours, a Jesuit writer of dialogues on the _Manière de bien penser -dans les ouvrages d'esprit_ (1687), says that "'heart' and 'wit' are -greatly in fashion just now, nothing else is spoken of in polite -conversation, and all discourse is at last brought round to _l'esprit -et le cœur._"[6] - -[Sidenote: _Taste._] - -The word _taste_ or _good taste_ was equally widespread and -fashionable, signifying the faculty of judgement brought to bear -on the beautiful, distinct to some extent from intellectual power, -and sometimes divided into active and passive, so that it was usual -to speak of one kind of taste as "productive" or "fertile" (thus -coinciding with "wit"), and of another as "sterile." - -[Sidenote: _Various meanings of the word taste._] - -From the rough notes which we possess as to the history of the concept -of taste, several meanings of the word, not all of equal importance -as indications of the development of ideas, detach themselves in a -somewhat confused manner. "Taste," meaning "pleasure" or "delight," was -an old-established word in Italy and Spain, as is shown in such phrases -as "to have a taste for, to be to one's taste"; when Lope di Vega -and other Spaniards speak continually of the drama of their country -as seeking to please the popular taste ("_deleita el gusto_"; "_para -darle gusto_") they mean only the "pleasure" of the populace. In Italy -there was a very ancient use of the word in the metaphorical sense -of "judgement," either literary, scientific, or artistic; numberless -examples of this use occur in writers of the sixteenth century -(Ariosto, Varchi, Michæl Angelo, Tasso). To take but one of these: the -lines in _Orlando Furioso_ where it is said of the Emperor Augustus, -"_L' aver avuto in poesia buon gusto La proscrizione iniqua gli -perdona,_" "For having had good taste in poetry he shall be forgiven -his iniquitous proscriptions"; or the remark of Ludovico Dolce that' -some person "had such exquisite taste, he sang no verses save those of -Catullus and Calvus."[7] The word "taste," in the sense of a special -faculty or attitude of mind, appears to have been used for the first -time in Spain in the middle of the seventeenth century by Gracian,[8] -the moralist and political writer already quoted. It is evidently to -him that the Italian author Trevisano alludes in a preface to a book by -Muratori (1708) when he speaks of "Spaniards, above all others cunning -in metaphor," who express themselves in "that eloquent and laconic -phrase, good taste"; touching further on taste and genius he quotes, -"that ingenious Spaniard," Gracian,[9] who gave the word the sense of -"practical wit," enabling one to perceive the "true signification" of -things; his "man of good taste" becomes in our language "a man of tact" -in the affairs of life.[10] - -The transference of the word to the domain of æsthetic seems to have -taken place in France during the last quarter of the century. "_Il y -a dans l'art un point de perfection, comme de bonté ou de maturité -dans la nature: celui qui le sent et qui l'aime a le goût parfait; -celui qui ne le sent pas, et qui aime au deçà ou au delà, a le goût -défectueux. Il y a donc un bon et un mauvais goût, et l'on dispute des -goûts avec fondement,_" writes La Bruyère[11] (1688). As attributes -or variants of taste it was usual to mention _delicacy_ and _variety_ -or _variability._ Bearing its fresh critical--literary content, -but not freed from the encumbrance of its earlier practical and -moral significance, the word spread from France into other European -countries. Thomasius introduced it into Germany in 1687;[12] and in -England it becomes "good taste." In Italy it appears as early as 1696 -as title of a large book written by Camillo Ettori, the Jesuit, _Il -buon gusto ne' componimenti rettorici_.[13] The preface notes: "The -expression 'good taste,' proper to those who rightly distinguish good -from bad flavour in foods, is now in general use and claimed by every -one as a title in connexion with literature and the humanities"; it -reappears in 1708 at the beginning of Muratori's[14] book already -quoted: Trevisano treats of it philosophically: Salvini discusses it -in his note upon the _Perfetta Poesia_ of Muratori above mentioned, -where the subject of good taste occupies several pages,[15] and finally -it gives its name to the Academy of Good Taste founded at Palermo in -1718.[16] Scholars of the day who took up the discussion of the theme, -recollecting some passages scattered throughout the ancient classics, -placed the new concept in relation with the "_tacitus quidam sensus -sine ulla ratione et arte_" of Cicero; and with the "_indicium_" which -"_nec magis arte traditur quam gustus aut odor_" of Quintilian.[17] -More particularly Montfaucon de Villars (1671)[18] wrote a book on -"Delicacy"; Ettori strove to find some definition more satisfactory -than those current at the time (_e.g._ "it is the finest invention -of wit, the flower of wit and extract of beauty's self," and similar -conceits);[19] Orsi made it the subject of his _Considerazioni_ written -in reply to Bouhours' book. - -[Sidenote: _Fancy or Imagination._] - -In Italy in the seventeenth century we find imagination or fancy -placed on a pinnacle. What do you mean by talking of probability -and historical truth (asks Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino in 1644), of -false or true in connexion with poetry; which deals not with fiction, -fact or historical probability but with primary apprehensions which -assert neither truth nor falsehood? Following this line of argument, -imagination takes the place of that probable, neither true nor false, -advocated by some commentators of Aristotle; a theory strongly -criticized by Pallavicino, here agreeing with Piccolomini, whom however -he does not name, and in opposition to Castelvetro whom he explicitly -mentions. He who goes to the play (continues Pallavicino) knows quite -well that the scenes acted on the stage are not real; although he has -no belief in them yet they please him greatly. For "if poetry desired -to be mistaken for truth, the end she had in view would be a he, by -the laws of nature and of God doomed inevitably to perish: for a lie -is nothing but an untruth uttered in the hope that it may be mistaken -for truth. How then should an art so tainted be allowed to flourish in -the best-regulated republics? How should it be commended and used by -the very writers of Holy Scripture?" _Ut pictura poësis_: poetry is -like painting, which is a "diligent imitation" aiming at a close copy -of the features, colours, acts, nay, even the hidden motives, of the -objects it represents: and it "does not pretend that fiction is truth." -The sole aim of poetic tales is "to adorn our understanding with -imagery, that is to say, with sumptuous, novel, marvellous and splendid -appearances. And this is known to diffuse so useful an influence on -mankind that humanity insists on rewarding poets with praise more -glorious than is bestowed on any other men; their books are protected -from the ravages of time with greater solicitude than is shown to -scientific treatises or productions of any other art; in the end the -names of poets are crowned with adoring veneration. See how the world -thirsts for beautiful first apprehensions, although these are neither -laden with science nor are they vehicles of truth."[20] - -Sixty years later these ideas, although expressed by a Cardinal, seemed -all too daring to Muratori, who could not bring himself to allow poets -so much latitude, or to enfranchize them from their obligations to the -probable. Nevertheless Muratori allows a large space to imagination, -"an inferior apprehensive faculty" which, without caring whether -things be false or true, confines itself to apprehending them, and -"represents" the truth merely, leaving the task of "cognition" to the -"superior apprehensive faculty" or intellect.[21] Even the stony heart -of Gravina yields to the charm of imagination: he admits it occupies -a considerable place in the realm of poetry and suffers his own arid -prose to describe it as "a sorceress, but beneficent," "a delirium -which cures madness."[22] - -Earlier than either of these, Ettori commended it to the good -rhetorician, "who in order that he may awaken images" must "familiarize -himself with whatever is subject to bodily feeling" and "encounter -the genius of imagination, which is a sensuous faculty," to these -ends using "species rather than genera (since the latter, being more -universal than the former, are less sensible), individuals rather than -species, effects than causes, the number of the greater rather than the -number of the less."[23] - -As far back as 1578 the Spaniard Huarte had maintained that eloquence -is the product of imagination rather than of intellect or reason.[24] -In England Bacon (1605) ascribed science to intellect, history to -memory and poetry to imagination or fancy:[25] Hobbes inquired into -the procedure of poetry:[26] Addison (1712) devoted several numbers -of his _Spectator_ to analysis of the "pleasures of imagination."[27] -Somewhat later, the importance of imagination was felt in Germany, -where it found advocates in Bodmer, Breitinger and other writers of the -Swiss school, who owed much to the influence of the Italians (Muratori, -Gravina, Calepio) and the English: acting in their turn as teachers of -Klopstock and the new German critical school.[28] - -[Sidenote: _Feeling._] - -It was at this same period that opposition became clearly marked -between those accustomed "_à juger par le sentiment_" and those used -to "_raisonner par principes_."[29] The Frenchman, Du Bos, author of -_Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture_ (1719), upholds the -theory of feeling; according to him art is simply a self-abandonment -"_aux impressions que les objets étrangers font sur nous,_" setting -aside all reflective labour. He laughs at those philosophers who -deny the force of imagination, and Malebranche's eloquent discourse -founded on this denial draws from Du Bos the remark, "_c'est à notre -imagination qu'il parle contre l'abus de l'imagination._" He refuses -to see any intellectual nucleus in the productions of the arts, saying -that art consists not in instruction but in style: nor is he too -respectful towards the probable: he says he finds himself unable to -set limits between it and the marvellous, and leaves to "born poets" -the task of thus miraculously uniting opposites. For Du Bos there is -no criterion of art save feeling, which he calls a "_sixième sens,_" -against which dispute is vain since in such matters popular opinion -invariably wins the day over the dogmatic pronouncements of artists -and men of letters: all the ingenious conceits of the greatest -metaphysicians, though unimpeachable in themselves, will not in the -slightest degree diminish the lustre of poetry or despoil it of one -single attraction. Attempts to discredit Ariosto and Tasso in the eyes -of Italians were as vain as those made against the _Cid_ in France. -Other people's arguments can never persuade us of the contrary of -what we feel.[29] These notions were adopted by many French writers: -for example Cartaut de la Villate[30] observes, "_Le grand talent -d'un écrivain qui veut plaire, est de tourner ses réflexions en -sentiments_;" and Trublet, "_C'est un principe sûr, que la poésie doit -être une expression de sentiment._"[30] Nor were the English slow in -emphasizing the concept of "emotion" in their theories of literature. - -[Sidenote: _Tendency to unite these terms._] - -In the writings of this period _imagination_ was often identified with -_wit, wit_ with _taste, taste_ with _feeling,_ and _feeling_ with -first apprehensions or _imagination_;[31] we have already noted that -taste is sometimes critical and sometimes productive: this fusion, -identification and subordination of terms apparently distinct shows how -they gravitate round one single concept. - -[Sidenote: _Difficulties and contradictions in their definition._] - -A German critic, one of the very few who have sought to penetrate -the darkness surrounding the origins of modern Æsthetic, considers -the concept of taste (which we owe, he thinks, to Gracian) "the -most important æsthetic doctrine which remained for modern times to -discover."[32] But without going so far as to say that taste is the -chief doctrine of the science, and the foundation of all the rest, -instead of only a particular doctrine, and without recapitulating what -we have already said of Gracian's relation to the theory of taste, -it is well to repeat that taste, wit, imagination, feeling, and so -on, instead of new concepts scientifically grasped, were simply new -words corresponding to vague impressions: at most they were problems, -not concepts: apprehensions of ground still to be conquered, not yet -annexed and brought into subjection. It must not be forgotten that the -very men who made use of these terms could scarcely grope after the -ideas they suggested without falling back into the old traditions, the -only ones on which they had an intellectual grasp. To them the new -words were shades, not bodies: when they tried to embrace them their -arms returned empty to their own breasts. - -[Sidenote: _Wit and intellect._] - -Certainly wit differs to a certain extent from intellect. Yet -Pellegrini and Tesauro, with other writers of treatises, never fail to -point out that intellectual truth lies at the root of wit. Trevisano -defines it as "an internal virtue of the soul which invents methods -for expressing and executing its own concepts: it is recognizable now -in the arrangement of things we invent, now in the clear expression -of them: sometimes in cunning reconciliations of matters seemingly -opposed, sometimes in tracing analogies but faintly discernible." To -sum up, one must not "allow the actions of wit to go unaccompanied -by those of intellect," or even by those of practical morality.[33] -More ingenuously Muratori says, "Wit is that virtue and active force -with which the intellect is able to assemble, unite and discover the -similarities, relations and reasons of things."[34] In this manner wit, -after having been distinguished from intellect, eventually becomes a -part or a manifestation of it. By a somewhat different path the same -conclusion is reached by Alexander Pope when he counsels that wit be -reined in like a mettlesome horse, and observes: - - For wit and judgement often are at strife, - Though meant each other's aid like man and wife.[35] - -[Sidenote: _Taste and intellectual judgement._] - -Similar vicissitudes befell the word "taste," outcome of a metaphor -(as was noted by Kant) whose effect was to stand in opposition -to intellectualistic principles, as if to say that the judgement -governing the choice of food destined solely for the delectation -of the palate is of the same nature as that which decides opinions -in matters of art.[36] Nevertheless, the very definition of this -anti-intellectualistic concept contained a reference to intellect and -reason; the implicit comparison with the palate was ultimately taken -as signifying an anticipation of reflexion: as Voltaire wrote in the -following century: "_De même que la sensation du palais anticipe -la réflexion._"[37] Intellect and reason glimmer through all the -definitions of taste belonging to this period. Mme. Dacier wrote in -1684, "_Une harmonie, un accord de l'esprit et de la raison._"[38] -"_Une raison éclairée qui, d'intelligence avec le cœur, fait -toujours un juste choix parmi des choses opposées ou semblables,_" -wrote the author of _Entretiens galants._[39] According to another -writer quoted by Bonhours, "taste" is "a natural feeling implanted in -the soul, independent of any science that can possibly be acquired"; it -is practically "an instinct of right reason."[40] The same Bouhours, -whilst deprecating this interpretation of one metaphor by another, -says, "Taste is more nearly allied to judgement than wit."[41] The -Italian Ettori thinks that it may generally be described as "judgement -regulated by art,"[42] and Baruffaldi (1710) identifies it with -"discernment" reduced from theory to practice.[43] De Crousaz (1715) -observes: "_Le bon goût nous fait d'abord estimer par sentiment ce que -la raison aurait approuvé, après qu'elle se serait donné le temps de -l'examiner assez pour en juger par des justes idées._"[44] And somewhat -prior to him Trevisano considered it "a sentiment always willing to -conform to whatsoever reason accepts," and in conjunction with divine -grace, a powerful help to man in revealing the true and good, no longer -able to circulate freely among mankind owing to original sin. For -König (1727) in Germany taste was "a power of the intellect, product -of a healthy mind and acute judgement which makes one able to feel -the true, good and beautiful"; and for Bodmer in 1736 (after lengthy -correspondence on the subject with his Italian friend Calepio) "a -practised reflexion, prompt and penetrating into the smallest details, -by which intellect is able to distinguish the true from the false, the -perfect from the imperfect." Calepio and Bodmer were opponents of pure -feeling, and made a distinction between "taste" and "good taste."[45] -Traversing the same intellectualistic path, Muratori speaks of "good -taste" in "erudition" and others of "good taste in philosophy." - -[Sidenote: _The "je ne sais quoi."_] - -Perhaps those authors were wise who preferred to remain vague and to -identify taste with an indefinable Something, a _je ne sais quoi_; a -_nescio quid_: a new expression which expressed nothing new, but at -least called attention to the problem. Bouhours (1671) discusses it at -length: "_Les Italiens, qui font mystère de tout, emploient en toutes -rencontres leur_ non so che: _on ne voit rien de plus commune dans -leurs poètes,_" and quotes Tasso and others in confirmation.[45] A -note upon it is found in Salvini: "This 'good taste' has but recently -come to the front; it seems a vague term applicable to nothing -particular, and is equivalent to the _non so che,_ to a happy or -successful turn of wit."[46] Father Feijóo, who wrote on the _Razón -del gusto_ and on _El no se qué_ (1733), says very wisely: "_En muchas -producciones no solo de la naturaleza, sino del arte, y aun mas del -arte que de la naturaleza, encuentran los hombres, fuera di aquellas -perfecciones sujetes á su comprehension racional, otro genero de primor -misterioso que, lisonjeando el gusto, atormenta el entendemento. Los -sentidos le palpan, pero no le puede dissipar la razon, y así, al -querer explicarle, no se encuentran voces ni conceptos que cuadren -á su idea, y salimos del paso con decir que hay un non se qué, que -agrada, que enamora que hechiza, sin que pueda encontrarse revelacion -mas clara da este natural misterio._"[47] And President Montesquieu: -"_Il y a quelquefois dans les personnes ou dans les choses un charme -invisible, une grâce naturelle, qu'on n'a pu définir, et qu'on a été -forcé d'appeler le je ne sais quoi. Il me semble que c'est un effet -principalement fondé sur la surprise._"[48] Some writers rebelled -against the subterfuge of the _je ne sais quoi,_ saying, rightly -enough, that it was a confession of ignorance: but they knew not how to -escape that ignorance without falling into confusion between taste and -intellectual judgement. - -[Sidenote: _Imagination and sensationalism. The corrective of -Imagination._] - -If the attempt to define "wit" and "taste" usually resulted in -intellectualism, it was easy to transform imagination and feeling into -sensationalistic doctrines. We have seen how earnestly Pallavicino -insisted on the non-intellectuality of the fantasies and inventions -of the imagination. "Nothing presents itself to the admirer of the -beautiful (he writes) to enable him to verify his cognition and satisfy -himself that the object recognized is or is not that for which he takes -it; if either by vision or by strong apprehension he is led to think -it actually present by an act of judgement, his taste for beauty as -beauty does not arise from such act of judgement, but from the vision -or lively apprehension which might remain in ourselves even when the -deception of belief was corrected"; just as happens when we are drowsy -and know ourselves to be but half awake, yet are unwilling to tear -ourselves from sweet dreams. For Pallavicino imagination cannot err; he -assimilates it wholly to the sensations, which are incapable of truth -or falsity. And if imaginative knowledge pleases, it is not because -it holds a special truth (imaginative truth), but because it creates -objects which "though false are pleasing": the painter makes not -likenesses but images which, all resemblance apart, are pleasing to the -sight: the poet awakens apprehensions "sumptuous, novel, marvellous, -splendid."[49] His opinion coincides, if we mistake not, with Marino's -sensationalism: "The poet should aim only at the marvellous ... he who -cannot amaze his hearers is not worth a straw":[50] he applauds the -oft-repeated dictum of "Gabriel Chiabrera, that Pindar of Savona, that -poetry should cause the eyebrows to arch themselves."[51] But in the -_Treatise upon Style_ written later (1646) he repents of his youthful -achievement and appears willing to return to the pedagogic theory: -"And forasmuch as I theorized concerning poetry in the basest manner, -treating it solely as a minister of that delight which the mind enjoys -in the less noble operation of imagination or apprehension arising -from imagination; and, therefore, in consequence I somewhat relaxed the -strings which bind it to the probable: I now wish to demonstrate that -poetry has other functions more exalted and fruitful, while remaining -in strict servitude to the probable: which office is to guide our -minds in the noble exercise of judgement; thus it becomes the nurse of -philosophy which it nourishes with sweet milk."[52] The Jesuit Ettori, -while inculcating the use of imagination and recommending orators to go -to school with the "actors," points out that imagination should fulfil -the simple office of "interpreter" between intellect and truth, never -assuming dominion, otherwise the orator would be treating his audience -or readers "not as men, to whom intellect is proper, but as beasts whom -imagination satisfies."[53] - -The conception of imagination as purely sensuous shows strongly in -Muratori, who is so convinced that the faculty, if left to itself, -would deteriorate into a riot of dreams and intoxication, that he links -it to intellect as to "an authoritative friend" who shall influence -the choice and combination of images.[54] The problem of the nature of -imagination had strong attraction for Muratori, and, while traducing -and vilifying, he returns to it again in his _Della forza della -fantasia umana_;[55] describing it as a material faculty essentially -different from the mental or spiritual, and denying it the validity of -knowledge. Although he had observed that the aim of poetry is distinct -from that of science, in that the latter seeks to "know," and the -former to "represent" truth,[56] he persisted in counting Poetry as an -"art of delectation" subordinate to Moral Philosophy, of whom she was -one of the three servants or ministers.[57] Very similarly Gravina held -that along with novelty and delight in the marvellous, poetry should -endow the mind of the vulgar with "truth and universal cognitions."[58] - -Outside Italy the same movement was going on. Bacon, although he -assigned poetry to imagination, yet considered it as something -intermediary between history and science, approximating epic to -history and the most lofty style, the parabolic, to science: ("_poēsis -parabolica inter reliquas eminet"._) Elsewhere he calls poetry -_somnium_ or declares absolutely that "_scientias fere non parit,_" and -that "_pro lusu potius ingenii quam pro scientia est habenda_": music, -painting and sculpture are voluptuous arts.[59] Addison identified the -pleasures of the imagination with those produced by visible objects or -the ideas to which they give rise: such pleasures are not so strong as -those of the senses nor so refined as those of the intellect: he groups -together the pleasures experienced respectively in comparing imitations -with the objects imitated, and in sharpening by this means the faculty -of observation.[60] - -[Sidenote _Feeling and Sensationalism._] - -The sensationalism of Du Bos and other upholders of feeling appears -very clearly. For Du Bos art is a pastime whose pleasantness consists -in the fact that it occupies the mind without fatigue, and has -affinities with the pleasure provoked by gladiatorial contests, -bullfights and tourneys.[61] - -For these reasons, whilst noting the importance, in the prehistory -of Æsthetic, of these new words and the new views they express; and -while recognizing their value as a ferment in the discussion of the -æsthetic problem, taken up by thinkers of the Renaissance at the point -at which it had been left by the ancients; we yet cannot discern in -their apparition the true origin of our science. By these words and the -discussions they aroused, the æsthetic fact clamoured even louder and -more insistently for its own philosophical justification; but this it -was not yet to attain either by this means or by any other. - - -[1] _E.g._ Molière, _Préc. ridic._ sc. i, 10. - -[2] _I fonti dell' ingegno ridotti ad arte,_ Bologna, 1650. - -[3] _Delle acutezze che altrimenti spiriti, vivezze e concetti -volgarmenti si appellano,_ Genova-Bologna, 1639. - -[4] _Agudeza y arte de ingenio,_ Madrid, 1642; enlarged, Huesca, 1649. - -[5] _Saggio del gusto e delle belle arti,_ 1783, ch. I, _note._ - -[6] Ital. trans. in Orsi, _Considerazioni,_ etc. (Modena, 1735), vol. -i. dial. 1. - -[7] _Orl. Furioso_, xxxv. 26; L. Dolce, _Dial. del pittura_ (Venice, -1557); _ad init_. - -[8] Borinski, _Poet. d. Renaiss._ p. 308 _seqq._; _B. Gracian_, pp. -39-54. - -[9] _Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto_ (Venice, 1766), introd. pp. 72-84. - -[10] Gracian, _Obras_ (Antwerp, 1669); _El héroe, El discreto,_ with -introd. by A. Farinelli, Madrid, 1900. Cf. Borinski, _Poet. d. Renais, -l.c._ - -[11] _Les Caractères, ou les mœurs du siècle,_ ch. I; _Des ouvrages de -l'esprit._ - -[12] In the programme: _Von der Nachahmung der Franzosen,_ Leipzig, -1687. - -[13] _Opera ... nella quale con alcune certe considerazioni si mostra -in che consista il vero buon gusto ne' suddetti componimenti,_ etc., -etc., Bologna, 1696. - -[14] _Delle riflessioni sopra il buon gusto nelle scienze e nell' -arti,_ 1708 (Venice, 1766). - -[15] Muratori, _Della perfetta poesia italiana,_ Modena, 1706, bk. ii. -ch. 5. - -[16] Mazzuchelli, _Scrittori d' Italia,_ vol. ii. part iv. p. 2389. - -[17] Cicero, _De oratore,_ iii. ch. 50; Quintilian, _Inst. Orator,_ vi. -ch. 5. - -[18] _De la délicatesse,_ Paris, 1671. - -[19] _Il buon gusto,_ ch. 39, p. 367. - -[20] _Del bene_ (Naples, 1681), bk. i. part i. chs. 49-53. Cf. the same -writer's _Arte della perfezion cristiana,_ Rome, 1665, bk. i. ch. 3. - -[21] _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. i. chs. 14, 21. - -[22] _Ragion poetica,_ in _Prose italiane,_ ed. De Stefano, Naples, -1839, i. ch. 7. 2 _Il buon gusto,_ p. 10. - -[23] _Esame degl' ingegni degl' huomini per apprender le scienze_ -(Ital. trans. by C. Camilli, Venice, 1586), chs. 9-12. - -[24] _De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum,_ bk. ii. ch. 13. - -[25] _De homine_ (in _Opera phil.,_ ed. Molesworth, vol. iii.), ch. 2. - -[26] _Spectator,_ Nos. 411-421 (_Works,_ London, 1721, pp. 486-519). - -[27] _Die Discourse der Mahlern,_ 1721--1723; _Von dem Einflüss und -Gebrauche der Einbildungskraft,_ etc., 1727; and other writings of -Bodmer and Breitinger. - -[28] Pascal, _Pensées sur l'éloquence et le style,_ § 15. - -[29] _Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture,_ 1719 (ed. 7, -Paris, 1770) _passim._; see especially sections 1, 23, 26, 28, 33, 34. - -[30] Cartaut de la Villate, _Essais historiques et philosophiques sur -le goût,_ Aix, 1737; Trublet, _Essais sur divers sujets de littérature -et de morale,_ Amsterdam, 1755. - -[31] Cf. Du Bos, _op. cit._ § 33. - -[32] Borinski, _B. Gracian_, p. 39. - -[33] Trevisano, _op. cit._ pp. 82, 84. - -[34] _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. ii. ch. I (_ed. cit._ i. p. 299). - -[35] A. Pope, _An Essay on Criticism,_ 1709 (in _Poetical Works,_ -London, 1827), lines 81, 82. - -[36] _Kritik der Urtheilskraft_ (ed. Kirchmann), § 33. - -[37] _Essai sur le goût_ (in appendix to A. Gérard, _Essai sur le -goût,_ Paris, 1766). - -[38] _Ibid._ - -[39] Quoted in Sulzer, _Allg. Th. d. s. K._ ii. p. 377. - -[40] _Manière de bien penser_ (Ital. trans. _cit._), dial. 4. 2 _Ibid._ - -[41] _Op. cit._ chs. 2-4. - -[42] _Osservazioni critiche_ (in vol. ii. of Orsi's _Considerazioni)_, -ch. 8, p. 23. - -[43] _Traité du beau_ (Amsterdam ed., 1724), i. p. 170. - -[44] J. Ulr. König, _Untersuchung von dem guten Geschmack in der Dicht- -und Redekunst,_ Leipzig, 1727, and (Calepio-Bodmer) _Briefwechsel von -der Natur des poetischen Geschmackes,_ Zürich, 1736; cf. for both -Sulzer, ii. p. 380. - -[45] _Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène,_ 1671 (Paris ed., 1734), -conversation v.; "_Le je ne sçai quoi_"; cf. Gracian, _Oraculo manual,_ -No. 127, and _El héroe,_ ch. 13. - -[46] In the notes to Muratori's _Perfetta poesia._ - -[47] Feijóo, _Theatro critico,_ vol. vi. Nos. 11-12. - -[48] _Essai sur le goût dans les choses de la nature et de l'art._ -Posthumous fragment (in appendix to A. Gérard, _op. cit._). - -[49] _Del bene, cap. cit._ - -[50] Marino, in one of the sonnets in the _Murtoleide_ (1608). - -[51] _Del bene,_ bk. i. part i. ch. 8. - -[52] _Trattato dello stile_ (Rome, 1666), ch. 30. - -[53] _Il buon gusto,_ pp. 12-13. - -[54] _Perf. poesia,_ i. ch. 18, pp. 232-233. - -[55] Venice, 1745. - -[56] _Perf. poesia,_ i. ch. 6. - -[57] _Op. cit._ i. ch. 4, p. 42. - -[58] _Ragion poetica,_ i. ch. 7. - -[59] _De dignitate,_ ii. ch. 13; iii. ch. I; iv. ch. 2; v. ch. 1. - -[60] _Spectator, loc. cit._ esp. pp. 487, 503. - -[61] _Op. cit._ § 2. - - - - -IV - - -ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN THE CARTESIAN AND LEIBNITIAN SCHOOLS, AND THE -"ÆSTHETIC" OF BAUMGARTEN - - -[Sidenote: _Cartesianism and imagination._] - -The obscure world of wit, taste, imagination, feeling and the _je ne -sais quoi_ was not selected for examination or even, so to speak, -included in the picture of Cartesian philosophy. The French philosopher -abhorred imagination, the outcome, according to him, of the agitation -of the animal spirits: and though not utterly condemning poetry, he -allowed it to exist only in so far as it was guided by intellect, that -being the sole faculty able to save men from the caprices of the _folle -du logis._ He tolerated it, but that was all; and went so far as not to -deny it anything "_qu'un philosophe lui puisse permettre sans offenser -sa conscience._"[1] It has been observed that the æsthetic parallel -with Cartesian intellectualism is to be found in Boileau,[2] slave to -rigid _raison_ ("_Mais nous que la raison à ses règles engage ..._") -and enthusiastic partisan of allegory. We have already had occasion -to draw attention to the diatribe of Malebranche against imagination. -The mathematical spirit fostered in France by Descartes forbade all -possibility of a serious consideration of poetry and art. The Italian -Antonio Conti, living in that country and witness of the literary -disputes raging around him, thus describes the French critics (La -Motte, Fontenelle and their followers): "_Ils ont introduit dans les -belles lettres l'esprit et la méthode de M. Descartes; et ils jugent -de la poésie et de l'éloquence indépendamment des qualités sensibles. -De là vient aussi qu'ils confondent le progrès de la philosophie avec -celui des arts. Les modernes, dit l'Abbé Terrasson, sont plus grands -géomètres que les anciens: donc ils sont plus grands orateurs et plus -grands poètes._"[3] The fight against this mathematical spirit in the -matters of art and feeling was still going on in France in the day of -the encyclopædists; the din of the battle was heard in Italy, as is -shown by the writings of Bettinelli and others. At the time when Du Bos -published his daring book there was a counsellor in the parliament of -Bordeaux, Jean-Jacques Bel by name, who composed a dissertation (1726) -against the doctrine that feeling should be the judge of art.[4] - -[Sidenote: _Crousaz and André._] - -Cartesianism was incapable of an Æsthetic of imagination. The _Traité -du beau_ by the eclectic Cartesian J. P. de Crousaz (1715), maintained -the dependence of beauty not upon pleasure or feeling, matters about -which there can be no difference of opinion, but upon that which can -be _approved_ and therefore reduced to ideas. He enumerates five such -ideas: variety, unity, regularity, order and proportion, observing, -"_La variété tempérée par l'unité, la régularité, l'ordre et la -proportion, ne sont pas assurément des chimères; elles ne sont pas -du ressort de la fantaisie, ce n'est pas le caprice qui en décide_": -for him, that is to say, they were real qualities of the beautiful -founded in nature and truth. He discovered similar characteristics of -the beautiful in the individual beauties of the sciences (geometry, -algebra, astronomy, physics, history), of virtue, eloquence and -religion, finding in each the qualities laid down above.[5] Another -Cartesian, the Jesuit André (1742),[6] distinguished between an -_essential_ beauty, independent of every institution, human and even -divine; a _natural_ beauty, independent of the opinions of mankind; -and, lastly, a beauty to a certain extent _arbitrary_ and of human -invention: the first composed of regularity, order, proportion and -symmetry (here André relied upon Plato and also as an afterthought -brought in St. Augustine's definition): the second having its principal -measure in the light which generates colours (as a good Cartesian, -he took full advantage of Newton's discoveries): the third belonging -to fashion and convention, but never at liberty to violate essential -beauty. Each of these three forms of beauty was subdivided into -_sensible_ beauty pertaining to bodies, and _intelligible_ beauty of -soul. - -[Sidenote: _The English: Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the -Scottish School._] - -Like Descartes in France, Locke in England (1690) is an -intellectualist, and recognizes no form of spiritual elaboration save -reflexion on the senses. None the less he takes over from contemporary -literature the distinction between wit and judgement; according to him -the former combines ideas with pleasing variety, discovering their -similarities and relations and thus grouping them into beautiful -pictures which divert and strike the imagination: the latter (judgement -or intellect) seeks dissimilarities, guided by the criterion of truth. -"The mind, without looking any further, rests satisfied with the -agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy; and it is -a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the severe rules of -truth and good reason; whereby it appears that it consists in something -that is not perfectly conformable to them."[7] England produced -philosophers who developed an abstract and transcendent Æsthetic, -but one more tinged with sensationalism than that of the French -Cartesians. Shaftesbury (1709) raises taste to a sense or instinct for -the beautiful; a sense of order and proportion identical with moral -sense and, with its preconceptions or presentations, anticipating the -recognition of reason. Bodies, spirits, God are the three degrees of -beauty.[8] Lineal descendant of Shaftesbury was Francis Hutcheson -(1723), who succeeded in popularizing the idea of an inward sense of -beauty as something intermediate between sense and reason, and adapted -to distinguish unity in variety, concord in the manifold, the true, -the beautiful and the good in their substantial identity. Hutcheson -maintains that from this sense springs the pleasure we take in art, -in imitation and in the likeness between copy and original: the last -a relative, as distinct from an absolute, beauty.[9] This view on the -whole predominated in England during the eighteenth century and was -adopted by Adam Smith as well as by Reid, head of the Scottish school. - -[Sidenote: _Leibniz. Petites perceptions and confused knowledge._] - -Much more thoroughly and with much greater philosophical vigour Leibniz -opened the door to that crowd of psychic facts from which Cartesianism -recoiled in horror. In his conception of the real, governed by the law -of continuity (_natura non facit saltus_), presenting an uninterrupted -scale of existence from the lowest beings to God, imagination, taste, -wit and the like found ample room for shelter. The facts now called -æsthetic were identified by Leibniz with Descartes' _confused_ -cognition, which might be _clear_ without being _distinct_: scholastic -terms borrowed, it would appear, from Duns Scotus, whose works were -reprinted and widely read in the seventeenth century.[10] - -In his _De cognitione, veritate et ideis_ (1684), after dividing -_cognitio_ into _obscura vel clara,_ the _clara_ into _confusa vel -distincta,_ and the _distincta_ into _adaequata vel inadaequata,_ Leibniz -remarks that while painters and other artists are able to judge works -of art very fairly they can give no reason for their decisions, and -if questioned as to the reason of their condemnation of any work -of art, they reply it lacks a _je ne sais quoi_: ("_at iudicii sui -rationem reddere saepe non posse, et quaerenti dicere, se in re, quae -displicet, desiderare nescio quid_").[11] They do possess, in fact, -clear cognition, but confused and not distinct; what we should call -to-day imaginative, not _ratiocinative,_ consciousness: and indeed the -latter does not exist in the case of art. There are things impossible -to define: "_on ne les fait connaître que par des exemples, et, au -reste, il faut dire que c'est un je ne sais quoi, jusqu'à ce qu'on -en déchiffre la contexture_."[12] But these _perceptions confuses -ou sentiments_ have "_plus grande efficacité que l'on ne pense: ce -sont elles qui forment ce je ne sais quoi, ces goûts, ces images -des qualités des sens._"[13] Whence it appears plainly that in his -discussion of these perceptions Leibniz reposes upon the æsthetic -theories we discussed in the preceding chapter; indeed at one point[14] -he mentions Bouhours' book. - -[Sidenote: _Intellectualism of Leibniz_] - -It might seem that by according _claritas_ and denying _distinctio_ -to æsthetic facts Leibniz recognized that their peculiar character is -neither sensuous nor intellectual. He might seem to have distinguished -them by their "_claritas_" from pleasure or sense-motions, and from -intellect by their lack of "_distinctio._" But the "_lex continui_" -and the Leibnitian intellectualism forbid this interpretation. In this -case obscurity and clarity are quantitative degrees of one single -consciousness, distinct or intellectual, towards which both converge -and with which in the extreme case they unite. - -To admit that artists judge with confused perceptions, clear but not -distinct, does not involve denying that these perceptions may be -capable of being connected and verified by intellectual consciousness. -The self-same object that is confusedly though clearly recognized by -imagination is recognized clearly and distinctly by the intellect; -which amounts to saying that a work of art may be perfected by being -determined by thought. In the very terminology adopted by Leibniz, who -represents sense and imagination as obscure and confused, there is a -tinge of contempt, as well as the suggestion of a single form of all -cognition. This will help us to understand Leibniz' definition of music -as "_exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi._" -Elsewhere he says: "_Le but principal de l'histoire, aussi bien que -de la poésie, doit être d'enseigner la prudence et la vertu par des -exemples, et puis de montrer le vice d'une manière qui en donne -l'aversion et qui porte ou serve à l'éviter._"[15] - -The "_claritas_" attributed to æsthetic fact is not specifically -different from, but rather a partial anticipation of, the -"_distinctio_" of intellect. Undoubtedly this distinction of degree -marks a great advance: but careful analysis shows that Leibniz does -not differ fundamentally from those who, by inventing the new words -and empirical distinctions examined above, called attention to the -peculiarities of æsthetic facts. - -[Sidenote: _Speculation on language._] - -We find the same invincible intellectualism in the speculations on -language greatly in vogue at the time. When critics of the Renaissance -and sixteenth century tried to rise above merely empirical and -practical grammar and strove to reduce grammatical science to a -systematic form, they fell into logicism and described grammatical -forms by such terms as pleonastic, improper, metaphorical or elliptic. -Thus Julius Cæsar Scaliger (1540); thus, too, the most learned of -all, Francisco Sanchez (Sanctius or Sanzio), called Brocense, who, in -his _Minerva_ (1587), asserts that names are attached to things by -reason, exclusive of interjections which are not parts of speech but -merely sounds expressive of joy or sorrow; he denies the existence of -heterogeneous and heteroclitic words, and works out a system of syntax -by means of four figures of construction, proclaiming the principle -"_doctrinam supplendi esse valde necessarium,_" that is to say, that -grammatical diversities must be explained as ellipsis, abbreviation -or omission with reference to the typical logical form.[16] Gaspare -Scioppio follows him exactly, abusing the old grammar with his -accustomed violence and crying up the "Sanctian" method, at that time -still almost unknown, in his _Grammatica philosophica_ (1628).[17] -Amongst critics of the seventeenth century, Jacopo Perizonio must not -be forgotten; he wrote a commentary on Sanchez' book (1687). Amongst -recognized philosophers who studied the philosophy of grammar and -noted the merits and defects of various tongues, we find Bacon.[18] In -1660 Claude Lancelot and Arnauld brought out the _Grammaire générale -et raisonnée de Port-Royal,_ a work applying the intellectualism -of Descartes rigorously to grammatical forms, and dominated by the -doctrine of the artificial nature of language. Locke and Leibniz both -speculated about language,[19] but neither succeeded in creating a -fresh point of view, although the latter did much to provoke inquiry -into the historical origin of languages. All his life Leibniz cherished -the notion of a universal language and of an "_ars characteristica -universalis_" as a combination likely to result in great scientific -discoveries: prior to him, Wilkins had fostered the same hope, nor -indeed, in spite of its utter absurdity, is it even yet wholly extinct. - -[Sidenote: _C. Wolff._] - -In order to correct the æsthetic ideas of Leibniz it was necessary -to alter the very foundations of his system, the Cartesianism upon -which it rested. This could not be undertaken by disciples of -his own personal school, in whom we notice rather an increase of -intellectualism. Giving scholastic form to the brilliant observations -of the master, Johann Christian Wolff's system began with the theory -of knowledge conceived as an "organon" or instrument, followed by -systems of natural law, ethics and politics, together constituting -the "organon" of practical activity: the remainder was theology -and metaphysics, or pneumatology and physics (doctrine of the soul -and doctrine of phenomenal nature). Although Wolff distinguishes a -productive imagination, ruled by the principle of sufficient reason, -from the merely associative and chaotic,[20] yet a science of -imagination considered as a new theoretical value could find no niche -in his schematism. Knowledge of a lower order, as such, belonged to -Pneumatology and was incapable of possessing its own "organon": at most -it could be brought under the organon already existing, which corrected -and transcended it by means of logical knowledge in the same way in -which Ethics treats the "_facilitas appetitiva inferior._" As in France -the poetics of Boileau corresponded with the philosophy of Descartes, -so in Germany the rationalistic poetics of Gottsched[21] reflect the -Cartesian-Leibnitian theories of Wolff (1729). - -[Sidenote: _Demand for an organon of inferior knowledge._] - -It was no doubt dimly seen that even in the inferior faculties some -distinction was operative between perfect and imperfect, value and -non-value. A passage in a book (1725) by the Leibnitian Bülffinger -has often been quoted where he says: "_Vellem existerent qui circa -facultatem sentiendi, imaginandi, attendendi, abstrahendi et memoriam -praestarent quod bonus ille Aristoteles, adeo hodie omnibus sordens, -praestitit circa intellectum: hoc est ut in artis formant redigerent -quicquid ad illas in suo usu dirigendas et iuvandas pertinet et -conducid, quem ad modum Aristoteles in Organo logicam sive facultatem -demonstrandi redegit in ordinem._"[22] But on reading the extract in -its context one recognizes at once that the desired organon would have -been merely a series of recipes for strengthening the memory, educating -the attention, and so forth: a technique, in a word, not an æsthetic. -Similar ideas had been spread in Italy by Trevisano (1708), who, by -declaring that the senses might be educated through the mind, asserted -the possibility of an _art of feeling_ which should "endow manners -with prudence and judgement with good taste."[23] We notice, moreover, -that in his day Bülffinger was counted a depreciator of poetry, so -much so that a tract against him was written in order to show that -"poetry does not diminish the faculty of clear conception."[24] Bodmer -and Breitinger were ready "to deduce all the parts of eloquence with -mathematical precision" (1727), and the latter sketched a Logic of -the Imagination (1740) to which he would have assigned the study of -similitudes and metaphors; even had he carried out his project, it -is difficult to see how it could have differed materially, from a -philosophic point of view, from the treatises on the subject written by -the Italian rhetoricians of the seventeenth century. - -[Sidenote: _Alexander Baumgarten: his "Æsthetic."_] - -These discussions and experiments filled the boyhood and helped to -form the intellect of young Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten of Berlin, -a follower of the philosophy of Wolff and, at the same time, student -and teacher of Latin rhetoric and poetry; these studies led him to -reconsider the problem and search for some method by which the precepts -of rhetoricians could be reduced to a rigorous philosophical system. -On taking his doctor's degree in September 1735, when twenty-one years -old, he published a thesis _Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad -poēma pertinentibus_:[25] in which the word "Æsthetic" appears for the -first time as name of a special science.[26] Baumgarten always remained -much attached to his youthful discovery, and in 1742 when called to -teach at the university of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and again in 1749, -he gave by request a course of lectures on Æsthetic (_quaedam consilia -dirigendarum facultatum inferiorum novam per acroasin exposuit_).[27] -In 1750 he printed a voluminous treatise wherein the word "Æsthetic" -attained the honours of a title-page;[28] in 1758 he published a more -slender second part: illness and finally death in 1762 prevented him -from completing the work. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic as science of sensory consciousness._] - -What was Æsthetic to Baumgarten? Its objects are sensible facts -(ασθητά), carefully distinguished by the ancients from mental objects -(νοητά);[29] hence it becomes _scientia cognitionis sensitivae, theoria -liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars -analogi rationis_[30] Rhetoric and Poetry constitute two special -and interdependent disciplines which are entrusted by Æsthetic with -the distinction between the various styles in literature and other -small differences,[31] for the laws she herself investigates are -diffused throughout all the arts like guiding-stars for these various -subsidiary arts (_quasi cynosura quaedam specialium_)[32] and must be -extracted not from isolated cases only, or from incomplete induction -empirically, but from the totality of facts (_falsa regula peior est -quant nulla._)[33] Nor must Æsthetic be confounded with Psychology, -which furnishes its presuppositions only; an independent science, it -gives the norm of sensitive cognition (_sensitive quid cognoscendi_) -and deals with "_perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis,_" which is -beauty (_pulcritudo)_, just as the opposite, imperfection, is ugliness -(_deformitas_)[34] From the beauty of sensitive cognition (_pulcritudo -cognitionis_) we must exclude the beauty of objects and matter -(_pulcritudo obiectorum et materiae_) with which it is often confused -owing to habits of language, since it is easy to show that ugly things -may be thought of in a beautiful manner and beautiful things in an -ugly manner (_quacum ob receptam rei significationem saepe sed male -confunditur; possunt turpia pulcre cogitare ut talia, et pulcriora -turpiter_).[35] Poetical representations are confused or imaginative: -distinctness, that is intellect, is not poetical. The greater the -determination, the greater the poetry; individuals "_omnimode -determinata_" are highly poetical; poetical also are images or -phantasms as well as all that appertains to the senses.[36] That which -judges sensible or imaginary presentations is taste, or "_indicium -sensuum._" These, in brief, are the truths displayed by Baumgarten in -his _Meditationes_ and, with many distinctions and examples, in his -_Æsthetic._[37] - -[Sidenote: _Cricisism of judgements based on Baumgarten._] - -Nearly all German critics[38] are of opinion that from his own -conception of Æsthetic as the science of sensitive cognition Baumgarten -should have evolved a species of inductive Logic. But he can be cleared -of this accusation: a better philosopher, perhaps, than his critics, -he held that an inductive Logic must always be intellectual, since -it leads to abstractions and the formation of concepts. The relation -existing between "_cognitio confusa_" and the poetical and artistic -facts which belong to the realm of taste had been shown before his -day, by Leibniz: neither he nor Wolff nor any other of their school -ever dreamed of transforming a treatment of the "_cognitio confusa_" -or "_petites perceptions_" into an inductive Logic. On the other hand, -as a kind of compensation, these critics attribute to Baumgarten -a merit he cannot claim, at least to the extent implied by their -praises. According to them, he effected a revolution by converting[39] -Leibniz' differences of degree or quantitative distinctions into a -specific difference, and turning confused knowledge into something no -longer negative but positive[40] by attributing a "_perfectio_" to -sensitive cognition _qua talis_; and by thus destroying the unity of -the Leibnitian monad and breaking up the law of continuity, founded -the science of Æsthetic. Had he really accomplished such a giant -stride, his claim to the title of "father of Æsthetic" would have -been placed beyond question. But, in order to win this appellation, -Baumgarten ought to have been successful in unravelling all those -contradictions in which he was involved no less than Leibniz and all -intellectualists. It is not enough to posit a "_perfectio_"; even -Leibniz did that when he attributed _claritas_ to confused cognition, -which, when devoid of clearness, remains obscure, that is to say, -imperfect. It was imperative that this perfection "_qua talis_" should -be upheld against the "_lex continui,_" and kept uncontaminated by any -intellectualistic admixture. Otherwise he was bound to fall back into -the pathless labyrinth of the "probable" which is and is not false, -of the wit which is and is not intellect, of the taste which is and -is not intellectual judgement, of the imagination and feeling which -are and are not sensibility and material pleasure. And in that case, -notwithstanding the new name: notwithstanding (as we freely admit) the -greater insistence than that of Leibniz upon the sensible nature of -poetry, Æsthetic, as a science, would not have been born. - -[Sidenote: _Intellectualism of Baumgarten._] - -Now Baumgarten overcame none of the obstacles above mentioned. -Unprejudiced and continued study of his works forces one to this -conclusion. Already in his _Meditationes_ he does not seem able to -distinguish clearly between imagination and intellect, confused and -distinct cognition. The law of continuity leads him to set up a scale -of more and less: amongst cognitions, the obscure are less poetical -than the confused; the distinct are not poetical, but even those -of the higher kinds (that is the distinct and intellectual) are to -a certain extent poetical in proportion as they are lower in their -nature; compound concepts are more poetical than simple; those of -larger comprehension are "_extensive clariores._"[41] In the _Æsthetic_ -Baumgarten expounds his thought more fully and thereby exposes its -defects. If the introduction of the book leads one to believe that he -sees æsthetic truth to consist in consciousness of the individual, -the belief is shattered by the explanations which follow. As a good -objectivist he asserts that truth in the metaphysical sense has its -counterpart in the soul, namely, subjective truth, logical truth in a -wide sense, or æsthetico-logical.[42] And the complete truth lies not -in the genus or species, but in the individual. The genus is true, -the species more true, the individual most true.[43] Formal logical -truth is acquired "_cum iactura,_" by jettisoning much great material -perfection: "_quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est?_"[44] -So much being granted, logical truth differs from æsthetic in this: -metaphysical or objective truth is presented now to the intellect, -when it is logical truth in a narrow sense; now to the analogy of -reason and the lower cognitive faculties, when it is æsthetic;[45] -a lesser truth in exchange for the greater which man is not always -able to attain, thanks to the "_malum metaphysicum._"[46] Thus moral -truths are comprehended in one fashion by a comic poet, in another -by a moral philosopher; an eclipse is described in one way by an -astronomer and in another by a shepherd speaking to his friends or -his sweetheart.[47] Universals even are accessible, in part at least, -to the inferior faculty.[48] Take the case of two philosophers, a -dogmatic and a sceptic, arguing, with an æsthete listening to them. If -the arguments of either party are so balanced that the hearer cannot -determine which is true and which false, this appearance is to him -æsthetic truth: if one adversary succeed in overbearing the other -so that one argument is shown clearly to be wrong, the error just -revealed is likewise æsthetic[49] falsity. Truths strictly æsthetic are -(and this is the decisive point) those which appear neither entirely -true nor entirely false: probable truths. "_Talia autem de quibus -non complete quidem certi sumus, neque tamen falsitatem aliquam in -iisdem appercipimus, sunt verisimilia. Est ergo veritas æsthetica, -a potiori dicta verisimilitudo, ille veritatis gradus, qui, etiamsi -non evectus sit ad completam certitudinem, tamen nihil contineat -falsitatis observabilis._"[50] And especially the immediate sequel: -"_Cujus habent spectator es auditor esve intra animum quum vident -audiuntve, quasdam anticipationes, quod plerumque fit, quod fieri -solet, quod in opinione positum est, quod habet ad haec in se quandam -similitudinem, sive id falsum (logice et latissime), sive verum -sit (logice et strictissime), quod non sit facile a nostris sensibus -abhorrens: hoc illud_ est εἰκός _et verisimile quod, Aristotele et -Cicerone assentiente, sectetur æstheticus._"[51] The probable embraces -that which is true and certain to the intellect and the senses, that -which is certain to the senses but not to the intellect, that which -is probable logically and æsthetically, or logically improbable but -æsthetically probable, or, finally, æsthetically improbable but on the -whole probable or that whose improbability is not evident.[52] So we -reach the admission of the impossible and absurd, the _αδύνατον_ and -_ἄτοπον_ of Aristotle. - -If after reading these paragraphs, highly important as revealing the -true thought of Baumgarten, we turn once more to the Introduction to -his work, we notice at once his commonplace and erroneous conception of -the poetic faculty. To a friend who suggested that there was no need -for him to concern himself with confused or inferior consciousness both -because "_confusio mater erroris_" and because "_facilitate inferior -es, caro, debellandae potius sunt quam excitandae et confirmandae,_" -Baumgarten replied that confusion is a condition wherein to find truth: -that nature makes no sudden leap from obscurity to clarity: that -noonday light is reached from night time through the dawn (_ex node per -auroram meridies_): that in the case of the inferior faculties a guide, -not a tyrant, is needed (_imperium in facilitates inferiores poscitur, -non tyrannis_).[53] This is still the attitude of Leibniz, Trevisano -and Bülffinger. Baumgarten is terrified lest he should be accused of -treating subjects unworthy a philosopher. "_Quousque tandem_" (says he -to himself), "dost thou, professor of theoretic and moral philosophy, -dare to praise lies and mixtures of true and false as though they were -noble works?"[54] And if there is one thing above all others from -which he is anxious to guard himself it is sensualism, unbridled and -non-moralized. The sensitive perfection of Cartesianism and Wolffianism -was liable to be confused with simple pleasure, with the feeling of -the perfection of our organism:[55] but Baumgarten falls into no such -confusion. When in 1745 one Quistorp combated his æsthetic theory by -saying that if poetry consisted in sensuous perfection it was a thing -hurtful to men, Baumgarten answered disdainfully that he did not expect -he should ever find time to reply to a critic of such calibre as to -mistake his "_oratio perfecta sensitiva_" for an "_oratio perfecte_ -(that is _omnino) sensitiva._"[56] - -[Sidenote: _New names and old meanings._] - -Save in its title and its first definitions Baumgarten's _Æsthetic_ is -covered with the mould of antiquity and commonplace. We have seen that -he refers back to Aristotle and Cicero for the first principles of his -science; in another instance he attaches his Æsthetic to the Rhetoric -of antiquity, quoting the truth enunciated by Zeno the Stoic, "_esse -duo cogitandi genera, alterum perpetuum et latius, quod Rhetorices sit, -alterum concisum et contractius, quod Dialectices,_" and identifying -the former with the æsthetic horizon, the latter with the logical.[57] -In his _Meditationes_ he rests upon Scaliger and Vossius;[58] of -modern writers beside the philosophers (Leibniz, Wolff, Bülffinger) -he quotes Gottsched, Arnold,[59] Werenfels, Breitinger[60]; by means -of these latter he is able to make acquaintance with discussions upon -taste and imagination, even without direct acquaintance with Addison -and Du Bos, as well as the Italians, whose writings had immense vogue -in Germany in his day, and with whom his resemblances leap to the -eye. Baumgarten always feels himself to be in perfect accord with his -predecessors; never at variance with them. He never felt himself to -be a revolutionary; and though some have been revolutionaries without -knowing it, Baumgarten was not one of them. Baumgarten's works are but -another presentation of the problem of Æsthetic still clamouring for -solution in a voice so much the stronger as it uttered a commonplace: -he proclaims a new science and presents it in conventional scholastic -form; the babe about to be born receives the name of Æsthetic by -premature baptism at his hands: and the name remains. But the new name -is devoid of new matter; the philosophical armour covers no muscular -body. Our good Baumgarten, full of ardour and conviction, and often -curiously brisk and vivacious in his scholastic Latinism, is a most -sympathetic and attractive figure in the history of Æsthetic: of the -science in formation, that is to say, not of the science brought to -completion: of Æsthetic _condenda_ not _condita._ - - -[1] Letters to Balzac and the Princess Elizabeth. - -[2] _Art poétique_ (1669-1674). - -[3] Letters to Marquis Maffei, about 1720, in _Prose e poesie,_ Venice, -1756, ii. p. cxx. - -[4] Sulzer, _op. cit._ i. p. 50. - -[5] _Traité du beau_ (2nd ed., Amsterdam, 1724; Paris ed., 1810). - -[6] _Essai sur le beau,_ Paris, 1741. - -[7] _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_ (French trans. in -_Œuvres,_ Paris, 1854), bk. ii. ch. 11, § 2. - -[8] _Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times,_ 1709-1711. - -[9] _Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,_ -London, 1723. - -[10] See above, p. 179. - -[11] _Opera philosophica_ (ed. Erdmann), p. 78. - -[12] _Ibid,_ preface. - -[13] _Nouveaux Essais,_ ii. ch. 22. - -[14] _Op. cit._ ii. ch. 11. - -[15] _Essais de Théodicée,_ part. ii. § 148. - -[16] Francisci Sanctii, _Minerva seu de causis linguæ latinæ -commentarius,_ 1587 (ed. with add. by Gaspare Scioppio, Padua, 1663); -cf. bk. i. chs. 2, 9, and bk. iv. - -[17] Gasperis Sciopii, _Grammatica philosophica,_ Milan, 1628 (Venice, -1728). - -[18] _De dignitate,_ etc., bk. vi. ch. i. - -[19] Locke, _Essay,_ etc., bk. lii.; Leibniz, _Nouveaux Essais,_ bk. -iii. - -[20] _Psychol. empirica_ (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1738), §§ 138-172. - -[21] Joh. Chr. Gottsched, _Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst,_ -Leipzig, 1729. - -[22] _Dilucidationes philosophicæ de Deo, anima humana et mundo,_ 1725 -(Tübingen, 1768), § 268. - -[23] Preface to _Rifless. sul gusto, ed. cit._ p. 75. - -[24] Borinski, _Poetik d. Renaiss._ p. 380 note. - -[25] Halæ Magdeburgicæ, 1735 (reprinted, ed. B. Croce, Naples, 1900). - -[26] _Med._ § 116. - -[27] _Æsthetica,_ i. pref. - -[28] _Æsthetica. Scripsit_ Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten, _Prof. -Philosoph., Traiecti eis Viadrum, Impens. Ioannis Christiani Kleyb,_ -1750; 2nd part, 1758. - -[29] _Med._ § 116. - -[30] _Æsth._ § i. - -[31] _Med.%_ 117. - -[32] _Æsth._ § 71. - -[33] _Ibid._ § 53. - -[34] _Med._ § 115. - -[35] _Æsth._ § 14. - -[36] _Ibid._ § 18. - -[37] _Med._ § 92. - -[38] Ritter, _Gesch. d. Philos._ (Fr. trans., _Hist, de la phil. mod._ -iii. p. 365); Zimmermann, _Gesch. d. Æsth._ p. 168; J. Schmidt, _L. u. -B._ p. 48. - -[39] Danzel, _Gottsched,_ p. 218; Meyer, _L. u. B._ pp. 35-38. - -[40] Schmidt, _op. cit._ p. 44. - -[41] _Med._ §§ 19, 20, 23. - -[42] _Æsth._ § 424. - -[43] _Op. cit._ § 441. - -[44] _Op. cit._ § 560. - -[45] _Æsth._ § 424. - -[46] _Op. cit._ § 557. - -[47] _Op. cit._ §§ 425, 429. - -[48] _Op. cit._ § 443. - -[49] _Op. cit._ § 448. - -[50] _Op. cit._ § 483. - -[51] _Op. cit._ § 484. - -[52] _Æsth._ §§ 485, 486. - -[53] _Op. cit._ §§ 7, 12. - -[54] _Op. cit._ § 478. - -[55] Cf. Wolff, Psych, empir. § 511, and the passage there quoted from -Descartes; also §§ 542, 550. - -[56] Th. Joh. Quistorp, in _Neuen Bücher-Saal,_ 1745, fasc. 5; _Erweis -dass die Poesie schon für sie selbst ihre Liebhaber leichtlich -unglücklich machen könne_; and A. G. Baumgarten, _Metaphysica,_ 2nd -ed., 1748, preface; cf. Danzel, _Gottsched,_ pp. 215, 221. - -[57] _Æsth._ § 122. - -[58] _Med._ § 9. - -[59] _Op. cit._ §§ 111, 113. - -[60] _Æsth._ § 11. - - - - -V - - -GIAMBATTISTA VICO - - -[Sidenote: _Vico as inventor of æsthetic science._] - -The real revolutionary who by putting aside the concept of probability -and conceiving imagination in a novel manner actually discovered the -true nature of poetry and art and, so to speak, invented the science of -Æsthetic, was the Italian Giambattista Vico. - -Ten years prior to the publication in Germany of Baumgarten's first -treatise, there had appeared in Naples (1725) the first _Scienza -nuova,_ which developed ideas on the nature of poetry outlined in -a former work (1721), _De constantia iurisprudentis,_ outcome of -"twenty-five years' continuous and harsh meditation."[1] In 1730 Vico -republished it with fresh developments which gave rise to two special -books (_Della sapienza poetica_ and _Della discoperta del vero Omero_) -in the second _Scienza Nuova._ Nor did he ever tire of repeating his -views and forcing them upon the attention of his hostile contemporaries -at every opportunity, seizing such occasion even in prefaces and -letters, poems on the occasion of weddings or funerals, and in such -press notices as fell to his duty as public censor of literature. - -And what were these ideas? Neither more nor less, we may say, than -the solution of the problem stated by Plato, attacked but not solved -by Aristotle, and again vainly attacked during the Renaissance and -afterwards: is poetry rational or irrational, spiritual or brutal? -and, if spiritual, what is its special nature and what distinguishes -it from history and science? - -As we know, Plato confined it within the baser part of the soul, the -animal spirits. Vico re-elevates it and makes of it a period in the -history of humanity: and since history for him means an ideal history -whose periods consist not of contingent facts but of forms of the -spirit, he makes it a moment in the ideal history of the spirit, a form -of consciousness. Poetry precedes intellect, but follows sense; through -confusing it with the latter, Plato failed to grasp the position it -should really occupy and banished it from his Republic. "Men at first -feel without being aware; next they become aware with a perturbed and -agitated soul; finally they reflect with an undisturbed mind. This -Aphorism is the Principle of poetical sentences which are formed by the -sense of passions and affections; differing thereby from philosophical -sentences which are formed by reflexion through ratiocination; whence -the latter approach more nearly to truth the more they rise towards -the universal, while the former have more of certainty the more they -approach the individual."[2] An imaginative phase of consciousness, but -one possessed of positive value. - -[Sidenote: _Poetry and Philosophy: imagination and intellect._] - -The imaginative phase is altogether independent and autonomous with -respect to the intellectual, which is not only incapable of endowing -it with any fresh perfection but can only destroy it. "The studies of -Metaphysics and Poetry are in natural opposition one to the other; -for the former purges the mind of childish prejudice and the latter -immerses and drowns it in the same: the former offers resistance to -the judgement of the senses, while the latter makes this its chief -rule: the former debilitates, the latter strengthens, imagination: the -former prides itself in not turning spirit into body, the latter does -its utmost to give a body to spirit: hence the thoughts of the former -must necessarily be abstract, while the concepts of the latter show -best when most clothed with matter: to sum up, the former strives that -the learned may know the truth of things stripped of all passion: the -latter that the vulgar may act truly by means of intense excitement -of the senses, without which stimulant they assuredly would not act -at all. Hence from all time, in all languages known to man, never has -there been a strong man equally great as metaphysician and poet: such a -poet as Homer, father and prince of poetry."[3] Poets are the senses, -philosophers the intellect, of mankind.[4] Imagination is "stronger in -proportion as reason is weaker."[5] - -No doubt "reflexion" may be put in verse; but it does not become poetry -thereby. "Abstract sentences belong to philosophers, since they contain -universals; and reflexions concerning such passions are made by poets -who are false and frigid."[6] Those poets "who sing of the beauty and -virtue of ladies by reflexion ... are philosophers arguing in verses -or in love-rhymes."[7] One set of ideas belongs to philosophers, -another to poets: these latter are identical with those of painters, -from which "they differ only in colours and words."[8] Great poets are -born not in epochs of reflexion but in those of imagination, generally -called barbarous: Homer, in the barbarism of antiquity: Dante in that -of the Middle Ages, the "second barbarism of Italy."[9] Those who have -chosen to read philosophic reason into the verse of the great father -of Greek poetry have transferred the character of a later age into -an earlier, since the era of poets precedes that of philosophers and -countries in infancy were sublime poets. Poetic locutions arose before -prose, "by the necessity of nature" not "by caprice of pleasure"; -fables or imaginative universals were conceived before reasoned, _i.e._ -philosophical universals.[10] - -With these observations Vico justified and at the same time corrected -the opinion of Plato in the _Republic,_ denying to Homer wisdom, every -kind of wisdom; the legislative of Lycurgus and Solon, the philosophic -of Thales, Anacharsis and Pythagoras, the strategic of military -commanders.[11] To Homer (he says) belongs wisdom, undoubtedly, but -poetic wisdom only: the Homeric images and comparisons derived from -wild beasts and the elements of savage nature are incomparable; but -"such success does not spring from talent imbued with domesticity and -civilized with any philosophy."[12] - -When anybody takes to writing poetry in an era of reflexion, it is -because he is returning to childhood and "putting his mind in fetters"; -no longer reflecting with his intellect, he follows imagination -and loses himself in the particular. If a true poet dallies with -philosophical ideas, it is not "that he may assimilate them and dismiss -imagination," but merely "that he may have them in front of him, to -examine as though on a stage or public platform."[13] The New Comedy -which made its appearance after Socrates is undeniably impregnated with -philosophic ideas, with intellectual universals, with "intelligible -kinds of human conduct"; but its authors were poets in so far only as -they knew how to transform logic into imagination and their ideas into -portraits.[14] - -[Sidenote: _Poetry and History._] - -The dividing line between art and science, imagination and intellect, -is here very strongly drawn: the two distinct activities are repeatedly -contrasted with a sharpness that leaves no room for confusion. The -line of demarcation between poetry and history is hardly less firm. -While not quoting Aristotle's passage, Vico implicitly shows why -poetry seemed to Aristotle more philosophical than history, and at -the same time he dispels the erroneous opinion that history concerns -the particular and poetry the universal. Poetry joins hands with -science not because it consists in the contemplation of concepts but -because, like science, it is ideal. The most beautiful poetic story -must be "wholly ideal": "by means of idea, the poet breathes reality -into things otherwise unreal; masters of poetry claim that their art -must be wholly compact of imagination, like a painter of the ideal, -not imitative like a portrait-painter: whence, from their likeness to -God the Creator, poets and painters alike are called divine."[15] And -against those who blame poets for telling stories which, they say, are -untrue, Vico protests: "The best stories are those approximating most -nearly to ideal truth, the eternal truth of God: it is immeasurably -more certain than the truth of historians who often bring into play -caprice, necessity or fortune; but such a Captain as, for instance, -Tasso's Godfrey is the type of a captain of all times, of all nations, -and so are all personages of poetry, whatever difference there may be -in sex, age, temperament, custom, nation, republic, grade, condition -or fortune; they are nothing save the eternal properties of the human -soul, rationally discussed by politicians, economists and moral -philosophers, and painted as portraits by the poet."[16] Referring -to an observation made by Castelvetro, and approving it in part, to -the effect that if poetry is a presentiment of the possible it should -be preceded by history, imitation of the real, yet finding himself -confronted by the difficulty that, nevertheless, poets invariably -precede historians, Vico solves the problem by identifying history -with poetry: primitive history was poetry, its plot was narration of -fact, and Homer was the first historian; or rather "he was a heroic -character amongst Greek men, in so far as they poetically narrated -their own history."[17] Poetry and history, therefore, are originally -identical; or rather, undifferentiated. "But inasmuch as it is not -possible to give false ideas, since falsity arises from an embroiled -combination of ideas, so is it impossible to give a tradition, however -fabulous, that has not had, at the beginning, a basis of truth."[18] -Hence we gain an entirely new insight into mythology: it is no longer -an arbitrary calculated invention, but a spontaneous vision of truth -as it presented itself to the spirit of primitive man. Poetry gives an -imaginative vision; science or philosophy intelligible truth; history -the consciousness of certitude. - -[Sidenote: _Poetry and language._] - -Language and poetry are, in Vico's estimation, substantially the same. -In refuting the "vulgar error of grammarians" who maintain the priority -of the birth of prose over that of verse, he finds "within the origin -of Poetry, so far as it has been herein discovered," the "origin of -languages and the origin of letters."[19] This discovery was made by -Vico after "toil as disagreeable and overwhelming as we should undergo -had we to strip off our own nature and enter into that of the primæval -men of Hobbes, Grotius, or Puffendorf; creatures possessing no language -at all, by whom were created the languages of the ancient world."[20] -But his painful labour was richly repaid by his refutation of the -erroneous theory that languages sprang from convention or, as he said, -"signified at will," whereas it is evident that "from their natural -origin words must have had natural meanings; this is plainly seen -in common Latin ... wherein almost all words have arisen by natural -necessity, either from natural properties or from their sensible -effects; and in general, metaphor forms the bulk of language in the -case of every people."[21] This argument strikes a blow at another -common error of the grammarians, "that the language of prose writers -is correct, that of poets incorrect."[22] The poetic tropes grouped -under the heading of metonymy seem to Vico to be "born of the nature -of primitive peoples, not of capricious selection by men skilled in -poetic art";[23] stories told "by means of similitudes, imagery and -comparisons," result "from lack of the genera and species required to -define things with propriety," and "are therefore, by reason of natural -necessities, common to entire peoples."[24] The earliest languages -must have consisted of "dumb gestures and objects which had natural -connexions with the ideas to be expressed."[25] He observes very -acutely that to these figurate languages belong not only hieroglyphics -but the emblems, knightly bearings, devices and blazons which he calls -"mediæval hieroglyphics."[26] In the barbarous Middle Ages "Italy was -forced to fall back on the mute language ... of the earliest gentile -nations in which men, before discovering articulate speech, were -obliged like mutes to use actions or objects having natural connexions -with the ideas, which at that time must have been exceedingly sensuous, -of the things which they wished to signify; such expressions, clad in -almost vocal words, must have had all the lively expressiveness of -poetic diction." [27] Hence arise three kinds or phases of language: -dumb show, the language of the gods; heraldic language, or that of the -heroes; and spoken language. Vico also looked forward to a universal -system of etymology, a "dictionary of mental words common to all -nations." - -[Sidenote: _Inductive and formalistic_] - -A man with ideas of this sort about imagination, language and poetry -could not say he was satisfied with formalistic and verbal Logic, -whether Aristotelian or scholastic. The human mind (says Vico) "makes -use of intellect when from things which it feels by sense it gathers -something that does not fall under sense: this is the true meaning -of the Latin _intelligere_."[28] In a rapid outline of the history -of Logic, Vico wrote: "Aristotle came and taught the syllogism, a -method more suited to expound universals in their particulars than to -unite particulars by the discovery of universals: then came Zeno with -his sorites, which corresponds with modern philosophic methods and -refines, without sharpening, the wits; and no advantage whatever was -reaped from either by mankind at large. With great reason, therefore, -does Verulam, equally eminent as politician and philosopher, propound, -commend and illustrate induction in his Organum: he is followed by the -English with excellent results to experimental philosophy."[29] From -this source is derived his criticism of mathematics, which have always, -but especially in his day, been considered as the type of perfect -science. - -[Sidenote: Vico opposed to all formal theories of poetry.] - -In all this, Vico is not only a thorough revolutionary, but is quite -conscious of being so: he knows himself to be in opposition to all -previous theories on the subject. He says that his new principles of -poetry "are wholly opposed to, and not merely different from, all which -have been imagined from the time of Plato and his disciple Aristotle -to Patrizzi, Scaliger and Castelvetro among the moderns; poetry is now -discovered to have been the first language used by all nations alike, -even the Hebrew."[30] In another passage he says that by his theories -"is overthrown all that has ever been said of the origin of poetry, -beginning from Plato and Aristotle, right down to our own Patrizzi, -Scaliger and Castelvetro; and it is found that poetry arising through -defect of human ratiocination is as sublime as any which owes its -being to the later rise of philosophy and the arts of composition and -criticism; indeed, that these later sources never gave rise to any -poetry that could equal, far less surpass it."[31] In the Autobiography -he boasts of having discovered "other principles of poetry than those -found by Greeks and Latins and all others from those times down to the -present day; on these are founded other views on mythology."[32] - -These ancient principles of poetry "laid down first by Plato and -confirmed by Aristotle" had been the anticipation or prejudice which -had misled all writers on poetic reason (among whom he cites Jacopo -Mazzoni). Statements "even of most serious philosophers such as -Patrizzi and others" upon the origin of song and verse are so inept -that he "blushes even to mention them."[33] It is curious to see him -annotating the _Ars Poetica_ of Horace, with a view to finding some -plausible sense in it by applying the principles of the _Scienza -nuova_.[34] - -It is probable that he was familiar with the writings of Muratori -among contemporaries, for he quotes him by name, and of Gravina, who -was a personal acquaintance; but if he read the _Perfetta Poesia_ and -the _Forza della fantasia_ he could not have been satisfied by the -treatment meted out to the faculty of imagination, so highly valued -and respected by himself; and if Gravina influenced him at all it must -have been by provoking him to contradiction. In this latter (if not -directly in such French writers as Le Bossu) he may have met with the -fallacy of regarding Homer as a repository of wisdom, a fallacy which -he combated with vigour and pertinacity. In his estimation, among the -gravest faults of the Cartesians was their inability to appreciate the -world of imagination and poetry. Of his own times he complained they -were "benumbed by analytical methods and by a philosophy which sought -to deaden every faculty of soul which reached it through the body, -especially that of imagination, now held to be mother of all human -error": times "of a wisdom which freezes the generous soul of the best -poetry," and prevents all understanding of it.[35] - -[Sidenote: _Judgments of grammarians and linguists who preceded him_] - -It is just the same with the theory of language. "The manner of birth -and the nature of languages has been the cause of much painful toil -and meditation: nor, from the _Cratylus_ of Plato, in which in our -other works we have falsely delighted and believed" (he alludes to -the doctrine followed by him in his own first book, _De antiquissima -Italorum sapientia_), "down to Wolfgang Latius, Julius Cæsar Scaliger, -Francisco Sanchez and others, can we find anything to satisfy our -understanding; so much that in discussing matters of this kind Signor -Giovanni Clerico says there is nothing in philology involved in such a -maze of doubt and difficulty."[36] The chief grammarian-philosophers do -not escape criticism. Grammar, says he, lays down rules for speaking -correctly: Logic for speaking truly; "and since in the order of -nature we must speak truly before learning to speak correctly, Giulio -Cesare della Scala, followed by the best grammarians, employs all his -magnificent energy to reason to the causes of the Latin language from -the principles of logic. But his great design ended in failure for this -reason, that he attached himself to the logical principles of a single -philosopher, namely Aristotle, whose principles are too universal to -explain the almost infinite particulars which naturally beset him who -would reason concerning a language. Whence it happened that Francisco -Sanchez, who followed him with admirable zeal, attempting in his -_Minerva_ to explain the innumerable particles which are found in -Latin by his famous principle of ellipsis, and trying thereby, though -without success, to vindicate the logical principles of Aristotle, fell -into the most cumbrous clumsinesses among an almost innumerable host -of Latin phrases whereby he meant to make good the slight and subtle -omissions employed by Latin in expressing its meaning."[37] The origin -of parts of speech and syntax is wholly different from that assigned -to them by folk who fancied that "the people who invented language -must first have gone to school to Aristotle."[38] The same criticism -undoubtedly must have extended to the logico-grammarians of Port-Royal, -for Vico remarked that the Logic of Arnauld was built "on the same plan -as that of Aristotle."[39] - -[Sidenote: _Influence of seventeenth century writers on Vico._] - -It may well be granted that Vico was more in sympathy with the -seventeenth-century rhetoricians, in whom we have detected a -premonition of æsthetic science. For Vico, as for them, wit (referring -to imagination and memory) was "the father of all invention": judgement -concerning poetry was for him a "judgement of the senses," a phrase -equivalent to "taste" or "good taste," expressions never used by him -in this connexion. There is no doubt he was familiar with the writers -of treatises on wit and conceits, for, in a dry rhetorical manual -written for the use of his school (in which one looks in vain for a -shadow of his own personal ideas), he quotes Paolo Beni, Pellegrini, -Pallavicino and the Marquis Orsi.[40] He highly esteems Pallavicini's -treatise on _Style_ and has knowledge of the book _Del bene_ by the -same author;[41] perhaps too his mind was not unaffected by the flash -of genius which had enabled the Jesuit for one instant to perceive that -poetry consists of "first apprehensions." He does not name Tesauro, but -there is no doubt he knew him; indeed the _Scienza nuova_ includes a -section, besides that on poetry, upon "blazons," "knightly bearings," -"military banners," "medals," and so forth, precisely similar in -method to that of Tesauro when he treats of" figurate conceits" in -his _Cannochiale aristotelico_.[42] For Tesauro such conceits are -merely metaphorical ingenuities, like any other; for Vico they are -wholly the work of imagination, for imagination expresses itself not -in words only, but in the "mute language" of lines and colours. He -knew something also of Leibniz; the great German and Newton were by -him described as" the greatest wits of the time"[43]; but he seems to -have remained in complete ignorance of the æsthetic attempts of the -Leibnitian school in Germany. His "Logic of poetry" was a discovery -independent of, and earlier than, Bülffinger's Organon of the inferior -faculties, the _Gnoseologia inferior_ of Baumgarten, and the _Logik -der Einbildungskraft_ of Breitinger. In truth, Vico belongs on one -side to the vast Renaissance reaction against formalism and scholastic -verbalism, which, beginning with the reaffirmation of experience and -sensation (Telesio, Campanella, Galileo, Bacon), was bound to go on by -reasserting the function of imagination in individual and social life: -on the other side he is a precursor of Romanticism. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic in the "Scienza nuova."_] - -The importance of Vico's new poetic theory in his thought as a whole -as well as in the organism of his _Scienza nuova_ has never been fully -appreciated, and the Neapolitan philosopher is still commonly regarded -as the inventor of the Philosophy of History. If by such a science is -meant the attempt to deduce concrete history by ratiocination and to -treat epochs and events as if they were concepts, the only result of -Vico's efforts to solve the problem could have been failure; and the -same is true of his many successors. The fact is that his philosophy of -history, his ideal history, his _Scienza nuova d' intorno alia comune -natura delle nazioni,_ does not concern the concrete empirical history -which unfolds itself in time: it is not history, it is a science of the -ideal, a Philosophy of the Spirit. That Vico made many discoveries in -history proper which have been to a great extent confirmed by modern -criticism (_e.g._ on the development of the Greek epic and the nature -and genesis of feudal society in antiquity and in the Middle Ages) -certainly deserves all emphasis; but this side of his work must be kept -distinctly apart from the other, strictly philosophical, side. And -if the philosophical part is a doctrine expounding the ideal moments -of the spirit, or in his own words "the modifications of our human -mind," of these moments or modifications Vico undertakes especially -to define and fully describe not the logical, ethical and economic -moments (though on these too he throws much fight), but precisely the -imaginative or poetic. The larger portion of the second _Scienza nuova_ -hinges on the discovery of the creative imagination, including the "new -principles of Poetry," the observations on the nature of language, -mythology, writing, symbolic figures and so forth. All his "system -of civilization, of the Republic, of laws, of poetry, of history, in -a word, of humanity at large" is founded upon this discovery, which -constitutes the novel point of view at which Vico places himself. The -author himself observes that his second book, dedicated to Poetic -Wisdom, "wherein is made a discovery totally opposed to Verulam's," -forms "nearly the whole body of the work"; but the first and third -books also deal almost exclusively with works of the imagination. It -might be maintained, therefore, that Vico's "New Science" was really -just Æsthetic; or at least the Philosophy of the Spirit with special -emphasis upon the Philosophy of the Æsthetic Spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Vico's mistakes._] - - -Among so many luminous points, or rather in such a general blaze of -light, there are yet dark nooks in his mind; corners that remain in -shadow. By not maintaining a rigid distinction between concrete history -and the philosophy of the spirit, Vico allowed himself to suggest -historical periods which do not correspond with the real periods, but -are rather allegories, the mythological expression of his philosophy -of the spirit. From the same source arises the multiplicity of those -periods (usually three in number) which Vico finds in the history of -civilization in general, in poetry and language and practically every -subject. "The first peoples, who were the children of the human race, -founded first the world of the arts: next, after a long interval, the -philosophers, who were therefore the aged among nations, founded the -world of the sciences: with which humanity attained completion."[44] -Historically, understood in an approximate sense, this scheme of -evolution has some truth; but only an approximate truth. In consequence -of the same confusion of history and philosophy he denied primitive -peoples any kind of intellectual logic, and conceived not only their -physics, cosmology, astronomy and geography as poetic in character, but -their morals, their economy and their politics as well. But not only -has there never been a period in concrete human history entirely poetic -and ignorant of all abstraction or power of reasoning, but such a state -cannot even be conceived. Morals, politics, physics, all presuppose -intellectual work, however imperfect they may be. The ideal priority of -poetry cannot be materialized into a historical period of civilization. - -Linked with this error is another into which Vico often falls when -he asserts that "the chief aim of poetry" is to "teach the ignorant -vulgar to act virtuously" and to "invent fables adapted with the -popular understanding capable of producing strong emotion."[45] -Having regard to the clear explanations he himself gave of the -inessentiality of abstractions and intellectual artifice in poetry; -when we remember that for him poetry makes her own rules for herself -without consulting anybody, and that he clearly established the -peculiar theoretical nature of the imagination, such a proposition -cannot be taken as a return to the pedagogic and heteronomous theory -of poetry which in substance he had left far behind: therefore, -without doubt, it follows from his historical hypothesis of a wholly -poetical epoch of civilization, in which education, science and -morality were administered by poets. Another consequence is that -"imaginative universals" are apparently sometimes understood by him as -imperfect universals (empirical or representative concepts as they were -subsequently called); although, on the other hand, individualization -is so marked in them and their unphilosophical nature so accentuated -that their interpretation as purely imaginative forms may be taken -as normal. In conclusion, we remark that fundamental terms are not -always used by Vico in the same sense: it is not always clear how -far "sensation," "memory," "imagination," "wit" are synonymous -or different. Sometimes "sensation" seems outside the spirit, at -others one of its chief moments; poets are sometimes the organ of -"imagination," sometimes the "sensation" of humanity; and imagination -is described as "dilated memory." These are the aberrations of a -thought so virgin and original that it was not easy to regulate. - -[Sidenote: _Progress still to be achieved._] - -To sever the Philosophy of the Spirit from History, the modifications -of the human mind from the historic vicissitudes of peoples, and -Æsthetic from Homeric civilization, and by continuing Vico's analyses -to determine more clearly the truths he uttered, the distinctions he -drew and the identities he divined; in short, to purge Æsthetic of the -remains of ancient Rhetoric and Poetics as well as from some over-hasty -schematisms imposed upon her by the author of her being: such is the -field of labour, such the progress still to be achieved after the -discovery of the autonomy of the æsthetic world due to the genius of -Giambattista Vico. - - -[1] _Scienza nuova prima,_ bk. iii. ch. 5 (_Opere di G. B. Vico,_ -edited by G. Ferrari, 2nd ed., Milan, 1852-1854). - -[2] _Scienza nuova seconda, Elementi,_ liii. - -[3] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 26. - -[4] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii. introd. - -[5] _Op. cit. Elem._ xxxvi. - -[6] _Op. cit._ bk. ii.; _Sentenze eroiche._ - -[7] Letter to De Angelis of December 25, 1725. - -[8] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._ - -[9] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii.; Letter to De Angelis, _cit._; -_Giudizio su Dante._ - -[10] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii.; _Logica poetica._ - -[11] _Republica,_ x. - -[12] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii. _ad init._ - -[13] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._ - -[14] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii. _passim._ - -[15] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 4. - -[16] Letter to Solla, January 12, 1729; cf. _Scienza nuova sec. Elem._ -xliii. - -[17] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii. - -[18] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 6. - -[19] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno all' origine -della locuzion poetica,_ etc. - -[20] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 22. - -[21] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno all' origini -delle lingue_, etc. - -[22] _Op. cit._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno a' tropi,_ etc., § 4. - -[23] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 22. - -[24] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii., _Pruove filosofiche._ - -[25] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii.-ch. 22. - -[26] _Op. cit._ bk. iii. chs. 27-33. - -[27] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._ - -[28] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii. introd. - -[29] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Ultimi corollari,_ § vi. - -[30] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 2. - -[31] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Della metafisica poetica,_ etc. - -[32] _Vita scritta da sè medesimo,_ in _Opere, ed. cit._ iv. p. 365. - -[33] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 37. - -[34] _Note all' Arte poetica di Orazio,_ in _Opere, ed. cit._ vi. pp. -52-79. - -[35] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._ - -[36] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 22; cf. the review of Clerico (Le -Clerc) in _Opere,_ iv. p. 382. - -[37] _Giudizio intorno alia gram. d' Antonio d' Aronne,_ in _Opere,_ -vi. pp. 149-150. - -[38] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno all' origini -delle lingue,_ etc. - -[39] _Vita, cit._ p. 343. - -[40] _Instituzioni oratorie e scritti inediti,_ Naples, 1865, pp. 90 -_seqq._: _De senteniiis, vulgo del ben parlare in concetti._ - -[41] Letter to the Duke of Laurenzana, March 1, 1732; and cf. letter to -Muzio Gæta. - -[42] Cf. p. 190. - -[43] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. i., _Del metodo._ - -[44] _Scienza nuova sec., Ultimi corollari,_ § 5. - -[45] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii. ch. 3; _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., -_Della metafisica poetica_; and bk. iii. _ad init._ - - - - -VI - - -MINOR ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY - - -[Sidenote: _The influence of Vico._] - -This step in advance had no immediate effect. The pages in the _Scienza -nuova_ devoted to æsthetic doctrine were actually the least read of any -in that marvellous book. Not that Vico exercised no influence at all; -we shall see that several Italian authors both of his own time and of -the generation immediately following show traces of his æsthetic ideas; -but these traces are all external and material and therefore sterile. -Outside Italy the _Scienza nuova_ (already announced by a compatriot -in 1726 in the _Acta_ of Leipzig with the graceful comment that _magis -indulget ingenio quam veritati_ and the pleasing information that _ab -ipsis Italis taedio magis quam applausu excipitur_)[1] was mentioned -toward the end of the century, as is well known, by Herder, Goethe, -and some few others.[2] In connection with poetry, especially with the -Homeric question, Vico's book was quoted by Friedrich August Wolf, to -whom it had been recommended by Cesarotti[3] after the publication of -the _Prolegomena ad Homerum_ (1795), but without any suspicion of the -importance of its general doctrine of poetry, of which the Homeric -hypothesis was a mere application. Wolf (1807) imagined himself in the -presence of a talented forerunner in an isolated problem, instead of -a man of intellectual stature towering above any philologist, however -great. - -[Sidenote: _Italian writers: Conti._] - -Neither by reliance on the works of Vico, who founded no real school, -nor, it must be added, by any independent effort along new lines, -did thought succeed in maintaining or improving upon the position -already attained. A notable attempt to establish a philosophical -theory of poetry and the arts was made by the Venetian A. Conti, who -left numerous sketches for essays on imagination, the faculties of the -soul, poetic imitation and similar subjects, designed for inclusion -in a large treatise on the Beautiful and Art. Conti had started by -professing ideas very like those of Du Bos, affirming that the poet -must "put everything in images"; that taste is as indefinable as -feeling, and that there are persons without taste just as there are -blind and deaf persons; he also wrote polemical tracts against the -Cartesians. Later he abandoned his sensationalistic or sentimentalist -theories,[4] and, inquiring into the nature of poetry, declared -himself ill-satisfied with Castelvetro, Patrizzi, and even Gravina. -"Had Castelvetro," he observes, "who writes so subtly of Aristotle's -_Poetics,_ given two or three chapters to a philosophical explanation -of the idea of imitation, he would have solved many questions raised -but not clearly answered by himself concerning poetic theories. In his -_Poetica_ and in his controversy against Torquato Tasso, Patrizzi never -succeeded in clearly defining the philosophical idea of imitation; he -collected much useful information about the history of poetry, but -wilfully lost the Platonic doctrine by allowing it to mingle with the -historical detail instead of gathering it up without sophistry into a -single point, when it would have appeared in a very different guise. -The _Ragion poetica_ of Gravina shadows forth a sort of philosophical -idea of imitation; but so wholly engrossed is he in deducing therefrom -rules for lyrical, dramatical and epic poetry, and illustrating each -with examples from the most celebrated poets, Greek, Latin and Italian, -that he is too busy to question the sufficiency of the fertile idea he -has propounded."[5] A close follower of contemporary European thought, -Conti was familiar with Hutcheson, whose theories he vigorously -repudiated, observing, "Why this multiplication of faculties?" The -soul is one, and for scholastic convenience only has been divided into -three faculties: sense, imagination, intellect; the first "concerns -herself with objects present before her; imagination with those afar -into which memory gradually merges: but the object of sense and -imagination is always particular; it is only the mind, the intellect, -the spirit, that by comparing particulars apprehends the universal." -"Before introducing a new sense for the pleasure of beauty" Hutcheson -should have "assigned limits to these three faculties of cognition and -demonstrated that the pleasure occasioned by beauty does not arise from -the three pleasures of these three faculties, or from intellectual -pleasure alone, to which they all reduce, if the functions of the -soul be carefully analysed." Thus it would appear that the mistake -of the Scotchman[6] arose from his habit of separating pleasure from -the cognitive faculties, placing the former apart in a special empty -"sense of beauty."[7] On the other hand, when rewriting the history of -the opinions of various critics upon the Aristotelian doctrine of the -universal in poetry, Conti gave much weight to the dialogue _Naugerius -seu De poëtica_ of Fracastoro;[8] for an instant he seems on the -point of grasping the essence of the poetic universal and identifying -it with the characteristic, which makes us call even horrible things -wholly beautiful. "In all his journeys Balzac never saw a beautiful -old woman: in the poetic or picturesque sense an old woman is highly -beautiful, if depicted as having suffered all the dilapidations of -age": immediately after, however, he identifies the characteristic with -Wolff's concept of perfection: "It does not differ from being, nor does -being differ from the truth which the schoolmen call transcendental -and which is the object of all arts and all sciences; we call it the -object of poetry when by means of imaginary presentations it ravishes -the intellect and moves the wall, transporting both these faculties -into the ideal and archetypal world of which, following S. Augustine, -Father Malebranche discourses at length in his _Recherche de la -vérité_."[9] In the same way Fracastoro's universal gives place to the -universal of science: "Owing to the infinity of their determinations -all we can know of particulars is their common properties, which -is merely another manner of saying that we have no science save of -universal. Thus it is precisely the same if we say the object of -poetry is science or the universal; which is the doctrine of Navagero, -following Aristotle."[10] The "imaginative universals of Signor Vico" -(with whom he had interchanged some letters) opened no new views for -him: he notes that Signor Vico "talks a great deal about them" and -"holds that the most uncivilized men, having framed them not from any -wish to please or serve others, but from the necessity of expressing -their feelings as nature taught them, spoke in poetical language the -elements of a theology, a physics, and an ethics wholly poetical." -Conti excuses himself from immediate examination of "this critical -question" and only opines that "it can be shown in many ways that -these imaginative universals are the material or object of poetry, -in so far as they contain within them sciences or things considered -in themselves"[11]--a conclusion diametrically opposed to that which -"Signor Vico" meant to express. Conti is next obliged to ask himself -how it is possible that poetry's object should be not the true but the -probable, when the universal of poetry is the same as that of science. -He answers by coming down to the commonplace level of a Baumgarten: -"When sciences receive a particular colouring, we pass from the true to -the probable." Imitation means giving the impression of truth; that is -done by selecting a few of its features only; and this is the procedure -in which the probable just consists. If you wish to describe the -rainbow poetically, a great part of the Newtonian optics must be thrown -overboard; thus "many circumstances of mathematical demonstration" will -be neglected in poetical descriptions, and the rest, which is utilized, -will form the probable or that particular "which awakens the universal -idea, slumbering in the minds of the learned." The great art of poetry -consists "in selection of the image containing the greatest number of -points of universal doctrine which, by being inserted in the example, -may so colour the precept that I may find it without seeking it, or -recognize it through its connexion with events described."[12] Hence -poetry cannot be content with imitation; allegory too is needed: "in -ancient poetry one thing is read and another is meant." Here follows -the inevitable instance of the Homeric poems, in which Conti certainly -finds elements which cannot be reduced to instruction and allegory and -therefore to some extent deserve the Platonic condemnation.[13] He -recognizes a species of imagination differing from passive sensibility, -"which Father Malebranche calls active imagination, and Plato the art -of imagery; it comprises all that is meant by wit, sagacity, judgement -and good taste, which teach a poet to use or not to use at a given time -or place the rules and licences of art, and to control the extravagance -of his imagery."[14] On the question of literary taste he follows -the opinion of Trevisano and decides that it consists in "setting in -mutual harmony, that is to say restraining within limits, the soul's -cognitive faculties, memory, imagination and intellect, allowing none -to overwhelm another."[15] - -[Sidenote: _Quadrio and Zanotti._] - -By assiduous travail of thought and perpetual search for the best, -Conti kept himself at the highest level of æsthetic speculation in -contemporary Europe (Vico always excepted); at the same level as -Baumgarten in Germany. We pass rapidly over other Italian writers -such as Quadrio (1739), author of the first great encyclopædia of -universal literature, in which he defines poetry as "the science of -things human and divine, presented in pictures to the populace, and -written in words connected by measure";[16] and Francesco Maria Zanotti -(1768), who describes poetry as "the art of versification in order to -give pleasure":[17] the first is worthy of a mediæval anthologist, -the second of a no less mediæval composer of handbooks on rhythm and -methods of composition. The only serious student of æsthetic was -Melchior Cesarotti. - -[Sidenote: _Cesarotti_] - -Cesarotti called attention to popular and primitive poetry: he -translated Ossian and illustrated the text with dissertations; he -unearthed antique Spanish poems and even the folk-songs of Mexico and -Lapland; he studied Hebrew poetry; he dedicated the greater part of -his life to the Homeric poems, examining all the theories of critics -past and present, encountering Vico in this connexion and discussing -his views. Besides this, he debated the origin of poetry, the pleasure -given by tragedy, taste, the beautiful, eloquence, style, in short -every problem belonging to æsthetics which had been raised up to his -time.[18] One seems to catch an echo of Vico as one listens to his -words on La Motte: "He had logic, but knew not that the logic of -poetry differs somewhat from ordinary logic: he was a man of great -talent, but he recognized talent only, and was incapable of feeling the -immeasurable distance between judicious prose and poetry: the real -Homer with his attractive faults will always be more beloved than his -reformed Homer with his cold, affected virtue."[19] Cesarotti purposed -(1762) bringing out a great theoretico-historical book in whose first -part "we shall suppose the non-existence of poetry and poetic art and -try to trace by what path a man of illuminated reason can have reached -the idea of the possibility of such an art and how he can have attained -perfection by these means: every one will be able to see poetry growing -up under his eyes, so to speak, and attest the truth of theory by -the testimony of his own personal feelings."[20] Although celebrated -throughout Italy in his day as one who "with the most pure torch of -philosophy has thrown beams of light into the darkest recesses of -poetry and eloquence,"[21] it does not appear that the distinguished -scholar, the pleasing and desultory philosopher, offered any profound -or original solutions. In 1797 he defined poetry as "the art of -representing and perfecting nature by means of picturesque, animated, -imaginative and harmonious discourse."[22] - -[Sidenote: _Bettinelli and Pagano._] - -The fashion of the day in philosophy made men impatient of the ideas -found in writers of treatises of former times. Arteaga praises -Cesarotti for "that fine tact, that impartial criticism, that -logical spirit derived not from the trickling streamlets of Sperone, -Castelvetro, Casa and Bembo, but from the profound and inexhaustible -springs of Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, d'Alembert, Sulzer, and -writers of like temper."[23] Writing to Saverio Bettinelli, who was -preparing a work on _Enthusiasm,_ Paradisi hoped it would prove "a -metaphysical history of enthusiasm which shall outweigh all those -Poetics which are only fit to be burned," and would "make waste paper -of Castelvetro, the 'Mintumo,' and that stupid creature, Quadrio."[24] -In spite of these aspirations Bettinelli's book (1769) contains little -beyond vivacious and eloquent empirical observations concerning the -psychology of poets, "poetic enthusiasm," to which he assigns six -degrees, namely, elevation, vision, rapidity, novelty and surprise, -passion and transfusion. Equally empirical was Mario Pagano in his two -fragments, _Gusto e le belle arti_ and _Origine e natura della poesia_ -(1783-1785), in which he grotesquely combines some ideas from Vico with -the current sensationalism. Theoretico-imaginative form and sensuous -pleasure are presented by him as two historical periods of art. "In -their cradle the fine arts are directed towards making a true imitation -of nature rather than towards loveliness. Their first steps are towards -expression rather than charm.... In the most ancient poetry, even in -the ballads of barbarous ages, there lives a most compelling pathos: -passions are expressed naturally, even the sound of the words is -alive with the expression of the things described." But "the period -of perfection is reached at the moment when exact imitation of nature -is coupled with complete beauty, accord and harmony," when "the taste -is refined and society reaches its most complete form of culture." -Fine arts "precede by a short time the dawn of philosophy, that is -to say, the time of the most intense perfection of society"; indeed, -certain modes of art, such as tragedy, must necessarily come later -than philosophy whose aid must be invoked to further "the purgation of -manners."[25] - -[Sidenote: _German disciples of Baumgarten. G. F. Meier._] - -The compatriots and successors of Baumgarten, like those of Vico, -did little by way of understanding or improving upon his work. An -enthusiastic admirer and disciple of Baumgarten who had attended his -lectures at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, Georg Friedrich Meier, came forward -in 1746 to defend the _Meditationes_ against the attacks of Quistorp to -whom the master had deigned no reply;[26] already in 1748, prior to -the publication of the _Æsthetic,_ he had published the first volume -of his _Principles of all the Beautiful Sciences_,[27] followed in -1749 and 1750 by the second and third volumes. This book, which is -a complete exposition of Baumgarten's theory, is divided, according -to the master's method, into three parts: invention of beautiful -thoughts (heuristic), æsthetic method (methodic), and the beautiful -signification of thoughts (semiotic); the first of these (occupying -two and a half volumes) is subdivided into three sections: beauty -of sense-apprehension (æsthetic richness, grandeur, verisimilitude, -vivacity, certainty, sensitive life and wit), sensitive faculties -(attention, abstraction, senses, imagination, subtlety, acumen, -memory, poetic power, taste, foresight, conjecture, signification and -the minor appetitive faculties), and the diverse kinds of beautiful -thought (æsthetic concepts, judgements, and syllogisms). Elsewhere -than in this book, which was reprinted many times (in 1757 an epitome -was issued[28]), Meier discusses Æsthetic in several of his numerous -works, especially in a little tract, _Considerations on the First -Principles of all Fine Arts and Sciences_.[29] Who was more tenderly -inclined than he towards the science so recently born and baptized? He -was ardent in her defence against those who denied both her possibility -and her utility, and against those who admitted these yet complained, -not unreasonably, that she was substantially the same as that which in -former days had been treated as Poetics and Rhetoric. He parried this -accusation, of which he recognized the partial truth, by asserting -that it was impossible for one writer to have perfect knowledge of all -the arts: another of his excuses was to the effect that Æsthetic was -a science too young to show the perfection reached by other sciences -after the cultivation of centuries; in one place he says he has no -intention of arguing "with those enemies of Æsthetic who will not or -cannot see the true nature and aim of this science, but have built for -themselves in its place a deformed and miserable image against which, -when they fight, they fight against themselves." With philosophic -resignation he concludes that the same fate is in store for Æsthetic as -for every science: "At first when almost unknown they encounter enemies -and detractors who ridicule them through ignorance and prejudice; -but later they meet persons of intellect who, by working at them -conjointly, carry them on to their proper perfection."[30] - -[Sidenote: _Confusions of Meier._] - -Students of the new science flocked to Halle University to hear Meier -lecture on Æsthetic whose "chief author" or "inventor" (_Haupturheber, -Erfinder_), as Meier never tired of repeating, was "Herr Professor -Baumgarten"; at the same time warning them that his own _Anfangsgründe_ -were no mere transcription of Baumgarten's lectures.[31] Still, while -recognizing the great gifts of Meier as publicity-agent, the facility, -clarity and wealth of his eloquence, and his shrewdness in polemic, -one cannot altogether deny the justice of the remark upon "Professor -Baumgarten of Frankfort and his ape (_Affe)_ Professor Meier of -Halle."[32] Every defect of Baumgarten's Æsthetic reappears accentuated -in Meier; the limits of the inferior cognitive faculties, alleged as -the domain of poetry and the arts, are laid down by him most strangely. -It is curious to note how, for example, he interprets the difference -between the confused (æsthetical) and the distinct (logical), and the -proposition that beauty disappears when made the object of distinct -thought. "The cheeks of a beautiful girl whereon bloom the roses of -youth are lovely so long as they are looked at with the naked eye. But -let them be examined with a magnifying glass. Where is their beauty? -One can hardly believe that such a disgusting surface, scaly, all -mounts and hollows, the pores full of dirt, with hairs sprouting here -and there, can be the seat of that amorous attraction which subdues -the heart."[33] That is described as "æsthetically false" whose truth -the inferior faculty is unable to grasp: for example, the theory that -bodies are composed of monads.[34] Once they have become intelligible -to these faculties, general concepts possess great æsthetic richness, -since they include infinite consequences and particular cases.[35] -Æsthetic also comprehends those things which cannot be thought -distinctly or, if so thought, might be capable of upsetting philosophic -gravity: a kiss may be an excellent subject for a poet; but whatever -would be thought of a philosopher who sought to demonstrate its -necessity by the mathematical method?[36] Moreover, Meier includes the -whole theory of observation and experiment in Æsthetic, to which this -theory belongs, he says, by right of its connexion with the senses,[37] -and also the whole theory of the appetitive faculties, because -"æsthetic requires not only a fine wit but a noble heart as well."[38] -He comes near truth sometimes, when, for example, he observes that -the logical form presupposes the æsthetic and that our first concepts -are sensitive, later becoming distinct by the help of logic;[39] -and when he condemns allegory as "among the most decadent forms of -beautiful thinking."[40] But, on the other hand, he thinks that logical -distinctions and definitions, although not necessarily sought after -by genius, are very useful in poetry; they are even indispensable as -regulators of beautiful thinking and make up, as it were, the skeleton -of the body poetic: great care, however, must be taken not to judge -æsthetical general concepts, _notiones æstheticæ universales,_ with -the rigorous exactitude demanded by philosophical. And since such -concepts, taken singly, may be likened to unstrung jewels, they must be -connected by the string of æsthetic judgement and syllogism, the theory -of which is identical with that presented by Logic, setting aside that -part which is of little or no use to genius, but belongs exclusively -to the philosopher.[41] In his _Considerations_ of 1757 Meier, having -combated the principle of imitation (which appeared to him at once too -broad, since science and morals are also imitations of nature, and too -narrow, since art does not imitate natural objects solely nor should -it imitate them all, for the immoral must be excluded), reaffirmed the -thesis that the æsthetic principle consists in the "greatest possible -beauty of sense-perception."[42] He upheld this by condemning as -erroneous the belief that this sense-perception is wholly sensuous -and confused, without any gleam of distinctness or rationality. The -perception of sweet, bitter, red, etc., is wholly sensuous; but there -is another perception which is both sensuous and intellectual, confused -and distinct, in which both faculties, the higher and the lower, -collaborate. When intellectuality prevails in this consciousness, -then we have science: when sensibility, then we have poetry. "From -our explanation it will be gathered that the inferior cognitive -faculties must collect all the material of a poem, and all its parts. -Intellect and judgement, on the other hand, watch and ensure that these -materials are placed side by side in such a way that in their connexion -distinction and order may be observed."[43] Here a plunge into -sensationalism, there a fugitive glimpse of truth: most often, and in -conclusion, an adherence to the old mechanical, ornamental, pedagogic -theory of poetry: this is the impression left on us by the æsthetic -writings of Meier. - -[Sidenote: _M. Mendelssohn and other followers of Baumgarten. Vogue of -Æsthetic._] - -Another disciple of Baumgarten, Mendelssohn, conceiving beauty -as "indistinct image of a perfection," deduced that God can have -no perception of beauty, as this is merely a phenomenon of human -imperfection. According to him a primary form of pleasure is that -of the senses, arising from "the bettered state of our bodily -constitution"; a secondary form is the æsthetic fact of sensible -beauty, that is to say, unity in variety; a third form is perfection, -or harmony in variety.[44] He too repudiates Hutcheson's _deus ex -machina,_ the sense of beauty. Sensible beauty, perfection such as -can be apprehended by the senses, is independent of the fact that -the object represented is beautiful or ugly, good or bad by nature; -it suffices that it leaves us not indifferent: whence Mendelssohn -agrees with Baumgarten's definition, "a poem is a discourse sensibly -perfect."[45] Elias Schlegel (1742) conceived art as imitation, not -so servile as to seem a copy, but having similarity rather than -identity with nature: he considered the duty of poetry was first to -please and only afterwards to instruct.[46] Treatises on Æsthetic, -university lectures or slender volumes for use of the public, _Theories -of the Fine Arts and Letters, Manuals, Sketches, Texts, Principles, -Introductions, Lectures, Essays,_ and _Considerations on Taste_ poured -down thick and fast on Germany during the second half of the eighteenth -century. There are at least thirty full or complete treatises and many -dozens of minor tracts or fragments. After the Protestant universities, -the Catholic took up the new science, which was taught by Riedel at -Vienna, Herwigh at Würzburg, Ladrone at Mainz, Jacobi at Freiburg, -and by others at Ingolstadt after the expulsion of the Jesuits.[47] A -pretty little volume on the _First Principles of the Fine Arts_[48] was -written (1790) for Catholic schools by the notorious Franciscan friar -Eulogius Schneider, who, after being unfrocked, terrorised Strasburg in -the days of the Convention, and met his end under the guillotine. The -frenzied output of these German _Æsthetics_ resembles that of _Poetics_ -in Italy in the sixteenth century, after the rise to popularity of -Aristotle's treatise. Between 1771 and 1774 the Swiss Sulzer brought -out his great æsthetic encyclopædia, _The General Theory of the Fine -Arts,_ in alphabetical order, with historical notes upon each article, -which were greatly enlarged in the second edition of 1792, edited by a -retired Prussian captain, von Blankenburg.[49] In 1799, one J. Roller -published a first _Sketch of the History of Æsthetic,_[50] in which he -observes not unjustly, "Patriotic youth will be pleased to recognize -that Germany has produced more literature on this subject than any -other country."[51] - -[Sidenote: _Eberhard and Eschenburg._] - -Confining ourselves to bare mention of the works of Riedel (1767), -Faber (1767), Schütz (1776-1778), Schubart (1777-1781), Westenrieder -(1777), Szerdahel (1779), König (1784), Gang (1785), Meiners (1787), -Schott (1789), Moritz (1788),[52] we will select from the crowd the -_Theory of Fine Arts and Letters_ (1783) of Johann August Eberhard, -successor to Meier in the Chair at Halle,[53] and the _Sketch of a -Theory and Literature of Letters_ (1783) by Johann Joachim Eschenburg, -one of the most popular books of the day for students.[54] Both -these authors are followers of Baumgarten, with inclinations towards -sensationalism; amongst other things Eberhard considered the beautiful -as "that which pleases the most distinct senses," that is to say, of -sight and hearing. - -[Sidenote: _J. G. Sulzer._] - -A word must be accorded to Sulzer, in whom we find the most curious -alternation of new and old, the romantic influence of the new Swiss -school and the utilitarianism and intellectualism of his day. He -asserts that beauty exists wherever unity, variety and order are found: -the work of an artist is strictly in the form, in lively expression -(_lebhafte Darstellung_): the material is irrelevant to art, but -the duty of every reasonable and sensible man is to make judicious -selection. The beauty which is used to clothe the good as well as the -bad is not the ineffable, celestial Beauty, offspring of the alliance -between the beautiful, the good and the perfect, which awakens more -than mere pleasure, a veritable joy which ravishes and beatifies our -soul. Such is the human face when, by filling the eye of the beholder -with the pleasure of form arising from the variety, proportion and -order of the features, it proceeds to arouse the imagination and -intellect by its suggestion of interior perfection; of the same -nature is the statue of a great man carved by Phidias, or a patriotic -oration by Cicero. If truth lie outside art and belong to philosophy, -the most noble use to which art may be put is to make us feel the -important truths which lend her strength and energy, not to mention -that truth itself enters into art in the shape of truthful imitation -or representation. Sulzer also repeats (and he is not the last) that -orators, historians and poets are intermediaries between speculative -philosophy and the people.[55] - -[Sidenote: _K. H. Heydenreich._] - -Karl Heinrich Heydenreich returns to a sounder tradition when he -defines art (1790) as "a representation of a determinate state of -sensibility," and observes that man, as a cognitive being, is impelled -to enlarge the sphere of his cognitions and impart his discoveries to -his fellows, while as a sensitive being he is impelled to represent -and communicate his sensations; whence arise science and art. But -Heydenreich does not clearly grasp the cognitive character of art; for -in his opinion sensations become objects of artistic representation -either because they are pleasing or, when not pleasing, because they -are useful to further the moral aims of man as a social being; the -objects of sensibility which enter into art must be possessed of -intrinsic excellence and value and bear reference not to a single -individual but to the individual as a rational being: hence the -objectivity and necessity of taste. Like Baumgarten and Meier, he -divides Æsthetic into three parts: a doctrine of _inventio,_ another of -_methodica,_ a third of the _ars significandi_.[56] - -[Sidenote: J. G. Herder.] - -Another disciple of Baumgarten is J. G. Herder, who had an unbounded -admiration for the old Berlin master, whom he calls "the Aristotle -of his day," and defends him warmly against those who think fit to -describe him as a "stupid and obtuse syllogizer" (1769). On the -other hand he had slight esteem for subsequent Æsthetic, for example -Meier's work, which he stigmatized accurately enough as "in part a -re-mastication of Logic, in part a patchwork of metaphorical terms, -comparisons and examples." "O Æsthetic!" he cries with emphasis, -"O Æsthetic! the most fertile, the most beautiful and by far the -most novel of all abstract sciences, in what cavern of the Muses is -sleeping the youth of my philosophic nation destined to bring thee -to perfection?"[57] He denied Baumgarten's claim to have established -an _Ars pulchre cogitandi_ instead of limiting himself to a simple -_Scientia de pulchro et pulchris philosophice cogitans,_ and ridiculed -the scruple which held Æsthetic to be unworthy of the dignity of -Philosophy.[58] To compensate for this, however, he accepted the -fundamental definition cf poetry as _oratio sensitiva perfecta_: -gem of definitions (says he), the best that has ever been invented, -that penetrates to the heart of the matter, touches the true poetic -principles and opens the most extended view over the entire philosophy -of the beautiful, "coupling poetry with her sisters, the fine -arts."[59] Like Cesarotti the Italian, but with much less vivacity and -brilliance, Herder the German had studied primitive poetry, Ossian and -the songs of ancient peoples, Shakespeare (1773), popular love-songs -(1778), the spirit of Hebrew poetry (1782), and oriental poetry; these -studies powerfully impressed upon his mind the sensitive nature of -poetry. His friend Hamann (1762) had written these memorable words, -which read like an extract from one of Vico's aphorisms: "Poetry is -the mother-tongue of mankind: in the same way that the garden is older -than the ploughed field, painting than writing, song than declamation, -barter than trade. The repose of our most ancient progenitors was a -slumber deeper than ours; their motion a tumultuous dance. They spent -seven days in the silence of thought or of stupor; and opened their -mouths to pronounce winged words. Their speech was sensation and -passion, and they understood nothing but images. Of images is composed -all the treasure of human knowledge and felicity."[60] Although -Herder, who knew and admired Vico,[61] does not mention him by name -when treating of language and poetry, one might suppose him to be -influenced by the great Neapolitan at least in the final consolidation -of his theories; but, on the contrary, the authors whom he chiefly -quotes in this connexion are Du Bos, Goguet and Condillac, and observes -"the first beginnings of human speech in tone, gesture, expression of -sensations and thoughts by means of images and signs, can only have -been a kind of crude poetry, and so it is among every savage nation -in the world." Not a speech with punctuation and a sense of syllable, -like ours, learning as we do to read and write, but an unsyllabled -melody which gave birth to the primitive epic. "Natural man depicts -what he sees and as he sees it, alive, powerful, monstrous; in order -or disorder, as he sees and hears, so he reproduces. Not alone did -barbarous tongues thus arrange their images, but Greek and Latin do -the same. As the senses offered material, so the poets utilized it; -especially in Homer we see how closely nature is followed in images -which glow and fade perpetually and inimitably. He describes things -and events line by line, scene by scene; and, in the same way, he -paints men in their very bodies, actually as they speak and move." -Later we distinguish epic from what we call history; because the former -"not only describes what has happened but describes the event in its -entirety, showing how it occurred in the only possible way, having -regard to surrounding circumstance of body and spirit": this is the -reason of the more philosophical character of poetry. As for pleasure, -no doubt we do find poetry pleasant; but the idea that the poet's -motive is merely to excite pleasure cannot be condemned too strongly. -"Homer's gods were as essential and indispensable to the poet's world -as the forces of motion are to the world of matter. Without the -deliberations and activities of Olympus, none of the necessary events -which happen on this earth could take place. Homer's magic island in -the western sea belongs to the map of his hero's wanderings by the same -necessity which placed it on the map of the world: it was necessary -to the plan of his poem. It is the same with the severe Dante and his -circles of Hell and Heaven." Art is formative: she disciplines, orders -and governs the imagination and every faculty of man: not only did she -generate history, "but, earlier yet, she created gods and heroes and -purified the uncouth imaginations and fables of peoples with their -Titans, monsters and Gorgons, reducing to limit and law the riotous -imagination of ignorant men which knows no bounds or rule."[62] - -Notwithstanding these intuitions, so like those of Vico early in the -same century, Herder as a philosopher is inferior to his Italian -predecessor, and in point of fact does not rise superior to Baumgarten. -By application of Leibniz' law of continuity, he too arrived at the -opinion that the pleasing, the true, the beautiful and the good are -degrees of one single activity. For instance, sensible pleasure" is -a participation in the true and the good, so far as the senses may -comprehend them; the feeling of pleasure and pain is no other than the -feeling of the true and the good, that is to say, the consciousness -that the aim of our organism, the conservation of our well-being and -the avoidance of our hurt, has been attained."[63] Fine arts and -letters are all instructive (_bildend_): hence the terms _humaniora,_ -the Greek _καλόν,_ the Latin _pulchrum,_ the _gentle_ arts of days -of chivalry, _les belles lettres et les beaux arts_ of the French. A -group of them (gymnastic, dance, etc.) educates the body; a second -group (painting, plastic, music) educates the nobler senses of man, -the eye, the ear, the hand and tongue; a third (poetry) touches the -intellect, the imagination and the reason: a fourth group governs human -tendencies and inclinations.[64] Herder disapproved of the facile -theorists of art who began straight away with a definition of beauty, -a complex and involved concept. He held that the theory of fine arts -should be subdivided into three theories, each to be built up from -the foundations, the theory of sight, of hearing and of touch, that -is to say of painting, music and sculpture, _i.e._ into æsthetical -Optics, æsthetical Acoustics and æsthetical Physiology. "Fairly well -elaborated in the psychological and subjective aspects, Æsthetic -is sadly undeveloped in all that belongs to the object and to the -sensation of beauty, without which there can never be a fertile theory -of the Beautiful capable of influencing all the arts."[65] Taste is not -"a fundamental faculty of the soul but a habitual application of our -judgement (intellectual judgement) to objects of beauty"; an acquired -facility of the intellect (of which Herder outlines the genesis).[66] -The poet is poet not only in his imagination but in his intellect. -In 1782 he writes: "The barbarous name Æsthetic of recent invention -indicates nothing beyond a section of Logic: that which we call taste -is neither more nor less than a quick and rapid judgement which does -not exclude truth and profundity, but rather presupposes and promotes -them. All didactic poetry is nothing more than philosophy rendered -sensible: the fable as exposition of a general doctrine is truth in -act, in activity.... When expounded and applied to human affairs, -Philosophy is not only a fine art in herself (_schöne Wissenschaft,_) -but the mother of Beauty: it is only through her that Rhetoric and -Poetry can ever be educational, useful, or in the truest sense -pleasant."[67] - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy of language._] - -Herder and Hamann deserve our gratitude for having brought a current of -fresh air into the study of the philosophy of language. The lead given -by the Port-Royal authors had been followed since the beginning of -the century by many writers of logical or general grammars. According -to the French Encyclopædia, "_La grammaire générale est la science -raisonnée des principes immuables et généraux de la parole prononcée -ou écrite dans toutes les langues_,"[68] and d'Alembert spoke of -grammarians of invention and grammarians of memory, assigning to the -former the duty of studying the metaphysics of grammar.[69] General -grammars had been written by Du Marsais, De Beauzée, and Condillac -in France; Harris in England; and many others.[70] But what was the -relation between general grammar and particular grammars? If logic be -one, how comes it that languages are many? Is the variety of tongues -but a deviation on their part from one single model? And, if there be -no such deviation or error, what is the explanation of the fact? What -is language, and how was it born? If language be external to thought, -how can thought exist if not in language? "_Si les hommes_," says -Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "_ont eu besoin de la parole pour apprendre -à penser, ils ont eu bien plus besoin encore de savoir penser pour -trouver l'art de la parole_"; appalled at the difficulty, he declares -his conviction "_de l'impossibilité presque démontrée que les langues -aient pu naître et s'établir par des moyens purement humains._"[71] -Such questions became fashionable; books on the origin and formation -of language were written by de Brosses (1765) and Court de Gébelin -(1776) in France, by Monboddo (1774) in England, Süssmilch (1766) and -Tiedemann in Germany, and Cesarotti (1785) in Italy, and by others -who had some slight acquaintance with Vico, but profited little by -it.[72] None of the above-named writers was able to free himself of -the notion that speech was either natural and mechanical, or else a -symbol attached to thought: whereas in fact it was impossible to solve -the difficulties under which they were labouring except by dropping -the notion of a sign or symbol and attaining the conception of the -active and expressive imagination, verbal imagination, language as -the expression not of intellect but of intuition. An approach towards -this explanation was made by Herder in a brilliant and imaginative -thesis in 1770 upon this subject of the origin of language, chosen -for discussion by the Berlin Academy. In it he says that language is -the reflexion or consciousness (_Besonnenheit_) of man. "Man shows -reflexion when he puts forth freely such force of mind as enables him -to make selection from amongst the crowd of sensations by which he is -assailed: from the ocean of the senses, so to speak, to select a single -wave and consciously to watch it. He shows reflexion when, amidst the -thronging chaos of images which pass before him as in a dream, he can -in a waking moment collect himself and fasten his attention upon a -single image, examine it calmly and clearly, and separate it from its -neighbours. Once again, man shows reflexion when he is able not merely -to grasp vividly and clearly all the properties of an image, but also -to recognize one or more of its distinctive properties." The language -of man "does not depend on the organization of the mouth, for even he -who is dumb from birth has, if he reflects, a language; it is not a -cry of the senses, since it resides in a reflective creature, not in a -breathing machine; it is not an affair of imitation, since imitation -of nature is a means, and we are here trying to explain the end: much -less is it an arbitrary convention; a savage in the depths of the -forest would have had to create a language for himself even though he -never used it. Language is an understanding of the soul with herself, -necessary just in so far as man is man."[73] Here language begins to -show itself no longer as purely mechanical or as something derived -from arbitrary choice and invention, but as a creative activity and a -primary affirmation of the activity of the human mind. Herder's essay -may not state such a view unequivocally, but it points forward to such -a conclusion in a striking way for which its author has not received -the credit he deserves. Hamann, in reviewing his friend's theories, -agreed with him in denying the origin of language by invention or -arbitrary choice; while dwelling also on the liberty of man, he -regarded language as something which man could only have learned by -means of a mystical _communicatio idiomatum_ from God.[74] That, too, -was one way of recognizing that the mystery of language is not to be -solved except by placing it in the forefront of the problem of the -spirit. - - -[1] Vico, _Opere, ed. cit._ iv. p. 305. - -[2] Herder, _Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität,_ 1793-1797, Letter -59; Goethe, _Italien. Reise,_ Mar. 5, 1787. - -[3] Letters from Wolf to Cesarotti, June 5, 1802; in Cesarotti, -_Opere,_ vol. xxxviii. pp. 108-112; cf. _ibid._ pp. 43-44, and vol. -xxxvii. pp. 281, 284, 324; cf. on the question of the relations between -Wolf and Vico, Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana,_ pp. 51, 56-58, and -_Supplem._ pp. 12-14. - -[4] Letter in French to Mme. Ferrant (1719), and to the Marquis Maffei -in _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. (1756), pp. lxxxv.-civ., cviii.-cix. - -[5] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. i., 1739, pref. - -[6] Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) was an Irishman. Croce's mistake is -probably due to the fact that he studied and taught at Glasgow, or that -his family was ultimately of Scottish origin.--TR. - -[7] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. pp. clxxi.-clxxvii. - -[8] See above, pp. 184-185. - -[9] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. pp. 242-246. - -[10] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 249. - -[11] _Op. cit._ ii. pp. 252-253. - -[12] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. pp. 233-234. - -[13] _Op. cit._ i. pref. - -[14] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 127. - -[15] _Op. cit._ i. p. xliii. - -[16] Fr. Sav. Quadrio, _Della storia e della ragione d' ogni poesia,_ -Bologna, 1739, vol. i. part i. dist. i. ch. 1. - -[17] Fr. M. Zanotti, _Dell' arte poetica, ragionamenti cinque,_ -Bologna, 1768. - -[18] On Ossian, _Opere,_ vols, ii.-v.; on Homer, vols, vi.-x.; _Saggio -copra il diletto della tragedia,_ vol. xxix. pp. 117-167; _Saggio sul -bello,_ vol. xxx. pp. 13-70; on _Filosofia del gusto,_ vol. i.; on -_Eloquenza,_ lecture, vol. xxxi. - -[19] _Opere,_ vol. xl. p. 49. - -[20] _Ibid._ p. 55. - -[21] Letter from Corniani to Cesarotti, November 21, 1790, in _Opere,_ -vol. xxxvii. p. 146. - -[22] _Saggio sopra le istituzioni scolastiche, private e pubbliche,_ in -_Opere,_ vol. xxix. pp. 1-116. - -[23] Letter of March 30, 1764, in _Opere,_ vol. xxxv. p. 202. - -[24] Saverio Bettinelli, _Dell' entusiasmo nelle belle arti, 1769,_ in -_Opere,_ iii. pp. xi.-xiii. - -[25] Fr. M. Pagano, _De' saggi politici,_ Naples, 1783-1785, vol. i. -Appendix to § 1, "Sull' origine e natura della poesia"; vol. ii. § 6, -"Del gusto e delle belle arti." - -[26] See above, p. 217. - -[27] _Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften,_ Halle, 1748-1750. - -[28] _Auszug aus den Anfangsgründe,_ etc., _ibid._ 1758. - -[29] _Betrachtungen über den ersten Grundsätzen aller schönen Künste u. -Wissenschaften, ibid._ 1757. - -[30] Preface to 2nd ed. (1768) of vol. ii. of _Anfangsgründe,_ and -_Betrachtungen, cit.,_ esp. §§ 1, 2, 34. - -[31] Preface to vol. i., and cf. § 5. - -[32] In a letter to Gottsched, 1747, in Danzel, _Gottsched,_ p. 215. - -[33] _Anfangsgründe,_ § 23. - -[34] _Op. cit._ § 92. - -[35] _Op. cit._ § 49. - -[36] _Op. cit._ § 55. - -[37] _Op. cit._ §§ 355-370. - -[38] _Op. cit._ §§ 529-540. - -[39] _Op. cit._ § 5. - -[40] _Op. cit._ § 413. - -[41] Anfangsgründe, §§ 541-670. - -[42] Betrachtungen, § 20. - -[43] Op. cit. § 21. - -[44] _Briefe über die Empfindungen,_ 1755 (in _Opere filosofiche,_ -Ital. trans., Parma, 1800, vol. ii.). Letters 2, 5, 11. - -[45] _Betrachtungen üb. d. Quellen d. sch. Wiss. u. K.,_ 1757, later -entitled _Über die Hauptgrundsätze,_ etc., 1761, in _Opere, ed. cit._ -ii. pp. 10, 12-15, 21-30. - -[46] J. E. Schlegel, _Von der Nachahmung,_ 1742; cf. Braitmaier, -_Gesch. d. poet. Th._ i. p. 249 _sqq._ - -[47] Koller, _Entwurf,_ p. 103. - -[48] _Die ersten Grundsätze der schönen Kunst überhaupt, und der -schönen Schreibart insbesondere,_ Bonn, 1790; cf. Sulzer, i. p. 55, and -Koller, pp. 55-56. - -[49] See Bibliographical Appendix. - -[50] _Entwurf zur Geschichte u. Literatur d. Ästhetik,_ etc., -Regensburg. 1799; see Bibl. App. - -[51] Koller, _op. cit._ p. 7. - -[52] Notices and extracts in Sulzer and Koller, _opp. citt._ - -[53] Joh. Aug. Eberhard, _Theorie der schönen Künste u. -Wissenschaften,_ Halle, 1783; reprinted 1789, 1790. - -[54] Joh. Joach. Eschenburg, _Entwurf einer Theorie u. Literatur d. s. -W.,_ Berlin, 1783; reprinted 1789. - -[55] Allgem. Th. d. sch. Künste, on words Schön, Schönheit, Wahrheit, -Werke des Geschmacks, etc. - -[56] Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, _System der Ästhetik,_ vol. i., -Leipzig, 1790, esp. pp. 149-154. 367-385. 385-392. - -[57] _Kritische Wälder oder Betrachtungen über die Wissenschaft und -Kunst des Schönen,_ Fourth Forest, 1769, in _Sämmtliche Werke,_ ed. B. -Suphan, Berlin, 1878, vol. iv. pp. 19, 21, 27. - -[58] _Kritische Wälder, loc. cit._ pp. 22-27. - -[59] Fragment, _Von Baumgarten Denkart_; and cf. _op. cit._ pp. 132-133. - -[60] _Æsthetica in mice,_ in _Kreuzzüge des Philologen,_ Königsberg, -quoted in Herder, _Werke,_ xii. 145. - -[61] See above, p. 235. - -[62] _Kaligone,_ 1800, in _Werke, ed. cit.,_ xii. pp. 145-150. - -[63] _Kaligone,_ pp. 34-55. - -[64] _Ibid._ pp. 308-317. - -[65] _Kritische Wälder, loc. cit._ iv. pp. 47-127. - -[66] _Op. cit._ pp. 27-36. - -[67] _Sophron,_ 1782, § 4. - -[68] _Encyclopédie, ad verb._ - -[69] _Éloge de Du Marsais,_ 1756 (introd. to _Œuvres de Du Marsais,_ -Paris, 1797, vol. i.). - -[70] Du Marsais, _Méthode raisonnée,_ 1722; _Traité des tropes,_ -1730; _Traité de grammaire générale_ (in _Encyclopédie_); De Beauzée, -_Grammaire générale pour servir de fondement à l'étude de toutes les -langues,_ 1767; Condillac, _Grammaire française,_ 1755; J. Harris, -_Hermes, or a Philosophical Enquiry concerning Language and Universal -Grammar,_ 1751. - -[71] _Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes,_ 1754. - -[72] De Brosses, _Traité de la formation mécanique des langues,_ 1765; -Court de Gébelin, _Histoire naturelle de la parole,_ 1776; Monboddo, -_Origin and Progress of Language,_ 1774; Süssmilch, _Beweis dass der -Ursprung der menschlichen Sprache göttlich sei,_ 1766; Tiedemann, -_Ursprung der Sprache;_ Cesarotti, _Saggio sulla filosofia delle -lingue,_ 1785 (in _Opere,_ vol. i.); D. Colao Agata, _Piano, ovvero -ricerche filosofiche sulle lingue,_ 1774; Soave, _Ricerche intorno all' -istituzione naturale d'una società e d'una lingua,_ 1774. - -[73] _Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache,_ in a small book _Zwei -Preisschriften,_ etc. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1789), esp. pp. 60-65. - -[74] Steinthal, _Ursprung der Sprache,_ 4th ed., pp. 39-58. - - - - -VII - - -OTHER ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE SAME PERIOD - - -[Sidenote: _Other writers of the eighteenth century: Batteux._] - -A great medley of heterogeneous ideas is noticeable among other writers -on Æsthetic during the same period. In 1746 appeared a little volume -by Abbé Batteux bearing the attractive title of _The Fine Arts reduced -to a Single Principle,_ in which the author attempted a unification -of all the different rules laid down by the writers of treatises. All -such rules (says Batteux) are branches emerging from one trunk; he who -possesses the simple principle will be able to deduce the rules one by -one without entangling himself in their mass, which can but involve him -in endless coils. The author had passed in review the _Ars Poetica_ of -Horace and that of Boileau, and the works of Rollin, Dacier, le Bossu -and d'Aubignac; but had found real help only in Aristotle's principle -of imitation, which he thought could be easily and strikingly applied -to poetry, painting, music and the art of gesture. But suddenly the -Aristotelian principle of imitation yields place to a wholly new -rendering, namely the "imitation of natural _beauty._" The business -of art is to "select the most beautiful parts of nature in order to -frame them into an exquisite whole which shall be more beautiful than -nature's self, without ceasing to be natural." Now, what may this -greater perfection, this beautiful nature, be? On one occasion Batteux -identifies it with truth: but "with the truth which may be; with -beauty-truth, which is represented as though it really existed with all -the perfections it could possibly receive," recalling one example from -the ancients in the Helen of Zeuxis, and one from the moderns in the -_Misanthrope_ of Molière. In another place he explains that beautiful -nature, _"tum ipsius (obiecti) naturæ, tum nostræ convenit," i.e._ that -it has the closest connexion with our own perfection, our advantage -and our interest, and is, at the same time, perfect in itself. The -aim of imitation is "to please, to move, to soften, in one word, to -delight"; so beautiful nature must be interesting and furnished with -unity, variety, symmetry and proportion. Embarrassed by the question -of artistic imitation of things naturally ugly or objectionable, -Batteux falls back on saying, as Castelvetro had said before him, that -displeasing objects please when imitated, since imitation, being always -imperfect, in comparison with the reality, cannot excite the horror and -disgust aroused by the latter. From pleasure he deduces the other aim -of utility: if the aim of poetry be to give pleasure, and "pleasure -by moving the passions, then in order to give a perfect and enduring -pleasure it ought to rouse such passions only as it is well to excite, -not those inimical to goodness."[1] - -[Sidenote: _The English: W. Hogarth._] - -It is difficult to string together a more insubstantial mass of -contradictions. But Batteux is rivalled and outdone by the English -philosophers or rather scribblers on Æsthetic or rather on things in -general which sometimes accidentally include æsthetic facts. Happening -to find in Lomazzo some words attributed to Michæl Angelo on the beauty -of shapes, Hogarth the artist took into his head the idea that the -figurative arts can be regulated by a special principle which can be -expressed in a particular fine.[2] Filled with this discovery, in 1745 -he designed a frontispiece for a volume of his engravings; it depicted -a painter's palette scored across with an undulating line and the words -_The Line of Beauty._ Public curiosity was immediately aroused by this -hieroglyphic, to be satisfied a little later by the publication of -his book _The Analysis of Beauty_ (1753).[3] In this he combated the -mistake of judging pictures either by the subject or the excellence of -the imitation instead of by their form, which is the true essential -of art and is composed "of symmetry, variety, uniformity, simplicity, -intricacy and quantity; all things which co-operate in the production -of beauty, correcting and restraining each other as required."[4] -But immediately afterwards Hogarth proclaims that there must also be -correspondence and agreement with the thing copied; for "regularity, -uniformity and symmetry give pleasure in so far only as they serve -to give the illusion of faithful correspondence."[5] Further on, the -reader learns that "amongst the immense variety of undulating lines -which may be conceived, there is but one which truly merits the name of -the Line of Beauty, and this is a precisely serpentine line which may -be called the Line of Grace."[6] Again, we are told that intricacy of -lines is beautiful because "the active mind likes to be engaged," and -the eye delights in being "guided in a sort of hunt."[7] A straight -line has no beauty, and the pig, the bear, the spider and the toad are -ugly because devoid of undulating lines.[8] The ancients showed much -judgement in the management and grouping of lines, "varying from the -precise line of grace only on those occasions when the character or -action demanded."[9] - -[Sidenote: _E. Burke._] - -With similar indecision Edmund Burke wavers between the principle -of imitation and other heterogeneous or imaginary principles in his -book, _An Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the -Beautiful_ (1756). He observes, "Natural properties contained in an -object give pleasure or displeasure to the imagination: beyond this, -however, imagination may delight in the likeness of a copy to its -original"; he asserts that from "these two reasons" arises the whole -pleasure of imagination.[10] - -Without dwelling further on the second, he proceeds to a lengthy -discussion of the natural qualities which should be found in an object -of sensible beauty: "Firstly, comparative smallness; secondly, smooth -surface; thirdly, variety in disposition of the parts; fourthly, that -it have no angularity, all lines fusing one in another; fifthly, a -structure of great delicacy betraying no signs of violence; sixthly, -vivid colouring without glare or harshness; seventhly, if it have any -glaring colour, let it be different from the background." These are the -properties of beauty working in harmony with nature and least liable to -suffer from caprice and differences of taste.[11] - -[Sidenote: _H. Home._] - -These books of Hogarth and Burke are generally described as classical; -if so, they belong to the type of classic that fails to convince. To -a somewhat higher type belongs the _Elements of Criticism_ (1761) -of Henry Home, Lord Kaimes, who seeks "the true principles of the -fine arts" with the object of converting criticism into "a rational -science," and to this end chooses "the upward path of facts and -experiments." Home confines himself to feelings derived from objects -of sight and hearing, which, in so far as unaccompanied by desires, -are more truly described as simple feelings (emotions, not passions). -These occupy a middle position between mere sense-impressions and -intellectual or moral ideas, and are therefore akin to both; and it is -from these that the pleasures of beauty are derived. Beauty is divided -into beauty of relation and intrinsic beauty.[12] Of the latter, Home's -only account is that regularity, simplicity, uniformity, proportion, -order and other pleasing qualities have been "so disposed by the Author -of nature in order to increase our happiness here on earth which, as -is clearly shown in numberless instances, is not foreign to his care." -This notion is confirmed when he reflects that "our taste for such -details is not accidental, but uniform and universal, being a very -part of our nature"; adding that "regularity, uniformity, order and -simplicity help to facilitate perception and make it possible for us -to form clearer conception of objects than it would be possible to -gain by the most earnest attention were such qualities not present." -Proportions are often combined with a view to utility, "as we see that -the best proportioned amongst animals are also the strongest; but there -are also many examples in which this conjunction does not hold good"; -wherefore the wisest plan "is to rest content with the final cause just -mentioned: that of the increase of our happiness intended by the Author -of nature."[13] In his _Essay on Taste_ (1758) and on _Genius_ (1774) -Alexander Gérard employs by turns, according to the various forms of -art, the principles of association, of direct pleasure, of expression, -and even of moral sense: the same kind of explanation reappears in -another _Essay on Taste_ by Alison (1792). - -[Sidenote: _Eclecticism and sensationalism. E. Platner._] - -It is impossible to classify works of such calibre, almost wholly -lacking as they are in scientific method; on each page their writers -pass from physiological sensationalism to moralism; from the imitation -of nature to mysticism and transcendent finalism without the slightest -sense of incongruity. It would be absurd to take them seriously; in -comparison it is almost refreshing to come across a frank hedonist -in the German, Ernst Plainer, who interpreted Hogarth's inquiry into -lines after a fashion of his own and was unable to see anything in -æsthetic facts except a reverberation of sexual pleasure. Where can we -find a beauty, he asks, that is not derived from the female figure, -the centre of all beauty? Undulating lines are beautiful because -found in a woman's body; beautiful are all movements distinctively -feminine; beautiful the tones of music melting one into another; -beautiful the poem where one thought embraces another with tenderness -and facility.[14] Condillac's sensationalism had already shown -itself wholly incapable of understanding æsthetic productivity; the -associationism especially promoted by the work of Hume fared no better. - -[Sidenote: _Fr. Hemsterhuis._] - -The Dutchman Hemsterhuis considered beauty as a phenomenon born of -the meeting between sensibility, which gives multiplicity, and the -internal sense, which tends to unity; hence the beautiful is "that -which exhibits the greatest number of ideas in the shortest time." Man, -to whom it is not permitted to attain ultimate unity, finds in beauty -an approximate unity which gives him a pleasure somewhat analogous -with the joy of love. This theory of Hemsterhuis, in which elements of -mysticism and sensationalism mingle with glimpses of truth, developed -later into the sentimentalism of Jacobi, for whom the totality of Truth -and Goodness and even the Supersensible itself are sensibly present to -the soul in the form of beauty.[15] - -[Sidenote: _Neo-Platonism and mysticism. Winckelmann._] - -Platonism or, more accurately, neo-Platonism was revived by the creator -of the history of figurative art, Winckelmann (1764). Contemplation -of the masterpieces of antique plastic art, and the impression of -superhuman loftiness and divine indifference which they create all -the more irresistibly because we cannot reawaken the life they once -possessed or understand their real significance, led Winckelmann, and -others with him, to the conception of a Beauty which, descending from -the seventh heaven of the divine Idea, embodied itself in works of this -description. Baumgarten's follower Mendelssohn had denied the enjoyment -of beauty to God: the neo-Platonist Winckelmann gave it back to him and -lodged it in his bosom. - -[Sidenote: _Beauty and lack of significance._] - -"Wise men who have meditated upon the causes of universal Beauty, -seeking her amongst created things and trying to gain the contemplation -of Supreme Beauty, have placed it in the perfect harmony of creatures -with their ends and of their parts with one another. But as this is -equivalent to perfection, which man is incapable of attaining, our -concept of universal beauty remains indeterminate, and arises by means -of particular cognitions which, when accurately collected and fitted -together, give us the highest idea we can attain of human beauty, -which we elevate in proportion as we raise it above matter. But, -again, since the Creator deals out perfection to all his creatures -in the proportion that befits them, and since every concept rests -on some cause which must be sought outside the concept itself, the -cause of Beauty which is to be found in every created thing cannot -be sought in anything outside these created things. For this reason, -and because our cognitions are comparative concepts, whereas Beauty -cannot be compared with anything higher, it is difficult to attain a -distinct and universal cognition of Beauty."[16] The only way out of -this difficulty and others like it is the recognition that "supreme -beauty resides in God": "the concept of human beauty becomes the more -perfect in proportion as it can be thought more in conformity and -agreement with supreme Being, which is distinguished from matter by -its own unity and indivisibility. This conception of Beauty is as a -spirit which, freed by fire from the prison of matter, strives to -conjure up a creature in the likeness of the first reasonable creature -formed by the divine intelligence. The forms of such an image are -simple and continuous and within this unity they are varied and for -that very reason harmonious."[17] 2 To these characteristics is added -"lack of significance" (_Unbezeichnung_), since supreme beauty cannot -be described with points or fines different from those which alone -can constitute that beauty; its form "is not peculiar to this or that -determinate person, neither does it express any state of feeling or -sensation of passion, things which disturb unity and overcloud beauty." -Winckelmann concludes: "We look upon Beauty as a purest water drawn -from the centre of the spring; the less taste it has the higher it is -esteemed because free from all impurities."[18] - -To perceive pure beauty, a special faculty is required, which certainly -is not sense, but may perhaps be intellect or even, as Winckelmann -says, "a fine internal sense" free from all intentions or passions -of instinct, inclination or pleasure. Having asserted beauty to be -something supersensible, it is not surprising that Winckelmann should -wish, if not wholly to exclude colour, at least to reduce it to a -minimum, and treat it not as a constitutive element in beauty but as -secondary and ancillary.[19] True beauty is given in form: by which he -means line and surface, forgetting that these are only apprehended by -the senses, and could not be seen without being in some way coloured. - -[Sidenote: _Winckelmann's contradictions and compromises._] - -When error refuses to retire, hermit-like, to the narrow cell of a -brief aphorism, it finds itself condemned to self-contradiction in -order to live at all in the world of concrete facts and problems. -Although composed with a view to stating a theory, the work of -Winckelmann always led him among concrete historical facts clamouring -to be brought into relation with his formally stated idea of supreme -beauty. In his admission of line-drawing and his further admission, on -a lower plane, of colour, we have two compromises already; to which -a third is added in his principle of Expression. "Since human nature -has no state intermediate between pain and pleasure" and as living -creature without such feelings is inconceivable, "the human figure must -be represented in a condition of action and passion, which artists -call expression." Hence Winckelmann, after dealing with Beauty, goes -on to treat of Expression.[20] He then found himself obliged to effect -a fourth compromise between the single constant supreme beauty and -individual beauties; for while he preferred the male to the female body -as a completer embodiment of perfect beauty, he could not shut his eyes -to the obvious fact that we know and admire beautiful women's bodies -and even beautiful animals' bodies. - -[Sidenote: _A. R. Mengs._] - -Friend and, in a sense, collaborator of Winckelmann was Raphæl Mengs -the artist, no less eager than his archæological fellow-countryman to -understand the nature of that beauty which the one studied as a critic -while the other produced it as a painter. Remarking, writes Mengs, -that of the two chief duties of a painter, the imitation of appearances -and the selection of the most beautiful objects, much has been written -on the former, while the latter "has scarcely been touched by the -modems, who would have been ignorant of the art of drawing were it -not for the statues of ancient Greece";[21] pondering this, "I read, -asked and looked at everything likely to throw light on the subject, -but never was I satisfied; either they spoke of beautiful things or -of qualities which are the attributes of beauty, or they pretended to -explain, as the saying is, the obscure by the more obscure, or even -confused the beautiful with the pleasing: so that finally I determined -to search for the nature of beauty on my own account."[22] One of his -works on this subject was published during his lifetime by the advice -and assistance of Winckelmann (1761); many others appeared posthumously -(1780), all were reprinted several times and translated into several -languages. In his _Dreams of Beauty_ he says, "I have been sailing -a long time on a vast sea seeking the understanding of beauty, and -still I am far from any shore and in great doubt how to shape my -course: gazing around, my sight is confounded by the immensity of the -subject."[23] In truth it seems as though Mengs never arrived at a -formula satisfactory to himself, although he conformed more or less to -Winckelmann's doctrine that "beauty consists in material perfection -according to our ideas; and since God alone is perfect, beauty is -divine"; it is the "visible idea of perfection" and stands in the same -relation to it as does a visible to a mathematical point. Our ideas -proceed from the purposes which the Creator has willed to fulfil in -various things; hence the multiplicity of beauties. In general, Mengs -finds the types of things in natural species: _e.g._ "a stone, of -which we have the idea that it should be uniform in colour"; which" -is called ugly if it happen to be spotted"; or a child "would be -ugly if he were like a man of mature age, just as a man is ugly when -shaped like a woman, and a woman when she is like a man." He adds -surprisingly, "As among stones there is but one perfect species, the -diamond; among metals, gold; and among animated creatures, man only; so -there is difference and distinction in every order, and very rarely is -there perfection."[24] In his _Dreams of Beauty_ he considers beauty -as "a middle disposition, including perfection on the one hand and -the pleasing on the other"; in reality it is a third thing, differing -from perfection and the pleasing, and deserving a special name for -itself.[25] The art of painting arises from four sources: beauty, -significant or expressive character, the pleasing united to harmony, -and colouring. Mengs finds the first amongst the ancients, the second -in Raphæl, the third in Correggio and the fourth in Titian.[26] From -this empirical studio-gossip he rouses himself to exclaim, "The force -of beauty so transports me that I will tell thee, reader, what I -feel. All nature is beautiful, and so is virtue; beautiful are forms -and proportions; beautiful are appearances and beautiful the causes -thereof; more beautiful is reason, most beautiful of all is the great -first cause."[27] - -[Sidenote: _G. E. Lessing._] - -An attenuated, that is to say, a less metaphysical, echo of -Winckelmann's theory is found in Lessing (1766), who infused a new -spirit into the literature and social life of the Germany of his time. -According to Lessing the aim of art is "delight"; and since delight is -a "superfluous thing" it seems reasonable that the legislator should -not allow to art that liberty which is indispensable to science in -her search for truth, the soul's necessity. For the Greeks painting -was what by its nature it ought to be, "the imitation of beautiful -bodies." "Its (Hellenic) cultivator represented nothing but the -beautiful: common beauty of a low grade served him as an accidental -subject, an exercise, a diversion. The attractiveness of his work -must depend simply and solely on the perfection of his subject: he -was far too true an artist to wish his audience to content itself -with the barren pleasure arising from mere resemblance or from the -inspection of skilful workmanship: nothing in his art was dearer to -him, nothing seemed more noble, than the end at which it aimed."[28] -Pictorial representation must exclude everything unpleasing or ugly; -"painting as imitation may express ugliness: painting as a fine art -will refuse to do so: all visible objects belong to art taken under -the former title: the latter may claim only such objects as awaken -pleasing sensations." If, on the contrary, ugliness may be represented -by the poet, the reason is this: poetic description "conveys a less -displeasing sense of bodily malformation which, in the end, almost -loses its character as such; unable to use it for itself, the poet -uses it as a means to provoke certain mixed feelings (the ridiculous, -the terrible), in which we are content to remain, in the absence of -any purely pleasant feelings."[29] In his _Dramaturgie_ (1767) Lessing -takes his stand upon the Aristotelian _Poetics_: it is well known that -not only did he approve of rules in general but he believed those -laid down by Aristotle to be as incontrovertible as the theorems of -Euclid. His polemic against French writers and critics is waged in the -name of probability, not to be confounded with historical accuracy. -He understood the universal as a sort of average of what appears in -individuals, and catharsis as a conversion of passions into virtuous -dispositions, asserting it as beyond doubt that the aim of all -poetry is to inspire a love for virtue.[30] He follows the example -of Winckelmann in introducing the concept of ideal beauty into the -doctrine of figurative art: "expression of corporeal beauty is the aim -of painting: therefore supreme beauty of body is the supreme aim of -art. But this supreme beauty of body is found in man only, and for -him it exists only through the ideal. This ideal may be found among -the brute creation in inferior degree; but is entirely absent from -vegetable or inanimate nature." Landscape and flower painters are not -really artists because "they imitate beauties possessed of no ideal: -whereby they work by eye and hand alone, genius having little or no -part in their compositions." Nevertheless, Lessing prefers a landscape -painter to "the painter of historic pieces who, instead of making -beauty his aim, merely depicts a crowd in order to show his cunning in -simple expression, not in expression subordinate to beauty."[31] The -ideal of bodily beauty then consists "chiefly in the ideal of form, -but also in that of texture of the flesh, and in that of permanent -expression. Mere colouring and transitory expression have no ideal -since nature herself has placed no indelible seal upon them."[32] At -the bottom of his heart Lessing dislikes colour; and when he finds -the pen-sketches of painters showing "a life, a freedom, a brilliancy -never to be found in their painted pictures," he asks himself "whether -the most marvellous colouring can compensate so heavy a loss," and -whether it is not to be wished "that painting in oils had never been -invented"?[33] - -[Sidenote: _Theorists of ideal beauty._] - -Ideal beauty, that curious alliance between God and the subtle outline -traced with pen or graver, that cold academical mysticism, came into -fashion. In Italy (the home of Winckelmann and Mengs, who published -many of their works in Italian) it was much discussed by artists, -antiquaries and connoisseurs. The architect Francesco Milizia professed -himself a follower of "the principles of Sulzer and Mengs";[34] -the Spaniard d'Azara, living in Italy, edited and annotated Mengs, -adding his own definition of beauty: "The union of the perfect and -the pleasing made visible";[35] another Spaniard, Arteaga, one of -the many Jesuit refugees in Italy, wrote a treatise on _Ideal Beauty_ -(1789);[36] the Englishman Daniel Webb on coming to Rome and making -the acquaintance of Mengs seized upon the ideas he heard him express -on beauty, collected them and actually published them in a book -anticipating Mengs' own.[37] - -[Sidenote: _G. Spalletti and the characteristic._] - -The first voice of dissent from this doctrine of ideal beauty was -raised in 1764 by a small circle of Italians who asserted the -characteristic to be the principle of art. As such appears to -be the necessary interpretation of the little _Essay on Beauty_ -written by Guiseppe Spalletti in the form of a letter to Mengs, -with whom Spalletti had discussed the subject "in the solitudes of -Grottaferrata," and who had urged him to put all his thoughts in -writing.[38] Its polemical character, though not openly asserted, is -discernible in every page. "Truth in general, conscientiously rendered -by the artist, is the object of Beauty in general. When the soul finds -those characteristics which wholly converge upon the matter which the -work of art claims to represent, it judges that work beautiful. The -same is true of the works of nature: if the soul perceives a man of -fine proportions having the face of a lovely woman, which causes it to -doubt whether the object before it be man or woman, it esteems that man -ugly rather than the reverse, through deficiency of the characteristic -of truth; if this can be said of natural Beauty, how much more can -it be said of the Beauty of art." The pleasure given by Beauty is -intellectual, that is to say, it is the pleasure of apprehending -truth: when confronted by ugly things represented characteristically, -man "delights in having increased his cognitions": Beauty, "with its -property of supplying to the soul likeness, order, proportion, harmony -and variety, provides it with an immense field for the construction -of innumerable syllogisms, and by reasoning in this manner it will -take pleasure in itself, in the object which arouses such pleasure, and -in the feeling of its own perfection." Finally, the beautiful may be -defined as "the inherent modification of the object under observation -which presents it in the inevitably characteristic manner in which it -is bound to appear."[39] In contrast to the fallacious profundity of -Winckelmann and Mengs we welcome the sound good sense of this obscure -Spalletti, upholder of the Aristotelian position against the revived -neo-Platonism of the æstheticians. - -[Sidenote: _Beauty and the characteristic: Hirt, Meyer, Goethe._] - -Many years went by before a similar rebellion arose in Germany; at -length in 1797 the art-historian Ludwig Hirt, basing his case on -ancient works of art which depicted all things, even things utterly -vulgar and ugly, ventured to deny the view that ideal beauty is the -principle of art, and that expression has only a secondary place, above -which it must not rise for fear of disturbing ideal beauty. For the -ideal he substituted the characteristic, as a principle to be applied -equally to gods, heroes or animals. Character is "that individuality by -which form, movement, signs, physiognomy and expression, local colour, -fight, shade and chiaroscuro are distinguished and represented in the -manner demanded by the object."[40] Another historian of art, Heinrich -Meyer, who started from the position of Winckelmann and went on by -adopting a series of compromises, finally asserting an ideal of trees -and landscape side by side with the ideal of man and various other -animals, tried to find an intermediate position between this doctrine -and Hirt's, in the course of controversy with the latter. And Wolfgang -von Goethe, forgetful of his youthful days when he chanted the praises -of Gothic architecture, returning home from an Italian tour impregnated -with Greece and Rome in 1798, also sought a middle term between Beauty -and Expression; dwelling on the thought of certain characteristic -contents which should supply the artist with forms of beauty to be by -him remodelled and developed into complete beauty. The characteristic -was thus the mere point of departure, and beauty was simply the result -of the artist's elaboration: "we must start from the characteristic" -(says he) "in order to attain the beautiful."[41] - - -[1] _Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe,_ Paris, 1746; see esp. -part i. ch. 3; part ii. chs. 4, 5; part iii. ch. 3. - -[2] See above, p. 110. - -[3] _Analysis of Beauty,_ London, 1753 (Ital. trans., Leghorn, 1761). - -[4] _Op. cit._ p. 47. - -[5] _Op. cit._ p. 57. - -[6] _Op. cit._ p. 93. - -[7] _Op. cit._ pp. 61, 65. - -[8] _Analisi della bellezza,_ p. 91. - -[9] _Op. cit._ p. 176. - -[10] _Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the -Beautiful,_ 1756 (Ital. trans., Milan, 1804); cf. the preliminary -discourse on "Taste." - -[11] _Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the -Beautiful,_ part iii. § 18. - -[12] _Elements of Criticism,_ 1761, vol. i. introd. and chs. 1-3. - -[13] _Elements of Criticism,_ i. ch. 3, pp. 201-202. - -[14] _Neue Anthropologie,_ Leipzig, 1790, § 814, and the lectures on -Æsthetic published posthumously in 1836; cf. Zimmermann, _op. cit._ p. -204. - -[15] Zimmermann, _op. cit._ pp. 302-309; v. Stein, _Entstehung d. n. -Ästh._ p. 113. - -[16] _Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums,_ 1764 (in _Werke,_ Stuttgart, -1847, vol. i.), bk. iv. ch. 2, § 51, p. 131. - -[17] _Op. cit._ § 22, pp. 131-132. - -[18] _Op. cit._ § 23, p. 132. - -[19] _Geschichte,_ § 19, pp. 130-131. - -[20] _Op. cit._ bk. iv. ch. ii. § 24. - -[21] _Geschichte,_ bk. v. chs. ii. and vi. - -[22] Letter of January 2, 1778, _Opere,_ Rome, 1787 (reprinted Milan, -1836), ii. pp. 315-316. - -[23] _Opere,_ i. p. 206. - -[24] _Riflessioni sulla bellezza e sul gusto della pittura,_ in -_Opere,_ i. pp. 95, 100, 102-103. - -[25] _Opere,_ i. p. 197. - -[26] _Ibid._ p. 161. - -[27] _Ibid._ p. 206. - -[28] Laokoon, § 2. - -[29] Op. cit. §§ 23, 24. - -[30] Hamburg. Dramaturgie (ed. Göring, vols. xi. and xii.), passim, -esp. Nos. 11, 18, 24, 78, 89. - -[31] _Laokoon,_ appendix, § 31. - -[32] _Op. cit._ §§ 22, 23. - -[33] _Op. cit. ad fin._ p. 268. - -[34] _Dell' arte di vedere nelle belle arti del disegno secondo i -principi di Sulzer e di Mengs,_ Venice, 1871. - -[35] D'Azara, in Mengs, _Opere,_ i. p. 168. - -[36] _Investigaciones filosóficas sobre la belleza ideal, considerada -como objeto de todas las artes de imitación,_ Madrid, 1789. - -[37] _Ricerche su le bellezze della pittura_ (Ital. trans., Parma, -1804); cf. D'Azara, _Vita del Mengs,_ in _Opere,_ i. p. 27. - -[38] _Saggio sopra la bellezza,_ dated "Grottaferrata, July 14, 1764," -and published at Rome, 1765, anonymously. - -[39] _Saggio,_ esp. §§ 3, 12, 15, 17, 19, 34. - -[40] _Über das Kunstschöne,_ in the review _Die Horen,_ 1797; cf. -Hegel, _Vorles. ii. Ästh._ i. p. 24; and Zimmermann, _Gesch. d. Ästh._ -pp. 356-357. - -[41] Goethe, _Der Sammler und die Seinigen_ (in _Werke,_ ed. Goedecke, -vol. xxx.) - - - - -VIII - - -IMMANUEL KANT - - -[Sidenote: _I. Kant._] - -Of all these writers, Winckelmann and Mengs, Home and Hogarth, Lessing -and Goethe, none was a philosopher in the true sense of the word: not -even those who like Meier laid claim to the title, nor those who had -some gifts for philosophy like Herder or Hamann. After Vico, the next -European mind of real speculative genius is Immanuel Kant, who now -comes before us in his turn. - -[Sidenote: _Kant and Vico._] - -That Kant took up the problem of philosophy where Vico laid it down -(not, of course, in a directly historical, but in an ideal, sense) has -already been noted by others.[1] How far he made an advance upon his -predecessor and how far he failed to reach the same level it is not -here our business to inquire; we must confine ourselves strictly to the -consideration of Æsthetic questions. - -Summarizing the results of such a consideration, we may say at once -that though Kant holds an immensely important place in the development -of German thought; though the book containing his examination of -æsthetic facts is among his most influential works; and though in -histories of Æsthetic written from the German point of view, which -ignore practically the whole development of European thought from the -sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Kant can pose as the man who -discovered the problem of Æsthetic or solved it or brought it within -sight of solution; yet in an unprejudiced and complete history whose -aim is to take broad views and to consider not the popularity of a -book or the historical importance of a nation but the intrinsic value -of ideas, the judgement passed on Kant must be very different. Like -Vico in the serious tenacity with which he reflected upon æsthetic -facts, more fortunate than he in having a much larger stock of material -gathered from preceding discussion and argument, Kant was at once -unlike and less successful than Vico in that he was unable to attain a -doctrine substantially true, and unable also to give his thoughts the -necessary system and unity. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of the concept of art in Kant and Baumgarten._] - -In fact, what was Kant's idea of art? Strange as our reply may -seem to those who recollect the explicit and insistent war waged -by him against the school of Wolff, and the concept of beauty as a -perfection confusedly perceived, we must assert that Kant's idea of -art was fundamentally the same as that of Baumgarten and the Wolffian -school.[2] In that school his mind had been trained; he always had a -great respect for Baumgarten whom in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ he -calls "that excellent analyst"; he chose the text of Baumgarten for -two of his University lectures on Metaphysics, and that of Meier for -his lecture on Logic (_Vernunftlehre_). Kant, like them, therefore -considered Logic and Æsthetic (or theory of art) as conjoined sciences. -They were thus described by him in his _Scheme of Lectures_ in 1765, -when he proposed, while expounding the critique of reason, to "throw a -glance at that of taste, that is to say, at Æsthetic, since the rules -of one apply to the other and each throws light upon the other." - -[Sidenote: _Kant's "Lectures."_] - -In his University lectures he distinguished æsthetic truth from logical -truth in the style of Meier; even citing the example of the beautiful -rosy face of a girl which, when seen distinctly, _i.e._ through a -microscope, ceases to be beautiful.[3] It is æsthetically true (said -he) that a man once dead cannot come to life again, although this -is in opposition to logic and moral truth: it is æsthetically true -that the sun plunges into the sea, but it is false logically and -objectively. To what degree it is necessary to combine logical truth -with æsthetic the learned have never yet been able to decide; not even -the greatest æstheticians. In order to become accessible, logical -concepts must assume æsthetic forms; a garb to be abandoned only in -the rational sciences which seek profundity. Æsthetic certainty is -subjective: it is content with authority, _i.e._ the citation of the -opinions of great men. On account of our weakness, for we are strongly -attached to the sensible, æsthetic perfection often helps us to render -our thoughts distinct. In this, examples and images co-operate; -æsthetic perfection is the vehicle for logical perfection; taste is -the analogue of intellect. There are logical truths which are not -æsthetic truths: and on the other hand we must exclude from abstract -philosophy exclamations and other sentimental commotions proper to the -other truth. Poetry is a harmonious play of thoughts and sensations. -Poetry and eloquence differ in this: in the former, thoughts adapt -themselves to sensations; in the latter the contrary is the case. -In these lectures Kant sometimes taught that poetry is anterior to -eloquence because sensations come before thoughts; and he observed -(perhaps under Herder's influence) that the poetry of Eastern peoples, -lacking concepts, is wanting in unity and taste although rich in -imaginative detail. Poetry formed out of the pure play of sensibility -is doubtless a possibility, _e.g._ love-poems: but true poetry disdains -such productions, concerned as they are with sensations which every one -knows ought to be expelled from our breasts. True poetry must strive -to present virtue and intellectual truth in sensible form, as has been -done by Pope in his _Essay on Man,_ in which he attempts to vivify -poetry by means of reason. On other occasions Kant definitely says that -logical perfection is the basis of every other, æsthetic perfection -being merely an adornment of the logical; something of the latter may -be omitted in order to appeal to the audience, but it must never be -disguised or falsified.[4] - -This is Baumgartenism pure and simple; unless we are prepared to look -on these Lectures as representing a pre-critical period of thought, -or an exoteric doctrine superseded eventually by Kant's own original -esoteric ideas in his _Critique of the Judgment_ (1790). Not to open -such a controversy, let us put these Lectures on one side (although -they often throw no little light on the signification of Kantian -phrases and formulæ), and refuse to raise the question what pages -of the _Critique of the Judgment_ are derived from Baumgarten and -Meier; he who reads the works of these disciples of Wolff and passes -immediately to the _Critique of Judgment_ often has the impression that -the atmosphere surrounding him is unchanged. But if the _Critique of -Judgment_ itself be examined without prejudice it will be seen that -Kant always adhered to Baumgarten's conception of art as the sensible -and imaginative vesture of an intellectual concept. - -[Sidenote: _Art in the "Critique of Judgment."_] - -According to Kant, art is not pure beauty wholly detached from the -concept, it is adherent beauty, which presupposes and attaches -itself to a concept.[5] This is the work of genius, the faculty of -representing æsthetic ideas. An æsthetic idea is "a representation of -the imagination which accompanies a given concept: a representation -conjoined with such truthful representation of particulars as to be -unable to find for it any expression that may mark a determinate -concept, thereby endowing the given concept with something of the -ineffable; a feeling which stimulates the cognitive faculties and -reinforcing the tongue, which is simply the letter, with the spirit." -Genius, then, has two constitutive elements, imagination and intellect; -it consists in "that happy disposition, which no science can teach or -diligence attain, to find ideas for a given concept and, also, to -select the expression by which the subjective commotion it excites -as accompaniment to a concept may be communicated to others." No -concept is adequate to the æsthetic idea, as no representation of the -imagination can ever possibly be adequate to the concept. Examples -of æsthetic attributes are found in the eagle of Jupiter with the -thunderbolt in its claws, and the peacock of the proud Queen of -Heaven: "they do not, like logical attributes, represent that which -is contained in our concepts of the sublimity or majesty of creation, -but something else which gives occasion to the imagination to run -riot over a multitude of kindred representations which make us think -more than we can express in a given concept by means of words, and -give us an æsthetic idea, which serves to this rational idea instead -of a logical representation, precisely with the aim of quickening our -feelings by throwing open to them a view over a vast field of kindred -representations." There are a _modus logicos_ and a _modus æstheticus_ -of expressing our thoughts: the first consists in following determinate -principles: the other in the mere feeling of the unity of the -representation.[6] To imagination, to intellect and to spirit (_Geist_) -we must add taste, the link between imagination and intellect.[7] Art -may therefore represent natural ugliness: artistic beauty "is not a -beautiful _thing_ but a beautiful representation of a thing": although -the representation of ugliness has limits varying with the individual -arts (a reminiscence of Lessing and Winckelmann), and an absolute limit -at the disgusting and nauseating, which kill representation itself.[8] -In natural things, too, there is adherent beauty which cannot be judged -by the æsthetic judgement alone but demands a concept. Nature thus -appears as a work of art, though superhuman art: "the teleological -judgement is the basis and condition of the æsthetic." When we say -"this is a beautiful woman," we merely mean that "nature beautifully -represents in the form of this woman her purpose in the construction -of the female body": it is necessary therefore, besides noting simple -form, to aim at a concept, "so that the object may be apprehended -through an æsthetic judgement logically conditioned."[9] By this -means is formed the ideal of beauty in the human face, the expression -of moral life.[10] Kant admits that there may also be artistic -productions without a concept, comparable with the free beauties of -nature, flowers and some birds (parrot, humming-bird, bird of paradise, -etc.): ornamental drawings, cornice-mouldings, musical fantasies -without words, represent nothing, no object reducible to a determined -concept, and must be reckoned among free beauties.[11] But does not -this necessitate their exclusion from true and proper art, from the -operation of genius in which fancy and intellect must both, according -to Kant, have a place? - -[Sidenote: _Imagination in Kant's system._] - -This is Baumgartenism transposed into a higher key, more concentrated, -more elaborated, more suggestive, until from moment to moment it seems -about to burst into a wholly different conception of art. But it is -still Baumgartenism, from whose intellectualistic bonds it never -escapes. Nor was escape possible. A profound concept of imagination was -entirely lacking to Kant's system and his philosophy of the spirit. -Glancing over the table of faculties of the spirit which precedes -his _Critique of Judgment,_ we see that Kant co-ordinates with it -the cognitive faculty, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the -appetitive faculty; to the first corresponds intellect, to the second, -judgement (teleological and æsthetic), to the third, reason;[12] he -finds no place for imagination amongst powers of the spirit but places -it among the facts of sensation. He knows a reproductive imagination -and an associative, but he knows nothing of a genuinely productive -imagination, imagination in the proper sense.[13] We have seen that, in -his doctrine, genius is the co-operation of several faculties. - -[Sidenote: _The forms of intuition and the Transcendental Æsthetic._] - -Yet sometimes Kant had an inkling that intellectual activity is -preceded by something which is not mere sensational material, but -is an independent non-intellectual theoretical form. He obtained a -glimpse of this latter form not when he was reflecting on art in the -strict sense but when he was examining the process of knowledge: he -does not treat of it in his _Critique of Judgment,_ but in the first -section of his _Critique of Pure Reason,_ in the first part of the -_Transcendental Doctrine of Elements._ He says here that sensations -only enter the spirit when the latter itself gives them form; a form -not identical with that which intellect gives to sensations, but -much simpler, namely pure intuition, the totality of the _a priori_ -principles of sensibility. There must therefore be "a science which -forms the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, -distinct from that which contains the principles of pure thought and is -named transcendental Logic." Now, what name does Kant confer upon this -science whose existence he has deduced? None other than Transcendental -Æsthetic (_die transcendentale Ästhetik_). In a note he even insists -that this is the right name for the new science of which he treats, and -censures the Germans for their habit of applying it to the Critique of -Taste, which, as he thought at that time, could never become a science. -Thus, he concludes, we approach more closely to the usage of the -ancients, among whom the distinction between _αἰσθητὰ καὶ νοητά_[14] -was well known. - -Nevertheless, after having so rightly postulated the necessity -for a science of the forms of sensation or pure intuition, purely -intuitive knowledge, Kant went on, simply because he had no exact idea -of the nature of the æsthetic faculty and of art, to fall into an -intellectualistic error by reducing the form of sensibility or pure -intuition into the two categories or functions of space and time, -and by asserting that the spirit emerges from the chaos of sensation -by organizing its sensations in space and time.[15] But space and -time as such are very far from being primitive categories; they are -relatively late and complex formations.[16] As examples of the matter -of sensation Kant quoted hardness, impenetrability, colour and so -forth. But the mind only recognizes colour and hardness in so far as it -has already given form to its sensations; considered as brute matter, -sensations fall outside the cognitive spirit, they are a limit; colour, -hardness, impenetrability and so on, when recognized, are already -intuitions, spiritual elaborations, the æsthetic activity in its -rudimentary manifestation. The characterizing or qualifying imagination -which is æsthetic activity ought to have occupied in the _Critique of -Pure Reason_ the pages devoted to the discussion of space and time, -and would thus have constituted a real Transcendental Æsthetic, a real -prologue to the transcendental Logic. In this manner Kant would have -achieved the truth aimed at by Leibniz and Baumgarten and would have -joined hands with Vico. - -[Sidenote: _Theory of Beauty distinguished by Kant from that of Art._] - -His repeatedly announced opposition to the school of Wolff concerns not -the concept of art but that of Beauty; two concepts for Kant entirely -distinct. First of all, he did not admit that sensation could be -called "confused knowledge," a confused form, that is, of intellectual -cognition; rightly judging this to be a false account of sensibility, -since a concept, however confused, is always a concept or a rough -sketch of a concept, never an intuition.[17] But he further denied that -pure beauty contained a concept, and therefore denied that it was a -perfection sensibly apprehended. These reflexions have no doubt some -connexion with those concerning the nature of art in the _Critique of -Judgment;_ but the connexion is far from close, still less are they -actually fused into a single whole. That Kant was minutely familiar -with eighteenth-century writers who had discussed beauty and taste is -shown by his Lectures, wherein they are all quoted and used.[18] Of -these the greater part, especially the English, were sensationalists, -others intellectualists; some few, as we have noted, were inclined -towards mysticism. Kant began by tending towards sensationalism -in æsthetic problems, then became the adversary of sensationalists -and intellectualists alike. This development can be traced in his -_Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime,_ as well as in his -Lectures; its final expression is reached in the _Critique of Judgment._ - -Of the four moments, as he calls them, _i.e._ the four determinations, -he accords to Beauty, the two negative are directed, one against the -sensationalists, the other against the intellectualists. "That is -beautiful which pleases _without interest_": "That is beautiful which -pleases _without concepts_."[19] Here he asserts the existence of a -spiritual region, distinct on one side from the pleasurable, the useful -and the good, and on the other from truth. But this region, as we know -very well, is not that of art, which Kant attaches to the concept: it -is the region of a special activity of feeling which he calls judgement -or, more exactly, æsthetic judgement. - -[Sidenote: _Mystical features in Kant's theory of Beauty._] - -The other two moments give some kind of a definition of this region: -"That is beautiful which has the form of finality without the -representation of an end": "That is beautiful which is the object of -universal pleasure."[20] What is this mysterious sphere? What this -disinterested pleasure we experience in pure colours and tones, in -flowers, and even in adherent beauty when we make abstraction from the -concept to which it adheres? - -Our answer is: there is no such sphere; it does not exist; the -examples given are instances either of pleasure in general or of -facts of artistic expression. Kant, who so emphatically criticizes -the sensationalists and the intellectualists, does not show the same -severity towards the neo-Platonic line of thought whose revival we -remarked in the eighteenth century. Winckelmann in particular exercised -strong influence over his mind. In one course of his Lectures we find -him making a curious distinction between form and matter: in music -melody is matter and harmony form: in a flower the scent is material -and the shape (_Gestalt)_ is form (_Form_).[21] This reappears -slightly modified in the _Critique of Judgment._ "In painting, -statuary and all the figurative arts in architecture and gardening, -so far as they are fine arts, the drawing is the essential; in which -the foundation of taste lies not in what gratifies (_vergnügt_) in -sensation, but in that which pleases (_gefällt_) by its form. The -colours which illuminate the drawing belong to sensuous stimulus -(_Reiz_) and may bring the object more vividly before the senses, but -do not render it worthy of contemplation as a thing of beauty; they -are, moreover, often limited by the exigencies of the beautiful form, -and even where their sensuous stimulus is legitimate, they are ennobled -only by the beautiful form."[22] Continuing in pursuit of this phantasm -of beauty which is not the beauty of art nor yet the pleasing, and is -equally detached from expressiveness and pleasure, Kant loses himself -in insoluble contradictions. Little inclined to submit himself to the -charm of imagination, abhorring "poetic philosophers" like Herder,[23] -he makes statements and refuses to commit himself to them, affirms -and immediately criticizes his affirmations, and wraps up Beauty in -a mystery which, at bottom, was nothing more than his own individual -incertitude and inability to see clearly the existence of an activity -of feeling which, in the spirit of his sane philosophy, represented a -logical contradiction. "Necessary and universal pleasure" and "finality -without the idea of an end" are the organized expression in words of -this contradiction. - -By way of clearing up the contradiction he arrives at the following -thought: "The judgement of taste is founded on a concept (the concept -of a general foundation of the subjective teleology of nature through -judgement); but it is a concept by which it is impossible to know or -demonstrate anything of the object, because the object in itself is -indeterminable and unsuited to cognition; on the other hand, it has -validity for every one (for every one, I say, in so far as it is an -individual judgement, immediately accompanying intuition), since its -determining reason reposes, perhaps, in the concept of that which may -be regarded as the supersensible substrate of mankind." Beauty, then, -is a symbol of morality. "The subjective principle alone, that is the -indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us, can be considered the -only key able to unlock this faculty springing from a source we cannot -fathom: excepting by its aid, no comprehension of it can possibly -be reached."[24] These cautious words, and all others here used by -Kant to conceal his thoughts, do not hide his tendency to mysticism. -A mysticism without conviction or enthusiasm, almost in spite of -himself, but very evident nevertheless. His inadequate grasp of the -æsthetic activity led him to see double, even triple, and caused the -unnecessary multiplication of his explanatory principles. Although he -was always ignorant of the genuine nature of the æsthetic activity, he -was indebted to it for suggesting to him the pure categories of space -and time as the Transcendental Æsthetic; it caused him to develop the -theory of imaginative embellishment of intellectual concepts by the -work of genius; finally it forced him to acknowledge a mysterious -faculty of feeling, midway between theoretical and practical activity, -cognitive and yet not cognitive, moral and indifferent to morality, -pleasing yet wholly detached from the pleasure of the senses. Great -use of this power was made by Kant's immediate successors in Germany -who were delighted to find their daring speculations supported by that -severe critic of experience, the philosopher of Königsberg. - - -[1] B. Spaventa, _Prolus. ed introd. alle lezioni di filosofia,_ -Naples, 1862 pp. 83-102; _Scritti filosofici,_ ed. Gentile, pp. -139-145, 303-307. - -[2] _Kritik d. rein. Vernunft_ (ed. Kirchmann), i. 1, § 1, note. - -[3] See above, p. 244. - -[4] Extract from Kant's lectures of 1764 and later, in O. Schlapp, -_Kant's Lehre vom Genie, passim,_ esp. pp. 17, 58, 59, 79, 93, 96, -131-134, 136-137, 222, 225, 231-232, etc. - -[5] _Kritik d. Urtheilskraft_ (ed. Kirchmann), § 16. - -[6] _Kritik d. Urth._ § 49. - -[7] _Op. cit._ § 50. - -[8] _Op. cit._ § 48. - -[9] _Krit. d. Urth._ § 48. - -[10] _Op. cit._ § 17. - -[11] _Op. cit._ § 16. - -[12] For the historical genesis of this tripartition, cf. remarks in -Schlapp, _op. cit._ pp. 150-153. - -[13] See also _Anthropol._ (ed. Kirchmann), §§ 26-31; cf. Schlapp, _op. -cit._ p. 296. - -[14] _Kritik d. rein. Vernunft,_ i. I, § 1 and note. - -[15] _Op. cit._ §§ 1-8. - -[16] See above, pp. 4-5. - -[17] _Krit. d. r. Vern._ § 8, and introd. to § ii.; cf. _Krit. d. -Urth._ § 15. - -[18] See catalogue in Schlapp, _op. cit._ pp. 403-404, and _passim._ - -[19] _Krit. d. Urth._ §§ 1-9. - -[20] _Op. cit._ §§ 10-22. - -[21] Schlapp, _op. cit._ p. 78. - -[22] _Krit. d. Urth._ § 14. - -[23] For Kant's judgement of Herder, see Schlapp, _op. cit._ pp. -320-327, note. - -[24] _Kritik d. Orth._ §§ 57-59. - - - - -IX - - -THE ÆSTHETIC OF IDEALISM: SCHILLER, SCHELLING, SOLGER, HEGEL - - - - -[Sidenote: _The "Critique of Judgment" and metaphysical idealism._] - -It is well known that Schelling held the _Critique of Judgment_ to be -the most important of the three Kantian _Critiques,_ and that Hegel -together with the great majority of the followers of metaphysical -idealism had a special affection for the book. According to them the -third _Critique_ was the attempt to bridge the gulf, to resolve the -antitheses between liberty and necessity, teleology and mechanism, -spirit and nature: it was the correction Kant was preparing for -himself, the concrete vision which dispelled the last traces of his -abstract subjectivism. - -[Sidenote: _F. Schiller._] - -The same admiration and an opinion even more favourable were extended -by them to Friedrich Schiller, the first to elaborate that part -of Kant's philosophy and to study the third sphere which united -sensibility to reason. "It was the artistic sense dwelling in his -also profoundly philosophical mind," says Hegel, "which, against the -abstract infinity of Kant's thought, against his living for duty, -against his conception of nature and reality, and of sense and feeling -as utterly hostile to intellect, asserted the necessity and enunciated -the principle of totality and reconciliation, even before it had been -recognized by professed philosophers: to Schiller must be allowed the -great merit of having been the first to oppose the subjectivity of -Kant, and of having dared try to go beyond it."[1] - -[Sidenote: _Relations between Schiller and Kant._] - -Discussion has raged around the true relation between Schiller and -Kant, and it has lately been maintained that his Æsthetic was not, as -would seem to be the case, derived from Kant, but from the pandynamism -which, starting from Leibniz, had propagated itself in Germany through -Creuzens, Ploucket and Reimarus down to Herder, who had conceived -a wholly animated nature.[2] There can be no doubt that Schiller -shared Herder's conception, as may be seen from the theosophical tone -of the fragment of correspondence between Julius and Raphæl and in -other writings. It cannot be denied, however, that whatever personal -feelings Kant may have had towards Herder, or Herder towards his -former teacher (against whose _Critique of Judgment_ he published his -_Kaligone,_ as he had replied to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ with his -_Metacritica_), when Kant in a somewhat dubious manner made the first -step towards a reconciliation, the breach was at all events partially -healed. The dispute is therefore of small importance: we shall find it -more useful to observe that Schiller introduced an important correction -of Kant's views when he obliterated every trace of the double theory -of art and the beautiful, giving no weight to the distinction drawn -between pure and adherent beauty, and finally abandoning the mechanical -conception of art as consisting in beauty joined to the intellectual -concept. It was certainly his own experience of active artistic work -that led him to this simplification. - -[Sidenote: _The æsthetic sphere as the sphere of Play._] - -Schiller defined the æsthetic sphere as the sphere of play (_Spiel_); -the unfortunate term, suggested to him partly by some phrases of Kant, -partly, perhaps, by an article on card-games by one Weisshuhn which he -published in his review _The Hours_ (_Die Horen_),[3] has given rise -to the belief that he anticipated certain modern doctrines of artistic -activity as the overflow of exuberant spirits, analogous with the play -of children and animals. Schiller did not fail to warn his readers -against such a mistaken interpretation (to which, however, he lent -himself) when he begged them not to think of "games in real life, -which are usually concerned with wholly material things," nor yet of -the idle dreaming of the imagination left to itself.[4] The activity -of the play of which he treated held the mean between the material -activity of the senses, of nature, of animal instinct or passion as -it is called, and the formal activity of intellect and morality. The -man who plays, _i.e._ contemplates nature æsthetically and produces -art, sees all natural objects as animated; in such a phantasmagoria -mere natural necessity gives place to the free determination of the -faculties; spirit appears as spontaneously reconciled with nature, -form with matter. Beauty is life, the living form (_lebende Gestalt)_; -not life in the physiological sense, since beauty does not extend -throughout all physiological life, nor is it restricted to that alone: -marble when worked by an artist may have a living form; and a man, -although possessed of life and form, need not be a living form.[5] -Wherefore art must conquer nature with form: "in an artistic work of -true beauty the content ought to be nil, the form everything: by form -man is influenced in his entirety; by content in his separate faculties -only. The true secret of great artists is that they cancel matter -through form (_den Stoff durch die Form vertilgt)_; the more imposing, -overwhelming or seductive the matter is in itself, the greater its -obstinacy in striving to emphasize its own particular effect, the more -the spectator inclines to lose himself immediately in the matter, so -much the more triumphant is the art which brings it into subjection -and enforces its own sovereign power. The mind of hearer or spectator -should remain perfectly free and calm; from the magic circle of art -it should issue as pure and perfect as when it left the hands of the -Creator. The most frivolous object should be treated in such a manner -as to enable us to pass at once to the most serious matters; and the -most serious in such a way that we may pass from them to the lightest -game." There is a fine art of passion; a passionate fine art would be -a contradiction in terms.[6] "So long as man in his early physical -state passively absorbs the world of senses and simply feels it, he is -one with it; and precisely because he merely is a world there is for -him as yet no world at all. Only when in his æsthetic state he places -the world outside himself and contemplates it, does he detach his -personality from the rest; then a world appears to him, since he is no -longer one with the world."[7] - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic education._] - -Schiller ascribed high educational value to art thus conceived as at -once sensible and rational, material and formal. Not that it teaches -moral precepts or excites to good actions; if it acted thus, or when -it acted thus, it would at once cease, as we have seen, to be art. -Determination in whatsoever direction, to the good or the bad, to -pleasure or to duty, destroys the character of the æsthetic sphere, -which is rather indeterminism. By means of art man frees himself from -the yoke of the senses; but before putting himself spontaneously under -that of reason and duty, he takes as it were a little breathing-space -by staying in a region of indifference and serene contemplation. "While -having no claim to promote exclusively any special human faculty, the -æsthetic condition is favourable to each and all without favouritism; -and the reason why it favours none in particular is that it is the -foundation of the possibility of all alike. Every other exercise gives -some inclination to the soul, and therefore presupposes a special -limit; æsthetic activity alone is unlimited." This indifference, which -if not yet pure form is not pure matter, confers its educational value -on art; it opens a way to morality, not by preaching and persuading, -that is to say, determining, but by making determination possible. -Such is the fundamental concept of his celebrated _Letters on the -Æsthetic Education of Man_ (1795), in which Schiller took his cue from -the conditions of his times and from the necessity of finding a middle -way between supine acquiescence in tyranny and savage rebellion as -exemplified by the revolution then raging in France. - -[Sidenote: _Vagueness and lack of precision in Schiller's Æsthetic._] - -The defects of Schiller's æsthetic doctrine are its lack of precision -and its generality. Who has given a better description of certain -aspects of art, the catharsis produced by artistic activity, the -serenity and calm resulting from the domination over natural -impressions? Equally just is his remark that art, although wholly -independent of morality, is in some way connected with it. But what -precisely this connexion may be, or what the exact nature of æsthetic -activity, Schiller does not succeed in explaining. Conceiving the -moral and intellectual as the only formal activities (_Formtrieb)_ and -denying as a convinced anti-sensationalist in opposition to Burke and -philosophers of his type that art can belong to the passionate and -sensuous nature (_Stofftrieb_), he cut himself off from the means of -recognizing the general category to which artistic activity belongs. -His own concept of the formal is too narrow: too narrow, also, his -concept of the cognitive activity, in which he is able to see the -logical or intellectual form, but not that of the imagination. What -for him was this art he describes as an activity neither formal nor -material, neither cognitive nor moral? Was it for him, as for Kant, -an activity of feeling, a play of several faculties at once? It would -seem so, since Schiller distinguishes four points of view or relations -of man with things: the physical, in which these affect our senses: -the logical, in which they excite knowledge: the moral, in which they -appear to us as an object of rational volition: and the æsthetic -"in which they refer to our powers in entirety without becoming the -determinate object of any one faculty." For example, a man is pleased -æsthetically when his feeling depends in no way on the pleasure of -the senses and when he is not conscious of thinking about any law or -end.[8] We look in vain for any more conclusive reply. - -It must not be overlooked that Schiller delivered a course of lectures -on Æsthetic in Jena University in 1792, and that his writings on the -subject intended for reviews were couched in a popular style: no -less popular, in his own opinion, was the style of the book quoted -above, which grew out of a series of letters actually sent to his -patron the Duke of Holstein-Augustenburg. But the great work to be -entitled _Rallias,_ which he intended writing upon Æsthetic, was never -completed; the only fragments which have reached us are contained in -the correspondence with Körner (1793-1794). From the discussions between -the two friends we gather that Körner was not satisfied with Schiller's -formula and desired something objective, something more precise, a -positive characteristic of the beautiful: and one day Schiller told him -that he had definitely discovered such a characteristic. But what it -was that he had discovered we do not know; no mention of it occurs in -any further document, and we are left in doubt as to whether we have -lost an integral part of his thought or merely the momentary illusion -of a discovery. - -[Sidenote: _Schiller's caution and the rashness of the Romanticists._] - -The uncertainty and vagueness of Schiller's theory seem almost a merit -in contrast with that which followed. He had constituted himself -guardian of the teaching of Kant and refused to abandon the realm of -criticism; faithful disciple of his master, he conceived the third -sphere not as real but as an ideal, a concept not constitutive but -regulative, an imperative. "From transcendental motives, reason here -demands that communion be established between formal and material -activity; that is to say, there must be an activity of play, since the -concept of humanity can be complete only by the union of reality with -form, the accidental with the necessary, passivity with liberty. This -demand must be made because reason, in conformity with her essence, -aims at perfection and at sweeping away all obstacles; and every -exclusive operation of one or other activity leaves humanity incomplete -and confined within limits."[9] Schiller's thought, as it appears in -his correspondence with Körner, has been well represented as follows:" -The union of sensibility with liberty in the Beautiful, which does -not actually take place but is supposed to do so, suggests to man -an intuition of the union of these elements within himself: a union -which does not take place actually but ought to do so."[10] The times -which followed had no such nice scruples. Kant had given new vigour -to the production of works on æsthetic, and, as in the days following -Baumgarten, every new year saw a number of new treatises. It was the -fashion. "Nothing swarms like æstheticians" (wrote Jean Paul Richter -in 1804 when preparing his own book on the subject for publication): -"it is rare for a youth who has paid his fees for a course of lectures -on Æsthetic not to produce a book on some point of the science in the -hope that the public may refund him his expenses by buying his book: -some there are indeed who pay their professor's fees out of their -author's royalties."[11] It was hoped, not unreasonably, that the -exploration of the obscure region of æsthetic might throw some light -on metaphysics, and the procedure of artists seemed to offer a good -example to philosophers seeking to create a world for themselves: -so philosophy modelled itself upon art and, as though to render the -transition easier, the concept of art was brought as close as possible -to that of philosophy. Romanticism, gaining vogue daily, was a renewal -or continuation of that "age of genius" in which the youth of Goethe -and Schiller had been passed; and as the period of _Sturm und Drang_ -had zealously worshipped the genius who breaks all rules and oversteps -all limitations, so did Romanticism hail the domination of a faculty -called Fancy, or more frequently Imagination, to which were attributed -the most diverse characteristics and the most miraculous effects. - -[Sidenote: _Ideas on Art: J. P. Richter._] - -The Romantic theorists, artists themselves for the most part, abounded -in truthful and subtle observations concerning artistic procedure. Jean -Paul Richter makes many excellent remarks about productive imagination, -which he distinguishes clearly from the reproductive and asserts to be -shared by all men as soon as they are able to say "This is beautiful"; -for "how could a genius be acclaimed or even tolerated for a single -month, not to mention thousands of centuries, by the common herd, if -he had not a strong connecting-link of relationship with the herd?" He -also describes how imagination is variously divided among individuals: -as simple talent, as passive or feminine genius, and in the highest -degree as the active or masculine genius, formed by reflexion and -instinct, in which "all faculties flourish simultaneously and fancy -is no isolated flower, but the goddess Flora herself who, in order -to produce new combinations, crosses with each other those blossoms -whose conjunction is fertile, and is, so to speak, a faculty full of -faculties."[12] This latter sentence betrays a tendency on Richter's -part to exaggerate the functions of imagination and to construct upon -it a kind of mythology. - -[Sidenote: _Romantic Æsthetic and idealistic Æsthetic._] - -Contemporary systems of philosophy are partly impregnated with, and -partly the source of, such mythologies: the Romantic conception of -art may be said to have found its most complete expression in German -idealism, where this attained its most coherent and systematic form. - -[Sidenote: _J. G. Fichte._] - -It did not attain this form with Fichte, the first great pupil of Kant; -for though Fichte regarded imagination as the activity which creates -the universe, effects the synthesis of the ego and the non-ego, posits -the object and therefore precedes consciousness, he does not connect it -with art.[13] In his æsthetic notions Fichte is influenced by Schiller, -with the addition of a moralism imposed upon him by the general -character of his system; hence the ethical sphere, midway between the -cognitive and the æsthetic, becomes from his point of view a mere -appurtenance of morality, as being the representation of, and hence -reverence for, the moral ideal.[14] His subjective idealism eventually -produced an æsthetic doctrine through the work of Friedrich Schlegel -and Ludwig Tieck; the doctrine of Irony as the basis of art. - -[Sidenote: _Irony: Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis._] - -The ego which created the universe can also destroy it; the universe is -an empty appearance at which the only true reality, the ego, can smile, -holding itself aloof, like an artist or a creative god, from creatures -of its own which it does not take seriously.[15] Friedrich Schlegel -described art as a perpetual parody of itself and a "transcendental -farce." Tieck defined irony as "a power which allows the poet to -dominate the matter which he handles." Another Romantic Fichtian, -Novalis, dreamed of a magical idealism, an art of creation by the -instantaneous act of the ego and of realizing our dreams. - -[Sidenote: _F. Schelling._] - -But it is only to the _System of Transcendental Idealism_ (1800) of -Schelling, to his _Bruno_ (1802), to his celebrated course of lectures -on the _Philosophy of Art_ given at Jena in 1802-1803 (repeated at -Würzburg, and distributed subsequently in manuscript notes all over -Germany), to the no less celebrated lecture on the _Relation between -the Figurative Arts and Nature_ (1807), as well as to other works -of this eloquent and enthusiastic philosopher that we owe the first -great philosophical affirmation of Romanticism, and of a renewed and -conscious neo-Platonism in Æsthetic. - -[Sidenote: _Beauty and character._] - -Like all the other idealistic philosophers, Schelling held firmly to -the fusion of the theories of art and the beautiful already effected -by Schiller. From this point of view it is interesting to note his -explanation of the condemnation of art by Plato: this condemnation, -says Schelling, was directed against the art of his time, the natural -and realistic art of antiquity in general, with its character of -finitude: Plato could not have uttered such a condemnation (as we -moderns are unable to utter it) if he had known Christian art, whose -characteristic is infinity.[16] The pure abstract beauty of Winckelmann -is not enough; no less inadequate, false and negative is that concept -of the characteristic which would try to make art something dead, hard -and ugly by imposing upon it the limitations of the individual. Art is -beauty and characteristic in one; characteristic beauty, character from -which beauty is evolved, according to Goethe's saying; it is therefore -not the individual but the living concept of the individual. When the -artist's eye recognizes the creative idea of the individual and draws -it forth, he transforms the individual into a world in itself, into a -species (_Gattung_), an eternal idea (_Urbild_), and fears no more the -limitation or hardness which is the condition of life: characteristic -beauty is that plenitude of form which kills form; it does not inflame -passion, it regulates it, like the banks of a river which are filled -but not overflowed by the waters.[17] In all of this we feel the -influence of Schiller, with something added which Schiller could never -have expressed. - -[Sidenote: _Art and Philosophy._] - -Indeed, whilst gratefully acknowledging the excellent contributions to -the theory of art made by the writers who succeeded Kant, Schelling -laments that in none of them can he find exact scientific method -(_Wissenschaftlichkeit_),[18] The true point of departure in his -theory is in the philosophy of nature, _i.e._ in that criticism of -the teleological judgement which Kant places directly after that of -the æsthetic judgement in his third _Critique._ Teleology is the -union of theoretical and practical philosophy; but the system would -be incomplete but for the possibility of demonstrating in the subject -itself, in the ego, the identity of the two worlds, theoretical and -practical; an activity which has, and at the same time has not, -consciousness; unconscious as nature, conscious as spirit. This -activity is precisely the æsthetic activity: "the general organ of -philosophy, keystone of the whole edifice."[19] There are but two ways -open to one who is desirous of escaping from common realities: poetry, -which transports into the ideal world; and philosophy which annihilates -the real world.[20] Strictly speaking, "there is but one sole absolute -work of art; it may exist in various exemplars, but in itself it is -one, although it may not yet possess existence in its original form." -True art is not the impression of one moment, but the representation -of infinite life;[21] it is transcendental intuition become objective, -and is therefore not only the organ but the document of philosophy. -A time will come when philosophy will return to poetry, from which -she has detached herself; and from the new philosophy a new mythology -will arise.[22] The Absolute is thus the object of art as well as of -philosophy (as Schelling insists elsewhere in greater detail): the -first represents it in idea (_Urbild_), the second in its reflexion -(_Gegenbild)_: "philosophy portrays ideas, not realities: so is it with -art: those same ideas of which real things, as philosophy demonstrates, -are imperfect copies, themselves appear in the objective arts as -ideas, _i.e._ in all their perfection, and represent the intellectual -world in the world of reflexion."[23] Music is the "very ideal rhythm -of Nature and the Universe, which by means of this art makes itself -felt in the derivative world"; perfect creations of statuary are "the -very ideas of organic nature represented objectively"; the Homeric -epic, "the very identity constituting the foundation of history in the -Absolute."[24] But while philosophy gives an immediate representation -of the Divine, of absolute Identity, art can but give the immediate -representation of Indifference; and "since the degree of perfection -or reality in a thing becomes higher in proportion as it approaches -nearer to the absolute Idea and the fulness of infinite affirmation -and in proportion as it comprehends within itself other powers, it is -clear that art, above everything else, is in closest relation with -philosophy, from which it is distinguished merely by the character -of its specification: in everything else it may be considered as the -highest power in the ideal world."[25] To the three powers of the real -and ideal world correspond in a rising scale the three ideas of Truth, -Goodness and Beauty. Beauty is neither the mere universal (truth), -nor mere reality (action), but the perfect interpenetration of both: -"beauty exists when the particular (the real) is so adequate to its -concept that the latter, as infinite, enters the finite and presents -itself to our contemplation in concrete form. With the appearance of -the concept, the real becomes truly similar and equal to the idea, -wherein the universal and the particular find their absolute identity. -Without ceasing to be rational, the rational becomes at the same time -apparent and sensible."[26] But as above the three powers is poised -God, their point of union, so Philosophy stands supreme over the three -ideas; concerning itself not with truth or morality or even beauty -alone, but with that which belongs to all the three in common, deduced -from one common source. If philosophy assumes the character of science -and truth, while yet remaining superior to truth, this is made possible -by the fact that science and truth are its formal determination; -"philosophy is science in the sense that truth, goodness and beauty, -_i.e._ science, virtue and art, interpenetrate each other; therefore -it is also not science but is that which is common to science, virtue -and art." This interpenetration distinguishes philosophy from all other -sciences; for instance, if mathematics can dispense with morality and -beauty, philosophy cannot do so.[27] - -[Sidenote: _Ideas and the gods. Art and mythology._] - -In Beauty are contained truth and goodness, necessity and liberty. When -beauty appears to be in conflict with truth, the truth in question -is a finite truth with which beauty ought not to agree, because, as -we have seen, the art of naturalism and of the merely characteristic -is a false art.[28] The individual forms of art, being in themselves -representatives of the infinite and the universe, are called Ideas.[29] -Considered from the point of view of reality, Ideas are gods; their -essence, their "in-itself," is in fact equivalent to God; every idea -is an idea so far as it is God in a particular form; every idea, -therefore, is equal to God, but to a particular god. Characteristic of -all the gods is pure limitation and indivisible absoluteness: Minerva -is the idea of wisdom united with strength, but she is lacking in -womanly tenderness; Juno is power without wisdom and without the sweet -attraction of love, for which she is forced to borrow the cestus of -Venus; Venus again has not the weighty wisdom of Minerva. What would -become of these ideas if deprived of their limitations? They would -cease to be objects of Imagination.[30] Imagination is a faculty which -has no connexion with pure intellect or with reason (_Vernunft_) and is -distinct from fancy (_Einbildungskraft_) which collects and arranges -the products of art, whereas imagination intuits them, forms them out -of itself, represents them. Imagination is to fancy as intellectual -intuition is to reason: it is therefore the intellectual intuition of -art.[31] "Reason" no longer suffices in a philosophy such as this: -intellectual intuition, which for Kant was a limiting concept, is now -asserted as really existing: intellect sinks to a subordinate place: -even the genuine imagination which operates in art is overshadowed -by this new-fangled Imagination, twin with intellectual Intuition, -who sometimes changes places with this sister of hers. Mythology -is proclaimed a necessary condition of all art: mythology which is -not allegory, for in the latter the particular signifies only the -universal, while the former is already itself the universal; which -explains how easy it is to allegorize, and how fascinating are such -poems as those of Homer which lend themselves to such interpretations. -Christian, as well as Hellenic, art has its mythology: Christ; the -persons of the Trinity; the Virgin mother of God.[32] The fine between -mythology and art is as shadowy as that between art and philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _K. W. Solger._] - -The year 1815 saw the publication of Solger's principal work, _Erwin,_ -a long philosophical dialogue on the beautiful; subsequently in -1819 he gave a course of lectures on Æsthetic which were published -posthumously. He was one of those who found but a glimpse of truth -in Kant and held the post-Kantians in very slight estimation, -particularly Fichte; in Schelling, who begins from the original unity -of the subjective and the objective, he detects for the first time a -speculative principle not adequately developed, since Schelling had -never triumphed dialectically over the difficulties of intellectual -intuition.[33] - -[Sidenote: _Fancy and Imagination._] - -Solger was one of those who conceived of Imagination as totally -distinct from Fancy: fancy (says he) belongs to common cognition -and is none other than "the human consciousness, in so far as it -continues, in temporal succession, infinitely reasserting an original -intuition"; it presupposes the distinctions between common cognition, -abstraction and judgement, concept and representation, amongst which -"it acts as mediator by giving to the general concept the form of -individual representation; and to the latter the form of a general -concept; in this manner it has its being among the antitheses of the -ordinary understanding." Imagination is totally different; proceeding -"from the original unity of the antitheses in the Idea, it acts so -that the elements in opposition, separated as they are from the idea, -find themselves united in the reality; by its means we are capable -of apprehending objects higher than those of common cognition and of -recognizing in them the idea itself as real: also, in art, it is the -faculty of transforming the idea into reality." It presents itself -in three modes or degrees: as Imagination of the Imagination, which -conceives the whole as idea, and activity as nothing more than the -development of the idea in reality; as Sensibility of the Imagination, -in so far as it expresses the life of the idea in the real and reduces -the one to the other; lastly (and here we have the highest grade of -artistic activity, corresponding with Dialectic in philosophy) as -Intellect of the Imagination or artistic Dialectic, conceiving idea and -reality in such a way that one passes over into the other, that is to -say, into reality. Other divisions and subdivisions are made on which -it is not necessary to dwell. Imagination is said to produce the Irony -essential to true art: this is the Irony of Tieck and Novalis, of whom -Solger is in a sense a follower.[34] - -[Sidenote: _Art, practice and religion._] - -Solger joins Schelling in placing beauty in the region of the Idea, -inaccessible to common consciousness. It is distinct from the idea -of Truth, because instead of dissolving the appearances of common -consciousness after the manner of truth, art accomplishes the -miracle of making appearance dissolve itself while still remaining -appearance; artistic thought, therefore, is practical, not theoretical. -Furthermore, it is distinct from the idea of Goodness, with which -at first sight it would seem to be closely related, because in the -case of Goodness the union of ideal with real, of the simple with the -multiple, of the infinite with the finite, is not real and complete, -but remains ideal, a mere ought-to-be. It is related more closely -to Religion, which thinks the Idea as the abyss of life where our -individual conscience must lose itself in order to become "essential" -(_wesentlich_), while in beauty and art the Idea manifests itself by -gathering into itself the world of distinctions between universal -and particular and placing itself in their place. Artistic activity -is more than theoretical, it is of a practical nature, but realized -and perfected; art, therefore, belongs not to theoretical philosophy -(as Kant thought, according to Solger), but to practical. Necessarily -attached on one side to infinity, it cannot have common nature as its -object; for example, art is absent from a portrait, and the ancients -showed their discrimination in selecting gods and heroes for objects -in sculpture since every deity--even in limited and particular -form--always signifies a determinate modification of the Idea.[35] - -[Sidenote:_ G. W. F. Hegel_.] - -The same concept of art appears in the philosophy of Hegel, whatever -may be the minor differences which he felt to separate himself from his -predecessors. Little concerned as we are with the shades and varieties -of mystical Æsthetic exhibited by each of these thinkers, we are -chiefly concerned to lay bare the substantial underlying identity, -the mysticism of arbitrarism which gives them their historic place in -Æsthetic. - -[Sidenote: _Art in the sphere of absolute spirit._] - -Opening the _Phenomenology_ and the _Philosophy of Spirit,_ one need -not expect to find any discussion of art in the analysis of the forms -of the theoretical Spirit, among definitions of sensibility and -intuition, language and symbolism, and various grades of imagination -and thought. Hegel places Art in the sphere of absolute Spirit, -together with Religion and Philosophy,[36] and in this he regards -Kant, Schiller, Schelling and Solger as his precursors, for like them -he strongly denies that art has the function of representing the -abstract concept, but not that it represents the concrete concept -or Idea. Hegel's whole philosophy consists in the affirmation of a -concrete concept, unknown to ordinary or scientific thought. "Indeed," -says he, "no concept has in our day been more mishandled than the -concept in itself and for itself; for by concept is generally meant -the abstract determinateness or one-sidedness of representation and -intellectualistic thought, with which it is naturally impossible to -think either the entirety of truth or concrete beauty."[37] To the -realm of the concrete concept belongs art, as one of the three forms -wherein the freedom of the spirit is achieved; it is the first form, -namely that of immediate, sensible, objective knowledge (the second is -religion, a representative consciousness _plus_ worship, an element -extraneous to mere art: the third is philosophy, free thought of the -absolute spirit).[38] - -[Sidenote: _Beauty as sensible appearance of the Idea._] - -Beauty and truth are at the same time one yet distinct. "Truth is -Idea as Idea, according to its being-in-itself and its universal -principle, and so far as it is thought as such. There is no sensible -or material existence in Truth; thought contemplates therein nothing -but universal idea. But the Idea must also realize itself externally -and attain an actual and determinate existence. Truth also as such -has existence; but when in its determinate external existence it is -immediately for consciousness, and the concept remains immediately one -with the external appearance, the Idea is not only true but beautiful. -In this way Beauty may be defined as the sensible appearance of the -Idea."[39] The Idea is the content of art: its sensible and imaginative -configuration; its form: two elements which must interpenetrate and -form a whole, hence the necessity that a content destined to become -a work of art should show itself capable of such transformation; -otherwise we have but an imperfect union of poetic form with prosaic -and incongruous content.[40] An ideal content must gleam through the -sensible form; the form is spiritualized by this ideal light;[41] -artistic imagination does not work in the same way as the passive -or receptive fancy, it does not stop at the appearances of sensible -reality but searches for the internal truth and rationality of the -real. "The rationality of the object selected by him should not be -alone in awakening the consciousness of the artist: he should have -well meditated upon the essential and the true in all their extension -and profundity, for without reflexion a man cannot become conscious -of that which is within himself, and all great works of art show -that their material has been thought again and again from every -side. No successful work of art can issue from light and careless -imagination."[42] It is a delusion to fancy that poet and painter need -nothing beyond intuitions: "a true poet must reflect and meditate -before and during the execution of his poem."[43] But it is always -understood that the thought of the poet does not take the form of -abstraction. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic in metaphysical idealism and Baumgartenism._] - -Some critics[44] affirm that the æsthetic movement from Schelling to -Hegel is a revived Baumgartenism on the ground that this movement -regarded art as a mediator of philosophical concepts; they mention -the fact that a follower of Schelling, one Ast, was moved by the trend -of his system to substitute didactic poetry for drama as the highest -form of art.[45] Putting aside some isolated and accidental deviations, -there is no truth in this affirmation: these philosophers are hostile -to intellectualistic and moralistic views, frequently entering upon -definite and explicit polemic against them. Schelling wrote: "Æsthetic -production is in its origin an absolutely free production.... This -independence on any extraneous purpose constitutes the sanctity and -purity of art, enabling it to repel all connexion with mere pleasure, a -connexion which is a mark of barbarism, or with utility, which cannot -be demanded of art save at times when the loftiest form of the human -spirit is found in utilitarian discoveries. The same reasons forbid an -alliance with morality and hold even science at arm's length, although -nearest by reason of her disinterestedness; having her aim, however, -outside herself, she must restrict herself definitely to serve as means -to something higher than herself: the arts."[46] Hegel says, "Art -contains no universal as such." "If the aim of instruction is treated -as an aim, so that the nature of the content represented appears for -itself directly, as an abstract proposition, prosaic reflexion, or -general theory, and is not merely contained indirectly and implicitly -in the concrete artistic form, the result of such a separation is to -reduce the sensible and imaginative form, the true constituent of a -work of art, to an idle ornament, a covering (_Hülle)_ presented simply -as a covering, an appearance maintained as mere appearance. The very -nature of the work of art is thus completely altered, for a work of art -must not present to intuition a content in its universality, but this -universal individualized and converted into a sensible individual."[47] -It is a bad sign, he adds, when an artist sets himself about his work -from a motive of abstract ideas instead of that of the fulness of -life (_Überfülle des Lebens_).[48] The aim of art lies in itself, in -presentation of truth in a sensible form; any other aim is altogether -extraneous.[49] It would not be hard to prove, certainly, that by -separating art from pure representation and imagination and making it -in some sense the vehicle of the concept, the universal, the infinite, -these philosophers were facing in the direction of the road opened by -Baumgarten. But to prove this would mean accepting as a presupposition -the dilemma that if art be not pure imagination, it must be sensuous -and subordinate to reason; and it is just this presupposition and -dilemma that the metaphysical idealists denied. The road they tried to -follow was to conceive a faculty which should be neither imagination -nor intellect but should partake of both; an intellectual intuition or -intuitive intellect, a mental imagination after the fashion of Plotinus. - -[Sidenote: _Mortality and decay of art in Hegel's system._] - -In a greater degree than any of his predecessors Hegel emphasized the -cognitive character of art. But this very merit brought him into a -difficulty more easily avoided by the rest. Art being placed in the -sphere of absolute Spirit, in company with Religion and Philosophy, -how will she be able to hold her own in such powerful and aggressive -company, especially in that of Philosophy, which in the Hegelian -system stands at the summit of all spiritual evolution? If Art and -Religion fulfilled functions other than the knowledge of the Absolute, -they would be inferior levels of the Spirit, but yet necessary and -indispensable. But if they have in view the same end as Philosophy -and are allowed to compete with it, what value can they retain? None -whatever; or, at the very most, they may have that sort of value which -attaches to transitory historical phases in the life of humanity. The -principles of Hegel's system are at bottom rationalistic and hostile to -religion, and hostile no less to art. A strange and painful consequence -for a man like Hegel, endowed with a warmly æsthetic spirit and a -fervid lover of the arts; almost a repetition of the hard fate endured -by Plato. But as the Greek philosopher, in obedience to the presumed -command of religion, did not hesitate to condemn the mimetic art and -the Homeric poetry he loved, so the German refused to evade the logical -exigencies of his system and proclaimed the mortality, nay, the very -death, of art. "We have assigned," he says, "a very high place to -art: but it must be recollected that neither in content nor in form -can art be considered the most perfect means of bringing before the -consciousness of the mind its true interests. Precisely by reason of -its form, art is limited to a particular content. Only a definite -circle or grade of truth can be made visible in a work of art; that -is to say, such truth as may be transfused into the sensible and -adequately presented in that form, as were the Greek gods. But there -is a deeper conception of truth, by which it is not so intimately -allied to the sensible as to permit of its being received or expressed -suitably in material fashion. To this class belongs the Christian -conception of truth; and, furthermore, the spirit of our modern world, -more especially that of our religion and our mental evolution, seems to -have passed the point at which art is the best road to the apprehension -of the Absolute. The peculiar character of artistic production no -longer satisfies our highest aspirations.... Thought and reflexion -have superseded fine art." Many reasons have been adduced in order to -account for the moribund condition of modern art; in especial, the -prevalence of material and political interests; the true reason, says -Hegel, consists of the inferiority in grade of art in comparison with -pure thought. "Art in its highest form is and for us must remain a -thing of the past"; and just because the thing has vanished, one can -reason about it philosophically.[50] The Æsthetic of Hegel is thus a -funeral oration: he passes in review the successive forms of art, shows -the progressive steps of internal consumption and lays the whole in -its grave, leaving Philosophy to write its epitaph. - -Romanticism and metaphysical idealism had elevated art to such a -fantastic height among the clouds that at last they were obliged to -admit that it was so far away as to be absolutely useless. - - -[1] _Vorles. über die Ästhetik_ (2nd ed., Berlin, 1842), vol. i. p. 78. - -[2] Sommer, _Gesch. d. Psych. u. Ästh._ pp. 365-432. - -[3] Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ p. 242. - -[4] _Briefe ü. d. Ästh. Erzieh._ (in Werke, ed. Goedecke), Letters 15, -27. - -[5] _Op. cit._ Letter 15. - -[6] _Briefe_, Letter 22. - -[7] _Op. cit._ Letter 25. - -[8] _Briefe_, Letter 20. - -[9] _Briefe,_ Letter 15. - -[10] Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ p. 241. - -[11] _Vorschule der Ästh.,_ 1804 (French trans., _Poétique ou -introduction à l'Esth.,_ Paris, 1862), preface. - -[12] _Vorschule d. Ästh._ chs. 2, 3. - -[13] _Grundl. der Wissenschaftslehre,_ in _Werke_ (Berlin, 1845), vol. -i. pp. 214-217. - -[14] Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ pp. 25-30; Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp. 522-572. - -[15] Hegel, _Vorles. üb. d. Ästh._ introd. vol. i. pp. 82-88. - -[16] _Vorles. üb. d. Methode d. akadem. Stud._ (1803), lecture 14; in -_Werke_ (Stuttgart, 1856-1861), vol. v, pp. 346-347. - -[17] _Üb. d. Verhältniss d. bild. Künste, z. d. Natur_ in _Werke,_ vol. -vii. pp. 299-310. - -[18] _Philos, d. Kunst,_ posthumous, introd. in _Werke,_ v. p. 362. - -[19] _System d. transcend. Idealismus,_ in _Werke,_ § i. vol. iii. -introd. § 3, p. 349. - -[20] _Op. cit._ § 4, p. 351. - -[21] _System d. transcend. Idealismus,_ in _Werke,_ part vi. § 3, p. -627. - -[22] _Op. cit._ § 3, pp. 627-629. - -[23] _Phil. d. Kunst,_ pp. 368-369. - -[24] _Op. cit._ p. 369. - -[25] _Op. cit._ General Part, p. 381. - -[26] _Phil. d. Kunst,_ p. 382. - -[27] _Op. cit._ p. 383. - -[28] _Op. cit._ p. 385. - -[29] _Op. cit._ pp. 389-390. - -[30] _Phil. d. Kunst,_ pp. 390-393. - -[31] _Op. cit._ p. 395. - -[32] _Op. cit._ pp. 405-451. - -[33] _Vorles. üb. Ästhetik_, Heyse, Leipzig, 1829, pp. 35-43. - -[34] Vorles. üb. Ästh. pp. 186-200. - -[35] Op. cit. pp. 48-85. - -[36] _Encykl. d. phil. Wiss._ §§ 557-563. - -[37] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ (_ed. cit._) i. p. 118. - -[38] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 129-133. - -[39] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ i. p. 141. - -[40] _Op. cit._ i. p. 89. - -[41] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 50-51. - -[42] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 354-355. - -[43] _Encykl._ § 450. - -[44] Danzel, _Ästh. d. hegel. Sch._ p. 62; Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp. -693-697; J. Schmidt, _L. u. B._ pp. 103-105; Spitzer, _Krit. St._ p. 48. - -[45] Fr. Ast, _System der Kunstlehre,_ Leipzig, 1805; cf. Spitzer, _op. -cit._ p. 48. - -[46] _System d. transcend. Idealismus_ (1800), part vi. § 2; in -_Werke,_ § I, vol. iii. pp. 622-623. - -[47] _Vorles. üb. d. Ästh._ i. pp. 66-67. - -[48] _Vorles. üb. d. Ästh._ i. p. 353. - -[49] _Op. cit._ i. p. 72. - -[50] _Vorles. üb. d. Ästh._ i. pp. 13-16. - - - - -X - - -SCHOPENHAUER AND HERBART - - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic mysticism in the opponents of Idealism._] - -Nothing, perhaps, shows more clearly how well this imaginative -conception of art suited the spirit of the times (not only a particular -fashion in philosophy, but the psychological conditions expressed -by the Romantic movement) than the fact that the adversaries of -the systems of Schelling, Solger and Hegel either agreed with this -conception in general or, while believing themselves to be departing -widely from it, actually returned to it involuntarily. - -[Sidenote: _A. Schopenhauer._] - -Everybody knows with what lack, shall we say, of _phlegma -philosophicum_ Arthur Schopenhauer fought against Schelling, Hegel -and all the "charlatans" and "professors" who had divided amongst -themselves the heritage of Kant. But what was the artistic theory -accepted and developed by Schopenhauer? - -[Sidenote: _Ideas as the object of art._] - -His theory, like Hegel's own, turns upon the distinction between -the concept which is abstraction and the concept which is concrete, -or Idea; although Schopenhauer's Ideas are by himself likened to -Plato's, and in the particular form in which he presents them more -nearly resemble those of Schelling than the Idea of Hegel. They have -something in common with intellectual concepts, for like them they -are unities representing a plurality of real things: but "the concept -is abstract and discursive, entirely indeterminate in its sphere, -rigorously precise within its own limits only; the intellect suffices -to conceive and understand it, speech expresses it without need for -other intermediary, and its own definition exhausts its whole nature; -the idea, on the contrary (which may be defined clearly as the adequate -representative of the concept) is absolutely intuitive, and although -it represents an infinite number of individual things, it is not for -that any the less determined in all its aspects. The individual, as -individual, cannot know it; in order to conceive it he must strip -himself of all will, of all individuality, and raise himself to the -state of a pure knowing subject. The idea, therefore, is attained -by genius only, or by one who finds himself in a genial disposition -attained by that elevation of his cognitive powers inspired usually -by genius." "The idea is unity become plurality by means of space -and time, forms of one intuitive apperception; the concept, on the -contrary, is unity extracted from plurality by means of abstraction, -which is the procedure of our intellect: the concept may be described -as _unitas post yewi_ the idea, _unitas ante rem._"[1] Schopenhauer is -in the habit of calling ideas the genera of things; but on one occasion -he remarks that ideas are of species, not genera; that genera are -simply concepts, and that there are natural species, but only logical -genera.[2] This psychological illusion as to the existence of ideas for -types originates (as we find elsewhere in Schopenhauer) in the habit -of converting the empirical classifications of the natural sciences -into living realities. "Do you wish to see ideas?" he asks; "look at -the clouds which scud across the sky; look at a brooklet leaping over -rocks; look at the crystallization of hoar-frost on a window-pane -with its designs of trees and flowers. The shapes of the clouds, the -ripples of the gushing brook, the configurations of the crystals exist -for us individual observers, in themselves they are indifferent. The -clouds in themselves are elastic vapour; the brook is an incompressible -fluid, mobile, transparent, amorphous, the ice obeys the laws of -crystallization: and in these determinations their ideas consist."[3] -All these are the immediate objectification of will in its various -degrees; and it is these, not their pale copies in real things, -that art delineates; whence Plato was right in one sense and wrong -in another, and is justified and condemned by Schopenhauer exactly -in the same way as by Plotinus of old, as well as by Schopenhauer's -worst enemy, the modern Schelling.[4] In consequence, each art has -a special category of ideas for its own dominion. Architecture, and -in some cases hydraulics, facilitate the clear intuition of those -ideas which constitute the lower degrees of objectification--weight, -cohesion, resistance, hardness, the general properties of stone and -some combinations of light; gardening and (most curious association) -landscape painting represent the ideas of vegetable nature; sculpture -and animal painting those of zoology; historical painting and the -higher forms of sculpture that of the human body; poetry the very idea -of man himself.[5] As for music, that (let him who can justify the -logical discontinuity) is outside the hierarchy of the other arts. -We have seen how Schelling considered it to be representative of the -very rhythm of the universe;[6] differing but slightly from this, -Schopenhauer affirms that music does not express ideas but, parallel -with ideas, Will itself. The analogies between music and the world, -between the fundamental bass and crude matter, between the scale and -the series of species, between melody and conscious will, led him to -the conclusion that music was not, as Leibniz thought, an arithmetic -but a metaphysic: _exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se -philosophari animi_.[7] - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic catharsis._] - -To Schopenhauer, no less than his idealistic predecessors, art -beatifies; it is the flower of life; he who contemplates art is no -longer an individual but a pure knowing subject, at liberty, free from -desire, from pain, from time.[8] - -[Sidenote: _Signs of a better theory in Schopenhauer._] - -Schopenhauer's system no doubt contains here and there premonitions -of a better and more profound treatment of art. Schopenhauer, who was -capable on occasion of clear and keen analysis, constantly insists -that the forms of space and time must not be applied to the idea -or to artistic contemplation, which admits of the general form of -representation only.[9] From this he might have inferred that art, so -far from being a superior and extraordinary level of consciousness, is -actually its most immediate level, namely that which in its primitive -simplicity precedes even common perception with its reference of -objects to a position in the spatial and temporal series. To free -oneself from common perception and to live in imagination does not mean -rising to a Platonic contemplation of the ideas, but descending once -more into the region of immediate intuition, becoming children again, -as Vico had seen. On the other hand Schopenhauer had begun to examine -the categories of Kant with an unprejudiced eye; he was not satisfied -with the two forms of intuition, and wished to add to them a third, -causality.[10] In conclusion, we note that, like his predecessors, he -makes a comparison between art and history, with this difference and -advantage over the idealist authors of the philosophy of history, that -for him history was irreducible to concepts; it was contemplation of -the individual, and therefore not science. Had he persevered in his -comparison between art and history, he would have arrived at a better -solution than that at which he stopped; that is to say, that the matter -of history is the particular in its particularity and contingency, -while that of art is that which is, and is always identical.[11] But -instead of pursuing these happy ideas Schopenhauer preferred to play -variations on the themes fashionable in his day. - -[Sidenote: _J. F. Herbart._] - -Most astounding of all is the fact that a dry intellectualist, -the avowed enemy of idealism, of dialectic and of speculative -constructions, head of the school calling itself realistic or the -school of exact philosophy, Johann Friedrich Herbart, when he -turns his attention to Æsthetic, turns mystic too, though in a -slightly different way. How weightily he speaks when expounding his -philosophical method! Æsthetic must not bear the blame of the faults -into which metaphysic has fallen; we must make it an independent study, -and detach it from all hypothesis about the universe. Nor must it be -confounded with psychology or asked to describe the emotions awakened -by the content of works of art, such as the pathetic or the comic, -sadness or joy; its duty is to determine the essential character of -art and beauty. In the analysis of particular cases of beauty and -in registering what they reveal lies the way of salvation. These -proposals and promises have misled numbers of people as to the nature -of Herbart's Æsthetic. But _ce sont là jeux de princes_; by paying -attention we shall see what Herbart meant by analysis of particular -case; and how he held himself aloof from metaphysics. - -[Sidenote: _Pure Beauty and relations of form._] - -Beauty, for him, consisted in relations: relations of tone, colour, -line, thought and will; experience must decide which of these relations -are beautiful, and æsthetic science consists solely in enumerating the -fundamental concepts (_Musterbegriffe)_ in which are summarized the -particular cases of beauty. But these relations, Herbart thought, were -not like physiological facts; they could not be empirically observed, -_e.g._ in a psycho-physical laboratory. To correct this error it is -only necessary to observe that these relations include not only tones, -lines and colours, but also thoughts and will, and that they extend to -moral facts no less than to objects of external intuition. He declares -explicitly "No true beauty is sensible, although it frequently happens -that sense-impressions precede and follow the intuition of beauty."[12] -There is a profound distinction between the beautiful and the pleasant; -for the pleasant needs no representation, while the beautiful consists -in representation of relations, followed immediately in consciousness -by a judgment, an appendix (_Zusatz)_ which expresses unqualified -approbation ("_es gefällt!_"). And while the pleasant and the -unpleasant "in the progress of culture gradually become transient and -unimportant, Beauty stands out more and more as something permanent and -possessed of undeniable value."[13] The judgment of taste is universal, -eternal, immutable: "the complete representation (_vollendete -Vorstellung_) of the same relations is always followed by the same -judgment; just as the same cause always produces the same effect. -This happens at all times and in all circumstances, conditions and -complications, which gives to the particularity of certain cases the -appearance of a universal rule. Granted that the elements of a relation -are universal concepts, it is plain that although in judging we think -only of the content of these concepts, the judgment must have a sphere -as large as that common to the two concepts."[14] Herbart considers -æsthetic judgements as a general class comprising ethical judgements as -a subdivision: "amongst other beauties is to be distinguished morality, -as a thing not only of value in itself but as actually determining the -unconditioned value of persons"; within morality in the narrowest sense -is distinguished in turn justice.[15] The five ethica ideas guiding -moral life (internal liberty, perfection, benevolence, equity and -justice) are five æsthetic ideas or rather æsthetic concepts applied to -relations of will. - -[Sidenote: _Art as sum of content and form._] - -Herbart looks on art as a complex fact, the combination of an -extra-æsthetic element, content, which may have logical or -psychological or any other kind of value, and a purely æsthetic -element, form, which is an application of the fundamental æsthetic -concepts. Man looks for that which is diverting, instructive, moving, -majestic, ridiculous; and "all these are mingled with the beautiful -in order to procure favour and interest for the work. The beautiful -thus assumes various complexions, and becomes graceful, magnificent, -tragic, or comic; it can become all these because the æsthetic -judgement, in itself calmly serene, tolerates the company of the most -diverse excitations of the soul which are no part of itself."[16] But -all these things have nothing to do with beauty. In order to discover -the objectively beautiful or ugly, one must make abstraction from -every predicate concerning the content. "In order to recognize the -objectively beautiful or ugly in poetry, one must show the difference -between this and that thought, and the discussion will concern itself -with thoughts; to recognize it in sculpture, one must show the -difference between this and that outline, and the discussion will turn -upon outlines; to recognize it in music, one should show the difference -between this and that tone, and the discussion will turn upon tones. -Now, such predicates as 'magnificent, charming, graceful' and so -forth contain nothing whatever about tones, outlines or thoughts, and -therefore tell us nothing about the objectively beautiful in poetry, -sculpture, or music; indeed they rather lead us to believe in the -existence of an objective beauty to which thought, outline, or tone are -equally accidental, which may be approached by receiving impressions -from poetry, sculpture, music and so forth, obliterating the object -and giving oneself up to the pure emotion of mind."[17] Very different -is the æsthetic judgement, the "cold judgement of the connoisseur" -who considers exclusively form, _i.e._ objectively pleasant formal -relations. This abstraction from the content in order to contemplate -pure form is the catharsis produced by art. Content is transitory, -relative, subject to moral law and liable to moral judgement: form is -permanent, absolute, free.[18] Concrete art may be the sum of two or -more values; but the æsthetic fact is form alone. - -[Sidenote: _Herbart and Kantian thought._] - -The reader who goes behind appearances and discounts diversities of -terminology will not fail to observe the close similarity of the -æsthetic doctrine of Herbart to that of Kant. In Herbart we again -find the distinction between free and adherent beauty, and between -form and the sensuous stimulus (_Reiz)_ attached to form: we find an -affirmation of the existence of pure beauty, the object of necessary -and universal, but not discursive, judgements; lastly, we find a -certain connexion between beauty and morality, between Æsthetic and -Ethics. In these matters Herbart is perhaps the most faithful follower -and propagator of the thought of Kant, whose doctrine contains the germ -of his own. In one passage he describes himself as "a Kantian, but of -the year 1828"; and he is quite right, even in pointing out the exact -difference in date. Amidst the errors and uncertainties of his æsthetic -thought, Kant is rich in suggestion and scatters fertile seed; he -belongs to a period when philosophy was still young and impressionable. -Herbart, coming later, is dry and one-sided; he takes whatever is -false in Kant's doctrine and hardens it into a system. If they had -done little else, the Romanticists and idealists had at least united -the theory of beauty to that of art, and destroyed the rhetorical -and mechanical view; and they had brought into relief (frequently -exaggerating, doubtless) various important characteristics of artistic -activity. Herbart re-states the mechanical view, restores the duality, -and presents a capricious, narrow, barren mysticism, devoid of all -breath of artistic feeling. - - -[1] _Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung,_ 1819 (in _Sämmtl. Werke,_ ed. -Grisebach, vol. i.). bk. iii. § 49. - -[2] _Ergänzungen_ (ed. Grisebach, vol. ii.), ch. 29. - -[3] _Welt a. W. u. V._ iii. § 35. - -[4] See above, p. 291. - -[5] _Welt a. W. u. V._ iii. §§ 42-51. - -[6] See above, p. 293. - -[7] _Welt a. W. u. V._ § 53. - -[8] _Op. cit._ § 34. - -[9] _Welt a. W. u. V._ § 32. - -[10] _Kritik d. kantischen Philosophie,_ in append, to _op. cit._ pp. -558-576. - -[11] _Ergänzungen,_ ch. 38. - -[12] _Einleitung in die Philosophie,_ 1813, in _Werke,_ ed. -Hartenstein, vol. 1. p. 49. - -[13] _Einleitung in die Philosophie,_ pp. 125-128. - -[14] _Allgemeine praktische Philosophie,_ in _Werke,_ viii. p. 25. - -[15] _Einleitung,_ p. 128. - -[16] _Einleitung,_ p. 162. - -[17] _Op. cit._ pp. 129-130. - -[18] _Op. cit._ p. 163. - - - - -XI - - -FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER - - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic of content and Æsthetic of form: meaning of the -contrast._] - -We have now reached a point when we are able to give ourselves an exact -account of the signification and importance of the celebrated war -waged for over a century in Germany between the Æsthetic of content -(_Gehaltsästhetik)_ and the Æsthetic of form (_Formästhetik_); a war -which gave birth to vast works on the history of Æsthetic undertaken -from one or other point of view, and sprang from Herbart's opposition -to the idealism of Schelling, Hegel, and their contemporaries and -followers. "Form" and "Content" are among the most equivocal words -in the whole philosophical vocabulary, particularly in Æsthetic; -sometimes, indeed, what one calls form, others call content. The -Herbartians were specially given to quoting in their own defence -Schiller's dictum, that the secret of art consists in "cancelling -content by form." But what is there in common between Schiller's -concept of "form," which placed the æsthetic activity side by side -with the moral and intellectual, and Herbart's "form," which does not -penetrate or enliven, but clothes and adorns a content? Hegel, on -the other hand, often gives the name "form" to what Schiller would -call "matter" (_Stoff_), that is, the sensible matter which it is -the business of spiritual energy to dominate. Hegel's "content" is -the idea, the metaphysical truth, the constituent element of beauty: -Herbart's "content" is the emotional and intellectual element which -falls outside beauty. The Æsthetic of "form" in Italy is an æsthetic of -expressive activity; the form is neither a clothing nor a metaphysical -idea nor sensible matter, but a representative or imaginative faculty -with the power of framing impressions; yet there have been attempts -to confute this Italian æsthetic formalism with the same arguments -that are used against German æsthetic formalism, a totally different -thing in every respect. And so forth. Having given a plain account of -the thoughts of the post-Kantian æstheticians, we shall be able to -appreciate their opponents without seeking light from their obscure -terminology or allowing ourselves to be misled by the banners they -wave. The antithesis between the Æsthetic of content and that of -form, the Æsthetic of idealism and that of realism, the Æsthetic of -Schelling, Solger, Hegel and Schopenhauer and that of Herbart, will -appear in its true light, as the lamily quarrel between two conceptions -of art united by a common mysticism, although one is destined almost to -meet with truth during its long journey, while the other wanders ever -further away. - -The first half of the nineteenth century was for Germany a period of -many fine-sounding philosophical formulæ: subjectivism, objectivism, -subjective--objectivism; abstract, concrete, abstract-concrete; -idealism, realism, idealism--realism; between pantheism and theism -Krause inserted his pan-en-theism. In the midst of this uproar, in -which the second-rate men shouted down the first-rate and made good -their claim to their only true property, namely words, it is not -surprising that a few modest clear thinkers, philosophers who preferred -to think about realities, should have the worst of it and remain -unheard and unnoticed, lost among the roaring crowd or labelled with a -false ticket. - -[Sidenote: _Friedrich Schleiermacher._] - -This, at least, seems to have been the lot of Friedrich Schleiermacher, -whose æsthetic doctrine is amongst the least known although it is -perhaps the most noteworthy of the day. - -[Sidenote: _Wrong judgements concerning him._] - -Schleiermacher delivered his first lectures on Æsthetic at Berlin -University in 1819, and from that date he began to study the subject -seriously with a view to writing a book on it. He repeated his -lectures on two occasions, in 1825 and 1832-1833; but his death, -which occurred in the following year, prevented him from carrying -out his plan, and all we know of his thoughts on Æsthetic comes from -his lectures, as collected by his pupils and published in 1842.[1] A -Herbartian historian of Æsthetic, Zimmermann, attacks the posthumous -work of Schleiermacher with real ferocity; after twenty pages of -invective and sarcasm he concludes by asking, how could his pupils -so dishonour their great master by publishing such a mass of waste -paper, "all play upon words, sophistical conceits and dialectical -subtleties"?[2] Nor was the idealistic historian Hartmann much more -benevolent when he describes the work as "a confused mess in which, -among much that is merely trivial, many half-truths and exaggerations, -one can detect a few acute observations"; and says that, in order -to make bearable "such unctuous afternoon sermons delivered by a -preacher in his dotage," it must be shortened by three-quarters; and -that, "as regards fundamental principles," it is simply useless, -offering no innovations upon concrete idealism as presented by Hegel -and others; and that, in any case, it seems impossible "to attach it -to any line of thought except the Hegelian, to which Schleiermacher's -contribution is only of second-rate importance." He further observes -that Schleiermacher was primarily a theologian, and in philosophy more -or less an amateur.[3] Now it cannot be denied that Schleiermacher's -doctrine has reached us in a hazy form, by no means free from -uncertainties and contradictions; and, which is more important, -it is here and there affected for the worse by the influence of -contemporary metaphysics. But, side by side with these defects, what -excellent method, really scientific and philosophical; what a number of -cornerstones well and truly laid; what wealth of new truths, and of -difficulties and problems not suspected or discussed before his day! - -[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher contrasted with his predecessors._] - -Schleiermacher considered Æsthetic as an essentially modern line -of thought, and drew a sharp distinction between the _Poetics_ of -Aristotle, which never shakes itself free from the empirical standpoint -of the maker of rules, and what Baumgarten tried to do in the -eighteenth century. He praised Kant for having been the first truly -to include Æsthetic among the philosophical sciences, and recognized -that in Hegel artistic activity had attained the highest elevation by -being brought into connexion and almost into equality with religion -and philosophy. But he was not satisfied either with the followers of -Baumgarten when they degenerated into the absurd attempt to construct -a science or theory of sensuous pleasure, or with the Kantian point of -view which made its principal aim the consideration of taste; or with -the philosophy of Fichte, in which art became a means of education; or -with the more widely received opinion which placed at the centre of -Æsthetic the vague and equivocal concept of Beauty. Schiller pleased -him by having called attention to the moment of artistic spontaneity or -productiveness, and he praised Schelling for having laid stress on the -importance of the figurative arts, which lend themselves less easily -than poetry to facile and illusory moralistic interpretations.[4] -Having with the utmost clearness excluded from Æsthetic the study of -practical rules as empirical, and therefore irreducible to a science, -he assigned to Æsthetic the task of determining the proper position of -artistic activity in the scheme of ethics.[5] - -[Sidenote: _Place assigned to Æsthetic in his Ethics._] - -To avoid falling into error over this terminology, we must call to -mind that the philosophy of Schleiermacher followed the ancient -traditions in its tripartite division into Dialectic, Ethics and -Physics. Dialectic corresponds with ontology; Physics embraces all -the sciences of natural facts; Ethics includes the study of all free -activities of mankind (language, thought, art, religion and morality). -Ethics represented to him not only the science of morality but what -others name Psychology or, better still, the Science or Philosophy of -the Spirit. This explanation once given, Schleiermacher's point of -departure seems to be the only one just and permissible, and we shall -not be surprised when he talks of will, of voluntary acts and so on, -where others would have simply spoken of activity or spiritual energy; -he even endows such expressions with a broader meaning than that -conferred upon them by practical philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic activity as immanent and individual._] - -A double distinction may be made amongst human activities. In the -first place, there are activities which we presume to be constituted -in the same manner in all men (such as the logical activity) and are -called activities of identity; and others whose diversity is presumed, -which are called activities of difference or individual activities. -Secondly, there are activities which exhaust themselves in the -internal life, and others which actualize themselves in the external -world: immanent activities and practical activities. To which of the -two classes in each of the two orders does artistic activity belong? -There can be no doubt of its different modes of development, if not -actually in each individual person, at least in different peoples and -nations; therefore it belongs properly to activities of difference or -individual activities.[6] As for the other distinction, it is true -that art does realize itself in the external world, but this fact is -something superadded ("_ein später Hinzukommendes_") "which stands to -the internal fact as the communication of thought by means of speech -or writing stands to thought itself": art's true work is the internal -image ("_das innere Bild ist das eigentliche Kunstwerk_"). Exceptions -to this might be adduced, such as mimicry; but they would be apparent -only. Between a really angry man and the actor who plays the part of -an angry man on the stage there is this difference: in the second case -anger appears as controlled and therefore beautiful; that is, the -internal image is in the actor's soul interposed between the fact of -passion and its physical manifestation.[7] Artistic activity "belongs -to those human activities in which we presuppose the individual in its -differentiation; it belongs equally to those activities developing -essentially within themselves and not completing themselves in any -external world. Art, therefore, is an immanent activity in which we -presuppose differentiation." Internal, not practical: individual, not -universal or logical. - -[Sidenote: _Artistic truth and intellectual truth._] - -But if art be one form of thought, there must be one form of thought -in which identity is presupposed, and another in which difference is -presupposed. We do not look for truth in poetry; or, rather, we do look -for truth, but for one that is totally different from that objective -truth to which there must correspond some being, either universal or -individual (scientific and historical truth). "When a character in a -poem is said to be devoid of truth, a slur is cast on the given poem; -but if the character is said to be a pure invention, corresponding with -no reality, that is quite a different matter." The truth of a poetic -character consists in the coherence with which a single person's divers -modes of thinking and acting are represented: even in portraits it is -not an exact correspondence with an objective reality that makes the -thing a work of art. From art and poetry "springs no iota of knowledge" -(_das Geringste vom Wissen_); "it expresses but the truth of the single -consciousness." There are then "productions of thought and of sensible -intuitions, opposed to the other productions because they do not -presuppose identity, and they express the singular as such."[8] - -[Sidenote: _Difference of artistic consciousness from feeling and -religion._] - -The domain of art is immediate self-consciousness (_unmittelbare -Selbstbewusstsein_), which must be carefully distinguished from the -thought or concept of the ego or of the determinate ego. This latter is -the consciousness of identity in the diversity of moments; immediate -self-consciousness is "diversity itself, of which one must be aware, -since life in its entirety is but the development of consciousness." In -this domain art has often been confused with two facts which accompany -it: sensuous consciousness (the feeling of pleasure and pain), and -religion. A double confusion, of which the sensationalists fall into -the first half and Hegel into the second; Schleiermacher clears it up -by proving that art is free productivity, whereas sensuous pleasure and -religious feeling, however different in other ways, are both determined -by an objective fact (_äussere Sein_).[9] - -[Sidenote: _Dreams and art: inspiration and deliberation._] - -The better to understand this free productivity, we must further -circumscribe the domain of immediate consciousness. In this we can -find nothing more helpful than comparing it with the images produced -by dreams. The artist has his own dreams: he dreams with open eyes, -and from among the thick-thronging images of this dream-state those -having sufficient energy alone become works of art, the rest remaining -a mere background from which the others stand out. All the essential -elements of art are found in the dream-state, which is the production -of free thoughts and sensuous intuitions consisting of mere images. -Certainly something is lacking in dreams, and they differ from art not -only in their absence of technique, which has already been excluded as -irrelevant to art, but in another way, viz. that a dream is a chaotic -fact, without stability, order, connexion or measure. But when some -sort of order is introduced into the chaos the difference at once -disappears, and the likeness to art merges in identity. This internal -activity which introduces order and measure, fixes and determines the -image, is that which distinguishes art from a dream or transforms a -dream into art. It often involves struggle, labour, the obligation to -stem the involuntary flood of internal images; in a word, it means -reflexion or deliberation. But the dream and the cessation of dreaming -are equally indispensable elements of art. There must be production of -thoughts and images and, together with such production, there must -be measure, determination and unity, "otherwise each image would be -confused with its neighbour and have no definiteness." The instant of -inspiration (_Begeisterung_) is as essential as that of deliberation -(_Besonnenheit)_.[10] - -[Sidenote: _Art and the typical._] - -But in order to arrive at artistic truth it is also I necessary (here -Schleiermacher's thought becomes less clear and accurate) that the -singular be accompanied by consciousness of the species; consciousness -of the self as individual man is impossible without consciousness of -mankind; nor is a single object true unless referred to its universal. -In a pictured landscape "every tree must possess natural truth, that -is to say, it must be contemplated as a specimen of a given kind; -similarly, the whole complex of natural and individual life must have -effective truth of nature and constitute a single harmony. Just because -in art we do not strive after the production of individual figures -in themselves and for themselves, but their internal truth as well, -we commonly assign to them a high place as being a free realization -of that in which all cognition has its value, that is to say, in the -principle that all forms of being are inherent in the human spirit. -If this principle fails, truth is no longer possible; scepticism only -remains." The productions of art are the ideal or typical figures -which real nature would create were it not impeded by external -influences.[11] "The artist creates a figure on the basis of a general -scheme, rejecting whatever may hinder or impede the play of the living -forces of reality; such a production, founded on a general scheme, is -what we call the Ideal."[12] - -In spite of all these determinations, Schleiermacher did not apparently -intend to limit the artist's scope. He remarks, "When an artist -represents something really given, whether portrait, landscape or -single human figure, he renounces the freedom of productivity and -adheres to the real."[13] There is a twofold tendency at work in the -artist: towards perfection of type, and towards representation of -natural reality. An artist must not fall into the abstractness of -the type or into the unmeaningness of empirical reality.[14] If in -flower-painting it is necessary to bring out the specific type, a much -more complete individualisation is demanded when representing man, -owing to the lofty position which he occupies.[15] Representation -of the ideal in the real does not exclude "an infinite variety, -such as is found in actual reality." "For instance, the human face -wavers between the ideal and caricature, in its moral conformation -no less than in its physical. Every human face contains elements of -disfigurement (_Verbildung,_) but it has also something by which it -is a determinate modification of human nature; this does not appear -openly, but a practised eye can seize it and ideally complete the face -in question."[16] Schleiermacher is keenly aware of the difficulties -and perplexities of' such problems as the question whether there exists -one or many ideals of the human face.[17] He observes that the two -views which strive for mastery in the field of poetry may be extended -to art as a whole. Some assert that poetry and art should represent the -perfect, the ideal, that which would have been produced by nature, had -she not been prevented by mechanical forces; others reject the ideal as -incapable of realisation and prefer that the artist should depict man -as he really is, with those perturbing elements which in reality belong -to him no less than his ideal qualities. Each view is a half-truth: -it is the duty of art to represent the ideal as well as the real, the -subjective as well as the objective.[18] The comic element, that is the -unideal and the faulty ideal, is included in the circle of art.[19] - -[Sidenote: _Independence of art._] - -In respect to morality, art is free just as philosophical speculation -is free: its essence excludes practical and moral effects. This leads -to the proposition that "there is no difference between various -works of art, except in so far as they can be compared in respect -of artistic perfection" (_Vollkommenheit in der Kunst._) "Given an -artistic object perfect of its kind, it has an absolute value which -cannot be increased or diminished by anything else. If motions of -the will could truly be described as consequences of works of art, a -different standard of values would apply to works of art: and since -the objects which an artist may depict are not all equally adapted to -influence volition, a scale of values would exist which did not depend -on artistic perfection." Nor must we confound the judgement passed -upon the varied and complex personality of the artist himself with the -strictly æsthetic judgement passed upon his work. "In this respect -the biggest, most complicated canvas is on a level with the smallest -arabesque, the longest poem with the shortest: the value of a work of -art depends on the perfect manner in which the external corresponds to -the internal."[20] - -Schleiermacher rejects the doctrine of Schiller because in his opinion -it makes art a sort of game or pastime in contrast to the serious -affairs of life: a view, he says, for business men to whom their -business is the only serious thing. Artistic activity is universally -human, a man devoid of it is inconceivable; although, of course, there -are in this respect great differences betwixt man and man, running from -the mere desire to enjoy art to real taste, and from this again to -productive genius.[21] - -[Sidenote: _Art and language._] - -The artist makes use of instruments which, by their nature, are framed -not for the individual but for the universal; of this kind is language. -But it is the business of poetry to extract the individual from -language which is universal without giving to its productions the form -of the antithesis between individual and universal which is proper to -science. Of the two elements of language, the musical and the logical, -the poet claims the first for his own ends and constrains the other -to awaken individual images. In comparison with pure science as in -comparison with the individual image, there is something irrational -about language: but the tendencies of speculation and of poetry are -always contrary, even in their use of language; the former tends to -make language approximate to mathematical formulæ; the latter to -imagery (_Bild_)[22] - -[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher's defects._] - -Leaving out many details which will be touched on in their -proper places, the foregoing is a fair summary of the heads of -Schleiermacher's æsthetic thought. Adding up the accounts of the -whole statement of views, on the side of error and oversight we -find: first, ideas or types are not wholly excluded, in spite -of all Schleiermacher's care and anxiety to safeguard artistic -individualisation and to make the ideas and types superfluous. -Secondly, there is still, undefeated and unexpelled, a certain residue -of abstract formalism, visible at various points of his theories.[23] -Thirdly, the definition of art as an activity of mere difference may be -diluted but is not destroyed by making art a difference of complexes -of individuals, a national difference. A closer reflexion on the -history of art, a recognition of the possibility of appreciating the -art of various nations and various times, a more patient investigation -into the moment of artistic reproduction, even an examination of the -relation between science and art, would have led Schleiermacher to -treat this difference as empirical and surmountable, still holding -firmly to the distinctive character (individual as opposed to -universal) he assigned to art in comparison with science. Fourthly, he -did not recognize the identity of æsthetic activity with linguistic, -and failed to make it the basis of all other theoretic activity. It -would seem, moreover, that Schleiermacher had no clear ideas concerning -that artistic element which enters into the constitution of historic -narrative and is indispensable as the concrete form of science; or -concerning language, taken not as a complex of abstract means of -expression but as expressive activity. - -[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher's services to Æsthetic._] - -These defects and uncertainties may perhaps be attributable in part -to the fact that his thoughts on æsthetic have reached us in an -inchoate form, very far from a mature development. But if on the other -hand we wish to cast up the sum of his very striking merits, it will -suffice to run over the list of accusations heaped upon him by the two -historians before mentioned, Zimmermann and Hartmann. Schleiermacher -has denuded Æsthetic of its imperative character; he recognizes in it a -form of thought differing from logical thought; he gives this science -a non-metaphysical and merely anthropological character; he denies -the concept of beauty, substituting that of artistic perfection, and -actually affirms the æsthetic equivalence of small and great works of -art, so long as each is perfect in its own sphere; he considers the -æsthetic fact as pure human productivity: and so on and so forth. All -these criticisms are meant for blame and are really praise; for what -is blame to the mind of a Zimmermann or a Hartmann, is to ours praise. -In the metaphysical orgy of his day, in the perpetual building and -pulling down of more or less arbitrary systems, Schleiermacher the -theologian, with philosophic acumen, fixed his eye upon what was really -characteristic of the æsthetic fact and succeeded in defining its -properties and connexions; when he failed to see clearly and wandered -from the track, he never abandoned analysis for fantastic caprice. -By his discovery that the obscure region of immediate consciousness -is also that of the æsthetic fact, he seems to bid his distracted -contemporaries listen to the old adage: _Hic Rhodus, hic salta._ - - -[1] _Vorlesungen üb. Ästhetik_ published by Lommatsch, Berlin, 1842 -(_Werke,_ sect. iii. vol. vii.). - -[2] Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp. 608-634. - -[3] E. von Hartmann, _Deutsche Ästh. s. Kant,_ pp. 156-169. - -[4] _Vorles. üb. Ästhetik_ pp. 1-30. - -[5] _Op. cit._ pp. 35-51. - -[6] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 51-54. - -[7] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 55-61. - -[8] _Op. cit._ pp. 61-66; cf. _Dialektik,_ ed. Halpern, pp. 54-55, 67. - -[9] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 67-77. - -[10] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 79-91. - -[11] _Op. cit._ pp. 123, 143-150. - -[12] _Op. cit._ p. 505; cf. p. 607. - -[13] _Op. cit._ p. 505. - -[14] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 506-508. - -[15] _Op. cit._ pp. 156-157. - -[16] _Op. cit._ pp. 550-551. - -[17] _Op. cit._ p. 608. - -[18] _Op. cit._ pp. 684-686. - -[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 191-196; cf. pp. 364-365. - -[20] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 209-219; of. pp. 527-528. - -[21] _Op. cit._ pp. 98-111. - -[22] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 635-648. - -[23] Cf. _e.g._ p. 467 _seqq._ - - - - -XII - - -THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: HUMBOLDT AND STEINTHAL - - -[Sidenote: _Progress of Linguistic._] - -About the time when Schleiermacher was meditating on the nature of the -æsthetic fact, a movement of thought was gaining ground in Germany -which, tending as it did to overthrow the old concept of language, -might have proved a powerful aid to æsthetic science. But not only had -the æsthetic specialists--if we may so call them--no notion of the -existence of this movement, the new philosophers of language never -brought their ideas into relation with the æsthetic problem, and -their discoveries languished imprisoned within the narrow scope of -Linguistic, condemned to sterility. - -[Sidenote: _Linguistic speculation at the beginning of the nineteenth -century_.] - -Research into the relations between thought and speech, between the -unity of logic and the multiplicity of languages, had been promoted, -like many other things, by the _Critique of Pure Reason_: the earliest -Kantians often tried to apply the Kantian categories of intuition -(space and time) and of intellect to language. The first to make the -attempt was Roth[1] in 1795; the same who wrote an essay twenty years -later on _Pure Linguistic._ Many other noteworthy books on this subject -appeared in quick succession: those of Vater, Bernhardi, Reinbeck and -Koch were published one after another in the first ten years of the -nineteenth century. In all these treatises the dominating subject is -the difference between language and languages; between the universal -language, corresponding with Logic, and concrete, historical languages -disturbed by feeling and imagination or whatever other name was applied -to the psychological element of differentiation. Vater distinguishes a -general Linguistic (_all gemeine Sprachlehre_), constructed _a priori_ -by means of the analysis of the concepts contained in the judgement, -from a comparative Linguistic (_vergleichende Sprachlehre_) which -attempts by means of induction to reach probable laws through the -study of a number of languages. Bemhardi considers language to be an -"allegory of intellect" and distinguishes it as functioning either -as the organ of poetry or that of science. Reinbeck speaks of an -Æsthetic Grammar and a Logical. Koch, more energetic than the others, -asserts positively that the character of language is "_non ad Logices -sed ad Psychologiae rationem revocanda._"[2] Some few philosophers -speculated on language and mythology: for example Schelling considered -them to be the products of a pre-human consciousness (_vormenschliche -Bewusstsein,_) presenting them, in a fantastic allegory, as diabolic -suggestions which precipitate the ego from the infinite to the -finite.[3] - -[Sidenote: _Wilhelm von Humboldt. Relics of intellectualism._] - -Even the famous philologist, Wilhelm von Humboldt, was unable to detach -himself entirely from the prejudice of the substantial identity and -the purely historical, accidental diversity between logical thought -and language. His celebrated dissertation, _On the Diversity of -Structure of Human Languages_ (1836),[4] is based on the notion of a -perfect language split up and distributed amongst particular tongues -according to the linguistic or intellectual capacity of various -nations. "For," says he, "since disposition towards speech is general -in mankind, and all men must necessarily carry within themselves the -key to the comprehension of all languages, it follows that the form -of all languages must be substantially equal and all must attain the -same general end. Diversity can exist solely in the means, and within -the bounds permitted by the attainment of the end." Yet this same -diversity becomes a real divergence not only in sounds, but in the -use of sound made by the linguistic sense in respect to the form of -language, or rather, in respect to its own idea of the form of the -determinate language. "Languages being merely formal, the operation -of the linguistic sense by itself should produce mere uniformity; -the linguistic sense must exact from every tongue the same right and -legitimate construction that is found in one of them. In practice, -however, the facts are quite otherwise, partly owing to the reaction of -sounds, and partly by reason of the individual aspect assumed by the -same internal meaning in phenomenal reality." Linguistic force "cannot -maintain its equality everywhere or show the same intensity, vivacity -or regularity; it cannot be supported by an exactly equal tendency -towards the symbolic treatment of thought or by exactly equal pleasure -in richness and harmony of sound." These, then, are the causes which -produce in human languages that diversity which manifests itself in -every branch of the civilization of nations. But reflexion on languages -"ought to reveal to us a form which of all possible forms best fits the -purpose of language" and approaches most closely to its ideal; and "the -merits and defects of existing languages must be estimated by their -nearness or remoteness from this form." Humboldt finds the nearest -approximation to such an ideal in the Sanskrit tongues, which can -therefore be used as a standard of comparison. Setting Chinese apart in -a class by itself, he proceeds to the division of the possible forms of -language into inflective, agglutinative and incorporative; types which -are found combined in various proportions in every real language.[5] He -also inaugurated the division of languages into inferior and superior, -unformed and formed, according to the way in which verbs are treated. -He was never able to rid himself of a second prejudice connected with -the first, namely that language exists as something objective outside -the talking man, unattached and independent, and waking up when needed -for use. - -[Sidenote: _Language an activity. Internal form._] - -But Humboldt opposes Humboldt: amongst the old dross we detect the -brilliant gleams of a wholly new concept of language. Certainly his -work is for this very reason not always free from contradictions -and from a kind of hesitation and awkwardness which appear -characteristically in his literary style and make it at times laboured -and obscure. The new man in Humboldt criticizes the old man when he -says, "Languages must be considered not as dead products but as an act -of production. ... Language in its reality is something continually -changing and passing away. Even its preservation in writing is -incomplete, a kind of mummification: it is always necessary to render -the living speech sensible. Language is not a work, _ergon,_ but -an activity, _energeia._ ... It is an eternally repeated effort of -the spirit in order to make articulated tones capable of expressing -thought." Language is the act of speaking. "True and proper language -consists in the very act of producing it by means of connected -utterance; that is the only thing that must be thought of as the -starting-point or the truth in any inquiry which aims at penetrating -into the living essence of language. Division into words and rules is a -lifeless artifice of scientific analysis."[6] Language is not a thing -arising out of the need of external communication; on the contrary, it -springs from the wholly internal thirst for knowledge and the struggle -to reach an intuition of things." From its earliest commencement it is -entirely human, and extends without intention to all objects of sensory -perception or internal elaboration.... Words gush spontaneously from -the breast without constraint or intention: there is no nomad tribe in -any desert without its songs. Taken as a zoological species, man is a -singing animal which connects its thoughts with its utterances."[7] -The new man leads Humboldt to discover a fact hidden from the authors -of logico-universal grammars: namely the internal form of language -(_innere Sprachform_), which is neither logical concept nor physical -sound, but the subjective view of things formed by man, the product -of imagination and feeling, the individualization of the concept. -Conjunction of the internal form of language with physical sound is -the work of an internal synthesis; "and here, more than anywhere else, -language by its profound and mysterious operation recalls art. Sculptor -and painter also unite the idea with matter, and their efforts are -judged praiseworthy or not according as this union, this intimate -interpenetration, is the work of true genius, or as the idea is -something separate, painfully and laboriously imposed upon the matter -by sheer force of brush or chisel."[8] - -[Sidenote: _Language and art in Humboldt._] - -But Humboldt was content to regard the procedure of artist and speaker -as comparable by analogy, without proceeding to identify them. On the -one hand, he was too one-sided in his view of language as a means -for the development of thought (logical thought); on the other, his -own æsthetic ideas, always vague and not always true, prevented his -perception of the identity. Of his two principal writings on Æsthetic, -that on _Beauty Masculine and Feminine_ (1795) seems to be wholly -under the influence of Winckelmann, whose antithesis between beauty -and expression is revived, and the opinion expressed that specific -sexual characters diminish the beauty of the human body and that beauty -asserts itself only by triumphing over differences of sex. His other -work, which is inspired by Goethe's _Hermann und Dorothee,_ defines -art as "representation of nature by means of fancy; the representation -being beautiful, just because it is the work of fancy," a metamorphosis -of nature carried to a higher sphere. The poet reflects the pictures -of language, itself a complex of abstractions.[9] In his dissertation -on Linguistic, Humboldt distinguishes poetry and prose, treating -the two concepts philosophically, not by the empirical distinction -between free and measured or periodic and metric language. "Poetry -gives us reality in its sensible appearance, as it is felt internally -and externally; but is indifferent to the character which makes it -real, and even deliberately ignores that character. It presents the -sensuous appearance to fancy and, by this means, leads towards the -contemplation of an artistically ideal whole. Prose, on the contrary, -looks in reality for the roots which attach it to existence, the cords -which bind her to it: hence it fastens fact to fact and concept to -concept according to the methods of the intellect, and strives towards -the objective union of them all in an idea."[10] Poetry precedes -prose: before producing prose, the spirit necessarily forms itself in -poetry.[11] But, beside these views, some of which are profoundly true, -Humboldt looks on poets as perfecters of language, and on poetry as -belonging only to certain exceptional moments,[12] and makes us suspect -that after all he never recognized clearly or maintained firmly that -language is always poetry, and that prose (science) is a distinction -not of æsthetic form but of content, that is, of logical form. - -[Sidenote: _H. Steinthal. The linguistic function independent of the -logical._] - -Humboldt's contradictions about the concept of language lost him his -principal follower, Steinthal. With the help of his master, Steinthal -restated the position that language belongs not to Logic but to -Psychology,[13] and in 1855 waged a gallant war against the Hegelian -Becker, author of _The Organisms of Language,_ one of the last logical -grammarians, who pledged himself to deduce the entire body of the -Sanskrit languages from twelve cardinal concepts. Steinthal declares it -is not true that one cannot think without words: the deaf-mute thinks -in signs; the mathematician in formulæ. In some languages, as in -Chinese, the visual element is as necessary to thought as the phonetic, -if not more so.[14] In this he may have overshot the mark, and failed -to establish the autonomy of expression with regard to logical thought; -for his examples only confirm the fact that if we can think without -words, we cannot think without expressions.[15] But he successfully -demonstrates that concept and word, logical judgement and proposition, -are incommensurable. The proposition is not the judgement but the -representation (_Darstellung_) of a judgement; and all propositions do -not represent logical judgements. It is possible to express several -judgements in a single proposition. The logical divisions of judgements -(the relations of concepts) find no counterpart in the grammatical -divisions of propositions. "A logical form of the proposition is just -as much a contradiction as the angle of a circle or the circumference -of a triangle." He who talks, in so far as he talks, possesses not -thoughts but language.[16] - -[Sidenote: _Identity of the problems of the origin and the nature of -language._] - -Having thus freed language from all dependence on Logic, having -repeatedly proclaimed the principle that language produces its forms -independently of Logic and in the fullest autonomy,[17] and having -purified Humboldt's theory from the taint of the logical grammar of -Port Royal, Steinthal seeks the origin of language, recognizing, with -his master, that the question of its origin is identical with that of -nature of language, its psychological genesis or rather the position -it occupies in evolution of the spirit. "In the matter of language -there is no difference between its original creation (_Urschöpfung_) -and the creation which is daily repeated."[18] Language belongs to the -vast class of reflex movements; but to say that is to look at it from -one side only and to omit its own essential peculiarity. Animals have -reflex movements and sensations like man; but in animals the senses -"are wide gates through which external nature rushes to the assault -with such impetus as to overwhelm the mind and deprive it of all -independence and freedom of movement." In man, however, language can -arise because man is resistance to nature, conqueror of his own body, -freedom incarnate: "language is liberation: even to-day we feel our -mind lightened and freed from a weight when we speak." In the situation -immediately preceding the production of speech man must be conceived as -"accompanying all his sensations and all the intuitions received by his -mind with the most lively contortions of body, attitudes of mimicry, -gestures, and above all tones, articulate tones." What element of -speech did he lack? One only, but a most important one: the conscious -conjunction of reflex bodily movements with the excitations of his -mind. If sensuous consciousness is already consciousness, it lacks the -consciousness of being conscious; if it is already intuition, it is -not intuition of intuition; what it lacks is in a word the internal -form of speech. When that arises, there arises too its inseparable -accompaniment, words. Man does not select sound: it is given him, -and he takes it of necessity, instinctively, without intention or -choice.[19] - -[Sidenote: _Steinthal's mistaken ideas on art: his failure to unite -Linguistic and Æsthetic._] - -This is not the place for detailed examination of the whole of -Steinthal's theory and the various phases, not always progressive, -through which he travelled, especially after the beginning of -his spiritual collaboration with Lazarus, with whom he studied -ethnopsychology (_Völkerpsychologie_), of which they both took -Linguistic to be a part.[20] But, while giving him full credit for -bringing Humboldt's ideas into coherent order, and for clearly -differentiating, as had never before been done, between linguistic -activity and the activity of logical thought, it must be noted -that Steintha! never recognized the identity of the internal form -of language (which he also called the intuition of intuition, or -apperception) with the æsthetic imagination. The Herbartian psychology -to which he clung afforded him no clue to such a discovery. Herbart and -his followers divorced psychology from logic as a normative science -and never succeeded in discerning the true connection between feeling -and spiritual formation, soul and spirit; they never understood that -logical thought is one of these spiritual formations: an activity, not -a code of external laws. The domain allotted by them to Æsthetic we -already know; for them Æsthetic too was only another code of beautiful -formal relations. Under the influence of these doctrines Steinthal -was led to regard Art as the embellishment of thoughts, Linguistic as -the science of speech, and Rhetoric or Æsthetic as a thing differing -from Linguistic since it is science of fine or beautiful speaking.[21] -In one of his innumerable tracts he says, "Poetics and Rhetoric both -differ from Linguistic, since they are obliged to touch on many -important topics before reaching language. These sciences therefore -have but one section devoted to Linguistic, which is the concluding -section of Syntax. Moreover Syntax has a character entirely different -from Rhetoric and from Poetics; the former is occupied solely with -correctness (_Richtigkeit)_ of language; the latter two sciences -study beauty or grace of expression (_Schönheit oder Angemessenheit -des Ausdrucks_): the principles of the first are merely grammatical, -the others must consider matters outside language; for example, the -disposition of the orator and so forth. To speak plainly, Syntax is -to Stylistic as is the grammatical measure of the quantity of vowels -to the theory of metre."[22] That speaking invariably means good or -beautiful speaking, since speech that is neither good nor beautiful is -not really speech,[23] and that the radical renewal of the concept of -language inaugurated by Humboldt and himself must produce far-reaching -effects on the cognate sciences of Poetics, Rhetoric and Æsthetic and, -by transforming, unify them, never entered Steinthal's head. After -all this labour and all this minute analysis, the identification of -language and poetry, and of the science of language with the science of -poetry, the identification of Linguistic with Æsthetic, still found its -least faulty expression in the prophetic aphorisms of Giambattista Vico. - - -[1] _Antihermes oder philosophische Untersuchung üb. d. reine Begriff -d. menschl. Sprache und die allgemeine Sprachlehre,_ Frankfurt and -Leipzig, 1795. - -[2] For these writers, see accounts and quotations in Loewe, _Hist, -crit. gramm. univ., passim,_ and Pott, introd. to Humboldt, pp. -clxxi.-ccxii.; cf. also Benfey, _Gesch. d. Sprachwiss.,_ introd. - -[3] In _Philos, der Mythologie_: cf. Steinthal, _Urspr._ pp. 81-89. - -[4] _Üb. d. Verschiedenheit d. menschl. Sprachbaues,_ posthumous work -(2nd ed. by A. F. Pott, Berlin, 1880). - -[5] _Verschiedenheit_, etc. pp. 308-310. - -[6] _Verschiedenheit,_ etc., pp. 54-56. - -[7] _Verschiedenheit,_ etc., pp. 25, 73-74, 79. - -[8] _Op. cit._ pp. 105-118. - -[9] Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp. 533-544. - -[10] _Verschiedenheit,_ etc., pp. 326-328. - -[11] _Op. cit._ pp. 239-240. - -[12] _Op. cit._ pp. 205-206, 547, etc. - -[13] _Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie, ihre Principien u. ihr -Verhältn. z. einand.,_ Berlin, 1855. - -[14] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych._ pp. 153-158. - -[15] See above, pp. 28-30. - -[16] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych,_ pp. 183, 195. - -[17] _Einleitung i. d. Psych, u. Sprachwissenschaft_ (2nd ed., Berlin, -1881), p. 62. - -[18] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych,_ p. 231. - -[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 285, 292, 295-306. - -[20] Steinthal, _Ursprung d. Sprache_ (4th ed. Berlin, 1888), pp. -120-124. M. Lazarus, _Das Leben der Seele,_ 1855 (Berlin, 1876-1878), -vol. ii. _Zeitschrift f. Völkerpsych. u. Sprachwiss._ from 1860 -onwards, edited by Steinthal and Lazarus together. - -[21] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych,_ pp. 139-140, 146. - -[22] _Einleit._ pp. 34-35. - -[23] See above, pp. 78-79. - - - - -XIII - - -MINOR GERMAN ÆSTHETICIANS - - -[Sidenote: _Minor æstheticians in the metaphysical school._] - - -When we turn from the pages of methodical and serious thinkers such as -Schleiermacher, Humboldt and Steinthal, we are filled with distaste -by the books written in enormous quantities during the first half of -the nineteenth century by disciples of Schelling and Hegel. We are -fatigued and almost disgusted as we pass from this illuminating and -scientific study to something which oscillates between vapid fancies -and charlatanism; between the vanity of empty formulæ and the attempt, -not always free from dishonesty, to employ them in order to amaze and -overwhelm the reader or student. - -[Sidenote: _Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse and others._] - -Why should we encumber a general History of Æsthetic (which ought, -certainly, to take account of aberrations from the truth, but only in -so far as they indicate the general trend of contemporary thought) with -the theories of such men as Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse, Deutinger, -Oersted, Zeising, Eckardt and the crowd of manipulators of manuals and -systems? The only one who obtained a hearing outside his native Germany -was Krause, who was imported into Spain; we are justified, therefore, -in leaving them to the memory or forgetfulness of their compatriots. -For Krause,[1] the humanitarian, the freethinker, the theosophist, -everything is organism, everything is beauty; beauty is organism, and -organism is beauty: Essence, that is to say God, is one, free and -entire; one, free and entire is Beauty. There is but one artist, God; -but one art, the divine. The beauty of finite things is the Divinity, -or rather the likeness of Divinity manifested in the finite. Beauty -brings into play reason, intellect and imagination in a mode conforming -to their laws, and awakens disinterested pleasure and inclination in -the soul. Trahndorff,[2] describing the various degrees by which the -individual seeks to grasp the essence or form of the universe (the -degrees of feeling, intuition, reflexion and presentiment), and noting -the insufficiency of simple theoretical knowledge till supplemented -by the Will, the Will which is power (_Können_), in its three degrees -of Aspiration, Faith and Love, places the Beautiful in the highest -grade, in Love: it would seem, therefore, that Beauty is Love which -comprehends itself. Christian Weisse[3] attempted, like Trahndorff, to -reconcile the God of Christianity with the Hegelian philosophy: in his -estimation the æsthetic Idea is superior to the logical, and leads to -religion, to God; the idea of beauty, existing outside the sensible -universe, is the reality of the concept of beauty, and, as the idea of -divinity is absolute Love, so must that of Beauty be found truly in -Love. The same reconciliation was attempted by the Catholic theologian -Deutinger;[4] beauty, for him, is born of power (_Können_), an activity -parallel with those of the knowledge of truth and the doing of good -but (differing in this from knowledge, which is receptive) realizing -itself in an outward movement from within, mastering the world of -matter and imprinting upon it the seal of personality. An internal -ideal intuition, the Idea: an external shapable matter: the power of -interpenetrating internal with external, invisible with visible, ideal -with real: such is Beauty. Oersted[5] (the celebrated Danish naturalist -whose works were translated into German and gained him a considerable -reputation in Germany) defines beauty as the objective Idea in the -moment of subjective contemplation: the Idea expressed in things in so -far as it reveals itself to intuition. Zeising[6] turned his attention -partly to exploration of the mysteries of the golden section, and -partly to speculations on Beauty, which he considered as one of the -three forms of the Idea; first, the Idea which expresses itself in -object and subject; secondly, the Idea as intuition; and thirdly, the -Absolute which appears in the world and is conceived intuitively by -the spirit. Eckardt,[7] intent on creating a theistic Æsthetic which -should avoid the one-sided transcendence of deism on the one hand and -the one-sided immanence of pantheism on the other, maintained that its -principles must be sought not in the feelings of the contemplator, not -in works of art, not in the idea of the beautiful, not in the concept -of art, but in the creative spirit of the artist, the original fount -of beauty; and since a creative artist cannot be conceived except as -derived from the highest creative genius which is God, Eckardt invokes -aid from a psychology of God (_eine Psychologie des Weltkünstlers_). - -[Sidenote: _Fried. Theodor Vischer._] - -If quantity is as important as quality, we must devote some space to -Friedrich Theodor Vischer, the bulkiest of all German æstheticians, -indeed the German æsthetician _par excellence_: after publishing a book -on _The Sublime and the Comic, a contribution to the Philosophy of -the Beautiful_,[8] in 1837, he produced four huge tomes on _Æsthetic -as Science of the Beautiful_ between 1846 and 1857,[9] where, in -hundreds of paragraphs and long observations and sub-observations, is -massed a stupendous amount of æsthetic material, of matter foreign to -Æsthetic, and of subjects taken haphazard from the whole thinkable -universe. Vischer's work is divided into three parts: a Metaphysic of -the Beautiful, which investigates the concept of Beauty in itself, no -matter where and how it is realized: a treatise on concrete Beauty, -which inquires into the two one-sided modes of realization, Beauty -of nature and Beauty of imagination, one lacking subjective, the -other lacking objective, existence: lastly, a theory of the arts, -which studies the synthesis in art of the two artistic moments, the -physical and psychical, the objective and subjective. It is easy to -sum up Vischer's concept of æsthetic activity; it is Hegel's concept, -debased. For Vischer, Beauty belongs neither to the theoretical nor to -the practical activity, but is placed in a serene sphere, superior to -these antitheses; that is to say in the sphere of absolute Spirit, in -company with Religion and Philosophy;[10] but, in contradistinction to -Hegel, Vischer assigns the first place in this sphere to Religion, the -second to Art, and the third to Philosophy. Much ingenuity was devoted -in those days to moving these words about like pieces on a chess-board; -it has been observed that of the six possible combinations of the -three terms Art, Religion and Philosophy, four were actually adopted: -by Schelling, _P.R.A._; by Hegel, _A.R.P._; by Weisse, _P.A.R._; and -by Vischer, _R.A.P_.[11] But Vischer himself[12] states that Wirth, -author of a _System of Ethics_,[13] opted for the fifth combination, -_R.P.A.,_ which leaves us but the sixth, _A.P.R.,_ unclaimed, unless -(as is not improbable) some unrecognized genius seized upon it and made -it the text of his system. Beauty, therefore, as the second form of -the absolute Spirit, is the realization of the Idea, not as abstract -concept but as union of concept and reality; and the Idea determines -itself as species (_Gattung_), and every idea of a species, even on the -lowest degree, is beautiful as being an integral part in the totality -of Ideas; although the higher the degree of the idea the greater is -its beauty.[14] Highest of all degrees is that of human personality: -"in this spiritual world the Idea attains its true significance; the -name of idea is given to the great moral motive powers to which the -concept of species may also be applied in the sense that they stand -to their restricted spheres in the same relation in which the genus -stands to its species and individuals." At the head of all is the Idea -of morality: "the world of moral and autonomous ends is destined to -furnish the most important, the most worthy content of the Beautiful"; -with the warning, however, that Beauty, in actualizing this world -through intuition, excludes art having a moral tendency.[15] So Vischer -proceeds now to degrade Hegel's Idea to the simple class-concept, -now to couple it with the idea of the Good; now, in accord with the -teaching of his master, to make it different from, yet superior to, -intellect and morality. - -[Sidenote: _Other tendencies._] - -From the first, the Herbartian formalism was little studied and less -followed: two writers, Griepenkerl in 1827 and Bobrik in 1834, made -some attempt to develop and apply the cursory notes with which Herbart -contented himself.[16] Schleiermacher's lectures, even before their -appearance in book form, had served as basis for a series of elegant -dissertations by Erich Ritter (1840)[17] (better known as a historian -of philosophy); his work is of little value, for instead of dwelling -on the important points of the master's doctrine Ritter brings into -prominence secondary matters relating to sociability and the æsthetic -fife. A penetrating critic of German Æsthetic from Baumgarten to the -post-Kantian school was Wilhelm Theodor Danzel, who lived about this -time and very properly rebelled against the claim to find "thought" in -works of art: "Artistic thought:" he writes; "unhappy phrase, which -helped to condemn an entire epoch to the Sisyphean labour of trying to -reduce art to intellectual and rational thinking! The thought of a -work of art is nothing save that which is contemplated in a definite -way; it is not represented, as is commonly asserted, in a work of art, -it is the work of art itself. Artistic thought can never be expressed -by concepts and words."[18] By his early death Danzel ended the hopes -he raised by his original views on the science and history of Æsthetic. - -[Sidenote: _Theory of the Beautiful in nature, and that of the -Modifications of Beauty._] - -The post-Hegelian metaphysical Æsthetic is chiefly noteworthy for -the fuller development of two theories or, to speak more accurately, -of two very curious combinations of arbitrary assertion and fanciful -caprice: the so-called theory of Natural Beauty, and the theory of -Modifications of the Beautiful. Neither of the two had any intimate -or necessary connexion with this philosophical movement, to which -they are rather linked by historical or psychological causes; by the -relationship between facts of pleasure and pain and the inclination -towards mysticism; by the confusion arising from the really æsthetic -(imaginative) quality of some representations wrongly described as -observation of natural beauties; or by the scholastic and literary -tradition of discussing these cases of pleasure and pain and -extra-æsthetic natural beauties in books devoted to the discussion -of art.[19] These metaphysicians were sometimes rather grotesque -and remind one of the story told of Paisiello, that in the fury of -composition he set even the stage directions of his libretto to music; -bitten with the rage for construction and dialectic, they did not spare -even the indexes of chaotic old books, but seized on them as suitable -material for a dialectical exercise. - -[Sidenote: _Development of the first theory. Herder._] - -Beginning with the theory of Natural Beauty, observations on beautiful -natural objects are found among the inquiries of the ancient -philosophers on beauty, and especially among the mystical effusions -of neo-Platonists and their followers in the Middle Ages and the -Renaissance.[20] Less frequently such questions were introduced into -treatises on Poetics: Tesauro (1654) is among the first who, in his -_Cannochiale aristotelico,_ discusses not only the conceits of men, but -also of God, the angels, nature and animals; and somewhat later (1707) -Muratori speaks of "the beauty of matter," of which examples are "the -gods, a flower, the sun, a rivulet."[21] Observations on that which -is outside art and is merely natural, are made by Crousaz, by André, -and especially by those authors of the eighteenth century who wrote -on Beauty and Art in an empirical and gallant style.[22] It was the -influence of these persons that led Kant, as we have seen, to sever the -theory of beauty from that of art, specially connecting free beauty -with objects of nature and those productions of man which reproduce -natural beauties.[23] When the adversary of Kant's theory of Æsthetic, -Herder (1800), in his sketch of an ethical system united spirit and -nature, pleasure and value, feeling and intellect, he inevitably made -much of natural beauty, and affirmed that everything in nature has its -own beauty, the expression of its own greatest content, and that this -accounts for the ascending scale of beautiful objects: beginning with. -outlines, colours and tones, light and sound, and proceeding by way of -flowers, water and sea, to birds, terrestrial animals, and man himself. -For instance "a bird is the sum of the properties and perfections of -its element, a representation of its potency, a creature of light, song -and air"; amongst terrestrial animals, the ugliest are those resembling -man, as the melancholy moping monkey; the most beautiful, those of -perfect build, well proportioned, noble, free in action; those which -express sweetness; those, in fine, which live in harmony and happiness, -endowed with a perfection of their own, harmless to man.[24] - -[Sidenote: _Schelling, Solger, Hegel._] - -Schelling, on the contrary, utterly, denies the concept of beauty -in nature, and considers that such beauty is purely accidental and -that art alone supplies the norm by which it can be discovered and -judged.[25] Solger also excludes natural beauty;[26] so does Hegel, -who distinguishes himself not by denying it but by proceeding with -the utmost inconsequence to deal at length with the beautiful in -nature. It is in fact not clear whether he means that really no beauty -exists in nature and that man introduces it in his vision of things, -or whether natural beauty really exists though inferior in degree -to the beauty of art. "The beauty of art," he says," stands higher -than that of nature; it is beauty born and reborn by the work of the -spirit, and spirit alone is truth and reality; hence beauty is truly -beauty only when it participates in spirit and is produced therefrom. -Taken in this sense, the beauty of nature appears as a mere reflexion -of the beauty appertaining to spirit, as an imperfect and incomplete -mode, which substantially is contained within the spirit itself." In -confirmation, he adds that nobody has attempted a systematic exposition -of natural beauties, whereas there actually is, from the point of view -of the utility of natural objects, a _materia medica_[27] But the -second chapter of the first part of his Æsthetic is devoted precisely -to natural Beauty on the ground that, in order to grasp the idea of -artistic beauty in its entirety, three stages must be traversed: beauty -in general, natural beauty (whose defects show the necessity for art), -and, lastly, the Idea; "the first existence of the Idea is nature, -and its first beauty is natural beauty." This beauty, which is beauty -for us and not for itself, has several phases, from that in which the -concept is immersed in matter to the point of disappearing, such as -physical facts and isolated mechanisms, to that higher phase in which -physical facts are united in systems (_e.g._ the solar system); but -the Idea first reaches a true and real existence in organic facts, in -the living creature. And even the living creature is liable to the -distinction between beautiful and ugly; for example, among animals, -the sloth, trailing itself laboriously and incapable of animation or -activity, displeases us by its apathetic somnolence; nor can beauty be -found in amphibians or in many kinds of fish, or in crocodiles, or -toads, as well as in many insects and especially in those equivocal -creatures which express a transition from one i class to another, such -as the ornithorhyncus, a mixture of bird and beast.[28] These samples -may suffice to show the general trend of Hegel's doctrine of natural -beauty; elsewhere he discusses the external beauty of abstract form, -regularity, symmetry, harmony, etc., which are; precisely the concepts -which the formalism of Herbart placed in the heaven of the Ideas of the -Beautiful. - -[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher._] - -Schleiermacher, who praised Hegel for his attempt to exclude natural -beauty from his Æsthetic, excluded it from his own not verbally but -actually, by confining his attention to the artistic perfection of -the internal image formed by the energy of the human spirit.[29] But -the so-called Feeling for Nature which came in with Romanticism, and -the _Cosmos_ and other descriptive works of Humboldt,[30] directed -attention increasingly to the impressions awakened by natural facts. - -[Sidenote: _Alexander Humboldt._] - -This led to the compilation of those systematic lists of natural -beauties whose impossibility had been proclaimed by Hegel, though he -himself had furnished an example of them; amongst others, Bratranek -published an _Æsthetic of the Vegetable World._[31] - -[Sidenote: _Vischer's "Æsthetic Physics."_] - -The best-known and most widely circulated treatment of the subject was -contained in this very work of Vischer's; who following Hegel's example -devoted a section of his _Æsthetic,_ as we have seen, to the objective -existence of Beauty, _i.e._ to the Beauty of nature, and entitled it by -the perhaps new and certainly characteristic name of Æsthetic Physics -(_ästhetische Physik_). This Æsthetic Physics comprised the beauty of -inorganic nature (light, heat, air, water, earth); organic nature, with -its four vegetable types and its animals vertebrate and invertebrate; -and beauty of human beings, divided into generic and historic. The -generic was subdivided into sections on the beauty of general forms -(age, sex, conditions, love, marriage, family); of special forms -(races, peoples, culture, political life); and of individual forms -(temperament and character). Historical beauty included that of -ancient history (Oriental, Greek, Roman), of Mediæval or Germanic, and -of modern times; because, according to Vischer, it was the duty of -Æsthetic to cast a glance over universal history before summing up the -different degrees of the beautiful according to the varying phases of -the struggle for freedom against nature.[32] - -[Sidenote: _The Theory of the Modifications of Beauty. From antiquity -to the eighteenth century._] - -As regards the Modifications of Beauty, it should be remembered that -the ancient manuals of Poetics, and more frequently those of Rhetoric, -contained more or less scientific definitions of psychological states -and facts; Aristotle attempted in his _Poetics_ to determine the nature -of a tragic action or personality, and sketched a definition of the -comic; in his Rhetoric he writes at considerable length of wit;[33] -sections of the _De oratore_ of Cicero and the _Institutions_ of -Quintilian[34] are devoted to wit and the comic; the lofty style was -the subject of a lost treatise of Cæcilius, which anticipated that -attributed to Longinus, whose title was translated in modern times -as _De sublimitate_ or _On the Sublime._ Following the example of -the ancients, this kind of medley was perpetuated by writers of the -sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; whole treatises on the comic are -incorporated in, for instance, the _Argutezza_ of Matteo Pellegrini -(1639) and the _Cannochiale_ of Tesauro. La Bruyère treated of the -sublime[35] and Boileau by his translation gave a fresh vogue to -Longinus: the following century saw Burke inquiring into the origin -of our ideas of the beautiful and the sublime, and deriving the -former from the instinct for sociability, the latter from that of -self-preservation; he also tried to define ugliness, grace, elegance -and extraordinary beauty; Home, in his celebrated _Elements of -Criticism,_ discussed grandeur, sublimity, the ridiculous, wit, -dignity and grace: Mendelssohn discussed sublimity, dignity and -grace in fine art, and described some of these facts as due to mixed -feelings, in which he was followed by Lessing[36] and others: Sulzer -welcomed all these various concepts into his æsthetic encyclopædia -and collected round them an elaborate bibliography. A new and curious -meaning of the word humour reached the continent from England at this -time. Its original meaning was simply "temperament," and sometimes -"spirit," or "wit" ("_belli umori_" in Italy; in the seventeenth -century there was in Rome an Academy of _Umoristi_). Voltaire -introduced it into France and wrote in 1761, "_Les Anglais ont un terme -pour signifier cette plaisanterie, ce vrai comique, cette gaieté, cette -urbanité, ces saillies, qui échappent à un homme sans qu'il s'en doute; -et ils rendent cette idée par le mot_ humour ...";[37] in 1767 Lessing -distinguishes humour from the German _Laune_ (caprice, whim),[38] a -distinction maintained by Herder in 1769 in opposition to Riedel who -had confused the terms.[39] - -[Sidenote: _Kant and the post-Kantians._] - -Accustomed to find all these subjects treated in the same book, -philosophers at first theorized about them all without attempting to -link them up together by introducing an artificial logical connexion. -Kant, who had already in imitation of Burke written in 1764 a -dissertation on the beautiful and the sublime, ingenuously remarked -in the course of his lectures on Logic in 1771 that the beautiful and -the æsthetic are not identical, because "the sublime also belongs to -Æsthetic";[40] and in his _Critique of Judgment,_ while treating of -the comic in a mere digression (a magnificent piece of psychological -analysis)[41] places side by side with and as if on an equality with -the "Analytic of Beauty," an "Analytic of the Sublime."[42] We may -note in passing that, before the publication of the third Critique, -Heydenreich arrived at the same doctrine of the sublime which is -contained in Kant's book.[43] Did Kant ever think of uniting the -beautiful and the sublime and deducing them from a single concept? -Apparently not. By his declaration that the principle of beauty must -be sought outside ourselves, and that of the sublime within us, he -tacitly assumes that the two objects are wholly disparate. In 1805 Ast, -a follower of Schelling, declared the necessity of overcoming what he -called the Kantian dualism of the beautiful and the sublime:[44] others -reproached Kant with having treated the comic by the psychological, not -the metaphysical, method. Schiller wrote a series of dissertations on -the tragic, the sentimental, the ingenuous, the sublime, the pathetic, -the trivial, the low, the dignified and the graceful, and their -varieties, the fascinating, the majestic, the grave, and the solemn. -Another artist, Jean Paul Richter, discoursed at great length on wit -and humour, described by him as the romantic comic, or the sublime -reversed (_umgekehrte Erhabene)_.[45] - -Herbart, in virtue of his formalistic principle, asserts that all -these concepts are irrelevant to Æsthetic; he attributes them to the -work of art, not to pure beauty;[46] Schleiermacher comes to the same -conclusion, but for much better reasons, as a result of his sane -conception of art. Amongst other things he observes: "It is usual -to describe the beautiful and the sublime as two kinds of artistic -perfection; and so accustomed have we grown to the union of these -two concepts that we must make an effort to convince ourselves how -very far they are from being co-ordinate or from together exhausting -the concept of artistic perfection"; he regrets that even the best -æstheticians should give rhetorical descriptions of them instead of -demonstrating them. "The thing," says he, "is not right and just" (_hat -keine Richtigkeit_), and he proceeds to exclude the whole subject from -his Æsthetic,[47] as he had done previously in the case of natural -beauty. Other philosophers, however, clung persistently to their search -for a connexion between these various concepts, and called in dialectic -to help them. The habit of applying dialectic to empirical concepts -affected everybody at that time; even the great enemy of dialectic, -Herbart, showed the cloven hoof, when in order to explain the union of -different æsthetic ideas in the beautiful he appealed to the formula -"they lose regularity in order to regain it."[48] Schelling asserted -that the sublime is the infinite in the finite, and the beautiful the -finite in the infinite, adding that the absolutely sublime includes the -beautiful, and the beautiful the sublime;[49] and Ast, whom we have -mentioned already, spoke of a masculine, positive element, which is the -sublime, and a feminine, negative element which is the graceful and -pleasing: between which there is a contrast and a struggle. - -[Sidenote: _Culmination of the development._] - -These exercises in dialectical system-building developed and increased -till about the middle of the nineteenth century they assumed two -distinct forms whose history must here be shortly outlined. - -[Sidenote: _Double form of the theory. The overcoming of the ugly. -Solger, Weisse and others._] - -The first form may be called the Overcoming of the Ugly. This theory -conceives the comic, the sublime, the tragic, the humorous, and so -forth, as so many engagements in the war between the Ugly and the -Beautiful, wherein the latter was invariably victorious, and arose by -means of this war to more and more lofty and complex manifestations. -The second form of the theory may be described as the Passage from -Abstract to Concrete; it held that Beauty cannot emerge from the -abstract, cannot become this or that concrete beauty, except by -particularizing itself in the comic, tragic, sublime, humorous, or -some other modification. The first form was already well developed in -Solgei, an adherent of the romantic theory of Irony: but historically -it presupposes the æsthetic theory of the Ugly, first sketched by -Friedrich Schlegel in 1797. We have already noted that Schlegel -considered the characteristic or interesting, not the beautiful, to -be the principle of modern art; hence the importance attached by him -to the piquant, the striking (_frappant_), the daring, the cruel, the -ugly.[50] Solger found here the basis for his dialectic; amongst other -things he maintains that the finite, earthly element may be dissolved -and absorbed in the divine, which constitutes the tragic: or else the -divine element may be entirely corrupted by the earthly, producing the -comic.[51] These methods of Solger were followed by Weisse (1830), and -by Ruge (1837); for the former, ugliness is "the immediate existence of -beauty" which is overcome in the sublime and the comic; for the latter, -the effort to achieve the Idea, or the Idea searching for itself, -generates the sublime; when the Idea loses instead of discovering -itself, ugliness is produced; when the Idea rediscovers itself and -rises out of ugliness to new life, the comic.[52] A whole treatise -entitled _The Æsthetic of the Ugly_[53] was published by Rosenkranz in -1853, presenting this concept as intermediate between the beautiful -and the comic, and tracing it from its first origin to that "sort -of perfection" it attains in the satanic. Passing from the common -(_Gemeine)_ which is the petty, the weak, the low, and the sub-species -of the low, viz. the usual, the casual, the arbitrary and the crude, -Rosenkranz goes on to describe the repugnant, trisected into the -awkward, the dead and empty, and the horrible: thus he proceeds from -tripartition to tripartition, dividing the horrible into the absurd, -the nauseating and the wicked: the wicked into criminal, spectral and -diabolical: the diabolical into demoniac, magical and satanic. He -opposes the childish notion that ugliness acts as a foil to beauty -in art, and justifies its introduction by the necessity for art to -represent the entire appearance of the Idea; on the other hand he -admits that the ugly is not on the same level as the beautiful, for, -if the beautiful can stand by itself alone, the other cannot do so and -must always be reflected by and in the beautiful.[54] - -[Sidenote: _Passage from abstract to concrete: Vischer._] - -The second form prevailed with Vischer. The following extract will -serve as an illustration of his manner: "The Idea arouses itself from -the tranquil unity in which it was fused with the appearance and -pushes onward, affirming, in face of its own finitude, its infinity"; -this rebellion and transcendence is the sublime. "But Beauty demands -full satisfaction for this disruption of its harmony: the violated -right of the image must be reasserted: this can be accomplished only -by means of a fresh contradiction, that is to say by the negative -position now taken up by the image towards the Idea by rejecting all -interpenetration with it and by affirming its own separate existence -as the whole"; this second moment is the comic, negation of a -negation.[55] The same process is further enriched and complicated by -Zeising, who compares the modifications of Beauty to the refraction of -colours: the three primary modifications, the sublime, the attractive -and the humorous, correspond with the primary colours violet, orange -and green; the three secondary, pure beauty, comic and tragic, to -the colours red, yellow and blue. Each of these six modifications -(exactly like the degrees of the Ugly in Rosenkranz) branches out, like -fireworks, into three rays: pure beauty into the decorous, noble and -pleasing: the attractive into graceful, interesting and piquant: the -comic into buffoonery, the diverting and burlesque: the humorous into -the quaint, capricious and melancholy: the tragic into the moving, -pathetic and demoniac: the sublime into the glorious, majestic and -imposing.[56] - -[Sidenote: _The Legend of Sir Purebeauty._] - -All the works of this period on Æsthetic are filled in this way -with the _gest, chanson_ or romaunt of the knight Sir Purebeauty -(_Reinschon)_ and his extraordinary adventures, recounted in two -conflicting versions. According to one story, Sir Purebeauty is -constrained to abandon his beloved leisure by the Mephistophelean -devices of the temptress Ugliness, who leads him into countless -dangers from which he invariably emerges victorious; his victories and -successes (his Marengo, Austerlitz and Jena) are called the Sublime, -the Comic, the Humorous and so forth. The other story tells how the -knight, bored by his life of loneliness, sallies forth purposely to -seek adversaries and occasions for fighting; he is always vanquished, -but even in his overthrow _ferum victorem capit,_ he transforms -and irradiates the enemy. Beyond this artificial mythology, this -legend composed without the least imagination or literary skill, -this miserably dull tale, it is vain to look for anything whatever -in the much elaborated theory of German æstheticians known as the -Modifications of Beauty. - - -[1] _Abriss der Ästhetik,_ post. 1837; _Vorlesung üb. Ästh._ -(1828-1829), post. 1882. - -[2] _Ästhetik,_ Berlin, 1827. - -[3] _Ästhetik,_ Leipzig, 1830; _System d. Ästh.,_ lectures, post. -Leipzig, 1872. - -[4] _Kunstlehre,_ Ratisbon, 1845-1846 (_Grundlinien einer positiven -Philosophie,_ vols. iv. v.). - -[5] _Der Geist in der Natur,_ 1850-1851; _Neue Beitrage z. d. Geist i. -d. Natur,_ post. 1855. - -[6] _Ästhetische Forschungen,_ Frankfurt a. M. 1855. - -[7] _Die theistische Begründung d. Ästhetik im Gegensatz z. d. -pantheistichen,_ Jena, 1857; same author, _Vorschule d. Ästh.,_ -Karlsruhe, 1864-1865. - -[8] _Üb. d. Erhabene u. Komische,_ Stuttgart, 1837. - -[9] _Ästhetik oder Wissenschaft d. Schönen,_ Reutlingen, Leipzig and -Stuttgart, 1846-1857, 3 parts in 4 vols. - -[10] _Ästh._ introd. §§ 2-5. - -[11] Hartmann, _Dtsch. Ästh. s. Kant,_ p. 217, note. - -[12] _Ästh._ introd. § 5. - -[13] _System der spekulativen Ethik,_ Heilbronn, 1841-1842. - -[14] _Ästh._ §§ 15-17. - -[15] _Op. cit._ §§ 19-24. - -[16] Griepenkerl, _Lehrb. d. Ästh.,_ Brunswick, 1827. Bobrik, _Freie -Verträge üb. Ästh.,_ Zürich, 1834. - -[17] _Üb. d. Principien d. Ästh.,_ Kiel, 1840. - -[18] _Ges. Aufs._ pp. 216-221. - -[19] See above, pp. 87-93. - -[20] See above, pp. 179-180. - -[21] _Cannochiale arist._ ch. 3: _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. I. chs. 6, 8. - -[22] See above, pp. 205-206, 258-261. - -[23] See above, pp. 275-277. - -[24] _Kaligone, op. cit._ pp. 55-90. - -[25] _System d. transcend. Ideal,_ part vi. § 2. - -[26] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ p. 4. - -[27] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ I. pp. 4-5. - -[28] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ I. pp. 148-180. - -[29] _Op. cit._ introd. - -[30] _Ansichten der Natur,_ 1088; _Kosmos,_ 1845-1858. - -[31] _Ästhetik. Pflanzenwelt,_ Leipzig, 1853. - -[32] _Ästh._ § 341. - -[33] _Poet._ 5. 13-14; _Rhet._ iii. 10, 18. - -[34] _De orat._ ii. 54-71; _Inst. orat._ vi. 3. - -[35] _Caractères,_ I. - -[36] _Hamb. Dramat._ Nos. 74-75. - -[37] Letter to abbé d'Olivet, August 20, 1761. - -[38] _Hamb. Dramat._ No. 93; in _Werke, ed. cit._ xii. pp. 170-171, -note. - -[39] _Kritische Wälder,_ in _Werke, ed. cit._ iv. pp. 182-186. - -[40] Schlapp, _op. cit._ p. 55. - -[41] _Kr. d. Urth., Anmerkung,_ § 54. - -[42] _Op. cit._ bk. ii. §§ 23-29. - -[43] _System d. Ästh._ introd. p. xxxvi _n._ - -[44] _System der Kunstlehre:_ cf. Hartmann, _op. cit._ p. 387. - -[45] _Vorschule d. Ästh._ chs. 6-9. - -[46] See above, pp. 309-310. - -[47] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ p. 240 _seqq._ - -[48] Cf. Zimmermann, _G. d. Ästh._ p. 788. - -[49] _Philos, d. Kunst,_ §§ 65-66. - -[50] Cf. Hartmann, _Deutsch. Ästh. s. Kant,_ pp. 363-364. - -[51] _Vorles üb. Ästh._ p. 85. - -[52] _Neue Vorschule d. Ästh._ Halle, 1837. - -[53] K. Rosenkranz, _Ästhetik des Hässlichen,_ Kœnigsberg, 1853. - -[54] _Ästh. d. Hässl._ pp. 36-40. - -[55] _Ästh._ §§ 83-84, 154-155. - -[56] _Ästh. Forsch._ p. 413. - - - - -XIV - - -ÆSTHETIC IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND ITALY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE -NINETEENTH CENTURY - - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic movement in France: Cousin, Jouffroy._] - -In the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first half of -the nineteenth century German thought, notwithstanding the glaring -errors which vitiated it, and were soon to bring about a violent and -indeed exaggerated reaction, must on the whole be awarded the foremost -place in the general history of European thought as well as in the -individual study of Æsthetic, the contemporary philosophy of other -countries standing on an inferior level of the second and third degree. -France still lay under the dominion of the sensationalism of Condillac -and, at the opening of the century, was quite incapable of grasping -the spiritual activity of art. A faint gleam of Winckelmann's abstract -spiritualism just appears in the theories of Quatremère de Quincy, who, -in criticism of Émeric-David (in his turn a critic of ideal beauty and -an adherent of the imitation of nature),[1] maintained that the arts -of design have pure beauty, devoid of individual character, as their -objective; they depict man and not; men.[2] Some sensationalists, such -as Bonstetten, vainly endeavoured to trace the peculiar processes -of imagination in life and in art.[3] Followers of the orthodox -spiritualism of the French universities date the beginning of a new -era, and the foundation of Æsthetic in France, to 1818, the year when -Victor Cousin first delivered at the Sorbonne his lectures on the -True, the Beautiful and the Good, which later formed his book with the -same name, frequently reprinted.[4] These lectures of Cousin are but -poor stuff, although some scraps of Kant are to be found in them here -and there; he denies the identity of the beautiful with the pleasant -or useful, and substitutes the affirmation of a threefold beauty, -physical, intellectual and moral, the last being the true ideal beauty, -having its foundations in God; he says that art expresses ideal Beauty, -the infinite, God, that genius is the power of creation, and that taste -is a mixture of fancy, sentiment and reason.[5] Academic phrases all -of them; pompous and void and, for that very reason, well received. Of -much greater value were the lectures on Æsthetic delivered by Théodore -Jouffroy in 1822, before a small audience, and published posthumously -in 1843.[6] Jouffroy allowed a beauty of expression, to be found alike -in art and nature: a beauty of imitation, consisting in the perfect -accuracy with which a model is reproduced: a beauty of idealisation, -which reproduces the model, accentuating a particular quality in -order to give it greater significance: and, finally, a beauty of the -invisible or of content, reducible to force (physical, sensible, -intellectual, moral), which, as force, awakens sympathy. Ugliness is -the negation of this sympathetic beauty; its species or modifications -are the sublime and the graceful. One sees that Jouffroy did not -succeed in isolating the strictly æsthetic fact in his analysis and -gave, instead of a scientific system, little beyond explanations of the -use of words. He could not see or understand that expression, imitation -and idealization are identical with each other and with artistic -activity. Moreover he had many curious ideas, chiefly concerning -expression. He said that if we were to see a drunkard with all the -most disgusting symptoms of intoxication on a road where there was also -an unhewn rock, we should be pleased by the drunken man, since he had -expression, and not by the rock, since it had none. Beside Jouffroy, -whose theories, crude and immature though they be, reveal an inquiring -mind, it is hardly worth while to cite Lamennais,[7] who like Cousin -regarded art as the manifestation of the infinite through the finite, -of the absolute through the relative. French Romanticism in de Bonald, -de Barante and Mme. de Staël had defined literature as "the expression -of society," had honoured, under German influence, the characteristic -and the grotesque,[8] and had proclaimed the independence of art by -means of the formula "art for art's sake"; but these vague affirmations -or aphorisms did not supersede, philosophically speaking, the old -doctrine of the "imitation of nature." - -[Sidenote: _English Æsthetic._] - -In England associationistic psychology still flourished (and has -continued to flourish uninterruptedly), unable to emancipate itself -wholly from sensationalism or to understand imagination. Dugald -Stewart[9] had recourse to the wretched expedient of establishing -two forms of association: one of accidental associations, the other -of associations innate in human nature and therefore common to all -mankind. England did not escape German influence, as appears, for -example, in Coleridge, to whom we owe a saner concept of poetry and -the difference between it and science[10] (in collaboration with -the poet Wordsworth), and in Carlyle, who placed intellect lower -than imagination, "organ of the Divine." The most noteworthy English -æsthetic essay of this period is the _Defence of Poetry_ by Shelley -(1821),[11] containing profound, if not very systematic, views on the -distinctions between reason and imagination, prose and poetry; on -primitive language and the faculty of poetic objectification which -enshrines and preserves "the record of the best and happiest moments of -the happiest and best minds." - -[Sidenote: _Italian Æsthetic._] - -In Italy, where neither Parini nor Foscolo[12] had been able to shake -off the fetters of the old doctrines (although the latter, in his later -writings, was in several ways an innovator in literary criticism), many -treatises and essays on Æsthetic were published during the earlier -decades of the century, the greater part showing the influence of -Condillac's sensationalism, which had a great vogue in Italy. Such -authors as Delfico, Malaspina, Cicognara, Talia, Pasquali, Visconti -and Bonacci belong more exclusively to the special, or rather, the -anecdotal, history of Italian philosophy. Now and then, however, -one comes across remarks that are not wholly contemptible, as in -Melchiorre Delfico (1818) who, after wandering aimlessly hither and -thither, fixes on the principle of expression, observing, "If it -were possible to establish that expression is always an element in -the beautiful, it would be a legitimate inference to regard it as -the real characteristic of beauty, _i.e._ a condition without which -the beautiful could not exist, and the pleasing modification which -arouses the sentiment of beauty could not take place in us"; he tries -to develop this principle by asserting that all other characters -(order, harmony, proportion, symmetry, simplicity, unity and variety) -have significance only by their subordination to the principle of -expression.[13] In opposition to Malaspina's definition of beauty -as "pleasure born of a representation"; and in opposition to the -then fashionable threefold division of beauty into sensible, moral -and intellectual, a critic of Malaspina observed that if beauty be -representation, it is inconceivable that there should be intellectual -beauty, which would be intelligible but not presentable.[14] Nor must -Pasquale Balestrieri be forgotten; he was a student of medicine who -in 1847 tried to construct an Æsthetic of an exact or mathematical -kind, with neither better nor worse result than many famous authors in -other countries. He noticed, while turning his algebraical expressions -into numerals, that such general formulæ "fulfil their object with an -infinite number of systems of different ciphers"; and that in art there -is an element "not arbitrary, but unknown."[15] Works by German authors -were frequently translated at this time, some of them, for example -the writings of the two Schlegels, being reprinted several times; the -_Æsthetic_ of Bouterweck, deriving from Kant and Schiller,[16] was read -and discussed; Colecchi gave an excellent statement of the æsthetic -doctrines of Kant;[17] and in 1831 a certain Lichtenthal adapted the -_Æsthetic_ of Franz Ficker[18] to the use of Italian readers; later the -same book was fully translated by another hand; some of Schelling's -writings were translated, _e.g._ his discourses on the relation between -figurative art and nature. - -[Sidenote: _Rosmini and Gioberti._] - -It must be admitted that in Italy Æsthetic received but inadequate -treatment in the revival of philosophical speculation effected by -the work of Galluppi, Rosmini and Gioberti. It is treated in a -merely incidental and popular manner by the first named.[19] Rosmini -devotes a section of his philosophical system to the deontological -sciences, which "treat of the perfection of being, and the method of -acquiring or producing such perfection or losing it"; among these -sciences is that of "beauty in the universal" under the name of -Callology, of which a special part is Æsthetic, the science of "beauty -in the sensible," establishing the "archetypes of beings."[20] In -his longest literary work, considered by him as his Æsthetic,[21] -his essay on _The Idyl_,[22] Rosmini declares the aim of art to be -neither imitation of nature nor direct intuition of the archetypes, -but the reduction of natural things to their archetypes, which are -arranged in a hierarchy of three ideals, natural, intellectual and -moral. Gioberti[23] is clearly under the influence of German idealism, -especially of Schelling's; for him the beautiful is "the individual -union of an intelligible type with an imaginative element called into -being by fancy"; the phantasm gives material, while the intelligible -type (concept) gives form, in the Aristotelian sense,[24] and since the -ideal element predominates over the sensible or fantastic, art is a -propædeutic to the true and the good. Gioberti is of opinion that Hegel -was wrong in detaching natural beauty from Æsthetic, for perfect beauty -of nature is "the full correspondence of sensible reality with the Idea -which informs and represents it," and as such "makes its appearance -in the sensible universe during the second period of the primordial -age described in detail by Moses in the six days of creation"; it is -only through original sin that imperfection and ugliness arose in -nature.[25] Art is nothing but a supplement to natural beauty, whose -decadence it presupposes, and thus art is at once record and prophecy, -referring to the first and last ages of the world. The Last Judgement -will reintroduce perfect beauty: "organic restitution, by empowering -the faculties to contemplate the intelligible in the sensible, and by -refining their capabilities, will greatly intensify and purify æsthetic -enjoyment. The contemplation of perfect beauty will be the beatitude of -imagination, of which Christ gave an ineffable foretaste by appearing -to his disciples visibly transfigured and shining with celestial -radiance."[26] Gioberti agrees with Schelling's division of art into -pagan and Christian, a "heterodox beauty" (Oriental and Græco-Italian -art), imperfect when compared with "orthodox beauty"; and between the -two, a "semi-orthodox" beauty,[27] transitional to Christian art; he -also attempted a doctrine of modifications of the beautiful, wherein he -held the sublime to be creator of the beautiful. Beauty is the relative -intelligibility of created things apprehended by fancy: the sublime -is the absolute intelligibility of time, space and infinite power as -presented to itself by the faculty of imagination: "The ideal formula: -the Being creates the Existing, translated into æsthetic language, -gives the following formula: by means of the dynamical sublime Being -creates the beautiful; and by means of the mathematical sublime -contains it: this shows the ontological and psychological connexions of -Æsthetic in First Science." Ugliness enters into the beautiful either -as relief and counterpoise, or to open a way to the comic, or to depict -the struggle between good and evil. The Christian ideal of artistic -beauty is the figure of the God-Man, absolute union of the two forms -of beauty, the sublime and the beautiful, a transfigured and divinely -illuminated expression of man.[28] However carefully we sift the -thoughts of Gioberti from their mythological Judaico-Christian husk, we -find nothing of the least value to science. - -[Sidenote: _Italian Romantics. Dependence of Art._] - -On the other hand, if Italian literature of the day chose to revive -and refurbish certain antiquated critical ideas, a much wider field -was opened by social and political upheavals which tended to make -use of literature as a practical instrument for spreading abroad the -truths of history, science, religion and morality. In 1816 Giovanni -Berchet wrote that "poetry ... is intended to improve the habits of -man and satisfy the cravings of his imagination and heart, since the -tendency towards poetry, like every other desire, awakens in us moral -needs";[29] and Ermes Visconti in his _Conciliatore_ of 1818 says that -æsthetic aims must be subordinated "to the improvement of mankind and -public and private weal, the eminent aim of all studies." Manzoni, -who subsequently took to philosophizing on art on the principles of -Rosmini, declared in his letter on Romanticism (1823) that "poetry -or literature in general should have utility as its objective, truth -as its subject and interest as its means";[30] and though noticing -the vagueness of the concept of truth in poetry, he inclined always -(as is seen also in his discourse on the historical novel) to its -identification with historical and scientific truth.[31] Pietro -Maroncelli proposed as a substitute for the classic formula of art, -"founded on imitation of the real and having pleasure as its object," -a formula of art as "founded on inspiration, having the beautiful as -means and good as end"; this doctrine he baptized "cormentalism," -contrasting it with the doctrine of art for art's sake found in the -writings of August Wilhelm Schlegel and Victor Hugo.[32] Tommaseo -defined beauty as "the union of many truths in one concept" effected -by the power of feeling.[33] Giuseppe Mazzini, too, always conceived -literature as the mediator of the universal idea or intellectual -concept.[34] Attempting to restore serious content to a literature -grown weak and frivolous, the Italian Romantics found themselves forced -on the theoretical side, by a natural reaction, into constant and -perpetual opposition to every tendency of thought likely to affirm the -independence of art. - - -[1] Émeric-David, _Recherches sur l'art du statuaire chez les anciens,_ -Paris, 1805 (Ital. trans., Florence, 1857). - -[2] Quatremère de Quincy, _Essai sur l'imitation dans les beaux arts,_ -1823. - -[3] _Recherches sur la nature et les lois de l'imagination,_ 1807. - -[4] _Du vrai, du beau et du bien,_ 1818, many lines revised (23rd ed. -Paris, 1881). - -[5] _Op. cit._ lectures 6-8. - -[6] _Cours d' esthétique,_ ed. Damiron, Paris, 1843. - -[7] _De l'art et du beau,_ 1843-1846. - -[8] Victor Hugo, Preface to _Cromwell,_ 1827. - -[9] Dugald Stewart, _Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,_ -1837. - -[10] Gayley-Scott, _An Introd._ pp. 305-306. - -[11] P. B. Shelley, _A Defence of Poetry_ (in _Works,_ London, 1880, -vol. vii.) - -[12] Parini, _Principi delle belle lettere applicati alle belle arti,_ -from 1773 onward; Foscolo, _Dell' origine e dell' uffizio della -letteratura,_ 1809, and _Saggi di critica,_ composed in England. - -[13] M. Delfico, _Nuove ricerche sul bello,_ Naples, 1818, ch. 9. - -[14] Malaspina, _Delle leggi del bello,_ Milan, 1828, pp. 26, 233. - -[15] P. Balestrieri, _Fondamenti di estetica,_ Naples, 1847. - -[16] Friedrich Bouterweck, _Ästhetik,_ 1806, 1815 (3rd ed., Göttingen, -1824-1825). - -[17] O. Colecchi, _Questions filosofiche,_ vol. iii., Naples, 1843. - -[18] P. Lichtenthal, _Estetica ossia dottrina del bello e delle arti -belle,_ Milan, 1831. - -[19] _Elementi di filosofia_ (5th ed., Naples, 1846), vol. ii. pp. -427-476. - -[20] _Sistema filosofico,_ by A. Rosmini-Serbati, Turin, 1886, § 210. - -[21] Cf. _Nuovo saggio sopra l' orig. delle idee,_ § v. part iv. ch. 5. - -[22] _Sull' idillio e sulla nuova letteratura italiana (opuscoli -filosofici,_ vol. i.). - -[23] V. Gioberti, _Del buono e del bello_ (Florence ed., 1857). - -[24] _Del bello,_ ch. 1. - -[25] _Op. cit._ ch. 7. - -[26] _Op. cit._ ch. 7. - -[27] _Del bello,_ chs. 8-10. - -[28] _Op. cit._ ch. 4. - -[29] G. Berchet, _Opere,_ ed. Cusani, Milan, 1863, p. 227. - -[30] Words suppressed in ed. of 1870. - -[31] _Epistolario,_ ed. Sforza, i. pp. 285, 306, 308; _Discorso sul -romanzo storico,_ 1845; _Dell' invenzione,_ dialogue. - -[32] _Addizioni alle Miei Prigioni,_ 1831 (in Pellico, _Prose,_ -Florence, 1858); see pp. about the _Conciliatore._ - -[33] _Del bello e del sublime_, 1827; _Studî filosofici_ (Venice, -1840), vol. ii. part v. - -[34] Cf. De Sanctis, _Lett. Hal. nel s. XIX,_ ed. Croce, Naples 1896, -pp. 427-431. - - - - -XV - - -FRANCESCO DE SANCTIS - - -[Sidenote: _F. de Sanctis: development of his thought._] - -On the other hand, the autonomy of art found a strong supporter in -Italy in the critical work of Francesco de Sanctis, who held private -classes in literature at Naples from 1838 to 1848, taught at Turin and -Zürich from 1852 to 1860 and in 1870 became professor in the University -of Naples. He expressed his doctrines in critical essays, in monographs -on Italian writers and in his classic _History of Italian Literature._ -Receiving his first elements of old Italian culture in Puoti's -school, his natural bent! towards speculation led him to investigate -grammatical and rhetorical doctrines with the view of reducing them -to a system; but he soon began to criticize and to grow out of this -phase. He pronounced Fortunio, Alunno, Accarisio and Corso "empirics"; -he had a slightly better opinion of Bembo, Varchi, Castelvetro and -Salviati, who introduced "method" into grammar, a process completed -subsequently by Buonmattei, Corticelli and Bartoli; and he proclaimed -Francisco Sanchez, author of the _Minerva,_ "the Descartes of -grammarians." From these his admiration spread to the French writers of -the eighteenth century and the philosophical grammars of; Du Marsais, -Beauzée, Condillac and Gérard; following in their wake and pursuing the -ideal of Leibniz, he conceived a "logical grammar"; in this effort, -however, he soon began to recognize the impossibility of reducing the -differences of languages to fixed logical principles., If he found -the French theorists admirable in their ability to reconstitute the -simple and primitive forms; from "I love" to "I am loving," something -disquieted him; "Such decomposition of 'I love' into 'I am loving'" -(said he) "deadens the word by depriving it of the movement proceeding -from active will."[1] In the same way he read and criticized the -writers of treatises on Rhetoric and Poetics from sixteenth-century -men such as Castelvetro and Torquato Tasso (whom he dared to describe -as an "indifferent critic," to the great scandal of Neapolitan men -of letters) to Muratori and Gravina, "more acute than accurate"; and -eighteenth-century Italians, Bettinelli, Algarotti and Cesarotti. -Coldly rational rules found no favour with him: he urged the young to -confront literary works boldly and freely absorb impressions, the only -possible foundation for taste.[2] - -[Sidenote: _Influence of Hegelism._] - -Philosophical study had not been abandoned and had not even fallen -into entire decadence in Southern Italy; in these days of renewed -interest in philosophy the theories on Beauty from over the Alps and -the new ideas of Gioberti and other Italians[3] aroused enthusiastic -discussion. Vico was read again, and Bénard's French translation of -Hegel's _Æsthetic_ appeared and was canvassed in Naples volume by -volume (the first in 1840, the second in 1843, and the rest between -1848 and 1852). In its desire for new intellectual food Italian youth -set itself to learn German: De Sanctis himself had to translate the -greater _Logic_ of Hegel and Rosenkranz's _History of Literature_ -in the dungeon of the Bourbon prison where he was incarcerated on -account of his liberal opinions. The new critical tendency was named -"philosophism" to distinguish it from the old grammatical criticism -and from the vague, incoherent, exaggerated Romanticism. Philosophism -attracted De Sanctis; to show how deeply he was imbued with the -Hegelian spirit a tale was told that, having devoured the first volumes -of Bénard's translation, he guessed the contents of the remaining -volumes and, before they could appear, was expounding them publicly in -his classroom.[4] - -His first writings show traces of metaphysical idealism and Hegelism; -and they still linger here and there in the terminology of his later -works. In a lecture prior to 1848 he placed the safety of criticism in -the philosophic school which, in works of literature, fixed its eyes -upon "that absolute part ... that uncertain idea which moves within the -mind of great writers, till it appears abroad clothed in fine raiment -only less beautiful than itself."[5] In a preface to Schiller's plays -(1850) he wrote, "The Idea is not thought, nor is poetry reason in -song, as a poet of our time is pleased to assert; the idea is at once -necessity and freedom, reason and passion, and its perfect form in -drama is action."[6] Elsewhere he calls attention to the death of faith -and poetry, absorbed by the development of philosophy: a thesis, he -remarked some years later, "imposed on our generation by Hegel with his -omnipotent thought."[7] In 1856 he attempted a definition of humour as -"an artistic form having for signification the destruction of limit, -with consciousness of such destruction."[8] Not to dwell too long on -other particulars, in the distinction to which De Sanctis always held -firm throughout his critical work, that between Fancy and Imagination, -the latter considered as the true and only faculty of poetry, arises -undoubtedly from suggestions of Schelling and Hegel (_Einbildungskraft, -Phantasie)_; from the same philosophers come the phrases "prosaic -content," "prosaic world," sometimes used by him. - -[Sidenote: _Unconscious criticism of Hegelism._] - -For De Sanctis the Hegelian Æsthetic was but a lever wherewith to -lift himself clear of the discussions and views of the old Italian -schools. A fresh, clear spirit such as his could not escape the -arbitrary shackles of grammarians and rhetoricians only to fall into -those of metaphysicians, the torturers of art. He absorbed the vital -part of Hegel's teaching and re-expressed the Hegelian theories in -correct or somewhat attenuated interpretations; but he only maintained -with hesitation, and in the end openly rebelled against, all that was -artificial, formalistic and pedantic in Hegel. - -The following examples of such reductions and attenuations show how -substantial and radical was the change he effected. "Faith has vanished -and poetry is dead" (he wrote in 1856, echoing Hegel); "or it were -better to say" (here is De Sanctis' own correction) "faith and poetry -are immortal: what has disappeared is but one particular mode of their -being. To-day faith springs from conviction and poetry is the spark -struck from meditation; they are not dead, they are transformed."[9] -Certainly he distinguished between imagination and fancy; but for -him imagination was never the mystic faculty of transcendental -apperception, the intellectual intuition of German metaphysicians, -but simply the poet's faculty of synthesis and creation, contrasting -with fancy as the faculty of collecting particulars and materials in -a somewhat mechanical fashion.[10] When students of Vico and Hegel -understood and expounded their master's theories as emphasizing the -importance of concepts in art, De Sanctis replied, "The concept does -not exist in art, nature or history: the poet works unconsciously and -sees no concept but only form, in which he is involved and well-nigh -lost. If the philosopher, by means of abstraction, can extract the -concept thence and contemplate it in all its purity, he acts in a way -entirely contrary to that of art, nature and history." He warned his -hearers not to misunderstand Vico, who, when he extracts concepts and -exemplary types from the Homeric poems, is not writing as an art critic -but as a historian of civilization: Achilles is artistically Achilles, -not strength or any other abstraction.[11] Thus his polemic is directed -in the first instance against misunderstanding what he called the true -Hegelian thought, which was in fact usually a correction made upon -Hegel more or less consciously by himself. He was able to boast in -his latter years that even at the time when all Naples went wild over -Hegel, "at the time when Hegel was master of the field," he had always -"made certain reservations and refused to accept his apriorism, his -triad or his formulæ."[12] - -[Sidenote: _Criticisms of German Æsthetic._] - -De Sanctis also took up an independent attitude towards the other -German æstheticians. The views of Wilhelm Schlegel, very advanced -for the day in which they had been promulgated, seemed to him to -have been already superseded. In 1856 he wrote that Schlegel strives -to "transcend ordinary criticism, which leads a humdrum existence -among phraseology, versification and elocution, but loses its way -and never comes face to face with art: whereas Schlegel throws -himself headlong into the probable, the decorous and the moral; into -everything save art."[13] Thrown by the hazards of life into German -territory, he found himself at the Zürich Polytechnic, and found among -his colleagues (only imagine such a thing!) Theodor Vischer. What -opinion can he have formed of the ponderous Hegelian scholastic who -emerged dusty and panting from the systematic labours so well known to -us, and smiled disdainfully at the poetry and music of the decadent -Italian race? De Sanctis writes, "I went there with my opinions and -my prejudices and ridiculed their ridicule. Richard Wagner seemed to -me a corrupter of music, and nothing could be more inæsthetic than -the Æsthetic of Vischer."[14] His desire to correct the distorted -views of Vischer, Adolf Wagner, Valentin Schmidt and other German -critics and philosophers led him to undertake in 1858-59 a course of -lectures before an international audience at Zürich upon Ariosto -and Petrarch, the two Italian poets worst maltreated by these judges -because hardest to reduce to philosophical allegory. He sketched a -typical German critic and contrasted him with a French one, each with -his own characteristic defects. "The Frenchman does not indulge in -theories; he goes straight to the subject: his argument palpitates with -warmth of impression and sagacity of observation: he never leaves the -concrete: he estimates the quality of the talent and the work, studying -the man in order to understand the writer." He makes the mistake of -substituting reflexion on the psychology of the author and history of -his time for reflexion upon art. "Quite otherwise is your German: be a -thing never so plain, he makes it his business to manipulate, distort -and embroil: he accumulates a mass of darkness from whose centre rays -of dazzling light now and again shoot forth: truth is there at bottom, -in grievous pangs of parturition. Confronted with a work of art, he -labours to fasten down and fix the quality which is most evanescent -and impalpable. While nobody is more given to talk of life and the -world of the living, nobody on earth takes more pains to decompose and -disembody it in generalities: as consequence of this last process (last -in appearance, that is to say; in reality preconceived and _a priori_), -he is able to fit you the same boot on every foot and the same coat on -every back." "The German school is dominated by metaphysic, the French -by history."[15] About this time (1858) a Piedmontese review published -his exhaustive critical survey of the philosophy of Schopenhauer,[16] -which was then beginning to attract disciples among his friends -and companions in exile in Switzerland; the criticism provoked the -philosopher himself to confess that "this Italian" had "absorbed him -_in succum et sanguinem._"[17] What value did De Sanctis attach to -all Schopenhauer's subtleties concerning art? Having fully stated his -doctrine of ideas, he contents himself with the merest reference to the -third book "wherein is found an exaggerated theory of Æsthetic."[18] - -[Sidenote: _Final rebellion against metaphysical Æsthetic._] - -This moderate resistance and opposition to the partisans of the -concept and to the romantic Italian mystics and moralists (he directed -criticisms equally against Manzoni, Mazzini, Tommaseo and Cantù[19]) -turned to open rebellion in one of his critical writings on Petrarch -(1868) in which this false tendency is characterized with biting -sarcasm. "According to this school" (he says, meaning the school of -Hegel and Gioberti), "according to this school the real and living is -art only in so far as it surpasses its form and reveals its concept or -the pure idea. The beautiful is the manifestation of the idea. Art is -the ideal, a particular idea. Under the gaze of the artist the body -becomes subtilized until it is nothing but the shadow of the soul, a -beautiful veil. The world of poetry is peopled with phantasms; and -the poet, eternal dreamer, with the eyes of one slightly intoxicated -sees bodies float unsteadily around him and change their shapes. Nor -do bodies merely become attenuated into forms and phantasms; these -forms and phantasms themselves become free manifestations of every -idea and every concept. The theory of the ideal has been driven to -its last victorious limit, to the destruction of the very phantasms -themselves, to concept as concept, form becoming a mere accessory." -"Thus the vague, the undecided, the undulating, the vaporous, the -celestial, the ærial, the veiled, the angelic, have now a high position -among artistic forms: whilst criticism revels in the beautiful, -the ideal, the infinite, genius, the concept, the idea, truth, the -superintelligible, the supersensible, the being and the existent, and -many more generalities cast into barbarous formulæ just like those -of the scholastics from whose influence we had so much difficulty in -escaping." All these things, instead of determining the character of -art, do nothing; save illustrate the contrary of art: its feebleness -and impotence, preventing it from slaying abstractions and laying hold -of life. If beauty and the ideal have actually the meaning given them -by these philosophers "the essence of art is neither the beautiful nor -the ideal, but the living, the form; the ugly too belongs to art since -ugliness lives also in nature; outside the domain of art lies nothing -but the formless and the deformed. Thais in Malebolge is more living -and poetical than Beatrice, who is pure allegory representing abstract -combinations. The Beautiful? Tell me of anything as beautiful as Iago, -a form uprisen from the profundity of real life; so rich, so concrete; -in every part, in each finest gradation, one of the most beautiful -creations in the world of poetry." If in the course of "wrangling -about the idea or the concept or real, moral, or intellectual beauty, -and confusing philosophical or moral truths with æsthetic" you choose -to call "a great part of the poetic world ugly, granting it a permit -merely that it may act as contrast, antagonist or foil to beauty, -accepting Mephistopheles as a foil to Faust, or Iago as foil to -Othello," you are imitating "those good folk who thought, _in illo -tempore,_ that the stars shone in the firmament in order to give light -to this earth."[20] - -[Sidenote: _De Sanctis own theory_] - -The æsthetic theory of De Sanctis himself arises entirely from the -criticism of the highest manifestations of European æsthetic as known -to him. Its nature is revealed by the contrast. "If you desire a statue -in the vestibule of art," says he, "let it be that of Form; gaze upon -this, question this, begin with this. Before form is attained, that -exists which existed before the creation: chaos. Chaos is no doubt a -respectable thing, with a most interesting history: science has not yet -uttered its last word about this pre-world of fermenting elements. Art -also has its pre-world: art also has its geology, born but yesterday -and as yet scarcely stretched, a science _sui generis,_ which is -neither Criticism nor Æsthetic. Æsthetic appears when form appears, -in which this pre-world is sunk, fused, forgotten and lost. Form is -itself as the individual is himself; and no theory is so destructive -to art as the continual harping upon the beautiful as manifestation, -clothing, light, or veil of truth or the idea. The æsthetic world -is not appearance, it is substance; to it indeed belongs everything -substantial and living: its criterion, its _raison d'être,_ lies -nowhere save in this motto: I live."[21] - -[Sidenote: _The concept of form._] - -For De Sanctis, form did not mean form "in the pedantic sense attached -to it until the end of the eighteenth century," that is to say, that -which first strikes a superficial observer, the words, the period, the -sense, the individual image;[22] or form in the Herbartian sense, the -metaphysical hypostatization of the former. "Form is not _a Priori,_ it -is not something existing of itself and distinct from the content as -though it were a kind of ornament or vesture or appearance or adjunct -of the content: it is generated by the content acting in the mind of -the artist: such as the content is, such is the form."[23] Between -form and content there is at the same time identity and diversity. In -a work of art the content, which had been lying in a chaotic state in -the mind of the artist, appears "not as it was originally, but as it -has become; the whole of it, with its own value, its own importance, -its own natural beauty enriched, not weakened, by the process." -Therefore content is essential for the production of concrete form; -but the abstract quality of the content does not determine that of -artistic form." If the content, though beautiful and important, remain -inoperative or lifeless or waste within the mind of the artist, if it -have not sufficient generative power and reveal itself in the form as -weak or false or vitiated, why trouble to sing its praises? In such -cases the content may be important in itself, but as literature or -art it is worthless. On the other hand the content may be immoral, -absurd, false or frivolous: but if at certain times or in certain -circumstances it has worked powerfully on in the brain of the artist, -and taken form, such content is immortal. The gods of Homer are dead; -the _Iliad_ remains. Italy may die and, with her, every memory of Guelf -and Ghibelline; the _Divina Commedia_ will remain. The content is -subject to all the hazards of history; it is born and it dies; the form -is immortal."[24] He held firmly to the independence of art, without -which there can be no Æsthetic; but he objected to the exaggeration of -the formula of art for art's sake in that it tended to the separation -of the artist from life, to the mutilation of the content and to the -conversion of art into a proof of mere cleverness.[25] - -[Sidenote: _De Sanctis as art-critic._] - -For De Sanctis, the concept of form was identical with that of -imagination, the faculty of expression or representation, artistic -vision. So much must be said by any one anxious to express clearly -the direction which his thought was taking. But De Sanctis himself -never succeeded in defining his own theory with scientific exactitude; -and his æsthetic ideas remained the mere sketch of a system never -properly interrelated and deduced. The speculative tendency shared his -attention with many other lively interests, the desire to understand -the concrete, to enjoy art and rewrite its actual history, to plunge -into practical and political life; so that by turns he was professor, -conspirator, journalist and statesman. "My mind inclines to the -concrete," he was wont to say. He philosophized just so much as was -necessary to the acquisition of a point of view in problems of art, -history and life; and, having procured light for his intellect, found -his bearings, derived some satisfaction from the consciousness of his -own activity, he plunged as quickly as possible into the particular and -the determinate. To immense power of seizing the truth in the highest -general principles was joined a no less intense abhorrence for the -pale region of ideas in which the philosopher takes an almost ascetic -delight. As critic and historian of literature he is unrivalled. Those -who have compared him with Lessing, Macaulay, Sainte-Beuve or Taine are -making rhetorical comparisons. - -Gustave Flaubert wrote to George Sand: "In your last letter you speak -of criticism, and say you expect it soon to disappear. I think, on the -contrary, that it is just appearing over the horizon. Criticism to-day -is the exact opposite of what it was, but that is all. In the days of -Laharpe the critic was a grammarian; to-day he is a historian like -Sainte-Beuve and Taine. When will he be an artist, a mere artist, but a -real artist? Do you know a critic who interests himself whole-heartedly -in the work itself? They analyse with the greatest delicacy the -historical surroundings of the work and the causes which produced -it: but the underlying poetry and its causes? the composition? the -style? the author's own point of view? Never. Such a critic must have -great imagination and a great goodness of heart; I mean an ever-ready -faculty of enthusiasm; and then, taste; but this last is so rare, even -among the best, that it is never mentioned nowadays."[26] Flaubert's -ideal has been worthily reached by one critic only (that is to say, -amongst critics who have given themselves to the interpretation of -great writers and entire periods of literature) and that one is De -Sanctis.[27] No literature of any country possesses so perfect a mirror -as that possessed by Italy in the _History_ and the other critical -essays of Francesco de Sanctis. - -[Sidenote: _De Sanctis as philosopher._] - -But the philosopher of art, the æsthetician in De Sanctis is less -great than the critic and historian of literature. The critic is -primary, the philosopher a mere accessory. The æsthetic observations -scattered in aphorisms up and down his essays and monographs take -various colours from various occasions, and are expressed in uncertain -and often metaphorical language; this has led to his being accused of -contradictions and inexactitudes which had no existence in his inmost -thought and whose very appearance vanishes as soon as one takes into -account the particular cases with which he was dealing. But form, -forms, content, the living, the beautiful, natural beauty, ugliness, -fancy, feeling, imagination, the real, the ideal, and all the other -terms which he used with varying signification, demand a science both -on which to rest and from which to derive. Meditation on these words -stirs up doubts and problems on every side and reveals everywhere gaps -and discontinuities. Compared with the few philosophical æstheticians, -De Sanctis seems wanting in analysis, in order and in system, and -vague in his definitions. But these defects are outweighed by the -contact he establishes between the reader and real concrete works of -art, and by the feeling for truth which never leaves him. He has, too, -the attraction possessed by those writers who lead one on to suspect -and to divine new treasures in store beyond what they themselves -reveal--living thought, which stimulates living men to pursue and -prolong it. - - -[1] _Frammenti di scuola,_ in _Nuovi saggi critici,_ pp. 321-333; _La -giovinezza di Fr. de S._ (autobiography), pp. 62, 101, 163-166 (works -cited are those of De S. in stereotyped Naples ed. by Morano, 12 vols.). - -[2] _La giovinezza di Fr. de S._ pp. 260-261, 315-316. - -[3] _Saggi critici,_ p. 534. - -[4] De Meis, _Comm, di Fr. de S._ (in vol. _In Memoria,_ Naples, 1884, -p. 116). - -[5] _Scritti vori,_ ed. Croce, vol. ii. pp. 153-154. - -[6] _Saggi critici,_ p 18. - -[7] _Op. cit._ pp. 226-228; _Scritti varî,_ ii. pp. 185-187; cf. vol. -ii. p. 70. - -[8] _Saggi critici,_ ed. Imbriani, p. 91. - -[9] _Saggi critici,_ p. 228; cf. _Scritti varî,_ vol. ii. p. 70. - -[10] _Storia della letteratura,_ i. pp. 66-67 _ Saggi critici,_ pp. -98-99; _Scritti varî,_ vol. i. pp. 276-278, 384. - -[11] _La giovinezza di Fr. de S._ pp. 279, 313-314, 321-324. - -[12] _Scritti varî,_ vol. ii. p. 83; cf. p. 274. - -[13] _Op. cit._ vol. i. pp. 228-236. - -[14] _Saggio sul Petrarca,_ new ed. by B. Croce, p. 309 _seqq._ - -[15] _Saggi critici,_ pp. 361-363, 413-414; cf. as touching Klein, -_Scritti varî,_ vol. i. pp. 32-34. - -[16] _Op. cit., Schopenhauer e Leopardi,_ pp. 246, 299. - -[17] Schopenhauer, _Briefe,_ ed. Grisebach, pp. 405-406; cf. pp. -381-383, 403-404, 438-439. - -[18] _Saggi critici,_ p. 269, note. - -[19] Cf. _Scritti varî,_ i. pp. 39-45, and _Letterat. ital. nel sec. -XIX,_ lectures, ed. Croce, pp. 241-243, 427-432. - -[20] _Saggio sut Petrarca,_ introd. pp. 17-29. - -[21] _Saggio sul Petrarca,_ p. 29 _seqq._ - -[22] _Scritti varî,_ vol. i. pp. 276-277, 317. - -[23] _Nuovi saggi critici,_ pp. 239-240, note. - -[24] _Nuovi saggi critici, loc. cit._ - -[25] _Ibid._ and cf. _Saggio sul Petrarca,_ p. 182; also _Scritti -varî,_ i. pp. 209-212, 226. - -[26] _Lettres à George Sand,_ Paris, 1884 (Letter of Feb. 2, 1869), p. -81. - -[27] See above, p. 363, the judgement of De S. on French criticism. - - - - -XVI - - -ÆSTHETIC OF THE EPIGONI - - -[Sidenote: _Revival of Herbartian Æsthetic._] - -When the cry "Away with metaphysic!" was raised in Germany, and a -furious reaction began against the kind of Walpurgis-night to which -the later Hegelians had reduced the life of science and history, the -disciples of Herbart came to the front and seemed to ask, with an -insinuating air: "What is all this? a rebellion against Idealism and -Metaphysic? why, it is exactly what Herbart wished and undertook all by -himself half a century ago! Here we stand, his legitimate descendants, -and we offer you our services as allies. We shall not find it hard to -agree. Our Metaphysic accords with the atomic theory, our Psychology -with mechanism, and our Ethics and Æsthetic with hedonism." Herbart -himself (had he not died in 1841) would most likely have spumed these -disciples of his who pandered to popularity, cheapened metaphysics and -gave naturalistic interpretations to his reals, his representations, -his ideas, and all his highest conceptions. - -With the school thus coming into fashion, the Herbartian Æsthetic -too tried to put on flesh and acquire a pleasing plumpness so as not -to cut too miserable a figure beside the well-nourished _corpora_ of -science launched upon the world by idealists. The feeding-up process -was accomplished by Robert Zimmermann, professor of philosophy at -Prague and later at Vienna, who, after years of laborious effort and -an introductory sample in the shape of an ample history of Æsthetic -(1858), at length produced his _General Æsthetic as Science of Form_ -in 1865.[1] - -[Sidenote: _Robert Zimmermann._] - -This formalistic Æsthetic, born under bad auspices, is a curious example -of servile fidelity in externals combined with internal infidelity. -Starting from unity, or rather from subordination of Ethics and -Æsthetic to a general Æsthetic defined as "a science which treats of -the modes by which any given content may acquire the right to arouse -approval or disapproval" (thereby differing from Metaphysic, science -of the real, and from Logic, science of right thinking), Zimmermann -places such modes in form, that is to say, in the reciprocal relation -of elements. A simple mathematical point in space, a simple impression -of hearing or sight, a simple note, is in fact neither pleasing nor -displeasing: music shows that the judgement of beauty or ugliness -always depends on the relation between two notes at least. Now these -relations, _i.e._ forms universally pleasing, cannot be empirically -collected by induction; they must be developed by deduction. By -the deductive method it can be demonstrated that the elements of -an image, which in themselves are representations, may enter into -relations either according to their force (quantity), or according to -their nature (quality); whence we have two groups--æsthetic forms of -quantity, and æsthetic forms of quality. According to the first, the -strong (large) is pleasing in comparison with the weak (small), and -these latter are displeasing when set beside the former; according -to the other form, that pleases which is substantially identical in -quality (the harmonious), and that displeases which is on the whole -diverse (the discordant). - -But the substantial identity must not be pushed to the point of -absolute identity, for in that case the harmony itself would cease to -be. From harmonious form is deduced the pleasure of the characteristic -or expression; for what is the characteristic but a relation of -prevalent identity between the thing itself and its model? But while -similarity prevailing in the distinction produces accord (_Einklang_), -qualitative disharmony is as such disagreeable, and demands a -resolution. (It is easy to detect the sleight of hand with which -Zimmermann first slips the characteristic into the relations of pure -form, thereby entirely altering Herbart's original thought; and how, by -a second trick, he here introduces into pure beauty the variations and -modifications of the beautiful, by the help of the despised Hegelian -dialectic.) If such resolution is effected by the skilful substitution -of something other than the unpleasant image, we shall certainly have -removed the cause of offence and established quietude (not accord: -_Eintracht, nicht Einklang_), but we shall have gained the mere form -of correctness: it is better, then, to supersede this by means of the -true image so as to reach the form of compensation (_Ausgleichung_); -and, when the true image is also pleasing in itself, the final form -of definitive compensation (_abschliessende Ausgleich,_) with which -we exhaust the series of possible forms. And, in conclusion, what is -Beauty? It is a conjunction of all these forms: a model (_Vorbild_) -which has grandeur, plenitude, order, accord, correctness, definitive -compensation; all this appears in a copy (_Nachbild_) in the form of -the characteristic. - -Putting on one side the artificial connexion Zimmermann makes between -the sublime, the comic, the tragic, the ironic, the humorous and -the æsthetic forms, notice must be taken (so that we may recognize -into which of the seven heavens he is wafting us) that these general -æsthetic forms concern art equally with nature and morality, whose -individual spheres are differentiated solely by the application of the -general æsthetic forms to particular contents. These forms, applied to -nature, give us natural beauty, the cosmos; applied to representation, -beauty of wit (_Schöngeist_) or imagination; applied to feeling, -the beautiful soul (_schöne Seele_) or taste; applied to the will, -character or virtue. On one side, then, is natural beauty, on the other -human beauty, in which (latter), on one hand, we have the beauty of -representation, that is to say æsthetic fact in the strict sense (art); -on the other, we have the beauty of will, or morality; and between the -two, lastly, we have taste, common to Ethics and Æsthetic. Æsthetic in -the narrow sense, as the theory of beautiful representation, determines -the beauty of representations, divided into the three classes of -the beauty of temporal and spatial connexion (figurative arts); the -beauty of sensitive representation (music); and the beauty of thoughts -(poetry). This tripartition of beauty into figurative, musical and -poetical brings to a conclusion theoretical Æsthetic, the only section -developed by Zimmermann. - -[Sidenote: _Vischer versus Zimmermann._] - -Zimmermann's work was a polemic against the principal representative -of Hegelian Æsthetic, Vischer, who had little difficulty in defending -his own position and counter-attacking that of his assailant. He -held Zimmermann up to ridicule, for example, in connexion with his -view of symbolism. Zimmermann defined a symbol as the object "round -which beautiful forms adhere." A painter depicts a fox simply for the -sake of painting a part of animal nature. Nothing of the sort: this -is a symbol, because the painter "makes use of fines and colours to -express things other than fines and colours." "You think I'm a fox," -says the animal in the picture, "but you make a great mistake: I'm a -clothes-peg: I'm an appearance created by the painter with gradations -of grey, white, yellow and red." Even easier was it to make game of -Zimmermann's enthusiastic praises of the æsthetic quality of the sense -of touch. It was a pity, the latter had written, that the pleasures of -this sense were so difficult to attain; since "to touch the back of the -Resting Hercules and the sinuous limbs of the Venus of Melos or the -Barberini Faun would give to the hand a delight comparable only with -that felt by the ear when listening to the majestic fugues of Bach or -the suave melodies of Mozart." Vischer does not seem to be far wrong in -declaring formalistic Æsthetic to be "a grotesque union of mysticism -and mathematics."[2] - -[Sidenote: _Hermann Lotze._] - -The works of Zimmermann seem to have given satisfaction to nobody -save himself. Even Lotze, by no means an adversary of Herbartianism, -blames him severely in his _History of Æsthetic in Germany_ (1868) and -other writings. Still, Lotze was unable to offer any better substitute -for æsthetic formalism than of a variant of the old idealism. "Can -any one persuade us," he wrote in criticism of the formalists, -"that a spiritual discord expressed by a corresponding discord in -external appearances may have a value equal to that of the harmonious -expression of a harmonious content solely because, in both cases, -the formal relation of accord is respected? Can any one persuade us -that the human form is pleasing solely for its formal stereometric -relations, irrespective of the spiritual life by which it is animated? -In empirical reality the three domains of laws, facts and values -invariably appear as divided; and although they are united in the -Highest Good, in Goodness in itself, in the living Love of a Personal -God, in the Ought which is the basis of Being, our reason is unable to -attain or to know such union. Beauty alone can reveal it to us: it is -in close connexion with the Good and the Holy and reproduces the rhythm -of the divine ordinance and the moral government of the universe. -Æsthetic fact is neither intuition nor concept; it is idea, which -presents the essential of an object in the form of an end referred to -the ultimate end. Art, like beauty, must include the world of values -in the world of forms."[3] The war between the Æsthetic of content and -that of form, having Zimmermann, Vischer and Lotze as protagonists, -reached its culminating point between 1860 and 1870. - -[Sidenote: _Efforts to reconcile Æsthetic of form and Æsthetic of -content._] - -Several people were in favour of a reconciliation. But the -reconciliations they offered were not the right one, which was at -least glimpsed by a certain young Johann Schmidt, who in his thesis -for doctorate observed (1875) that, with all respect for Zimmermann -and Lotze, it seemed to him they were both wrong in confusing the -various meanings of the word "beauty," and discussed such an absurdity -as a beauty or ugliness of natural objects, that is to say, of things -external to the spirit; that Lotze, following Hegel, added the second -absurdity of an intuitive concept or conceptual intuition: lastly, -that neither of them grasped the fact that the æsthetic problem does -not turn upon the beauty or ugliness of the abstract content or of -form understood as a system of mathematical relations, but with the -beauty or ugliness of representation. Form undoubtedly must exist, but -"concrete form, full of content."[4] These utterances of Schmidt met -with a hostile reception: it is easy (he was told in reply) to identify -beauty with artistic perfection, but the whole crux of the matter lies -in finding whether, beside this perfection, there exists another beauty -dependent on a supreme cosmic or metaphysical principle: otherwise one -is guilty of a naïve _petitio principii_.[5] It was thought better, -therefore, to seek other modes of reconciliation, which consisted -in cooking up an appetizing dish in which a little formalism and a -little contentism were mixed to taste, the latter as a rule giving the -predominant flavour. - -Some Herbartians were found in the ranks of the mediating or -conciliatory party. Hardly had Zimmermann's rigid formalism appeared, -when Nahlowsky jumped up to protest that it had never entered the -master's head to exclude content from Æsthetic;[6] but even the ablest -of the school, men such as Volkmann and Lazarus, chose a middle -course.[7] In the opposite camp Carrière,[8] and even Vischer himself -(in a criticism of his own old _Æsthetic_), began to concede a larger -part to the consideration of form; thus for Vischer beauty became -"life appearing harmoniously," which when it appears in space is called -form, and must always possess form, _i.e._ limitation (_Begrenzung_ ) -in space and time, measure, regularity, symmetry, proportion, propriety -(these characters constituting its quantitative moments) and harmony -(qualitative moment), which includes variety and contrast and is -therefore the most important characteristic.[9] - -[Sidenote: _K. Köstlin._] - -A conciliatory Æsthetic in which formalism prevailed was attempted -by Karl Köstlin, a professor at Tübingen and formerly collaborator in -the musical section of the works of Vischer. Köstlin[10] had been -influenced by Schleiermacher, Hegel, Vischer and Herbart, but, truth -to tell, does not seem to have perfectly understood the teaching -of any one of his predecessors. According to him, the æsthetic -object presented three requirements: richness and variety of imagery -(_anregende Gestaltenfülle_), interesting content and beautiful form. -Under the first we recognize, with no little difficulty, a distorted -reflexion of Schleiermacher's "inspiration" (_Begeisterung_). -Interesting content he defined as that which concerns man; that which -he knows or does not know; that which he loves or hates (it is thus -always relative to the individual and the conditions in which he -exists); and he asserted that interest of content is joined to value -of form, that is, he conceived content as a second value, the same -of which we have heard Herbart speak. He also agreed with Herbart -that form is absolute, and that its general character is determined -as being easily perceptible by intuition (_anschaulich_), and by its -power of giving satisfaction, pleasure and delight, in fact, as being -beautiful. Its particular characteristics for Köstlin were, according -to quantity, circumscription, simplicity (_Einheitlichkeit_), extensive -and intensive size, and equilibrium (_Gleichmass_); according to -quality, determination (_Bestimmtheit_), unity (_Einheit_), importance -(_Bedeutung_) extensive and intensive, and harmony. But when Köstlin -sets himself to the empirical verification of his categories, he falls -into hopeless confusion. Greatness is pleasing, but so is smallness; -unity is pleasing, but so is variety; regularity is pleasing, but so, -confound it, is irregularity: uncertainties and contradictions at every -step; he was aware of them and made no effort to conceal them; but they -should have convinced him that the abstraction of "beautiful form," -whose qualities and quantities he had so laboriously collected, is a -ghostly shape without body, since that alone gives æsthetic pleasure -which fulfils an expressive function. But having illustrated the three -demands of the æsthetic object, Köstlin wasted all his remaining breath -in constructing a kingdom of intuitive imagination in the manner of -Vischer, _i.e._ beauty of organic and inorganic nature; of civil life; -of morality; of religion; of science; of games; of conversations; of -feasts and banquets; and lastly of history, reviewing and passing -æsthetic comment on its three periods, patriarchal, heroic and -historical. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic of content. M. Schasler._] - -Schasler, who had written as vast a history on Æsthetic as Zimmermann's -own, found a starting-point for a movement toward formalism in absolute -idealism, or realism-idealism, as he called it. He began by defining -Æsthetic as "the science of the beautiful and of art" (a single -science ill defined as having two different objects), and proceeded -to justify his unmethodical definition by saying that beauty does not -exist in art alone, nor does art concern itself solely with beauty. The -sphere of Æsthetic he defines as that of intuition (_Anschauung_) in -which knowledge assumes a practical character and will a theoretical: -the sphere of indivisible unity and absolute reconciliation of the -theoretical and practical spirit, in which in a certain sense the -highest human activities are developed. Beauty is the ideal, but the -concrete ideal; this is why there is no ideal of a human body in -abstraction from sex, no ideal of a mammal in general, but only of such -and such species, as of horse or dog, and then only of determinate -kind of horse or dog. Thus by descending from the more to the less -abstract genus Schasler vainly attempted to reach the concrete, which -inevitably escaped his grasp. In art we pass from the typical, which -is natural beauty, to the characteristic, which is the typical of -human feeling; hence we can frame the ideal of an old woman, a beggar -or a ruffian. The characteristic of art is in closer relationship -to the ugly than to the beautiful in nature. On this head (passing -over the remainder, which is on familiar lines) it is well to notice -that Schasler has a bias towards that version of the romaunt of Sir -Purebeauty which ascribes the birth of the "modifications of Beauty" to -the influence of the Ugly.[11] "Although," he writes, "the thought may -disturb our minds, it must not be forgotten that were there no world -of ugliness there could be no world of beauty; for it is only when -the Ugly stirs up empty abstract Beauty, that it begins to combat the -enemy and thus to produce concrete Beauty."[12] He even succeeded in -converting Vischer himself, the chief supporter of the other version: -"Formerly I had been accustomed to think in the old-fashioned Hegelian -style," Vischer confesses, "that unrest, fermentation and strife dwelt -in the essence of Beauty; that the Idea prevails and thrusts the -image forth into the infinite; so arises the Sublime; that the image, -offended in its finitude, makes war on the Idea; whence arises the -Comic; this finished the struggle; Beauty returned to itself from the -conflict of the two moments, and was created." But now, he continues, -"I must acknowledge that Schasler is right, and so are his predecessors -Weisse and Ruge: the Ugly has a hand in the matter; this is the -principle of movement, the ferment of differentiation: without such -leaven we never reach the special forms of Beauty, for each single one -presupposes' the Ugly."[13] - -[Sidenote: _Ed. von Hartmann._] - -Closely allied to that of Schasler is the Æsthetic of Eduard von -Hartmann (1890), preceded by a historical treatise on _German Æsthetic -since Kant_[14] wherein with meticulous, critical and polemical study -he upholds the definition of Beauty as "the appearance of the Idea" -(_das Scheinen der Idee_). Inasmuch as he insisted on appearance -(_Schein_) as the necessary characteristic of Beauty, Hartmann held -himself justified in naming his Æsthetic the "Æsthetic of Concrete -Idealism," and in ranging himself alongside Hegel, Trahndorff, -Schleiermacher, Deutinger, Oersted, Vischer, Meising, Carrière -and Schasler, against the abstract idealism of Schelling, Solger, -Schopenhauer, Krause, Weisse and Lotze, all of whom, by placing -beauty in the supersensible idea, overlooked the sensory element and -reduced it to the rank of a mere accessory.[15] By his insistence on -the idea as the other indispensable and determining element, Hartmann -proclaimed himself as opposed to the Herbartian formalism. Beauty is -truth; neither historical, scientific nor reflective, but metaphysical -or idealistic, the very truth of Philosophy: "in proportion as Beauty -is in opposition to every science and to realistic truth, so much -nearer is it to Philosophy and metaphysical truth": "Beauty, with its -own peculiar efficacy, remains the prophet of idealistic truth in an -unbelieving age that abhors Metaphysic and recognizes no value in -anything but realistic truth." Æsthetic truth, which leaps immediately -from subjective appearance to ideal essence, is lacking in the control -and method possessed by philosophical truth; in compensation, however, -she possesses the fascinating power of conviction, the sole property of -sensible intuition, and unattainable by gradual or reflected mediation. -The higher Philosophy soars, the less does it need the gradual passage -through the world of the senses and of science, and the slighter -becomes the distance separating Philosophy and Art. The latter, for -its part, will be well advised to start on its journey towards the -ideal world as Bædeker's handbooks counsel the intending traveller, -"with as little luggage as possible"; "not overloading herself with a -weight which paralyses the wings and is made up of unnecessary and -indifferent trifles,"[16] Logical character, the microcosmic idea, -the unconscious are immanent in beauty; by means of the unconscious, -intellectual intuition operates in it,[17] and, from its being rooted -in the unconscious, it is a Mystery.[18] - -[Sidenote: _Hartmann and the theory of Modifications._] - -In his employment of the exciting or reactionary influence of the -Ugly, Hartmann exceeded Schasler himself. Lowest among the degrees of -Beauty, indeed forming the lower limit of æsthetic fact, lies sensuous -pleasure, which is unconscious formal beauty; its first true degree -is formal beauty of the first order, or the mathematically pleasing -(unity, variety, symmetry, proportion, the golden section, etc.); its -second degree is formal beauty of the second order, the dynamically -pleasing; its third is formal beauty of the third order, the passive -teleological, as in the case of utensils or machinery. Indeed it may -here be noted that among machines and utensils, on a level with jars, -plates and cups, Hartmann placed language: it is a dead thing, said -he; receiving the appearances of life (_Scheinleben_)[19] only at the -very instant of utterance. Language a "dead thing," an "utensil" for -the philosopher of the Unconscious, in the land of Humboldt, with a -Steinthal still living! There follow, as formal beauty of the fourth -order, the active teleological or living, and as formal beauty of the -fifth order, conformity to species (_das Gattungsmässige)_: lastly -and above all, since the individual idea is superior to the specific, -is beauty concrete beauty or the microcosmic individual, which is no -longer formal, but beauty of content. As is to be expected, the passage -from lower to Higher degrees is made by means of the Ugly: nobody has -laboured like Hartmann to recount in detail the services rendered by -Ugliness to Beauty. From ugliness, in the form of the destruction of -the beauty of equality, arises symmetry: from ugliness in the case of -the circle arises the ellipse; the beauty of a waterfall tumbling over -rocks is caused by the mathematically ugly; destruction, that is to -say, of a fall in a parabolic curve; beauty of spiritual expression is -achieved through the introduction of an ugliness relative to fleshly -perfection. Beauty of a higher degree is founded on ugliness at a -lower degree. When the highest degree is reached, that of individual -beauty beyond which there can be nothing, even then elemental ugliness -continues its work of beneficent irritation. The later phases thus -produced are well known to us as the famous Modifications of the -Beautiful: in this section also, nobody is so copious or detailed as -Hartmann. He certainly does admit, side by side with simple or pure -beauty, certain modifications free from conflict, such as the sublime -or graceful; but the more important modifications can arise only -through conflict. There are four cases, because the resolution must -be either immanent, logical, transcendent or combined: immanent in -the idyllic, the melancholy, the sad, the cheerful, the moving, the -elegiac; logical in the comic in all its varieties; transcendent in the -tragic; combined in the humorous with the tragi-comic and its other -varieties. When none of these resolutions is possible, there arises -ugliness; when an ugliness of content is expressed by an ugliness of -form, we have the maximum of ugliness, the real æsthetic devil. - -[Sidenote: _Metaphysical Æsthetic in France. C. Levêque._] - -Hartmann is the last considerable representative of the old æsthetic -school in Germany; he inspires terror by the mass of his literary -production, like many others of the school, who seem to accept it as -a dogma that art cannot be dealt with except in several volumes a -thousand pages long. Those who are not afraid of giants and are able -to attack this sort of Æsthetic, will find it a fat good-humoured -Magog full of vulgar prejudices, and so constituted that, despite his -apparent strength, a little blow will kill him. - -In other countries metaphysical Æsthetic had few followers. In France -the celebrated competition of the Academy of Moral and Political -Sciences in 1857 crowned with their approval and presented to the -world the _Science of Beauty_ by Levêque;[20] of which nobody now -thinks or speaks, only remembering the author (who attitudinized -as a disciple of Plato) by his eight characteristics of Beauty, -derived by him from examination of a lily. The eight characteristics -were as follows:--sufficient size of form, unity, variety, harmony, -proportion, normal vivacity of colour, grace and propriety; ultimately -reducible to two, size and order. As supplementary proof of the truth -of his theory, Levêque applied it to three beautiful things: a child -playing with its mother, a symphony of Beethoven and the life of a -philosopher (Socrates). Really, it is somewhat difficult (says one of -his fellow-spiritualists, venturing to comment on this doctrine though -speaking with the utmost deference) to imagine what may be the normal -vivacity of colour in the life of a philosopher.[21] Translations and -explanatory articles by Charles Bénard[22] and books by various writers -belonging to French Switzerland (Töpffer, Pictet, Cherbuliez) were not -successful in popularizing the German systems of Æsthetic in France. - -[Sidenote: _In England. J. Ruskin._] - -England showed even less disposition to interest herself, although -John Ruskin may have some claim to be considered a metaphysical -æsthetician with a distinctive national stamp. But it is difficult -to treat of Ruskin in a history of science, for his temperament was -wholly opposed to the scientific. His disposition was that of the -artist, impressionable, excitable, voluble, rich in feeling; a dogmatic -tone and the appearance of theoretical form veil, in his exquisite -and enthusiastic pages, a texture of dreams and fancies. The reader -who recalls those pages will regard as irreverent any detailed and -prosaic review of Ruskin's æsthetic thought, which must inevitably -reveal its poverty and incoherence. Suffice it to say that, following -a finalistic, mystical intuition of nature, he considered beauty as a -revelation of divine intentions, the seal "God sets on his works, even -upon the smallest." For him the faculty which perceives the beautiful -is neither intellect nor sensibility, but a particular feeling which -he names the theoretic faculty. Natural beauty, which reveals itself -to a pure heart when contemplating any object untouched and unspoiled -by the hand of man, asserts itself for this reason as immeasurably -superior to any work of art. Ruskin was too hasty in analysis to -understand the complicated psychological and æsthetic process which -went on in his mind when he was moved to an artist's ecstasy by -contemplating some humble natural object such as a bird's nest or a -flowing rivulet.[23] - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic in Italy._] - -In Italy the Abate Tornasi wrote a half-Hegelian, half-Catholic -Æsthetic, wherein the beautiful is identified with the second person of -the Trinity, the Word made man;[24] by this means he hoped to raise a -bank of opposition against the liberal criticism of De Sanctis, whom he -considered, from the sublime height of his own philosophy, as "a subtle -grammarian." Combined Giobertian and German, especially Hegelian, -influence produced several works of secondary importance; De Meis -developed at length the thesis of the death of Art in the historical -world.[25] Somewhat later Gallo also treated Æsthetic from the Hegelian -point of view,[26] and others repeated, nearly word for word, the -doctrines of Schasler and Hartmann on the overcoming of the Ugly.[27] - -[Sidenote: _Antonio Tari and his lectures._] - -The only genuine Italian teacher of metaphysical Æsthetic according -to the Germans was Antonio Tari, who lectured on this very subject -in Naples University from 1861 to 1884. He had a meticulous and -superstitiously minute knowledge of everything that issued from German -printing-presses, and was the author of an _Ideal Æsthetic_ as well -as essays on style, taste, serious work and play (_Spiel,_) music and -architecture, wherein he tried to keep the mean between the idealism -of Hegel and the formalism of Herbart:[28] his lectures on Æsthetic -attracted huge throngs and were one of the regular sights in the noisy, -crowded Neapolitan university. Tari divided his treatment under three -heads, Æsthesinomy, Æsthesigraphy and Æsthesipraxis, corresponding to -the Metaphysic of the beautiful, to the doctrine of beauty in nature, -and to that of beauty in art; like the German idealists, he defined the -æsthetic sphere as intermediate between the theoretical and practical: -he says emphatically that "in the world of spirit the temperate zone -is equidistant from the glacial, peopled by the Esquimaux of thought, -and from the torrid, peopled by the giants of action." He pulled Beauty -from her throne, substituting in her stead the Æsthetic, of which -Beauty is but an initial moment, the simple "beginning of æsthetic -life, eternal mortality, flower and fruit in one," whose successive -moments are represented by the Sublime, the Comic, the Humorous, and -the Dramatic. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthesigraphy._] - -But the most attractive part of Tari's lectures was that devoted -to Æsthesigraphy, subdivided into Cosmography, Physiography and -Psychography, in the course of which he frequently quoted Vischer with -great devotion; "the great Vischer" as he called him, in imitation of -whom he constructed his own "æsthetic physics," brightening it with -much varied erudition and enlivening it with quaint comparisons. Is -he speaking of beauty in inorganic nature--water, for example? He -says in his fanciful manner, "When water ripples in the sunshine, in -that act it has its smile; it has its frown in the breaking wave, its -caprice in the fountain, its majestic fury in the foam." Is he speaking -of geological configuration? "The vale, cradle perchance of the -human race, is idyllic; the plain, monotonous but fat, is didactic." -Of metals? "Gold is born great; iron, the apotheosis of human toil, -achieves greatness; the former boasts of its cradle when it does not -bring it to dishonour; the latter causes it to be forgotten." He looked -on vegetable life as a dream, repeating Herder's fine saying that the -plant is "the new-born babe that hangs sucking upon the breast of -mother nature." He divided vegetables into three types: foliaceous, -ramified and umbelliferous: "the foliaceous type," he says, "attains -gigantic proportions in the tropics, where the queen of monocotyledons, -the Palm-tree, represents despotism, the human scourge of those desert -regions. Of that solitary pinnacle, all crown, the negro may well be -identified as the reptile that crawls round its base." Amongst flowers, -the carnation is "symbol of betrayal, by reason of the variegation of -its colours and its deeply-dissected petals"; the celebrated comparison -by Ariosto of a rose with a young girl is permissible only when the -flower is still in bud, because "when it has unfolded its petals, -disdaining the protection of thorns, displaying itself in all the pomp -of its full colour, and boldly asking to be plucked by any hand, then -it is woman, all woman, to call it by no harsher name, giving pleasure -without feeling it, simulating love by its perfume and modesty by the -crimson of its petals." He searches for and comments upon analogies -between certain fruits and certain flowers; between the strawberry, for -instance, and the violet; between the orange and the rose; he admired -"the luxuriant spirals and the delicate architecture of a bunch of -grapes": the mandarin-orange reminded him of the nobleman _qui s'est -donné la peine de naître_; the fig, on the contrary, was the great -country bumpkin, "rough, rude, but profitable." In the animal kingdom, -the spider symbolized primitive isolation; the bee, monasticism; the -ant, republicanism. He noted, with Michelet, that the spider is a -living paralogism; it cannot feed itself without its web, and it cannot -spin its web without feeding. Fish he condemns as un-æsthetic: "they -are of stupid appearance with their wide--open eyes and incessant -gaping, which makes them look voraciously gluttonous." Not so with -amphibians, for which he entertains a sympathy: the frog and the -crocodile, "alpha and omega of the family, start from the comical, or -even the scurrilous, and attain the sublimity of the horrid." Birds -are especially æsthetic by nature, "possessing the three most genial -attributes of a living being: love, song, and flight"; moreover, they -present contrasts and antitheses: "opposite to the eagle, queen of the -skies, stands the swan, the mild king of the marshes; the libertine -vainglorious cock has its contrast in the humble uxorious turtle-dove; -the magnificent peacock is balanced by the rude and rustic turkey." -Amongst mammals, nature compensates for defects of pure beauty by -dramatic value; if they cannot throw their song into the air, they -have the rudiments of speech; if they have no variegated, myriad-hued -plumage, they have dark, heavily-marked colouring, instinct with life; -if they cannot fly, they have many other modes of powerful progression; -and, the higher they go, the more do they attain individuality in -appearance and life. "The epic of animal life is comedy in the donkey, -_iniquae mentis asellus_; idyl in the great wild beasts; downright -tragedy in the Kaffir bull, that cloven-hoofed Codrus, who gives -himself voluntarily to the lion in order to save the herd." As amongst -birds, so amongst beasts attractive contrasts are to be made:--the lamb -and the kid seem to typify Jesus and the devil; dog and cat, abnegation -and egoism; hare and fox, the foolish simpleton and crafty villain. -Many quaint and subtle observations does Tari let fall on human beauty -and the relative beauty of the sexes, allowing the female to have -charm, not beauty: "bodily beauty is poise, and woman's body is so -ill-poised that she falls easily when running; made for child-bearing, -she has knock-kneed legs, adapted to support the large pelvis; her -shoulders have a curve compensating the convexity of the chest." He -describes the various parts of the body: "curly hair expresses physical -force; straight hair, moral"; "blue, napoleonic eyes have sometimes -a depth like the sea; green eyes have a melancholy fascination; grey -eyes are wanting in individuality; black eyes are the most intensely -individual"; "a lovely mouth has been best described by Heine; two lips -evenly matched; to lovers the mouth will rather seem a shell whose -pearl is the kiss."[29] - -How could we better take a smiling leave of metaphysical Æsthetic in -the German manner than by recording this quaint vernacular version -of it made by Tari, that kindly little old man, "the last jovial -high-priest of an arbitrary and confused Æsthetic"?[30] - - -[1] _Allgemeine Ästhetik als Formwissenschaft,_ Vienna, 1865; see -also Meyer's _Konversations-Lexikon_ (4th ed.), art. _Ästhetik,_ by -Zimmermann. - -[2] _Kritische Gänge,_ vi., Stuttgart, 1873, pp. 6, 21, 32. - -[3] _Geschichte d. Ästh. i. Deutschl., passim,_ esp. pp. 27, 97, -100, 125, 147, 232. 234, 265, 286, 293, 487; _Grundzüge der Ästh._ -(posth., Leipzig, 1884), §§ 8-13; and two juvenile works, _Üb. d. -Begriff d. Schönheit,_ Göttingen, 1845, and _Üb. d. Bedingungen d. -Kunstschönheit,_ Göttingen, 1847. - -[4] _Leibniz u. Baumgarten,_ Halle, 1875, pp. 76-102. - -[5] G. Neudecker, _Studien z. Gesch. d. dtschn. Ästh. s. Kant,_ pp. -54-55. - -[6] Polemic in _Zeitschr. f. exacte Philos._ (Herbartian organ) for -1862-1863, ii. p. 309 _seqq.,_ ii. p. 384 _seqq,_ iv. pp. 26 _seqq.,_ -199 _seqq.,_ 300 _seqq._ - -[7] Volkmann, _Lehrbuch der Psychologie,_ 3rd ed., Cöthen, 1884-1885. -Lazarus, _Das Leben der Seele,_ 1856-1858. - -[8] Moriz Carrière, _Ästhetik,_ 1889 (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1885). - -[9] _Kritische Gänge,_ v., Stuttgart, 1866, p. 59. - -[10] _Ästhetik,_ Tübingen, 1869. - -[11] See above, pp. 348-349. - -[12] _Ästhetik,_ Leipzig, 1886, i. pp. 1-16, 19-24, 70; ii. p. 52: -cf. _Kritische Gesch. der Ästhetik,_ pp. 795, 963, 1041-1044, 1028, -1036-1038. - -[13] _Kritische Gänge,_ v. pp. 112-115. - -[14] _Die dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,_ 1886 (Part i. of _Ästh._). - -[15] _Philosophie des Schönen_ (Part ii. of _Ästh._), Leipzig, 1890, -pp. 463-464; cf. _Deutsche Ästh. s. K._ pp. 357-362. - -[16] _Phil. d. Sch._ pp. 434-437. - -[17] _Op. cit._ pp. 115-116. - -[18] _Op. cit._ pp. 197-198. - -[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 150-152. - -[20] Ch. Levêque, _La Science du beau,_ Paris, 1862. - -[21] E. Saisset, _L'Esthétique française_ (in app. to vol. _L'Âme et la -vie,_ Paris, 1864), pp. 118-120. - -[22] In _Revue philosophique,_ vols. i. ii. x. xii. xvi. - -[23] J. Ruskin, _Modern Painters_ (4th ed., London, 1891); cf. De la -Sizeranne, pp. 112-278. - -[24] Vito Fornari, _Arte del dire,_ Naples, 1866--1872; cf. vol. iv. - -[25] A. C. De Meis, _Dopo la laurea,_ Bologna, 1868-1869. - -[26] Nic. Gallo, _L' idealismo e la letteratura,_ Rome, 1880; _La -scienza dell' arte,_ Turin, 1887. - -[27] _E.g._ F. Masci, _Psicologia del comico,_ Naples, 1888. - -[28] _Estetica ideale,_ Naples, 1863; _Saggi di critica_ (collected -posthumously), Trani, 1886. - -[29] A. Tari, _Lezioni di estetica generale,_ collected by C. -Scamaccia-Luvara, Naples, 1884; _Elementi di estetica,_ compiled by G. -Tommasuolo, Naples, 1885. - -[30] V. Pica, _L'Arte dell' Estremo Oriente,_ Turin, 1894, p. 13. - - - - -XVII - - -ÆSTHETIC POSITIVISM AND NATURALISM - - -[Sidenote: _Positivism and Evolutionism._] - -The ground lost by idealistic metaphysic was conquered in the latter -half of the nineteenth century by positivistic and evolutionary -metaphysic, a confused substitution of natural for philosophical -sciences, and a hotch-potch of materialistic and idealistic, mechanical -and theological theories, the whole crowned with scepticism and -agnosticism. Characteristic of this trend of opinion was its contempt -of history, especially the history of philosophy; which prevented its -ever making that contact with the unbroken and age-long efforts of -thinkers without which it is idle to hope for fertile work and true -progress. - -[Sidenote_Æsthetic of H. Spencer._] - -Spencer (the greatest positivist of his day), whilst discussing -Æsthetic, actually did not know that he was dealing with problems for -all, or almost all, of which solutions had been already proposed and -discussed. At the beginning of his essay on the _Philosophy of Style,_ -he remarks innocently: "I believe nobody has ever sketched a general -theory of the art of writing" (in 1852!); and in his _Principles of -Psychology_ (1855), touching the æsthetic feelings he remarks that -he has some recollection of observations concerning the relation of -art and play made "by some German author whose name I cannot recall" -(Schiller!). Had his pages on Æsthetic been written in the seventeenth -century, they would have won a low position amongst the early crude -attempts at æsthetic speculation; in the nineteenth century, one knows -not how to judge them. In his essay on _The Useful and the Beautiful_ -(1852-1854), he shows how the useful becomes beautiful when it ceases -to be useful, illustrating this by a ruined castle useless for the -purposes of modern life, but a suitable scene for picnic parties and -a good subject for a picture to hang on a parlour wall; which leads -him to identify the principle of evolution from the useful to the -beautiful as contrast. In another essay on the _Beauty of the Human -Face_ (1852) he explains this beauty as a sign and effect of moral -goodness; in that on _Grace_ (1852) he considers the sentiment of the -graceful as sympathy for power in conjunction with agility. In the -_Origin of Architectural Styles_ (1852-1854) he discovers the beauty of -architecture as consisting in uniformity and symmetry, an idea which -is aroused in a man looking at the bodily equilibrium of the higher -animals or, as in Gothic architecture, by analogy with the vegetable -kingdom; in his essay on _Style,_ he places the cause of stylistic -beauty in economy of effort; in his _Origin and Function of Music_ -(1857) he theorizes on music as the natural language of the passions, -adapted to increase sympathy between men.[1] In his _Principles of -Psychology,_ he maintains that the æsthetic feelings arise from the -overflow of exuberant energy in the organism, and distinguishes -various degrees of them, from simple sensation to that accompanied -by representative elements, and so on until perception is reached, -with more complex elements of representation, then emotion, and, last -of all, that state of consciousness which transcends sensation and -perception. The most perfect form of æsthetic feeling is attained -by the coincidence of the three orders of pleasures, a coincidence -produced by the full action of their respective faculties with the -least possible subtraction due to the painful effect of excessive -activity. But it is very rarely that we experience æsthetic excitement -of this kind and strength; almost all works of art are imperfect -because they contain a mixture of artistic with anti-artistic effects; -now the technique is unsatisfactory, now the emotion is of a low -order. These works of art which are universally admired, are found -when measured by this criterion to deserve a lower place than that -accorded them by popular taste. "Beginning with the Greek epic and -the representations of analogous legends given by their sculptors, -tending to excite egoistic or ego-altruistic sentiments, and passing -through the literature of the Middle Ages, equally impregnated with -inferior sentiments, then through the works of the old masters, whose -ideas and sentiments seldom compensate for the displeasing effect they -inflict on our senses overrefined in study of appearances; and coming -at last to the vaunted works of modern art, excellent for technical -execution in many cases but deplorable for the emotions they arouse -and express, such as Gérôme's battle-pieces, alternately sensual and -sanguinary;--they are all far off indeed from the qualities deemed -desirable, from the artistic forms corresponding to the highest forms -of æsthetic feeling."[2] These last critical denunciations, like the -theories noticed above, are mere substitutions of one word for another; -"facility" for "grace"; "economy" for "beauty," and so on. Indeed, -when one tries to define the exact philosophical position of Spencer, -one can only possibly say that he wavers between sensationalism and -moralism, and is never for a moment conscious of art as art. - -[Sidenote: _Physiologists of Æsthetic. Grant Allen, Helmholtz, and -others._] - -The same oscillation is noticeable in other English writers such as -Sully and Bain, in whom, however, we find more familiarity with works -of art.[3] In his numerous essays and in _Physiological Æsthetics_ -(1877), Grant Allen collected a great many records of physiological -experiments, all of which may be of supreme value to physiology, for -aught we know to the contrary, but most assuredly are worthless from -the point of view of Æsthetic. He keeps to the distinction between -necessary or vital activity and the superfluous or that of play, and -defines æsthetic pleasure as "the subjective concomitant of the normal -sum of activity, not connected directly with the vital functions, in -the terminal peripheric organs of the cerebrospinal nervous system."[4] -Physiological processes considered as causes of pleasure in art are -presented under other aspects by later investigators, who assert that -such pleasure arises not only "from the activity of the visual organs -and the muscular systems associated with them, but also from the -participation of some of the more important functions of the organism, -as for instance breathing, circulation of the blood, equilibrium and -internal muscular accommodation." Art, then, indubitably originated -in "a prehistoric man who was habitually a deep-breather, having -no call to rearrange his natural habits when scratching lines on -bones or in mud and taking pains to draw them regularly spaced."[5] -Physical-Æsthetic researches were pursued in Germany by Helmholtz, -Brücke and Stumpf,[6] who generally confined themselves to the narrower -field of optics and acoustics, giving descriptions of the physical -processes of artistic technique and the conditions to which pleasurable -visual and auditive impressions must conform, without claiming to merge -Æsthetic in Physics, but even pointing out the divergences between -them. Degenerate Herbartians hastened to disguise in physiological -terms the metaphysical forms and relations of which their master had -spoken, and to coquet with the hedonism of the naturalists. - -[Sidenote: _Method of the natural sciences in Æsthetic._] - -The superstitious cult of natural sciences was often accompanied (as is -frequently the fate of superstition) by a sort of hypocrisy. Chemical, -physical and physiological laboratories became Sybilline grottoes, -resounding with the questions of credulous inquirers concerning the -profoundest problems of the human spirit; and many of those who were -really conducting their inquiries on inherently philosophic principles -pretended or deluded themselves into believing that they followed the -Method of Natural Science. A proof of this illusion or pretence is -Hippolyte Taine's _Philosophy of Art_[7] - -[Sidenote: _H. Taine's Æsthetic._] - -"If by studying the art of various peoples and various epochs," says -Taine, "we could define the nature and establish the conditions of -the existence of each art, we should have arrived at a complete -explanation of the fine arts and of art in general, _i.e._ at what -is called an Æsthetic." A historical Æsthetic, not a dogmatic, which -fixes characters and indicates laws "like Botany, and studies with -equal attention orange and ivy, pine and birch; indeed it is a sort of -botanical science applied to the works of man instead of to plants"; -an Æsthetic which shall follow "the general movement which tends -daily more and more to join the moral to the natural sciences and by -extending to the former the principles, the safeguards and the rules of -the latter, enables both to attain the same security and maintain the -same progress."[8] The naturalistic prelude is followed by definitions -and doctrines indistinguishable from those offered by philosophers -whose infallibility is not guaranteed by scientific methods, indeed, -from those of the wildest of such philosophers. For, says Taine, art -is imitation, an imitation so carried out as to render sensible the -essential character of objects; the essential character being "a -quality from which all other qualities, or many others, are derived and -follow unalterably from it." The essential character of a lion, for -example, is to be "a great carnivore"; this determines the formation of -all its limbs; the essential character of Holland is to be "a country -formed by alluvial soil." This is why art is not restricted to objects -existing in reality, but is able, as in architecture or in music, to -represent essential characters without natural objects to correspond.[9] - -[Sidenote: _Taine's metaphysic and moralism._] - -Now, in what do these essential characters, this carnivorosity and this -alluviality differ, save perhaps in extravagance of example, from the -"types" and "ideas" which intellectualiste or metaphysical Æsthetic -had always considered as the proper content of art? Taine himself -clears away every doubt in the matter by explicitly stating that "this -character is what philosophers call the 'essence of things,' in virtue -of which they affirm that the aim and end of art is to make manifest -the essence of things"; he adds that, for his part, he "refuses to -make use of the word 'essence' as being a technical term":[10] of the -word itself, maybe; not of the concept for which it stands. There are -two ways (says Taine, for all the world as though he were a Schelling) -leading to the higher life of man, to contemplation: the way of -science and the way of art: "the former investigates the causes and -fundamental laws of reality, and expresses them in exact formulæ and -abstract terms: the latter makes manifest these causes and laws, not in -dry definitions inaccessible to the vulgar, and intelligible only to -the select few, but in a sensible manner, appealing not merely to the -reason but to the heart and senses of the most commonplace man; it has -the power of being both elevated and popular, of manifesting what is -most noble and elevated, and of manifesting it to every one."[11] - -For Taine, as for the Hegelian æstheticians, works of art are arranged -in a scale of values; so that, having begun by condemning as absurd -every judgement of taste (every one to his taste[12]), he ends by -asserting that "personal taste has no value whatever," and that some -common measure should be abstracted and set up as a standard of -progress and retrogression, ornamentation and degeneracy; a standard -by which to approve and disapprove, praise and blame.[13] The scale of -values set up by him is twofold or threefold, in the first instance -it turns on the degree of importance of the character, _i.e._ the -greater or less generality in idea, and the degree of beneficent effect -(_degré de bienfaisance_), _i.e._ the greater or less moral value of -the representation (two grades which are aspects of one single quality, -viz. power, considered first for its own sake and then in its connexion -with others): in the second instance upon the degree of convergence of -effects, _i.e._ the fulness of expression, the harmony between idea -and form.[14] This intellectualistic, moralistic, rhetorical doctrine -is interrupted now and then by the usual naturalistic protests: "We -shall, according to our custom, study this question in the manner of -the natural scientist; that is to say methodically, by analysis; hoping -to raise not merely a song of praise, but a code of laws," etc.;[15] as -though that sufficed to alter the substance of the method adopted and -the doctrine expounded. Taine finally gave himself over to dialectical -treatments and solutions, and asserted that in the primitive period -of Italian art, in the pictures of Giotto, we have soul without body -(thesis); under the Renaissance, in Verrocchio's pictures, body without -soul (antithesis); in the sixteenth century, in Raphæl, there is -harmony of expression and anatomy, soul and body (synthesis).[16] - -[Sidenote: _G. T. Feckner. Inductive Æsthetic._] - -The same protests and similar methods are to be found in the works of -Gustav Theodor Fechner. In his _Introduction to Æsthetic_ (1876), -Fechner claims to "abandon the attempt at conceptual determination -of the objective essence of beauty," since he desires to compose not -a metaphysical Æsthetic from above (_von oben_), but an inductive -Æsthetic from below (_von unten)_ and to achieve clearness, not -sublimity; metaphysical Æsthetic should bear the same relation to -inductive, as the Philosophy of Nature to Physics.[17] Proceeding -on inductive lines, he discovers a long series of æsthetic laws or -principles: the æsthetic threshold; assistance or increment; unity in -variety; absence of contradictions; clarity; association; contrast; -consequence; conciliation; the correct mean; economic use; persistency; -change; measure; and so on without end. This chaos of concepts he -expounds with a chapter apiece, pleased and proud to show himself so -highly scientific and so wholly inconclusive. - -[Sidenote: _Experiments._] - -Next he describes the experiments he can recommend to his readers. -They are of this type. Take ten rectangular pieces of white cardboard -of fairly equal area (say ten square inches), but with sides variously -proportioned from a ratio of 1:1 to one of 2:5, including the ratio -of the golden section, 21:34; mix all these together on a black table -and collect persons of every kind and character, but all belonging -to the educated classes, and applying the method of choice ask these -people first to free their minds of all questions as to a particular -use and then to pick out the pieces of cardboard which give them the -highest sensation of pleasure and those which inspire them with the -strongest feelings of disgust; the answers to be most carefully noted, -keeping male and female subjects apart, and tabulated. Then see what -follows. Fechner admits that the chosen cardboard-pickers often made -reservations when questioned by himself, not knowing (very naturally) -how to tell whether they liked a shape or disliked it without referring -it to a definite use; sometimes they refused point-blank to make any -selection at all; and they almost always seemed vague and perplexed in -mind and generally, when submitted to a second test, answered in a way -totally different from the first. Still, we all know that errors cancel -out; and anyhow the tabulations showed that the highest sensations -of delight were aroused not by the square, but by rectangular forms -most nearly approaching the square, an enthusiastic rush being made -for the proportion 21:34.[18] This method of selection received an -extraordinarily felicitous definition; it was known as "an average of -arbitrary judgements by an arbitrary number of persons arbitrarily -selected."[19] Fechner also informs us (always in tabular form) of the -result of a statistical inquiry of his own, by means of countless heaps -of catalogues and gallery-guides, as to the dimensions and shapes of -pictures in relation to the subjects they depict.[20] - -[Sidenote: _Trivial nature of his ideas on Beauty and Art._] - - -Nevertheless, when he tries to tell us what beauty is, he falls back -on using--whether well or ill--the old speculative method, which he -prefaces with the remark that for him the concept of beauty is "merely -an expedient in conformity with linguistic usage for indicating -briefly the link which unites the prevailing conditions of immediate -pleasure."[21] He distinguishes three meanings of the word "beauty": -first, in a broad sense, the pleasing in general: secondly, in a -narrow sense, a higher pleasure, but still sensuous: thirdly, in the -narrowest sense, true beauty, which "not only pleases, but has the -right of pleasing, possesses value in pleasing"; in it are united the -concepts of beauty (the pleasing) and of goodness.[22] Beauty, in fact, -is that which must please objectively and as such it corresponds with -the good of action. "The Good," says Fechner, "is like a serious man, -the capable organiser of his whole domestic life, sagaciously weighing -the present and future, setting himself to extract the greatest benefit -from both. Beauty is his florid spouse, careful of the present and -mindful of her husband's wishes. The Pleasing is the baby, all senses -and play: the Useful is the servant who puts his hands at his master's -disposal and is given bread solely in accordance with his deserts. -Truth, lastly, is the preacher and teacher to the household; preacher -in matters of faith, teacher in those of learning: he gives an eye to -the Good and a helping hand to the Useful, and holds up a looking-glass -to Beauty."[23] When speaking of art, he sums up all essential laws or -rules into the following: (1) art chooses a valuable or, at any rate, -an interesting, idea for representation: (2) it expresses the idea in -sensible material in the manner most suitable to its contents: (3) from -amongst the various means at its disposal, it selects those which in -themselves are more pleasing than the others: (4) the same procedure -is observed in all particulars: (5) in the event of conflict between -these rules, one is made to give way to another in such a way that the -greatest possible pleasure and that of highest value is attained (_das -grösstmögliche und werthvollste Gefallen_).[24] But why should Fechner, -who had this eudemonistic theory of beauty and art (as he calls it) all -ready made in advance,[25] take the trouble to enumerate principles -and laws and conduct experiments and tabulate statistics wholly -incapable of illustrating or proving it? One is tempted to believe -that these pseudo-scientific operations were to him, and still are to -his followers, a pastime or hobby neither more nor less important than -playing Patience or collecting stamps. - -[Sidenote: _Ernst Grosse. Speculative Æsthetic and the science of art._] - -Another example of the superstitious cult of the natural sciences is to -be found in Professor Ernst Grosse's _Origins of Art._[26] Contemner of -all philosophical research into art, which he dismisses under the title -of "Speculative Æsthetic," Grosse invokes a Science of art (_Kunst -wissenschaft)_ whose mission is to dig out all the laws lying hidden -in the mass of historical facts collected to date. It is his opinion -that all ethnographic and prehistoric material should be united to -historical matter proper, there being no possibility, according to him, -of framing general laws when study is restricted to the art of cultured -peoples "just as a theory of generation must necessarily be imperfect -if founded exclusively on the form of that function predominant among -mammals."[27] But immediately after his declaration of abhorrence for -philosophy, and of faith in scientific methods, Grosse finds himself -in the same difficulty as Taine and Fechner. Indeed, there is no -escape; in order to examine the artistic productions of primitive and -savage peoples, a start must be made from some sort of concept of -art. All the scientific metaphors, all the verbal emollients employed -by Grosse cannot hide the nature of the plan he is forced to adopt, -or its striking resemblance to the despised speculative Æsthetic. -"As a traveller who desires to explore an unknown land must provide -himself with a general outline of the country and have some knowledge -of the direction in which his path should lie, if he does not wish to -lose his way entirely; so we, before beginning our enquiry, need a -general preliminary orientation concerning the essence of the phenomena -(_über das Wesen der Erscheinungen_) about to engage our attention." -Most certainly "we may count upon having an exact and exhaustive -answer, at earliest, when our enquiry is finished; and it is not yet -begun. That characteristic which we seek to determine at the outset -... may be most radically modified by the time we reach the end:" -there is no question, fie on the suggestion! of imitating the old -æstheticians: the only question is how "to give a definition which may -serve as provisional scaffolding, to be broken away on completion of -the edifice."[28] Words, words, words: the mite of general ideas and -artistic laws to be found in his book has been quarried by Grosse not -from study of the reports brought back by travellers in savage lands, -but from speculation on the forms of the spirit; and (inevitably) his -interpretation of the former is reached by the light thrown on it by -the latter. In his final definition, Grosse concludes by considering -art as an activity which in its development or as its result, possesses -immediate feeling-value (_Gefühlswerth_), and is an end to itself; -practical and æsthetic activity are in direct mutual opposition between -which as a middle term lies the activity of play, which like the -practical activity has its end outside itself, but, like the æsthetic, -finds its enjoyment not in its external end, which is more or less -insignificant, but in its own activity.[29] At the end of his book he -remarks that the artistic activity of primitive peoples is hardly ever -unaccompanied by the practical; and that art began by being social and -became individual only in civilized times.[30] - -The Æsthetics of Taine and Grosse have also been described by the -epithet sociological. - -[Sidenote: _Sociological Æsthetic._] - -But since no one knows what the science of Sociology is, we must deal -with the sociological superstition as we dealt with the naturalistic; -that is to say, by skipping the preface with its proposals that -can never be carried out, and seeing what it is that the objective -necessities of the case have forced the author to assert, and which of -the possible alternative views he accepts, or between what selection of -them his allegiance wavers. During this examination we shall ignore the -fairly common case of an author who while pretending to construct an -Æsthetic simply compiles a list of facts connected with the history of -art or civilization. - -[Sidenote: _Proudhon._] - - -Some social reformers of our day, like Proudhon, have revived the -condemnations of Plato, or the mitigated moralism of antiquity and -the Middle Ages. Proudhon denied the formula Art for Art's sake; he -looked on art as a mere purveyor of sensuous pleasure, something which -must be subordinated to legal and economical ends; poetry, sculpture, -painting, music, romance, history, comedy, tragedy had for him no aim -save exhortation to virtue and dissuasion from vice.[31] - -[Sidenote: _J. M. Guyau._] - -Development of social sympathy is the whole duty of art in the -estimation of J. M. Guyau, who became famous as the founder of Social -Æsthetic and was, according to certain French critics, inaugurator -of the third epoch in the history of Æsthetic, the first being the -æsthetic of the ideal (Plato), the second that of perception (Kant), -and the third that of "Social Sympathy" (Guyau). In his _Problems -of Contemporary Æsthetic_ (1884) Guyau combats the theory of play, -and substitutes that of Life; in a posthumous publication _Art in -Its Sociological Aspect_ (1889) he explains more clearly that the -life of which he speaks is social life.[32] If the beautiful be the -intellectually pleasing, certainly it cannot be identified with the -useful which is only searching for what is pleasing; but the useful -(says Guyau, in the belief that he is correcting both Kant and -the evolutionists) does not always exclude the beautiful, of which -indeed it often forms the lowest degree. The study of art is embraced -partly,[33] not wholly, by Sociology: for art fulfils two ends, firstly -and primarily that of provoking pleasant sensations (of colour, sound, -etc.) and in this sense finds itself in the presence of practically -incontestable scientific laws which connect Æsthetic with the physics -(optics, acoustics, etc.), mathematics, physiology and psychophysics. -Sculpture, in fact, rests especially on anatomy and physiology: -painting on anatomy, physiology and optics: architecture on optics -(golden section, etc.): music on physiology and acoustics: poetry on -metrics, whose most general laws are acoustical and physiological. The -second function of art is to produce the phenomena of "psychological -induction," which bring to a head ideas and sentiments of most -complex nature (sympathy with personages represented, interest, pity, -indignation, etc.), in short all the social feelings, which constitute -it "the expression of life." Whence are derived the two tendencies -recognised in art; one inclining towards harmony, consonance, and -everything delightful to ear and eye: the other towards the transfusion -of life into the domain of art. Genius, true genius is destined to -preserve the balance of the two tendencies: decadents and degenerates -deprive art of its social sympathetic aim by setting æsthetic sympathy -at war against human sympathy.[34] Translating all this into familiar -terms, we may say that Guy au asserts one purely hedonistic art, above -which he superimposes another art, also hedonistic, but serviceable to -the cause of morality. - -[Sidenote: _M. Nordau._] - -The same polemic against decadents, degenerates and individualists -is carried on by another writer, Max Nordau, who gives art the task -of re-establishing the wholeness of life amongst the fragmentary -specialisation characteristic of industrial society; he asserts that -art for art's sake, art as the simple expression of internal states or -the objectification of the artist's feelings, no doubt exists, but is -merely "the art of Quaternary man, the art of the cave-dweller."[35] - -[Sidenote: _Naturalism. C. Lombroso._] - -Naturalistic is the best term with which to qualify the Æsthetic -derived from that identification of genius with degeneracy which made -the fortune of Lombroso and his school. This identification derives -its chief strength from the following piece of reasoning. Great mental -efforts, total absorption in one dominating thought, often bring about -physiological disorders in the bodily organism and weakness or atrophy -of various vital functions. But such derangements come under the -head of the pathological concept of illness, degeneration, madness. -Therefore genius is identical with illness, degeneration and madness. -A syllogism from particular to general, in which case, according to -traditional Logic, _non est consequentia._ But with sociologists such -as Nordau, Lombroso and company, we almost overstep the line separating -respectable error from that grosser form which we call a blunder. - -A mere confusion between scientific analysis and historical inquiry -or description is visible in the works of certain sociologists and -anthropologists. Thus one of them, Carl Bücher, in studying the life of -primitive peoples, asserts that poetry, music and work were originally -fused in one single act; that poetry and music were used to regulate -the rhythms of labour.[36] This may be historically true or false, -important or no: it has nothing whatever to do with æsthetic science. -In the same way Andrew Lang maintains that the doctrine concerning the -origin of art as disinterested expression of the mimetic faculty finds -no confirmation from what we know of primitive art, which is decorative -rather than expressive:[37] as though primitive art, which is a mere -fact awaiting interpretation, could ever be converted into a criterion -for the interpretation of art in general. - -[Sidenote: _Decline of Linguistic._] - -The same vague naturalism exercised a baneful influence on Linguistic, -which of late years has been wholly lacking in such profound research -as that inaugurated by Humboldt and followed up by Steinthal. But -Steinthal never succeeded in founding a school. Max Müller, popular -and inaccurate, maintained the indivisibility of speech and thought, -confounding, or at least not distinguishing, æsthetic and logical -thought; although at one time he had noted that the formation of -names had a closer connexion with wit, in the sense of Locke, than -with judgement. He maintained, moreover, that the science of language -is not a historical but a natural science, because language is not -the invention of man: the dilemma of "historical" and "natural" was -canvassed and resolved over and over again with little result.[38] -Another philologist, Whitney, attacked the "miraculous" theory of -Müller and denied that thought is indivisible from speech: "The -deaf-mute does not speak, but he can think," he observes; "thought is -not function of the acoustic nerve." By this means Whitney relapsed -into the ancient doctrine that speech is a symbol or means of -expression, of human thought, subject to the will, the result of a -synthesis of faculties and of a capacity for intelligent adaptation of -means to end.[39] - -[Sidenote: _Signs of revival. H. Paul._] - -Philosophical spirit reappeared in Paul's _Principles of the History -of Language_ (1880),[40] though the author's efforts to defend himself -from the terrifying accusation of being a philosopher led him to hunt -out a fresh title to replace the scandalous "Philosophy of Language." -But if Paul is vague about the relation of Logic to Grammar, he must -be given every credit for identifying, as Humboldt had already done, -the question of the origin of language with that of its nature; and -reasserting that language is created afresh whenever we speak. He -must also be given credit for having conclusively criticized the -Ethnopsychology (_Völkerpsychologie_) of Steinthal and Lazarus, showing -that there is no such thing as collective psyche and that there can be -no language other than of the individual. - -[Sidenote: _The linguistic of Wundt._] - -Wundt[41] on the other hand attached the study of language, mythology -and customs to this non-existent science of Ethnopsychology; in his -latest work, on this very subject of language,[42] he foolishly echoes -Whitney's gibes and denounces as a "miracle theory" (_Wundertheorie_) -that glorious doctrine inaugurated by Herder and Humboldt, whom he -accuses of "mystical obscurity" (_mystiche Dunkel_): he observes that -this view may have had some justification before the principle of -evolution had reached its triumphant application to organic nature in -general and to man in particular. He has not the faintest notion of -the function of imagination, or of the true relation between thought -and expression; he finds no substantial difference between expression -in the naturalistic, and expression in the spiritual and linguistic -sense; he considers language as a special highly developed form of the -vital psychophysical manifestations and of the expressive movements -of animals. Out of these facts language is developed by imperceptible -gradations; so that, beyond the general concept of expressive movement -(_Ausdrucksbewegung_) "there is no specific mark by which language can -be distinguished in any but an arbitrary manner."[43] The philosophy -of Wundt betrays its own weakness by showing its inability to master -the problem of language and art. In his _Ethics_ æsthetic facts are -presented as a complex of logical and ethical elements; the existence -of æsthetic as a special normative science is denied, not for the good -and sufficient reason that there are no such things as "normative -sciences," but because this special science is said by him to be -absorbed by the two sciences of Logic and Ethics,[44] which amounts to -denying the existence of Æsthetic and the originality of art. - - -[1] _Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative, 1858-1862._ - -[2] _Principles of Psychology,_ 1855; 2nd ed. 1870, part viii. ch. 9, -§§ 533-540. - -[3] J. Sully, _Outlines of Psychology,_ London, 1884; _Sensation -and Intuition, Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics,_ London, 1874; -cf. _Encycl. Britannica,_ ed. 9, art. "Æsthetics"; Alex. Bain, _The -Emotions and the Will,_ London, 1859, ch. 14. - -[4] _Physiological Æsthetics,_ London, 1877; various arts, in _Mind,_ -vols. iii. iv. v. (o. s.). - -[5] Vernon Lee and C. Anstruther-Thomson, "Beauty and Ugliness," in -_Contemp. Review,_ October-November, 1897: (abstract in Arréat, _Dix -années de philosophie,_ pp. 80-85); same author's _Le Rôle de l'élément -moteur dans la perception esthétique visuelle, Mémoire et questionnaire -soumis au 4<sup>me</sup> Congrès de Psychologie,_ reprinted Imola, 1901. - -[6] H. Helmholtz, _Die Lehre von der Tonempfindungen als physiologische -Grundlage für die Théorie der Musik,_ 1863, 4th ed., 1877; -Brücke-Helmholtz, _Principes scientifiques des beaux arts,_ Fr. ed., -Paris, 1881; C. Stumpf, _Tonpsychologie,_ Leipzig, 1883. - -[7] _Philosophie de l'art,_ 1866-1869 (4th ed. Paris, 1885). - -[8] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 13-15. - -[9] _Philosophie de l'art,_ i. pp. 17-54. - -[10] _Op. cit._ i. p. 37. - -[11] _Op. cit._ i. p. 54. - -[12] _Op. cit._ i. p. 15. - -[13] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 277. - -[14] _Philos. de l'art,_ ii. pp. 257-400. - -[15] _Op. cit._ ii. pp. 257-258. - -[16] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 393. - -[17] _Vorschule der Ästhetik,_ 1876 (2nd ed. Leipzig, 1897-1898). - -[18] _Vorschule der Ästhetik,_ i. ch. 19. - -[19] Schasler, _Krit. Geschichte d. Ästh._ p. 1117. - -[20] _Vorschule der Ästh._ ii. pp 273-314. - -[21] _Op. cit._ pref. p. iv. - -[22] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 15-30. - -[23] _Op. cit._ i. p. 32. - -[24] _Vorschule der Ästh._ ii. pp. 12-13. - -[25] _Op. cit._ i. p. 38. - -[26] _Die Anfänge der Kunst,_ Freiburg i. B. 1894. - -[27] _Op. cit._ p. 19. - -[28] _Die Anfänge der Kunst,_ pp. 45-46. - -[29] _Op. cit._ pp. 46-48. - -[30] _Op. cit._ pp. 293-301. - -[31] _Du principe de l'art et de sa destination sociale,_ Paris, 1875. - -[32] M. Guyau, _L'Art au point de vue sociologique,_ 1889 (3rd ed. -Paris, 1895); _Les Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine,_ Paris, -1884; cf. Fouillée, pref. to the former work, pp. xli-xliii. - -[33] _L'Art au point de vue sociologique,_ pref. p. xlvii. - -[34] _Op. cit., passim,_ esp. ch. 4; cf. pp. 64, 85, 380. - -[35] Max Nordau, _Social Function of Art,_ 2nd ed., Turin, 1897. - -[36] Karl Bücher, _Arbeit u. Rhythmus,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1899. - -[37] _Custom and Myth,_ p. 276; quoted by Knight, _The Philosophy of -the Beautiful,_ vol. i. pp. 9-10. - -[38] _Lectures on the Science of Language,_ 1861 and 1864 (Fr. tr., -Paris, 1867). - -[39] William Dwight Whitney, _The Life and Growth of Language,_ London, -1875 (It. tr., Milan, 1876). - -[40] Hermann Paul, _Principien der Sprachgeschichte,_ 1880 (2nd ed., -Halle, 1886). - -[41] Wilh. Wundt, _Über Wege u. Ziele d. Völkerpsychologie,_ Leipzig, -1886. - -[42] _Die Sprache,_ Leipzig, 1900, 2 vols, (part i. of -_Völkerpsychologie, eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von -Sprache, Mythus und Sitte_). - -[43] _Die Sprache, passim;_ cf. i. p. 31 _seqq.,_ ii. pp. 599, 603-609. - -[44] _Ethik,_ ed. 2, Stuttgart, 1892, p. 6. - - - - -XVIII - - -ÆSTHETIC PSYCHOLOGISM AND OTHER RECENT TENDENCIES - - -[Sidenote: _Neo-criticism and empiricism._] - -The neo-critical or neo-Kantian movement was powerless to make headway -against hedonistic, psychological and moralistic views of the æsthetic -fact, although it made every effort to save the concept of spirit from -the invading rush of naturalism and materialism.[1] Kant bequeathed to -neo-criticism his own failure to understand creative imagination, and -the neo-Kantians do not seem to have had the faintest notion of any -form of cognition other than the intellectual. - -[Sidenote: _Kirchmann._] - -Amongst German philosophers of any renown who clung to æsthetic -sensationalism and psychologism was Kirchmann, promoter of a so-called -realism, and author of _Æsthetic on a Realistic Basis_ (1868).[2] -In his doctrine the æsthetic fact is an image (_Bild_) of a real; -an animated (_seelenvolles_) image, purified and strengthened, that -is, idealized, and divided into the image of pleasure, which is the -beautiful, and that of pain, which is the ugly. Beauty admits of a -threefold series of varieties or modifications, being determined -according to the content as sublime, comic, tragic, etc.; according -to the image, as beauty of nature or of art; and according to the -idealization as idealistic or naturalistic, formal or spiritual, -symbolical or classical. Not having grasped the nature of æsthetic -objectification, Kirchmann takes the trouble to draw up a new -psychological category of ideal or apparent feelings, arising from -artistic images and being attenuations of the feelings of real life.[3] - -[Sidenote: _Metaphysic translated into Psychology. Vischer._] - -To the evolution or involution of the Herbartians into physiologists -of æsthetic pleasure corresponds a similar evolution or involution of -the idealists into adherents of psychologism. The first place must be -given to the veteran Theodor Vischer, who in a criticism of his own -work pronounced Æsthetic to be "the union of mimics and harmonics" -(_vereinte Mimik und Harmonik_), and Beauty the "harmony of the -universe," never actually realized because realized only at infinity, -so that when we think to seize it in the Beautiful, we are under an -illusion: a transcendent illusion, which is the very essence of the -æsthetic fact.[4] His son Robert Yischer coined the word _Einfühlung_ -to express the life with which man endows natural objects by means of -the æsthetic process.[5] Volkelt, when treating of the _Symbol_[6] and -joining symbolism to pantheism, opposed associationism and favoured a -natural teleology immanent in Beauty. - -[Sidenote: _Siebeck._] - -The Herbartian Siebeck (1875) abandoned the formalistic theory and -tried to explain the fact of beauty by the concept of the appearance of -personality.[7] He distinguishes between objects which please by their -content alone (sensuous pleasures), those which please by form alone -(moral facts), and those which please by the connexion of content with -form (organic and æsthetic facts). In organic facts the form is not -outside the content, but is the expression of the reciprocal action and -conjunction of the constitutive elements: whereas in æsthetic facts -the form is outside the content, and as it were its mere surface; not -a means to the end, but an end in itself. Æsthetic intuition is a -relation between the sensible and the spiritual, matter and spirit, -and is thus form regarded as the appearance of personality. Æsthetic -pleasure arises from the spirit's consciousness of discovering itself -in the sensible. Siebeck borrows the theory of modifications of the -beautiful from the metaphysical idealists, who held that only in such -modifications can beauty be found in the concrete, just as humanity can -only exist as a man of determinate race and nationality. The sublime is -that species of beauty wherein the formal moment of circumscription is -lost, and is therefore the unlimited, which is a kind of extensive or -intensive infinity; the tragic arises when the harmony is not given but -is the result of conflict and development; the comic is a relation of -the small to the great; and so on. These traces of idealism, together -with his firm hold on the Kantian and Herbartian absoluteness of the -judgement of taste, make it impossible to regard Siebeck's Æsthetic as -purely psychological and empirical and wholly devoid of philosophical -elements. - -[Sidenote: _M. Diez._] - -It is the same with Diez, who, in his _Theory of Feeling as Foundation -of Æsthetic_ (1892),[8] tries to explain the artistic activity as -a return to the ideal of feeling (_Ideal des fühlenden Geistes_), -parallel with science (ideal of thought), morality (ideal of will) -and religion (ideal of personality). But whatever is this so-called -feeling? is it the empirical feeling of the psychologists, irreducible -to an ideal, or the mystic faculty of communication and conjunction -with the Infinite and the Absolute? the absurd "pleasure-value" of -Fechner, or the "judgement" of Kant? One is inclined to say that -these writers, and others like them, still under the influence of -metaphysical views, lack the courage of their opinions: they feel -themselves to be in an atmosphere of hostility and speak under -reservations or compromises. The psychologist Jodi asserts the -existence of elementary æsthetic feelings, as discovered by Herbart, -and defines them as "immediate excitations not resting upon associative -or reproductive activity or on the fancy," although "in ultimate -analysis they must be reduced to the same principles."[9] - -[Sidenote: _Psychological tendency. Teodor Lipps._] - -The purely psychological and associationistic tendency becomes clearly -defined in Professor Teodor Lipps and his school. Lipps criticizes -and rejects a whole series of æsthetic theories: (_a_) of play; -(_b_) of pleasure; (_c_) of art as recognition of real life, even -if displeasing; (_d_) of emotion and passional excitation; (_e_) -syncretism, attributing to art beside the primary purpose of play and -pleasure the further ends of recognition of life, in its reality, -revelation of individuality, commotion, freedom from a weight, or free -play of the imagination. His theory differs little at bottom from that -of Jouffroy, for in his thesis he assumes artistic beauty to be the -sympathetic. "The object of sympathy is our objectified ego, transposed -into others and therefore discovered in them. We feel ourselves in -others and we feel others in ourselves. In others, or by means of them, -we feel ourselves happy, free, enlarged, elevated, or the contrary -of all these. The æsthetic feeling of sympathy is not a mere mode of -æsthetic enjoyment, it is that enjoyment itself. All æsthetic enjoyment -is founded, in the last analysis, singly and wholly upon sympathy; even -that caused by geometrical, architectonic, tectonic, ceramic, etc., -lines and forms." "Whenever in a work of art we find a personality (not -a defect of the man, but something positively human) which harmonizes -with and awakes an echo in the possibilities and tendencies of our -own life and vital activities: whenever we find positive, objective -humanity, pure and free from all real interests lying outside the work -of art, as art only can reproduce it and æsthetic contemplation alone -can demand; the harmony, the resonance, fills us with joy. The value -of personality is ethical value: outside it there is no possibility -or determination of ethical character. All artistic and in general -æsthetic enjoyment is, therefore, the enjoyment of something which has -ethical value (_eines ethische Werthvollen_); not as element of a -complex, but as object of æsthetic intuition."[10] - -The æsthetic fact is thus deprived of all its own value and allowed -merely a reflexion from the value of morality. - -Without lingering over Lipps's pupils (such as Stern and others[11]) -and writers of similar tendency (such as Biese, with his theory -of anthropomorphism and universal metaphor;[12] or Konrad Lange, -who propounds a thesis that art is conscious self-deception),[13] -we will call attention to Professor Karl Groos (1892), who comes -within measurable distance of the concept of æsthetic activity as -a theoretic value.[14] Between the two poles of consciousness, -sensibility and intellect, are several intermediate grades, amongst -which lies intuition or fancy, whose product, the image or appearance -(_Schein_), is midway between sensation and concept. The image is -full like sensation, but regulated like the concept; it has neither -the inexhaustible richness of the former, or the barren nudity of the -latter. Of the nature of image or appearance is the æsthetic fact; -which is distinguished from the simple, ordinary image not by its -quality, but by its intensity alone: the æsthetic image is merely a -simple image occupying the summit of consciousness. Representations -pass through consciousness like a crowd of people hurrying over a -bridge, each bent on his own business; but when a passer-by halts on -the bridge and looks at the scene, then is it holiday, then arises the -æsthetic fact. This is therefore not passivity but activity; according -to the formula adopted by Groos it is internal imitation (_innere -Nachahnung_).[15] It may be objected against the theory that every -image, so far as it is an image at all, must occupy the summit of -consciousness if only for an instant; and that the mere image is either -the product of an activity just as is the æsthetic image, or it is not -a real image at all. It may also be objected that the definition of the -image as something sharing in the nature of sensation and concept may -lead back to intellectual intuition and the other mysterious faculties -of the metaphysical school, for which Groos professes abhorrence. His -division of the æsthetic fact into form and content is even less happy. -He recognizes four classes of content: associative (in the strict -sense), symbolic, typical, individual:[16] and into his inquiries -he introduces, quite unnecessarily, the concepts of infusion of -personality and of play. In connexion with the latter he remarks that -"internal imitation is the noblest game of man,"[17] and adds that "the -concept of play applies fully to contemplation, but not to æsthetic -production, save in the case of primitive peoples."[18] - -[Sidenote: _The modifications of the Beautiful in Groos and Lipps._] - -Groos does however free himself from the "modifications of Beauty," -because, æsthetic activity having been identified with internal -imitation, it is clear that whatever is not internal imitation is -excluded from that activity as something different. "All Beauty -(beauty understood in the sense of 'sympathetic') belongs to the -æsthetic activity, but not every æsthetic fact is beautiful." Beauty, -then, is the representation of the sensuously pleasant; ugliness, the -representation of the unpleasant; the sublime, that of a mighty thing -(_Gewaltiges_) in a simple form; the comic, that of an inferiority -which arouses in us a pleasing sense of our own superiority. And so -forth.[19] With great good sense Groos holds up to derision the office -assigned to the ugly by Schasler and Hartmann with their superficial -dialectic. To say that an ellipse contains an element of ugliness -in comparison with the circle because it is symmetrical about its -two axes only and not about infinite diameters is like saying "wine -has a relatively unpleasant taste because in it is lacking (_ist -aufgehoben_) the pleasant taste of beer."[20] Lipps too, in his -writings upon Æsthetic, recognizes that the comic (of which he gives an -accurate psychological analysis)[21] has in itself no æsthetic value; -but his moralistic views lead him to outline a theory of it not unlike -that of the overcoming of the ugly; he explains it as a process leading -to a higher æsthetic value (_i.e._ sympathy).[22] - -[Sidenote: _E. Viron and the double form of Æsthetic._] - -Work such as that of Groos and, occasionally, of Lipps is of some -value towards the elimination of errors, as well as confining æsthetic -research to the field of internal analysis. Merit of the same kind -belongs to the work of a Frenchman, Véron,[23] who controverts the -Absolute Beauty of academical Æsthetic and, after accusing Taine of -confounding Art with Science and Æsthetic with Logic, remarks that if -it be the duty of art to make manifest the essence of things, their -one dominating quality, then "the greatest artists would be those who -have best succeeded in exhibiting this essence ... and the greatest -works would resemble each other more closely than any others and would -clearly demonstrate their common identity, whereas the exact opposite -happens."[24] But one looks in vain for scientific method in Véron; a -precursor of Guyau,[25] he asserts that art is at bottom two different -things; there are two arts: one decorative, whose end is beauty, that -is to say the pleasure of eye and ear resulting from determinate -dispositions of fines, forms, colours, sounds, rhythms, movements, -fight and shade, without necessary interventions of ideas and feelings, -and capable of being studied by Optics and Acoustics: the other, -expressive, which gives "the agitated expression of human personality." -He considers that decorative art prevails in the ancient world, and -expressive art in the modern.[26] - -We cannot here examine in detail the æsthetic theories of artists -and men of letters; the scientific and historicist prejudices, the -theory of experiment and human document, which underlie the realism of -Zola, or the moralism which underlies the problem-art of Ibsen and the -Scandinavian school. Gustave Flaubert wrote of art profoundly, better -perhaps than any other Frenchman has ever written, not in special -treatises but throughout his letters, which were published after his -death.[27] - -[Sidenote: _L. Tolstoy._] - -Under the influence of Véron and his hatred for the concept of beauty, -Leo Tolstoy wrote his book on art,[28] which, according to the great -Russian artist, communicates feelings in the same way in which words -communicate thoughts. The meaning of this theory is made clear by the -parallel he drew between Art and Science, and his conclusion that "the -mission of art is to render sensible and capable of assimilation that -which could not be assimilated under the form of argumentation"; -and that "true science examines truths considered as important for a -certain society at a given epoch and fixes them in the consciousness -of man, whereas art transports them from the domain of knowledge to -that of feeling."[29] There is therefore no such thing as art for art's -sake, any more than science for science' sake. Every human function -should be directed to increase morality and to suppress violence. -This amounts to saying that nearly all art, from the beginning of the -world, is false. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Dante, -Tasso, Milton, Shakespeare, Raphæl, Michæl Angelo, Bach, Beethoven are -(according to Tolstoy) "artificial reputations created by critics."[30] - -[Sidenote: _F. Nietzsche._] - -Amongst artists rather than amongst philosophers must be reckoned -Friedrich Nietzsche, whom we should wrong (as we said of Ruskin) by -trying to expound his æsthetic doctrines in scientific language and -then holding them up to the facile criticism which, so translated, -they would draw upon themselves. In none of his books, not even in -his first, _The Birth of Tragedy,_[31] in spite of the title, does he -offer us a real theory of art; what appears to be theory is the mere -expression of the author's feelings and tendencies. He shows a kind -of anxiety concerning the value and aim of art and the problem of its -inferiority or superiority to science and philosophy, a state of mind -characteristic of the Romantic period of which Nietzsche was, in many -respects, a belated but magnificent representative. To Romanticism, as -well as to Schopenhauer, belong the elements of thought which issued in -the distinction between Apollinesque art (that of serene contemplation, -to which belong the epic and sculpture) and Dionysiac art (the art of -agitation and tumult, such as music and the drama). The thought is -vague and does not bear criticism; but it is supported by a flight of -inspiration which lifts the mind to a spiritual region seldom if ever -reached again in the second half of the nineteenth century. - -[Sidenote: _An æsthetician of music: E. Hanslick._] - -The most notable æsthetic students of that time were perhaps a group -of persons engaged in constructing theories of particular arts. -And since--as we have seen[32]--philosophical laws or theories of -individual arts are inconceivable, it was inevitable that the ideas -presented by such thinkers should be (as indeed they are) nothing more -than general æsthetic conclusions. First may be mentioned the acute -Bohemian critic Eduard Hanslick, who published his work _On Musical -Beauty_ in 1854; it was often reprinted and was translated into various -languages.[33] Hanslick waged war against Richard Wagner and in general -against the pretension of finding concepts, feelings and other definite -contents in music. "In the most insignificant musical works, where the -most powerful microscope can discover nothing, we are now asked to -recognize a _Night Before the Battle,_ a _Summer Night in Norway,_ a -_Longing for the Sea,_ or some such absurdity, should the cover have -the audacity to affirm that this is the subject of the piece."[34] With -equal vivacity he protests against the sentimental hearers who, instead -of enjoying the work of art, set themselves to extract pathological -effects of passionate excitement and practical activity. If it be true -that Greek music produced effects of this kind, "if it needed but a -few Phrygian strains to animate troops with courage in the face of -the enemy, or a melody in the Dorian mode to ensure the fidelity of -a wife whose husband was far away, then the loss of Greek music is -a melancholy thing for generals and husbands; but æstheticians and -composers need not regret it."[35] "If every senseless _Requiem,_ every -noisy funeral march, every wailing _Adagio_ had the power of depressing -us, who could put up with existence under such conditions? But let a -real musical work confront us, clear-eyed and glowing with beauty, and -we feel ourselves enslaved by its invincible fascination even if its -material is all the sorrows of the age."[36] - -[Sidenote: _Hanslick's concept of form._] - -Hanslick maintained that the sole aim of music is form, musical -beauty. This affirmation won him the goodwill of the Herbartians, who -hastened to welcome such a vigorous and unexpected ally; by way of -returning the compliment, Hanslick felt obliged in later editions of -his work to mention Herbart himself and his faithful disciple Robert -Zimmermann who had given (so he said) "full development to the great -æsthetic principle of Form."[37] The praises of the Herbartians and the -courteous declarations of Hanslick both arose from a misunderstanding: -for the words "beauty" and "form" have one meaning for the former and -quite another for the latter. Hanslick never thought that symmetry, -purely acoustical relations and pleasures of the ear constituted -musical beauty;[38] mathematics, he held, are utterly useless to -musical Æsthetic.[39] Musical beauty is spiritual and significative: it -has thoughts, undoubtedly; but those thoughts are musical. "Sonorous -forms are not empty, but perfectly filled; they cannot be compared -with simple lines delimiting a space; they are the spirit assuming body -and extracting from itself the stuff of its own incarnation. Rather -than an arabesque, music is a picture; but a picture whose subject -can neither be expressed in words nor enclosed in precise concept. -There are in music both meaning and connexion, but these are of a -specifically musical nature; music is a language we understand and -speak, but which it is not possible to translate."[40] Hanslick asserts -that though music does not portray the quality of feelings, it does -portray their dynamic aspect or tone: if not the substantives, then -the adjectives: it depicts not "murmuring tenderness" or "impetuous -courage," but the "murmuring" and the "impetuous."[41] The backbone of -the book is the denial that form and content can ever be separated in -music. "In music there can be no content in opposition to the form, -since there can be no form outside the content." "Take a motive, the -first that comes into your head; what is its content, what its form? -where does this begin, and that end? ... What do you wish to call -content? The sounds? Very well: but they have already received a form. -What will you call form? Also the sounds? but they are form already -filled; form supplied with content."[42] Such observations denote -acute penetration of the nature of art, though not scientifically -formulated or framed into a system. Hanslick thought he was dealing -with peculiarities of music,[43] instead of with the universal and -constitutive character of every form of art, and this prevented him -from taking larger views. - -[Sidenote: _Æstheticians of the figurative arts. C. Fiedler._] - -Another specialist æsthetician is Conrad Fiedler, author of many -essays on the figurative arts, the most important being his _Origin -of Artistic Activity_ (1887).[44] No one, perhaps, has better or -more eloquently emphasized the activistic character of art, which -he compares with language. "Art begins exactly where intuition -(perception) ends. The artist is not differentiated from other people -by any special perceptive attitude enabling him to perceive more or -with greater intensity, or endowing his eye with any special power -of selecting, collecting, transforming, ennobling or illuminating; -but rather by his peculiar gift of being able to pass immediately -from perception to intuitive expression; his relation with nature is -not perceptive, but expressive." "A man standing passively at gaze -may well imagine himself in possession of the visible world as an -immense, rich, varied whole: the entire absence of fatigue with which -he traverses the infinite mass of visual impressions, the rapidity -with which representations dart across his consciousness, convince -him that he stands in the midst of an immense visible world, although -he may quite well be unable at any one instant to represent it to -himself as a whole. But this world, so great, so rich, so immeasurable, -disappears the moment art seeks to become its master. The very first -effort to emerge from this twilight and arrive at clear vision -restricts the circle of things to be seen. Artistic activity may be -conceived as continuation of that concentration by which consciousness -makes the first step towards clear vision, which it reaches only by -self-limitation." Spiritual process and bodily process are here an -indivisible whole, which is expression. - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and Expression._] - -"This activity, simply because it is spiritual, must consist of forms -wholly determinate, tangible, sensibly demonstrative." Art is not in -a state of subjection to science. Like the man of science, the artist -desires to escape from the natural perceptive state and to make the -world his own; but there are regions to which we can penetrate not -by the forms of thought and science but only through art. Art is, -strictly speaking, not imitation of nature; for what is nature save -this confused mass of perceptions and representations, whose real -poverty has been demonstrated already? In another sense, however, art -may be called imitation of nature inasmuch as its aim is not to expound -concepts or to arouse emotions, that is to create values of intellect -and feeling. Art does create both these values, if you like to say so; -but only in one quite peculiar quality, which consists in complete -visibility (_Sichtbarkeit_). Here we have the same sane conception, the -same lively comprehension of the true nature of art which we found in -Hanslick, only expressed in a more rigorous and philosophical manner. -With Fiedler is connected his friend Adolf Hildebrand, who brought into -high relief the activistic, or architectonic as opposed to imitative, -character of art, illustrating his theoretical discussions especially -from sculpture, the art which he himself followed.[45] - -[Sidenote: _Narrow limits of these theories._] - -What we chiefly miss in Fiedler and others of the same tendency is the -conception of the æsthetic fact not as something exceptional, produced -by exceptionally gifted men, but as a ceaseless activity of man as -such; for man possesses the world, so far as he does possess it, only -in the form of representation-expressions, and only knows in so far as -he creates.[46] Nor are these writers justified in treating language -as parallel with art, or art with language; for comparisons are drawn -between things at least partially different, whereas art and language -are identical. - -[Sidenote: _H. Bergson._] - -The same criticism can be made in the case of the French philosopher -Bergson, who in his book on _Laughter_[47] states a theory of art very -similar to that of Fiedler and makes the same mistake of conceiving the -artistic faculty as something distinct and exceptional in comparison -with the language of everyday use. In ordinary life, says Bergson, the -individuality of things escapes us; we see only as much of them as -our practical needs demand. Language helps this simplification; since -all names, proper names excepted, are names of kinds or classes. Now -and then, however, nature, as if in a fit of absence of mind, creates -souls of a more divisible and detached kind (artists), who discover -and reveal the riches hidden under the colourless signs and labels -of everyday life, and help others (non-artists) to catch a glimpse of -what they themselves see, employing for this purpose colours, forms, -rhythmic connexions of words, and those rhythms of life and breath even -more intimate to man, the sounds and notes of music. - -[Sidenote: _Attempts to return to Baumgarten. C. Hermann._] - -A healthy return to Baumgarten, a revival and correction of the old -philosopher's theories in the light of later discoveries, might -perhaps have given Æsthetic some assistance, after the collapse of -the old idealistic metaphysic, towards thinking the concept of art -in its universality and discovering its identity with pure and true -intuitive knowledge. But Conrad Hermann, who preached the return to -Baumgarten[48] in 1876, did bad service to what might have been a good -cause. According to him Æsthetic and Logic are normative sciences; -but Logic does not contain, as does Æsthetic, "a definite category -of external objects exclusively and specifically adequate to the -faculty of thought"; and on the other hand "the products and results -of scientific thought are not so external and sensibly intuitive as -those of artistic invention." Logic and Æsthetic alike refer not to the -empirical thinking and feeling of the soul, but to pure and absolute -sensation and thought. Art constructs a representation standing midway -between the individual and the universal. Beauty expresses specific -perfection, the essential or, so to speak, the rightful (_seinsollend_) -character of things. Form is "the external sensible limit, or mode of -appearance of a thing, in opposition to the kernel of the thing itself -and to its essential and substantial content." Content and form are -both æsthetic, and the æsthetic interest concerns the entirety of the -beautiful object. The artistic activity has no special organ such as -thought possesses in speech. The æsthetician, like the lexicographer, -has the task of compiling a dictionary of tones and colours and of -the different meanings which may possibly be attached to them.[49] -We can see that Hermann accepted side by side the most inconsistent -propositions. He welcomes even the æsthetic law of the golden section, -and applies it to tragedy; the longer segment of the Une is the tragic -hero; the punishment which overtakes him (the entire line) exceeds his -crime in the same proportion in which he oversteps the common measure -(the shorter segment of the line).[50] It reads almost like a joke. - -Without direct reference to Baumgarten, a proposal that Æsthetic be -reformed and treated as the "science of intuitive knowledge" was made -in a miserable little work by one Willy Nef (1898),[51] who makes the -dumb animals share his "intuitive knowledge," in which he distinguishes -a formal side (intuition) and a material side or content (knowledge), -and considers the everyday relations between men, their games and their -art, as belonging to intuitive knowledge. - -[Sidenote: _Eclecticism. B. Bosanquet._] - -The English historian of Æsthetic, Bosanquet (1892) tried to find -a reconciliation between content and form in unity of expression. -"Beauty," says Bosanquet in the Introduction to his _History,_ "is -that which has characteristic and individual expressiveness for -sensuous perception or imagination, subject to the conditions of -general or abstract expressiveness by the same means." In another -passage he observes: "The difficulty of real Æsthetic is to show how -the combination of decorative forms in characteristic representations, -by intensifying the essential character immanent in them from the -beginning, subordinates them to a central signification which stands -to their complex combination as their abstract signification stands to -each one of them taken singly."[52] But the problem, as propounded in a -way suggested by the antithesis between the two schools (contentism and -formalism) of German Æsthetic, is in our opinion insoluble. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic of expression: present state._] - -De Sanctis founded no school of æsthetic science in Italy. His thought -was quickly misunderstood and mutilated by those who presumed to -correct it, and, in fact, only returned to the outworn rhetorical -conception of art as consisting of a little content and a little -form. Only within the last ten years has there been a renewal of -philosophical studies, arising out of discussions concerning the nature -of history[53] and the relation in which it stands to art and science, -and nourished by the controversy excited by the publication of De -Sanctis' posthumous works.[54] The same problem of the relation between -history and science, and their difference or antithesis, reappeared -also in Germany, but without being put in its true connexion with the -problem of Æsthetic.[55] These inquiries and discussions, and the -revival of a Linguistic impregnated by philosophy in the work of Paul -and some others, appear to us to offer much more favourable ground for -the scientific development of Æsthetic than can be found on the summits -of mysticism or the low plains of positivism and sensationalism. - - - -[1] A. F. Lange, _Geschichte des Materialismus, u. Kritik seiner -Bedeutung i. d. Gegenwart,_ 1866. - -[2] J. F. v. Kirchmann, _Ästhetik auf realistischer Grundlage,_ Berlin, -1868. - -[3] _Ästh. auf real. Grund._ vol. i. pp. 54-57; see above, pp. 80-81. - -[4] _Kritische Gänge,_ vol. v. pp. 25-26, 131. - -[5] R. Vischer, _Über das optische Formgefühl,_ Leipzig, 1873. - -[6] _Der Symbol-Begriff in der neuesten Ästh.,_ Jena, 1876. - -[7] _Das Wesen d. ästh. Anschauung, Psychologische Untersuchungen z. -Theorie d. Schönen u. d. Kunst,_ Berlin, 1875. - -[8] Max Diez, _Theorie des Gefühls z. Begründung d. Ästhetik,_ -Stuttgart, 1892. - -[9] Friedr. Jodi, _Lehrb. der Psychologie,_ Stuttgart, 1896, § 53, pp. -404-414. - -[10] _Komik und Humor, eine psychol. ästhet. Untersuch.,_ -Hamburg-Leipzig, pp. 223-227. - -[11] Paul Stern, _Einfühling u. Association i. d. neueren Ästh.,_ 1898, -in _Beiträge z. Ästh.,_ ed. Lipps and R. M. Werner (Hamburg-Leipzig). - -[12] Alfr. Biese, _Das Associationsprincip u. d. Anthropomorphismus i. -d. Ästh.,_ 1890; _Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen,_ Hamburg-Leipzig, -1893. - -[13] Konrad Lange, _Die bewusste Selbsttäuschung als Kern des -künstlerischen Genusses,_ Leipzig, 1895. - -[14] Karl Groos, _Einleitung i. d. Ästhetik,_ Giessen, 1892. - -[15] _Op. cit._ pp. 6-46, 83-100. - -[16] _Einleitung i. d. Ästh._ pp. 100-147. - -[17] _Op. cit._ pp. 168-170. - -[18] _Op. cit._ pp. 175-176. - -[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 46-50, and all part iii. - -[20] _Einleitung i. d. Ästh._ p. 292, note. - -[21] See above, pp. 91-92. - -[22] _Komik und Humor,_ p. 199 _seqq._ - -[23] Eug. Véron, _L'Esthétique,_ 2nd ed. Paris, 1883. - -[24] _Op. cit._ p. 89. - -[25] See above, pp. 399-400. - -[26] _Esthétique,_ pp. 38, 109, 123 _seqq._ - -[27] _Correspondance,_ 1830-1880, 4 vols., new ed., Paris, 1902-1904. - -[28] _What is Art?_ Eng. tr. - -[29] _Op. cit._ pp. 171-172, 308. - -[30] _Op. cit._ pp. 201-202. - -[31] _Die Geburt der Tragödie oder Griechenthum und Pessimismus,_ 1872 -(Ital. trans., Bari, 1907). - -[32] See above, p. 114. - -[33] _Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,_ Leipzig, 1854; 7th ed. 1885 (French -trans., _Du beau dans la musique,_ Paris, 1877). - -[34] _Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,_ p. 20. - -[35] _Op. cit._ p. 98. - -[36] _Op. cit._ p. 101. - -[37] _Op. cit._ p. 119, note. - -[38] _Op. cit._ p. 50. - -[39] _Op. cit._ p. 65. - -[40] _Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,_ pp. 50-51. - -[41] _Op. cit._ pp. 25-39. - -[42] _Op. cit._ p. 122. - -[43] _Op. cit._ pp. 52, 67, 113, etc. - -[44] Conrad Fiedler, _Der Ursprung der künstlerischen Thätigkeit,_ -Leipzig, 1887. Collected with others of same author in _Schriften tiber -die Kunst,_ ed. H. Marbach, Leipzig, 1896. - -[45] _Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst,_ 2nd ed. 1898 (4th -ed., Strassburg, 1903). - -[46] See above, pp. 12-18. - -[47] H. Bergson, _Le Rire, essai sur la signification du comique,_ -Paris, 1900, pp. 153-161 (Eng. tr., London). - -[48] Conrad Hermann, _Die Ästhetik in ihrer Geschichte und ah -wissenschaftliches System,_ Leipzig, 1876. - -[49] _Die Ästhetik,_ etc., _passim._ - -[50] _Die Ästhetik,_ § 56. - -[51] Willy Nef, _Die Ästhetik als Wissenschaft der anschaulichen -Erkenntniss,_ Leipzig, 1898. - -[52] _A History of Æsthetics,_ pp. 4-6, 372, 391, 447, 458, 466. - -[53] B. Croce, _La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale dell' -arte,_ 1893 (2nd ed. entitled _Il concetto della storia nelle sue -relazioni col concetto dell' arte,_ Rome, 1896); P. R. Trojano, _La -storia come scienza sociale,_ vol. i., Naples, 1897; G. Gentile, _Il -concetto della storia_ (in Crivellucci's _Studî storici,_ 1889); see -also F. de Sarlo, _Il problema estetico,_ in _Saggi di filosofia,_ -vol. ii., Turin, 1897; and by same author, _I dati dell' esperienza -psichica,_ Florence, 1903, concluding chapter. - -[54] _La letteratura italiana nel secolo XIX,_ edited by B. Croce, -Naples, 1896; also _Scritti varî,_ ed. Croce, Naples, 1898, 2 vols. - -[55] H. Rickert, _Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen -Begriffsbildung,_ Freiburg i. B., 1896-1902. - - - - -XIX - - -HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOME PARTICULAR DOCTRINES - - -[Sidenote: _Result of the history of Æsthetic._] - - -We have reached the end of our history. Having passed in review the -travail and doubt through which the discovery of the æsthetic concept -was achieved, the vicissitudes first of neglect, then of revival and -rediscovery to which it was exposed, the various oscillations and -failures in its exact determination, the resurrection, triumphant and -overwhelming, of ancient errors supposed to be dead and buried; we -may now conclude, without appearing to assert anything unproven, that -of Æsthetic in the proper sense of the word we have seen very little, -even including the last two centuries' active research. Exceptional -intellects have hit the mark and have supported their views with -energy, with logic, and with consciousness of what they were doing. -It would no doubt be possible to extract many true affirmations -leading to the same point of view from the works of non-philosophical -writers, art-critics and artists, from commonly received opinions and -proverbial sayings; such a collection would show that this handful -of philosophers does not stand alone, but is surrounded by a throng -of supporters and is in perfect agreement with the general mind and -universal common sense. But if Schiller was right in saying that the -rhythm of philosophy is to diverge from common opinion in order to -return with redoubled vigour, it is evident that such divergence is -necessary, and constitutes the growth of science, which is science -itself. During this tedious process Æsthetic made mistakes which were -at once deviations from the truth and attempts to reach it: such were -the hedonism of the sophists and rhetoricians of antiquity and of the -sensationalists of the eighteenth and second half of the nineteenth -century; the moralistic hedonism of Aristophanes, of the Stoics, of -the Roman eclectics, of the mediæval and Renaissance writers; the -ascetic and logical hedonism of Plato and the Fathers of the Church, -of some mediæval and even some quite modern rigorists; and finally, -the æsthetic mysticism which first appeared in Plotinus and reappeared -again and again until its last and great triumph in the classical -period of German philosophy. In the midst of these variously erroneous -tendencies, ploughing the field of thought in every direction, a -tenuous golden rivulet seems to flow, formed by the acute empiricism -of Aristotle, the forceful penetration of Vico, the analytical work -of Schleiermacher, Humboldt, De Sanctis and others who echoed them -with weaker voice. This series of thinkers suffices to remind us that -æsthetic science no longer remains to be discovered; but at the same -time the fact that they are so few and so often despised, ignored or -controverted, proves that it is in its infancy. - -[Sidenote: _History of science and history of the scientific criticism -of particular errors._] - -The birth of a science is like that of a living being: its later -development consists, like every life, in fighting the difficulties -and errors, general and particular, which lurk in its path on every -side. The forms of error are numerous in the extreme and mingle with -each other and with the truth in complications equally numerous: -root out one, another appears in its stead; the uprooted ones also -reappear, though never in the same shape. Hence the necessity for -perpetual scientific criticism and the impossibility of repose or -finality in a science and of an end to further discussion. The errors -which may be described as general, negations of the concept of art -itself, have been touched on from time to time in the course of this -History; whence it may be gathered a simple affirmation of the truth -has not always been accompanied by any considerable recapture of enemy -territory. As to what we have called particular errors, it is clear -that when freed from confusing admixture of other forms and divested -of fanciful expression, they reduce themselves to three heads, under -which they have already been criticized in the first or theoretical -part of this work. That is to say, errors may be directed (_a_) against -the characteristic quality of the æsthetic fact; (_b_) against the -specific; (_c_) against the generic: they may involve denial of the -character of intuition, of theoretic contemplation, or of spiritual -activity, which together constitute the æsthetic fact. Among the errors -which fall into these three categories we are now to sketch in outline -the history of those which have had, or have to-day, the greatest -importance. Rather than a history it will be a historical essay, -sufficient to show that, even in the criticism of individual errors, -æsthetic science is in its infancy. If among these errors some appear -to be decadent and nearly forgotten, they are not dead; they have not -accomplished a legal demise at the hands of scientific criticism. -Oblivion or instinctive rejection is not the same thing as scientific -denial. - - - - -I - - -RHETORIC: OR THE THEORY OF ORNATE FORM - - -[Sidenote: _Rhetoric in the ancient sense._] - -Proceeding according to rank in importance, we inevitably head the list -of theories for examination with the theory of Rhetoric, or Ornate Form. - -It will not be superfluous to observe that the meaning given in -modern times to the word Rhetoric, namely, the doctrine of ornate -form, differs from that which it had for the ancients. Rhetoric in -the modern sense is above all a theory of elocution, while elocution -(λέξις, φράσις, ἑρμηνεία, elocutio) was but one portion, and not -the principal one, of ancient Rhetoric. Taken as a whole, it consisted -strictly of a manual or _vade-mecum_ for advocates and politicians; -it concerned itself with the two or the three "styles" (judicial, -deliberative, demonstrative), and gave advice or furnished models to -those striving to produce certain effects by means of speech. -No definition of the art is more accurate than that given by its -inventors the earliest Sicilian rhetoricians, scholars of Empedocles -(Corax, Tisias, Gorgias): Rhetoric is the creator of persuasion -(πειθος δημιουργός). It devoted itself to showing the method of -using language so as to create a certain belief, a certain state of -mind, in the hearer; hence the phrase "making the weaker case stronger" -(τὸ τὸν ἥττω λόgον κρείττω ποιεῖν); the "increase or diminution -according to circumstances" (_eloquentia in augendo minuendoque -consistit_); the advice of Gorgias to "turn a thing to a jest if the -adversary takes it seriously, or to a serious matter if he takes it as -a jest,"[1] and many similar well-known maxims. - -[Sidenote: _Criticism from moral point of view._] - -He who acts in this manner is not only æsthetically accomplished, -as saying beautifully that which he wishes to say; he is also and -especially a practical man with a practical end in view. As a practical -man, however, he cannot evade moral responsibility for his actions; -this point was fastened upon by Plato's polemic against Rhetoric, that -is to say against fluent political charlatans and unscrupulous lawyers -and journalists. Plato was quite right to condemn Rhetoric (when -dissociated from a good purpose) as blameworthy and discreditable, -directed to arouse the passions, a diet ruinous to health, a paint -disastrous to beauty. Even had Rhetoric allied herself to Ethics, -becoming a true guide of the soul (ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ τῶν λόγον); -had Plato's criticism been directed solely against her abusers -(everything being liable to abuse save virtue itself, says Aristotle); -had Rhetoric been purified, producing such an orator as Cicero desired, -_non ex rhetorum officinis sed ex academiae spatiis_[2] and imposing on -him, with Quintilian, the duty of being _vir bonus dicendi peritus_;[3] -yet the unalterable fact remains that Rhetoric can never be considered -a regular science, being formed of a congeries of widely dissimilar -cognitions. - -[Sidenote: _Accumulation without system._] - -It included descriptions of passions and affections, comparisons of -political and judicial institutions, theories of the abbreviated -syllogism or enthymeme and of proof leading to a probable conclusion, -pedagogic and popular exposition, literary elocution, declamation and -mimicry, mnemonic, and so forth. - -[Sidenote: _Its fortunes in the Middle Ages and Renaissance._] - -The rich and heterogeneous content of this ancient Rhetoric (which -reached its highest development in the hands of Hermagoras of Temnos -in the second century B.C.) gradually diminished in volume with the -decadence of the ancient world and the change in political conditions. -This is not the place to dwell on its fortunes in the Middle Ages or -its partial replacement by formularies and _Artes dictandi_ (and later -by treatises upon the art of preaching), or to quote the reasons given -by such writers as Patrizzi and Tassoni for its disappearance from the -world of their day;[4] such history would be well worth writing, but -would be out of place here. We will merely state that whilst conditions -were at work on every side corroding this complex of cognitions, Louis -Vives, Peter Ramus and Patrizzi himself were busy criticizing it from -the point of view of systematic science. - -[Sidenote: _Criticisms by Vives, Ramus and Patrizzi._] - -Vives emphasized the confused methods of the ancient treatise-writers, -who embraced _omnia,_ united eloquence with morality, and insisted that -the orator must be _vir bonus._ He rejected four-fifths of ancient -Rhetoric as extraneous: namely, memory, which is necessary in all arts; -invention, which is the matter of each individual art; recitation, -which is external; and disposition, which belongs to invention. He -retained elocution only, not that which treats of _quid dicendum,_ but -of _quem ad modum,_ extending it beyond the three styles or kinds to -include history, apologue, epistles, novels and poetry.[5] Antiquity -furnishes us with few and faint attempts at such extension; now and -then a Rhetorician ventures to suggest that the γένος ίστορικόν and -ἐπιστολικόν be included in Rhetoric, and even (in spite of opposition) -"infinite" questions, that is to say merely theoretical questions -with no practical application, which amounts to a scientific or -philosophical genus;[6] others agreed with Cicero[7] that when one had -mastered the most difficult of all arts, forensic eloquence, all else -seemed child's-play (_ludus est homini non hebeti_ ...). Ramus and -his pupil Omer Talon reproached Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian with -having confused Dialectic and Rhetoric; and they assigned invention -and disposition to the former, agreeing with Vives that "elocution" -alone should be allowed to Rhetoric.[8] Patrizzi, on the other hand, -refused the name of science to either, recognizing them as simple -faculties, containing no individual matter (not even the three genera), -and differentiating them only by attaching the term Dialectic to the -dialogue form and proof of the necessary, and Rhetoric to connected -discourse directed to persuasion in matters of opinion. Patrizzi -observes that "conjoined speech" is used by historians, poets and -philosophers, no less than by orators; and thus approaches the view of -Vives.[9] - -[Sidenote: _Survival into modern times._] - -In spite of these opinions the body of rhetorical doctrine continued -to flourish in the schools. Patrizzi was forgotten; if Ramus and Vives -had some followers (such as Francisco Sanchez and Keckermann), they -were generally held up to odium by the traditionalists. In the end, -Rhetoric found a supporter in philosophy when Campanella made the -following declaration in his _Rational Philosophy_: "_quodammodo Magiae -portiuncula, quae affectus animi moderator et per ipsos voluntatem ciet -ad quaecumque vult sequenda vel fugienda._"[10] Baumgarten owed to it -his tripartition of Æsthetic into heuristic, methodology and semeiotic -(invention, disposition and elocution), adopted later by Meier. Among -Meier's numerous works is a little book entitled _Theoretic Doctrine -of Emotional Disturbances in General_,[11] considered by him to be a -psychological introduction to æsthetic doctrine. On the other hand, -Immanuel Kant in his _Critique of Judgment_ observes that eloquence, in -the sense of _ars oratoria_ or art of persuasion by means of beautiful -appearance and dialectical form, must be distinguished from beautiful -speaking (_Wohlredenheit)_; and that the art of oratory, playing upon -the weakness of men to gain its own ends, "is worthy of no esteem" -(_gar keiner Achtungwürdig)_[12] But in the schools it flourished in -many celebrated compilations, including one by the French Jesuit Father -Dominique de Colonne, which was in use until some few decades ago. Even -to-day, in so-called Literary Institutions, we come across survivals of -ancient Rhetoric, notably in chapters devoted to the art of oratory; -and fresh manuals on judicial or sacred eloquence (Ortloff, Whately, -etc.[13]) are actually appearing, though rarely, to-day. Still, -Rhetoric in the ancient sense may be said to have disappeared from the -system of the sciences; to-day no philosopher would dream of following -Campanella in dedicating a special section of rational philosophy to -Rhetoric. - -[Sidenote: _Modern signification of Rhetoric. Theory of literary form._] - -In compensation for this process, the theory of elocution and beautiful -speech has been in modern times progressively emphasized and thrown -into scientific form. But the idea of such a science is ancient, as we -have seen; and equally ancient is the style of exposition, consisting -in the doctrine of a double form and the concept of ornate form. - -[Sidenote: _Concept of ornament._] - -The concept of "ornament" must have occurred spontaneously to the mind -as soon as attention was directed to the values of speech by listening -to poets reciting[14] or to oratorical contests in public gatherings. -It must very early have been thought that the difference between -good speaking and bad, or between that which gave more pleasure and -that which gave less, between grave or solemn, and commonplace or -colloquial, consisted in something additional superimposed upon the -canvas of ordinary speech like an embroidery by a skilful orator. These -considerations led the Græco-Roman rhetoricians to adopt the practice, -like the Indians, who arrived at the distinction independently, to -distinguish the bare (ψιλή) or purely grammatical form from another -form containing an addition which they called ornament, κόσμος: _ornatum -est_ (Quintilian will serve, as typical of all the rest) quod perspicuo -ac probabili plus est.[15] - -The notion of ornament as something added on from outside forms the -basis of the theory which Aristotle, the philosopher of Rhetoric, gave -of the queen of ornaments, Metaphor. According to him the high pleasure -aroused by metaphor arises from the collocation of different terms -and the discovery of relations between species and genera, producing -"learning and knowledge by means of the genus" (μαθησιν καi γνῶσιν -διὰ τοῦ γένους), and that easy learning which is the greatest of human -pleasures,[16] which amounts to saying that metaphor adds to the -concept under consideration a group of minor incidental cognitions, as -a kind of diversion and relief and pleasant instruction for the mind. - -[Sidenote: _Classes of ornament._] - -Ornaments were divided and subdivided in a number of different ways. -Aristotle (and previously Isocrates, rather differently) classified -the ornaments which diversify bare or nude form, under the heads of -dialect forms, substitutions and epithets, prolongations, truncations -and abbreviations of words, and other departures from common usage, -and, finally, rhythm and harmony. Substitutions were of four classes: -species for genus; genus for species; species for species; and -proportionate.[17] After Aristotle, elocution was especially studied -by Theophrastus and Demetrius Phalereus; these rhetoricians and their -followers further solidified the classification of ornament by -distinguishing tropes from figures (σχήματα) and dividing figures -into figures of speech (scheimata τῆς λέχεως) and of thought -(τῆς διανοίας), figures of speech into grammatical and rhetorical, -and figures of thought into pathetic and ethic. Substitutions were -divided into fourteen principal forms, metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, -antonomasia, onomatopeia, catachresis, metalepsis, epithet, allegory, -enigma, irony, periphrase, hyperbaton and hyperbole; each divided -into subspecies and contrasted with its relative vice. Figures of -speech amounted to a score or so (repetition, anaphora, antistrophe, -climax, asyndeton, assonance, etc.); figures of thought to about the -same number (interrogation, prosopopœia, ætiopœia, hypotyposis, -commotion, simulation, exclamation, apostrophe, aposiopesis, etc.). -If these divisions have any value as aids to memory in relation to -particular literary forms, considered rationally they are simply -capricious, as is evidenced by the fact that many classes of the ornate -appear now under the heading of tropes, now of figures; sometimes -under figures of speech, then as those of thought, no reason for the -alteration is given except the arbitrary caprice of an individual -rhetorician which so decrees and disposes. And since one function -which may be fulfilled by the rhetorical categories is to point -out the divergence between two ways of expressing the same thing, -one of which is arbitrarily selected as "proper,"[18] it is easy -to see why the ancients defined metaphor as "_verbi vel sermonis a -propria significatione in aliam cum virtute mutatio,_" and figure as -"_conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerenti -ratione._"[19] - -[Sidenote: _The concept of the Fitting._] - -So far as we know, antiquity raised no revolt against the theory of -ornament or of double form. We do sometimes hear Cicero, Quintilian, -Seneca and others saying, _Ipsae res verba rapiunt, Pectus est quod -disertos facit et vis mentis, Rem tene, verba sequentur, Curam -verborum rerum volo esse sollicitudinem,_ or _Nulla est verborum nisi -rei cohaerentium virtus._ But these maxims did not bear the weighty -meanings which we moderns might attach to them; they were perhaps in -contradiction with the theory of ornament, but as the contradiction was -unheeded, it was ineffective: they were the protests of common sense, -powerless to combat the fallacies of school doctrine. Moreover, the -latter was fitted with a safety-valve, a sage contrivance to disguise -its inherent absurdity. If the ornate consisted of a _plus,_ in what -degree should it be used? if it gave pleasure, must we not conclude -that the more it were used, the greater the pleasure derived? would its -extravagant use be attended by extravagant pleasure? Herein was peril: -instinctively the rhetoricians hastened to the defence, snatching -up the first weapon that came to hand, namely, the fitting (πρέπον) -Ornament must be used carefully; neither too much too little; _in medio -virtus_; as much as is fitting (ἀλλά πρέπον). Aristotle recommends -a style seasoned with "a certain dose" (δεῑ ἃρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως -τούτοις.) for ornament should be a condiment, not a food (ἤδυσμα, οὐκ -ἒδεσμα). [20] The fitting was a concept quite inconsistent with that of -ornament; it was a rival, and enemy, destined to destroy it. Fitting to -what? to expression of course; but that which is fitting to expression -cannot be called an ornament, an external addition; it coincides with -expression itself. But the rhetoricians contented themselves with -maintaining peaceful relations between the ornate and the fitting, -without troubling to mediate them through a third concept. The -pseudo-Longinus alone in answer to an observation of his predecessor -Cæcilius that more than two or three metaphors must not be used in -the same place, remarked that a larger number ought to be used where -passion (τὰ πάθη) rushes headlong like a torrent, carrying with it as -necessaries (ὡς ἀναγκαῑον) a multitude of such substitutions.[21] - -[Sidenote: _The theory of ornament in the Middle Ages and Renaissance._] - -Preserved in the compilations of later antiquity (such as the works of -Donatus and Priscian and the celebrated allegorical tract of Marcianus -Capella), and in the compendia of Bede, Rhabanus Maurus and others, -the theory of ornament passed to the Middle Ages. Throughout this -period Rhetoric, Grammar and Logic continued to form the _trivium_ of -the schools. The theory was to some extent favoured in mediæval times -by the fact that writers and scholars made use of a dead language; -this helped to reinforce the idea that beautiful form was not a -spontaneous thing but consisted in an addition or embroidery. Under the -Renaissance the theory continued to flourish and was revived by study -of the best classical sources; to the works of Cicero were added the -_Institutiones_ of Quintilian and the _Rhetoric_ of Aristotle, with the -host of minor Latin and Greek rhetoricians, amongst whom was Hermogenes -with his celebrated _Ideas,_ brought into fashion by Giulio Camillo.[22] - -Even those writers who dared to criticize the organism of ancient -Rhetoric left the theory of ornament unassailed. Vives lamented -over the "exaggerated subtlety of the Greeks" which had multiplied -distinctions to infinity in this matter without diffusing light,[23] -but he never took up a definite stand against the theory of ornament. -Patrizzi was dissatisfied with the insufficient definition of -ornament given by the ancients; but he asserted the existence of -ornaments and metaphors as well as seven different modes of "conjoined -speech,"--narrative, proof, amplification, diminution, ornament with -its contrary, elevation and depression.[24] The school of Ramus -continued to entrust Rhetoric with the "embellishment" of thought. -Owing to the vast extension and intensification of life and literature -in the sixteenth century, it would be easy to quote phrases, as we have -done from ancient authors, asserting the strict dependence of speech -upon the things it wishes to express, and lively attacks on pedants -and pedantic forms and rules for beautiful speech. But what would be -the use? The theory of ornament was always in the background, tacitly -admitted as indisputable by all. Juan de Valdés, for instance, makes -the following confession of stylistic faith: "_Escribo como hablo; -solamente tengo cuidado de usar de vocablos que sinifiquen bien lo -que quiero decir, y dígolo cuanto más llanamente me es posible, -porqué, á mi parecer, en ninguna lengua está bien la afectación._" -But Valdés also says that beautiful language consists "_en que digais -lo que quereis con las menos palabras que pudiéredes, de tal manera -que ... no se pueda quitar ninguna sin ofender á la sentencia, ó -al encarescimiento, ó á la elegancia._"[25] Here it seems that -amplification and elegance are conceived as extraneous to the meaning -or content.--A gleam of truth is visible in Montaigne, who, confronted -by the laboured categories into which rhetoricians divide ornament, -observes: "_Oyez dire Métonymie, Métaphore, Allégorie et aultres tels -noms de la Grammaire; semble il pas qu'on signifie quelque forme de -langage rare et pellegrin? Ce sont tiltres qui touchent le babil de -vostre chambrière._"[26] That is to say, they are anything but language -remote from the _primum se offerens ratio._ - -[Sidenote: Reductio ad absurdum in the seventeenth century.] - -The impossibility of upholding the theory of ornament was first noticed -during the decadence of Italian literature in the seventeenth century, -when literary production became but a play of empty forms, and the -convenient, long violated in practice, was abandoned and forgotten even -in theory, and came to be looked on as a limit arbitrarily imposed on -the fundamental principle of ornamentation. The opponents of that style -loaded with conceits which is known as "secentismo" from its prevalence -in the seventeenth century (Matteo Pellegrini, Orsi and others) felt -the viciousness of the literary production of their day; they were -aware that decadence was due to the fact that literature was no longer -the serious expression of a content; but they were embarrassed by the -reasoning of the champions of bad taste, who were able to demonstrate -that the whole business conformed in every particular with the literary -theory of ornament, the common ground of both parties. In vain did the -former appeal to the "convenient," the "moderate," the "avoidance of -affectation," to ornament as "condiment, not food," and all the other -weapons which had sufficed in times when healthy literary production -and sound æsthetic taste had automatically corrected faulty theory: -the other party replied, there was no reason to be sparing in use -of ornament when it lay in masses ready to hand, or to avoid an -ostentatious display of wit when one had an inexhaustible supply.[27] - -[Sidenote: _Polemic concerning the theory of ornament._] - -The same reaction against the abuse of ornament, against "Spanish and -Italian conceits" (whose supporters had been Gracian in Spain and -Tesauro in Italy), took place in France. "... _Laissez à l'Italie -De tous ces faux brillants l'éclatante folie"; "Ce que l'on conçoit -bien s'énonce clairement. Et les mots, pour le dire, arrivent -aisément._"[28] Among the sharpest critics of conceits was the Jesuit -Bouhours, already quoted, author of the _Manière de bien penser dans -les œuvres d'esprit._ The rhetorical forms were the subject of warm -controversy. Orsi, on national grounds the opponent of Bouhours (1703), -asserted that all the ornamental devices of wit rested on a middle -term and could be reduced to a rhetorical syllogism, and that wit -consists of a truth which appears false or a falsehood which appears -true.[29] If this controversy produced no great scientific result at -the time, at least it prepared the mind for greater liberty; and, as -we have remarked elsewhere,[30] it may have influenced Vico, who, in -framing his new concept of poetical imagination, recognized that it -necessitated a wholesale reconstruction of the theory of rhetoric -and the conclusion that its figures and tropes are not "caprices of -pleasure" but "necessities of the human mind."[31] - -[Sidenote: _Du Marsais and metaphor._] - -We find the theory of rhetorical ornament jealously kept intact by -Baumgarten and Meier, while in France it was as vigorously assailed -by César Chesneau du Marsais, who published in 1730 a treatise on -_Tropes_ (the seventh part of his _General Grammar_)[32] wherein he -develops, on the subject of metaphor, the observation already made by -Montaigne: indeed he was perhaps inspired by Montaigne, although he -does not mention his name. Du Marsais remarks that it is said that -figures are modes of speech and turns of expression removed from the -ordinary and common; which is an empty phrase, as good as saying "the -figured differs from the non-figured and figures are figures and not -non-figures." On the other hand it is wholly untrue that figures -are removed from ordinary speech, for "nothing is more natural, -ordinary and common than figures: more figures of speech are used -in the town square on a market-day than in many days of academical -discussion"; and no speech, however short, can be composed entirely of -non-figurative expressions. And Du Marsais gives instances of quite -obvious and spontaneous expressions in which Rhetoric cannot refuse -to recognize the figures of apostrophe, congeries, interrogation, -ellipsis, prosopopœia: "The apostles were persecuted and suffered -their persecutions with patience. What can be more natural than -the description given by St. Paul? _Maledicimur et benedicimus; -persecutionem patimur et sustinemus; blasphemamur et obsecramus._ -Yet the apostle makes use of a fine figure of antithesis; cursing is -the opposite to blessing; persecution to endurance; blasphemy to -prayer." But further, the very language of the figure is figured, -since it is a metaphor.--But after such acute observations, Du Marsais -ends by himself becoming confused and defines figures as "manners of -speech differing from others in a particular modification by which it -is possible to reduce each one to a species apart, and give a more -lively, noble or pleasing effect than can be gained by a manner of -speech expressing the same content of thought without such particular -modification."[33] - -[Sidenote: _Psychological interpretation._] - -But the psychological interpretation of figures of speech, the first -stage towards their æsthetic criticism, was not allowed to drop here. -In his _Elements of Criticism,_ Home says that he had long questioned -whether that part of Rhetoric concerning figures might not be reduced -to rational principles, and had finally discovered that figures consist -in the passional element;[34] he set himself therefore to analyse -prosopopœia, apostrophe and hyperbole in the light of the passional -faculty. From Du Marsais and Home is derived everything of value in the -_Lectures on Rhetoric and belles lettres_ of Hugh Blair, professor -at Edinburgh University from 1759 onwards;[35] published in book form, -these lectures had an immense vogue in all the schools of Europe -including those of Italy, and replaced advantageously, by their "reason -and good sense," works of a much cruder type. Blair defined figures -in general as "language suggested by imagination or passion."[36] -Similar ideas were promulgated in France by Marmontel in his _Elements -of Literature_.[37] In Italy Cesarotti was contrasting the logical -element or "cypher-terms" of language with the rhetorical element or -"figure-terms," and rational eloquence with imaginative eloquence.[38] -Beccaria, though a shrewd psychological analyst, held to the view of -literary style as "accessory ideas or feelings added to the principal -in any discourse"; that is, he failed to free himself from the -distinction between the intellectual form intended for the expression -of the principal ideas, and the literary form, modifying the first by -the addition of accessory ideas.[39] In Germany an effort was made by -Herder to interpret tropes and metaphors as Vico had done, that is to -say as essential to primitive language and poetry. - -[Sidenote: _Romanticism and Rhetoric. Present day._] - -Romanticism was the ruin of the theory of ornament, and caused it -practically to be thrown on the scrap-heap, but it cannot be said -to have gone under for good or to have been superseded by a new and -accurately stated theory. The chief philosophers of Æsthetic (not -only Kant, who as we know remained in bondage to the mechanical and -ornamental theory; not only Herder, whose knowledge of art seems to -have been confined to a little music and a great deal of rhetoric; -but such romantic philosophers as Schelling, Solger and Hegel) still -retained the sections devoted to metaphor, trope and allegory for -tradition's sake, without severe scrutiny. Italian Romanticism with -Manzoni at its head destroyed the belief in beautiful and elegant -words, and dealt a blow at Rhetoric: but was it killed by the stroke? -Apparently not, judging by the concessions unconsciously made by the -scholastic treatise-writer Ruggero Bonghi, whose _Critical Letters_ -assert the existence of two styles or forms, which at bottom are -nothing else than the plain and the ornate.[40] German schools of -philology have pretty generally accepted the stylistic theory of -Gröber, who divides style into logical (objective) and affective -(subjective):[41] an ancient error masked by terminology borrowed from -the psychological philosophy in fashion at modern universities. In -the same spirit a recent writer rechristens the rhetorical doctrine -of tropes and figures by the title "Doctrine of the Forms of Æsthetic -Apperception," and divides them into the four categories (the ancient -wealth of categories reduced to a paltry four!) of personification, -metaphor, antithesis, and symbol.[42] Biese has devoted an entire -book to metaphor; but one searches it in vain for a serious æsthetic -analysis of this category.[43] - -The best scientific criticism of the theory of ornament is found -scattered throughout the writings of De Sanctis, who when lecturing on -rhetoric preached what he called anti-rhetoric.[44] But even here the -criticism is not conducted from a strictly systematic point of view. It -seems to us that the true criticism should be deduced negatively from -the very nature of æsthetic activity, which does not lend itself to -partition; there is no such thing as activity type _a_ or type _b,_ nor -can the same concept be expressed now in one way, now in another. Such -is the only way of abolishing the double monster of bare form which -is, no one knows how, deprived of imagination, and ornate form which -contains, no one knows how, an addition on the side of imagination.[45] - - - -[1] For Gorgias' saying see Aristotle, _Rhet._ iii. ch. 18. - -[2] Cicero, _Orat. ad Brut.,_ introd. - -[3] Quintilian, _Inst. orat._ xii. c. i. - -[4] Fran. Patrizzi, _Della rhetorica,_ ten dialogues, Venice, 1582, -dial. 7; Tassoni, _Pensieri diversi,_ bk. x. ch. 15. - -[5] _De causis corruptarum artium,_ 1531, bk. iv.; _De ratione -dicendi,_ 1533. - -[6] Cicero, _De or at:_ i. chs. 10-11; Quintil. _Inst. oral._ iii. ch. -5. - -[7] _De orat._ ii. chs. 16-17. - -[8] P. Ramus, _Instil, dialecticæ,_ 1543; _Scholæ in artes liberales,_ -1555 etc.; Talæus, _Instit. orator.,_ 1545. - -[9] _Della rhetorica,_ dial. 10, and _passim._ - -[10] _Ration. Philos.,_ part iii. _Rhetoricorum liber unus juxta -propria dogmata_ (Paris, 1636), ch. 3. - -[11] _Theoretische Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen überhaupt,_ Halle, -1744. - -[12] _Kritik d. Urtheils kraft,_ § 53 and _n._ - -[13] H. F. Ortloff, _Die gerichtliche Redekunst,_ Neuwied, 1887; R. -Whately, _Rhetoric,_ 1828 (for _Encyd. Brit._); Ital. trans., Pistoia, -1889. - -[14] Aristotle, _Rhet._ iii. ch. 1. - -[15] Quintil. _Inst. orat._ viii. ch. 3. - -[16] _Rhet._ iii. ch. 10. - -[17] _Poet._ chs. 19-22; cf. _Rhet._ iii. cc. 2, 10. - -[18] See above, pp. 68-69. - -[19] Quintilian, _Inst. orat._ viii. ch. 6; ix. ch. 1. - -[20] Aristotle, _Rhet._ iii. ch. 2; _Poet._ ch. 22. - -[21] _De sublimitate_ (in _Rhet. græci,_ ed. Spengel, vol. 1. § 32.) - -[22] Giulio Camillo Delminio, _Discorso sopra le Idee di Ermogene_ (in -_Opere,_ Venice, 1560); and trans. of Hermogenes (Udine, 1594). - -[23] _De causis corruptarum artium, loc. cit._ - -[24] _Della rhetorica,_ dial. 6. - -[25] _Diálogo de las lenguas_ (ed. Mayans y Siscar, _Origines de la -lengua espanola,_ Madrid, 1873), pp. 115, 119. - -[26] _Essais,_ i. ch. 52 (ed. Garnier, i. 285); ci. _ibid._ chs. 10, -25, 39; 10. - -[27] Croce, _I trattatisti italiani del concettismo,_ pp. 8-22. - -[28] Boileau, _Art poétique,_ i. 11. 43-44, 153-154. - -[29] G. G. Orsi, _Considerazioni sopra la maniera di ben pensare,_ -etc., 1703 (reprinted Modena, 1735, with all polemics relating thereto). - -[30] See above, pp. 230-231. - -[31] See above, pp. 225-226. - -[32] _Des tropes ou des différens sens dans lesquels on peut prendre un -même mot dans une même langue._ Paris, 1730 (_Œuvres de Du Marsais,_ -Paris, 1797, vol. i.). - -[33] _Des tropes ou des différens sens dans lesquels on peut prendre un -même mot dans une même langue,_ part i. art. 1; cf. art. 4. - -[34] _Elem. of Criticism,_ iii. ch. 20. - -[35] Hugh Blair, _Lectures on Rhetoric and belles lettres_ (London, -1823). - -[36] _Lect. on Rhet. and belles lettres,_ lecture 14. - -[37] Marmontel, _Éléments de littéral,_ (in _Œuvres,_ Paris, 1819), iv. -p. 559. - -[38] Cesarotti, _Saggio sulla filos. del linguaggio,_ part ii. - -[39] _Ricerche intorno alla natura dello stile_ (Turin, 1853), ch. 1. - -[40] R. Bonghi, _Lettere critiche,_ 1856 (4th ed., Naples, 1884), pp. -37 65-67, 90, 103. - -[41] Gustav Gröber, _Grundriss d. romanischen Philologie,_ vol. 1. pp. -200-250, K. Vossler, _B. Cellinis Stil in seiner Vita, Versuch einer -psychol. Stilbetrachtung,_ Halle a. S., 1899; cf. the self-criticism -of Vossler, _Positivismus u. Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft,_ -Heidelberg, 1904 (It. trans., Bari, Laterza, 1908). - -[42] Ernst Elsteb, _Principien d. Literaturwissenschaft,_ Halle a. S., -1097. vol. i. pp. 359-413. - -[43] Biese, _Philos, des Metaphorischen,_ Hamburg-Leipzig, 1893. - -[44] _La Giovinezza di Fr. de S._ chs. 23, 25; _Scritti varî,_ ii. pp. -272-274. - -[45] See above, pp. 67-73. - - - - -II - - -HISTORY OF THE ARTISTIC AND LITERARY KINDS - - -[Sidenote: _The kinds in antiquity. Aristotle._] - - -The theory of artistic and literary kinds and of the laws or rules -proper to each separate kind has almost always followed the fortunes of -the rhetorical theory. - -Traces of the threefold division into epic, lyric and dramatic are -found in Plato; and Aristophanes gives an example of criticism -according to the canon of the kinds, particularly that of tragedy.[1] -But the most conspicuous theoretical treatment of the kinds bequeathed -us by antiquity is precisely the doctrine of Tragedy which forms a -large part of the Aristotelian fragment known as the Poetics. Aristotle -defines such a composition as an imitation of a serious and complete -action, having size, in language adorned in accordance with the -requirements of the different parts, its exposition to be by action and -not by narration, and using pity or terror as means to free or purify -us from these same passions;[2] he gives minute details as to the six -parts of which it is composed, especially the plot and the tragic -character. It has been often said, ever since the days of Vincenzo -Maggio in the sixteenth century, that Aristotle treated of the nature -of poetry, or particular forms of poetry, without claiming to give -precepts. But Piccolomini answered that "all these things and other -similar ones are shown or asserted with no other purpose but that we -may see in what way their precepts and laws must be obeyed and carried -out," just as, to make a hammer or saw, one begins by describing -the parts of which they are composed.[3] The error of which we take -Aristotle as representative lies in transmuting abstractions and -empirical partitions into rational concepts: this was almost inevitable -at the beginnings of æsthetic reflexion, and the Sanskrit theory of -poetry employed the same method independently when, for example, it -defines and legislates for ten principal and eighteen secondary styles -of drama; forty-eight varieties of hero; and we know not how many kinds -of heroines.[4] - -[Sidenote: _In the Middle Ages and Renaissance_.] - -After Aristotle, the theory of poetic kinds does not seem to have been -completely or elaborately developed in antiquity. The Middle Ages may -be said to have expressed the doctrine in treatises of the kind known -as "rhythmic arts" or "methods of composition." When the Aristotelian -fragment was first noticed, it is curious to see the way in which -the paraphrase of Averroes distorted the theory of kinds. Averroes -conceives tragedy as the art of praise, comedy as that of blame, -which amounts to identifying the former with panegyric, the latter -with satire; and he believes the _peripeteia_ to be the same thing as -antithesis, or the artifice of beginning the description of a thing by -describing its opposite.[5] This distortion demonstrates afresh the -merely historical character of these kinds and their unintelligibility -by the methods of pure logic to a thinker living in times and under -customs different from those of the Hellenic world. The Renaissance -seized upon Aristotle's text, partly expounded it, partly distorted it -and partly thought it out afresh, and thus succeeded in establishing -a long list of kinds and sub-kinds rigidly defined and subjected to -inexorable laws. Controversy now began over the correct understanding -of the unities of epic or dramatic poetry; over the moral quality and -social standing proper to the characters in this kind of poem and in -that; over the nature of the plot, and whether it includes passions and -thoughts, and whether lyrics should or should not be received as true -poetry; whether the material of tragedy should be historical; whether -the dialogue of comedy may be in prose; whether a happy ending may -be allowed in tragedy; whether the tragic character may be a perfect -gentleman; what kind and number of episodes is admissible in the poem, -and how they should be incorporated in the main plot; and so on. -Great anguish was caused by the mysterious rule of catharsis found in -black and white in Aristotle's text, and Segni naïvely predicted that -tragic poetry would be revived in its perfect spectacular entirety -for the sake of experiencing the effect spoken of by Aristotle, that -"purgation" which causes "the birth of tranquillity in the soul and of -freedom of all perturbation."[6] - -[Sidenote: _The doctrine of the three unities._] - -Amongst the many undertakings brought to a glorious end by the critics -and treatise-writers of the sixteenth century, the best known is the -establishment of the three unities of time, place and action. One -cannot indeed see why they are called unities, for in strictness they -could at most be spoken of as shortness of time, straitness of space -and limitation of tragic subjects to a certain class of action. It is -well known that Aristotle prescribed unity of action only, and reminded -his hearers that theatrical custom alone imposed on the action a -time-limit of one day. On this last point the critics of the sixteenth -century accorded six, eight, or twelve hours according to individual -taste or humour: some of them (amongst them Segni) allowed twenty-four -hours, including the night as particularly propitious to assassinations -and the other acts of violence which usually form the plot of -tragedies; others extended the limit to thirty-six or forty-eight -hours. The last, and most curious, unity, that of place, was slowly -developed by Castelvetro, Riccoboni and Scaliger until the Frenchman -Jean de la Taille joined it as a third to the existing two in 1572, and -in 1598 Angelo Ingegneri finally formulated it more explicitly. - -[Sidenote: _Poetics of the kinds and rules. Scaliger._] - -The Italian treatises were widely read and regarded as authoritative -all over Europe, and awakened the first effort towards a learned theory -of poetry in France, Spain. England and Germany. A good representative -of his class is Julius Cæsar Scaliger, who has been considered, with -some exaggeration, as the true founder of French pseudo-classicism or -neo-classicism; as one who (it has been said) "laid the first stone of -the classical Bastille." But if he was neither the first nor the only -one, he certainly helped greatly to reduce "to a system of doctrines -the principal consequences of the sovranty of Reason in works of -literature," with his minute distinctions and classifications of kinds, -the insurmountable barriers he erected between them, and his distrust -of free inspiration and imagination.[7] Scaliger numbers among his -descendants (beside Daniel Heinsius) d'Aubignac, Rapin, Dacier and -other tyrants of French literature and drama: Boileau turned the rules -of neo-classicism into neat verses. - -[Sidenote: _Lessing._] - -It has been noticed that Lessing entered the same field; his opposition -to the French rules (which was an opposition of rule to rule, in which -he had been forestalled by Italian writers, for example by Calepio in -1732) is anything but radical. Lessing maintained that Corneille and -other authors had misinterpreted Aristotle, to whose laws even the -Shakespearian drama could be shown to conform;[8] but on the other -hand he strongly opposed the abolition of all rules and those who -shouted "genius, genius," placing genius above the law and saying that -genius makes the law. For the very reason that genius is law, replied -Lessing, laws have their value and can be determined: negation of them -would entail the confinement of genius to its first trial flights, -making example or practice useless.[9] - -[Sidenote: _Compromises and extensions._] - -But the "kinds" and their "limits" could be maintained for centuries -solely by means of infinitely subtle interpretations, analogical -extensions and more or less concealed compromises. The Italian -Renaissance critics, while working at their Poetics in the style of -Aristotle, found themselves confronted with chivalric poetry, and had -to make the best of it; this they did by assigning it to a kind of poem -not foreseen by antiquity (Giraldi Cintio).[10] Here and there indeed -a rigorist was heard protesting that romances were in no way different -from heroic poetry, and were only "badly written heroics" (Salviati). -And since it was impossible to deny a place in Italian literature to -Dante's poem, Iacopo Mazzoni, in his _Defence of Dante,_ overhauled -once more the categories of Poetics in order to find a niche for the -sacred poem.[11] Farces made their appearance at this time, and Cecchi -(1585) declares "Farce is a third novelty, occupying a place between -tragedy and comedy ..."[12] The _Pastor fido_ of Guarini was published, -neither tragedy nor comedy, but tragicomedy; and discovering no heading -among the kinds deduced from moral or civil philosophy suitable for -the intruder, Jason de Nores proceeded to rule it out of existence; -Guarini made a valiant defence and claimed special protection for his -beloved _Pastor_ under a third, or mixed, style, representative of real -life.[13] Another rigorist, Fioretti (Udeno Nisieli) proclaimed the -poem "a poetic monster, so huge and deformed that centaurs, hippogriffs -and chimæras are comparatively graceful and charming ..., fit to bring -a blush to the cheek of the muse, a disgrace to poetry, a mixture of -ingredients in themselves discordant, inimical and incompatible";[14] -but will this bluster drive the delicious _Pastor fido_ from the hands -of lovers of poetry? The same thing occurred in the case of Marino's -_Adone,_ described by Chapelain as "a poem of peace" for want of -a better definition, though other supporters called it "a new form -of epic poem";[15] and the same thing happened again in the case of -the comedy of art and musical drama. Corneille, who had called down -a furious tempest from Scudéry and the Academicians on the head of -his _Cid,_ remarked in his discourse on Tragedy, though basing his -position on that of Aristotle, that there was necessity for "_quelque -modération, quelque favorable interprétation,... pour n'être pas -obligés de condamner beaucoup de poèmes, que nous avons vu réussir sur -nos théâtres." "Il est aisé de nous accommoder avec Aristote_..."[16] -he says in another place: a piece of literary hypocrisy which startles -by its verbal resemblance to "_les accommodements avec le Ciel_" of -the Tartuffian ethics. The following century saw the accepted kinds -augmented by "bourgeois tragedy" and pathetic comedy, nicknamed -"lachrymose" by its enemies; de Chassiron[17] attacked, and Diderot, -Gellert and Lessing[18] defended the new arrival. In this way the -schematism of the kinds continued to suffer violence and to cut a very -poor figure; nevertheless, in spite of adversity, it made every effort -to retain power even at the sacrifice of dignity: just as an absolute -king turns constitutional by force of circumstance, and chooses the -lesser evil of squaring his divine right with the will of the nation. - -[Sidenote: _Rebellion against rules in general._] - -This retention of power would have been more difficult had any success -attended the attempts at rebellion against all laws, against law in -general, which broke out in varying degrees at the end of the sixteenth -century. Pietro Aretino made mock of the most sacred precepts: in a -prologue to one of his comedies he remarks derisively, "If you see more -than five characters on the stage at once, do not laugh; for chains -which would fasten water-mills to the river could not hold the fools of -to-day."[19] - -[Sidenote: _G. Bruno. Guarini._] - -A philosopher, Giordano Bruno, entered the lists against the -"regulators of poetry": rules, said he, are derived from poetry: "there -are as many genera and species of true rules as there are genera and -species of true poets"; such an individualization of kinds dealt them -a deathblow. "How then" (asks the interlocutory opponent) "shall -veritable poets be recognized?" "By their singing of verse" (answers -Bruno); "of that which, being sung, either delights or instructs, or -delights and instructs at the same time."[20] In much the same way -Guarini defended his _Pastor fido_ in 1588, declaring "the world is the -judge of poets; against its sentence there is no appeal."[21] - -[Sidenote: _Spanish critics._] - -Amongst European countries, Spain was perhaps the sturdiest in her -resistance to the pedantic theories of the writers of treatises; -Spain was the land of freedom in criticism from Vives to Feijóo, from -the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century when decadence -of the old Spanish spirit allowed Luzán, with others, to introduce -neo-classical poetry of Italian and French origin.[22] That rules -must change with the times and with actual conditions; that modern -literature demands modern poetics; that work carried out contrary to -established rule does not signify that it is contrary to all rule -or unwilling to submit itself to a higher law; that nature should -give, not receive, laws; that the laws of the three unities are -as ridiculous as it would be to forbid a painter to paint a large -landscape in a small picture; that the pleasure, taste, approbation of -readers and spectators are the deciding element in the long run; that -notwithstanding the laws of counterpoint, the ear is the true judge of -music; these affirmations and many like them are frequent in Spanish -criticism of the period. One critic, Francisco de la Barreda (1622), -went so far as to compassionate the strong wits of Italy bound by fear -and cowardice (_temerosos y acobardados_) to rules that hampered them -on every side;[23] he may have been thinking of Tasso, a memorable case -of such degradation. Lope de Vega wavered between neglect of rules in -practice, and obsequious acceptance of them in theory, alleging in -excuse for his conduct that he was forced to yield to the demands of -the public who paid money to see his plays; he said, "when I write my -comedies, I lock and double-lock the door against the precept-mongers, -that they may not rise up and bear witness against me"; "Art (that is, -Poetics) speaks truth which is contradicted by the vulgar ignorant"; -"may the rules forgive us when we are induced to violate them."[24] But -a contemporary admirer of Lope's work writes of him that "_en muchas -partes de sus escritos dice que el no guardar el arte antiguo lo hace -por conformarse con el gusto de la plebe ... dicelo por su natural -modestia, y porqué no atribuya la malicia ignorante à arrogancia lo que -es politica perfeccion._"[25] - -[Sidenote: _G. B. Marino._] - -Giambattista Marino also protested "I assert that I have a more -thorough knowledge of the rules than have all the pedants in the -world; but the only true rule is to know how to break the rules at the -right place and time, and to conform with the custom and taste of the -day."[26] The drama of Spain, the comedy of art, and other literary -novelties of the seventeenth century caused Minturno, Castelvetro and -other rigid treatise-writers of the preceding century to be looked at -with contemptuous pity as "antiquaries"; this may be seen in Andrea -Perucci (1699), the theorist of improvised comedy.[27] Pallavicino -criticized the writers on "the disciplines of beautiful speech" on -the ground that they "generally base their precepts on observing by -experience what things in writers give pleasure, rather than pointing -out what would naturally conform to the particular affections and -instincts implanted by the Creator in the souls of men."[28] - -[Sidenote: _G. V. Gravina._] - -A note of distrust towards the fixed kinds may be heard in the -_Discorso sull' Endimione_ (1691), wherein Gravina severely blames -the "ambitious and miserly precepts" of rhetoricians, and makes the -penetrating comment: "No work can see the fight without finding itself -confronted by a tribunal of critics specially convened to examine it, -and questioned firstly as to its name and nature. Next begins the -action which lawyers call prejudicial, and controversy arises as to -its status, whether it is a poem, a romance, a tragedy, a comedy, or -another of the prescribed kinds. And if the said work have ignored the -slightest precept ... they decree forthwith its exile and perpetual -banishment. And yet, however they recast and expand their aphorisms, -they will never be able to include all the different kinds that can -be freshly created by the varied and ceaseless motion of human wit. -For this reason I cannot see why we should not free ourselves from -this insolent curb on the soaring grandeur of our imaginations, and -allow them to follow an open road amongst those immeasurable spaces -they are fitted to explore." He remarks on the work of Guidi which -forms the subject of his discourse, "I know not whether it be tragedy, -comedy, tragicomedy, or anything else invented by rhetoricians. It is a -representation of the loves of Endymion and Diana. If those terms have -sufficient breadth of extension, they will comprehend this work; if -they have not, let another be framed (a power which may be granted to -any one in so unimportant a matter); if no such term can be invented, -let us not, for want of a word, deprive ourselves of a thing so -beautiful."[29] These remarks have quite a modern ring, but Gravina can -hardly have thought out their implications very deeply, for later on he -wrote a special treatise on the rules of the tragic kind.[30] Antonio -Conti too declared at times his antagonism towards the rules, but he -referred to the Aristotelian rules only.[31] - -[Sidenote: _Fr. Montani._] - -More courage was displayed by Count Francesco Montani of Pesaro in the -polemic roused by Orsi's book against Bouhours; in 1705 he wrote: "I -know that there are immutable and eternal rules, founded on such sound -good sense and solid reason as will remain unshaken as long as mankind -lives. But these rules, whose incorruptibility gives them authority to -guide our spirits to the end of time, are rare enough to be counted -with the nose, and it seems to me somewhat arbitrary to claim to -test and regulate our new works by old laws now wholly abrogated and -annulled."[32] - -[Sidenote: _Critics of the eighteenth century._] - -In France the rigorism of Boileau was followed by the rebellion of Du -Bos, who unhesitatingly declared that "men will always prefer poetry -which moves them to that composed according to rule,"[33] and the like -heresies. In 1730, De la Motte made war against the unities of time -and place, asserting as the most general, and even superior to that of -action, the unity of interest.[34] Batteux tended to make free with -the rules; and Voltaire, though he opposed De la Motte and declared -the three unities to be the "three great laws of good sense," uttered -some bold sentiments in his _Essay on Epic Poetry,_ and it was he who -remarked that "_tous les genres sont bons hors le genre ennuyeux,_" -and that the best kind is "_celui qui est le mieux traité._" Diderot -was in certain respects a forerunner of Romanticism, and with him must -be mentioned Friedrich Melchior Grimm, who was influenced by him. A -breath of liberty was wafted into Italy by Metastasio, Bettinelli, -Baretti and Cesarotti: in 1766 Buonafede notes in his _Epistola della -libertà poetica_ that when erudite persons "define epic poetry, or -comedy, or odes, they ought to frame as many definitions as there -are compositions and authors."[35] In Germany the first to rise in -rebellion against the rules (opposing Gottsched and his disciples) -were the representatives of the Swiss school.[36] In England, after -examining the definitions by which critics endeavoured to distinguish -epic poetry from other compositions, Home wrote, "It affords no little -diversion to watch so many profound critics hunting after that which -does not exist. They presuppose--without shadow of proof--that there -exists a precise criterion by which to distinguish epic poetry from -all other kinds of composition. But literary compositions melt one -into another like colours: and if in their stronger shades it is easy -to recognize them, they are susceptible of such variety and of so many -different forms that it is impossible to say where one ends and another -begins."[37] - -[Sidenote: _Romanticism and the "strict kinds": Berchet, V. Hugo._] - -Literary thought between the late eighteenth and the first decades of -the nineteenth century, that is to say from" the period of genius" -to that of romanticism properly so called, rose in rebellion against -separate individual rules and against all rules as such. But to -describe the battles fought, and their more important episodes; to -recount the names of captains victorious or discomfited, or to deplore -the excesses committed by the conquerors, is no part of our present -task. Upon the ruins of the strict kinds, the "_genres tranchés_" -beloved by Napoleon[38] (a Romanticist in the art of war, but a -Classicist in poetry), flourished the drama, the romance and every -other mixed kind: upon the ruins of the three unities, flourished the -unity of _ensemble._ Italy made her protest against rules of style in -Berchet's famous _Lettera semiseria di Grisostomo_ (1816); and France -made hers somewhat later in Victor Hugo's preface to _Cromwell_ (1827). -Henceforth men discussed not the kinds, but Art. What is the unity of -_ensemble_ but the demand of art itself, which is always an _ensemble,_ -a synthesis? What else is the principle, introduced by August Wilhelm -Schlegel and adopted by Manzoni and other Italian romanticists, to the -effect that form of component parts must be "organic not mechanical, -resulting from the nature of the subject and its interior development -... not from the impress of an external and extraneous stamp"?[39] - -[Sidenote: _Their persistence in philosophical theories._] - -But it would be quite wrong to suppose that this victory over the -rhetoric of kinds was either the cause or the consequence of a final -victory over its philosophical presuppositions. In pure theory, none -of the critics above named wholly abandoned the kinds and the rules. -Berchet admitted four elementary forms, that is four fundamental -kinds, in poetry; lyrical, didactic, epic and dramatic, claiming for -the poet only the right of "uniting and fusing together the elementary -forms in a thousand fashions."[40] Manzoni's only real quarrel was -with those rules "founded on special facts instead of on general -principles; on the authority of rhetoricians instead of reason."[41] -Even De Sanctis was satisfied with a concept somewhat vague, though -true enough at bottom: "the most important rules are not those capable -of being applied to every content, but those which draw their force _ex -visceribus caussæ,_ from the very heart of the content itself."[42] -Even more diverting than the spectacle which had delighted Home, is -the sight of German philosophy according the honour of a dialectical -deduction to the empirical classification of kinds. We shall give two -examples, each representing one extreme end of the chain: - -[Sidenote: _Fr. Schelling._] - -Schelling at the beginning of the century (1803), and Hartmann at -the end (1890). One section of Schelling's _Philosophy of Art_ is -devoted to "the construction of individual poetic kinds"; in it he -remarks that were he to follow the historical order, Epic would come -first; whereas in the scientific order the Lyric occupies the first -place: indeed, if poetry is the representation of the infinite in -the finite, the Lyric, in which difference prevails (the finite, the -subject), is its first moment, corresponding with the first power of -the ideal series, reflexion, knowledge, consciousness, whereas Epic -corresponds with the second power, action.[43] From Epic, which is _par -excellence_ the objective kind (as being the identity of subjective and -objective), derive the Elegy and the Idyl if subjectivity be placed in -the object and objectivity in the poet: if objectivity be placed in -the object and subjectivity in the poet, didactic poetry results.[44] -To these differentiations of the Epic, Schelling adds the romantic or -modern Epic, the poem of chivalry; the novel; and the experiments in -an epic of ordinary life such as the _Luisa_ of Voss and the _Hermann -and Dorothea_ of Goethe; and, co-ordinate with all the foregoing, the -_Comedia_ of Dante, "an epic kind in itself" (_eine epische Gattung -für sich_). Finally, from the union on a higher plane of Lyric with -Epic, liberty with necessity, arises the third form, the Drama, the -reconciliation of antitheses in a totality, "supreme incarnation of the -essence and the in-itself of all art."[45] - -[Sidenote: _E. von Hartmann._] - -In Hartmann's _Philosophy of the Beautiful,_ poetry is divided into -spoken poetry and read poetry. The former is subdivided into Epic, -Lyric and Dramatic, with further subdivisions of Epic into plastic -Epic, or strictly epic Epic, and pictorial or lyrical Epic; of Lyric -into epical Lyric, lyrical Lyric and dramatic Lyric; of Dramatic into -lyrical Drama, epic Drama and dramatic Drama. Read poetry (_Lese -poesie_) is again subdivided into predominantly epical, lyrical or -dramatic form with tertiary partitions of the affecting, the comic, the -tragic and humorous; and into poems "to be read at a sitting" (like the -short story) or to be taken up again and again (like the novel).[46] - -[Sidenote: _The kinds in the schools._] - -Without these highly philosophical trivialities the divisions of kinds -still wander through the books called _Institutions of Literature,_ -written by philologists and men of letters, and the ordinary -school-books of Italy, France and Germany; and psychologists and -philosophers still persist in writing about the Æsthetic of the tragic, -of the comic and of the humorous.[47] The objectivity of literary kinds -is frankly maintained by Ferdinand Brunetière, who looks on literary -history as "the evolution of kinds,"[48] and gives sharply defined form -to a superstition which, seldom confessed so truthfully or applied so -rigorously, survives to contaminate modern literary history.[49] - - -[1] _Republic,_ iii. 394; see also E. Müller, _Gesch. i. Th. d. Kunst,_ -i. pp. 134-206; ii. pp. 238-239, note. - -[2] _Poet._ ch. 6 - -[3] _Annotazioni,_ introd. - -[4] Cf. for Sanskrit poetry S. Levi, _Le Théâtre indien,_ pp. 11-152. - -[5] Cf. Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ I., i. pp. 126-154, 2nd ed. - -[6] Introd. to his tr. of the _Poetics._ - -[7] Lintilhac, _Un Coup d'état,_ etc., p. 543. - -[8] _Hamburg. Dramat._ Nos. 81, 101-104. - -[9] _Op. cit._ Nos. 96, 101-104. - -[10] G. B. Giraldi Cintio, _De' romanzi, delle comedie e delle -tragedie,_ 1554 (ed. Dælli, 1864). - -[11] Iacopo Mazzoni, _Difesa della commedia di Dante,_ Cesena, 1587. - -[12] G. M. Cecchi, prologue to _Romanesca,_ 1585. - -[13] Cf. besides the two _Veratti,_ the _Compendio della poesia -tragicomica,_ Venice, 1601. - -[14] _Proginn. poet.,_ Florence, 1627, iii. p. 130. - -[15] Cf. A. Belloni, _Il seicento,_ Milan, 1898, pp. 162-164. - -[16] _Examens,_ and _Discours du poème dramatique, de la tragédie, des -trois unités,_ etc. - -[17] _Réflexions sur le comique larmoyant,_ 1749 (trans. by Lessing, -_Werke, vol. cit._). - -[18] Gellert, _De comædia commovente,_ 1751; Lessing, _Abhandlungen von -den weinerlichen oder rührenden Lustspiele,_ 1754 (in _Werke,_ vol. -vii.). - -[19] Prologue to the _Cortigiana,_ 1534. - -[20] _Degli eroici furori_ in _Opere italiane,_ ed. Gentile, ii. pp. -310-311. - -[21] _Il Veratto_ (against Jason de Nores), Ferrara, 1588. - -[22] Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. pp. 174-175 (1st ed.), i. - -[23] Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. p. 468 (2nd ed.). - -[24] _Arte nuevo de hacer comedias_ (1609), ed. Morel Fatio, 11. 40-41, -138-140, 157-158. - -[25] Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. p. 459. - -[26] Marino, letter to G. Preti, in _Lettere,_ Venice, 1627, p. 127. - -[27] _Dell' arte rappresentiva meditata e all' improvviso,_ Naples, -1699; cf. pp. 47, 48, 65. - -[28] _Trattato dello stile e del dialogo,_ 1646, preface. - -[29] _Discorso su l' Endimione_ (in _Opere italiane, ed. cit._), ii. -pp. 15-16. - -[30] _Della tragedia,_ 1715 (_ibid._ vol. i.). - -[31] _Prose e poesie, cit.,_ pref. and _passim._ - -[32] In Orsi, _Considerazioni, ed. cit._ ii. pp. 8, 9. - -[33] _Réflexions, cit._ sect. 34. - -[34] _Discours sur la tragédie,_ 1730. - -[35] _Opuscoli_ of Agatopisto Cromaziano, Venice, 1797. - -[36] Danzel, _Gottsched,_ p. 206 _seqq._ - -[37] _Elements of Criticism,_ iii. pp. 144-145, note. - -[38] See conversation of Napoleon with Goethe, in Lewes, _The Life and -Works of Goethe,_ ii. p. 441. [ -F9] Manzoni, _Epistol._ i. pp. 355-356; cf. _Lettera sul romanticismo, -ibid._ pp. 293-299. - -[40] _Lettera di Grisostomo, opere,_ ed. Cusani, p. 227. - -[41] _Lettera sul romanticismo, ibid._ p. 280. - -[42] _La giovinezza di F. de S._ chs. 26-28. - -[43] _Philos, d. Kunst,_ pp. 639-645. - -[44] _Op. cit._ pp. 657-659. - -[45] _Op. cit._ p. 687. - -[46] _Philosophie d. Schönen,_ ch. 2, § 2. - -[47] See, _e.g.,_ Volkelt, _Ästh. d. Tragischen,_ Munich, 1897; Lipps, -_Der Streit über Tragödie,_ etc. - -[48] See his other works, _L'évolution des genres dans l'histoire de la -littérature,_ Paris, 1890 _seqq.,_ and _Manuel de l'hist. de la littér. -française, ibid.,_ 1898. - -[49] Croce, _Per la storia della critica e storiografia letter,_ pp. -23-25. - - - - -III - - -THE THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTS - - -To Lessing must be ascribed the merit and the sole glory of having -discovered that every art has its special character and inviolable -limits. But his merit lies not in his own theory, which, in itself, -is scarcely tenable,[1] but in having, though by an error, aroused -discussion of a highly important æsthetical point till then wholly -overlooked. After some slight notice from Du Bos and Batteux, some -preparation of the field by Diderot[2] and Mendelssohn,[3] and -long disquisitions by Meier and other Wolffians upon natural and -conventional symbols,[4] Lessing was the first to raise clearly the -question of the value attaching to the distinction between the various -arts. Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had enumerated -the arts according to denominations of current phraseology, and had -composed numbers of technical hand-books distinguishing major and -minor arts; but in Aristoxenus or Vitruvius, Marchetto da Padova or -Cennino Cennini, Leonardo da Vinci or Leon Battista Alberti, Palladio -or Scamozzi, it would be vain to look for the problem proposed by -Lessing, for the spirit of these technical treatise-writers is entirely -different. Some rudiments of the question may be detected in the -comparisons made, and the questions of precedence raised, between -poetry and painting or painting and sculpture, to be found now and -then in stray paragraphs of their books (Leonardo da Vinci pressed -the claims of painting, Michæl Angelo those of sculpture): the theme -eventually became a favourite one for academic discussion, and was not -despised by Galileo himself.[5] - -[Sidenote: _The limits of the arts in Lessing. Arts of space and arts -of time._] - -Lessing was induced to raise the question in the attempt to controvert -the strange views of Spence concerning the close union between painting -and poetry among the ancients, and of Count Caylus, who held that -the excellence of a poem must be judged by the number of subjects -it offers to the brush of the painter. He was further instigated by -the comparisons between poetry and painting upon which were commonly -founded the most ridiculous rules for tragedy: the maxim _Ut pictura -poësis,_ whose original motive was to emphasize the representative or -imaginative character of poetry, and the community of nature among the -arts, had been converted by superficial interpretation into a defence -of the most vicious intellectualistic and realistic prejudices. Lessing -argued in this wise: "If painting in its imitations employs precisely -a medium or symbol different from that of poetry (the former employing -spatial forms and colours, the latter temporal articulated sounds), -since the symbol must certainly be in close relation with that -which is signified, coexistent symbols can only express coexistent -objects or parts of objects, and consecutive symbols can only express -consecutive objects or parts of objects. Objects mutually coexistent, -or having mutually coexistent parts, are called bodies. Bodies, then, -through their quality of visibility, are the true objects of painting. -Objects successively consecutive amongst themselves, or whose parts -are consecutive, are called in general actions. Actions, then, are -the suitable objects of poetry." Painting, undoubtedly, may represent -action, but only by means of bodies which indicate it; and poetry may -represent bodies, but only by indicating them by means of actions. -When a poet using language, _i.e._ arbitrary symbols, sets himself -to describe bodies, he is no longer a poet but a prose-writer, since -a true poet only describes bodies by the effect they produce on the -soul.[6] Retouching and developing this distinction, Lessing described -action or movement in a picture as an addition made by the imagination -of the beholder; so true is this, says he, that animals perceive -nothing save immobility in a picture. He further studied the various -unions of arbitrary with natural symbols, such as that of poetry with -music (in which the former is subordinate to the latter), of music -with dancing, of poetry with dancing, and of music and poetry with -dancing (union of arbitrary consecutive audible symbols with natural -visible symbols): of the pantomime of antiquity (union of arbitrary -consecutive visible symbols with natural consecutive visible symbols): -of the language of the dumb (the only art that employs arbitrary -consecutive visible symbols): and, lastly, of imperfect unions, such -as that of painting with poetry. If not every use to which language is -put is poetic, Lessing holds that not every use of natural coexistent -signs is pictorial: painting, like language, has its prose. Prosaic -painters are those who represent consecutive objects notwithstanding -the character of coexistence in their signs, allegorical painters -those who make arbitrary use of natural signs, and those who pretend -to represent the invisible or the audible by means of the visible. -Desirous of preserving the naturalness of symbolism, Lessing ended by -condemning the custom of painting objects on a diminished scale, and -concludes: "I think that the aim of an art should be that only to which -it is specially adapted, not that which can be performed equally well -by other arts. I find in Plutarch a comparison which illustrates this -admirably: he who would split wood with a key and open the door with an -axe not only spoils both utensils but deprives himself of the unity of -each alike."[7] - -[Sidenote: _Limits and classifications of the arts in later -philosophy._] - -The principle of limitations or of the specific character of individual -arts, as laid down by Lessing, occupied the attention of philosophers -in later days, who, without discussing the principle itself, employed -it in classifying the arts and arranging them in series. - -[Sidenote: _Herder and Kant._] - -Herder here and there continued Lessing's examination in his fragment -on _Plastic_ (1769);[8] Heydenreich wrote a treatise (1790) on the -limits of the six arts (music, dance, figurative arts gardening, -poetry and representative art), and criticized the _clavecin oculaire_ -of Father Castel, a contrivance for the combination of colours which -should act in the same way as the series of musical notes in harmony -and melody,[9] Kant appealed to the analogy of a speaking man, and -classified the arts according to speech, gesture and tone as arts of -speech, figurative arts, and arts producing a mere play of sensations -(mimicry and colouring).[10] - -[Sidenote: _Schelling._] - -Schelling differentiated the artistic identity according as it -consisted in the infusion of the infinite into the finite, or of the -finite into the infinite (ideal art or real art): into poetry and art -proper. Under the heading of real arts he included the figurative arts, -music, painting, plastic (which comprehended architecture, bas-relief -and sculpture): in the ideal series were the three corresponding forms -of poetry, lyrical, epical and dramatic.[11] - -[Sidenote: _Solger._] - -With a similar method, Solger placed poetry, the universal art, -side by side with art strictly so called, which is either symbolical -(sculpture) or allegorical (painting), and, in either case, is a union -of concepts and bodies: if you take corporality without concept, you -have architecture; if concept without matter, music.[12] Hegel makes -poetry the bond of union between the two extremes of figurative art and -of music.[13] - -[Sidenote: _Schopenhauer._] - -We have already seen how Schopenhauer destroyed the accepted -limitations of art and built them up again, following the order of -the ideas which they represent.[14] Herbart clung to Lessing's two -groups, simultaneous arts and successive arts, and defined the former -as "permitting themselves to be inspected from every side," the latter -as "rejecting complete investigation and remaining in semi-darkness": -in the first group he placed architecture, plastic, church music and -classical poetry; in the second ornamental gardening, painting, secular -music and romantic poetry.[15] - -[Sidenote: _Herbart._] - -Herbart was implacable against those who look in one art for the -perfections of another; who "look on music as a sort of painting, -painting as poetry, poetry as an elevated plastic and plastic as -a species of æsthetic philosophy,"[16] while admitting that a -concrete work of art, such as a picture, may contain elements of the -picturesque, the poetic and other kinds, held together by the skill of -the artist.[17] - -[Sidenote: _Weisse. Zeising._] - -Weisse divided the arts into three triads, intended to recall the -nine Muses.[18] Zeising invented-a cross-division into figurative -arts (architecture, sculpture, painting), musical arts (instrumental -music, song, poetry), and arts of mimicry (dance, musical mimicry, -representative art), and into macrocosmic arts (architecture, -instrumental music, dance), microcosmic arts (sculpture, song, musical -mimicry) and historical arts (painting, poetry and representative -art).[19] - -[Sidenote: _Vischer._] - -Vischer classified them according to the three forms of -imagination (figurative, sensuous and poetic), into objective arts -(architecture, plastic and painting), a subjective art (music) and an -objective-subjective art[20] (poetry). Gerber proposed to recognize a -special "art of language" (_Sprachkunst_), distinguishable alike from -prose and poetry and consisting in the expression of simple movements -of the soul. Such an art would correspond with plastic in the following -scheme: arts of the eye--(_a)_ architecture, (_b_) plastic, (c) -painting; arts of the ear--(_a)_ prose, (_b)_ the art of language, (c) -poetry.[21] - -[Sidenote: _M. Schasler._] - -The two most recent systems of classification are furnished by Schasler -and Hartmann, who have also submitted the schemes of their predecessors -to searching criticism. Schasler[22] arranges the arts in two groups, -adopting the criterion of simultaneity and succession: the arts of -simultaneity are architecture, plastic and painting; of succession, -music, mimicry and poetry. He says that by following the series in -the order indicated, it will be seen that simultaneity, originally -predominant, yields place to succession, which predominates in the -second group and subordinates without wholly displacing the other. -Parallel with this, another division is evolved, deduced from the -relation between the ideal and material elements in each separate art, -between movement and repose; which begins with architecture "materially -the heaviest, spiritually the lightest of all the arts," and ends -with poetry, in which the opposite relation is observed. Curious -analogies are established by this method between the first and second -group of arts: between architecture and music; between plastic and -mimicry; between painting in its three forms of landscape, _genre_ and -historical, and poetry in its three forms of lyric (declamatory), epic -(rhapsodic) and drama (representative). - -[Sidenote: _E. v. Hartmann._] - -Hartmann[23] divides the arts into arts of perception and arts of -imagination: the former tripartite into spatial or visual (plastic -and painting), temporal or auditory (instrumental music, linguistic -mimicry, expressive song) and temporal-spatial or mimic (pantomime, -mimic dances, art of the actor, art of the opera-singer); the second -contains but one single species, which is poetry. Architecture, -decoration, gardening, cosmetic and prosewriting are excluded from this -system of classification and lumped together as non-free arts. - -[Sidenote: _The supreme art. Richard Wagner._] - -Parallel with this search for a classification of the arts, the same -philosophers were led into the quest of the supreme art. Some favoured -poetry, others music or sculpture; others again claimed the supremacy -for combined arts, especially for Opera, according to the theory of -it already advanced in the eighteenth century[24] and maintained -and developed in our day by Richard Wagner.[25] One of the latest -philosophers to raise the question "whether single arts, or arts in -combination, had the greater value," concluded that single arts as such -possess their own perfection, yet the perfection of united arts is -still greater, notwithstanding the compromises and mutual concessions -enforced upon them by their union; that single arts, from another -point of view, have the greater value; and lastly, that both single -and combined arts are necessary to the realisation of the concept of -art.[26] - -[Sidenote: _Lotze's attack on classifications._] - -The capriciousness, emptiness and childishness of such problems -and their solutions must have excited feelings of impatience and -disgust, but we rarely find a doubt thrown on their validity. One such -dissentient is Lotze when he writes: "It is difficult to see the use -of such attempts. Knowledge of the nature and laws of individual arts -is but little increased by indication of the systematic place allotted -to each." He further observed that in real life the arts are variously -conjoined, forming themselves into no systematic series, while in -the world of thought an immense variety of orders can be created; he -therefore selected one of these possible orders, not because it was -the sole legitimate one, but because it was convenient (_bequem_). His -series begins with music, "the art of free beauty, determined only by -the laws of its matter, not by conditions imposed by a given task of -purpose or of imitation"; followed by architecture, "which no longer -plays freely with forms, but subjects them to the service of an end"; -and then by sculpture, painting and poetry, excluding minor arts which -cannot be co-ordinated with the others, since they are incapable of -expressing with any approach to completeness the totality of the -spiritual life.[27] A recent French critic, Basch, opens his treatise -with the following excellent remarks: "Is it necessary to show there is -no such thing as an absolute art, differentiating itself later by means -of one knows not what immanent laws? What exists is the particular -forms of art, or rather artists who have striven to translate, as best -they can, according to the material means at their command, the song of -the ideal in their souls." But later on he thinks it possible to effect -a division of the arts by starting "from the artist, instead of the -art in itself," by proceeding "according to the three great types of -fancy, visual, motor and auditory"; and as for the debated point of the -supreme art, he thinks it must be settled in favour of music.[28] - -Schasler is not altogether wrong in his spirited counterattack on -Lotze's criticism; he protests against the principle of indifference -and convenience, and remarks that "the classification of the arts -must be regarded as the real touchstone, the real differential test -of the scientific value of an æsthetic system; for on this point all -theoretical questions are concentrated and crowd together to find a -concrete solution."[29] - -[Sidenote: _Contradictions in Lotze._] - -The principle of convenience may be excellent as applied to the -approximative grouping of botanical or zoological classifications, but -it has no place in philosophy; and as Lotze, in common with Schasler -and other æstheticians, conformed to Lessing's principle of the -constancy, limits and peculiar nature of each art, and therefore held -that the concepts of the individual arts were speculative and not -empirical concepts, he could not evade the duty of fixing the mutual -relations of these concepts, arranging them in series, subordinating -and co-ordinating them, and arriving at each of them either deductively -or dialectically. He ought, in order to get definitely rid of these -barren attempts at classification and at discovering the supreme -art, to have criticized and dissolved Lessing's principle itself: to -keep the principle and deny the need for a classification, as Lotze -did, was obviously inconsistent. But not a single æsthetician has -ever re-examined or investigated the scientific foundation of the -distinctions enunciated by Lessing in his fluent and elegant prose; no -one has probed to the bottom the truth which was illumined by Aristotle -in a single lightning-flash, when he refused to allow an extrinsic -difference, that of metre, as the real distinction between prose and -poetry:[30] no one, that is to say, save perhaps Schleiermacher, who at -least called attention to the difficulties of the current doctrine. - -[Sidenote: _Doubts in Schleiermacher._] - -He proposed to start from the general concept of art and prove by -deduction the necessity of all its forms; and after finding two sides -to artistic activity, the objective consciousness (_gegenständliche)_ -and the immediate consciousness (_unmittelbare)_, and observing that -art stands wholly neither in the one nor in the other and that the -immediate consciousness or representation (_Vorstellung)_ gives rise to -mimicry and music, while the objective consciousness or image (_Bild_) -gives rise to the figurative arts, he then, proceeding to analyse a -painting, found the two forms of consciousness to be in this case -inseparable, and remarks: "Here we arrive at the precise opposite: -searching for distinction, we find unity." Nor did the traditional -division of the arts into simultaneous and successive seem to him -very solid, for "when looked at attentively, it evaporates entirely"; -in architecture or gardening, contemplation is successive, while in -the arts labelled as successive, such as poetry, the chief thing -is coexistence and grouping: "from whichever side we look at it, -the difference is but secondary and the antithesis between the two -orders of art merely means that every contemplation, like every act of -production, is always successive, but, in thinking out the relation of -the two sides in a work of art, both seem indispensable: coexistence -(_Zugleichsein_) and successive existence (_das Successivsein_)." In -another passage he observes: "The reality of art as external appearance -is conditioned by the mode, depending on our physical and corporeal -organism, in which the internal is externalised: movements, forms, -words.... That which is common to all arts is not the external, which -is rather the element of diversification." When these observations -are compared with the sharp distinction he himself drew between art -and technique, it would be easy to deduce that he held the partitions -of the arts and the concepts of the particular arts to be devoid -of æsthetic value. But Schleiermacher does not draw this logical -inference, he wavers and hesitates: he recognizes the inseparability -of the subjective and objective, musical and figurative, elements in -poetry, yet he struggles to discover the definitions and limits of -the individual arts; sometimes he dreams of a union of the various -arts from which a complete art would spring; and when composing the -syllabus of his lectures on Æsthetic, he arranged the arts into arts -of accompaniment (mimicry and music), figurative arts (architecture, -gardening, painting, sculpture) and poetry.[31] Nebulous, vague, -contradictory as this may be, Schleiermacher had the acumen to distrust -the soundness of Lessing's theory and to inquire by what right -particular arts are singled out from art in general. - - - -[1] See above, pp. 113-115. - -[2] D. Diderot, _Lettre sur les aveugles,_ 1749; _Lettre sur les sourds -et muets,_ 1751; _Essai sur la peinture,_ 1765. - -[3] M. Mendelssohn, _Briefe über Empfind.,_ 1755; _Betrachtungen, -cit.,_ 1757. - -[4] J. Chr. Wolff, _Psychol. empirica,_ §§ 272-312; Meier, -_Anfangsgründe,_ §§ 513-528, 708-735; _Betrachtungen,_ § 126. - -[5] Letter to Lodovico Cardi da Cigoli, June 26, 1612. - -[6] _Laokoon,_ §§ 16-20. - -[8] _Laokoon,_ appendix, § 43. - -[9] _Plastik einige Wahrnehmungen über Form und Gestalt aus Pygmalions -bildenden Träume,_ 1778 (Select Works of Herder in the collection -_Deutsche Nationlitteratur,_ vol. 76, part iii. § 2). - -[10] _System der Ästhetik,_ pp. 154-236. - -[11] _Kritik d. Urtheilskr._ § 51. 5 _Phil. d. Kunst,_ pp. 370-371. - -[12] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 257-262. - -[13] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 222. - -[14] See above, pp. 305-306. - -[15] _Einleitung,_ § 115, pp. 170-171. - -[16] _Schriften z. prakt. Phil,_ in _Werke,_ viii. p. 2. - -[17] _Einleitung,_ § 110, pp. 164-165. - -[18] Cf. Hartmann, _Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,_ pp. 539-540. - -[19] _Ästh. Forsch._ pp. 547-549. - -[20] _Ästh._ §§ 404, 535, 537, 838, etc. - -[21] Gustav Gerber, _Die Sprache als Kunst,_ Bromberg, 1871-1874. - -[22] _Das System der Künste,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig-Berlin, 1881. - -[23] _Phil. d. Sch._ chs. 9, 10. - -[24] _E.g._ by Sulzer, _Allg. Theorie,_ on word _Oper._ - -[25] Rich. Wagner, _Oper und Drama,_ 1851. - -[26] Gustav Engel, _Ästh. der Tonkunst,_ 1884, abstracted in Hartmann, -_Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,_ pp. 579-580. - -[27] Lotze, _Geschichte d. Ästh._ pp. 458-460; cf. p. 445. - -[28] _Essai critique sur l'Esth. de Kant,_ pp. 89-496. - -[29] _Das System der Künste,_ p. 47. - -[30] _Poet._ ch. i. - -[31] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ pp. 11, 122-129, 137, 143, 151, 167, 172, -284-286, 487-488, 508, 635. - - - - -IV - - -OTHER PARTICULAR DOCTRINES - - -[Sidenote: _The æsthetic theory of Natural Beauty._] - -I. Schleiermacher also rejected the concept of Natural Beauty, giving -Hegel greater praise than he deserved in the matter, because Hegel's -denial of this concept was, as we have seen, more verbal than real. -At all events, Schleiermacher's radical denial of the existence of a -natural beauty external to and independent of the human mind marked -a victory over a serious error, and appears to us imperfect and -one-sided only so far as it seems to exclude those æsthetic facts of -imagination which are attached to objects given in nature.[1] Important -contributions towards the correction of this imperfect and one-sided -element were supplied by the historical and psychological study of the -"feeling for nature," promoted successfully by Alexander Humboldt in -his dissertation to be found in the second volume of _Cosmos_,[2] and -continued by Laprade, Biese, and others in our own time.[3] In his -criticism of his own _Ästhetik,_ Vischer completes the passage from -the metaphysical construction of beauty in nature to the psychological -interpretation of it, and recognizes the necessity of suppressing -the section devoted to Natural Beauty in his first æsthetic system, -and incorporating it with the doctrine of imagination: he says that -such treatments do not belong to æsthetic science, being a medley -of zoology, sentiment, fantasy and humour, worthy of development in -monographs in the style of the poet G. G. Fischer's on the life of -birds, or Bratranek's on the æsthetic of the vegetable world.[4] -Hartmann, as heir of the old metaphysics, reproaches Vischer for -this exclusion, and maintains that, in addition to the beauty of -imagination introduced by man into natural things (_hineingelegte -Schönheit_), there exist a formal and a substantial beauty in nature, -coinciding with realisation of the immanent ends or ideas of nature.[5] -But the way chosen ultimately by Vischer is the only one by which -Schleiermacher's thesis can be successfully developed so as to show -the precise meaning which may be given to the assertion of (æsthetic) -beauty in nature. - -[Sidenote: _The theory of æsthetic senses._] - -II. That æsthetic senses or superior senses exist and that beauty -attaches to certain senses only, not to all, is a very old opinion. We -have seen already[6] that Socrates, in the _Hippias maior,_ mentions -the doctrine of beauty as "that which pleases hearing and sight" (τὸ -καlὸν eστὶ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆs τε καὶ ὃψεως ήδύ): and he adds, it seems -impossible to deny that we take pleasure in looking at handsome men -and fine ornaments, pictures and statues with our eyes, and hearing -beautiful songs or beautiful voices, music, speeches and conversations -with our ears. Nevertheless Socrates himself in the same dialogue -confutes this theory by perfectly valid arguments, amongst which is -that, besides the difficulty arising from the fact that beautiful -things may be found outside the range of the sensible impressions of -eye and ear, there is no reason for creating a special class for the -pleasure arising from impressions on these two senses, to the exclusion -of others. He also states the more subtle and philosophical objection -that that which is pleasing to the sight is not so to the hearing, and -_vice versa_; whence it follows that the ground of beauty must not be -sought in visibility or audibility, but in something differing from -either and common to both.[7] - -The problem was never again, perhaps, attacked with such acumen and -seriousness as in this ancient dialogue. In the eighteenth century -Home remarked that beauty depended on sight, and that impressions -received by the other senses might be agreeable but were not -beautiful, and distinguished sight and hearing as superior to those -of touch, taste and smell, the latter being merely bodily in nature -and without the spiritual refinement of the other two. He held these -to produce pleasures superior to organic pleasures though inferior to -intellectual; decorous pleasures, that is to say; elevated, sweet, -moderately exhilarating; as far removed from the turbulence of the -passions as from the languor of indolence, and intended to refresh -and soothe the spirit.[8] Following suggestions of Diderot, Rousseau -and Berkeley, Herder drew attention to the importance of the sense of -touch (_Gefühl_) in plastic art: of this "third sense, which perhaps -deserves to be investigated first of all, and is unjustly relegated to -a place amongst the grosser senses." Certainly "touch knows nothing of -surface or colour," but "sight, for its part, knows nothing of forms -and configurations." Thus "touch cannot be so gross a sense as it is -reputed, if it is the very organ by which we sensate all other bodies, -and rules over a vast kingdom of subtle and complex concepts. As the -surface stands to the body, so does sight stand in respect of touch, -and it is merely a colloquial abbreviation to speak of seeing bodies as -surfaces and to suppose that we see with our eyes that which we have -gradually learnt in infancy simply by the sense of touch." Every beauty -of form or corporeity is a concept not visible, but palpable.[9] From -the triad of æsthetic senses thus established by Herder (sight for -painting; hearing for music; touch for sculpture), Hegel returned to -the customary dyad, saying that "the sensory part of art has reference -only to the two theoretic senses of sight and hearing"; that smell, -taste and touch must be excluded from artistic pleasures, since they -are connected with matter as such and the immediate sensible quality it -may possess (smell with material volatilization; taste with material -solution of objects; and touch with hot, cold, smooth and so forth); -and that hence they can claim no concern with the objects of art, -which are obliged to keep themselves in real independence, rejecting -all relation with the merely sensory. That which pleases these senses -is not the beautiful of art.[10] - -It was Schleiermacher once more who recognized the impossibility of -disposing of the matter in this summary fashion. He refused to admit -the distinction between confused senses and clear senses, and asserted -that the superiority of sight and hearing over the other senses lay in -the fact that the others "are not capable of any free activity, and -indeed represent the maximum of passivity, whereas sight and hearing -are capable of an activity proceeding from within, and are able to -produce forms and notes without having received impressions from -outside"; were eye and ear merely means of perception, there would -be no visual or auditory arts, but they also operate as a function -of voluntary movements which supply a content to the dominion of the -senses. From another standpoint, however, Schleiermacher thinks that -"the difference seems to be one rather of degree or quantity, and a -minimum of independence must be recognized as existing in the other -senses as well."[11] Vischer remains faithful to the traditional "two -æsthetic senses," "free organs and no less spiritual than sensuous," -which "have no reference to the material composition of the object," -but allow this "to subsist as a whole and work upon them."[12] Köstlin -was of opinion that the inferior senses offer "nothing intuitible -separate from themselves, and are only modifications of ourselves, but -taste, smell and touch are not devoid of all æsthetic importance, since -they assist the superior senses; without touch an image could not be -recognized by the eye as being hard, resistant or rough; without smell -certain images could not be represented as sweet or scented."[13] - -We cannot go into a detailed account of all doctrines connected with -sensationalistic principles,[14] for all the senses are naturally -accepted as æsthetic by the sensationalists, who use "æsthetic" -interchangeably with" hedonistic": it will suffice if we recall the -"learned" Kralik, who was ridiculed by Tolstoy for his theory of the -five arts of taste, smell, touch, hearing and sight.[15] The few -quotations already given show the embarrassing difficulty caused -by the use of the word "æsthetic" as a qualification of "sense," -compelling writers to invent absurd distinctions between various groups -of senses, or to recognize all senses as being æsthetic, thus giving -æsthetic value to every sensory impression, as such. No way out of -this labyrinth can be found save by asserting the impossibility of -effecting a union between such wholly disparate orders of ideas as the -concept of the representative form of the spirit and that of particular -physiological organs or a particular matter of sense-impressions.[16] - -[Sidenote: _The theory of kinds of style_.] - -III. A variety of the error of literary kinds is to be found in -the theory of modes, forms or kinds of style (χαρακτῆρες τῆς -φράσεως), considered by the ancients as consisting of three forms, -the sublime, the medium and the tenuous, a tripartition due, it would -seem, to Antisthenes,[17] modified later into _subtile, robustum_ -and _floridum,_ or amplified into a fourfold division, or designated -by adjectives of historic origin as in the Attic, Asiatic or Rhodian -styles. The Middle Ages preserved the tradition of a tripartite -division, sometimes giving it a curious interpretation, to the effect -that the sublime style treats of kings, princes and barons (_e.g._ the -_Aeneid_); the mediocre, of middle-class people (_e.g. Georgies)_; the -humble, of the lowest class (_e.g. Bucolics;_) and the three styles -were for this reason also called tragic, elegiac and comic.[18] It -is a well-known fact that kinds in style have never ceased to afford -matter for discussion in rhetorical text-books down to modern times; -for instance, we find Blair distinguishing styles by such epithets -as the diffuse, the concise, the nervous, the daring, the soft, the -elegant, the flowery, etc. In 1818 the Italian Melchiorre Delfico, in -his book on _The Beautiful,_ energetically criticized the "endless -division of styles," or the superstition "that there could be so many -kinds of style"; saying that "style is either good or bad," and adding -that it is not possible "it should exist as a preconceived idea in the -artist's mind," but that "it should be the consequence of the principal -idea, _i.e._ that conception which determines the invention and the -composition."[19] - -[Sidenote: _The theory of grammatical forms or parts of speech._] - -IV. The same error reappears in the philosophy of language, as the -theory of grammatical forms or parts of speech,[20] first created by -the sophists (Protagoras is credited with having first distinguished -the gender of nouns), adopted by the philosophers, notably by Aristotle -and the Stoics (the former was acquainted with two or three parts of -speech, the latter with four or five), developed and elaborated by the -Alexandrian grammarians in the famous and endless controversy between -the analogists and the anomalists. The analogists (Aristarchus) aimed -at introducing logical order and regularity into linguistic facts, -and described as deviations all such as seemed to them irreducible -to logical form. These they called pleonasm, ellipsis, enallage, -parallage, and metalepsis. The violence thus wrought by the analogists -upon spoken and written language was such that (as Quintilian tells -us) some one wittily (_non invenuste_) remarked that it appeared to -be one thing to talk Latin and quite another to talk grammar (_aliud -esse latine_, _aliud grammatice loqui_).[21] The anomalists must be -credited with restoring to language its free imaginative movement: the -Stoic Chrysippus composed a treatise to prove that one thing (one same -concept) may be expressed by different sounds, and one and the same -sound may express different concepts (_similes res dissimilibus verbis -et similibus dissimiles esse vocabulis notatas._) Another anomalist -was the celebrated grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, who rejected -the metalepsis, the schemes, and the other artifices by which the -analogists tried to explain facts which did not fit their categories, -and pointed out that the use of one word for another, or one part of -speech for another, is not a grammatical figure, but a blunder, a thing -hardly to be attributed to a poet such as Homer. The upshot of the -dispute between anomalists and analogists was the science of Grammar -(τεχνη γραμματική), as handed down by the ancients to the modern -world, which is justly considered as a sort of compromise between the -two opposed parties because, if the schemes of inflection (κανόνες) -satisfy the demands of the analogists, their variety satisfies those -of the anomalists; hence the original definition of Grammar as theory -of analogy was changed subsequently to "theory of analogy and anomaly" -(ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνoμoίου θεωρία). The concept of correct usage, with -which Varro hoped to settle the controversy, fell into the trap (common -to compromises), merely stating the contradiction in set terms, like -the "convenient ornament" of Rhetoric or the kinds accorded a "certain -licence" in the literature of precept. If language follows usage (that -is to say, the imagination), it does not follow reason (or logic); if -it follows reason, it does not follow usage. When the analogists upheld -logic as supreme at least inside the individual kinds and sub-kinds, -the anomalists hastened to show that even this was not the case. Varro -himself was forced to confess that "this part of the subject really is -very difficult" (_hic locus maxime lubricus est_).[22] - -In the Middle Ages grammar was cultivated to the point of superstition. -Divine inspiration was found lurking in the eight parts of speech -because "_octavus numerus frequenter in divinis scripturis sacratis -invenitur,_" and in the three persons of verbal conjugation, created -simply "_ut quod in Trinitatis fide credimus, in eloquiis inesse -videatur._"[23] Grammarians of the Renaissance and later recommenced -the study of linguistic problems and worked to death ellipsis, -pleonasm, licence, anomaly and exception; only in comparatively recent -times has Linguistic begun to question the very validity of the concept -of parts of speech (Pott, Paul and others).[24] If they still survive, -the reason may lie in the facts that empirical, practical grammar -cannot do without them; that their venerable antiquity disguises their -illegitimate and shady origin; and that energetic opposition has been -worn down by the fatigue of an endless war. - -[Sidenote: _Theory of æsthetic criticism._] - -V. The relativity of taste is a sensationalistic theory which denies -a spiritual value to art. But it is rarely maintained by writers in -the ingenuous categorical garb of the old adage: _De gustibus non -est disputandum_ (concerning which it would be useful to enquire -when the saying was born, and what it fust meant: whether, too, the -word _gustibus_ referred solely to impressions of the palate, and -was only later extended to include æsthetic impressions); as though -sensationalists, as if dimly conscious of the higher nature of art, -have never been able to resign themselves to the complete relativity -of taste. Their torments in the matter really move one to pity. "Is -there," Batteux asks, "such a thing as good taste, and is it the only -good taste? In what does it consist? Upon what depend? Does it depend -upon the object itself or the genius at work upon it? Are there, or are -there not, rules? Is wit alone, or heart alone, the organ of taste, or -both together? How many questions have been raised on this familiar -often-treated subject, how many obscure and involved answers have -been given!"[25] This perplexity is shared by Home. Tastes, he says, -must not be disputed; neither those of the palate nor those of other -senses. A remark which seems highly reasonable from one point of view; -but, from another, somewhat exaggerated. But yet how can one dispute -it? how can one maintain that what actually pleases a man ought not -to please him? The proposition then must be true. But now no man of -taste will assent to it. We speak of good taste and bad taste; are all -criticisms which turn upon this distinction to be considered absurd? -have these everyday expressions no meaning? Home ends by asserting -a common standard of taste, deduced from the necessity of a common -life for mankind or, as he says, from a "final cause"; for without -uniformity of taste, who would trouble to produce works of art, build -elegant and costly edifices, or lay out beautiful gardens and so forth? -He does not fail to draw attention to a second final cause; that of -the advisability of attracting citizens to public shows and uniting -those whom class-differences and diversity of occupation tend to keep -apart. But how shall a standard of taste be established? This is a new -perplexity, which one cannot think to be escaped by observing that, as -in framing moral rules we seek the counsel of the most honourable of -educated men, not of savages; so to determine the standard of taste -we should have recourse to the few who are not worn out by degrading -bodily labour, not corrupted in taste, and not rendered effeminate -by pleasure, who have received the gift of good taste from nature, -and have brought it to perfection by the education and practice of a -lifetime: if, notwithstanding, controversies arise, then reference -must be made to the principles of Criticism as set forth by Home -himself in his own book.[26] Similar contradictions and vicious circles -reappear in David Hume's _Essay on Taste,_ where Hume tries in vain -to define the distinctive characteristics of the man of taste whose -judgement must be law, and, while asserting the uniformity of the -general principles of taste as founded in human nature, and warning -the reader against giving undue weight to individual perversions and -ignorances, at the same time asserts that divergences in taste may be -irreconcilable, insuperable, and yet blameless.[27] - -But a criticism of æsthetic relativism cannot be based upon the -opposite doctrine which, by its affirmation of absoluteness, resolves -taste into concepts and logical inferences. The eighteenth century -offers examples of this mistake in Muratori, one of the first to -maintain the existence of a rule of taste and a universal beauty -whose rules are furnished by Poetics;[28] in André, who said that -"the beauty in a work of art is not that which pleases at the first -glance of fancy through certain individual dispositions of the mental -faculties or bodily organs, but that which has a right to please the -reason and reflexion by its own inherent excellence or rightness and, -if the expression be allowed, by its intrinsic agreeableness";[29] -in Voltaire, who recognized a "universal taste" which was -"intellectual";[30] and in very many others. This intellectualistic -error, no less than the sensationalistic, was attacked by Kant; but -even Kant, by making beauty consist in a symbolism of morality, failed -to grasp the concept of an imaginative absoluteness of taste.[31] -Succeeding generations of philosophers met the difficulty by passing it -over in silence. - -Nevertheless, this criterion of an imaginative absoluteness, the idea -that in order to judge works of art one must place oneself at the -artist's point of view at the moment of production, and that to judge -is to reproduce, gathered weight little by little from the beginning -of the eighteenth century, when its first appearance is seen in the -work of the Italian Francesco Montani already quoted (1705), and by -the English poet Alexander Pope in his _Essay on Criticism._ ("A -perfect judge will read each work of wit With the same spirit that its -author writ."[32]) A few years later Antonio Conti recognized part of -the truth in the _règle du premier aspect_ advised by Terrasson as -a test for judging poetry, while noting it to be more applicable to -modern than to ancient works: "_quand on n'a pas l'esprit prévenu, -et que d'ailleurs on l'a assez pénétrant, on peut voir tout d'un -coup si un poète a bien imité son objet; car, comme on connaît -l'original, c'est-à-dire les hommes et les mœurs de son siècle, -on peut aisément lui confronter la copie, c'est-à-dire la poésie qui -les imite._" In judging ancient writers something more is necessary: -"_cette règle du premier aspect n'est presque d'aucun usage dans -l'examen de l'ancienne poésie, dont on ne peut pas juger qu'après -avoir longtemps réfléchi sur la religion des anciens, sur leurs lois, -leur mœurs, sur leurs manières de combattre et d'haranguer, etc. -Les beautés d'un poème, indépendantes de toutes ces circonstances -individuelles, sont très rares, et les grands peintres les ont toujours -évitées avec soin, car ils voulaient peindre la nature et non pas -leurs idées;_"[33] the necessary criterion, therefore, is to be found -in history. The end of the same century saw the concept of congenial -reproduction sufficiently defined by Heydenreich: "A philosophical -critic of art must himself be possessed of genius for art; reason -exacts this qualification and grants no dispensation, just as she will -refuse to appoint a blind man as judge of colours. The critic must -not pretend to be able to feel the attraction of beauty by means of -syllogisms (_Vernunftschlüsse_); beauty must manifest itself to feeling -with irresistible self-evidence and, attracted by its fascination, -reason must find no time to linger over the why and wherefore; the -effect, with its delightful and unexpected possession and domination -of the whole being, should suffocate at birth any inquiry into origins -or causes. But this state of fanatical admiration cannot last long; -reason must inevitably recover consciousness of itself and direct -its attention upon the state in which it was during the enjoyment -of beauty and upon its present memories of that state...."[34] This -was the wholesomely impressionistic theory which prevailed among the -Romanticists and was accepted even by De Sanctis.[35] Still there -was even then no definite theory of criticism, which demanded as its -condition of existence a precise concept of art and of the relations -of the work of art with its historical antecedents.[36] The very -possibility of æsthetic criticism was questioned in the second half -of the nineteenth century, when taste was relegated to a place amongst -the facts of individual caprice, and a so-called historical criticism -was proclaimed the sole scientific criticism and expounded in works of -irrelevant learning or buried beneath the preconceptions of positivists -and materialists. Those who reacted against such extremalism and -materialism generally made the mistake of supporting themselves by a -kind of intellectualistic dogmatism[37] or an empty æstheticism.[38] - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between taste and genius._] - -VI. We have seen that in the seventeenth century, when the words -"taste" and "genius" or "wit" were in fashion, the facts they -designated were sometimes interchanged amongst themselves and came to -be considered as one single fact, while sometimes each was conceived -as distinct in itself, genius being the faculty of production, and -taste the faculty of judgement, taste being further subdivided into -the sterile and the fertile: a terminology adopted by Muratori[39] in -Italy and Ulrich König[40] in Germany. Batteux said, "_le goût juge -des productions du génie_"[41]; and Kant speaks of defective works -having genius without taste or taste without genius, and of others in -which taste alone suffices;[42] now we find him distinguishing the two -concepts as the judging and producing faculties, now he speaks of them -as a single faculty existing in various degrees. An inherent difference -between taste and genius was accepted by later writers on Æsthetic and -assumed its most rigid form in the hands of Herbart and his followers. - -[Sidenote: _Concept of artistic and literary history._] - -VII. The evolutionary theory of art made its appearance towards the -end of the eighteenth century. This was the time when the distinction -between classical and romantic art was first made; a classification -later augmented by an introductory section on Oriental art, owing to -the increase of knowledge concerning the pre-Hellenic world. Towards -the end of his life Goethe told his friend Eckermann that the concepts -of classical and romantic had been formed by himself and Schiller, for -he himself had upheld the objective method in poetry, whilst Schiller, -in order to champion the subjective form to which he inclined, had -written the essay _On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry_, in which the word -naïve (_naiv_) expresses the style later called classical and the -word sentimental (_sentimentalisch)_ that later called romantic. "The -Schlegels," continues Goethe, "seized upon these ideas and disseminated -them, so that to-day everyone uses them and speaks of classical and -romantic, things perfectly unknown fifty years ago"[43] (Goethe was -speaking in 1831). Schiller's essay bears the imprint of Rousseau's -influence and is dated 1795-6.[44] It contains such statements as this: -"Poets are above all things the preservers of nature; and when they -cannot be so entirely, and have tried upon themselves the destructive -force of arbitrary and artificial forms or have fought against such -forms, they stand up to bear witness on her behalf. Poets, therefore, -either are nature or, having lost her, seek her. Hence arise two wholly -distinct kinds of poetic composition, exhausting between them the whole -field of poetry; all poets who are worthy of the name must belong, -according to the times and conditions in which they flourish, either -to the category of naïve or to that of sentimental poets." Schiller -recognized three kinds of sentimental poetry: satirical, elegiac and -idyllic; he defined a satirical poet as one "who takes as his object -the desertion of nature and the contrast of the real with the ideal." -The weak point of this division is the concept of two distinct kinds -of poetry, the reduction of the infinite forms in which poetry appears -to individuals, to two kinds. If one of these two kinds be taken the -perfect and the other as the imperfect kind, the mistake is made of -converting imperfection into a kind or species, the negative into a -positive. Wilhelm von Humboldt pointed out to his friend that if -form is the essence of art, there cannot be a kind of poetry, such -as the sentimental or romantic is supposed to be, in which matter -preponderates over form, for that would constitute a pseudo-art, not -a separate kind of art.[45] Schiller attached no historical meaning -to his classification, in fact he declared explicitly that in using -the words "ancient" and "modern" as equivalent to "ingenuous" and -"sentimental" he did not mean to deny that some "ancient" poets, in his -sense of the word, could be found among contemporary writers; the two -characters might even be united in the same poet or the same poetical -work, as (to give Schiller's own example) in _Werther_[46] The first to -assign a historical meaning to the division were Friedrich and Wilhelm -von Schlegel; the former in an early work of 1795, the latter in his -celebrated lectures on literary history given at Berlin in 1801-4. But -the two senses, systematic and historical, were variously alternated -and mixed by literary men and critics, and other distinctions were -added; "classical" was sometimes used to describe poetry of a frigid -and imitative style, while "romantic" poetry was the inspired; in some -countries the word "romantic" came to mean a political reactionary, in -Italy it stood for "liberal"; and so forth. In 1815, when Friedrich -Schlegel spoke of ancient Persian romantic poems, or when in our times -attention is called to the romanticism of the Greek, Latin or French -classics, the historical signification is lost in the theoretical, the -sense originally intended by Schiller. - -But the historical sense was prevalent in German idealism, which -inclined towards the construction of a universal history, including -that of literature and art, upon a scheme of ideal evolution. Schelling -made a sharp division between pagan and Christian art; the second -being held an advance upon the former which was the lowest step.[47] -Hegel accepted this division and introduced a final regress by -dividing the history of art into three periods: symbolic (Oriental) -art, classical (Hellenic) and romantic (modern). Just as he conceived -Roman art (with its introduction of satire and other kinds indicative -of a failure to maintain harmony between form and content) as the -dissolution of classical art, a thought suggested by Schiller, so -he found in the subjective humour of Cervantes and Ariosto[48] the -dissolution of romantic art; and he regarded this series as completing -the possibilities of art, though some interpreters think that by a -self-contradiction he admitted the possibility of a fourth period, an -art of the modern or future world. Indeed amongst his disciples we -find Weiss rejecting the Oriental period in order to save the triadic -division, and placing as third the modern period, synthesis of the -ancient and the mediæval:[49] Vischer too inclines to recognize a -modern or progressive period.[50] - -These arbitrary constructions reappear in the works of positivist -metaphysicians in the shape of an evolutionary or progressive history -of art. Spencer dreamed of writing some sort of treatise on the -subject, and in the published programme of his system (1860) we read -that the third volume of his _Principles of Sociology_ was to contain -amongst other things a chapter on æsthetic progress "with the gradual -differentiation of fine arts from primitive institutions and from each -other, with their increasing variety in development, their progress in -reality of expression and superiority of end." No grief need be felt -that the chapter was left unwritten when we remember the samples of it -preserved in the _Principles of Psychology_ and already reviewed in -these pages.[51] - -The strong historical sense of our own day is leading us further and -further away from the evolutionary or abstractly progressive theories -which falsify the free and original movement of art. Fiedler remarked -not without justice that unity and progress cannot be introduced -into a history of art, and that the works of artists must be judged -discretely as so many fragments of the life of the universe.[52] -In recent times a remarkable student of the history of figurative -art, Venturi, has tried to bring evolutionism into fashion, and has -illustrated it in a _History of the Madonna,_ in which the presentment -of the Virgin is conceived as an organism which is born, grows, attains -perfection, grows old and dies! Others have claimed for artistic -history its true character, intolerant of outward curb and rule, -drawing her ever-varied productions from the well-head of the infinite -Spirit.[53] - -_Conclusion._ - -These hurried notes may suffice to show in how narrow a circle has -hitherto moved the scientific criticism of the errors we have called -"particular." Æsthetic needs to be surrounded and nourished by a -watchful and vigorous critical literature drawing its life from her and -forming in turn her safeguard and strength. - - -[1] See above, pp. 98-99. - -[2] _Das Naturgefühl nach Verschiedenheit der Zeiten und Volksstämme,_ -in _Cosmos,_ ii. - -[3] V. Laprade, _Le Sentiment de la nature avant le christianisme,_ -1866; also _chez les modernes,_ 1867; Alfred Biese, _Die Entwicklung -des Naturgefühls den Griechen und Römern,_ Kiel, 1882-1884; _Die -Entwicklung des Naturgefühls im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit,_ 2nd -ed., Leipzig, 1892. - -[4] _Kritische Gänge,_ v. pp. 5-23. - -[5] _Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,_ pp. 217-218; cf. _Philos, d. Schönen,_ bk. -ii. ch. 7. - -[6] See above, pp. 164-165. - -[7] _Hippias maior, passim._ - -[8] _Elements of Criticism,_ introd., and cf. ch. 3. - -[9] Herder, _Kritische Wälder_ (in _Werke, ed. cit._ iv.), pp. 47-53; -cf. _Kaligone (ibid._ vol. xxii.), _passim;_ and fragment on _Plastic._ - -[10] _Vorles. üb. Ästh._ i. pp. 50-51. - -[11] _Op. cit._ p. 92 _seqq._ - -[12] _Ästh._ i. p. 181. - -[13] _Ästh._ pp. 80-83. - -[14] _E.g._ Grant Allen, _Physiological Æsthetics_, chs. 4 and 5. - -[15] Tolstoy, _What is Art?_ pp. 19-22. Kralik is the author of -_Weltschönheit, Versuch einer allgemeinen Ästhetik,_ Vienna, 1894. - -[16] See above, pp. 18-20. - -[17] Cf. Volkmann, _Rhet. d. G. u. Röm._ pp. 532-544. - -[18] Comparetti, _Virgilio net M. E._ i. p. 172. - -[19] _Nuove ricerche sul hello,_ ch. 10. - -[20] See above, pp. 145-146. - -[21] _Inst. Oral._ i. ch. 6. - -[22] For all this cf. the works of Lersch and of Steinthal, which -contain the more important texts. - -[23] Comparetti, _Virgilio nel M. E.,_ i. pp. 169-170. - -[24] Pott, introd. to Humboldt, _cit._ Paul, _Principien d. -Sprachgeschichte,_ ch. 20. - -[25] Batteux, _Les Beaux Arts,_ part ii. p. 54. - -[26] _Elem. of Criticism,_ iii. ch. 25. - -[27] _Essays, Moral, Political and Literary_ (London ed., 1862), ch. -23: _On the Standard of Taste._ - -[28] _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. v. ch. 5. - -[29] _Essai sur le beau,_ dise. 3. - -[30] _Essai sur le goût, cil._ - -[31] See above, pp. 280-282. - -[32] _Essay on Criticism,_ 1711, part ii. 11. 233-234. - -[33] Letter to Maffei, in _Prose e poesie,_ ii. pp. cxx-cxxi. - -[34] _System d. Ästhetik,_ pref. pp. xxi-xxv. - -[35] Amongst other places _Saggi critici,_ pp. 355-358. - -[36] See above, pp. 123-127. - -[37] _E.g._ A. Ricardou, _La Critique littéraire,_ Paris, 1896. - -[38] _E.g._ A. Conti, _Sul fiume del tempo,_ Naples, 1907. - -[39] _Perf. poesia,_ bk. v. ch. 5. - -[40] _Untersuchung v. d. guten Geschmack,_ 1727. - -[41] _Les Beaux Arts,_ part ii. ch. 1. - -[42] _Krit. d. Urtheilskr._ § 48. - -[43] Eckermann, _Gespräche mit Goethe,_ under date March 21, 1831. - -[44] _Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung,_ 1795-1796 (in _Werke,_ -ed. Goedecke, vol. xii.). - -[45] Quoted in Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ pp. 21-22. - -[46] _Üb. naive u. sentim. Dicht., ed. cit.,_ p. 155, note. - -[47] See above, p. 291. - -[48] _Vorles. üb. Ästh.,_ vols. ii. and iii. - -[49] Cf. von Hartmann, _Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,_ pp. 99-101. - -[50] _Ästh._ part iii. - -[51] See above, pp. 388-390. - -[52] C. Fiedler, _Ursprung d. künstl. Thätigkeit,_ p. 136 _seqq._ - -[53] Ad. Venturi, _La Madonna,_ Milan, 1899. Cf. B. Labanca, in -_Rivista polit, e lett._ (Rome), Oct. 1899, and in _Rivisla di filos. -e pedag._ (Bologna), 1900; and B. Croce, in _Nap. nobiliss., Rivista -di lopografia e storia dell' arte,_ viii. pp. 161-163, ix. pp. 13-14 -(reprinted in _Probl. di estetica,_ pp. 265-272). On the theory of -method in artistic and literary history cf. above, pp. 128-139. - - - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX - - -The first attempt at a history of Æsthetic is the work of J. Roller -(see above, p. 248) mentioned by Zimmermann (_Gesch. d. Ästh._ pref., -p. v) as being so exceedingly rare that he had never been able to see -a copy of the book. We ourselves have had the good fortune to find the -book in the Royal Library of Munich in Bavaria, by the help of our -friend Dr. Arturo Farinelli of Innsbruck University, and to obtain the -loan of it. It bears the title _Entwurf_ | _zur_ | _Geschichte und -Literatur_ | _der Æsthetik_ | _von Baumgarten auf die_ | _neueste -Zeit._ | _Herausgegeben_ | _von_ | _J. Koller_. | _Regensburg_ | in -der Montag und Weissischen Buchhandlung | 1799 (pp. viii-107, small -8vo); in the preface the author declares his intention of supplying -young men attending Lectures on the Criticism of Taste and the Theory -of the Fine Arts in the German Universities with a "lucid summary of -the origin and later progress of these studies," premising that he will -treat of general theories only and that his judgements are frequently -derived from reviews in literary periodicals. The introduction (§§ -1-7) treats of æsthetic theories from antiquity down to the beginning -of the eighteenth century; Koller observes that "the names and form -of a general Theory of Fine Art and Criticism of Taste were unknown -to the ancients, whose imperfect ethical theory prevented their -producing anything in this field." He dedicates § 5 to the Italians, -"who have produced little in theory"; indeed the only Italian books -mentioned are the _Entusiasmo_ of Bettinelli and the small work of -Jagemann, _Saggio di buon gusto nelle belle arti ove si spiegano gli -elementi dell' estetica,_ di Fr. Gaud. Jagemann, Regente agostiniano, -In Firenze, MDCCLXXI, Presso Luigi Bastianelli e compagni; 60 pp. -(concerning this, see B. Croce, _Problemi di estetica,_ pp. 387-390). -The section on the History and Literature of Æsthetic begins with the -oft-quoted passage from Bülffinger ("_Vellem existerent,_ etc.") and -passes at once to Baumgarten: "the theoretical epoch owes its existence -undeniably to Baumgarten; to him belongs the inalienable merit of -having first conceived an Æsthetic founded on principles of reason and -wholly developed, and of having tried to put it into practice by the -means offered him by his own philosophy." Immediately after this, Meier -is mentioned, followed by the titles, accompanied by brief extracts -and remarks--a sort of _catalogue raisonné_--of many German books on -Æsthetic from those of K. W. Müller (1759) to one by Ramier (1799), -mixed with various French and English writings under the dates of their -German translations. Special emphasis is laid on Kant (pp. 64-74), with -the remark that, prior to the appearance of the _Critique of Judgment,_ -æstheticians were divided into sceptics, dogmatics and empiricists: the -most powerful intellects of the nation inclined towards empiricism, so -much so that had Kant himself "been asked by what literature he had -been most strongly influenced in the development of his own thought, -he would certainly have named the acute empirical writers of England, -France and Germany"; but "by no pre-Kantian method had it been possible -to establish an agreement (_eine Einhelligkeit_) between men upon -matters of taste." The last pages call attention to the revival of -interest in æsthetic studies, which nobody would now dare call a waste -of time as in former days. "May Jacobi, Schiller and Mehmel soon enrich -literature by publication of their theories!" (p. 104). - -The rarity of Koller's book has led us to notice it at some length. -Apart from this the first general history of Æsthetic worthy the -name is that written by Robert Zimmermann, _Geschichte der Ästhetik -als philosophischer Wissenschaft,_ Vienna, 1858. It is divided into -four books: "the first of these contains the history of philosophical -concepts concerning the beautiful and art from the Greeks down to the -constitution of Æsthetic as a philosophical science through the labours -of Baumgarten"; the second runs from Baumgarten down to the reform of -Æsthetic brought about by the _Critique of Judgment_; the third, from -Kant to the Æsthetic of idealism; the fourth, from the beginnings of -idealistic Æsthetic down to the author's own day (1798-1858). The work -is on Herbartian lines, and is remarkable for solid research and lucid -exposition, although the erroneous point of view and neglect of all -æsthetic movement other than Græco-Roman or German are grave defects; -besides, it is now sixty years out of date. - -Less solid and more compilatory in nature, whilst retaining all the -defects of the foregoing, is the history by Max Schasler, _Kritische -Geschichte der Ästhetik,_ Berlin, 1872, divided into three books -treating of ancient Æsthetic and that of the eighteenth and nineteenth -centuries. The author belongs to the Hegelian school and conceives his -history as a propædeutic to theory, "in order, that is, to attain a -supreme principle for the construction of a new system"; he schematizes -the material of facts for each period into three grades of Æsthetic of -sensation (_Empfindungsurtheil,_) of intellect (_Verstandsurtheil_) and -of reason (_Vernunfturtheil._) - -English literature has Bernard Bosanquet's _History of Æsthetics,_ -London, 1892; a sober and well-arranged work, written from an eclectic -point of view between the Æsthetic of content and the Æsthetic of -form. The author, however, is wrong in believing he has passed over -"no writer of the first rank"; he has passed over not only writers but -some important movements of ideas, and in general he shows insufficient -knowledge of the literature of the Latin races. Another general -history of Æsthetic in English is the first volume of _The Philosophy -of the Beautiful, being Outlines of the History of Æsthetics,_ by -William Knight, London, Murray, 1895: it consists mainly of a rich -collection of extracts and abridgements of ancient and modern books -treating of Æsthetic. In this respect the most noteworthy chapters -are those on Holland, Great Britain and America (10-13); the second -volume, published in 1898, has in an appendix, pp. 251-281, notices -upon Æsthetic in Russia and Denmark. Another recent publication is -George Saintsbury's _A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in -Europe from the Earliest Times to the Present Day_; vol. i., Edinburgh -and London, 1900, concerning classical and mediæval criticism; vol. -ii., 1902, criticism from the Renaissance to end of the eighteenth -century: vol. iii., 1904, modern criticism. The writer of this History, -equally skilled in literature and innocent of philosophy, has thought -it possible to exclude æsthetic science in the strict sense, "the -more transcendental Æsthetic, those ambitious theories of Beauty and -artistic pleasure in general which seem so noble and fascinating until -we discover them to be but cloud-appearances of Juno," and to limit his -treatise to "lofty Rhetoric and Poetic, to the theory and practice of -Criticism and literary taste" (book i. ch. I). Thus is produced a book -instructive in many ways but wholly deficient in method and definite -object. What is lofty Rhetoric and Poetic, the theory of Criticism and -literary taste, if not Æsthetic pure and simple? how can the history of -these be composed without due notice of metaphysical Æsthetic and other -manifestations whose interaction and development are the fabric of -history itself? Perhaps Saintsbury hoped to be able to write a History -of Criticism as distinct from that of Æsthetic; if that be the case, -he has been unsuccessful in writing either one or the other. Cf. _La -Critica,_ ii. (1904), pp. 59-63. - -The generosity of the Hungarian Academy of Science has enabled us to -handle the History of Æsthetic (_Az Æsthetika története_) of Bela -Janosi, Budapesth, 1899-1901, in three volumes; the first volume treats -the Æsthetic of Greece; the second, of Æsthetic from the Middle Ages to -Baumgarten; the third, from Baumgarten to the present day. For us it is -a book sealed with seven seals, save for reviews which have appeared in -the _Deutsche Litteraturzeitung_ of Berlin, August 25, 1900, July 12, -1902, and May 2, 1903. - -Amongst Latin countries, France has no special history of Æsthetic, -for this title cannot be given to the portion of the second volume -(pp. 311-570) of the work by Ch. Levêque, _La Science du beau_ -(Paris, 1862), under the heading _Examen des principaux systèmes -d'esthétique anciens et modernes,_ where eight chapters are devoted -to an exposition of the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and -St. Augustine, Hutcheson, André and Baumgarten, Reid, Kant, Schelling -and Hegel. Spain, on the other hand, possesses the work of Marcelino -Menendez y Pelayo, _Historia de las idéas estéticas en España,_ 2nd -ed., Madrid, 1890-1901 (5 vols., variously distributed amongst the -1st ed., 1883-1891, and the 2nd), which is not restricted, as the -title suggests, to Spain alone or to Æsthetic alone but, as the author -observes in his preface (i. pp. xx-xxi), includes the metaphysical -disquisitions on the beautiful, the speculations of mystics on the -beauty of God and on love; the theories of art scattered through -the pages of philosophers; the æsthetic considerations found in -treatises upon individual arts (Poetics and Rhetoric, works on -painting, architecture, etc.); and, finally, ideas enunciated by -artists concerning their own particular arts. This work is of capital -importance on everything to do with Spanish authors, and also in its -general part contains good treatments of matters generally passed over -by historians. Menendez y Pelayo inclines to metaphysical idealism, -yet seems not disinclined to welcome elements from other systems, even -empirical theories: in our opinion this vagueness has an unfortunate -effect on the work as a whole. Some years ago Professor V. Spinazzola -announced the forthcoming publication of a course of lectures given -by Francesco de Sanctis in Naples in 1845 on _Storia della critica da -Aristotele ad Hegel._ For the history of Æsthetic in Italy cf. Alfredo -Rolla, _Storia delle idee estetiche in Italia,_ Turin, 1904; on which -see Croce, _Problemi di estetica,_ pp. 401-415. - -We need take no notice of the historical remarks or chapters that -generally stand at the beginning of treatises on Æsthetic; the most -important occur in the volumes of Solger, Hegel and Schleiermacher. A -general history of Æsthetic, from the rigorous point of view of the -principle of Expression, has not been attempted before the present work. - -For the bibliography down to the end of the eighteenth century, -Sulzer's _Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste,_ 2nd ed., with -additions by von Blankenburg, Leipzig, 1792, in four volumes, is -practically complete and is an inexhaustible mine of information. -For the nineteenth century much material is collected by C. Mills -Gayley and Fred Newton Scott in _An Introduction to the Methods and -Materials of Literary Criticism. The Bases in Æsthetics and Poetics,_ -Boston, 1899. Besides Sulzer, we may mention æsthetic dictionaries -by Gruber, _Wörterbuch z. Behuf d. Ästh. d. schönen Künste,_ Weimar, -1810: Jeithles, _Ästhetisches Lexikon,_ vol. i. A-K, Vienna, 1835: -Hebenstreit, _Encyklopädie d. Ästhetik,_ 2nd ed., Vienna, 1848. - -The following notes contain for the convenience of the student several -books which the author has not been able to see. - - -I. Concerning ancient Æsthetic no better or more comprehensive work can -be found than the _Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten,_ -by Ed. Müller, Breslau, 1831-1837, 2 vols. For inquiries concerning -the Beautiful special reference should be made to Julius Walter, _Die -Geschichte der Ästhetik im Alterthum ihren begrifflichen Entwicklung -nach,_ Leipzig, 1893. See also Em. Egger, _Essai sur l'histoire de la -critique chez les Grecs,_ 2nd ed., Paris, 1886: Zimmermann, Bk. I.: -Bosanquet, ch. ii.-v. and Saintsbury, vol. i. - -Of the innumerable special monographs: for Plato's Æsthetic see Arn. -Ruge, _Die platonische Ästhetik,_ Halle, 1832: for Aristotle's, Döring, -_Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles,_ Jena, 1876: C. Bénard, _L'Esthétique -d'Aristote et de ses successeurs,_ Paris, 1890: S. H. Butcher, -_Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art,_ 3rd ed., London, 1902. For -Plotinus, E. Vacherot, _Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie,_ -Paris, 1846: E. Brenning, _Die Lehre vom Schönen bei Plotin im -Zusammenhang seines Systems dargestellt,_ Göttingen, 1864. On the _Ars -Poetica_ of Horace, A. Viola, _L' arte poetica di Orazio nella critica -italiana e straniera,_ 2 vols. Naples, 1901-1907. - -For the history of ancient Psychology see H. Siebeck, _Geschichte der -Psychologie,_ 1880; A. E. Chaignet, _Histoire de la psychologie des -Grecs,_ Paris, 1887; L. Ambrosi, _La psicologia dell' immaginazione -nella storia della filosofia,_ Rome, 1898. For the history of -the philosophy of language see H. Steinthal, _Geschichte der -Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht -auf die Logik,_ 2nd ed. Berlin, 1890-1891, 2 vols. - - -II. For the æsthetic ideas of St. Augustine and early Christian authors -see Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ pp. 193-266. For Thomas Aquinas, L. -Taparelli, _Delle ragioni del bello seconde la dottrina di san Tommaso -d'Aquino_ (in _Civiltà cattolica_ for 1859-1860): P. Vallet, _L'Idée -du beau dans la philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin,_ 1883: M. de Wulf, -_Études historiques sur l'esthétique de St. Thomas,_ Louvain, 1896. - -For the literary doctrines of the Middle Ages see D. Comparetti, -_Virgilio nel medio evo,_ 2nd ed. Florence, 1893, vol. i., and G. -Saintsbury, _op. cit.,_ vol. i. pp. 369-486. For the early Renaissance -see K. Vossler, _Poetische Theorien in d. italien. Frührenaissance,_ -Berlin, 1900. For the Poetics of the high Renaissance see J. E. -Spingarn, _History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, with -special reference to the influence of Italy,_ New York, 1899 (Italian -trans. with corrections and additions, Bari, 1905). See also F. de -Sanctis, _Storia della letteratura italiana,_ Naples, 1870, _passim._ - -For the traditions of Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas in the Middle -Ages and Renaissance, for best and fullest information see Menendez y -Pelayo, _op. cit.,_ vol. i. part ii. and vol. ii. For Italian treatises -on beauty and love see Michele Rosi, _Saggi sui trattati d' amore -del cinquecento,_ Recanati, 1899, and F. Flamini, _Il cinquecento,_ -Milan, Vallardi, N.D., ch. iv. pp. 378-381. For Tasso see Alfredo -Giannini, _Il "Minturno" di T. Tasso,_ Ariano, 1899: see also E. Proto -in _Rass. crit. lett. ital._ vi. (Naples, 1901) pp. 127-145. For Leone -Ebreo see Edm. Solmi, _Benedetto Spinoza e L. E., studio su una fonte -italiana dimenticata dello spinozismo,_ Modena, 1903: cf. G. Gentile in -_Critica,_ ii. pp. 313-319. - -On J. C. Scaliger see Eug. Lintilhac, _Un Coup d'État dans la -république des lettres: Jules César Scaliger, fondateur du classicisme -cent ans avant Boileau_ (in the _Nouv. Revue,_ 1890, vol. lxiv. -pp. 333-346, 528-547). On Fracastoro, Giuseppe Rossi, _Girolamo_ -_Fracastoro in relazione all' aristotelismo e alla scienza nel -Rinascimento,_ Pisa, 1893. On Castelvetro, Ant. Fusco, _La poetica di -Ludovico Castelvetro,_ Naples, 1904. On Patrizzi, Oddone Zenatti, _Fr. -Patrizzi, Orazio Ariosto, e Torquato Tasso,_ etc. (Verona, per le nozze -Morpurgo-Franchetti, N.D.). - - -III. For this period of ferment see H. von Stein, _Die Entstehung -der neueren Ästhetik,_ Stuttgart, 1886: K. Borinski, _Die Poetik der -Renaissance und die Anfänge der litterarischen Kritik in Deutschland,_ -Berlin, 1886 (esp. the last chapter): also same author's _Baltasar -Gracian und die Hofliteratur in Deutschland,_ Halle a. S., 1894, B. -Croce, _I trattatisti italiani del Concettismo e B. Gracian,_ Naples, -1899 (in _Atti dell' Acc. Pont._ vol. xxix., reprinted in _Problemi di -estetica,_ pp. 309-345), _Elizabethan Critical Essays,_ edited with -an introduction by G. Gregory Smith, Oxford, 1904, 2 vols.: _Critical -Essays of the Seventeenth Century,_ edited by J. E. Spingam, Oxford, -1908, 2 vols.: Leone Donati, _J. J. Bodmer und die italienische -Litteratur_ (in the vol. _J. J. Bodmer, Denkschrift z. C. C. -Geburtstag,_ Zürich, 1900, pp. 241-312): see also _Probl. di estetica,_ -pp. 371-380. - -On Bacon see K. Fischer, _Franz Baco von Verulam,_ Leipzig, 1856 (2nd -ed. 1875), cf. P. Jacquinet, _Fr. Baconis in re litteraria iudicia,_ -Paris, 1863. On Gravina, Em. Reich, _G. V. Gravina als Ästhetiker_ (in -the Trans, of the Viennese Academy, vol. cxx. 1890): B. Croce, _Di -alcuni giudizi sul Gravina considerate come estetico,_ Florence, 1901 -(in _Miscellanea d' Ancona,_ pp. 456-464), reprinted in _Probl. di -est._ pp. 360-370. On Du Bos, Morel,_Étude sur l'abbé du Bos,_ Paris, -1849: P. Petent, _J. B. Dubos,_ Tramelan, 1902. On Bouhours, Doncieux, -_Un jésuite homme de lettres au XVIIe siècle,_ Paris, 1886. On the -Bouhours-Orsi controversy, F. Fottano, _Una polemica nel settecento,_ -in _Ricerche letterarie,_ Leghorn, 1897, pp. 313-332: A. Boeri, _Una -contesa letteraria franco-italiana nel secolo XVIII,_ Palermo, 1900 -(cf. _Giorn. stor. lett. ital._ xxxvi. pp. 255-256): B. Croce, _Varietà -di storia dell' estetica,_ §§ 1-2, in _Rass. crit. lett. ital._ cit., -vi. 1901, pp. 115-126, reprinted in _Probl. di est._ pp. 346-359. - - -IV. On Cartesianism in literature see É. Krantz, _L'Esthétique de -Descartes étudiée dans les rapports de la doctrine cartésienne avec -la littérature classique française au XVIIIe siècle,_ Paris, 1882; -see also the chapter on André, pp. 311-341, and the introduction by -V. Cousin to the _œuvres philosophiques du p. André,_ Paris, 1843: -on Boileau, Borinski, _Poetik d. Renaissance,_ c. 6, pp. 314-329; J. -Brunetière, _L'Esthétique de B._ in _Revue des Deux Mondes,_ June 1, -1899. - -On the English intellectualist æstheticians see Zimmermann, _op. cit._ -pp. 273-301; also von Stein, _op. cit._ pp. 185-216. On Shaftesbury -and Hutcheson see esp. Gid. Spicker, _Die Philosophie d. Grafen v. -Shaftesbury,_ Freiburg i. B., 1872, part iv. on art and literature, pp. -196-233: T. Fowler, S. _and Hutcheson,_ London, 1882: William Robert -Scott, _Francis Hutcheson, his life, teaching and position in the -history of philosophy_, Cambridge, 1900. - -On Leibniz, Baumgarten and contemporary German writers see Th. W. -Danzel, _Gottsched und seine Zeit,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1855: H. G. -Meyer, _Leibnitz und Baumgarten als Begründer der deutschen Ästhetik,_ -Inaugural Dissertation, Halle, 1874: Joh. Schmidt, _L. und B.,_ Halle, -1875: Ém. Grucker, _Histoire des doctrines littéraires et esthétiques -en Allemagne_ (from Opitz to the Swiss writers), Paris, 1883: Fr. -Braitmaier, _Geschichte der poetischen Theorie und Kritik von den -Diskursen der Maler his auf Lessing,_ Frauenfeld, 1888-1889. In the -last-named book the first part treats of the beginning of Poetics and -criticism in Germany, considered in their relation to the doctrines -of classical, French and English writers: the second part treats of -an attempt to found an æsthetic philosophy and theory of poetry upon -a basis of Leibnitian-Wolffian psychology: which includes a long -discussion of Baumgarten and quotations from two dissertations, Raabe's -_A. G. Baumgarten, æstheticæ in disciplinæ formam parens et auctor,_ -and Prieger's _Anregung u. metaphysische Grundlage d. Ästh. von A. G. -Baumgarten,_ 1875 (cf. vol. ii. p. 2). - - -V. On Vico as æsthetician see B. Zumbini, _Sopra alcuni principî -di critica letteraria di G. B. V._ (reprinted in _Studî di letter. -italiana,_ Florence, 1894, pp. 257-268): B. Croce, _G. B. V. primo -scopritore della scienza estetica,_ Naples, 1901 (reprinted from -_Flegrea._ April 1901), incorporated in the present volume as has been -mentioned already: see also G. Gentile in _Rass. crit. della lett. -ital.,_ cit., vi. pp. 254-265: E. Bertana, in _Giorn. stor. lett. -ital._ xxxviii. pp. 449-451: A. Martinazzoli, _Intorno alle dottrine -vichiane di ragion poetica,_ in _Riv. di filos. e sc. aff._ of Bologna, -July 1902: also the reply of B. Croce, _ibid.,_ August 1902: Giovanni -Rossi, _Il pensiero di G. B. V. intorno alla natura della lingua e all' -ufficio dette lettere,_ Salerno, 1901. The important position occupied -by Vico in respect to Æsthetic had been remarked earlier by C. Marini, -_G. B. V. al cospetto del secolo XIX,_ Naples, 1852, c. 7, § 10. For -the influence exercised by Vico, B. Croce, _Per la storia della critica -e storiografia letteraria,_ Naples, 1903 (in _Atti d. Acc. Pont.,_ vol. -xxxiii.), pp. 7-8, 26-28 (reprinted in _Probl. di est._ pp. 423-425), -and G. A. Borgese, _Storia della critica romantica in Italia,_ Naples, -1905, _passim._ - -On Vico's thought in general, as well as on his Æsthetic, see B. Croce, -_La filosofia di Giambattista Vico,_ Bari, 1911: English translation -by R. G. Collingwood, 1913. The copious literature concerning Vico is -given by B. Croce in _Bibliografia vichiana,_ Naples, 1904 (reprinted -from _Atti dell' Acad. Pont._ vol. xxxiv.), and _Supplemento, ibid._ -1907, and _Secondo Supplemento,_ 1910 (_Atti_ cit., vols, xxxvii. and -xli.). - - -VI. On the literary doctrines of Conti see G. Brognoligo, _L' opera -letteraria di A. Conti,_ in _Arch. veneto,_ 1894, vol. i. pp. 152-209: -on Cesarotti, Vitt. Alemanni, _Un filosofo delle lettere,_ vol. i. -Turin, 1894: on Pagano, B. Croce, _Varietà di storia dell' estetica,_ § -3; _Di alcuni estetici italiani della seconda metà del secolo XVIII,_ -in _Rass. crit._ cit. vii. 1902, pp. 1-17 (reprinted in _Probl. di -est._ pp. 381-450). - -On the German æstheticians, in addition to the various general -histories already quoted, see R. Sommer, _Grundzüge einer Geschichte -der deutschen Psychologie u. Ästhetik von Wolff-Baumgarten his -Kant-Schiller,_ Würzburg, 1892. Greatly inferior is M. Dessoir, -_Geschichte d. neueren deutschen Psychologie,_ 2nd ed., Berlin, 1897 -(the first half only is published, down to Kant exclusive). - -On Sulzer, Braitmaier, _op. cit._ ii. pp. 55-71: on Mendelssohn, -_ibid._ pp. 72-279: for Elias Schlegel, _op. cit._ i. p. 249 _seqq._; -on Mendelssohn see also Th. Wilh. Danzel, _Gesammelte Aufsätze,_ -Leipzig, Jahn, 1855, pp. 85-98: Kannegiesser, _Stellung Mendelssohns -in d. Gesch. d. Ästh.,_ 1868. On Riedel, K. F. Wize, _F. J. Riedel u. -seine Ästhetik,_ Diss., Berlin, 1907. On Herder, Ch. Joiet, _H. et la -renaissance littéraire en Allemagne au XVIIIe siècle,_ Paris, 1875: -R. Haym, _H. nach seinem Leben u. seinen Werken,_ 2 vols., Berlin, -1880: G. Jacobi, _H.'s und Kant's Ästh.,_ Leipzig, 1907. For the ideas -of Hamann and Herder concerning the origins of poetry see Croce in -_Critica,_ ix. (1911), pp. 469-472. On the history of Linguistic, see -Th. Benfey, _Geschichte d. Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland,_ Munich, -1869, introd.: H. Steinthal, _Der Ursprung der Sprache im Zusammenhange -mit d. letzen Fragen alles Wissens, eine Darstellung, Kritik und -Fortentwicklung der vorzüglichsten Ansichten,_ 4th ed., Berlin, 1888. - - -VII. On Batteux see E. v. Danckelmann, _Charles Batteux, sein Leben u. -sein ästhetisches Lehrgebäude,_ Rostock, 1902. On Hogarth, Burke and -Home, Zimmermann, _op. cit._ pp. 223-273; Bosanquet, _op. cit._ pp. -202-210. On Home esp. J. Wohlgemüth, _H. Home's Ästhetik,_ Rostock, -1894: W. Neumann, _Die Bedeutung Homes für d. Ästhetik, u. sein -Einflüss auf d. deutschen Ästhetik,_ Halle, 1894. On Hemsterhuis, Ém. -Grucker, _François H., sa vie et ses oeuvres,_ Paris, 1866. - -On Winckelmann, Goethe, _W. u. sein Jahrhundert,_ 1805 (in _Werke,_ -ed. Goedecke, vol. xxxi.): C. Justi, _W. u. seine Zeitgenossen,_ 2nd -ed., Leipzig, 1898. A criticism of Winckelmann's theory, by H. Hettner, -appeared in the _Revue Moderne,_ 1866. On Mengs, Zimmermann, _op. cit._ -pp. 338-355. On Lessing, Th. Wilh. Danzel, _G. E. Lessing, sein Leben -und seine Werke,_ Leipzig, 1849-1853: Kuno Fischer, _L. als Reformater -d. deutschen Litteratur,_ Stuttgart, 1881: Ém. Grucker, _Lessing,_ -Paris, 1891: Erich Schmidt, _Lessing,_ 2nd ed., Berlin, 1899: K. -Borinski, _Lessing,_ Berlin, 1900. - -On Spalletti see B. Croce, _Var.,_ cit., § 3 (_Probl. d. est._ -pp. 392-398). On Meier, Hirth and Goethe, Danzel, _Goethe und die -Weimarsche Kunstfreunde in ihrem Verhältniss z. Winckelmann,_ in -_Gesamm. Aufs._ pp. 118-145. On Goethe's Æsthetic esp. see Wilh. Bode, -_Goethes Ästhetik,_ Berlin, 1901. - - -VIII. Critical expositions of Kant's Æsthetic are very numerous even -in Italy: for example, O. Colecchi, _Questioni filosofiche,_ Naples, -1843, vol. iii.; C. Cantoni, _E. Kant,_ Milan, 1884, vol. iii. In -German, esp. H. Cohen, _Kants Begründung der Ästhetik,_ Berlin, -1889; also an important chapter in Sommer, _op. cit._ pp. 337-352; a -sufficient representative of a host of others is the elaborate work of -Victor Basch, _Essai critique sur l'esthétique de Kant,_ Paris, 1896. -See also, on an Italian trans. of the _Kr. d. Urth.,_ B. Croce in -_Critica,_ v. (1907), pp. 160-164. - -For Kant's lectures and the historical antecedents of his _Critique of -Judgment_ (besides the dissertations of H. Falkenheim, _Die Entstehung -der kantischen Ästhetik,_ Heidelberg, 1890, and Rich. Grundmann, _Die -Entwickel d. Ästh. Kants,_ Leipzig, 1893) see the exhaustive work of -Otto Schlapp, _Kant's Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung d. Kritik d. -Urtheilskraft,_ Göttingen, 1901. - - -IX. For the whole of this period, beside the general histories already -quoted which treat of it in great detail, see Th. Wilh. Danzel, _Über -den gegenwärtigen Zustand d. Philosophie d. Kunst u. ihre nächste -Aufgabe_ (in the _Zeitschr. f. Phil,_ of Fichte, 1844-1845, and -reprinted in _Gesammelte Aufsätze,_ pp. 1-84): this treats of Kant, -Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and, more particularly, of Solger, -pp. 51-84: Herm. Lotze, _Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland,_ -Munich, 1868 (in the coll. "History of the Sciences in Germany," -published by the Royal Academy of Sciences of Munich in Bavaria): -first book, history of general points of view from Baumgarten to the -Herbartian school: second book, history of individual fundamental -æsthetic concepts: third book, contributions to the history of the -theory of the arts: Ed. v. Hartmann, _Die deutsche Ästhetik s. Kant_ -(first part, historico-critical), Berlin, 1886, divided into two books. -The first book discusses the doctrine of the chief æstheticians and, -after an introduction on the foundation of philosophical æsthetic by -Kant, treats of the Æsthetic of the content, divided into that of -abstract idealism (Schelling, Schopenhauer, Solger, Krause, Weisse, -Lotze); of concrete idealism (Hegel, Trahndorff, Schleiermacher, -Deutinger, Oersted, Vischer, Zeising, Carrière, Schasler); of the -Æsthetic of feeling (Kirchmann, Wiener, Horwicz); the Æsthetic of form, -subdivided into abstract formalism (Herbart, Zimmermann), and concrete -formalism (Köstlin, Siebeck). The second book is concerned with the -more important special problems. - -On the Æsthetic of Schiller specially see, amongst numerous monographs, -Danzel, _Schillers Briefwechsel mit Körner,_ in _Ges. Aufs._ pp. -227-244: G. Zimmermann, _Versuch einer schillerschen Ästhetik,_ -Leipzig, 1889: F. Montargis, _L'Esthétique de Schiller,_ Paris, 1890: -the chapter in Sommer, _op. cit._ pp. 365-432: V. Basch, _La Poétique -de Schiller,_ Paris, 1901. - -On the Æsthetic of Romanticism, R. Haym, _Die romantische Schule: -ein Beitrag z. Geschichte d. deutschen Geistes,_ Berlin, 1870 (cf. -on Tieck, book i.; on Novalis, book iii.: for criticism of the two -Schlegels, bk. ii. and bk. iii. ch. 5): N. M. Pichtos, _Die Ästhetik -Aug. W. v. Schlegel in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung,_ Berlin, -1893. On the Æsthetic of Fichte, G. Tempel, _Fichtes Stellung z. -Kunst,_ Metz, 1901. - -On the Æsthetic of Hegel, Danzel, _Über d. Ästhetik der hegelschen -Philosophie,_ Hamburg, 1844: R. Haym, _Hegel u. seine Zeit,_ Berlin, -1857, pp. 433-443: J. S. Kedney, _Hegel's Æsthetics: a critical -exposition,_ Chicago, 1885: Kuno Fischer, _Hegels Leben u. Werke,_ -Heidelberg, 1898-1901, chs. 38-42, pp. 811-947: J. Kohn, _Hegels -Ästhetik_ in _Zeitschrift für Philosophie,_ 1902, vol. 120, fasc. ii.: -see also B. Croce, _Cio che è vivo e cio che è morto della filosofia di -Hegel,_ Bari, 1907, ch. 6; Engl. tr. by D. Ainslie, 1915. - - -X. For the Æsthetic of Schopenhauer, Fr. Sommerlad, _Darstellung u. -Kritik d. ästh. Grundanschauungen Schopenhauers,_ Diss., Giessen, 1895: -Ed. v. Mayer, _Schopenhauers Ästhetik u. ihr Verhältniss z. d. ästh. -Lehren Kants u. Schellings,_ Halle, 1897: Ett. Zoccoli, _L' estetica -di A. Sch.: propedeutica all' estetica Wagneriana,_ Milan, 1901: G. -Chialvo, _L' estetica di A. Sch., saggio esplicativo-critico,_ Rome, -1905. - -For the Æsthetic of Herbart, beside Zimmermann, _op. cit._ pp. 754-804, -see O. Hostinsky, _Herbarts Ästhetik in ihrer grundlegenden Theilen -quellenmässig dargestellt u. erläutert,_ Hamburg-Leipzig, 1891. - - -XI. Of the Æsthetic of Schleiermacher, the fullest treatment is given -by Zimmermann, pp. 609-634, and von Hartmann, pp. 156-169. - - -XII. For the history of the theory of Language, beside Benfey, _op. -cit._ introd., see Max. Leop. Loewe, _Historiæ criticæ grammatices -universalis seu philosophicæ lineamenta,_ Dresden, 1839: A. F. Pott, -_W. v. Humboldt und die Sprachwissenschaft,_ introd. to the reprint of -Humboldt's _Verschiedenheit d. menschl. Sprachbaues_ (2nd ed., Berlin, -1880, vol. i.). - -On Humboldt see esp. Steinthal, _Der Ursprung der Sprache,_ pp. 59-81, -and Pott's introd. cit., _Wilh. v. Humboldt u. die Sprachwissenschaft._ - - -XIII. For this period, treated with unnecessary fulness, see von -Hartmann, _op. cit._ bk. i.: more concisely by Menendez y Pelayo, vol. -iv. (1st ed.), part i. chs. 6-8. - -For the doctrine of the modifications of beauty see Zimmermann, _op. -cit._ pp. 715-744: Schasler, _op. cit._ §§ 517-546: Bosanquet, _op. -cit._ ch. 14, pp. 393-440: in greater detail, v. Hartmann, bk. ii. part -i. pp. 363-461. - -For the history of the Sublime see also F. Unruh, _Der Begriff des -Erhabenen seit Kant,_ Königsberg, 1898. For Humour see B. Croce, _Dei -varî significanti della parola umorismo e del suo uso nella critica -letteraria,_ in the _Journal of Comparative Literature_ of New York, -1903, fasc. iii. (reprinted in _Probl. di est._ pp. 275-286) F. -Baldensperger, _Les Définitions de l'humour,_ in _Études; d'hist. -litt._ Paris, 1907. For the history of the concept of the Graceful, F. -Torraca, _La grazia secondo il Castiglione e secondo lo Spencer_ (in -Morandi, _Antol. della critica lett. ital._ 2nd ed., Città di Castello, -1885, pp. 440-444): F. Braitmaier, _op. cit._ ii. pp. 166-167. - - -XIV. For the history of Æsthetic in France during the nineteenth -century there is nothing so good as Menendez y Pelayo, vol. iii. -part ii. chs. 3-9; _ibid._ chs. 1-2 give full information concerning -Æsthetic in England. - -For Æsthetic in Italy in the first half of the nineteenth century, -Karl Werner, _Idealistische Theorien des Schönen in d. italienischen -Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,_ Vienna, 1884 (from Trans, -of the Imperial and Royal Viennese Academy). On Rosmini see esp. P. -Bellezza, _Antonio Rosmini e la grande questione letteraria del secolo -XIX_ (in the collection _Per Antonio Rosmini nel primo centenario,_ -Milan, 1897, vol. i. pp. 364-385). On Gioberti, Ad. Faggi, _Vinc. -Gioberti esteta e letterato,_ Palermo, 1901 (from the _Atti della R. -Accad. di Palermo,_ s. iii. vol. vi.). On Delfico, G. Gentile, _Dal -Gcnovesi al Galluppi,_ Naples, 1903, ch. ii. On Leopardi, E. Bertana -in _Giorn. stor. lett. ital._ xli. pp. 193-283; R. Giani, _L'estetica -nei pensieri di G. Leopardi,_ Turin, 1904 (cf. G. Gentile in _Critica,_ -ii. pp. 144-147). See also a book quoted by A. Rolla and B. Croce, -_loc. cit.,_ containing a catalogue of Italian books on Æsthetic of the -nineteenth century (_Probl. di est._ pp. 401-415). - -On the theories of the Italian Romanticists, F. De Sanctis, _La poetica -del Manzoni,_ in _Scritti varî,_ ed. Croce, i. pp. 23-45; and the same -author's _La letteratura italiana nel secolo XIX,_ ed. Croce, Naples, -1897, on Tommaseo, pp. 233-243: on Cantù, pp. 244-273: on Berchet, -pp. 479-493: on Mazzini, pp. 424-441. On Mazzini esp. F. Ricitari, -_Concetto dell' arte e della critica letteraria nella mente di G. -Mazzini,_ Catania, 1896. For all these see G. A. Borgese, _Storia della -critica romantica in Italia,_ cit. - - -XV. For the life of De Sanctis and the bibliography of his works see -_Scritti varî,_ ed. Croce, ii. pp. 267-308, also the volume _In memoria -di Fr. de S._ edited by M. Mandalari, Naples, 1884. - -On De Sanctis as literary critic, P. Villari, _Commemorazione_: A. C. -de Meis, _Commem.,_ in the above-mentioned vol. _In memoria_: Marc -Monnier in _Revue des Deux Mondes,_ April I, 1884: Pio Ferrieri, -_Fr. de S. e la critica letteraria,_ Milan, 1888: B. Croce, _La -critica letteraria,_ Rome, 1896, ch. 5; _Fr. de S. e i suoi critici -recenti_ (in _Atti dell' Accad. Pontan._ vol. xxviii. reprinted in -_Scritti varî,_ append, ii. 309-352), and prefs. to vols, already -quoted, _La lett. ital. nel sec. XIX,_ and _Scritti varî; De Sanctis e -Schopenhauer,_ in _Atti della Pontaniana,_ xxxii. 1902: Enr. Cocchia, -_II pensiero critico di Fr. de S. nell' arte e nella politica,_ -Naples, 1899: G. A. Borgese, _op. cit._ last chapter and _passim._ - - -XVI. On the last phase of metaphysical Æsthetic, G. Neudecker, _Studien -z. Geschichte d. deutschen Ästhetik s. Kant,_ Würzburg, 1878, which -discusses and criticises more particularly Vischer (self-criticism), -Zimmermann, Lotze, Köstlin, Siebeck, Fechner and Deutinger. On -Zimmermann, von Hartmann, _op. cit._ pp. 267-304: Bonatelli, in _Nuova -Antologia,_ October 1867. On Lotze, Fritz Kogel, _Lotzes Ästhetik,_ -Göttingen, 1886: A. Matragrin, _Essai sur l'esthétique de Lotze,_ -Paris, 1901. On Köstlin, von Hartmann, pp. 304-317. On Schasler, see -the same, pp. 248-252, also Bosanquet, pp. 414-424. On Hartmann, Ad. -Faggi, _Ed. H. e l' estetica tedesca,_ Florence, 1895. On Vischer see -M. Diez, _Fried. Vischer u. d. ästh. Formalismus,_ Stuttgart, 1889. - -For French and English æstheticians, besides Menendez y Pelayo, _op. -cit.,_ on Ruskin, see J. Milsand, _L'Esthétique anglaise, étude sur J. -Ruskin,_ Paris, 1864: R. de la Sizeranne, _Ruskin et la religion de la -beauté,_ 3rd ed., Paris, 1898; cf. part iii. On Fornari, V. Imbriani, -_Vito Fornari estetico_ (reprinted in _Studî letterarî e bizzarri e -satiriche,_ ed. Croce, Bari, 1907). On Tari see Nic. Gallo, _Antonio -Tari, studio critico,_ Palermo, 1884: Croce, in _Critica,_ v. (1907), -pp. 357-361; also in pref. to vol.: _A. Tari, saggi di estetica e -metafisica,_ Bari, 1910. - - -XVII. For positivist Æsthetic see Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iv. -(1st ed.) vol. ii. pp. 120-136, 326-369: N. Gallo, _La scienza dell' -arte,_ Turin, 1887, chs. 6-8, pp. 162-216. - - -XVIII. On Kirchmann, von Hartmann, pp. 253-265. For various recent -German æstheticians, Hugo Spitzer, _Kritische Studien z. Ästhet. der -Gegenwart,_ Leipzig, 1897. On Nietzsche, Ettore G. Zoccoli, _Fred. -Nietzsche,_ Modena, 1898, pp. 268-344: Jul. Zeitler, _Nietzsches -Ästhetik,_ Leipzig, 1900. On Flaubert, A. Fusco, _La teoria dell' arte -in G. F.,_ Naples, 1907: cf. _Critica,_ vi. (1908), pp. 125-134. For -books on Æsthetic published during the last decade of the nineteenth -century see Luc. Arréat, _Dix années de philosophie,_ 1891-1900, Paris, -1901, pp. 74-116. A few remarks on contemporary Æsthetic are made by -K. Groos in _Die Philosophie im Beginn. des XXen Jahrh.,_ ed. by W. -Windelband, Heidelberg, 1904-1905. For latest books on Æsthetic see -_Critica,_ ed. B. Croce (Naples), from 1903 onward, which publishes -reviews of them. There is also a review, started in 1906, published -at Stuttgart (ed. F. Enke), _Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine -Kunstwissenschaft,_ edited by Max Dessoir. - - -XIX. The history of particular problems is usually omitted, or, at -best, erroneously treated in histories of Æsthetic: for example, see -the difficulty experienced by Ed. Müller, _Gesch.,_ cit., ii. pref. pp. -vi-vii, in connecting his treatment of the history of Rhetoric with -that of Poetics. Some writers attach Rhetoric to the individual arts or -to artistic technique; others treat the doctrines of the modification -of beauty and of natural beauty (in the metaphysical sense) as special -problems; others, again, discuss the kinds or classifications in art -in an incidental manner, without seeking to incorporate them in the -principal æsthetic problem. - -§ 1. On the history of Rhetoric in the ancient sense see Rich. -Volkmann, _Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer -Übersicht dargestellt,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1885, of capital importance: -A. Ed. Chaignet, _La Rhétorique et son histoire,_ Paris, 1888; rich in -material, but ill-arranged and with the preconception that Rhetoric -is still a defensible body of science. For special treatment see -Ch. Benoist, _Essai historique sur les premiers manuels d'invention -oratoire, jusqu'à Aristote,_ Paris, 1846: Georg Thiele, _Hermagoras, -ein Beitrag z. Geschichte d. Rhetorik,_ Strasburg, 1893. There is no -history of rhetoric in modern times. For criticism of Vives and other -Spaniards see Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. pp. 211-300 (2nd ed.). -For Patrizzi see B. Croce, _F. Patrizzi e la critica della rettorica -antica,_ in the vol. of _Studî_ in honour of A. Graf, Bergamo, 1903 -(_Probl. d. est._ pp. 297-308). - -For Rhetoric as theory of literary form in antiquity see Volkmann, -_op. cit._ pp. 393-566: Chaignet, _op. cit._ pp. 413-539: also Egger, -_passim,_ and Saintsbury, bks. i. ii. For purposes of comparison see -Paul Reynaud, _La Rhétorique sanskrite exposée dans son développement -historique et ses rapports avec la rhétorique classique,_ Paris, 1884. -For the Middle Ages, Comparetti, _Virgilio nel medio evo,_ vol. i., -and Saintsbury, bk. iii. There is need for a work on modern Rhetoric -in this sense also. For the form it assumed ultimately according to -the theory of Gröber see B. Croce, _Di alcuni principî di sintassi e -stilistica psicologiche del Gröber,_ in _Atti dell' Accad. Pontan._ -vol. xxix. 1899: K. Vossler, _Literaturblatt für germ. u. roman. -Philologie,_ 1900, N.I.: B. Croce, _Le categorie rettoriche e il prof. -Gröber,_ in _Flegrea,_ April 1900: K. Vossler, _Positivismo e idealismo -nella scienza del linguaggio,_ Ital. trans. Bari, 1908, pp. 48-61 (cf. -_Probl. d. est._ pp. 143-171). Very incomplete observations on the -history of the concept of metaphor are made by A. Biese, _Philosophie -d. Metaphorischen,_ Hamburg-Leipzig, 1893, pp. 1-16; but this book -has the merit of calling attention to the importance of the views and -influence of Vico. - -§ 2. For the history of the literary kinds in antiquity see the works -above quoted by Müller, Egger, Saintsbury, and the vast literature on -Aristotle's _Poetics._ For comparison with Sanskrit poetics, Sylvain -Levi, _Le Théâtre indien,_ Paris, 1890, esp. pp. 11, 152. For mediæval -poetry see esp. Gio. Mari, _I trattati medievali di ritmica latina,_ -Milan, 1899; and his recent edition of _Poetica magistri Iohannis -anglici,_ 1901. - -For the history of the kinds under the Renaissance see principally -Spingarn, _op. cit._ i. chs. 3-4; ii. ch. 2; iii. ch. 3. Also Menendez -y Pelayo, Borinski, Saintsbury, _passim._ - -Special works: on Pietro Aretino, De Sanctis, _Storia della letteratura -italiana,_ ii. pp. 122-144: A. Graf, _Attraverso il cinquecento,_ -Turin, 1888, pp. 87-167: K. Vossler, _P. A.'s künstlerisches -Bekenntniss,_ Heidelberg, 1901. On Guarini, V. Rossi, _G. B. Guarini -e il Pastor Fido,_ Turin, 1886, pp. 238-250. On Scaliger, Lintilhac, -_Un Coup d'État,_ cit. For the three unities, L. Morandi, _Baretti -contro Voltaire,_ 2nd ed., Città di Castello, 1884: Breitinger, _Les -Unités d'Aristote avant le Cid de Corneille,_ 2nd ed., Geneva-Basle, -1895: J. Ebner, _Beitrag z. einer Geschichte d. dramatischen Einheiten -in Italien,_ Munich, 1898. On the Spanish polemic concerning comedy -see A. Morel Fatio on the defenders of comedy and of the _Arte -nuevo,_ in the _Bulletin Hispanique_ of Bordeaux, vols. iii. and iv.: -on the dramatic theories see Arnaud, _Les Théories dramatiques au -XVIIe siècle, étude sur la vie et les œuvres de l'abbé D'Aubignac,_ -Paris, 1888: Paul Dupont, _Un Poète philosophe au commencement du_ -_XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, Houdar de la Motte,_ Paris, 1898: Alfredo -Galletti, _Le teorie drammatiche e la tragedia in Italia nel secolo -XVIII,_ part i. 1700-1750, Cremona, 1901. On the history of French -Poetics, F. Brunetière, _L'Évolution des genres dans l'histoire de -la littérature,_ Paris, 1890, vol. i. introd.: "_L'évolution de la -critique depuis la Renaissance jusqu'à nos jours._" On that of English -Poetics, Paul Hamelius, _Die Kritik in d. engl. Literatur des XVII en -u. XVIII<sup>en</sup> Jahrh.,_ Leipzig, 1897: also the well-filled -chapter in Gayley-Scott, _op. cit._ pp. 382-422, the sketch of a book -on the subject. For the romantic period see Alfred Michiels, _Histoire -des idées littéraires en France au XIXe siècle, et de leurs origines -dans les siècles antérieures,_ 4th ed., Paris, 1863. For Italy see G. -A. Borgese, _op. cit._ - -§ 3. For the early history of the distinction and classification of the -arts see the literature quoted above in relation to Lessing, and his -_Laokoon,_ with notes by Blümner. For subsequent history, H. Lotze, -_Geschichte,_ cit., bk. iii.: Max Schasler, _Das System der Künste -auf einem neuen, im Wesen der Kunst begründeten Gliederungsprincip,_ -2nd ed., Leipzig-Berlin, 1881, introd.: Ed. v. Hartmann, _Deutsche -Ästh. s. Kant,_ bk. ii. part ii. especially pp. 524-580: V. Basch, -_Essai sur l'esth. de Kant,_ pp. 483-496. - -§ 4. For the doctrine of styles in antiquity see Volkmann, _op. cit._ -pp. 532-566. The history of grammar and parts of speech is treated -fully so far as Græco-Roman antiquity is concerned in Laur. Lersch, -_Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten,_ Bonn, 1838-1841: better still by -Steinthal, _Geschichte,_ cit. vol. ii. For Apollonius Dyscolus see -Egger, _Apollon Dyscole,_ Paris, 1854. For the history of grammar in -the Middle Ages see Ch. Thurot, _Extraits de divers manuscrits latins -pour servir à l'histoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen âge,_ -Paris, 1869. For modern times, C. Trabalza, _Storia della grammatica -italiana,_ Milan, 1908. For the history of Criticism several books -mentioned under § 2 may be consulted: in addition to these, B. Croce, -_Per la storia della critica e storiografia letteraria,_ containing -Italian examples (_Probl. d. est._ pp. 419-448): for the theories of -recent French criticism see Ém. Hennequin, _La Critique scientifique,_ -Paris, 1888, and Ernest Tissot, _Les évolutions de la critique -française,_ Paris, 1890. On the concept of "romanticism" see G. Muoni, -_Note per una poetica storica del romanticismo,_ Milan, 1906: cf. B. -Croce, _Le definizioni del romanticismo,_ in _Critica,_ iv. pp. 241-245 -(reprinted in _Probl. di estetica,_ pp. 285-294). - - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Aesthetic as science of expression and -general linguistic, by Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AESTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION *** - -***** This file should be named 54618-0.txt or 54618-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/6/1/54618/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Translator: Douglas Ainslie - -Release Date: April 28, 2017 [EBook #54618] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AESTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Internet Archive. - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> -<h1>ÆSTHETIC</h1> - -<h3><i>As science of expression and general linguistic</i></h3> - -<h3>BY</h3> - -<h2>BENEDETTO CROCE</h2> - -<h4><i>translated, from the Italian by</i><br /> DOUGLAS AINSLIE</h4> - -<h5>THE NOONDAY PRESS</h5> - -<h5><i>A division of</i></h5> - -<h5>FARRAR, STRAUS, AND COMPANY</h5> - -<h5>1920</h5> - - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 1.2em;">ÆSTHETIC</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">TO THE MEMORY OF HIS PARENTS</p> - -<p class="center"><span style="font-size: 1.2em;">PASQUALE</span> AND <span style="font-size: 1.2em;">LUISA SIPARI</span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">AND OF HIS SISTER</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 1.2em;">MARIA</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - - -<p class="transnote"> Benedetto Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit, in the English translation -by Douglas Ainslie, consists of 4 volumes (which can be read separately):<br /> -1. Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic. (This -is the second augmented edition. A first ed. is also available at -Project Gutenberg.)<br /> -2. Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic. (In preparation)<br /> -3. Logic as the science of the pure concept.<br /> -4. Theory and history of historiography. (In preparation)<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 60%;">Transcriber's note.</span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h4> - - - -<p class="center">EXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION <span class="linenum">xix</span></p> - -<p class="center">NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR <span class="linenum">xxv</span></p> - -<p class="center">AUTHOR'S PREFACE <span class="linenum">xxvii</span></p> -<hr /> - -<p class="center">I</p> - -<p class="center">THEORY OF ÆSTHETIC</p> -<hr class="r5" /> -<p class="center">I <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">INTUITION AND EXPRESSION</p> - -<p>Intuitive knowledge—Its independence with respect to intellectual -knowledge—Intuition and perception—Intuition and the concepts -of space and time—Intuition and sensation—Intuition and -association—Intuition and representation—Intuition and -expression—Illusion as to their difference—Identity of intuition and -expression</p> - -<p class="center">II <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">INTUITION AND ART</p> - -<p>Corollaries and explanations—Identity of art and intuitive -knowledge—No specific difference—No difference of intensity—The -difference is extensive and empirical—Artistic genius—Content and -form in Æsthetic—Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the -artistic illusion—Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling, -not a theoretical fact—Æsthetic appearance, and feeling—Criticism of -the theory of æsthetic senses—Unity and indivisibility of the work of -art—Art as liberator</p> - -<p class="center">III <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_22">22</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ART AND PHILOSOPHY</p> - -<p>Inseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge—Criticism -of the negations of this thesis—Art and science—Content and form:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> -another meaning—Prose and poetry—The relation of first and second -degree—Non-existence of other forms of cognition—Historicity—Its -identity with and difference from art—Historical criticism—Historical -scepticism—Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural -sciences, and their limits—The phenomenon and the noumenon</p> - -<p class="center">IV <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_32">32</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN ÆSTHETIC</p> - -<p>Criticism of the probable and of naturalism—Criticism of ideas in -art, of theses in art, and of the typical—Criticism of the symbol -and of the allegory—Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary -kinds—Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art—Empirical -sense of the divisions of kinds</p> - -<p class="center">V <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_39">39</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ANALOGOUS ERRORS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY AND IN LOGIC</p> - -<p>Criticism of the philosophy of History—Æsthetic intrusions into -Logic—Logic in its essence—Distinction between logical and -non-logical judgements—Syllogistic—Logical falsehood and æsthetic -truth—Reformed logic—Note to the fourth Italian edition</p> - -<p class="center">VI <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_47">47</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THE THEORETIC ACTIVITY AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY</p> - -<p>The will—The will as an ulterior stage in respect to -knowledge—Objections and explanations—Criticism of practical -judgements or judgements of value—Exclusion of the practical from the -æsthetic—Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice -of content—Practical innocence of art—Independence of art—Criticism -of the saying: the style is the man—Criticism of the concept of -sincerity in art</p> - -<p class="center">VII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_55">55</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL</p> - -<p>The two forms of the practical activity—The economically -useful—Distinction between the useful and the technical—Distinction -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> the useful from the egoistic—Economic will and moral will—Pure -economicity—The economic side of morality—The merely economical and -the error of the morally indifferent—Criticism of utilitarianism and -the reform of Ethics and of Economics—Phenomenon and noumenon in -practical activity</p> - -<p class="center">VIII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_61">61</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">EXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS</p> - -<p>The system of the spirit—The forms of genius—Non-existence of a -fifth form of activity—Law; sociability—Religion—Metaphysic—Mental -imagination and the intuitive intellect—Mystical Æsthetic—Mortality -and immortality of art</p> - -<p class="center">IX <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_67">67</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">INDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR DEGREES AND CRITICISM OF -RHETORIC</p> - -<p>The characters of art—Non-existence of modes of -expression—Impossibility of translations—Criticism of the rhetorical -categories—Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories—Their use as -synonyms of the æsthetic fact—Their use to indicate various æsthetic -imperfections—Their use in a sense transcending æsthetic, in the -service of science—Rhetoric in the schools—The resemblances of -expressions—The relative possibility of translations</p> - -<p class="center">X <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_74">74</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY</p> - -<p>Various significations of the word feeling—Feeling as activity -—Identification of feeling with economic activity—Criticism -of hedonism—Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity -—Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings—Value -and disvalue: the contraries and their union—The beautiful as the -value of expression, or expression without qualification—The ugly, -and the elements of beauty which compose it—Illusion that there exist -expressions neither beautiful nor ugly—True æsthetic feelings and -concomitant and accidental feelings—Criticism of apparent feelings</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">XI <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">CRITICISM OF ÆSTHETIC HEDONISM</p> - -<p>Criticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher -senses—Criticism of the theory of play—Criticism of the theory of -sexuality and of triumph—Criticism of the Æsthetic of the sympathetic: -meaning in it of content and form—Æsthetic hedonism and moralism—The -rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of art—Criticism -of pure beauty</p> - -<p class="center">XII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_87">87</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THE ÆSTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-ÆSTHETIC CONCEPTS</p> - -<p>Pseudo-æsthetic concepts, and the Æsthetic of the -sympathetic—Criticism of the theory of the ugly in art and -of the overcoming of it—Pseudo-æsthetic concepts belong to -Psychology—Impossibility of rigorous definitions of them—Examples: -definitions of the sublime, of the comic, of the humorous—Relation -between these concepts and æsthetic concepts</p> - -<p class="center">XIII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_94">94</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THE "PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL" IN NATURE AND IN ART</p> - -<p>Æsthetic activity and physical concepts—Expression in the æsthetic -sense, and expression in the naturalistic sense—Representations and -memory—The production of aids to memory—Physical beauty—Content and -form: another meaning—Natural beauty and artificial beauty—Mixed -beauty—Writings—Free and non-free beauty—Criticism of non-free -beauty—Stimulants of production</p> - -<p class="center">XIV <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_104">104</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND ÆSTHETIC</p> - -<p>Criticism of æsthetic associationism—Criticism of æsthetic -Physics—Criticism of the theory of the beauty of the human -body—Criticism of the beauty of geometrical figures—Criticism of -another aspect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> of the imitation of nature—Criticism of the theory of -the elementary forms of the beautiful—Criticism of the search for the -objective conditions of the beautiful—The astrology of Æsthetic</p> - -<p class="center">XV <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_111">111</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS</p> - -<p>The practical activity of externalization—The technique of -externalization—Technical theories of the different arts—Criticism of -æsthetic theories of particular arts—Criticism of the classification -of the arts—Criticism of the theory of the union of the arts—Relation -of the activity of externalization to utility and morality</p> - -<p class="center">XVI <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_118">118</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">TASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART</p> - -<p>Æsthetic judgement: its identity with æsthetic -reproduction—Impossibility of divergences—Identity of taste -and genius—Analogy with other activities—Criticism of æsthetic -absolutism (intellectualism) and relativism—Criticism of relative -relativism—Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and -of psychic disposition—Criticism of the distinction of signs into -natural and conventional—The surmounting of variety—Restorations and -historical interpretation</p> - -<p class="center">XVII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND OF ART</p> - -<p>Historical criticism in literature and art: its importance—Literary -and artistic history: its distinction from historical criticism and -from the æsthetic judgement—The method of artistic and literary -history—Criticism of the problem of the origin of art—The criterion -of progress and history—Non-existence of a single line of progress -in artistic and literary history—Errors committed against this law— -Other meanings of the word "progress" in relation to Æsthetic</p> - -<p class="center">XVIII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_140">140</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">CONCLUSION: IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND ÆSTHETIC</p> - -<p>Summary of the study—Identity of Linguistic with Æsthetic—Æsthetic -formulation of linguistic problems—Nature of language—Origin<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> -of language and its development—Relation between Grammar and -Logic—Grammatical kinds or parts of speech—The individuality of -speech and the classification of languages—Impossibility of a -normative Grammar—Didactic organisms—Elementary linguistic facts, or -roots—Æsthetic judgement and the model language—Conclusion</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="center">II</p> - -<p class="center">HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC</p> -<hr class="r5" /> -<p class="center">I <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN GRÆCO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY</p> - -<p>Point of view of this History of Æsthetic—Mistaken tendencies, and -attempts towards an Æsthetic, in Græco-Roman antiquity—Origin of the -æsthetic problem in Greece—Plato's rigoristic negation—Æsthetic -hedonism and moralism—Mystical æsthetic in antiquity—Investigations -as to the Beautiful—Distinction between the theory of Art and the -theory of the Beautiful—Fusion of the two by Plotinus—The scientific -tendency: Aristotle—The concepts of imitation and of imagination after -Aristotle: Philostratus—Speculations on language</p> - -<p class="center">II <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_175">175</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE</p> - -<p>Middle Ages. Mysticism: Ideas on the Beautiful—The pedagogic theory -of art in the Middle Ages—Hints of an Æsthetic in scholastic -philosophy—Renaissance: Philography and philosophical and empirical -inquiries concerning the Beautiful—The pedagogic theory of art and -the Poetics of Aristotle—The "Poetics of the Renaissance"—Dispute -concerning the universal and the probable in art—G. Fracastoro—L. -Castelvetro—Piccolomini and Pinciano—Fr. Patrizzi (Patricius)</p> - -<p class="center">III <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">FERMENTS OF THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY</p> - -<p>New words and new observations in the seventeenth -century—Wit—Taste—Various meanings of the word taste—Fancy or -imaginatio<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span>n—Feeling—Tendency to unite these terms—Difficulties -and contradictions in their definition—Wit and intellect—Taste -and intellectual judgement—The "<i>je ne sais quoi</i>"—Imagination -and sensationalism: the corrective of imagination—Feeling and -sensationalism</p> - -<p class="center">IV <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC IDEAS OF THE CARTESIAN AND LEIBNITIAN SCHOOLS, AND THE -"ÆSTHETIC" OF BAUMGARTEN</p> - -<p>Cartesianism and imagination—Crousaz and André—The English: -Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the Scottish School—Leibniz: -"<i>petites perceptions</i>" and confused knowledge—Intellectualism of -Leibniz—Speculations on language—J. C. Wolff—Demand for an organon -of inferior knowledge—Alexander Baumgarten: his "Æsthetic"—Æsthetic -as science of sensory consciousness—Criticism of judgements passed on -Baumgarten—Intellectualism of Baumgarten—New names and old meanings</p> - -<p class="center">V <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_220">220</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">GIAMBATTISTA VICO</p> - -<p>Vico as inventor of æsthetic science—Poetry and philosophy: -imagination and intellect—Poetry and history—Poetry and -language—Inductive and formalistic logic—Vico opposed to all -former theories of poetry—Vico's judgements of the grammarians and -linguists who preceded him—Influence of seventeenth-century writers on -Vico—Æsthetic in the <i>Scienza Nuova</i>—Vico's mistakes—Progress still -to be achieved</p> - -<p class="center">VI <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_235">235</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">MINOR ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY</p> - -<p>The influence of Vico—Italian writers: A. Conti—Quadrio and -Zanotti—M. Cesarotti—Bettinelli and Pagano—German disciples of -Baumgarten: G. F. Meier—Confusions of Meier—M. Mendelssohn and other -followers of Baumgarten—Vogue of Æsthetic—Eberhard and Eschenburg—J. -G. Sulzer—K. H. Heydenreich—J. G. Herder—Philosophy of language</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">VII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_257">257</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">OTHER ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE SAME PERIOD</p> - -<p>Other writers of the eighteenth century: Batteux—The English: -W. Hogarth—E. Burke—H. Home—Eclecticism and sensationalism: -E. Platner—Fr. Hemsterhuis—Neo-Platonism and mysticism: -Winckelmann—Beauty and lack of significance—Winckelmann's -contradictions and compromises—A. R. Mengs—G. E. Lessing—Theorists -of ideal Beauty—G. Spalletti and the characteristic—Beauty and the -characteristic: Hirt, Meyer, Goethe</p> - -<p class="center">VIII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_272">272</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">IMMANUEL KANT</p> - -<p>I. Kant—Kant and Vico—Identity of the concept of Art in Kant -and Baumgarten—Kant's "Lectures"—Art in the <i>Critique of -Judgment</i>—Imagination in Kant's system—The forms of intuition and the -Transcendental Æsthetic—Theory of Beauty distinguished by Kant from -that of Art—Mystical features in Kant's theory of Beauty</p> - -<p class="center">IX <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_283">283</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THE ÆSTHETIC OF IDEALISM: SCHILLER, SCHELLING, SOLGER, HEGEL</p> - -<p>The <i>Critique of Judgment</i> and metaphysical idealism—F. -Schiller—Relations between Schiller and Kant—The æsthetic sphere as -the sphere of Play—Æsthetic education—Vagueness and lack of precision -in Schiller's Æsthetic—Schiller's caution and the rashness of the -Romanticists—Ideas on Art: J. P. Richter—Romantic Æsthetic and -idealistic Æsthetic—J. G. Fichte—Irony: Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis—F. -Schelling—Beauty and character—Art and Philosophy—Ideas and the -gods: Art and mythology—K. W. Solger—Fancy and imagination—Art, -practice and religion—G. W. F. Hegel—Art in the sphere of absolute -spirit—Beauty as sensible appearance of the Idea—Æsthetic in -metaphysical idealism and Baumgartenism—Mortality and decay of art in -Hegel's system</p> - -<p class="center">X <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_304">304</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">SCHOPENHAUER AND HERBART</p> - -<p>Æsthetic mysticism in the opponents of idealism—A. Schopenhauer—Ideas -as the object of art—Æsthetic catharsis—Signs of a better<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> theory in -Schopenhauer—J. F. Herbart—Pure Beauty and relations of form—Art as -sum of content and form—Herbart and Kantian thought</p> - -<p class="center">XI <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER</p> - -<p>Æsthetic of content and Æsthetic of form: meaning of the -contrast—Friedrich Schleiermacher—Wrong judgements concerning -him—Schleiermacher contrasted with his predecessors—Place assigned -to Æsthetic in his Ethics—Æsthetic activity as immanent and -individual—Artistic truth and intellectual truth—Difference of -artistic consciousness from feeling and religion—Dreams and art: -inspiration and deliberation—Art and the typical—Independence of -art—Art and language—Schleiermacher's defects—Schleiermacher's -services to Æsthetic.</p> - -<p class="center">XII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_324">324</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: HUMBOLDT AND STEINTHAL</p> - -<p>Progress of Linguistic—Linguistic speculation at the beginning -of the nineteenth century—Wilhelm von Humboldt: relics of -intellectualism—Language as activity: internal form—Language and -art in Humboldt—II. Steinthal: the linguistic function independent -of the logical—Identity of the problems of the origin and the nature -of language—Steinthal's mistaken ideas on art: his failure to unite -Linguistic and Æsthetic</p> - -<p class="center">XIII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_334">334</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">MINOR GERMAN ÆSTHETICIANS</p> - -<p>Minor æstheticians in the metaphysical school—Krause, Trahndorff, -Weisse and others—Fried. Theodor Vischer—Other tendencies—Theory -of the Beautiful in nature, and that of the Modifications of -Beauty—Development of the first theory: Herder—Schelling, Solger, -Hegel—Schleiermacher—Alexander von Humboldt—Vischer's "Æsthetic -Physics"—The theory of the Modifications of Beauty: from antiquity -to the eighteenth century—Kant and the post-Kantians—Culmination -of the development—Double form of the theory: the overcoming of the -ugly: Solger, Weisse and others—Passage from abstract to concrete: -Vischer—The "legend of Sir Purebeauty"</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">XIV <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_350">350</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND ITALY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE -NINETEENTH CENTURY</p> - -<p>Æsthetic movement in France: Cousin, Jouffroy—English Æsthetic— -Italian Æsthetic—Rosmini and Gioberti—Italian Romantics. Dependence -of art</p> - -<p class="center">XV <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_358">358</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">FRANCESCO DE SANCTIS</p> - -<p>F. de Sanctis: development of his thought—Influence of -Hegelism—Unconscious criticism of Hegelism—Criticisms of German -Æsthetic—Final rebellion against metaphysical Æsthetic—De Sanctis' -own theory—The concept of form—De Sanctis as art-critic—De Sanctis -as philosopher</p> - -<p class="center">XVI <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_370">370</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC OF THE EPIGONI</p> - -<p>Revival of Herbartian Æsthetic—Robert Zimmermann—Vischer <i>versus</i> -Zimmermann—Hermann Lotze—Efforts to reconcile Æsthetic of form and -Æsthetic of content—K. Köstlin—Æsthetic of content. M. Schasler -—Eduard von Hartmann—Hartmann and the theory of modifications -—Metaphysical Æsthetic in France: C. Levêque—In England: J. Ruskin -—Æsthetic in Italy—Antonio Tari and his lectures—Æsthesigraphy</p> - -<p class="center">XVII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_388">388</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC POSITIVISM AND NATURALISM</p> - -<p>Positivism and evolutionism—Æsthetic of H. Spencer—Physiologists of -Æsthetic: Grant Allen, Helmholtz and others—Method of the natural -sciences in Æsthetic—H. Taine's Æsthetic—Taine's metaphysic and -moralism—G. T. Fechner: inductive Æsthetic—Experiments—Trivial -nature of his ideas on Beauty and Art—Ernst Grosse: speculative -Æsthetic and the Science of Art—Sociological Æsthetic—Proudhon—J. M. -Guyau—M. Nordau—Naturalism: C. Lombroso—Decline of linguistic—Signs -of revival: H. Paul—The linguistic of Wundt</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">XVIII <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_404">404</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETIC PSYCHOLOGISM AND OTHER RECENT TENDENCIES</p> - -<p>Neo-criticism and empiricism—Kirchmann—Metaphysic translated into -Psychology: Vischer—Siebeck—M. Diez—Psychological tendency. -Teodor Lipps—K. Groos—The modifications of the Beautiful in Groos and -Lipps—E. Véron and the double form of Æsthetic—L. Tolstoy—F. Nietzsche -—An æsthetician of Music: E. Hanslick—Hanslick's concept of form -—Æstheticians of the figurative arts: C. Fiedler—Intuition and -expression—Narrow limits of these theories—H. Bergson—Attempts -to return to Baumgarten: C. Hermann—Eclecticism: B. Bosanquet -—Æsthetic of expression: present state 404</p> - -<p class="center">XIX <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_420">420</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOME PARTICULAR DOCTRINES</p> - -<p>Result of the history of Æsthetic—History of science and history of -the scientific criticism of particular errors</p> - -<p class="center">I. RHETORIC: OR THE THEORY OF ORNATE FORM. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_422">422</a></span></p> - -<p>Rhetoric in the ancient sense—Criticism from moral point of -view—Accumulation without system—Its fortunes in the Middle Ages -and Renaissance—Criticisms by Vives, Ramus and Patrizzi—Survival -into modern times—Modern signification of Rhetoric: theory of -literary form—Concept of ornament—Classes of ornament—The -concept of the Fitting—The theory of ornament in the Middle -Ages and Renaissance—<i>Reductio ad absurdum</i> in the seventeenth -century—Polemic concerning the theory of ornament—Du Marsais and -metaphor—Psychological interpretation—Romanticism and Rhetoric: -present day</p> - -<p class="center">II. HISTORY OF ARTISTIC AND LITERARY KINDS <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_436">436</a></span></p> - -<p>The kinds in antiquity: Aristotle—In the Middle Ages and -Renaissance—The doctrine of the three unities—Poetics of the kinds -and rules: Scaliger—Lessing—Compromises and extensions—Rebellion -against rules in general—G. Bruno, Guarini—Spanish critics—G. -B. Marino—G. V. Gravina—Fr. Montani—Critics of the eighteenth -century—Romanticism and the "strict kinds": Berchet, V. Hugo—Their -persistence in philosophical theories—Fr. Schelling—E. von -Hartmann—The kinds in the schools</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">III. THE THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTS <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_449">449</a></span></p> - -<p>The limits of the arts in Lessing—Arts of space and arts of -time—Limits and classifications of the arts in later philosophy: -Herder and Kant—Schelling, Solger—Schopenhauer, Herbart—Weisse, -Zeising, Vischer—M. Schasler—E. v. Hartmann—The supreme art: -Richard Wagner—Lotze's attack on classifications—Contradictions in -Lotze—Doubts in Schleiermacher</p> - -<p class="center">IV. OTHER PARTICULAR DOCTRINES <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_459">459</a></span></p> - -<p>The Æsthetic theory of natural beauty—The theory of æsthetic -senses—The theory of kinds of style—The theory of grammatical forms -or parts of speech—Theory of æsthetic criticism—Distinction between -taste and genius—Concept of artistic and literary history—Conclusion -</p> -<hr class="r5" /> -<p class="center">BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_475">475</a></span></p> - -<p class="center"><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a> <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_491">491</a></span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="EXTRACT_FROM_INTRODUCTION_TO_THE_FIRST_ENGLISH_EDITION_1909" id="EXTRACT_FROM_INTRODUCTION_TO_THE_FIRST_ENGLISH_EDITION_1909">EXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ENGLISH EDITION, 1909</a></h4> - - -<p>I can lay no claim to having discovered an America, but I do claim to -have discovered a Columbus. His name is Benedetto Croce, and he dwells -on the shores of the Mediterranean, at Naples, city of the antique -Parthenope.</p> - -<p>It was at Naples, in the winter of 1907, that I first saw the -Philosopher of Æsthetic. Benedetto Croce, although born in the Abruzzi, -Province of Aquila (1866), is essentially a Neapolitan, and rarely -remains long absent from the city, on the shore of that magical sea -where once Ulysses sailed, and where sometimes yet (near Amalfi) we -may hear the Syrens sing their song. But more wonderful than the song -of any Syren seems to me the Theory of Æsthetic as the Science of -Expression, and that is why I have overcome the obstacles that stood -between me and the giving of this theory, which in my belief is the -truth, to the English-speaking world.</p> - -<p>. . . . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>The solution of the problem of Æsthetic is not in the gift of the Muses.</p> - -<p>This Philosophy of the Spirit is symptomatic of the happy reaction of -the twentieth century against the crude materialism of the second half -of the nineteenth. It is the spirit which gives to the work of art its -value, not this or that method of arrangement, this or that tint or -cadence, which can always be copied by skilful plagiarists:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span> not so -the <i>spirit</i> of the creator. In England we hear too much of (natural) -science, which has usurped the very name of Philosophy. The natural -sciences are very well in their place, but discoveries such as aviation -are of infinitely less importance to the race than the smallest -addition to the philosophy of the spirit. Empirical science, with the -collusion of positivism, has stolen the cloak of philosophy and must be -made to give it back.</p> - -<p>. . . . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>Yet though severe, the editor of <i>La Critica</i> is uncompromisingly just, -and would never allow personal dislike or jealousy, or any extrinsic -consideration, to stand in the way of fair treatment to the writer -concerned. Many superficial English critics might benefit considerably -by attention to this quality in one who is in other respects also so -immeasurably their superior. A good instance of this impartiality is -his critique of Schopenhauer, with whose system he is in complete -disagreement, yet affords him full credit for what of truth is -contained in his voluminous writings.</p> - -<p>. . . . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>This thoroughness it is which gives such importance to the literary -and philosophical criticisms of <i>La Critica.</i> Croce's method is always -historical, and his object in approaching any work of art is to -classify the spirit of its author, as expressed in that work. There -are, he maintains, but two things to be considered in criticizing a -book. These are, <i>firstly,</i> what is its <i>peculiarity,</i> in what way is -it singular, how is it differentiated from other works? <i>Secondly,</i> -what is its degree of <i>purity</i>?—That is, to what extent has its author -kept himself free from all considerations alien to the perfection of -the work as an expression, as a lyrical intuition? With the answering -of these questions Croce is satisfied. He does not care to know if the -author keep a motor-car, like Mæterlinck; or prefer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span> to walk on Putney -Heath, like Swinburne. This amounts to saying that all works of art -must be judged by their own standard. How far has the author succeeded -in doing what he intended?</p> - -<p>. . . . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>As regards Croce's general philosophical position, it is important to -understand that he is <i>not</i> a Hegelian, in the sense of being a close -follower of that philosopher. One of his last works is that in which -he deals in a masterly manner with the philosophy of Hegel. The title -may be translated, "What is living and what is dead of the philosophy -of Hegel." Here he explains to us the Hegelian system more clearly -than that wondrous edifice was ever before explained, and we realize -at the same time that Croce is quite as independent of Hegel as of -Kant, of Vico as of Spinoza. Of course he has made use of the best of -Hegel, just as every thinker makes use of his predecessors and is in -his turn made use of by those that follow him. But it is incorrect -to accuse of Hegelianism the author of an anti-hegelian <i>Æsthetic,</i> -of a <i>Logic</i> where Hegel is only half accepted, and of a <i>Philosophy -of the Practical</i> which contains hardly a trace of Hegel. I give an -instance. If the great conquest of Hegel be the dialectic of opposites, -his great mistake lies in the confusion of opposites with things -which are distinct but not opposite. If, says Croce, we take as an -example the application of the Hegelian triad that formulates becoming -(affirmation, negation and synthesis), we find it applicable for those -opposites which are true and false, good and evil, being and not-being, -but <i>not applicable</i> to things which are distinct but not opposite, -such as art and philosophy, beauty and truth, the useful and the moral. -These confusions led Hegel to talk of the death of art, to conceive as -possible a Philosophy of History, and to the application of the natural -sciences to the absurd task of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a></span> constructing a Philosophy of Nature. -Croce has cleared away these difficulties by showing that if from the -meeting of opposites must arise a superior synthesis, such a synthesis -cannot arise from things which are distinct <i>but not opposite,</i> since -the former are connected together as superior and inferior, and the -inferior can exist without the superior, but <i>not vice versa.</i> Thus we -see how philosophy cannot exist without art, while art, occupying the -lower place, can and does exist without philosophy. This brief example -reveals Croce's independence in dealing with Hegelian problems.</p> - -<p>I know of no philosopher more generous than Croce in praise and -elucidation of other workers in the same field, past and present. For -instance, and apart from Hegel, <i>Kant</i> has to thank him for drawing -attention to the marvellous excellence of the <i>Critique of Judgment,</i> -generally neglected in favour of the Critiques of <i>Pure Reason and of -Practical Judgment</i>; <i>Baumgarten</i> for drawing the attention of the -world to his obscure name and for reprinting his Latin thesis in which -the word <i>Æsthetic</i> occurs for the first time; and <i>Schleiermacher</i> for -the tributes paid to his neglected genius in the History of Æsthetic. -<i>La Critica,</i> too, is full of generous appreciation of contemporaries -by Croce and by that profound thinker, Gentile.</p> - -<p>. . . . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>There can be no doubt of the great value of Croce's work as an -<i>educative influence,</i> and if we are to judge of a philosophical system -by its action on others, then we must place the <i>Philosophy of the -Spirit</i> very high. It may be said with perfect truth that since the -death of the poet Carducci there has been no influence in Italy to -compare with that of Benedetto Croce.</p> - -<p>. . . . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>Of the popularity that his system and teaching have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span> already attained -we may judge by the fact that the <i>Æsthetic,</i> despite the difficulty of -the subject, is already in its third edition in Italy, where, owing to -its influence, philosophy sells better than fiction; while the French -and Germans, not to mention the Czechs, have long had translations -of the earlier editions. His <i>Logic</i> is on the point of appearing -in its second edition, and I have no doubt that the <i>Philosophy of -the Practical</i> will eventually equal these works in popularity. <i>The -importance and value of Italian thought have been too long neglected -in Great Britain.</i> Where, as in Benedetto Croce, we get the clarity -of vision of the Latin, joined to the thoroughness and erudition of -the best German tradition, we have a combination of rare power and -effectiveness, which can by no means be neglected.</p> - -<p>The philosopher feels that he has a great mission, which is nothing -less than the leading back of thought to belief in the spirit, deserted -by so many for crude empiricism and positivism. His view of philosophy -is that it sums up all the higher human activities, including religion, -and that in proper hands it is able to solve any problem. But there is -no finality about problems: the solution of one leads to the posing -of another, and so on. Man is the maker of life, and his spirit ever -proceeds from a lower to a higher perfection.</p> - -<p>. . . . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>I believe that Croce will one day be recognized as one of the very -few great teachers of humanity. At present he is not appreciated at -nearly his full value. One rises from a study of his philosophy with -a sense of having been all the time as it were in personal touch with -the truth, which is very far from the case after the perusal of certain -other philosophies.</p> - -<p>Secure in his strength, Croce will often introduce a joke<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[Pg xxiv]</a></span> or some -amusing illustration from contemporary life, in the midst of a most -profound and serious argument. This spirit of mirth is a sign of -superiority. He who is not sure of himself can spare no energy for -the making of mirth. Croce loves to laugh at his enemies and with -his friends. So the philosopher of Naples sits by the blue gulf -and explains the universe to those who have ears to hear. "One can -philosophize anywhere," he says—but he remains significantly at Naples.</p> - -<p>Thus I conclude these brief remarks upon the author of the <i>Æsthetic,</i> -confident that those who give time and attention to its study will be -grateful for having placed in their hands this pearl of great price -from the diadem of the antique Parthenope.</p> - -<p style="text-align: right; font-size: 0.8em;">DOUGLAS AINSLIE.</p> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE ATHENÆUM, PALL MALL,</p> - -<p><i>May</i> 1909.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxv" id="Page_xxv">[Pg xxv]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="NOTE_BY_THE_TRANSLATOR" id="NOTE_BY_THE_TRANSLATOR">NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR</a></h4> - - -<h5>TO THE SECOND ENGLISH EDITION</h5> - -<p>This second edition of the <i>Æsthetic</i> will be found to contain the -complete translation of the historical portion, which I was obliged to -summarize in the first edition. I have made a number of alterations and -some additions to the theoretical portion, following closely the fourth -(definitive) Italian edition, and in so doing have received much advice -and assistance of value from Mrs. Salusbury, to whom I beg to tender -my best thanks. I trust that this new edition will enable all those -desirous of studying the work to get into direct touch with the thought -of the author.</p> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE ATHENÆUM, PALL MALL, S.W.,</p> - -<p><i>November</i> 1920.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxvi" id="Page_xxvi">[Pg xxvi]</a><br /><a name="Page_xxvii" id="Page_xxvii">[Pg xxvii]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="AUTHORS_PREFACE" id="AUTHORS_PREFACE">AUTHOR'S PREFACE</a></h4> - - -<p>This volume is composed of a theoretical and of a historical part, -which form two independent but complementary books.</p> - -<p>The nucleus of the theoretical part is a memoir, bearing the title -<i>Fundamental Theses of an Æsthetic as Science of Expression and General -Linguistic,</i> which was read at the Accademia Pontaniana of Naples -during the sessions of February 18 and May 6, 1900, and printed in vol. -xxx. of its <i>Acts.</i> The author has added few substantial variations, -but not a few additions and amplifications in rewriting it, also -following a somewhat different sequence with a view to rendering the -exposition more plain and easy. The first five chapters only of the -historical portion were inserted in the Neapolitan review <i>Flegrea</i> -(April 1901), under the title <i>Giambattista Vico, First Discoverer of -Æsthetic Science,</i> and these also reappear amplified and brought into -harmony with the rest.</p> - -<p>The author has dwelt, especially in the theoretical part, upon general -questions which are side-issues in respect to the theme that he has -treated. But this will not seem a digression to those who remember -that, strictly speaking, there are no particular philosophical -sciences, standing by themselves. Philosophy is unity, and when we -treat of Æsthetic or of Logic or of Ethics, we treat always of the -whole of philosophy, although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxviii" id="Page_xxviii">[Pg xxviii]</a></span> illustrating for didactic purposes only -one side of that inseparable unity. In like manner, owing to this -intimate connexion of all the parts of philosophy, the uncertainty and -misunderstanding as to the æsthetic activity, the representative and -productive imagination, this firstborn of the spiritual activities, -mainstay of the others, generates everywhere else misunderstandings, -uncertainties and errors: in Psychology as in Logic, in History as -in the Philosophy of Practice. If language is the first spiritual -manifestation, and if the æsthetic form is language itself, taken in -all its true scientific extension, it is hopeless to try to understand -clearly the later and more complicated phases of the life of the -spirit, when their first and simplest moment is ill known, mutilated -and disfigured. From the explanation of the æsthetic activity is also -to be expected the correction of several concepts and the solution -of certain philosophic problems which generally seem to be almost -desperate. Such is precisely the spirit animating the present work. And -if the present attempt and the historical illustrations which accompany -it may be of use in winning friends to these studies, by levelling -obstacles and indicating paths to be followed; if this happen, -especially here in Italy, whose æsthetic traditions (as has been -demonstrated in its place) are very noble, the author will consider -that he has gained his end, and one of his keenest desires will have -been satisfied.</p> - -<p>NAPLES, <i>December</i> 1901.</p> - -<p>In addition to a careful literary revision, (in which, as well as in -the revision of the notes, I have received valuable help from my friend -Fausto Nicolini) I have in this third edition made certain alterations -of theory,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxix" id="Page_xxix">[Pg xxix]</a></span> especially in Chapters X. and XI. of Part I., suggested by -further reflexion and self-criticism.</p> - -<p>But I have refrained from introducing corrections or additions of such -a kind as to alter the original plan of the book, which was, or was -meant to be, a complete but brief æsthetic theory set in the framework -of a general sketch of a Philosophy of the Spirit.</p> - -<p>The reader who desires a complete statement of the general or -collateral doctrines or a more particular exposition of the other parts -of philosophy (<i>e.g.</i> the lyrical nature of art) is now referred to the -volumes on <i>Logic</i> and the <i>Philosophy of Practice,</i> which together -with the present work compose the <i>Philosophy of the Spirit</i> which in -the author's opinion exhausts the entire field of Philosophy. The three -volumes were not conceived and written simultaneously; if they had -been, some details would have been differently arranged. When I wrote -the first I had no idea of giving it, as I have now done, two such -companions; and I therefore designed it to be, as I say, complete in -itself. In the second place, the present state of the study of Æsthetic -made it desirable to append to the theoretical exposition a somewhat -full history of the science, whereas for the other parts of Philosophy -I was able to restrict myself to brief historical notes merely designed -to show how, from my point of view, such a history would best be -composed. Lastly, there are many things which now, after a systematic -exposition of the various philosophical sciences, I see in closer -connexions and in a clearer, or at least a different, light; a certain -hesitation and even some doctrinal errors visible here and there in the -<i>Æsthetic,</i> especially where subjects foreign to Æsthetic itself are -being treated, would now no longer be justified. For all these reasons -the three volumes, in spite of their substantial unity of spirit and of -aim, have each its own physiognomy, and show marks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxx" id="Page_xxx">[Pg xxx]</a></span> of the different -periods of life at which they were written, so as to group themselves, -and to demand interpretation, as a progressive series according to -their dates of publication.</p> - -<p>With what may be called the minor problems of Æsthetic, and the -objections which have been or might be brought against my theory, I -have dealt and am continuing to deal in special essays, of which I -shall shortly publish a first collection which will form a kind of -explanatory and polemical appendix to the present volume.</p> - -<p><i>November</i> 1907.</p> - -<p>In revising this book once more for a fourth edition, I take the -opportunity of announcing that the supplementary volume of essays -promised above was published in 1910 under the title <i>Problems of -Æsthetic and Contributions to the History of Æsthetic in Italy.</i></p> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em; text-align: right;">B. C.</p> - -<p><i>May</i> 1911.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<h3><a name="THEORY_OF_AESTHETIC" id="THEORY_OF_AESTHETIC">THEORY OF ÆSTHETIC</a></h3> - -<hr /> - - -<h4><a name="Ia" id="Ia">I</a></h4> - - -<h4>INTUITION AND EXPRESSION</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuitive knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>Knowledge has two forms: it is either <i>intuitive</i> knowledge or -<i>logical</i> knowledge; knowledge obtained through the <i>imagination</i> -or knowledge obtained through the <i>intellect</i>; knowledge of the -<i>individual</i> or knowledge of the <i>universal</i>; of <i>individual things</i> or -of the <i>relations</i> between them: it is, in fact, productive either of -<i>images</i> or of <i>concepts.</i></p> - -<p>In ordinary life, constant appeal is made to intuitive knowledge. It is -said that we cannot give definitions of certain truths; that they are -not demonstrable by syllogisms; that they must be learnt intuitively. -The politician finds fault with the abstract reasoner, who possesses no -lively intuition of actual conditions; the educational theorist insists -upon the necessity of developing the intuitive faculty in the pupil -before everything else; the critic in judging a work of art makes it -a point of honour to set aside theory and abstractions, and to judge -it by direct intuition; the practical man professes to live rather by -intuition than by reason.</p> - -<p>But this ample acknowledgment granted to intuitive knowledge -in ordinary life, does not correspond to an equal and adequate -acknowledgment in the field of theory and of philosophy. There exists a -very ancient science of intellectual knowledge, admitted by all without -discussion, namely, Logic; but a science of intuitive knowledge is -timidly and with difficulty asserted by but a few. Logical knowledge -has appropriated the lion's share; and if she does not slay and devour -her<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> companion outright, yet yields to her but grudgingly the humble -place of maid-servant or doorkeeper.—What can intuitive knowledge be -without the light of intellectual knowledge? It is a servant without -a master; and though a master find a servant useful, the master is a -necessity to the servant, since he enables him to gain his livelihood. -Intuition is blind; intellect lends her eyes.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its independence with respect to intellectual knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>Now, the first point to be firmly fixed in the mind is that intuitive -knowledge has no need of a master, nor to lean upon any one; she does -not need to borrow the eyes of others, for she has excellent eyes -of her own. Doubtless it is possible to find concepts mingled with -intuitions. But in many other intuitions there is no trace of such -a mixture, which proves that it is not necessary. The impression of -a moonlight scene by a painter; the outline of a country drawn by a -cartographer; a musical motive, tender or energetic; the words of -a sighing lyric, or those with which we ask, command and lament in -ordinary life, may well all be intuitive facts without a shadow of -intellectual relation. But, think what one may of these instances, -and admitting further the contention that the greater part of the -intuitions of civilized man are impregnated with concepts, there yet -remains to be observed something more important and more conclusive. -Those concepts which are found mingled and fused with the intuitions -are no longer concepts, in so far as they are really mingled and -fused, for they have lost all independence and autonomy. They have -been concepts, but have now become simple elements of intuition. -The philosophical maxims placed in the mouth of a personage of -tragedy or of comedy, perform there the function, not of concepts, -but of characteristics of such personage; in the same way as the -red in a painted face does not there represent the red colour of -the physicists, but is a characteristic element of the portrait. -The whole is that which determines the quality of the parts. A work -of art may be full of philosophical concepts; it may contain them -in greater<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> abundance and they may there be even more profound than -in a philosophical dissertation, which in its turn may be rich to -overflowing with descriptions and intuitions. But notwithstanding all -these concepts the total effect of the work of art is an intuition; -and notwithstanding all those intuitions, the total effect of the -philosophical dissertation is a concept. The <i>Promessi Sposi</i> contains -copious ethical observations and distinctions, but does not for that -reason lose as a whole its character of simple story or intuition. In -like manner the anecdotes and satirical effusions to be found in the -works of a philosopher like Schopenhauer do not deprive those works -of their character of intellectual treatises. The difference between -a scientific work and a work of art, that is, between an intellectual -fact and an intuitive fact, lies in the difference of the total effect -aimed at by their respective authors. This it is that determines and -rules over the several parts of each not these parts separated and -considered abstractly in themselves.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and perception.</i></div> - -<p>But to admit the independence of intuition as regards concept does -not suffice to give a true and precise idea of intuition. Another -error arises among those who recognize this, or who at any rate do not -explicitly make intuition dependent upon the intellect, to obscure -and confuse the real nature of intuition. By intuition is frequently -understood <i>perception,</i> or the knowledge of actual reality, the -apprehension of something as <i>real.</i></p> - -<p>Certainly perception is intuition: the perceptions of the room in -which I am writing, of the ink-bottle and paper that are before me, -of the pen I am using, of the objects that I touch and make use of as -instruments of my person, which, if it write, therefore exists;—these -are all intuitions. But the image that is now passing through my brain -of a me writing in another room, in another town, with different paper, -pen and ink, is also an intuition. This means that the distinction -between reality and non-reality is extraneous, secondary, to the true -nature of intuition. If we imagine a human mind having intuitions -for the first time, it would seem that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> it could have intuitions of -actual reality only, that is to say, that it could have perceptions -of nothing but the real. But since knowledge of reality is based upon -the distinction between real images and unreal images, and since this -distinction does not at the first moment exist, these intuitions -would in truth not be intuitions either of the real or of the unreal, -not perceptions, but pure intuitions. Where all is real, nothing is -real. The child, with its difficulty of distinguishing true from -false, history from fable, which are all one to childhood, can furnish -us with a sort of very vague and only remotely approximate idea of -this ingenuous state. Intuition is the undifferentiated unity of the -perception of the real and of the simple image of the possible. In our -intuitions we do not oppose ourselves as empirical beings to external -reality, but we simply objectify our impressions, whatever they be.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and the concepts of space and time.</i></div> - -<p>Those, therefore, who look upon intuition as sensation formed and -arranged simply according to the categories of space and time, would -seem to approximate more nearly to the truth. Space and time (they -say) are the forms of intuition; to have an intuition is to place -it in space and in temporal sequence. Intuitive activity would then -consist in this double and concurrent function of spatiality and -temporality. But for these two categories must be repeated what was -said of intellectual distinctions, when found mingled with intuitions. -We have intuitions without space and without time: the colour of a -sky, the colour of a feeling, a cry of pain and an effort of will, -objectified in consciousness: these are intuitions which we possess, -and with their making space and time have nothing to do. In some -intuitions, spatiality may be found without temporality, in others, -<i>vice versa</i>; and even where both are found, they are perceived by -later reflexion: they can be fused with the intuition in like manner -with all its other elements: that is, they are in it <i>materialiter</i> -and not <i>formaliter,</i> as ingredients and not as arrangement. Who, -without an act of reflexion which for a moment breaks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> in upon his -contemplation, can think of space while looking at a drawing or a -view? Who is conscious of temporal sequence while listening to a story -or a piece of music without breaking into it with a similar act of -reflexion? What intuition reveals in a work of art is not space and -time, but <i>character, individual physiognomy.</i> The view here maintained -is confirmed in several quarters of modern philosophy. Space and time, -far from being simple and primitive functions, are nowadays conceived -as intellectual constructions of great complexity. And further, even -in some of those who do not altogether deny to space and time the -quality of formative principles, categories and functions, one observes -an effort to unite them and to regard them in a different manner from -that in which these categories are generally conceived. Some limit -intuition to the sole category of spatiality, maintaining that even -time can only be intuited in terms of space. Others abandon the three -dimensions of space as not philosophically necessary, and conceive the -function of spatiality as void of all particular spatial determination. -But what could such a spatial function be, a simple arrangement that -should arrange even time? It represents, surely, all that criticism -and refutation have left standing—the bare demand for the affirmation -of some intuitive activity in general. And is not this activity -truly determined, when one single function is attributed to it, not -spatializing nor temporalizing, but characterizing? Or rather, when it -is conceived as itself a category or function which gives us knowledge -of things in their concreteness and individuality?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and sensation.</i></div> - -<p>Having thus freed intuitive knowledge from any suggestion of -intellectualism and from every later and external addition, we must -now explain it and determine its limits from another side and defend -it from a different kind of invasion and confusion. On the hither side -of the lower limit is sensation, formless matter, which the spirit can -never apprehend in itself as simple matter. This it can only possess -with form and in form, but postulates the notion of it as a mere limit. -Matter, in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> abstraction, is mechanism, passivity; it is what the -spirit of man suffers, but does not produce. Without it no human -knowledge or activity is possible; but mere matter produces animality, -whatever is brutal and impulsive in man, not the spiritual dominion, -which is humanity. How often we strive to understand clearly what is -passing within us! We do catch a glimpse of something, but this does -not appear to the mind as objectified and formed. It is in such moments -as these that we best perceive the profound difference between matter -and form. These are not two acts of ours, opposed to one another; but -the one is outside us and assaults and sweeps us off our feet, while -the other inside us tends to absorb and identify itself with that -which is outside. Matter, clothed and conquered by form, produces -concrete form. It is the matter, the content, which differentiates one -of our intuitions from another: the form is constant: it is spiritual -activity, while matter is changeable. Without matter spiritual -activity would not forsake its abstractness to become concrete and -real activity, this or that spiritual content, this or that definite -intuition.</p> - -<p>It is a curious fact, characteristic of our times, that this very form, -this very activity of the spirit, which is essentially ourselves, is -so often ignored or denied. Some confound the spiritual activity of -man with the metaphorical and mythological activity of what is called -nature, which is mechanism and has no resemblance to human activity, -save when we imagine, with Æsop, that "<i>arbores loquuntur non tantum -ferae.</i>" Some affirm that they have never observed in themselves this -"miraculous" activity, as though there were no difference, or only -one of quantity, between sweating and thinking, feeling cold and the -energy of the will. Others, certainly with greater reason, would -unify activity and mechanism in a more general concept, though they -are specifically distinct. Let us, however, refrain for the moment -from examining if such a final unification be possible, and in what -sense, but admitting that the attempt may be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> made, it is clear that -to unify two concepts in a third implies to begin with the admission -of a difference between the two first. Here it is this difference that -concerns us and we set it in relief.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and association.</i></div> - -<p>Intuition has sometimes been confused with simple sensation. But since -this confusion ends by being offensive to common sense, it has more -frequently been attenuated or concealed with a phraseology apparently -designed at once to confuse and to distinguish them. Thus, it has -been asserted that intuition is sensation, but not so much simple -sensation as <i>association</i> of sensations. Here a double meaning is -concealed in the word "association." Association is understood, either -as memory, mnemonic association, conscious recollection, and in that -case the claim to unite in memory elements which are not intuited, -distinguished, possessed in some way by the spirit and produced by -consciousness, seems inconceivable: or it is understood as association -of unconscious elements, in which case we remain in the world of -sensation and of nature. But if with certain associationists we speak -of an association which is neither memory nor flux of sensations, but -a <i>productive</i> association (formative, constructive, distinguishing); -then our contention is admitted and only its name is denied to it. -For productive association is no longer association in the sense -of the sensationalists, but <i>synthesis,</i> that is to say, spiritual -activity. Synthesis may be called association; but with the concept of -productivity is already posited the distinction between passivity and -activity, between sensation and intuition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and representation.</i></div> - -<p>Other psychologists are disposed to distinguish from sensation -something which is sensation no longer, but is not yet intellectual -concept: the <i>representation</i> or <i>image.</i> What is the difference -between their representation or image and our intuitive knowledge? -Everything and nothing: for "representation" is a very equivocal word. -If by representation be understood something cut off and standing -out from the psychic basis of the sensations, then representation is -intuition. If, on the other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> hand, it be conceived as complex sensation -we are back once more in crude sensation, which does not vary in -quality according to its richness or poverty, or according to whether -the organism in which it appears is rudimentary or highly developed -and full of traces of past sensations. Nor is the ambiguity remedied -by defining representation as a psychic product of secondary degree -in relation to sensation, defined as occupying the first place. What -does secondary degree mean here? Does it mean a qualitative, formal -difference? If so, representation is an elaboration of sensation -and therefore intuition. Or does it mean greater complexity and -complication, a quantitative, material difference? In that case -intuition is once more confused with simple sensation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and expression.</i></div> - -<p>And yet there is a sure method of distinguishing true intuition, true -representation, from that which is inferior to it: the spiritual fact -from the mechanical, passive, natural fact. Every true intuition or -representation is also <i>expression.</i> That which does not objectify -itself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation -and mere natural fact. The spirit only intuites in making, forming, -expressing. He who separates intuition from expression never succeeds -in reuniting them.</p> - -<p>Intuitive activity <i>possesses intuitions to the extent that it -expresses them.</i> Should this proposition sound paradoxical, that is -partly because, as a general rule, a too restricted meaning is given to -the word "expression." It is generally restricted to what are called -verbal expressions alone. But there exist also non-verbal expressions, -such as those of line, colour and sound, and to all of these must -be extended our affirmation, which embraces therefore every sort of -manifestation of the man, as orator, musician, painter, or anything -else. But be it pictorial, or verbal, or musical, or in whatever other -form it appear, to no intuition can expression in one of its forms be -wanting; it is, in fact, an inseparable part of intuition. How can we -really possess an intuition of a geometrical figure, unless we possess -so accurate an image of it as to be able to trace it immediately upon -paper or on the blackboard?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> - -<p>How can we really have an intuition of the contour of a region, for -example of the island of Sicily, if we are not able to draw it as -it is in all its meanderings? Every one can experience the internal -illumination which follows upon his success in formulating to -himself his impressions and feelings, but only so far as he is able -to formulate them. Feelings or impressions, then, pass by means of -words from the obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the -contemplative spirit. It is impossible to distinguish intuition from -expression in this cognitive process. The one appears with the other at -the same instant, because they are not two, but one.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Illusion as to their difference.</i></div> - -<p>The principal reason which makes our view appear paradoxical as we -maintain it, is the illusion or prejudice that we possess a more -complete intuition of reality than we really do. One often hears people -say that they have many great thoughts in their minds, but that they -are not able to express them. But if they really had them, they would -have coined them into just so many beautiful, sounding words, and thus -have expressed them. If these thoughts seem to vanish or to become few -and meagre in the act of expressing them, the reason is that they did -not exist or really were few and meagre. People think that all of us -ordinary men imagine and intuite countries, figures and scenes like -painters, and bodies like sculptors; save that painters and sculptors -know how to paint and carve such images, while we bear them unexpressed -in our souls. They believe that any one could have imagined a Madonna -of Raphæl; but that Raphæl was Raphæl owing to his technical ability -in putting the Madonna upon canvas. Nothing can be more false than -this view. The world which as a rule we intuite is a small thing. It -consists of little expressions, which gradually become greater and -wider with the increasing spiritual concentration of certain moments. -They are the words we say to ourselves, our silent judgments: "Here -is a man, here is a horse, this is heavy, this is sharp, this pleases -me," etc. It is a medley of light and colour, with no greater pictorial -value than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> would be expressed by a haphazard splash of colours, from -among which one could barely make out a few special, distinctive -traits. This and nothing else is what we possess in our ordinary life; -this is the basis of our ordinary action. It is the index of a book. -The labels tied to things (it has been said) take the place of the -things themselves. This index and these labels (themselves expressions) -suffice for small needs and small actions. From time to time we pass -from the index to the book, from the label to the thing, or from the -slight to the greater intuitions, and from these to the greatest and -most lofty. This passage is sometimes far from easy. It has been -observed by those who have best studied the psychology of artists that -when, after having given a rapid glance at any one, they attempt to -obtain a real intuition of him, in order, for example, to paint his -portrait, then this ordinary vision, that seemed so precise, so lively, -reveals itself as little better than nothing. What remains is found to -be at the most some superficial trait, which would not even suffice for -a caricature. The person to be painted stands before the artist like a -world to discover. Michæl Angelo said, "One paints, not with the hands, -but with the brain." Leonardo shocked the prior of the Convent of the -Graces by standing for days together gazing at the "Last Supper," -without touching it with the brush. He remarked of this attitude: "The -minds of men of lofty genius are most active in invention when they are -doing the least external work." The painter is a painter, because he -sees what others only feel or catch a glimpse of, but do not see. We -think we see a smile, but in reality we have only a vague impression -of it, we do not perceive all the characteristic traits of which it -is the sum, as the painter discovers them after he has worked upon -them and is thus able to fix them on the canvas. We do not intuitively -possess more even of our intimate friend, who is with us every day -and at all hours, than at most certain traits of physiognomy which -enable us to distinguish him from others. The illusion is less easy as -regards musical expression; because it would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> seem strange to every -one to say that the composer had added or attached notes to a motive -which was already in the mind of him who is not the composer; as if -Beethoven's Ninth Symphony were not his own intuition and his intuition -the Ninth Symphony. Now, just as one who is deluded as to the amount -of his material wealth is confuted by arithmetic, which states its -exact amount, so he who nourishes delusions as to the wealth of his -own thoughts and images is brought back to reality, when he is obliged -to cross the <i>Pons Asinorum</i> of expression. Let us say to the former, -count; to the latter, speak; or, here is a pencil, draw, express -yourself.</p> - -<p>Each of us, as a matter of fact, has in him a little of the poet, of -the sculptor, of the musician, of the painter, of the prose writer: -but how little, as compared with those who bear those names, just -because they possess the most universal dispositions and energies -of human nature in so lofty a degree! How little too does a painter -possess of the intuitions of a poet! And how little does one painter -possess those of another painter! Nevertheless, that little is all -our actual patrimony of intuitions or representations. Beyond these -are only impressions, sensations, feelings, impulses, emotions, or -whatever else one may term what still falls short of the spirit and is -not assimilated by man; something postulated for the convenience of -exposition, while actually non-existent, since to exist also is a fact -of the spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of intuition and expression.</i></div> - -<p>We may thus add this to the various verbal descriptions of intuition, -noted at the beginning: intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge. -Independent and autonomous in respect to intellectual function; -indifferent to later empirical discriminations, to reality and to -unreality, to formations and apperceptions of space and time, which are -also later: intuition or representation is distinguished as <i>form</i> from -what is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation, or from -psychic matter; and this form, this taking possession, is expression. -To intuite is to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing -less) than <i>to express.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="II" id="II">II</a></h4> - - -<h4>INTUITION AND ART</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Corollaries and explanations.</i></div> - -<p>Before proceeding further, it may be well to draw certain consequences -from what has been established and to add some explanations.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of art and intuitive knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>We have frankly identified intuitive or expressive knowledge with the -æsthetic or artistic fact, taking works of art as examples of intuitive -knowledge and attributing to them the characteristics of intuition, and -<i>vice versa.</i> But our identification is combated by a view held even by -many philosophers, who consider art to be an intuition of an altogether -special sort. "Let us admit" (they say) "that art is intuition; but -intuition is not always art: artistic intuition is a distinct species -differing from intuition in general by something <i>more</i>."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>No specific difference.</i></div> - -<p>But no one has ever been able to indicate of what this something more -consists. It has sometimes been thought that art is not a simple -intuition, but an intuition of an intuition, in the same way as the -concept of science has been defined, not as the ordinary concept, -but as the concept of a concept. Thus man would attain to art by -objectifying, not his sensations, as happens with ordinary intuition, -but intuition itself. But this process of raising to a second power -does not exist; and the comparison of it with the ordinary and -scientific concept does not prove what is intended, for the good -reason that it is not true that the scientific concept is the concept -of a concept. If this comparison proves anything, it proves just the -opposite. The ordinary concept, if it be really a concept<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> and not a -simple representation, is a perfect concept, however poor and limited. -Science substitutes concepts for representations; for those concepts -that are poor and limited it substitutes others, larger and more -comprehensive; it is ever discovering new relations. But its method -does not differ from that by which is formed the smallest universal -in the brain of the humblest of men. What is generally called <i>par -excellence</i> art, collects intuitions that are wider and more complex -than those which we generally experience, but these intuitions are -always of sensations and impressions.</p> - -<p>Art is expression of impressions, not expression of expression.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>No difference of intensity.</i></div> - -<p>For the same reason, it cannot be asserted that the intuition, which is -generally called artistic, differs from ordinary intuition as intensive -intuition. This would be the case if it were to operate differently on -the same matter. But since the artistic function is extended to wider -fields, yet does not differ in method from ordinary intuition, the -difference between them is not intensive but extensive. The intuition -of the simplest popular love-song, which says the same thing, or very -nearly, as any declaration of love that issues at every moment from the -lips of thousands of ordinary men, may be intensively perfect in its -poor simplicity, although it be extensively so much more limited than -the complex intuition of a love-song by Leopardi.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The difference is extensive and empirical.</i></div> - -<p>The whole difference, then, is quantitative, and as such is indifferent -to philosophy, <i>scientia qualitatum.</i> Certain men have a greater -aptitude, a more frequent inclination fully to express certain -complex states of the soul. These men are known in ordinary language -as artists. Some very complicated and difficult expressions are not -often achieved, and these are called works of art. The limits of -the expression-intuitions that are called art, as opposed to those -that are vulgarly called non-art, are empirical and impossible to -define. If an epigram be art, why not a simple word? If a story, why -not the news-jottings of the journalist? If a landscape,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> why not a -topographical sketch? The teacher of philosophy in Molière's comedy was -right: "whenever we speak, we create prose." But there will always be -scholars like Monsieur Jourdain, astonished at having spoken prose for -forty years without knowing it, who will have difficulty in persuading -themselves that when they call their servant John to bring their -slippers, they have spoken nothing less than—prose.</p> - -<p>We must hold firmly to our identification, because among the principal -reasons which have prevented Æsthetic, the science of art, from -revealing the true nature of art, its real roots in human nature, -has been its separation from the general spiritual life, the having -made of it a sort of special function or aristocratic club. No one -is astonished when he learns from physiology that every cell is an -organism and every organism a cell or synthesis of cells. No one is -astonished at finding in a lofty mountain the same chemical elements -that compose a small stone fragment. There is not one physiology of -small animals and one of large animals; nor is there a special chemical -theory of stones as distinct from mountains. In the same way, there is -not a science of lesser intuition as distinct from a science of greater -intuition, nor one of ordinary intuition as distinct from artistic -intuition. There is but one Æsthetic, the science of intuitive or -expressive knowledge, which is the æsthetic or artistic fact. And this -Æsthetic is the true analogue of Logic, which includes, as facts of the -same nature, the formation of the smallest and most ordinary concept -and the most complicated scientific and philosophical system.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Artistic genius.</i></div> - -<p>Nor can we admit that the word <i>genius</i> or artistic genius, as -distinct from the non-genius of the ordinary man, possesses more than -a quantitative signification. Great artists are said to reveal us to -ourselves. But how could this be possible, unless there were identity -of nature between their imagination and ours, and unless the difference -were only one of quantity? It were better to change <i>poeta nascitur</i> -into <i>homo nascitur poeta</i>: some men<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> are born great poets, some small. -The cult of the genius with all its attendant superstitions has arisen -from this quantitative difference having been taken as a difference of -quality. It has been forgotten that genius is not something that has -fallen from heaven, but humanity itself. The man of genius who poses or -is represented as remote from humanity finds his punishment in becoming -or appearing somewhat ridiculous. Examples of this are the <i>genius</i> of -the romantic period and the <i>superman</i> of our time.</p> - -<p>But it is well to note here, that those who claim unconsciousness as -the chief quality of an artistic genius, hurl him from an eminence -far above humanity to a position far below it. Intuitive or artistic -genius, like every form of human activity, is always conscious; -otherwise it would be blind mechanism. The only thing that can be -wanting to artistic genius is the <i>reflective</i> consciousness, the -superadded consciousness of the historian or critic, which is not -essential to it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Content and form in Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>The relation between matter and form, or between <i>content</i> and -<i>form,</i> as is generally said, is one of the most disputed questions -in Æsthetic. Does the æsthetic fact consist of content alone, or of -form alone, or of both together? This question has taken on various -meanings, which we shall mention, each in its place. But when these -words are taken as signifying what we have above defined, and matter is -understood as emotionality not æsthetically elaborated, or impressions, -and form as intellectual activity and expression, then our view cannot -be in doubt. We must, that is to say, reject both the thesis that makes -the æsthetic fact to consist of the content alone (that is, the simple -impressions), and the thesis which makes it to consist of a junction -between form and content, that is, of impressions plus expressions. -In the æsthetic fact, expressive activity is not added to the fact of -the impressions, but these latter are formed and elaborated by it. The -impressions reappear as it were in expression, like water put into a -filter, which reappears the same and yet different on the other side.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> -The æsthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing but form.</p> - -<p>From this was inferred not that the content is something superfluous -(it is, on the contrary, the necessary point of departure for the -expressive fact); but that <i>there is no passage</i> from the qualities of -the content to those of the form. It has sometimes been thought that -the content, in order to be æsthetic, that is to say, transformable -into form, should possess some determined or determinable qualities. -But were that so, then form and content, expression and impression, -would be the same thing. It is true that the content is that which -is convertible into form, but it has no determinable qualities until -this transformation takes place. We know nothing about it. It does not -become æsthetic content before, but only after it has been actually -transformed. The æsthetic content has also been defined as the -<i>interesting.</i> That is not an untrue statement; it is merely void of -meaning. Interesting to what? To the expressive activity? Certainly -the expressive activity would not have raised the content to the -dignity of form, had it not been interested in it. Being interested is -precisely the raising of the content to the dignity of form. But the -word "interesting" has also been employed in another and a illegitimate -sense, which we shall explain further on.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the artistic -illusion.</i></div> - -<p>The proposition that art is <i>imitation of nature</i> has also several -meanings. Sometimes truths have been expressed or at least shadowed -forth in these words, sometimes errors have been promulgated. More -frequently, no definite thought has been expressed at all. One of -the scientifically legitimate meanings occurs when "imitation" is -understood as representation or intuition of nature, a form of -knowledge. And when the phrase is used with this intention, and in -order to emphasize the spiritual character of the process, another -proposition becomes legitimate also: namely, that art is the -<i>idealization</i> or <i>idealizing</i> imitation of nature. But if by imitation -of nature be understood that art gives mechanical reproductions, -more or less perfect duplicates of natural<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> objects, in the presence -of which is renewed the same tumult of impressions as that caused -by natural objects, then the proposition is evidently false. The -coloured waxen effigies that imitate the life, before which we stand -astonished in the museums where such things are shown, do not give -æsthetic intuitions. Illusion and hallucination have nothing to do -with the calm domain of artistic intuition. But on the other hand if -an artist paint the interior of a wax-work museum, or if an actor -give a burlesque portrait of a man-statue on the stage, we have work -of the spirit and artistic intuition. Finally, if photography have in -it anything artistic, it will be to the extent that it transmits the -intuition of the photographer, his point of view, the pose and grouping -which he has striven to attain. And if photography be not quite an art, -that is precisely because the element of nature in it remains more or -less unconquered and ineradicable. Do we ever, indeed, feel complete -satisfaction before even the best of photographs? Would not an artist -vary and touch up much or little, remove or add something to all of -them?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling, not a -theoretical fact. Æsthetic appearance, and feeling.</i></div> - -<p>The statements repeated so often, that art is not knowledge, that -it does not tell the truth, that it does not belong to the world of -theory, but to the world of feeling, and so forth, arise from the -failure to realize exactly the theoretic character of simple intuition. -This simple intuition is quite distinct from intellectual knowledge, -as it is distinct from perception of the real; and the statements -quoted above arise from the belief that only intellectual cognition is -knowledge. We have seen that intuition is knowledge, free from concepts -and more simple than the so-called perception of the real. Therefore -art is knowledge, form; it does not belong to the world of feeling or -to psychic matter. The reason why so many æstheticians have so often -insisted that art is <i>appearance</i> (<i>Schein</i>), is precisely that they -have felt the necessity of distinguishing it from the more complex fact -of perception, by maintaining its pure intuitiveness. And if for the -same reason it has been claimed that art<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> is <i>feeling</i> the reason is -the same. For if the concept as content of art, and historical reality -as such, be excluded from the sphere of art, there remains no other -content than reality apprehended in all its ingenuousness and immediacy -in the vital impulse, in its <i>feeling,</i> that is to say again, pure -intuition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of æsthetic senses.</i></div> - -<p>The theory of the <i>æsthetic senses</i> has also arisen from the failure to -establish, or from having lost to view, the character of expression as -distinct from impression, of form as distinct from matter.</p> - -<p>This theory can be reduced to the error just indicated of wishing to -find a passage from the qualities of the content to those of the form. -To ask, in fact, what the æsthetic senses are, implies asking what -sensible impressions are able to enter into æsthetic expressions, and -which must of necessity do so. To this we must at once reply, that -all impressions can enter into æsthetic expressions or formations, -but that none are bound to do so of necessity. Dante raised to the -dignity of form not only the "sweet colour of the oriental sapphire" -(visual impressions), but also tactual or thermic impressions, such as -the "dense air" and the "fresh rivulets" which "parch the more" the -throat of the thirsty. The belief that a picture yields only visual -impressions is a curious illusion. The bloom on a cheek, the warmth of -a youthful body, the sweetness and freshness of a fruit, the edge of a -sharp knife, are not these, too, impressions obtainable from a picture? -Are they visual? What would a picture mean to an imaginary man, lacking -all or many of his senses, who should in an instant acquire the organ -of sight alone? The picture we are looking at and believe we see only -with our eyes would seem to his eyes to be little more than an artist's -paint-smeared palette.</p> - -<p>Some who hold firmly to the æsthetic character of certain groups of -impressions (for example, the visual and auditive), and exclude others, -are nevertheless ready to admit that if visual and auditive impressions -enter <i>directly</i> into the æsthetic fact, those of the other senses<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> -also enter into it, but only as <i>associated.</i> But this distinction is -altogether arbitrary. Æsthetic expression is synthesis, in which it -is impossible to distinguish direct and indirect. All impressions are -placed by it on a level, in so far as they are æstheticized. A man who -absorbs the subject of a picture or poem does not have it before him as -a series of impressions, some of which have prerogatives and precedence -over the others. He knows nothing as to what has happened prior to -having absorbed it, just as, on the other hand, distinctions made after -reflexion have nothing whatever to do with art as such.</p> - -<p>The theory of the æsthetic senses has also been presented in another -way; as an attempt to establish what physiological organs are necessary -for the æsthetic fact. The physiological organ or apparatus is nothing -but a group of cells, constituted and disposed in a particular manner; -that is to say, it is a merely physical and natural fact or concept. -But expression does not know physiological facts. Expression has its -point of departure in the impressions, and the physiological path -by which these have found their way to the mind is to it altogether -indifferent. One way or another comes to the same thing: it suffices -that they should be impressions.</p> - -<p>It is true that the want of given organs, that is, of certain groups of -cells, prevents the formation of certain impressions (when these are -not otherwise obtained through a kind of organic compensation). The -man born blind cannot intuite and express light. But the impressions -are not conditioned solely by the organ, but also by the stimuli which -operate upon the organ. One who has never had the impression of the sea -will never be able to express it, in the same way as one who has never -had the impression of the life of high society or of the political -arena will never express either. This, however, does not prove the -dependence of the expressive function on the stimulus or on the -organ. It merely repeats what we know already: expression presupposes -impression, and particular expressions particular impressions. For the -rest, every impression excludes other impressions during<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> the moment in -which it dominates; and so does every expression.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Unity and indivisibility of the work of art.</i></div> - -<p>Another corollary of the conception of expression as activity is the -<i>indivisibility</i> of the work of art. Every expression is a single -expression. Activity is a fusion of the impressions in an organic -whole. A desire to express this has always prompted the affirmation -that the work of art should have <i>unity,</i> or, what amounts to the same -thing, <i>unity in variety.</i> Expression is a synthesis of the various, or -multiple, in the one.</p> - -<p>The fact that we divide a work of art into parts, a poem into scenes, -episodes, similes, sentences, or a picture into single figures and -objects, background, foreground, etc., may seem opposed to this -affirmation. But such division annihilates the work, as dividing the -organism into heart, brain, nerves, muscles and so on, turns the living -being into a corpse. It is true that there exist organisms in which -division gives rise to other living beings, but in such a case we must -conclude, maintaining the analogy between the organism and the work of -art, that in the latter case too there are numerous germs of life each -ready to grow, in a moment, into a single complete expression.</p> - -<p>It may be said that expression sometimes arises from other expressions. -There are simple and there are <i>compound</i> expressions. One must surely -admit some difference between the <i>eureka,</i> with which Archimedes -expressed all his joy at his discovery, and the expressive act (indeed -all the five acts) of a regular tragedy.—Not in the least: expression -always arises directly from impressions. He who conceives a tragedy -puts into a crucible a great quantity, so to say, of impressions: -expressions themselves, conceived on other occasions, are fused -together with the new in a single mass, in the same way as we can -cast into a melting furnace formless pieces of bronze and choicest -statuettes. Those choicest statuettes must be melted just like the -pieces of bronze, before there can be a new statue. The old expressions -must descend again to the level of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> impressions, in order to be -synthesized in a new single expression.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art as liberator.</i></div> - -<p>By elaborating his impressions, man <i>frees</i> himself from them. By -objectifying them, he removes them from him and makes himself their -superior. The liberating and purifying function of art is another -aspect and another formula of its character as activity. Activity is -the deliverer, just because it drives away passivity.</p> - -<p>This also explains why it is usual to attribute to artists both the -maximum of sensibility or <i>passion</i>, and the maximum of insensibility -or Olympian <i>serenity.</i> The two characters are compatible, for they do -not refer to the same object. The sensibility or passion relates to -the rich material which the artist absorbs into his psychic organism; -the insensibility or serenity to the form with which he subdues and -dominates the tumult of the sensations and passions.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIIa" id="IIIa">III</a></h4> - - -<h4>ART AND PHILOSOPHY</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Inseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>The two forms of knowledge, æsthetic and intellectual or conceptual, -are indeed different, but this does not altogether amount to separation -and disjunction, as of two forces each pulling in its own direction. -If we have shown that the æsthetic form is altogether independent of -the intellectual and suffices to itself without external support, we -have not said that the intellectual can stand without the æsthetic. To -describe the independence as <i>reciprocal</i> would not be true.</p> - -<p>What is knowledge by concepts? It is knowledge of the relations of -things, and things are intuitions. Concepts are not possible without -intuitions, just as intuition is itself impossible without the matter -of impressions. Intuitions are: this river, this lake, this brook, -this rain, this glass of water; the concept is: water, not this or -that appearance and particular example of water, but water in general, -in whatever time or place it be realized; the material of infinite -intuitions, but of one single constant concept.</p> - -<p>But the concept, the universal, if it be no longer intuition in one -respect, is intuition in another respect, and cannot fail of being -intuition. The man who thinks has impressions and emotions, in so far -as he thinks. His impression and emotion will be not love or hate, -not the passion of the man who is not a philosopher, not hate or love -for certain objects and individuals, but <i>the effort of his thought -itself,</i> with the pain and the joy, the love and the hate joined to it. -This effort cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> but assume an intuitive form, in becoming objective -to the spirit. To speak is not to think logically; but to <i>think -logically</i> is also to <i>speak.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the negations of this thesis.</i></div> - -<p>That thought cannot exist without speech, is a truth generally -admitted. The negations of this thesis are all founded on equivocations -and errors.</p> - -<p>The first of the equivocations is that of those who observe that one -can likewise think with geometrical figures, algebraical numbers, -ideographic signs, without any word, even pronounced silently and -almost insensibly within one; that there are languages in which the -word, the phonetic sign, expresses nothing, unless the written sign -also be examined, and so on. But when we said "speak," we intended -to employ a synecdoche, by which was to be understood "expression" -in general, for we have already remarked that expression is not only -so-called verbal expression. It may or may not be true that certain -concepts may be thought without phonetic manifestations. But the very -examples adduced to show this also prove that those concepts never -exist without expressions.</p> - -<p>Others point out that animals, or certain animals, think and reason -without speaking. Now as to how, whether, and what animals think, -whether they be rudimentary men, like savages who refuse to be -civilized, rather than physiological machines, as the old spiritualists -maintained, are questions that do not concern us here. When the -philosopher talks of animal, brutal, impulsive, instinctive nature -and the like, he does not base himself on such conjectures as to -dogs or cats, lions or ants; but upon observations of what is called -animal and brutal in man: of the animal side or basis of what we feel -in ourselves. If individual animals, dogs or cats, lions or ants, -possess something of the activity of man, so much the better, or so -much the worse, for them. This means that in respect to them also we -must talk, not of "nature" as a whole, but of its animal basis, as -being perhaps larger and stronger in them than the animal basis of -man. And if we suppose that animals think and form concepts, what kind -of conjecture would justify the assertion that they do so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> without -corresponding expressions? Analogy with man, knowledge of the spirit, -human psychology, the instrument of all our conjectures as to animal -psychology, would constrain us on the contrary to suppose that if they -think in any way, they also somehow speak.</p> - -<p>Another objection is derived from human psychology, and indeed literary -psychology, to the effect that the concept can exist without the word, -for it is certainly true that we all know books <i>well thought and -ill written</i>: that is to say, a thought which remains <i>beyond</i> the -expression, or <i>notwithstanding</i> faulty expression. But when we talk of -books well thought and ill written, we cannot mean anything but that in -such books are parts, pages, periods or propositions well thought and -well written, and other parts (perhaps the least important) ill thought -and ill written, not really thought and so not really expressed. Where -Vico's <i>Scienza nuova</i> is really ill written, it is also ill thought. -If we pass from the consideration of big books to a short sentence, the -error or inaccuracy of such a contention will leap to the eyes. How -could a single sentence be clearly thought and confusedly written?</p> - -<p>All that can be admitted is that sometimes we possess thoughts -(concepts) in an intuitive form, which is an abbreviated or rather -peculiar expression, sufficient for us, but not sufficient to -communicate it easily to any other given person or persons. Hence it -is incorrect to say that we have the thought without the expression; -whereas we should rather say that we have, indeed, the expression, but -in such a form that it is not easy to communicate it to others. This, -however, is a very variable, relative fact. There are always those who -catch our thought on the wing, prefer it in this abbreviated form, -and would be wearied by the greater development of it required by -others. In other words, the thought considered abstractly and logically -will be the same; but æsthetically we are dealing with two different -intuition-expressions, into which different psychological elements -enter. The same argument suffices to destroy, that is,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> to interpret -correctly, the altogether empirical distinctior between an <i>internal</i> -and an <i>external</i> language.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art and science.</i></div> - -<p>The most lofty manifestations, the summits of intellectual and of -intuitive knowledge shining from afar, are called, as we know, Art and -Science. Art and Science, then, are different and yet linked together; -they meet on one side, which is the æsthetic side. Every scientific -work is also a work of art. The æsthetic side may remain little noticed -when our mind is altogether taken up with the effort to understand the -thought of the man of science and to examine its truth. But it is no -longer unnoticed when we pass from the activity of understanding to -that of contemplation and see that thought either develop itself before -us, limpid, exact, well-shaped, without superfluous or insufficient -words, with appropriate rhythm and intonation; or confused, broken, -embarrassed, tentative. Great thinkers are sometimes called great -writers, while other equally great thinkers remain more or less -fragmentary writers even if their fragments have the scientific value -of harmonious, coherent, and perfect works.</p> - -<p>We pardon thinkers and men of science their literary mediocrity. The -fragments, the flashes, console us for the whole, because it is far -easier to recover the well-arranged composition from the fragmentary -work of genius, to liberate the flame latent in the spark, than to -achieve the discovery of genius. But how can we pardon mediocre -expression in pure artists? "<i>Mediocribus esse poetis non di, non -homines, non concessere columnae</i>" The poet or painter who lacks -form, lacks everything, because he lacks <i>himself.</i> Poetical material -permeates the souls of all: the expression alone, that is to say, -the form, makes the poet. And here appears the truth of the view -which denies all content to art, just the intellectual concept being -understood as content. In this sense, when we take "content" as equal -to "concept" it is most true, not only that art does not consist of -content, but also that <i>it has no content.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Content and form: another meaning. Prose and poetry.</i></div> - -<p>The distinction between <i>poetry and prose</i> also cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> be justified, -save as that between art and science. It was seen in antiquity that -such distinction could not be founded on external elements, such as -rhythm and metre, or on rhymed or unrhymed form; that it was, on the -contrary, altogether internal. Poetry is the language of feeling, prose -of the intellect; but since the intellect is also feeling, in its -concreteness and reality, all prose has its poetical side.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The relation of first and second degree.</i></div> - -<p>The relation between intuitive knowledge or expression and intellectual -knowledge or concept, between art and science, poetry and prose, cannot -be otherwise defined than by saying that it is one of <i>double degree.</i> -The first degree is the expression, the second the concept: the first -can stand without the second, but the second cannot stand without the -first. There is poetry without prose, but not prose without poetry. -Expression, indeed, is the first affirmation of human activity. Poetry -is "the mother tongue of the human race"; the first men "were by nature -sublime poets." We assert this in another way, when we observe that -the passage from soul to spirit, from animal to human activity, is -effected by means of language. And this should be said of intuition -or expression in general. But to us it appears somewhat inaccurate to -define language or expression as an <i>intermediate</i> link between nature -and humanity, as though it were a mixture of both. Where humanity -appears, the other has already disappeared; the man who expresses -himself, certainly emerges from the state of nature, but he really does -emerge: he does not stand half within and half without, as the use of -the phrase "intermediate link" would imply.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-existence of other forms of knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>The cognitive spirit has no form other than these two. Expression and -concept exhaust it completely. The whole speculative life of man is -spent in passing from one to the other and back again.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Historicity. Its identity with and difference from art.</i></div> - -<p><i>Historicity</i> is incorrectly held to be a third theoretical form. -Historicity is not form, but content: as form, it is nothing but -intuition or æsthetic fact. History does not seek for laws nor form -concepts; it employs neither<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> induction nor deduction; it is directed -<i>ad narrandum, non ad demonstrandum</i>; it does not construct universals -and abstractions, but posits intuitions. The this and here, the -<i>individuum omnimode determinatum,</i> is its domain, as it is the domain -of art. History, therefore, is included in the universal concept of art.</p> - -<p>As against this doctrine, in view of the impossibility of conceiving -a third mode of knowledge, objections have been brought forward which -would lead to the affiliation of history to intellectual or scientific -knowledge. The greater portion of these objections is animated by the -prejudice that in refusing to history the character of conceptual -science something of its value and dignity has been taken from it. This -really arises from a false idea of art, conceived not as an essential -theoretic function, but as an amusement, a superfluity, a frivolity. -Without reopening a long debate, which so far as we are concerned -is finally closed, we will mention here one sophism which has been -and still is widely repeated. Its purpose is to show the logical and -scientific nature of history. The sophism consists in admitting that -historical knowledge has for its object the individual; but not the -representation, it is added, but rather the concept of the individual. -From this it is argued that history is also a logical or scientific -form of knowledge. History, in fact, is supposed to work out the -concept of a personage such as Charlemagne or Napoleon; of an epoch, -like the Renaissance or the Reformation; of an event, such as the -French Revolution and the Unification of Italy. This it is held to do -in the same way as Geometry works out the concepts of spatial forms, or -Æsthetic that of expression. But all this is untrue. History cannot do -otherwise than <i>represent</i> Napoleon and Charlemagne, the Renaissance -and the Reformation, the French Revolution and the Unification of Italy -as individual facts with their individual physiognomy: that is, in the -sense in which logicians use the word "represent" when they say that -one cannot have a concept of the individual, but only a representation. -The so-called concept of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> individual is always a universal or -general concept, full of characteristics, supremely full, if you like, -but however full it be, incapable of attaining to that individuality to -which historical knowledge, as æsthetic knowledge, alone attains.</p> - -<p>To show how the content of history comes to be distinguished from -that of art in the narrow sense, we must recall what has already -been observed as to the ideal character of the intuition or first -perception, in which all is real and therefore nothing is real. Only -at a later stage does the spirit form the concepts of external and -internal, of what has happened and what is desired, of object and -subject, and the like: only at this later stage, that is, does it -distinguish historical from non-historical intuition, the <i>real</i> from -the <i>unreal,</i> real imagination from pure imagination. Even internal -facts, what is desired and imagined, castles in the air, and countries -of Cockaigne, have their reality, and the soul, too, has its history. -His illusions form part of the biography of every individual as real -facts. But the history of an individual soul is history, because -the distinction between the real and the unreal is always active -in it, even when the illusions themselves are the real. But these -distinctive concepts do not appear in history like the concepts of -science, but rather like those that we have seen dissolved and melted -in the æsthetic intuitions, although in history they stand out in a -manner altogether special to themselves. History does not construct -the concepts of the real and unreal, but makes use of them. History, -in fact, is not the theory of history. Mere conceptual analysis is -of no use in ascertaining whether an event in our lives was real or -imaginary. We must mentally reproduce the intuitions in the most -complete form, as they were at the moment of production. Historicity -is distinguished in the concrete from pure imagination as any one -intuition is distinguished from any other: in memory.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Historical criticism.</i></div> - -<p>Where this is not possible, where the delicate and fleeting shades -between the real and unreal intuitions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> are so slight as to mingle -the one with the other, we must either renounce for the time being at -least the knowledge of what really happened (and this we often do), or -we must fall back upon conjecture, verisimilitude, probability. The -principle of verisimilitude and of probability in fact dominates all -historical criticism. Examination of sources and authorities is devoted -to establishing the most credible evidence. And what is the most -credible evidence, save that of the best observers, that is, of those -who best remember and (be it understood) have not wished to falsify, -nor had interest in falsifying the truth of things?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Historical scepticism.</i></div> - -<p>From this it follows that intellectualistic scepticism finds it easy -to deny the certainty of any history, for the certainty of history -differs from that of science. It is the certainty of memory and -of authority, not that of analysis and demonstration. To speak of -historical induction or demonstration is to make a metaphorical use of -these expressions, which bear a quite different meaning in history to -that which they bear in science. The conviction of the historian is the -undemonstrable conviction of the juryman, who has heard the witnesses, -listened attentively to the case, and prayed Heaven to inspire him. -Sometimes, without doubt, he is mistaken, but the mistakes are in a -negligible minority compared with the occasions when he grasps the -truth. That is why good sense is right against the intellectualists in -believing in history, which is not a "fable agreed upon," but what the -individual and humanity remember of their past. We strive to enlarge -and to render as precise as possible this record, which in some places -is dim, in others very clear. We cannot do without it, such as it is, -and taken as a whole it is rich in truth. Only in a spirit of paradox -can one doubt that there ever was a Greece or a Rome, an Alexander or a -Cæsar, a feudal Europe overthrown by a series of revolutions, that on -the 1st of November 1517 the theses of Luther were fixed to the door of -the church at Wittemberg, or that the Bastile was taken by the people -of Paris on the 14th of July 1789.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span></p> - -<p>"What proof hast thou of all this?" asks the sophist, ironically. -Humanity replies: "I remember it."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural -sciences, and their limits.</i></div> - -<p>The world of what has happened, of the concrete, of historical fact, -is the world called real, natural, including in this definition both -the reality called physical and that called spiritual and human. All -this world is intuition; historical intuition, if it be shown as it -realistically is; imaginary or artistic intuition in the narrow sense, -if presented in the aspect of the possible, that is to say, of the -imaginable.</p> - -<p>Science, true science, which is not intuition but concept, not -individuality but universality, cannot be anything but science of the -spirit, that is, of what reality has of universal: Philosophy. If -natural <i>sciences</i> be spoken of, apart from philosophy, we must observe -that these are not perfect sciences: they are aggregates of cognitions, -arbitrarily abstracted and fixed. The so-called natural sciences -indeed themselves recognize that they are surrounded by limitations, -and these limitations are nothing but historical and intuitive data. -They calculate, measure, establish equalities and uniformities, -create classes and types, formulate laws, show in their own way how -one fact arises out of other facts; but while doing this they are -constantly running into facts known intuitively and historically. -Even geometry now states that it rests altogether on hypotheses, -since threedimensional or Euclidean space is but one of the possible -spaces, selected for purposes of study because more convenient. What -is true in the natural sciences is either philosophy or historical -fact. What of properly naturalistic they contain, is abstraction and -caprice. When the natural sciences wish to become perfect sciences, -they must leave their circle and enter philosophy. They do this when -they posit concepts which are anything but naturalistic, such as those -of the unextended atom, of ether or vibration, of vital force, of -non-intuitional space, and the like. These are true and proper attempts -at philosophy, when they are not mere words void of meaning. The -concepts of natural science are, without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> doubt, most useful; but one -cannot obtain from them that <i>system</i> which belongs only to the spirit.</p> - -<p>These historical and intuitive data which cannot be eliminated from the -natural sciences furthermore explain not only how, with the advance -of knowledge, what was once believed to be true sinks gradually to -the level of mythological belief and fantastic illusion, but also how -among natural scientists some are to be found who call everything in -their sciences upon which reasoning is founded <i>mythical facts, verbal -expedients,</i> or <i>conventions.</i> Natural scientists and mathematicians -who approach the study of the energies of the spirit without -preparation, are apt to carry thither such mental habits and to speak -in philosophy of such and such conventions as "decreed by man." They -make conventions of truth and morality, and a supreme convention of -the Spirit itself! But if there are to be conventions, something must -exist which is no convention, but is itself the author of conventions. -This is the spiritual activity of man. The limitation of the natural -sciences postulates the illimitability of philosophy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The phenomenon and the noumenon.</i></div> - -<p>These explications have firmly established that the pure or fundamental -forms of knowledge are two: the intuition and the concept—Art, and -Science or Philosophy. With these are to be included History, which -is, as it were, the product of intuition placed in contact with the -concept, that is, of art receiving in itself philosophic distinctions, -while remaining concrete and individual. All other forms (natural -sciences and mathematics) are impure, being mingled with extraneous -elements of practical origin. Intuition gives us the world, the -phenomenon; the concept gives us the noumenon, the Spirit.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IVa" id="IVa">IV</a></h4> - - -<h4>HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN ÆSTHETIC</h4> - - -<p>These relations between intuitive or æsthetic knowledge and the other -fundamental or derivative forms of knowledge having been definitely -established, we are now in a position to reveal the errors of a series -of theories which have been, or are, presented as theories of Æsthetic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of probability and of naturalism.</i></div> - -<p>From the confusion between the demands of art in general and the -particular demands of history has resulted the theory (which has lost -ground to-day, but was once dominant) of the <i>probable</i> as the object -of art. As is generally the case with erroneous propositions, the -meaning of those who employed and employ the concept of probability -has no doubt often been much more reasonable than their definition -of the word. By probability used really to be meant the artistic -<i>coherence</i> of the representation, that is to say, its completeness -and effectiveness, its actual presence. If "probable" be translated -"coherent," a very just meaning will often be found in the discussions, -examples, and judgements of the critics who employ this word. An -improbable personage, an improbable ending to a comedy, are really -badly-drawn personages, badly-arranged endings, happenings without -artistic motive. It has been said with reason that even fairies and -sprites must have probability, that is to say, be really sprites and -fairies, coherent artistic intuitions. Sometimes the word "possible" -has been used instead of "probable." As we have already remarked in -passing, this word possible is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> synonymous with the imaginable or -intuitible. Everything truly, that is to say coherently, imagined, is -possible. But also, by a good many critics and theorists, the probable -was taken to mean the historically credible, or that historical truth -which is not demonstrable but conjecturable, not true but probable. -This was the character which these theorists sought to impose upon art. -Who does not remember how great a part was played in literary history -by criticism based on probability, for example, censure of <i>Jerusalem -Delivered,</i> based upon the history of the Crusades, or of the Homeric -poems, upon the probable customs of emperors and kings? Sometimes too -the æsthetic reproduction of historical reality has been imposed upon -art. This is another of the erroneous forms taken by the theory of the -<i>imitation of nature.</i> Verism and naturalism also have afforded the -spectacle of a confusion of the æsthetic fact with the processes of the -natural sciences, by aiming at some sort of <i>experimental</i> drama or -romance.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of ideas in art, of theses in art and of the -typical.</i></div> - -<p>Confusions between the methods of art and those of the philosophic -sciences have been far more frequent. Thus it has often been held to -be the task of art to expound concepts, to unite an intelligible with -a sensible, to represent <i>ideas</i> or <i>universals</i>; putting art in the -place of science, that is, confusing the artistic function in general -with the particular case in which it becomes æsthetico-logical.</p> - -<p>The theory of art as supporting <i>theses,</i> of art considered as an -individual representation exemplifying scientific laws, can be proved -false in like manner. The example, as example, stands for the thing -exemplified, and is thus an exposition of the universal, that is to -say, a form of science, more or less popular or vulgarizing.</p> - -<p>The same may be said of the æsthetic theory of the <i>typical,</i> when -by type is understood, as it frequently is, the abstraction or the -concept, and it is affirmed that art should make the <i>species</i> shine -in the <i>individual.</i> If individual be here understood by typical, we -have here too a merely verbal variation. To typify would signify, in -this case, to characterize; that is, to determine and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> to represent -the individual. Don Quixote is a type; but of what is he a type, save -of all Don Quixotes? A type, so to speak, of himself. Certainly he -is not a type of abstract concepts, such as the loss of the sense of -reality, or of the love of glory. An infinite number of personages -can be thought of under these concepts, who are not Don Quixotes. In -other words, we find our own impressions fully determined and realized -in the expression of a poet (for example in a poetical personage). We -call that expression typical, which we might call simply æsthetic. Thus -poetical or artistic universals have sometimes been spoken of, only to -show that the artistic product is altogether spiritual and ideal.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the symbol and of the allegory.</i></div> - -<p>Continuing to correct these errors, or to clear up misunderstandings, -we shall also remark that the <i>symbol</i> has sometimes been given as the -essence of art. Now, if the symbol be conceived as inseparable from the -artistic intuition, it is a synonym for the intuition itself, which -always has an ideal character. There is no double bottom to art, but -one only; in art all is symbolical, because all is ideal. But if the -symbol be conceived as separable—if the symbol can be on one side, -and on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the -intellectualist error: the so-called symbol is the exposition of an -abstract concept, an <i>allegory</i>; it is science, or art aping science. -But we must also be just toward the allegorical. Sometimes it is -altogether harmless. Given the <i>Gerusalemme liberata,</i> the allegory -was imagined afterwards; given the <i>A done</i> of Marino, the poet of -the lascivious afterwards insinuated that it was written to show how -"immoderate indulgence ends in pain"; given a statue of a beautiful -woman, the sculptor can attach a label to the statue saying that -it represents <i>Clemency</i> or <i>Goodness.</i> This allegory that arrives -attached to a finished work <i>post festum</i> does not change the work of -art. What then is it? It is an expression externally <i>added</i> to another -expression. A little page of prose is added to the <i>Gerusalemme,</i> -expressing another thought of the poet; a verse or a strophe is added -to the <i>Adone,</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> expressing what the poet would like to make a part -of his public believe; to the statue nothing but the single word: -<i>Clemency</i> or <i>Goodness.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary kinds.</i></div> - -<p>But the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error lies in the -theory of artistic and literary kinds, which still has vogue in -literary treatises and disturbs the critics and the historians of art. -Let us observe its genesis.</p> - -<p>The human mind can pass from the æsthetic to the logical, just because -the former is a first step in respect to the latter. It can destroy -expression, that is, the thought of the individual, by thinking of the -universal. It can gather up expressive facts into logical relations. -We have already shown that this operation becomes in its turn concrete -in an expression, but this does not mean that the first expressions -have not been destroyed. They have yielded their place to the new -æsthetico-logical expressions. When we are on the second step, we have -left the first.</p> - -<p>One who enters a picture-gallery, or who reads a series of poems, -having looked and read, may go further: he may seek out the nature and -the relations of the things there expressed. Thus those pictures and -compositions, each of which is an individual inexpressible in logical -terms, are gradually resolved into universals and abstractions, such -as <i>costumes, landscapes, portraits, domestic life, battles, animals, -flowers, fruit, seascapes, lakes, deserts; tragic, comic, pathetic, -cruel, lyrical, epic, dramatic, chivalrous, idyllic facts,</i> and the -like. They are often also resolved into merely quantitative categories, -such as <i>miniature, picture, statuette, group, madrigal, ballad, -sonnet, sonnet-sequence, poetry, poem, story, romance,</i> and the like.</p> - -<p>When we think the concept <i>domestic life,</i> or <i>chivalry,</i> or <i>idyll,</i> -or <i>cruelty,</i> or one of the quantitative concepts mentioned above, the -individual expressive fact from which we started has been abandoned. -From æsthetes that we were, we have changed into logicians; from -contemplators of expression, into reasoners. Certainly no objection -can be made to such a process. In what other way could science arise, -which, if it have æsthetic expressions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> presupposed in it, must yet go -beyond them in order to fulfil its function? The logical or scientific -form, as such, excludes the æsthetic form. He who begins to think -scientifically has already ceased to contemplate æsthetically; although -his thought assumes of necessity in its turn an æsthetic form, as has -already been said, and as it would be superfluous to repeat.</p> - -<p>Error begins when we try to deduce the expression from the concept, and -to find in what takes its place the laws of the thing whose place is -taken; when the difference between the second and the first step has -not been observed, and when, in consequence, we declare that we are -standing on the first step, when we are really standing on the second. -This error is known as the <i>theory of artistic and literary kinds.</i></p> - -<p>"What is the <i>æsthetic</i> form of domestic life, of chivalry, of -the idyll, of cruelty, and so forth? How should these contents be -<i>represented</i>?" Such is the absurd problem implied in the theory of -artistic and literary classes, when it has been shorn of excrescences -and reduced to a simple formula. It is in this that consists all -search after laws or rules of classes. Domestic life, chivalry, idyll, -cruelty and the like, are not impressions, but concepts. They are not -contents, but logical-æsthetic forms. You cannot express the form, -for it is already itself expression. For what are the words cruelty, -idyll, chivalry, domestic life, and so on, but the expression of those -concepts?</p> - -<p>Even the most refined of such distinctions, which possess the most -philosophic appearance, do not resist criticism; as when works of art -are divided into subjective and objective kinds, into lyric and epic, -into works of feeling and decorative works. In æsthetic analysis it is -impossible to separate subjective from objective, lyric from epic, the -image of feeling from that of things.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art.</i></div> - -<p>From the theory of artistic and literary kinds derive those erroneous -modes of judgement and of criticism, thanks to which, instead of asking -before a work of art if it be expressive and what it expresses, whether -it speak<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> or stammer or is altogether silent, they ask if it obey the -<i>laws</i> of epic or of tragedy, of historical painting or of landscape. -While making a verbal pretence of agreeing, or yielding a feigned -obedience, artists have, however, really always disregarded these <i>laws -of the kinds.</i> Every true work of art has violated some established -kind and upset the ideas of the critics, who have thus been obliged to -broaden the kinds, until finally even the broadened kind has proved too -narrow, owing to the appearance of new works of art, naturally followed -by new scandals, new upsettings and—new broadenings.</p> - -<p>To the same theory are due the prejudices, owing to which at one time -(is it really passed?) people used to lament that Italy had no tragedy -(until one arose who bestowed such a wreath, which alone of adornments -was wanting to her glorious locks), nor France the epic poem (until the -<i>Henriade,</i> which slaked the thirsty throats of the critics). Eulogies -accorded to the inventors of new kinds are connected with these -prejudices, so much so, that in the seventeenth century the invention -of the <i>mock-heroic</i> poem seemed an important event, and the honour of -it was disputed, as though it were the discovery of America. But the -works adorned with this name (the <i>Secchia rapita</i> and the <i>Scherno -degli Dei</i>) were still-born, because their authors (a slight drawback) -had nothing new or original to say. Mediocrities racked their brains to -invent new kinds artificially. The <i>piscatorial</i> eclogue was added to -the <i>pastoral,</i> and finally the <i>military</i> eclogue. The <i>Aminta</i> was -dipped and became the <i>Alceo.</i> Finally, there have been historians of -art and literature, so much fascinated with these ideas of kinds, that -they claimed to write the history, not of individual and real literary -and artistic works, but of those empty phantoms, their kinds. They have -claimed to portray, not the evolution of the <i>artistic spirit,</i> but the -<i>evolution of kinds.</i></p> - -<p>The philosophical condemnation of artistic and literary kinds is found -in the formulation and demonstration of what artistic activity has -always done and good taste always recognized. What are we to do if good -taste and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> the real fact, when reduced to formulas, sometimes assume -the air of paradoxes?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical sense of the divisions of kinds.</i></div> - -<p>It is not scientifically incorrect to talk of tragedies, comedies, -dramas, romances, pictures of everyday life, battle-pieces, landscapes, -seascapes, poems, versicles, lyrics, and the like, if it be only with -a view to be understood, and to draw attention to certain groups -of works, in general and approximately, to which, for one reason -or another, it is desired to draw attention. To employ <i>words</i> and -<i>phrases</i> is not to establish <i>laws</i> and <i>definitions.</i> The mistake -only arises when the weight of a scientific definition is given to a -word, when we ingenuously let ourselves be caught in the meshes of -that phraseology. Pray permit me a comparison. The books in a library -must be arranged in one way or another. This used generally to be done -by a rough classification of subjects (among which the categories of -miscellaneous and eccentric were not wanting); they are now generally -arranged by sizes or by publishers. Who can deny the necessity and -the utility of such arrangements? But what should we say if some one -began seriously to seek out the literary laws of miscellanies and of -eccentricities, of the Aldines or Bodonis, of shelf A or shelf B, -that is to say, of those altogether arbitrary groupings whose sole -object was their practical utility. Yet should any one attempt such -an undertaking, he would be doing neither more nor less than those do -who seek out the <i>æsthetic laws</i> which must in their belief control -literary and artistic kinds.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="Va" id="Va">V</a></h4> - - -<h4>ANALOGOUS ERRORS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY AND IN LOGIC</h4> - - -<p>The better to confirm these criticisms, it will be useful to cast a -rapid glance over analogous and opposite errors, due to ignorance as -to the true nature of art and its relation to history and to science. -These errors have injured alike the theory of history and that of -science, Historic (or Historiology) and Logic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the philosophy of history.</i></div> - -<p>Historical intellectualism has opened the way to the many attempts, -made especially during the last two centuries and continued to-day, to -discover <i>a philosophy of history,</i> an <i>ideal history,</i> a <i>sociology,</i> -a <i>historical psychology,</i> or whatever else a science may be called, -whose object is to extract from history concepts and universal laws. -What must these laws, these universals be? Historical laws and -historical concepts? In that case, an elementary acquaintance with -the theory of knowledge suffices to make clear the absurdity of the -attempt. When such expressions as a <i>historical law,</i> a <i>historical -concept</i> are not simply metaphors colloquially employed, they are truly -contradictory terms: the adjective is as unsuitable to the substantive -as in the expressions "qualitative quantity" or "pluralistic monism." -History implies concreteness and individuality, law and concept -mean abstractness and universality. But if the attempt to extract -<i>historical</i> laws and concepts from history be abandoned, and it be -merely desired to draw from it laws and concepts, the attempt is -certainly not frivolous; but the science thus obtained will be, not -a philosophy of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> history, but rather, according to circumstances, -either philosophy in its various forms of Ethics, Logic, etc., or -empirical science with its infinite divisions and subdivisions. The -search is in fact either for those philosophical concepts which, as -already remarked, are the basis of every historical construction and -differentiate perception from intuition, historical intuition from pure -intuition, history from art; or already formed historical intuitions -are collected and arranged in types and classes, which is exactly the -method of the natural sciences. Great thinkers have sometimes donned -the ill-fitting cloak of the philosophy of history, and notwithstanding -the covering, they have attained philosophical truths of the greatest -magnitude. The cloak discarded, the truth has remained. Modern -sociologists are rather to be blamed, not so much for the illusion -in which they are involved when they talk of an impossible science -of sociology, as for the infecundity which almost always accompanies -their illusion. It matters little that Æsthetic should be called -"sociological Æsthetic," or Logic, "sociological Logic." The grave evil -is that such Æsthetic is an old-fashioned expression of sensationalism, -such Logic verbal and incoherent. The philosophical movement to which -we have referred has however borne two good fruits in relation to -history. First of all, a keener desire has arisen for a theory of -history, that is, a theory of the nature and the limits of history, a -theory which, in conformity with the analysis made above, cannot obtain -satisfaction save in a general science of intuition, in an Æsthetic, in -which the theory of history would form a special chapter, distinguished -by the insertion of universal functions. Furthermore, concrete truths -relating to historical events have often been expressed beneath the -false and presumptuous cloak of a philosophy of history; rules and -warnings have been formulated, empirical no doubt, yet by no means -useless to students and critics. It does not seem possible to deny this -utility even to the most recent of philosophies of history, known as -historical materialism, which has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> thrown a very vivid light upon many -sides of social life formerly neglected or ill understood.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic intrusions into Logic.</i></div> - -<p>The principle of authority, of the <i>ipse dixit</i>, is an intrusion -by historicity into the domains of science and philosophy which -has dominated the schools and substitutes for introspection -and philosophical analysis this or that evidence, document, or -authoritative statement, with which history certainly cannot dispense. -But Logic, the science of thought and of intellectual knowledge, has -suffered the most grave and destructive of all disturbances and errors -through an imperfect understanding of the æsthetic fact. How could it -be otherwise, if logical activity come after and contain in itself -æsthetic activity? An inexact Æsthetic must of necessity drag after it -an inexact Logic.</p> - -<p>Whoever opens a logical treatise, from the <i>Organon</i> of Aristotle -to the modern works on the subject, must agree that all contain a -haphazard mixture of verbal facts and facts of thought, of grammatical -forms and of conceptual forms, of Æsthetic and of Logic. Not that -attempts have been wanting to escape from verbal expression and to -seize thought in its true nature. Aristotelian logic itself did not -become mere syllogistic and verbalism without some hesitation and -indecision. The problem proper to logic was often touched upon in -their disputes by the nominalists, realists and conceptualists of the -Middle Ages. With Galileo and with Bacon, the natural sciences gave an -honourable place to induction. Vico combated formalist and mathematical -logic in favour of inventive methods. Kant called attention to the <i>a -priori</i> synthesis. Absolute idealism despised the Aristotelian Logic. -The followers of Herbart, though still loyal to Aristotle, emphasized -those judgements which they called narrative and which have a character -altogether differing from that of other logical judgements. Finally, -the linguists insisted upon the irrationality of the word, in relation -to the concept. But a conscious, sure and radical movement of reform -can find no basis or point of departure, save in the science of -Æsthetic.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Logic in its essence.</i></div> - -<p>In a Logic suitably reformed on this basis, this truth must first and -foremost be proclaimed, and all its consequences deduced: the logical -fact, <i>the only logical fact,</i> is <i>the concept,</i> the universal, the -spirit that forms, and in so far as it forms, the universal. And if -by induction be understood, as sometimes it has been, the formation -of universals, and by deduction their verbal development, then it is -clear that true Logic can be nothing but inductive Logic. But since by -the word "deduction" has been more frequently understood the special -processes of mathematics, and the word "induction" those of the natural -sciences, it will be best to avoid both words and say that true Logic -is Logic of the concept. The Logic of the concept, while employing -a method which is both induction and deduction, will employ neither -exclusively, that is, it will employ the speculative method which is -intrinsic to it.</p> - -<p>The concept, the universal, considered abstractly in itself, is -<i>inexpressible.</i> No word is proper to it. So true is this, that the -logical concept remains always the same, notwithstanding the variation -of verbal forms. In respect to the concept, expression is a simple -<i>sign</i> or <i>indication.</i> There must be an expression, it cannot be -absent; but what it is to be, this or that, is determined by the -historical and psychological conditions of the individual who is -speaking. The quality of the expression is not deducible from the -nature of the concept. There does not exist a true (logical) sense of -words. The true sense of words is that which is conferred upon them on -each occasion by the person forming a concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between logical and non-logical judgements.</i></div> - -<p>This being so, the only truly logical (that is, æsthetico-logical) -propositions, the only rigorously logical judgements, must be those -whose proper and sole content is the determination of a concept. These -propositions or judgements are <i>definitions.</i> Science itself is nothing -but a collection of definitions, unified in a supreme definition; a -system of concepts, or highest concept.</p> - -<p>It is therefore necessary (at least as a preliminary) to exclude -from Logic all those propositions which do not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> affirm universals. -Narrative judgements, not less than those termed non-enunciative by -Aristotle, such as the expression of desires, are not properly logical -judgements. They are either purely æsthetic propositions or historical -propositions. "Peter is passing; it is raining to-day; I am sleepy; I -want to read": these and an infinity of propositions of the same kind -are nothing but either a mere enclosing in words the impression of -the fact that Peter is passing, of the falling rain, of my organism -inclining to sleep, and of my will directed to reading, or an -existential affirmation concerning those facts. They are expressions of -the real or of the unreal, historical-imaginative or pure-imaginative; -they are certainly not definitions of universals.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Syllogistic.</i></div> - -<p>This exclusion cannot meet with great difficulties. It is already -almost an accomplished fact, and the only thing required is to render -it explicit, decisive and coherent. But what is to be done with -all that part of human thought called <i>syllogistic,</i> consisting of -judgements and reasonings based upon concepts? What is syllogistic? -Is it to be looked down upon with contempt, as something useless, as -has so often been done by the humanists in their reaction against -scholasticism, by absolute idealism, by the enthusiastic admiration of -our times for the methods of observation and experiment of the natural -sciences?—Syllogistic, reasonings <i>forma,</i> is not the discovery of -truth; it is the art of expounding, debating, disputing with oneself -and others. Proceeding from concepts already formed, from facts already -observed, and appealing to the persistence of the true or of thought -(such is the meaning of the laws of identity and contradiction), it -infers consequences from those data, that is, it re-states what has -already been discovered. Therefore, if it be an <i>idem per idem</i> from -the point of view of invention, it is most efficacious in teaching and -in exposition. To reduce affirmations to a syllogistic form is a way of -controlling one's own thought and of criticizing the thought of others. -It is easy to laugh at syllogizers, but, if syllogistic has been born -and persists, it must have good reasons of its own. Satire on it can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> -concern only its abuses, such as the attempt to prove syllogistically -questions of fact, observation and intuition, or the neglect of -profound meditation and unprejudiced investigation of problems, in -favour of syllogistic externality. And if so-called <i>mathematical -Logic</i> can sometimes aid us in our attempt to remember with ease, -rapidly to control the results of our own thought, let us welcome this -form of syllogistic also, anticipated by Leibnitz among others and -again attempted by some in our own days.</p> - -<p>But precisely because syllogistic is the art of exposition and debate, -its theory cannot hold the first place in a philosophical Logic, thus -usurping that belonging to the doctrine of the concept, which is -the central and dominating doctrine, to which everything logical in -syllogistic is reducible, without leaving a residuum (relations of -concepts, subordination, co-ordination, identification and so on). Nor -must it ever be forgotten that concept and (logical) judgement and -syllogism are not in the same line. The first alone is the logical -fact, the second and third are the forms in which the first manifests -itself. These, in so far as they are forms, can only be examined -æsthetically (grammatically), and in so far as they possess logical -content, only by ignoring the forms themselves and passing to the -doctrine of the concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Logical falsehood and æsthetic truth.</i></div> - -<p>This confirms the truth of the ordinary remark to the effect that -he who reasons ill, also speaks and writes ill, that exact logical -analysis is the basis of good expression. This truth is a tautology, -for to reason well is in fact to express oneself well, because the -expression is the intuitive possession of one's own logical thought. -The principle of contradiction itself is at bottom nothing but -the æsthetic principle of coherence. It may be maintained that it -is possible to write and to speak exceedingly well, as it is also -possible to reason well though starting from erroneous concepts; that -some, though lacking the acuteness that makes a great discoverer, -are nevertheless exceedingly lucid writers; because to write well -depends upon having a clear intuition of one's own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> thought, even if -it be erroneous; not of its scientific, but of its æsthetic truth, -which indeed is the same thing as writing well. A philosopher like -Schopenhauer can imagine that art is a representation of the Platonic -ideas. This doctrine is scientifically false, yet he may develop this -false knowledge in excellent prose, æsthetically most true. But we -have already replied to these objections, when observing that at that -precise point where a speaker or a writer enunciates an ill-thought -concept, he is at the same time a bad speaker and a bad writer, -although he may afterwards recover himself in the many other parts -of his thought which contain true propositions not connected with -the preceding error, and therefore lucid expressions following upon -confused expressions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reformed logic.</i></div> - -<p>All researches as to the forms of judgements and of syllogisms, their -conversions and their various relations, which still encumber treatises -on Logic, are therefore destined to diminish, to be transformed, to be -converted into something else. The doctrine of the concept and of the -organism of concepts, of definition, of system, of philosophy and the -various sciences, and the like, will occupy the field and alone will -constitute true and proper Logic.</p> - -<p>Those who first had some suspicion of the intimate connexion between -Æsthetic and Logic and conceived Æsthetic as a <i>Logic of sensible -knowledge</i> were peculiarly addicted to applying logical categories to -the new knowledge, talking of <i>æsthetic concepts, æsthetic judgements, -æsthetic syllogisms,</i> and so on. We who are less superstitious as -regards the permanence of the traditional Logic of the schools, -and better informed as to the nature of Æsthetic, do not recommend -the application of Logic to Æsthetic, but the liberation of Logic -from æsthetic forms. These have given rise to non-existent forms or -categories of Logic, due to the adoption of altogether arbitrary and -ill-considered distinctions.</p> - -<p>Logic thus reformed will still be <i>formal</i> Logic; it will study the -true form or activity of thought, the concept,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> excluding individual -and particular concepts. The old Logic is ill called formal; it would -be better to call it <i>verbal</i> or <i>formalistic.</i> Formal Logic will drive -out formalistic Logic. To attain this object, it will not be necessary -to have recourse, as some have done, to a real or material Logic, -which is no longer a science of thought, but thought itself in action; -not only a Logic, but the whole of Philosophy, in which Logic is also -included. The science of thought (Logic) is that of the concept, as -that of imagination (Æsthetic) is that of expression. The well-being -of both sciences lies in exactly carrying out in every particular the -distinction between the two domains.</p> - -<p><i>Note to the Fourth Italian Edition.</i>—The observations contained in -this chapter on Logic, which are not all of them clear or accurate, -should be clarified and corrected by means of the further treatment -of the theme in the second volume of the <i>Philosophy of the Spirit,</i> -dedicated to Logic, where the distinction between logical and -historical propositions is again examined and their synthetic unity -demonstrated.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIa" id="VIa">VI</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE THEORETIC ACTIVITY AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY</h4> - - -<p>The intuitive and intellectual forms contain between them, as we have -said, the whole theoretic domain of the spirit. But it is not possible -to know them thoroughly, nor to criticize another series of erroneous -æsthetic theories, without first establishing clearly the relations of -the theoretic spirit with the <i>practical</i> spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The will.</i></div> - -<p>The practical form or activity is the <i>will.</i> We do not here employ -this word in the sense of some philosophical systems, where the will -is the foundation of the universe, the ground of things and the true -reality. Nor do we employ it in the wide sense of other systems, -which understand by will the energy of the spirit, spirit or activity -in general, making of every act of the human spirit an act of will. -Neither such metaphysical nor such metaphorical meaning is ours. For -us, the will is, as generally understood, that activity of the spirit -which differs from the merely theoretical contemplation of things, -and is productive, not of knowledge, but of actions. Action is really -action, in so far as it is voluntary. It is not necessary to remark -that in the will to do, we include, in the scientific sense, also what -is usually called not-doing: the will to resist, to reject, the will of -a Prometheus, which also is action.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The will as an ulterior stage in respect to knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>Man understands things with the theoretical form, with the practical -form he changes them; with the one he appropriates the universe, with -the other he creates it. But the first form is the basis of the second; -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> the relation of <i>double degree,</i> which we have already found -existing between æsthetic and logical activity, is repeated between -these two on a larger scale. A knowing independent of the will is -thinkable, at least in a certain sense; will independent of knowing is -unthinkable. Blind will is not will; true will has eyes.</p> - -<p>How can we will, without having before us historical intuitions -(perceptions) of objects, and knowledge of (logical) relations, which -enlightens us as to the nature of those objects? How can we really -will, if we do not know the world which surrounds us or how to change -things by acting upon them?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Objections and explanations.</i></div> - -<p>It has been objected that men of action, practical men <i>par -excellence,</i> are the least disposed to contemplate and to theorize: -their energy is not delayed in contemplation, it rushes at once into -will. And conversely, that contemplative men, philosophers, are -often very mediocre in practical matters, weak willed, and therefore -neglected and thrust aside in the tumult of life. It is easy to -see that these distinctions are merely empirical and quantitative. -Certainly, the practical man has no need of a philosophical system in -order to act, but in the spheres where he does act, he starts from -intuitions and concepts which are perfectly clear to him. Otherwise the -most ordinary actions could not be willed. It would not be possible -to will to feed oneself, for instance, without knowledge of the food, -and of the link of cause and effect between certain movements and -certain satisfactions. Rising gradually to the more complex forms -of action, for example to the political, how could we will anything -politically good or bad without knowing the real conditions of society, -and consequently the means and expedients to be adopted? When the -practical man feels himself in the dark about one or more of these -points, or when he is seized with doubt, action either does not begin -or stops. It is then that the theoretical moment, which in the rapid -succession of human actions is hardly noticed and rapidly forgotten, -becomes important and occupies consciousness for a longer time. And -if this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> moment be prolonged, then the practical man may become a -Hamlet, divided between desire for action and his deficient theoretical -clarity as regards the situation and the means to be employed. And if -he develop a taste for contemplation and discovery, and leave willing -and acting, to a greater or less extent, to others, there is formed in -him the calm disposition of the artist, of the man of science, or of -the philosopher, who in practice are sometimes incompetent or downright -immoral. These observations are all obvious. Their exactitude cannot be -denied. Let us, however, repeat that they are founded on quantitative -distinctions and do not disprove but confirm the fact that an action, -however slight it be, cannot really be an action, that is, an action -that is willed, unless it be preceded by the cognitive activity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of practical judgements or judgements of value.</i></div> - -<p>Some psychologists, on the other hand, place before practical action -an altogether special class of judgements, which they call <i>practical</i> -judgements or <i>judgements of value.</i> They say that in order to resolve -on performing an action there must have been a judgement to the -effect: "this action is useful, this action is good." And at first -sight this seems to have the testimony of consciousness on its side. -But closer observation and analysis of greater subtlety reveal that -such judgements follow instead of preceding the affirmation of the -will, and are nothing but the expression of the volition already -exercised. A good or useful action is an action willed. It will always -be impossible to distil a single drop of usefulness or goodness from -the objective study of things. We do not desire things because we know -them to be good or useful; but we know them to be good and useful, -because we desire them. Here too, the rapidity with which the facts -of consciousness follow one another has given rise to an illusion. -Practical action is preceded by knowledge, but not by practical -knowledge, or rather, knowledge of the practical: to obtain this, we -must first have practical action. The third moment, therefore, of -practical judgements, or judgements of value, is altogether imaginary. -It does not come between the two moments or degrees<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> of theory and -practice. For the rest, normative sciences in general, which regulate -or command, discover and indicate values to the practical activity, -do not exist; indeed none exist for any sort of activity, since every -science presupposes that activity to be already realized and developed, -which it afterwards takes as its object.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Exclusion of the practical from the æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>These distinctions established, we must condemn as erroneous every -theory which annexes the æsthetic activity to the practical, or -introduces the laws of the second into the first. That science is -theory and art practice has been many times affirmed. Those who make -this statement, and look upon the æsthetic fact as a practical fact, -do not do so capriciously or because they are groping in the void; but -because they have their eye on something which is really practical. But -the practical which they aim is not Æsthetic, nor within Æsthetic; it -is <i>outside and beside it</i>; and although often found united, they are -not united necessarily or by the bond of identity of nature.</p> - -<p>The æsthetic fact is altogether completed in the expressive elaboration -of impressions. When we have achieved the word within us, conceived -definitely and vividly a figure or a statue, or found a musical motive, -expression is born and is complete; there is no need for anything else. -If after this we should open our mouths-<i>will</i> to open them to speak, -or our throats to sing, that is to say, utter by word of mouth and -audible melody what we have completely said or sung to ourselves; or -if we should stretch out<i>—will</i> to stretch out our hands to touch the -notes of the piano, or to take up the brush and chisel, thus making -on a large scale movements which we have already made in little and -rapidly, in a material in which we leave more or less durable traces; -this is all an addition, a fact which obeys quite different laws from -the former, with which we are not concerned for the moment, although -we recognize henceforth that this second movement is a production -of things, a <i>practical</i> fact, or fact of <i>will</i>. It is usual to -distinguish the internal from the external work of art: the terminology -seems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> to us infelicitous, for the work of art (the æsthetic work) is -always <i>internal</i>; and what is called <i>external</i> is no longer a work of -art. Others distinguish between <i>æsthetic</i> fact and <i>artistic</i> fact, -meaning by the second the external or practical stage, which may follow -and generally does follow the first. But in this case, it is simply a -question of a linguistic usage, doubtless permissible, though perhaps -not advisable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice -of content.</i></div> - -<p>For the same reasons the search for the <i>end of art</i> is ridiculous, -when it is understood of art as art. And since to fix an end is to -choose, the theory that the content of art must be <i>selected</i> is -another form of the same error. A selection among impressions and -sensations implies that these are already expressions, otherwise how -could a selection be made among the continuous and indistinct? To -choose is to will: to will this and not to will that: and this and that -must be before us, expressed. Practice follows, it does not precede -theory; expression is free inspiration.</p> - -<p>The true artist, in fact, finds himself big with his theme, he knows -not how; he feels the moment of birth drawing near, but he cannot will -it or not will it. If he were to wish to act in opposition to his -inspiration, to make an arbitrary choice, if, born Anacreon, he should -wish to sing of Atreus and of Alcides, his lyre would warn him of -his mistake, sounding only of Venus and of Love, notwithstanding his -efforts to the contrary.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Practical innocence of art.</i></div> - -<p>The theme or content cannot, therefore, be practically or morally -charged with epithets of praise or blame. When critics of art remark -that a theme is <i>badly selected,</i> in cases where that observation has -a just foundation, it is a question of blaming, not the selection of -the theme (which would be absurd), but the manner in which the artist -has treated it, the failure of the expression due to the contradictions -which it contains. And when the same critics object to the theme or -content of works which they proclaim to be artistically perfect as -being unworthy of art and blameworthy; if these expressions really are -perfect, there is nothing to be done but to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> advise the critics to -leave the artists in peace, for they can only derive inspiration from -what has moved their soul. They should rather direct their attention -towards effecting changes in surrounding nature and society, that -such impressions and states of soul should not recur. If ugliness -were to vanish from the world, if universal virtue and felicity were -established there, perhaps artists would no longer represent perverse -or pessimistic feelings, but calm, innocent and joyous feelings, -Arcadians of a real Arcady. But so long as ugliness and turpitude -exist in nature and impose themselves upon the artist, to prevent -the expression of these things also is impossible; and when it has -arisen, <i>factum infectum fieri nequit.</i> We speak thus entirely from the -æsthetic point of view, and of pure criticism of art.</p> - -<p>We are not concerned to estimate the damage which the criticism of -"choice" does to artistic production, with the prejudices which it -produces or maintains among the artists themselves, and with the -conflict to which it gives rise between artistic impulse and critical -demands. It is true that sometimes it seems also to do some good, by -aiding artists to discover themselves, that is, their own impressions -and their own inspiration, and to acquire consciousness of the task -which is, as it were, imposed upon them by the historical moment in -which they live, and by their individual temperament. In these cases, -criticism of "choice," while believing that it generates, merely -recognizes and aids the expressions which are already being formed. -It believes itself to be the mother, where, at most, it is only the -midwife.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The independence of art.</i></div> - -<p>The impossibility of choice of content completes the theorem of the -<i>independence of art,</i> and is also the only legitimate meaning of the -expression: <i>art for art's sake.</i> Art is independent both of science -and of the useful and the moral. There should be no fear lest frivolous -or cold art should thus be justified, since what is truly frivolous -or cold is so because it has not been raised to expression; or in -other words, frivolity and frigidity come always from the form of the -æsthetic treatment, from failure to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> grasp a content, not from the -material qualities of the content itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the saying: the style is the man</i></div> - -<p>The saying: <i>the style is the man</i>, can also not be completely -criticized, save by starting from the distinction between the theoretic -and the practical, and from the theoretic character of the æsthetic -activity. Man is not simply knowledge and contemplation: he is will, -which contains the cognitive moment in itself. Hence the saying is -either altogether void, as when it is taken to mean that the style is -the man <i>qua</i> style—is the man, that is, but only so far as he is -expressive activity; or it is erroneous, as when the attempt is made -to deduce what a man has done and willed from what he has seen and -expressed, thereby asserting that there is a logical connexion between -knowing and willing. Many legends in the biographies of artists have -sprung from this erroneous identification, since it seemed impossible -that a man who gives expression to generous feelings should not be a -noble and generous man in practical life; or that the dramatist whose -plays are full of stabbing, should not himself have done a little -stabbing in real life. Artists protest vainly: "<i>Lasciva est nobis -pagina, vita proba.</i>" They are merely taxed in addition with lying -and hypocrisy. How far more prudent you were, poor women of Verona, -when you founded your belief that Dante had really descended to hell -upon his blackened countenance! Yours was at any rate a historical -conjecture.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the concept of sincerity in art.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, <i>sincerity</i> imposed as a duty upon the artist (a law of ethics -also said to be a law of æsthetic) rests upon another double meaning. -For by sincerity may be meant, in the first place, the moral duty not -to deceive one's neighbour; and in that case it is foreign to the -artist. For indeed he deceives no one, since he gives form to what -is already in his soul. He would only deceive if he were to betray -his duty as an artist by failing to execute his task in its essential -nature. If lies and deceit are in his soul, then the form which he -gives to these things cannot be deceit or lies, precisely because it -is æsthetic. If the artist be a charlatan, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> liar, or a miscreant, -he purifies his other self by reflecting it in art. If by sincerity -be meant, in the second place, fulness and truth of expression, it is -clear that this second sense has no relation to the ethical concept. -The law, called both ethical and æsthetic, reveals itself here as -nothing but a word used both by Ethics and Æsthetic.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIIa" id="VIIa">VII</a></h4> - - -<h4>ANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The two forms of the practical activity.</i></div> - -<p>The double degree of the theoretical activity, æsthetic and logical, -has an important parallel in the practical activity, which has not yet -been placed in due relief. The practical activity is also divided into -a first and second degree, the second implying the first. The first -practical degree is the simply <i>useful</i> or <i>economical</i> activity; the -second the <i>moral</i> activity.</p> - -<p>Economy is, as it were, the Æsthetic of practical life; Morality its -Logic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The economically useful.</i></div> - -<p>If this has not been clearly seen by philosophers; if the correct -place in the system of the spirit has not been given to the economic -activity, if it has been left to wander about in the prolegomena to -treatises on political economy, often vague and but little developed, -this is due, among other reasons, to the fact that the useful or -economic has been confused, sometimes with the concept of the -<i>technical,</i> sometimes with that of the <i>egoistical.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between the useful and the technical.</i></div> - -<p><i>Technique</i> is certainly not a special activity of the spirit. -Technique is knowledge; or rather, it is knowledge itself in general -which takes this name when it serves as basis, as we have seen it does, -for practical action. Knowledge which is not followed, or is supposed -not to be easily followed by practical action, is called "pure": the -same knowledge, if effectively followed by action, is called "applied"; -if it is supposed that it can be easily followed by a particular -action, it is called "applicable"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> or "technical." This word, then, -indicates a <i>situation</i> in which knowledge is, or may easily be, not a -special form of knowledge. So true is this, that it would be altogether -impossible to establish whether a given order of knowledge were, -intrinsically, pure or applied. All knowledge, however abstract and -philosophical it may be believed to be, may be a guide to practical -acts; a theoretical error in the ultimate principles of morality may be -reflected and always in some way is reflected in practical life. One -can only speak roughly and unscientifically of certain truths as pure -and of others as applied.</p> - -<p>The same knowledge that is called technical may also be called -<i>useful.</i> But the word "<i>useful</i>" in conformity with the criticism of -judgements of value made above, is to be understood as used here in -a verbal or metaphorical sense. When we say that water is useful for -putting out fire, the word "useful" is used in a non-scientific sense. -Water thrown on the fire is the cause of its going out: this is the -knowledge that serves for basis to the action, let us say, of firemen. -There is a link, not of nature, but of simple succession, between the -useful action of the person who extinguishes the conflagration and that -knowledge. The technique of the effects of the water is the theoretical -activity which precedes; the only useful thing is the <i>action</i> of the -man who extinguishes the fire.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction of the useful from the egoistic.</i></div> - -<p>Some economists identify utility, that is to say, merely economic -action or will, with the <i>egoistic,</i> that is to say, with what is -profitable to the individual, in so far as individual, without regard -to and indeed in complete opposition to the moral law. The egoistic is -the immoral. In this case Economics would be a very strange science, -standing not beside but opposite Ethics, like the devil facing God, or -at least like the <i>advocatus diaboli</i> in the processes of canonization. -Such a conception is altogether inadmissible: the science of immorality -is implied in that of morality, as the science of the false is implied -in Logic, science of the true, and a science of unsuccessful expression -in Æsthetic, science of successful expression. If, then, Economics were -the scientific treatment of egoism, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> would be a chapter of Ethics, -or Ethics itself; because every moral determination implies, at the -same time, a negation of its contrary.</p> - -<p>Further, conscience tells us that to conduct oneself economically -is not to conduct oneself egoistically; that even the most morally -scrupulous man must conduct himself usefully (economically), if he -does not wish to act at hazard and consequently in a manner quite the -reverse of moral. If utility were egoism, how could it be the duty of -the altruist to behave like an egoist?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Economic will and moral will.</i></div> - -<p>If we are not mistaken, the difficulty is solved in a manner perfectly -analogous to that in which is solved the problem of the relations -between expression and concept, Æsthetic and Logic.</p> - -<p>To will economically is to <i>will an end;</i> to will morally is to <i>will -the rational end.</i> But whoever wills and acts morally, cannot but will -and act usefully (economically). How could he will the <i>rational</i> end, -unless he also willed it <i>as his particular end</i>?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Pure economicity.</i></div> - -<p>The converse is not true; as it is not true in æsthetic science that -the expressive fact must of necessity be linked with the logical fact. -It is possible to will economically without willing morally; and it -is possible to conduct oneself with perfect economic coherence, while -pursuing an end which is objectively irrational (immoral), or, rather, -an end which would be held to be so at a higher grade of consciousness.</p> - -<p>Examples of the economic, without the moral character, are -Machiavelli's hero Cæsar Borgia, or the Iago of Shakespeare. Who can -help admiring their strength of will, although their activity is only -economic, and is developed in opposition to what we hold moral? Who -can help admiring the Ser Ciappelletto of Boccaccio, who pursues and -realizes his ideal of the perfect rascal even on his death-bed, making -the petty and timid little thieves who are present at his burlesque -confession exclaim: "What manner of man is this, whose perversity -neither age, nor infirmity, nor the fear of death which he sees at -hand, nor the fear of God before whose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> judgement-seat he must stand in -a little while, have been able to remove, nor to make him wish to die -otherwise than as he has lived?"</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The economic side of morality.</i></div> - -<p>The moral man unites with the pertinacity and fearlessness of a Cæsar -Borgia, of an Iago, or of a Ser Ciappelletto, the good will of the -saint or of the hero. Or, rather, good will would not be will, and -consequently not good, if it did not possess, in addition to the side -which makes it <i>good,</i> also that which makes it <i>will.</i> So a logical -thought which does not succeed in expressing itself is not thought, but -at the most a confused presentiment of a thought beyond yet to come.</p> - -<p>It is not correct, then, to conceive of the amoral man as also -anti-economical, or to make of morality an element of coherence in -the acts of life, and therefore of economicity. Nothing prevents us -from conceiving (an hypothesis which is verified at least during -certain periods and moments, if not during whole lifetimes) a man -altogether without moral conscience. In a man thus organized, what -for us is immorality is not so for him, because it is not felt as -such. The consciousness of the contradiction between what is desired -as a rational end and what is pursued egoistically cannot arise -in him. This contradiction is anti-economicity. Immoral conduct -becomes also anti-economical only in the man who possesses moral -conscience. The moral remorse which is the indication of this, is -also economical remorse; that is to say, sorrow at not having known -how to will completely and to attain that moral ideal which was -willed at first, instead of allowing himself to be led astray by the -passions. <i>Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.</i> The <i>video</i> -and the <i>probo</i> are here an initial <i>volo</i> immediately contradicted -and overthrown. In the man without moral sense, we must admit a -remorse that is <i>merely economic</i>; like that of a thief or of an -assassin who, when on the point of robbing or of assassinating should -abstain from doing so, not owing to a conversion of his being, but -to nervousness and bewilderment, or even to a momentary awakening of -moral consciousness. When he has come<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> back to himself, such a thief -or assassin will regret and be ashamed of his incoherence; his remorse -will not be due to having done wrong, but to <i>not</i> having done wrong; -it is therefore economic, not moral, since the latter is excluded by -hypothesis. But since a lively moral consciousness is generally found -among the majority of men and its total absence is a rare and perhaps -non-existent monstrosity, it may be admitted that morality, in general, -coincides with economicity in the conduct of life.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The merely economic and the error of the morally -indifferent.</i></div> - -<p>There need be no fear lest the parallelism that we support should -introduce afresh into science the category of the <i>morally -indifferent,</i> of that which is in truth action and volition, but is -neither moral nor immoral; the category in short of the <i>licit</i> and -of the <i>permissible,</i> which has always been the cause or reflexion of -ethical corruption, as was the case with Jesuitical morality, which it -dominated. It remains quite certain that indifferent moral actions do -not exist, because moral activity pervades and must pervade every least -volitional movement of man. But far from upsetting the established -parallelism, this confirms it. Are there by any chance intuitions which -science and the intellect do not pervade and analyse, resolving them -into universal concepts, or changing them into historical affirmations? -We have already seen that true science, philosophy, knows no external -limits which bar its way, as happens with the so-called natural -sciences. Science and morality entirely dominate, the one the æsthetic -intuitions, the other the economic volitions of man, although neither -of them can appear in the concrete, save the one in the intuitive, the -other in the economic form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of utilitarianism and the reform of Ethics and of -Economics.</i></div> - -<p>This combined identity and difference of the useful and the moral, of -the economic and the ethical, explains the success at the present time -and formerly of the utilitarian theory of Ethics. Indeed it is easy to -discover and to illustrate a utilitarian side in every moral action; as -it is easy to reveal the æsthetic side in every logical proposition. -The criticism of ethical utilitarianism cannot begin by denying this -truth and seeking out absurd and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> non-existent examples of <i>useless</i> -moral actions. It must admit the utilitarian side and explain it as -the concrete form of morality, which consists in this, that it is -<i>inside</i> this form. Utilitarians do not see this inside. This is not -the place for the fuller development that such ideas deserve. Ethics -and Economics cannot however fail to be gainers (as we have said of -Logic and Æsthetic) by a more exact determination of the relations that -exist between them. Economic science is now rising to the activistical -concept of the useful, as it attempts to surpass the mathematical -phase in which it is still entangled; a phase which was in its turn -a progress when it superseded historicism, or the confusion of the -theoretical with the historical, and destroyed a number of capricious -distinctions and false economic theories. With this conception, it will -be easy on the one hand to absorb and to verify the semi-philosophical -theories of so-called pure economics, and on the other, by the -introduction of successive complications and additions, to effect a -transition from the philosophical to the empirical or naturalistic -method and thus to embrace the particular theories expounded in the -so-called political or national economy of the schools.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Phenomenon and noumenon in practical activity.</i></div> - -<p>As æsthetic intuition knows the phenomenon or nature, and the -philosophic concept the noumenon or spirit; so the economic activity -wills the phenomenon or nature, and the moral activity the noumenon or -spirit. <i>The spirit which wills itself,</i> its true self, the universal -which is in the empirical and finite spirit: that is the formula which -perhaps defines the essence of morality with the least impropriety. -This will for the true self is <i>absolute freedom.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIIIa" id="VIIIa">VIII</a></h4> - - -<h4>EXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS</h4> - - -<p>In this summary sketch that we have given of the entire philosophy of -the spirit in its fundamental moments, the spirit is thus conceived -as consisting of four moments or degrees, disposed in such a way that -the theoretical activity is to the practical as the first theoretical -degree is to the second theoretical, and the first practical degree to -the second practical. The four moments imply one another regressively -by their concreteness. The concept cannot exist without expression, the -useful without both and morality without the three preceding degrees. -If the æsthetic fact is in a certain sense alone independent while -the others are more or less dependent, then the logical is the least -dependent and the moral will the most. Moral intention acts on given -theoretic bases, with which it cannot dispense, unless we are willing -to accept that absurd procedure known to the Jesuits as <i>direction of -intention,</i> in which people pretend to themselves not to know what they -know only too well.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The forms of genius.</i></div> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The system of the spirit.</i></div> - -<p>If the forms of human activity are four, four also are the forms of -<i>genius.</i> Men endowed with genius in art, in science, and in moral -will or heroes, have always been recognized. But the genius of pure -economicity has met with repugnance. It is not altogether without -reason that a category of bad geniuses or of <i>geniuses of evil</i> has -been created. The practical, merely economic genius, which is not -directed to a rational end, cannot but excite an admiration mingled -with alarm. To dispute as to whether the word "genius"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> should be -applied only to creators of æsthetic expression or also to men of -scientific research and of action would be a mere question of words. To -observe, on the other hand, that "genius," of whatever kind it be, is -always a quantitative conception and an empirical distinction, would be -to repeat what has already been explained as regards artistic genius.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-existence of a fifth form of activity. Law; -sociability.</i></div> - -<p>A fifth form of spiritual activity does not exist. It would be easy to -show how all the other forms either do not possess the character of -activity, or are verbal variants of the activities already examined, or -are complex and derivative facts, in which the various activities are -mingled, and are filled with particular and contingent contents.</p> - -<p>The <i>juridical</i> fact, for example, considered as what is called -objective law, is derived both from the economic and from the logical -activities. Law is a rule, a formula (whether oral or written matters -little here) in which is fixed an economic relation willed by an -individual or by a community, and this economic side at once unites it -with and distinguishes it from moral activity. Take another example. -Sociology (among the many meanings the word bears in our times) is -sometimes conceived as the study of an original element, which is -called <i>sociability.</i> Now what is it that distinguishes sociability, -or the relations which are developed in a meeting of men, and not in a -meeting of sub-human beings, if it be not just the various spiritual -activities which exist among the former and which are supposed not to -exist, or to exist only in a rudimentary degree, among the latter? -Sociability, then, far from being an original, simple, irreducible -conception, is very complex and complicated. A proof of this would -be the impossibility, generally recognized, of enunciating a single -law which could be described as purely sociological. Those that are -improperly so called are shown to be either empirical historical -observations, or spiritual laws, that is to say judgements into which -the conceptions of the spiritual activities are translated, when -they are not simply empty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> and indeterminate generalities, like the -so-called law of evolution. Sometimes, too, nothing more is understood -by "sociability" than "social rule," and so law; thus confounding -sociology with the science or theory of law itself. Law, sociability, -and similar concepts, are to be dealt with in a mode analogous to that -employed by us in the consideration and analysis of historicity and -technique.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Religion.</i></div> - -<p>It may seem that <i>religious</i> activity should be judged otherwise. -But religion is nothing but knowledge, and does not differ from its -other forms and sub-forms. For it is in turn either the expression of -practical aspirations and ideals (religious ideals), or historical -narrative (legend), or conceptual science (dogma).</p> - -<p>It can therefore be maintained with equal truth either that religion -is destroyed by the progress of human knowledge, or that it is always -present there. Their religion was the whole intellectual patrimony of -primitive peoples: our intellectual patrimony is our religion. The -content has been changed, bettered, refined, and it will change and -become better and more refined in the future also; but its form is -always the same. We do not know what use could be made of religion by -those who wish to preserve it side by side with the theoretic activity -of man, with his art, with his criticism and with his philosophy. It -is impossible to preserve an imperfect and inferior kind of knowledge, -such as religion, side by side with what has surpassed and disproved -it. Catholicism, which is always consistent, will not tolerate a -Science, a History, an Ethics, in contradiction to its views and -doctrines. The rationalists are less coherent: they are disposed to -allow a little space in their souls for a religion in contradiction -with their whole theoretic world.</p> - -<p>The religious affectations and weaknesses prevalent among the -rationalists of our time have their origin in the superstitious worship -so recklessly lavished upon the natural sciences. We know ourselves -and their chief representatives admit that these sciences are all -surrounded by <i>limits.</i> Science having been wrongly identified<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> with -the so-called natural sciences, it could be foreseen that the remainder -would be sought in religion; that remainder with which the human -spirit cannot dispense. We are therefore indebted to materialism, to -positivism, to naturalism for this unhealthy and often disingenuous -recrudescence of religious exaltation, which belongs to the hospital, -when it does not belong to the politician.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Metaphysic.</i></div> - -<p>Philosophy removes from religion all reason for existing, because it -substitutes itself for religion. As the science of the spirit, it -looks upon religion as a phenomenon, a transitory historical fact, a -psychic condition that can be surpassed. Philosophy shares the domain -of knowledge with the natural sciences, with history and with art. -To the first it leaves enumeration, measurement and classification; -to the second, the chronicling of what has individually happened; to -the third, the individually possible. There is nothing left to allot -to religion. For the same reason, philosophy, as the science of the -spirit, cannot be philosophy of the intuitive datum; nor, as has -been seen, <i>philosophy of history,</i> nor <i>philosophy of nature</i>; and -therefore there cannot be a philosophical science of what is not form -and universal, but material and particular. This amounts to affirming -the impossibility of <i>Metaphysic.</i></p> - -<p>The methodology or logic of history has supplanted the philosophy -of history; an epistemology of the concepts employed in the natural -sciences succeeded the Philosophy of Nature. What philosophy can -study of history is its mode of construction (intuition, perception, -document, probability, etc.); of the natural sciences the forms of the -concepts which constitute them (space, time, motion, number, types, -classes, etc.). Philosophy as metaphysic in the sense above described -would, on the other hand, claim to compete with history and with the -natural sciences, which alone are legitimate and effective in their -field. Such a challenge could do nothing but reveal the incompetence -of those who made it. In this sense we are <i>anti-metaphysicans,</i> -while declaring ourselves to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> <i>ultra-metaphysicians,</i> when the -word is used to claim and to affirm the office of philosophy as -self-consciousness of the spirit, distinguished from the merely -empirical and classificatory office of the natural sciences.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mental imagination and the intuitive intellect.</i></div> - -<p>Metaphysic has been obliged to assert the existence of a specific -spiritual activity producing it, in order to maintain itself side -by side with the sciences of the spirit. This activity, called in -antiquity <i>mental or superior imagination,</i> and more often in modern -times <i>intuitive intellect or intellectual intuition,</i> was held to -unite the characters of imagination and intellect in an altogether -special form. It was supposed to provide the means of passing by -deduction or dialectic from the infinite to the finite, from form to -matter, from the concept to the intuition, from science to history, -acting by a method which was held to penetrate both the universal and -the particular, the abstract and the concrete, intuition and intellect. -A faculty marvellous indeed and most valuable to possess; but we, who -do not possess it, have no means of establishing its existence.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mystical Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>Intellectual intuition has sometimes been considered to be the true -æsthetic activity. At others a no less marvellous æsthetic activity -has been placed beside, below, or above it, a faculty altogether -different from simple intuition. The glories of this faculty have been -celebrated, and the production of art attributed to it, or at least -of certain groups of artistic production, arbitrarily chosen. Art, -religion and philosophy have seemed in turn to be one only, or three -distinct faculties of the spirit, sometimes one, sometimes another of -them being supreme in the dignity shared by all.</p> - -<p>It is impossible to enumerate all the various attitudes assumed or -capable of being assumed by this conception of Æsthetic, which we will -call <i>mystical.</i> We are here in the kingdom, not of the science of -imagination, but of imagination itself, which creates its world out -of varying elements drawn from impressions and feelings. Suffice it -to mention that this mysterious faculty has been conceived, sometimes -as practical, sometimes as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> mean between the theoretic and the -practical, at others again as a theoretic form side by side with -philosophy and religion.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mortality and immortality of art.</i></div> - -<p>The immortality of art has sometimes been deduced from this last -conception, as belonging with its sisters to the sphere of absolute -spirit. At other times, on the other hand, when religion has been -looked upon as mortal and as dissolved in philosophy, then has been -proclaimed the mortality, even the death, actual or at least imminent, -of art. This question has no meaning for us, because, seeing that the -function of art is a necessary degree of the spirit, to ask if art can -be eliminated is the same as to ask if sensation or intelligence can be -eliminated. But Metaphysic, in the above sense, transplanting itself -into an arbitrary world, is not to be criticized in its particulars, -any more than we can criticize the botany of the garden of Alcina or -the navigation of the voyage of Astolfo. Criticism can only exist when -we refuse to join in the game; that is to say, when we reject the very -possibility of Metaphysic, always in the sense above indicated.</p> - -<p>There is therefore no intellectual intuition in philosophy, as there -is no surrogate or equivalent of it in art, or any other mode by which -this imaginary function may be called and represented. There does not -exist (if we may repeat ourselves) a fifth degree, a fifth or supreme -faculty, theoretic or practical-theoretic, imaginative-intellectual, or -intellectual-imaginative, or however otherwise it may be attempted to -conceive such a faculty.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IXa" id="IXa">IX</a></h4> - -<h4>INDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR DEGREES AND CRITICISM OF -RHETORIC</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The characters of art.</i></div> - -<p>It is customary to give long catalogues of the <i>characters</i> of art. -Having reached this point of the treatise, after having studied -art as spiritual activity, as theoretic activity, and as special -theoretic activity (intuitive), we are able to discover that those -varied and numerous determinations of characters, where they refer -to anything real, do nothing but represent what we have already met -with as genera, species and individuality of the æsthetic form. To the -generic are reducible, as we have already observed, the characters, or -rather, the verbal variants of <i>unity,</i> and of <i>unity</i> in <i>variety,</i> -of <i>simplicity,</i> or <i>originality,</i> and so on; to the specific, -the characters of <i>truth,</i> of <i>sincerity,</i> and the like; to the -individual, the characters of <i>life,</i> of <i>vivacity,</i> of <i>animation,</i> of -<i>concreteness,</i> of <i>individuality,</i> of <i>characteristicality</i>. The words -may change again, but they will not contribute anything scientifically -new. The analysis of expression as such is completely effected in the -results expounded above.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-existence of modes of expression.</i></div> - -<p>It might, on the other hand, be asked at this point if there be <i>modes</i> -or <i>degrees</i> of expression; if, having distinguished two degrees of -activity of the spirit, each of which is subdivided into two other -degrees, one of these, the intuitive-expressive, is not in its turn -subdivided into two or more intuitive modes, into a first, second or -third degree of expression. But this further division is impossible; -a classification of intuition-expressions is certainly permissible, -but is not philosophical: individual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> expressive facts are so many -individuals, not one of which is interchangeable with another, save -in its common quality of expression. To employ the language of the -schools: expression is a species which cannot function in its turn -as a genus. Impressions or contents vary; every content differs from -every other content, because nothing repeats itself in life; and -the irreducible variety of the forms of expression corresponds to -the continual variation of the contents, the æsthetic synthesis of -impressions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of translations.</i></div> - -<p>A corollary of this is the impossibility of <i>translations,</i> in so -far as they pretend to effect the re-moulding of one expression into -another, like a liquid poured from a vase of a certain shape into a -vase of another shape. We can elaborate logically what we have already -elaborated in æsthetic form only; but we cannot reduce what has already -possessed its æsthetic form to another form also æsthetic. Indeed, -every translation either diminishes and spoils, or it creates a new -expression, by putting the former back into the crucible and mingling -it with the personal impressions of the so-called translator. In the -former case, the expression always remains one, that of the original, -the translation being more or less deficient, that is to say, not -properly expression: in the other case, there would certainly be two -expressions, but with two different contents. "Faithful ugliness or -faithless beauty" is a proverb that well expresses the dilemma with -which every translator is faced. Un-æsthetic translations, such as -those that are word for word, or paraphrastic, are to be looked upon as -simple commentaries upon the original.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the rhetorical categories.</i></div> - -<p>The illegitimate division of expressions into various grades is known -in literature by the name of doctrine of <i>ornament</i> or of <i>rhetorical -categories.</i> But similar attempts at distinctions in other artistic -groups are not wanting: suffice it to recall the <i>realistic</i> and -<i>symbolic</i> forms, so often mentioned in relation to painting and -sculpture.</p> - -<p><i>Realistic</i> and <i>symbolic, objective</i> and <i>subjective, classical</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> -and <i>romantic, simple</i> and <i>ornate, proper</i> and <i>metaphorical,</i> the -fourteen forms of metaphor, the figures of <i>word</i> and <i>sentence, -pleonasm, ellipse, inversion, repetition, synonyms</i> and <i>homonyms,</i> -these and all other determinations of modes or degrees of expression -reveal their philosophical nullity when the attempt is made to develop -them in precise definitions, because they either grasp the void or -fall into the absurd. A typical example of this is the very common -definition of metaphor as of <i>another word used in place of the proper -word.</i> Now why give oneself this trouble? Why substitute the improper -for the proper word? Why take the worse and longer road when you know -the shorter and better road? Perhaps, as is commonly said, because the -proper word is in certain cases not so <i>expressive</i> as the so-called -improper word or metaphor? But if this be so the metaphor is exactly -the proper word in that case, and the so-called "proper" word, if -it were used, would be <i>inexpressive</i> and therefore most improper. -Similar observations of elementary good sense can be made regarding the -other categories, as, for example, the general one of the <i>ornate.</i> -Here for instance it may be asked how an ornament can be joined to -expression. Externally? In that case it is always separated from the -expression. Internally? In that case, either it does not assist the -expression and mars it; or it does form part of it and is not an -ornament, but a constituent element of the expression, indivisible and -indistinguishable in its unity.</p> - -<p>It is needless to say how much harm has been done by rhetorical -distinctions. Rhetoric has often been declaimed against, but although -there has been rebellion against its consequences, its principles -have, at the same time, been carefully preserved (perhaps in order to -show proof of philosophic consistency). In literature the rhetorical -categories have contributed, if not to make dominant, at least to -justify theoretically, that particular kind of <i>bad writing</i> which is -called <i>fine writing</i> or writing according to rhetoric.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Use of these categories as synonyms of the æsthetic fact.</i></div> - -<p>The terms above mentioned would never have gone<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> beyond the schools, -where we all of us learned them (only we never found an opportunity -of using them in strictly æsthetic discussions, or at most of doing -so jocosely and with a comic intention), were it not that they can -sometimes be employed in one of the following significations: as -<i>verbal variants</i> of the æsthetic concept; as indications of the -<i>anti-æsthetic,</i> or, finally (and this is their most important use), no -longer in the service of art and æsthetic, but of <i>science</i> and <i>logic.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories.</i></div> - -<p><i>First.</i> Expressions considered directly or positively are -not divisible into classes, but some are successful, others -half-successful, others failures. There are perfect and imperfect, -successful and unsuccessful expressions. The words recorded, and others -of the same sort, may therefore sometimes indicate the successful -expression, and the various forms of the failures. But they do this in -the most inconstant and capricious manner, so much so that the same -word serves sometimes to proclaim the perfect, sometimes to condemn the -imperfect.</p> - -<p>For example, some will say of two pictures—one without inspiration, in -which the author has copied natural objects without intelligence; the -other inspired, but without close relation to existing objects—that -the first is <i>realistic,</i> the second <i>symbolic.</i> Others, on the -contrary, utter the word <i>realistic</i> before a picture strongly felt -representing a scene of ordinary life, while they apply that of -<i>symbolic</i> to another picture that is but a cold allegory. It is -evident that in the first case symbolic means artistic and realistic -inartistic, while in the second, realistic is synonymous with artistic -and symbolic with inartistic. What wonder, then, that some hotly -maintain the true art form is the symbolic, and that the realistic is -inartistic; others, that the realistic is artistic and the symbolic -inartistic? We cannot but grant that both are right, since each uses -the same words in such a different sense.</p> - -<p>The great disputes about <i>classicism</i> and <i>romanticism</i> were frequently -based upon such equivocations. Sometimes the former was understood -as the artistically perfect,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> and the second as lacking balance and -imperfect; at others "classic" meant cold and artificial, "romantic" -pure, warm, powerful, truly expressive. Thus it was always possible -reasonably to take the side of the classic against the romantic, or of -the romantic against the classic.</p> - -<p>The same thing happens as regards the word <i>style.</i> Sometimes it is -said that every writer must have style. Here style is synonymous with -form of expression. At others the form of a code of laws or of a -mathematical work is said to be without style. Here the error is again -committed of admitting diverse modes of expression, an ornate and a -naked form, because, if style is form, the code and the mathematical -treatise must also be asserted, strictly speaking, to have each its -style. At other times, one hears the critics blaming some one for -"having too much style" or for "writing a style." Here it is clear -that style signifies, not the form, nor a mode of it, but improper and -pretentious expression, a form of the inartistic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Their use to indicate various æsthetic imperfections.</i></div> - -<p><i>Second.</i> The second not altogether meaningless use of these words -and distinctions is to be found when we hear in the examination of a -literal composition such remarks as these: here is a pleonasm, here an -ellipse, there a metaphor, here again a synonym or an ambiguity. The -meaning is: Here is an error consisting of using a larger number of -words than necessary (pleonasm); here, on the other hand, the error -arises from too few having been used (ellipse), here from the use of -an unsuitable word (metaphor), here of two words which seem to say -two different things, but really say the same thing (synonym); here, -on the contrary, of one word which seems to express the same thing, -whereas it says two different things (ambiguity). This depreciatory -and pathological use of the terms is, however, less common than the -preceding.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Their use in a sense transcending æsthetic, in the -service of science.</i></div> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i> and finally, when rhetorical terminology possesses no -æsthetic signification similar or analogous to those passed in review, -and yet one feels that it is not void of meaning and designates -something that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> deserves to be noted, this means that it is used in -the service of logic and of science. Granted that a concept used by -a writer in a scientific sense is designated by a definite term, it -is natural that other terms found in use by that writer on which he -incidentally employs himself to signify the same thought, become <i>in -respect to</i> the vocabulary fixed upon by him as true, metaphors, -synecdoches, synonyms, elliptical forms and the like. We ourselves in -the course of this treatise have several times made use of, and intend -again to make use of such language, in order to make clear the sense of -the words we employ, or may find employed. But this proceeding, which -is of value in discussions pertaining to the criticism of science and -philosophy, has none whatever in literary and artistic criticism. There -are words and metaphors proper to science: the same concept may be -psychologically formed in various circumstances and therefore differ in -its intuitional expression. When the scientific terminology of a given -writer has been established and one of these modes fixed as correct, -then all other uses of it become improper or tropical. But in the -æsthetic fact there are none but proper words: the same intuition can -be expressed in one way only, precisely because it is intuition and not -concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rhetoric in the schools.</i></div> - -<p>Some, while admitting the æsthetic non-existence of the rhetorical -categories, yet make a reservation as to their utility and the service -they are supposed to render, especially in schools of literature. We -confess that we fail to understand how error and confusion can educate -the mind to logical distinction, or aid the teaching of a science -which they disturb and obscure. Perhaps what is meant is that such -distinctions, as empirical classes, can aid memory and learning, as was -admitted above for literary and artistic kinds. To this there is no -objection. There is certainly another purpose for which the rhetorical -categories should continue to appear in schools: to be criticized -there. The errors of the past must not be forgotten and no more said, -and truths cannot be kept alive save by making them combat errors. -Unless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> an account of the rhetorical categories be given, accompanied -by a criticism of them, there is a risk of their springing up again, -and it may be said that they are already springing up among certain -philologists as the latest <i>psychological</i> discoveries.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The resemblances of expressions.</i></div> - -<p>It might seem that we thus wished to deny all bond of resemblance -between different expressions and works of art. Resemblances -exist, and by means of them, works of art can be arranged in this -or that group. But they are likenesses such as are observed among -individuals, and can never be rendered with abstract determinations. -That is to say, it would be incorrect to apply identification, -subordination, co-ordination and the other relations of concepts to -these resemblances, which consist wholly of what is called a <i>family -likeness,</i> derived from the historical conditions in which the various -works have appeared and from relationship of soul among the artists.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The relative possibility of translations.</i></div> - -<p>It is in these resemblances that lies the <i>relative</i> possibility of -translations; not as reproductions of the same original expressions -(which it would be vain to attempt), but as productions of <i>similar</i> -expressions more or less nearly resembling the originals. The -translation called good is an approximation which has original value as -a work of art and can stand by itself.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="Xa" id="Xa">X</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Various significations of the word feeling.</i></div> - -<p>Passing to the study of more complex concepts, where the æsthetic -activity is to be considered in conjunction with other orders of facts, -and showing the mode of their union or complication, we find ourselves -first face to face with the concept of <i>feeling</i> and with those -feelings that are called <i>æsthetic.</i></p> - -<p>The word "feeling" is one of the richest in meanings in philosophic -terminology. We have already had occasion to meet with it once, among -those used to designate the spirit in its passivity, the matter or -content of art, and so as synonym of <i>impressions.</i> Once again (and -then the meaning was altogether different), we have met with it as -designating the <i>non-logical</i> and <i>non-historical</i> character of the -æsthetic fact, that is to say, pure intuition, a form of truth which -defines no concept and affirms no fact.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Feeling as activity.</i></div> - -<p>But here it is not regarded in either of these two meanings, nor in -the others which have also been conferred upon it to designate other -<i>cognitive</i> forms of the spirit, but only in that where feeling is -understood as a special activity, of non-cognitive nature, having its -two poles, positive and negative, in <i>pleasure</i> and <i>pain.</i></p> - -<p>This activity has always greatly embarrassed philosophers, who have -therefore attempted either to deny it as activity, or to attribute it -to <i>nature,</i> excluding it from the spirit. But both these solutions -bristle with difficulties of such a kind as to prove them finally -unacceptable to any one who examines them with care. For what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> could -a non-spiritual activity ever be, an <i>activity of nature,</i> when we -have no other knowledge of activity save as spirituality, nor of -spirituality save as activity? Nature is in this case, by definition, -the merely passive, inert, mechanical, material. On the other hand, -the negation of the character of activity to feeling is energetically -disproved by those very poles of pleasure and of pain which appear in -it and manifest activity in its concreteness, or, so to say, quivering.</p> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identification of feeling with economic activity.</i></div> - -<p>This critical conclusion should place us especially in the greatest -embarrassment, for in the sketch of the system of the spirit given -above we have left no room for the new activity of which we are now -obliged to recognize the existence. But the activity of feeling, if -it is activity, is not new. It has already had its place assigned to -it in the system that we have sketched, where, however, it has been -given another name, <i>economic</i> activity. What is called the activity of -feeling is nothing but that more elementary and fundamental practical -activity which we have distinguished from the ethical activity and made -to consist of the appetition and volition for some individual end, -apart from any moral determination.</p> - -<p>If feeling has been sometimes considered to be an organic or natural -activity, this has happened just because it does not coincide either -with logical, æsthetic or ethical activity. Looked at from the -standpoint of those three (which were the only ones admitted), it -has seemed to lie <i>outside</i> the true and real spirit, spirit in its -aristocracy, and to be almost a determination of nature, or of the -soul in so far as it is nature. From this too results the truth of -another thesis, often maintained, that the æsthetic activity, like the -ethical and intellectual activities, is not feeling. This thesis is -inexpugnable, when feeling has already been understood implicitly and -unconsciously as economic volition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of hedonism.</i></div> - -<p>The view refuted in this thesis is known as <i>hedonism.</i> This consists -in reducing all the various forms of the spirit to one, which thus also -loses its own distinctive character and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> becomes something obscure -and mysterious, like "the night in which all cows are black." Having -brought about this reduction and mutilation, the hedonists naturally do -not succeed in seeing anything else in any activity but pleasure and -pain. They find no substantial difference between the pleasure of art -and that of easy digestion, between the pleasure of a good action and -that of breathing the fresh air with wide-expanded lungs.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity.</i></div> - -<p>But if the activity of feeling in the sense here defined must not be -substituted for all the other forms of spiritual activity, we have not -said that it cannot <i>accompany</i> them. Indeed it accompanies them of -necessity, because they are all in close relation both with one another -and with the elementary volitional form. Therefore each of them has for -concomitants individual volitions and volitional pleasures and pains, -known as feeling. But we must not confound a concomitant with the -principal fact, and substitute the one for the other. The discovery of -a truth, or the fulfilment of a moral duty, produces in us a joy which -makes vibrate our whole being, which, by attaining the aim of those -forms of spiritual activity, attains at the same time that to which -it was <i>practically</i> tending, as its end. Nevertheless, <i>economic</i> -or <i>hedonistic</i> satisfaction, <i>ethical</i> satisfaction, <i>æsthetic</i> -satisfaction, <i>intellectual</i> satisfaction, though thus united, remain -always distinct.</p> - -<p>A question often asked is thus answered at the same time, one which -has correctly seemed to be a matter of life or death for æsthetic -science, namely, whether feeling and pleasure precede or follow, are -cause or effect of the æsthetic fact. We must widen this question to -include the relation between the various spiritual forms, and answer -it by maintaining that one cannot talk of cause and effect and of a -chronological before and after in the unity of the spirit.</p> - -<p>And once the relation above expounded is established, all necessity for -inquiry as to the nature of æsthetic, moral, intellectual and even what -was sometimes called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> economic feelings, must disappear. In this last -case, it is clear that it is a question, not of two terms, but of one, -and inquiry as to economic feeling must be the same as that relating to -economic activity. But in the other cases also, we must attend, not to -the substantive, but to the adjective: the æsthetic, moral and logical -character will explain the colouring of the feelings as æsthetic, moral -and intellectual, whereas feeling, studied alone, will never explain -those refractions and colorations.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings.</i></div> - -<p>A further consequence is, that we no longer need retain the well-known -distinctions between values or feelings <i>of value,</i> and feelings -that are merely hedonistic and <i>without value</i>; <i>disinterested</i> -and <i>interested</i> feelings, <i>objective</i> feelings and feelings not -<i>objective</i> but simply <i>subjective</i> feelings of <i>approbation</i> and of -<i>mere pleasure</i> (cf. the distinction of <i>Gefallen</i> and <i>Vergnügen</i> -in German). Those distinctions were used to save the three spiritual -forms, which were recognized as the triad of the <i>True,</i> the <i>Good</i> -and the <i>Beautiful,</i> from confusion with the fourth form, still -unknown, and therefore insidious in its indeterminateness and mother -of scandals. For us this triad has completed its task, because we are -capable of reaching the distinction far more directly, by receiving -also the selfish, subjective, merely pleasurable feelings among the -respectable forms of the spirit; and where formerly antitheses were -conceived (by ourselves and others), between value and feelings, as -between spirituality and naturality, henceforth we see nothing but -differences between value and value.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Value and disvalue: the contraries and their union.</i></div> - -<p>As has already been said, feeling or the economic activity presents -itself as divided into two poles, positive and negative, pleasure -and pain, which we can now translate into useful and disuseful (or -hurtful). This bipartition has already been noted above, as a mark of -the activistic character of feeling, and one which is to be found in -all forms of activity. If each of these is <i>value,</i> each has opposed -to it <i>antivalue</i> or <i>disvalue.</i> Absence of value is not sufficient to -cause dis value, but activity and passivity must be struggling between -themselves, without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> the one getting the better of the other; hence -the contradiction and disvalue of the activity that is embarrassed, -impeded, or interrupted. Value is activity that unfolds itself freely: -disvalue is its contrary.</p> - -<p>We will content ourselves with this definition of the two terms, -without entering into the problem of the relation between value and -disvalue, that is, the problem of contraries (that is to say, whether -they are to be thought of dualistically, as two beings or two orders -of beings, like Ormuzd and Ahriman, angels and devils, enemies to one -another; or as a unity, which is also contrariety). This definition -of the two terms will be sufficient for our purpose, which is to make -clear the nature of æsthetic activity, and at this particular point one -of the most obscure and disputed concepts of Æsthetic: the concept of -the <i>Beautiful.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Beautiful as the value of expression, or expression -without qualification.</i></div> - -<p>Æsthetic, intellectual, economic and ethical values and disvalues -are variously denominated in current speech: <i>beautiful, true, good, -useful, expedient, just, right</i> and so on—thus designating the free -development of spiritual activity, action, scientific research, -artistic production, when they are successful; <i>ugly, false, bad, -useless, inexpedient, unjust,</i> wrong designating embarrassed activity, -the product that is a failure. In linguistic usage, these denominations -are being continually shifted from one order of facts to another. -<i>Beautiful,</i> for instance, is said not only of a successful expression, -but also of a scientific truth, of an action successfully achieved, -and of a moral action: thus we talk of an <i>intellectual beauty,</i> of a -<i>beautiful action,</i> of a <i>moral beauty.</i> The attempt to keep up with -these infinitely varying usages leads into a trackless labyrinth of -verbalism in which many philosophers and students of art have lost -their way. For this reason we have thought it best studiously to avoid -the use of the word "beautiful" to indicate successful expression in -its positive value. But after all the explanations that we have given, -all danger of misunderstanding being now dissipated, and since on the -other hand we cannot fail to recognize that the prevailing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> tendency, -both in current speech and in philosophy, is to limit the meaning of -the word "beautiful" precisely to the æsthetic value, it seems now both -permissible and advisable to define beauty as <i>successful expression,</i> -or rather, as <i>expression</i> and nothing more, because expression when it -is not successful is not expression.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The ugly, and the elements of beauty which compose it.</i></div> - -<p>Consequently, the ugly is unsuccessful expression. The paradox is true, -for works of art that are failures, that the beautiful presents itself -as <i>unity,</i> the ugly as <i>multiplicity.</i> Hence we hear of <i>merits</i> in -relation to works of art that are more or less failures, that is to -say, of <i>those parts of them that are beautiful,</i> which is not the case -with perfect works. It is in fact impossible to enumerate the merits or -to point out what parts of the latter are beautiful, because being a -complete fusion they have but one value. Life circulates in the whole -organism: it is not withdrawn into the several parts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Illusion that there exist expressions neither beautiful nor -ugly.</i></div> - -<p>Unsuccessful works may have merit in various degrees, even the -greatest. The beautiful does not possess degrees, for there is no -conceiving a more beautiful, that is, an expressive that is more -expressive, an adequate that is more than adequate. Ugliness, on the -other hand, does possess degrees, from the rather ugly (or almost -beautiful) to the extremely ugly. But if the ugly were <i>complete,</i> -that is to say, without any element of beauty, it would for that very -reason cease to be ugly, because it would be without the contradiction -in which is the reason of its existence. The disvalue would become -non-value; activity would give place to passivity, with which it is not -at war, save when activity is really present to oppose it.</p> - -<p>And because the distinctive consciousness of the beautiful and of the -ugly is based on the conflicts and contradictions in which æsthetic -activity is developed, it is evident that this consciousness becomes -attenuated to the point of disappearing altogether, as we descend from -the more complicated to the more simple and to the simplest instances -of expression. Hence the illusion that there are expressions neither -beautiful nor ugly, those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> which are obtained without sensible effort -and appear easy and natural being considered such.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>True æsthetic feelings and concomitant or accidental -feelings.</i></div> - -<p>The whole mystery of the <i>beautiful</i> and the <i>ugly</i> is reduced to -these henceforth most easy definitions. Should any one object that -there exist perfect æsthetic expressions before which no pleasure is -felt, and others, perhaps even failures, which give him the greatest -pleasure, we must recommend him to concentrate his attention in the -æsthetic fact, upon that which is truly æsthetic pleasure. Æsthetic -pleasure is sometimes reinforced or rather complicated by pleasures -arising from extraneous facts, which are only accidentally found united -with it. The poet or any other artist affords an instance of purely -æsthetic pleasure at the moment when he sees (or intuites) his work -for the first time; that is to say, when his impressions take form and -his countenance is irradiated with the divine joy of the creator. On -the other hand, a mixed pleasure is experienced by one who goes to the -theatre, after a day's work, to witness a comedy: when the pleasure of -rest and amusement, or that of laughingly snatching a nail from his -coffin, accompanies the moment of true æsthetic pleasure in the art -of the dramatist and actors. The same may be said of the artist who -looks upon his labour with pleasure when it is finished, experiencing, -in addition to the æsthetic pleasure, that very different one which -arises from the thought of self-complacency satisfied, or even of the -economic gain which will come to him from his work. Instances could be -multiplied.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of apparent feelings.</i></div> - -<p>A category of <i>apparent</i> æsthetic feelings has been formed in modern -Æsthetic, not arising from the form, that is to say, from the works of -art as such, but from their content. It has been remarked that artistic -representations arouse pleasure and pain in their infinite shades -of variety. We tremble with anxiety, we rejoice, we fear, we laugh, -we weep, we desire, with the personages of a drama or of a romance, -with the figures in a picture and with the melody of music. But these -feelings are not such as would be aroused by the real fact outside -art; or rather, they are the same in quality, but are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> quantitatively -an attenuation of real things. Æsthetic and <i>apparent</i> pleasure and -pain show themselves to be light, shallow, mobile. We have no need to -treat here of these <i>apparent feelings,</i> for the good reason that we -have already amply discussed them; indeed, we have hitherto treated -of nothing but them. What are these apparent or manifested feelings, -but feelings objectified, intuited, expressed? And it is natural that -they do not trouble and afflict us as passionately as those of real -life, because those were matter, these are form and activity; those -true and proper feelings, these intuitions and expressions. The formula -of <i>apparent feelings</i> is therefore for us nothing but a tautology, -through which we can run the pen without scruple.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIa" id="XIa">XI</a></h4> - - -<h4>CRITICISM OF ÆSTHETIC HEDONISM</h4> - - -<p>As we are opposed to hedonism in general, that is to say, to the theory -based upon the pleasure and pain intrinsic to the economic activity and -accompanying every other form of activity, which, confounding container -and content, fails to recognize any process but the hedonistic; so we -are opposed to æsthetic hedonism in particular, which looks at any rate -upon the æsthetic, if not also upon all other activities, as a simple -fact of feeling, and confounds the pleasurable expression, which is the -beautiful, with the simply pleasurable and all its other species.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher -senses.</i></div> - -<p>The æsthetic-hedonistic point of view has been presented in several -forms. One of the most ancient conceives the beautiful as that which -pleases sight and hearing, that is to say, the so-called <i>higher -senses.</i> When analysis of æsthetic facts first began, it was, indeed, -difficult to avoid the false belief that a picture and a piece of -music are impressions of sight or hearing and correctly to interpret -the obvious remark that the blind man does not enjoy the picture, nor -the deaf man the music. To show, as we have shown, that the æsthetic -fact does not depend upon the nature of the impressions, but that all -sensible impressions can be raised to æsthetic expression and that -none need of necessity be so raised, is an idea which presents itself -only when all other doctrinal constructions of this problem have been -tried. Any one who holds that the æsthetic fact is something pleasing -to the eyes or to the hearing, has no line of defence against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> him who -consistently proceeds to identify the beautiful with the pleasurable in -general, and includes in Æsthetic cooking, or (as some positivists have -called it) the viscerally beautiful.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of play.</i></div> - -<p>The theory of <i>play</i> is another form of æsthetic hedonism. The concept -of play has sometimes helped towards the realization of the activistic -character of the expressive fact: man (it has been said) is not really -man, save when he begins to play (that is to say, when he frees himself -from natural and mechanical causality and works spiritually); and his -first game is art. But since the word "play" also means that pleasure -which arises from the expenditure of the exuberant energy of the -organism (which is a practical fact), the consequence of this theory -has been that every game has been called an æsthetic fact, or that the -æsthetic function has been called a game, because like science and -everything else, it may form part of a game. Morality alone cannot -ever be caused by the will to play (for it will never consent to such -an origin), but on the contrary itself dominates and regulates the act -itself of playing.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theories of sexuality and of triumph.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, some have tried to deduce the pleasure of art from the echo -of that of the sexual organs. And some of the most recent æstheticians -confidently find the genesis of the æsthetic fact in the pleasure of -<i>conquering</i> and in that of <i>triumphing,</i> or, as others add, in the -wish of the male to conquer the female. This theory is seasoned with -much anecdotal erudition, heaven knows of what degree of credibility, -as to the customs of savage peoples. But there was really no need for -such assistance, since in ordinary life one often meets poets who adorn -themselves with their poetry, like cocks raising their crests, or -turkeys spreading out their tails. But any one who does this, in so far -as he does it, is not a poet but a poor fool, in fact, a poor fool of -a cock or turkey, and the desire for the victorious conquest of women -has nothing to do with the fact of art. It would be just as correct to -look upon poetry as <i>economic,</i> because there once were court poets -and salaried poets, and there are poets now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> who find in the sale of -their verses an aid to life if not a complete living. This deduction -and definition has not failed to attract some zealous neophytes in -historical materialism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the Æsthetic of the sympathetic. Meaning in it -of content and form.</i></div> - -<p>Another less vulgar current of thought considers Æsthetic as the -science of the <i>sympathetic,</i> as that with which we sympathize, -which attracts, rejoices, arouses pleasure and admiration. But the -sympathetic is nothing but the image or representation of what pleases. -And as such it is a complex fact, resulting from a constant element, -the æsthetic element of representation, and a variable element, the -pleasing in its infinite forms, arising from all the various classes of -values.</p> - -<p>In ordinary language, there is sometimes a feeling of repugnance at -calling an expression "beautiful," unless it is an expression of the -sympathetic. Hence the continual conflicts between the point of view -of the æsthetician or art critic and that of the ordinary person, -who cannot succeed in persuading himself that the image of pain and -baseness can be beautiful or at least that it has as much right to be -beautiful as the pleasing and the good.</p> - -<p>The conflict could be put an end to by distinguishing two different -sciences, one of expression and the other of the sympathetic, if the -latter could be the object of a special science; that is to say, if -it were not, as has been shown, a complex and equivocal concept. If -predominance be given to the expressive fact, it enters Æsthetic as -science of expression; if to the pleasurable content, we fall back -to the study of facts essentially hedonistic (utilitarian), however -complicated they may appear. The particular origin of the doctrine -which conceives the relation between form and content as the sum of two -values is also to be sought in the doctrine of the sympathetic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic hedonism and moralism.</i></div> - -<p>In all the doctrines just now discussed, art is considered as a merely -hedonistic thing. But æsthetic hedonism cannot be maintained, save by -uniting it with a general philosophical hedonism, which does not admit -any other form of value. Hardly has this hedonistic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> conception of art -been received by philosophers who admit one or more spiritual values, -truth or morality, when the following question must necessarily be -asked: What must be done with art? To what use should it be put? Should -a free course be allowed to the pleasures it procures? And if so, to -what extent? The question of the <i>end of art,</i> which in the Æsthetic of -expression is inconceivable, has a clear significance in the Æsthetic -of the Sympathetic and demands a solution.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of -art.</i></div> - -<p>Now it is evident that such solution can have but two forms, one -altogether negative, the other of a restrictive nature. The first, -which we shall call <i>rigoristic</i> or <i>ascetic,</i> appears several times, -although not frequently, in the history of ideas. It looks upon art -as an inebriation of the senses and therefore as not only useless but -harmful. According to this theory, then, we must exert all our strength -to liberate the human soul from its disturbing influence. The other -solution, which we shall call <i>pedagogic</i> or <i>moralistic-utilitarian,</i> -admits art, but only in so far as it co-operates with the end of -morality; in so far as it assists with innocent pleasure the work -of him who points the way to the true and the good; in so far as it -anoints the edge of the cup of wisdom and morality with sweet honey.</p> - -<p>It is well to observe that it would be an error to divide this second -view into intellectualistic and moralistic-utilitarian, according as to -whether be assigned to art the end of leading to the true or to what -is practically good. The educational task which is imposed upon it, -precisely because it is an end which is sought after and advised, is no -longer merely a theoretical fact, but a theoretical fact already become -the ground for practical action; it is not, therefore, intellectualism, -but pedagogism and practicism. Nor would it be more exact to subdivide -the pedagogic view into pure utilitarian and moralistic-utilitarian; -because those who admit only the satisfaction of the individual -(the desire of the individual), precisely because they are absolute -hedonists, have no motive for seeking an ulterior justification for -art.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p> - -<p>But to enunciate these theories at the point to which we have attained -is to confute them. We prefer to restrict ourselves to observing that -in the pedagogic theory of art is to be found another of the reasons -why the claim has erroneously been made that the content of art should -be <i>chosen</i> with a view to certain practical effects.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of pure beauty.</i></div> - -<p>The thesis that art consists of <i>pure beauty</i> has often been brought -forward against hedonistic and pedagogic Æsthetic, and eagerly taken -up by artists: "Heaven places all our joy in <i>pure beauty,</i> and the -Verse is everything." If by this be understood that art is not to be -confounded with sensual pleasure (utilitarian practicism), nor with -the exercise of morality, then our Æsthetic also must be permitted to -adorn itself with the title of <i>Æsthetic of pure beauty.</i> But if (as is -often the case) something mystical and transcendent be meant by this, -something unknown to our poor human world, or something spiritual and -beatific, but not expressive, we must reply that while applauding the -conception of a beauty <i>free from all that is not the spiritual form of -expression,</i> we are unable to conceive a beauty superior to this and -still less that it should be <i>purified of expression,</i> or severed from -itself.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIIa" id="XIIa">XII</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE ÆSTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-ÆSTHETIC CONCEPTS</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Pseudo-æsthetic concepts, and the æsthetic of the -sympathetic.</i></div> - -<p>The doctrine of the sympathetic (very often animated and seconded in -this by the capricious metaphysical and mystical Æsthetic, and by that -blind traditionalism which assumes an intimate connection between -things fortuitously treated together by the same authors in the same -books), has introduced and rendered familiar in systems of Æsthetic a -series of concepts a rapid mention of which suffices to justify our -resolute expulsion of them from our own treatise.</p> - -<p>Their catalogue is long, not to say interminable: <i>tragic, comic, -sublime, pathetic, moving, sad, ridiculous, melancholy, tragi-comic, -humorous, majestic, dignified, serious, grave, imposing, noble, -decorous, graceful, attractive, piquant, coquettish, idyllic, elegiac, -cheerful, violent, ingenuous, cruel, base, horrible, disgusting, -dreadful, nauseating;</i> the fist can be increased at will.</p> - -<p>Since that doctrine took the sympathetic as its special object, it was -naturally unable to neglect any of the varieties of the sympathetic, -any of the mixtures or gradations by means of which, starting from -the sympathetic in its loftiest and most intense manifestation, its -contrary, the antipathetic and repugnant, is finally reached. And -since the sympathetic content was held to be the <i>beautiful</i> and -the antipathetic the <i>ugly,</i> the varieties (tragic, comic, sublime, -pathetic, etc.) constituted for that conception of Æsthetic the shades -and gradations intervening between the beautiful and the ugly.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of the ugly in art and of the -overcoming of it.</i></div> - -<p>Having enumerated and defined as well as it could, the chief of these -varieties, the Æsthetic of the sympathetic set itself the problem -of the place to be assigned to the <i>ugly in art.</i> This problem is -without meaning for us, who do not recognize any ugliness save the -anti-æsthetic or inexpressive, which can never form <i>part</i> of the -æsthetic fact, being, on the contrary, its <i>antithesis.</i> But in the -doctrine which we are here criticizing the positing and discussion -of that problem meant neither more nor less than the necessity of -reconciling in some way the false and defective idea of art from which -it started—art reduced to the representation of the pleasurable—with -real art, which occupies a far wider field. Hence the artificial -attempt to settle what examples of the <i>ugly</i> (antipathetic) could be -admitted in artistic representation, and for what reasons, and in what -ways.</p> - -<p>The answer was: that the ugly is admissible, only when it can be -<i>overcome</i>; an unconquerable ugliness, such as the <i>disgusting</i> or the -<i>nauseating,</i> being altogether excluded. Further, that the duty of -the ugly, when admitted in art, is to contribute towards heightening -the effect of the beautiful (sympathetic), by producing a series of -contrasts, from which the pleasurable may issue more efficacious and -joy-giving. It is, indeed, a common observation that pleasure is more -vividly felt when preceded by abstinence and suffering. Thus the ugly -in art was looked upon as adapted for the service of the beautiful, a -stimulant and condiment of æsthetic pleasure.</p> - -<p>That special refinement of hedonistic theory which used to be pompously -called the doctrine of the <i>overcoming of the ugly</i> falls with the -Æsthetic of the sympathetic, and with it the enumeration and definition -of the concepts mentioned above, which show themselves to be completely -foreign to Æsthetic. For Æsthetic does not recognize the sympathetic or -the antipathetic or their varieties, but only the spiritual activity of -representation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Pseudo-æsthetic concepts belong to Psychology.</i></div> - -<p>Nevertheless, the important place which, as we have said, those -concepts have hitherto occupied in æsthetic treatises makes it -advisable to supply a rather more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> complete explanation as to their -nature. What shall be their lot? Excluded from Æsthetic, in what other -part of Philosophy will they be received?</p> - -<p>In truth, nowhere; for all those concepts are without philosophical -value. They are nothing but a series of classes, which can be fashioned -in the most various ways and multiplied at pleasure, to which it is -sought to reduce the infinite complications and shadings of the values -and disvalues of life. Of these classes, some have an especially -positive significance, like the beautiful, the sublime, the majestic, -the solemn, the serious, the weighty, the noble, the elevated; others -a significance chiefly negative, like the ugly, the painful, the -horrible, the dreadful, the tremendous, the monstrous, the insipid, the -extravagant; finally in others a mixed significance prevails, such as -the comic, the tender, the melancholy, the humorous, the tragi-comic. -The complications are infinite, because the individuations are -infinite; hence it is not possible to construct the concepts, save in -the arbitrary and approximate manner proper to the natural sciences, -satisfied with making the best classification they can of that reality -which they can neither exhaust by enumeration, nor understand and -conquer speculatively. And since <i>Psychology</i> is the naturalistic -science which undertakes to construct types and schemes of the -spiritual life of man (a science whose merely empirical and descriptive -character becomes more evident day by day), these concepts do not -belong to Æsthetic, nor to Philosophy in general, but must simply be -handed over to Psychology.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of rigorous definitions of them.</i></div> - -<p>The case of those concepts is that of all other psychological -constructions: no rigorous definitions of them are possible; and -consequently they cannot be deduced from one another nor be connected -in a system, though this has often been attempted, with great waste -of time and without obtaining thereby any useful results. Nor can it -be claimed as possible to obtain empirical definitions, universally -acceptable as precise and true in the place of those philosophical -definitions recognized as impossible. For no single definition of a -single fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> can be given, but there are innumerable definitions of it, -according to the cases and the purposes for which they are made; and -it is clear that if there were only one which had the value of truth -it would no longer be an empirical, but a rigorous and philosophical -definition. And as a matter of fact whenever one of the terms to which -we have referred has been employed (or indeed any other belonging to -the same class), a new definition of it has been given at the same -time, expressed or understood. Each one of those definitions differed -somehow from the others, in some particular, however minute, and in its -implied reference to some individual fact or other, which thus became a -special object of attention and was raised to the position of a general -type. Thus it is that not one of such definitions satisfies either the -hearer or the constructor of it. For a moment later he finds himself -before a new instance to which he recognizes that his definition is -more or less insufficient, ill-adapted, and in need of retouching. So -we must leave writers and speakers free to define the sublime or the -comic, the tragic or the humorous, on every occasion as they please and -as may suit the end they have in view. And if an empirical definition -of universal validity be demanded, we can but submit this one:—The -sublime (or comic, tragic, humorous, etc.) is <i>everything</i> that is or -shall be so <i>called</i> by those who have employed or shall employ these -<i>words.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Examples: definitions of the sublime, the comic, the -humorous.</i></div> - -<p>What is the sublime? The unexpected affirmation of an overwhelming -moral force: that is one definition. But the other definition is -equally good, which recognizes the sublime also where the force which -affirms itself is certainly overwhelming, but immoral and destructive. -Both remain vague and lack precision, until applied to a concrete -case, to an example which makes clear what is meant by "overwhelming," -and what by unexpected. They are quantitative concepts, but falsely -quantitative, since there is no way of measuring them; they are at -bottom metaphors, emphatic phrases, or logical tautologies. The -humorous will be laughter amid tears, bitter laughter, the sudden -spring from the comic to the tragic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> and from the tragic to the comic, -the romantic comic, the opposite of the sublime, war declared against -every attempt at insincerity, compassion ashamed to weep, a laugh, -not at the fact, but at the ideal itself; and what you will beside, -according as it is wished to get a view of the physiognomy of this or -that poet, of this or that poem, which, in its uniqueness, is its own -definition, and though momentary and circumscribed, is alone adequate. -The comic has been defined as the displeasure arising from the -perception of a deformity immediately followed by a greater pleasure -arising from the relaxation of our psychical forces, strained in -expectation of a perception looked upon as important. While listening -to a narrative, which might, for example, be a description of the -magnificently heroic purpose of some individual, we anticipate in -imagination the occurrence of a magnificent and heroic action, and we -prepare for its reception by concentrating our psychic forces. All of -a sudden, however, instead of the magnificent and heroic action, which -the preliminaries and the tone of the narrative had led us to expect, -there is an unexpected change to a small, mean, foolish action, which -does not satisfy to our expectation. We have been deceived, and the -recognition of the deceit brings with it an instant of displeasure. But -this instant is as it were conquered by that which immediately follows: -we are able to relax our strained attention, to free ourselves from -the provision of accumulated psychic energy henceforth superfluous, to -feel ourselves light and well. This is the pleasure of the comic, with -its physiological equivalent of laughter. If the unpleasant fact that -has appeared should painfully affect our interests, there would not -be pleasure, laughter would be at once suffocated, the psychic energy -would be strained and overstrained by other more weighty perceptions. -If on the other hand such more weighty perceptions do not appear, if -the whole loss be limited to a slight deception of our foresight, -then the feeling of our psychic wealth that ensues affords ample -compensation for this very slight disappointment. Such, expressed in -a few words,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> is one of the most accurate modern definitions of the -comic. It boasts of containing in itself, justified or corrected and -verified, the manifold attempts to define the comic, from Hellenic -antiquity to our own day, from Plato's definition in the <i>Philebus,</i> -and from Aristotle's, which is more explicit, and looks upon the comic -as an <i>ugliness without pain,</i> to that of Hobbes, who replaced it in -the feeling of <i>individual superiority</i>; of Kant, who saw in it the -<i>relaxation of a tension</i>; or from the other proposals of those for -whom it was <i>the conflict between great and small, between the finite -and the infinite</i> and so on. But on close observation, the analysis -and definition above given, although in appearance most elaborate -and precise, yet enunciates characteristics which are applicable, -not only to the comic, but to every spiritual process; such as the -succession of painful and pleasing moments and the satisfaction -arising from the consciousness of strength and of its free expansion. -The differentiation is here given by quantitative determinations -whose limits cannot be laid down. They therefore remain vague words, -possessing some degree of meaning from their reference to this or that -particular comic fact, and from the psychic disposition of qualities of -the speaker. If such definitions be taken too seriously, there happens -to them what Jean Paul Richter said of all the definitions of the -comic: namely, that their sole merit is <i>to be themselves comic</i> and to -produce in reality the fact which they vainly try to fix logically. And -who will ever logically determine the dividing line between the comic -and the non-comic, between laughter and smiles, between smiling and -gravity, or cut the ever varying continuum into which life melts into -clearly divided parts?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relation between these concepts and æsthetic concepts.</i></div> - -<p>The facts, classified as far as possible in these psychological -concepts, bear no relation to the artistic fact, beyond the general -one, that all of them, in so far as they constitute the material of -life, can become the object of artistic representation; and the other, -an accidental relation, that æsthetic facts also may sometimes enter -the processes described, such as the impression of the sublime aroused<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> -by the work of a Titanic artist, such as Dante or Shakespeare, and of -the comic produced by the attempts of a dauber or scribbler.</p> - -<p>But here too the process is external to the æsthetic fact, to which -is linked only the feeling of æsthetic value and disvalue, of the -beautiful and of the ugly. Dante's Farinata is æsthetically beautiful -and nothing but beautiful: if the force of will of that personage seem -also sublime, or the expression that Dante gives him seem, by reason of -his great genius, sublime in comparison with that of a less energetic -poet, these are things altogether outside æsthetic consideration. We -repeat again that this last pays attention always and only to the -adequateness of the expression, that is to say, to beauty.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIIIa" id="XIIIa">XIII</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE "PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL" IN NATURE AND IN ART</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic activity and physical concepts.</i></div> - -<p>Æsthetic activity, distinct from the practical activity, is always -accompanied by it in its manifestations. Hence its utilitarian or -hedonistic side, and the pleasure and pain which are, as it were, the -practical echo of æsthetic value and disvalue, of the beautiful and of -the ugly. But this practical side of the æsthetic activity has in its -turn a <i>physical</i> or <i>psycho-physical</i> accompaniment, which consists of -sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines and colours, and so on.</p> - -<p>Does it <i>really</i> possess this side, or does it only seem to possess it, -through the construction which we put on it in physical science, and -the useful and arbitrary methods which we have already several times -set in relief as proper to the empirical and abstract sciences? Our -reply cannot be doubtful, that is, it must affirm to the second of the -two hypotheses.</p> - -<p>However, it will be better to leave this point in suspense, since it -is not at present necessary to press this line of inquiry further. The -mere mention suffices to secure our speaking (for reasons of simplicity -and adhesion to ordinary language) of the physical element as something -objective and existing, against leading to hasty conclusions as to the -concepts of spirit and nature and their relation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Expression in the æsthetic sense, and expression in the -naturalistic sense.</i></div> - -<p>It is important, on the other hand, to make clear that as the existence -of the hedonistic side in every spiritual activity has given rise -to the confusion between the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> æsthetic activity and the useful or -pleasurable, so the existence of, or rather the possibility of -constructing, this physical side, has caused the confusion between -<i>æsthetic</i> expression and expression <i>in a naturalistic sense</i>; that -is to say, between a spiritual fact and a mechanical and passive fact -(not to say, between a concrete reality and an abstraction or fiction). -In common speech, sometimes it is the words of the poet that are -called <i>expressions,</i> the notes of the musician, or the figures of the -painter; sometimes the blush which generally accompanies the feeling of -shame, the pallor often due to fear, the grinding of the teeth proper -to violent anger, the shining of the eyes and certain movements of the -muscles of the mouth, which manifest cheerfulness. We also say that a -certain degree of heat is the <i>expression</i> of fever, that the falling -of the barometer is the <i>expression</i> of rain, and even that the height -of the exchange <i>expresses</i> the depreciation of the paper currency of a -State, or social discontent the approach of a revolution. One can well -imagine what sort of scientific results would be attained by allowing -oneself to be governed by verbal usage and classing together facts so -widely different. But there is, in fact, an abyss between a man who -is the prey of anger with all its natural manifestations and another -man who expresses it æsthetically; between the appearance, the cries -and contortions of some one grieving at the loss of a dear one and the -words or song with which the same individual portrays his suffering -at another time; between the grimace of emotion and the gesture of -the actor. Darwin's book on the expression of the emotions in man and -animals does not belong to Æsthetic; because there is nothing in common -between the science of spiritual expression and a <i>Semiotic,</i> whether -it be medical, meteorological, political, physiognomic, or chiromantic.</p> - -<p>Expression in the naturalistic sense simply lacks <i>expression in the -spiritual sense,</i> that is to say, the very character of activity and -of spirituality, and therefore the bipartition into the poles of -beauty and of ugliness.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> It is nothing but a relation between cause -and effect, fixed by the abstract intellect. The complete process -of æsthetic production can be symbolized in four stages, which are: -<i>a,</i> impressions; <i>b,</i> expression or spiritual æsthetic synthesis; -<i>c,</i> hedonistic accompaniment, or pleasure of the beautiful (æsthetic -pleasure); <i>d,</i> translation of the æsthetic fact into physical -phenomena (sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines and colours, -etc.). Any one can see that the capital point, the only one that -is properly speaking æsthetic and truly real, is in <i>b,</i> which is -lacking to the merely naturalistic manifestation or construction also -metaphorically called expression.</p> - -<p>The expressive process is exhausted when these four stages have been -passed through. It begins again with new impressions, a new æsthetic -synthesis, and the accompaniments that belong to it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Representations and memory.</i></div> - -<p>Expressions or representations follow one another, the one drives out -the other. Certainly, this passing away, this being driven out, is -not a perishing, it is not total elimination: nothing that is born -dies with that complete death which would be identical with never -having been born. If all things pass away, nothing can die. Even the -representations that we have forgotten persist somehow in our spirit, -for without this we could not explain acquired habits and capacities. -Indeed the strength of life lies in this apparent forgetting: one -forgets what has been absorbed and what life has superseded.</p> - -<p>But other representations are also powerful elements in the present -processes of our spirit; and it is incumbent upon us not to forget -them, or to be capable of recalling them when they are wanted. The -will is always vigilant in this work of preservation, which aims at -preserving (we may say) the greater, the more fundamental part of all -our riches. But its vigilance does not always suffice. Memory, as we -say, abandons or betrays us in different ways. For this very reason, -the human spirit devises expedients which succour the weakness of -memory and are its <i>aids.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The production of aids to memory.</i></div> - -<p>How these aids are possible we have been informed from what has been -said. Expressions or representations are <i>also</i> practical facts, which -are also called physical in so far as physics classifies and reduces -them to types. Now it is clear that if we can succeed in making those -practical or physical facts somehow permanent, it will always be -possible (all other conditions remaining equal) on perceiving them to -reproduce in ourselves the already produced expression or intuition.</p> - -<p>If that be called the object or physical stimulus in which the -practical concomitant acts, or (to use physical terms) in which the -movements have been isolated and made in some sort permanent, and -if that object or stimulus be designated by the letter <i>e</i>; the -process of reproduction will take place in the following order: <i>e,</i> -the physical stimulus; <i>d-b,</i> perception of physical facts (sounds, -tones, mimetic, combinations of lines and colours, etc.), which is -together the æsthetic synthesis, already produced; <i>c</i>, the hedonistic -accompaniment, which is also reproduced.</p> - -<p>And what else are those combinations of words called poetry, prose, -poems, novels, romances, tragedies or comedies, but <i>physical -stimulants of reproduction</i> (the stage <i>e</i>); what else are those -combinations of sound called operas, symphonies, sonatas; or -those combinations of lines and colours called pictures, statues, -architecture? The spiritual energy of memory, with the assistance of -the physical facts above mentioned, makes possible the preservation and -the reproduction of the intuitions produced by man. The physiological -organism and with it the memory become weakened; the monuments of art -are destroyed, and lo, all that æsthetic wealth, the fruit of the -labours of many generations, diminishes and rapidly disappears.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Physical beauty.</i></div> - -<p>Monuments of art, the stimulants of æsthetic reproduction, are called -<i>beautiful things</i> or <i>physical beauty.</i> This combination of words -constitutes a verbal paradox, for the beautiful is not a physical -fact; it does not belong to things, but to the activity of man, to -spiritual energy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> But it is now clear through what transferences and -associations, physical things and facts which are simply aids to the -reproduction of the beautiful are finally called elliptically beautiful -things and physical beauty. And now that we have explained this -elliptical usage, we shall ourselves employ it without hesitation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Content and form: another meaning.</i></div> - -<p>The intervention of "physical beauty" serves to explain another meaning -of the words "<i>content</i>" and "<i>form,</i>" as used by æstheticians. Some -call "content" the internal fact or expression (for us, on the other -hand, form), and "form" the marble, the colours, the rhythm, the sounds -(for us the antithesis of form); thus looking upon the physical fact -as the form, which may or may not be joined to the content. It also -serves to explain another aspect of what is called æsthetic "ugliness." -Somebody who has nothing definite to express may try to conceal his -internal emptiness in a flood of words, in sounding verse, in deafening -polyphony, in painting that dazzles the eye, or by heaping together -great architectural masses which arrest and astonish us without -conveying anything whatever. Ugliness, then, is the capricious, the -charlatanesque; and, in reality, if practical caprice did not intervene -in the theoretic function, there might be absence of beauty, but never -the real presence of something deserving the adjective "ugly."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Natural and artificial beauty.</i></div> - -<p>Physical beauty is usually divided into <i>natural</i> and <i>artificial</i> -beauty. Thus we reach one of the facts which have given the greatest -trouble to thinkers: <i>natural beauty.</i> These words often designate -facts of merely practical pleasure. Any one who calls a landscape -beautiful where the eye rests upon verdure, where the body moves -briskly and the warm sun envelops and caresses the limbs, does not -speak of anything æsthetic. But it is nevertheless indubitable that -on other occasions the adjective "beautiful," applied to objects and -scenes existing in nature, has a completely æsthetic signification.</p> - -<p>It has been observed that in order to enjoy natural objects -æsthetically, we must abstract from their external<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> and historical -reality, and separate their simple semblance or appearance from -existence; that if we contemplate a landscape with our head between -our legs, so as to cancel our wonted relations with it, the landscape -appears to us to be an ideal spectacle; that nature is beautiful -only for him who contemplates her <i>with the eye of the artist</i>; that -zoologists and botanists do not recognize <i>beautiful</i> animals and -flowers; that natural beauty is <i>discovered</i> (and examples of discovery -are the points of view, pointed out by men of taste and imagination, -to which more or less æsthetic travellers and excursionists afterwards -have recourse in pilgrimage, whence a kind of collective <i>suggestion)</i>; -that, without the <i>aid of the imagination,</i> no part of nature is -beautiful, and that with such aid the same natural object or fact -is, according to the disposition of the soul, now expressive, now -insignificant, now expressive of one definite thing, now of another, -sad or glad, sublime or ridiculous, sweet or laughable; finally, that -a <i>natural beauty</i> which an artist would not <i>to some extent correct, -does not exist.</i></p> - -<p>All these observations are just, and fully confirm the fact that -natural beauty is simply a <i>stimulus</i> to æsthetic reproduction, -which presupposes previous production. Without the previous æsthetic -intuitions of the imagination, nature cannot awaken any at all. As -regards natural beauty, man is like the mythical Narcissus at the -fountain. Leopardi said that natural beauty is "rare, scattered, and -fugitive": it is imperfect, equivocal, variable. Each refers the -natural fact to the expression in his mind. One artist is thrown into -transports by a smiling landscape, another by a rag-shop, another by -the pretty face of a young girl, another by the squalid countenance -of an old rascal. Perhaps the first will say that the rag-shop and -the ugly face of the old rascal are <i>repulsive</i>; the second, that the -smiling landscape and the face of the young girl are <i>insipid.</i> They -may dispute for ever; but they will never agree, save when they are -supplied with a sufficient dose of æsthetic knowledge to enable them to -recognize that both are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> right. <i>Artificial</i> beauty, created by man, -supplies an aid that is far more ductile and efficacious.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mixed beauty.</i></div> - -<p>In addition to these two classes, æstheticians also sometimes talk in -their treatises of a <i>mixed</i> beauty. A mixture of what? Precisely of -natural and artificial. Whoever fixes and externalizes, operates with -natural data which he does not create but combines and transforms. -In this sense, every artificial product is a mixture of nature and -artifice; and there would be no occasion to speak of a mixed beauty, -as of a special category. But it sometimes happens that combinations -already given in nature can be used a great deal more than in others; -as, for instance, when we design a beautiful garden and include in our -design groups of trees or ponds already in place. On other occasions -externalization is limited by the impossibility of producing certain -effects artificially. Thus we can mix colouring matters, but we cannot -create a powerful voice or a face and figure appropriate to this or -that character in a play. We must therefore seek them among already -existing things, and make use of them when found. When, therefore, we -employ a great number of combinations already existing in nature, such -as we should not be able to produce artificially if they did not exist, -the resulting fact is called <i>mixed</i> beauty.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Writings.</i></div> - -<p>We must distinguish from artificial beauty those instruments of -reproduction called <i>writings,</i> such as alphabets, musical notes, -hieroglyphics, and all pseudolanguages, from the language of flowers -and flags to the language of patches (so much in vogue in the society -of the eighteenth century). Writings are not physical facts which -arouse directly impressions answering to æsthetic expressions; they -are simple <i>indications</i> of what must be done in order to produce such -physical facts. A series of graphic signs serves to remind us of the -movements which we must execute with our vocal apparatus in order to -emit certain definite sounds. If, through practice, we become able -to hear the words without opening our mouths and (what is much more -difficult) to hear the sounds by running the eye along the stave, all -this does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> not alter in any way the nature of the writings, which are -altogether different from direct physical beauty. No one calls the -book which contains the <i>Divine Comedy,</i> or the score which contains -<i>Don Giovanni,</i> beautiful in the same sense in which the block of -marble which contains Michæl Angelo's <i>Moses,</i> or the piece of coloured -wood which contains the <i>Transfiguration,</i> is metaphorically called -beautiful. Both serve the reproduction of the beautiful, but the former -by a far longer and more indirect route than the latter.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Free and non-free beauty.</i></div> - -<p>Another division of the beautiful, still found in treatises, is that -into <i>free and not free.</i> By not-free beauties have been understood -those objects which have to serve a double purpose, extra-æsthetic -and æsthetic (stimulants of intuitions); and since it seems that the -first purpose sets limits and barriers in the way of the second, the -resulting beautiful object has been considered as not-free beauty.</p> - -<p>Architectural works are especially cited; and just for this reason, -architecture has often been excluded from the number of what are called -the fine arts. A temple must above all things be for the use of a -cult; a house must contain all the rooms needed for the convenience -of life, and they must be arranged with a view to this convenience; a -fortress must be a construction capable of resisting the attacks of -given armies and the blows of given instruments of war. It is therefore -concluded that the architect's field is restricted: he may <i>embellish</i> -to some extent the temple, the house, the fortress; but he is bound by -the <i>object</i> of those edifices, and he can only manifest that part of -his vision of beauty which does not impair their extra-æsthetic but -fundamental objects.</p> - -<p>Other examples are taken from what is called art applied to industry. -Plates, glasses, knives, guns and combs can be made beautiful; but it -is held that their beauty must not be pushed so far as to prevent our -eating from the plate, drinking from the glass, cutting with the knife, -firing off the gun, or combing one's hair with the comb. The same is -said of the art of typography: a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> book should be beautiful, but not to -the extent of being difficult or impossible to read.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of non-free beauty.</i></div> - -<p>In respect of all this we must observe in the first place that the -extrinsic purpose is not necessarily, precisely because it is such, -a limit or impediment to the other purpose of being a stimulus to -æsthetic reproduction. It is therefore quite false to maintain that -architecture, for example, is by its nature imperfect and not free, -since it must also obey other practical purposes; in fact, the mere -presence of fine works of architecture is enough to dispel any such -illusion.</p> - -<p>In the second place, not only are the two purposes not necessarily -contradictory, but we must add that the artist always has the means -of preventing this contradiction from arising. How? by simply making -the <i>destination</i> of the object which serves a practical end enter -as material into his æsthetic intuition and externalization. He will -not need to add anything to the object, in order to make it the -instrument of æsthetic intuitions: it will be so, if perfectly adapted -to its practical purpose. Rustic dwellings and palaces, churches and -barracks, swords and ploughs, are beautiful, not in so far as they are -embellished and adorned, but in so far as they express their end. A -garment is only beautiful because it is exactly suitable to a given -person in given conditions. The sword bound to the side of the warrior -Rinaldo by the amorous Armida was not beautiful: "so adorned that it -may seem a useless ornament, not the free instrument of war," or it -was beautiful, if you will, but to the eyes and imagination of the -sorceress, who liked to see her lover equipped in that effeminate way. -The æsthetic activity can always agree with the practical, because -expression is truth.</p> - -<p>It cannot however be denied that æsthetic contemplation sometimes -hinders practical usage. For instance, it is a quite common experience -to find certain new objects seem so well adapted to their purpose, -and therefore so beautiful, that people occasionally feel scruples in -maltreating them by passing from their contemplation to their use. It -was for this reason that King Frederick<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> William of Prussia showed -such repugnance to sending his magnificent grenadiers, so well adapted -to war, into the mud and fire of battle, while his less æsthetic son, -Frederick the Great, obtained from them excellent service.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Stimulants of production.</i></div> - -<p>It might be objected to the explanation of the physically beautiful -as a simple aid to the reproduction of the internally beautiful, or -expressions, that the artist creates his expressions by painting or -by sculpturing, by writing or by composing, and that therefore the -physically beautiful, instead of following, sometimes precedes the -æsthetically beautiful. This would be a somewhat superficial mode of -understanding the procedure of the artist, who never in reality makes -a stroke with his brush without having previously seen it with his -imagination; and if he has not yet seen it, he will make the stroke, -not in order to externalize his expression (which does not yet exist), -but as a kind of experiment and in order to have a point of departure -for further meditation and internal concentration. The physical -point of departure is not the physically beautiful instrument of -reproduction, but a means that may be called <i>pedagogic,</i> like retiring -into solitude, or the many other expedients frequently very strange, -adopted by artists and scientists, who vary in these according to their -various idiosyncrasies. The old æsthetician Baumgarten advised poets -seeking inspiration to ride on horseback, to drink wine in moderation, -and (provided they were chaste) to look at beautiful women.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIVa" id="XIVa">XIV</a></h4> - - -<h4>ERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND ÆSTHETIC</h4> - - -<p>We must mention a series of fallacious scientific doctrines which have -arisen from the failure to understand the purely external relation -between the æsthetic fact or artistic vision and the physical fact -or instrument which aids in its reproduction, together with brief -criticisms of them deduced from what has already been said.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of æsthetic associationism.</i></div> - -<p>That form of associationism which identifies the æsthetic fact with the -<i>association</i> of two images finds support in such lack of apprehension. -By what path has it been possible to arrive at such an error, so -repugnant to our æsthetic consciousness, which is a consciousness of -perfect unity, never of duality? Precisely because the physical and -æsthetic facts have been considered separately, as two distinct images, -which enter the spirit, the one drawn in by the other, first one and -then the other. A picture has been divided into the image of the -<i>picture</i> and the image of the <i>meaning</i> of the picture; a poem, into -the image of the <i>words</i> and the image of the <i>meaning</i> of the words. -But this dualism of images is non-existent: the physical fact does not -enter the spirit as an image, but causes the reproduction of the image -(the only image, which is the æsthetic fact), in so far as it blindly -stimulates the psychic organism and produces the impression which -answers to the æsthetic expression already produced.</p> - -<p>The efforts of the associationists (the usurpers of to-day in the field -of Æsthetic) to emerge from the difficulty, and to reaffirm in some way -the unity which has been destroyed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> by their principle of association, -are highly instructive. Some maintain that the image recalled is -unconscious; others, leaving unconsciousness alone, hold that, on the -contrary, it is vague, vaporous, confused, thus reducing the <i>force</i> of -the æsthetic fact to the <i>weakness</i> of bad memory. But the dilemma is -inexorable: either keep association and give up unity, or keep unity -and give up association. No third way out of the difficulty exists.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of æsthetic physics.</i></div> - -<p>From the failure to analyse so-called natural beauty thoroughly and to -recognize that it is simply an incident of æsthetic reproduction, and -from having looked upon it, on the contrary, as given in nature, is -derived all that portion of treatises upon Æsthetic entitled <i>Beauty -of Nature</i> or <i>Æsthetic Physics</i>; sometimes even subdivided, save -the mark, into æsthetic Mineralogy, Botany and Zoology. We do not -wish to deny that such treatises contain many just observations, and -are sometimes themselves works of art, in so far as they represent -beautifully the imaginings and fancies or impressions of their authors. -But we must affirm it to be scientifically false to ask oneself if -the dog be beautiful and the ornithorhynchus ugly, the lily beautiful -and the artichoke ugly. Indeed, the error is here double. On the one -hand, æsthetic Physics falls back into the equivocation of the theory -of artistic and literary kinds, of attempting to attach æsthetic -determinations to the abstractions of our intellect; on the other, it -fails to recognize, as we said, the true formation of so-called natural -beauty, a formation which excludes even the possibility of the question -as to whether some given individual animal, flower or man be beautiful -or ugly. What is not produced by the æsthetic spirit, or cannot be -referred to it, is neither beautiful nor ugly. The æsthetic process -arises from the ideal connexions in which natural objects are placed.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of the beauty of the human body.</i></div> - -<p>The double error can be exemplified by the question as to the <i>Beauty -of the human body,</i> upon which whole volumes have been written. Here -we must before everything turn those who discuss this subject from the -abstract toward the concrete, by asking: "What do you mean by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> the -human body, that of the male, the female, or the hermaphrodite?" Let -us assume that they reply by dividing the inquiry into two distinct -inquiries, as to male and female beauty (there really are writers -who seriously discuss whether man or woman is the more beautiful); -and let us continue: "Masculine or feminine beauty; but of what race -of men—the white, the yellow or the black, or any others that may -exist, according to the division you prefer?" Let us assume that they -limit themselves to the white race, and drive home the argument: "To -what sub-species of the white race?" And when we have restricted them -gradually to one corner of the white world, going, let us say, from -the Italian to the Tuscan, the Siennese, the Porta Camollia quarter, -we will proceed: "Very good; but at what age of the human body, and in -what condition and stage—that of the newborn babe, of the child, of -the boy, of the adolescent, of the man of middle age, and so on? and of -him who is at rest or of him who is at work, or of him who is occupied -like Paul Potter's bull, or the Ganymede of Rembrandt?"</p> - -<p>Having thus arrived, by successive reductions, at the individual -<i>omnimode determinatum,</i> or rather at "this man here," pointed out with -the finger, it will be easy to expose the other error, by recalling -what we have said about the natural fact, which is now beautiful, now -ugly, according to the point of view and to what is passing in the soul -of the artist. If even the Gulf of Naples have its detractors, and if -there be artists who declare it inexpressive, preferring the "gloomy -firs," the "clouds and perpetual north winds," of northern seas; is it -really possible that such relativity does not exist for the human body, -source of the most varied suggestions?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the beauty of geometrical figures.</i></div> - -<p>The question of the <i>beauty of geometrical figures</i> is connected with -æsthetic Physics. But if by geometrical figures be understood the -concepts of geometry (the concepts of the triangle, the square, the -cone), these are neither beautiful nor ugly, just because they are -concepts. If, on the other hand, by such figures be understood bodies -which possess definite geometrical forms, they will be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> beautiful -or ugly, like every natural fact, according to the ideal connexions -in which they are placed. Some hold that those geometrical figures -are beautiful which point upwards, since they give the suggestion -of firmness and of power. We do not deny that this may be so. But -it must not be denied on the other hand that those also may possess -beauty which give the impression of instability and weakness, where -they represent just the insecure and the feeble; and that in these -last cases the firmness of the straight fine and the lightness of the -cone or of the equilateral triangle would seem to be on the contrary -elements of ugliness.</p> - -<p>Certainly, such questions as to the beauty of nature and the beauty -of geometry, like others analogous as to the historically beautiful -and human beauty, seem less absurd in the Æsthetic of the sympathetic, -which really means by the words "æsthetic beauty" the representation -of the pleasing. But the claim to determine scientifically what are -sympathetic contents and what are irremediably antipathetic is none the -less erroneous, even in the sphere of that doctrine and after laying -down those premises. One can only answer such questions by repeating -with an infinitely long postscript the <i>Sunt quos</i> of the first ode of -the first book of Horace, and the <i>Havvi chi</i> of Leopardi's letter to -Carlo Pepoli. To each man his beautiful (= sympathetic), as to each man -his fair one. Philography is not science.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of another aspect of the imitation of nature.</i></div> - -<p>The artist sometimes has naturally existing facts before him, in -producing the artificial instrument, or physically beautiful. These are -called his <i>models</i>: bodies, stuffs, flowers and so on. Let us run over -the sketches, studies and notes of artists: Leonardo noted down in his -pocket-book, when he was working on the Last Supper: "Giovannina, weird -face, is at St. Catherine's, at the Hospital; Cristofano di Castiglione -is at the Pietà, he has a fine head; Christ, Giovan Conte, of Cardinal -Mortaro's suite." And so on. From this comes the illusion that the -artist <i>imitates nature,</i> when it would perhaps be more exact to say -that nature imitates the artist, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> obeys him. The illusion that -<i>art imitates nature</i> has sometimes found ground and support in this -illusion, as also in its variant, more easily maintained, which makes -of art the <i>idealizer of nature.</i> This last theory presents the process -out of its true order, which indeed is not merely upset but actually -inverted; for the artist does not proceed from external reality, in -order to modify it by approximating it to the ideal; he goes from -the impression of external nature to expression, that is to say, his -ideal, and from this passes to the natural fact, which he employs as -instrument of reproduction of the ideal fact.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of the elementary forms of the -beautiful.</i></div> - -<p>Another consequence of the confusion between the æsthetic fact and the -physical fact is the theory of the <i>elementary forms of the beautiful.</i> -If expression, if the beautiful, be indivisible, the physical fact on -the contrary, in which it externalizes itself, can easily be divided -and subdivided: for example, a painted surface, into lines and colours, -groups and curves of lines, kinds of colours, and so on; a poem, into -strophes, verses, feet, syllables; a piece of prose, into chapters, -paragraphs, headings, periods, phrases, words and so on. The parts -thus obtained are not æsthetic facts, but smaller physical facts, -arbitrarily divided. If this path were followed and the confusion -persisted in, we should end by concluding that the true elementary -forms of the beautiful are <i>atoms.</i></p> - -<p>The æsthetic law, several times promulgated, that beauty must -have <i>bulk,</i> could be invoked against the atoms. It cannot be the -imperceptibility of the too small, or the inapprehensibility of the -too large. But a greatness determined by perceptibility, not by -measurement, implies a concept widely different from the mathematical. -Indeed, what is called imperceptible and inapprehensible does not -produce an impression, because it is not a real fact, but a concept: -the demand for bulk in the beautiful is thus reduced to the actual -presence of the physical fact, which serves for the reproduction of the -beautiful.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the search for the objective conditions of the -beautiful.</i></div> - -<p>Continuing the search for the <i>physical laws</i> or for the <i>objective -conditions of the beautiful,</i> it has been asked: To what physical facts -does the beautiful correspond? To<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> what the ugly? To what unions of -tones, colours, sizes, mathematically determinable? Such inquiries are -as if in Political Economy one were to seek for the laws of exchange -in the physical nature of the objects exchanged. The persistent -fruitlessness of the attempt should have given rise before long to some -suspicion of its vanity. In our times, especially, necessity for an -<i>inductive</i> Æsthetic has been often proclaimed, of an Æsthetic starting -<i>from below,</i> proceeding like natural science and not jumping to its -conclusions. Inductive? But Æsthetic has always been both inductive and -deductive, like every philosophical science; induction and deduction -cannot be separated, nor can they separately avail to characterize -a true science. But the word "induction" was not pronounced here by -chance. The intention was to imply that the æsthetic fact is really -nothing but a physical fact, to be studied by the methods proper to the -physical and natural sciences.</p> - -<p>With such a presupposition and in such a faith did inductive Æsthetic -or Æsthetic <i>from below</i> (what pride in this modesty!) begin its -labours. It conscientiously began by making a collection of <i>beautiful -things,</i> for example, a great number of envelopes of various shapes and -sizes, and asked which of these give the impression of beauty and which -of ugliness. As was to be expected, the inductive æstheticians speedily -found themselves in a difficulty, for the same objects that appeared -ugly in one aspect appeared beautiful in another. A coarse yellow -envelope, which would be extremely ugly for the purpose of enclosing -a love-letter, is just what is wanted for a writ served by process on -stamped paper, which in its turn would look very bad, or seem at any -rate an irony, enclosed in a square envelope of English paper. Such -considerations of simple common sense should have sufficed to convince -inductive æstheticians that the beautiful has no physical existence, -and cause them to desist from their vain and ridiculous quest. But no: -they had recourse to an expedient, as to which we should hardly like to -say how far it belongs to the strict method of natural science. They -sent their envelopes round<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> and opened a <i>referendum,</i> trying to settle -in what beauty or ugliness consists by the votes of the majority.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Astrology of Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>We will not waste time over this subject, lest we should seem to be -turning ourselves into tellers of comic tales rather than expositors of -æsthetic science and of its problems. It is a matter of fact that the -inductive æstheticians have not yet discovered <i>one single law.</i></p> - -<p>He who despairs of doctors is apt to abandon himself to charlatans. -This has befallen those who have believed in the naturalistic laws of -the beautiful. Artists sometimes adopt empirical canons, such as that -of the proportions of the human body, or of the golden section, that -is to say, of a line divided into two parts in such a manner that the -less is to the greater as is the greater to the whole line (<i>be : ac -= ac : ab</i>). Such canons easily become their superstitions, and they -attribute to them the success of their works. Thus Michæl Angelo left -as a precept to his disciple Marco del Pino da Siena that "he should -always make a pyramidal serpentine figure multiplied by one two and -three," a precept which did not enable Marco da Siena to emerge from -that mediocrity which we can yet observe in many of his paintings that -exist here in Naples. Others took Michæl Angelo's words as authority -for the precept that serpentine undulating lines were the true <i>lines -of beauty.</i> Whole volumes have been composed on these laws of beauty, -on the golden section and on the undulating and serpentine lines. These -should in our opinion be looked upon as the <i>astrology of Æsthetic.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVa" id="XVa">XV</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The practical activity of externalization.</i></div> - -<p>The fact of the production of physical beauty implies, as has already -been remarked, a vigilant will, which persists in not allowing certain -visions, intuitions or representations to be lost. Such a will must be -able to act with the utmost rapidity and as it were instinctively, and -may also need long and laborious deliberations. In any case, thus and -thus only does the practical activity enter into relations with the -æsthetic, that is to say, no longer as its simple accompaniment, but as -a really distinct moment of it. We cannot will or not will our æsthetic -vision: we can however will or not will to externalize it, or rather, -to preserve and communicate to others, or not, the externalization -produced.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The technique of externalization.</i></div> - -<p>This volitional fact of externalization is preceded by a complex of -various kinds of knowledge. These are known as <i>technique,</i> like all -knowledge which precedes a practical activity. Thus we talk of an -<i>artistic technique</i> in the same metaphorical and elliptic manner that -we talk of the physically beautiful, that is to say (in more precise -language), <i>knowledge at the service of the practical activity directed -to producing stimuli to æsthetic reproduction.</i> In place of employing -so lengthy a phrase, we shall here avail ourselves of ordinary -terminology, whose meaning we now understand.</p> - -<p>The possibility of this technical knowledge, at the service of artistic -reproduction, is what has led minds astray to imagine the existence -of an æsthetic technique of internal expression, which is tantamount -to saying, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> doctrine of the <i>means of internal expression,</i> a thing -that is altogether inconceivable. And we know well the reason of its -inconceivability; expression, considered in itself, is a primary -theoretic activity, and as such precedes practice and intellectual -knowledge which illumines practice and is independent alike of both. -It aids for its part to illumine practice, but is not illuminated by -it. Expression does not possess <i>means,</i> because it has not an <i>end</i>; -it has intuitions of things, but it does not will and is therefore -unanalysable into the abstract components of volition, means and end. -Sometimes a certain writer is said to have invented a new technique -of fiction or of drama, or a painter is said to have discovered a new -technique of distributing light. The word is used here at hazard; -because the so-called <i>new technique</i> is really <i>that romance itself, -or that new picture</i> itself and nothing else. The distribution of -light belongs to the vision of the picture itself; as the technique -of a dramatist is his dramatic conception itself. On other occasions, -the word "technique" is used to designate certain merits or defects -in a work that is a failure; and it is euphemistically said that the -conception is bad but the technique good, or that the conception is -good but the technique bad.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, when we talk of the different ways of painting -in oils, or of etching, or of sculpturing in alabaster, then the -word "technique" is in its place; but in such a case the adjective -"artistic" is used metaphorically. And if a dramatic technique in the -æsthetic sense be impossible, a theatrical technique of processes of -externalization of certain particular æsthetic works is not impossible. -When, for instance, women were introduced on the stage in Italy in the -second half of the sixteenth century, in place of men dressed as women, -this was a true and real discovery in theatrical technique; such too -was the perfecting in the following century of machines for the rapid -changing of scenery by the impresarios of Venice.</p> - -<p>The collection of technical knowledge at the service of artists -desirous of externalizing their expressions, can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> be divided into -groups, which may be entitled <i>theories of the arts.</i> Thus arises -a theory of Architecture, comprising mechanical laws, information -relating to the weight or resistance of the materials of construction -or of fortification, manuals relating to the method of mixing lime or -stucco; a theory of Sculpture, containing advice as to the instruments -to be used for sculpturing the various sorts of stone, for obtaining -a successful mixture of bronze, for working with the chisel, for -the accurate casting of the clay or plaster model, for keeping clay -damp; a theory of Painting, on the various techniques of tempera, -of oil-painting, of water-colour, of pastel, on the proportions of -the human body, on the laws of perspective; a theory of Oratory, -with precepts as to the method of producing, of exercising and of -strengthening the voice, of attitude in impersonation and gesture; a -theory of Music, on the combinations and fusions of tones and sounds; -and so on. Such collections of precepts abound in all literatures. -And since it is impossible to say what is useful and what useless to -know, books of this sort become very often a sort of encyclopædias or -<i>catalogues of desiderata.</i> Vitruvius, in his treatise on Architecture, -claims for the architect a knowledge of letters, of drawing, of -geometry, of arithmetic, of optic, of history, of natural and moral -philosophy, of jurisprudence, of medicine, of astrology, of music, and -so on. Everything is worth knowing: learn the art and have done with it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Technical theories of the different arts.</i></div> - -<p>It should be evident that such empirical collections are not reducible -to science. They are composed of notions, taken from various sciences -and disciplines, and their philosophical and scientific principles -are to be found in the latter. To propose to construct a scientific -theory of the different arts would be to wish to reduce to the single -and homogeneous what is by nature multiple and heterogeneous; to wish -to destroy the existence as a collection of what was put together -precisely to form a collection. Were we to try to give scientific -form to the manuals of the architect, the painter, or the musician, -it is clear that nothing would remain in our hands but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> the general -principles of Mechanics, Optics, or Acoustics. And if we were to -extract and isolate what may be scattered among them of properly -artistic observations, to make of them a scientific system, then the -sphere of the individual art would be abandoned and that of Æsthetic -entered, for Æsthetic is always general Æsthetic, or rather it cannot -be divided into general and special. This last case (that is, the -attempt to furnish a technique which ends in composing an Æsthetic) -arises when men possessing strong scientific instincts and a natural -tendency to philosophy set themselves to work to produce such theories -and technical manuals.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of æsthetic theories of particular arts</i>.</div> - -<p>But the confusion between Physics and Æsthetic has attained to its -highest degree, when æsthetic theories of particular arts are imagined, -to answer such questions as: What are the <i>limits</i> of each art? What -can be represented with colours, and what with sounds? What with simple -monochromatic lines and what with touches of various colours? What with -tones, and what with metres and rhythms? What are the limits between -the figurative and the auditive arts, between painting and sculpture, -poetry and music?</p> - -<p>This, translated into scientific language, is tantamount to asking: -What is the connexion between Acoustics and æsthetic expression? What -between the latter and Optics?—and the like. Now, if <i>there is no -passage</i> from the physical fact to the æsthetic, how could there be -from the æsthetic to particular groups of physical facts, such as the -phenomena of Optics or of Acoustics?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the classification of the arts.</i></div> - -<p>The so-called <i>arts</i> have no æsthetic limits, because, in order to -have them, they would need to have also æsthetic existence in their -particularity; and we have demonstrated the altogether empirical -genesis of those partitions. Consequently, any attempt at an æsthetic -classification of the arts is absurd. If they be without limits, -they are not exactly determinable, and consequently cannot be -philosophically classified. All the books dealing with classifications -and systems of the arts could be burned without any loss whatever. (We -say this with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> utmost respect to the writers who have expended -their labours upon them.)</p> - -<p>The impossibility of such systematizations finds something like a proof -in the strange attempts made to carry it out. The first and most common -partition is that into arts of <i>hearing, sight,</i> and <i>imagination</i>; -as if eyes, ears, and imagination were on the same level and could be -deduced from the same logical variable as <i>fundamentum divisionis.</i> -Others have proposed the division into arts of <i>space</i> and arts of -<i>time,</i> arts of <i>rest</i>; and <i>movement</i>; as if the concepts of space, -time, rest and motion could determine special æsthetic forms and -possess anything in common with art as such. Finally, others have -amused themselves by dividing them into <i>classic</i> and <i>romantic,</i> -or into <i>oriental, classic,</i> and <i>romantic,</i> thereby conferring the -value of scientific concepts upon simple historical denominations, or -falling into those rhetorical partitions of expressive forms, already -criticized above; or into arts <i>that can only be seen from one side,</i> -like painting, and arts <i>that can be seen from all sides,</i> like -sculpture—and similar extravagances, which hold good neither in heaven -nor on earth.</p> - -<p>The theory of the limits of the arts was perhaps at the time when -it was put forward a beneficial critical reaction against those who -believed in the possibility of remodelling one expression into another, -as the <i>Iliad</i> or <i>Paradise Lost</i> into a series of paintings, and -indeed held a poem to be of greater or lesser value according as it -could or could not be translated into pictures by a painter. But if the -rebellion were reasonable and resulted in victory, this does not mean -that the arguments employed and the systems constructed for the purpose -were sound.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the theory of the union of the arts.</i></div> - -<p>Another theory which is a corollary to that of the arts and their -limits, falls with them; that of the <i>union of the arts.</i> Given -particular arts, distinct and limited, it was asked: Which is the most -<i>powerful</i>? Do we not obtain <i>more powerful</i> effects by <i>uniting</i> -several? We know nothing of this: we know only that in each particular -case certain given artistic intuitions have need of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> definite physical -means for their reproduction and other artistic intuitions of other -means. We can obtain the effect of certain plays by simply reading -them; others need declamation and scenic display: there are some -artistic intuitions which need for their full externalization words, -song, musical instruments, colours, statuary, architecture, actors; -while others are quite complete in a slight outline made with the -pen, or a few strokes of the pencil. But it is false to suppose that -declamation and scenic effects and all the other things together that -we have mentioned are <i>more powerful</i> than a simple reading or a simple -outline of pen or pencil; because each of those facts or groups of -facts has, so to say, a different purpose, and the power of the means -cannot be compared when the purposes are different.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relation of the activity of externalization to utility and -morality.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, it is only from the point of view of a clear and rigorous -distinction between the true and proper æsthetic activity and the -practical activity of externalization that we can solve the complicated -and confused questions as to the relations between <i>art and utility</i> -and <i>art and morality.</i></p> - -<p>We have demonstrated above that art as art is independent both of -utility and of morality, as also of all practical value. Without this -independence, it would not be possible to speak of an intrinsic value -of art, nor indeed to conceive an æsthetic science, which demands the -autonomy of the æsthetic fact as its necessary condition.</p> - -<p>But it would be erroneous to maintain that this independence of the -vision or intuition or <i>internal expression</i> of the artist should -be simply extended to the practical activity of externalization and -communication which may or may not follow the æsthetic fact. If by art -be understood the externalization of art, then utility and morality -have a perfect right to enter into it; that is to say, the right to be -master in one's own house.</p> - -<p>Indeed we do not externalize and fix all the many expressions and -intuitions which we form in our spirit; we do not declare our every -thought in a loud voice, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> write it down, or print, or draw, or -paint, or expose it to the public. We <i>select</i> from the crowd of -intuitions which are formed or at least sketched within us; and the -selection is ruled by the criteria of the economic disposition of life -and of its moral direction. Therefore, when we have fixed an intuition, -we have still to decide whether or no we should communicate it to -others, and to whom, and when, and how; all which deliberations come -equally under the utilitarian and ethical criterion.</p> - -<p>Thus we find the concepts of <i>selection,</i> of the <i>interesting,</i> of -<i>morality,</i> of an <i>educational end,</i> of <i>popularity,</i> etc., to some -extent justified, although these can in no way be justified when -imposed upon art as art, and we have ourselves rejected them in pure -Æsthetic. Error always contains an element of truth. He who formulated -those erroneous æsthetic propositions in reality had his eye on -practical facts, which attach themselves externally to the æsthetic -fact and belong to economic and moral fife.</p> - -<p>It is well to advocate yet greater freedom in making known the means -of æsthetic reproduction; we are of the same opinion, and leave -projects for legislation and for legal action against immoral art, -to hypocrites, to the ingenuous and to wasters of time. But the -proclamation of this freedom, and the fixing of its limits, how -wide soever they be, is always the task of morality. And it would -in any case be out of place to invoke that highest principle, that -<i>fundamentum æsthetices,</i> which is the independence of art, to deduce -from it the guiltlessness of the artist who calculates like an -immoral speculator upon the unhealthy tastes of his readers in the -externalization of his imaginings, or the freedom of hawkers to sell -obscene statuettes in the public squares. This last case is the affair -of the police, as the first must be brought before the tribunal of -the moral consciousness. The æsthetic judgement on the work of art -has nothing to do with the morality of the artist as a practical man, -or with the provisions to be taken that the things of art may not be -diverted to evil ends alien to her nature, which is pure theoretic -contemplation.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVIa" id="XVIa">XVI</a></h4> - - -<h4>TASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic judgement. Its identity with æsthetic -reproduction.</i></div> - -<p>When the entire æsthetic and externalizing process has been completed, -when a beautiful expression has been produced and it has been fixed -in a definite physical material, what is meant by <i>judging ill To -reproduce it in oneself,</i> answer the critics of art, almost with one -voice. Very good. Let us try thoroughly to understand this fact, and -with that object in view, let us represent it schematically.</p> - -<p>The individual A is seeking the expression of an impression which -he feels or anticipates, but has not yet expressed. See him trying -various words and phrases which may give the sought-for expression, -that expression which must exist, but which he does not possess. He -tries the combination <i>m,</i> but rejects it as unsuitable, inexpressive, -incomplete, ugly: he tries the combination <i>n,</i> with a like result. -<i>He does not see at all, or does not see clearly.</i> The expression -still eludes him. After other vain attempts, during which he sometimes -approaches, sometimes retreats from the mark at which he aims, all of a -sudden (almost as though formed spontaneously of itself) he forms the -sought-for expression, and <i>lux facta est.</i> He enjoys for an instant -æsthetic pleasure or the pleasure of the beautiful. The ugly, with -its correlative displeasure, was the æsthetic activity which had not -succeeded in conquering the obstacle; the beautiful is the expressive -activity which now displays itself triumphant.</p> - -<p>We have taken this example from the domain of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> speech, as being nearer -and more accessible, and because we all talk, though we do not all draw -or paint. Now if another individual, whom we shall call B, is to judge -that expression and decide whether it be beautiful or ugly, he <i>must of -necessity place himself at A's point of view,</i> and go through the whole -process again, with the help of the physical sign supplied to him by A. -If A has seen clearly, then B (who has placed himself at A's point of -view) will also see clearly and will see this expression as beautiful. -If A has not seen clearly, then B also will not see clearly, and will -find the expression more or less ugly, <i>just as A did.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of divergences.</i></div> - -<p>It may be observed that we have not taken into consideration two other -cases: that of A having a clear and B an obscure vision; and that of A -having an obscure and B a clear vision. Strictly speaking, these two -cases are <i>impossible.</i></p> - -<p>Expressive activity, just because it is activity, is not caprice, but -spiritual necessity; it cannot solve a definite æsthetic problem save -in one way, which is the right way. It will be objected to this plain -statement that works which seem beautiful to the artists are afterwards -found to be ugly by the critics; while other works with which the -artists were discontented and held to be imperfect or failures are, on -the contrary, held to be beautiful and perfect by the critics. But in -this case, one of the two is wrong: either the critics or the artists, -sometimes the artists, at other times the critics. Indeed, the producer -of an expression does not always fully realize what is happening in -his soul. Haste, vanity, want of reflexion, theoretic prejudices, -make people say, and others sometimes almost believe, that works of -ours are beautiful, which, if we really looked into ourselves, we -should see to be ugly, as they are in reality. Thus poor Don Quixote, -when he had reattached to his helmet as well as he could the vizor of -cardboard—the vizor that had showed itself to possess but the feeblest -force of resistance at the first encounter,—took good care not to test -it again with a well-delivered sword-thrust, but simply declared and -maintained it to be (says the author) <i>por<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> celada finisima de encaxe.</i> -And in other cases, the same reasons, or opposite but analogous -ones, trouble the consciousness of the artist, and cause him to value -badly what he has successfully produced, or to strive to undo! and do -again for the worse what he has done well in artistic spontaneity. -An instance of this is Tasso and his passage from the <i>Gerusalemme -liberata</i> to the <i>Gerusalemme conquistata.</i> In the same way, haste, -laziness, want of reflexion, theoretic prejudices, personal sympathies -or animosities, and other motives of a similar sort, sometimes cause -the critics to proclaim ugly what is beautiful, and beautiful what is -ugly. Were they to eliminate such disturbing elements, they would feel -the work of art as it really is, and would not leave it to posterity, -that more diligent and more dispassionate judge, to award the palm, or -to do that justice which they have refused.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of taste and genius.</i></div> - -<p>It is clear from the preceding theorem that the activity of judgement -which criticizes and recognizes the beautiful is identical with -what produces it. The only difference lies in the diversity of -circumstances, since in the one case it is a question of æsthetic -production, in the other of reproduction. The activity which judges is -called <i>taste</i>; the productive activity is called <i>genius</i>: genius and -taste are therefore substantially <i>identical.</i></p> - -<p>The common remark that the critic should possess something of the -genius of the artist and that the artist should possess taste, gives -a glimpse of this identity; or the remark that there exists an active -(productive) and a passive (reproductive) taste. But it is also -negated in other equally common remarks, as when people speak of taste -without genius, or of genius without taste. These last observations -are meaningless, unless they allude to quantitative or psychological -differences, those being called geniuses without taste who produce -works of art, inspired in their chief parts and neglected or defective -in their secondary parts, and men of taste without genius, those -who, while they succeed in obtaining certain isolated or secondary -merits, do not possess sufficient power for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> a great artistic -synthesis. Analogous explanations can easily be given of other similar -expressions. But to posit a substantial difference between genius and -taste, between artistic production and reproduction, would render both -communication and judgement alike inconceivable. How could we judge -what remained external to us? How could that which is produced by a -given activity be judged by a <i>different</i> activity? The critic may -be a small genius, the artist a great one; the former may have the -strength of ten, the latter of a hundred; the former, in order to reach -a certain height, will have need of the assistance of the other; but -the nature of both must remain the same. To judge Dante, we must raise -ourselves to his level: let it be well understood that empirically we -are not Dante, nor Dante we; but in that moment of contemplation and -judgement, our spirit is one with that of the poet, and in that moment -we and he are one thing. In this identity alone resides the possibility -that our little souls can echo great souls, and grow great with them in -the universality of the spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Analogy with other activities.</i></div> - -<p>Let us remark in passing that what has been said of the æsthetic -judgement holds good equally for every other activity and for every -other judgement; and that scientific, economic, and ethical criticism -is effected in a like manner. To limit ourselves to this last, only if -we place ourselves ideally in the same conditions in which he found -himself who took a given resolution, can we form a judgement as to -whether his decision were moral or immoral. An action would otherwise -remain incomprehensible and therefore impossible to judge. A homicide -may be a rascal or a hero: if this be, within limits, indifferent -as regards the defence of society, which condemns both to the same -punishment, it is not indifferent to one who wishes to distinguish and -judge from the moral point of view, and we therefore cannot dispense -with reconstructing the individual psychology of the homicide, in order -to determine the true nature of his deed, not merely in its legal, -but also in its moral aspect. In Ethics, a moral taste or tact is -sometimes mentioned, answering to what is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> generally called the moral -consciousness, that is to say, to the activity of the good will itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of æsthetic absolutism (intellectualism) and -relativism.</i></div> - -<p>The explanation above given of æsthetic judgement or reproduction both -agrees with and condemns the absolutists and relativists, those who -affirm and those who deny the absoluteness of taste.</p> - -<p>In affirming that the beautiful can be judged, the absolutists are -right; but the theory on which they found their affirmation is not -tenable, because they conceive of the beautiful, that is, æsthetic -value, as something placed outside the æsthetic activity, as a concept -or a model which an artist realizes in his work, and of which the -critic avails himself afterwards in judging the work itself. These -concepts and models have no existence in art, for when proclaiming -that every art can be judged only in itself and that it has its model -in itself, they implicitly denied the existence of objective models of -beauty, whether these are intellectual concepts, or ideas suspended in -a metaphysical heaven.</p> - -<p>In proclaiming this, their-adversaries, the relativists, are perfectly -right, and effect an advance upon them. However, the initial -rationality of their thesis in its turn becomes converted into a false -theory. Repeating the ancient adage that there is no accounting for -tastes, they believe that æsthetic expression is of the same nature as -the pleasant and the unpleasant, which every one feels in his own way, -and about which there is no dispute. But we know that the pleasant and -the unpleasant are utilitarian, practical facts. Thus the relativists -deny the specific character of the æsthetic fact, and again confound -expression with impression, the theoretic with the practical.</p> - -<p>The true solution lies in rejecting alike relativism or psychologism -and false absolutism; and in recognizing that the criterion of taste is -absolute, but absolute in a different way from that of the intellect, -which expresses itself in ratiocination. The criterion of taste is -absolute, with the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination. Thus any -act of expressive activity, which is so really, is to be recognized -as beautiful, and any fact as ugly in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> expressive activity and -passivity are found engaged with one another in an unfinished struggle.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of relative relativism.</i></div> - -<p>Between absolutists and relativists is a third class, which may be -called that of the relative relativists. These affirm the existence of -absolute values in other fields, such as Logic and Ethic, but deny it -in the field of Æsthetic. To dispute about science or morals seems to -them to be rational and justifiable, because science depends upon the -universal, common to all men, and morality upon duty, which is also -a law of human nature; but how dispute about art, which depends upon -imagination? Not only, however, is the imaginative activity universal -and no less inherent in human nature than the logical concept and -practical duty; but there is a preliminary objection to the thesis in -question. If the absoluteness of the imagination be denied, we must -also deny intellectual or conceptual truth and implicitly morality. -Does not morality presuppose logical distinctions? How could these be -known, otherwise than in expressions and words, that is to say, in -imaginative form? If the absoluteness of the imagination were removed, -the life of the spirit would tremble to its foundations. One individual -would no longer understand another, nor indeed his own self of a moment -before, which is already another individual considered a moment after.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and of -psychic disposition.</i></div> - -<p>Nevertheless, variety of judgements is an indubitable fact. Men -disagree as to logical, ethical, and economical valuations; and they -disagree equally or even more as to the æsthetic. If certain reasons -recorded by us above, such as haste, prejudices, passions, etc., may -lessen the importance of this disagreement, they do not on that account -annul it. When speaking of the stimuli of reproduction we have added a -caution, for we said that reproduction takes place, <i>if all the other -conditions remain equal.</i> Do they remain equal? Does the hypothesis -correspond to reality?</p> - -<p>It would appear not. In order to reproduce an impression several times -by means of a suitable physical stimulus it is necessary that this -stimulus be not changed, and that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> the organism remain in the same -psychical conditions as those in which was experienced the impression -that it is desired to reproduce. Now it is a fact that the physical -stimulus is continually changing, and in like manner the psychological -conditions.</p> - -<p>Oil-paintings grow dark, frescoes fade, statues lose noses, hands -and legs, architecture becomes totally or partially a ruin, the -tradition of the execution of a piece of music is lost, the text of a -poem is corrupted by bad copyists or bad printing. These are obvious -instances of I the changes which daily occur in objects or physical -stimuli. As regards psychological conditions, we will not dwell upon -the cases of deafness or blindness, that is to say, upon the loss of -entire orders of psychical impressions; these cases are secondary and -of less importance compared with the fundamental, daily, inevitable -and perpetual changes of the society around us and of the internal -conditions of our individual life. The phonetic manifestations or -words and verses of Dante's <i>Commedia</i> must produce a very different -impression on an Italian citizen engaged in the politics of the -third Rome, from that experienced by a well-informed and intimate -contemporary of the poet. The Madonna of Cimabue is still in the Church -of Santa Maria Novella; but does she speak to the visitor of to-day as -to the Florentines of the thirteenth century? Even though she were not -also darkened by time, must we not suppose that the impression which -she now produces is altogether different from that of former times? And -even in the case of the same individual poet, will a poem composed by -him in youth make the same impression upon him when he re-reads it in -his old age, with psychic conditions altogether changed?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the distinction of signs into natural and -conventional.</i></div> - -<p>It is true that certain æstheticians have attempted a distinction -between stimuli and stimuli, between <i>natural</i> and <i>conventional</i> -signs. The former are held to have a constant effect upon all; the -latter only upon a limited circle. In their belief, signs employed -in painting are natural, those used in poetry conventional. But the -difference between them is at the most only one of degree.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> It has -often been said that painting is a language understood by all, while -with poetry it is otherwise. Here, for example, Leonardo found one -of the prerogatives of his art, "which hath not need of interpreters -of different tongues as have letters," and it pleases man and beast. -He relates the anecdote of that portrait of the father of a family -"which the little grandchildren were wont to caress while they were -still in swaddling-clothes, and the dogs and cats of the house in like -manner." But other anecdotes, such as those of the savages who took the -portrait of a soldier for a boat, or considered the portrait of a man -on horseback to be furnished with only one leg, are apt to shake one's -faith in the understanding of painting by sucklings, dogs and cats. -Fortunately, no arduous researches are necessary to convince oneself -that pictures, poetry and all works of art only produce effects upon -souls prepared to receive them. Natural signs do not exist; because -all are equally conventional, or, to speak with greater exactness, -<i>historically conditioned.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The surmounting of variety.</i></div> - -<p>Granting this, how are we to succeed in causing the expression to be -reproduced by means of the physical object? How obtain the same effect, -when the conditions are no longer the same? Would it not, rather, seem -necessary to conclude that expressions cannot be reproduced, despite -the physical instruments made for the purpose, and that what is called -reproduction consists in ever new expressions? Such would indeed be the -conclusion if the varieties of physical and psychical conditions were -intrinsically insurmountable. But since the insuperability has none -of the characteristics of necessity we must on the contrary conclude -that reproduction always occurs when we can replace ourselves in the -conditions in which the stimulus (physical beauty) was produced.</p> - -<p>Not only can we replace ourselves in these conditions as an abstract -possibility, but as a matter of fact we do so continually. Individual -life, which is communion with ourselves (with our past), and social -life, which is communion with our like, would not otherwise be -possible.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Restorations and historical interpretation.</i></div> - -<p>As regards the physical object, palæographers and philologists, -who <i>restore</i> to texts their original physiognomy, <i>restorers</i> of -pictures and of statues and other industrious toilers strive precisely -to preserve or to restore to the physical object all its primitive -energy. These efforts are certainly not always successful, or are -not completely successful, for it is never or hardly ever possible -to obtain a restoration complete in its smallest details. But the -insurmountable is here only present accidentally and must not lead us -to overlook the successes which actually are achieved.</p> - -<p><i>Historical interpretation</i> labours for its part to reintegrate in -us the psychological conditions which have changed in the course of -history. It revives the dead, completes the fragmentary, and enables us -to see a work of art (a physical object) as its author saw it in the -moment of production.</p> - -<p>A condition of this historical labour is tradition, with the help of -which it is possible to collect the scattered rays and concentrate them -in one focus. With the help of memory we surround the physical stimulus -with all the facts among which it arose; and thus we enable it to act -upon us as it acted upon him who produced it.</p> - -<p>Where the tradition is broken, interpretation is arrested; in this -case, the products of the past remain silent for us. Thus the -expressions contained in the Etruscan or Mexican inscriptions are -unattainable; thus we still hear discussions among ethnographers as -to whether certain products of the art of savages are pictures or -writings; thus archæologists and prehistorians are not always able -to establish with certainty whether the figures found on the pottery -of a certain region, and on other instruments employed, are of a -religious or profane nature. But the arrest of interpretation, as that -of restoration, is never a definitely insurmountable barrier; and the -daily discoveries of new historical sources and of new methods of -better exploiting the old, which we may hope to see ever improving, -link up again broken traditions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span></p> - -<p>We do not wish to deny that erroneous historical interpretation -sometimes produces what may be called <i>palimpsests,</i> new expressions -imposed upon the ancient, artistic fancies instead of historical -reproductions. The so-called "fascination of the past" depends in part -upon these expressions of ours, which we weave upon the historical. -Thus has been discovered in Greek plastic art the calm and serene -intuition of life of those peoples, who nevertheless felt the universal -sorrow so poignantly; thus "the terror of the year 1000" has recently -been discerned on the faces of the Byzantine saints, a terror which is -a misunderstanding, or an artificial legend invented later by men of -learning. But <i>historical criticism</i> tends precisely to circumscribe -fancies and to establish exactly the point of view from which we must -look.</p> - -<p>By means of the above process we live in communication with other men -of the present and of the past; and we must not conclude because we -sometimes, and indeed often, meet with an unknown or an ill-known, -that therefore, when we believe we are engaged in a dialogue, we are -always speaking a monologue; or that we are unable even to repeat the -monologue which we formerly held with ourselves.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVIIa" id="XVIIa">XVII</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND ART</h4> - - -<p>This brief exposition of the method by which is obtained the -reintegration of the original conditions in which the work of art -was produced, and consequently reproduction and judgement are made -possible, shows how important is the function fulfilled by historical -research in relation to artistic and literary works which is what is -usually called <i>historical criticism</i> or method in literature and art.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Historical criticism in literature and art. Its -importance.</i></div> - -<p>Without tradition and historical criticism the enjoyment of all or -nearly all the works of art produced by humanity would be irrevocably -lost: we should be little more than animals, immersed in the present -alone, or in the most recent past. It is fatuous to despise and laugh -at one who reconstitutes an authentic text, explains the sense of -forgotten words and customs, investigates the conditions in which an -artist lived, and accomplishes all those labours which revive the -qualities and the original colouring of works of art.</p> - -<p>Sometimes a depreciatory or negative judgement is passed upon -historical research because of the presumed or proved inability of such -researches, in many cases, to give us a true understanding of works -of art. But it must be observed, in the first place, that historical -research does not only fulfil the task of helping to reproduce and -judge artistic works: the biography of a writer or of an artist, for -example, and the study of the customs of a period, have an interest of -their own, that is to say, extraneous to the history of art, but not to -other forms of historiography. If allusion be made to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> those researches -which do not appear to have interest of any kind, nor to fulfil any -purpose, it must be replied that the historical student must often -reconcile himself to the useful but inglorious function of a collector -of facts. These facts remain for the time being formless, incoherent -and meaningless, but they are preserves or mines for the historian of -the future and for whosoever may afterwards want them for any purpose. -In the same way in a library, books which nobody asks for are placed -on the shelves and catalogued, because they may be asked for at some -time or other. Certainly, just as an intelligent librarian gives the -preference to the acquisition and cataloguing of those books which he -foresees may be of more or better service, so intelligent students -possess an instinct as to what is or may more probably be of use among -the material of facts which they are examining; while others less -well endowed, less intelligent or more hasty in producing, accumulate -useless rubbish, refuse and sweepings, and lose themselves in details -and petty discussions. But this appertains to the economy of research, -and does not concern us. It concerns at most the master who selects the -subjects, the publisher who pays for the printing, and the critic who -is called upon to praise or to blame the research workers.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it is clear that historical research directed to -illuminate a work of art does not alone suffice to bring it to birth -in our spirit and place us in a position to judge it, but presupposes -taste, that is to say, an alert and cultivated imagination. The -greatest historical erudition may accompany a gross or otherwise -defective taste, a slow imagination, or, as they say, a cold hard heart -closed to art. Which is the lesser evil, great erudition with defective -taste, or natural taste and much ignorance? The question has often been -asked, and perhaps it will be best to deny that it has any meaning, -because one cannot tell which of two evils is the less, or what exactly -that means. The merely learned man never succeeds in entering into -direct communion with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> great spirits; he keeps wandering for ever about -the outer courts, the staircases and antechambers of their palaces; but -the gifted ignoramus either passes by masterpieces to him inaccessible, -or instead of understanding works of art as they really are, invents -others with his fancy. Now, the labour of the former may at least serve -to enlighten others; but the genius of the latter remains altogether -sterile in relation to knowledge. How then can we in a certain respect -fail to prefer the conscientious learned man to the inconclusive though -gifted man, who is not really gifted, if he resign himself and in so -far as he resigns himself, to his inconclusiveness?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Literary and artistic history. Its distinction from -historical criticism and from the æsthetic judgement.</i></div> - -<p>We must accurately distinguish <i>the history of art and literature</i> -from those historical labours where works of art are used, but for -extraneous purposes (such as biography, civil, religious and political -history, etc.), and also from historical erudition directed to the -preparation of the æsthetic synthesis of reproduction.</p> - -<p>The difference of the first two is obvious. The history of art and -literature has the works of art themselves as its principal subject; -those other labours invoke and interrogate works of art, but only -as witnesses from whom to discover the truth of facts which are not -æsthetic. The second difference to which we have referred may seem less -profound. It is, however, very great. Erudition directed to illuminate -the understanding of works of art aims simply at calling into existence -a certain internal fact, an æsthetic reproduction. Artistic and -literary history, on the other hand, does not appear until after such -reproduction has been obtained. It implies, therefore, a further stage -of labour.</p> - -<p>Like all other history, its object is to record precisely such facts -as have really taken place, in this case artistic and literary facts. -A man who, after having acquired the requisite historical erudition, -reproduces in himself and tastes a work of art, may remain simply -a man of taste, or at the most express his own feeling with an -exclamation of praise or condemnation. This does not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> suffice for -the making of a historian of literature and art. Something else is -needed, namely, that a new mental operation succeed in him the simple -reproduction. This new operation is in its turn an expression: the -expression of the reproduction; the historical description, exposition -or representation. There is this difference, then, between the man of -taste and the historian: the first merely reproduces in his spirit the -work of art; the second, after having reproduced it, represents it -historically, or applies those categories by which, as we know, history -is differentiated from pure art. Artistic and literary history is -therefore <i>a historical work of art founded upon one or more works of -art.</i></p> - -<p>The name "artistic" or "literary" critic is used in various senses: -sometimes it is applied to the scholar who devotes his services to -literature; sometimes to the historian who reveals the works of art of -the past in their reality; more often to both. By critic is sometimes -understood in a more restricted sense he who judges and describes -contemporary literary works, and by historian, he who treats of those -less recent. These are linguistic uses and empirical distinctions, -which may be neglected; because the true difference lies between -<i>the scholar, the man of taste</i> and <i>the historian of art.</i> These -words designate three successive stages of work, each one independent -relatively to the one that follows, but not to that which precedes. As -we have seen, a man may be a mere scholar, and possess little capacity -for understanding works of art; he may even both be learned and possess -taste, yet be unable to portray them by writing a page of artistic and -literary history. But the true and complete historian, while containing -in himself both the scholar and the man of taste as necessary -pre-requisites, must add to their qualities the gift of historical -comprehension and representation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The method of artistic and literary history.</i></div> - -<p>The theory of artistic and literary historical method presents problems -and difficulties, some common to the theory of historical method in -general, others peculiar to it, because derived from the concept of art -itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism of the problem of the origin of art.</i></div> - -<p>History is commonly divided into human history, natural history, and -the mixture of both. Without! examining here the question of the -solidity of this distinction, it is clear that artistic and literary -history belongs in any case to the first, since it concerns a spiritual -activity, that is to say, an activity proper to man. And since this -activity is its subject, the absurdity of propounding the historical -problem of the <i>origin</i> of <i>art</i> becomes at once evident. We should -note that by this formula many different things have in turn been -included on many different occasions. <i>Origin</i> has often meant <i>nature</i> -or <i>character</i> of the artistic fact, in which case an attempt was -made to deal with a real scientific or philosophic problem, the very -problem in fact which our treatise has attempted to solve. At other -times, by origin has been understood the <i>ideal genesis,</i> the search -for the reason of art, the deduction of the artistic fact from a first -principle containing in itself both spirit and nature. This is also -a philosophical problem, complementary to the preceding, coinciding -indeed with it, although it has sometimes been strangely interpreted -and solved by means of an arbitrary and semi-imaginary metaphysic. -But when the object was to discover further exactly in what way the -artistic function was <i>historically formed,</i> the result has been the -absurdity which we have mentioned. If expression be the first form of -consciousness, how can we look for the historical origin of what is not -a product of nature and is presupposed by human history? How can we -assign a historical genesis to a thing which is a category by means of -which all historical processes and facts are understood? The absurdity -has arisen from the comparison with human institutions, which have been -formed in the course of history, and have disappeared or may disappear -in its course. Between the æsthetic fact and a human institution -(such as monogamic marriage or the fief) there exists a difference -comparable with that between simple and compound bodies in chemistry. -It is impossible to indicate the formation of the former, otherwise -they would not be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> simple, and if this be discovered, they cease to be -simple and become compound.</p> - -<p>The problem of the origin of art, historically understood, is only -justified when it is proposed to investigate, not the formation of -the artistic category, but where and when art has appeared for the -first time (appeared, that is to say, in a striking manner), at what -point or in what region of the globe and at what point or epoch of its -history; when, that is to say, not the origin of art, but its earliest -or primitive history is the object of research. This problem forms -one with that of the appearance of human civilization on the earth. -Data for its solution are certainly wanting, but there yet remains -the abstract possibility of a solution, and certainly tentative and -hypothetical solutions abound.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The criterion of progress and history.</i></div> - -<p>Every representation of human history has the concept of <i>progress</i> as -foundation. But by progress must not be understood the imaginary <i>law -of progress</i> which is supposed to lead the generations of man with -irresistible force to some unknown destiny, according to a providential -plan which we can divine and then understand logically. A supposed law -of this sort is the negation of history itself, of that accidentality, -that empiricity, that contingency, which distinguish concrete fact -from abstraction. And for the same reason, progress has nothing to do -with the so-called law of <i>evolution,</i> which, if it mean that reality -evolves (and it is only reality in so far as it evolves or becomes), -cannot be called a law, and if it be given as a law, becomes identical -with the law of progress in the sense just described. The progress -of which we speak here is nothing but <i>the very concept of human -activity,</i> which, working upon the material supplied to it by nature, -conquers its obstacles and bends it to its own ends.</p> - -<p>Such conception of progress, that is to say, of human activity -applied to a given material, is the <i>point of view</i> of the historian -of humanity. No one but a mere collector of unrelated facts, a mere -antiquary or inconsequent annalist, can put together the smallest -narrative of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> human doings unless he have a determined point of -view, that is to say, a personal conviction of his own regarding the -facts whose history he has undertaken to relate. No one can start -from the confused and discordant mass of crude facts and arrive at -the historical work of art save by means of this apperception, which -makes it possible to carve a definite representation in that rough and -formless mass. The historian of a practical action should know what is -economy and what is morality; the historian of mathematics, what is -mathematics; the historian of botany, what is botany; the historian -of philosophy, what is philosophy. If he does not really know these -things, he must at least have the illusion of knowing them; otherwise -he will not even be able to delude himself into believing that he is -writing history.</p> - -<p>We cannot here expand the demonstration of the necessity and -inevitability of this subjective criterion in every narrative of human -affairs (which is compatible with the utmost objectivity, impartiality -and scrupulousness in dealing with data of fact and indeed forms a -constitutive element in these virtues), in every narrative of human -doings and happenings. It suffices to read any book of history to -discover at once the point of view of the author, if he be a historian -worthy of the name and know his own business. There are liberal and -reactionary, rationalist and catholic historians, who deal with -political or social history; for the history of philosophy there -are metaphysical, empirical, sceptical, idealist and spiritualist -historians. Purely historical historians do not and cannot exist. -Were Thucydides and Polybius, Livy and Tacitus, Machiavelli and -Guicciardini, Giannone and Voltaire, wholly without moral and political -views; and, in our time, was Guizot or Thiers, Macaulay or Balbo, -Ranke or Mommsen? And in the history of philosophy, from Hegel, who -was the first to raise it to a great height, to Ritter, Zeller, -Cousin, Lewes and our Spaventa, was there one who did not possess his -conception of progress and his criterion of judgement? Is there one -single work of any value on the history of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> Æsthetic which has not -been written from this or that point of view, with this or that bias -(Hegelian or Herbartian), from a sensationalist or from an eclectic -or some other point of view? If the historian is to escape from the -inevitable necessity of taking a side, he must become a political or -scientific eunuch; and history is not an occupation for eunuchs. Such -would at most be of use in compiling those great tomes of not useless -erudition, <i>elumbis atque fracta,</i> which are called, not without -reason, monkish.</p> - -<p>If, then, a concept of progress, a point of view, a criterion, be -inevitable, the best to be done is not to try and escape from it, -but to obtain the best possible. Every one tends to this end when he -forms his own convictions, seriously and laboriously. Historians who -profess to wish to interrogate the facts without adding anything of -their own to them are not to be trusted. This is at best the result -of ingenuousness and illusion on their part: they will always add -something of their own, if they be truly historians, even without -knowing it, or they will only believe that they have avoided doing -so because they have conveyed it only by hints, which is the most -insinuating, penetrative and effective of methods.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-existence of a single line of progress in artistic and -literary history.</i></div> - -<p>Artistic and literary history cannot dispense with the criterion of -progress any more easily than other history. We cannot show what a -given work of art is, save by proceeding from a conception of art, in -order to fix the artistic problem which the author of such work of art -had to solve, and by determining whether or no he has solved it, or by -how much and in what way he has failed to do so. But it is important -to note that the criterion of progress assumes a different form in -artistic and literary history to that which it assumes (or is believed -to assume) in the history of science.</p> - -<p>It is customary to represent the whole history of knowledge by one -single line of progress and regress. Science is the universal, and -its problems are arranged in one single vast system or comprehensive -problem.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> All thinkers labour upon the same problem as to the nature of -reality and of knowledge: contemplative Indians and Greek philosophers, -Christians and Mohammedans, bare heads and turbaned heads, wigged heads -and college-capped heads (as Heine said); and future generations will -weary themselves with it, as ours has done. It would take too long to -inquire here if this be true or not of science. But it is certainly -not true of art; art is intuition, and intuition is individuality, and -individuality does not repeat itself. To conceive of the history of the -artistic production of the human race as developed along a single line -of progress and regress would therefore be altogether erroneous.</p> - -<p>At the most, and working to some extent with generalizations and -abstractions, it may be asserted that the history of æsthetic -productions shows progressive cycles, but each cycle with its own -problem and each progressive only in respect to that problem. When many -are at work in a general way upon the same subject, without succeeding -in giving to it the suitable form, yet drawing always more near to -it, there is said to be progress, and when appears the man who gives -it definite form, the cycle is said to be complete, and progress is -ended. A typical example of this would here be the progress in the -elaboration of the mode of using the subject-matter of chivalry, during -the Italian Renaissance, from Pulci to Ariosto (using this as an -example and excusing excessive simplification). Nothing but repetition -and imitation, diminution or exaggeration, a spoiling of what had -already been done, in short decadence could be the result of employing -that same material after Ariosto. The epigoni of Ariosto prove this. -Progress begins with the beginning of a new cycle. Cervantes, with -his more open and conscious irony, is an instance of this. In what -did the general decadence of Italian literature at the end of the -sixteenth century consist? Simply in having nothing more to say and in -repeating and exaggerating motives already discovered. If the Italians -of this period had even been able to express their own decadence, they -would not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> have been altogether failures, but would have anticipated -the literary movement of the Risorgimento. Where the matter is not -the same, a progressive cycle does not exist. Shakespeare does not -represent an advance on Dante, nor Goethe upon Shakespeare. Dante, -however, represents an advance on the visionaries of the Middle Ages, -Shakespeare on the Elizabethan dramatists, Goethe, with <i>Werther</i> and -the first part of <i>Faust,</i> on the writers of the <i>Sturm und Drang</i> -period. This mode of presenting the history of poetry and art contains, -however, as we have remarked, something of the abstract, of the merely -practical, and is without strict philosophical value. Not only is the -art of savages not inferior, as art, to that of civilized peoples, -if it be correlative to the impressions of the savage; but every -individual, indeed every moment of the spiritual life of an individual, -has its artistic world; none of these worlds can be compared with any -other in respect of artistic value.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Errors committed against this law.</i></div> - -<p>Many have sinned and continue to sin against this special form of the -criterion of progress in artistic and literary history. Some, for -instance, talk of the infancy of Italian art in Giotto, and of its -maturity in Raphæl or in Titian; as though Giotto were not complete -and absolutely perfect, granted the material of feeling with which his -mind was furnished. He was certainly incapable of drawing a figure -like Raphæl, or of colouring it like Titian; but was Raphæl or Titian -capable of creating the <i>Marriage of Saint Francis with Poverty</i> or -the <i>Death of Saint Francis</i>? The spirit of Giotto had not felt the -attraction of the body beautiful, which the Renaissance studied and -raised to a place of honour; the spirits of Raphæl and of Titian were -no longer interested in certain movements of ardour and of tenderness -with which the man of the fourteenth century was in love. How, then, -can a comparison be made, where there is no comparative term?</p> - -<p>The celebrated divisions of the history of art into an oriental period, -representing a lack of equilibrium between idea and form, the latter -dominating, a classical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> representing an equilibrium between idea and -form, a romantic representing a new lack of equilibrium between idea -and form, the former dominating, suffer from the same defect. The same -is true of the division into oriental art, representing imperfection -of form; classical, perfection of form; romantic or modern, perfection -of content and of form. Thus classic and romantic have also received, -among their many other meanings, that of progressive or regressive -periods, in respect to the realization of some alleged artistic ideal -of all humanity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Other meanings of the word "progress" in respect to -Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>There is no such thing, then, as an <i>æsthetic</i> progress of humanity. -However, by æsthetic progress is sometimes meant, not what the two -words coupled together really signify, but the ever-increasing -accumulation of our historical knowledge, which makes us able to -sympathize with all the artistic products of all peoples and of all -times, or, as they say, makes our taste more catholic. The difference -appears very great if the eighteenth century, so incapable of escaping -from itself, be compared with our own time, which enjoys alike Greek -and Roman art, now better understood, Byzantine, mediæval, Arabic and -Renaissance art, the art of the Cinquecento, baroque art, and the art -of the eighteenth century. Egyptian, Babylonian, Etruscan, and even -prehistoric art are more profoundly studied every day. Certainly, -the difference between the savage and civilized man does not lie in -the human faculties. The savage has speech, intellect, religion and -morality in common with civilized man, and is a complete man. The only -difference lies in this, that civilized man penetrates and dominates -a larger portion of the universe with his theoretic and practical -activity. We cannot claim to be more spiritually alert than, for -example, the contemporaries of Pericles; but no one can deny that we -are richer than they—rich with their riches and with those of how many -other peoples and generations besides our own?</p> - -<p>By æsthetic progress is also meant, in another sense, which is also -improper, the greater abundance of artistic intuitions and the smaller -number of imperfect or inferior<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> works which one epoch produces in -respect to another. Thus it may be said that there was æsthetic -progress, an artistic awakening in Italy, at the end of the thirteenth -or of the fifteenth century.</p> - -<p>Finally, æsthetic progress is talked of in a third sense, with an eye -to the refinement and complications of soul-states exhibited in the -works of art of the most civilized peoples, as compared with those of -less civilized peoples, barbarians and savages. But in this case the -progress is of the comprehensive psycho-social conditions, not of the -artistic activity, to which the material is indifferent.</p> - -<p>These are the most important points to note concerning the method of -artistic and literary history.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVIIIa" id="XVIIIa">XVIII</a></h4> - - -<h5>CONCLUSION:</h5> - - -<h4>IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND ÆSTHETIC</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Summary of the study.</i></div> - - -<p>A glance over the path traversed will show that we have completed -the entire programme of our treatise. We have studied the nature of -intuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the æsthetic or artistic -fact (I. and II.), and described the other form of knowledge, the -intellectual, and the successive complications of these forms (III.); -it thus became possible for us to criticize all erroneous æsthetic -theories arising from the confusion between the various forms and from -the illicit transference of the characteristics of one form to another -(IV.), noting at the same time the opposite errors to be found in the -theory of intellectual knowledge and of historiography (V.). Passing -on to examine the relations between the æsthetic activity and the -other activities of the spirit, no longer theoretic but practical, we -indicated the true character of the practical activity and the place -which it occupies in respect to the theoretic activity: hence the -criticism of the intrusion into æsthetic theory of practical concepts -(VI.); we have distinguished the two forms of the practical activity, -as economic and ethical (VII.), reaching the conclusion that there are -no other forms of the spirit beyond the four which we have analyzed; -hence (VIII.) the criticism of every mystical or imaginative Æsthetic. -And since there are no other spiritual forms co-ordinate with these, -so there are no original subdivisions of the four established, and -in particular of Æsthetic. From this arises the impossibility<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> of -classes of expressions and the criticism of Rhetoric, that is, of -ornate expression distinct from simple expression, and of other similar -distinctions and subdistinctions (IX.) But by the law of the unity of -the spirit, the æsthetic fact is also a practical fact, and as such, -occasions pleasure and pain. This led us to study f the feelings of -value in general, and those of æsthetic value or of the beautiful in -particular (X.), to criticize æsthetic hedonism in all its various -manifestations and complications (XI.), and to expel from the system -of Æsthetic the long series of psychological concepts which had been -introduced into it (XII.). Proceeding from æsthetic production to the -facts of reproduction, we began by investigating the external fixing -of the æsthetic expression, for the purpose of reproduction. This -is called the physically beautiful, whether natural or artificial -(XIII.). We derived from this distinction the criticism of the errors -which arise from confounding the physical with the æsthetic side of -facts (XIV.). We determined the meaning of artistic technique, or that -technique which is at the service of reproduction, thus criticizing -the divisions, limits and classifications of the individual arts, -and establishing the relations of art, economy and morality (XV.). -Since the existence of physical objects does not suffice to stimulate -æsthetic reproduction to the full, and since, in order to obtain it, -we must recall the conditions in which the stimulus first operated, -we have also studied the function of historical erudition, directed -toward re-establishing the communication between the imagination and -the works of the past, and to serve as the basis of the æsthetic -judgement (XVI.). We have concluded our treatise by showing how the -reproduction thus obtained is afterwards elaborated by the categories -of thought, that is to say, by an examination of the method of literary -and artistic history (XVII.).</p> - -<p>The æsthetic fact has in short been considered both in itself and in -its relations with the other spiritual activities, with the feelings -of pleasure and pain, with what are called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> physical facts, with -memory and with historical treatment. It has passed before us as -<i>subject</i> until it became <i>object,</i> that is to say, from the moment -of <i>its birth</i> until it becomes gradually changed for the spirit into -<i>subject-matter of history.</i></p> - -<p>Our treatise may appear to be somewhat meagre when externally compared -with the great volumes usually dedicated to Æsthetic. But it will not -seem so when we perceive that those volumes are nine-tenths full of -matter that is not pertinent, such as definitions, psychological or -metaphysical, of pseudo-æsthetic concepts (the sublime, the comic, -the tragic, the humorous, etc.), or of the exposition of the supposed -Zoology, Botany and Mineralogy of Æsthetic, and of universal history -æsthetically judged; that the whole history of concrete art and -literature has also been dragged into those Æsthetics and generally -mangled, and that they contain judgements upon Homer and Dante, Ariosto -and Shakespeare, Beethoven and Rossini, Michæl Angelo and Raphæl. When -all this has been deducted from them, we flatter ourselves that our -treatise will no longer be held to be too meagre, but, on the contrary, -far richer than ordinary treatises, which either omit altogether, or -hardly touch at all, the greater part of the difficult problems proper -to Æsthetic which we have felt it to be our duty to study.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of linguistic and Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>But although Æsthetic as science of expression has been studied by us -in its every aspect, it remains to justify the sub-title which we have -added to the title of our book, <i>General Linguistic,</i> to state and make -clear the thesis that the science of art and that of language, Æsthetic -and Linguistic, conceived as true sciences, are not two distinct -things, but one thing only. Not that there is a special Linguistic; -but the much-sought-for science of language, general Linguistic, <i>in -so far as what it contains is reducible to philosophy,</i> is nothing -but Æsthetic. Whoever studies general Linguistic, that is to say, -philosophical Linguistic, studies æsthetic problems, and <i>vice versa. -Philosophy of language and philosophy of art are the same thing.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span></p> - -<p>Were Linguistic really a <i>different</i> science from Æsthetic it would -not have for its object expression, which is the essentially æsthetic -fact; that is to say, we must deny that language is expression. But an -emission of sounds which expresses nothing is not language. Language -is sound articulated, circumscribed and organized for the purposes of -expression. If, on the other hand, linguistic were a <i>special</i> science -in respect to Æsthetic, it would necessarily have for its object a -<i>special class</i> of expressions. But the non-existence of classes of -expression is a point which we have already demonstrated.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic formulation of linguistic problems. Nature of -language.</i></div> - -<p>The problems which Linguistic tries to solve, and the errors in which -Linguistic has been and is involved, are the same that respectively -occupy and complicate Æsthetic. If it be not always easy, it is on -the other hand always possible to reduce the philosophic questions of -Linguistic to their æsthetic formula.</p> - -<p>The disputes themselves as to the nature of the one find their parallel -in those as to the nature of the other. Thus it has been disputed -whether Linguistic be a historical or a scientific discipline, and, -the scientific having been distinguished from the historical, it -has been asked whether it belong to the order of the natural or of -the psychological sciences, understanding by these latter empirical -Psychology as well as the Sciences of the spirit. The same has happened -with Æsthetic, which some have looked upon as a natural science -(confusing the æsthetic and the physical sense of the word expression). -Others have looked upon it as a psychological science (confusing -expression in its universality with the empirical classification of -expressions). Others again, denying the very possibility of a science -of such a subject, change it into a simple collection of historical -facts; not one of these attaining to the consciousness of Æsthetic as a -science of activity or of value, a science of the spirit.</p> - -<p>Linguistic expression, or speech, has often seemed to be a fact of -<i>interjection,</i> which belongs to the so-called physical expressions -of the feelings, common alike to men and animals. But it was soon -perceived that an abyss<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> yawns between the "Ah!" which is a physical -reflex of pain and a word; as also between that "Ah!" of pain and -the "Ah!" employed as a word. The theory of the interjection being -abandoned (jocosely termed the "Ah! Ah!" theory by German linguists), -the theory of <i>association</i> or <i>convention</i> appeared. This is liable to -the same objection which destroyed æsthetic associationism in general: -speech is unity, not multiplicity of images, and multiplicity does -not explain, but indeed presupposes the expression to be explained. A -variant of linguistic associationism is the imitative, that is to say, -the theory of <i>onomatopœia,</i> which the same philologists deride under -the name of the "bow-wow" theory, from the imitation of the dog's bark, -which, according to the onomatopœists, must have given its name to -the dog.</p> - -<p>The most usual theory of our times as regards language (apart from mere -crass naturalism) consists of a sort of eclecticism or mixture of the -various theories to which we have referred. It is assumed that language -is in part the product of interjections and in part of onomatopœia and -convention. This doctrine is altogether worthy of the philosophical -decadence of the second half of the nineteenth century.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Origin of language and its development.</i></div> - -<p>We must here note an error into which have fallen those very -philologists who have best discerned the activistic nature of language, -when they maintain that although language was <i>originally a spiritual -creation,</i> yet that it afterwards increased by <i>association.</i> But the -distinction does not hold, for origin in this case cannot mean anything -but nature or character; and if language be spiritual creation, it must -always be creation; if it be association, it must have been so from the -beginning. The error has arisen from having failed to grasp the general -principle of Æsthetic, known to us: that expressions already produced -must descend to the rank of impressions before they can give rise to -new impressions. When we utter new words we generally transform the -old ones, varying or enlarging their meaning; but this process is not -associative, it is <i>creative,</i> although the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> creation has for material -the impressions, not of the hypothetical primitive man, but of man who -has lived long ages in society, and who has, so to say, stored so many -things in his psychic organism, and among them so much language.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relation between Grammar and Logic.</i></div> - -<p>The question of the distinction between the æsthetic and the -intellectual fact appears in Linguistic as that of the relations -between Grammar and Logic. This problem has been solved in two -partially true ways: the <i>inseparability</i> and the <i>separability</i> of -Logic and Grammar. But the complete solution is this: if the logical -form be inseparable from the grammatical (æsthetic), the grammatical is -separable from the logical.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Grammatical kinds or parts of speech.</i></div> - -<p>If we look at a picture which for instance portrays a man walking on a -country road we may say: "This picture represents a fact of <i>movement,</i> -which, if conceived as voluntary, is called <i>action</i>; and since every -movement implies a <i>material object,</i> and every action a <i>being</i> that -acts, this picture also represents a <i>material object</i> or <i>being.</i> -But this movement takes place in a definite place, which is a piece -of a definite heavenly body (the Earth), and precisely of a piece of -it which is called <i>terra-firma,</i> and more precisely of a part of it -that is wooded and covered with grass, which is called <i>country,</i> -cut naturally or artificially into a form called <i>road.</i> Now, there -is only one example of that star, which is called Earth: the earth -is an <i>individual.</i> But <i>terra-firma, country, road</i> are genera or -<i>universals,</i> because there are other terra-firmas, other countries, -other roads." And it would be possible to continue for a while with -similar considerations. By substituting a phrase for the picture that -we have imagined, for example one to this effect: "Peter is walking on -a country road," and by making the same remarks, we obtain the concepts -of <i>verb</i> (motion or action), of <i>noun</i> (material object or agent), of -<i>proper noun,</i> of <i>common noun;</i> and so on.</p> - -<p>What have we done in both cases? Neither more nor less than submit to -logical elaboration what first presented itself only æsthetically; -that is to say, we have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> destroyed the æsthetic for the logical. But -since in general Æsthetic error begins when we wish to return from the -logical to the æsthetic and ask what is the <i>expression</i> of motion, -action, matter, being, of the general, of the individual, etc.; so in -the case of language, error begins when motion or action are called -<i>verb,</i> being or matter, <i>noun</i> or <i>substantive,</i> and when linguistic -categories, or <i>parts of speech,</i> are made of all these, noun and verb -and so on. The theory of the parts of speech is really identical with -that of artistic and literary kinds, already criticized in our Æsthetic.</p> - -<p>It is false to say that the verb or noun is expressed in definite -words, truly distinguishable from others. Expression is an indivisible -whole. Noun and verb do not exist in it, but are abstractions made by -us, destroying the sole linguistic reality, which is the <i>sentence.</i> -This last is to be understood, not in the way common to grammars, but -as an organism expressive of a complete meaning, which includes alike -the simplest exclamation and a great poem. This sounds paradoxical, but -is nevertheless the simplest truth.</p> - -<p>And since in Æsthetic the artistic productions of certain peoples -have been looked upon as imperfect, owing to the error above -mentioned, because the supposed kinds have seemed not yet to have -been discriminated, or to be in part wanting; so in Linguistic, the -theory of the parts of speech has caused the analogous error of judging -languages as <i>formed</i> and <i>unformed,</i> according to whether there appear -in them or no some of those supposed parts of speech; for example, the -verb.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The individuality of speech and the classification of -languages.</i></div> - -<p>Linguistic also discovered the irreducible individuality of the -æsthetic fact, when it affirmed that the word is what is really -spoken, and that two truly identical words do not exist. Thus were -synonyms and homonyms destroyed, and thus was shown the impossibility -of really translating one word into another, from so-called dialect -into so-called language, or from the so-called mother-tongue into the -so-called foreign tongue.</p> - -<p>But the attempt to classify languages ill agrees with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> this just view. -Languages have no reality beyond the propositions and complexes of -propositions really written and pronounced by given peoples at definite -periods; that is to say, they have no existence outside the works of -art (whether little or great, oral or written, soon forgotten or long -remembered, does not matter) in which they exist concretely. And what -is the art of a given people but the whole of its artistic products? -What is the character of an art (for example of Greek art or Provençal -literature) but the whole physiognomy of those products? And how can -such a question be answered, save by narrating in its particulars the -history of the literature, that is to say, of the language in its -actuality?</p> - -<p>It may be thought that this argument, although possessing validity -as against many of the usual classifications of languages, yet -is without any as regards that queen of classifications, the -historico-genealogical, that glory of comparative philology. And this -it certainly is; but why? Precisely because that historico-genealogical -method is not a mere classification. He who writes history does not -classify, and the philologists themselves have hastened to say that -languages which can be arranged in historical series (those whose -series have hitherto been traced) are not distinct and separate species -but a single whole of facts in the various phases of its development.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of a normative grammar.</i></div> - -<p>Language has sometimes been regarded as a voluntary or arbitrary act. -But at others the impossibility of creating language artificially, by -an act of will, has been clearly seen. "<i>Tu, Caesar, civitatem dare -potes homini, verbo non potes</i>" was once said to a Roman Emperor. And -the æsthetic (and therefore theoretic as opposed to practical) nature -of expression supplies the method of discovering the scientific error -which lies in the conception of a (normative) <i>Grammar</i>, establishing -the rules of correct speech. Good sense has always rebelled against -this error. An example of such rebellion is the "So much the worse for -grammar" attributed to Monsieur de Voltaire. But the impossibility -of a normative grammar is also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> recognized by those who teach it, -when they confess that to write well cannot be learned by rules, that -there are no rules without exceptions, and that the study of Grammar -should be conducted practically, by reading and examples, which should -form the literary taste. The scientific reason of this impossibility -lies in the principle that we have demonstrated: that a technique of -the theoretical amounts to a contradiction in terms. And what could -a (normative) grammar be, but precisely a technique of linguistic -expression, that is to say of a theoretic fact?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Didactic organisms.</i></div> - -<p>The case in which Grammar is understood merely as an empirical -discipline, that is to say, as a collection of schemes useful for -learning languages, without any claim whatever to philosophic truth, is -quite different. Even the abstractions of the parts of speech are in -this case both admissible and useful. And we must tolerate as merely -didascalic many books entitled "Treatises of Linguistic," where we -generally find a little of everything, from the description of the -vocal apparatus and of the artificial machines (phonographs) which can -imitate it, to summaries of the most important I results obtained by -Indo-European, Semitic, Coptic, Chinese, or other philologies; from -philosophical generalizations as to the origin or nature of language, -to advice on format, calligraphy and the arrangement of notes relating -to philological work. But this mass of notions, here administered in -a fragmentary and incomplete manner about language in its essence, -about language as expression, resolves itself into notions of Æsthetic. -Nothing exists outside <i>Æsthetic,</i> which gives knowledge of the -nature of language, and <i>empirical Grammar,</i> which is a pedagogic -expedient, save the <i>History of languages</i> in their living reality, -that is to say, the history of concrete literary productions, which is -substantially identical with the <i>History of literature.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Elementary linguistic facts or roots.</i></div> - -<p>The same error of taking the physical for the æsthetic, from which the -search for the <i>elementary forms</i> of the beautiful originates, is made -by those who go in search<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> of <i>elementary linguistic facts,</i> decorating -with that name the divisions of the longer series of physical sounds -into shorter series. Syllables, vowels and consonants, and the series -of syllables called words, all these elements of speech, which give -no definite sense when taken alone, must be called not <i>facts of -language,</i> but mere sounds, or rather sounds abstracted and classified -physically.</p> - -<p>Another error of the same sort is that of <i>roots,</i> to which the most -distinguished philologists now accord but small value. Having confused -physical with linguistic or expressive facts, and considering that the -simple precedes the complex in the order of ideas, they necessarily -ended by thinking that the smallest physical facts indicated the -simplest linguistic facts. Hence the imaginary necessity that the most -ancient primitive languages had a monosyllabic character, and that -historical research must always lead to the discovery of monosyllabic -roots. But (to follow up the imaginary hypothesis) the first expression -that the first man conceived may have had not a phonetic but a mimetic -physical reflex; may have been externalized not in a sound but in -a gesture. And assuming that it was externalized in a sound, there -is no reason to suppose that sound to have been monosyllabic rather -than polysyllabic. Philologists readily blame their own ignorance and -impotence, when they do not always succeed in reducing polysyllabism to -monosyllabism, and rely upon the future to accomplish the reduction. -But their faith is without foundation, and their blame of themselves is -an act of humility arising from an erroneous presumption.</p> - -<p>For the rest, the limits of syllables, as those of words, are -altogether arbitrary, and distinguished somehow or other by empirical -use. Primitive speech, or the speech of uneducated man, is a -<i>continuum,</i> unaccompanied by any consciousness of divisions of the -discourse into words or syllables, imaginary beings created by schools. -No true law of Linguistic can be founded on such divisions. Proof of -this is to be found in the confession of linguists,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> that there are -no truly phonetic laws of the hiatus, of cacophony, of diæresis or -synæresis, but merely laws of taste and convenience; that is to say, -<i>æsthetic</i> laws. And what are laws of <i>words</i> which are not at the same -time laws of <i>style</i>?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic judgement and the model language.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, the search for a <i>model language,</i> or for a method of reducing -linguistic usage to <i>unity,</i> arises from the superstition of a -rationalistic measure of the beautiful, from that concept which we have -called false æsthetic absoluteness. In Italy we call this the question -of the <i>unity of the language.</i></p> - -<p>Language is perpetual creation. What has been linguistically expressed -is not repeated, save by reproduction of what has already been -produced. The ever-new impressions give rise to continuous changes -of sound and meaning, that is, to ever-new expressions. To seek the -model language, then, is to seek the immobility of motion. Everyone -speaks and should speak according to the echoes which things arouse -in his soul, that is, according to his impressions. It is not without -reason that the most convinced supporter of any one of the solutions of -the problem of the unity of language (whether by adopting a standard -Italian approximating to Latin, or to fourteenth-century usage, or -to the Florentine dialect) feels repugnance in applying his theory, -when he is speaking to communicate his thoughts and to make himself -understood. The reason is that he feels that in substituting the Latin, -fourteenth-century Italian, or Florentine word for that of different -origin, but which answers to his natural impressions, he would be -falsifying the genuine form of truth. He would become a vain listener -to himself instead of a speaker, a pedant in place of a serious man, an -actor instead of a sincere person. To write according to a theory is -not really to write: at the most, it is making <i>literature.</i></p> - -<p>The question of the unity of language is always reappearing, because, -stated as it is, it is insoluble, being based upon a false conception -of what language is. Language is not an arsenal of arms already made, -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> it is not a <i>vocabulary,</i> a collection of abstractions, or a -cemetery of corpses more or less well embalmed.</p> - -<p>Our dismissal of the question of the model language, or of the unity of -the language, may seem somewhat abrupt, and yet we would not wish to -appear otherwise than respectful towards the long line of literary men -who have debated this question in Italy for centuries. But those ardent -debates were fundamentally concerned with debates of æstheticity, not -of æsthetic science, of literature rather than of literary theory, of -effective speaking and writing, not of linguistic science. Their error -consisted in transforming the manifestation of a need into a scientific -thesis, the desirability, for example, of easier mutual understanding -among a people divided by dialects into the philosophic demand for -a single, ideal language. Such a search was as absurd as that other -search for a <i>universal language,</i> a language possessing the immobility -of the concept and of abstraction. The social need for a better -understanding of one another cannot be satisfied save by the spread of -education becoming general, by the increase of communications, and by -the interchange of thought among men.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Conclusion.</i></div> - -<p>These scattered observations must suffice to show that all the -scientific problems of Linguistic are the same as those of Æsthetic, -and that the truths and errors of the one are the truths and errors -of the other. If Linguistic and Æsthetic appear to be two different -sciences, this arises from the fact that people think of the former -as grammar, or as a mixture between philosophy and grammar, that -is, an arbitrary mnemonic schematism or a pedagogic medley, and not -of a rational science and a pure philosophy of speaking. Grammar, -or something not unconnected with grammar, also introduces into the -mind the prejudice that the reality of language lies in isolated and -combinable words, not in living discourse, in the expressive organisms, -rationally indivisible.</p> - -<p>Those linguists or philologists, philosophically endowed, who have -penetrated deepest into the problems of language, find themselves (to -employ a trite but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> effective simile) like workmen piercing a tunnel: -at a certain point they must hear the voices of their companions, the -philosophers of Æsthetic, who have been at work on the other side. At -a certain stage of scientific elaboration, Linguistic, in so far as it -is philosophy, must merge itself in Æsthetic: and this indeed it does -without leaving a residue.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3>II</h3> - -<h3>HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC</h3> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a><br /><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="Ib" id="Ib">I</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN GRÆCO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Point of view of this history of Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>The question whether Æsthetic is to be considered as an ancient or a -modern science has on several occasions been a matter of controversy; -whether, that is to say, it arose for the first time in the eighteenth -century, or had previously arisen in the Græco-Roman world. This is -a question, not only of facts, but of criteria, as is easily to be -understood: whether one answers it in this way or that depends upon -one's idea of that science, an idea afterwards adopted as a standard or -criterion.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>Our view is that Æsthetic is the <i>science of the expressive</i> -(representative or imaginative) <i>activity.</i> In our opinion, therefore, -it does not appear until a precise concept is formulated of -imagination, representation or expression, or in whatever other manner -we prefer to name that attitude of the spirit, which is theoretical but -not intellectual, a producer of knowledge, but of the individual, not -of the universal. Outside this point of view, we for our part are not -able to discover anything but deviations and errors.</p> - -<p>These deviations can lead in various directions. Following the -distinctions and terminology of an eminent Italian philosopher<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> in -an analogous case, we shall be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> inclined to say that they arise either -from <i>excess</i> or from <i>defect.</i> The deviation from defect would be -that which denies the existence of a special æsthetic and imaginative -activity, or, which amounts to the same thing, denies its autonomy, -and thus mutilates the reality of the spirit. Deviation by excess is -that which substitutes for it or imposes upon it another activity, -altogether undiscoverable in the experience of the interior life, a -mysterious activity which does not really exist. Both these deviations, -as can be deduced from the theoretical part of this work, take -various forms. The first, that due to defect, may be: (<i>a</i>) <i>purely -hedonistic,</i> in so far as it considers and accepts art as a simple fact -of sensuous pleasure; (<i>b</i>) <i>rigoristic-hedonistic,</i> in so far as, -looking upon it in the same way, it declares it to be irreconcilable -with the highest life of man; (<i>c</i>) <i>hedonistic-moralistic</i> or -<i>pedagogic,</i> in so far as it consents to a compromise, and while still -considering art to be a fact of sense, declares that it need not be -harmful, indeed that it may render some service to morality, provided -always that it is submissive and obedient.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The forms of the second -deviation (which we shall call "mystical") are not determinable <i>a -priori,</i> for they belong to feeling and imagination in their infinite -variety and shades of meaning.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mistaken tendencies, and attempts towards an Æsthetic, in -Græco-Roman antiquity.</i></div> - -<p>The Græco-Roman world presents all these fundamental forms of -deviation: pure hedonism, moralism or pedagogism, mysticism, and -together with them the most solemn and celebrated rigoristic negation -of art which has ever been made. It also exhibits attempts at the -theory of expression or pure imagination; but nothing more than -approaches and attempts. Hence, since we must now take sides in the -controversy as to whether Æsthetic is an ancient or modern science, -we cannot but place ourselves upon the side of those who affirm its -modernity.</p> - -<p>A rapid glance at the theories of antiquity will suffice to justify -what we have said. We say rapid, because to enter into minute -particulars, collecting all the scattered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> observations of ancient -writers upon art, would be to do again what has been done many times -and sometimes very well. Further, those ideas, propositions and -theories have passed into the common patrimony of knowledge, together -with what else remains of the classical world. It is therefore more -advisable here than in any other part of this history merely to -indicate the general lines of development.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Origin of the æsthetic problem in Greece.</div> - -<p>Art, the artistic faculty, only became a philosophical problem in -Greece after the sophistical movement and as a consequence of the -Socratic dialectic. The historians of literature generally point to -the origins of Greek Æsthetic in the first appearance of criticism -and reflection upon poetical works, painting and sculpture; in the -judgements pronounced on the occasion of poetical competitions, in -the observations that were made as to the methods of the different -artists, in the analogies between painting and poetry as expressed in -the sayings attributed to Simonides and Sophocles; or, finally, in the -appearance of that word which served to group together the various -arts and to indicate in a certain way their relationship—the word -mimesis or mimetic (μίμησις)—which oscillates between the meaning of -"imitation" and that of "representation." Others make the origin of -Æsthetic go back to the polemics which were conducted by the first -naturalistic and moralistic philosophers against the tales, fantasies -and morals of poets, and to the interpretations of the hidden meaning -(υπόνοια), or, as the moderns call it, allegory, employed to defend the -good name of Homer and of the other poets; finally, to the <i>ancient -quarrel</i> between philosophy and poetry, as Plato was afterwards to call -it.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> But, to tell the truth, none of these reflections, observations -and arguments implied a true and proper philosophical discussion of -the nature of art. Nor was the sophistical movement favourable to its -appearance. For although attention was at that time certainly given to -internal psychical facts, yet these were conceived as mere phenomena -of opinion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> and feeling, of pleasure and pain, of illusion, whim or -caprice. And where there is no true and no false, no good and no evil, -there can be no question of beautiful and ugly, nor of a difference -between the true and the beautiful or between the beautiful and the -good. The most one has in that case is the general problem of the -irrational and the rational, but not that of the nature of art, which -assumes the difference between rational and irrational, material -and spiritual, mere fact and value, to have been already stated and -grasped. If, then, the sophistical period was the necessary antecedent -to the discoveries of Socrates, the æsthetic problem could only arise -after Socrates. And it did indeed arise with Plato, author of the -first, or indeed of the only really great negation of art of which -there remains documentary proof in the history of ideas.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Plato's rigoristic negation.</i></div> - -<p>Is art, mimesis, a rational or an irrational fact? Does it belong to -the noble region of the soul, where philosophy and virtue are found, -or does it dwell in that base lower sphere, with sensuality and crude -passionality? This is the question asked by Plato,<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> who thus states -the problem of Æsthetic for the first time. The sophist Gorgias was -able to note, with his sceptical acuteness, that tragic representation -is a deception, which (strangely enough) turns out to the honour -both of him who deceives and of him who is deceived, in which it is -shameful not to know how to deceive oneself and not to let oneself be -deceived.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> With that remark he could rest content. That was for him -a fact like another. But Plato, the philosopher, was bound to solve -the problem: if it were a deception, then down with tragedy and the -rest of mimetic productions: down with them among the other things to -be despised, among the animal qualities of man. But if it were not -deception, what was it? What place did art occupy among the lofty -activities of philosophy and of good action?</p> - -<p>The answer that he gave is well known. Mimetic does not realize the -ideas, that is to say the truth of things,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> but reproduces natural or -artificial things, which are pale shadows of them; it is a diminution -of a diminution, a third-hand work. Art, then, does not belong to the -lofty and rational region of the soul (του λογιστικοϋ ἐν ψυχή) but to -the sensual; it is not a strengthening but a corruption of the mind -(λώβη τής διάνοιας); it can serve only sensual pleasure, which troubles -and obscures. For this reason, mimetic, poetry and poets, must be -excluded from the perfect Republic.</p> - -<p>Plato is the most consistent example of those who do not succeed in -discovering any other form of knowledge but the intellectual. It was -correctly observed by him that imitation stops at natural things, -at the image (το φάντασμα), and does not reach the concept, logical -truth (άλήθεια), of which poets and painters are altogether ignorant. -But his error consisted in believing that there is no other form of -truth below the intellectual; that there is nothing but sensuality and -passionality outside or prior to the intellect, that which discovers -the ideas. Certainly, the fine æsthetic sense of Plato did not echo -that depreciatory judgement of art; he himself declared that he would -have been very glad to have been shown how to justify art and to place -it among the forms of the spirit. But since none was able to give him -this assistance, and since art with its <i>appearance</i> that yet lacks -<i>reality</i> was repugnant to his ethical consciousness, and reason -compelled him (ό λόγος ήρει) to banish it and place it with its peers, -he resolutely obeyed his conscience and his reason.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic hedonism and moralism.</i></div> - -<p>Others were not troubled with these scruples, and although art was -always looked upon as a mere thing of pleasure among the later -hedonistic schools of various sorts, among rhetoricians and worldly -people the duty of combating or of abolishing it was not felt. -Nevertheless, this opposite extreme was also not calculated to meet -with the endorsement of public opinion, for the latter, if tender -towards art, is no less tender towards rationality and morality. For -this reason both rationalists and moralists, compelled to recognize -the force of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> such a condemnation as Plato's, sought for a compromise, -a half measure. Away with the sensual and with art: certainly. But -can we expel the sensual and the pleasurable without more ado? Can -fragile human nature nourish itself exclusively with the strong food of -philosophy and morality? Can we obtain observance of the true and of -the good from the young and from the people, without allowing them at -the same time some amusement? And has not man himself always something -of the child, has he not always something of the people in him, is -he not to be treated with the same precautions? Is there not a risk -that the over-bent bow will break?—These considerations prepared the -way for the justification of art, for they showed that if it were not -rational in itself, it could on the other hand serve a rational end. -Hence the search for the <i>external end</i> of art, which takes the place -of the search for the essence or <i>internal end</i>. When art had been -lowered to the level of a simple pleasurable illusion, an inebriation -of the senses, it was necessary to subordinate the practical action -of producing such an illusion and inebriation, like any other action, -to the moral end. Art, being deprived of any dignity of its own, -was obliged to assume a reflected or secondhand dignity. Thus the -moralistic and pedagogic theory was constructed upon a hedonistic -basis. The artist, who, for the pure hedonist, was comparable to -a <i>hetaira,</i> became for the moralist a <i>pedagogue.</i> Hetaira and -pedagogue, these are the symbols of the two conceptions of art that -were disseminated in antiquity, and the second was grafted upon the -first.</p> - -<p>Even before Plato's peremptory negation had directed thought to this -way of issue, the literary criticism of Aristophanes was already full -of the pedagogic idea: "What schoolmasters are to children, poets -are to young men" (τοΐς ήβώσιν δὲ ποιηταί), he says in a celebrated -verse<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> But we can find traces of it in Plato himself (in the -dialogues in which he seems to withdraw from the too rigid conclusions -of the <i>Republic)</i> and in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> Aristotle, both in the <i>Politics,</i> where he -determines the use of music in education, and perhaps in the <i>Poetics,</i> -where he speaks obscurely of a tragical <i>catharsis</i>; although as -regards this latter, it is not to be altogether denied that he may -have had a sort of glimpse of the modern idea of the liberating power -of art.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Later on, the pedagogic theory takes a form that was much -affected by the Stoics. Strabo develops and defends this at great -length, in the introduction to his geographical work, where he combats -Eratosthenes, who has made poetry consist in mere pleasure without any -notion of teaching. Strabo, on the contrary, maintained the opinion of -the ancients, that it was "a first philosophy (φιλοσοφίαν τινα πρωτήν), -which educated young men for life, and created customs, affections and -actions, by means of pleasure." Therefore, he said, poetry has always -been a part of education; one cannot be a good poet unless one is a -good man (άνδρα άγαθόν). Legislators and founders of cities were the -first to employ fables to admonish and to terrify: then this duty, -which must be performed for women and children and even for adults, -passed to the poets. We caress and dominate the multitude with fiction -and with falsehood.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> "The poets tell many lies" (πολλά ψεύδονται -άοιδοί) is a hemistich recorded by Plutarch, who describes minutely in -one of his lesser works how the poets should be read to youths.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> -For him too poetry is a preparation for philosophy; it is a disguised -philosophy, and therefore delights us in the same way as do fish and -meat at feasts, so prepared as not to seem to be fish and meat; it is -philosophy softened with fables, like the vine that grows close to the -mandragora, and produces a wine that is the giver of sweet slumbers. -It is not possible to pass from dense darkness to sunlight; one should -first accustom the eyes to moderate light. Philosophers, in order to -exhort and instruct, take their examples from true things; poets<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> aim -at a like result, when they create fictions and fables.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Lucretius, -in Roman literature, gives us the well-known comparison of the boys for -whom the doctors "<i>prius or as pocula circum Contingunt mellis dulci -flavoque liquore,</i>" in order to administer the bitter wormwood.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -Horace, in certain verses of the Epistle to the Pisones which have -become proverbial (perhaps his source for them was the Greek of -Neoptolemus of Paros?), offers both views (that of art as courtesan and -of art as pedagogue) in his "<i>Aut prodesse volunt aut deledare poetae -... omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<p>Thus looked at, the office of the poet was confounded with that of the -orator, for he too was a practical man aiming at practical effects; -hence there arose discussions as to whether Virgil was to be considered -as a poet or as an orator ("<i>Virgilius poeta an orator?</i>"). To both was -assigned the triple end of <i>delectare, movere, docere</i>; in any case -this tripartition was very empirical, for we clearly perceive that -the <i>delectare</i> is here a means-and the <i>docere</i> a simple part of the -<i>movere</i>: to move in the direction of the good, and therefore, among -other goods, towards that of instruction. In like manner, it was said -of the orator and poet (recording the meretricious basis of their task, -and with a metaphor significant in its <i>naïveté</i>) that they were bound -to avail themselves of the <i>allurements</i> (<i>lenocinium</i>) of form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mystical æsthetic in antiquity.</i></div> - -<p>The mystical view, which considers art as a special mode of -self-beatification, of entering into relation with the Absolute, with -the Summum Bonum, with the ultimate root of things, appeared only -in late antiquity, almost at the entrance to the Middle Ages. Its -representative is the founder of the neo-Platonic school, Plotinus.</p> - -<p>It is strange that Plato should be usually selected as the founder -and head of this æsthetic tendency, and that for this very reason to -him should be attributed the honour of being the father of Æsthetic. -But how could he, who had expounded with such great limpidity and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> -clearness the reasons for which he was not able to accord to art a -high place among the activities of the spirit, be credited with having -accorded to it one of the highest places, equal, if not superior, to -philosophy itself? This misunderstanding has evidently arisen out of -the enthusiastic effusions about the Beautiful that we read in the -<i>Gorgias,</i> the <i>Philebus,</i> the <i>Phædrus,</i> the <i>Symposium,</i> and other -Platonic dialogues. It is well to dissipate it by declaring that the -<i>Beauty</i> of which Plato discourses has nothing to do with art or with -<i>artistic beauty.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Investigations as to the Beautiful.</i></div> - -<p>The search for the meaning and scientific content of the word -"beautiful" could not but early attract the attention of the subtle -and elegant Greek dialecticians. Indeed, we find Socrates engaged -in discussing this question in one of the discourses that have been -preserved for us by Xenophon; and we find him disposed to stop for -the moment at the conclusion that the beautiful is <i>that which is -convenient and which answers to the end desired,</i> or at the other -conclusion that it is <i>that which one loves</i><a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Plato too examines -this sort of problem and proposes various sorts of solutions or -attempts at solutions of it. He sometimes speaks of a beauty that -dwells not only in bodies, but also in laws, in actions, in the -sciences; sometimes he seems to conjoin and almost to identify it -with the true, the good and the divine; now he returns to the view of -Socrates and confuses it with the useful; now he distinguishes between -a beautiful in itself (καλά καθ' αυτά) and a relatively beautiful (πρός -τι καλά); or he makes true beauty consist in pure pleasure (ήδονη -καθαρά), free from all shadow of pain; or he places it in measure and -proportion (μετριότης καί ξνμμετρία); or talks of colours and sounds -as possessing a beauty in themselves.[17] It was impossible to find -an independent dominion for the beautiful, if the artistic or mimetic -activity were deserted. This explains his wandering among so many -different conceptions, among which it is just possible to say that the -identification of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> the Beautiful with the Good prevails. Nothing better -describes this uncertainty than the dialogue of the <i>Hippias maior</i> -(which, if it be not Plato's, is Platonic). He here wishes to find -out not what things are beautiful things, but what the beautiful is; -that is to say, what it is that makes beautiful, not only a beautiful -virgin, but also a beautiful mare, a beautiful lyre, a beautiful pot -with two graceful ears of clay. Hippias and Socrates himself propose -in turn the most various solutions; but the latter ends by confuting -them all. "That which makes things beautiful is the gold that is added -to them by way of ornament." No: gold only embellishes where it is -<i>fitting</i> (πρέπων): for instance, a pot should have a wooden rather -than a golden handle. "That is beautiful which cannot seem ugly to any -one." But it is not a question of <i>seeming</i>: the question is to define -what the beautiful is, whether it seems so or not. It is the <i>fitting</i> -which makes things seem to be beautiful. But in that case, the fitting -(which makes them <i>appear,</i> not <i>be)</i> is one thing, and the beautiful -another. "The beautiful is what leads to the end, that is to say, the -<i>useful</i> (χρήσιμον)." But if that were so, then evil would also be -beautiful, because the useful leads also to the evil. "The beautiful -is the <i>helpful,</i> that which leads to the good (ωφέλιμον)." But in -this case, the good would not be beautiful nor the beautiful good; for -the cause is not the effect, and the effect is not the cause. "The -beautiful is that which delights the sight and hearing." But this fails -to persuade for three reasons: firstly, because beautiful studies and -laws are beautiful, which have nothing to do with the eye or with the -ear; secondly, because we cannot discover a reason for limiting the -beautiful to those senses, while excluding the pleasure of eating and -smelling, and the extremely vivid pleasures of sex; thirdly, because, -if the foundation of the beautiful were <i>visibility,</i> it would not be -<i>audibility,</i> and if it were audibility it would not be visibility; -hence that which constitutes the beautiful cannot dwell in either -of the two qualities. And the question which has been repeated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> so -insistently in the course of the dialogue: <i>what is the beautiful?</i> (τί -εστι το καλόν;) remains unanswered.<a name="FNanchor_18_17" id="FNanchor_18_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_17" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>Later writers also conducted inquiries into the beautiful, and we -possess the titles of several treatises upon the theme, which have -been lost. Aristotle shows himself changeable and uncertain upon the -point. In the scanty references which he makes to it, he at one time -confounds the beautiful with the good, defining it as that which is -both good and pleasing;<a name="FNanchor_19_18" id="FNanchor_19_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_18" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> at another he notes that the good consists -of action (εν πράξει) and the beautiful also in things that are -immoveable (εν τοΐς άκινήτοις), drawing from this the argument that -mathematics should be studied in order to determine its characters, -order, symmetry and limit;<a name="FNanchor_20_19" id="FNanchor_20_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_19" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> sometimes he places it in bigness and -in order (εν μεγεθει καί τάξει);<a name="FNanchor_21_20" id="FNanchor_21_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_20" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> at others he was led to look upon -it as something apparently indefinable.<a name="FNanchor_22_21" id="FNanchor_22_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_21" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> Antiquity also established -canons of beautiful things, such as that attributed to Polycletus on -the proportions of the human body. And Cicero said of the beauty of -bodies that they were "<i>quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam -suavitate.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_23_22" id="FNanchor_23_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_22" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> All these affirmations, even when they are not mere -empirical observations, or verbal glosses and substitutions, meet with -unsurmountable obstacles.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between the theory of Art and the theory of the -Beautiful.</i></div> - -<p>In any case, not only is the conception of the beautiful, taken as -a whole, identified with art in none of them; but sometimes art and -beauty, mimesis and pleasing or displeasing material of mimesis, are -clearly distinguished. Aristotle notes in his <i>Poetics</i> that it pleases -us to see the most faithful images of things that are repugnant to -us in reality, such, for instance, as the most contemptible forms of -animals, or corpses (τάς εικόνας τάς μάλιστα ήκριβωμενας χαίρομεν -θεωρουντες).<a name="FNanchor_24_23" id="FNanchor_24_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_23" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> Plutarch demonstrates at length that works of art -please us not as beautiful but as <i>resembling</i> (ούχ ως καλόν, άλλ,' -ως ομοιον); he affirms that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> if the artist beautified things that are -ugly in nature he would be offending against fitness and resemblance -(το πρεπον και το eίκός); and he proclaims the principle that <i>the -beautiful is one thing and beautiful imitation another</i> (oύ yaρ εστι -ταυτό, το καλον και καλως τι μιμεισθαι). Paintings of horrible events -are pleasing, such as <i>Medea slaying her sons</i> by Timomachus, <i>Orestes -the matricide</i> by Theon, and the <i>Pretended madness of Ulysses</i> by -Parrhasius; and if the grunting of a pig, the grating of a machine, -the noise of the winds and the tumult of the sea are unpleasing, they -pleased on the contrary in the case of Parmenon, who imitated the pig -perfectly, and in Theodorus, who was not less expert in rendering the -grating of machines.<a name="FNanchor_25_24" id="FNanchor_25_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_24" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> If the ancients had really wanted to place -the beautiful and art in relation, a secondary and partial connexion -of the two conceptions was to hand in the shape of the category of the -<i>relatively</i> as distinguished from the <i>absolutely</i> beautiful. But -where the word <i>καλόν</i> or <i>pulchrum</i> is applied to artistic productions -in the writings of literary critics, it does not seem to be more than a -linguistic usage, as we find, for instance, in the case of Plutarch's -<i>beautiful</i> imitation, or also in the terminology of the rhetoricians, -who sometimes called elegance and adornment of discourse <i>beauty</i> of -elocution (το τής φράσεως κάλλος).</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fusion of the two by Plotinus.</i></div> - -<p>It is only with Plotinus that the two divided territories are united -and <i>the beautiful and art are fused into a single concept,</i> not by -means of a beneficial absorption of the <i>equivocal</i> Platonic conception -of beauty into the <i>unequivocal</i> conception of art, but by absorption -of the clear into the confused, of <i>imitative art</i> in the so-called -<i>beautiful.</i> And thus we reach an altogether new view: the beautiful -and art are now both alike melted into a mystical passion and elevation -of the spirit.</p> - -<p>Beauty, observes Plotinus, resides chiefly in things visible; but it -is also to be found in things audible, such as verbal and musical -compositions, and it is not lacking in things supersensible, such as -works, offices, actions,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> habits, sciences and virtues. What is it -that makes beautiful sensible and supersensible things alike? Not, he -answers, the symmetry of their parts among themselves, and with the -whole (συμμετρία των μερών προς αλληλα και προς το ολον) and their -colour (ενχροια), according to one of the definitions most in vogue, -which we have quoted above in the words of Cicero; because there are -proportions in things ugly, and there are things that are simply -beautiful without any relation of proportion: beauty, then, is one -thing and symmetry another.<a name="FNanchor_26_25" id="FNanchor_26_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_25" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> The beautiful is what we welcome as -akin to our own nature; the ugly is what repels us as our opposite, -and the affinity of beautiful things with our souls that perceive them -has its origin in the Idea, which produces both. That is beautiful -which is <i>formed</i>; the ugly is what is <i>unformed,</i> that is to say, -something which is capable of receiving form, but does not receive it -or is not entirely dominated by it. A beautiful body is such, because -of its communion (κοινωνία) with the Divine; beauty is the Divine, the -Idea, shining through; and matter is beautiful, not in itself, but only -when it is illuminated by the Idea. Light and fire, which are nearest -to this state, shed beauty upon visible things, as the most spiritual -among bodies. But the soul must purify itself, in order to perceive the -beautiful, and make the power of the Idea that lies in it efficacious. -Moderation, strength, prudence, and every other virtue, what else are -they, according to the oracle, but <i>purification</i>? Thus there opens -another eye in the soul, beside that of sensible beauty, which permits -it to contemplate divine Beauty coincident with the Good, which is the -supreme condition of beatitude.<a name="FNanchor_27_26" id="FNanchor_27_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_26" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> Art enters into such contemplation, -because beauty, in things made by man, comes from the mind. Compare two -blocks of stone, the one placed beside the other: one rough and crude, -the other reduced to the statue of a god or of a man, for example of -a Grace or of a Muse, or of a human being of such a shape, as art has -collected from many particular beauties. The beauty of a block of this -shape<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> does not consist in its being of stone, but in the form that -art has been able to give to it (παρά του ειδους o ενηκεν η τέχνη); -and when the form is fully impressed upon it, the thing of art is more -beautiful than any other natural thing. Hence he who despised the arts -(Plato), because they imitated nature, was wrong; whereas the truth -is, in the first place, that nature itself imitates the idea, and then -that the arts do not simply limit themselves to imitating what the eyes -see, but go back to those reasons or ideas from which nature itself is -derived (ώς ούχ απλώς το όρώμενον μεμούνται, αλλ' άνατρέχουσιν επι τούς -λόγους έξ ων η φύσις). Art therefore does not belong to nature, but -adds beauty where it is wanting in nature: Phidias did not represent -Jove because he had seen him, but such as he would appear if he wished -to reveal himself to mortal eyes.<a name="FNanchor_28_27" id="FNanchor_28_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_27" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> The beauty of natural things -is the archetype existing in the soul, the sole source of natural -beauty.<a name="FNanchor_29_28" id="FNanchor_29_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_28" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The scientific tendency. Aristotle.</i></div> - -<p>This affirmation of Plotinus and of neo-Platonism is the first -true and proper affirmation of mystical Æsthetic, destined to such -high fortunes in modern times, especially in the first half of the -nineteenth century. But the attempts at a true Æsthetic, excluding -certain luminous but incidental observations to be found even in -Plato: for instance, that the poet should weave fables, not arguments -(μύθους άλλ' ού λόγους),<a name="FNanchor_30_29" id="FNanchor_30_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_29" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> go back to Aristotle and are altogether -independent of his few and feeble speculations as to the beautiful. -Aristotle by no means agreed with the Platonic condemnation; he felt -(as indeed Plato himself had suspected) that such a result could not -be altogether true, and that some aspect of the problem must have been -neglected. When in his turn he attempted to find a solution, he found -himself in more advantageous conditions than his great predecessor, -since he had already overcome the obstacle that arose from the Platonic -doctrine of ideas, a hypostasis of concepts and abstractions. The ideas -were for him<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> simply concepts, and reality presented itself in a far -more lively manner, not as a diminution of ideas, but as a synthesis of -matter and form, it was thus much more easy for him to recognize the -rationality of mimesis in his general philosophical doctrine and to -assign to it its right place; and indeed it seems generally clear to -Aristotle that mimesis, being proper to man by nature, is contemplation -or theoretic activity; although he sometimes seems to forget this (as -when he confuses imitation with the case of boys, who acquire their -first knowledge by following an example<a name="FNanchor_31_30" id="FNanchor_31_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_30" class="fnanchor">[31]</a>), and although his system, -which admits practical sciences and poietic activities (distinguished -from the practical as leaving a material object behind them), disturbed -the firm and constant consideration of artistic mimesis and poetry as -a theoretical activity. But if it is a theoretical activity, by what -characteristic is poetry distinguished both from <i>scientific</i> knowledge -and from <i>historical</i> knowledge? This is the way Aristotle states the -problem concerning the nature of art, and this is the true and only -way of stating it. Even we moderns ask ourselves in what way art is -distinguished from history and from science, and what this artistic -form can be, which has the ideality of science and the concreteness -and individuality of history. Poetry, answers Aristotle, differs from -history, because, while the latter draws things that have happened -(τα γενόμενα), poetry draws things that may possibly happen (οια αν -γένοιτο), and differs from science, because, although it regards the -universal and not the particular (τα καθ' εκαστον) like history, -it does not regard it in the same way as science, but in a certain -measure, which the philosopher indicates by the word <i>rather</i> (μαλλον -τα καθόλου). The point then is to establish the precise meaning of -the <i>possible,</i> the <i>rather</i> and the <i>historical particular.</i> But no -sooner does Aristotle attempt to determine the meaning of these words, -than he falls into contradictions and fallacies. That <i>universal</i> of -poetry, which is the <i>possible,</i> seems to identify itself for him with -the probable or the necessary (τα<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> <i>κατά το είκος η το άναγκαΐον</i>), -and the particular of history is not explained at all, except by -giving instances: "that which Alcibiades did and what happened to -him."<a name="FNanchor_32_31" id="FNanchor_32_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_31" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Aristotle, in fact, after having made so good a beginning -in the discovery of the purely imaginative, proper to poetry, remains -half-way, perplexed and uncertain. Thus he sometimes makes the truth -of imitation consist in a certain learning and syllogizing that takes -place when we look at imitations, by which we recognize that "this is -that," that a copy answers to the original;<a name="FNanchor_33_32" id="FNanchor_33_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_32" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> or, worse, he loses the -grains of truth that he has found and forgets that poetry has for its -content the possible, admitting, not only that it may also depict the -<i>impossible</i> (το αδύνατον), and even the <i>absurd</i> (το άτοπον), seeing -that both are <i>credible</i> and that they do not injure the end of art, -but even that we must prefer impossible probabilities to incredible -possibilities.<a name="FNanchor_34_33" id="FNanchor_34_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_33" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Art, since it has to do even with the impossible -and absurd, will not therefore have in it anything of the rational, -but in accordance with the Platonic theory it will be an imitation of -the appearance in which empty sense indulges itself; that is to say, a -thing of pleasure. Aristotle does not attain to this result, because -he does not attain to any clear and precise result in this part of the -subject, but it is one of the results that can be deduced from what he -has said, or that, at any rate he is not able to exclude. This means -that he did not fulfil his tacitly assumed task, and that although -he re-examined the problem with marvellous acuteness after Plato, he -failed truly to rid himself of the Platonic definition, by substituting -a firmly-established one of his own.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concepts of imitation and of imagination after A -ristotle. Philostratus.</i></div> - -<p>But the field of investigation toward which Aristotle had turned was -generally neglected in antiquity: the very <i>Poetics</i> of Aristotle does -not seem to have been widely known or influential. Ancient psychology -knew fancy or imagination as a faculty midway between sense and -intellect, but always as conservative and reproductive of sensuous -impressions or conveying conceptions to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> senses, never properly -as a productive autonomous activity. That faculty was rarely and with -little result placed in relation with the problem of art. Several -historians of Æsthetic attach singular importance to certain passages -in the <i>Life of Apollonius of Tyana</i> by the elder Philostratus, in -which they believe that they discover a correction of the theory of -<i>mimesis</i> and the first affirmation in history of the conception of -<i>imaginative creation.</i> Phidias and Praxiteles (says the extract in -question) did not need to go to heaven to see the gods, in order to -be able to depict them in their works, as would have been necessary -according to the theory of imitation. Imagination, without any need -of models, made them able to do what they did: imagination, which is -a wiser agent than simple imitation (φαντασία ... σοφωτόρα μιμήσεως -δημιουργός), and gives form, like the other, not only to what has been -seen, but also to what has never been seen, imagining it on the basis -of existing things and in that way creating Jupiters and Minervas.<a name="FNanchor_35_34" id="FNanchor_35_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_34" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> -However, the imagination of which Philostratus speaks here is not -something different from the Aristotelian mimesis, which, as has been -noted, was concerned not only with real things but also and chiefly -with possible things. And had not Socrates observed (in the dialogue -with the painter Parrhasius, preserved for us by Xenophon) that -painters work by collecting what they need to form their figures from -several bodies (εκ πολλων συνάγοντες τα εξ εκάστου καλλιστα)?<a name="FNanchor_36_35" id="FNanchor_36_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_35" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> And -was not the anecdote of Zeuxis, who was supposed to have taken the -best of five Crotonian maidens in order to paint his Helen, and other -anecdotes of a like sort, sufficiently widespread in antiquity? And -had not Cicero eloquently explained, some years before Philostratus, -how Phidias, when he was carving Jupiter, did not copy anything real, -but kept his looks fixed upon "<i>species pulcritudinis eximia quaedam,</i>" -which he had in his soul and which directed his art and his hand?<a name="FNanchor_37_36" id="FNanchor_37_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_36" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> -Nor can it be said that Philostratus opened<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> the way to Plotinus, -for whom the superior or intellectual imagination (νοητή), or eye of -supersensible beauty, when it is not a new designation for beautiful -imitation, is mystical intuition.</p> - -<p>The vagueness of the concept of mimesis reached its apex in those -writers who gave it as a general title to any sort of work that had -nature for its object, employing the Aristotelian phrase to affirm -that "<i>omnis ars naturae imitatio est,</i>"<a name="FNanchor_38_37" id="FNanchor_38_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_37" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> or saying, like the -painter Eupompus when he blamed his servile imitators, that "<i>natura -est imitanda, non artifex.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_39_38" id="FNanchor_39_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_38" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> And those who wished to escape this -vagueness did not know how to do so, save by conceiving the activity of -imitation as the practical producer of duplicates of natural objects, a -prejudice bora in the bosom of the pictorial and plastic arts, against -which Philostratus perhaps intended to argue, in common with the other -advocates of imagination.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Speculations on language.</i></div> - -<p>The speculations upon language had a close connexion with those upon -the nature of art begun by the sophists, for whom it became a matter -for wonder that sounds could signify colours or things inaudible; that -is to say, <i>speech</i> presented itself as a <i>problem.</i><a name="FNanchor_40_39" id="FNanchor_40_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_39" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> It was then -discussed whether language was by nature (φύσει or by convention νόμω). -By nature was sometimes understood mental necessity, and by convention -what we should call a merely natural fact, psychological mechanism or -sensationalism. In that sense of the terms, language would have been -better called φύσει than νόμω. But at other times the distinction led -to the question whether language answers to objective or logical truth -and to the real relations between things (όρθότης των ονομάτων); and -in this case, those would seem to be nearer the truth who proclaimed -it to be conventional or arbitrary in respect to logical truth: νόμω -or θέσει, and not φύσει Two different questions were consequently -being treated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> together, and both were confusedly and equivocally -discussed. They find their monument in the obscure <i>Cratylus</i> of -Plato, which seems to fluctuate between different solutions. Nor did -the later affirmation that the word is a sign (σημείον) of the thought -solve anything, for it still remained to be shown in what way the sign -was to be understood, whether φύσει or νόμω. Aristotle, who looked -upon words as imitations (μιμηματα), in the same way as poetry,<a name="FNanchor_41_40" id="FNanchor_41_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_40" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> -made an observation of first-rate importance: in addition to the -<i>enunciative</i> propositions, which express the (logically) true or -false, there are others which do not express either the (logically) -true or false, as for example the expressions of aspirations and of -desires (εύχή), which therefore belong, not to logical exposition, but -to poetical and rhetorical exposition.<a name="FNanchor_42_41" id="FNanchor_42_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_41" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> And in another place we -find him affirming in opposition to Bryson (who had said that a base -thing remained such with whatever word it were designated) that base -things can be expressed both with words that place them beneath the -eye in all their crudity, and with other words which surround them -with a veil.<a name="FNanchor_43_42" id="FNanchor_43_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_42" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> All this might have led to the separation of the -linguistic faculty from the properly logical, and to its consideration -in union with the poetical and artistic faculty; but here too the -attempt stopped half-way. The Aristotelian logic assumed a verbal and -formalistic character, which became more and more accentuated as time -went on and formed an obstacle to the distinction between the two -theoretical forms. Nevertheless, Epicurus asserted that the diversity -of names designating the same thing with various peoples was due, -not to convention and caprice, but to the fact that the impressions -produced by things were different in each one of them.<a name="FNanchor_44_43" id="FNanchor_44_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_43" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> And the -Stoics, although they connected language with thought (διάνοια) and -not with imagination, seem to have had a suspicion of the non-logical -nature of language, for they interposed between thought and sound a -<i>certain something</i> which was indicated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> in Greek by the word λεκτόν, -and by the words <i>effatum</i> or <i>dicibile</i> in Latin. But we are not sure -what they really meant, and whether that vague concept were intended -by them to distinguish the linguistic representation from the abstract -concept (which would bring them into touch with the modern view), or -the meaning of sound in general.<a name="FNanchor_45_44" id="FNanchor_45_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_44" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<p>We cannot collect any other germ of truth from the ancient writers. -A philosophical Grammar, like a philosophical Poetics, remained -unattainable in antiquity.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_128">128</a>-<a href="#Page_131">131</a>. Quotations which give only the -name of the author, or are otherwise abbreviated, refer to historical -or critical works of which the complete title is given in the -Bibliographical Appendix.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Rosmini, <i>Nuovo saggio sull' origine delle idee,</i> sections -iii. and iv., where theories of knowledge are classified.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_83">83</a>-<a href="#Page_84">84</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, x. 607.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, x. 607.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Plutarch, <i>De audiendis poetis</i>, ch. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Republic</i> x.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Frogs,</i> 1, 1055.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Plato, <i>Laws,</i> bk. ii.; Aristotle, <i>Poet.</i> ch. 14; -<i>Polit,</i> bk. viii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Strabo, <i>Geographica,</i> i. ch. 2, §§ 3-9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Texts collected in E. Müller, <i>Gesch. d. Th. d. K.</i> i. -pp. 57-85.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Plutarch, <i>De aud. poetis,</i> chs. 1-4, 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>De rerum natura,</i> i. 935-947.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Ad Pisones,</i> 333-334.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Memorab.</i> iii. ch. 8; iv. ch. 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_17" id="Footnote_18_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_17"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Hippias maior, passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_18" id="Footnote_19_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_18"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Rhet.</i> i. ch. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_19" id="Footnote_20_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_19"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Metaphys.</i> xii. ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_20" id="Footnote_21_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_20"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Poet.</i> ch. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_21" id="Footnote_22_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_21"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Diog. Lært. v. ch. i, § 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_22" id="Footnote_23_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_22"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Tuscul. quæst.</i> bk. iv. § 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_23" id="Footnote_24_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_23"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Poet.</i> ch. iv. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_24" id="Footnote_25_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_24"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>De aud. poetis</i>, ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_25" id="Footnote_26_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_25"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Enneads,</i> I. bk. vi. ch. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_26" id="Footnote_27_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_26"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Enneads, loc. cit.</i> chs. 2-9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_27" id="Footnote_28_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_27"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Enneads,</i> V. bk. viii. ch. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_28" id="Footnote_29_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_28"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Enneads, loc. cit.</i> chs. 2-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_29" id="Footnote_30_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_29"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Phædrus,</i> ch. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_30" id="Footnote_31_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_30"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Poet. ch. 4, § 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_31" id="Footnote_32_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_31"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Poet. ch. 9, §§ 1-4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_32" id="Footnote_33_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_32"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Poet. ch. 4, §§ 4-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_33" id="Footnote_34_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_33"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Poet. chs. 24-25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_34" id="Footnote_35_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_34"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Apoll. vita,</i> vi. ch. io.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_35" id="Footnote_36_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_35"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Memorab.</i> iii. ch. io.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_36" id="Footnote_37_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_36"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Orator ad Brutum,</i> ch. 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_37" id="Footnote_38_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_37"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> For example, Seneca, <i>Epist.</i> 65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_38" id="Footnote_39_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_38"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Pliny, <i>Nat. Hist.</i> xxxiv. ch. 19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_39" id="Footnote_40_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_39"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Gorgias in <i>De Xenoph., Zen. et Gorg.</i> (in Aristot., ed. -Didot), chs. 5-6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_40" id="Footnote_41_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_40"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Rhet.</i> bk. iii. ch. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_41" id="Footnote_42_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_41"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Rhet.</i> bk. iii. ch. 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_42" id="Footnote_43_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_42"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>De interp.</i> ch. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_43" id="Footnote_44_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_43"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> Diog. Lært. bk. x. § 75.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_44" id="Footnote_45_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_44"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Steinthal, <i>Gesch. d. Sprachw.,</i> 2nd ed., i. pp. 288, -293, 296-297.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIb" id="IIb">II</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Middle Ages, Mysticism, Ideas on the beautiful.</i></div> - - -<p>Almost all the developments of ancient Æsthetic were continued by -tradition or reappeared by spontaneous generation in the course of the -Middle Ages. Neo-Platonic mysticism continued, entrusted to the care -of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (<i>De cœlesti hierarchia, -De ecclesiastica hierarchia, De divinis nominibus,</i> etc.), to the -translations of these works made by John Scotus Eriugena, and to the -divulgations of the Spanish Jews (Avicebron). The Christian God took -the place of the Summum Bonum or Idea: God, wisdom, goodness, supreme -beauty, source of beautiful things in nature, which are a ladder to -the contemplation of the Creator. But these speculations continued to -recede further and further from the consideration of art, with which -Plotinus had connected them; and the empty definitions of the beautiful -by Cicero and other ancient writers were often repeated. Saint -Augustine defined beauty in general as unity (<i>omnis pulchritudinis -forma unitas est,</i>) and that of the body as <i>congruentia partium cum -quadam colons suavitate,</i> and the old distinction between something -that is beautiful in itself and relative beauty reappeared in a book -of his, which has been lost, entitled <i>De pulchro et apto;</i> the very -name shows that he reasserted the old distinction between the beautiful -in itself and the relatively beautiful, <i>quoniam apte accommodaretur -alicui.</i> Elsewhere he notes that an image is called beautiful <i>si -perfecte implei illud cujus imago est, et coaequatur ei.</i><a name="FNanchor_1_45" id="FNanchor_1_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_45" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span></p> - -<p>Thomas Aquinas varied but little from him in positing three requisites -for beauty: integrity or perfection, due proportion, and clearness; -following Aristotle, he distinguished the beautiful from the good, -defining the first as that which pleases in the mere contemplation of -it (<i>pulcrum ... id cujus ipsa apprehensio placet</i>); he referred to -the beauty that even base things possess if well imitated, and applied -the doctrine of imitation to the beauty of the Second Person of the -Trinity (<i>in quantum est imago expressa Patris</i>).<a name="FNanchor_2_46" id="FNanchor_2_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_46" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> If it were wished -to discover references to the hedonistic conception of art, it would -be possible to do this, with a little goodwill, in some of the sayings -of jongleurs and troubadours. Æsthetic rigorism, the total negation -of art for religion or for divine and human science, shows itself in -Tertullian and among certain Fathers of the Church, at the entrance to -the Middle Ages; at their conclusion, in a certain crude scholastic -spirit, for example in Cecco d' Ascoli, who proclaimed against Dante: -"I leave trifles behind me and return to the <i>true</i>; fables are always -unpleasing to me," and later, in the reactionary Savonarola. But the -narcotic theory of pedagogic or moralistic art prevailed over every -other. It had contributed to send to sleep the æsthetic doubts and -inquiries of the ancients, and was well suited to a period of relative -decadence of culture. This was all the more the case, seeing that it -accorded well with the moral and religious ideas of the Middle Ages, -and afforded a justification not only for the new art of Christian -inspiration, but also for the surviving works of classical and pagan -art.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The pedagogic theory of art in the Middle Ages.</i></div> - -<p>The allegorical interpretation was again a means of salvation for these -last. The <i>De continentia Virgiliana</i> of Fulgentius (sixth century) -is a curious monument to this fact. This work made Virgil compatible -with the Middle Ages and opened his way to that great reputation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> which -he was destined to attain, as the "gentle sage who knew all things." -Even John of Salisbury says of the Roman poet, that "<i>sub imagine -fabularum totius philosophiae exprimit veritatem.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_3_47" id="FNanchor_3_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_47" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The process of -interpretation became fixed in the doctrine of the <i>four meanings,</i> -literal, allegorical, moral and anagogic, which Dante afterwards -transferred to vernacular poetry. It would be easy to accumulate -quotations from mediæval writers, repeating in all keys the theory -that art inculcates the truths of morality and of faith and constrains -hearts to Christian piety, beginning with those well-known verses of -Theodulf: "<i>In quorum dictis</i> (that is to say, in the utterances of the -poets) <i>quamquam sint frivola multa, Plurima sub falso tegmine vera -latent,</i>" and so on, until we reach the doctrines and opinions of our -own great men, Dante and Boccaccio. For Dante, poetry "<i>nihil aliud est -quam fictio rhethorica in musicaque posita.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_4_48" id="FNanchor_4_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_48" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The poet should have -a "reasoning" in his verses "under a cloak of figure or of rhetorical -colour"; and it would be a shameful thing for him, if, "when asked, -he were not able to divest his words of such a garment, in such a way -as to show that they possessed a true meaning."<a name="FNanchor_5_49" id="FNanchor_5_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_49" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Readers sometimes -stop at the external vesture alone, and this indeed suffices for -those who, like the vulgar, do not succeed in penetrating the hidden -meaning. Poetry will say to the vulgar, which does not understand "its -argument," what a song of Dante's says at its conclusion, "At least -behold how <i>beautiful</i> I am": if you are not able to obtain instruction -from me, at least enjoy me as a pleasing thing. Many, indeed, "their -beauty more than their goodness will delight," in poems, unless they -are assisted by commentaries in the nature of the <i>Convivio,</i> "a light -which will allow every shade of meaning to reach them."<a name="FNanchor_6_50" id="FNanchor_6_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_50" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Poetry was -the "gay science," "<i>un fingimiento</i>" (as the Spanish poet the Marquis -of Santillana wrote) "<i>de cosas utiles, cubiertas ó veladas con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> muy -fermosa cobertura, compuestas, distinguidas é scandidas, por cierto -cuento, pessoé medida.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_7_51" id="FNanchor_7_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_51" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>It would not then be correct to say that the Middle Ages simply -identified art with theology and with philosophy. Indeed it sharply -distinguished the one from the other, defining art and poetry, like -Dante, with the words <i>fictio rhethorica</i>, "figure" and "rhetorical -colour," "cloak," "beauty," or like Santillana with those of -<i>fingimiento</i> or <i>fermosa cobertura.</i> This pleasing falsity was -justified from the practical point of view, very much in the same way -as sexual union and love were justified and sanctified in matrimony. -This did not exclude, indeed it implied, that the perfect state was -certainly celibacy—that is to say, pure science, free from admixture -of art.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Hints of an Æsthetic in scholastic philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>The only tendency that had no true and proper representatives was -the sound scientific tendency. The <i>Poetics</i> of Aristotle itself was -hardly known or rather it was ill-known, from the Latin translation -that a German of the name of Hermann made, not earlier than 1256, of -the paraphrase or commentary of Averroes. Perhaps the best of the -mediæval investigations into language is that supplied by Dante's <i>De -vulgari eloquentia,</i> where the word is, however, still looked upon as -a sign ("<i>rationale signum et sensuale ... natura sensuale quidem, -in quantum sonus est, rationale vero in quantum aliquid significare -videtur ad piacitum</i>").<a name="FNanchor_8_52" id="FNanchor_8_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_52" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> The study of the expressive, æsthetic, -linguistic faculty would, however, have found an appropriate occasion -and a point of departure in the secular debate between nominalism and -realism, which could not avoid touching to some extent the relations -between the word and the flesh, thought and language. Duns Scotus wrote -a treatise <i>De modis significandi seu</i> (the addition is due perhaps to -the editors) <i>grammatica speculativa</i>.<a name="FNanchor_9_53" id="FNanchor_9_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_53" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Abelard had defined sensation -as <i>confusa conceptio,</i> and <i>imaginatio</i> as a faculty that preserved<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> -sensations; the intellect renders discursive what is intuitive in the -preceding stage, and we have finally the perfection of knowledge in -the intuitive knowledge of the discursive. We find the same importance -attached to intuitive knowledge, perception, of the individual or -<i>species specialissima,</i> in Duns Scotus, together with the progressive -denominations of the different sorts of knowledge as <i>confusæ, -indistinctæ</i> and <i>distinctæ.</i> We shall see this terminology reappear, -big with consequences, at the very commencement of modern Æsthetic.<a name="FNanchor_10_54" id="FNanchor_10_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_54" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Renaissance. Philography and philosophical and empirical -inquiries concerning the beautiful.</i></div> - -<p>It may be said that the literary and artistic doctrines and opinions -of the Middle Ages have, with few exceptions, a value rather for the -history of culture than for the general history of science. The like -observation holds good of the Renaissance, for here, too, the circle of -the ideas of antiquity was not overstepped. Culture increases; original -sources are studied; the ancient writers are translated and commented -upon; many treatises are written and henceforth printed upon poetry -and the arts, grammars, rhetorics, dialogues, and dissertations upon -the beautiful: the proportions have increased, the world has become -bigger; but truly original ideas do not yet show themselves in the -domain of æsthetic science. The mystical tradition is refreshed and -strengthened by the renewed cult of Plato: Marsilio Ficino, Pico della -Mirandola, Cattani, Leon Battista Alberti, in the fifteenth century, -and Pietro Bembo, Mario Equicola, Castiglione, Nobili, Betussi, and -very many others in the following century, wrote upon the Beautiful -and upon Love. Among the most noteworthy productions of the sort, a -crossing of the mediæval and classical currents, is the book of the -<i>Dialogues of Love</i> (1535), composed in Italian by the Spanish Jew -Leo, and translated into all the cultured languages of the time.<a name="FNanchor_11_55" id="FNanchor_11_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_55" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> -The three parts into which it is divided treat of the nature and -essence, of the universality, and of the origin of love; and it is -demonstrated that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> every beautiful thing is good, but not every good -thing is beautiful; that beauty is a grace which dilates the soul and -moves it to love, and that knowledge of lesser beauties leads to that -of higher spiritual beauties. The author gave the name of "Philography" -to these and similar affirmations and effusions of which the book is -composed. Equicola's<a name="FNanchor_12_56" id="FNanchor_12_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_56" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> work is also interesting, because it contains -historical accounts of those who wrote upon the subject before he did -so himself. The same intuition was versified and sighed forth by the -Petrarchists in their sonnets and ballads, while others, rebellious and -mocking, derided it in comedies, verses in <i>terza rima</i> and parodies of -all sorts. Some mathematicians, reincarnations of Pythagoras, set to -work to determine beauty by exact relations: for instance Leonardo's -friend, Luca Paciolo, in the <i>De divina proportione</i> (1509), in which -he laid down the pretended æsthetic law of the golden section.<a name="FNanchor_13_57" id="FNanchor_13_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_57" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> And -side by side with these new Pythagoreans were those who revived the -canon of Polycletus as to the beauty of the human body, especially -of the female body, such as Firenzuola, Franco, Luigini, and Dolce. -Michæl Angelo fixed an empirical canon for painting in general, when -he stated that the means of giving movement and grace to figures<a name="FNanchor_14_58" id="FNanchor_14_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_58" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -consisted in the observance of a certain arithmetical relation. Others, -such as Fulvio Pellegrino Morato, investigated the symbolism or meaning -of colours. The Platonists generally placed beauty in the soul, the -Aristotelians rather in the physical qualities. The Averroist, Agostino -Nifo, amid much chatter and many inconclusive remarks, demonstrated -the existence of the beautiful in nature by describing the supremely -beautiful body of Joan of Aragon, Princess of Tagliacozzo, to whom the -book is dedicated.<a name="FNanchor_15_59" id="FNanchor_15_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_59" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Torquato Tasso, in the "Mintumo,"<a name="FNanchor_16_60" id="FNanchor_16_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_60" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> imitated -the uncertainties of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> the <i>Hippias</i> of Plato, not without making a free -use of the speculations of Plotinus. A chapter of the <i>Poetica</i> of -Campanella possesses greater importance, where he describes the good as -<i>signum boni</i> and the ugly as <i>signum mali,</i> understanding by good the -three prime forces of Power, Wisdom and Love. Although Campanella was -still tied to the Platonic idea of the beautiful, the conception of a -sign or symbol, here introduced by him, represents progress. By this -means he succeeded in perceiving that material things or external facts -are neither beautiful nor ugly in themselves. "Mandricard called the -wounds in the bodies of his friends the Moors beautiful, for they were -large and gave evidence of the great strength of Roland who dealt them; -Saint Augustine called the gashes and the dislocations in the body of -Saint Vincent beautiful, because they were evidence of his endurance, -but they were on the other hand ugly in so far as they were signs of -the cruelty of the tyrant Dacianus and of his executioners. It is -beautiful to die fighting, said Virgil, for it is the sign of a strong -soul. The pet dog of his mistress will seem beautiful to the lover, and -doctors call even urine and fæces beautiful, when they indicate health. -Everything is both beautiful and ugly" (<i>quapropter nihil est quod non -sit pulcrum simul et turpe</i>).<a name="FNanchor_17_61" id="FNanchor_17_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_61" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> In such observations as these we have -not a mere state of mystical exaltation, but to some extent a movement -in the direction of analysis.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The pedagogic theory of art and the Poetics of Aristotle.</i></div> - -<p>Nothing better serves to demonstrate that the Renaissance did not pass -beyond the confines of ancient æsthetic thought than the fact that -notwithstanding the renewed acquaintance with the thought of Aristotle, -the pedagogic theory of art not only persisted and triumphed, but was -transplanted bodily into the text of Aristotle, where its interpreters -read it with a certainty that we have to make efforts to achieve. -Certainly, a Robortelli (1548) or a Castelvetro (1570) stopped short -at the simple, purely hedonistic solution, giving simple pleasure as -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> end of art: poetry, says Castelvetro, "was discovered solely -for the purpose of delighting and of recreating ... the souls of the -rude multitude and of the common people."<a name="FNanchor_18_62" id="FNanchor_18_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_62" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> And here and there -some were able to free themselves from both the pleasure theory and -that of the didactic end; but the majority, such as Segni, Maggi, -Vettori,<a name="FNanchor_19_63" id="FNanchor_19_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_63" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> were for the <i>docere delectando.</i> Scaliger (1561) declared -that mimesis or imitation was "<i>finis medius ad illum ultimum qui est -docendi cum delectatione,</i>" and believing himself to be altogether in -agreement with Aristotle as to this, he continued, "<i>docet affectus -poeta per actiones, ut bonos amplectamur atque imitemur ad agendum, -malos aspernemur ad abstinendum.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_20_64" id="FNanchor_20_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_64" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Piccolomini (1575) observed -that "It must not be thought that so many excellent poets and artists, -ancient and modern, would have devoted such care and diligence to this -most noble study, had they not known and believed that in so doing -they were aiding human life," and if "they had not thought that we -were to be instructed, directed, and well established by it."<a name="FNanchor_21_65" id="FNanchor_21_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_65" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The -"truth preserved in soft verses, which attracts and persuades the most -reluctant" (Tasso),<a name="FNanchor_22_66" id="FNanchor_22_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_66" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> with the comparison from Lucretius attached, -is the conception that even Campanella repeats. Poetry is for him -"<i>Rhetorica quaedam figurata, quasi magica, quae exempla ministrat ad -suadendum bonum et dissuadendum malum delectabiliter iis qui simplici -verum et bonum audire nolunt, aut non possunt aut nesciunt.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_23_67" id="FNanchor_23_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_67" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Thus -returned the comparison of poetry with oratory; according to Segni -they only differ because the first occupies a more lofty situation: -"for since imitation representing itself in act by means of poetry, in -mighty, chosen words,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> in metaphors, images, and indeed the whole of -figured speech, which is to be found more in poetry than in the art -of oratory, the metrical qualities that are also required in verse, -the subjects of which it treats, which have something of the great and -delightful, make it appear most beautiful and worthy of being held all -the greater marvel."<a name="FNanchor_24_68" id="FNanchor_24_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_68" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> "Three most noble arts" (wrote Tassoni in -1620, and he repeated common opinion), "History, Poetics, and Oratory, -come under the heading of Politics and depend upon it; the first of -these has reference to the instruction of princes and gentlemen, the -second of the people, the third of those who give counsel in public -trials or defend private ones that come up for judgment."<a name="FNanchor_25_69" id="FNanchor_25_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_69" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<p>According to these views, the tragical catharsis was regarded as -designed in general to demonstrate the instability of fortune, or to -terrify by example, or to proclaim the triumph of justice, or to render -the spectators insensible to the strokes of fortune, owing to their -familiarity with suffering. The pedagogic theory, thus renewed and -sustained by the authority of the ancients, was popularized in France, -Spain, England and Germany, together with all the Italian poetic -doctrines of the Renaissance. The French writers of the period of Louis -XIV. are altogether penetrated with it. "<i>Cette science agréable qui -mêle la gravité des préceptes avec la douceur du langage</i>," is what La -Ménardière calls poetry (1640), in the same way as Le Bossu (1675), for -whom "<i>le premier but du poète est d'instruire</i>,"<a name="FNanchor_26_70" id="FNanchor_26_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_70" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> as Homer taught, -when he wrote two interesting didactic manuals relating to military and -political events: the <i>Iliad</i> and the <i>Odyssey.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The "Poetics of the Renaissance."</i></div> - -<p>This pedagogic theory has therefore been reasonably described by all -the modern critics in concert, as if by antonomasia, as the <i>Poetics -of the Renaissance.</i> It must, however, always be understood that it -did not appear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> for the first time in the fifteenth or sixteenth -century, but that it was prevalent and generally accepted at that -time. It may even be remarked, as has already been acutely done,<a name="FNanchor_27_71" id="FNanchor_27_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_71" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> -that the Renaissance naturally did not distinguish the didactic kind -of poetry from the other kinds, since for it every kind of poetry was -didactic. But the Renaissance was not a real Renaissance, save when -and where it continued the interrupted spiritual work of antiquity, -and in this sense it would perhaps be more just to describe as its -Poetics, or rather, as the important element in its Poetics, not the -repetition of the pedagogic theory of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, -but the resumption, which also took place, of the discussions upon -the possible, the probable (<i>verisimile</i>, εικός) of Aristotle, on the -reasons of Plato's condemnation and on the procedure of the artist who -creates by imagining.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Dispute concerning the universal and the probable in art.</i></div> - -<p>It is in such discussions that is to be found the true contribution of -that epoch, not to learning, but to the formation of the science of -Æsthetic. The ground was prepared and enriched through the work of the -interpreters and commentators of Aristotle and of the new writers on -Poetics, especially the Italians, and it was also enriched with some -seed that was destined to sprout and to become a vigorous plant in -the future. The study of Plato also contributed not a little to call -attention to the function of the idea, or of the universal, in poetry. -What meaning was to be attached to the statement that poetry should aim -at the universal and history at the particular? What was the meaning of -the proposition that poetry should proceed according to <i>probability</i>? -What could that <i>certain idea</i> consist of, which Raphæl said that he -followed in his painting?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fracastoro.</i></div> - -<p>Girolamo Fracastoro was among the first to ask himself this question -seriously, in the dialogue <i>Naugerius, sive De poetica</i> (1555). He -disdainfully rejected the thesis that the end of poetry is pleasure: -far be from us,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> he exclaimed, so bad an opinion of the poets, who the -ancients said were the inventors of all the good arts. Nor did the -end of instruction seem to him to be acceptable, which is the task, -not of poetry, but of other faculties, such as geography, history, -agronomy, philosophy. The poet's task is to represent or to imitate, -and he differs from the historian, not in the matter, but in the manner -of representation. The others imitate the particular, the poet the -universal: the others are like the painters of portraits, the poet -produces things as he contemplates the universal and most beautiful -idea of them: the others say only what they need to say for their -purposes, the poet that he may say everything beautifully and fully.</p> - -<p>But the beauty of a poem must always be understood as relative to -the class of subject of which it treats; it is the most beautiful -in this class, not the supremely beautiful: one must be careful to -guard against the equivocal or double meaning of this word "beauty" -(<i>æquivocatio illius verbi</i>). A poet never utters what is false or -expresses what does not exist, for his words inevitably harmonize in -appearance or signification either with the opinions of men or with the -universal. Nor can we accept the Platonic axiom that the poet has no -knowledge of the things of which he treats; he does know them, but in -his own poet's manner.<a name="FNanchor_28_72" id="FNanchor_28_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_72" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>L. Castelvetro.</i></div> - -<p>While Fracastoro strives to elaborate the important passage in -Aristotle touching the universal of poetry, and though somewhat -vague in his treatment, keeps fairly close to the mark; Castelvetro, -on the contrary, judges the Aristotelian fragment with the freedom -and superior knowledge of the true critic. He recognizes that the -<i>Poetics</i> is merely a notebook recording certain principles and -methods of compiling the art, not the art fully compiled. He remarks, -moreover, not without logical acumen, that Aristotle having adopted -the criterion of probability or of that "which presents an appearance -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> historic truth," should have applied his theory in the first -case to history, not to poetry; for history being a "narrative -according to truth of memorable human actions," and poetry a narrative -according to probability of events which might possibly occur, the -second cannot receive "all its radiance" from the first. Nor does it -escape him that Aristotle describes two different things by the one -word "imitation": (<i>a</i>) "following the example of another," which is -"acting in exactly the same way as another without knowing the reason -of such action": and (<i>b</i>) the imitation "demanded by poetry," which -"does things in a manner totally different from that in which they -have been done hitherto and proposes a new example for imitation." -Nevertheless Castelvetro cannot extricate himself from the confusion -between the imaginary and the historical; for he himself says "the -realm of the former is generally that of certainty," but "the field -of certainty is often crossed with bars of uncertainty just as the -field of uncertainty is often crossed with bars of certainty." Also -what can be said of this curious interpretation of the Aristotelian -theory of pleasure experienced in the imitation of ugly models, that -such pleasure is based on the fact that since an imitation is always -imperfect, it is incapable of exciting the disgust and fear which would -arise from the contemplation of real ugliness? And what of his remark -that the characteristics of painting and poetry are so diverse as to -be in opposition one to the other; imitation of objects giving rise -to great pleasure in the former art and as great displeasure in the -latter? And so on in numberless cases of bold but scarcely felicitous -subtleties.<a name="FNanchor_29_73" id="FNanchor_29_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_73" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Piccolomini and Pinciano.</i></div> - -<p>In opposition to Robortelli, who asserted the identity of the probable -and the false, Piccolomini held that the probable (<i>verisimile</i>) is -inherently neither false nor true, only by accident becoming one or -other.<a name="FNanchor_30_74" id="FNanchor_30_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_74" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> Of the same mind is the Spaniard Alfonso Lopez Pinciano -(1596), who says the scope of poetry "<i>no es la mentira, que seria<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> -coincider con la sophística, ni la historia que seria tomar la materia -al histórico; y no siendo historia porque toca fabúlas ni mentira -porque toca historia, tiene por objeto el verisimil, que todo lo -abraza. De aqui resulta que es un arte superior á la metaphysica, -porqué comprende mucho mas, y se extiende a lo que es y á lo que no -es.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_31_75" id="FNanchor_31_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_75" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> What may lie behind this notion of probability is still -indefinite and impenetrable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fr. Patrizzi</i> (<i>Patricius</i>).</div> - -<p>Moved by a wish to place poetry on a foundation other than the -probable, Francesco Patrizzi, the anti-Aristotelian, composed his -<i>Poetica</i> between 1555 and 1586 in refutation of all Aristotle's main -doctrines. Patrizzi notes that the word "imitation" is given many -meanings by the Greek philosopher, who uses it now to denote a single -word, now to describe a tragedy; at times it stands for a figure of -speech, at others for a fiction: whence he draws the logical conclusion -(from which, however, he shrinks alarmed) "that all philosophic and -other kinds of writing and speaking are poetry, since they are made -of words which themselves are imitations." He observes further that, -according to Aristotle, it is impossible to distinguish between poetry -and history (since both are imitations), or to prove that verse is not -essential to poetry, or that history, science and art are unsuitable -material for it; since Aristotle in several passages says that poetry -may comprise "fable, actual occurrences, belief of others, duty, -the best, necessity, the possible, the probable, the credible, the -incredible, the suitable" as well as "all things worldly." After these -objections, some sound, others sophistical, Patrizzi comes to the -conclusion that "there is no truth in the dogma that poetry is wholly -imitation; and even if it be imitation at all, it belongs not to poets -alone, nor is it mere imitation of any kind, but something else not -mentioned by Aristotle nor pointed out by any one else, nor yet borne -into the mind of man. The discovery may possibly be made in course of -time, or some one may hit upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> truth and bring it to light"; but -up to the present "such discovery has not been made."<a name="FNanchor_32_76" id="FNanchor_32_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_76" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> - -<p>Yet these confessions of ignorance, these endeavours, though vain, to -escape from the Aristotelian circle of ideas, and the great literary -controversies of the sixteenth century concerning the concept of poetic -truth and the probable had their use in that they stimulated interest -by directing attention to a mystery still unsolved. Thought had once -more begun to move upon the æsthetic problem, and this time it was not -destined to be broken off or to lose itself.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_45" id="Footnote_1_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_45"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Confess,</i> iv. x. ch. 13; <i>De Trinitate,</i> vi. ch. 10; -<i>Epist.</i> 3, 18; <i>De civitate Dei,</i> xxii. ch. 19 (in <i>Opera,</i> ed. dei -Maurini, Paris, 1679-1690, vols. i. ii. vii. viii.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_46" id="Footnote_2_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_46"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Summa theol.</i> I. 1. xxxix. 8; I. 11. xxvii. I (ed. Migne, -i. cols. 794-795; ii. col. 219).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_47" id="Footnote_3_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_47"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Comparetti, <i>Virg. nel medio evo,</i> vol. i. <i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_48" id="Footnote_4_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_48"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>De vulg. eloq.</i> (ed. Rajna), bk. ii. ch. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_49" id="Footnote_5_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_49"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Vita nuova,</i> ch. 25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_50" id="Footnote_6_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_50"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Convivio,</i> i. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_51" id="Footnote_7_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_51"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Prohemio al Condestable de Portugal,</i> 1445-1449 (in -<i>Obras,</i> ed. Amador de los Rios, 1852), § 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_52" id="Footnote_8_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_52"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>De vulg. eloq.</i> bk. i. ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_53" id="Footnote_9_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_53"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Lately reprinted under the editorship of padre M. -Fernandez Garcia, Ad claras Aquas (Quarracchi), 1902.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_54" id="Footnote_10_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_54"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Windelband, <i>Gesch. d. Phil.</i> ii. pp. 251-270; De Wulf, -<i>Philos, médiév.,</i> Louvain, 1900, pp. 317-320.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_55" id="Footnote_11_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_55"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Dialogi di amore, composti per Leone, medico ...,</i> Rome, -1535.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_56" id="Footnote_12_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_56"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Libro di natura e d' amore,</i> Venice, 1525 (Ven. 1563).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_57" id="Footnote_13_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_57"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>De divina proportione,</i> Venice, 1509.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_58" id="Footnote_14_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_58"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> G. P. Lomazzo, <i>Trattato dell' arte della pittura, -scultura ed architettura,</i> Milan, 1585, i. I, pp. 22-23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_59" id="Footnote_15_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_59"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Aug. Niphi, <i>De pulcro el amore,</i> Rome, 1529.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_60" id="Footnote_16_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_60"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Il Minturno o vero de la belleza</i> (in <i>Dialoghi,</i> ed. -Guasti, vol. iii.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_61" id="Footnote_17_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_61"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Ration. philos.</i> part iv.; <i>Poeticor.</i> (Paris, 1638), -art. vii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_62" id="Footnote_18_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_62"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Fr. Robortelli, <i>In librum Arts, de arte poet, -explicationes,</i> Florence, 1548; Lud. Castelvetro, <i>Poetica d' -Aristotele vulgarizzata ed esposta,</i> 1570 (Basle, 1576), part i. -particella iv. pp. 29-30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_63" id="Footnote_19_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_63"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Bern. Segni, <i>Rettor. e poet. trad.</i> Florence, 1549; -Vinc. Madii, <i>In Arist.... explanationes,</i> 1550; Petri Victorii, -<i>Commentarii,</i> etc., Florence, 1560.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_64" id="Footnote_20_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_64"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Poetica,</i> 1561 (ed. 3, 1586), i. I; vii. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_65" id="Footnote_21_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_65"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Annotationi net libro della Poetica,</i> Venice, 1575, -preface.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_66" id="Footnote_22_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_66"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Gerus. lib.</i> i. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_67" id="Footnote_23_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_67"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Poetic,</i> ch. I, art. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_68" id="Footnote_24_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_68"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Poetica trad</i>. preface.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_69" id="Footnote_25_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_69"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Pensieri diversi</i>, bk. x. ch. 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_70" id="Footnote_26_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_70"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> La Ménardière, <i>Poétique</i>, Paris, 1640; Le Bossu, <i>Traité -du poème épique</i>, Paris, 1675.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_71" id="Footnote_27_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_71"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Borinski, <i>Poet. d. Renaiss.</i> p. 26.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_72" id="Footnote_28_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_72"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Hyeron. Frascatorii <i>Opera,</i> Venetian edition, Giunti, -1574, pp. 112-120.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_73" id="Footnote_29_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_73"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Poet., ed. cit.</i> i. 1; ii. 1; iii. 7; v. I (pp. 64, 66, -71-72, 208, 580).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_74" id="Footnote_30_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_74"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Annotationi,</i> preface.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_75" id="Footnote_31_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_75"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Philosophia antiqua poetica,</i> Madrid, 1596 (reprinted -Valladolid 1894).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_76" id="Footnote_32_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_76"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Francesco Patrici, <i>Della poetica, la Deca disputata,</i> -"in which by history, by reason, by authority of the greatest worthies -of antiquity, is shown the falsity of the most received opinions -concerning Poetry down to our own day." Ferrara, 1586.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIIb" id="IIIb">III</a></h4> - - -<h4>FERMENTS OF THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>New words and new observations in the seventeenth century</i></div> - -<p>Interest in æsthetic investigation increased rapidly in the early years -of the following century, owing either to the popularity acquired by -certain new words or to the novel meanings given to words already -familiar, which emphasized new aspects of artistic production and -criticism, complicating the problem and rendering it thereby more -puzzling and attractive. For example: wit, taste, imagination or fancy, -feeling, and several others, which must be examined rather closely.</p> - -<p>Wit (<i>ingegno</i>) differed somewhat from intellect. Free use of the word -arose, if we mistake not, from its convenience in Rhetoric as conceived -by antiquity; that is to say, a suave and facile mode of knowledge, as -opposed to the severity of Dialectic; an "Antistrophe to Dialectic," -which substituted for reasons of actual fact those of probability or -fancy; enthymemes for syllogisms, examples for inductions; so much -so that Zeno the Stoic figured Dialectic with her fist clenched and -Rhetoric with her hand open. The empty style of the decadent Italian -authors in the seventeenth century found its complete justification -in this theory of rhetoric; their prose and verse, Marinesque and -Achillinesque, professed to exhibit not the true but the striking, -subtly conceited, curious or nice. The word wit, <i>ingegno,</i> was now -repeated much more frequently than in the preceding century; wit -was hailed as presiding genius of Rhetoric; its "vivacities" were -lauded to the skies; "<i>belli ingegni</i>"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> was a phrase seized upon by -the French, who rendered it as "<i>esprit</i>" or "<i>beaux esprits</i>."<a name="FNanchor_1_77" id="FNanchor_1_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_77" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -One of the most noteworthy commentators on these matters (although -opposed to the literary excesses of the times), Matteo Pellegrini -of Bologna (1650), defines wit as "that part of the soul which in -a certain way practises, aims, and seeks to find and create the -beautiful and the efficacious";<a name="FNanchor_2_78" id="FNanchor_2_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_78" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> he considers the work of "wit" to -be the "conceits" and "subtleties" noted by him in a previous pamphlet -(1639).<a name="FNanchor_3_79" id="FNanchor_3_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_79" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Emmanuele Tesauro also descants at considerable length -in his <i>Cannochiale Aristotelico</i> (1654) upon wit and subtleties, -not alone "verbal" and "lapidary" conceits, but also "symbolic" and -"figurative" (statues, stories, devices, satires, hieroglyphs, mosaics, -emblems, insignia, sceptres), and even "animated agents" (pantomimes, -play-scenes, masques and dances): all things which may be grouped under -"polite quibbling" or rhetoric as distinct from "dialectic."</p> - -<p>Amongst such treatises, product of their age, one written by the -Spaniard Baltasar Gracian (1642) became celebrated throughout -Europe.<a name="FNanchor_4_80" id="FNanchor_4_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_80" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Wit became in his hands the strictly inventive or artistic -faculty, "genius"; <i>génie,</i> "genius" were now used as synonyms of -wit, <i>ingegno</i> and <i>esprit.</i> In the following century Mario Pagano<a name="FNanchor_5_81" id="FNanchor_5_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_81" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -wrote: "Wit may be taken as equivalent to the <i>génie</i> of the French, a -word now commonly used in Italy." To return to the seventeenth century, -Bouhours, a Jesuit writer of dialogues on the <i>Manière de bien penser -dans les ouvrages d'esprit</i> (1687), says that "'heart' and 'wit' are -greatly in fashion just now, nothing else is spoken of in polite -conversation, and all discourse is at last brought round to <i>l'esprit -et le cœur.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_6_82" id="FNanchor_6_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_82" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Taste.</i></div> - -<p>The word <i>taste</i> or <i>good taste</i> was equally widespread and -fashionable, signifying the faculty of judgement brought to bear -on the beautiful, distinct to some extent from intellectual power, -and sometimes divided into active and passive, so that it was usual -to speak of one kind of taste as "productive" or "fertile" (thus -coinciding with "wit"), and of another as "sterile."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Various meanings of the word taste.</i></div> - -<p>From the rough notes which we possess as to the history of the concept -of taste, several meanings of the word, not all of equal importance -as indications of the development of ideas, detach themselves in a -somewhat confused manner. "Taste," meaning "pleasure" or "delight," was -an old-established word in Italy and Spain, as is shown in such phrases -as "to have a taste for, to be to one's taste"; when Lope di Vega -and other Spaniards speak continually of the drama of their country -as seeking to please the popular taste ("<i>deleita el gusto</i>"; "<i>para -darle gusto</i>") they mean only the "pleasure" of the populace. In Italy -there was a very ancient use of the word in the metaphorical sense -of "judgement," either literary, scientific, or artistic; numberless -examples of this use occur in writers of the sixteenth century -(Ariosto, Varchi, Michæl Angelo, Tasso). To take but one of these: the -lines in <i>Orlando Furioso</i> where it is said of the Emperor Augustus, -"<i>L' aver avuto in poesia buon gusto La proscrizione iniqua gli -perdona,</i>" "For having had good taste in poetry he shall be forgiven -his iniquitous proscriptions"; or the remark of Ludovico Dolce that' -some person "had such exquisite taste, he sang no verses save those of -Catullus and Calvus."<a name="FNanchor_7_83" id="FNanchor_7_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_83" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> The word "taste," in the sense of a special -faculty or attitude of mind, appears to have been used for the first -time in Spain in the middle of the seventeenth century by Gracian,<a name="FNanchor_8_84" id="FNanchor_8_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_84" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -the moralist and political writer already quoted. It is evidently to -him that the Italian author Trevisano alludes in a preface to a book by -Muratori (1708) when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> he speaks of "Spaniards, above all others cunning -in metaphor," who express themselves in "that eloquent and laconic -phrase, good taste"; touching further on taste and genius he quotes, -"that ingenious Spaniard," Gracian,<a name="FNanchor_9_85" id="FNanchor_9_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_85" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> who gave the word the sense of -"practical wit," enabling one to perceive the "true signification" of -things; his "man of good taste" becomes in our language "a man of tact" -in the affairs of life.<a name="FNanchor_10_86" id="FNanchor_10_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_86" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>The transference of the word to the domain of æsthetic seems to have -taken place in France during the last quarter of the century. "<i>Il y -a dans l'art un point de perfection, comme de bonté ou de maturité -dans la nature: celui qui le sent et qui l'aime a le goût parfait; -celui qui ne le sent pas, et qui aime au deçà ou au delà, a le goût -défectueux. Il y a donc un bon et un mauvais goût, et l'on dispute des -goûts avec fondement,</i>" writes La Bruyère<a name="FNanchor_11_87" id="FNanchor_11_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_87" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> (1688). As attributes -or variants of taste it was usual to mention <i>delicacy</i> and <i>variety</i> -or <i>variability.</i> Bearing its fresh critical—literary content, -but not freed from the encumbrance of its earlier practical and -moral significance, the word spread from France into other European -countries. Thomasius introduced it into Germany in 1687;<a name="FNanchor_12_88" id="FNanchor_12_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_88" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> and in -England it becomes "good taste." In Italy it appears as early as 1696 -as title of a large book written by Camillo Ettori, the Jesuit, <i>Il -buon gusto ne' componimenti rettorici</i>.<a name="FNanchor_13_89" id="FNanchor_13_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_89" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The preface notes: "The -expression 'good taste,' proper to those who rightly distinguish good -from bad flavour in foods, is now in general use and claimed by every -one as a title in connexion with literature and the humanities"; it -reappears in 1708 at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> the beginning of Muratori's<a name="FNanchor_14_90" id="FNanchor_14_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_90" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> book already -quoted: Trevisano treats of it philosophically: Salvini discusses it -in his note upon the <i>Perfetta Poesia</i> of Muratori above mentioned, -where the subject of good taste occupies several pages,<a name="FNanchor_15_91" id="FNanchor_15_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_91" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> and finally -it gives its name to the Academy of Good Taste founded at Palermo in -1718.<a name="FNanchor_16_92" id="FNanchor_16_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_92" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Scholars of the day who took up the discussion of the theme, -recollecting some passages scattered throughout the ancient classics, -placed the new concept in relation with the "<i>tacitus quidam sensus -sine ulla ratione et arte</i>" of Cicero; and with the "<i>indicium</i>" which -"<i>nec magis arte traditur quam gustus aut odor</i>" of Quintilian.<a name="FNanchor_17_93" id="FNanchor_17_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_93" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> -More particularly Montfaucon de Villars (1671)<a name="FNanchor_18_94" id="FNanchor_18_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_94" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> wrote a book on -"Delicacy"; Ettori strove to find some definition more satisfactory -than those current at the time (<i>e.g.</i> "it is the finest invention -of wit, the flower of wit and extract of beauty's self," and similar -conceits);<a name="FNanchor_19_95" id="FNanchor_19_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_95" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Orsi made it the subject of his <i>Considerazioni</i> written -in reply to Bouhours' book.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fancy or Imagination.</i></div> - -<p>In Italy in the seventeenth century we find imagination or fancy -placed on a pinnacle. What do you mean by talking of probability -and historical truth (asks Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino in 1644), of -false or true in connexion with poetry; which deals not with fiction, -fact or historical probability but with primary apprehensions which -assert neither truth nor falsehood? Following this line of argument, -imagination takes the place of that probable, neither true nor false, -advocated by some commentators of Aristotle; a theory strongly -criticized by Pallavicino, here agreeing with Piccolomini, whom however -he does not name, and in opposition to Castelvetro whom he explicitly -mentions. He who goes to the play (continues Pallavicino) knows quite -well<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> that the scenes acted on the stage are not real; although he has -no belief in them yet they please him greatly. For "if poetry desired -to be mistaken for truth, the end she had in view would be a he, by -the laws of nature and of God doomed inevitably to perish: for a lie -is nothing but an untruth uttered in the hope that it may be mistaken -for truth. How then should an art so tainted be allowed to flourish in -the best-regulated republics? How should it be commended and used by -the very writers of Holy Scripture?" <i>Ut pictura poësis</i>: poetry is -like painting, which is a "diligent imitation" aiming at a close copy -of the features, colours, acts, nay, even the hidden motives, of the -objects it represents: and it "does not pretend that fiction is truth." -The sole aim of poetic tales is "to adorn our understanding with -imagery, that is to say, with sumptuous, novel, marvellous and splendid -appearances. And this is known to diffuse so useful an influence on -mankind that humanity insists on rewarding poets with praise more -glorious than is bestowed on any other men; their books are protected -from the ravages of time with greater solicitude than is shown to -scientific treatises or productions of any other art; in the end the -names of poets are crowned with adoring veneration. See how the world -thirsts for beautiful first apprehensions, although these are neither -laden with science nor are they vehicles of truth."<a name="FNanchor_20_96" id="FNanchor_20_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_96" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>Sixty years later these ideas, although expressed by a Cardinal, seemed -all too daring to Muratori, who could not bring himself to allow poets -so much latitude, or to enfranchize them from their obligations to the -probable. Nevertheless Muratori allows a large space to imagination, -"an inferior apprehensive faculty" which, without caring whether -things be false or true, confines itself to apprehending them, and -"represents" the truth merely, leaving the task of "cognition" to the -"superior apprehensive faculty" or intellect.<a name="FNanchor_21_97" id="FNanchor_21_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_97" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> Even the stony heart<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> -of Gravina yields to the charm of imagination: he admits it occupies -a considerable place in the realm of poetry and suffers his own arid -prose to describe it as "a sorceress, but beneficent," "a delirium -which cures madness."<a name="FNanchor_22_98" id="FNanchor_22_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_98" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<p>Earlier than either of these, Ettori commended it to the good -rhetorician, "who in order that he may awaken images" must "familiarize -himself with whatever is subject to bodily feeling" and "encounter -the genius of imagination, which is a sensuous faculty," to these -ends using "species rather than genera (since the latter, being more -universal than the former, are less sensible), individuals rather than -species, effects than causes, the number of the greater rather than the -number of the less."<a name="FNanchor_23_99" id="FNanchor_23_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_99" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> - -<p>As far back as 1578 the Spaniard Huarte had maintained that eloquence -is the product of imagination rather than of intellect or reason.<a name="FNanchor_24_100" id="FNanchor_24_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_100" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> -In England Bacon (1605) ascribed science to intellect, history to -memory and poetry to imagination or fancy:<a name="FNanchor_25_101" id="FNanchor_25_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_101" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Hobbes inquired into -the procedure of poetry:<a name="FNanchor_26_102" id="FNanchor_26_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_102" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Addison (1712) devoted several numbers -of his <i>Spectator</i> to analysis of the "pleasures of imagination."<a name="FNanchor_27_103" id="FNanchor_27_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_103" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> -Somewhat later, the importance of imagination was felt in Germany, -where it found advocates in Bodmer, Breitinger and other writers of the -Swiss school, who owed much to the influence of the Italians (Muratori, -Gravina, Calepio) and the English: acting in their turn as teachers of -Klopstock and the new German critical school.<a name="FNanchor_28_104" id="FNanchor_28_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_104" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Feeling.</i></div> - -<p>It was at this same period that opposition became clearly marked -between those accustomed "<i>à juger par le sentiment</i>" and those used -to "<i>raisonner par principes</i>."[29]<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> The Frenchman, Du Bos, author of -<i>Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture</i> (1719), upholds the -theory of feeling; according to him art is simply a self-abandonment -"<i>aux impressions que les objets étrangers font sur nous,</i>" setting -aside all reflective labour. He laughs at those philosophers who -deny the force of imagination, and Malebranche's eloquent discourse -founded on this denial draws from Du Bos the remark, "<i>c'est à notre -imagination qu'il parle contre l'abus de l'imagination.</i>" He refuses -to see any intellectual nucleus in the productions of the arts, saying -that art consists not in instruction but in style: nor is he too -respectful towards the probable: he says he finds himself unable to -set limits between it and the marvellous, and leaves to "born poets" -the task of thus miraculously uniting opposites. For Du Bos there is -no criterion of art save feeling, which he calls a "<i>sixième sens,</i>" -against which dispute is vain since in such matters popular opinion -invariably wins the day over the dogmatic pronouncements of artists -and men of letters: all the ingenious conceits of the greatest -metaphysicians, though unimpeachable in themselves, will not in the -slightest degree diminish the lustre of poetry or despoil it of one -single attraction. Attempts to discredit Ariosto and Tasso in the eyes -of Italians were as vain as those made against the <i>Cid</i> in France. -Other people's arguments can never persuade us of the contrary of -what we feel.<a name="FNanchor_29_105" id="FNanchor_29_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_105" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> These notions were adopted by many French writers: -for example Cartaut de la Villate[30] observes, "<i>Le grand talent -d'un écrivain qui veut plaire, est de tourner ses réflexions en -sentiments</i>;" and Trublet, "<i>C'est un principe sûr, que la poésie doit -être une expression de sentiment.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_30_106" id="FNanchor_30_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_106" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> Nor were the English slow in -emphasizing the concept of "emotion" in their theories of literature.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Tendency to unite these terms.</i></div> - -<p>In the writings of this period <i>imagination</i> was often identified with -<i>wit, wit</i> with <i>taste, taste</i> with <i>feeling,</i> and <i>feeling</i> with -first apprehensions or <i>imagination</i>;<a name="FNanchor_31_107" id="FNanchor_31_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_107" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> we have already noted that -taste is sometimes critical and sometimes productive: this fusion, -identification and subordination of terms apparently distinct shows how -they gravitate round one single concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Difficulties and contradictions in their definition.</i></div> - -<p>A German critic, one of the very few who have sought to penetrate -the darkness surrounding the origins of modern Æsthetic, considers -the concept of taste (which we owe, he thinks, to Gracian) "the -most important æsthetic doctrine which remained for modern times to -discover."<a name="FNanchor_32_108" id="FNanchor_32_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_108" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> But without going so far as to say that taste is the -chief doctrine of the science, and the foundation of all the rest, -instead of only a particular doctrine, and without recapitulating what -we have already said of Gracian's relation to the theory of taste, -it is well to repeat that taste, wit, imagination, feeling, and so -on, instead of new concepts scientifically grasped, were simply new -words corresponding to vague impressions: at most they were problems, -not concepts: apprehensions of ground still to be conquered, not yet -annexed and brought into subjection. It must not be forgotten that the -very men who made use of these terms could scarcely grope after the -ideas they suggested without falling back into the old traditions, the -only ones on which they had an intellectual grasp. To them the new -words were shades, not bodies: when they tried to embrace them their -arms returned empty to their own breasts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Wit and intellect.</i></div> - -<p>Certainly wit differs to a certain extent from intellect. Yet -Pellegrini and Tesauro, with other writers of treatises, never fail to -point out that intellectual truth lies at the root of wit. Trevisano -defines it as "an internal virtue of the soul which invents methods -for expressing and executing its own concepts: it is recognizable now -in the arrangement of things we invent, now in the clear expression -of them: sometimes in cunning reconciliations of matters seemingly -opposed, sometimes in tracing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> analogies but faintly discernible." To -sum up, one must not "allow the actions of wit to go unaccompanied -by those of intellect," or even by those of practical morality.<a name="FNanchor_33_109" id="FNanchor_33_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_109" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> -More ingenuously Muratori says, "Wit is that virtue and active force -with which the intellect is able to assemble, unite and discover the -similarities, relations and reasons of things."<a name="FNanchor_34_110" id="FNanchor_34_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_110" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> In this manner wit, -after having been distinguished from intellect, eventually becomes a -part or a manifestation of it. By a somewhat different path the same -conclusion is reached by Alexander Pope when he counsels that wit be -reined in like a mettlesome horse, and observes:</p> - -<p> -For wit and judgement often are at strife,<br /> -Though meant each other's aid like man and wife.<a name="FNanchor_35_111" id="FNanchor_35_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_111" class="fnanchor">[35]</a><br /> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Taste and intellectual judgement.</i></div> - -<p>Similar vicissitudes befell the word "taste," outcome of a metaphor -(as was noted by Kant) whose effect was to stand in opposition -to intellectualistic principles, as if to say that the judgement -governing the choice of food destined solely for the delectation -of the palate is of the same nature as that which decides opinions -in matters of art.<a name="FNanchor_36_112" id="FNanchor_36_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_112" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Nevertheless, the very definition of this -anti-intellectualistic concept contained a reference to intellect and -reason; the implicit comparison with the palate was ultimately taken -as signifying an anticipation of reflexion: as Voltaire wrote in the -following century: "<i>De même que la sensation du palais anticipe -la réflexion.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_37_113" id="FNanchor_37_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_113" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> Intellect and reason glimmer through all the -definitions of taste belonging to this period. Mme. Dacier wrote in -1684, "<i>Une harmonie, un accord de l'esprit et de la raison.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_38_114" id="FNanchor_38_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_114" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> -"<i>Une raison éclairée qui, d'intelligence avec le cœur, fait -toujours un juste choix parmi des choses opposées ou semblables,</i>" -wrote the author of <i>Entretiens galants.</i><a name="FNanchor_39_115" id="FNanchor_39_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_115" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> According to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> another -writer quoted by Bonhours, "taste" is "a natural feeling implanted in -the soul, independent of any science that can possibly be acquired"; it -is practically "an instinct of right reason."<a name="FNanchor_40_116" id="FNanchor_40_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_116" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> The same Bouhours, -whilst deprecating this interpretation of one metaphor by another, -says, "Taste is more nearly allied to judgement than wit."<a name="FNanchor_41_117" id="FNanchor_41_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_117" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> The -Italian Ettori thinks that it may generally be described as "judgement -regulated by art,"<a name="FNanchor_42_118" id="FNanchor_42_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_118" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> and Baruffaldi (1710) identifies it with -"discernment" reduced from theory to practice.<a name="FNanchor_43_119" id="FNanchor_43_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_119" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> De Crousaz (1715) -observes: "<i>Le bon goût nous fait d'abord estimer par sentiment ce que -la raison aurait approuvé, après qu'elle se serait donné le temps de -l'examiner assez pour en juger par des justes idées.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_44_120" id="FNanchor_44_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_120" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> And somewhat -prior to him Trevisano considered it "a sentiment always willing to -conform to whatsoever reason accepts," and in conjunction with divine -grace, a powerful help to man in revealing the true and good, no longer -able to circulate freely among mankind owing to original sin. For -König (1727) in Germany taste was "a power of the intellect, product -of a healthy mind and acute judgement which makes one able to feel -the true, good and beautiful"; and for Bodmer in 1736 (after lengthy -correspondence on the subject with his Italian friend Calepio) "a -practised reflexion, prompt and penetrating into the smallest details, -by which intellect is able to distinguish the true from the false, the -perfect from the imperfect." Calepio and Bodmer were opponents of pure -feeling, and made a distinction between "taste" and "good taste."[45] -Traversing the same intellectualistic path, Muratori speaks of "good -taste" in "erudition" and others of "good taste in philosophy."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The "je ne sais quoi."</i></div> - -<p>Perhaps those authors were wise who preferred to remain vague and to -identify taste with an indefinable Something, a <i>je ne sais quoi</i>; a -<i>nescio quid</i>: a new expression which expressed nothing new, but at -least called attention to the problem. Bouhours (1671) discusses it at -length: "<i>Les Italiens, qui font mystère de tout, emploient en toutes -rencontres leur</i> non so che: <i>on ne voit rien de plus commune dans -leurs poètes,</i>" and quotes Tasso and others in confirmation.<a name="FNanchor_45_121" id="FNanchor_45_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_121" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> A -note upon it is found in Salvini: "This 'good taste' has but recently -come to the front; it seems a vague term applicable to nothing -particular, and is equivalent to the <i>non so che,</i> to a happy or -successful turn of wit."<a name="FNanchor_46_122" id="FNanchor_46_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_122" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Father Feijóo, who wrote on the <i>Razón -del gusto</i> and on <i>El no se qué</i> (1733), says very wisely: "<i>En muchas -producciones no solo de la naturaleza, sino del arte, y aun mas del -arte que de la naturaleza, encuentran los hombres, fuera di aquellas -perfecciones sujetes á su comprehension racional, otro genero de primor -misterioso que, lisonjeando el gusto, atormenta el entendemento. Los -sentidos le palpan, pero no le puede dissipar la razon, y así, al -querer explicarle, no se encuentran voces ni conceptos que cuadren -á su idea, y salimos del paso con decir que hay un non se qué, que -agrada, que enamora que hechiza, sin que pueda encontrarse revelacion -mas clara da este natural misterio.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_47_123" id="FNanchor_47_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_123" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> And President Montesquieu: -"<i>Il y a quelquefois dans les personnes ou dans les choses un charme -invisible, une grâce naturelle, qu'on n'a pu définir, et qu'on a été -forcé d'appeler le je ne sais quoi. Il me semble que c'est un effet -principalement fondé sur la surprise.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_48_124" id="FNanchor_48_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_124" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> Some writers rebelled -against the subterfuge of the <i>je ne sais quoi,</i> saying, rightly -enough, that it was a confession of ignorance: but they knew not how to -escape that ignorance without falling into confusion between taste and -intellectual judgement.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Imagination and sensationalism. The corrective of -Imagination.</i></div> - -<p>If the attempt to define "wit" and "taste" usually resulted in -intellectualism, it was easy to transform imagination and feeling into -sensationalistic doctrines. We have seen how earnestly Pallavicino -insisted on the non-intellectuality of the fantasies and inventions -of the imagination. "Nothing presents itself to the admirer of the -beautiful (he writes) to enable him to verify his cognition and satisfy -himself that the object recognized is or is not that for which he takes -it; if either by vision or by strong apprehension he is led to think -it actually present by an act of judgement, his taste for beauty as -beauty does not arise from such act of judgement, but from the vision -or lively apprehension which might remain in ourselves even when the -deception of belief was corrected"; just as happens when we are drowsy -and know ourselves to be but half awake, yet are unwilling to tear -ourselves from sweet dreams. For Pallavicino imagination cannot err; he -assimilates it wholly to the sensations, which are incapable of truth -or falsity. And if imaginative knowledge pleases, it is not because -it holds a special truth (imaginative truth), but because it creates -objects which "though false are pleasing": the painter makes not -likenesses but images which, all resemblance apart, are pleasing to the -sight: the poet awakens apprehensions "sumptuous, novel, marvellous, -splendid."<a name="FNanchor_49_125" id="FNanchor_49_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_125" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> His opinion coincides, if we mistake not, with Marino's -sensationalism: "The poet should aim only at the marvellous ... he who -cannot amaze his hearers is not worth a straw":<a name="FNanchor_50_126" id="FNanchor_50_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_126" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> he applauds the -oft-repeated dictum of "Gabriel Chiabrera, that Pindar of Savona, that -poetry should cause the eyebrows to arch themselves."<a name="FNanchor_51_127" id="FNanchor_51_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_127" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> But in the -<i>Treatise upon Style</i> written later (1646) he repents of his youthful -achievement and appears willing to return to the pedagogic theory: -"And forasmuch as I theorized concerning poetry in the basest manner, -treating it solely as a minister of that delight which the mind enjoys -in the less noble operation of imagination or apprehension<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> arising -from imagination; and, therefore, in consequence I somewhat relaxed the -strings which bind it to the probable: I now wish to demonstrate that -poetry has other functions more exalted and fruitful, while remaining -in strict servitude to the probable: which office is to guide our -minds in the noble exercise of judgement; thus it becomes the nurse of -philosophy which it nourishes with sweet milk."<a name="FNanchor_52_128" id="FNanchor_52_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_128" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> The Jesuit Ettori, -while inculcating the use of imagination and recommending orators to go -to school with the "actors," points out that imagination should fulfil -the simple office of "interpreter" between intellect and truth, never -assuming dominion, otherwise the orator would be treating his audience -or readers "not as men, to whom intellect is proper, but as beasts whom -imagination satisfies."<a name="FNanchor_53_129" id="FNanchor_53_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_129" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p> - -<p>The conception of imagination as purely sensuous shows strongly in -Muratori, who is so convinced that the faculty, if left to itself, -would deteriorate into a riot of dreams and intoxication, that he links -it to intellect as to "an authoritative friend" who shall influence -the choice and combination of images.<a name="FNanchor_54_130" id="FNanchor_54_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_130" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> The problem of the nature of -imagination had strong attraction for Muratori, and, while traducing -and vilifying, he returns to it again in his <i>Della forza della -fantasia umana</i>;<a name="FNanchor_55_131" id="FNanchor_55_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_131" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> describing it as a material faculty essentially -different from the mental or spiritual, and denying it the validity of -knowledge. Although he had observed that the aim of poetry is distinct -from that of science, in that the latter seeks to "know," and the -former to "represent" truth,<a name="FNanchor_56_132" id="FNanchor_56_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_132" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> he persisted in counting Poetry as an -"art of delectation" subordinate to Moral Philosophy, of whom she was -one of the three servants or ministers.<a name="FNanchor_57_133" id="FNanchor_57_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_133" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> Very similarly Gravina held -that along with novelty and delight in the marvellous, poetry should -endow the mind of the vulgar with "truth and universal cognitions."<a name="FNanchor_58_134" id="FNanchor_58_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_134" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span></p> - -<p>Outside Italy the same movement was going on. Bacon, although he -assigned poetry to imagination, yet considered it as something -intermediary between history and science, approximating epic to -history and the most lofty style, the parabolic, to science: ("<i>poēsis -parabolica inter reliquas eminet".</i>) Elsewhere he calls poetry -<i>somnium</i> or declares absolutely that "<i>scientias fere non parit,</i>" and -that "<i>pro lusu potius ingenii quam pro scientia est habenda</i>": music, -painting and sculpture are voluptuous arts.<a name="FNanchor_59_135" id="FNanchor_59_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_135" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> Addison identified the -pleasures of the imagination with those produced by visible objects or -the ideas to which they give rise: such pleasures are not so strong as -those of the senses nor so refined as those of the intellect: he groups -together the pleasures experienced respectively in comparing imitations -with the objects imitated, and in sharpening by this means the faculty -of observation.<a name="FNanchor_60_136" id="FNanchor_60_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_136" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p> - -<p>[Sidenote <i>Feeling and Sensationalism.</i>]</p> - -<p>The sensationalism of Du Bos and other upholders of feeling appears -very clearly. For Du Bos art is a pastime whose pleasantness consists -in the fact that it occupies the mind without fatigue, and has -affinities with the pleasure provoked by gladiatorial contests, -bullfights and tourneys.<a name="FNanchor_61_137" id="FNanchor_61_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_137" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p> - -<p>For these reasons, whilst noting the importance, in the prehistory -of Æsthetic, of these new words and the new views they express; and -while recognizing their value as a ferment in the discussion of the -æsthetic problem, taken up by thinkers of the Renaissance at the point -at which it had been left by the ancients; we yet cannot discern in -their apparition the true origin of our science. By these words and the -discussions they aroused, the æsthetic fact clamoured even louder and -more insistently for its own philosophical justification; but this it -was not yet to attain either by this means or by any other.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_77" id="Footnote_1_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_77"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> Molière, <i>Préc. ridic.</i> sc. i, 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_78" id="Footnote_2_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_78"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>I fonti dell' ingegno ridotti ad arte,</i> Bologna, 1650.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_79" id="Footnote_3_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_79"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Delle acutezze che altrimenti spiriti, vivezze e concetti -volgarmenti si appellano,</i> Genova-Bologna, 1639.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_80" id="Footnote_4_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_80"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Agudeza y arte de ingenio,</i> Madrid, 1642; enlarged, -Huesca, 1649.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_81" id="Footnote_5_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_81"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Saggio del gusto e delle belle arti,</i> 1783, ch. I, -<i>note.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_82" id="Footnote_6_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_82"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Ital. trans. in Orsi, <i>Considerazioni,</i> etc. (Modena, -1735), vol. i. dial. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_83" id="Footnote_7_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_83"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Orl. Furioso</i>, xxxv. 26; L. Dolce, <i>Dial. del pittura</i> -(Venice, 1557); <i>ad init</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_84" id="Footnote_8_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_84"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Borinski, <i>Poet. d. Renaiss.</i> p. 308 <i>seqq.</i>; <i>B. -Gracian</i>, pp. 39-54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_85" id="Footnote_9_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_85"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto</i> (Venice, 1766), introd. -pp. 72-84.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_86" id="Footnote_10_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_86"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Gracian, <i>Obras</i> (Antwerp, 1669); <i>El héroe, El -discreto,</i> with introd. by A. Farinelli, Madrid, 1900. Cf. Borinski, -<i>Poet. d. Renais, l.c.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_87" id="Footnote_11_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_87"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Les Caractères, ou les mœurs du siècle,</i> ch. I; <i>Des -ouvrages de l'esprit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_88" id="Footnote_12_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_88"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> In the programme: <i>Von der Nachahmung der Franzosen,</i> -Leipzig, 1687.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_89" id="Footnote_13_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_89"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Opera ... nella quale con alcune certe considerazioni si -mostra in che consista il vero buon gusto ne' suddetti componimenti,</i> -etc., etc., Bologna, 1696.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_90" id="Footnote_14_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_90"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Delle riflessioni sopra il buon gusto nelle scienze e -nell' arti,</i> 1708 (Venice, 1766).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_91" id="Footnote_15_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_91"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Muratori, <i>Della perfetta poesia italiana,</i> Modena, 1706, -bk. ii. ch. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_92" id="Footnote_16_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_92"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Mazzuchelli, <i>Scrittori d' Italia,</i> vol. ii. part iv. p. -2389.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_93" id="Footnote_17_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_93"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Cicero, <i>De oratore,</i> iii. ch. 50; Quintilian, <i>Inst. -Orator,</i> vi. ch. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_94" id="Footnote_18_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_94"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>De la délicatesse,</i> Paris, 1671.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_95" id="Footnote_19_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_95"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Il buon gusto,</i> ch. 39, p. 367.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_96" id="Footnote_20_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_96"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Del bene</i> (Naples, 1681), bk. i. part i. chs. 49-53. Cf. -the same writer's <i>Arte della perfezion cristiana,</i> Rome, 1665, bk. i. -ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_97" id="Footnote_21_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_97"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Perfetta poesia,</i> bk. i. chs. 14, 21.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_98" id="Footnote_22_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_98"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Ragion poetica,</i> in <i>Prose italiane,</i> ed. De Stefano, -Naples, 1839, i. ch. 7. 2 <i>Il buon gusto,</i> p. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_99" id="Footnote_23_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_99"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Esame degl' ingegni degl' huomini per apprender le -scienze</i> (Ital. trans. by C. Camilli, Venice, 1586), chs. 9-12.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_100" id="Footnote_24_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_100"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum,</i> bk. ii. ch. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_101" id="Footnote_25_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_101"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>De homine</i> (in <i>Opera phil.,</i> ed. Molesworth, vol. -iii.), ch. 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_102" id="Footnote_26_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_102"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Spectator,</i> Nos. 411-421 (<i>Works,</i> London, 1721, pp. -486-519).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_103" id="Footnote_27_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_103"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Die Discourse der Mahlern,</i> 1721—1723; <i>Von dem -Einflüss und Gebrauche der Einbildungskraft,</i> etc., 1727; and other -writings of Bodmer and Breitinger.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_104" id="Footnote_28_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_104"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Pascal, <i>Pensées sur l'éloquence et le style,</i> § 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_105" id="Footnote_29_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_105"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture,</i> 1719 -(ed. 7, Paris, 1770) <i>passim.</i>; see especially sections 1, 23, 26, 28, -33, 34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_106" id="Footnote_30_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_106"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Cartaut de la Villate, <i>Essais historiques et -philosophiques sur le goût,</i> Aix, 1737; Trublet, <i>Essais sur divers -sujets de littérature et de morale,</i> Amsterdam, 1755.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_107" id="Footnote_31_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_107"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Cf. Du Bos, <i>op. cit.</i> § 33.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_108" id="Footnote_32_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_108"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Borinski, <i>B. Gracian</i>, p. 39.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_109" id="Footnote_33_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_109"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Trevisano, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 82, 84.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_110" id="Footnote_34_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_110"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Perfetta poesia,</i> bk. ii. ch. I (<i>ed. cit.</i> i. p. 299).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_111" id="Footnote_35_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_111"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> A. Pope, <i>An Essay on Criticism,</i> 1709 (in <i>Poetical -Works,</i> London, 1827), lines 81, 82.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_112" id="Footnote_36_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_112"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Kritik der Urtheilskraft</i> (ed. Kirchmann), § 33.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_113" id="Footnote_37_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_113"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Essai sur le goût</i> (in appendix to A. Gérard, <i>Essai sur -le goût,</i> Paris, 1766).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_114" id="Footnote_38_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_114"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_115" id="Footnote_39_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_115"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Quoted in Sulzer, <i>Allg. Th. d. s. K.</i> ii. p. 377.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_116" id="Footnote_40_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_116"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Manière de bien penser</i> (Ital. trans. <i>cit.</i>), dial. 4. -2 <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_117" id="Footnote_41_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_117"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> chs. 2-4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_118" id="Footnote_42_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_118"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Osservazioni critiche</i> (in vol. ii. of Orsi's <i>Considerazioni)</i>, ch. 8, p. 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_119" id="Footnote_43_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_119"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Traité du beau</i> (Amsterdam ed., 1724), i. p. 170.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_120" id="Footnote_44_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_120"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> J. Ulr. König, <i>Untersuchung von dem guten Geschmack -in der Dicht- und Redekunst,</i> Leipzig, 1727, and (Calepio-Bodmer) -<i>Briefwechsel von der Natur des poetischen Geschmackes,</i> Zürich, 1736; -cf. for both Sulzer, ii. p. 380.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_121" id="Footnote_45_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_121"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène,</i> 1671 (Paris ed., -1734), conversation v.; "<i>Le je ne sçai quoi</i>"; cf. Gracian, <i>Oraculo -manual,</i> No. 127, and <i>El héroe,</i> ch. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_122" id="Footnote_46_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_122"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> In the notes to Muratori's <i>Perfetta poesia.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_123" id="Footnote_47_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_123"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Feijóo, <i>Theatro critico,</i> vol. vi. Nos. 11-12.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_124" id="Footnote_48_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_124"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Essai sur le goût dans les choses de la nature et de -l'art.</i> Posthumous fragment (in appendix to A. Gérard, <i>op. cit.</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_125" id="Footnote_49_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_125"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Del bene, cap. cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_126" id="Footnote_50_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_126"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Marino, in one of the sonnets in the <i>Murtoleide</i> (1608).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_127" id="Footnote_51_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_127"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Del bene,</i> bk. i. part i. ch. 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_128" id="Footnote_52_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_128"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Trattato dello stile</i> (Rome, 1666), ch. 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_129" id="Footnote_53_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_129"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> <i>Il buon gusto,</i> pp. 12-13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_130" id="Footnote_54_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_130"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Perf. poesia,</i> i. ch. 18, pp. 232-233.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_131" id="Footnote_55_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_131"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> Venice, 1745.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56_132" id="Footnote_56_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_132"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>Perf. poesia,</i> i. ch. 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57_133" id="Footnote_57_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_133"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. ch. 4, p. 42.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58_134" id="Footnote_58_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_134"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>Ragion poetica,</i> i. ch. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59_135" id="Footnote_59_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_135"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>De dignitate,</i> ii. ch. 13; iii. ch. I; iv. ch. 2; v. ch. -1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60_136" id="Footnote_60_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_136"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <i>Spectator, loc. cit.</i> esp. pp. 487, 503.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61_137" id="Footnote_61_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_137"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 2.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IVb" id="IVb">IV</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN THE CARTESIAN AND LEIBNITIAN SCHOOLS, AND THE -"ÆSTHETIC" OF BAUMGARTEN</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Cartesianism and imagination.</i></div> - -<p>The obscure world of wit, taste, imagination, feeling and the <i>je ne -sais quoi</i> was not selected for examination or even, so to speak, -included in the picture of Cartesian philosophy. The French philosopher -abhorred imagination, the outcome, according to him, of the agitation -of the animal spirits: and though not utterly condemning poetry, he -allowed it to exist only in so far as it was guided by intellect, that -being the sole faculty able to save men from the caprices of the <i>folle -du logis.</i> He tolerated it, but that was all; and went so far as not to -deny it anything "<i>qu'un philosophe lui puisse permettre sans offenser -sa conscience.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_1_138" id="FNanchor_1_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_138" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> It has been observed that the æsthetic parallel -with Cartesian intellectualism is to be found in Boileau,<a name="FNanchor_2_139" id="FNanchor_2_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_139" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> slave to -rigid <i>raison</i> ("<i>Mais nous que la raison à ses règles engage ...</i>") -and enthusiastic partisan of allegory. We have already had occasion -to draw attention to the diatribe of Malebranche against imagination. -The mathematical spirit fostered in France by Descartes forbade all -possibility of a serious consideration of poetry and art. The Italian -Antonio Conti, living in that country and witness of the literary -disputes raging around him, thus describes the French critics (La -Motte, Fontenelle and their followers): "<i>Ils ont introduit dans les -belles lettres l'esprit et la méthode<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> de M. Descartes; et ils jugent -de la poésie et de l'éloquence indépendamment des qualités sensibles. -De là vient aussi qu'ils confondent le progrès de la philosophie avec -celui des arts. Les modernes, dit l'Abbé Terrasson, sont plus grands -géomètres que les anciens: donc ils sont plus grands orateurs et plus -grands poètes.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_3_140" id="FNanchor_3_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_140" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The fight against this mathematical spirit in the -matters of art and feeling was still going on in France in the day of -the encyclopædists; the din of the battle was heard in Italy, as is -shown by the writings of Bettinelli and others. At the time when Du Bos -published his daring book there was a counsellor in the parliament of -Bordeaux, Jean-Jacques Bel by name, who composed a dissertation (1726) -against the doctrine that feeling should be the judge of art.<a name="FNanchor_4_141" id="FNanchor_4_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_141" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Crousaz and André.</i></div> - -<p>Cartesianism was incapable of an Æsthetic of imagination. The <i>Traité -du beau</i> by the eclectic Cartesian J. P. de Crousaz (1715), maintained -the dependence of beauty not upon pleasure or feeling, matters about -which there can be no difference of opinion, but upon that which can -be <i>approved</i> and therefore reduced to ideas. He enumerates five such -ideas: variety, unity, regularity, order and proportion, observing, -"<i>La variété tempérée par l'unité, la régularité, l'ordre et la -proportion, ne sont pas assurément des chimères; elles ne sont pas -du ressort de la fantaisie, ce n'est pas le caprice qui en décide</i>": -for him, that is to say, they were real qualities of the beautiful -founded in nature and truth. He discovered similar characteristics of -the beautiful in the individual beauties of the sciences (geometry, -algebra, astronomy, physics, history), of virtue, eloquence and -religion, finding in each the qualities laid down above.<a name="FNanchor_5_142" id="FNanchor_5_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_142" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Another -Cartesian, the Jesuit André (1742),<a name="FNanchor_6_143" id="FNanchor_6_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_143" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> distinguished between an -<i>essential</i> beauty, independent of every institution, human and even -divine; a <i>natural</i> beauty, independent of the opinions of mankind; -and, lastly, a beauty to a certain extent <i>arbitrary</i> and of human -invention: the first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> composed of regularity, order, proportion and -symmetry (here André relied upon Plato and also as an afterthought -brought in St. Augustine's definition): the second having its principal -measure in the light which generates colours (as a good Cartesian, -he took full advantage of Newton's discoveries): the third belonging -to fashion and convention, but never at liberty to violate essential -beauty. Each of these three forms of beauty was subdivided into -<i>sensible</i> beauty pertaining to bodies, and <i>intelligible</i> beauty of -soul.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The English: Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the -Scottish School.</i></div> - -<p>Like Descartes in France, Locke in England (1690) is an -intellectualist, and recognizes no form of spiritual elaboration save -reflexion on the senses. None the less he takes over from contemporary -literature the distinction between wit and judgement; according to him -the former combines ideas with pleasing variety, discovering their -similarities and relations and thus grouping them into beautiful -pictures which divert and strike the imagination: the latter (judgement -or intellect) seeks dissimilarities, guided by the criterion of truth. -"The mind, without looking any further, rests satisfied with the -agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy; and it is -a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the severe rules of -truth and good reason; whereby it appears that it consists in something -that is not perfectly conformable to them."<a name="FNanchor_7_144" id="FNanchor_7_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_144" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> England produced -philosophers who developed an abstract and transcendent Æsthetic, -but one more tinged with sensationalism than that of the French -Cartesians. Shaftesbury (1709) raises taste to a sense or instinct for -the beautiful; a sense of order and proportion identical with moral -sense and, with its preconceptions or presentations, anticipating the -recognition of reason. Bodies, spirits, God are the three degrees of -beauty.<a name="FNanchor_8_145" id="FNanchor_8_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_145" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Lineal descendant of Shaftesbury was Francis Hutcheson -(1723), who succeeded in popularizing the idea of an inward sense of -beauty as something<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> intermediate between sense and reason, and adapted -to distinguish unity in variety, concord in the manifold, the true, -the beautiful and the good in their substantial identity. Hutcheson -maintains that from this sense springs the pleasure we take in art, -in imitation and in the likeness between copy and original: the last -a relative, as distinct from an absolute, beauty.<a name="FNanchor_9_146" id="FNanchor_9_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_146" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> This view on the -whole predominated in England during the eighteenth century and was -adopted by Adam Smith as well as by Reid, head of the Scottish school.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Leibniz. Petites perceptions and confused knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>Much more thoroughly and with much greater philosophical vigour Leibniz -opened the door to that crowd of psychic facts from which Cartesianism -recoiled in horror. In his conception of the real, governed by the law -of continuity (<i>natura non facit saltus</i>), presenting an uninterrupted -scale of existence from the lowest beings to God, imagination, taste, -wit and the like found ample room for shelter. The facts now called -æsthetic were identified by Leibniz with Descartes' <i>confused</i> -cognition, which might be <i>clear</i> without being <i>distinct</i>: scholastic -terms borrowed, it would appear, from Duns Scotus, whose works were -reprinted and widely read in the seventeenth century.<a name="FNanchor_10_147" id="FNanchor_10_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_147" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>In his <i>De cognitione, veritate et ideis</i> (1684), after dividing -<i>cognitio</i> into <i>obscura vel clara,</i> the <i>clara</i> into <i>confusa vel -distincta,</i> and the <i>distincta</i> into <i>adaequata vel inadaequata,</i> Leibniz -remarks that while painters and other artists are able to judge works -of art very fairly they can give no reason for their decisions, and -if questioned as to the reason of their condemnation of any work -of art, they reply it lacks a <i>je ne sais quoi</i>: ("<i>at iudicii sui -rationem reddere saepe non posse, et quaerenti dicere, se in re, quae -displicet, desiderare nescio quid</i>").<a name="FNanchor_11_148" id="FNanchor_11_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_148" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> They do possess, in fact, -clear cognition, but confused and not distinct; what we should call -to-day imaginative, not <i>ratiocinative,</i> consciousness: and indeed the -latter does not exist in the case of art. There are things impossible -to define:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> "<i>on ne les fait connaître que par des exemples, et, au -reste, il faut dire que c'est un je ne sais quoi, jusqu'à ce qu'on -en déchiffre la contexture</i>."<a name="FNanchor_12_149" id="FNanchor_12_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_149" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> But these <i>perceptions confuses -ou sentiments</i> have "<i>plus grande efficacité que l'on ne pense: ce -sont elles qui forment ce je ne sais quoi, ces goûts, ces images -des qualités des sens.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_13_150" id="FNanchor_13_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_150" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Whence it appears plainly that in his -discussion of these perceptions Leibniz reposes upon the æsthetic -theories we discussed in the preceding chapter; indeed at one point<a name="FNanchor_14_151" id="FNanchor_14_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_151" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -he mentions Bouhours' book.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intellectualism of Leibniz</i></div> - -<p>It might seem that by according <i>claritas</i> and denying <i>distinctio</i> -to æsthetic facts Leibniz recognized that their peculiar character is -neither sensuous nor intellectual. He might seem to have distinguished -them by their "<i>claritas</i>" from pleasure or sense-motions, and from -intellect by their lack of "<i>distinctio.</i>" But the "<i>lex continui</i>" -and the Leibnitian intellectualism forbid this interpretation. In this -case obscurity and clarity are quantitative degrees of one single -consciousness, distinct or intellectual, towards which both converge -and with which in the extreme case they unite.</p> - -<p>To admit that artists judge with confused perceptions, clear but not -distinct, does not involve denying that these perceptions may be -capable of being connected and verified by intellectual consciousness. -The self-same object that is confusedly though clearly recognized by -imagination is recognized clearly and distinctly by the intellect; -which amounts to saying that a work of art may be perfected by being -determined by thought. In the very terminology adopted by Leibniz, who -represents sense and imagination as obscure and confused, there is a -tinge of contempt, as well as the suggestion of a single form of all -cognition. This will help us to understand Leibniz' definition of music -as "<i>exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi.</i>" -Elsewhere he says: "<i>Le but principal de l'histoire, aussi bien que -de la poésie, doit être d'enseigner la prudence et la vertu par des<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> -exemples, et puis de montrer le vice d'une manière qui en donne -l'aversion et qui porte ou serve à l'éviter.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_15_152" id="FNanchor_15_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_152" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<p>The "<i>claritas</i>" attributed to æsthetic fact is not specifically -different from, but rather a partial anticipation of, the -"<i>distinctio</i>" of intellect. Undoubtedly this distinction of degree -marks a great advance: but careful analysis shows that Leibniz does -not differ fundamentally from those who, by inventing the new words -and empirical distinctions examined above, called attention to the -peculiarities of æsthetic facts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Speculation on language.</i></div> - -<p>We find the same invincible intellectualism in the speculations on -language greatly in vogue at the time. When critics of the Renaissance -and sixteenth century tried to rise above merely empirical and -practical grammar and strove to reduce grammatical science to a -systematic form, they fell into logicism and described grammatical -forms by such terms as pleonastic, improper, metaphorical or elliptic. -Thus Julius Cæsar Scaliger (1540); thus, too, the most learned of -all, Francisco Sanchez (Sanctius or Sanzio), called Brocense, who, in -his <i>Minerva</i> (1587), asserts that names are attached to things by -reason, exclusive of interjections which are not parts of speech but -merely sounds expressive of joy or sorrow; he denies the existence of -heterogeneous and heteroclitic words, and works out a system of syntax -by means of four figures of construction, proclaiming the principle -"<i>doctrinam supplendi esse valde necessarium,</i>" that is to say, that -grammatical diversities must be explained as ellipsis, abbreviation -or omission with reference to the typical logical form.<a name="FNanchor_16_153" id="FNanchor_16_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_153" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Gaspare -Scioppio follows him exactly, abusing the old grammar with his -accustomed violence and crying up the "Sanctian" method, at that time -still almost unknown, in his <i>Grammatica philosophica</i> (1628).<a name="FNanchor_17_154" id="FNanchor_17_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_154" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> -Amongst critics of the seventeenth century, Jacopo Perizonio<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> must not -be forgotten; he wrote a commentary on Sanchez' book (1687). Amongst -recognized philosophers who studied the philosophy of grammar and -noted the merits and defects of various tongues, we find Bacon.<a name="FNanchor_18_155" id="FNanchor_18_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_155" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> In -1660 Claude Lancelot and Arnauld brought out the <i>Grammaire générale -et raisonnée de Port-Royal,</i> a work applying the intellectualism -of Descartes rigorously to grammatical forms, and dominated by the -doctrine of the artificial nature of language. Locke and Leibniz both -speculated about language,<a name="FNanchor_19_156" id="FNanchor_19_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_156" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> but neither succeeded in creating a -fresh point of view, although the latter did much to provoke inquiry -into the historical origin of languages. All his life Leibniz cherished -the notion of a universal language and of an "<i>ars characteristica -universalis</i>" as a combination likely to result in great scientific -discoveries: prior to him, Wilkins had fostered the same hope, nor -indeed, in spite of its utter absurdity, is it even yet wholly extinct.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>C. Wolff.</i></div> - -<p>In order to correct the æsthetic ideas of Leibniz it was necessary -to alter the very foundations of his system, the Cartesianism upon -which it rested. This could not be undertaken by disciples of -his own personal school, in whom we notice rather an increase of -intellectualism. Giving scholastic form to the brilliant observations -of the master, Johann Christian Wolff's system began with the theory -of knowledge conceived as an "organon" or instrument, followed by -systems of natural law, ethics and politics, together constituting -the "organon" of practical activity: the remainder was theology -and metaphysics, or pneumatology and physics (doctrine of the soul -and doctrine of phenomenal nature). Although Wolff distinguishes a -productive imagination, ruled by the principle of sufficient reason, -from the merely associative and chaotic,<a name="FNanchor_20_157" id="FNanchor_20_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_157" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> yet a science of -imagination considered as a new theoretical value could find no niche -in his schematism. Knowledge of a lower order, as such,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> belonged to -Pneumatology and was incapable of possessing its own "organon": at most -it could be brought under the organon already existing, which corrected -and transcended it by means of logical knowledge in the same way in -which Ethics treats the "<i>facilitas appetitiva inferior.</i>" As in France -the poetics of Boileau corresponded with the philosophy of Descartes, -so in Germany the rationalistic poetics of Gottsched<a name="FNanchor_21_158" id="FNanchor_21_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_158" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> reflect the -Cartesian-Leibnitian theories of Wolff (1729).</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Demand for an organon of inferior knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>It was no doubt dimly seen that even in the inferior faculties some -distinction was operative between perfect and imperfect, value and -non-value. A passage in a book (1725) by the Leibnitian Bülffinger -has often been quoted where he says: "<i>Vellem existerent qui circa -facultatem sentiendi, imaginandi, attendendi, abstrahendi et memoriam -praestarent quod bonus ille Aristoteles, adeo hodie omnibus sordens, -praestitit circa intellectum: hoc est ut in artis formant redigerent -quicquid ad illas in suo usu dirigendas et iuvandas pertinet et -conducid, quem ad modum Aristoteles in Organo logicam sive facultatem -demonstrandi redegit in ordinem.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_22_159" id="FNanchor_22_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_159" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> But on reading the extract in -its context one recognizes at once that the desired organon would have -been merely a series of recipes for strengthening the memory, educating -the attention, and so forth: a technique, in a word, not an æsthetic. -Similar ideas had been spread in Italy by Trevisano (1708), who, by -declaring that the senses might be educated through the mind, asserted -the possibility of an <i>art of feeling</i> which should "endow manners -with prudence and judgement with good taste."<a name="FNanchor_23_160" id="FNanchor_23_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_160" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> We notice, moreover, -that in his day Bülffinger was counted a depreciator of poetry, so -much so that a tract against him was written in order to show that -"poetry does not diminish the faculty of clear conception."<a name="FNanchor_24_161" id="FNanchor_24_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_161" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> Bodmer -and Breitinger were ready "to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> deduce all the parts of eloquence with -mathematical precision" (1727), and the latter sketched a Logic of -the Imagination (1740) to which he would have assigned the study of -similitudes and metaphors; even had he carried out his project, it -is difficult to see how it could have differed materially, from a -philosophic point of view, from the treatises on the subject written by -the Italian rhetoricians of the seventeenth century.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Alexander Baumgarten: his "Æsthetic."</i></div> - -<p>These discussions and experiments filled the boyhood and helped to -form the intellect of young Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten of Berlin, -a follower of the philosophy of Wolff and, at the same time, student -and teacher of Latin rhetoric and poetry; these studies led him to -reconsider the problem and search for some method by which the precepts -of rhetoricians could be reduced to a rigorous philosophical system. -On taking his doctor's degree in September 1735, when twenty-one years -old, he published a thesis <i>Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad -poēma pertinentibus</i>:<a name="FNanchor_25_162" id="FNanchor_25_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_162" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> in which the word "Æsthetic" appears for the -first time as name of a special science.<a name="FNanchor_26_163" id="FNanchor_26_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_163" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Baumgarten always remained -much attached to his youthful discovery, and in 1742 when called to -teach at the university of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and again in 1749, -he gave by request a course of lectures on Æsthetic (<i>quaedam consilia -dirigendarum facultatum inferiorum novam per acroasin exposuit</i>).<a name="FNanchor_27_164" id="FNanchor_27_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_164" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> -In 1750 he printed a voluminous treatise wherein the word "Æsthetic" -attained the honours of a title-page;<a name="FNanchor_28_165" id="FNanchor_28_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_165" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> in 1758 he published a more -slender second part: illness and finally death in 1762 prevented him -from completing the work.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic as science of sensory consciousness.</i></div> - -<p>What was Æsthetic to Baumgarten? Its objects are sensible facts -(ασθητά), carefully distinguished by the ancients from mental objects -(νοητά);<a name="FNanchor_29_166" id="FNanchor_29_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_166" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> hence it becomes <i>scientia cognitionis sensitivae, theoria -liberalium artium,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars -analogi rationis</i><a name="FNanchor_30_167" id="FNanchor_30_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_167" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> Rhetoric and Poetry constitute two special -and interdependent disciplines which are entrusted by Æsthetic with -the distinction between the various styles in literature and other -small differences,<a name="FNanchor_31_168" id="FNanchor_31_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_168" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> for the laws she herself investigates are -diffused throughout all the arts like guiding-stars for these various -subsidiary arts (<i>quasi cynosura quaedam specialium</i>)<a name="FNanchor_32_169" id="FNanchor_32_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_169" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> and must be -extracted not from isolated cases only, or from incomplete induction -empirically, but from the totality of facts (<i>falsa regula peior est -quant nulla.</i>)<a name="FNanchor_33_170" id="FNanchor_33_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_170" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Nor must Æsthetic be confounded with Psychology, -which furnishes its presuppositions only; an independent science, it -gives the norm of sensitive cognition (<i>sensitive quid cognoscendi</i>) -and deals with "<i>perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis,</i>" which is -beauty (<i>pulcritudo)</i>, just as the opposite, imperfection, is ugliness -(<i>deformitas</i>)<a name="FNanchor_34_171" id="FNanchor_34_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_171" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> From the beauty of sensitive cognition (<i>pulcritudo -cognitionis</i>) we must exclude the beauty of objects and matter -(<i>pulcritudo obiectorum et materiae</i>) with which it is often confused -owing to habits of language, since it is easy to show that ugly things -may be thought of in a beautiful manner and beautiful things in an -ugly manner (<i>quacum ob receptam rei significationem saepe sed male -confunditur; possunt turpia pulcre cogitare ut talia, et pulcriora -turpiter</i>).<a name="FNanchor_35_172" id="FNanchor_35_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_172" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Poetical representations are confused or imaginative: -distinctness, that is intellect, is not poetical. The greater the -determination, the greater the poetry; individuals "<i>omnimode -determinata</i>" are highly poetical; poetical also are images or -phantasms as well as all that appertains to the senses.<a name="FNanchor_36_173" id="FNanchor_36_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_173" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> That which -judges sensible or imaginary presentations is taste, or "<i>indicium -sensuum.</i>" These, in brief, are the truths displayed by Baumgarten in -his <i>Meditationes</i> and, with many distinctions and examples, in his -<i>Æsthetic.</i><a name="FNanchor_37_174" id="FNanchor_37_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_174" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Cricisism of judgements based on Baumgarten.</i></div> - -<p>Nearly all German critics<a name="FNanchor_38_175" id="FNanchor_38_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_175" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> are of opinion that from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> his own -conception of Æsthetic as the science of sensitive cognition Baumgarten -should have evolved a species of inductive Logic. But he can be cleared -of this accusation: a better philosopher, perhaps, than his critics, -he held that an inductive Logic must always be intellectual, since -it leads to abstractions and the formation of concepts. The relation -existing between "<i>cognitio confusa</i>" and the poetical and artistic -facts which belong to the realm of taste had been shown before his -day, by Leibniz: neither he nor Wolff nor any other of their school -ever dreamed of transforming a treatment of the "<i>cognitio confusa</i>" -or "<i>petites perceptions</i>" into an inductive Logic. On the other hand, -as a kind of compensation, these critics attribute to Baumgarten -a merit he cannot claim, at least to the extent implied by their -praises. According to them, he effected a revolution by converting<a name="FNanchor_39_176" id="FNanchor_39_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_176" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> -Leibniz' differences of degree or quantitative distinctions into a -specific difference, and turning confused knowledge into something no -longer negative but positive<a name="FNanchor_40_177" id="FNanchor_40_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_177" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> by attributing a "<i>perfectio</i>" to -sensitive cognition <i>qua talis</i>; and by thus destroying the unity of -the Leibnitian monad and breaking up the law of continuity, founded -the science of Æsthetic. Had he really accomplished such a giant -stride, his claim to the title of "father of Æsthetic" would have -been placed beyond question. But, in order to win this appellation, -Baumgarten ought to have been successful in unravelling all those -contradictions in which he was involved no less than Leibniz and all -intellectualists. It is not enough to posit a "<i>perfectio</i>"; even -Leibniz did that when he attributed <i>claritas</i> to confused cognition, -which, when devoid of clearness, remains obscure, that is to say, -imperfect. It was imperative that this perfection "<i>qua talis</i>" should -be upheld against the "<i>lex continui,</i>" and kept uncontaminated by any -intellectualistic admixture. Otherwise he was bound to fall back into -the pathless labyrinth of the "probable" which is and is not false, -of the wit which is and is not intellect, of the taste<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> which is and -is not intellectual judgement, of the imagination and feeling which -are and are not sensibility and material pleasure. And in that case, -notwithstanding the new name: notwithstanding (as we freely admit) the -greater insistence than that of Leibniz upon the sensible nature of -poetry, Æsthetic, as a science, would not have been born.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intellectualism of Baumgarten.</i></div> - -<p>Now Baumgarten overcame none of the obstacles above mentioned. -Unprejudiced and continued study of his works forces one to this -conclusion. Already in his <i>Meditationes</i> he does not seem able to -distinguish clearly between imagination and intellect, confused and -distinct cognition. The law of continuity leads him to set up a scale -of more and less: amongst cognitions, the obscure are less poetical -than the confused; the distinct are not poetical, but even those -of the higher kinds (that is the distinct and intellectual) are to -a certain extent poetical in proportion as they are lower in their -nature; compound concepts are more poetical than simple; those of -larger comprehension are "<i>extensive clariores.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_41_178" id="FNanchor_41_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_178" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> In the <i>Æsthetic</i> -Baumgarten expounds his thought more fully and thereby exposes its -defects. If the introduction of the book leads one to believe that he -sees æsthetic truth to consist in consciousness of the individual, -the belief is shattered by the explanations which follow. As a good -objectivist he asserts that truth in the metaphysical sense has its -counterpart in the soul, namely, subjective truth, logical truth in a -wide sense, or æsthetico-logical.<a name="FNanchor_42_179" id="FNanchor_42_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_179" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> And the complete truth lies not -in the genus or species, but in the individual. The genus is true, -the species more true, the individual most true.<a name="FNanchor_43_180" id="FNanchor_43_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_180" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Formal logical -truth is acquired "<i>cum iactura,</i>" by jettisoning much great material -perfection: "<i>quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est?</i>"<a name="FNanchor_44_181" id="FNanchor_44_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_181" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> -So much being granted, logical truth differs from æsthetic in this: -metaphysical or objective truth is presented now to the intellect, -when it is logical truth in a narrow sense; now to the analogy of -reason<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> and the lower cognitive faculties, when it is æsthetic;<a name="FNanchor_45_182" id="FNanchor_45_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_182" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> -a lesser truth in exchange for the greater which man is not always -able to attain, thanks to the "<i>malum metaphysicum.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_46_183" id="FNanchor_46_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_183" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Thus moral -truths are comprehended in one fashion by a comic poet, in another -by a moral philosopher; an eclipse is described in one way by an -astronomer and in another by a shepherd speaking to his friends or -his sweetheart.<a name="FNanchor_47_184" id="FNanchor_47_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_184" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> Universals even are accessible, in part at least, -to the inferior faculty.<a name="FNanchor_48_185" id="FNanchor_48_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_185" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> Take the case of two philosophers, a -dogmatic and a sceptic, arguing, with an æsthete listening to them. If -the arguments of either party are so balanced that the hearer cannot -determine which is true and which false, this appearance is to him -æsthetic truth: if one adversary succeed in overbearing the other -so that one argument is shown clearly to be wrong, the error just -revealed is likewise æsthetic<a name="FNanchor_49_186" id="FNanchor_49_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_186" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> falsity. Truths strictly æsthetic are -(and this is the decisive point) those which appear neither entirely -true nor entirely false: probable truths. "<i>Talia autem de quibus -non complete quidem certi sumus, neque tamen falsitatem aliquam in -iisdem appercipimus, sunt verisimilia. Est ergo veritas æsthetica, -a potiori dicta verisimilitudo, ille veritatis gradus, qui, etiamsi -non evectus sit ad completam certitudinem, tamen nihil contineat -falsitatis observabilis.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_50_187" id="FNanchor_50_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_187" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> And especially the immediate sequel: -"<i>Cujus habent spectator es auditor esve intra animum quum vident -audiuntve, quasdam anticipationes, quod plerumque fit, quod fieri -solet, quod in opinione positum est, quod habet ad haec in se quandam -similitudinem, sive id falsum (logice et latissime), sive verum -sit (logice et strictissime), quod non sit facile a nostris sensibus -abhorrens: hoc illud</i> est εἰκός <i>et verisimile quod, Aristotele et -Cicerone assentiente, sectetur æstheticus.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_51_188" id="FNanchor_51_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_188" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> The probable embraces -that which is true and certain to the intellect and the senses, that -which is certain to the senses but not to the intellect, that which -is probable logically and æsthetically, or logically<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> improbable but -æsthetically probable, or, finally, æsthetically improbable but on the -whole probable or that whose improbability is not evident.<a name="FNanchor_52_189" id="FNanchor_52_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_189" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> So we -reach the admission of the impossible and absurd, the <i>αδύνατον</i> and -<i>ἄτοπον</i> of Aristotle.</p> - -<p>If after reading these paragraphs, highly important as revealing the -true thought of Baumgarten, we turn once more to the Introduction to -his work, we notice at once his commonplace and erroneous conception of -the poetic faculty. To a friend who suggested that there was no need -for him to concern himself with confused or inferior consciousness both -because "<i>confusio mater erroris</i>" and because "<i>facilitate inferior -es, caro, debellandae potius sunt quam excitandae et confirmandae,</i>" -Baumgarten replied that confusion is a condition wherein to find truth: -that nature makes no sudden leap from obscurity to clarity: that -noonday light is reached from night time through the dawn (<i>ex node per -auroram meridies</i>): that in the case of the inferior faculties a guide, -not a tyrant, is needed (<i>imperium in facilitates inferiores poscitur, -non tyrannis</i>).<a name="FNanchor_53_190" id="FNanchor_53_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_190" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> This is still the attitude of Leibniz, Trevisano -and Bülffinger. Baumgarten is terrified lest he should be accused of -treating subjects unworthy a philosopher. "<i>Quousque tandem</i>" (says he -to himself), "dost thou, professor of theoretic and moral philosophy, -dare to praise lies and mixtures of true and false as though they were -noble works?"<a name="FNanchor_54_191" id="FNanchor_54_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_191" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> And if there is one thing above all others from -which he is anxious to guard himself it is sensualism, unbridled and -non-moralized. The sensitive perfection of Cartesianism and Wolffianism -was liable to be confused with simple pleasure, with the feeling of -the perfection of our organism:<a name="FNanchor_55_192" id="FNanchor_55_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_192" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> but Baumgarten falls into no such -confusion. When in 1745 one Quistorp combated his æsthetic theory by -saying that if poetry consisted in sensuous perfection it was a thing -hurtful to men, Baumgarten answered disdainfully that he did not expect -he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> should ever find time to reply to a critic of such calibre as to -mistake his "<i>oratio perfecta sensitiva</i>" for an "<i>oratio perfecte</i> -(that is <i>omnino) sensitiva.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_56_193" id="FNanchor_56_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_193" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>New names and old meanings.</i></div> - -<p>Save in its title and its first definitions Baumgarten's <i>Æsthetic</i> is -covered with the mould of antiquity and commonplace. We have seen that -he refers back to Aristotle and Cicero for the first principles of his -science; in another instance he attaches his Æsthetic to the Rhetoric -of antiquity, quoting the truth enunciated by Zeno the Stoic, "<i>esse -duo cogitandi genera, alterum perpetuum et latius, quod Rhetorices sit, -alterum concisum et contractius, quod Dialectices,</i>" and identifying -the former with the æsthetic horizon, the latter with the logical.<a name="FNanchor_57_194" id="FNanchor_57_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_194" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> -In his <i>Meditationes</i> he rests upon Scaliger and Vossius;<a name="FNanchor_58_195" id="FNanchor_58_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_195" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> of -modern writers beside the philosophers (Leibniz, Wolff, Bülffinger) -he quotes Gottsched, Arnold,<a name="FNanchor_59_196" id="FNanchor_59_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_196" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> Werenfels, Breitinger<a name="FNanchor_60_197" id="FNanchor_60_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_197" class="fnanchor">[60]</a>; by means -of these latter he is able to make acquaintance with discussions upon -taste and imagination, even without direct acquaintance with Addison -and Du Bos, as well as the Italians, whose writings had immense vogue -in Germany in his day, and with whom his resemblances leap to the -eye. Baumgarten always feels himself to be in perfect accord with his -predecessors; never at variance with them. He never felt himself to -be a revolutionary; and though some have been revolutionaries without -knowing it, Baumgarten was not one of them. Baumgarten's works are but -another presentation of the problem of Æsthetic still clamouring for -solution in a voice so much the stronger as it uttered a commonplace: -he proclaims a new science and presents it in conventional scholastic -form; the babe about to be born receives the name of Æsthetic by -premature baptism at his hands: and the name remains. But the new name -is devoid of new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> matter; the philosophical armour covers no muscular -body. Our good Baumgarten, full of ardour and conviction, and often -curiously brisk and vivacious in his scholastic Latinism, is a most -sympathetic and attractive figure in the history of Æsthetic: of the -science in formation, that is to say, not of the science brought to -completion: of Æsthetic <i>condenda</i> not <i>condita.</i></p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_138" id="Footnote_1_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_138"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Letters to Balzac and the Princess Elizabeth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_139" id="Footnote_2_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_139"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Art poétique</i> (1669-1674).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_140" id="Footnote_3_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_140"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Letters to Marquis Maffei, about 1720, in <i>Prose e -poesie,</i> Venice, 1756, ii. p. cxx.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_141" id="Footnote_4_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_141"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Sulzer, <i>op. cit.</i> i. p. 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_142" id="Footnote_5_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_142"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Traité du beau</i> (2nd ed., Amsterdam, 1724; Paris ed., -1810).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_143" id="Footnote_6_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_143"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Essai sur le beau,</i> Paris, 1741.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_144" id="Footnote_7_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_144"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>An Essay concerning Human Understanding</i> (French trans. -in <i>Œuvres,</i> Paris, 1854), bk. ii. ch. 11, § 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_145" id="Footnote_8_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_145"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times,</i> -1709-1711.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_146" id="Footnote_9_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_146"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and -Virtue,</i> London, 1723.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_147" id="Footnote_10_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_147"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_179">179</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_148" id="Footnote_11_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_148"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Opera philosophica</i> (ed. Erdmann), p. 78.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_149" id="Footnote_12_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_149"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Ibid,</i> preface.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_150" id="Footnote_13_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_150"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Nouveaux Essais,</i> ii. ch. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_151" id="Footnote_14_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_151"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. ch. 11.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_152" id="Footnote_15_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_152"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Essais de Théodicée,</i> part. ii. § 148.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_153" id="Footnote_16_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_153"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Francisci Sanctii, <i>Minerva seu de causis linguæ latinæ -commentarius,</i> 1587 (ed. with add. by Gaspare Scioppio, Padua, 1663); -cf. bk. i. chs. 2, 9, and bk. iv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_154" id="Footnote_17_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_154"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Gasperis Sciopii, <i>Grammatica philosophica,</i> Milan, 1628 -(Venice, 1728).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_155" id="Footnote_18_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_155"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>De dignitate,</i> etc., bk. vi. ch. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_156" id="Footnote_19_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_156"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Locke, <i>Essay,</i> etc., bk. lii.; Leibniz, <i>Nouveaux -Essais,</i> bk. iii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_157" id="Footnote_20_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_157"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Psychol. empirica</i> (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1738), §§ -138-172.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_158" id="Footnote_21_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_158"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Joh. Chr. Gottsched, <i>Versuch einer critischen -Dichtkunst,</i> Leipzig, 1729.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_159" id="Footnote_22_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_159"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Dilucidationes philosophicæ de Deo, anima humana et -mundo,</i> 1725 (Tübingen, 1768), § 268.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_160" id="Footnote_23_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_160"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Preface to <i>Rifless. sul gusto, ed. cit.</i> p. 75.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_161" id="Footnote_24_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_161"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Borinski, <i>Poetik d. Renaiss.</i> p. 380 note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_162" id="Footnote_25_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_162"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Halæ Magdeburgicæ, 1735 (reprinted, ed. B. Croce, Naples, -1900).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_163" id="Footnote_26_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_163"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Med.</i> § 116.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_164" id="Footnote_27_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_164"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Æsthetica,</i> i. pref.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_165" id="Footnote_28_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_165"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Æsthetica. Scripsit</i> Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten, <i>Prof. -Philosoph., Traiecti eis Viadrum, Impens. Ioannis Christiani Kleyb,</i> -1750; 2nd part, 1758.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_166" id="Footnote_29_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_166"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Med.</i> § 116.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_167" id="Footnote_30_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_167"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> § i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_168" id="Footnote_31_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_168"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Med.%</i> 117.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_169" id="Footnote_32_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_169"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> § 71.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_170" id="Footnote_33_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_170"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> § 53.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_171" id="Footnote_34_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_171"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Med.</i> § 115.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_172" id="Footnote_35_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_172"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> § 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_173" id="Footnote_36_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_173"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> § 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_174" id="Footnote_37_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_174"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Med.</i> § 92.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_175" id="Footnote_38_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_175"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Ritter, <i>Gesch. d. Philos.</i> (Fr. trans., <i>Hist, de la -phil. mod.</i> iii. p. 365); Zimmermann, <i>Gesch. d. Æsth.</i> p. 168; J. -Schmidt, <i>L. u. B.</i> p. 48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_176" id="Footnote_39_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_176"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Danzel, <i>Gottsched,</i> p. 218; Meyer, <i>L. u. B.</i> pp. 35-38.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_177" id="Footnote_40_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_177"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Schmidt, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 44.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_178" id="Footnote_41_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_178"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Med.</i> §§ 19, 20, 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_179" id="Footnote_42_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_179"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> § 424.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_180" id="Footnote_43_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_180"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 441.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_181" id="Footnote_44_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_181"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 560.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_182" id="Footnote_45_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_182"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> § 424.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_183" id="Footnote_46_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_183"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 557.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_184" id="Footnote_47_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_184"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 425, 429.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_185" id="Footnote_48_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_185"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 443.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_186" id="Footnote_49_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_186"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 448.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_187" id="Footnote_50_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_187"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 483.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_188" id="Footnote_51_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_188"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 484.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_189" id="Footnote_52_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_189"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> §§ 485, 486.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_190" id="Footnote_53_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_190"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 7, 12.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_191" id="Footnote_54_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_191"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 478.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_192" id="Footnote_55_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_192"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> Cf. Wolff, Psych, empir. § 511, and the passage there -quoted from Descartes; also §§ 542, 550.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56_193" id="Footnote_56_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_193"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> Th. Joh. Quistorp, in <i>Neuen Bücher-Saal,</i> 1745, fasc. 5; -<i>Erweis dass die Poesie schon für sie selbst ihre Liebhaber leichtlich -unglücklich machen könne</i>; and A. G. Baumgarten, <i>Metaphysica,</i> 2nd -ed., 1748, preface; cf. Danzel, <i>Gottsched,</i> pp. 215, 221.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57_194" id="Footnote_57_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_194"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> § 122.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58_195" id="Footnote_58_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_195"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>Med.</i> § 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59_196" id="Footnote_59_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_196"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 111, 113.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60_197" id="Footnote_60_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_197"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <i>Æsth.</i> § 11.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="Vb" id="Vb">V</a></h4> - - -<h4>GIAMBATTISTA VICO</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Vico as inventor of æsthetic science.</i></div> - -<p>The real revolutionary who by putting aside the concept of probability -and conceiving imagination in a novel manner actually discovered the -true nature of poetry and art and, so to speak, invented the science of -Æsthetic, was the Italian Giambattista Vico.</p> - -<p>Ten years prior to the publication in Germany of Baumgarten's first -treatise, there had appeared in Naples (1725) the first <i>Scienza -nuova,</i> which developed ideas on the nature of poetry outlined in -a former work (1721), <i>De constantia iurisprudentis,</i> outcome of -"twenty-five years' continuous and harsh meditation."<a name="FNanchor_1_198" id="FNanchor_1_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_198" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> In 1730 Vico -republished it with fresh developments which gave rise to two special -books (<i>Della sapienza poetica</i> and <i>Della discoperta del vero Omero</i>) -in the second <i>Scienza Nuova.</i> Nor did he ever tire of repeating his -views and forcing them upon the attention of his hostile contemporaries -at every opportunity, seizing such occasion even in prefaces and -letters, poems on the occasion of weddings or funerals, and in such -press notices as fell to his duty as public censor of literature.</p> - -<p>And what were these ideas? Neither more nor less, we may say, than -the solution of the problem stated by Plato, attacked but not solved -by Aristotle, and again vainly attacked during the Renaissance and -afterwards: is poetry rational or irrational, spiritual or brutal? -and,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> if spiritual, what is its special nature and what distinguishes -it from history and science?</p> - -<p>As we know, Plato confined it within the baser part of the soul, the -animal spirits. Vico re-elevates it and makes of it a period in the -history of humanity: and since history for him means an ideal history -whose periods consist not of contingent facts but of forms of the -spirit, he makes it a moment in the ideal history of the spirit, a form -of consciousness. Poetry precedes intellect, but follows sense; through -confusing it with the latter, Plato failed to grasp the position it -should really occupy and banished it from his Republic. "Men at first -feel without being aware; next they become aware with a perturbed and -agitated soul; finally they reflect with an undisturbed mind. This -Aphorism is the Principle of poetical sentences which are formed by the -sense of passions and affections; differing thereby from philosophical -sentences which are formed by reflexion through ratiocination; whence -the latter approach more nearly to truth the more they rise towards -the universal, while the former have more of certainty the more they -approach the individual."<a name="FNanchor_2_199" id="FNanchor_2_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_199" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> An imaginative phase of consciousness, but -one possessed of positive value.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Poetry and Philosophy: imagination and intellect.</i></div> - -<p>The imaginative phase is altogether independent and autonomous with -respect to the intellectual, which is not only incapable of endowing -it with any fresh perfection but can only destroy it. "The studies of -Metaphysics and Poetry are in natural opposition one to the other; -for the former purges the mind of childish prejudice and the latter -immerses and drowns it in the same: the former offers resistance to -the judgement of the senses, while the latter makes this its chief -rule: the former debilitates, the latter strengthens, imagination: the -former prides itself in not turning spirit into body, the latter does -its utmost to give a body to spirit: hence the thoughts of the former -must necessarily be abstract, while the concepts of the latter show -best when most clothed with matter: to sum up, the former strives that -the learned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> may know the truth of things stripped of all passion: the -latter that the vulgar may act truly by means of intense excitement -of the senses, without which stimulant they assuredly would not act -at all. Hence from all time, in all languages known to man, never has -there been a strong man equally great as metaphysician and poet: such a -poet as Homer, father and prince of poetry."<a name="FNanchor_3_200" id="FNanchor_3_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_200" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Poets are the senses, -philosophers the intellect, of mankind.<a name="FNanchor_4_201" id="FNanchor_4_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_201" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Imagination is "stronger in -proportion as reason is weaker."<a name="FNanchor_5_202" id="FNanchor_5_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_202" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<p>No doubt "reflexion" may be put in verse; but it does not become poetry -thereby. "Abstract sentences belong to philosophers, since they contain -universals; and reflexions concerning such passions are made by poets -who are false and frigid."<a name="FNanchor_6_203" id="FNanchor_6_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_203" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Those poets "who sing of the beauty and -virtue of ladies by reflexion ... are philosophers arguing in verses -or in love-rhymes."<a name="FNanchor_7_204" id="FNanchor_7_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_204" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> One set of ideas belongs to philosophers, -another to poets: these latter are identical with those of painters, -from which "they differ only in colours and words."<a name="FNanchor_8_205" id="FNanchor_8_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_205" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Great poets are -born not in epochs of reflexion but in those of imagination, generally -called barbarous: Homer, in the barbarism of antiquity: Dante in that -of the Middle Ages, the "second barbarism of Italy."<a name="FNanchor_9_206" id="FNanchor_9_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_206" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Those who have -chosen to read philosophic reason into the verse of the great father -of Greek poetry have transferred the character of a later age into -an earlier, since the era of poets precedes that of philosophers and -countries in infancy were sublime poets. Poetic locutions arose before -prose, "by the necessity of nature" not "by caprice of pleasure"; -fables or imaginative universals were conceived before reasoned, <i>i.e.</i> -philosophical universals.<a name="FNanchor_10_207" id="FNanchor_10_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_207" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span></p> - -<p>With these observations Vico justified and at the same time corrected -the opinion of Plato in the <i>Republic,</i> denying to Homer wisdom, every -kind of wisdom; the legislative of Lycurgus and Solon, the philosophic -of Thales, Anacharsis and Pythagoras, the strategic of military -commanders.<a name="FNanchor_11_208" id="FNanchor_11_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_208" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> To Homer (he says) belongs wisdom, undoubtedly, but -poetic wisdom only: the Homeric images and comparisons derived from -wild beasts and the elements of savage nature are incomparable; but -"such success does not spring from talent imbued with domesticity and -civilized with any philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_12_209" id="FNanchor_12_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_209" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>When anybody takes to writing poetry in an era of reflexion, it is -because he is returning to childhood and "putting his mind in fetters"; -no longer reflecting with his intellect, he follows imagination -and loses himself in the particular. If a true poet dallies with -philosophical ideas, it is not "that he may assimilate them and dismiss -imagination," but merely "that he may have them in front of him, to -examine as though on a stage or public platform."<a name="FNanchor_13_210" id="FNanchor_13_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_210" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The New Comedy -which made its appearance after Socrates is undeniably impregnated with -philosophic ideas, with intellectual universals, with "intelligible -kinds of human conduct"; but its authors were poets in so far only as -they knew how to transform logic into imagination and their ideas into -portraits.<a name="FNanchor_14_211" id="FNanchor_14_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_211" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Poetry and History.</i></div> - -<p>The dividing line between art and science, imagination and intellect, -is here very strongly drawn: the two distinct activities are repeatedly -contrasted with a sharpness that leaves no room for confusion. The -line of demarcation between poetry and history is hardly less firm. -While not quoting Aristotle's passage, Vico implicitly shows why -poetry seemed to Aristotle more philosophical than history, and at -the same time he dispels the erroneous opinion that history concerns -the particular and poetry the universal. Poetry joins hands with -science not because it consists in the contemplation of concepts but -because, like science, it is ideal. The most beautiful<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> poetic story -must be "wholly ideal": "by means of idea, the poet breathes reality -into things otherwise unreal; masters of poetry claim that their art -must be wholly compact of imagination, like a painter of the ideal, -not imitative like a portrait-painter: whence, from their likeness to -God the Creator, poets and painters alike are called divine."<a name="FNanchor_15_212" id="FNanchor_15_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_212" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> And -against those who blame poets for telling stories which, they say, are -untrue, Vico protests: "The best stories are those approximating most -nearly to ideal truth, the eternal truth of God: it is immeasurably -more certain than the truth of historians who often bring into play -caprice, necessity or fortune; but such a Captain as, for instance, -Tasso's Godfrey is the type of a captain of all times, of all nations, -and so are all personages of poetry, whatever difference there may be -in sex, age, temperament, custom, nation, republic, grade, condition -or fortune; they are nothing save the eternal properties of the human -soul, rationally discussed by politicians, economists and moral -philosophers, and painted as portraits by the poet."<a name="FNanchor_16_213" id="FNanchor_16_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_213" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Referring -to an observation made by Castelvetro, and approving it in part, to -the effect that if poetry is a presentiment of the possible it should -be preceded by history, imitation of the real, yet finding himself -confronted by the difficulty that, nevertheless, poets invariably -precede historians, Vico solves the problem by identifying history -with poetry: primitive history was poetry, its plot was narration of -fact, and Homer was the first historian; or rather "he was a heroic -character amongst Greek men, in so far as they poetically narrated -their own history."<a name="FNanchor_17_214" id="FNanchor_17_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_214" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Poetry and history, therefore, are originally -identical; or rather, undifferentiated. "But inasmuch as it is not -possible to give false ideas, since falsity arises from an embroiled -combination of ideas, so is it impossible to give a tradition, however -fabulous, that has not had, at the beginning, a basis of truth."<a name="FNanchor_18_215" id="FNanchor_18_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_215" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> -Hence we gain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> an entirely new insight into mythology: it is no longer -an arbitrary calculated invention, but a spontaneous vision of truth -as it presented itself to the spirit of primitive man. Poetry gives an -imaginative vision; science or philosophy intelligible truth; history -the consciousness of certitude.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Poetry and language.</i></div> - -<p>Language and poetry are, in Vico's estimation, substantially the same. -In refuting the "vulgar error of grammarians" who maintain the priority -of the birth of prose over that of verse, he finds "within the origin -of Poetry, so far as it has been herein discovered," the "origin of -languages and the origin of letters."<a name="FNanchor_19_216" id="FNanchor_19_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_216" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> This discovery was made by -Vico after "toil as disagreeable and overwhelming as we should undergo -had we to strip off our own nature and enter into that of the primæval -men of Hobbes, Grotius, or Puffendorf; creatures possessing no language -at all, by whom were created the languages of the ancient world."<a name="FNanchor_20_217" id="FNanchor_20_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_217" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> -But his painful labour was richly repaid by his refutation of the -erroneous theory that languages sprang from convention or, as he said, -"signified at will," whereas it is evident that "from their natural -origin words must have had natural meanings; this is plainly seen -in common Latin ... wherein almost all words have arisen by natural -necessity, either from natural properties or from their sensible -effects; and in general, metaphor forms the bulk of language in the -case of every people."<a name="FNanchor_21_218" id="FNanchor_21_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_218" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> This argument strikes a blow at another -common error of the grammarians, "that the language of prose writers -is correct, that of poets incorrect."<a name="FNanchor_22_219" id="FNanchor_22_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_219" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> The poetic tropes grouped -under the heading of metonymy seem to Vico to be "born of the nature -of primitive peoples, not of capricious selection by men skilled in -poetic art";<a name="FNanchor_23_220" id="FNanchor_23_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_220" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> stories told "by means of similitudes,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> imagery and -comparisons," result "from lack of the genera and species required to -define things with propriety," and "are therefore, by reason of natural -necessities, common to entire peoples."<a name="FNanchor_24_221" id="FNanchor_24_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_221" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> The earliest languages -must have consisted of "dumb gestures and objects which had natural -connexions with the ideas to be expressed."<a name="FNanchor_25_222" id="FNanchor_25_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_222" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> He observes very -acutely that to these figurate languages belong not only hieroglyphics -but the emblems, knightly bearings, devices and blazons which he calls -"mediæval hieroglyphics."<a name="FNanchor_26_223" id="FNanchor_26_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_223" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> In the barbarous Middle Ages "Italy was -forced to fall back on the mute language ... of the earliest gentile -nations in which men, before discovering articulate speech, were -obliged like mutes to use actions or objects having natural connexions -with the ideas, which at that time must have been exceedingly sensuous, -of the things which they wished to signify; such expressions, clad in -almost vocal words, must have had all the lively expressiveness of -poetic diction." <a name="FNanchor_27_224" id="FNanchor_27_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_224" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> Hence arise three kinds or phases of language: -dumb show, the language of the gods; heraldic language, or that of the -heroes; and spoken language. Vico also looked forward to a universal -system of etymology, a "dictionary of mental words common to all -nations."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Inductive and formalistic</i></div> - -<p>A man with ideas of this sort about imagination, language and poetry -could not say he was satisfied with formalistic and verbal Logic, -whether Aristotelian or scholastic. The human mind (says Vico) "makes -use of intellect when from things which it feels by sense it gathers -something that does not fall under sense: this is the true meaning -of the Latin <i>intelligere</i>."<a name="FNanchor_28_225" id="FNanchor_28_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_225" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> In a rapid outline of the history -of Logic, Vico wrote: "Aristotle came and taught the syllogism, a -method more suited to expound universals in their particulars than to -unite particulars by the discovery of universals: then came Zeno with -his sorites, which corresponds with modern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> philosophic methods and -refines, without sharpening, the wits; and no advantage whatever was -reaped from either by mankind at large. With great reason, therefore, -does Verulam, equally eminent as politician and philosopher, propound, -commend and illustrate induction in his Organum: he is followed by the -English with excellent results to experimental philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_29_226" id="FNanchor_29_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_226" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> From -this source is derived his criticism of mathematics, which have always, -but especially in his day, been considered as the type of perfect -science.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Vico opposed to all formal theories of poetry.</div> - -<p>In all this, Vico is not only a thorough revolutionary, but is quite -conscious of being so: he knows himself to be in opposition to all -previous theories on the subject. He says that his new principles of -poetry "are wholly opposed to, and not merely different from, all which -have been imagined from the time of Plato and his disciple Aristotle -to Patrizzi, Scaliger and Castelvetro among the moderns; poetry is now -discovered to have been the first language used by all nations alike, -even the Hebrew."<a name="FNanchor_30_227" id="FNanchor_30_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_227" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> In another passage he says that by his theories -"is overthrown all that has ever been said of the origin of poetry, -beginning from Plato and Aristotle, right down to our own Patrizzi, -Scaliger and Castelvetro; and it is found that poetry arising through -defect of human ratiocination is as sublime as any which owes its -being to the later rise of philosophy and the arts of composition and -criticism; indeed, that these later sources never gave rise to any -poetry that could equal, far less surpass it."<a name="FNanchor_31_228" id="FNanchor_31_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_228" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> In the Autobiography -he boasts of having discovered "other principles of poetry than those -found by Greeks and Latins and all others from those times down to the -present day; on these are founded other views on mythology."<a name="FNanchor_32_229" id="FNanchor_32_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_229" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> - -<p>These ancient principles of poetry "laid down first by Plato and -confirmed by Aristotle" had been the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> anticipation or prejudice which -had misled all writers on poetic reason (among whom he cites Jacopo -Mazzoni). Statements "even of most serious philosophers such as -Patrizzi and others" upon the origin of song and verse are so inept -that he "blushes even to mention them."<a name="FNanchor_33_230" id="FNanchor_33_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_230" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> It is curious to see him -annotating the <i>Ars Poetica</i> of Horace, with a view to finding some -plausible sense in it by applying the principles of the <i>Scienza -nuova</i>.<a name="FNanchor_34_231" id="FNanchor_34_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_231" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p> - -<p>It is probable that he was familiar with the writings of Muratori -among contemporaries, for he quotes him by name, and of Gravina, who -was a personal acquaintance; but if he read the <i>Perfetta Poesia</i> and -the <i>Forza della fantasia</i> he could not have been satisfied by the -treatment meted out to the faculty of imagination, so highly valued -and respected by himself; and if Gravina influenced him at all it must -have been by provoking him to contradiction. In this latter (if not -directly in such French writers as Le Bossu) he may have met with the -fallacy of regarding Homer as a repository of wisdom, a fallacy which -he combated with vigour and pertinacity. In his estimation, among the -gravest faults of the Cartesians was their inability to appreciate the -world of imagination and poetry. Of his own times he complained they -were "benumbed by analytical methods and by a philosophy which sought -to deaden every faculty of soul which reached it through the body, -especially that of imagination, now held to be mother of all human -error": times "of a wisdom which freezes the generous soul of the best -poetry," and prevents all understanding of it.<a name="FNanchor_35_232" id="FNanchor_35_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_232" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Judgments of grammarians and linguists who preceded him</i></div> - -<p>It is just the same with the theory of language. "The manner of birth -and the nature of languages has been the cause of much painful toil -and meditation: nor, from the <i>Cratylus</i> of Plato, in which in our -other works we have falsely delighted and believed" (he alludes to -the doctrine followed by him in his own first book, <i>De antiquissima -Italorum sapientia</i>), "down to Wolfgang<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> Latius, Julius Cæsar Scaliger, -Francisco Sanchez and others, can we find anything to satisfy our -understanding; so much that in discussing matters of this kind Signor -Giovanni Clerico says there is nothing in philology involved in such a -maze of doubt and difficulty."<a name="FNanchor_36_233" id="FNanchor_36_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_233" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> The chief grammarian-philosophers do -not escape criticism. Grammar, says he, lays down rules for speaking -correctly: Logic for speaking truly; "and since in the order of -nature we must speak truly before learning to speak correctly, Giulio -Cesare della Scala, followed by the best grammarians, employs all his -magnificent energy to reason to the causes of the Latin language from -the principles of logic. But his great design ended in failure for this -reason, that he attached himself to the logical principles of a single -philosopher, namely Aristotle, whose principles are too universal to -explain the almost infinite particulars which naturally beset him who -would reason concerning a language. Whence it happened that Francisco -Sanchez, who followed him with admirable zeal, attempting in his -<i>Minerva</i> to explain the innumerable particles which are found in -Latin by his famous principle of ellipsis, and trying thereby, though -without success, to vindicate the logical principles of Aristotle, fell -into the most cumbrous clumsinesses among an almost innumerable host -of Latin phrases whereby he meant to make good the slight and subtle -omissions employed by Latin in expressing its meaning."<a name="FNanchor_37_234" id="FNanchor_37_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_234" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> The origin -of parts of speech and syntax is wholly different from that assigned -to them by folk who fancied that "the people who invented language -must first have gone to school to Aristotle."<a name="FNanchor_38_235" id="FNanchor_38_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_235" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The same criticism -undoubtedly must have extended to the logico-grammarians of Port-Royal, -for Vico remarked that the Logic of Arnauld was built "on the same plan -as that of Aristotle."<a name="FNanchor_39_236" id="FNanchor_39_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_236" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Influence of seventeenth century writers on Vico.</i></div> - -<p>It may well be granted that Vico was more in sympathy with the -seventeenth-century rhetoricians, in whom we have detected a -premonition of æsthetic science. For Vico, as for them, wit (referring -to imagination and memory) was "the father of all invention": judgement -concerning poetry was for him a "judgement of the senses," a phrase -equivalent to "taste" or "good taste," expressions never used by him -in this connexion. There is no doubt he was familiar with the writers -of treatises on wit and conceits, for, in a dry rhetorical manual -written for the use of his school (in which one looks in vain for a -shadow of his own personal ideas), he quotes Paolo Beni, Pellegrini, -Pallavicino and the Marquis Orsi.<a name="FNanchor_40_237" id="FNanchor_40_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_237" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> He highly esteems Pallavicini's -treatise on <i>Style</i> and has knowledge of the book <i>Del bene</i> by the -same author;<a name="FNanchor_41_238" id="FNanchor_41_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_238" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> perhaps too his mind was not unaffected by the flash -of genius which had enabled the Jesuit for one instant to perceive that -poetry consists of "first apprehensions." He does not name Tesauro, but -there is no doubt he knew him; indeed the <i>Scienza nuova</i> includes a -section, besides that on poetry, upon "blazons," "knightly bearings," -"military banners," "medals," and so forth, precisely similar in -method to that of Tesauro when he treats of" figurate conceits" in -his <i>Cannochiale aristotelico</i>.<a name="FNanchor_42_239" id="FNanchor_42_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_239" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> For Tesauro such conceits are -merely metaphorical ingenuities, like any other; for Vico they are -wholly the work of imagination, for imagination expresses itself not -in words only, but in the "mute language" of lines and colours. He -knew something also of Leibniz; the great German and Newton were by -him described as" the greatest wits of the time"<a name="FNanchor_43_240" id="FNanchor_43_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_240" class="fnanchor">[43]</a>; but he seems to -have remained in complete ignorance of the æsthetic attempts of the -Leibnitian school in Germany. His "Logic of poetry" was a discovery -independent of, and earlier than, Bülffinger's Organon of the inferior -faculties, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> <i>Gnoseologia inferior</i> of Baumgarten, and the <i>Logik -der Einbildungskraft</i> of Breitinger. In truth, Vico belongs on one -side to the vast Renaissance reaction against formalism and scholastic -verbalism, which, beginning with the reaffirmation of experience and -sensation (Telesio, Campanella, Galileo, Bacon), was bound to go on by -reasserting the function of imagination in individual and social life: -on the other side he is a precursor of Romanticism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic in the "Scienza nuova."</i></div> - -<p>The importance of Vico's new poetic theory in his thought as a whole -as well as in the organism of his <i>Scienza nuova</i> has never been fully -appreciated, and the Neapolitan philosopher is still commonly regarded -as the inventor of the Philosophy of History. If by such a science is -meant the attempt to deduce concrete history by ratiocination and to -treat epochs and events as if they were concepts, the only result of -Vico's efforts to solve the problem could have been failure; and the -same is true of his many successors. The fact is that his philosophy of -history, his ideal history, his <i>Scienza nuova d' intorno alia comune -natura delle nazioni,</i> does not concern the concrete empirical history -which unfolds itself in time: it is not history, it is a science of the -ideal, a Philosophy of the Spirit. That Vico made many discoveries in -history proper which have been to a great extent confirmed by modern -criticism (<i>e.g.</i> on the development of the Greek epic and the nature -and genesis of feudal society in antiquity and in the Middle Ages) -certainly deserves all emphasis; but this side of his work must be kept -distinctly apart from the other, strictly philosophical, side. And -if the philosophical part is a doctrine expounding the ideal moments -of the spirit, or in his own words "the modifications of our human -mind," of these moments or modifications Vico undertakes especially -to define and fully describe not the logical, ethical and economic -moments (though on these too he throws much fight), but precisely the -imaginative or poetic. The larger portion of the second <i>Scienza nuova</i> -hinges on the discovery of the creative imagination, including the "new -principles of Poetry," the observations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> on the nature of language, -mythology, writing, symbolic figures and so forth. All his "system -of civilization, of the Republic, of laws, of poetry, of history, in -a word, of humanity at large" is founded upon this discovery, which -constitutes the novel point of view at which Vico places himself. The -author himself observes that his second book, dedicated to Poetic -Wisdom, "wherein is made a discovery totally opposed to Verulam's," -forms "nearly the whole body of the work"; but the first and third -books also deal almost exclusively with works of the imagination. It -might be maintained, therefore, that Vico's "New Science" was really -just Æsthetic; or at least the Philosophy of the Spirit with special -emphasis upon the Philosophy of the Æsthetic Spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Vico's mistakes.</i></div> - - -<p>Among so many luminous points, or rather in such a general blaze of -light, there are yet dark nooks in his mind; corners that remain in -shadow. By not maintaining a rigid distinction between concrete history -and the philosophy of the spirit, Vico allowed himself to suggest -historical periods which do not correspond with the real periods, but -are rather allegories, the mythological expression of his philosophy -of the spirit. From the same source arises the multiplicity of those -periods (usually three in number) which Vico finds in the history of -civilization in general, in poetry and language and practically every -subject. "The first peoples, who were the children of the human race, -founded first the world of the arts: next, after a long interval, the -philosophers, who were therefore the aged among nations, founded the -world of the sciences: with which humanity attained completion."<a name="FNanchor_44_241" id="FNanchor_44_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_241" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> -Historically, understood in an approximate sense, this scheme of -evolution has some truth; but only an approximate truth. In consequence -of the same confusion of history and philosophy he denied primitive -peoples any kind of intellectual logic, and conceived not only their -physics, cosmology, astronomy and geography as poetic in character, but -their morals, their economy and their politics as well. But not only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> -has there never been a period in concrete human history entirely poetic -and ignorant of all abstraction or power of reasoning, but such a state -cannot even be conceived. Morals, politics, physics, all presuppose -intellectual work, however imperfect they may be. The ideal priority of -poetry cannot be materialized into a historical period of civilization.</p> - -<p>Linked with this error is another into which Vico often falls when -he asserts that "the chief aim of poetry" is to "teach the ignorant -vulgar to act virtuously" and to "invent fables adapted with the -popular understanding capable of producing strong emotion."<a name="FNanchor_45_242" id="FNanchor_45_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_242" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> -Having regard to the clear explanations he himself gave of the -inessentiality of abstractions and intellectual artifice in poetry; -when we remember that for him poetry makes her own rules for herself -without consulting anybody, and that he clearly established the -peculiar theoretical nature of the imagination, such a proposition -cannot be taken as a return to the pedagogic and heteronomous theory -of poetry which in substance he had left far behind: therefore, -without doubt, it follows from his historical hypothesis of a wholly -poetical epoch of civilization, in which education, science and -morality were administered by poets. Another consequence is that -"imaginative universals" are apparently sometimes understood by him as -imperfect universals (empirical or representative concepts as they were -subsequently called); although, on the other hand, individualization -is so marked in them and their unphilosophical nature so accentuated -that their interpretation as purely imaginative forms may be taken -as normal. In conclusion, we remark that fundamental terms are not -always used by Vico in the same sense: it is not always clear how -far "sensation," "memory," "imagination," "wit" are synonymous -or different. Sometimes "sensation" seems outside the spirit, at -others one of its chief moments; poets are sometimes the organ of -"imagination,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> sometimes the "sensation" of humanity; and imagination -is described as "dilated memory." These are the aberrations of a -thought so virgin and original that it was not easy to regulate.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Progress still to be achieved.</i></div> - -<p>To sever the Philosophy of the Spirit from History, the modifications -of the human mind from the historic vicissitudes of peoples, and -Æsthetic from Homeric civilization, and by continuing Vico's analyses -to determine more clearly the truths he uttered, the distinctions he -drew and the identities he divined; in short, to purge Æsthetic of the -remains of ancient Rhetoric and Poetics as well as from some over-hasty -schematisms imposed upon her by the author of her being: such is the -field of labour, such the progress still to be achieved after the -discovery of the autonomy of the æsthetic world due to the genius of -Giambattista Vico.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_198" id="Footnote_1_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_198"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova prima,</i> bk. iii. ch. 5 (<i>Opere di G. B. -Vico,</i> edited by G. Ferrari, 2nd ed., Milan, 1852-1854).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_199" id="Footnote_2_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_199"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova seconda, Elementi,</i> liii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_200" id="Footnote_3_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_200"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 26.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_201" id="Footnote_4_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_201"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii. introd.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_202" id="Footnote_5_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_202"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Op. cit. Elem.</i> xxxvi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_203" id="Footnote_6_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_203"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> bk. ii.; <i>Sentenze eroiche.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_204" id="Footnote_7_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_204"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Letter to De Angelis of December 25, 1725.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_205" id="Footnote_8_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_205"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Letter to De Angelis, <i>cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_206" id="Footnote_9_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_206"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. iii.; Letter to De Angelis, -<i>cit.</i>; <i>Giudizio su Dante.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_207" id="Footnote_10_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_207"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii.; <i>Logica poetica.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_208" id="Footnote_11_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_208"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Republica,</i> x.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_209" id="Footnote_12_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_209"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. iii. <i>ad init.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_210" id="Footnote_13_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_210"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Letter to De Angelis, <i>cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_211" id="Footnote_14_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_211"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. iii. <i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_212" id="Footnote_15_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_212"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_213" id="Footnote_16_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_213"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Letter to Solla, January 12, 1729; cf. <i>Scienza nuova -sec. Elem.</i> xliii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_214" id="Footnote_17_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_214"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. iii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_215" id="Footnote_18_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_215"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_216" id="Footnote_19_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_216"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii., <i>Corollari d' intorno all' -origine della locuzion poetica,</i> etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_217" id="Footnote_20_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_217"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_218" id="Footnote_21_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_218"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii., <i>Corollari d' intorno all' -origini delle lingue</i>, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_219" id="Footnote_22_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_219"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> bk. ii., <i>Corollari d' intorno a' tropi,</i> -etc., § 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_220" id="Footnote_23_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_220"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_221" id="Footnote_24_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_221"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. iii., <i>Pruove filosofiche.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_222" id="Footnote_25_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_222"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii.-ch. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_223" id="Footnote_26_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_223"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> bk. iii. chs. 27-33.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_224" id="Footnote_27_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_224"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Letter to De Angelis, <i>cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_225" id="Footnote_28_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_225"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii. introd.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_226" id="Footnote_29_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_226"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii., <i>Ultimi corollari,</i> § vi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_227" id="Footnote_30_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_227"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_228" id="Footnote_31_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_228"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii., <i>Della metafisica poetica,</i> -etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_229" id="Footnote_32_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_229"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Vita scritta da sè medesimo,</i> in <i>Opere, ed. cit.</i> iv. p. -365.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_230" id="Footnote_33_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_230"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 37.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_231" id="Footnote_34_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_231"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Note all' Arte poetica di Orazio,</i> in <i>Opere, ed. cit.</i> -vi. pp. 52-79.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_232" id="Footnote_35_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_232"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Letter to De Angelis, <i>cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_233" id="Footnote_36_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_233"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova pr.</i> bk. iii. ch. 22; cf. the review of -Clerico (Le Clerc) in <i>Opere,</i> iv. p. 382.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_234" id="Footnote_37_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_234"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Giudizio intorno alia gram. d' Antonio d' Aronne,</i> in -<i>Opere,</i> vi. pp. 149-150.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_235" id="Footnote_38_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_235"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. ii., <i>Corollari d' intorno all' -origini delle lingue,</i> etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_236" id="Footnote_39_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_236"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Vita, cit.</i> p. 343.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_237" id="Footnote_40_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_237"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Instituzioni oratorie e scritti inediti,</i> Naples, 1865, -pp. 90 <i>seqq.</i>: <i>De senteniiis, vulgo del ben parlare in concetti.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_238" id="Footnote_41_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_238"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Letter to the Duke of Laurenzana, March 1, 1732; and cf. -letter to Muzio Gæta.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_239" id="Footnote_42_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_239"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Cf. p. 190.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_240" id="Footnote_43_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_240"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. i., <i>Del metodo.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_241" id="Footnote_44_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_241"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec., Ultimi corollari,</i> § 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_242" id="Footnote_45_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_242"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> bk. iii. ch. 3; <i>Scienza nuova sec.</i> -bk. ii., <i>Della metafisica poetica</i>; and bk. iii. <i>ad init.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIb" id="VIb">VI</a></h4> - - -<h4>MINOR ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The influence of Vico.</i></div> - -<p>This step in advance had no immediate effect. The pages in the <i>Scienza -nuova</i> devoted to æsthetic doctrine were actually the least read of any -in that marvellous book. Not that Vico exercised no influence at all; -we shall see that several Italian authors both of his own time and of -the generation immediately following show traces of his æsthetic ideas; -but these traces are all external and material and therefore sterile. -Outside Italy the <i>Scienza nuova</i> (already announced by a compatriot -in 1726 in the <i>Acta</i> of Leipzig with the graceful comment that <i>magis -indulget ingenio quam veritati</i> and the pleasing information that <i>ab -ipsis Italis taedio magis quam applausu excipitur</i>)<a name="FNanchor_1_243" id="FNanchor_1_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_243" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> was mentioned -toward the end of the century, as is well known, by Herder, Goethe, -and some few others.<a name="FNanchor_2_244" id="FNanchor_2_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_244" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> In connection with poetry, especially with the -Homeric question, Vico's book was quoted by Friedrich August Wolf, to -whom it had been recommended by Cesarotti<a name="FNanchor_3_245" id="FNanchor_3_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_245" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> after the publication of -the <i>Prolegomena ad Homerum</i> (1795), but without any suspicion of the -importance of its general doctrine of poetry, of which the Homeric -hypothesis was a mere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> application. Wolf (1807) imagined himself in the -presence of a talented forerunner in an isolated problem, instead of -a man of intellectual stature towering above any philologist, however -great.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Italian writers: Conti.</i></div> - -<p>Neither by reliance on the works of Vico, who founded no real school, -nor, it must be added, by any independent effort along new lines, -did thought succeed in maintaining or improving upon the position -already attained. A notable attempt to establish a philosophical -theory of poetry and the arts was made by the Venetian A. Conti, who -left numerous sketches for essays on imagination, the faculties of the -soul, poetic imitation and similar subjects, designed for inclusion -in a large treatise on the Beautiful and Art. Conti had started by -professing ideas very like those of Du Bos, affirming that the poet -must "put everything in images"; that taste is as indefinable as -feeling, and that there are persons without taste just as there are -blind and deaf persons; he also wrote polemical tracts against the -Cartesians. Later he abandoned his sensationalistic or sentimentalist -theories,<a name="FNanchor_4_246" id="FNanchor_4_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_246" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> and, inquiring into the nature of poetry, declared -himself ill-satisfied with Castelvetro, Patrizzi, and even Gravina. -"Had Castelvetro," he observes, "who writes so subtly of Aristotle's -<i>Poetics,</i> given two or three chapters to a philosophical explanation -of the idea of imitation, he would have solved many questions raised -but not clearly answered by himself concerning poetic theories. In his -<i>Poetica</i> and in his controversy against Torquato Tasso, Patrizzi never -succeeded in clearly defining the philosophical idea of imitation; he -collected much useful information about the history of poetry, but -wilfully lost the Platonic doctrine by allowing it to mingle with the -historical detail instead of gathering it up without sophistry into a -single point, when it would have appeared in a very different guise. -The <i>Ragion poetica</i> of Gravina shadows forth a sort of philosophical -idea of imitation; but so wholly engrossed is he in deducing therefrom -rules for lyrical, dramatical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> and epic poetry, and illustrating each -with examples from the most celebrated poets, Greek, Latin and Italian, -that he is too busy to question the sufficiency of the fertile idea he -has propounded."<a name="FNanchor_5_247" id="FNanchor_5_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_247" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> A close follower of contemporary European thought, -Conti was familiar with Hutcheson, whose theories he vigorously -repudiated, observing, "Why this multiplication of faculties?" The -soul is one, and for scholastic convenience only has been divided into -three faculties: sense, imagination, intellect; the first "concerns -herself with objects present before her; imagination with those afar -into which memory gradually merges: but the object of sense and -imagination is always particular; it is only the mind, the intellect, -the spirit, that by comparing particulars apprehends the universal." -"Before introducing a new sense for the pleasure of beauty" Hutcheson -should have "assigned limits to these three faculties of cognition and -demonstrated that the pleasure occasioned by beauty does not arise from -the three pleasures of these three faculties, or from intellectual -pleasure alone, to which they all reduce, if the functions of the -soul be carefully analysed." Thus it would appear that the mistake -of the Scotchman<a name="FNanchor_6_248" id="FNanchor_6_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_248" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> arose from his habit of separating pleasure from -the cognitive faculties, placing the former apart in a special empty -"sense of beauty."<a name="FNanchor_7_249" id="FNanchor_7_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_249" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> On the other hand, when rewriting the history of -the opinions of various critics upon the Aristotelian doctrine of the -universal in poetry, Conti gave much weight to the dialogue <i>Naugerius -seu De poëtica</i> of Fracastoro;<a name="FNanchor_8_250" id="FNanchor_8_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_250" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> for an instant he seems on the -point of grasping the essence of the poetic universal and identifying -it with the characteristic, which makes us call even horrible things -wholly beautiful. "In all his journeys Balzac never saw a beautiful -old woman: in the poetic or picturesque sense an old woman is highly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> -beautiful, if depicted as having suffered all the dilapidations of -age": immediately after, however, he identifies the characteristic with -Wolff's concept of perfection: "It does not differ from being, nor does -being differ from the truth which the schoolmen call transcendental -and which is the object of all arts and all sciences; we call it the -object of poetry when by means of imaginary presentations it ravishes -the intellect and moves the wall, transporting both these faculties -into the ideal and archetypal world of which, following S. Augustine, -Father Malebranche discourses at length in his <i>Recherche de la -vérité</i>."<a name="FNanchor_9_251" id="FNanchor_9_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_251" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> In the same way Fracastoro's universal gives place to the -universal of science: "Owing to the infinity of their determinations -all we can know of particulars is their common properties, which -is merely another manner of saying that we have no science save of -universal. Thus it is precisely the same if we say the object of -poetry is science or the universal; which is the doctrine of Navagero, -following Aristotle."<a name="FNanchor_10_252" id="FNanchor_10_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_252" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The "imaginative universals of Signor Vico" -(with whom he had interchanged some letters) opened no new views for -him: he notes that Signor Vico "talks a great deal about them" and -"holds that the most uncivilized men, having framed them not from any -wish to please or serve others, but from the necessity of expressing -their feelings as nature taught them, spoke in poetical language the -elements of a theology, a physics, and an ethics wholly poetical." -Conti excuses himself from immediate examination of "this critical -question" and only opines that "it can be shown in many ways that -these imaginative universals are the material or object of poetry, -in so far as they contain within them sciences or things considered -in themselves"<a name="FNanchor_11_253" id="FNanchor_11_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_253" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>—a conclusion diametrically opposed to that which -"Signor Vico" meant to express. Conti is next obliged to ask himself -how it is possible that poetry's object should be not the true but the -probable, when the universal of poetry is the same as that of science. -He<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> answers by coming down to the commonplace level of a Baumgarten: -"When sciences receive a particular colouring, we pass from the true to -the probable." Imitation means giving the impression of truth; that is -done by selecting a few of its features only; and this is the procedure -in which the probable just consists. If you wish to describe the -rainbow poetically, a great part of the Newtonian optics must be thrown -overboard; thus "many circumstances of mathematical demonstration" will -be neglected in poetical descriptions, and the rest, which is utilized, -will form the probable or that particular "which awakens the universal -idea, slumbering in the minds of the learned." The great art of poetry -consists "in selection of the image containing the greatest number of -points of universal doctrine which, by being inserted in the example, -may so colour the precept that I may find it without seeking it, or -recognize it through its connexion with events described."<a name="FNanchor_12_254" id="FNanchor_12_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_254" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Hence -poetry cannot be content with imitation; allegory too is needed: "in -ancient poetry one thing is read and another is meant." Here follows -the inevitable instance of the Homeric poems, in which Conti certainly -finds elements which cannot be reduced to instruction and allegory and -therefore to some extent deserve the Platonic condemnation.<a name="FNanchor_13_255" id="FNanchor_13_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_255" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> He -recognizes a species of imagination differing from passive sensibility, -"which Father Malebranche calls active imagination, and Plato the art -of imagery; it comprises all that is meant by wit, sagacity, judgement -and good taste, which teach a poet to use or not to use at a given time -or place the rules and licences of art, and to control the extravagance -of his imagery."<a name="FNanchor_14_256" id="FNanchor_14_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_256" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> On the question of literary taste he follows -the opinion of Trevisano and decides that it consists in "setting in -mutual harmony, that is to say restraining within limits, the soul's -cognitive faculties, memory, imagination and intellect, allowing none -to overwhelm another."<a name="FNanchor_15_257" id="FNanchor_15_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_257" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Quadrio and Zanotti.</i></div> - -<p>By assiduous travail of thought and perpetual search<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> for the best, -Conti kept himself at the highest level of æsthetic speculation in -contemporary Europe (Vico always excepted); at the same level as -Baumgarten in Germany. We pass rapidly over other Italian writers -such as Quadrio (1739), author of the first great encyclopædia of -universal literature, in which he defines poetry as "the science of -things human and divine, presented in pictures to the populace, and -written in words connected by measure";<a name="FNanchor_16_258" id="FNanchor_16_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_258" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and Francesco Maria Zanotti -(1768), who describes poetry as "the art of versification in order to -give pleasure":<a name="FNanchor_17_259" id="FNanchor_17_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_259" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> the first is worthy of a mediæval anthologist, -the second of a no less mediæval composer of handbooks on rhythm and -methods of composition. The only serious student of æsthetic was -Melchior Cesarotti.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Cesarotti</i></div> - -<p>Cesarotti called attention to popular and primitive poetry: he -translated Ossian and illustrated the text with dissertations; he -unearthed antique Spanish poems and even the folk-songs of Mexico and -Lapland; he studied Hebrew poetry; he dedicated the greater part of -his life to the Homeric poems, examining all the theories of critics -past and present, encountering Vico in this connexion and discussing -his views. Besides this, he debated the origin of poetry, the pleasure -given by tragedy, taste, the beautiful, eloquence, style, in short -every problem belonging to æsthetics which had been raised up to his -time.<a name="FNanchor_18_260" id="FNanchor_18_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_260" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> One seems to catch an echo of Vico as one listens to his -words on La Motte: "He had logic, but knew not that the logic of -poetry differs somewhat from ordinary logic: he was a man of great -talent, but he recognized talent only, and was incapable of feeling the -immeasurable distance between judicious prose and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> poetry: the real -Homer with his attractive faults will always be more beloved than his -reformed Homer with his cold, affected virtue."<a name="FNanchor_19_261" id="FNanchor_19_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_261" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Cesarotti purposed -(1762) bringing out a great theoretico-historical book in whose first -part "we shall suppose the non-existence of poetry and poetic art and -try to trace by what path a man of illuminated reason can have reached -the idea of the possibility of such an art and how he can have attained -perfection by these means: every one will be able to see poetry growing -up under his eyes, so to speak, and attest the truth of theory by -the testimony of his own personal feelings."<a name="FNanchor_20_262" id="FNanchor_20_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_262" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Although celebrated -throughout Italy in his day as one who "with the most pure torch of -philosophy has thrown beams of light into the darkest recesses of -poetry and eloquence,"<a name="FNanchor_21_263" id="FNanchor_21_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_263" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> it does not appear that the distinguished -scholar, the pleasing and desultory philosopher, offered any profound -or original solutions. In 1797 he defined poetry as "the art of -representing and perfecting nature by means of picturesque, animated, -imaginative and harmonious discourse."<a name="FNanchor_22_264" id="FNanchor_22_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_264" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Bettinelli and Pagano.</i></div> - -<p>The fashion of the day in philosophy made men impatient of the ideas -found in writers of treatises of former times. Arteaga praises -Cesarotti for "that fine tact, that impartial criticism, that -logical spirit derived not from the trickling streamlets of Sperone, -Castelvetro, Casa and Bembo, but from the profound and inexhaustible -springs of Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, d'Alembert, Sulzer, and -writers of like temper."<a name="FNanchor_23_265" id="FNanchor_23_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_265" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Writing to Saverio Bettinelli, who was -preparing a work on <i>Enthusiasm,</i> Paradisi hoped it would prove "a -metaphysical history of enthusiasm which shall outweigh all those -Poetics which are only fit to be burned," and would "make waste paper -of Castelvetro, the 'Mintumo,' and that stupid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> creature, Quadrio."<a name="FNanchor_24_266" id="FNanchor_24_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_266" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> -In spite of these aspirations Bettinelli's book (1769) contains little -beyond vivacious and eloquent empirical observations concerning the -psychology of poets, "poetic enthusiasm," to which he assigns six -degrees, namely, elevation, vision, rapidity, novelty and surprise, -passion and transfusion. Equally empirical was Mario Pagano in his two -fragments, <i>Gusto e le belle arti</i> and <i>Origine e natura della poesia</i> -(1783-1785), in which he grotesquely combines some ideas from Vico with -the current sensationalism. Theoretico-imaginative form and sensuous -pleasure are presented by him as two historical periods of art. "In -their cradle the fine arts are directed towards making a true imitation -of nature rather than towards loveliness. Their first steps are towards -expression rather than charm.... In the most ancient poetry, even in -the ballads of barbarous ages, there lives a most compelling pathos: -passions are expressed naturally, even the sound of the words is -alive with the expression of the things described." But "the period -of perfection is reached at the moment when exact imitation of nature -is coupled with complete beauty, accord and harmony," when "the taste -is refined and society reaches its most complete form of culture." -Fine arts "precede by a short time the dawn of philosophy, that is -to say, the time of the most intense perfection of society"; indeed, -certain modes of art, such as tragedy, must necessarily come later -than philosophy whose aid must be invoked to further "the purgation of -manners."<a name="FNanchor_25_267" id="FNanchor_25_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_267" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>German disciples of Baumgarten. G. F. Meier.</i></div> - -<p>The compatriots and successors of Baumgarten, like those of Vico, -did little by way of understanding or improving upon his work. An -enthusiastic admirer and disciple of Baumgarten who had attended his -lectures at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, Georg Friedrich Meier, came forward -in 1746 to defend the <i>Meditationes</i> against the attacks of Quistorp to -whom the master had deigned no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> reply;<a name="FNanchor_26_268" id="FNanchor_26_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_268" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> already in 1748, prior to -the publication of the <i>Æsthetic,</i> he had published the first volume -of his <i>Principles of all the Beautiful Sciences</i>,<a name="FNanchor_27_269" id="FNanchor_27_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_269" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> followed in -1749 and 1750 by the second and third volumes. This book, which is -a complete exposition of Baumgarten's theory, is divided, according -to the master's method, into three parts: invention of beautiful -thoughts (heuristic), æsthetic method (methodic), and the beautiful -signification of thoughts (semiotic); the first of these (occupying -two and a half volumes) is subdivided into three sections: beauty -of sense-apprehension (æsthetic richness, grandeur, verisimilitude, -vivacity, certainty, sensitive life and wit), sensitive faculties -(attention, abstraction, senses, imagination, subtlety, acumen, -memory, poetic power, taste, foresight, conjecture, signification and -the minor appetitive faculties), and the diverse kinds of beautiful -thought (æsthetic concepts, judgements, and syllogisms). Elsewhere -than in this book, which was reprinted many times (in 1757 an epitome -was issued<a name="FNanchor_28_270" id="FNanchor_28_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_270" class="fnanchor">[28]</a>), Meier discusses Æsthetic in several of his numerous -works, especially in a little tract, <i>Considerations on the First -Principles of all Fine Arts and Sciences</i>.<a name="FNanchor_29_271" id="FNanchor_29_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_271" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Who was more tenderly -inclined than he towards the science so recently born and baptized? He -was ardent in her defence against those who denied both her possibility -and her utility, and against those who admitted these yet complained, -not unreasonably, that she was substantially the same as that which in -former days had been treated as Poetics and Rhetoric. He parried this -accusation, of which he recognized the partial truth, by asserting -that it was impossible for one writer to have perfect knowledge of all -the arts: another of his excuses was to the effect that Æsthetic was -a science too young to show the perfection reached by other sciences -after the cultivation of centuries; in one place he says he has no -intention of arguing "with those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> enemies of Æsthetic who will not or -cannot see the true nature and aim of this science, but have built for -themselves in its place a deformed and miserable image against which, -when they fight, they fight against themselves." With philosophic -resignation he concludes that the same fate is in store for Æsthetic as -for every science: "At first when almost unknown they encounter enemies -and detractors who ridicule them through ignorance and prejudice; -but later they meet persons of intellect who, by working at them -conjointly, carry them on to their proper perfection."<a name="FNanchor_30_272" id="FNanchor_30_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_272" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Confusions of Meier.</i></div> - -<p>Students of the new science flocked to Halle University to hear Meier -lecture on Æsthetic whose "chief author" or "inventor" (<i>Haupturheber, -Erfinder</i>), as Meier never tired of repeating, was "Herr Professor -Baumgarten"; at the same time warning them that his own <i>Anfangsgründe</i> -were no mere transcription of Baumgarten's lectures.<a name="FNanchor_31_273" id="FNanchor_31_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_273" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Still, while -recognizing the great gifts of Meier as publicity-agent, the facility, -clarity and wealth of his eloquence, and his shrewdness in polemic, -one cannot altogether deny the justice of the remark upon "Professor -Baumgarten of Frankfort and his ape (<i>Affe)</i> Professor Meier of -Halle."<a name="FNanchor_32_274" id="FNanchor_32_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_274" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Every defect of Baumgarten's Æsthetic reappears accentuated -in Meier; the limits of the inferior cognitive faculties, alleged as -the domain of poetry and the arts, are laid down by him most strangely. -It is curious to note how, for example, he interprets the difference -between the confused (æsthetical) and the distinct (logical), and the -proposition that beauty disappears when made the object of distinct -thought. "The cheeks of a beautiful girl whereon bloom the roses of -youth are lovely so long as they are looked at with the naked eye. But -let them be examined with a magnifying glass. Where is their beauty? -One can hardly believe that such a disgusting surface, scaly, all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> -mounts and hollows, the pores full of dirt, with hairs sprouting here -and there, can be the seat of that amorous attraction which subdues -the heart."<a name="FNanchor_33_275" id="FNanchor_33_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_275" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> That is described as "æsthetically false" whose truth -the inferior faculty is unable to grasp: for example, the theory that -bodies are composed of monads.<a name="FNanchor_34_276" id="FNanchor_34_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_276" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Once they have become intelligible -to these faculties, general concepts possess great æsthetic richness, -since they include infinite consequences and particular cases.<a name="FNanchor_35_277" id="FNanchor_35_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_277" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> -Æsthetic also comprehends those things which cannot be thought -distinctly or, if so thought, might be capable of upsetting philosophic -gravity: a kiss may be an excellent subject for a poet; but whatever -would be thought of a philosopher who sought to demonstrate its -necessity by the mathematical method?<a name="FNanchor_36_278" id="FNanchor_36_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_278" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Moreover, Meier includes the -whole theory of observation and experiment in Æsthetic, to which this -theory belongs, he says, by right of its connexion with the senses,<a name="FNanchor_37_279" id="FNanchor_37_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_279" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> -and also the whole theory of the appetitive faculties, because -"æsthetic requires not only a fine wit but a noble heart as well."<a name="FNanchor_38_280" id="FNanchor_38_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_280" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> -He comes near truth sometimes, when, for example, he observes that -the logical form presupposes the æsthetic and that our first concepts -are sensitive, later becoming distinct by the help of logic;<a name="FNanchor_39_281" id="FNanchor_39_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_281" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> -and when he condemns allegory as "among the most decadent forms of -beautiful thinking."<a name="FNanchor_40_282" id="FNanchor_40_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_282" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> But, on the other hand, he thinks that logical -distinctions and definitions, although not necessarily sought after -by genius, are very useful in poetry; they are even indispensable as -regulators of beautiful thinking and make up, as it were, the skeleton -of the body poetic: great care, however, must be taken not to judge -æsthetical general concepts, <i>notiones æstheticæ universales,</i> with -the rigorous exactitude demanded by philosophical. And since such -concepts, taken singly, may be likened to unstrung jewels, they must be -connected by the string of æsthetic judgement and syllogism, the theory -of which is identical with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> that presented by Logic, setting aside that -part which is of little or no use to genius, but belongs exclusively -to the philosopher.<a name="FNanchor_41_283" id="FNanchor_41_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_283" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> In his <i>Considerations</i> of 1757 Meier, having -combated the principle of imitation (which appeared to him at once too -broad, since science and morals are also imitations of nature, and too -narrow, since art does not imitate natural objects solely nor should -it imitate them all, for the immoral must be excluded), reaffirmed the -thesis that the æsthetic principle consists in the "greatest possible -beauty of sense-perception."<a name="FNanchor_42_284" id="FNanchor_42_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_284" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> He upheld this by condemning as -erroneous the belief that this sense-perception is wholly sensuous -and confused, without any gleam of distinctness or rationality. The -perception of sweet, bitter, red, etc., is wholly sensuous; but there -is another perception which is both sensuous and intellectual, confused -and distinct, in which both faculties, the higher and the lower, -collaborate. When intellectuality prevails in this consciousness, -then we have science: when sensibility, then we have poetry. "From -our explanation it will be gathered that the inferior cognitive -faculties must collect all the material of a poem, and all its parts. -Intellect and judgement, on the other hand, watch and ensure that these -materials are placed side by side in such a way that in their connexion -distinction and order may be observed."<a name="FNanchor_43_285" id="FNanchor_43_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_285" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Here a plunge into -sensationalism, there a fugitive glimpse of truth: most often, and in -conclusion, an adherence to the old mechanical, ornamental, pedagogic -theory of poetry: this is the impression left on us by the æsthetic -writings of Meier.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>M. Mendelssohn and other followers of Baumgarten. Vogue of -Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>Another disciple of Baumgarten, Mendelssohn, conceiving beauty -as "indistinct image of a perfection," deduced that God can have -no perception of beauty, as this is merely a phenomenon of human -imperfection. According to him a primary form of pleasure is that -of the senses, arising from "the bettered state of our bodily -constitution"; a secondary form is the æsthetic fact of sensible -beauty, that is to say, unity in variety; a third<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> form is perfection, -or harmony in variety.<a name="FNanchor_44_286" id="FNanchor_44_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_286" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> He too repudiates Hutcheson's <i>deus ex -machina,</i> the sense of beauty. Sensible beauty, perfection such as -can be apprehended by the senses, is independent of the fact that -the object represented is beautiful or ugly, good or bad by nature; -it suffices that it leaves us not indifferent: whence Mendelssohn -agrees with Baumgarten's definition, "a poem is a discourse sensibly -perfect."<a name="FNanchor_45_287" id="FNanchor_45_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_287" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Elias Schlegel (1742) conceived art as imitation, not -so servile as to seem a copy, but having similarity rather than -identity with nature: he considered the duty of poetry was first to -please and only afterwards to instruct.<a name="FNanchor_46_288" id="FNanchor_46_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_288" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Treatises on Æsthetic, -university lectures or slender volumes for use of the public, <i>Theories -of the Fine Arts and Letters, Manuals, Sketches, Texts, Principles, -Introductions, Lectures, Essays,</i> and <i>Considerations on Taste</i> poured -down thick and fast on Germany during the second half of the eighteenth -century. There are at least thirty full or complete treatises and many -dozens of minor tracts or fragments. After the Protestant universities, -the Catholic took up the new science, which was taught by Riedel at -Vienna, Herwigh at Würzburg, Ladrone at Mainz, Jacobi at Freiburg, -and by others at Ingolstadt after the expulsion of the Jesuits.<a name="FNanchor_47_289" id="FNanchor_47_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_289" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> A -pretty little volume on the <i>First Principles of the Fine Arts</i><a name="FNanchor_48_290" id="FNanchor_48_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_290" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> was -written (1790) for Catholic schools by the notorious Franciscan friar -Eulogius Schneider, who, after being unfrocked, terrorised Strasburg in -the days of the Convention, and met his end under the guillotine. The -frenzied output of these German <i>Æsthetics</i> resembles that of <i>Poetics</i> -in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> Italy in the sixteenth century, after the rise to popularity of -Aristotle's treatise. Between 1771 and 1774 the Swiss Sulzer brought -out his great æsthetic encyclopædia, <i>The General Theory of the Fine -Arts,</i> in alphabetical order, with historical notes upon each article, -which were greatly enlarged in the second edition of 1792, edited by a -retired Prussian captain, von Blankenburg.<a name="FNanchor_49_291" id="FNanchor_49_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_291" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> In 1799, one J. Roller -published a first <i>Sketch of the History of Æsthetic,</i><a name="FNanchor_50_292" id="FNanchor_50_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_292" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> in which he -observes not unjustly, "Patriotic youth will be pleased to recognize -that Germany has produced more literature on this subject than any -other country."<a name="FNanchor_51_293" id="FNanchor_51_293"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_293" class="fnanchor">[51]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Eberhard and Eschenburg.</i></div> - -<p>Confining ourselves to bare mention of the works of Riedel (1767), -Faber (1767), Schütz (1776-1778), Schubart (1777-1781), Westenrieder -(1777), Szerdahel (1779), König (1784), Gang (1785), Meiners (1787), -Schott (1789), Moritz (1788),<a name="FNanchor_52_294" id="FNanchor_52_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_294" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> we will select from the crowd the -<i>Theory of Fine Arts and Letters</i> (1783) of Johann August Eberhard, -successor to Meier in the Chair at Halle,<a name="FNanchor_53_295" id="FNanchor_53_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_295" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> and the <i>Sketch of a -Theory and Literature of Letters</i> (1783) by Johann Joachim Eschenburg, -one of the most popular books of the day for students.<a name="FNanchor_54_296" id="FNanchor_54_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_296" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> Both -these authors are followers of Baumgarten, with inclinations towards -sensationalism; amongst other things Eberhard considered the beautiful -as "that which pleases the most distinct senses," that is to say, of -sight and hearing.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>J. G. Sulzer.</i></div> - -<p>A word must be accorded to Sulzer, in whom we find the most curious -alternation of new and old, the romantic influence of the new Swiss -school and the utilitarianism and intellectualism of his day. He -asserts that beauty exists wherever unity, variety and order are found: -the work of an artist is strictly in the form, in lively expression -(<i>lebhafte<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> Darstellung</i>): the material is irrelevant to art, but -the duty of every reasonable and sensible man is to make judicious -selection. The beauty which is used to clothe the good as well as the -bad is not the ineffable, celestial Beauty, offspring of the alliance -between the beautiful, the good and the perfect, which awakens more -than mere pleasure, a veritable joy which ravishes and beatifies our -soul. Such is the human face when, by filling the eye of the beholder -with the pleasure of form arising from the variety, proportion and -order of the features, it proceeds to arouse the imagination and -intellect by its suggestion of interior perfection; of the same -nature is the statue of a great man carved by Phidias, or a patriotic -oration by Cicero. If truth lie outside art and belong to philosophy, -the most noble use to which art may be put is to make us feel the -important truths which lend her strength and energy, not to mention -that truth itself enters into art in the shape of truthful imitation -or representation. Sulzer also repeats (and he is not the last) that -orators, historians and poets are intermediaries between speculative -philosophy and the people.<a name="FNanchor_55_297" id="FNanchor_55_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_297" class="fnanchor">[55]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>K. H. Heydenreich.</i></div> - -<p>Karl Heinrich Heydenreich returns to a sounder tradition when he -defines art (1790) as "a representation of a determinate state of -sensibility," and observes that man, as a cognitive being, is impelled -to enlarge the sphere of his cognitions and impart his discoveries to -his fellows, while as a sensitive being he is impelled to represent -and communicate his sensations; whence arise science and art. But -Heydenreich does not clearly grasp the cognitive character of art; for -in his opinion sensations become objects of artistic representation -either because they are pleasing or, when not pleasing, because they -are useful to further the moral aims of man as a social being; the -objects of sensibility which enter into art must be possessed of -intrinsic excellence and value and bear reference not to a single -individual but to the individual as a rational being: hence the -objectivity and necessity of taste. Like Baumgarten<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> and Meier, he -divides Æsthetic into three parts: a doctrine of <i>inventio,</i> another of -<i>methodica,</i> a third of the <i>ars significandi</i>.<a name="FNanchor_56_298" id="FNanchor_56_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_298" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote">J. G. Herder.</div> - -<p>Another disciple of Baumgarten is J. G. Herder, who had an unbounded -admiration for the old Berlin master, whom he calls "the Aristotle -of his day," and defends him warmly against those who think fit to -describe him as a "stupid and obtuse syllogizer" (1769). On the -other hand he had slight esteem for subsequent Æsthetic, for example -Meier's work, which he stigmatized accurately enough as "in part a -re-mastication of Logic, in part a patchwork of metaphorical terms, -comparisons and examples." "O Æsthetic!" he cries with emphasis, -"O Æsthetic! the most fertile, the most beautiful and by far the -most novel of all abstract sciences, in what cavern of the Muses is -sleeping the youth of my philosophic nation destined to bring thee -to perfection?"<a name="FNanchor_57_299" id="FNanchor_57_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_299" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> He denied Baumgarten's claim to have established -an <i>Ars pulchre cogitandi</i> instead of limiting himself to a simple -<i>Scientia de pulchro et pulchris philosophice cogitans,</i> and ridiculed -the scruple which held Æsthetic to be unworthy of the dignity of -Philosophy.<a name="FNanchor_58_300" id="FNanchor_58_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_300" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> To compensate for this, however, he accepted the -fundamental definition cf poetry as <i>oratio sensitiva perfecta</i>: -gem of definitions (says he), the best that has ever been invented, -that penetrates to the heart of the matter, touches the true poetic -principles and opens the most extended view over the entire philosophy -of the beautiful, "coupling poetry with her sisters, the fine -arts."<a name="FNanchor_59_301" id="FNanchor_59_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_301" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> Like Cesarotti the Italian, but with much less vivacity and -brilliance, Herder the German had studied primitive poetry, Ossian and -the songs of ancient peoples, Shakespeare (1773), popular love-songs -(1778), the spirit of Hebrew poetry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> (1782), and oriental poetry; these -studies powerfully impressed upon his mind the sensitive nature of -poetry. His friend Hamann (1762) had written these memorable words, -which read like an extract from one of Vico's aphorisms: "Poetry is -the mother-tongue of mankind: in the same way that the garden is older -than the ploughed field, painting than writing, song than declamation, -barter than trade. The repose of our most ancient progenitors was a -slumber deeper than ours; their motion a tumultuous dance. They spent -seven days in the silence of thought or of stupor; and opened their -mouths to pronounce winged words. Their speech was sensation and -passion, and they understood nothing but images. Of images is composed -all the treasure of human knowledge and felicity."<a name="FNanchor_60_302" id="FNanchor_60_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_302" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> Although -Herder, who knew and admired Vico,<a name="FNanchor_61_303" id="FNanchor_61_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_303" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> does not mention him by name -when treating of language and poetry, one might suppose him to be -influenced by the great Neapolitan at least in the final consolidation -of his theories; but, on the contrary, the authors whom he chiefly -quotes in this connexion are Du Bos, Goguet and Condillac, and observes -"the first beginnings of human speech in tone, gesture, expression of -sensations and thoughts by means of images and signs, can only have -been a kind of crude poetry, and so it is among every savage nation -in the world." Not a speech with punctuation and a sense of syllable, -like ours, learning as we do to read and write, but an unsyllabled -melody which gave birth to the primitive epic. "Natural man depicts -what he sees and as he sees it, alive, powerful, monstrous; in order -or disorder, as he sees and hears, so he reproduces. Not alone did -barbarous tongues thus arrange their images, but Greek and Latin do -the same. As the senses offered material, so the poets utilized it; -especially in Homer we see how closely nature is followed in images -which glow and fade perpetually and inimitably. He describes things<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> -and events line by line, scene by scene; and, in the same way, he -paints men in their very bodies, actually as they speak and move." -Later we distinguish epic from what we call history; because the former -"not only describes what has happened but describes the event in its -entirety, showing how it occurred in the only possible way, having -regard to surrounding circumstance of body and spirit": this is the -reason of the more philosophical character of poetry. As for pleasure, -no doubt we do find poetry pleasant; but the idea that the poet's -motive is merely to excite pleasure cannot be condemned too strongly. -"Homer's gods were as essential and indispensable to the poet's world -as the forces of motion are to the world of matter. Without the -deliberations and activities of Olympus, none of the necessary events -which happen on this earth could take place. Homer's magic island in -the western sea belongs to the map of his hero's wanderings by the same -necessity which placed it on the map of the world: it was necessary -to the plan of his poem. It is the same with the severe Dante and his -circles of Hell and Heaven." Art is formative: she disciplines, orders -and governs the imagination and every faculty of man: not only did she -generate history, "but, earlier yet, she created gods and heroes and -purified the uncouth imaginations and fables of peoples with their -Titans, monsters and Gorgons, reducing to limit and law the riotous -imagination of ignorant men which knows no bounds or rule."<a name="FNanchor_62_304" id="FNanchor_62_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_304" class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p> - -<p>Notwithstanding these intuitions, so like those of Vico early in the -same century, Herder as a philosopher is inferior to his Italian -predecessor, and in point of fact does not rise superior to Baumgarten. -By application of Leibniz' law of continuity, he too arrived at the -opinion that the pleasing, the true, the beautiful and the good are -degrees of one single activity. For instance, sensible pleasure" is -a participation in the true and the good, so far as the senses may -comprehend them; the feeling of pleasure and pain is no other than the -feeling of the true<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> and the good, that is to say, the consciousness -that the aim of our organism, the conservation of our well-being and -the avoidance of our hurt, has been attained."<a name="FNanchor_63_305" id="FNanchor_63_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_305" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> Fine arts and -letters are all instructive (<i>bildend</i>): hence the terms <i>humaniora,</i> -the Greek <i>καλόν,</i> the Latin <i>pulchrum,</i> the <i>gentle</i> arts of days -of chivalry, <i>les belles lettres et les beaux arts</i> of the French. A -group of them (gymnastic, dance, etc.) educates the body; a second -group (painting, plastic, music) educates the nobler senses of man, -the eye, the ear, the hand and tongue; a third (poetry) touches the -intellect, the imagination and the reason: a fourth group governs human -tendencies and inclinations.<a name="FNanchor_64_306" id="FNanchor_64_306"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_306" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> Herder disapproved of the facile -theorists of art who began straight away with a definition of beauty, -a complex and involved concept. He held that the theory of fine arts -should be subdivided into three theories, each to be built up from -the foundations, the theory of sight, of hearing and of touch, that -is to say of painting, music and sculpture, <i>i.e.</i> into æsthetical -Optics, æsthetical Acoustics and æsthetical Physiology. "Fairly well -elaborated in the psychological and subjective aspects, Æsthetic -is sadly undeveloped in all that belongs to the object and to the -sensation of beauty, without which there can never be a fertile theory -of the Beautiful capable of influencing all the arts."<a name="FNanchor_65_307" id="FNanchor_65_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_307" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> Taste is not -"a fundamental faculty of the soul but a habitual application of our -judgement (intellectual judgement) to objects of beauty"; an acquired -facility of the intellect (of which Herder outlines the genesis).<a name="FNanchor_66_308" id="FNanchor_66_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_308" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> -The poet is poet not only in his imagination but in his intellect. -In 1782 he writes: "The barbarous name Æsthetic of recent invention -indicates nothing beyond a section of Logic: that which we call taste -is neither more nor less than a quick and rapid judgement which does -not exclude truth and profundity, but rather presupposes and promotes -them. All didactic poetry is nothing more than philosophy rendered -sensible: the fable as exposition of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> general doctrine is truth in -act, in activity.... When expounded and applied to human affairs, -Philosophy is not only a fine art in herself (<i>schöne Wissenschaft,</i>) -but the mother of Beauty: it is only through her that Rhetoric and -Poetry can ever be educational, useful, or in the truest sense -pleasant."<a name="FNanchor_67_309" id="FNanchor_67_309"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_309" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy of language.</i></div> - -<p>Herder and Hamann deserve our gratitude for having brought a current of -fresh air into the study of the philosophy of language. The lead given -by the Port-Royal authors had been followed since the beginning of -the century by many writers of logical or general grammars. According -to the French Encyclopædia, "<i>La grammaire générale est la science -raisonnée des principes immuables et généraux de la parole prononcée -ou écrite dans toutes les langues</i>,"<a name="FNanchor_68_310" id="FNanchor_68_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_310" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> and d'Alembert spoke of -grammarians of invention and grammarians of memory, assigning to the -former the duty of studying the metaphysics of grammar.<a name="FNanchor_69_311" id="FNanchor_69_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_311" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> General -grammars had been written by Du Marsais, De Beauzée, and Condillac -in France; Harris in England; and many others.<a name="FNanchor_70_312" id="FNanchor_70_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_312" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> But what was the -relation between general grammar and particular grammars? If logic be -one, how comes it that languages are many? Is the variety of tongues -but a deviation on their part from one single model? And, if there be -no such deviation or error, what is the explanation of the fact? What -is language, and how was it born? If language be external to thought, -how can thought exist if not in language? "<i>Si les hommes</i>," says -Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "<i>ont eu besoin de la parole pour apprendre -à penser, ils ont eu bien plus besoin encore de savoir penser pour -trouver l'art de la parole</i>"; appalled at the difficulty, he declares -his conviction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> "<i>de l'impossibilité presque démontrée que les langues -aient pu naître et s'établir par des moyens purement humains.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_71_313" id="FNanchor_71_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_313" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> -Such questions became fashionable; books on the origin and formation -of language were written by de Brosses (1765) and Court de Gébelin -(1776) in France, by Monboddo (1774) in England, Süssmilch (1766) and -Tiedemann in Germany, and Cesarotti (1785) in Italy, and by others -who had some slight acquaintance with Vico, but profited little by -it.<a name="FNanchor_72_314" id="FNanchor_72_314"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_314" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> None of the above-named writers was able to free himself of -the notion that speech was either natural and mechanical, or else a -symbol attached to thought: whereas in fact it was impossible to solve -the difficulties under which they were labouring except by dropping -the notion of a sign or symbol and attaining the conception of the -active and expressive imagination, verbal imagination, language as -the expression not of intellect but of intuition. An approach towards -this explanation was made by Herder in a brilliant and imaginative -thesis in 1770 upon this subject of the origin of language, chosen -for discussion by the Berlin Academy. In it he says that language is -the reflexion or consciousness (<i>Besonnenheit</i>) of man. "Man shows -reflexion when he puts forth freely such force of mind as enables him -to make selection from amongst the crowd of sensations by which he is -assailed: from the ocean of the senses, so to speak, to select a single -wave and consciously to watch it. He shows reflexion when, amidst the -thronging chaos of images which pass before him as in a dream, he can -in a waking moment collect himself and fasten his attention upon a -single image, examine it calmly and clearly, and separate it from its -neighbours. Once again, man shows reflexion when he is able not merely -to grasp vividly and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> clearly all the properties of an image, but also -to recognize one or more of its distinctive properties." The language -of man "does not depend on the organization of the mouth, for even he -who is dumb from birth has, if he reflects, a language; it is not a -cry of the senses, since it resides in a reflective creature, not in a -breathing machine; it is not an affair of imitation, since imitation -of nature is a means, and we are here trying to explain the end: much -less is it an arbitrary convention; a savage in the depths of the -forest would have had to create a language for himself even though he -never used it. Language is an understanding of the soul with herself, -necessary just in so far as man is man."<a name="FNanchor_73_315" id="FNanchor_73_315"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_315" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> Here language begins to -show itself no longer as purely mechanical or as something derived -from arbitrary choice and invention, but as a creative activity and a -primary affirmation of the activity of the human mind. Herder's essay -may not state such a view unequivocally, but it points forward to such -a conclusion in a striking way for which its author has not received -the credit he deserves. Hamann, in reviewing his friend's theories, -agreed with him in denying the origin of language by invention or -arbitrary choice; while dwelling also on the liberty of man, he -regarded language as something which man could only have learned by -means of a mystical <i>communicatio idiomatum</i> from God.<a name="FNanchor_74_316" id="FNanchor_74_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_316" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> That, too, -was one way of recognizing that the mystery of language is not to be -solved except by placing it in the forefront of the problem of the -spirit.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_243" id="Footnote_1_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_243"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Vico, <i>Opere, ed. cit.</i> iv. p. 305.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_244" id="Footnote_2_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_244"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Herder, <i>Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität,</i> 1793-1797, -Letter 59; Goethe, <i>Italien. Reise,</i> Mar. 5, 1787.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_245" id="Footnote_3_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_245"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Letters from Wolf to Cesarotti, June 5, 1802; in -Cesarotti, <i>Opere,</i> vol. xxxviii. pp. 108-112; cf. <i>ibid.</i> pp. 43-44, -and vol. xxxvii. pp. 281, 284, 324; cf. on the question of the -relations between Wolf and Vico, Croce, <i>Bibliografia vichiana,</i> pp. -51, 56-58, and <i>Supplem.</i> pp. 12-14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_246" id="Footnote_4_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_246"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Letter in French to Mme. Ferrant (1719), and to the -Marquis Maffei in <i>Prose e poesie,</i> vol. ii. (1756), pp. lxxxv.-civ., -cviii.-cix.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_247" id="Footnote_5_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_247"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Prose e poesie,</i> vol. i., 1739, pref.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_248" id="Footnote_6_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_248"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) was an Irishman. Croce's -mistake is probably due to the fact that he studied and taught at -Glasgow, or that his family was ultimately of Scottish origin.—TR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_249" id="Footnote_7_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_249"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Prose e poesie,</i> vol. ii. pp. clxxi.-clxxvii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_250" id="Footnote_8_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_250"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_184">184</a>-<a href="#Page_185">185</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_251" id="Footnote_9_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_251"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Prose e poesie,</i> vol. ii. pp. 242-246.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_252" id="Footnote_10_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_252"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. p. 249.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_253" id="Footnote_11_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_253"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. pp. 252-253.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_254" id="Footnote_12_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_254"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Prose e poesie,</i> vol. ii. pp. 233-234.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_255" id="Footnote_13_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_255"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. pref.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_256" id="Footnote_14_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_256"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. p. 127.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_257" id="Footnote_15_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_257"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. xliii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_258" id="Footnote_16_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_258"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Fr. Sav. Quadrio, <i>Della storia e della ragione d' ogni -poesia,</i> Bologna, 1739, vol. i. part i. dist. i. ch. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_259" id="Footnote_17_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_259"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Fr. M. Zanotti, <i>Dell' arte poetica, ragionamenti -cinque,</i> Bologna, 1768.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_260" id="Footnote_18_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_260"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> On Ossian, <i>Opere,</i> vols, ii.-v.; on Homer, vols, vi.-x.; -<i>Saggio copra il diletto della tragedia,</i> vol. xxix. pp. 117-167; -<i>Saggio sul bello,</i> vol. xxx. pp. 13-70; on <i>Filosofia del gusto,</i> vol. -i.; on <i>Eloquenza,</i> lecture, vol. xxxi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_261" id="Footnote_19_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_261"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Opere,</i> vol. xl. p. 49.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_262" id="Footnote_20_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_262"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 55.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_263" id="Footnote_21_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_263"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Letter from Corniani to Cesarotti, November 21, 1790, in -<i>Opere,</i> vol. xxxvii. p. 146.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_264" id="Footnote_22_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_264"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Saggio sopra le istituzioni scolastiche, private e -pubbliche,</i> in <i>Opere,</i> vol. xxix. pp. 1-116.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_265" id="Footnote_23_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_265"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Letter of March 30, 1764, in <i>Opere,</i> vol. xxxv. p. 202.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_266" id="Footnote_24_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_266"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Saverio Bettinelli, <i>Dell' entusiasmo nelle belle arti, -1769,</i> in <i>Opere,</i> iii. pp. xi.-xiii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_267" id="Footnote_25_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_267"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Fr. M. Pagano, <i>De' saggi politici,</i> Naples, 1783-1785, -vol. i. Appendix to § 1, "Sull' origine e natura della poesia"; vol. -ii. § 6, "Del gusto e delle belle arti."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_268" id="Footnote_26_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_268"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_217">217</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_269" id="Footnote_27_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_269"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften,</i> Halle, -1748-1750.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_270" id="Footnote_28_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_270"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Auszug aus den Anfangsgründe,</i> etc., <i>ibid.</i> 1758.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_271" id="Footnote_29_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_271"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Betrachtungen über den ersten Grundsätzen aller schönen -Künste u. Wissenschaften, ibid.</i> 1757.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_272" id="Footnote_30_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_272"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Preface to 2nd ed. (1768) of vol. ii. of <i>Anfangsgründe,</i> -and <i>Betrachtungen, cit.,</i> esp. §§ 1, 2, 34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_273" id="Footnote_31_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_273"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Preface to vol. i., and cf. § 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_274" id="Footnote_32_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_274"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> In a letter to Gottsched, 1747, in Danzel, <i>Gottsched,</i> -p. 215.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_275" id="Footnote_33_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_275"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Anfangsgründe,</i> § 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_276" id="Footnote_34_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_276"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 92.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_277" id="Footnote_35_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_277"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 49.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_278" id="Footnote_36_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_278"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 55.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_279" id="Footnote_37_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_279"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 355-370.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_280" id="Footnote_38_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_280"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 529-540.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_281" id="Footnote_39_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_281"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_282" id="Footnote_40_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_282"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 413.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_283" id="Footnote_41_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_283"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Anfangsgründe, §§ 541-670.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_284" id="Footnote_42_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_284"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Betrachtungen, § 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_285" id="Footnote_43_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_285"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Op. cit. § 21.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_286" id="Footnote_44_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_286"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Briefe über die Empfindungen,</i> 1755 (in <i>Opere -filosofiche,</i> Ital. trans., Parma, 1800, vol. ii.). Letters 2, 5, 11.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_287" id="Footnote_45_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_287"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Betrachtungen üb. d. Quellen d. sch. Wiss. u. K.,</i> 1757, -later entitled <i>Über die Hauptgrundsätze,</i> etc., 1761, in <i>Opere, ed. -cit.</i> ii. pp. 10, 12-15, 21-30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_288" id="Footnote_46_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_288"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> J. E. Schlegel, <i>Von der Nachahmung,</i> 1742; cf. -Braitmaier, <i>Gesch. d. poet. Th.</i> i. p. 249 <i>sqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_289" id="Footnote_47_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_289"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Koller, <i>Entwurf,</i> p. 103.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_290" id="Footnote_48_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_290"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Die ersten Grundsätze der schönen Kunst überhaupt, und -der schönen Schreibart insbesondere,</i> Bonn, 1790; cf. Sulzer, i. p. -55, and Koller, pp. 55-56.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_291" id="Footnote_49_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_291"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> See Bibliographical Appendix.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_292" id="Footnote_50_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_292"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Entwurf zur Geschichte u. Literatur d. Ästhetik,</i> etc., -Regensburg. 1799; see Bibl. App.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_293" id="Footnote_51_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_293"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> Koller, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_294" id="Footnote_52_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_294"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Notices and extracts in Sulzer and Koller, <i>opp. citt.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_295" id="Footnote_53_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_295"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> Joh. Aug. Eberhard, <i>Theorie der schönen Künste u. -Wissenschaften,</i> Halle, 1783; reprinted 1789, 1790.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_296" id="Footnote_54_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_296"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> Joh. Joach. Eschenburg, <i>Entwurf einer Theorie u. -Literatur d. s. W.,</i> Berlin, 1783; reprinted 1789.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_297" id="Footnote_55_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_297"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> Allgem. Th. d. sch. Künste, on words Schön, Schönheit, -Wahrheit, Werke des Geschmacks, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56_298" id="Footnote_56_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_298"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, <i>System der Ästhetik,</i> vol. -i., Leipzig, 1790, esp. pp. 149-154. 367-385. 385-392.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57_299" id="Footnote_57_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_299"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>Kritische Wälder oder Betrachtungen über die -Wissenschaft und Kunst des Schönen,</i> Fourth Forest, 1769, in -<i>Sämmtliche Werke,</i> ed. B. Suphan, Berlin, 1878, vol. iv. pp. 19, 21, -27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58_300" id="Footnote_58_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_300"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>Kritische Wälder, loc. cit.</i> pp. 22-27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59_301" id="Footnote_59_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_301"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> Fragment, <i>Von Baumgarten Denkart</i>; and cf. <i>op. cit.</i> -pp. 132-133.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60_302" id="Footnote_60_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_302"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <i>Æsthetica in mice,</i> in <i>Kreuzzüge des Philologen,</i> -Königsberg, quoted in Herder, <i>Werke,</i> xii. 145.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61_303" id="Footnote_61_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_303"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_235">235</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_62_304" id="Footnote_62_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_304"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> <i>Kaligone,</i> 1800, in <i>Werke, ed. cit.,</i> xii. pp. 145-150.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_63_305" id="Footnote_63_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_305"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> <i>Kaligone,</i> pp. 34-55.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_64_306" id="Footnote_64_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_306"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> pp. 308-317.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_65_307" id="Footnote_65_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_307"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> <i>Kritische Wälder, loc. cit.</i> iv. pp. 47-127.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_66_308" id="Footnote_66_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_308"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 27-36.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_67_309" id="Footnote_67_309"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_309"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> <i>Sophron,</i> 1782, § 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_68_310" id="Footnote_68_310"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_310"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> <i>Encyclopédie, ad verb.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_69_311" id="Footnote_69_311"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_311"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> <i>Éloge de Du Marsais,</i> 1756 (introd. to <i>Œuvres de Du -Marsais,</i> Paris, 1797, vol. i.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_70_312" id="Footnote_70_312"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_312"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> Du Marsais, <i>Méthode raisonnée,</i> 1722; <i>Traité des -tropes,</i> 1730; <i>Traité de grammaire générale</i> (in <i>Encyclopédie</i>); De -Beauzée, <i>Grammaire générale pour servir de fondement à l'étude de -toutes les langues,</i> 1767; Condillac, <i>Grammaire française,</i> 1755; J. -Harris, <i>Hermes, or a Philosophical Enquiry concerning Language and -Universal Grammar,</i> 1751.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_71_313" id="Footnote_71_313"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_313"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> <i>Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes,</i> -1754.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_72_314" id="Footnote_72_314"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_314"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> De Brosses, <i>Traité de la formation mécanique des -langues,</i> 1765; Court de Gébelin, <i>Histoire naturelle de la parole,</i> -1776; Monboddo, <i>Origin and Progress of Language,</i> 1774; Süssmilch, -<i>Beweis dass der Ursprung der menschlichen Sprache göttlich sei,</i> 1766; -Tiedemann, <i>Ursprung der Sprache;</i> Cesarotti, <i>Saggio sulla filosofia -delle lingue,</i> 1785 (in <i>Opere,</i> vol. i.); D. Colao Agata, <i>Piano, -ovvero ricerche filosofiche sulle lingue,</i> 1774; Soave, <i>Ricerche -intorno all' istituzione naturale d'una società e d'una lingua,</i> 1774.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_73_315" id="Footnote_73_315"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_315"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache,</i> in a small -book <i>Zwei Preisschriften,</i> etc. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1789), esp. pp. -60-65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_74_316" id="Footnote_74_316"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_316"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Steinthal, <i>Ursprung der Sprache,</i> 4th ed., pp. 39-58.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIIb" id="VIIb">VII</a></h4> - - -<h4>OTHER ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE SAME PERIOD</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Other writers of the eighteenth century: Batteux.</i></div> - -<p>A great medley of heterogeneous ideas is noticeable among other writers -on Æsthetic during the same period. In 1746 appeared a little volume -by Abbé Batteux bearing the attractive title of <i>The Fine Arts reduced -to a Single Principle,</i> in which the author attempted a unification -of all the different rules laid down by the writers of treatises. All -such rules (says Batteux) are branches emerging from one trunk; he who -possesses the simple principle will be able to deduce the rules one by -one without entangling himself in their mass, which can but involve him -in endless coils. The author had passed in review the <i>Ars Poetica</i> of -Horace and that of Boileau, and the works of Rollin, Dacier, le Bossu -and d'Aubignac; but had found real help only in Aristotle's principle -of imitation, which he thought could be easily and strikingly applied -to poetry, painting, music and the art of gesture. But suddenly the -Aristotelian principle of imitation yields place to a wholly new -rendering, namely the "imitation of natural <i>beauty.</i>" The business -of art is to "select the most beautiful parts of nature in order to -frame them into an exquisite whole which shall be more beautiful than -nature's self, without ceasing to be natural." Now, what may this -greater perfection, this beautiful nature, be? On one occasion Batteux -identifies it with truth: but "with the truth which may be; with -beauty-truth, which is represented as though it really existed with all -the perfections it could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> possibly receive," recalling one example from -the ancients in the Helen of Zeuxis, and one from the moderns in the -<i>Misanthrope</i> of Molière. In another place he explains that beautiful -nature, <i>"tum ipsius (obiecti) naturæ, tum nostræ convenit," i.e.</i> that -it has the closest connexion with our own perfection, our advantage -and our interest, and is, at the same time, perfect in itself. The -aim of imitation is "to please, to move, to soften, in one word, to -delight"; so beautiful nature must be interesting and furnished with -unity, variety, symmetry and proportion. Embarrassed by the question -of artistic imitation of things naturally ugly or objectionable, -Batteux falls back on saying, as Castelvetro had said before him, that -displeasing objects please when imitated, since imitation, being always -imperfect, in comparison with the reality, cannot excite the horror and -disgust aroused by the latter. From pleasure he deduces the other aim -of utility: if the aim of poetry be to give pleasure, and "pleasure -by moving the passions, then in order to give a perfect and enduring -pleasure it ought to rouse such passions only as it is well to excite, -not those inimical to goodness."<a name="FNanchor_1_317" id="FNanchor_1_317"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_317" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The English: W. Hogarth.</i></div> - -<p>It is difficult to string together a more insubstantial mass of -contradictions. But Batteux is rivalled and outdone by the English -philosophers or rather scribblers on Æsthetic or rather on things in -general which sometimes accidentally include æsthetic facts. Happening -to find in Lomazzo some words attributed to Michæl Angelo on the beauty -of shapes, Hogarth the artist took into his head the idea that the -figurative arts can be regulated by a special principle which can be -expressed in a particular fine.<a name="FNanchor_2_318" id="FNanchor_2_318"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_318" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Filled with this discovery, in 1745 -he designed a frontispiece for a volume of his engravings; it depicted -a painter's palette scored across with an undulating line and the words -<i>The Line of Beauty.</i> Public curiosity was immediately aroused by this -hieroglyphic, to be satisfied a little later by the publication of -his book <i>The Analysis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> of Beauty</i> (1753).<a name="FNanchor_3_319" id="FNanchor_3_319"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_319" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In this he combated the -mistake of judging pictures either by the subject or the excellence of -the imitation instead of by their form, which is the true essential -of art and is composed "of symmetry, variety, uniformity, simplicity, -intricacy and quantity; all things which co-operate in the production -of beauty, correcting and restraining each other as required."<a name="FNanchor_4_320" id="FNanchor_4_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_320" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -But immediately afterwards Hogarth proclaims that there must also be -correspondence and agreement with the thing copied; for "regularity, -uniformity and symmetry give pleasure in so far only as they serve -to give the illusion of faithful correspondence."<a name="FNanchor_5_321" id="FNanchor_5_321"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_321" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Further on, the -reader learns that "amongst the immense variety of undulating lines -which may be conceived, there is but one which truly merits the name of -the Line of Beauty, and this is a precisely serpentine line which may -be called the Line of Grace."<a name="FNanchor_6_322" id="FNanchor_6_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_322" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Again, we are told that intricacy of -lines is beautiful because "the active mind likes to be engaged," and -the eye delights in being "guided in a sort of hunt."<a name="FNanchor_7_323" id="FNanchor_7_323"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_323" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> A straight -line has no beauty, and the pig, the bear, the spider and the toad are -ugly because devoid of undulating lines.<a name="FNanchor_8_324" id="FNanchor_8_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_324" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> The ancients showed much -judgement in the management and grouping of lines, "varying from the -precise line of grace only on those occasions when the character or -action demanded."<a name="FNanchor_9_325" id="FNanchor_9_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_325" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>E. Burke.</i></div> - -<p>With similar indecision Edmund Burke wavers between the principle -of imitation and other heterogeneous or imaginary principles in his -book, <i>An Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the -Beautiful</i> (1756). He observes, "Natural properties contained in an -object give pleasure or displeasure to the imagination: beyond this, -however, imagination may delight in the likeness of a copy to its -original"; he asserts that from "these two reasons" arises the whole -pleasure of imagination.<a name="FNanchor_10_326" id="FNanchor_10_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_326" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span></p> - -<p>Without dwelling further on the second, he proceeds to a lengthy -discussion of the natural qualities which should be found in an object -of sensible beauty: "Firstly, comparative smallness; secondly, smooth -surface; thirdly, variety in disposition of the parts; fourthly, that -it have no angularity, all lines fusing one in another; fifthly, a -structure of great delicacy betraying no signs of violence; sixthly, -vivid colouring without glare or harshness; seventhly, if it have any -glaring colour, let it be different from the background." These are the -properties of beauty working in harmony with nature and least liable to -suffer from caprice and differences of taste.<a name="FNanchor_11_327" id="FNanchor_11_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_327" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>H. Home.</i></div> - -<p>These books of Hogarth and Burke are generally described as classical; -if so, they belong to the type of classic that fails to convince. To -a somewhat higher type belongs the <i>Elements of Criticism</i> (1761) -of Henry Home, Lord Kaimes, who seeks "the true principles of the -fine arts" with the object of converting criticism into "a rational -science," and to this end chooses "the upward path of facts and -experiments." Home confines himself to feelings derived from objects -of sight and hearing, which, in so far as unaccompanied by desires, -are more truly described as simple feelings (emotions, not passions). -These occupy a middle position between mere sense-impressions and -intellectual or moral ideas, and are therefore akin to both; and it is -from these that the pleasures of beauty are derived. Beauty is divided -into beauty of relation and intrinsic beauty.<a name="FNanchor_12_328" id="FNanchor_12_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_328" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Of the latter, Home's -only account is that regularity, simplicity, uniformity, proportion, -order and other pleasing qualities have been "so disposed by the Author -of nature in order to increase our happiness here on earth which, as -is clearly shown in numberless instances, is not foreign to his care." -This notion is confirmed when he reflects that "our taste for such -details is not accidental, but uniform and universal, being a very -part of our nature"; adding that "regularity, uniformity, order and -simplicity help to facilitate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> perception and make it possible for us -to form clearer conception of objects than it would be possible to -gain by the most earnest attention were such qualities not present." -Proportions are often combined with a view to utility, "as we see that -the best proportioned amongst animals are also the strongest; but there -are also many examples in which this conjunction does not hold good"; -wherefore the wisest plan "is to rest content with the final cause just -mentioned: that of the increase of our happiness intended by the Author -of nature."<a name="FNanchor_13_329" id="FNanchor_13_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_329" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> In his <i>Essay on Taste</i> (1758) and on <i>Genius</i> (1774) -Alexander Gérard employs by turns, according to the various forms of -art, the principles of association, of direct pleasure, of expression, -and even of moral sense: the same kind of explanation reappears in -another <i>Essay on Taste</i> by Alison (1792).</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Eclecticism and sensationalism. E. Platner.</i></div> - -<p>It is impossible to classify works of such calibre, almost wholly -lacking as they are in scientific method; on each page their writers -pass from physiological sensationalism to moralism; from the imitation -of nature to mysticism and transcendent finalism without the slightest -sense of incongruity. It would be absurd to take them seriously; in -comparison it is almost refreshing to come across a frank hedonist -in the German, Ernst Plainer, who interpreted Hogarth's inquiry into -lines after a fashion of his own and was unable to see anything in -æsthetic facts except a reverberation of sexual pleasure. Where can we -find a beauty, he asks, that is not derived from the female figure, -the centre of all beauty? Undulating lines are beautiful because -found in a woman's body; beautiful are all movements distinctively -feminine; beautiful the tones of music melting one into another; -beautiful the poem where one thought embraces another with tenderness -and facility.<a name="FNanchor_14_330" id="FNanchor_14_330"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_330" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Condillac's sensationalism had already shown -itself wholly incapable of understanding æsthetic productivity; the -associationism especially promoted by the work of Hume fared no better.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fr. Hemsterhuis.</i></div> - -<p>The Dutchman Hemsterhuis considered beauty as a phenomenon born of -the meeting between sensibility, which gives multiplicity, and the -internal sense, which tends to unity; hence the beautiful is "that -which exhibits the greatest number of ideas in the shortest time." Man, -to whom it is not permitted to attain ultimate unity, finds in beauty -an approximate unity which gives him a pleasure somewhat analogous -with the joy of love. This theory of Hemsterhuis, in which elements of -mysticism and sensationalism mingle with glimpses of truth, developed -later into the sentimentalism of Jacobi, for whom the totality of Truth -and Goodness and even the Supersensible itself are sensibly present to -the soul in the form of beauty.<a name="FNanchor_15_331" id="FNanchor_15_331"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_331" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Neo-Platonism and mysticism. Winckelmann.</i></div> - -<p>Platonism or, more accurately, neo-Platonism was revived by the creator -of the history of figurative art, Winckelmann (1764). Contemplation -of the masterpieces of antique plastic art, and the impression of -superhuman loftiness and divine indifference which they create all -the more irresistibly because we cannot reawaken the life they once -possessed or understand their real significance, led Winckelmann, and -others with him, to the conception of a Beauty which, descending from -the seventh heaven of the divine Idea, embodied itself in works of this -description. Baumgarten's follower Mendelssohn had denied the enjoyment -of beauty to God: the neo-Platonist Winckelmann gave it back to him and -lodged it in his bosom.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Beauty and lack of significance.</i></div> - -<p>"Wise men who have meditated upon the causes of universal Beauty, -seeking her amongst created things and trying to gain the contemplation -of Supreme Beauty, have placed it in the perfect harmony of creatures -with their ends and of their parts with one another. But as this is -equivalent to perfection, which man is incapable of attaining, our -concept of universal beauty remains indeterminate, and arises by means -of particular cognitions which, when accurately collected and fitted -together,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> give us the highest idea we can attain of human beauty, -which we elevate in proportion as we raise it above matter. But, -again, since the Creator deals out perfection to all his creatures -in the proportion that befits them, and since every concept rests -on some cause which must be sought outside the concept itself, the -cause of Beauty which is to be found in every created thing cannot -be sought in anything outside these created things. For this reason, -and because our cognitions are comparative concepts, whereas Beauty -cannot be compared with anything higher, it is difficult to attain a -distinct and universal cognition of Beauty."<a name="FNanchor_16_332" id="FNanchor_16_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_332" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> The only way out of -this difficulty and others like it is the recognition that "supreme -beauty resides in God": "the concept of human beauty becomes the more -perfect in proportion as it can be thought more in conformity and -agreement with supreme Being, which is distinguished from matter by -its own unity and indivisibility. This conception of Beauty is as a -spirit which, freed by fire from the prison of matter, strives to -conjure up a creature in the likeness of the first reasonable creature -formed by the divine intelligence. The forms of such an image are -simple and continuous and within this unity they are varied and for -that very reason harmonious."<a name="FNanchor_17_333" id="FNanchor_17_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_333" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> 2 To these characteristics is added -"lack of significance" (<i>Unbezeichnung</i>), since supreme beauty cannot -be described with points or fines different from those which alone -can constitute that beauty; its form "is not peculiar to this or that -determinate person, neither does it express any state of feeling or -sensation of passion, things which disturb unity and overcloud beauty." -Winckelmann concludes: "We look upon Beauty as a purest water drawn -from the centre of the spring; the less taste it has the higher it is -esteemed because free from all impurities."<a name="FNanchor_18_334" id="FNanchor_18_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_334" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>To perceive pure beauty, a special faculty is required, which certainly -is not sense, but may perhaps be intellect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> or even, as Winckelmann -says, "a fine internal sense" free from all intentions or passions -of instinct, inclination or pleasure. Having asserted beauty to be -something supersensible, it is not surprising that Winckelmann should -wish, if not wholly to exclude colour, at least to reduce it to a -minimum, and treat it not as a constitutive element in beauty but as -secondary and ancillary.<a name="FNanchor_19_335" id="FNanchor_19_335"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_335" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> True beauty is given in form: by which he -means line and surface, forgetting that these are only apprehended by -the senses, and could not be seen without being in some way coloured.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Winckelmann's contradictions and compromises.</i></div> - -<p>When error refuses to retire, hermit-like, to the narrow cell of a -brief aphorism, it finds itself condemned to self-contradiction in -order to live at all in the world of concrete facts and problems. -Although composed with a view to stating a theory, the work of -Winckelmann always led him among concrete historical facts clamouring -to be brought into relation with his formally stated idea of supreme -beauty. In his admission of line-drawing and his further admission, on -a lower plane, of colour, we have two compromises already; to which -a third is added in his principle of Expression. "Since human nature -has no state intermediate between pain and pleasure" and as living -creature without such feelings is inconceivable, "the human figure must -be represented in a condition of action and passion, which artists -call expression." Hence Winckelmann, after dealing with Beauty, goes -on to treat of Expression.<a name="FNanchor_20_336" id="FNanchor_20_336"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_336" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> He then found himself obliged to effect -a fourth compromise between the single constant supreme beauty and -individual beauties; for while he preferred the male to the female body -as a completer embodiment of perfect beauty, he could not shut his eyes -to the obvious fact that we know and admire beautiful women's bodies -and even beautiful animals' bodies.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>A. R. Mengs.</i></div> - -<p>Friend and, in a sense, collaborator of Winckelmann was Raphæl Mengs -the artist, no less eager than his archæological fellow-countryman to -understand the nature of that beauty which the one studied as a critic -while the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> other produced it as a painter. Remarking, writes Mengs, -that of the two chief duties of a painter, the imitation of appearances -and the selection of the most beautiful objects, much has been written -on the former, while the latter "has scarcely been touched by the -modems, who would have been ignorant of the art of drawing were it -not for the statues of ancient Greece";<a name="FNanchor_21_337" id="FNanchor_21_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_337" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> pondering this, "I read, -asked and looked at everything likely to throw light on the subject, -but never was I satisfied; either they spoke of beautiful things or -of qualities which are the attributes of beauty, or they pretended to -explain, as the saying is, the obscure by the more obscure, or even -confused the beautiful with the pleasing: so that finally I determined -to search for the nature of beauty on my own account."<a name="FNanchor_22_338" id="FNanchor_22_338"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_338" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> One of his -works on this subject was published during his lifetime by the advice -and assistance of Winckelmann (1761); many others appeared posthumously -(1780), all were reprinted several times and translated into several -languages. In his <i>Dreams of Beauty</i> he says, "I have been sailing -a long time on a vast sea seeking the understanding of beauty, and -still I am far from any shore and in great doubt how to shape my -course: gazing around, my sight is confounded by the immensity of the -subject."<a name="FNanchor_23_339" id="FNanchor_23_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_339" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> In truth it seems as though Mengs never arrived at a -formula satisfactory to himself, although he conformed more or less to -Winckelmann's doctrine that "beauty consists in material perfection -according to our ideas; and since God alone is perfect, beauty is -divine"; it is the "visible idea of perfection" and stands in the same -relation to it as does a visible to a mathematical point. Our ideas -proceed from the purposes which the Creator has willed to fulfil in -various things; hence the multiplicity of beauties. In general, Mengs -finds the types of things in natural species: <i>e.g.</i> "a stone, of -which we have the idea that it should be uniform in colour"; which" -is called ugly if it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> happen to be spotted"; or a child "would be -ugly if he were like a man of mature age, just as a man is ugly when -shaped like a woman, and a woman when she is like a man." He adds -surprisingly, "As among stones there is but one perfect species, the -diamond; among metals, gold; and among animated creatures, man only; so -there is difference and distinction in every order, and very rarely is -there perfection."<a name="FNanchor_24_340" id="FNanchor_24_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_340" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> In his <i>Dreams of Beauty</i> he considers beauty -as "a middle disposition, including perfection on the one hand and -the pleasing on the other"; in reality it is a third thing, differing -from perfection and the pleasing, and deserving a special name for -itself.<a name="FNanchor_25_341" id="FNanchor_25_341"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_341" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> The art of painting arises from four sources: beauty, -significant or expressive character, the pleasing united to harmony, -and colouring. Mengs finds the first amongst the ancients, the second -in Raphæl, the third in Correggio and the fourth in Titian.<a name="FNanchor_26_342" id="FNanchor_26_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_342" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> From -this empirical studio-gossip he rouses himself to exclaim, "The force -of beauty so transports me that I will tell thee, reader, what I -feel. All nature is beautiful, and so is virtue; beautiful are forms -and proportions; beautiful are appearances and beautiful the causes -thereof; more beautiful is reason, most beautiful of all is the great -first cause."<a name="FNanchor_27_343" id="FNanchor_27_343"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_343" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>G. E. Lessing.</i></div> - -<p>An attenuated, that is to say, a less metaphysical, echo of -Winckelmann's theory is found in Lessing (1766), who infused a new -spirit into the literature and social life of the Germany of his time. -According to Lessing the aim of art is "delight"; and since delight is -a "superfluous thing" it seems reasonable that the legislator should -not allow to art that liberty which is indispensable to science in -her search for truth, the soul's necessity. For the Greeks painting -was what by its nature it ought to be, "the imitation of beautiful -bodies." "Its (Hellenic) cultivator represented nothing but the -beautiful: common beauty of a low grade served him as an accidental -subject, an exercise, a diversion. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> attractiveness of his work -must depend simply and solely on the perfection of his subject: he -was far too true an artist to wish his audience to content itself -with the barren pleasure arising from mere resemblance or from the -inspection of skilful workmanship: nothing in his art was dearer to -him, nothing seemed more noble, than the end at which it aimed."<a name="FNanchor_28_344" id="FNanchor_28_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_344" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> -Pictorial representation must exclude everything unpleasing or ugly; -"painting as imitation may express ugliness: painting as a fine art -will refuse to do so: all visible objects belong to art taken under -the former title: the latter may claim only such objects as awaken -pleasing sensations." If, on the contrary, ugliness may be represented -by the poet, the reason is this: poetic description "conveys a less -displeasing sense of bodily malformation which, in the end, almost -loses its character as such; unable to use it for itself, the poet -uses it as a means to provoke certain mixed feelings (the ridiculous, -the terrible), in which we are content to remain, in the absence of -any purely pleasant feelings."<a name="FNanchor_29_345" id="FNanchor_29_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_345" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> In his <i>Dramaturgie</i> (1767) Lessing -takes his stand upon the Aristotelian <i>Poetics</i>: it is well known that -not only did he approve of rules in general but he believed those -laid down by Aristotle to be as incontrovertible as the theorems of -Euclid. His polemic against French writers and critics is waged in the -name of probability, not to be confounded with historical accuracy. -He understood the universal as a sort of average of what appears in -individuals, and catharsis as a conversion of passions into virtuous -dispositions, asserting it as beyond doubt that the aim of all -poetry is to inspire a love for virtue.<a name="FNanchor_30_346" id="FNanchor_30_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_346" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> He follows the example -of Winckelmann in introducing the concept of ideal beauty into the -doctrine of figurative art: "expression of corporeal beauty is the aim -of painting: therefore supreme beauty of body is the supreme aim of -art. But this supreme beauty of body is found in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> man only, and for -him it exists only through the ideal. This ideal may be found among -the brute creation in inferior degree; but is entirely absent from -vegetable or inanimate nature." Landscape and flower painters are not -really artists because "they imitate beauties possessed of no ideal: -whereby they work by eye and hand alone, genius having little or no -part in their compositions." Nevertheless, Lessing prefers a landscape -painter to "the painter of historic pieces who, instead of making -beauty his aim, merely depicts a crowd in order to show his cunning in -simple expression, not in expression subordinate to beauty."<a name="FNanchor_31_347" id="FNanchor_31_347"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_347" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> The -ideal of bodily beauty then consists "chiefly in the ideal of form, -but also in that of texture of the flesh, and in that of permanent -expression. Mere colouring and transitory expression have no ideal -since nature herself has placed no indelible seal upon them."<a name="FNanchor_32_348" id="FNanchor_32_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_348" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> At -the bottom of his heart Lessing dislikes colour; and when he finds -the pen-sketches of painters showing "a life, a freedom, a brilliancy -never to be found in their painted pictures," he asks himself "whether -the most marvellous colouring can compensate so heavy a loss," and -whether it is not to be wished "that painting in oils had never been -invented"?<a name="FNanchor_33_349" id="FNanchor_33_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_349" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Theorists of ideal beauty.</i></div> - -<p>Ideal beauty, that curious alliance between God and the subtle outline -traced with pen or graver, that cold academical mysticism, came into -fashion. In Italy (the home of Winckelmann and Mengs, who published -many of their works in Italian) it was much discussed by artists, -antiquaries and connoisseurs. The architect Francesco Milizia professed -himself a follower of "the principles of Sulzer and Mengs";<a name="FNanchor_34_350" id="FNanchor_34_350"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_350" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> -the Spaniard d'Azara, living in Italy, edited and annotated Mengs, -adding his own definition of beauty: "The union of the perfect and -the pleasing made visible";<a name="FNanchor_35_351" id="FNanchor_35_351"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_351" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> another Spaniard,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> Arteaga, one of -the many Jesuit refugees in Italy, wrote a treatise on <i>Ideal Beauty</i> -(1789);<a name="FNanchor_36_352" id="FNanchor_36_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_352" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> the Englishman Daniel Webb on coming to Rome and making -the acquaintance of Mengs seized upon the ideas he heard him express -on beauty, collected them and actually published them in a book -anticipating Mengs' own.<a name="FNanchor_37_353" id="FNanchor_37_353"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_353" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>G. Spalletti and the characteristic.</i></div> - -<p>The first voice of dissent from this doctrine of ideal beauty was -raised in 1764 by a small circle of Italians who asserted the -characteristic to be the principle of art. As such appears to -be the necessary interpretation of the little <i>Essay on Beauty</i> -written by Guiseppe Spalletti in the form of a letter to Mengs, -with whom Spalletti had discussed the subject "in the solitudes of -Grottaferrata," and who had urged him to put all his thoughts in -writing.<a name="FNanchor_38_354" id="FNanchor_38_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_354" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> Its polemical character, though not openly asserted, is -discernible in every page. "Truth in general, conscientiously rendered -by the artist, is the object of Beauty in general. When the soul finds -those characteristics which wholly converge upon the matter which the -work of art claims to represent, it judges that work beautiful. The -same is true of the works of nature: if the soul perceives a man of -fine proportions having the face of a lovely woman, which causes it to -doubt whether the object before it be man or woman, it esteems that man -ugly rather than the reverse, through deficiency of the characteristic -of truth; if this can be said of natural Beauty, how much more can -it be said of the Beauty of art." The pleasure given by Beauty is -intellectual, that is to say, it is the pleasure of apprehending -truth: when confronted by ugly things represented characteristically, -man "delights in having increased his cognitions": Beauty, "with its -property of supplying to the soul likeness, order, proportion, harmony -and variety, provides it with an immense field for the construction -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> innumerable syllogisms, and by reasoning in this manner it will -take pleasure in itself, in the object which arouses such pleasure, and -in the feeling of its own perfection." Finally, the beautiful may be -defined as "the inherent modification of the object under observation -which presents it in the inevitably characteristic manner in which it -is bound to appear."<a name="FNanchor_39_355" id="FNanchor_39_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_355" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> In contrast to the fallacious profundity of -Winckelmann and Mengs we welcome the sound good sense of this obscure -Spalletti, upholder of the Aristotelian position against the revived -neo-Platonism of the æstheticians.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Beauty and the characteristic: Hirt, Meyer, Goethe.</i></div> - -<p>Many years went by before a similar rebellion arose in Germany; at -length in 1797 the art-historian Ludwig Hirt, basing his case on -ancient works of art which depicted all things, even things utterly -vulgar and ugly, ventured to deny the view that ideal beauty is the -principle of art, and that expression has only a secondary place, above -which it must not rise for fear of disturbing ideal beauty. For the -ideal he substituted the characteristic, as a principle to be applied -equally to gods, heroes or animals. Character is "that individuality by -which form, movement, signs, physiognomy and expression, local colour, -fight, shade and chiaroscuro are distinguished and represented in the -manner demanded by the object."<a name="FNanchor_40_356" id="FNanchor_40_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_356" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Another historian of art, Heinrich -Meyer, who started from the position of Winckelmann and went on by -adopting a series of compromises, finally asserting an ideal of trees -and landscape side by side with the ideal of man and various other -animals, tried to find an intermediate position between this doctrine -and Hirt's, in the course of controversy with the latter. And Wolfgang -von Goethe, forgetful of his youthful days when he chanted the praises -of Gothic architecture, returning home from an Italian tour impregnated -with Greece and Rome in 1798, also sought a middle term between Beauty -and Expression; dwelling on the thought of certain characteristic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> -contents which should supply the artist with forms of beauty to be by -him remodelled and developed into complete beauty. The characteristic -was thus the mere point of departure, and beauty was simply the result -of the artist's elaboration: "we must start from the characteristic" -(says he) "in order to attain the beautiful."<a name="FNanchor_41_357" id="FNanchor_41_357"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_357" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_317" id="Footnote_1_317"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_317"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe,</i> Paris, 1746; -see esp. part i. ch. 3; part ii. chs. 4, 5; part iii. ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_318" id="Footnote_2_318"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_318"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_319" id="Footnote_3_319"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_319"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Analysis of Beauty,</i> London, 1753 (Ital. trans., Leghorn, -1761).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_320" id="Footnote_4_320"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_320"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 47.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_321" id="Footnote_5_321"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_321"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 57.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_322" id="Footnote_6_322"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_322"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 93.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_323" id="Footnote_7_323"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_323"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 61, 65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_324" id="Footnote_8_324"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_324"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Analisi della bellezza,</i> p. 91.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_325" id="Footnote_9_325"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_325"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 176.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_326" id="Footnote_10_326"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_326"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and -the Beautiful,</i> 1756 (Ital. trans., Milan, 1804); cf. the preliminary -discourse on "Taste."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_327" id="Footnote_11_327"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_327"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and -the Beautiful,</i> part iii. § 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_328" id="Footnote_12_328"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_328"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Elements of Criticism,</i> 1761, vol. i. introd. and chs. -1-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_329" id="Footnote_13_329"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_329"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Elements of Criticism,</i> i. ch. 3, pp. 201-202.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_330" id="Footnote_14_330"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_330"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Neue Anthropologie,</i> Leipzig, 1790, § 814, and the -lectures on Æsthetic published posthumously in 1836; cf. Zimmermann, -<i>op. cit.</i> p. 204.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_331" id="Footnote_15_331"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_331"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Zimmermann, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 302-309; v. Stein, <i>Entstehung -d. n. Ästh.</i> p. 113.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_332" id="Footnote_16_332"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_332"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums,</i> 1764 (in <i>Werke,</i> -Stuttgart, 1847, vol. i.), bk. iv. ch. 2, § 51, p. 131.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_333" id="Footnote_17_333"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_333"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 22, pp. 131-132.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_334" id="Footnote_18_334"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_334"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 23, p. 132.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_335" id="Footnote_19_335"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_335"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Geschichte,</i> § 19, pp. 130-131.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_336" id="Footnote_20_336"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_336"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> bk. iv. ch. ii. § 24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_337" id="Footnote_21_337"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_337"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Geschichte,</i> bk. v. chs. ii. and vi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_338" id="Footnote_22_338"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_338"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Letter of January 2, 1778, <i>Opere,</i> Rome, 1787 (reprinted -Milan, 1836), ii. pp. 315-316.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_339" id="Footnote_23_339"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_339"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Opere,</i> i. p. 206.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_340" id="Footnote_24_340"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_340"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Riflessioni sulla bellezza e sul gusto della pittura,</i> -in <i>Opere,</i> i. pp. 95, 100, 102-103.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_341" id="Footnote_25_341"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_341"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Opere,</i> i. p. 197.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_342" id="Footnote_26_342"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_342"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 161.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_343" id="Footnote_27_343"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_343"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 206.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_344" id="Footnote_28_344"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_344"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Laokoon, § 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_345" id="Footnote_29_345"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_345"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> Op. cit. §§ 23, 24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_346" id="Footnote_30_346"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_346"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Hamburg. Dramaturgie (ed. Göring, vols. xi. and xii.), -passim, esp. Nos. 11, 18, 24, 78, 89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_347" id="Footnote_31_347"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_347"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Laokoon,</i> appendix, § 31.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_348" id="Footnote_32_348"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_348"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 22, 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_349" id="Footnote_33_349"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_349"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Op. cit. ad fin.</i> p. 268.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_350" id="Footnote_34_350"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_350"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Dell' arte di vedere nelle belle arti del disegno -secondo i principi di Sulzer e di Mengs,</i> Venice, 1871.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_351" id="Footnote_35_351"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_351"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> D'Azara, in Mengs, <i>Opere,</i> i. p. 168.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_352" id="Footnote_36_352"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_352"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Investigaciones filosóficas sobre la belleza ideal, -considerada como objeto de todas las artes de imitación,</i> Madrid, -1789.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_353" id="Footnote_37_353"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_353"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Ricerche su le bellezze della pittura</i> (Ital. trans., -Parma, 1804); cf. D'Azara, <i>Vita del Mengs,</i> in <i>Opere,</i> i. p. 27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_354" id="Footnote_38_354"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_354"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Saggio sopra la bellezza,</i> dated "Grottaferrata, July -14, 1764," and published at Rome, 1765, anonymously.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_355" id="Footnote_39_355"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_355"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Saggio,</i> esp. §§ 3, 12, 15, 17, 19, 34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_356" id="Footnote_40_356"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_356"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Über das Kunstschöne,</i> in the review <i>Die Horen,</i> 1797; -cf. Hegel, <i>Vorles. ii. Ästh.</i> i. p. 24; and Zimmermann, <i>Gesch. d. -Ästh.</i> pp. 356-357.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_357" id="Footnote_41_357"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_357"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Goethe, <i>Der Sammler und die Seinigen</i> (in <i>Werke,</i> ed. -Goedecke, vol. xxx.)</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIIIb" id="VIIIb">VIII</a></h4> - - -<h4>IMMANUEL KANT</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>I. Kant.</i></div> - -<p>Of all these writers, Winckelmann and Mengs, Home and Hogarth, Lessing -and Goethe, none was a philosopher in the true sense of the word: not -even those who like Meier laid claim to the title, nor those who had -some gifts for philosophy like Herder or Hamann. After Vico, the next -European mind of real speculative genius is Immanuel Kant, who now -comes before us in his turn.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Kant and Vico.</i></div> - -<p>That Kant took up the problem of philosophy where Vico laid it down -(not, of course, in a directly historical, but in an ideal, sense) has -already been noted by others.<a name="FNanchor_1_358" id="FNanchor_1_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_358" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> How far he made an advance upon his -predecessor and how far he failed to reach the same level it is not -here our business to inquire; we must confine ourselves strictly to the -consideration of Æsthetic questions.</p> - -<p>Summarizing the results of such a consideration, we may say at once -that though Kant holds an immensely important place in the development -of German thought; though the book containing his examination of -æsthetic facts is among his most influential works; and though in -histories of Æsthetic written from the German point of view, which -ignore practically the whole development of European thought from the -sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Kant can pose as the man who -discovered the problem of Æsthetic or solved it or brought it within<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> -sight of solution; yet in an unprejudiced and complete history whose -aim is to take broad views and to consider not the popularity of a -book or the historical importance of a nation but the intrinsic value -of ideas, the judgement passed on Kant must be very different. Like -Vico in the serious tenacity with which he reflected upon æsthetic -facts, more fortunate than he in having a much larger stock of material -gathered from preceding discussion and argument, Kant was at once -unlike and less successful than Vico in that he was unable to attain a -doctrine substantially true, and unable also to give his thoughts the -necessary system and unity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of the concept of art in Kant and Baumgarten.</i></div> - -<p>In fact, what was Kant's idea of art? Strange as our reply may -seem to those who recollect the explicit and insistent war waged -by him against the school of Wolff, and the concept of beauty as a -perfection confusedly perceived, we must assert that Kant's idea of -art was fundamentally the same as that of Baumgarten and the Wolffian -school.<a name="FNanchor_2_359" id="FNanchor_2_359"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_359" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> In that school his mind had been trained; he always had a -great respect for Baumgarten whom in the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> he -calls "that excellent analyst"; he chose the text of Baumgarten for -two of his University lectures on Metaphysics, and that of Meier for -his lecture on Logic (<i>Vernunftlehre</i>). Kant, like them, therefore -considered Logic and Æsthetic (or theory of art) as conjoined sciences. -They were thus described by him in his <i>Scheme of Lectures</i> in 1765, -when he proposed, while expounding the critique of reason, to "throw a -glance at that of taste, that is to say, at Æsthetic, since the rules -of one apply to the other and each throws light upon the other."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Kant's "Lectures."</i></div> - -<p>In his University lectures he distinguished æsthetic truth from logical -truth in the style of Meier; even citing the example of the beautiful -rosy face of a girl which, when seen distinctly, <i>i.e.</i> through a -microscope, ceases to be beautiful.<a name="FNanchor_3_360" id="FNanchor_3_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_360" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> It is æsthetically true (said -he) that a man once dead cannot come to life again, although this -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> in opposition to logic and moral truth: it is æsthetically true -that the sun plunges into the sea, but it is false logically and -objectively. To what degree it is necessary to combine logical truth -with æsthetic the learned have never yet been able to decide; not even -the greatest æstheticians. In order to become accessible, logical -concepts must assume æsthetic forms; a garb to be abandoned only in -the rational sciences which seek profundity. Æsthetic certainty is -subjective: it is content with authority, <i>i.e.</i> the citation of the -opinions of great men. On account of our weakness, for we are strongly -attached to the sensible, æsthetic perfection often helps us to render -our thoughts distinct. In this, examples and images co-operate; -æsthetic perfection is the vehicle for logical perfection; taste is -the analogue of intellect. There are logical truths which are not -æsthetic truths: and on the other hand we must exclude from abstract -philosophy exclamations and other sentimental commotions proper to the -other truth. Poetry is a harmonious play of thoughts and sensations. -Poetry and eloquence differ in this: in the former, thoughts adapt -themselves to sensations; in the latter the contrary is the case. -In these lectures Kant sometimes taught that poetry is anterior to -eloquence because sensations come before thoughts; and he observed -(perhaps under Herder's influence) that the poetry of Eastern peoples, -lacking concepts, is wanting in unity and taste although rich in -imaginative detail. Poetry formed out of the pure play of sensibility -is doubtless a possibility, <i>e.g.</i> love-poems: but true poetry disdains -such productions, concerned as they are with sensations which every one -knows ought to be expelled from our breasts. True poetry must strive -to present virtue and intellectual truth in sensible form, as has been -done by Pope in his <i>Essay on Man,</i> in which he attempts to vivify -poetry by means of reason. On other occasions Kant definitely says that -logical perfection is the basis of every other, æsthetic perfection -being merely an adornment of the logical; something of the latter may -be omitted in order<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> to appeal to the audience, but it must never be -disguised or falsified.<a name="FNanchor_4_361" id="FNanchor_4_361"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_361" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>This is Baumgartenism pure and simple; unless we are prepared to look -on these Lectures as representing a pre-critical period of thought, -or an exoteric doctrine superseded eventually by Kant's own original -esoteric ideas in his <i>Critique of the Judgment</i> (1790). Not to open -such a controversy, let us put these Lectures on one side (although -they often throw no little light on the signification of Kantian -phrases and formulæ), and refuse to raise the question what pages -of the <i>Critique of the Judgment</i> are derived from Baumgarten and -Meier; he who reads the works of these disciples of Wolff and passes -immediately to the <i>Critique of Judgment</i> often has the impression that -the atmosphere surrounding him is unchanged. But if the <i>Critique of -Judgment</i> itself be examined without prejudice it will be seen that -Kant always adhered to Baumgarten's conception of art as the sensible -and imaginative vesture of an intellectual concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art in the "Critique of Judgment."</i></div> - -<p>According to Kant, art is not pure beauty wholly detached from the -concept, it is adherent beauty, which presupposes and attaches -itself to a concept.<a name="FNanchor_5_362" id="FNanchor_5_362"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_362" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> This is the work of genius, the faculty of -representing æsthetic ideas. An æsthetic idea is "a representation of -the imagination which accompanies a given concept: a representation -conjoined with such truthful representation of particulars as to be -unable to find for it any expression that may mark a determinate -concept, thereby endowing the given concept with something of the -ineffable; a feeling which stimulates the cognitive faculties and -reinforcing the tongue, which is simply the letter, with the spirit." -Genius, then, has two constitutive elements, imagination and intellect; -it consists in "that happy disposition, which no science can teach or -diligence attain, to find ideas for a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> given concept and, also, to -select the expression by which the subjective commotion it excites -as accompaniment to a concept may be communicated to others." No -concept is adequate to the æsthetic idea, as no representation of the -imagination can ever possibly be adequate to the concept. Examples -of æsthetic attributes are found in the eagle of Jupiter with the -thunderbolt in its claws, and the peacock of the proud Queen of -Heaven: "they do not, like logical attributes, represent that which -is contained in our concepts of the sublimity or majesty of creation, -but something else which gives occasion to the imagination to run -riot over a multitude of kindred representations which make us think -more than we can express in a given concept by means of words, and -give us an æsthetic idea, which serves to this rational idea instead -of a logical representation, precisely with the aim of quickening our -feelings by throwing open to them a view over a vast field of kindred -representations." There are a <i>modus logicos</i> and a <i>modus æstheticus</i> -of expressing our thoughts: the first consists in following determinate -principles: the other in the mere feeling of the unity of the -representation.<a name="FNanchor_6_363" id="FNanchor_6_363"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_363" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> To imagination, to intellect and to spirit (<i>Geist</i>) -we must add taste, the link between imagination and intellect.<a name="FNanchor_7_364" id="FNanchor_7_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_364" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Art -may therefore represent natural ugliness: artistic beauty "is not a -beautiful <i>thing</i> but a beautiful representation of a thing": although -the representation of ugliness has limits varying with the individual -arts (a reminiscence of Lessing and Winckelmann), and an absolute limit -at the disgusting and nauseating, which kill representation itself.<a name="FNanchor_8_365" id="FNanchor_8_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_365" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -In natural things, too, there is adherent beauty which cannot be judged -by the æsthetic judgement alone but demands a concept. Nature thus -appears as a work of art, though superhuman art: "the teleological -judgement is the basis and condition of the æsthetic." When we say -"this is a beautiful woman," we merely mean that "nature beautifully -represents in the form of this woman her purpose in the construction -of the female body": it is necessary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> therefore, besides noting simple -form, to aim at a concept, "so that the object may be apprehended -through an æsthetic judgement logically conditioned."<a name="FNanchor_9_366" id="FNanchor_9_366"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_366" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> By this -means is formed the ideal of beauty in the human face, the expression -of moral life.<a name="FNanchor_10_367" id="FNanchor_10_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_367" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Kant admits that there may also be artistic -productions without a concept, comparable with the free beauties of -nature, flowers and some birds (parrot, humming-bird, bird of paradise, -etc.): ornamental drawings, cornice-mouldings, musical fantasies -without words, represent nothing, no object reducible to a determined -concept, and must be reckoned among free beauties.<a name="FNanchor_11_368" id="FNanchor_11_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_368" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> But does not -this necessitate their exclusion from true and proper art, from the -operation of genius in which fancy and intellect must both, according -to Kant, have a place?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Imagination in Kant's system.</i></div> - -<p>This is Baumgartenism transposed into a higher key, more concentrated, -more elaborated, more suggestive, until from moment to moment it seems -about to burst into a wholly different conception of art. But it is -still Baumgartenism, from whose intellectualistic bonds it never -escapes. Nor was escape possible. A profound concept of imagination was -entirely lacking to Kant's system and his philosophy of the spirit. -Glancing over the table of faculties of the spirit which precedes -his <i>Critique of Judgment,</i> we see that Kant co-ordinates with it -the cognitive faculty, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the -appetitive faculty; to the first corresponds intellect, to the second, -judgement (teleological and æsthetic), to the third, reason;<a name="FNanchor_12_369" id="FNanchor_12_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_369" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> he -finds no place for imagination amongst powers of the spirit but places -it among the facts of sensation. He knows a reproductive imagination -and an associative, but he knows nothing of a genuinely productive -imagination, imagination in the proper sense.<a name="FNanchor_13_370" id="FNanchor_13_370"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_370" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> We have seen that, in -his doctrine, genius is the co-operation of several faculties.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The forms of intuition and the Transcendental Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>Yet sometimes Kant had an inkling that intellectual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> activity is -preceded by something which is not mere sensational material, but -is an independent non-intellectual theoretical form. He obtained a -glimpse of this latter form not when he was reflecting on art in the -strict sense but when he was examining the process of knowledge: he -does not treat of it in his <i>Critique of Judgment,</i> but in the first -section of his <i>Critique of Pure Reason,</i> in the first part of the -<i>Transcendental Doctrine of Elements.</i> He says here that sensations -only enter the spirit when the latter itself gives them form; a form -not identical with that which intellect gives to sensations, but -much simpler, namely pure intuition, the totality of the <i>a priori</i> -principles of sensibility. There must therefore be "a science which -forms the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, -distinct from that which contains the principles of pure thought and is -named transcendental Logic." Now, what name does Kant confer upon this -science whose existence he has deduced? None other than Transcendental -Æsthetic (<i>die transcendentale Ästhetik</i>). In a note he even insists -that this is the right name for the new science of which he treats, and -censures the Germans for their habit of applying it to the Critique of -Taste, which, as he thought at that time, could never become a science. -Thus, he concludes, we approach more closely to the usage of the -ancients, among whom the distinction between <i>αἰσθητὰ καὶ νοητά</i><a name="FNanchor_14_371" id="FNanchor_14_371"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_371" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -was well known.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, after having so rightly postulated the necessity -for a science of the forms of sensation or pure intuition, purely -intuitive knowledge, Kant went on, simply because he had no exact idea -of the nature of the æsthetic faculty and of art, to fall into an -intellectualistic error by reducing the form of sensibility or pure -intuition into the two categories or functions of space and time, -and by asserting that the spirit emerges from the chaos of sensation -by organizing its sensations in space and time.<a name="FNanchor_15_372" id="FNanchor_15_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_372" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> But space and -time as such are very far from being primitive categories; they are -relatively late and complex<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> formations.<a name="FNanchor_16_373" id="FNanchor_16_373"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_373" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> As examples of the matter -of sensation Kant quoted hardness, impenetrability, colour and so -forth. But the mind only recognizes colour and hardness in so far as it -has already given form to its sensations; considered as brute matter, -sensations fall outside the cognitive spirit, they are a limit; colour, -hardness, impenetrability and so on, when recognized, are already -intuitions, spiritual elaborations, the æsthetic activity in its -rudimentary manifestation. The characterizing or qualifying imagination -which is æsthetic activity ought to have occupied in the <i>Critique of -Pure Reason</i> the pages devoted to the discussion of space and time, -and would thus have constituted a real Transcendental Æsthetic, a real -prologue to the transcendental Logic. In this manner Kant would have -achieved the truth aimed at by Leibniz and Baumgarten and would have -joined hands with Vico.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Theory of Beauty distinguished by Kant from that of Art.</i></div> - -<p>His repeatedly announced opposition to the school of Wolff concerns not -the concept of art but that of Beauty; two concepts for Kant entirely -distinct. First of all, he did not admit that sensation could be -called "confused knowledge," a confused form, that is, of intellectual -cognition; rightly judging this to be a false account of sensibility, -since a concept, however confused, is always a concept or a rough -sketch of a concept, never an intuition.<a name="FNanchor_17_374" id="FNanchor_17_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_374" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> But he further denied that -pure beauty contained a concept, and therefore denied that it was a -perfection sensibly apprehended. These reflexions have no doubt some -connexion with those concerning the nature of art in the <i>Critique of -Judgment;</i> but the connexion is far from close, still less are they -actually fused into a single whole. That Kant was minutely familiar -with eighteenth-century writers who had discussed beauty and taste is -shown by his Lectures, wherein they are all quoted and used.<a name="FNanchor_18_375" id="FNanchor_18_375"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_375" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Of -these the greater part, especially the English, were sensationalists, -others intellectualists; some few, as we have noted, were inclined -towards mysticism. Kant began<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> by tending towards sensationalism -in æsthetic problems, then became the adversary of sensationalists -and intellectualists alike. This development can be traced in his -<i>Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime,</i> as well as in his -Lectures; its final expression is reached in the <i>Critique of Judgment.</i></p> - -<p>Of the four moments, as he calls them, <i>i.e.</i> the four determinations, -he accords to Beauty, the two negative are directed, one against the -sensationalists, the other against the intellectualists. "That is -beautiful which pleases <i>without interest</i>": "That is beautiful which -pleases <i>without concepts</i>."<a name="FNanchor_19_376" id="FNanchor_19_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_376" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Here he asserts the existence of a -spiritual region, distinct on one side from the pleasurable, the useful -and the good, and on the other from truth. But this region, as we know -very well, is not that of art, which Kant attaches to the concept: it -is the region of a special activity of feeling which he calls judgement -or, more exactly, æsthetic judgement.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mystical features in Kant's theory of Beauty.</i></div> - -<p>The other two moments give some kind of a definition of this region: -"That is beautiful which has the form of finality without the -representation of an end": "That is beautiful which is the object of -universal pleasure."<a name="FNanchor_20_377" id="FNanchor_20_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_377" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> What is this mysterious sphere? What this -disinterested pleasure we experience in pure colours and tones, in -flowers, and even in adherent beauty when we make abstraction from the -concept to which it adheres?</p> - -<p>Our answer is: there is no such sphere; it does not exist; the -examples given are instances either of pleasure in general or of -facts of artistic expression. Kant, who so emphatically criticizes -the sensationalists and the intellectualists, does not show the same -severity towards the neo-Platonic line of thought whose revival we -remarked in the eighteenth century. Winckelmann in particular exercised -strong influence over his mind. In one course of his Lectures we find -him making a curious distinction between form and matter: in music -melody is matter and harmony form: in a flower the scent is material -and the shape (<i>Gestalt)</i> is form (<i>Form</i>).<a name="FNanchor_21_378" id="FNanchor_21_378"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_378" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> reappears -slightly modified in the <i>Critique of Judgment.</i> "In painting, -statuary and all the figurative arts in architecture and gardening, -so far as they are fine arts, the drawing is the essential; in which -the foundation of taste lies not in what gratifies (<i>vergnügt</i>) in -sensation, but in that which pleases (<i>gefällt</i>) by its form. The -colours which illuminate the drawing belong to sensuous stimulus -(<i>Reiz</i>) and may bring the object more vividly before the senses, but -do not render it worthy of contemplation as a thing of beauty; they -are, moreover, often limited by the exigencies of the beautiful form, -and even where their sensuous stimulus is legitimate, they are ennobled -only by the beautiful form."<a name="FNanchor_22_379" id="FNanchor_22_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_379" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> Continuing in pursuit of this phantasm -of beauty which is not the beauty of art nor yet the pleasing, and is -equally detached from expressiveness and pleasure, Kant loses himself -in insoluble contradictions. Little inclined to submit himself to the -charm of imagination, abhorring "poetic philosophers" like Herder,<a name="FNanchor_23_380" id="FNanchor_23_380"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_380" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> -he makes statements and refuses to commit himself to them, affirms -and immediately criticizes his affirmations, and wraps up Beauty in -a mystery which, at bottom, was nothing more than his own individual -incertitude and inability to see clearly the existence of an activity -of feeling which, in the spirit of his sane philosophy, represented a -logical contradiction. "Necessary and universal pleasure" and "finality -without the idea of an end" are the organized expression in words of -this contradiction.</p> - -<p>By way of clearing up the contradiction he arrives at the following -thought: "The judgement of taste is founded on a concept (the concept -of a general foundation of the subjective teleology of nature through -judgement); but it is a concept by which it is impossible to know or -demonstrate anything of the object, because the object in itself is -indeterminable and unsuited to cognition; on the other hand, it has -validity for every one (for every one, I say, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> so far as it is an -individual judgement, immediately accompanying intuition), since its -determining reason reposes, perhaps, in the concept of that which may -be regarded as the supersensible substrate of mankind." Beauty, then, -is a symbol of morality. "The subjective principle alone, that is the -indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us, can be considered the -only key able to unlock this faculty springing from a source we cannot -fathom: excepting by its aid, no comprehension of it can possibly -be reached."<a name="FNanchor_24_381" id="FNanchor_24_381"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_381" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> These cautious words, and all others here used by -Kant to conceal his thoughts, do not hide his tendency to mysticism. -A mysticism without conviction or enthusiasm, almost in spite of -himself, but very evident nevertheless. His inadequate grasp of the -æsthetic activity led him to see double, even triple, and caused the -unnecessary multiplication of his explanatory principles. Although he -was always ignorant of the genuine nature of the æsthetic activity, he -was indebted to it for suggesting to him the pure categories of space -and time as the Transcendental Æsthetic; it caused him to develop the -theory of imaginative embellishment of intellectual concepts by the -work of genius; finally it forced him to acknowledge a mysterious -faculty of feeling, midway between theoretical and practical activity, -cognitive and yet not cognitive, moral and indifferent to morality, -pleasing yet wholly detached from the pleasure of the senses. Great -use of this power was made by Kant's immediate successors in Germany -who were delighted to find their daring speculations supported by that -severe critic of experience, the philosopher of Königsberg.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_358" id="Footnote_1_358"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_358"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> B. Spaventa, <i>Prolus. ed introd. alle lezioni di -filosofia,</i> Naples, 1862 pp. 83-102; <i>Scritti filosofici,</i> ed. Gentile, -pp. 139-145, 303-307.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_359" id="Footnote_2_359"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_359"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. rein. Vernunft</i> (ed. Kirchmann), i. 1, § 1, -note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_360" id="Footnote_3_360"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_360"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_244">244</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_361" id="Footnote_4_361"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_361"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Extract from Kant's lectures of 1764 and later, in O. -Schlapp, <i>Kant's Lehre vom Genie, passim,</i> esp. pp. 17, 58, 59, 79, 93, -96, 131-134, 136-137, 222, 225, 231-232, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_362" id="Footnote_5_362"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_362"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. Urtheilskraft</i> (ed. Kirchmann), § 16.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_363" id="Footnote_6_363"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_363"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. Urth.</i> § 49.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_364" id="Footnote_7_364"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_364"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_365" id="Footnote_8_365"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_365"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_366" id="Footnote_9_366"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_366"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Krit. d. Urth.</i> § 48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_367" id="Footnote_10_367"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_367"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_368" id="Footnote_11_368"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_368"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 16.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_369" id="Footnote_12_369"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_369"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> For the historical genesis of this tripartition, cf. -remarks in Schlapp, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 150-153.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_370" id="Footnote_13_370"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_370"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> See also <i>Anthropol.</i> (ed. Kirchmann), §§ 26-31; cf. -Schlapp, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 296.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_371" id="Footnote_14_371"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_371"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. rein. Vernunft,</i> i. I, § 1 and note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_372" id="Footnote_15_372"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_372"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 1-8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_373" id="Footnote_16_373"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_373"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_4">4</a>-<a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_374" id="Footnote_17_374"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_374"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Krit. d. r. Vern.</i> § 8, and introd. to § ii.; cf. <i>Krit. -d. Urth.</i> § 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_375" id="Footnote_18_375"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_375"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> See catalogue in Schlapp, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 403-404, and -<i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_376" id="Footnote_19_376"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_376"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Krit. d. Urth.</i> §§ 1-9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_377" id="Footnote_20_377"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_377"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 10-22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_378" id="Footnote_21_378"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_378"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Schlapp, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 78.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_379" id="Footnote_22_379"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_379"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Krit. d. Urth.</i> § 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_380" id="Footnote_23_380"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_380"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> For Kant's judgement of Herder, see Schlapp, <i>op. cit.</i> -pp. 320-327, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_381" id="Footnote_24_381"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_381"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. Orth.</i> §§ 57-59.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IXb" id="IXb">IX</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE ÆSTHETIC OF IDEALISM: SCHILLER, SCHELLING, SOLGER, HEGEL</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The "Critique of Judgment" and metaphysical idealism.</i></div> - -<p>It is well known that Schelling held the <i>Critique of Judgment</i> to be -the most important of the three Kantian <i>Critiques,</i> and that Hegel -together with the great majority of the followers of metaphysical -idealism had a special affection for the book. According to them the -third <i>Critique</i> was the attempt to bridge the gulf, to resolve the -antitheses between liberty and necessity, teleology and mechanism, -spirit and nature: it was the correction Kant was preparing for -himself, the concrete vision which dispelled the last traces of his -abstract subjectivism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>F. Schiller.</i></div> - -<p>The same admiration and an opinion even more favourable were extended -by them to Friedrich Schiller, the first to elaborate that part -of Kant's philosophy and to study the third sphere which united -sensibility to reason. "It was the artistic sense dwelling in his -also profoundly philosophical mind," says Hegel, "which, against the -abstract infinity of Kant's thought, against his living for duty, -against his conception of nature and reality, and of sense and feeling -as utterly hostile to intellect, asserted the necessity and enunciated -the principle of totality and reconciliation, even before it had been -recognized by professed philosophers: to Schiller must be allowed the -great merit of having been the first to oppose the subjectivity of -Kant, and of having dared try to go beyond it."<a name="FNanchor_1_382" id="FNanchor_1_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_382" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relations between Schiller and Kant.</i></div> - -<p>Discussion has raged around the true relation between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> Schiller and -Kant, and it has lately been maintained that his Æsthetic was not, as -would seem to be the case, derived from Kant, but from the pandynamism -which, starting from Leibniz, had propagated itself in Germany through -Creuzens, Ploucket and Reimarus down to Herder, who had conceived -a wholly animated nature.<a name="FNanchor_2_383" id="FNanchor_2_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_383" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> There can be no doubt that Schiller -shared Herder's conception, as may be seen from the theosophical tone -of the fragment of correspondence between Julius and Raphæl and in -other writings. It cannot be denied, however, that whatever personal -feelings Kant may have had towards Herder, or Herder towards his -former teacher (against whose <i>Critique of Judgment</i> he published his -<i>Kaligone,</i> as he had replied to the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> with his -<i>Metacritica</i>), when Kant in a somewhat dubious manner made the first -step towards a reconciliation, the breach was at all events partially -healed. The dispute is therefore of small importance: we shall find it -more useful to observe that Schiller introduced an important correction -of Kant's views when he obliterated every trace of the double theory -of art and the beautiful, giving no weight to the distinction drawn -between pure and adherent beauty, and finally abandoning the mechanical -conception of art as consisting in beauty joined to the intellectual -concept. It was certainly his own experience of active artistic work -that led him to this simplification.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The æsthetic sphere as the sphere of Play.</i></div> - -<p>Schiller defined the æsthetic sphere as the sphere of play (<i>Spiel</i>); -the unfortunate term, suggested to him partly by some phrases of Kant, -partly, perhaps, by an article on card-games by one Weisshuhn which he -published in his review <i>The Hours</i> (<i>Die Horen</i>),<a name="FNanchor_3_384" id="FNanchor_3_384"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_384" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> has given rise -to the belief that he anticipated certain modern doctrines of artistic -activity as the overflow of exuberant spirits, analogous with the play -of children and animals. Schiller did not fail to warn his readers -against such a mistaken interpretation (to which, however, he lent -himself) when he begged them not to think of "games in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> real life, -which are usually concerned with wholly material things," nor yet of -the idle dreaming of the imagination left to itself.<a name="FNanchor_4_385" id="FNanchor_4_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_385" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The activity -of the play of which he treated held the mean between the material -activity of the senses, of nature, of animal instinct or passion as -it is called, and the formal activity of intellect and morality. The -man who plays, <i>i.e.</i> contemplates nature æsthetically and produces -art, sees all natural objects as animated; in such a phantasmagoria -mere natural necessity gives place to the free determination of the -faculties; spirit appears as spontaneously reconciled with nature, -form with matter. Beauty is life, the living form (<i>lebende Gestalt)</i>; -not life in the physiological sense, since beauty does not extend -throughout all physiological life, nor is it restricted to that alone: -marble when worked by an artist may have a living form; and a man, -although possessed of life and form, need not be a living form.<a name="FNanchor_5_386" id="FNanchor_5_386"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_386" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -Wherefore art must conquer nature with form: "in an artistic work of -true beauty the content ought to be nil, the form everything: by form -man is influenced in his entirety; by content in his separate faculties -only. The true secret of great artists is that they cancel matter -through form (<i>den Stoff durch die Form vertilgt)</i>; the more imposing, -overwhelming or seductive the matter is in itself, the greater its -obstinacy in striving to emphasize its own particular effect, the more -the spectator inclines to lose himself immediately in the matter, so -much the more triumphant is the art which brings it into subjection -and enforces its own sovereign power. The mind of hearer or spectator -should remain perfectly free and calm; from the magic circle of art -it should issue as pure and perfect as when it left the hands of the -Creator. The most frivolous object should be treated in such a manner -as to enable us to pass at once to the most serious matters; and the -most serious in such a way that we may pass from them to the lightest -game." There is a fine art of passion; a passionate fine art would be -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> contradiction in terms.<a name="FNanchor_6_387" id="FNanchor_6_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_387" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> "So long as man in his early physical -state passively absorbs the world of senses and simply feels it, he is -one with it; and precisely because he merely is a world there is for -him as yet no world at all. Only when in his æsthetic state he places -the world outside himself and contemplates it, does he detach his -personality from the rest; then a world appears to him, since he is no -longer one with the world."<a name="FNanchor_7_388" id="FNanchor_7_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_388" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic education.</i></div> - -<p>Schiller ascribed high educational value to art thus conceived as at -once sensible and rational, material and formal. Not that it teaches -moral precepts or excites to good actions; if it acted thus, or when -it acted thus, it would at once cease, as we have seen, to be art. -Determination in whatsoever direction, to the good or the bad, to -pleasure or to duty, destroys the character of the æsthetic sphere, -which is rather indeterminism. By means of art man frees himself from -the yoke of the senses; but before putting himself spontaneously under -that of reason and duty, he takes as it were a little breathing-space -by staying in a region of indifference and serene contemplation. "While -having no claim to promote exclusively any special human faculty, the -æsthetic condition is favourable to each and all without favouritism; -and the reason why it favours none in particular is that it is the -foundation of the possibility of all alike. Every other exercise gives -some inclination to the soul, and therefore presupposes a special -limit; æsthetic activity alone is unlimited." This indifference, which -if not yet pure form is not pure matter, confers its educational value -on art; it opens a way to morality, not by preaching and persuading, -that is to say, determining, but by making determination possible. -Such is the fundamental concept of his celebrated <i>Letters on the -Æsthetic Education of Man</i> (1795), in which Schiller took his cue from -the conditions of his times and from the necessity of finding a middle -way between supine acquiescence in tyranny and savage rebellion as -exemplified by the revolution then raging in France.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Vagueness and lack of precision in Schiller's Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>The defects of Schiller's æsthetic doctrine are its lack of precision -and its generality. Who has given a better description of certain -aspects of art, the catharsis produced by artistic activity, the -serenity and calm resulting from the domination over natural -impressions? Equally just is his remark that art, although wholly -independent of morality, is in some way connected with it. But what -precisely this connexion may be, or what the exact nature of æsthetic -activity, Schiller does not succeed in explaining. Conceiving the -moral and intellectual as the only formal activities (<i>Formtrieb)</i> and -denying as a convinced anti-sensationalist in opposition to Burke and -philosophers of his type that art can belong to the passionate and -sensuous nature (<i>Stofftrieb</i>), he cut himself off from the means of -recognizing the general category to which artistic activity belongs. -His own concept of the formal is too narrow: too narrow, also, his -concept of the cognitive activity, in which he is able to see the -logical or intellectual form, but not that of the imagination. What -for him was this art he describes as an activity neither formal nor -material, neither cognitive nor moral? Was it for him, as for Kant, -an activity of feeling, a play of several faculties at once? It would -seem so, since Schiller distinguishes four points of view or relations -of man with things: the physical, in which these affect our senses: -the logical, in which they excite knowledge: the moral, in which they -appear to us as an object of rational volition: and the æsthetic -"in which they refer to our powers in entirety without becoming the -determinate object of any one faculty." For example, a man is pleased -æsthetically when his feeling depends in no way on the pleasure of -the senses and when he is not conscious of thinking about any law or -end.<a name="FNanchor_8_389" id="FNanchor_8_389"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_389" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> We look in vain for any more conclusive reply.</p> - -<p>It must not be overlooked that Schiller delivered a course of lectures -on Æsthetic in Jena University in 1792, and that his writings on the -subject intended for reviews were couched in a popular style: no -less popular,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> in his own opinion, was the style of the book quoted -above, which grew out of a series of letters actually sent to his -patron the Duke of Holstein-Augustenburg. But the great work to be -entitled <i>Rallias,</i> which he intended writing upon Æsthetic, was never -completed; the only fragments which have reached us are contained in -the correspondence with Körner (1793-1794). From the discussions between -the two friends we gather that Körner was not satisfied with Schiller's -formula and desired something objective, something more precise, a -positive characteristic of the beautiful: and one day Schiller told him -that he had definitely discovered such a characteristic. But what it -was that he had discovered we do not know; no mention of it occurs in -any further document, and we are left in doubt as to whether we have -lost an integral part of his thought or merely the momentary illusion -of a discovery.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schiller's caution and the rashness of the Romanticists.</i></div> - -<p>The uncertainty and vagueness of Schiller's theory seem almost a merit -in contrast with that which followed. He had constituted himself -guardian of the teaching of Kant and refused to abandon the realm of -criticism; faithful disciple of his master, he conceived the third -sphere not as real but as an ideal, a concept not constitutive but -regulative, an imperative. "From transcendental motives, reason here -demands that communion be established between formal and material -activity; that is to say, there must be an activity of play, since the -concept of humanity can be complete only by the union of reality with -form, the accidental with the necessary, passivity with liberty. This -demand must be made because reason, in conformity with her essence, -aims at perfection and at sweeping away all obstacles; and every -exclusive operation of one or other activity leaves humanity incomplete -and confined within limits."<a name="FNanchor_9_390" id="FNanchor_9_390"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_390" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Schiller's thought, as it appears in -his correspondence with Körner, has been well represented as follows:" -The union of sensibility with liberty in the Beautiful, which does -not actually take place but is supposed to do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> so, suggests to man -an intuition of the union of these elements within himself: a union -which does not take place actually but ought to do so."<a name="FNanchor_10_391" id="FNanchor_10_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_391" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The times -which followed had no such nice scruples. Kant had given new vigour -to the production of works on æsthetic, and, as in the days following -Baumgarten, every new year saw a number of new treatises. It was the -fashion. "Nothing swarms like æstheticians" (wrote Jean Paul Richter -in 1804 when preparing his own book on the subject for publication): -"it is rare for a youth who has paid his fees for a course of lectures -on Æsthetic not to produce a book on some point of the science in the -hope that the public may refund him his expenses by buying his book: -some there are indeed who pay their professor's fees out of their -author's royalties."<a name="FNanchor_11_392" id="FNanchor_11_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_392" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> It was hoped, not unreasonably, that the -exploration of the obscure region of æsthetic might throw some light -on metaphysics, and the procedure of artists seemed to offer a good -example to philosophers seeking to create a world for themselves: -so philosophy modelled itself upon art and, as though to render the -transition easier, the concept of art was brought as close as possible -to that of philosophy. Romanticism, gaining vogue daily, was a renewal -or continuation of that "age of genius" in which the youth of Goethe -and Schiller had been passed; and as the period of <i>Sturm und Drang</i> -had zealously worshipped the genius who breaks all rules and oversteps -all limitations, so did Romanticism hail the domination of a faculty -called Fancy, or more frequently Imagination, to which were attributed -the most diverse characteristics and the most miraculous effects.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Ideas on Art: J. P. Richter.</i></div> - -<p>The Romantic theorists, artists themselves for the most part, abounded -in truthful and subtle observations concerning artistic procedure. Jean -Paul Richter makes many excellent remarks about productive imagination, -which he distinguishes clearly from the reproductive and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> asserts to be -shared by all men as soon as they are able to say "This is beautiful"; -for "how could a genius be acclaimed or even tolerated for a single -month, not to mention thousands of centuries, by the common herd, if -he had not a strong connecting-link of relationship with the herd?" He -also describes how imagination is variously divided among individuals: -as simple talent, as passive or feminine genius, and in the highest -degree as the active or masculine genius, formed by reflexion and -instinct, in which "all faculties flourish simultaneously and fancy -is no isolated flower, but the goddess Flora herself who, in order -to produce new combinations, crosses with each other those blossoms -whose conjunction is fertile, and is, so to speak, a faculty full of -faculties."<a name="FNanchor_12_393" id="FNanchor_12_393"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_393" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> This latter sentence betrays a tendency on Richter's -part to exaggerate the functions of imagination and to construct upon -it a kind of mythology.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Romantic Æsthetic and idealistic Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>Contemporary systems of philosophy are partly impregnated with, and -partly the source of, such mythologies: the Romantic conception of -art may be said to have found its most complete expression in German -idealism, where this attained its most coherent and systematic form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>J. G. Fichte.</i></div> - -<p>It did not attain this form with Fichte, the first great pupil of Kant; -for though Fichte regarded imagination as the activity which creates -the universe, effects the synthesis of the ego and the non-ego, posits -the object and therefore precedes consciousness, he does not connect it -with art.<a name="FNanchor_13_394" id="FNanchor_13_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_394" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> In his æsthetic notions Fichte is influenced by Schiller, -with the addition of a moralism imposed upon him by the general -character of his system; hence the ethical sphere, midway between the -cognitive and the æsthetic, becomes from his point of view a mere -appurtenance of morality, as being the representation of, and hence -reverence for, the moral ideal.<a name="FNanchor_14_395" id="FNanchor_14_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_395" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> His subjective idealism eventually -produced an æsthetic doctrine through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> the work of Friedrich Schlegel -and Ludwig Tieck; the doctrine of Irony as the basis of art.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Irony: Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis.</i></div> - -<p>The ego which created the universe can also destroy it; the universe is -an empty appearance at which the only true reality, the ego, can smile, -holding itself aloof, like an artist or a creative god, from creatures -of its own which it does not take seriously.<a name="FNanchor_15_396" id="FNanchor_15_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_396" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Friedrich Schlegel -described art as a perpetual parody of itself and a "transcendental -farce." Tieck defined irony as "a power which allows the poet to -dominate the matter which he handles." Another Romantic Fichtian, -Novalis, dreamed of a magical idealism, an art of creation by the -instantaneous act of the ego and of realizing our dreams.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>F. Schelling.</i></div> - -<p>But it is only to the <i>System of Transcendental Idealism</i> (1800) of -Schelling, to his <i>Bruno</i> (1802), to his celebrated course of lectures -on the <i>Philosophy of Art</i> given at Jena in 1802-1803 (repeated at -Würzburg, and distributed subsequently in manuscript notes all over -Germany), to the no less celebrated lecture on the <i>Relation between -the Figurative Arts and Nature</i> (1807), as well as to other works -of this eloquent and enthusiastic philosopher that we owe the first -great philosophical affirmation of Romanticism, and of a renewed and -conscious neo-Platonism in Æsthetic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Beauty and character.</i></div> - -<p>Like all the other idealistic philosophers, Schelling held firmly to -the fusion of the theories of art and the beautiful already effected -by Schiller. From this point of view it is interesting to note his -explanation of the condemnation of art by Plato: this condemnation, -says Schelling, was directed against the art of his time, the natural -and realistic art of antiquity in general, with its character of -finitude: Plato could not have uttered such a condemnation (as we -moderns are unable to utter it) if he had known Christian art, whose -characteristic is infinity.<a name="FNanchor_16_397" id="FNanchor_16_397"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_397" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> The pure abstract beauty of Winckelmann -is not enough; no less inadequate, false and negative is that concept -of the characteristic which would try to make art some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span>thing dead, hard -and ugly by imposing upon it the limitations of the individual. Art is -beauty and characteristic in one; characteristic beauty, character from -which beauty is evolved, according to Goethe's saying; it is therefore -not the individual but the living concept of the individual. When the -artist's eye recognizes the creative idea of the individual and draws -it forth, he transforms the individual into a world in itself, into a -species (<i>Gattung</i>), an eternal idea (<i>Urbild</i>), and fears no more the -limitation or hardness which is the condition of life: characteristic -beauty is that plenitude of form which kills form; it does not inflame -passion, it regulates it, like the banks of a river which are filled -but not overflowed by the waters.<a name="FNanchor_17_398" id="FNanchor_17_398"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_398" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> In all of this we feel the -influence of Schiller, with something added which Schiller could never -have expressed.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art and Philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>Indeed, whilst gratefully acknowledging the excellent contributions to -the theory of art made by the writers who succeeded Kant, Schelling -laments that in none of them can he find exact scientific method -(<i>Wissenschaftlichkeit</i>),<a name="FNanchor_18_399" id="FNanchor_18_399"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_399" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> The true point of departure in his -theory is in the philosophy of nature, <i>i.e.</i> in that criticism of -the teleological judgement which Kant places directly after that of -the æsthetic judgement in his third <i>Critique.</i> Teleology is the -union of theoretical and practical philosophy; but the system would -be incomplete but for the possibility of demonstrating in the subject -itself, in the ego, the identity of the two worlds, theoretical and -practical; an activity which has, and at the same time has not, -consciousness; unconscious as nature, conscious as spirit. This -activity is precisely the æsthetic activity: "the general organ of -philosophy, keystone of the whole edifice."<a name="FNanchor_19_400" id="FNanchor_19_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_400" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> There are but two ways -open to one who is desirous of escaping from common realities: poetry, -which transports into the ideal world; and philosophy which annihilates -the real world.<a name="FNanchor_20_401" id="FNanchor_20_401"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_401" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Strictly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> speaking, "there is but one sole absolute -work of art; it may exist in various exemplars, but in itself it is -one, although it may not yet possess existence in its original form." -True art is not the impression of one moment, but the representation -of infinite life;<a name="FNanchor_21_402" id="FNanchor_21_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_402" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> it is transcendental intuition become objective, -and is therefore not only the organ but the document of philosophy. -A time will come when philosophy will return to poetry, from which -she has detached herself; and from the new philosophy a new mythology -will arise.<a name="FNanchor_22_403" id="FNanchor_22_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_403" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> The Absolute is thus the object of art as well as of -philosophy (as Schelling insists elsewhere in greater detail): the -first represents it in idea (<i>Urbild</i>), the second in its reflexion -(<i>Gegenbild)</i>: "philosophy portrays ideas, not realities: so is it with -art: those same ideas of which real things, as philosophy demonstrates, -are imperfect copies, themselves appear in the objective arts as -ideas, <i>i.e.</i> in all their perfection, and represent the intellectual -world in the world of reflexion."<a name="FNanchor_23_404" id="FNanchor_23_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_404" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Music is the "very ideal rhythm -of Nature and the Universe, which by means of this art makes itself -felt in the derivative world"; perfect creations of statuary are "the -very ideas of organic nature represented objectively"; the Homeric -epic, "the very identity constituting the foundation of history in the -Absolute."<a name="FNanchor_24_405" id="FNanchor_24_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_405" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But while philosophy gives an immediate representation -of the Divine, of absolute Identity, art can but give the immediate -representation of Indifference; and "since the degree of perfection -or reality in a thing becomes higher in proportion as it approaches -nearer to the absolute Idea and the fulness of infinite affirmation -and in proportion as it comprehends within itself other powers, it is -clear that art, above everything else, is in closest relation with -philosophy, from which it is distinguished merely by the character -of its specification: in everything else it may be considered as the -highest power in the ideal world."<a name="FNanchor_25_406" id="FNanchor_25_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_406" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> To the three powers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> of the real -and ideal world correspond in a rising scale the three ideas of Truth, -Goodness and Beauty. Beauty is neither the mere universal (truth), -nor mere reality (action), but the perfect interpenetration of both: -"beauty exists when the particular (the real) is so adequate to its -concept that the latter, as infinite, enters the finite and presents -itself to our contemplation in concrete form. With the appearance of -the concept, the real becomes truly similar and equal to the idea, -wherein the universal and the particular find their absolute identity. -Without ceasing to be rational, the rational becomes at the same time -apparent and sensible."<a name="FNanchor_26_407" id="FNanchor_26_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_407" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> But as above the three powers is poised -God, their point of union, so Philosophy stands supreme over the three -ideas; concerning itself not with truth or morality or even beauty -alone, but with that which belongs to all the three in common, deduced -from one common source. If philosophy assumes the character of science -and truth, while yet remaining superior to truth, this is made possible -by the fact that science and truth are its formal determination; -"philosophy is science in the sense that truth, goodness and beauty, -<i>i.e.</i> science, virtue and art, interpenetrate each other; therefore -it is also not science but is that which is common to science, virtue -and art." This interpenetration distinguishes philosophy from all other -sciences; for instance, if mathematics can dispense with morality and -beauty, philosophy cannot do so.<a name="FNanchor_27_408" id="FNanchor_27_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_408" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Ideas and the gods. Art and mythology.</i></div> - -<p>In Beauty are contained truth and goodness, necessity and liberty. When -beauty appears to be in conflict with truth, the truth in question -is a finite truth with which beauty ought not to agree, because, as -we have seen, the art of naturalism and of the merely characteristic -is a false art.<a name="FNanchor_28_409" id="FNanchor_28_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_409" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> The individual forms of art, being in themselves -representatives of the infinite and the universe, are called Ideas.<a name="FNanchor_29_410" id="FNanchor_29_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_410" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> -Considered from the point of view of reality, Ideas are gods; their -essence, their "in-itself," is in fact equivalent to God; every idea -is an idea so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> far as it is God in a particular form; every idea, -therefore, is equal to God, but to a particular god. Characteristic of -all the gods is pure limitation and indivisible absoluteness: Minerva -is the idea of wisdom united with strength, but she is lacking in -womanly tenderness; Juno is power without wisdom and without the sweet -attraction of love, for which she is forced to borrow the cestus of -Venus; Venus again has not the weighty wisdom of Minerva. What would -become of these ideas if deprived of their limitations? They would -cease to be objects of Imagination.<a name="FNanchor_30_411" id="FNanchor_30_411"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_411" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> Imagination is a faculty which -has no connexion with pure intellect or with reason (<i>Vernunft</i>) and is -distinct from fancy (<i>Einbildungskraft</i>) which collects and arranges -the products of art, whereas imagination intuits them, forms them out -of itself, represents them. Imagination is to fancy as intellectual -intuition is to reason: it is therefore the intellectual intuition of -art.<a name="FNanchor_31_412" id="FNanchor_31_412"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_412" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> "Reason" no longer suffices in a philosophy such as this: -intellectual intuition, which for Kant was a limiting concept, is now -asserted as really existing: intellect sinks to a subordinate place: -even the genuine imagination which operates in art is overshadowed -by this new-fangled Imagination, twin with intellectual Intuition, -who sometimes changes places with this sister of hers. Mythology -is proclaimed a necessary condition of all art: mythology which is -not allegory, for in the latter the particular signifies only the -universal, while the former is already itself the universal; which -explains how easy it is to allegorize, and how fascinating are such -poems as those of Homer which lend themselves to such interpretations. -Christian, as well as Hellenic, art has its mythology: Christ; the -persons of the Trinity; the Virgin mother of God.<a name="FNanchor_32_413" id="FNanchor_32_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_413" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> The fine between -mythology and art is as shadowy as that between art and philosophy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>K. W. Solger.</i></div> - -<p>The year 1815 saw the publication of Solger's principal work, <i>Erwin,</i> -a long philosophical dialogue on the beautiful;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> subsequently in -1819 he gave a course of lectures on Æsthetic which were published -posthumously. He was one of those who found but a glimpse of truth -in Kant and held the post-Kantians in very slight estimation, -particularly Fichte; in Schelling, who begins from the original unity -of the subjective and the objective, he detects for the first time a -speculative principle not adequately developed, since Schelling had -never triumphed dialectically over the difficulties of intellectual -intuition.<a name="FNanchor_33_414" id="FNanchor_33_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_414" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fancy and Imagination.</i></div> - -<p>Solger was one of those who conceived of Imagination as totally -distinct from Fancy: fancy (says he) belongs to common cognition -and is none other than "the human consciousness, in so far as it -continues, in temporal succession, infinitely reasserting an original -intuition"; it presupposes the distinctions between common cognition, -abstraction and judgement, concept and representation, amongst which -"it acts as mediator by giving to the general concept the form of -individual representation; and to the latter the form of a general -concept; in this manner it has its being among the antitheses of the -ordinary understanding." Imagination is totally different; proceeding -"from the original unity of the antitheses in the Idea, it acts so -that the elements in opposition, separated as they are from the idea, -find themselves united in the reality; by its means we are capable -of apprehending objects higher than those of common cognition and of -recognizing in them the idea itself as real: also, in art, it is the -faculty of transforming the idea into reality." It presents itself -in three modes or degrees: as Imagination of the Imagination, which -conceives the whole as idea, and activity as nothing more than the -development of the idea in reality; as Sensibility of the Imagination, -in so far as it expresses the life of the idea in the real and reduces -the one to the other; lastly (and here we have the highest grade of -artistic activity, corresponding with Dialectic in philosophy) as -Intellect of the Imagination or artistic Dialectic, conceiving idea and -reality in such a way that one passes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> over into the other, that is to -say, into reality. Other divisions and subdivisions are made on which -it is not necessary to dwell. Imagination is said to produce the Irony -essential to true art: this is the Irony of Tieck and Novalis, of whom -Solger is in a sense a follower.<a name="FNanchor_34_415" id="FNanchor_34_415"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_415" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art, practice and religion.</i></div> - -<p>Solger joins Schelling in placing beauty in the region of the Idea, -inaccessible to common consciousness. It is distinct from the idea -of Truth, because instead of dissolving the appearances of common -consciousness after the manner of truth, art accomplishes the -miracle of making appearance dissolve itself while still remaining -appearance; artistic thought, therefore, is practical, not theoretical. -Furthermore, it is distinct from the idea of Goodness, with which -at first sight it would seem to be closely related, because in the -case of Goodness the union of ideal with real, of the simple with the -multiple, of the infinite with the finite, is not real and complete, -but remains ideal, a mere ought-to-be. It is related more closely -to Religion, which thinks the Idea as the abyss of life where our -individual conscience must lose itself in order to become "essential" -(<i>wesentlich</i>), while in beauty and art the Idea manifests itself by -gathering into itself the world of distinctions between universal -and particular and placing itself in their place. Artistic activity -is more than theoretical, it is of a practical nature, but realized -and perfected; art, therefore, belongs not to theoretical philosophy -(as Kant thought, according to Solger), but to practical. Necessarily -attached on one side to infinity, it cannot have common nature as its -object; for example, art is absent from a portrait, and the ancients -showed their discrimination in selecting gods and heroes for objects -in sculpture since every deity—even in limited and particular -form—always signifies a determinate modification of the Idea.<a name="FNanchor_35_416" id="FNanchor_35_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_416" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i> G. W. F. Hegel</i>.</div> - -<p>The same concept of art appears in the philosophy of Hegel, whatever -may be the minor differences which he felt to separate himself from his -predecessors. Little concerned as we are with the shades and varieties -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> mystical Æsthetic exhibited by each of these thinkers, we are -chiefly concerned to lay bare the substantial underlying identity, -the mysticism of arbitrarism which gives them their historic place in -Æsthetic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art in the sphere of absolute spirit.</i></div> - -<p>Opening the <i>Phenomenology</i> and the <i>Philosophy of Spirit,</i> one need -not expect to find any discussion of art in the analysis of the forms -of the theoretical Spirit, among definitions of sensibility and -intuition, language and symbolism, and various grades of imagination -and thought. Hegel places Art in the sphere of absolute Spirit, -together with Religion and Philosophy,<a name="FNanchor_36_417" id="FNanchor_36_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_417" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> and in this he regards -Kant, Schiller, Schelling and Solger as his precursors, for like them -he strongly denies that art has the function of representing the -abstract concept, but not that it represents the concrete concept -or Idea. Hegel's whole philosophy consists in the affirmation of a -concrete concept, unknown to ordinary or scientific thought. "Indeed," -says he, "no concept has in our day been more mishandled than the -concept in itself and for itself; for by concept is generally meant -the abstract determinateness or one-sidedness of representation and -intellectualistic thought, with which it is naturally impossible to -think either the entirety of truth or concrete beauty."<a name="FNanchor_37_418" id="FNanchor_37_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_418" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> To the -realm of the concrete concept belongs art, as one of the three forms -wherein the freedom of the spirit is achieved; it is the first form, -namely that of immediate, sensible, objective knowledge (the second is -religion, a representative consciousness <i>plus</i> worship, an element -extraneous to mere art: the third is philosophy, free thought of the -absolute spirit).<a name="FNanchor_38_419" id="FNanchor_38_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_419" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Beauty as sensible appearance of the Idea.</i></div> - -<p>Beauty and truth are at the same time one yet distinct. "Truth is -Idea as Idea, according to its being-in-itself and its universal -principle, and so far as it is thought as such. There is no sensible -or material existence in Truth; thought contemplates therein nothing -but universal idea. But the Idea must also realize itself externally -and attain an actual and determinate existence. Truth also as such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> -has existence; but when in its determinate external existence it is -immediately for consciousness, and the concept remains immediately one -with the external appearance, the Idea is not only true but beautiful. -In this way Beauty may be defined as the sensible appearance of the -Idea."<a name="FNanchor_39_420" id="FNanchor_39_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_420" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> The Idea is the content of art: its sensible and imaginative -configuration; its form: two elements which must interpenetrate and -form a whole, hence the necessity that a content destined to become -a work of art should show itself capable of such transformation; -otherwise we have but an imperfect union of poetic form with prosaic -and incongruous content.<a name="FNanchor_40_421" id="FNanchor_40_421"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_421" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> An ideal content must gleam through the -sensible form; the form is spiritualized by this ideal light;<a name="FNanchor_41_422" id="FNanchor_41_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_422" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> -artistic imagination does not work in the same way as the passive -or receptive fancy, it does not stop at the appearances of sensible -reality but searches for the internal truth and rationality of the -real. "The rationality of the object selected by him should not be -alone in awakening the consciousness of the artist: he should have -well meditated upon the essential and the true in all their extension -and profundity, for without reflexion a man cannot become conscious -of that which is within himself, and all great works of art show -that their material has been thought again and again from every -side. No successful work of art can issue from light and careless -imagination."<a name="FNanchor_42_423" id="FNanchor_42_423"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_423" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> It is a delusion to fancy that poet and painter need -nothing beyond intuitions: "a true poet must reflect and meditate -before and during the execution of his poem."<a name="FNanchor_43_424" id="FNanchor_43_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_424" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> But it is always -understood that the thought of the poet does not take the form of -abstraction.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic in metaphysical idealism and Baumgartenism.</i></div> - -<p>Some critics<a name="FNanchor_44_425" id="FNanchor_44_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_425" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> affirm that the æsthetic movement from Schelling to -Hegel is a revived Baumgartenism on the ground that this movement -regarded art as a mediator<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> of philosophical concepts; they mention -the fact that a follower of Schelling, one Ast, was moved by the trend -of his system to substitute didactic poetry for drama as the highest -form of art.<a name="FNanchor_45_426" id="FNanchor_45_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_426" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Putting aside some isolated and accidental deviations, -there is no truth in this affirmation: these philosophers are hostile -to intellectualistic and moralistic views, frequently entering upon -definite and explicit polemic against them. Schelling wrote: "Æsthetic -production is in its origin an absolutely free production.... This -independence on any extraneous purpose constitutes the sanctity and -purity of art, enabling it to repel all connexion with mere pleasure, a -connexion which is a mark of barbarism, or with utility, which cannot -be demanded of art save at times when the loftiest form of the human -spirit is found in utilitarian discoveries. The same reasons forbid an -alliance with morality and hold even science at arm's length, although -nearest by reason of her disinterestedness; having her aim, however, -outside herself, she must restrict herself definitely to serve as means -to something higher than herself: the arts."<a name="FNanchor_46_427" id="FNanchor_46_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_427" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Hegel says, "Art -contains no universal as such." "If the aim of instruction is treated -as an aim, so that the nature of the content represented appears for -itself directly, as an abstract proposition, prosaic reflexion, or -general theory, and is not merely contained indirectly and implicitly -in the concrete artistic form, the result of such a separation is to -reduce the sensible and imaginative form, the true constituent of a -work of art, to an idle ornament, a covering (<i>Hülle)</i> presented simply -as a covering, an appearance maintained as mere appearance. The very -nature of the work of art is thus completely altered, for a work of art -must not present to intuition a content in its universality, but this -universal individualized and converted into a sensible individual."<a name="FNanchor_47_428" id="FNanchor_47_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_428" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> -It is a bad sign, he adds, when an artist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> sets himself about his work -from a motive of abstract ideas instead of that of the fulness of -life (<i>Überfülle des Lebens</i>).<a name="FNanchor_48_429" id="FNanchor_48_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_429" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> The aim of art lies in itself, in -presentation of truth in a sensible form; any other aim is altogether -extraneous.<a name="FNanchor_49_430" id="FNanchor_49_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_430" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> It would not be hard to prove, certainly, that by -separating art from pure representation and imagination and making it -in some sense the vehicle of the concept, the universal, the infinite, -these philosophers were facing in the direction of the road opened by -Baumgarten. But to prove this would mean accepting as a presupposition -the dilemma that if art be not pure imagination, it must be sensuous -and subordinate to reason; and it is just this presupposition and -dilemma that the metaphysical idealists denied. The road they tried to -follow was to conceive a faculty which should be neither imagination -nor intellect but should partake of both; an intellectual intuition or -intuitive intellect, a mental imagination after the fashion of Plotinus.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mortality and decay of art in Hegel's system.</i></div> - -<p>In a greater degree than any of his predecessors Hegel emphasized the -cognitive character of art. But this very merit brought him into a -difficulty more easily avoided by the rest. Art being placed in the -sphere of absolute Spirit, in company with Religion and Philosophy, -how will she be able to hold her own in such powerful and aggressive -company, especially in that of Philosophy, which in the Hegelian -system stands at the summit of all spiritual evolution? If Art and -Religion fulfilled functions other than the knowledge of the Absolute, -they would be inferior levels of the Spirit, but yet necessary and -indispensable. But if they have in view the same end as Philosophy -and are allowed to compete with it, what value can they retain? None -whatever; or, at the very most, they may have that sort of value which -attaches to transitory historical phases in the life of humanity. The -principles of Hegel's system are at bottom rationalistic and hostile to -religion, and hostile no less to art. A strange and painful consequence -for a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> man like Hegel, endowed with a warmly æsthetic spirit and a -fervid lover of the arts; almost a repetition of the hard fate endured -by Plato. But as the Greek philosopher, in obedience to the presumed -command of religion, did not hesitate to condemn the mimetic art and -the Homeric poetry he loved, so the German refused to evade the logical -exigencies of his system and proclaimed the mortality, nay, the very -death, of art. "We have assigned," he says, "a very high place to -art: but it must be recollected that neither in content nor in form -can art be considered the most perfect means of bringing before the -consciousness of the mind its true interests. Precisely by reason of -its form, art is limited to a particular content. Only a definite -circle or grade of truth can be made visible in a work of art; that -is to say, such truth as may be transfused into the sensible and -adequately presented in that form, as were the Greek gods. But there -is a deeper conception of truth, by which it is not so intimately -allied to the sensible as to permit of its being received or expressed -suitably in material fashion. To this class belongs the Christian -conception of truth; and, furthermore, the spirit of our modern world, -more especially that of our religion and our mental evolution, seems to -have passed the point at which art is the best road to the apprehension -of the Absolute. The peculiar character of artistic production no -longer satisfies our highest aspirations.... Thought and reflexion -have superseded fine art." Many reasons have been adduced in order to -account for the moribund condition of modern art; in especial, the -prevalence of material and political interests; the true reason, says -Hegel, consists of the inferiority in grade of art in comparison with -pure thought. "Art in its highest form is and for us must remain a -thing of the past"; and just because the thing has vanished, one can -reason about it philosophically.<a name="FNanchor_50_431" id="FNanchor_50_431"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_431" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> The Æsthetic of Hegel is thus a -funeral oration: he passes in review the successive forms of art, shows -the progressive steps of internal consumption and lays<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> the whole in -its grave, leaving Philosophy to write its epitaph.</p> - -<p>Romanticism and metaphysical idealism had elevated art to such a -fantastic height among the clouds that at last they were obliged to -admit that it was so far away as to be absolutely useless.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_382" id="Footnote_1_382"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_382"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Vorles. über die Ästhetik</i> (2nd ed., Berlin, 1842), vol. -i. p. 78.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_383" id="Footnote_2_383"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_383"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Sommer, <i>Gesch. d. Psych. u. Ästh.</i> pp. 365-432.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_384" id="Footnote_3_384"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_384"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Danzel, <i>Ges. Aufs.</i> p. 242.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_385" id="Footnote_4_385"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_385"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Briefe ü. d. Ästh. Erzieh.</i> (in Werke, ed. Goedecke), -Letters 15, 27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_386" id="Footnote_5_386"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_386"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> Letter 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_387" id="Footnote_6_387"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_387"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Briefe</i>, Letter 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_388" id="Footnote_7_388"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_388"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> Letter 25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_389" id="Footnote_8_389"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_389"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Briefe</i>, Letter 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_390" id="Footnote_9_390"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_390"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Briefe,</i> Letter 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_391" id="Footnote_10_391"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_391"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Danzel, <i>Ges. Aufs.</i> p. 241.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_392" id="Footnote_11_392"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_392"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Vorschule der Ästh.,</i> 1804 (French trans., <i>Poétique ou -introduction à l'Esth.,</i> Paris, 1862), preface.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_393" id="Footnote_12_393"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_393"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Vorschule d. Ästh.</i> chs. 2, 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_394" id="Footnote_13_394"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_394"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Grundl. der Wissenschaftslehre,</i> in <i>Werke</i> (Berlin, -1845), vol. i. pp. 214-217.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_395" id="Footnote_14_395"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_395"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Danzel, <i>Ges. Aufs.</i> pp. 25-30; Zimmermann, <i>G. d. A.</i> -pp. 522-572.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_396" id="Footnote_15_396"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_396"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Hegel, <i>Vorles. üb. d. Ästh.</i> introd. vol. i. pp. 82-88.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_397" id="Footnote_16_397"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_397"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. d. Methode d. akadem. Stud.</i> (1803), lecture -14; in <i>Werke</i> (Stuttgart, 1856-1861), vol. v, pp. 346-347.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_398" id="Footnote_17_398"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_398"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Üb. d. Verhältniss d. bild. Künste, z. d. Natur</i> in -<i>Werke,</i> vol. vii. pp. 299-310.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_399" id="Footnote_18_399"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_399"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Philos, d. Kunst,</i> posthumous, introd. in <i>Werke,</i> v. p. -362.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_400" id="Footnote_19_400"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_400"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>System d. transcend. Idealismus,</i> in <i>Werke,</i> § i. vol. -iii. introd. § 3, p. 349.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_401" id="Footnote_20_401"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_401"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 4, p. 351.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_402" id="Footnote_21_402"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_402"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>System d. transcend. Idealismus,</i> in <i>Werke,</i> part vi. § -3, p. 627.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_403" id="Footnote_22_403"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_403"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 3, pp. 627-629.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_404" id="Footnote_23_404"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_404"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Phil. d. Kunst,</i> pp. 368-369.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_405" id="Footnote_24_405"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_405"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 369.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_406" id="Footnote_25_406"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_406"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> General Part, p. 381.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_407" id="Footnote_26_407"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_407"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Phil. d. Kunst,</i> p. 382.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_408" id="Footnote_27_408"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_408"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 383.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_409" id="Footnote_28_409"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_409"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 385.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_410" id="Footnote_29_410"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_410"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 389-390.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_411" id="Footnote_30_411"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_411"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Phil. d. Kunst,</i> pp. 390-393.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_412" id="Footnote_31_412"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_412"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 395.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_413" id="Footnote_32_413"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_413"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 405-451.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_414" id="Footnote_33_414"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_414"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästhetik</i>, Heyse, Leipzig, 1829, pp. 35-43.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_415" id="Footnote_34_415"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_415"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Vorles. üb. Ästh. pp. 186-200.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_416" id="Footnote_35_416"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_416"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Op. cit. pp. 48-85.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_417" id="Footnote_36_417"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_417"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Encykl. d. phil. Wiss.</i> §§ 557-563.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_418" id="Footnote_37_418"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_418"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> (<i>ed. cit.</i>) i. p. 118.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_419" id="Footnote_38_419"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_419"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. pp. 129-133.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_420" id="Footnote_39_420"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_420"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> i. p. 141.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_421" id="Footnote_40_421"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_421"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. 89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_422" id="Footnote_41_422"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_422"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. pp. 50-51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_423" id="Footnote_42_423"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_423"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. pp. 354-355.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_424" id="Footnote_43_424"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_424"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Encykl.</i> § 450.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_425" id="Footnote_44_425"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_425"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> Danzel, <i>Ästh. d. hegel. Sch.</i> p. 62; Zimmermann, <i>G. d. -A.</i> pp. 693-697; J. Schmidt, <i>L. u. B.</i> pp. 103-105; Spitzer, <i>Krit. -St.</i> p. 48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_426" id="Footnote_45_426"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_426"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Fr. Ast, <i>System der Kunstlehre,</i> Leipzig, 1805; cf. -Spitzer, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_427" id="Footnote_46_427"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_427"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>System d. transcend. Idealismus</i> (1800), part vi. § 2; -in <i>Werke,</i> § I, vol. iii. pp. 622-623.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_428" id="Footnote_47_428"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_428"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. d. Ästh.</i> i. pp. 66-67.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_429" id="Footnote_48_429"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_429"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. d. Ästh.</i> i. p. 353.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_430" id="Footnote_49_430"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_430"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. 72.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_431" id="Footnote_50_431"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_431"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. d. Ästh.</i> i. pp. 13-16.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="Xb" id="Xb">X</a></h4> - - -<h4>SCHOPENHAUER AND HERBART</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic mysticism in the opponents of Idealism.</i></div> - -<p>Nothing, perhaps, shows more clearly how well this imaginative -conception of art suited the spirit of the times (not only a particular -fashion in philosophy, but the psychological conditions expressed -by the Romantic movement) than the fact that the adversaries of -the systems of Schelling, Solger and Hegel either agreed with this -conception in general or, while believing themselves to be departing -widely from it, actually returned to it involuntarily.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>A. Schopenhauer.</i></div> - -<p>Everybody knows with what lack, shall we say, of <i>phlegma -philosophicum</i> Arthur Schopenhauer fought against Schelling, Hegel -and all the "charlatans" and "professors" who had divided amongst -themselves the heritage of Kant. But what was the artistic theory -accepted and developed by Schopenhauer?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Ideas as the object of art.</i></div> - -<p>His theory, like Hegel's own, turns upon the distinction between -the concept which is abstraction and the concept which is concrete, -or Idea; although Schopenhauer's Ideas are by himself likened to -Plato's, and in the particular form in which he presents them more -nearly resemble those of Schelling than the Idea of Hegel. They have -something in common with intellectual concepts, for like them they -are unities representing a plurality of real things: but "the concept -is abstract and discursive, entirely indeterminate in its sphere, -rigorously precise within its own limits only; the intellect suffices -to conceive and understand it, speech expresses it without need for -other intermediary, and its own definition exhausts its whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> nature; -the idea, on the contrary (which may be defined clearly as the adequate -representative of the concept) is absolutely intuitive, and although -it represents an infinite number of individual things, it is not for -that any the less determined in all its aspects. The individual, as -individual, cannot know it; in order to conceive it he must strip -himself of all will, of all individuality, and raise himself to the -state of a pure knowing subject. The idea, therefore, is attained -by genius only, or by one who finds himself in a genial disposition -attained by that elevation of his cognitive powers inspired usually -by genius." "The idea is unity become plurality by means of space -and time, forms of one intuitive apperception; the concept, on the -contrary, is unity extracted from plurality by means of abstraction, -which is the procedure of our intellect: the concept may be described -as <i>unitas post yewi</i> the idea, <i>unitas ante rem.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_1_432" id="FNanchor_1_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_432" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Schopenhauer is -in the habit of calling ideas the genera of things; but on one occasion -he remarks that ideas are of species, not genera; that genera are -simply concepts, and that there are natural species, but only logical -genera.<a name="FNanchor_2_433" id="FNanchor_2_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_433" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> This psychological illusion as to the existence of ideas for -types originates (as we find elsewhere in Schopenhauer) in the habit -of converting the empirical classifications of the natural sciences -into living realities. "Do you wish to see ideas?" he asks; "look at -the clouds which scud across the sky; look at a brooklet leaping over -rocks; look at the crystallization of hoar-frost on a window-pane -with its designs of trees and flowers. The shapes of the clouds, the -ripples of the gushing brook, the configurations of the crystals exist -for us individual observers, in themselves they are indifferent. The -clouds in themselves are elastic vapour; the brook is an incompressible -fluid, mobile, transparent, amorphous, the ice obeys the laws of -crystallization: and in these determinations their ideas consist."<a name="FNanchor_3_434" id="FNanchor_3_434"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_434" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -All these are the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> immediate objectification of will in its various -degrees; and it is these, not their pale copies in real things, -that art delineates; whence Plato was right in one sense and wrong -in another, and is justified and condemned by Schopenhauer exactly -in the same way as by Plotinus of old, as well as by Schopenhauer's -worst enemy, the modern Schelling.<a name="FNanchor_4_435" id="FNanchor_4_435"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_435" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> In consequence, each art has -a special category of ideas for its own dominion. Architecture, and -in some cases hydraulics, facilitate the clear intuition of those -ideas which constitute the lower degrees of objectification—weight, -cohesion, resistance, hardness, the general properties of stone and -some combinations of light; gardening and (most curious association) -landscape painting represent the ideas of vegetable nature; sculpture -and animal painting those of zoology; historical painting and the -higher forms of sculpture that of the human body; poetry the very idea -of man himself.<a name="FNanchor_5_436" id="FNanchor_5_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_436" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> As for music, that (let him who can justify the -logical discontinuity) is outside the hierarchy of the other arts. -We have seen how Schelling considered it to be representative of the -very rhythm of the universe;<a name="FNanchor_6_437" id="FNanchor_6_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_437" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> differing but slightly from this, -Schopenhauer affirms that music does not express ideas but, parallel -with ideas, Will itself. The analogies between music and the world, -between the fundamental bass and crude matter, between the scale and -the series of species, between melody and conscious will, led him to -the conclusion that music was not, as Leibniz thought, an arithmetic -but a metaphysic: <i>exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se -philosophari animi</i>.<a name="FNanchor_7_438" id="FNanchor_7_438"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_438" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic catharsis.</i></div> - -<p>To Schopenhauer, no less than his idealistic predecessors, art -beatifies; it is the flower of life; he who contemplates art is no -longer an individual but a pure knowing subject, at liberty, free from -desire, from pain, from time.<a name="FNanchor_8_439" id="FNanchor_8_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_439" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Signs of a better theory in Schopenhauer.</i></div> - -<p>Schopenhauer's system no doubt contains here and there premonitions -of a better and more profound treatment of art. Schopenhauer, who was -capable on occasion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> of clear and keen analysis, constantly insists -that the forms of space and time must not be applied to the idea -or to artistic contemplation, which admits of the general form of -representation only.<a name="FNanchor_9_440" id="FNanchor_9_440"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_440" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> From this he might have inferred that art, so -far from being a superior and extraordinary level of consciousness, is -actually its most immediate level, namely that which in its primitive -simplicity precedes even common perception with its reference of -objects to a position in the spatial and temporal series. To free -oneself from common perception and to live in imagination does not mean -rising to a Platonic contemplation of the ideas, but descending once -more into the region of immediate intuition, becoming children again, -as Vico had seen. On the other hand Schopenhauer had begun to examine -the categories of Kant with an unprejudiced eye; he was not satisfied -with the two forms of intuition, and wished to add to them a third, -causality.<a name="FNanchor_10_441" id="FNanchor_10_441"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_441" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> In conclusion, we note that, like his predecessors, he -makes a comparison between art and history, with this difference and -advantage over the idealist authors of the philosophy of history, that -for him history was irreducible to concepts; it was contemplation of -the individual, and therefore not science. Had he persevered in his -comparison between art and history, he would have arrived at a better -solution than that at which he stopped; that is to say, that the matter -of history is the particular in its particularity and contingency, -while that of art is that which is, and is always identical.<a name="FNanchor_11_442" id="FNanchor_11_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_442" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> But -instead of pursuing these happy ideas Schopenhauer preferred to play -variations on the themes fashionable in his day.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>J. F. Herbart.</i></div> - -<p>Most astounding of all is the fact that a dry intellectualist, -the avowed enemy of idealism, of dialectic and of speculative -constructions, head of the school calling itself realistic or the -school of exact philosophy, Johann Friedrich Herbart, when he -turns his attention<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> to Æsthetic, turns mystic too, though in a -slightly different way. How weightily he speaks when expounding his -philosophical method! Æsthetic must not bear the blame of the faults -into which metaphysic has fallen; we must make it an independent study, -and detach it from all hypothesis about the universe. Nor must it be -confounded with psychology or asked to describe the emotions awakened -by the content of works of art, such as the pathetic or the comic, -sadness or joy; its duty is to determine the essential character of -art and beauty. In the analysis of particular cases of beauty and -in registering what they reveal lies the way of salvation. These -proposals and promises have misled numbers of people as to the nature -of Herbart's Æsthetic. But <i>ce sont là jeux de princes</i>; by paying -attention we shall see what Herbart meant by analysis of particular -case; and how he held himself aloof from metaphysics.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Pure Beauty and relations of form.</i></div> - -<p>Beauty, for him, consisted in relations: relations of tone, colour, -line, thought and will; experience must decide which of these relations -are beautiful, and æsthetic science consists solely in enumerating the -fundamental concepts (<i>Musterbegriffe)</i> in which are summarized the -particular cases of beauty. But these relations, Herbart thought, were -not like physiological facts; they could not be empirically observed, -<i>e.g.</i> in a psycho-physical laboratory. To correct this error it is -only necessary to observe that these relations include not only tones, -lines and colours, but also thoughts and will, and that they extend to -moral facts no less than to objects of external intuition. He declares -explicitly "No true beauty is sensible, although it frequently happens -that sense-impressions precede and follow the intuition of beauty."<a name="FNanchor_12_443" id="FNanchor_12_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_443" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> -There is a profound distinction between the beautiful and the pleasant; -for the pleasant needs no representation, while the beautiful consists -in representation of relations, followed immediately in consciousness -by a judgment, an appendix (<i>Zusatz)</i> which expresses unqualified -ap<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span>probation ("<i>es gefällt!</i>"). And while the pleasant and the -unpleasant "in the progress of culture gradually become transient and -unimportant, Beauty stands out more and more as something permanent and -possessed of undeniable value."<a name="FNanchor_13_444" id="FNanchor_13_444"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_444" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The judgment of taste is universal, -eternal, immutable: "the complete representation (<i>vollendete -Vorstellung</i>) of the same relations is always followed by the same -judgment; just as the same cause always produces the same effect. -This happens at all times and in all circumstances, conditions and -complications, which gives to the particularity of certain cases the -appearance of a universal rule. Granted that the elements of a relation -are universal concepts, it is plain that although in judging we think -only of the content of these concepts, the judgment must have a sphere -as large as that common to the two concepts."<a name="FNanchor_14_445" id="FNanchor_14_445"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_445" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Herbart considers -æsthetic judgements as a general class comprising ethical judgements as -a subdivision: "amongst other beauties is to be distinguished morality, -as a thing not only of value in itself but as actually determining the -unconditioned value of persons"; within morality in the narrowest sense -is distinguished in turn justice.<a name="FNanchor_15_446" id="FNanchor_15_446"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_446" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The five ethica ideas guiding -moral life (internal liberty, perfection, benevolence, equity and -justice) are five æsthetic ideas or rather æsthetic concepts applied to -relations of will.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art as sum of content and form.</i></div> - -<p>Herbart looks on art as a complex fact, the combination of an -extra-æsthetic element, content, which may have logical or -psychological or any other kind of value, and a purely æsthetic -element, form, which is an application of the fundamental æsthetic -concepts. Man looks for that which is diverting, instructive, moving, -majestic, ridiculous; and "all these are mingled with the beautiful -in order to procure favour and interest for the work. The beautiful -thus assumes various complexions, and becomes graceful, magnificent, -tragic, or comic; it can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> become all these because the æsthetic -judgement, in itself calmly serene, tolerates the company of the most -diverse excitations of the soul which are no part of itself."<a name="FNanchor_16_447" id="FNanchor_16_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_447" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> But -all these things have nothing to do with beauty. In order to discover -the objectively beautiful or ugly, one must make abstraction from -every predicate concerning the content. "In order to recognize the -objectively beautiful or ugly in poetry, one must show the difference -between this and that thought, and the discussion will concern itself -with thoughts; to recognize it in sculpture, one must show the -difference between this and that outline, and the discussion will turn -upon outlines; to recognize it in music, one should show the difference -between this and that tone, and the discussion will turn upon tones. -Now, such predicates as 'magnificent, charming, graceful' and so -forth contain nothing whatever about tones, outlines or thoughts, and -therefore tell us nothing about the objectively beautiful in poetry, -sculpture, or music; indeed they rather lead us to believe in the -existence of an objective beauty to which thought, outline, or tone are -equally accidental, which may be approached by receiving impressions -from poetry, sculpture, music and so forth, obliterating the object -and giving oneself up to the pure emotion of mind."<a name="FNanchor_17_448" id="FNanchor_17_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_448" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Very different -is the æsthetic judgement, the "cold judgement of the connoisseur" -who considers exclusively form, <i>i.e.</i> objectively pleasant formal -relations. This abstraction from the content in order to contemplate -pure form is the catharsis produced by art. Content is transitory, -relative, subject to moral law and liable to moral judgement: form is -permanent, absolute, free.<a name="FNanchor_18_449" id="FNanchor_18_449"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_449" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Concrete art may be the sum of two or -more values; but the æsthetic fact is form alone.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Herbart and Kantian thought.</i></div> - -<p>The reader who goes behind appearances and discounts diversities of -terminology will not fail to observe the close similarity of the -æsthetic doctrine of Herbart to that of Kant. In Herbart we again -find the distinction between free and adherent beauty, and between -form and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> sensuous stimulus (<i>Reiz)</i> attached to form: we find an -affirmation of the existence of pure beauty, the object of necessary -and universal, but not discursive, judgements; lastly, we find a -certain connexion between beauty and morality, between Æsthetic and -Ethics. In these matters Herbart is perhaps the most faithful follower -and propagator of the thought of Kant, whose doctrine contains the germ -of his own. In one passage he describes himself as "a Kantian, but of -the year 1828"; and he is quite right, even in pointing out the exact -difference in date. Amidst the errors and uncertainties of his æsthetic -thought, Kant is rich in suggestion and scatters fertile seed; he -belongs to a period when philosophy was still young and impressionable. -Herbart, coming later, is dry and one-sided; he takes whatever is -false in Kant's doctrine and hardens it into a system. If they had -done little else, the Romanticists and idealists had at least united -the theory of beauty to that of art, and destroyed the rhetorical -and mechanical view; and they had brought into relief (frequently -exaggerating, doubtless) various important characteristics of artistic -activity. Herbart re-states the mechanical view, restores the duality, -and presents a capricious, narrow, barren mysticism, devoid of all -breath of artistic feeling.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_432" id="Footnote_1_432"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_432"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung,</i> 1819 (in <i>Sämmtl. Werke,</i> -ed. Grisebach, vol. i.). bk. iii. § 49.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_433" id="Footnote_2_433"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_433"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Ergänzungen</i> (ed. Grisebach, vol. ii.), ch. 29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_434" id="Footnote_3_434"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_434"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Welt a. W. u. V.</i> iii. § 35.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_435" id="Footnote_4_435"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_435"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_291">291</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_436" id="Footnote_5_436"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_436"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Welt a. W. u. V.</i> iii. §§ 42-51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_437" id="Footnote_6_437"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_437"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_438" id="Footnote_7_438"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_438"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Welt a. W. u. V.</i> § 53.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_439" id="Footnote_8_439"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_439"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> § 34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_440" id="Footnote_9_440"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_440"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Welt a. W. u. V.</i> § 32.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_441" id="Footnote_10_441"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_441"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. kantischen Philosophie,</i> in append, to <i>op. -cit.</i> pp. 558-576.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_442" id="Footnote_11_442"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_442"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Ergänzungen,</i> ch. 38.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_443" id="Footnote_12_443"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_443"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Einleitung in die Philosophie,</i> 1813, in <i>Werke,</i> ed. -Hartenstein, vol. 1. p. 49.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_444" id="Footnote_13_444"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_444"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Einleitung in die Philosophie,</i> pp. 125-128.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_445" id="Footnote_14_445"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_445"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Allgemeine praktische Philosophie,</i> in <i>Werke,</i> viii. p. -25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_446" id="Footnote_15_446"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_446"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Einleitung,</i> p. 128.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_447" id="Footnote_16_447"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_447"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Einleitung,</i> p. 162.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_448" id="Footnote_17_448"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_448"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 129-130.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_449" id="Footnote_18_449"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_449"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 163.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIb" id="XIb">XI</a></h4> - - -<h4>FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic of content and Æsthetic of form: meaning of the -contrast.</i></div> - -<p>We have now reached a point when we are able to give ourselves an exact -account of the signification and importance of the celebrated war -waged for over a century in Germany between the Æsthetic of content -(<i>Gehaltsästhetik)</i> and the Æsthetic of form (<i>Formästhetik</i>); a war -which gave birth to vast works on the history of Æsthetic undertaken -from one or other point of view, and sprang from Herbart's opposition -to the idealism of Schelling, Hegel, and their contemporaries and -followers. "Form" and "Content" are among the most equivocal words -in the whole philosophical vocabulary, particularly in Æsthetic; -sometimes, indeed, what one calls form, others call content. The -Herbartians were specially given to quoting in their own defence -Schiller's dictum, that the secret of art consists in "cancelling -content by form." But what is there in common between Schiller's -concept of "form," which placed the æsthetic activity side by side -with the moral and intellectual, and Herbart's "form," which does not -penetrate or enliven, but clothes and adorns a content? Hegel, on -the other hand, often gives the name "form" to what Schiller would -call "matter" (<i>Stoff</i>), that is, the sensible matter which it is -the business of spiritual energy to dominate. Hegel's "content" is -the idea, the metaphysical truth, the constituent element of beauty: -Herbart's "content" is the emotional and intellectual element which -falls outside beauty. The Æsthetic of "form" in Italy is an æsthetic of -expressive activity; the form is neither a clothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> nor a metaphysical -idea nor sensible matter, but a representative or imaginative faculty -with the power of framing impressions; yet there have been attempts -to confute this Italian æsthetic formalism with the same arguments -that are used against German æsthetic formalism, a totally different -thing in every respect. And so forth. Having given a plain account of -the thoughts of the post-Kantian æstheticians, we shall be able to -appreciate their opponents without seeking light from their obscure -terminology or allowing ourselves to be misled by the banners they -wave. The antithesis between the Æsthetic of content and that of -form, the Æsthetic of idealism and that of realism, the Æsthetic of -Schelling, Solger, Hegel and Schopenhauer and that of Herbart, will -appear in its true light, as the lamily quarrel between two conceptions -of art united by a common mysticism, although one is destined almost to -meet with truth during its long journey, while the other wanders ever -further away.</p> - -<p>The first half of the nineteenth century was for Germany a period of -many fine-sounding philosophical formulæ: subjectivism, objectivism, -subjective—objectivism; abstract, concrete, abstract-concrete; -idealism, realism, idealism—realism; between pantheism and theism -Krause inserted his pan-en-theism. In the midst of this uproar, in -which the second-rate men shouted down the first-rate and made good -their claim to their only true property, namely words, it is not -surprising that a few modest clear thinkers, philosophers who preferred -to think about realities, should have the worst of it and remain -unheard and unnoticed, lost among the roaring crowd or labelled with a -false ticket.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Friedrich Schleiermacher.</i></div> - -<p>This, at least, seems to have been the lot of Friedrich Schleiermacher, -whose æsthetic doctrine is amongst the least known although it is -perhaps the most noteworthy of the day.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Wrong judgements concerning him.</i></div> - -<p>Schleiermacher delivered his first lectures on Æsthetic at Berlin -University in 1819, and from that date he began to study the subject -seriously with a view to writing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> a book on it. He repeated his -lectures on two occasions, in 1825 and 1832-1833; but his death, -which occurred in the following year, prevented him from carrying -out his plan, and all we know of his thoughts on Æsthetic comes from -his lectures, as collected by his pupils and published in 1842.<a name="FNanchor_1_450" id="FNanchor_1_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_450" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> A -Herbartian historian of Æsthetic, Zimmermann, attacks the posthumous -work of Schleiermacher with real ferocity; after twenty pages of -invective and sarcasm he concludes by asking, how could his pupils -so dishonour their great master by publishing such a mass of waste -paper, "all play upon words, sophistical conceits and dialectical -subtleties"?<a name="FNanchor_2_451" id="FNanchor_2_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_451" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Nor was the idealistic historian Hartmann much more -benevolent when he describes the work as "a confused mess in which, -among much that is merely trivial, many half-truths and exaggerations, -one can detect a few acute observations"; and says that, in order -to make bearable "such unctuous afternoon sermons delivered by a -preacher in his dotage," it must be shortened by three-quarters; and -that, "as regards fundamental principles," it is simply useless, -offering no innovations upon concrete idealism as presented by Hegel -and others; and that, in any case, it seems impossible "to attach it -to any line of thought except the Hegelian, to which Schleiermacher's -contribution is only of second-rate importance." He further observes -that Schleiermacher was primarily a theologian, and in philosophy more -or less an amateur.<a name="FNanchor_3_452" id="FNanchor_3_452"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_452" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Now it cannot be denied that Schleiermacher's -doctrine has reached us in a hazy form, by no means free from -uncertainties and contradictions; and, which is more important, -it is here and there affected for the worse by the influence of -contemporary metaphysics. But, side by side with these defects, what -excellent method, really scientific and philosophical; what a number of -cornerstones well and truly laid; what wealth of new truths,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> and of -difficulties and problems not suspected or discussed before his day!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schleiermacher contrasted with his predecessors.</i></div> - -<p>Schleiermacher considered Æsthetic as an essentially modern line -of thought, and drew a sharp distinction between the <i>Poetics</i> of -Aristotle, which never shakes itself free from the empirical standpoint -of the maker of rules, and what Baumgarten tried to do in the -eighteenth century. He praised Kant for having been the first truly -to include Æsthetic among the philosophical sciences, and recognized -that in Hegel artistic activity had attained the highest elevation by -being brought into connexion and almost into equality with religion -and philosophy. But he was not satisfied either with the followers of -Baumgarten when they degenerated into the absurd attempt to construct -a science or theory of sensuous pleasure, or with the Kantian point of -view which made its principal aim the consideration of taste; or with -the philosophy of Fichte, in which art became a means of education; or -with the more widely received opinion which placed at the centre of -Æsthetic the vague and equivocal concept of Beauty. Schiller pleased -him by having called attention to the moment of artistic spontaneity or -productiveness, and he praised Schelling for having laid stress on the -importance of the figurative arts, which lend themselves less easily -than poetry to facile and illusory moralistic interpretations.<a name="FNanchor_4_453" id="FNanchor_4_453"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_453" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -Having with the utmost clearness excluded from Æsthetic the study of -practical rules as empirical, and therefore irreducible to a science, -he assigned to Æsthetic the task of determining the proper position of -artistic activity in the scheme of ethics.<a name="FNanchor_5_454" id="FNanchor_5_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_454" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Place assigned to Æsthetic in his Ethics.</i></div> - -<p>To avoid falling into error over this terminology, we must call to -mind that the philosophy of Schleiermacher followed the ancient -traditions in its tripartite division into Dialectic, Ethics and -Physics. Dialectic corresponds with ontology; Physics embraces all -the sciences of natural facts; Ethics includes the study of all free -activities of mankind (language, thought, art, religion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> and morality). -Ethics represented to him not only the science of morality but what -others name Psychology or, better still, the Science or Philosophy of -the Spirit. This explanation once given, Schleiermacher's point of -departure seems to be the only one just and permissible, and we shall -not be surprised when he talks of will, of voluntary acts and so on, -where others would have simply spoken of activity or spiritual energy; -he even endows such expressions with a broader meaning than that -conferred upon them by practical philosophy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic activity as immanent and individual.</i></div> - -<p>A double distinction may be made amongst human activities. In the -first place, there are activities which we presume to be constituted -in the same manner in all men (such as the logical activity) and are -called activities of identity; and others whose diversity is presumed, -which are called activities of difference or individual activities. -Secondly, there are activities which exhaust themselves in the -internal life, and others which actualize themselves in the external -world: immanent activities and practical activities. To which of the -two classes in each of the two orders does artistic activity belong? -There can be no doubt of its different modes of development, if not -actually in each individual person, at least in different peoples and -nations; therefore it belongs properly to activities of difference or -individual activities.<a name="FNanchor_6_455" id="FNanchor_6_455"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_455" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> As for the other distinction, it is true -that art does realize itself in the external world, but this fact is -something superadded ("<i>ein später Hinzukommendes</i>") "which stands to -the internal fact as the communication of thought by means of speech -or writing stands to thought itself": art's true work is the internal -image ("<i>das innere Bild ist das eigentliche Kunstwerk</i>"). Exceptions -to this might be adduced, such as mimicry; but they would be apparent -only. Between a really angry man and the actor who plays the part of -an angry man on the stage there is this difference: in the second case -anger appears as controlled and therefore beautiful; that is, the -internal image is in the actor's soul interposed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> between the fact of -passion and its physical manifestation.<a name="FNanchor_7_456" id="FNanchor_7_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_456" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Artistic activity "belongs -to those human activities in which we presuppose the individual in its -differentiation; it belongs equally to those activities developing -essentially within themselves and not completing themselves in any -external world. Art, therefore, is an immanent activity in which we -presuppose differentiation." Internal, not practical: individual, not -universal or logical.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Artistic truth and intellectual truth.</i></div> - -<p>But if art be one form of thought, there must be one form of thought -in which identity is presupposed, and another in which difference is -presupposed. We do not look for truth in poetry; or, rather, we do look -for truth, but for one that is totally different from that objective -truth to which there must correspond some being, either universal or -individual (scientific and historical truth). "When a character in a -poem is said to be devoid of truth, a slur is cast on the given poem; -but if the character is said to be a pure invention, corresponding with -no reality, that is quite a different matter." The truth of a poetic -character consists in the coherence with which a single person's divers -modes of thinking and acting are represented: even in portraits it is -not an exact correspondence with an objective reality that makes the -thing a work of art. From art and poetry "springs no iota of knowledge" -(<i>das Geringste vom Wissen</i>); "it expresses but the truth of the single -consciousness." There are then "productions of thought and of sensible -intuitions, opposed to the other productions because they do not -presuppose identity, and they express the singular as such."<a name="FNanchor_8_457" id="FNanchor_8_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_457" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Difference of artistic consciousness from feeling and -religion.</i></div> - -<p>The domain of art is immediate self-consciousness (<i>unmittelbare -Selbstbewusstsein</i>), which must be carefully distinguished from the -thought or concept of the ego or of the determinate ego. This latter is -the consciousness of identity in the diversity of moments; immediate -self-consciousness is "diversity itself, of which one must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> be aware, -since life in its entirety is but the development of consciousness." In -this domain art has often been confused with two facts which accompany -it: sensuous consciousness (the feeling of pleasure and pain), and -religion. A double confusion, of which the sensationalists fall into -the first half and Hegel into the second; Schleiermacher clears it up -by proving that art is free productivity, whereas sensuous pleasure and -religious feeling, however different in other ways, are both determined -by an objective fact (<i>äussere Sein</i>).<a name="FNanchor_9_458" id="FNanchor_9_458"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_458" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Dreams and art: inspiration and deliberation.</i></div> - -<p>The better to understand this free productivity, we must further -circumscribe the domain of immediate consciousness. In this we can -find nothing more helpful than comparing it with the images produced -by dreams. The artist has his own dreams: he dreams with open eyes, -and from among the thick-thronging images of this dream-state those -having sufficient energy alone become works of art, the rest remaining -a mere background from which the others stand out. All the essential -elements of art are found in the dream-state, which is the production -of free thoughts and sensuous intuitions consisting of mere images. -Certainly something is lacking in dreams, and they differ from art not -only in their absence of technique, which has already been excluded as -irrelevant to art, but in another way, viz. that a dream is a chaotic -fact, without stability, order, connexion or measure. But when some -sort of order is introduced into the chaos the difference at once -disappears, and the likeness to art merges in identity. This internal -activity which introduces order and measure, fixes and determines the -image, is that which distinguishes art from a dream or transforms a -dream into art. It often involves struggle, labour, the obligation to -stem the involuntary flood of internal images; in a word, it means -reflexion or deliberation. But the dream and the cessation of dreaming -are equally indispensable elements of art. There must be production of -thoughts and images and, together with such production, there must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> -be measure, determination and unity, "otherwise each image would be -confused with its neighbour and have no definiteness." The instant of -inspiration (<i>Begeisterung</i>) is as essential as that of deliberation -(<i>Besonnenheit)</i>.<a name="FNanchor_10_459" id="FNanchor_10_459"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_459" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art and the typical.</i></div> - -<p>But in order to arrive at artistic truth it is also I necessary (here -Schleiermacher's thought becomes less clear and accurate) that the -singular be accompanied by consciousness of the species; consciousness -of the self as individual man is impossible without consciousness of -mankind; nor is a single object true unless referred to its universal. -In a pictured landscape "every tree must possess natural truth, that -is to say, it must be contemplated as a specimen of a given kind; -similarly, the whole complex of natural and individual life must have -effective truth of nature and constitute a single harmony. Just because -in art we do not strive after the production of individual figures -in themselves and for themselves, but their internal truth as well, -we commonly assign to them a high place as being a free realization -of that in which all cognition has its value, that is to say, in the -principle that all forms of being are inherent in the human spirit. -If this principle fails, truth is no longer possible; scepticism only -remains." The productions of art are the ideal or typical figures -which real nature would create were it not impeded by external -influences.<a name="FNanchor_11_460" id="FNanchor_11_460"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_460" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> "The artist creates a figure on the basis of a general -scheme, rejecting whatever may hinder or impede the play of the living -forces of reality; such a production, founded on a general scheme, is -what we call the Ideal."<a name="FNanchor_12_461" id="FNanchor_12_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_461" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>In spite of all these determinations, Schleiermacher did not apparently -intend to limit the artist's scope. He remarks, "When an artist -represents something really given, whether portrait, landscape or -single human figure, he renounces the freedom of productivity and -adheres to the real."<a name="FNanchor_13_462" id="FNanchor_13_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_462" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> There is a twofold tendency at work in the -artist: towards perfection of type, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> towards representation of -natural reality. An artist must not fall into the abstractness of -the type or into the unmeaningness of empirical reality.<a name="FNanchor_14_463" id="FNanchor_14_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_463" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> If in -flower-painting it is necessary to bring out the specific type, a much -more complete individualisation is demanded when representing man, -owing to the lofty position which he occupies.<a name="FNanchor_15_464" id="FNanchor_15_464"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_464" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Representation -of the ideal in the real does not exclude "an infinite variety, -such as is found in actual reality." "For instance, the human face -wavers between the ideal and caricature, in its moral conformation -no less than in its physical. Every human face contains elements of -disfigurement (<i>Verbildung,</i>) but it has also something by which it -is a determinate modification of human nature; this does not appear -openly, but a practised eye can seize it and ideally complete the face -in question."<a name="FNanchor_16_465" id="FNanchor_16_465"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_465" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Schleiermacher is keenly aware of the difficulties -and perplexities of' such problems as the question whether there exists -one or many ideals of the human face.<a name="FNanchor_17_466" id="FNanchor_17_466"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_466" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> He observes that the two -views which strive for mastery in the field of poetry may be extended -to art as a whole. Some assert that poetry and art should represent the -perfect, the ideal, that which would have been produced by nature, had -she not been prevented by mechanical forces; others reject the ideal as -incapable of realisation and prefer that the artist should depict man -as he really is, with those perturbing elements which in reality belong -to him no less than his ideal qualities. Each view is a half-truth: -it is the duty of art to represent the ideal as well as the real, the -subjective as well as the objective.<a name="FNanchor_18_467" id="FNanchor_18_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_467" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> The comic element, that is the -unideal and the faulty ideal, is included in the circle of art.<a name="FNanchor_19_468" id="FNanchor_19_468"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_468" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Independence of art.</i></div> - -<p>In respect to morality, art is free just as philosophical speculation -is free: its essence excludes practical and moral effects. This leads -to the proposition that "there is no difference between various -works of art, except in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> so far as they can be compared in respect -of artistic perfection" (<i>Vollkommenheit in der Kunst.</i>) "Given an -artistic object perfect of its kind, it has an absolute value which -cannot be increased or diminished by anything else. If motions of -the will could truly be described as consequences of works of art, a -different standard of values would apply to works of art: and since -the objects which an artist may depict are not all equally adapted to -influence volition, a scale of values would exist which did not depend -on artistic perfection." Nor must we confound the judgement passed -upon the varied and complex personality of the artist himself with the -strictly æsthetic judgement passed upon his work. "In this respect -the biggest, most complicated canvas is on a level with the smallest -arabesque, the longest poem with the shortest: the value of a work of -art depends on the perfect manner in which the external corresponds to -the internal."<a name="FNanchor_20_469" id="FNanchor_20_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_469" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>Schleiermacher rejects the doctrine of Schiller because in his opinion -it makes art a sort of game or pastime in contrast to the serious -affairs of life: a view, he says, for business men to whom their -business is the only serious thing. Artistic activity is universally -human, a man devoid of it is inconceivable; although, of course, there -are in this respect great differences betwixt man and man, running from -the mere desire to enjoy art to real taste, and from this again to -productive genius.<a name="FNanchor_21_470" id="FNanchor_21_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_470" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Art and language.</i></div> - -<p>The artist makes use of instruments which, by their nature, are framed -not for the individual but for the universal; of this kind is language. -But it is the business of poetry to extract the individual from -language which is universal without giving to its productions the form -of the antithesis between individual and universal which is proper to -science. Of the two elements of language, the musical and the logical, -the poet claims the first for his own ends and constrains the other -to awaken individual images. In comparison with pure science as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> in -comparison with the individual image, there is something irrational -about language: but the tendencies of speculation and of poetry are -always contrary, even in their use of language; the former tends to -make language approximate to mathematical formulæ; the latter to -imagery (<i>Bild</i>)<a name="FNanchor_22_471" id="FNanchor_22_471"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_471" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schleiermacher's defects.</i></div> - -<p>Leaving out many details which will be touched on in their -proper places, the foregoing is a fair summary of the heads of -Schleiermacher's æsthetic thought. Adding up the accounts of the -whole statement of views, on the side of error and oversight we -find: first, ideas or types are not wholly excluded, in spite -of all Schleiermacher's care and anxiety to safeguard artistic -individualisation and to make the ideas and types superfluous. -Secondly, there is still, undefeated and unexpelled, a certain residue -of abstract formalism, visible at various points of his theories.<a name="FNanchor_23_472" id="FNanchor_23_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_472" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> -Thirdly, the definition of art as an activity of mere difference may be -diluted but is not destroyed by making art a difference of complexes -of individuals, a national difference. A closer reflexion on the -history of art, a recognition of the possibility of appreciating the -art of various nations and various times, a more patient investigation -into the moment of artistic reproduction, even an examination of the -relation between science and art, would have led Schleiermacher to -treat this difference as empirical and surmountable, still holding -firmly to the distinctive character (individual as opposed to -universal) he assigned to art in comparison with science. Fourthly, he -did not recognize the identity of æsthetic activity with linguistic, -and failed to make it the basis of all other theoretic activity. It -would seem, moreover, that Schleiermacher had no clear ideas concerning -that artistic element which enters into the constitution of historic -narrative and is indispensable as the concrete form of science; or -concerning language, taken not as a complex of abstract means of -expression but as expressive activity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schleiermacher's services to Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>These defects and uncertainties may perhaps be attributable in part -to the fact that his thoughts on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> æsthetic have reached us in an -inchoate form, very far from a mature development. But if on the other -hand we wish to cast up the sum of his very striking merits, it will -suffice to run over the list of accusations heaped upon him by the two -historians before mentioned, Zimmermann and Hartmann. Schleiermacher -has denuded Æsthetic of its imperative character; he recognizes in it a -form of thought differing from logical thought; he gives this science -a non-metaphysical and merely anthropological character; he denies -the concept of beauty, substituting that of artistic perfection, and -actually affirms the æsthetic equivalence of small and great works of -art, so long as each is perfect in its own sphere; he considers the -æsthetic fact as pure human productivity: and so on and so forth. All -these criticisms are meant for blame and are really praise; for what -is blame to the mind of a Zimmermann or a Hartmann, is to ours praise. -In the metaphysical orgy of his day, in the perpetual building and -pulling down of more or less arbitrary systems, Schleiermacher the -theologian, with philosophic acumen, fixed his eye upon what was really -characteristic of the æsthetic fact and succeeded in defining its -properties and connexions; when he failed to see clearly and wandered -from the track, he never abandoned analysis for fantastic caprice. -By his discovery that the obscure region of immediate consciousness -is also that of the æsthetic fact, he seems to bid his distracted -contemporaries listen to the old adage: <i>Hic Rhodus, hic salta.</i></p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_450" id="Footnote_1_450"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_450"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Vorlesungen üb. Ästhetik</i> published by Lommatsch, Berlin, -1842 (<i>Werke,</i> sect. iii. vol. vii.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_451" id="Footnote_2_451"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_451"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Zimmermann, <i>G. d. A.</i> pp. 608-634.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_452" id="Footnote_3_452"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_452"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> E. von Hartmann, <i>Deutsche Ästh. s. Kant,</i> pp. 156-169.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_453" id="Footnote_4_453"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_453"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästhetik</i> pp. 1-30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_454" id="Footnote_5_454"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_454"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 35-51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_455" id="Footnote_6_455"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_455"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 51-54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_456" id="Footnote_7_456"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_456"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 55-61.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_457" id="Footnote_8_457"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_457"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 61-66; cf. <i>Dialektik,</i> ed. Halpern, pp. -54-55, 67.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_458" id="Footnote_9_458"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_458"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 67-77.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_459" id="Footnote_10_459"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_459"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 79-91.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_460" id="Footnote_11_460"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_460"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 123, 143-150.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_461" id="Footnote_12_461"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_461"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 505; cf. p. 607.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_462" id="Footnote_13_462"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_462"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 505.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_463" id="Footnote_14_463"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_463"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 506-508.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_464" id="Footnote_15_464"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_464"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 156-157.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_465" id="Footnote_16_465"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_465"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 550-551.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_466" id="Footnote_17_466"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_466"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 608.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_467" id="Footnote_18_467"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_467"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 684-686.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_468" id="Footnote_19_468"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_468"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 191-196; cf. pp. 364-365.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_469" id="Footnote_20_469"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_469"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 209-219; of. pp. 527-528.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_470" id="Footnote_21_470"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_470"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 98-111.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_471" id="Footnote_22_471"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_471"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 635-648.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_472" id="Footnote_23_472"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_472"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Cf. <i>e.g.</i> p. 467 <i>seqq.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIIb" id="XIIb">XII</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: HUMBOLDT AND STEINTHAL</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Progress of Linguistic.</i></div> - -<p>About the time when Schleiermacher was meditating on the nature of the -æsthetic fact, a movement of thought was gaining ground in Germany -which, tending as it did to overthrow the old concept of language, -might have proved a powerful aid to æsthetic science. But not only had -the æsthetic specialists—if we may so call them—no notion of the -existence of this movement, the new philosophers of language never -brought their ideas into relation with the æsthetic problem, and -their discoveries languished imprisoned within the narrow scope of -Linguistic, condemned to sterility.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Linguistic speculation at the beginning of the nineteenth -century</i>.</div> - -<p>Research into the relations between thought and speech, between the -unity of logic and the multiplicity of languages, had been promoted, -like many other things, by the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>: the earliest -Kantians often tried to apply the Kantian categories of intuition -(space and time) and of intellect to language. The first to make the -attempt was Roth<a name="FNanchor_1_473" id="FNanchor_1_473"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_473" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> in 1795; the same who wrote an essay twenty years -later on <i>Pure Linguistic.</i> Many other noteworthy books on this subject -appeared in quick succession: those of Vater, Bernhardi, Reinbeck and -Koch were published one after another in the first ten years of the -nineteenth century. In all these treatises the dominating subject is -the difference between language<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> and languages; between the universal -language, corresponding with Logic, and concrete, historical languages -disturbed by feeling and imagination or whatever other name was applied -to the psychological element of differentiation. Vater distinguishes a -general Linguistic (<i>all gemeine Sprachlehre</i>), constructed <i>a priori</i> -by means of the analysis of the concepts contained in the judgement, -from a comparative Linguistic (<i>vergleichende Sprachlehre</i>) which -attempts by means of induction to reach probable laws through the -study of a number of languages. Bemhardi considers language to be an -"allegory of intellect" and distinguishes it as functioning either -as the organ of poetry or that of science. Reinbeck speaks of an -Æsthetic Grammar and a Logical. Koch, more energetic than the others, -asserts positively that the character of language is "<i>non ad Logices -sed ad Psychologiae rationem revocanda.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_2_474" id="FNanchor_2_474"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_474" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Some few philosophers -speculated on language and mythology: for example Schelling considered -them to be the products of a pre-human consciousness (<i>vormenschliche -Bewusstsein,</i>) presenting them, in a fantastic allegory, as diabolic -suggestions which precipitate the ego from the infinite to the -finite.<a name="FNanchor_3_475" id="FNanchor_3_475"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_475" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Wilhelm von Humboldt. Relics of intellectualism.</i></div> - -<p>Even the famous philologist, Wilhelm von Humboldt, was unable to detach -himself entirely from the prejudice of the substantial identity and -the purely historical, accidental diversity between logical thought -and language. His celebrated dissertation, <i>On the Diversity of -Structure of Human Languages</i> (1836),<a name="FNanchor_4_476" id="FNanchor_4_476"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_476" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> is based on the notion of a -perfect language split up and distributed amongst particular tongues -according to the linguistic or intellectual capacity of various -nations. "For," says he, "since disposition towards speech is general -in mankind, and all men must necessarily carry within themselves the -key to the comprehension of all languages, it follows that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> form -of all languages must be substantially equal and all must attain the -same general end. Diversity can exist solely in the means, and within -the bounds permitted by the attainment of the end." Yet this same -diversity becomes a real divergence not only in sounds, but in the -use of sound made by the linguistic sense in respect to the form of -language, or rather, in respect to its own idea of the form of the -determinate language. "Languages being merely formal, the operation -of the linguistic sense by itself should produce mere uniformity; -the linguistic sense must exact from every tongue the same right and -legitimate construction that is found in one of them. In practice, -however, the facts are quite otherwise, partly owing to the reaction of -sounds, and partly by reason of the individual aspect assumed by the -same internal meaning in phenomenal reality." Linguistic force "cannot -maintain its equality everywhere or show the same intensity, vivacity -or regularity; it cannot be supported by an exactly equal tendency -towards the symbolic treatment of thought or by exactly equal pleasure -in richness and harmony of sound." These, then, are the causes which -produce in human languages that diversity which manifests itself in -every branch of the civilization of nations. But reflexion on languages -"ought to reveal to us a form which of all possible forms best fits the -purpose of language" and approaches most closely to its ideal; and "the -merits and defects of existing languages must be estimated by their -nearness or remoteness from this form." Humboldt finds the nearest -approximation to such an ideal in the Sanskrit tongues, which can -therefore be used as a standard of comparison. Setting Chinese apart in -a class by itself, he proceeds to the division of the possible forms of -language into inflective, agglutinative and incorporative; types which -are found combined in various proportions in every real language.<a name="FNanchor_5_477" id="FNanchor_5_477"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_477" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> He -also inaugurated the division of languages into inferior and superior, -unformed and formed, according to the way in which verbs are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> treated. -He was never able to rid himself of a second prejudice connected with -the first, namely that language exists as something objective outside -the talking man, unattached and independent, and waking up when needed -for use.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Language an activity. Internal form.</i></div> - -<p>But Humboldt opposes Humboldt: amongst the old dross we detect the -brilliant gleams of a wholly new concept of language. Certainly his -work is for this very reason not always free from contradictions -and from a kind of hesitation and awkwardness which appear -characteristically in his literary style and make it at times laboured -and obscure. The new man in Humboldt criticizes the old man when he -says, "Languages must be considered not as dead products but as an act -of production. ... Language in its reality is something continually -changing and passing away. Even its preservation in writing is -incomplete, a kind of mummification: it is always necessary to render -the living speech sensible. Language is not a work, <i>ergon,</i> but -an activity, <i>energeia.</i> ... It is an eternally repeated effort of -the spirit in order to make articulated tones capable of expressing -thought." Language is the act of speaking. "True and proper language -consists in the very act of producing it by means of connected -utterance; that is the only thing that must be thought of as the -starting-point or the truth in any inquiry which aims at penetrating -into the living essence of language. Division into words and rules is a -lifeless artifice of scientific analysis."<a name="FNanchor_6_478" id="FNanchor_6_478"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_478" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Language is not a thing -arising out of the need of external communication; on the contrary, it -springs from the wholly internal thirst for knowledge and the struggle -to reach an intuition of things." From its earliest commencement it is -entirely human, and extends without intention to all objects of sensory -perception or internal elaboration.... Words gush spontaneously from -the breast without constraint or intention: there is no nomad tribe in -any desert without its songs. Taken as a zoological species, man is a -singing animal which connects<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> its thoughts with its utterances."<a name="FNanchor_7_479" id="FNanchor_7_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_479" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> -The new man leads Humboldt to discover a fact hidden from the authors -of logico-universal grammars: namely the internal form of language -(<i>innere Sprachform</i>), which is neither logical concept nor physical -sound, but the subjective view of things formed by man, the product -of imagination and feeling, the individualization of the concept. -Conjunction of the internal form of language with physical sound is -the work of an internal synthesis; "and here, more than anywhere else, -language by its profound and mysterious operation recalls art. Sculptor -and painter also unite the idea with matter, and their efforts are -judged praiseworthy or not according as this union, this intimate -interpenetration, is the work of true genius, or as the idea is -something separate, painfully and laboriously imposed upon the matter -by sheer force of brush or chisel."<a name="FNanchor_8_480" id="FNanchor_8_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_480" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Language and art in Humboldt.</i></div> - -<p>But Humboldt was content to regard the procedure of artist and speaker -as comparable by analogy, without proceeding to identify them. On the -one hand, he was too one-sided in his view of language as a means -for the development of thought (logical thought); on the other, his -own æsthetic ideas, always vague and not always true, prevented his -perception of the identity. Of his two principal writings on Æsthetic, -that on <i>Beauty Masculine and Feminine</i> (1795) seems to be wholly -under the influence of Winckelmann, whose antithesis between beauty -and expression is revived, and the opinion expressed that specific -sexual characters diminish the beauty of the human body and that beauty -asserts itself only by triumphing over differences of sex. His other -work, which is inspired by Goethe's <i>Hermann und Dorothee,</i> defines -art as "representation of nature by means of fancy; the representation -being beautiful, just because it is the work of fancy," a metamorphosis -of nature carried to a higher sphere. The poet reflects the pictures -of language, itself a complex of abstractions.<a name="FNanchor_9_481" id="FNanchor_9_481"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_481" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> In his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> dissertation -on Linguistic, Humboldt distinguishes poetry and prose, treating -the two concepts philosophically, not by the empirical distinction -between free and measured or periodic and metric language. "Poetry -gives us reality in its sensible appearance, as it is felt internally -and externally; but is indifferent to the character which makes it -real, and even deliberately ignores that character. It presents the -sensuous appearance to fancy and, by this means, leads towards the -contemplation of an artistically ideal whole. Prose, on the contrary, -looks in reality for the roots which attach it to existence, the cords -which bind her to it: hence it fastens fact to fact and concept to -concept according to the methods of the intellect, and strives towards -the objective union of them all in an idea."<a name="FNanchor_10_482" id="FNanchor_10_482"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_482" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Poetry precedes -prose: before producing prose, the spirit necessarily forms itself in -poetry.<a name="FNanchor_11_483" id="FNanchor_11_483"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_483" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> But, beside these views, some of which are profoundly true, -Humboldt looks on poets as perfecters of language, and on poetry as -belonging only to certain exceptional moments,<a name="FNanchor_12_484" id="FNanchor_12_484"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_484" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> and makes us suspect -that after all he never recognized clearly or maintained firmly that -language is always poetry, and that prose (science) is a distinction -not of æsthetic form but of content, that is, of logical form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>H. Steinthal. The linguistic function independent of the -logical.</i></div> - -<p>Humboldt's contradictions about the concept of language lost him his -principal follower, Steinthal. With the help of his master, Steinthal -restated the position that language belongs not to Logic but to -Psychology,<a name="FNanchor_13_485" id="FNanchor_13_485"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_485" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> and in 1855 waged a gallant war against the Hegelian -Becker, author of <i>The Organisms of Language,</i> one of the last logical -grammarians, who pledged himself to deduce the entire body of the -Sanskrit languages from twelve cardinal concepts. Steinthal declares it -is not true that one cannot think without words: the deaf-mute thinks -in signs; the mathematician in formulæ. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> some languages, as in -Chinese, the visual element is as necessary to thought as the phonetic, -if not more so.<a name="FNanchor_14_486" id="FNanchor_14_486"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_486" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> In this he may have overshot the mark, and failed -to establish the autonomy of expression with regard to logical thought; -for his examples only confirm the fact that if we can think without -words, we cannot think without expressions.<a name="FNanchor_15_487" id="FNanchor_15_487"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_487" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> But he successfully -demonstrates that concept and word, logical judgement and proposition, -are incommensurable. The proposition is not the judgement but the -representation (<i>Darstellung</i>) of a judgement; and all propositions do -not represent logical judgements. It is possible to express several -judgements in a single proposition. The logical divisions of judgements -(the relations of concepts) find no counterpart in the grammatical -divisions of propositions. "A logical form of the proposition is just -as much a contradiction as the angle of a circle or the circumference -of a triangle." He who talks, in so far as he talks, possesses not -thoughts but language.<a name="FNanchor_16_488" id="FNanchor_16_488"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_488" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of the problems of the origin and the nature of -language.</i></div> - -<p>Having thus freed language from all dependence on Logic, having -repeatedly proclaimed the principle that language produces its forms -independently of Logic and in the fullest autonomy,<a name="FNanchor_17_489" id="FNanchor_17_489"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_489" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and having -purified Humboldt's theory from the taint of the logical grammar of -Port Royal, Steinthal seeks the origin of language, recognizing, with -his master, that the question of its origin is identical with that of -nature of language, its psychological genesis or rather the position -it occupies in evolution of the spirit. "In the matter of language -there is no difference between its original creation (<i>Urschöpfung</i>) -and the creation which is daily repeated."<a name="FNanchor_18_490" id="FNanchor_18_490"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_490" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Language belongs to the -vast class of reflex movements; but to say that is to look at it from -one side only and to omit its own essential peculiarity. Animals have -reflex movements<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> and sensations like man; but in animals the senses -"are wide gates through which external nature rushes to the assault -with such impetus as to overwhelm the mind and deprive it of all -independence and freedom of movement." In man, however, language can -arise because man is resistance to nature, conqueror of his own body, -freedom incarnate: "language is liberation: even to-day we feel our -mind lightened and freed from a weight when we speak." In the situation -immediately preceding the production of speech man must be conceived as -"accompanying all his sensations and all the intuitions received by his -mind with the most lively contortions of body, attitudes of mimicry, -gestures, and above all tones, articulate tones." What element of -speech did he lack? One only, but a most important one: the conscious -conjunction of reflex bodily movements with the excitations of his -mind. If sensuous consciousness is already consciousness, it lacks the -consciousness of being conscious; if it is already intuition, it is -not intuition of intuition; what it lacks is in a word the internal -form of speech. When that arises, there arises too its inseparable -accompaniment, words. Man does not select sound: it is given him, -and he takes it of necessity, instinctively, without intention or -choice.<a name="FNanchor_19_491" id="FNanchor_19_491"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_491" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Steinthal's mistaken ideas on art: his failure to unite -Linguistic and Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>This is not the place for detailed examination of the whole of -Steinthal's theory and the various phases, not always progressive, -through which he travelled, especially after the beginning of -his spiritual collaboration with Lazarus, with whom he studied -ethnopsychology (<i>Völkerpsychologie</i>), of which they both took -Linguistic to be a part.<a name="FNanchor_20_492" id="FNanchor_20_492"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_492" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> But, while giving him full credit for -bringing Humboldt's ideas into coherent order, and for clearly -differentiating, as had never before been done, between linguistic -activity and the activity of logical thought, it must be noted -that Steintha! never recognized the identity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> of the internal form -of language (which he also called the intuition of intuition, or -apperception) with the æsthetic imagination. The Herbartian psychology -to which he clung afforded him no clue to such a discovery. Herbart and -his followers divorced psychology from logic as a normative science -and never succeeded in discerning the true connection between feeling -and spiritual formation, soul and spirit; they never understood that -logical thought is one of these spiritual formations: an activity, not -a code of external laws. The domain allotted by them to Æsthetic we -already know; for them Æsthetic too was only another code of beautiful -formal relations. Under the influence of these doctrines Steinthal -was led to regard Art as the embellishment of thoughts, Linguistic as -the science of speech, and Rhetoric or Æsthetic as a thing differing -from Linguistic since it is science of fine or beautiful speaking.<a name="FNanchor_21_493" id="FNanchor_21_493"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_493" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> -In one of his innumerable tracts he says, "Poetics and Rhetoric both -differ from Linguistic, since they are obliged to touch on many -important topics before reaching language. These sciences therefore -have but one section devoted to Linguistic, which is the concluding -section of Syntax. Moreover Syntax has a character entirely different -from Rhetoric and from Poetics; the former is occupied solely with -correctness (<i>Richtigkeit)</i> of language; the latter two sciences -study beauty or grace of expression (<i>Schönheit oder Angemessenheit -des Ausdrucks</i>): the principles of the first are merely grammatical, -the others must consider matters outside language; for example, the -disposition of the orator and so forth. To speak plainly, Syntax is -to Stylistic as is the grammatical measure of the quantity of vowels -to the theory of metre."<a name="FNanchor_22_494" id="FNanchor_22_494"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_494" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> That speaking invariably means good or -beautiful speaking, since speech that is neither good nor beautiful is -not really speech,<a name="FNanchor_23_495" id="FNanchor_23_495"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_495" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> and that the radical renewal of the concept of -language inaugurated by Humboldt and himself must produce far-reaching -effects on the cognate sciences of Poetics, Rhetoric and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> Æsthetic and, -by transforming, unify them, never entered Steinthal's head. After -all this labour and all this minute analysis, the identification of -language and poetry, and of the science of language with the science of -poetry, the identification of Linguistic with Æsthetic, still found its -least faulty expression in the prophetic aphorisms of Giambattista Vico.</p> - -<hr class="full" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_473" id="Footnote_1_473"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_473"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Antihermes oder philosophische Untersuchung üb. d. reine -Begriff d. menschl. Sprache und die allgemeine Sprachlehre,</i> Frankfurt -and Leipzig, 1795.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_474" id="Footnote_2_474"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_474"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For these writers, see accounts and quotations in Loewe, -<i>Hist, crit. gramm. univ., passim,</i> and Pott, introd. to Humboldt, pp. -clxxi.-ccxii.; cf. also Benfey, <i>Gesch. d. Sprachwiss.,</i> introd.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_475" id="Footnote_3_475"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_475"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In <i>Philos, der Mythologie</i>: cf. Steinthal, <i>Urspr.</i> pp. -81-89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_476" id="Footnote_4_476"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_476"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Üb. d. Verschiedenheit d. menschl. Sprachbaues,</i> -posthumous work (2nd ed. by A. F. Pott, Berlin, 1880).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_477" id="Footnote_5_477"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_477"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Verschiedenheit</i>, etc. pp. 308-310.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_478" id="Footnote_6_478"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_478"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Verschiedenheit,</i> etc., pp. 54-56.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_479" id="Footnote_7_479"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_479"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Verschiedenheit,</i> etc., pp. 25, 73-74, 79.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_480" id="Footnote_8_480"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_480"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 105-118.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_481" id="Footnote_9_481"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_481"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Zimmermann, <i>G. d. A.</i> pp. 533-544.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_482" id="Footnote_10_482"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_482"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Verschiedenheit,</i> etc., pp. 326-328.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_483" id="Footnote_11_483"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_483"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 239-240.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_484" id="Footnote_12_484"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_484"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 205-206, 547, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_485" id="Footnote_13_485"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_485"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie, ihre Principien u. ihr -Verhältn. z. einand.,</i> Berlin, 1855.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_486" id="Footnote_14_486"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_486"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Gramm., Log. u. Psych.</i> pp. 153-158.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_487" id="Footnote_15_487"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_487"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_28">28</a>-<a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_488" id="Footnote_16_488"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_488"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Gramm., Log. u. Psych,</i> pp. 183, 195.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_489" id="Footnote_17_489"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_489"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Einleitung i. d. Psych, u. Sprachwissenschaft</i> (2nd ed., -Berlin, 1881), p. 62.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_490" id="Footnote_18_490"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_490"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Gramm., Log. u. Psych,</i> p. 231.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_491" id="Footnote_19_491"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_491"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 285, 292, 295-306.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_492" id="Footnote_20_492"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_492"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Steinthal, <i>Ursprung d. Sprache</i> (4th ed. Berlin, -1888), pp. 120-124. M. Lazarus, <i>Das Leben der Seele,</i> 1855 (Berlin, -1876-1878), vol. ii. <i>Zeitschrift f. Völkerpsych. u. Sprachwiss.</i> from -1860 onwards, edited by Steinthal and Lazarus together.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_493" id="Footnote_21_493"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_493"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Gramm., Log. u. Psych,</i> pp. 139-140, 146.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_494" id="Footnote_22_494"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_494"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Einleit.</i> pp. 34-35.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_495" id="Footnote_23_495"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_495"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_78">78</a>-<a href="#Page_79">79</a>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIIIb" id="XIIIb">XIII</a></h4> - - -<h4>MINOR GERMAN ÆSTHETICIANS</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Minor æstheticians in the metaphysical school.</i></div> - - -<p>When we turn from the pages of methodical and serious thinkers such as -Schleiermacher, Humboldt and Steinthal, we are filled with distaste -by the books written in enormous quantities during the first half of -the nineteenth century by disciples of Schelling and Hegel. We are -fatigued and almost disgusted as we pass from this illuminating and -scientific study to something which oscillates between vapid fancies -and charlatanism; between the vanity of empty formulæ and the attempt, -not always free from dishonesty, to employ them in order to amaze and -overwhelm the reader or student.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse and others.</i></div> - -<p>Why should we encumber a general History of Æsthetic (which ought, -certainly, to take account of aberrations from the truth, but only in -so far as they indicate the general trend of contemporary thought) with -the theories of such men as Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse, Deutinger, -Oersted, Zeising, Eckardt and the crowd of manipulators of manuals and -systems? The only one who obtained a hearing outside his native Germany -was Krause, who was imported into Spain; we are justified, therefore, -in leaving them to the memory or forgetfulness of their compatriots. -For Krause,<a name="FNanchor_1_496" id="FNanchor_1_496"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_496" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> the humanitarian, the freethinker, the theosophist, -everything is organism, everything is beauty; beauty is organism, and -organism is beauty: Essence, that is to say God, is one, free and -entire; one, free and entire is Beauty. There is but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> one artist, God; -but one art, the divine. The beauty of finite things is the Divinity, -or rather the likeness of Divinity manifested in the finite. Beauty -brings into play reason, intellect and imagination in a mode conforming -to their laws, and awakens disinterested pleasure and inclination in -the soul. Trahndorff,<a name="FNanchor_2_497" id="FNanchor_2_497"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_497" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> describing the various degrees by which the -individual seeks to grasp the essence or form of the universe (the -degrees of feeling, intuition, reflexion and presentiment), and noting -the insufficiency of simple theoretical knowledge till supplemented -by the Will, the Will which is power (<i>Können</i>), in its three degrees -of Aspiration, Faith and Love, places the Beautiful in the highest -grade, in Love: it would seem, therefore, that Beauty is Love which -comprehends itself. Christian Weisse<a name="FNanchor_3_498" id="FNanchor_3_498"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_498" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> attempted, like Trahndorff, to -reconcile the God of Christianity with the Hegelian philosophy: in his -estimation the æsthetic Idea is superior to the logical, and leads to -religion, to God; the idea of beauty, existing outside the sensible -universe, is the reality of the concept of beauty, and, as the idea of -divinity is absolute Love, so must that of Beauty be found truly in -Love. The same reconciliation was attempted by the Catholic theologian -Deutinger;<a name="FNanchor_4_499" id="FNanchor_4_499"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_499" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> beauty, for him, is born of power (<i>Können</i>), an activity -parallel with those of the knowledge of truth and the doing of good -but (differing in this from knowledge, which is receptive) realizing -itself in an outward movement from within, mastering the world of -matter and imprinting upon it the seal of personality. An internal -ideal intuition, the Idea: an external shapable matter: the power of -interpenetrating internal with external, invisible with visible, ideal -with real: such is Beauty. Oersted<a name="FNanchor_5_500" id="FNanchor_5_500"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_500" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> (the celebrated Danish naturalist -whose works<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> were translated into German and gained him a considerable -reputation in Germany) defines beauty as the objective Idea in the -moment of subjective contemplation: the Idea expressed in things in so -far as it reveals itself to intuition. Zeising<a name="FNanchor_6_501" id="FNanchor_6_501"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_501" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> turned his attention -partly to exploration of the mysteries of the golden section, and -partly to speculations on Beauty, which he considered as one of the -three forms of the Idea; first, the Idea which expresses itself in -object and subject; secondly, the Idea as intuition; and thirdly, the -Absolute which appears in the world and is conceived intuitively by -the spirit. Eckardt,<a name="FNanchor_7_502" id="FNanchor_7_502"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_502" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> intent on creating a theistic Æsthetic which -should avoid the one-sided transcendence of deism on the one hand and -the one-sided immanence of pantheism on the other, maintained that its -principles must be sought not in the feelings of the contemplator, not -in works of art, not in the idea of the beautiful, not in the concept -of art, but in the creative spirit of the artist, the original fount -of beauty; and since a creative artist cannot be conceived except as -derived from the highest creative genius which is God, Eckardt invokes -aid from a psychology of God (<i>eine Psychologie des Weltkünstlers</i>).</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fried. Theodor Vischer.</i></div> - -<p>If quantity is as important as quality, we must devote some space to -Friedrich Theodor Vischer, the bulkiest of all German æstheticians, -indeed the German æsthetician <i>par excellence</i>: after publishing a book -on <i>The Sublime and the Comic, a contribution to the Philosophy of -the Beautiful</i>,<a name="FNanchor_8_503" id="FNanchor_8_503"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_503" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> in 1837, he produced four huge tomes on <i>Æsthetic -as Science of the Beautiful</i> between 1846 and 1857,<a name="FNanchor_9_504" id="FNanchor_9_504"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_504" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> where, in -hundreds of paragraphs and long observations and sub-observations, is -massed a stupendous amount of æsthetic material, of matter foreign to -Æsthetic, and of subjects taken haphazard from the whole thinkable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> -universe. Vischer's work is divided into three parts: a Metaphysic of -the Beautiful, which investigates the concept of Beauty in itself, no -matter where and how it is realized: a treatise on concrete Beauty, -which inquires into the two one-sided modes of realization, Beauty -of nature and Beauty of imagination, one lacking subjective, the -other lacking objective, existence: lastly, a theory of the arts, -which studies the synthesis in art of the two artistic moments, the -physical and psychical, the objective and subjective. It is easy to -sum up Vischer's concept of æsthetic activity; it is Hegel's concept, -debased. For Vischer, Beauty belongs neither to the theoretical nor to -the practical activity, but is placed in a serene sphere, superior to -these antitheses; that is to say in the sphere of absolute Spirit, in -company with Religion and Philosophy;<a name="FNanchor_10_505" id="FNanchor_10_505"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_505" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> but, in contradistinction to -Hegel, Vischer assigns the first place in this sphere to Religion, the -second to Art, and the third to Philosophy. Much ingenuity was devoted -in those days to moving these words about like pieces on a chess-board; -it has been observed that of the six possible combinations of the -three terms Art, Religion and Philosophy, four were actually adopted: -by Schelling, <i>P.R.A.</i>; by Hegel, <i>A.R.P.</i>; by Weisse, <i>P.A.R.</i>; and -by Vischer, <i>R.A.P</i>.<a name="FNanchor_11_506" id="FNanchor_11_506"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_506" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> But Vischer himself<a name="FNanchor_12_507" id="FNanchor_12_507"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_507" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> states that Wirth, -author of a <i>System of Ethics</i>,<a name="FNanchor_13_508" id="FNanchor_13_508"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_508" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> opted for the fifth combination, -<i>R.P.A.,</i> which leaves us but the sixth, <i>A.P.R.,</i> unclaimed, unless -(as is not improbable) some unrecognized genius seized upon it and made -it the text of his system. Beauty, therefore, as the second form of -the absolute Spirit, is the realization of the Idea, not as abstract -concept but as union of concept and reality; and the Idea determines -itself as species (<i>Gattung</i>), and every idea of a species, even on the -lowest degree, is beautiful as being an integral part in the totality -of Ideas; although the higher the degree of the idea the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> greater is -its beauty.<a name="FNanchor_14_509" id="FNanchor_14_509"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_509" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Highest of all degrees is that of human personality: -"in this spiritual world the Idea attains its true significance; the -name of idea is given to the great moral motive powers to which the -concept of species may also be applied in the sense that they stand -to their restricted spheres in the same relation in which the genus -stands to its species and individuals." At the head of all is the Idea -of morality: "the world of moral and autonomous ends is destined to -furnish the most important, the most worthy content of the Beautiful"; -with the warning, however, that Beauty, in actualizing this world -through intuition, excludes art having a moral tendency.<a name="FNanchor_15_510" id="FNanchor_15_510"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_510" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> So Vischer -proceeds now to degrade Hegel's Idea to the simple class-concept, -now to couple it with the idea of the Good; now, in accord with the -teaching of his master, to make it different from, yet superior to, -intellect and morality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Other tendencies.</i></div> - -<p>From the first, the Herbartian formalism was little studied and less -followed: two writers, Griepenkerl in 1827 and Bobrik in 1834, made -some attempt to develop and apply the cursory notes with which Herbart -contented himself.<a name="FNanchor_16_511" id="FNanchor_16_511"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_511" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Schleiermacher's lectures, even before their -appearance in book form, had served as basis for a series of elegant -dissertations by Erich Ritter (1840)<a name="FNanchor_17_512" id="FNanchor_17_512"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_512" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> (better known as a historian -of philosophy); his work is of little value, for instead of dwelling -on the important points of the master's doctrine Ritter brings into -prominence secondary matters relating to sociability and the æsthetic -fife. A penetrating critic of German Æsthetic from Baumgarten to the -post-Kantian school was Wilhelm Theodor Danzel, who lived about this -time and very properly rebelled against the claim to find "thought" in -works of art: "Artistic thought:" he writes; "unhappy phrase, which -helped to condemn an entire epoch to the Sisyphean labour of trying to -reduce art to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> intellectual and rational thinking! The thought of a -work of art is nothing save that which is contemplated in a definite -way; it is not represented, as is commonly asserted, in a work of art, -it is the work of art itself. Artistic thought can never be expressed -by concepts and words."<a name="FNanchor_18_513" id="FNanchor_18_513"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_513" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> By his early death Danzel ended the hopes -he raised by his original views on the science and history of Æsthetic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Theory of the Beautiful in nature, and that of the -Modifications of Beauty.</i></div> - -<p>The post-Hegelian metaphysical Æsthetic is chiefly noteworthy for -the fuller development of two theories or, to speak more accurately, -of two very curious combinations of arbitrary assertion and fanciful -caprice: the so-called theory of Natural Beauty, and the theory of -Modifications of the Beautiful. Neither of the two had any intimate -or necessary connexion with this philosophical movement, to which -they are rather linked by historical or psychological causes; by the -relationship between facts of pleasure and pain and the inclination -towards mysticism; by the confusion arising from the really æsthetic -(imaginative) quality of some representations wrongly described as -observation of natural beauties; or by the scholastic and literary -tradition of discussing these cases of pleasure and pain and -extra-æsthetic natural beauties in books devoted to the discussion -of art.<a name="FNanchor_19_514" id="FNanchor_19_514"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_514" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> These metaphysicians were sometimes rather grotesque -and remind one of the story told of Paisiello, that in the fury of -composition he set even the stage directions of his libretto to music; -bitten with the rage for construction and dialectic, they did not spare -even the indexes of chaotic old books, but seized on them as suitable -material for a dialectical exercise.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Development of the first theory. Herder.</i></div> - -<p>Beginning with the theory of Natural Beauty, observations on beautiful -natural objects are found among the inquiries of the ancient -philosophers on beauty, and especially among the mystical effusions -of neo-Platonists and their followers in the Middle Ages and the -Renaissance.<a name="FNanchor_20_515" id="FNanchor_20_515"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_515" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Less frequently such questions were introduced into -treatises on Poetics: Tesauro (1654) is among the first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> who, in his -<i>Cannochiale aristotelico,</i> discusses not only the conceits of men, but -also of God, the angels, nature and animals; and somewhat later (1707) -Muratori speaks of "the beauty of matter," of which examples are "the -gods, a flower, the sun, a rivulet."<a name="FNanchor_21_516" id="FNanchor_21_516"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_516" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> Observations on that which -is outside art and is merely natural, are made by Crousaz, by André, -and especially by those authors of the eighteenth century who wrote -on Beauty and Art in an empirical and gallant style.<a name="FNanchor_22_517" id="FNanchor_22_517"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_517" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> It was the -influence of these persons that led Kant, as we have seen, to sever the -theory of beauty from that of art, specially connecting free beauty -with objects of nature and those productions of man which reproduce -natural beauties.<a name="FNanchor_23_518" id="FNanchor_23_518"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_518" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> When the adversary of Kant's theory of Æsthetic, -Herder (1800), in his sketch of an ethical system united spirit and -nature, pleasure and value, feeling and intellect, he inevitably made -much of natural beauty, and affirmed that everything in nature has its -own beauty, the expression of its own greatest content, and that this -accounts for the ascending scale of beautiful objects: beginning with. -outlines, colours and tones, light and sound, and proceeding by way of -flowers, water and sea, to birds, terrestrial animals, and man himself. -For instance "a bird is the sum of the properties and perfections of -its element, a representation of its potency, a creature of light, song -and air"; amongst terrestrial animals, the ugliest are those resembling -man, as the melancholy moping monkey; the most beautiful, those of -perfect build, well proportioned, noble, free in action; those which -express sweetness; those, in fine, which live in harmony and happiness, -endowed with a perfection of their own, harmless to man.<a name="FNanchor_24_519" id="FNanchor_24_519"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_519" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schelling, Solger, Hegel.</i></div> - -<p>Schelling, on the contrary, utterly, denies the concept of beauty -in nature, and considers that such beauty is purely accidental and -that art alone supplies the norm by which it can be discovered and -judged.<a name="FNanchor_25_520" id="FNanchor_25_520"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_520" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Solger also excludes natural beauty;<a name="FNanchor_26_521" id="FNanchor_26_521"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_521" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> so does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> Hegel, -who distinguishes himself not by denying it but by proceeding with -the utmost inconsequence to deal at length with the beautiful in -nature. It is in fact not clear whether he means that really no beauty -exists in nature and that man introduces it in his vision of things, -or whether natural beauty really exists though inferior in degree -to the beauty of art. "The beauty of art," he says," stands higher -than that of nature; it is beauty born and reborn by the work of the -spirit, and spirit alone is truth and reality; hence beauty is truly -beauty only when it participates in spirit and is produced therefrom. -Taken in this sense, the beauty of nature appears as a mere reflexion -of the beauty appertaining to spirit, as an imperfect and incomplete -mode, which substantially is contained within the spirit itself." In -confirmation, he adds that nobody has attempted a systematic exposition -of natural beauties, whereas there actually is, from the point of view -of the utility of natural objects, a <i>materia medica</i><a name="FNanchor_27_522" id="FNanchor_27_522"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_522" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> But the -second chapter of the first part of his Æsthetic is devoted precisely -to natural Beauty on the ground that, in order to grasp the idea of -artistic beauty in its entirety, three stages must be traversed: beauty -in general, natural beauty (whose defects show the necessity for art), -and, lastly, the Idea; "the first existence of the Idea is nature, -and its first beauty is natural beauty." This beauty, which is beauty -for us and not for itself, has several phases, from that in which the -concept is immersed in matter to the point of disappearing, such as -physical facts and isolated mechanisms, to that higher phase in which -physical facts are united in systems (<i>e.g.</i> the solar system); but -the Idea first reaches a true and real existence in organic facts, in -the living creature. And even the living creature is liable to the -distinction between beautiful and ugly; for example, among animals, -the sloth, trailing itself laboriously and incapable of animation or -activity, displeases us by its apathetic somnolence; nor can beauty be -found in amphibians or in many kinds of fish, or in crocodiles, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> -toads, as well as in many insects and especially in those equivocal -creatures which express a transition from one i class to another, such -as the ornithorhyncus, a mixture of bird and beast.<a name="FNanchor_28_523" id="FNanchor_28_523"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_523" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> These samples -may suffice to show the general trend of Hegel's doctrine of natural -beauty; elsewhere he discusses the external beauty of abstract form, -regularity, symmetry, harmony, etc., which are; precisely the concepts -which the formalism of Herbart placed in the heaven of the Ideas of the -Beautiful.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schleiermacher.</i></div> - -<p>Schleiermacher, who praised Hegel for his attempt to exclude natural -beauty from his Æsthetic, excluded it from his own not verbally but -actually, by confining his attention to the artistic perfection of -the internal image formed by the energy of the human spirit.<a name="FNanchor_29_524" id="FNanchor_29_524"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_524" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> But -the so-called Feeling for Nature which came in with Romanticism, and -the <i>Cosmos</i> and other descriptive works of Humboldt,<a name="FNanchor_30_525" id="FNanchor_30_525"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_525" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> directed -attention increasingly to the impressions awakened by natural facts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Alexander Humboldt.</i></div> - -<p>This led to the compilation of those systematic lists of natural -beauties whose impossibility had been proclaimed by Hegel, though he -himself had furnished an example of them; amongst others, Bratranek -published an <i>Æsthetic of the Vegetable World.</i><a name="FNanchor_31_526" id="FNanchor_31_526"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_526" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Vischer's "Æsthetic Physics."</i></div> - -<p>The best-known and most widely circulated treatment of the subject was -contained in this very work of Vischer's; who following Hegel's example -devoted a section of his <i>Æsthetic,</i> as we have seen, to the objective -existence of Beauty, <i>i.e.</i> to the Beauty of nature, and entitled it by -the perhaps new and certainly characteristic name of Æsthetic Physics -(<i>ästhetische Physik</i>). This Æsthetic Physics comprised the beauty of -inorganic nature (light, heat, air, water, earth); organic nature, with -its four vegetable types and its animals vertebrate and invertebrate; -and beauty of human beings, divided into generic and historic. The -generic was subdivided into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> sections on the beauty of general forms -(age, sex, conditions, love, marriage, family); of special forms -(races, peoples, culture, political life); and of individual forms -(temperament and character). Historical beauty included that of -ancient history (Oriental, Greek, Roman), of Mediæval or Germanic, and -of modern times; because, according to Vischer, it was the duty of -Æsthetic to cast a glance over universal history before summing up the -different degrees of the beautiful according to the varying phases of -the struggle for freedom against nature.<a name="FNanchor_32_527" id="FNanchor_32_527"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_527" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Theory of the Modifications of Beauty. From antiquity -to the eighteenth century.</i></div> - -<p>As regards the Modifications of Beauty, it should be remembered that -the ancient manuals of Poetics, and more frequently those of Rhetoric, -contained more or less scientific definitions of psychological states -and facts; Aristotle attempted in his <i>Poetics</i> to determine the nature -of a tragic action or personality, and sketched a definition of the -comic; in his Rhetoric he writes at considerable length of wit;<a name="FNanchor_33_528" id="FNanchor_33_528"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_528" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> -sections of the <i>De oratore</i> of Cicero and the <i>Institutions</i> of -Quintilian<a name="FNanchor_34_529" id="FNanchor_34_529"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_529" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> are devoted to wit and the comic; the lofty style was -the subject of a lost treatise of Cæcilius, which anticipated that -attributed to Longinus, whose title was translated in modern times -as <i>De sublimitate</i> or <i>On the Sublime.</i> Following the example of -the ancients, this kind of medley was perpetuated by writers of the -sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; whole treatises on the comic are -incorporated in, for instance, the <i>Argutezza</i> of Matteo Pellegrini -(1639) and the <i>Cannochiale</i> of Tesauro. La Bruyère treated of the -sublime<a name="FNanchor_35_530" id="FNanchor_35_530"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_530" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> and Boileau by his translation gave a fresh vogue to -Longinus: the following century saw Burke inquiring into the origin -of our ideas of the beautiful and the sublime, and deriving the -former from the instinct for sociability, the latter from that of -self-preservation; he also tried to define ugliness, grace, elegance -and extraordinary beauty; Home, in his celebrated <i>Elements of -Criticism,</i> discussed grandeur, sublimity, the ridiculous,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> wit, -dignity and grace: Mendelssohn discussed sublimity, dignity and -grace in fine art, and described some of these facts as due to mixed -feelings, in which he was followed by Lessing<a name="FNanchor_36_531" id="FNanchor_36_531"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_531" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> and others: Sulzer -welcomed all these various concepts into his æsthetic encyclopædia -and collected round them an elaborate bibliography. A new and curious -meaning of the word humour reached the continent from England at this -time. Its original meaning was simply "temperament," and sometimes -"spirit," or "wit" ("<i>belli umori</i>" in Italy; in the seventeenth -century there was in Rome an Academy of <i>Umoristi</i>). Voltaire -introduced it into France and wrote in 1761, "<i>Les Anglais ont un terme -pour signifier cette plaisanterie, ce vrai comique, cette gaieté, cette -urbanité, ces saillies, qui échappent à un homme sans qu'il s'en doute; -et ils rendent cette idée par le mot</i> humour ...";<a name="FNanchor_37_532" id="FNanchor_37_532"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_532" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> in 1767 Lessing -distinguishes humour from the German <i>Laune</i> (caprice, whim),<a name="FNanchor_38_533" id="FNanchor_38_533"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_533" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> a -distinction maintained by Herder in 1769 in opposition to Riedel who -had confused the terms.<a name="FNanchor_39_534" id="FNanchor_39_534"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_534" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Kant and the post-Kantians.</i></div> - -<p>Accustomed to find all these subjects treated in the same book, -philosophers at first theorized about them all without attempting to -link them up together by introducing an artificial logical connexion. -Kant, who had already in imitation of Burke written in 1764 a -dissertation on the beautiful and the sublime, ingenuously remarked -in the course of his lectures on Logic in 1771 that the beautiful and -the æsthetic are not identical, because "the sublime also belongs to -Æsthetic";<a name="FNanchor_40_535" id="FNanchor_40_535"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_535" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> and in his <i>Critique of Judgment,</i> while treating of -the comic in a mere digression (a magnificent piece of psychological -analysis)<a name="FNanchor_41_536" id="FNanchor_41_536"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_536" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> places side by side with and as if on an equality with -the "Analytic of Beauty," an "Analytic of the Sublime."<a name="FNanchor_42_537" id="FNanchor_42_537"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_537" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> We may -note in passing that, before the publication of the third Critique, -Heydenreich arrived at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> the same doctrine of the sublime which is -contained in Kant's book.<a name="FNanchor_43_538" id="FNanchor_43_538"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_538" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Did Kant ever think of uniting the -beautiful and the sublime and deducing them from a single concept? -Apparently not. By his declaration that the principle of beauty must -be sought outside ourselves, and that of the sublime within us, he -tacitly assumes that the two objects are wholly disparate. In 1805 Ast, -a follower of Schelling, declared the necessity of overcoming what he -called the Kantian dualism of the beautiful and the sublime:<a name="FNanchor_44_539" id="FNanchor_44_539"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_539" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> others -reproached Kant with having treated the comic by the psychological, not -the metaphysical, method. Schiller wrote a series of dissertations on -the tragic, the sentimental, the ingenuous, the sublime, the pathetic, -the trivial, the low, the dignified and the graceful, and their -varieties, the fascinating, the majestic, the grave, and the solemn. -Another artist, Jean Paul Richter, discoursed at great length on wit -and humour, described by him as the romantic comic, or the sublime -reversed (<i>umgekehrte Erhabene)</i>.<a name="FNanchor_45_540" id="FNanchor_45_540"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_540" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<p>Herbart, in virtue of his formalistic principle, asserts that all -these concepts are irrelevant to Æsthetic; he attributes them to the -work of art, not to pure beauty;<a name="FNanchor_46_541" id="FNanchor_46_541"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_541" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Schleiermacher comes to the same -conclusion, but for much better reasons, as a result of his sane -conception of art. Amongst other things he observes: "It is usual -to describe the beautiful and the sublime as two kinds of artistic -perfection; and so accustomed have we grown to the union of these -two concepts that we must make an effort to convince ourselves how -very far they are from being co-ordinate or from together exhausting -the concept of artistic perfection"; he regrets that even the best -æstheticians should give rhetorical descriptions of them instead of -demonstrating them. "The thing," says he, "is not right and just" (<i>hat -keine Richtigkeit</i>), and he proceeds to exclude the whole subject from -his Æsthetic,<a name="FNanchor_47_542" id="FNanchor_47_542"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_542" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> as he had done previously in the case of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> natural -beauty. Other philosophers, however, clung persistently to their search -for a connexion between these various concepts, and called in dialectic -to help them. The habit of applying dialectic to empirical concepts -affected everybody at that time; even the great enemy of dialectic, -Herbart, showed the cloven hoof, when in order to explain the union of -different æsthetic ideas in the beautiful he appealed to the formula -"they lose regularity in order to regain it."<a name="FNanchor_48_543" id="FNanchor_48_543"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_543" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> Schelling asserted -that the sublime is the infinite in the finite, and the beautiful the -finite in the infinite, adding that the absolutely sublime includes the -beautiful, and the beautiful the sublime;<a name="FNanchor_49_544" id="FNanchor_49_544"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_544" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> and Ast, whom we have -mentioned already, spoke of a masculine, positive element, which is the -sublime, and a feminine, negative element which is the graceful and -pleasing: between which there is a contrast and a struggle.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Culmination of the development.</i></div> - -<p>These exercises in dialectical system-building developed and increased -till about the middle of the nineteenth century they assumed two -distinct forms whose history must here be shortly outlined.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Double form of the theory. The overcoming of the ugly. -Solger, Weisse and others.</i></div> - -<p>The first form may be called the Overcoming of the Ugly. This theory -conceives the comic, the sublime, the tragic, the humorous, and so -forth, as so many engagements in the war between the Ugly and the -Beautiful, wherein the latter was invariably victorious, and arose by -means of this war to more and more lofty and complex manifestations. -The second form of the theory may be described as the Passage from -Abstract to Concrete; it held that Beauty cannot emerge from the -abstract, cannot become this or that concrete beauty, except by -particularizing itself in the comic, tragic, sublime, humorous, or -some other modification. The first form was already well developed in -Solgei, an adherent of the romantic theory of Irony: but historically -it presupposes the æsthetic theory of the Ugly, first sketched by -Friedrich Schlegel in 1797. We have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> already noted that Schlegel -considered the characteristic or interesting, not the beautiful, to -be the principle of modern art; hence the importance attached by him -to the piquant, the striking (<i>frappant</i>), the daring, the cruel, the -ugly.<a name="FNanchor_50_545" id="FNanchor_50_545"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_545" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> Solger found here the basis for his dialectic; amongst other -things he maintains that the finite, earthly element may be dissolved -and absorbed in the divine, which constitutes the tragic: or else the -divine element may be entirely corrupted by the earthly, producing the -comic.<a name="FNanchor_51_546" id="FNanchor_51_546"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_546" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> These methods of Solger were followed by Weisse (1830), and -by Ruge (1837); for the former, ugliness is "the immediate existence of -beauty" which is overcome in the sublime and the comic; for the latter, -the effort to achieve the Idea, or the Idea searching for itself, -generates the sublime; when the Idea loses instead of discovering -itself, ugliness is produced; when the Idea rediscovers itself and -rises out of ugliness to new life, the comic.<a name="FNanchor_52_547" id="FNanchor_52_547"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_547" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> A whole treatise -entitled <i>The Æsthetic of the Ugly</i><a name="FNanchor_53_548" id="FNanchor_53_548"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_548" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> was published by Rosenkranz in -1853, presenting this concept as intermediate between the beautiful -and the comic, and tracing it from its first origin to that "sort -of perfection" it attains in the satanic. Passing from the common -(<i>Gemeine)</i> which is the petty, the weak, the low, and the sub-species -of the low, viz. the usual, the casual, the arbitrary and the crude, -Rosenkranz goes on to describe the repugnant, trisected into the -awkward, the dead and empty, and the horrible: thus he proceeds from -tripartition to tripartition, dividing the horrible into the absurd, -the nauseating and the wicked: the wicked into criminal, spectral and -diabolical: the diabolical into demoniac, magical and satanic. He -opposes the childish notion that ugliness acts as a foil to beauty -in art, and justifies its introduction by the necessity for art to -represent the entire appearance of the Idea; on the other hand he -admits that the ugly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> is not on the same level as the beautiful, for, -if the beautiful can stand by itself alone, the other cannot do so and -must always be reflected by and in the beautiful.<a name="FNanchor_54_549" id="FNanchor_54_549"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_549" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Passage from abstract to concrete: Vischer.</i></div> - -<p>The second form prevailed with Vischer. The following extract will -serve as an illustration of his manner: "The Idea arouses itself from -the tranquil unity in which it was fused with the appearance and -pushes onward, affirming, in face of its own finitude, its infinity"; -this rebellion and transcendence is the sublime. "But Beauty demands -full satisfaction for this disruption of its harmony: the violated -right of the image must be reasserted: this can be accomplished only -by means of a fresh contradiction, that is to say by the negative -position now taken up by the image towards the Idea by rejecting all -interpenetration with it and by affirming its own separate existence -as the whole"; this second moment is the comic, negation of a -negation.<a name="FNanchor_55_550" id="FNanchor_55_550"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_550" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> The same process is further enriched and complicated by -Zeising, who compares the modifications of Beauty to the refraction of -colours: the three primary modifications, the sublime, the attractive -and the humorous, correspond with the primary colours violet, orange -and green; the three secondary, pure beauty, comic and tragic, to -the colours red, yellow and blue. Each of these six modifications -(exactly like the degrees of the Ugly in Rosenkranz) branches out, like -fireworks, into three rays: pure beauty into the decorous, noble and -pleasing: the attractive into graceful, interesting and piquant: the -comic into buffoonery, the diverting and burlesque: the humorous into -the quaint, capricious and melancholy: the tragic into the moving, -pathetic and demoniac: the sublime into the glorious, majestic and -imposing.<a name="FNanchor_56_551" id="FNanchor_56_551"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_551" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Legend of Sir Purebeauty.</i></div> - -<p>All the works of this period on Æsthetic are filled in this way -with the <i>gest, chanson</i> or romaunt of the knight Sir Purebeauty -(<i>Reinschon)</i> and his extraordinary adventures, recounted in two -conflicting versions. According to one story, Sir Purebeauty is -constrained to abandon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> his beloved leisure by the Mephistophelean -devices of the temptress Ugliness, who leads him into countless -dangers from which he invariably emerges victorious; his victories and -successes (his Marengo, Austerlitz and Jena) are called the Sublime, -the Comic, the Humorous and so forth. The other story tells how the -knight, bored by his life of loneliness, sallies forth purposely to -seek adversaries and occasions for fighting; he is always vanquished, -but even in his overthrow <i>ferum victorem capit,</i> he transforms -and irradiates the enemy. Beyond this artificial mythology, this -legend composed without the least imagination or literary skill, -this miserably dull tale, it is vain to look for anything whatever -in the much elaborated theory of German æstheticians known as the -Modifications of Beauty.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_496" id="Footnote_1_496"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_496"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Abriss der Ästhetik,</i> post. 1837; <i>Vorlesung üb. Ästh.</i> -(1828-1829), post. 1882.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_497" id="Footnote_2_497"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_497"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Ästhetik,</i> Berlin, 1827.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_498" id="Footnote_3_498"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_498"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Ästhetik,</i> Leipzig, 1830; <i>System d. Ästh.,</i> lectures, -post. Leipzig, 1872.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_499" id="Footnote_4_499"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_499"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Kunstlehre,</i> Ratisbon, 1845-1846 (<i>Grundlinien einer -positiven Philosophie,</i> vols. iv. v.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_500" id="Footnote_5_500"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_500"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Der Geist in der Natur,</i> 1850-1851; <i>Neue Beitrage z. d. -Geist i. d. Natur,</i> post. 1855.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_501" id="Footnote_6_501"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_501"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Ästhetische Forschungen,</i> Frankfurt a. M. 1855.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_502" id="Footnote_7_502"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_502"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Die theistische Begründung d. Ästhetik im Gegensatz z. -d. pantheistichen,</i> Jena, 1857; same author, <i>Vorschule d. Ästh.,</i> -Karlsruhe, 1864-1865.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_503" id="Footnote_8_503"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_503"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Üb. d. Erhabene u. Komische,</i> Stuttgart, 1837.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_504" id="Footnote_9_504"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_504"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Ästhetik oder Wissenschaft d. Schönen,</i> Reutlingen, -Leipzig and Stuttgart, 1846-1857, 3 parts in 4 vols.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_505" id="Footnote_10_505"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_505"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> introd. §§ 2-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_506" id="Footnote_11_506"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_506"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Hartmann, <i>Dtsch. Ästh. s. Kant,</i> p. 217, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_507" id="Footnote_12_507"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_507"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> introd. § 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_508" id="Footnote_13_508"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_508"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>System der spekulativen Ethik,</i> Heilbronn, 1841-1842.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_509" id="Footnote_14_509"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_509"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> §§ 15-17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_510" id="Footnote_15_510"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_510"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> §§ 19-24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_511" id="Footnote_16_511"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_511"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Griepenkerl, <i>Lehrb. d. Ästh.,</i> Brunswick, 1827. Bobrik, -<i>Freie Verträge üb. Ästh.,</i> Zürich, 1834.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_512" id="Footnote_17_512"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_512"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Üb. d. Principien d. Ästh.,</i> Kiel, 1840.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_513" id="Footnote_18_513"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_513"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Ges. Aufs.</i> pp. 216-221.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_514" id="Footnote_19_514"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_514"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>-<a href="#Page_93">93</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_515" id="Footnote_20_515"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_515"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_179">179</a>-<a href="#Page_180">180</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_516" id="Footnote_21_516"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_516"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Cannochiale arist.</i> ch. 3: <i>Perfetta poesia,</i> bk. I. -chs. 6, 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_517" id="Footnote_22_517"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_517"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_205">205</a>-<a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>-<a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_518" id="Footnote_23_518"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_518"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_275">275</a>-<a href="#Page_277">277</a>. </p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_519" id="Footnote_24_519"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_519"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Kaligone, op. cit.</i> pp. 55-90.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_520" id="Footnote_25_520"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_520"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>System d. transcend. Ideal,</i> part vi. § 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_521" id="Footnote_26_521"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_521"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> p. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_522" id="Footnote_27_522"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_522"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> I. pp. 4-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_523" id="Footnote_28_523"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_523"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> I. pp. 148-180.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_524" id="Footnote_29_524"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_524"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> introd.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_525" id="Footnote_30_525"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_525"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Ansichten der Natur,</i> 1088; <i>Kosmos,</i> 1845-1858.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_526" id="Footnote_31_526"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_526"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Ästhetik. Pflanzenwelt,</i> Leipzig, 1853.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_527" id="Footnote_32_527"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_527"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> § 341.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_528" id="Footnote_33_528"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_528"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Poet.</i> 5. 13-14; <i>Rhet.</i> iii. 10, 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_529" id="Footnote_34_529"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_529"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>De orat.</i> ii. 54-71; <i>Inst. orat.</i> vi. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_530" id="Footnote_35_530"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_530"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Caractères,</i> I.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_531" id="Footnote_36_531"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_531"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Hamb. Dramat.</i> Nos. 74-75.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_532" id="Footnote_37_532"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_532"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Letter to abbé d'Olivet, August 20, 1761.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_533" id="Footnote_38_533"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_533"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Hamb. Dramat.</i> No. 93; in <i>Werke, ed. cit.</i> xii. pp. -170-171, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_534" id="Footnote_39_534"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_534"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Kritische Wälder,</i> in <i>Werke, ed. cit.</i> iv. pp. 182-186.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_535" id="Footnote_40_535"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_535"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Schlapp, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 55.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_536" id="Footnote_41_536"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_536"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Kr. d. Urth., Anmerkung,</i> § 54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_537" id="Footnote_42_537"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_537"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> bk. ii. §§ 23-29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_538" id="Footnote_43_538"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_538"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>System d. Ästh.</i> introd. p. xxxvi <i>n.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_539" id="Footnote_44_539"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_539"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>System der Kunstlehre:</i> cf. Hartmann, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 387.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_540" id="Footnote_45_540"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_540"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Vorschule d. Ästh.</i> chs. 6-9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_541" id="Footnote_46_541"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_541"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_309">309</a>-<a href="#Page_310">310</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_542" id="Footnote_47_542"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_542"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> p. 240 <i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_543" id="Footnote_48_543"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_543"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Cf. Zimmermann, <i>G. d. Ästh.</i> p. 788.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_544" id="Footnote_49_544"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_544"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Philos, d. Kunst,</i> §§ 65-66.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_545" id="Footnote_50_545"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_545"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Cf. Hartmann, <i>Deutsch. Ästh. s. Kant,</i> pp. 363-364.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_546" id="Footnote_51_546"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_546"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Vorles üb. Ästh.</i> p. 85.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_547" id="Footnote_52_547"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_547"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Neue Vorschule d. Ästh.</i> Halle, 1837.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_548" id="Footnote_53_548"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_548"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> K. Rosenkranz, <i>Ästhetik des Hässlichen,</i> Kœnigsberg, -1853.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_549" id="Footnote_54_549"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_549"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Ästh. d. Hässl.</i> pp. 36-40.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_550" id="Footnote_55_550"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_550"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> §§ 83-84, 154-155.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56_551" id="Footnote_56_551"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_551"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>Ästh. Forsch.</i> p. 413.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIVb" id="XIVb">XIV</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND ITALY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE -NINETEENTH CENTURY</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic movement in France: Cousin, Jouffroy.</i></div> - -<p>In the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first half of -the nineteenth century German thought, notwithstanding the glaring -errors which vitiated it, and were soon to bring about a violent and -indeed exaggerated reaction, must on the whole be awarded the foremost -place in the general history of European thought as well as in the -individual study of Æsthetic, the contemporary philosophy of other -countries standing on an inferior level of the second and third degree. -France still lay under the dominion of the sensationalism of Condillac -and, at the opening of the century, was quite incapable of grasping -the spiritual activity of art. A faint gleam of Winckelmann's abstract -spiritualism just appears in the theories of Quatremère de Quincy, who, -in criticism of Émeric-David (in his turn a critic of ideal beauty and -an adherent of the imitation of nature),<a name="FNanchor_1_552" id="FNanchor_1_552"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_552" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> maintained that the arts -of design have pure beauty, devoid of individual character, as their -objective; they depict man and not; men.<a name="FNanchor_2_553" id="FNanchor_2_553"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_553" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Some sensationalists, such -as Bonstetten, vainly endeavoured to trace the peculiar processes -of imagination in life and in art.<a name="FNanchor_3_554" id="FNanchor_3_554"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_554" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Followers of the orthodox<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> -spiritualism of the French universities date the beginning of a new -era, and the foundation of Æsthetic in France, to 1818, the year when -Victor Cousin first delivered at the Sorbonne his lectures on the -True, the Beautiful and the Good, which later formed his book with the -same name, frequently reprinted.<a name="FNanchor_4_555" id="FNanchor_4_555"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_555" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> These lectures of Cousin are but -poor stuff, although some scraps of Kant are to be found in them here -and there; he denies the identity of the beautiful with the pleasant -or useful, and substitutes the affirmation of a threefold beauty, -physical, intellectual and moral, the last being the true ideal beauty, -having its foundations in God; he says that art expresses ideal Beauty, -the infinite, God, that genius is the power of creation, and that taste -is a mixture of fancy, sentiment and reason.<a name="FNanchor_5_556" id="FNanchor_5_556"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_556" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Academic phrases all -of them; pompous and void and, for that very reason, well received. Of -much greater value were the lectures on Æsthetic delivered by Théodore -Jouffroy in 1822, before a small audience, and published posthumously -in 1843.<a name="FNanchor_6_557" id="FNanchor_6_557"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_557" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Jouffroy allowed a beauty of expression, to be found alike -in art and nature: a beauty of imitation, consisting in the perfect -accuracy with which a model is reproduced: a beauty of idealisation, -which reproduces the model, accentuating a particular quality in -order to give it greater significance: and, finally, a beauty of the -invisible or of content, reducible to force (physical, sensible, -intellectual, moral), which, as force, awakens sympathy. Ugliness is -the negation of this sympathetic beauty; its species or modifications -are the sublime and the graceful. One sees that Jouffroy did not -succeed in isolating the strictly æsthetic fact in his analysis and -gave, instead of a scientific system, little beyond explanations of the -use of words. He could not see or understand that expression, imitation -and idealization are identical with each other and with artistic -activity. Moreover he had many curious ideas, chiefly concerning -expression. He said that if we were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> to see a drunkard with all the -most disgusting symptoms of intoxication on a road where there was also -an unhewn rock, we should be pleased by the drunken man, since he had -expression, and not by the rock, since it had none. Beside Jouffroy, -whose theories, crude and immature though they be, reveal an inquiring -mind, it is hardly worth while to cite Lamennais,<a name="FNanchor_7_558" id="FNanchor_7_558"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_558" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> who like Cousin -regarded art as the manifestation of the infinite through the finite, -of the absolute through the relative. French Romanticism in de Bonald, -de Barante and Mme. de Staël had defined literature as "the expression -of society," had honoured, under German influence, the characteristic -and the grotesque,<a name="FNanchor_8_559" id="FNanchor_8_559"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_559" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> and had proclaimed the independence of art by -means of the formula "art for art's sake"; but these vague affirmations -or aphorisms did not supersede, philosophically speaking, the old -doctrine of the "imitation of nature."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>English Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>In England associationistic psychology still flourished (and has -continued to flourish uninterruptedly), unable to emancipate itself -wholly from sensationalism or to understand imagination. Dugald -Stewart<a name="FNanchor_9_560" id="FNanchor_9_560"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_560" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> had recourse to the wretched expedient of establishing -two forms of association: one of accidental associations, the other -of associations innate in human nature and therefore common to all -mankind. England did not escape German influence, as appears, for -example, in Coleridge, to whom we owe a saner concept of poetry and -the difference between it and science<a name="FNanchor_10_561" id="FNanchor_10_561"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_561" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> (in collaboration with -the poet Wordsworth), and in Carlyle, who placed intellect lower -than imagination, "organ of the Divine." The most noteworthy English -æsthetic essay of this period is the <i>Defence of Poetry</i> by Shelley -(1821),<a name="FNanchor_11_562" id="FNanchor_11_562"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_562" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> containing profound, if not very systematic, views on the -distinctions between reason and imagination, prose and poetry; on -primitive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> language and the faculty of poetic objectification which -enshrines and preserves "the record of the best and happiest moments of -the happiest and best minds."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Italian Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>In Italy, where neither Parini nor Foscolo<a name="FNanchor_12_563" id="FNanchor_12_563"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_563" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> had been able to shake -off the fetters of the old doctrines (although the latter, in his later -writings, was in several ways an innovator in literary criticism), many -treatises and essays on Æsthetic were published during the earlier -decades of the century, the greater part showing the influence of -Condillac's sensationalism, which had a great vogue in Italy. Such -authors as Delfico, Malaspina, Cicognara, Talia, Pasquali, Visconti -and Bonacci belong more exclusively to the special, or rather, the -anecdotal, history of Italian philosophy. Now and then, however, -one comes across remarks that are not wholly contemptible, as in -Melchiorre Delfico (1818) who, after wandering aimlessly hither and -thither, fixes on the principle of expression, observing, "If it -were possible to establish that expression is always an element in -the beautiful, it would be a legitimate inference to regard it as -the real characteristic of beauty, <i>i.e.</i> a condition without which -the beautiful could not exist, and the pleasing modification which -arouses the sentiment of beauty could not take place in us"; he tries -to develop this principle by asserting that all other characters -(order, harmony, proportion, symmetry, simplicity, unity and variety) -have significance only by their subordination to the principle of -expression.<a name="FNanchor_13_564" id="FNanchor_13_564"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_564" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> In opposition to Malaspina's definition of beauty -as "pleasure born of a representation"; and in opposition to the -then fashionable threefold division of beauty into sensible, moral -and intellectual, a critic of Malaspina observed that if beauty be -representation, it is inconceivable that there should be intellectual -beauty, which would be intelligible but not presentable.<a name="FNanchor_14_565" id="FNanchor_14_565"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_565" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Nor must -Pasquale Balestrieri be forgotten; he was a student<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> of medicine who -in 1847 tried to construct an Æsthetic of an exact or mathematical -kind, with neither better nor worse result than many famous authors in -other countries. He noticed, while turning his algebraical expressions -into numerals, that such general formulæ "fulfil their object with an -infinite number of systems of different ciphers"; and that in art there -is an element "not arbitrary, but unknown."<a name="FNanchor_15_566" id="FNanchor_15_566"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_566" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Works by German authors -were frequently translated at this time, some of them, for example -the writings of the two Schlegels, being reprinted several times; the -<i>Æsthetic</i> of Bouterweck, deriving from Kant and Schiller,<a name="FNanchor_16_567" id="FNanchor_16_567"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_567" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> was read -and discussed; Colecchi gave an excellent statement of the æsthetic -doctrines of Kant;<a name="FNanchor_17_568" id="FNanchor_17_568"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_568" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and in 1831 a certain Lichtenthal adapted the -<i>Æsthetic</i> of Franz Ficker<a name="FNanchor_18_569" id="FNanchor_18_569"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_569" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> to the use of Italian readers; later the -same book was fully translated by another hand; some of Schelling's -writings were translated, <i>e.g.</i> his discourses on the relation between -figurative art and nature.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rosmini and Gioberti.</i></div> - -<p>It must be admitted that in Italy Æsthetic received but inadequate -treatment in the revival of philosophical speculation effected by -the work of Galluppi, Rosmini and Gioberti. It is treated in a -merely incidental and popular manner by the first named.<a name="FNanchor_19_570" id="FNanchor_19_570"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_570" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Rosmini -devotes a section of his philosophical system to the deontological -sciences, which "treat of the perfection of being, and the method of -acquiring or producing such perfection or losing it"; among these -sciences is that of "beauty in the universal" under the name of -Callology, of which a special part is Æsthetic, the science of "beauty -in the sensible," establishing the "archetypes of beings."<a name="FNanchor_20_571" id="FNanchor_20_571"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_571" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> In -his longest literary work, considered by him as his Æsthetic,<a name="FNanchor_21_572" id="FNanchor_21_572"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_572" class="fnanchor">[21]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> -his essay on <i>The Idyl</i>,<a name="FNanchor_22_573" id="FNanchor_22_573"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_573" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> Rosmini declares the aim of art to be -neither imitation of nature nor direct intuition of the archetypes, -but the reduction of natural things to their archetypes, which are -arranged in a hierarchy of three ideals, natural, intellectual and -moral. Gioberti<a name="FNanchor_23_574" id="FNanchor_23_574"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_574" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> is clearly under the influence of German idealism, -especially of Schelling's; for him the beautiful is "the individual -union of an intelligible type with an imaginative element called into -being by fancy"; the phantasm gives material, while the intelligible -type (concept) gives form, in the Aristotelian sense,<a name="FNanchor_24_575" id="FNanchor_24_575"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_575" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> and since the -ideal element predominates over the sensible or fantastic, art is a -propædeutic to the true and the good. Gioberti is of opinion that Hegel -was wrong in detaching natural beauty from Æsthetic, for perfect beauty -of nature is "the full correspondence of sensible reality with the Idea -which informs and represents it," and as such "makes its appearance -in the sensible universe during the second period of the primordial -age described in detail by Moses in the six days of creation"; it is -only through original sin that imperfection and ugliness arose in -nature.<a name="FNanchor_25_576" id="FNanchor_25_576"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_576" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Art is nothing but a supplement to natural beauty, whose -decadence it presupposes, and thus art is at once record and prophecy, -referring to the first and last ages of the world. The Last Judgement -will reintroduce perfect beauty: "organic restitution, by empowering -the faculties to contemplate the intelligible in the sensible, and by -refining their capabilities, will greatly intensify and purify æsthetic -enjoyment. The contemplation of perfect beauty will be the beatitude of -imagination, of which Christ gave an ineffable foretaste by appearing -to his disciples visibly transfigured and shining with celestial -radiance."<a name="FNanchor_26_577" id="FNanchor_26_577"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_577" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Gioberti agrees with Schelling's division of art into -pagan and Christian, a "heterodox beauty" (Oriental and Græco-Italian -art), imperfect when compared with "orthodox beauty"; and between the -two,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> a "semi-orthodox" beauty,<a name="FNanchor_27_578" id="FNanchor_27_578"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_578" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> transitional to Christian art; he -also attempted a doctrine of modifications of the beautiful, wherein he -held the sublime to be creator of the beautiful. Beauty is the relative -intelligibility of created things apprehended by fancy: the sublime -is the absolute intelligibility of time, space and infinite power as -presented to itself by the faculty of imagination: "The ideal formula: -the Being creates the Existing, translated into æsthetic language, -gives the following formula: by means of the dynamical sublime Being -creates the beautiful; and by means of the mathematical sublime -contains it: this shows the ontological and psychological connexions of -Æsthetic in First Science." Ugliness enters into the beautiful either -as relief and counterpoise, or to open a way to the comic, or to depict -the struggle between good and evil. The Christian ideal of artistic -beauty is the figure of the God-Man, absolute union of the two forms -of beauty, the sublime and the beautiful, a transfigured and divinely -illuminated expression of man.<a name="FNanchor_28_579" id="FNanchor_28_579"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_579" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> However carefully we sift the -thoughts of Gioberti from their mythological Judaico-Christian husk, we -find nothing of the least value to science.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Italian Romantics. Dependence of Art.</i></div> - -<p>On the other hand, if Italian literature of the day chose to revive -and refurbish certain antiquated critical ideas, a much wider field -was opened by social and political upheavals which tended to make -use of literature as a practical instrument for spreading abroad the -truths of history, science, religion and morality. In 1816 Giovanni -Berchet wrote that "poetry ... is intended to improve the habits of -man and satisfy the cravings of his imagination and heart, since the -tendency towards poetry, like every other desire, awakens in us moral -needs";<a name="FNanchor_29_580" id="FNanchor_29_580"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_580" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> and Ermes Visconti in his <i>Conciliatore</i> of 1818 says that -æsthetic aims must be subordinated "to the improvement of mankind and -public and private weal, the eminent aim of all studies." Manzoni, -who subsequently took to philosophizing on art on the principles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> of -Rosmini, declared in his letter on Romanticism (1823) that "poetry -or literature in general should have utility as its objective, truth -as its subject and interest as its means";<a name="FNanchor_30_581" id="FNanchor_30_581"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_581" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> and though noticing -the vagueness of the concept of truth in poetry, he inclined always -(as is seen also in his discourse on the historical novel) to its -identification with historical and scientific truth.<a name="FNanchor_31_582" id="FNanchor_31_582"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_582" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Pietro -Maroncelli proposed as a substitute for the classic formula of art, -"founded on imitation of the real and having pleasure as its object," -a formula of art as "founded on inspiration, having the beautiful as -means and good as end"; this doctrine he baptized "cormentalism," -contrasting it with the doctrine of art for art's sake found in the -writings of August Wilhelm Schlegel and Victor Hugo.<a name="FNanchor_32_583" id="FNanchor_32_583"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_583" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Tommaseo -defined beauty as "the union of many truths in one concept" effected -by the power of feeling.<a name="FNanchor_33_584" id="FNanchor_33_584"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_584" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Giuseppe Mazzini, too, always conceived -literature as the mediator of the universal idea or intellectual -concept.<a name="FNanchor_34_585" id="FNanchor_34_585"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_585" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Attempting to restore serious content to a literature -grown weak and frivolous, the Italian Romantics found themselves forced -on the theoretical side, by a natural reaction, into constant and -perpetual opposition to every tendency of thought likely to affirm the -independence of art.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_552" id="Footnote_1_552"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_552"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Émeric-David, <i>Recherches sur l'art du statuaire chez les -anciens,</i> Paris, 1805 (Ital. trans., Florence, 1857).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_553" id="Footnote_2_553"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_553"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Quatremère de Quincy, <i>Essai sur l'imitation dans les -beaux arts,</i> 1823.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_554" id="Footnote_3_554"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_554"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Recherches sur la nature et les lois de l'imagination,</i> -1807.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_555" id="Footnote_4_555"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_555"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Du vrai, du beau et du bien,</i> 1818, many lines revised -(23rd ed. Paris, 1881).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_556" id="Footnote_5_556"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_556"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> lectures 6-8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_557" id="Footnote_6_557"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_557"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Cours d' esthétique,</i> ed. Damiron, Paris, 1843.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_558" id="Footnote_7_558"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_558"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>De l'art et du beau,</i> 1843-1846.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_559" id="Footnote_8_559"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_559"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Victor Hugo, Preface to <i>Cromwell,</i> 1827.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_560" id="Footnote_9_560"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_560"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Dugald Stewart, <i>Elements of the Philosophy of the Human -Mind,</i> 1837.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_561" id="Footnote_10_561"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_561"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Gayley-Scott, <i>An Introd.</i> pp. 305-306.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_562" id="Footnote_11_562"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_562"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> P. B. Shelley, <i>A Defence of Poetry</i> (in <i>Works,</i> London, -1880, vol. vii.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_563" id="Footnote_12_563"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_563"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Parini, <i>Principi delle belle lettere applicati alle -belle arti,</i> from 1773 onward; Foscolo, <i>Dell' origine e dell' uffizio -della letteratura,</i> 1809, and <i>Saggi di critica,</i> composed in England.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_564" id="Footnote_13_564"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_564"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> M. Delfico, <i>Nuove ricerche sul bello,</i> Naples, 1818, ch. -9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_565" id="Footnote_14_565"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_565"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Malaspina, <i>Delle leggi del bello,</i> Milan, 1828, pp. 26, -233.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_566" id="Footnote_15_566"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_566"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> P. Balestrieri, <i>Fondamenti di estetica,</i> Naples, 1847.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_567" id="Footnote_16_567"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_567"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Friedrich Bouterweck, <i>Ästhetik,</i> 1806, 1815 (3rd ed., -Göttingen, 1824-1825).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_568" id="Footnote_17_568"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_568"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> O. Colecchi, <i>Questions filosofiche,</i> vol. iii., Naples, -1843.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_569" id="Footnote_18_569"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_569"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> P. Lichtenthal, <i>Estetica ossia dottrina del bello e -delle arti belle,</i> Milan, 1831.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_570" id="Footnote_19_570"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_570"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Elementi di filosofia</i> (5th ed., Naples, 1846), vol. ii. -pp. 427-476.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_571" id="Footnote_20_571"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_571"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Sistema filosofico,</i> by A. Rosmini-Serbati, Turin, 1886, -§ 210.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_572" id="Footnote_21_572"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_572"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Cf. <i>Nuovo saggio sopra l' orig. delle idee,</i> § v. part -iv. ch. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_573" id="Footnote_22_573"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_573"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Sull' idillio e sulla nuova letteratura italiana -(opuscoli filosofici,</i> vol. i.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_574" id="Footnote_23_574"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_574"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> V. Gioberti, <i>Del buono e del bello</i> (Florence ed., -1857).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_575" id="Footnote_24_575"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_575"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Del bello,</i> ch. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_576" id="Footnote_25_576"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_576"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ch. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_577" id="Footnote_26_577"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_577"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ch. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_578" id="Footnote_27_578"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_578"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Del bello,</i> chs. 8-10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_579" id="Footnote_28_579"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_579"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ch. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_580" id="Footnote_29_580"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_580"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> G. Berchet, <i>Opere,</i> ed. Cusani, Milan, 1863, p. 227.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_581" id="Footnote_30_581"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_581"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Words suppressed in ed. of 1870.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_582" id="Footnote_31_582"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_582"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Epistolario,</i> ed. Sforza, i. pp. 285, 306, 308; -<i>Discorso sul romanzo storico,</i> 1845; <i>Dell' invenzione,</i> dialogue.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_583" id="Footnote_32_583"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_583"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Addizioni alle Miei Prigioni,</i> 1831 (in Pellico, -<i>Prose,</i> Florence, 1858); see pp. about the <i>Conciliatore.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_584" id="Footnote_33_584"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_584"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Del bello e del sublime</i>, 1827; <i>Studî filosofici</i> -(Venice, 1840), vol. ii. part v.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_585" id="Footnote_34_585"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_585"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Cf. De Sanctis, <i>Lett. Hal. nel s. XIX,</i> ed. Croce, -Naples 1896, pp. 427-431.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVb" id="XVb">XV</a></h4> - - -<h4>FRANCESCO DE SANCTIS</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>F. de Sanctis: development of his thought.</i></div> - -<p>On the other hand, the autonomy of art found a strong supporter in -Italy in the critical work of Francesco de Sanctis, who held private -classes in literature at Naples from 1838 to 1848, taught at Turin and -Zürich from 1852 to 1860 and in 1870 became professor in the University -of Naples. He expressed his doctrines in critical essays, in monographs -on Italian writers and in his classic <i>History of Italian Literature.</i> -Receiving his first elements of old Italian culture in Puoti's -school, his natural bent! towards speculation led him to investigate -grammatical and rhetorical doctrines with the view of reducing them -to a system; but he soon began to criticize and to grow out of this -phase. He pronounced Fortunio, Alunno, Accarisio and Corso "empirics"; -he had a slightly better opinion of Bembo, Varchi, Castelvetro and -Salviati, who introduced "method" into grammar, a process completed -subsequently by Buonmattei, Corticelli and Bartoli; and he proclaimed -Francisco Sanchez, author of the <i>Minerva,</i> "the Descartes of -grammarians." From these his admiration spread to the French writers of -the eighteenth century and the philosophical grammars of; Du Marsais, -Beauzée, Condillac and Gérard; following in their wake and pursuing the -ideal of Leibniz, he conceived a "logical grammar"; in this effort, -however, he soon began to recognize the impossibility of reducing the -differences of languages to fixed logical principles., If he found -the French theorists admirable in their ability to reconstitute the -simple and primitive forms; from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> "I love" to "I am loving," something -disquieted him; "Such decomposition of 'I love' into 'I am loving'" -(said he) "deadens the word by depriving it of the movement proceeding -from active will."<a name="FNanchor_1_586" id="FNanchor_1_586"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_586" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> In the same way he read and criticized the -writers of treatises on Rhetoric and Poetics from sixteenth-century -men such as Castelvetro and Torquato Tasso (whom he dared to describe -as an "indifferent critic," to the great scandal of Neapolitan men -of letters) to Muratori and Gravina, "more acute than accurate"; and -eighteenth-century Italians, Bettinelli, Algarotti and Cesarotti. -Coldly rational rules found no favour with him: he urged the young to -confront literary works boldly and freely absorb impressions, the only -possible foundation for taste.<a name="FNanchor_2_587" id="FNanchor_2_587"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_587" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Influence of Hegelism.</i></div> - -<p>Philosophical study had not been abandoned and had not even fallen -into entire decadence in Southern Italy; in these days of renewed -interest in philosophy the theories on Beauty from over the Alps and -the new ideas of Gioberti and other Italians<a name="FNanchor_3_588" id="FNanchor_3_588"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_588" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> aroused enthusiastic -discussion. Vico was read again, and Bénard's French translation of -Hegel's <i>Æsthetic</i> appeared and was canvassed in Naples volume by -volume (the first in 1840, the second in 1843, and the rest between -1848 and 1852). In its desire for new intellectual food Italian youth -set itself to learn German: De Sanctis himself had to translate the -greater <i>Logic</i> of Hegel and Rosenkranz's <i>History of Literature</i> -in the dungeon of the Bourbon prison where he was incarcerated on -account of his liberal opinions. The new critical tendency was named -"philosophism" to distinguish it from the old grammatical criticism -and from the vague, incoherent, exaggerated Romanticism. Philosophism -attracted De Sanctis; to show how deeply he was imbued with the -Hegelian spirit a tale was told that, having devoured the first volumes -of Bénard's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> translation, he guessed the contents of the remaining -volumes and, before they could appear, was expounding them publicly in -his classroom.<a name="FNanchor_4_589" id="FNanchor_4_589"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_589" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>His first writings show traces of metaphysical idealism and Hegelism; -and they still linger here and there in the terminology of his later -works. In a lecture prior to 1848 he placed the safety of criticism in -the philosophic school which, in works of literature, fixed its eyes -upon "that absolute part ... that uncertain idea which moves within the -mind of great writers, till it appears abroad clothed in fine raiment -only less beautiful than itself."<a name="FNanchor_5_590" id="FNanchor_5_590"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_590" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> In a preface to Schiller's plays -(1850) he wrote, "The Idea is not thought, nor is poetry reason in -song, as a poet of our time is pleased to assert; the idea is at once -necessity and freedom, reason and passion, and its perfect form in -drama is action."<a name="FNanchor_6_591" id="FNanchor_6_591"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_591" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Elsewhere he calls attention to the death of faith -and poetry, absorbed by the development of philosophy: a thesis, he -remarked some years later, "imposed on our generation by Hegel with his -omnipotent thought."<a name="FNanchor_7_592" id="FNanchor_7_592"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_592" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> In 1856 he attempted a definition of humour as -"an artistic form having for signification the destruction of limit, -with consciousness of such destruction."<a name="FNanchor_8_593" id="FNanchor_8_593"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_593" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Not to dwell too long on -other particulars, in the distinction to which De Sanctis always held -firm throughout his critical work, that between Fancy and Imagination, -the latter considered as the true and only faculty of poetry, arises -undoubtedly from suggestions of Schelling and Hegel (<i>Einbildungskraft, -Phantasie)</i>; from the same philosophers come the phrases "prosaic -content," "prosaic world," sometimes used by him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Unconscious criticism of Hegelism.</i></div> - -<p>For De Sanctis the Hegelian Æsthetic was but a lever wherewith to -lift himself clear of the discussions and views of the old Italian -schools. A fresh, clear spirit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> such as his could not escape the -arbitrary shackles of grammarians and rhetoricians only to fall into -those of metaphysicians, the torturers of art. He absorbed the vital -part of Hegel's teaching and re-expressed the Hegelian theories in -correct or somewhat attenuated interpretations; but he only maintained -with hesitation, and in the end openly rebelled against, all that was -artificial, formalistic and pedantic in Hegel.</p> - -<p>The following examples of such reductions and attenuations show how -substantial and radical was the change he effected. "Faith has vanished -and poetry is dead" (he wrote in 1856, echoing Hegel); "or it were -better to say" (here is De Sanctis' own correction) "faith and poetry -are immortal: what has disappeared is but one particular mode of their -being. To-day faith springs from conviction and poetry is the spark -struck from meditation; they are not dead, they are transformed."<a name="FNanchor_9_594" id="FNanchor_9_594"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_594" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> -Certainly he distinguished between imagination and fancy; but for -him imagination was never the mystic faculty of transcendental -apperception, the intellectual intuition of German metaphysicians, -but simply the poet's faculty of synthesis and creation, contrasting -with fancy as the faculty of collecting particulars and materials in -a somewhat mechanical fashion.<a name="FNanchor_10_595" id="FNanchor_10_595"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_595" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> When students of Vico and Hegel -understood and expounded their master's theories as emphasizing the -importance of concepts in art, De Sanctis replied, "The concept does -not exist in art, nature or history: the poet works unconsciously and -sees no concept but only form, in which he is involved and well-nigh -lost. If the philosopher, by means of abstraction, can extract the -concept thence and contemplate it in all its purity, he acts in a way -entirely contrary to that of art, nature and history." He warned his -hearers not to misunderstand Vico, who, when he extracts concepts and -exemplary types from the Homeric poems, is not writing as an art critic -but as a historian of civilization: Achilles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> is artistically Achilles, -not strength or any other abstraction.<a name="FNanchor_11_596" id="FNanchor_11_596"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_596" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> Thus his polemic is directed -in the first instance against misunderstanding what he called the true -Hegelian thought, which was in fact usually a correction made upon -Hegel more or less consciously by himself. He was able to boast in -his latter years that even at the time when all Naples went wild over -Hegel, "at the time when Hegel was master of the field," he had always -"made certain reservations and refused to accept his apriorism, his -triad or his formulæ."<a name="FNanchor_12_597" id="FNanchor_12_597"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_597" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticisms of German Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>De Sanctis also took up an independent attitude towards the other -German æstheticians. The views of Wilhelm Schlegel, very advanced -for the day in which they had been promulgated, seemed to him to -have been already superseded. In 1856 he wrote that Schlegel strives -to "transcend ordinary criticism, which leads a humdrum existence -among phraseology, versification and elocution, but loses its way -and never comes face to face with art: whereas Schlegel throws -himself headlong into the probable, the decorous and the moral; into -everything save art."<a name="FNanchor_13_598" id="FNanchor_13_598"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_598" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Thrown by the hazards of life into German -territory, he found himself at the Zürich Polytechnic, and found among -his colleagues (only imagine such a thing!) Theodor Vischer. What -opinion can he have formed of the ponderous Hegelian scholastic who -emerged dusty and panting from the systematic labours so well known to -us, and smiled disdainfully at the poetry and music of the decadent -Italian race? De Sanctis writes, "I went there with my opinions and -my prejudices and ridiculed their ridicule. Richard Wagner seemed to -me a corrupter of music, and nothing could be more inæsthetic than -the Æsthetic of Vischer."<a name="FNanchor_14_599" id="FNanchor_14_599"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_599" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> His desire to correct the distorted -views of Vischer, Adolf Wagner, Valentin Schmidt and other German -critics and philosophers led him to undertake in 1858-59 a course of -lectures before an international<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> audience at Zürich upon Ariosto -and Petrarch, the two Italian poets worst maltreated by these judges -because hardest to reduce to philosophical allegory. He sketched a -typical German critic and contrasted him with a French one, each with -his own characteristic defects. "The Frenchman does not indulge in -theories; he goes straight to the subject: his argument palpitates with -warmth of impression and sagacity of observation: he never leaves the -concrete: he estimates the quality of the talent and the work, studying -the man in order to understand the writer." He makes the mistake of -substituting reflexion on the psychology of the author and history of -his time for reflexion upon art. "Quite otherwise is your German: be a -thing never so plain, he makes it his business to manipulate, distort -and embroil: he accumulates a mass of darkness from whose centre rays -of dazzling light now and again shoot forth: truth is there at bottom, -in grievous pangs of parturition. Confronted with a work of art, he -labours to fasten down and fix the quality which is most evanescent -and impalpable. While nobody is more given to talk of life and the -world of the living, nobody on earth takes more pains to decompose and -disembody it in generalities: as consequence of this last process (last -in appearance, that is to say; in reality preconceived and <i>a priori</i>), -he is able to fit you the same boot on every foot and the same coat on -every back." "The German school is dominated by metaphysic, the French -by history."<a name="FNanchor_15_600" id="FNanchor_15_600"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_600" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> About this time (1858) a Piedmontese review published -his exhaustive critical survey of the philosophy of Schopenhauer,<a name="FNanchor_16_601" id="FNanchor_16_601"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_601" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> -which was then beginning to attract disciples among his friends -and companions in exile in Switzerland; the criticism provoked the -philosopher himself to confess that "this Italian" had "absorbed him -<i>in succum et sanguinem.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_17_602" id="FNanchor_17_602"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_602" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> What value did De Sanctis attach to -all Schopenhauer's subtleties concerning art? Having fully<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> stated his -doctrine of ideas, he contents himself with the merest reference to the -third book "wherein is found an exaggerated theory of Æsthetic."<a name="FNanchor_18_603" id="FNanchor_18_603"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_603" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Final rebellion against metaphysical Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>This moderate resistance and opposition to the partisans of the -concept and to the romantic Italian mystics and moralists (he directed -criticisms equally against Manzoni, Mazzini, Tommaseo and Cantù<a name="FNanchor_19_604" id="FNanchor_19_604"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_604" class="fnanchor">[19]</a>) -turned to open rebellion in one of his critical writings on Petrarch -(1868) in which this false tendency is characterized with biting -sarcasm. "According to this school" (he says, meaning the school of -Hegel and Gioberti), "according to this school the real and living is -art only in so far as it surpasses its form and reveals its concept or -the pure idea. The beautiful is the manifestation of the idea. Art is -the ideal, a particular idea. Under the gaze of the artist the body -becomes subtilized until it is nothing but the shadow of the soul, a -beautiful veil. The world of poetry is peopled with phantasms; and -the poet, eternal dreamer, with the eyes of one slightly intoxicated -sees bodies float unsteadily around him and change their shapes. Nor -do bodies merely become attenuated into forms and phantasms; these -forms and phantasms themselves become free manifestations of every -idea and every concept. The theory of the ideal has been driven to -its last victorious limit, to the destruction of the very phantasms -themselves, to concept as concept, form becoming a mere accessory." -"Thus the vague, the undecided, the undulating, the vaporous, the -celestial, the ærial, the veiled, the angelic, have now a high position -among artistic forms: whilst criticism revels in the beautiful, -the ideal, the infinite, genius, the concept, the idea, truth, the -superintelligible, the supersensible, the being and the existent, and -many more generalities cast into barbarous formulæ just like those -of the scholastics from whose influence we had so much difficulty in -escaping." All these things, instead of determining the character of -art, do nothing;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> save illustrate the contrary of art: its feebleness -and impotence, preventing it from slaying abstractions and laying hold -of life. If beauty and the ideal have actually the meaning given them -by these philosophers "the essence of art is neither the beautiful nor -the ideal, but the living, the form; the ugly too belongs to art since -ugliness lives also in nature; outside the domain of art lies nothing -but the formless and the deformed. Thais in Malebolge is more living -and poetical than Beatrice, who is pure allegory representing abstract -combinations. The Beautiful? Tell me of anything as beautiful as Iago, -a form uprisen from the profundity of real life; so rich, so concrete; -in every part, in each finest gradation, one of the most beautiful -creations in the world of poetry." If in the course of "wrangling -about the idea or the concept or real, moral, or intellectual beauty, -and confusing philosophical or moral truths with æsthetic" you choose -to call "a great part of the poetic world ugly, granting it a permit -merely that it may act as contrast, antagonist or foil to beauty, -accepting Mephistopheles as a foil to Faust, or Iago as foil to -Othello," you are imitating "those good folk who thought, <i>in illo -tempore,</i> that the stars shone in the firmament in order to give light -to this earth."<a name="FNanchor_20_605" id="FNanchor_20_605"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_605" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>De Sanctis own theory</i></div> - -<p>The æsthetic theory of De Sanctis himself arises entirely from the -criticism of the highest manifestations of European æsthetic as known -to him. Its nature is revealed by the contrast. "If you desire a statue -in the vestibule of art," says he, "let it be that of Form; gaze upon -this, question this, begin with this. Before form is attained, that -exists which existed before the creation: chaos. Chaos is no doubt a -respectable thing, with a most interesting history: science has not yet -uttered its last word about this pre-world of fermenting elements. Art -also has its pre-world: art also has its geology, born but yesterday -and as yet scarcely stretched, a science <i>sui generis,</i> which is -neither Criticism nor Æsthetic. Æsthetic appears when form appears, -in which this pre-world is sunk, fused, forgotten and lost. Form is -itself as the individual is himself; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> no theory is so destructive -to art as the continual harping upon the beautiful as manifestation, -clothing, light, or veil of truth or the idea. The æsthetic world -is not appearance, it is substance; to it indeed belongs everything -substantial and living: its criterion, its <i>raison d'être,</i> lies -nowhere save in this motto: I live."<a name="FNanchor_21_606" id="FNanchor_21_606"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_606" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concept of form.</i></div> - -<p>For De Sanctis, form did not mean form "in the pedantic sense attached -to it until the end of the eighteenth century," that is to say, that -which first strikes a superficial observer, the words, the period, the -sense, the individual image;<a name="FNanchor_22_607" id="FNanchor_22_607"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_607" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> or form in the Herbartian sense, the -metaphysical hypostatization of the former. "Form is not <i>a Priori,</i> it -is not something existing of itself and distinct from the content as -though it were a kind of ornament or vesture or appearance or adjunct -of the content: it is generated by the content acting in the mind of -the artist: such as the content is, such is the form."<a name="FNanchor_23_608" id="FNanchor_23_608"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_608" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Between -form and content there is at the same time identity and diversity. In -a work of art the content, which had been lying in a chaotic state in -the mind of the artist, appears "not as it was originally, but as it -has become; the whole of it, with its own value, its own importance, -its own natural beauty enriched, not weakened, by the process." -Therefore content is essential for the production of concrete form; -but the abstract quality of the content does not determine that of -artistic form." If the content, though beautiful and important, remain -inoperative or lifeless or waste within the mind of the artist, if it -have not sufficient generative power and reveal itself in the form as -weak or false or vitiated, why trouble to sing its praises? In such -cases the content may be important in itself, but as literature or -art it is worthless. On the other hand the content may be immoral, -absurd, false or frivolous: but if at certain times or in certain -circumstances it has worked powerfully on in the brain of the artist, -and taken form, such content is immortal. The gods of Homer are dead;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> -the <i>Iliad</i> remains. Italy may die and, with her, every memory of Guelf -and Ghibelline; the <i>Divina Commedia</i> will remain. The content is -subject to all the hazards of history; it is born and it dies; the form -is immortal."<a name="FNanchor_24_609" id="FNanchor_24_609"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_609" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> He held firmly to the independence of art, without -which there can be no Æsthetic; but he objected to the exaggeration of -the formula of art for art's sake in that it tended to the separation -of the artist from life, to the mutilation of the content and to the -conversion of art into a proof of mere cleverness.<a name="FNanchor_25_610" id="FNanchor_25_610"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_610" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>De Sanctis as art-critic.</i></div> - -<p>For De Sanctis, the concept of form was identical with that of -imagination, the faculty of expression or representation, artistic -vision. So much must be said by any one anxious to express clearly -the direction which his thought was taking. But De Sanctis himself -never succeeded in defining his own theory with scientific exactitude; -and his æsthetic ideas remained the mere sketch of a system never -properly interrelated and deduced. The speculative tendency shared his -attention with many other lively interests, the desire to understand -the concrete, to enjoy art and rewrite its actual history, to plunge -into practical and political life; so that by turns he was professor, -conspirator, journalist and statesman. "My mind inclines to the -concrete," he was wont to say. He philosophized just so much as was -necessary to the acquisition of a point of view in problems of art, -history and life; and, having procured light for his intellect, found -his bearings, derived some satisfaction from the consciousness of his -own activity, he plunged as quickly as possible into the particular and -the determinate. To immense power of seizing the truth in the highest -general principles was joined a no less intense abhorrence for the -pale region of ideas in which the philosopher takes an almost ascetic -delight. As critic and historian of literature he is unrivalled. Those -who have compared him with Lessing, Macaulay, Sainte-Beuve or Taine are -making rhetorical comparisons.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span></p> - -<p>Gustave Flaubert wrote to George Sand: "In your last letter you speak -of criticism, and say you expect it soon to disappear. I think, on the -contrary, that it is just appearing over the horizon. Criticism to-day -is the exact opposite of what it was, but that is all. In the days of -Laharpe the critic was a grammarian; to-day he is a historian like -Sainte-Beuve and Taine. When will he be an artist, a mere artist, but a -real artist? Do you know a critic who interests himself whole-heartedly -in the work itself? They analyse with the greatest delicacy the -historical surroundings of the work and the causes which produced -it: but the underlying poetry and its causes? the composition? the -style? the author's own point of view? Never. Such a critic must have -great imagination and a great goodness of heart; I mean an ever-ready -faculty of enthusiasm; and then, taste; but this last is so rare, even -among the best, that it is never mentioned nowadays."<a name="FNanchor_26_611" id="FNanchor_26_611"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_611" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Flaubert's -ideal has been worthily reached by one critic only (that is to say, -amongst critics who have given themselves to the interpretation of -great writers and entire periods of literature) and that one is De -Sanctis.<a name="FNanchor_27_612" id="FNanchor_27_612"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_612" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> No literature of any country possesses so perfect a mirror -as that possessed by Italy in the <i>History</i> and the other critical -essays of Francesco de Sanctis.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>De Sanctis as philosopher.</i></div> - -<p>But the philosopher of art, the æsthetician in De Sanctis is less -great than the critic and historian of literature. The critic is -primary, the philosopher a mere accessory. The æsthetic observations -scattered in aphorisms up and down his essays and monographs take -various colours from various occasions, and are expressed in uncertain -and often metaphorical language; this has led to his being accused of -contradictions and inexactitudes which had no existence in his inmost -thought and whose very appearance vanishes as soon as one takes into -account the particular cases with which he was dealing. But form, -forms, content, the living, the beautiful, natural beauty, ugliness, -fancy, feeling, imagination, the real,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> the ideal, and all the other -terms which he used with varying signification, demand a science both -on which to rest and from which to derive. Meditation on these words -stirs up doubts and problems on every side and reveals everywhere gaps -and discontinuities. Compared with the few philosophical æstheticians, -De Sanctis seems wanting in analysis, in order and in system, and -vague in his definitions. But these defects are outweighed by the -contact he establishes between the reader and real concrete works of -art, and by the feeling for truth which never leaves him. He has, too, -the attraction possessed by those writers who lead one on to suspect -and to divine new treasures in store beyond what they themselves -reveal—living thought, which stimulates living men to pursue and -prolong it.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_586" id="Footnote_1_586"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_586"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Frammenti di scuola,</i> in <i>Nuovi saggi critici,</i> pp. -321-333; <i>La giovinezza di Fr. de S.</i> (autobiography), pp. 62, 101, -163-166 (works cited are those of De S. in stereotyped Naples ed. by -Morano, 12 vols.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_587" id="Footnote_2_587"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_587"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>La giovinezza di Fr. de S.</i> pp. 260-261, 315-316.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_588" id="Footnote_3_588"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_588"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Saggi critici,</i> p. 534.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_589" id="Footnote_4_589"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_589"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> De Meis, <i>Comm, di Fr. de S.</i> (in vol. <i>In Memoria,</i> -Naples, 1884, p. 116).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_590" id="Footnote_5_590"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_590"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Scritti vori,</i> ed. Croce, vol. ii. pp. 153-154.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_591" id="Footnote_6_591"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_591"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Saggi critici,</i> p 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_592" id="Footnote_7_592"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_592"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 226-228; <i>Scritti varî,</i> ii. pp. 185-187; -cf. vol. ii. p. 70.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_593" id="Footnote_8_593"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_593"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Saggi critici,</i> ed. Imbriani, p. 91.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_594" id="Footnote_9_594"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_594"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Saggi critici,</i> p. 228; cf. <i>Scritti varî,</i> vol. ii. p. -70.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_595" id="Footnote_10_595"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_595"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Storia della letteratura,</i> i. pp. 66-67 <i> Saggi -critici,</i> pp. 98-99; <i>Scritti varî,</i> vol. i. pp. 276-278, 384.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_596" id="Footnote_11_596"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_596"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>La giovinezza di Fr. de S.</i> pp. 279, 313-314, 321-324.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_597" id="Footnote_12_597"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_597"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Scritti varî,</i> vol. ii. p. 83; cf. p. 274.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_598" id="Footnote_13_598"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_598"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> vol. i. pp. 228-236.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_599" id="Footnote_14_599"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_599"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Saggio sul Petrarca,</i> new ed. by B. Croce, p. 309 -<i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_600" id="Footnote_15_600"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_600"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Saggi critici,</i> pp. 361-363, 413-414; cf. as touching -Klein, <i>Scritti varî,</i> vol. i. pp. 32-34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_601" id="Footnote_16_601"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_601"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Op. cit., Schopenhauer e Leopardi,</i> pp. 246, 299.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_602" id="Footnote_17_602"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_602"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Schopenhauer, <i>Briefe,</i> ed. Grisebach, pp. 405-406; cf. -pp. 381-383, 403-404, 438-439.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_603" id="Footnote_18_603"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_603"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Saggi critici,</i> p. 269, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_604" id="Footnote_19_604"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_604"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Cf. <i>Scritti varî,</i> i. pp. 39-45, and <i>Letterat. ital. -nel sec. XIX,</i> lectures, ed. Croce, pp. 241-243, 427-432.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_605" id="Footnote_20_605"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_605"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Saggio sut Petrarca,</i> introd. pp. 17-29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_606" id="Footnote_21_606"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_606"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Saggio sul Petrarca,</i> p. 29 <i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_607" id="Footnote_22_607"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_607"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Scritti varî,</i> vol. i. pp. 276-277, 317.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_608" id="Footnote_23_608"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_608"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Nuovi saggi critici,</i> pp. 239-240, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_609" id="Footnote_24_609"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_609"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Nuovi saggi critici, loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_610" id="Footnote_25_610"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_610"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> and cf. <i>Saggio sul Petrarca,</i> p. 182; also -<i>Scritti varî,</i> i. pp. 209-212, 226.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_611" id="Footnote_26_611"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_611"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Lettres à George Sand,</i> Paris, 1884 (Letter of Feb. 2, -1869), p. 81.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_612" id="Footnote_27_612"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_612"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, the judgement of De S. on French -criticism.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVIb" id="XVIb">XVI</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC OF THE EPIGONI</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Revival of Herbartian Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>When the cry "Away with metaphysic!" was raised in Germany, and a -furious reaction began against the kind of Walpurgis-night to which -the later Hegelians had reduced the life of science and history, the -disciples of Herbart came to the front and seemed to ask, with an -insinuating air: "What is all this? a rebellion against Idealism and -Metaphysic? why, it is exactly what Herbart wished and undertook all by -himself half a century ago! Here we stand, his legitimate descendants, -and we offer you our services as allies. We shall not find it hard to -agree. Our Metaphysic accords with the atomic theory, our Psychology -with mechanism, and our Ethics and Æsthetic with hedonism." Herbart -himself (had he not died in 1841) would most likely have spumed these -disciples of his who pandered to popularity, cheapened metaphysics and -gave naturalistic interpretations to his reals, his representations, -his ideas, and all his highest conceptions.</p> - -<p>With the school thus coming into fashion, the Herbartian Æsthetic -too tried to put on flesh and acquire a pleasing plumpness so as not -to cut too miserable a figure beside the well-nourished <i>corpora</i> of -science launched upon the world by idealists. The feeding-up process -was accomplished by Robert Zimmermann, professor of philosophy at -Prague and later at Vienna, who, after years of laborious effort and -an introductory sample in the shape of an ample history of Æsthetic -(1858), at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> length produced his <i>General Æsthetic as Science of Form</i> -in 1865.<a name="FNanchor_1_613" id="FNanchor_1_613"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_613" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Robert Zimmermann.</i></div> - -<p>This formalistic Æsthetic, born under bad auspices, is a curious example -of servile fidelity in externals combined with internal infidelity. -Starting from unity, or rather from subordination of Ethics and -Æsthetic to a general Æsthetic defined as "a science which treats of -the modes by which any given content may acquire the right to arouse -approval or disapproval" (thereby differing from Metaphysic, science -of the real, and from Logic, science of right thinking), Zimmermann -places such modes in form, that is to say, in the reciprocal relation -of elements. A simple mathematical point in space, a simple impression -of hearing or sight, a simple note, is in fact neither pleasing nor -displeasing: music shows that the judgement of beauty or ugliness -always depends on the relation between two notes at least. Now these -relations, <i>i.e.</i> forms universally pleasing, cannot be empirically -collected by induction; they must be developed by deduction. By -the deductive method it can be demonstrated that the elements of -an image, which in themselves are representations, may enter into -relations either according to their force (quantity), or according to -their nature (quality); whence we have two groups—æsthetic forms of -quantity, and æsthetic forms of quality. According to the first, the -strong (large) is pleasing in comparison with the weak (small), and -these latter are displeasing when set beside the former; according -to the other form, that pleases which is substantially identical in -quality (the harmonious), and that displeases which is on the whole -diverse (the discordant).</p> - -<p>But the substantial identity must not be pushed to the point of -absolute identity, for in that case the harmony itself would cease to -be. From harmonious form is deduced the pleasure of the characteristic -or expression; for what is the characteristic but a relation of -prevalent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> identity between the thing itself and its model? But while -similarity prevailing in the distinction produces accord (<i>Einklang</i>), -qualitative disharmony is as such disagreeable, and demands a -resolution. (It is easy to detect the sleight of hand with which -Zimmermann first slips the characteristic into the relations of pure -form, thereby entirely altering Herbart's original thought; and how, by -a second trick, he here introduces into pure beauty the variations and -modifications of the beautiful, by the help of the despised Hegelian -dialectic.) If such resolution is effected by the skilful substitution -of something other than the unpleasant image, we shall certainly have -removed the cause of offence and established quietude (not accord: -<i>Eintracht, nicht Einklang</i>), but we shall have gained the mere form -of correctness: it is better, then, to supersede this by means of the -true image so as to reach the form of compensation (<i>Ausgleichung</i>); -and, when the true image is also pleasing in itself, the final form -of definitive compensation (<i>abschliessende Ausgleich,</i>) with which -we exhaust the series of possible forms. And, in conclusion, what is -Beauty? It is a conjunction of all these forms: a model (<i>Vorbild</i>) -which has grandeur, plenitude, order, accord, correctness, definitive -compensation; all this appears in a copy (<i>Nachbild</i>) in the form of -the characteristic.</p> - -<p>Putting on one side the artificial connexion Zimmermann makes between -the sublime, the comic, the tragic, the ironic, the humorous and -the æsthetic forms, notice must be taken (so that we may recognize -into which of the seven heavens he is wafting us) that these general -æsthetic forms concern art equally with nature and morality, whose -individual spheres are differentiated solely by the application of the -general æsthetic forms to particular contents. These forms, applied to -nature, give us natural beauty, the cosmos; applied to representation, -beauty of wit (<i>Schöngeist</i>) or imagination; applied to feeling, -the beautiful soul (<i>schöne Seele</i>) or taste; applied to the will, -character or virtue. On one side, then, is natural beauty, on the other -human beauty, in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> (latter), on one hand, we have the beauty of -representation, that is to say æsthetic fact in the strict sense (art); -on the other, we have the beauty of will, or morality; and between the -two, lastly, we have taste, common to Ethics and Æsthetic. Æsthetic in -the narrow sense, as the theory of beautiful representation, determines -the beauty of representations, divided into the three classes of -the beauty of temporal and spatial connexion (figurative arts); the -beauty of sensitive representation (music); and the beauty of thoughts -(poetry). This tripartition of beauty into figurative, musical and -poetical brings to a conclusion theoretical Æsthetic, the only section -developed by Zimmermann.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Vischer versus Zimmermann.</i></div> - -<p>Zimmermann's work was a polemic against the principal representative -of Hegelian Æsthetic, Vischer, who had little difficulty in defending -his own position and counter-attacking that of his assailant. He -held Zimmermann up to ridicule, for example, in connexion with his -view of symbolism. Zimmermann defined a symbol as the object "round -which beautiful forms adhere." A painter depicts a fox simply for the -sake of painting a part of animal nature. Nothing of the sort: this -is a symbol, because the painter "makes use of fines and colours to -express things other than fines and colours." "You think I'm a fox," -says the animal in the picture, "but you make a great mistake: I'm a -clothes-peg: I'm an appearance created by the painter with gradations -of grey, white, yellow and red." Even easier was it to make game of -Zimmermann's enthusiastic praises of the æsthetic quality of the sense -of touch. It was a pity, the latter had written, that the pleasures of -this sense were so difficult to attain; since "to touch the back of the -Resting Hercules and the sinuous limbs of the Venus of Melos or the -Barberini Faun would give to the hand a delight comparable only with -that felt by the ear when listening to the majestic fugues of Bach or -the suave melodies of Mozart." Vischer does not seem to be far wrong in -declaring formalistic Æsthetic to be "a grotesque union of mysticism -and mathematics."<a name="FNanchor_2_614" id="FNanchor_2_614"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_614" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Hermann Lotze.</i></div> - -<p>The works of Zimmermann seem to have given satisfaction to nobody -save himself. Even Lotze, by no means an adversary of Herbartianism, -blames him severely in his <i>History of Æsthetic in Germany</i> (1868) and -other writings. Still, Lotze was unable to offer any better substitute -for æsthetic formalism than of a variant of the old idealism. "Can -any one persuade us," he wrote in criticism of the formalists, -"that a spiritual discord expressed by a corresponding discord in -external appearances may have a value equal to that of the harmonious -expression of a harmonious content solely because, in both cases, -the formal relation of accord is respected? Can any one persuade us -that the human form is pleasing solely for its formal stereometric -relations, irrespective of the spiritual life by which it is animated? -In empirical reality the three domains of laws, facts and values -invariably appear as divided; and although they are united in the -Highest Good, in Goodness in itself, in the living Love of a Personal -God, in the Ought which is the basis of Being, our reason is unable to -attain or to know such union. Beauty alone can reveal it to us: it is -in close connexion with the Good and the Holy and reproduces the rhythm -of the divine ordinance and the moral government of the universe. -Æsthetic fact is neither intuition nor concept; it is idea, which -presents the essential of an object in the form of an end referred to -the ultimate end. Art, like beauty, must include the world of values -in the world of forms."<a name="FNanchor_3_615" id="FNanchor_3_615"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_615" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The war between the Æsthetic of content and -that of form, having Zimmermann, Vischer and Lotze as protagonists, -reached its culminating point between 1860 and 1870.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Efforts to reconcile Æsthetic of form and Æsthetic of -content.</i></div> - -<p>Several people were in favour of a reconciliation. But the -reconciliations they offered were not the right one, which was at -least glimpsed by a certain young Johann<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span> Schmidt, who in his thesis -for doctorate observed (1875) that, with all respect for Zimmermann -and Lotze, it seemed to him they were both wrong in confusing the -various meanings of the word "beauty," and discussed such an absurdity -as a beauty or ugliness of natural objects, that is to say, of things -external to the spirit; that Lotze, following Hegel, added the second -absurdity of an intuitive concept or conceptual intuition: lastly, -that neither of them grasped the fact that the æsthetic problem does -not turn upon the beauty or ugliness of the abstract content or of -form understood as a system of mathematical relations, but with the -beauty or ugliness of representation. Form undoubtedly must exist, but -"concrete form, full of content."<a name="FNanchor_4_616" id="FNanchor_4_616"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_616" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> These utterances of Schmidt met -with a hostile reception: it is easy (he was told in reply) to identify -beauty with artistic perfection, but the whole crux of the matter lies -in finding whether, beside this perfection, there exists another beauty -dependent on a supreme cosmic or metaphysical principle: otherwise one -is guilty of a naïve <i>petitio principii</i>.<a name="FNanchor_5_617" id="FNanchor_5_617"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_617" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> It was thought better, -therefore, to seek other modes of reconciliation, which consisted -in cooking up an appetizing dish in which a little formalism and a -little contentism were mixed to taste, the latter as a rule giving the -predominant flavour.</p> - -<p>Some Herbartians were found in the ranks of the mediating or -conciliatory party. Hardly had Zimmermann's rigid formalism appeared, -when Nahlowsky jumped up to protest that it had never entered the -master's head to exclude content from Æsthetic;<a name="FNanchor_6_618" id="FNanchor_6_618"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_618" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> but even the ablest -of the school, men such as Volkmann and Lazarus, chose a middle -course.<a name="FNanchor_7_619" id="FNanchor_7_619"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_619" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> In the opposite camp Carrière,<a name="FNanchor_8_620" id="FNanchor_8_620"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_620" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> and even Vischer himself -(in a criticism of his own old <i>Æsthetic</i>), began to concede a larger -part to the consideration of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> form; thus for Vischer beauty became -"life appearing harmoniously," which when it appears in space is called -form, and must always possess form, <i>i.e.</i> limitation (<i>Begrenzung</i> ) -in space and time, measure, regularity, symmetry, proportion, propriety -(these characters constituting its quantitative moments) and harmony -(qualitative moment), which includes variety and contrast and is -therefore the most important characteristic.<a name="FNanchor_9_621" id="FNanchor_9_621"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_621" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>K. Köstlin.</i></div> - -<p>A conciliatory Æsthetic in which formalism prevailed was attempted -by Karl Köstlin, a professor at Tübingen and formerly collaborator in -the musical section of the works of Vischer. Köstlin<a name="FNanchor_10_622" id="FNanchor_10_622"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_622" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> had been -influenced by Schleiermacher, Hegel, Vischer and Herbart, but, truth -to tell, does not seem to have perfectly understood the teaching -of any one of his predecessors. According to him, the æsthetic -object presented three requirements: richness and variety of imagery -(<i>anregende Gestaltenfülle</i>), interesting content and beautiful form. -Under the first we recognize, with no little difficulty, a distorted -reflexion of Schleiermacher's "inspiration" (<i>Begeisterung</i>). -Interesting content he defined as that which concerns man; that which -he knows or does not know; that which he loves or hates (it is thus -always relative to the individual and the conditions in which he -exists); and he asserted that interest of content is joined to value -of form, that is, he conceived content as a second value, the same -of which we have heard Herbart speak. He also agreed with Herbart -that form is absolute, and that its general character is determined -as being easily perceptible by intuition (<i>anschaulich</i>), and by its -power of giving satisfaction, pleasure and delight, in fact, as being -beautiful. Its particular characteristics for Köstlin were, according -to quantity, circumscription, simplicity (<i>Einheitlichkeit</i>), extensive -and intensive size, and equilibrium (<i>Gleichmass</i>); according to -quality, determination (<i>Bestimmtheit</i>), unity (<i>Einheit</i>), importance -(<i>Bedeutung</i>) extensive and intensive, and harmony. But when Köstlin -sets himself to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> empirical verification of his categories, he falls -into hopeless confusion. Greatness is pleasing, but so is smallness; -unity is pleasing, but so is variety; regularity is pleasing, but so, -confound it, is irregularity: uncertainties and contradictions at every -step; he was aware of them and made no effort to conceal them; but they -should have convinced him that the abstraction of "beautiful form," -whose qualities and quantities he had so laboriously collected, is a -ghostly shape without body, since that alone gives æsthetic pleasure -which fulfils an expressive function. But having illustrated the three -demands of the æsthetic object, Köstlin wasted all his remaining breath -in constructing a kingdom of intuitive imagination in the manner of -Vischer, <i>i.e.</i> beauty of organic and inorganic nature; of civil life; -of morality; of religion; of science; of games; of conversations; of -feasts and banquets; and lastly of history, reviewing and passing -æsthetic comment on its three periods, patriarchal, heroic and -historical.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic of content. M. Schasler.</i></div> - -<p>Schasler, who had written as vast a history on Æsthetic as Zimmermann's -own, found a starting-point for a movement toward formalism in absolute -idealism, or realism-idealism, as he called it. He began by defining -Æsthetic as "the science of the beautiful and of art" (a single -science ill defined as having two different objects), and proceeded -to justify his unmethodical definition by saying that beauty does not -exist in art alone, nor does art concern itself solely with beauty. The -sphere of Æsthetic he defines as that of intuition (<i>Anschauung</i>) in -which knowledge assumes a practical character and will a theoretical: -the sphere of indivisible unity and absolute reconciliation of the -theoretical and practical spirit, in which in a certain sense the -highest human activities are developed. Beauty is the ideal, but the -concrete ideal; this is why there is no ideal of a human body in -abstraction from sex, no ideal of a mammal in general, but only of such -and such species, as of horse or dog, and then only of determinate -kind of horse or dog. Thus by descending from the more to the less -abstract genus Schasler vainly attempted to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> reach the concrete, which -inevitably escaped his grasp. In art we pass from the typical, which -is natural beauty, to the characteristic, which is the typical of -human feeling; hence we can frame the ideal of an old woman, a beggar -or a ruffian. The characteristic of art is in closer relationship -to the ugly than to the beautiful in nature. On this head (passing -over the remainder, which is on familiar lines) it is well to notice -that Schasler has a bias towards that version of the romaunt of Sir -Purebeauty which ascribes the birth of the "modifications of Beauty" to -the influence of the Ugly.<a name="FNanchor_11_623" id="FNanchor_11_623"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_623" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> "Although," he writes, "the thought may -disturb our minds, it must not be forgotten that were there no world -of ugliness there could be no world of beauty; for it is only when -the Ugly stirs up empty abstract Beauty, that it begins to combat the -enemy and thus to produce concrete Beauty."<a name="FNanchor_12_624" id="FNanchor_12_624"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_624" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> He even succeeded in -converting Vischer himself, the chief supporter of the other version: -"Formerly I had been accustomed to think in the old-fashioned Hegelian -style," Vischer confesses, "that unrest, fermentation and strife dwelt -in the essence of Beauty; that the Idea prevails and thrusts the -image forth into the infinite; so arises the Sublime; that the image, -offended in its finitude, makes war on the Idea; whence arises the -Comic; this finished the struggle; Beauty returned to itself from the -conflict of the two moments, and was created." But now, he continues, -"I must acknowledge that Schasler is right, and so are his predecessors -Weisse and Ruge: the Ugly has a hand in the matter; this is the -principle of movement, the ferment of differentiation: without such -leaven we never reach the special forms of Beauty, for each single one -presupposes' the Ugly."<a name="FNanchor_13_625" id="FNanchor_13_625"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_625" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Ed. von Hartmann.</i></div> - -<p>Closely allied to that of Schasler is the Æsthetic of Eduard von -Hartmann (1890), preceded by a historical treatise on <i>German Æsthetic -since Kant</i><a name="FNanchor_14_626" id="FNanchor_14_626"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_626" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> wherein with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> meticulous, critical and polemical study -he upholds the definition of Beauty as "the appearance of the Idea" -(<i>das Scheinen der Idee</i>). Inasmuch as he insisted on appearance -(<i>Schein</i>) as the necessary characteristic of Beauty, Hartmann held -himself justified in naming his Æsthetic the "Æsthetic of Concrete -Idealism," and in ranging himself alongside Hegel, Trahndorff, -Schleiermacher, Deutinger, Oersted, Vischer, Meising, Carrière -and Schasler, against the abstract idealism of Schelling, Solger, -Schopenhauer, Krause, Weisse and Lotze, all of whom, by placing -beauty in the supersensible idea, overlooked the sensory element and -reduced it to the rank of a mere accessory.<a name="FNanchor_15_627" id="FNanchor_15_627"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_627" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> By his insistence on -the idea as the other indispensable and determining element, Hartmann -proclaimed himself as opposed to the Herbartian formalism. Beauty is -truth; neither historical, scientific nor reflective, but metaphysical -or idealistic, the very truth of Philosophy: "in proportion as Beauty -is in opposition to every science and to realistic truth, so much -nearer is it to Philosophy and metaphysical truth": "Beauty, with its -own peculiar efficacy, remains the prophet of idealistic truth in an -unbelieving age that abhors Metaphysic and recognizes no value in -anything but realistic truth." Æsthetic truth, which leaps immediately -from subjective appearance to ideal essence, is lacking in the control -and method possessed by philosophical truth; in compensation, however, -she possesses the fascinating power of conviction, the sole property of -sensible intuition, and unattainable by gradual or reflected mediation. -The higher Philosophy soars, the less does it need the gradual passage -through the world of the senses and of science, and the slighter -becomes the distance separating Philosophy and Art. The latter, for -its part, will be well advised to start on its journey towards the -ideal world as Bædeker's handbooks counsel the intending traveller, -"with as little luggage as possible"; "not overloading herself with a -weight which paralyses the wings and is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> made up of unnecessary and -indifferent trifles,"<a name="FNanchor_16_628" id="FNanchor_16_628"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_628" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Logical character, the microcosmic idea, -the unconscious are immanent in beauty; by means of the unconscious, -intellectual intuition operates in it,<a name="FNanchor_17_629" id="FNanchor_17_629"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_629" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and, from its being rooted -in the unconscious, it is a Mystery.<a name="FNanchor_18_630" id="FNanchor_18_630"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_630" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Hartmann and the theory of Modifications.</i></div> - -<p>In his employment of the exciting or reactionary influence of the -Ugly, Hartmann exceeded Schasler himself. Lowest among the degrees of -Beauty, indeed forming the lower limit of æsthetic fact, lies sensuous -pleasure, which is unconscious formal beauty; its first true degree -is formal beauty of the first order, or the mathematically pleasing -(unity, variety, symmetry, proportion, the golden section, etc.); its -second degree is formal beauty of the second order, the dynamically -pleasing; its third is formal beauty of the third order, the passive -teleological, as in the case of utensils or machinery. Indeed it may -here be noted that among machines and utensils, on a level with jars, -plates and cups, Hartmann placed language: it is a dead thing, said -he; receiving the appearances of life (<i>Scheinleben</i>)<a name="FNanchor_19_631" id="FNanchor_19_631"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_631" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> only at the -very instant of utterance. Language a "dead thing," an "utensil" for -the philosopher of the Unconscious, in the land of Humboldt, with a -Steinthal still living! There follow, as formal beauty of the fourth -order, the active teleological or living, and as formal beauty of the -fifth order, conformity to species (<i>das Gattungsmässige)</i>: lastly -and above all, since the individual idea is superior to the specific, -is beauty concrete beauty or the microcosmic individual, which is no -longer formal, but beauty of content. As is to be expected, the passage -from lower to Higher degrees is made by means of the Ugly: nobody has -laboured like Hartmann to recount in detail the services rendered by -Ugliness to Beauty. From ugliness, in the form of the destruction of -the beauty of equality, arises symmetry: from ugliness in the case of -the circle arises the ellipse; the beauty of a waterfall tumbling over -rocks is caused by the mathematically ugly; destruction, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> is to -say, of a fall in a parabolic curve; beauty of spiritual expression is -achieved through the introduction of an ugliness relative to fleshly -perfection. Beauty of a higher degree is founded on ugliness at a -lower degree. When the highest degree is reached, that of individual -beauty beyond which there can be nothing, even then elemental ugliness -continues its work of beneficent irritation. The later phases thus -produced are well known to us as the famous Modifications of the -Beautiful: in this section also, nobody is so copious or detailed as -Hartmann. He certainly does admit, side by side with simple or pure -beauty, certain modifications free from conflict, such as the sublime -or graceful; but the more important modifications can arise only -through conflict. There are four cases, because the resolution must -be either immanent, logical, transcendent or combined: immanent in -the idyllic, the melancholy, the sad, the cheerful, the moving, the -elegiac; logical in the comic in all its varieties; transcendent in the -tragic; combined in the humorous with the tragi-comic and its other -varieties. When none of these resolutions is possible, there arises -ugliness; when an ugliness of content is expressed by an ugliness of -form, we have the maximum of ugliness, the real æsthetic devil.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Metaphysical Æsthetic in France. C. Levêque.</i></div> - -<p>Hartmann is the last considerable representative of the old æsthetic -school in Germany; he inspires terror by the mass of his literary -production, like many others of the school, who seem to accept it as -a dogma that art cannot be dealt with except in several volumes a -thousand pages long. Those who are not afraid of giants and are able -to attack this sort of Æsthetic, will find it a fat good-humoured -Magog full of vulgar prejudices, and so constituted that, despite his -apparent strength, a little blow will kill him.</p> - -<p>In other countries metaphysical Æsthetic had few followers. In France -the celebrated competition of the Academy of Moral and Political -Sciences in 1857 crowned with their approval and presented to the -world the <i>Science of Beauty</i> by Levêque;<a name="FNanchor_20_632" id="FNanchor_20_632"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_632" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> of which nobody now -thinks or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span> speaks, only remembering the author (who attitudinized -as a disciple of Plato) by his eight characteristics of Beauty, -derived by him from examination of a lily. The eight characteristics -were as follows:—sufficient size of form, unity, variety, harmony, -proportion, normal vivacity of colour, grace and propriety; ultimately -reducible to two, size and order. As supplementary proof of the truth -of his theory, Levêque applied it to three beautiful things: a child -playing with its mother, a symphony of Beethoven and the life of a -philosopher (Socrates). Really, it is somewhat difficult (says one of -his fellow-spiritualists, venturing to comment on this doctrine though -speaking with the utmost deference) to imagine what may be the normal -vivacity of colour in the life of a philosopher.<a name="FNanchor_21_633" id="FNanchor_21_633"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_633" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> Translations and -explanatory articles by Charles Bénard<a name="FNanchor_22_634" id="FNanchor_22_634"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_634" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> and books by various writers -belonging to French Switzerland (Töpffer, Pictet, Cherbuliez) were not -successful in popularizing the German systems of Æsthetic in France.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>In England. J. Ruskin.</i></div> - -<p>England showed even less disposition to interest herself, although -John Ruskin may have some claim to be considered a metaphysical -æsthetician with a distinctive national stamp. But it is difficult -to treat of Ruskin in a history of science, for his temperament was -wholly opposed to the scientific. His disposition was that of the -artist, impressionable, excitable, voluble, rich in feeling; a dogmatic -tone and the appearance of theoretical form veil, in his exquisite -and enthusiastic pages, a texture of dreams and fancies. The reader -who recalls those pages will regard as irreverent any detailed and -prosaic review of Ruskin's æsthetic thought, which must inevitably -reveal its poverty and incoherence. Suffice it to say that, following -a finalistic, mystical intuition of nature, he considered beauty as a -revelation of divine intentions, the seal "God sets on his works, even -upon the smallest." For him the faculty which perceives the beautiful -is neither intellect nor sensibility, but a particular feeling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> which -he names the theoretic faculty. Natural beauty, which reveals itself -to a pure heart when contemplating any object untouched and unspoiled -by the hand of man, asserts itself for this reason as immeasurably -superior to any work of art. Ruskin was too hasty in analysis to -understand the complicated psychological and æsthetic process which -went on in his mind when he was moved to an artist's ecstasy by -contemplating some humble natural object such as a bird's nest or a -flowing rivulet.<a name="FNanchor_23_635" id="FNanchor_23_635"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_635" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic in Italy.</i></div> - -<p>In Italy the Abate Tornasi wrote a half-Hegelian, half-Catholic -Æsthetic, wherein the beautiful is identified with the second person of -the Trinity, the Word made man;<a name="FNanchor_24_636" id="FNanchor_24_636"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_636" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> by this means he hoped to raise a -bank of opposition against the liberal criticism of De Sanctis, whom he -considered, from the sublime height of his own philosophy, as "a subtle -grammarian." Combined Giobertian and German, especially Hegelian, -influence produced several works of secondary importance; De Meis -developed at length the thesis of the death of Art in the historical -world.<a name="FNanchor_25_637" id="FNanchor_25_637"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_637" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Somewhat later Gallo also treated Æsthetic from the Hegelian -point of view,<a name="FNanchor_26_638" id="FNanchor_26_638"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_638" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> and others repeated, nearly word for word, the -doctrines of Schasler and Hartmann on the overcoming of the Ugly.<a name="FNanchor_27_639" id="FNanchor_27_639"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_639" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Antonio Tari and his lectures.</i></div> - -<p>The only genuine Italian teacher of metaphysical Æsthetic according -to the Germans was Antonio Tari, who lectured on this very subject -in Naples University from 1861 to 1884. He had a meticulous and -superstitiously minute knowledge of everything that issued from German -printing-presses, and was the author of an <i>Ideal Æsthetic</i> as well -as essays on style, taste, serious work and play (<i>Spiel,</i>) music and -architecture, wherein he tried to keep the mean between the idealism -of Hegel and the formalism of Herbart:<a name="FNanchor_28_640" id="FNanchor_28_640"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_640" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> lectures on Æsthetic -attracted huge throngs and were one of the regular sights in the noisy, -crowded Neapolitan university. Tari divided his treatment under three -heads, Æsthesinomy, Æsthesigraphy and Æsthesipraxis, corresponding to -the Metaphysic of the beautiful, to the doctrine of beauty in nature, -and to that of beauty in art; like the German idealists, he defined the -æsthetic sphere as intermediate between the theoretical and practical: -he says emphatically that "in the world of spirit the temperate zone -is equidistant from the glacial, peopled by the Esquimaux of thought, -and from the torrid, peopled by the giants of action." He pulled Beauty -from her throne, substituting in her stead the Æsthetic, of which -Beauty is but an initial moment, the simple "beginning of æsthetic -life, eternal mortality, flower and fruit in one," whose successive -moments are represented by the Sublime, the Comic, the Humorous, and -the Dramatic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthesigraphy.</i></div> - -<p>But the most attractive part of Tari's lectures was that devoted -to Æsthesigraphy, subdivided into Cosmography, Physiography and -Psychography, in the course of which he frequently quoted Vischer with -great devotion; "the great Vischer" as he called him, in imitation of -whom he constructed his own "æsthetic physics," brightening it with -much varied erudition and enlivening it with quaint comparisons. Is -he speaking of beauty in inorganic nature—water, for example? He -says in his fanciful manner, "When water ripples in the sunshine, in -that act it has its smile; it has its frown in the breaking wave, its -caprice in the fountain, its majestic fury in the foam." Is he speaking -of geological configuration? "The vale, cradle perchance of the -human race, is idyllic; the plain, monotonous but fat, is didactic." -Of metals? "Gold is born great; iron, the apotheosis of human toil, -achieves greatness; the former boasts of its cradle when it does not -bring it to dishonour; the latter causes it to be forgotten." He looked -on vegetable life as a dream, repeating Herder's fine saying that the -plant is "the new-born babe that hangs sucking upon the breast of -mother nature." He divided vegetables into three types:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> foliaceous, -ramified and umbelliferous: "the foliaceous type," he says, "attains -gigantic proportions in the tropics, where the queen of monocotyledons, -the Palm-tree, represents despotism, the human scourge of those desert -regions. Of that solitary pinnacle, all crown, the negro may well be -identified as the reptile that crawls round its base." Amongst flowers, -the carnation is "symbol of betrayal, by reason of the variegation of -its colours and its deeply-dissected petals"; the celebrated comparison -by Ariosto of a rose with a young girl is permissible only when the -flower is still in bud, because "when it has unfolded its petals, -disdaining the protection of thorns, displaying itself in all the pomp -of its full colour, and boldly asking to be plucked by any hand, then -it is woman, all woman, to call it by no harsher name, giving pleasure -without feeling it, simulating love by its perfume and modesty by the -crimson of its petals." He searches for and comments upon analogies -between certain fruits and certain flowers; between the strawberry, for -instance, and the violet; between the orange and the rose; he admired -"the luxuriant spirals and the delicate architecture of a bunch of -grapes": the mandarin-orange reminded him of the nobleman <i>qui s'est -donné la peine de naître</i>; the fig, on the contrary, was the great -country bumpkin, "rough, rude, but profitable." In the animal kingdom, -the spider symbolized primitive isolation; the bee, monasticism; the -ant, republicanism. He noted, with Michelet, that the spider is a -living paralogism; it cannot feed itself without its web, and it cannot -spin its web without feeding. Fish he condemns as un-æsthetic: "they -are of stupid appearance with their wide—open eyes and incessant -gaping, which makes them look voraciously gluttonous." Not so with -amphibians, for which he entertains a sympathy: the frog and the -crocodile, "alpha and omega of the family, start from the comical, or -even the scurrilous, and attain the sublimity of the horrid." Birds -are especially æsthetic by nature, "possessing the three most genial -attributes of a living being: love, song, and flight"; moreover, they -present contrasts and antitheses: "opposite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> to the eagle, queen of the -skies, stands the swan, the mild king of the marshes; the libertine -vainglorious cock has its contrast in the humble uxorious turtle-dove; -the magnificent peacock is balanced by the rude and rustic turkey." -Amongst mammals, nature compensates for defects of pure beauty by -dramatic value; if they cannot throw their song into the air, they -have the rudiments of speech; if they have no variegated, myriad-hued -plumage, they have dark, heavily-marked colouring, instinct with life; -if they cannot fly, they have many other modes of powerful progression; -and, the higher they go, the more do they attain individuality in -appearance and life. "The epic of animal life is comedy in the donkey, -<i>iniquae mentis asellus</i>; idyl in the great wild beasts; downright -tragedy in the Kaffir bull, that cloven-hoofed Codrus, who gives -himself voluntarily to the lion in order to save the herd." As amongst -birds, so amongst beasts attractive contrasts are to be made:—the lamb -and the kid seem to typify Jesus and the devil; dog and cat, abnegation -and egoism; hare and fox, the foolish simpleton and crafty villain. -Many quaint and subtle observations does Tari let fall on human beauty -and the relative beauty of the sexes, allowing the female to have -charm, not beauty: "bodily beauty is poise, and woman's body is so -ill-poised that she falls easily when running; made for child-bearing, -she has knock-kneed legs, adapted to support the large pelvis; her -shoulders have a curve compensating the convexity of the chest." He -describes the various parts of the body: "curly hair expresses physical -force; straight hair, moral"; "blue, napoleonic eyes have sometimes -a depth like the sea; green eyes have a melancholy fascination; grey -eyes are wanting in individuality; black eyes are the most intensely -individual"; "a lovely mouth has been best described by Heine; two lips -evenly matched; to lovers the mouth will rather seem a shell whose -pearl is the kiss."<a name="FNanchor_29_641" id="FNanchor_29_641"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_641" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span></p> - -<p>How could we better take a smiling leave of metaphysical Æsthetic in -the German manner than by recording this quaint vernacular version -of it made by Tari, that kindly little old man, "the last jovial -high-priest of an arbitrary and confused Æsthetic"?<a name="FNanchor_30_642" id="FNanchor_30_642"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_642" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_613" id="Footnote_1_613"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_613"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Allgemeine Ästhetik als Formwissenschaft,</i> Vienna, 1865; -see also Meyer's <i>Konversations-Lexikon</i> (4th ed.), art. <i>Ästhetik,</i> by -Zimmermann.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_614" id="Footnote_2_614"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_614"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Kritische Gänge,</i> vi., Stuttgart, 1873, pp. 6, 21, 32.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_615" id="Footnote_3_615"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_615"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Geschichte d. Ästh. i. Deutschl., passim,</i> esp. pp. -27, 97, 100, 125, 147, 232. 234, 265, 286, 293, 487; <i>Grundzüge der -Ästh.</i> (posth., Leipzig, 1884), §§ 8-13; and two juvenile works, <i>Üb. -d. Begriff d. Schönheit,</i> Göttingen, 1845, and <i>Üb. d. Bedingungen d. -Kunstschönheit,</i> Göttingen, 1847.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_616" id="Footnote_4_616"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_616"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Leibniz u. Baumgarten,</i> Halle, 1875, pp. 76-102.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_617" id="Footnote_5_617"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_617"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> G. Neudecker, <i>Studien z. Gesch. d. dtschn. Ästh. s. -Kant,</i> pp. 54-55.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_618" id="Footnote_6_618"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_618"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Polemic in <i>Zeitschr. f. exacte Philos.</i> (Herbartian -organ) for 1862-1863, ii. p. 309 <i>seqq.,</i> ii. p. 384 <i>seqq,</i> iv. pp. 26 -<i>seqq.,</i> 199 <i>seqq.,</i> 300 <i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_619" id="Footnote_7_619"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_619"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Volkmann, <i>Lehrbuch der Psychologie,</i> 3rd ed., Cöthen, -1884-1885. Lazarus, <i>Das Leben der Seele,</i> 1856-1858.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_620" id="Footnote_8_620"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_620"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Moriz Carrière, <i>Ästhetik,</i> 1889 (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1885).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_621" id="Footnote_9_621"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_621"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Kritische Gänge,</i> v., Stuttgart, 1866, p. 59.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_622" id="Footnote_10_622"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_622"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Ästhetik,</i> Tübingen, 1869.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_623" id="Footnote_11_623"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_623"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_348">348</a>-<a href="#Page_349">349</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_624" id="Footnote_12_624"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_624"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Ästhetik,</i> Leipzig, 1886, i. pp. 1-16, 19-24, 70; ii. p. -52: cf. <i>Kritische Gesch. der Ästhetik,</i> pp. 795, 963, 1041-1044, 1028, -1036-1038.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_625" id="Footnote_13_625"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_625"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Kritische Gänge,</i> v. pp. 112-115.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_626" id="Footnote_14_626"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_626"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Die dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,</i> 1886 (Part i. of <i>Ästh.</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_627" id="Footnote_15_627"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_627"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Philosophie des Schönen</i> (Part ii. of <i>Ästh.</i>), Leipzig, -1890, pp. 463-464; cf. <i>Deutsche Ästh. s. K.</i> pp. 357-362.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_628" id="Footnote_16_628"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_628"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Phil. d. Sch.</i> pp. 434-437.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_629" id="Footnote_17_629"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_629"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 115-116.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_630" id="Footnote_18_630"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_630"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 197-198.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_631" id="Footnote_19_631"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_631"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 150-152.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_632" id="Footnote_20_632"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_632"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Ch. Levêque, <i>La Science du beau,</i> Paris, 1862.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_633" id="Footnote_21_633"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_633"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> E. Saisset, <i>L'Esthétique française</i> (in app. to vol. -<i>L'Âme et la vie,</i> Paris, 1864), pp. 118-120.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_634" id="Footnote_22_634"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_634"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> In <i>Revue philosophique,</i> vols. i. ii. x. xii. xvi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_635" id="Footnote_23_635"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_635"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> J. Ruskin, <i>Modern Painters</i> (4th ed., London, 1891); cf. -De la Sizeranne, pp. 112-278.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_636" id="Footnote_24_636"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_636"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Vito Fornari, <i>Arte del dire,</i> Naples, 1866—1872; cf. -vol. iv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_637" id="Footnote_25_637"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_637"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> A. C. De Meis, <i>Dopo la laurea,</i> Bologna, 1868-1869.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_638" id="Footnote_26_638"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_638"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Nic. Gallo, <i>L' idealismo e la letteratura,</i> Rome, 1880; -<i>La scienza dell' arte,</i> Turin, 1887.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_639" id="Footnote_27_639"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_639"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> F. Masci, <i>Psicologia del comico,</i> Naples, 1888.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_640" id="Footnote_28_640"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_640"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Estetica ideale,</i> Naples, 1863; <i>Saggi di critica</i> -(collected posthumously), Trani, 1886.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_641" id="Footnote_29_641"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_641"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> A. Tari, <i>Lezioni di estetica generale,</i> collected by C. -Scamaccia-Luvara, Naples, 1884; <i>Elementi di estetica,</i> compiled by G. -Tommasuolo, Naples, 1885.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_642" id="Footnote_30_642"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_642"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> V. Pica, <i>L'Arte dell' Estremo Oriente,</i> Turin, 1894, p. -13.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVIIb" id="XVIIb">XVII</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC POSITIVISM AND NATURALISM</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Positivism and Evolutionism.</i></div> - -<p>The ground lost by idealistic metaphysic was conquered in the latter -half of the nineteenth century by positivistic and evolutionary -metaphysic, a confused substitution of natural for philosophical -sciences, and a hotch-potch of materialistic and idealistic, mechanical -and theological theories, the whole crowned with scepticism and -agnosticism. Characteristic of this trend of opinion was its contempt -of history, especially the history of philosophy; which prevented its -ever making that contact with the unbroken and age-long efforts of -thinkers without which it is idle to hope for fertile work and true -progress.</p> - -<p>[Sidenote<i>Æsthetic of H. Spencer.</i>]</p> - -<p>Spencer (the greatest positivist of his day), whilst discussing -Æsthetic, actually did not know that he was dealing with problems for -all, or almost all, of which solutions had been already proposed and -discussed. At the beginning of his essay on the <i>Philosophy of Style,</i> -he remarks innocently: "I believe nobody has ever sketched a general -theory of the art of writing" (in 1852!); and in his <i>Principles of -Psychology</i> (1855), touching the æsthetic feelings he remarks that -he has some recollection of observations concerning the relation of -art and play made "by some German author whose name I cannot recall" -(Schiller!). Had his pages on Æsthetic been written in the seventeenth -century, they would have won a low position amongst the early crude -attempts at æsthetic speculation; in the nineteenth century, one knows -not how to judge them. In his essay on <i>The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> Useful and the Beautiful</i> -(1852-1854), he shows how the useful becomes beautiful when it ceases -to be useful, illustrating this by a ruined castle useless for the -purposes of modern life, but a suitable scene for picnic parties and -a good subject for a picture to hang on a parlour wall; which leads -him to identify the principle of evolution from the useful to the -beautiful as contrast. In another essay on the <i>Beauty of the Human -Face</i> (1852) he explains this beauty as a sign and effect of moral -goodness; in that on <i>Grace</i> (1852) he considers the sentiment of the -graceful as sympathy for power in conjunction with agility. In the -<i>Origin of Architectural Styles</i> (1852-1854) he discovers the beauty of -architecture as consisting in uniformity and symmetry, an idea which -is aroused in a man looking at the bodily equilibrium of the higher -animals or, as in Gothic architecture, by analogy with the vegetable -kingdom; in his essay on <i>Style,</i> he places the cause of stylistic -beauty in economy of effort; in his <i>Origin and Function of Music</i> -(1857) he theorizes on music as the natural language of the passions, -adapted to increase sympathy between men.<a name="FNanchor_1_643" id="FNanchor_1_643"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_643" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> In his <i>Principles of -Psychology,</i> he maintains that the æsthetic feelings arise from the -overflow of exuberant energy in the organism, and distinguishes -various degrees of them, from simple sensation to that accompanied -by representative elements, and so on until perception is reached, -with more complex elements of representation, then emotion, and, last -of all, that state of consciousness which transcends sensation and -perception. The most perfect form of æsthetic feeling is attained -by the coincidence of the three orders of pleasures, a coincidence -produced by the full action of their respective faculties with the -least possible subtraction due to the painful effect of excessive -activity. But it is very rarely that we experience æsthetic excitement -of this kind and strength; almost all works of art are imperfect -because they contain a mixture of artistic with anti-artistic effects; -now the technique is unsatisfactory, now the emotion is of a low -order. These<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> works of art which are universally admired, are found -when measured by this criterion to deserve a lower place than that -accorded them by popular taste. "Beginning with the Greek epic and -the representations of analogous legends given by their sculptors, -tending to excite egoistic or ego-altruistic sentiments, and passing -through the literature of the Middle Ages, equally impregnated with -inferior sentiments, then through the works of the old masters, whose -ideas and sentiments seldom compensate for the displeasing effect they -inflict on our senses overrefined in study of appearances; and coming -at last to the vaunted works of modern art, excellent for technical -execution in many cases but deplorable for the emotions they arouse -and express, such as Gérôme's battle-pieces, alternately sensual and -sanguinary;—they are all far off indeed from the qualities deemed -desirable, from the artistic forms corresponding to the highest forms -of æsthetic feeling."<a name="FNanchor_2_644" id="FNanchor_2_644"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_644" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> These last critical denunciations, like the -theories noticed above, are mere substitutions of one word for another; -"facility" for "grace"; "economy" for "beauty," and so on. Indeed, -when one tries to define the exact philosophical position of Spencer, -one can only possibly say that he wavers between sensationalism and -moralism, and is never for a moment conscious of art as art.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Physiologists of Æsthetic. Grant Allen, Helmholtz, and -others.</i></div> - -<p>The same oscillation is noticeable in other English writers such as -Sully and Bain, in whom, however, we find more familiarity with works -of art.<a name="FNanchor_3_645" id="FNanchor_3_645"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_645" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In his numerous essays and in <i>Physiological Æsthetics</i> -(1877), Grant Allen collected a great many records of physiological -experiments, all of which may be of supreme value to physiology, for -aught we know to the contrary, but most assuredly are worthless from -the point of view of Æsthetic. He keeps to the distinction between -necessary or vital activity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> and the superfluous or that of play, and -defines æsthetic pleasure as "the subjective concomitant of the normal -sum of activity, not connected directly with the vital functions, in -the terminal peripheric organs of the cerebrospinal nervous system."<a name="FNanchor_4_646" id="FNanchor_4_646"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_646" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -Physiological processes considered as causes of pleasure in art are -presented under other aspects by later investigators, who assert that -such pleasure arises not only "from the activity of the visual organs -and the muscular systems associated with them, but also from the -participation of some of the more important functions of the organism, -as for instance breathing, circulation of the blood, equilibrium and -internal muscular accommodation." Art, then, indubitably originated -in "a prehistoric man who was habitually a deep-breather, having -no call to rearrange his natural habits when scratching lines on -bones or in mud and taking pains to draw them regularly spaced."<a name="FNanchor_5_647" id="FNanchor_5_647"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_647" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -Physical-Æsthetic researches were pursued in Germany by Helmholtz, -Brücke and Stumpf,<a name="FNanchor_6_648" id="FNanchor_6_648"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_648" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> who generally confined themselves to the narrower -field of optics and acoustics, giving descriptions of the physical -processes of artistic technique and the conditions to which pleasurable -visual and auditive impressions must conform, without claiming to merge -Æsthetic in Physics, but even pointing out the divergences between -them. Degenerate Herbartians hastened to disguise in physiological -terms the metaphysical forms and relations of which their master had -spoken, and to coquet with the hedonism of the naturalists.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Method of the natural sciences in Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>The superstitious cult of natural sciences was often accompanied (as is -frequently the fate of superstition) by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> a sort of hypocrisy. Chemical, -physical and physiological laboratories became Sybilline grottoes, -resounding with the questions of credulous inquirers concerning the -profoundest problems of the human spirit; and many of those who were -really conducting their inquiries on inherently philosophic principles -pretended or deluded themselves into believing that they followed the -Method of Natural Science. A proof of this illusion or pretence is -Hippolyte Taine's <i>Philosophy of Art</i><a name="FNanchor_7_649" id="FNanchor_7_649"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_649" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>H. Taine's Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>"If by studying the art of various peoples and various epochs," says -Taine, "we could define the nature and establish the conditions of -the existence of each art, we should have arrived at a complete -explanation of the fine arts and of art in general, <i>i.e.</i> at what -is called an Æsthetic." A historical Æsthetic, not a dogmatic, which -fixes characters and indicates laws "like Botany, and studies with -equal attention orange and ivy, pine and birch; indeed it is a sort of -botanical science applied to the works of man instead of to plants"; -an Æsthetic which shall follow "the general movement which tends -daily more and more to join the moral to the natural sciences and by -extending to the former the principles, the safeguards and the rules of -the latter, enables both to attain the same security and maintain the -same progress."<a name="FNanchor_8_650" id="FNanchor_8_650"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_650" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> The naturalistic prelude is followed by definitions -and doctrines indistinguishable from those offered by philosophers -whose infallibility is not guaranteed by scientific methods, indeed, -from those of the wildest of such philosophers. For, says Taine, art -is imitation, an imitation so carried out as to render sensible the -essential character of objects; the essential character being "a -quality from which all other qualities, or many others, are derived and -follow unalterably from it." The essential character of a lion, for -example, is to be "a great carnivore"; this determines the formation of -all its limbs; the essential character of Holland is to be "a country -formed by alluvial soil." This is why art is not restricted to objects -existing in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> reality, but is able, as in architecture or in music, to -represent essential characters without natural objects to correspond.<a name="FNanchor_9_651" id="FNanchor_9_651"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_651" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Taine's metaphysic and moralism.</i></div> - -<p>Now, in what do these essential characters, this carnivorosity and this -alluviality differ, save perhaps in extravagance of example, from the -"types" and "ideas" which intellectualiste or metaphysical Æsthetic -had always considered as the proper content of art? Taine himself -clears away every doubt in the matter by explicitly stating that "this -character is what philosophers call the 'essence of things,' in virtue -of which they affirm that the aim and end of art is to make manifest -the essence of things"; he adds that, for his part, he "refuses to -make use of the word 'essence' as being a technical term":<a name="FNanchor_10_652" id="FNanchor_10_652"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_652" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> of the -word itself, maybe; not of the concept for which it stands. There are -two ways (says Taine, for all the world as though he were a Schelling) -leading to the higher life of man, to contemplation: the way of -science and the way of art: "the former investigates the causes and -fundamental laws of reality, and expresses them in exact formulæ and -abstract terms: the latter makes manifest these causes and laws, not in -dry definitions inaccessible to the vulgar, and intelligible only to -the select few, but in a sensible manner, appealing not merely to the -reason but to the heart and senses of the most commonplace man; it has -the power of being both elevated and popular, of manifesting what is -most noble and elevated, and of manifesting it to every one."<a name="FNanchor_11_653" id="FNanchor_11_653"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_653" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<p>For Taine, as for the Hegelian æstheticians, works of art are arranged -in a scale of values; so that, having begun by condemning as absurd -every judgement of taste (every one to his taste<a name="FNanchor_12_654" id="FNanchor_12_654"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_654" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>), he ends by -asserting that "personal taste has no value whatever," and that some -common measure should be abstracted and set up as a standard of -progress and retrogression, ornamentation and degeneracy; a standard -by which to approve and disapprove, praise and blame.<a name="FNanchor_13_655" id="FNanchor_13_655"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_655" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The scale of -values set up by him is twofold or threefold, in the first instance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> -it turns on the degree of importance of the character, <i>i.e.</i> the -greater or less generality in idea, and the degree of beneficent effect -(<i>degré de bienfaisance</i>), <i>i.e.</i> the greater or less moral value of -the representation (two grades which are aspects of one single quality, -viz. power, considered first for its own sake and then in its connexion -with others): in the second instance upon the degree of convergence of -effects, <i>i.e.</i> the fulness of expression, the harmony between idea -and form.<a name="FNanchor_14_656" id="FNanchor_14_656"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_656" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> This intellectualistic, moralistic, rhetorical doctrine -is interrupted now and then by the usual naturalistic protests: "We -shall, according to our custom, study this question in the manner of -the natural scientist; that is to say methodically, by analysis; hoping -to raise not merely a song of praise, but a code of laws," etc.;<a name="FNanchor_15_657" id="FNanchor_15_657"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_657" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> as -though that sufficed to alter the substance of the method adopted and -the doctrine expounded. Taine finally gave himself over to dialectical -treatments and solutions, and asserted that in the primitive period -of Italian art, in the pictures of Giotto, we have soul without body -(thesis); under the Renaissance, in Verrocchio's pictures, body without -soul (antithesis); in the sixteenth century, in Raphæl, there is -harmony of expression and anatomy, soul and body (synthesis).<a name="FNanchor_16_658" id="FNanchor_16_658"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_658" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>G. T. Feckner. Inductive Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>The same protests and similar methods are to be found in the works of -Gustav Theodor Fechner. In his <i>Introduction to Æsthetic</i> (1876), -Fechner claims to "abandon the attempt at conceptual determination -of the objective essence of beauty," since he desires to compose not -a metaphysical Æsthetic from above (<i>von oben</i>), but an inductive -Æsthetic from below (<i>von unten)</i> and to achieve clearness, not -sublimity; metaphysical Æsthetic should bear the same relation to -inductive, as the Philosophy of Nature to Physics.<a name="FNanchor_17_659" id="FNanchor_17_659"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_659" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Proceeding -on inductive lines, he discovers a long series of æsthetic laws or -principles: the æsthetic threshold; assistance or increment; unity in -variety; absence of contradictions; clarity; association;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> contrast; -consequence; conciliation; the correct mean; economic use; persistency; -change; measure; and so on without end. This chaos of concepts he -expounds with a chapter apiece, pleased and proud to show himself so -highly scientific and so wholly inconclusive.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Experiments.</i></div> - -<p>Next he describes the experiments he can recommend to his readers. -They are of this type. Take ten rectangular pieces of white cardboard -of fairly equal area (say ten square inches), but with sides variously -proportioned from a ratio of 1:1 to one of 2:5, including the ratio -of the golden section, 21:34; mix all these together on a black table -and collect persons of every kind and character, but all belonging -to the educated classes, and applying the method of choice ask these -people first to free their minds of all questions as to a particular -use and then to pick out the pieces of cardboard which give them the -highest sensation of pleasure and those which inspire them with the -strongest feelings of disgust; the answers to be most carefully noted, -keeping male and female subjects apart, and tabulated. Then see what -follows. Fechner admits that the chosen cardboard-pickers often made -reservations when questioned by himself, not knowing (very naturally) -how to tell whether they liked a shape or disliked it without referring -it to a definite use; sometimes they refused point-blank to make any -selection at all; and they almost always seemed vague and perplexed in -mind and generally, when submitted to a second test, answered in a way -totally different from the first. Still, we all know that errors cancel -out; and anyhow the tabulations showed that the highest sensations -of delight were aroused not by the square, but by rectangular forms -most nearly approaching the square, an enthusiastic rush being made -for the proportion 21:34.<a name="FNanchor_18_660" id="FNanchor_18_660"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_660" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> This method of selection received an -extraordinarily felicitous definition; it was known as "an average of -arbitrary judgements by an arbitrary number of persons arbitrarily -selected."<a name="FNanchor_19_661" id="FNanchor_19_661"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_661" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Fechner also informs us (always<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> in tabular form) of the -result of a statistical inquiry of his own, by means of countless heaps -of catalogues and gallery-guides, as to the dimensions and shapes of -pictures in relation to the subjects they depict.<a name="FNanchor_20_662" id="FNanchor_20_662"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_662" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Trivial nature of his ideas on Beauty and Art.</i></div> - - -<p>Nevertheless, when he tries to tell us what beauty is, he falls back -on using—whether well or ill—the old speculative method, which he -prefaces with the remark that for him the concept of beauty is "merely -an expedient in conformity with linguistic usage for indicating -briefly the link which unites the prevailing conditions of immediate -pleasure."<a name="FNanchor_21_663" id="FNanchor_21_663"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_663" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> He distinguishes three meanings of the word "beauty": -first, in a broad sense, the pleasing in general: secondly, in a -narrow sense, a higher pleasure, but still sensuous: thirdly, in the -narrowest sense, true beauty, which "not only pleases, but has the -right of pleasing, possesses value in pleasing"; in it are united the -concepts of beauty (the pleasing) and of goodness.<a name="FNanchor_22_664" id="FNanchor_22_664"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_664" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> Beauty, in fact, -is that which must please objectively and as such it corresponds with -the good of action. "The Good," says Fechner, "is like a serious man, -the capable organiser of his whole domestic life, sagaciously weighing -the present and future, setting himself to extract the greatest benefit -from both. Beauty is his florid spouse, careful of the present and -mindful of her husband's wishes. The Pleasing is the baby, all senses -and play: the Useful is the servant who puts his hands at his master's -disposal and is given bread solely in accordance with his deserts. -Truth, lastly, is the preacher and teacher to the household; preacher -in matters of faith, teacher in those of learning: he gives an eye to -the Good and a helping hand to the Useful, and holds up a looking-glass -to Beauty."<a name="FNanchor_23_665" id="FNanchor_23_665"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_665" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> When speaking of art, he sums up all essential laws or -rules into the following: (1) art chooses a valuable or, at any rate, -an interesting, idea for representation: (2) it expresses the idea in -sensible material in the manner most suitable to its contents: (3) from -amongst the various means at its disposal, it selects those which in -themselves are more pleasing than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> the others: (4) the same procedure -is observed in all particulars: (5) in the event of conflict between -these rules, one is made to give way to another in such a way that the -greatest possible pleasure and that of highest value is attained (<i>das -grösstmögliche und werthvollste Gefallen</i>).<a name="FNanchor_24_666" id="FNanchor_24_666"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_666" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But why should Fechner, -who had this eudemonistic theory of beauty and art (as he calls it) all -ready made in advance,<a name="FNanchor_25_667" id="FNanchor_25_667"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_667" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> take the trouble to enumerate principles -and laws and conduct experiments and tabulate statistics wholly -incapable of illustrating or proving it? One is tempted to believe -that these pseudo-scientific operations were to him, and still are to -his followers, a pastime or hobby neither more nor less important than -playing Patience or collecting stamps.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Ernst Grosse. Speculative Æsthetic and the science of art.</i></div> - -<p>Another example of the superstitious cult of the natural sciences is to -be found in Professor Ernst Grosse's <i>Origins of Art.</i><a name="FNanchor_26_668" id="FNanchor_26_668"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_668" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Contemner of -all philosophical research into art, which he dismisses under the title -of "Speculative Æsthetic," Grosse invokes a Science of art (<i>Kunst -wissenschaft)</i> whose mission is to dig out all the laws lying hidden -in the mass of historical facts collected to date. It is his opinion -that all ethnographic and prehistoric material should be united to -historical matter proper, there being no possibility, according to him, -of framing general laws when study is restricted to the art of cultured -peoples "just as a theory of generation must necessarily be imperfect -if founded exclusively on the form of that function predominant among -mammals."<a name="FNanchor_27_669" id="FNanchor_27_669"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_669" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> But immediately after his declaration of abhorrence for -philosophy, and of faith in scientific methods, Grosse finds himself -in the same difficulty as Taine and Fechner. Indeed, there is no -escape; in order to examine the artistic productions of primitive and -savage peoples, a start must be made from some sort of concept of -art. All the scientific metaphors, all the verbal emollients employed -by Grosse cannot hide the nature of the plan he is forced to adopt, -or its striking resemblance to the despised speculative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> Æsthetic. -"As a traveller who desires to explore an unknown land must provide -himself with a general outline of the country and have some knowledge -of the direction in which his path should lie, if he does not wish to -lose his way entirely; so we, before beginning our enquiry, need a -general preliminary orientation concerning the essence of the phenomena -(<i>über das Wesen der Erscheinungen</i>) about to engage our attention." -Most certainly "we may count upon having an exact and exhaustive -answer, at earliest, when our enquiry is finished; and it is not yet -begun. That characteristic which we seek to determine at the outset -... may be most radically modified by the time we reach the end:" -there is no question, fie on the suggestion! of imitating the old -æstheticians: the only question is how "to give a definition which may -serve as provisional scaffolding, to be broken away on completion of -the edifice."<a name="FNanchor_28_670" id="FNanchor_28_670"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_670" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Words, words, words: the mite of general ideas and -artistic laws to be found in his book has been quarried by Grosse not -from study of the reports brought back by travellers in savage lands, -but from speculation on the forms of the spirit; and (inevitably) his -interpretation of the former is reached by the light thrown on it by -the latter. In his final definition, Grosse concludes by considering -art as an activity which in its development or as its result, possesses -immediate feeling-value (<i>Gefühlswerth</i>), and is an end to itself; -practical and æsthetic activity are in direct mutual opposition between -which as a middle term lies the activity of play, which like the -practical activity has its end outside itself, but, like the æsthetic, -finds its enjoyment not in its external end, which is more or less -insignificant, but in its own activity.<a name="FNanchor_29_671" id="FNanchor_29_671"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_671" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> At the end of his book he -remarks that the artistic activity of primitive peoples is hardly ever -unaccompanied by the practical; and that art began by being social and -became individual only in civilized times.<a name="FNanchor_30_672" id="FNanchor_30_672"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_672" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> - -<p>The Æsthetics of Taine and Grosse have also been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> described by the -epithet sociological.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Sociological Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>But since no one knows what the science of Sociology is, we must deal -with the sociological superstition as we dealt with the naturalistic; -that is to say, by skipping the preface with its proposals that -can never be carried out, and seeing what it is that the objective -necessities of the case have forced the author to assert, and which of -the possible alternative views he accepts, or between what selection of -them his allegiance wavers. During this examination we shall ignore the -fairly common case of an author who while pretending to construct an -Æsthetic simply compiles a list of facts connected with the history of -art or civilization.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Proudhon.</i></div> - - -<p>Some social reformers of our day, like Proudhon, have revived the -condemnations of Plato, or the mitigated moralism of antiquity and -the Middle Ages. Proudhon denied the formula Art for Art's sake; he -looked on art as a mere purveyor of sensuous pleasure, something which -must be subordinated to legal and economical ends; poetry, sculpture, -painting, music, romance, history, comedy, tragedy had for him no aim -save exhortation to virtue and dissuasion from vice.<a name="FNanchor_31_673" id="FNanchor_31_673"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_673" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>J. M. Guyau.</i></div> - -<p>Development of social sympathy is the whole duty of art in the -estimation of J. M. Guyau, who became famous as the founder of Social -Æsthetic and was, according to certain French critics, inaugurator -of the third epoch in the history of Æsthetic, the first being the -æsthetic of the ideal (Plato), the second that of perception (Kant), -and the third that of "Social Sympathy" (Guyau). In his <i>Problems -of Contemporary Æsthetic</i> (1884) Guyau combats the theory of play, -and substitutes that of Life; in a posthumous publication <i>Art in -Its Sociological Aspect</i> (1889) he explains more clearly that the -life of which he speaks is social life.<a name="FNanchor_32_674" id="FNanchor_32_674"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_674" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> If the beautiful be the -intellectually pleasing, certainly it cannot be identified with the -useful which is only searching for what is pleasing; but the useful -(says Guyau, in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> belief that he is correcting both Kant and -the evolutionists) does not always exclude the beautiful, of which -indeed it often forms the lowest degree. The study of art is embraced -partly,<a name="FNanchor_33_675" id="FNanchor_33_675"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_675" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> not wholly, by Sociology: for art fulfils two ends, firstly -and primarily that of provoking pleasant sensations (of colour, sound, -etc.) and in this sense finds itself in the presence of practically -incontestable scientific laws which connect Æsthetic with the physics -(optics, acoustics, etc.), mathematics, physiology and psychophysics. -Sculpture, in fact, rests especially on anatomy and physiology: -painting on anatomy, physiology and optics: architecture on optics -(golden section, etc.): music on physiology and acoustics: poetry on -metrics, whose most general laws are acoustical and physiological. The -second function of art is to produce the phenomena of "psychological -induction," which bring to a head ideas and sentiments of most -complex nature (sympathy with personages represented, interest, pity, -indignation, etc.), in short all the social feelings, which constitute -it "the expression of life." Whence are derived the two tendencies -recognised in art; one inclining towards harmony, consonance, and -everything delightful to ear and eye: the other towards the transfusion -of life into the domain of art. Genius, true genius is destined to -preserve the balance of the two tendencies: decadents and degenerates -deprive art of its social sympathetic aim by setting æsthetic sympathy -at war against human sympathy.<a name="FNanchor_34_676" id="FNanchor_34_676"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_676" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Translating all this into familiar -terms, we may say that Guy au asserts one purely hedonistic art, above -which he superimposes another art, also hedonistic, but serviceable to -the cause of morality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>M. Nordau.</i></div> - -<p>The same polemic against decadents, degenerates and individualists -is carried on by another writer, Max Nordau, who gives art the task -of re-establishing the wholeness of life amongst the fragmentary -specialisation characteristic of industrial society; he asserts that -art for art's sake, art as the simple expression of internal states<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> or -the objectification of the artist's feelings, no doubt exists, but is -merely "the art of Quaternary man, the art of the cave-dweller."<a name="FNanchor_35_677" id="FNanchor_35_677"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_677" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Naturalism. C. Lombroso.</i></div> - -<p>Naturalistic is the best term with which to qualify the Æsthetic -derived from that identification of genius with degeneracy which made -the fortune of Lombroso and his school. This identification derives -its chief strength from the following piece of reasoning. Great mental -efforts, total absorption in one dominating thought, often bring about -physiological disorders in the bodily organism and weakness or atrophy -of various vital functions. But such derangements come under the -head of the pathological concept of illness, degeneration, madness. -Therefore genius is identical with illness, degeneration and madness. -A syllogism from particular to general, in which case, according to -traditional Logic, <i>non est consequentia.</i> But with sociologists such -as Nordau, Lombroso and company, we almost overstep the line separating -respectable error from that grosser form which we call a blunder.</p> - -<p>A mere confusion between scientific analysis and historical inquiry -or description is visible in the works of certain sociologists and -anthropologists. Thus one of them, Carl Bücher, in studying the life of -primitive peoples, asserts that poetry, music and work were originally -fused in one single act; that poetry and music were used to regulate -the rhythms of labour.<a name="FNanchor_36_678" id="FNanchor_36_678"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_678" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> This may be historically true or false, -important or no: it has nothing whatever to do with æsthetic science. -In the same way Andrew Lang maintains that the doctrine concerning the -origin of art as disinterested expression of the mimetic faculty finds -no confirmation from what we know of primitive art, which is decorative -rather than expressive:<a name="FNanchor_37_679" id="FNanchor_37_679"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_679" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> as though primitive art, which is a mere -fact awaiting interpretation, could ever be converted into a criterion -for the interpretation of art in general.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Decline of Linguistic.</i></div> - -<p>The same vague naturalism exercised a baneful influence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> on Linguistic, -which of late years has been wholly lacking in such profound research -as that inaugurated by Humboldt and followed up by Steinthal. But -Steinthal never succeeded in founding a school. Max Müller, popular -and inaccurate, maintained the indivisibility of speech and thought, -confounding, or at least not distinguishing, æsthetic and logical -thought; although at one time he had noted that the formation of -names had a closer connexion with wit, in the sense of Locke, than -with judgement. He maintained, moreover, that the science of language -is not a historical but a natural science, because language is not -the invention of man: the dilemma of "historical" and "natural" was -canvassed and resolved over and over again with little result.<a name="FNanchor_38_680" id="FNanchor_38_680"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_680" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> -Another philologist, Whitney, attacked the "miraculous" theory of -Müller and denied that thought is indivisible from speech: "The -deaf-mute does not speak, but he can think," he observes; "thought is -not function of the acoustic nerve." By this means Whitney relapsed -into the ancient doctrine that speech is a symbol or means of -expression, of human thought, subject to the will, the result of a -synthesis of faculties and of a capacity for intelligent adaptation of -means to end.<a name="FNanchor_39_681" id="FNanchor_39_681"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_681" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Signs of revival. H. Paul.</i></div> - -<p>Philosophical spirit reappeared in Paul's <i>Principles of the History -of Language</i> (1880),<a name="FNanchor_40_682" id="FNanchor_40_682"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_682" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> though the author's efforts to defend himself -from the terrifying accusation of being a philosopher led him to hunt -out a fresh title to replace the scandalous "Philosophy of Language." -But if Paul is vague about the relation of Logic to Grammar, he must -be given every credit for identifying, as Humboldt had already done, -the question of the origin of language with that of its nature; and -reasserting that language is created afresh whenever we speak. He -must also be given credit for having conclusively criticized the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> -Ethnopsychology (<i>Völkerpsychologie</i>) of Steinthal and Lazarus, showing -that there is no such thing as collective psyche and that there can be -no language other than of the individual.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The linguistic of Wundt.</i></div> - -<p>Wundt<a name="FNanchor_41_683" id="FNanchor_41_683"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_683" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> on the other hand attached the study of language, mythology -and customs to this non-existent science of Ethnopsychology; in his -latest work, on this very subject of language,<a name="FNanchor_42_684" id="FNanchor_42_684"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_684" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> he foolishly echoes -Whitney's gibes and denounces as a "miracle theory" (<i>Wundertheorie</i>) -that glorious doctrine inaugurated by Herder and Humboldt, whom he -accuses of "mystical obscurity" (<i>mystiche Dunkel</i>): he observes that -this view may have had some justification before the principle of -evolution had reached its triumphant application to organic nature in -general and to man in particular. He has not the faintest notion of -the function of imagination, or of the true relation between thought -and expression; he finds no substantial difference between expression -in the naturalistic, and expression in the spiritual and linguistic -sense; he considers language as a special highly developed form of the -vital psychophysical manifestations and of the expressive movements -of animals. Out of these facts language is developed by imperceptible -gradations; so that, beyond the general concept of expressive movement -(<i>Ausdrucksbewegung</i>) "there is no specific mark by which language can -be distinguished in any but an arbitrary manner."<a name="FNanchor_43_685" id="FNanchor_43_685"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_685" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> The philosophy -of Wundt betrays its own weakness by showing its inability to master -the problem of language and art. In his <i>Ethics</i> æsthetic facts are -presented as a complex of logical and ethical elements; the existence -of æsthetic as a special normative science is denied, not for the good -and sufficient reason that there are no such things as "normative -sciences," but because this special science is said by him to be -absorbed by the two sciences of Logic and Ethics,<a name="FNanchor_44_686" id="FNanchor_44_686"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_686" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> which amounts to -denying the existence of Æsthetic and the originality of art.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_643" id="Footnote_1_643"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_643"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative, -1858-1862.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_644" id="Footnote_2_644"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_644"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Principles of Psychology,</i> 1855; 2nd ed. 1870, part viii. -ch. 9, §§ 533-540.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_645" id="Footnote_3_645"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_645"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> J. Sully, <i>Outlines of Psychology,</i> London, 1884; -<i>Sensation and Intuition, Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics,</i> -London, 1874; cf. <i>Encycl. Britannica,</i> ed. 9, art. "Æsthetics"; Alex. -Bain, <i>The Emotions and the Will,</i> London, 1859, ch. 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_646" id="Footnote_4_646"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_646"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Physiological Æsthetics,</i> London, 1877; various arts, in -<i>Mind,</i> vols. iii. iv. v. (o. s.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_647" id="Footnote_5_647"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_647"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Vernon Lee and C. Anstruther-Thomson, "Beauty and Ugliness," -in <i>Contemp. Review,</i> October-November, 1897: (abstract in Arréat, -<i>Dix années de philosophie,</i> pp. 80-85); same author's <i>Le Rôle -de l'élément moteur dans la perception esthétique visuelle, Mémoire -et questionnaire soumis au 4<sup>me</sup> Congrès de Psychologie,</i> -reprinted Imola, 1901.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_648" id="Footnote_6_648"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_648"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> H. Helmholtz, <i>Die Lehre von der Tonempfindungen als -physiologische Grundlage für die Théorie der Musik,</i> 1863, 4th ed., -1877; Brücke-Helmholtz, <i>Principes scientifiques des beaux arts,</i> Fr. -ed., Paris, 1881; C. Stumpf, <i>Tonpsychologie,</i> Leipzig, 1883.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_649" id="Footnote_7_649"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_649"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Philosophie de l'art,</i> 1866-1869 (4th ed. Paris, 1885).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_650" id="Footnote_8_650"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_650"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. pp. 13-15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_651" id="Footnote_9_651"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_651"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Philosophie de l'art,</i> i. pp. 17-54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_652" id="Footnote_10_652"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_652"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. 37.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_653" id="Footnote_11_653"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_653"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. 54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_654" id="Footnote_12_654"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_654"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_655" id="Footnote_13_655"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_655"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. p. 277.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_656" id="Footnote_14_656"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_656"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Philos. de l'art,</i> ii. pp. 257-400.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_657" id="Footnote_15_657"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_657"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. pp. 257-258.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_658" id="Footnote_16_658"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_658"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. p. 393.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_659" id="Footnote_17_659"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_659"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Vorschule der Ästhetik,</i> 1876 (2nd ed. Leipzig, -1897-1898).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_660" id="Footnote_18_660"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_660"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Vorschule der Ästhetik,</i> i. ch. 19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_661" id="Footnote_19_661"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_661"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Schasler, <i>Krit. Geschichte d. Ästh.</i> p. 1117.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_662" id="Footnote_20_662"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_662"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Vorschule der Ästh.</i> ii. pp 273-314.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_663" id="Footnote_21_663"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_663"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pref. p. iv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_664" id="Footnote_22_664"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_664"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. pp. 15-30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_665" id="Footnote_23_665"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_665"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. 32.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_666" id="Footnote_24_666"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_666"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Vorschule der Ästh.</i> ii. pp. 12-13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_667" id="Footnote_25_667"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_667"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> i. p. 38.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_668" id="Footnote_26_668"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_668"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Die Anfänge der Kunst,</i> Freiburg i. B. 1894.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_669" id="Footnote_27_669"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_669"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_670" id="Footnote_28_670"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_670"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Die Anfänge der Kunst,</i> pp. 45-46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_671" id="Footnote_29_671"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_671"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 46-48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_672" id="Footnote_30_672"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_672"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 293-301.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_673" id="Footnote_31_673"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_673"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Du principe de l'art et de sa destination sociale,</i> -Paris, 1875.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_674" id="Footnote_32_674"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_674"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> M. Guyau, <i>L'Art au point de vue sociologique,</i> 1889 (3rd -ed. Paris, 1895); <i>Les Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine,</i> Paris, -1884; cf. Fouillée, pref. to the former work, pp. xli-xliii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_675" id="Footnote_33_675"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_675"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>L'Art au point de vue sociologique,</i> pref. p. xlvii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_676" id="Footnote_34_676"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_676"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Op. cit., passim,</i> esp. ch. 4; cf. pp. 64, 85, 380.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_677" id="Footnote_35_677"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_677"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Max Nordau, <i>Social Function of Art,</i> 2nd ed., Turin, -1897.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_678" id="Footnote_36_678"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_678"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> Karl Bücher, <i>Arbeit u. Rhythmus,</i> 2nd ed., Leipzig, -1899.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_679" id="Footnote_37_679"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_679"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Custom and Myth,</i> p. 276; quoted by Knight, <i>The -Philosophy of the Beautiful,</i> vol. i. pp. 9-10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_680" id="Footnote_38_680"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_680"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Lectures on the Science of Language,</i> 1861 and 1864 (Fr. -tr., Paris, 1867).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_681" id="Footnote_39_681"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_681"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> William Dwight Whitney, <i>The Life and Growth of -Language,</i> London, 1875 (It. tr., Milan, 1876).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_682" id="Footnote_40_682"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_682"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Hermann Paul, <i>Principien der Sprachgeschichte,</i> 1880 -(2nd ed., Halle, 1886).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_683" id="Footnote_41_683"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_683"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Wilh. Wundt, <i>Über Wege u. Ziele d. Völkerpsychologie,</i> -Leipzig, 1886.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_684" id="Footnote_42_684"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_684"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Die Sprache,</i> Leipzig, 1900, 2 vols, (part i. of -<i>Völkerpsychologie, eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von -Sprache, Mythus und Sitte</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_685" id="Footnote_43_685"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_685"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Die Sprache, passim;</i> cf. i. p. 31 <i>seqq.,</i> ii. pp. 599, -603-609.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_686" id="Footnote_44_686"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_686"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Ethik,</i> ed. 2, Stuttgart, 1892, p. 6.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XVIIIb" id="XVIIIb">XVIII</a></h4> - - -<h4>ÆSTHETIC PSYCHOLOGISM AND OTHER RECENT TENDENCIES</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Neo-criticism and empiricism.</i></div> - -<p>The neo-critical or neo-Kantian movement was powerless to make headway -against hedonistic, psychological and moralistic views of the æsthetic -fact, although it made every effort to save the concept of spirit from -the invading rush of naturalism and materialism.<a name="FNanchor_1_687" id="FNanchor_1_687"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_687" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Kant bequeathed to -neo-criticism his own failure to understand creative imagination, and -the neo-Kantians do not seem to have had the faintest notion of any -form of cognition other than the intellectual.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Kirchmann.</i></div> - -<p>Amongst German philosophers of any renown who clung to æsthetic -sensationalism and psychologism was Kirchmann, promoter of a so-called -realism, and author of <i>Æsthetic on a Realistic Basis</i> (1868).<a name="FNanchor_2_688" id="FNanchor_2_688"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_688" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -In his doctrine the æsthetic fact is an image (<i>Bild</i>) of a real; -an animated (<i>seelenvolles</i>) image, purified and strengthened, that -is, idealized, and divided into the image of pleasure, which is the -beautiful, and that of pain, which is the ugly. Beauty admits of a -threefold series of varieties or modifications, being determined -according to the content as sublime, comic, tragic, etc.; according -to the image, as beauty of nature or of art; and according to the -idealization as idealistic or naturalistic, formal or spiritual,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> -symbolical or classical. Not having grasped the nature of æsthetic -objectification, Kirchmann takes the trouble to draw up a new -psychological category of ideal or apparent feelings, arising from -artistic images and being attenuations of the feelings of real life.<a name="FNanchor_3_689" id="FNanchor_3_689"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_689" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Metaphysic translated into Psychology. Vischer.</i></div> - -<p>To the evolution or involution of the Herbartians into physiologists -of æsthetic pleasure corresponds a similar evolution or involution of -the idealists into adherents of psychologism. The first place must be -given to the veteran Theodor Vischer, who in a criticism of his own -work pronounced Æsthetic to be "the union of mimics and harmonics" -(<i>vereinte Mimik und Harmonik</i>), and Beauty the "harmony of the -universe," never actually realized because realized only at infinity, -so that when we think to seize it in the Beautiful, we are under an -illusion: a transcendent illusion, which is the very essence of the -æsthetic fact.<a name="FNanchor_4_690" id="FNanchor_4_690"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_690" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> His son Robert Yischer coined the word <i>Einfühlung</i> -to express the life with which man endows natural objects by means of -the æsthetic process.<a name="FNanchor_5_691" id="FNanchor_5_691"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_691" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Volkelt, when treating of the <i>Symbol</i><a name="FNanchor_6_692" id="FNanchor_6_692"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_692" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> and -joining symbolism to pantheism, opposed associationism and favoured a -natural teleology immanent in Beauty.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Siebeck.</i></div> - -<p>The Herbartian Siebeck (1875) abandoned the formalistic theory and -tried to explain the fact of beauty by the concept of the appearance of -personality.<a name="FNanchor_7_693" id="FNanchor_7_693"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_693" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> He distinguishes between objects which please by their -content alone (sensuous pleasures), those which please by form alone -(moral facts), and those which please by the connexion of content with -form (organic and æsthetic facts). In organic facts the form is not -outside the content, but is the expression of the reciprocal action and -conjunction of the constitutive elements: whereas in æsthetic facts -the form is outside the content, and as it were its mere surface; not -a means to the end, but an end in itself. Æsthetic intuition is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> -relation between the sensible and the spiritual, matter and spirit, -and is thus form regarded as the appearance of personality. Æsthetic -pleasure arises from the spirit's consciousness of discovering itself -in the sensible. Siebeck borrows the theory of modifications of the -beautiful from the metaphysical idealists, who held that only in such -modifications can beauty be found in the concrete, just as humanity can -only exist as a man of determinate race and nationality. The sublime is -that species of beauty wherein the formal moment of circumscription is -lost, and is therefore the unlimited, which is a kind of extensive or -intensive infinity; the tragic arises when the harmony is not given but -is the result of conflict and development; the comic is a relation of -the small to the great; and so on. These traces of idealism, together -with his firm hold on the Kantian and Herbartian absoluteness of the -judgement of taste, make it impossible to regard Siebeck's Æsthetic as -purely psychological and empirical and wholly devoid of philosophical -elements.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>M. Diez.</i></div> - -<p>It is the same with Diez, who, in his <i>Theory of Feeling as Foundation -of Æsthetic</i> (1892),<a name="FNanchor_8_694" id="FNanchor_8_694"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_694" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> tries to explain the artistic activity as -a return to the ideal of feeling (<i>Ideal des fühlenden Geistes</i>), -parallel with science (ideal of thought), morality (ideal of will) -and religion (ideal of personality). But whatever is this so-called -feeling? is it the empirical feeling of the psychologists, irreducible -to an ideal, or the mystic faculty of communication and conjunction -with the Infinite and the Absolute? the absurd "pleasure-value" of -Fechner, or the "judgement" of Kant? One is inclined to say that -these writers, and others like them, still under the influence of -metaphysical views, lack the courage of their opinions: they feel -themselves to be in an atmosphere of hostility and speak under -reservations or compromises. The psychologist Jodi asserts the -existence of elementary æsthetic feelings, as discovered by Herbart, -and defines them as "immediate excitations not resting upon associative -or reproductive activity or on the fancy," although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> "in ultimate -analysis they must be reduced to the same principles."<a name="FNanchor_9_695" id="FNanchor_9_695"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_695" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Psychological tendency. Teodor Lipps.</i></div> - -<p>The purely psychological and associationistic tendency becomes clearly -defined in Professor Teodor Lipps and his school. Lipps criticizes -and rejects a whole series of æsthetic theories: (<i>a</i>) of play; -(<i>b</i>) of pleasure; (<i>c</i>) of art as recognition of real life, even -if displeasing; (<i>d</i>) of emotion and passional excitation; (<i>e</i>) -syncretism, attributing to art beside the primary purpose of play and -pleasure the further ends of recognition of life, in its reality, -revelation of individuality, commotion, freedom from a weight, or free -play of the imagination. His theory differs little at bottom from that -of Jouffroy, for in his thesis he assumes artistic beauty to be the -sympathetic. "The object of sympathy is our objectified ego, transposed -into others and therefore discovered in them. We feel ourselves in -others and we feel others in ourselves. In others, or by means of them, -we feel ourselves happy, free, enlarged, elevated, or the contrary -of all these. The æsthetic feeling of sympathy is not a mere mode of -æsthetic enjoyment, it is that enjoyment itself. All æsthetic enjoyment -is founded, in the last analysis, singly and wholly upon sympathy; even -that caused by geometrical, architectonic, tectonic, ceramic, etc., -lines and forms." "Whenever in a work of art we find a personality (not -a defect of the man, but something positively human) which harmonizes -with and awakes an echo in the possibilities and tendencies of our -own life and vital activities: whenever we find positive, objective -humanity, pure and free from all real interests lying outside the work -of art, as art only can reproduce it and æsthetic contemplation alone -can demand; the harmony, the resonance, fills us with joy. The value -of personality is ethical value: outside it there is no possibility -or determination of ethical character. All artistic and in general -æsthetic enjoyment is, therefore, the enjoyment of something which has -ethical value (<i>eines ethische<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> Werthvollen</i>); not as element of a -complex, but as object of æsthetic intuition."<a name="FNanchor_10_696" id="FNanchor_10_696"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_696" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>The æsthetic fact is thus deprived of all its own value and allowed -merely a reflexion from the value of morality.</p> - -<p>Without lingering over Lipps's pupils (such as Stern and others<a name="FNanchor_11_697" id="FNanchor_11_697"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_697" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>) -and writers of similar tendency (such as Biese, with his theory -of anthropomorphism and universal metaphor;<a name="FNanchor_12_698" id="FNanchor_12_698"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_698" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> or Konrad Lange, -who propounds a thesis that art is conscious self-deception),<a name="FNanchor_13_699" id="FNanchor_13_699"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_699" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> -we will call attention to Professor Karl Groos (1892), who comes -within measurable distance of the concept of æsthetic activity as -a theoretic value.<a name="FNanchor_14_700" id="FNanchor_14_700"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_700" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Between the two poles of consciousness, -sensibility and intellect, are several intermediate grades, amongst -which lies intuition or fancy, whose product, the image or appearance -(<i>Schein</i>), is midway between sensation and concept. The image is -full like sensation, but regulated like the concept; it has neither -the inexhaustible richness of the former, or the barren nudity of the -latter. Of the nature of image or appearance is the æsthetic fact; -which is distinguished from the simple, ordinary image not by its -quality, but by its intensity alone: the æsthetic image is merely a -simple image occupying the summit of consciousness. Representations -pass through consciousness like a crowd of people hurrying over a -bridge, each bent on his own business; but when a passer-by halts on -the bridge and looks at the scene, then is it holiday, then arises the -æsthetic fact. This is therefore not passivity but activity; according -to the formula adopted by Groos it is internal imitation (<i>innere -Nachahnung</i>).<a name="FNanchor_15_701" id="FNanchor_15_701"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_701" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> It may be objected against the theory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span> that every -image, so far as it is an image at all, must occupy the summit of -consciousness if only for an instant; and that the mere image is either -the product of an activity just as is the æsthetic image, or it is not -a real image at all. It may also be objected that the definition of the -image as something sharing in the nature of sensation and concept may -lead back to intellectual intuition and the other mysterious faculties -of the metaphysical school, for which Groos professes abhorrence. His -division of the æsthetic fact into form and content is even less happy. -He recognizes four classes of content: associative (in the strict -sense), symbolic, typical, individual:<a name="FNanchor_16_702" id="FNanchor_16_702"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_702" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and into his inquiries -he introduces, quite unnecessarily, the concepts of infusion of -personality and of play. In connexion with the latter he remarks that -"internal imitation is the noblest game of man,"<a name="FNanchor_17_703" id="FNanchor_17_703"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_703" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and adds that "the -concept of play applies fully to contemplation, but not to æsthetic -production, save in the case of primitive peoples."<a name="FNanchor_18_704" id="FNanchor_18_704"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_704" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The modifications of the Beautiful in Groos and Lipps.</i></div> - -<p>Groos does however free himself from the "modifications of Beauty," -because, æsthetic activity having been identified with internal -imitation, it is clear that whatever is not internal imitation is -excluded from that activity as something different. "All Beauty -(beauty understood in the sense of 'sympathetic') belongs to the -æsthetic activity, but not every æsthetic fact is beautiful." Beauty, -then, is the representation of the sensuously pleasant; ugliness, the -representation of the unpleasant; the sublime, that of a mighty thing -(<i>Gewaltiges</i>) in a simple form; the comic, that of an inferiority -which arouses in us a pleasing sense of our own superiority. And so -forth.<a name="FNanchor_19_705" id="FNanchor_19_705"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_705" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> With great good sense Groos holds up to derision the office -assigned to the ugly by Schasler and Hartmann with their superficial -dialectic. To say that an ellipse contains an element of ugliness -in comparison with the circle because it is symmetrical about its -two axes only and not about infinite diameters is like saying "wine -has a relatively unpleasant taste because in it is lacking<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> (<i>ist -aufgehoben</i>) the pleasant taste of beer."<a name="FNanchor_20_706" id="FNanchor_20_706"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_706" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Lipps too, in his -writings upon Æsthetic, recognizes that the comic (of which he gives an -accurate psychological analysis)<a name="FNanchor_21_707" id="FNanchor_21_707"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_707" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> has in itself no æsthetic value; -but his moralistic views lead him to outline a theory of it not unlike -that of the overcoming of the ugly; he explains it as a process leading -to a higher æsthetic value (<i>i.e.</i> sympathy).<a name="FNanchor_22_708" id="FNanchor_22_708"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_708" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>E. Viron and the double form of Æsthetic.</i></div> - -<p>Work such as that of Groos and, occasionally, of Lipps is of some -value towards the elimination of errors, as well as confining æsthetic -research to the field of internal analysis. Merit of the same kind -belongs to the work of a Frenchman, Véron,<a name="FNanchor_23_709" id="FNanchor_23_709"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_709" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> who controverts the -Absolute Beauty of academical Æsthetic and, after accusing Taine of -confounding Art with Science and Æsthetic with Logic, remarks that if -it be the duty of art to make manifest the essence of things, their -one dominating quality, then "the greatest artists would be those who -have best succeeded in exhibiting this essence ... and the greatest -works would resemble each other more closely than any others and would -clearly demonstrate their common identity, whereas the exact opposite -happens."<a name="FNanchor_24_710" id="FNanchor_24_710"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_710" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But one looks in vain for scientific method in Véron; a -precursor of Guyau,<a name="FNanchor_25_711" id="FNanchor_25_711"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_711" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> he asserts that art is at bottom two different -things; there are two arts: one decorative, whose end is beauty, that -is to say the pleasure of eye and ear resulting from determinate -dispositions of fines, forms, colours, sounds, rhythms, movements, -fight and shade, without necessary interventions of ideas and feelings, -and capable of being studied by Optics and Acoustics: the other, -expressive, which gives "the agitated expression of human personality." -He considers that decorative art prevails in the ancient world, and -expressive art in the modern.<a name="FNanchor_26_712" id="FNanchor_26_712"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_712" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> - -<p>We cannot here examine in detail the æsthetic theories<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> of artists -and men of letters; the scientific and historicist prejudices, the -theory of experiment and human document, which underlie the realism of -Zola, or the moralism which underlies the problem-art of Ibsen and the -Scandinavian school. Gustave Flaubert wrote of art profoundly, better -perhaps than any other Frenchman has ever written, not in special -treatises but throughout his letters, which were published after his -death.<a name="FNanchor_27_713" id="FNanchor_27_713"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_713" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>L. Tolstoy.</i></div> - -<p>Under the influence of Véron and his hatred for the concept of beauty, -Leo Tolstoy wrote his book on art,<a name="FNanchor_28_714" id="FNanchor_28_714"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_714" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> which, according to the great -Russian artist, communicates feelings in the same way in which words -communicate thoughts. The meaning of this theory is made clear by the -parallel he drew between Art and Science, and his conclusion that "the -mission of art is to render sensible and capable of assimilation that -which could not be assimilated under the form of argumentation"; -and that "true science examines truths considered as important for a -certain society at a given epoch and fixes them in the consciousness -of man, whereas art transports them from the domain of knowledge to -that of feeling."<a name="FNanchor_29_715" id="FNanchor_29_715"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_715" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> There is therefore no such thing as art for art's -sake, any more than science for science' sake. Every human function -should be directed to increase morality and to suppress violence. -This amounts to saying that nearly all art, from the beginning of the -world, is false. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Dante, -Tasso, Milton, Shakespeare, Raphæl, Michæl Angelo, Bach, Beethoven are -(according to Tolstoy) "artificial reputations created by critics."<a name="FNanchor_30_716" id="FNanchor_30_716"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_716" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>F. Nietzsche.</i></div> - -<p>Amongst artists rather than amongst philosophers must be reckoned -Friedrich Nietzsche, whom we should wrong (as we said of Ruskin) by -trying to expound his æsthetic doctrines in scientific language and -then holding them up to the facile criticism which, so translated, -they would draw upon themselves. In none of his books, not even in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> -his first, <i>The Birth of Tragedy,</i><a name="FNanchor_31_717" id="FNanchor_31_717"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_717" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> in spite of the title, does he -offer us a real theory of art; what appears to be theory is the mere -expression of the author's feelings and tendencies. He shows a kind -of anxiety concerning the value and aim of art and the problem of its -inferiority or superiority to science and philosophy, a state of mind -characteristic of the Romantic period of which Nietzsche was, in many -respects, a belated but magnificent representative. To Romanticism, as -well as to Schopenhauer, belong the elements of thought which issued in -the distinction between Apollinesque art (that of serene contemplation, -to which belong the epic and sculpture) and Dionysiac art (the art of -agitation and tumult, such as music and the drama). The thought is -vague and does not bear criticism; but it is supported by a flight of -inspiration which lifts the mind to a spiritual region seldom if ever -reached again in the second half of the nineteenth century.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>An æsthetician of music: E. Hanslick.</i></div> - -<p>The most notable æsthetic students of that time were perhaps a group -of persons engaged in constructing theories of particular arts. -And since—as we have seen<a name="FNanchor_32_718" id="FNanchor_32_718"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_718" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>—philosophical laws or theories of -individual arts are inconceivable, it was inevitable that the ideas -presented by such thinkers should be (as indeed they are) nothing more -than general æsthetic conclusions. First may be mentioned the acute -Bohemian critic Eduard Hanslick, who published his work <i>On Musical -Beauty</i> in 1854; it was often reprinted and was translated into various -languages.<a name="FNanchor_33_719" id="FNanchor_33_719"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_719" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Hanslick waged war against Richard Wagner and in general -against the pretension of finding concepts, feelings and other definite -contents in music. "In the most insignificant musical works, where the -most powerful microscope can discover nothing, we are now asked to -recognize a <i>Night Before the Battle,</i> a <i>Summer Night in Norway,</i> a -<i>Longing for the Sea,</i> or some such absurdity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> should the cover have -the audacity to affirm that this is the subject of the piece."<a name="FNanchor_34_720" id="FNanchor_34_720"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_720" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> With -equal vivacity he protests against the sentimental hearers who, instead -of enjoying the work of art, set themselves to extract pathological -effects of passionate excitement and practical activity. If it be true -that Greek music produced effects of this kind, "if it needed but a -few Phrygian strains to animate troops with courage in the face of -the enemy, or a melody in the Dorian mode to ensure the fidelity of -a wife whose husband was far away, then the loss of Greek music is -a melancholy thing for generals and husbands; but æstheticians and -composers need not regret it."<a name="FNanchor_35_721" id="FNanchor_35_721"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_721" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> "If every senseless <i>Requiem,</i> every -noisy funeral march, every wailing <i>Adagio</i> had the power of depressing -us, who could put up with existence under such conditions? But let a -real musical work confront us, clear-eyed and glowing with beauty, and -we feel ourselves enslaved by its invincible fascination even if its -material is all the sorrows of the age."<a name="FNanchor_36_722" id="FNanchor_36_722"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_722" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Hanslick's concept of form.</i></div> - -<p>Hanslick maintained that the sole aim of music is form, musical -beauty. This affirmation won him the goodwill of the Herbartians, who -hastened to welcome such a vigorous and unexpected ally; by way of -returning the compliment, Hanslick felt obliged in later editions of -his work to mention Herbart himself and his faithful disciple Robert -Zimmermann who had given (so he said) "full development to the great -æsthetic principle of Form."<a name="FNanchor_37_723" id="FNanchor_37_723"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_723" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> The praises of the Herbartians and the -courteous declarations of Hanslick both arose from a misunderstanding: -for the words "beauty" and "form" have one meaning for the former and -quite another for the latter. Hanslick never thought that symmetry, -purely acoustical relations and pleasures of the ear constituted -musical beauty;<a name="FNanchor_38_724" id="FNanchor_38_724"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_724" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> mathematics, he held, are utterly useless to -musical Æsthetic.<a name="FNanchor_39_725" id="FNanchor_39_725"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_725" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> Musical beauty is spiritual and significative: it -has thoughts, undoubtedly; but those thoughts are musical. "Sonorous -forms are not empty, but perfectly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> filled; they cannot be compared -with simple lines delimiting a space; they are the spirit assuming body -and extracting from itself the stuff of its own incarnation. Rather -than an arabesque, music is a picture; but a picture whose subject -can neither be expressed in words nor enclosed in precise concept. -There are in music both meaning and connexion, but these are of a -specifically musical nature; music is a language we understand and -speak, but which it is not possible to translate."<a name="FNanchor_40_726" id="FNanchor_40_726"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_726" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Hanslick asserts -that though music does not portray the quality of feelings, it does -portray their dynamic aspect or tone: if not the substantives, then -the adjectives: it depicts not "murmuring tenderness" or "impetuous -courage," but the "murmuring" and the "impetuous."<a name="FNanchor_41_727" id="FNanchor_41_727"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_727" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> The backbone of -the book is the denial that form and content can ever be separated in -music. "In music there can be no content in opposition to the form, -since there can be no form outside the content." "Take a motive, the -first that comes into your head; what is its content, what its form? -where does this begin, and that end? ... What do you wish to call -content? The sounds? Very well: but they have already received a form. -What will you call form? Also the sounds? but they are form already -filled; form supplied with content."<a name="FNanchor_42_728" id="FNanchor_42_728"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_728" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> Such observations denote -acute penetration of the nature of art, though not scientifically -formulated or framed into a system. Hanslick thought he was dealing -with peculiarities of music,<a name="FNanchor_43_729" id="FNanchor_43_729"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_729" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> instead of with the universal and -constitutive character of every form of art, and this prevented him -from taking larger views.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æstheticians of the figurative arts. C. Fiedler.</i></div> - -<p>Another specialist æsthetician is Conrad Fiedler, author of many -essays on the figurative arts, the most important being his <i>Origin -of Artistic Activity</i> (1887).<a name="FNanchor_44_730" id="FNanchor_44_730"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_730" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> No one, perhaps, has better or -more eloquently emphasized the activistic character of art, which -he compares with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> language. "Art begins exactly where intuition -(perception) ends. The artist is not differentiated from other people -by any special perceptive attitude enabling him to perceive more or -with greater intensity, or endowing his eye with any special power -of selecting, collecting, transforming, ennobling or illuminating; -but rather by his peculiar gift of being able to pass immediately -from perception to intuitive expression; his relation with nature is -not perceptive, but expressive." "A man standing passively at gaze -may well imagine himself in possession of the visible world as an -immense, rich, varied whole: the entire absence of fatigue with which -he traverses the infinite mass of visual impressions, the rapidity -with which representations dart across his consciousness, convince -him that he stands in the midst of an immense visible world, although -he may quite well be unable at any one instant to represent it to -himself as a whole. But this world, so great, so rich, so immeasurable, -disappears the moment art seeks to become its master. The very first -effort to emerge from this twilight and arrive at clear vision -restricts the circle of things to be seen. Artistic activity may be -conceived as continuation of that concentration by which consciousness -makes the first step towards clear vision, which it reaches only by -self-limitation." Spiritual process and bodily process are here an -indivisible whole, which is expression.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and Expression.</i></div> - -<p>"This activity, simply because it is spiritual, must consist of forms -wholly determinate, tangible, sensibly demonstrative." Art is not in -a state of subjection to science. Like the man of science, the artist -desires to escape from the natural perceptive state and to make the -world his own; but there are regions to which we can penetrate not -by the forms of thought and science but only through art. Art is, -strictly speaking, not imitation of nature; for what is nature save -this confused mass of perceptions and representations, whose real -poverty has been demonstrated already? In another sense, however, art -may be called imitation of nature inasmuch as its aim is not to expound -concepts or to arouse emotions, that is to create values of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span> intellect -and feeling. Art does create both these values, if you like to say so; -but only in one quite peculiar quality, which consists in complete -visibility (<i>Sichtbarkeit</i>). Here we have the same sane conception, the -same lively comprehension of the true nature of art which we found in -Hanslick, only expressed in a more rigorous and philosophical manner. -With Fiedler is connected his friend Adolf Hildebrand, who brought into -high relief the activistic, or architectonic as opposed to imitative, -character of art, illustrating his theoretical discussions especially -from sculpture, the art which he himself followed.<a name="FNanchor_45_731" id="FNanchor_45_731"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_731" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Narrow limits of these theories.</i></div> - -<p>What we chiefly miss in Fiedler and others of the same tendency is the -conception of the æsthetic fact not as something exceptional, produced -by exceptionally gifted men, but as a ceaseless activity of man as -such; for man possesses the world, so far as he does possess it, only -in the form of representation-expressions, and only knows in so far as -he creates.<a name="FNanchor_46_732" id="FNanchor_46_732"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_732" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Nor are these writers justified in treating language -as parallel with art, or art with language; for comparisons are drawn -between things at least partially different, whereas art and language -are identical.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>H. Bergson.</i></div> - -<p>The same criticism can be made in the case of the French philosopher -Bergson, who in his book on <i>Laughter</i><a name="FNanchor_47_733" id="FNanchor_47_733"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_733" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> states a theory of art very -similar to that of Fiedler and makes the same mistake of conceiving the -artistic faculty as something distinct and exceptional in comparison -with the language of everyday use. In ordinary life, says Bergson, the -individuality of things escapes us; we see only as much of them as -our practical needs demand. Language helps this simplification; since -all names, proper names excepted, are names of kinds or classes. Now -and then, however, nature, as if in a fit of absence of mind, creates -souls of a more divisible and detached kind (artists), who discover -and reveal the riches hidden under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> the colourless signs and labels -of everyday life, and help others (non-artists) to catch a glimpse of -what they themselves see, employing for this purpose colours, forms, -rhythmic connexions of words, and those rhythms of life and breath even -more intimate to man, the sounds and notes of music.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Attempts to return to Baumgarten. C. Hermann.</i></div> - -<p>A healthy return to Baumgarten, a revival and correction of the old -philosopher's theories in the light of later discoveries, might -perhaps have given Æsthetic some assistance, after the collapse of -the old idealistic metaphysic, towards thinking the concept of art -in its universality and discovering its identity with pure and true -intuitive knowledge. But Conrad Hermann, who preached the return to -Baumgarten<a name="FNanchor_48_734" id="FNanchor_48_734"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_734" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> in 1876, did bad service to what might have been a good -cause. According to him Æsthetic and Logic are normative sciences; -but Logic does not contain, as does Æsthetic, "a definite category -of external objects exclusively and specifically adequate to the -faculty of thought"; and on the other hand "the products and results -of scientific thought are not so external and sensibly intuitive as -those of artistic invention." Logic and Æsthetic alike refer not to the -empirical thinking and feeling of the soul, but to pure and absolute -sensation and thought. Art constructs a representation standing midway -between the individual and the universal. Beauty expresses specific -perfection, the essential or, so to speak, the rightful (<i>seinsollend</i>) -character of things. Form is "the external sensible limit, or mode of -appearance of a thing, in opposition to the kernel of the thing itself -and to its essential and substantial content." Content and form are -both æsthetic, and the æsthetic interest concerns the entirety of the -beautiful object. The artistic activity has no special organ such as -thought possesses in speech. The æsthetician, like the lexicographer, -has the task of compiling a dictionary of tones and colours and of -the different meanings which may possibly be attached to them.<a name="FNanchor_49_735" id="FNanchor_49_735"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_735" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> -We can see that Hermann<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> accepted side by side the most inconsistent -propositions. He welcomes even the æsthetic law of the golden section, -and applies it to tragedy; the longer segment of the Une is the tragic -hero; the punishment which overtakes him (the entire line) exceeds his -crime in the same proportion in which he oversteps the common measure -(the shorter segment of the line).<a name="FNanchor_50_736" id="FNanchor_50_736"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_736" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> It reads almost like a joke.</p> - -<p>Without direct reference to Baumgarten, a proposal that Æsthetic be -reformed and treated as the "science of intuitive knowledge" was made -in a miserable little work by one Willy Nef (1898),<a name="FNanchor_51_737" id="FNanchor_51_737"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_737" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> who makes the -dumb animals share his "intuitive knowledge," in which he distinguishes -a formal side (intuition) and a material side or content (knowledge), -and considers the everyday relations between men, their games and their -art, as belonging to intuitive knowledge.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Eclecticism. B. Bosanquet.</i></div> - -<p>The English historian of Æsthetic, Bosanquet (1892) tried to find -a reconciliation between content and form in unity of expression. -"Beauty," says Bosanquet in the Introduction to his <i>History,</i> "is -that which has characteristic and individual expressiveness for -sensuous perception or imagination, subject to the conditions of -general or abstract expressiveness by the same means." In another -passage he observes: "The difficulty of real Æsthetic is to show how -the combination of decorative forms in characteristic representations, -by intensifying the essential character immanent in them from the -beginning, subordinates them to a central signification which stands -to their complex combination as their abstract signification stands to -each one of them taken singly."<a name="FNanchor_52_738" id="FNanchor_52_738"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_738" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> But the problem, as propounded in a -way suggested by the antithesis between the two schools (contentism and -formalism) of German Æsthetic, is in our opinion insoluble.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic of expression: present state.</i></div> - -<p>De Sanctis founded no school of æsthetic science in Italy. His thought -was quickly misunderstood and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> mutilated by those who presumed to -correct it, and, in fact, only returned to the outworn rhetorical -conception of art as consisting of a little content and a little -form. Only within the last ten years has there been a renewal of -philosophical studies, arising out of discussions concerning the nature -of history<a name="FNanchor_53_739" id="FNanchor_53_739"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_739" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> and the relation in which it stands to art and science, -and nourished by the controversy excited by the publication of De -Sanctis' posthumous works.<a name="FNanchor_54_740" id="FNanchor_54_740"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_740" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> The same problem of the relation between -history and science, and their difference or antithesis, reappeared -also in Germany, but without being put in its true connexion with the -problem of Æsthetic.<a name="FNanchor_55_741" id="FNanchor_55_741"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_741" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> These inquiries and discussions, and the -revival of a Linguistic impregnated by philosophy in the work of Paul -and some others, appear to us to offer much more favourable ground for -the scientific development of Æsthetic than can be found on the summits -of mysticism or the low plains of positivism and sensationalism.</p> - - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_687" id="Footnote_1_687"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_687"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A. F. Lange, <i>Geschichte des Materialismus, u. Kritik -seiner Bedeutung i. d. Gegenwart,</i> 1866.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_688" id="Footnote_2_688"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_688"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> J. F. v. Kirchmann, <i>Ästhetik auf realistischer -Grundlage,</i> Berlin, 1868.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_689" id="Footnote_3_689"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_689"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Ästh. auf real. Grund.</i> vol. i. pp. 54-57; see above, -pp. <a href="#Page_80">80</a>-<a href="#Page_81">81</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_690" id="Footnote_4_690"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_690"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Kritische Gänge,</i> vol. v. pp. 25-26, 131.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_691" id="Footnote_5_691"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_691"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> R. Vischer, <i>Über das optische Formgefühl,</i> Leipzig, 1873.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_692" id="Footnote_6_692"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_692"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Der Symbol-Begriff in der neuesten Ästh.,</i> Jena, 1876.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_693" id="Footnote_7_693"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_693"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Das Wesen d. ästh. Anschauung, Psychologische -Untersuchungen z. Theorie d. Schönen u. d. Kunst,</i> Berlin, 1875.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_694" id="Footnote_8_694"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_694"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Max Diez, <i>Theorie des Gefühls z. Begründung d. Ästhetik,</i> -Stuttgart, 1892.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_695" id="Footnote_9_695"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_695"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Friedr. Jodi, <i>Lehrb. der Psychologie,</i> Stuttgart, 1896, § -53, pp. 404-414.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_696" id="Footnote_10_696"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_696"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Komik und Humor, eine psychol. ästhet. Untersuch.,</i> -Hamburg-Leipzig, pp. 223-227.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_697" id="Footnote_11_697"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_697"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Paul Stern, <i>Einfühling u. Association i. d. neueren -Ästh.,</i> 1898, in <i>Beiträge z. Ästh.,</i> ed. Lipps and R. M. Werner -(Hamburg-Leipzig).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_698" id="Footnote_12_698"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_698"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Alfr. Biese, <i>Das Associationsprincip u. d. -Anthropomorphismus i. d. Ästh.,</i> 1890; <i>Die Philosophie des -Metaphorischen,</i> Hamburg-Leipzig, 1893.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_699" id="Footnote_13_699"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_699"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Konrad Lange, <i>Die bewusste Selbsttäuschung als Kern des -künstlerischen Genusses,</i> Leipzig, 1895.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_700" id="Footnote_14_700"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_700"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Karl Groos, <i>Einleitung i. d. Ästhetik,</i> Giessen, 1892.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_701" id="Footnote_15_701"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_701"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 6-46, 83-100.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_702" id="Footnote_16_702"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_702"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Einleitung i. d. Ästh.</i> pp. 100-147.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_703" id="Footnote_17_703"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_703"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 168-170.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_704" id="Footnote_18_704"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_704"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 175-176.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_705" id="Footnote_19_705"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_705"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 46-50, and all part iii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_706" id="Footnote_20_706"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_706"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Einleitung i. d. Ästh.</i> p. 292, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_707" id="Footnote_21_707"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_707"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_91">91</a>-<a href="#Page_92">92</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_708" id="Footnote_22_708"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_708"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Komik und Humor,</i> p. 199 <i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_709" id="Footnote_23_709"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_709"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Eug. Véron, <i>L'Esthétique,</i> 2nd ed. Paris, 1883.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_710" id="Footnote_24_710"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_710"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_711" id="Footnote_25_711"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_711"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_399">399</a>-<a href="#Page_400">400</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_712" id="Footnote_26_712"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_712"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Esthétique,</i> pp. 38, 109, 123 <i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_713" id="Footnote_27_713"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_713"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Correspondance,</i> 1830-1880, 4 vols., new ed., Paris, -1902-1904.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_714" id="Footnote_28_714"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_714"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>What is Art?</i> Eng. tr.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_715" id="Footnote_29_715"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_715"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 171-172, 308.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_716" id="Footnote_30_716"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_716"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 201-202.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_717" id="Footnote_31_717"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_717"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Die Geburt der Tragödie oder Griechenthum und -Pessimismus,</i> 1872 (Ital. trans., Bari, 1907).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_718" id="Footnote_32_718"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_718"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_114">114</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_719" id="Footnote_33_719"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_719"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,</i> Leipzig, 1854; 7th ed. 1885 -(French trans., <i>Du beau dans la musique,</i> Paris, 1877).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_720" id="Footnote_34_720"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_720"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,</i> p. 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_721" id="Footnote_35_721"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_721"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 98.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_722" id="Footnote_36_722"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_722"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 101.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_723" id="Footnote_37_723"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_723"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 119, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_724" id="Footnote_38_724"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_724"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_725" id="Footnote_39_725"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_725"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_726" id="Footnote_40_726"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_726"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,</i> pp. 50-51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_727" id="Footnote_41_727"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_727"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 25-39.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_728" id="Footnote_42_728"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_728"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 122.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_729" id="Footnote_43_729"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_729"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 52, 67, 113, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_730" id="Footnote_44_730"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_730"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> Conrad Fiedler, <i>Der Ursprung der künstlerischen -Thätigkeit,</i> Leipzig, 1887. Collected with others of same author in -<i>Schriften tiber die Kunst,</i> ed. H. Marbach, Leipzig, 1896.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_731" id="Footnote_45_731"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_731"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst,</i> 2nd ed. -1898 (4th ed., Strassburg, 1903).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_732" id="Footnote_46_732"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_732"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_12">12</a>-<a href="#Page_18">18</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_733" id="Footnote_47_733"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_733"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> H. Bergson, <i>Le Rire, essai sur la signification du -comique,</i> Paris, 1900, pp. 153-161 (Eng. tr., London).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_734" id="Footnote_48_734"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_734"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Conrad Hermann, <i>Die Ästhetik in ihrer Geschichte und ah -wissenschaftliches System,</i> Leipzig, 1876.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_735" id="Footnote_49_735"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_735"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Die Ästhetik,</i> etc., <i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_736" id="Footnote_50_736"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_736"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Die Ästhetik,</i> § 56.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_737" id="Footnote_51_737"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_737"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> Willy Nef, <i>Die Ästhetik als Wissenschaft der -anschaulichen Erkenntniss,</i> Leipzig, 1898.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_738" id="Footnote_52_738"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_738"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>A History of Æsthetics,</i> pp. 4-6, 372, 391, 447, 458, -466.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_739" id="Footnote_53_739"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_739"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> B. Croce, <i>La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale -dell' arte,</i> 1893 (2nd ed. entitled <i>Il concetto della storia nelle -sue relazioni col concetto dell' arte,</i> Rome, 1896); P. R. Trojano, -<i>La storia come scienza sociale,</i> vol. i., Naples, 1897; G. Gentile, -<i>Il concetto della storia</i> (in Crivellucci's <i>Studî storici,</i> 1889); -see also F. de Sarlo, <i>Il problema estetico,</i> in <i>Saggi di filosofia,</i> -vol. ii., Turin, 1897; and by same author, <i>I dati dell' esperienza -psichica,</i> Florence, 1903, concluding chapter.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_740" id="Footnote_54_740"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_740"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>La letteratura italiana nel secolo XIX,</i> edited by B. -Croce, Naples, 1896; also <i>Scritti varî,</i> ed. Croce, Naples, 1898, 2 -vols.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_741" id="Footnote_55_741"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_741"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> H. Rickert, <i>Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen -Begriffsbildung,</i> Freiburg i. B., 1896-1902.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="XIX" id="XIX">XIX</a></h4> - - -<h4>HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOME PARTICULAR DOCTRINES</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Result of the history of Æsthetic.</i></div> - - -<p>We have reached the end of our history. Having passed in review the -travail and doubt through which the discovery of the æsthetic concept -was achieved, the vicissitudes first of neglect, then of revival and -rediscovery to which it was exposed, the various oscillations and -failures in its exact determination, the resurrection, triumphant and -overwhelming, of ancient errors supposed to be dead and buried; we -may now conclude, without appearing to assert anything unproven, that -of Æsthetic in the proper sense of the word we have seen very little, -even including the last two centuries' active research. Exceptional -intellects have hit the mark and have supported their views with -energy, with logic, and with consciousness of what they were doing. -It would no doubt be possible to extract many true affirmations -leading to the same point of view from the works of non-philosophical -writers, art-critics and artists, from commonly received opinions and -proverbial sayings; such a collection would show that this handful -of philosophers does not stand alone, but is surrounded by a throng -of supporters and is in perfect agreement with the general mind and -universal common sense. But if Schiller was right in saying that the -rhythm of philosophy is to diverge from common opinion in order to -return with redoubled vigour, it is evident that such divergence is -necessary, and constitutes the growth of science, which is science -itself. During this tedious process Æsthetic made mistakes which were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> -at once deviations from the truth and attempts to reach it: such were -the hedonism of the sophists and rhetoricians of antiquity and of the -sensationalists of the eighteenth and second half of the nineteenth -century; the moralistic hedonism of Aristophanes, of the Stoics, of -the Roman eclectics, of the mediæval and Renaissance writers; the -ascetic and logical hedonism of Plato and the Fathers of the Church, -of some mediæval and even some quite modern rigorists; and finally, -the æsthetic mysticism which first appeared in Plotinus and reappeared -again and again until its last and great triumph in the classical -period of German philosophy. In the midst of these variously erroneous -tendencies, ploughing the field of thought in every direction, a -tenuous golden rivulet seems to flow, formed by the acute empiricism -of Aristotle, the forceful penetration of Vico, the analytical work -of Schleiermacher, Humboldt, De Sanctis and others who echoed them -with weaker voice. This series of thinkers suffices to remind us that -æsthetic science no longer remains to be discovered; but at the same -time the fact that they are so few and so often despised, ignored or -controverted, proves that it is in its infancy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>History of science and history of the scientific criticism -of particular errors.</i></div> - -<p>The birth of a science is like that of a living being: its later -development consists, like every life, in fighting the difficulties -and errors, general and particular, which lurk in its path on every -side. The forms of error are numerous in the extreme and mingle with -each other and with the truth in complications equally numerous: -root out one, another appears in its stead; the uprooted ones also -reappear, though never in the same shape. Hence the necessity for -perpetual scientific criticism and the impossibility of repose or -finality in a science and of an end to further discussion. The errors -which may be described as general, negations of the concept of art -itself, have been touched on from time to time in the course of this -History; whence it may be gathered a simple affirmation of the truth -has not always been accompanied by any considerable recapture of enemy -territory. As to what we have called particular errors, it is clear -that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> when freed from confusing admixture of other forms and divested -of fanciful expression, they reduce themselves to three heads, under -which they have already been criticized in the first or theoretical -part of this work. That is to say, errors may be directed (<i>a</i>) against -the characteristic quality of the æsthetic fact; (<i>b</i>) against the -specific; (<i>c</i>) against the generic: they may involve denial of the -character of intuition, of theoretic contemplation, or of spiritual -activity, which together constitute the æsthetic fact. Among the errors -which fall into these three categories we are now to sketch in outline -the history of those which have had, or have to-day, the greatest -importance. Rather than a history it will be a historical essay, -sufficient to show that, even in the criticism of individual errors, -æsthetic science is in its infancy. If among these errors some appear -to be decadent and nearly forgotten, they are not dead; they have not -accomplished a legal demise at the hands of scientific criticism. -Oblivion or instinctive rejection is not the same thing as scientific -denial.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4><a name="Ic" id="Ic">I</a></h4> - - -<h5>RHETORIC: OR THE THEORY OF ORNATE FORM</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rhetoric in the ancient sense.</i></div> - -<p>Proceeding according to rank in importance, we inevitably head the list -of theories for examination with the theory of Rhetoric, or Ornate Form.</p> - -<p>It will not be superfluous to observe that the meaning given in -modern times to the word Rhetoric, namely, the doctrine of ornate -form, differs from that which it had for the ancients. Rhetoric in -the modern sense is above all a theory of elocution, while elocution -(λέξις, φράσις, ἑρμηνεία, elocutio) was but one portion, and not -the principal one, of ancient Rhetoric. Taken as a whole, it consisted -strictly of a manual or <i>vade-mecum</i> for advocates and politicians; -it concerned itself with the two or the three "styles" (judicial, -deliberative, demonstrative), and gave advice or furnished models to -those striving to produce certain effects by means of speech.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> -No definition of the art is more accurate than that given by its -inventors the earliest Sicilian rhetoricians, scholars of Empedocles -(Corax, Tisias, Gorgias): Rhetoric is the creator of persuasion -(πειθος δημιουργός). It devoted itself to showing the method of -using language so as to create a certain belief, a certain state of -mind, in the hearer; hence the phrase "making the weaker case stronger" -(τὸ τὸν ἥττω λόgον κρείττω ποιεῖν); the "increase or diminution -according to circumstances" (<i>eloquentia in augendo minuendoque -consistit</i>); the advice of Gorgias to "turn a thing to a jest if the -adversary takes it seriously, or to a serious matter if he takes it as -a jest,"<a name="FNanchor_1_742" id="FNanchor_1_742"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_742" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and many similar well-known maxims.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticism from moral point of view.</i></div> - -<p>He who acts in this manner is not only æsthetically accomplished, -as saying beautifully that which he wishes to say; he is also and -especially a practical man with a practical end in view. As a practical -man, however, he cannot evade moral responsibility for his actions; -this point was fastened upon by Plato's polemic against Rhetoric, that -is to say against fluent political charlatans and unscrupulous lawyers -and journalists. Plato was quite right to condemn Rhetoric (when -dissociated from a good purpose) as blameworthy and discreditable, -directed to arouse the passions, a diet ruinous to health, a paint -disastrous to beauty. Even had Rhetoric allied herself to Ethics, -becoming a true guide of the soul (ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ τῶν λόγον); -had Plato's criticism been directed solely against her abusers -(everything being liable to abuse save virtue itself, says Aristotle); -had Rhetoric been purified, producing such an orator as Cicero desired, -<i>non ex rhetorum officinis sed ex academiae spatiis</i><a name="FNanchor_2_743" id="FNanchor_2_743"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_743" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and imposing on -him, with Quintilian, the duty of being <i>vir bonus dicendi peritus</i>;<a name="FNanchor_3_744" id="FNanchor_3_744"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_744" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -yet the unalterable fact remains that Rhetoric can never be considered -a regular science, being formed of a congeries of widely dissimilar -cognitions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Accumulation without system.</i></div> - -<p>It included descriptions of passions and affections, comparisons of -political and judicial institutions, theories of the abbreviated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> -syllogism or enthymeme and of proof leading to a probable conclusion, -pedagogic and popular exposition, literary elocution, declamation and -mimicry, mnemonic, and so forth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its fortunes in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.</i></div> - -<p>The rich and heterogeneous content of this ancient Rhetoric (which -reached its highest development in the hands of Hermagoras of Temnos -in the second century B.C.) gradually diminished in volume with the -decadence of the ancient world and the change in political conditions. -This is not the place to dwell on its fortunes in the Middle Ages or -its partial replacement by formularies and <i>Artes dictandi</i> (and later -by treatises upon the art of preaching), or to quote the reasons given -by such writers as Patrizzi and Tassoni for its disappearance from the -world of their day;<a name="FNanchor_4_745" id="FNanchor_4_745"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_745" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> such history would be well worth writing, but -would be out of place here. We will merely state that whilst conditions -were at work on every side corroding this complex of cognitions, Louis -Vives, Peter Ramus and Patrizzi himself were busy criticizing it from -the point of view of systematic science.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Criticisms by Vives, Ramus and Patrizzi.</i></div> - -<p>Vives emphasized the confused methods of the ancient treatise-writers, -who embraced <i>omnia,</i> united eloquence with morality, and insisted that -the orator must be <i>vir bonus.</i> He rejected four-fifths of ancient -Rhetoric as extraneous: namely, memory, which is necessary in all arts; -invention, which is the matter of each individual art; recitation, -which is external; and disposition, which belongs to invention. He -retained elocution only, not that which treats of <i>quid dicendum,</i> but -of <i>quem ad modum,</i> extending it beyond the three styles or kinds to -include history, apologue, epistles, novels and poetry.<a name="FNanchor_5_746" id="FNanchor_5_746"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_746" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Antiquity -furnishes us with few and faint attempts at such extension; now and -then a Rhetorician ventures to suggest that the γένος ίστορικόν and -ἐπιστολικόν be included in Rhetoric, and even (in spite of opposition) -"infinite"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span> questions, that is to say merely theoretical questions -with no practical application, which amounts to a scientific or -philosophical genus;<a name="FNanchor_6_747" id="FNanchor_6_747"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_747" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> others agreed with Cicero<a name="FNanchor_7_748" id="FNanchor_7_748"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_748" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> that when one had -mastered the most difficult of all arts, forensic eloquence, all else -seemed child's-play (<i>ludus est homini non hebeti</i> ...). Ramus and -his pupil Omer Talon reproached Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian with -having confused Dialectic and Rhetoric; and they assigned invention -and disposition to the former, agreeing with Vives that "elocution" -alone should be allowed to Rhetoric.<a name="FNanchor_8_749" id="FNanchor_8_749"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_749" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Patrizzi, on the other hand, -refused the name of science to either, recognizing them as simple -faculties, containing no individual matter (not even the three genera), -and differentiating them only by attaching the term Dialectic to the -dialogue form and proof of the necessary, and Rhetoric to connected -discourse directed to persuasion in matters of opinion. Patrizzi -observes that "conjoined speech" is used by historians, poets and -philosophers, no less than by orators; and thus approaches the view of -Vives.<a name="FNanchor_9_750" id="FNanchor_9_750"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_750" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Survival into modern times.</i></div> - -<p>In spite of these opinions the body of rhetorical doctrine continued -to flourish in the schools. Patrizzi was forgotten; if Ramus and Vives -had some followers (such as Francisco Sanchez and Keckermann), they -were generally held up to odium by the traditionalists. In the end, -Rhetoric found a supporter in philosophy when Campanella made the -following declaration in his <i>Rational Philosophy</i>: "<i>quodammodo Magiae -portiuncula, quae affectus animi moderator et per ipsos voluntatem ciet -ad quaecumque vult sequenda vel fugienda.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_10_751" id="FNanchor_10_751"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_751" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Baumgarten owed to it -his tripartition of Æsthetic into heuristic, methodology and semeiotic -(invention, disposition and elocution), adopted later by Meier. Among -Meier's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> numerous works is a little book entitled <i>Theoretic Doctrine -of Emotional Disturbances in General</i>,<a name="FNanchor_11_752" id="FNanchor_11_752"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_752" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> considered by him to be a -psychological introduction to æsthetic doctrine. On the other hand, -Immanuel Kant in his <i>Critique of Judgment</i> observes that eloquence, in -the sense of <i>ars oratoria</i> or art of persuasion by means of beautiful -appearance and dialectical form, must be distinguished from beautiful -speaking (<i>Wohlredenheit)</i>; and that the art of oratory, playing upon -the weakness of men to gain its own ends, "is worthy of no esteem" -(<i>gar keiner Achtungwürdig)</i><a name="FNanchor_12_753" id="FNanchor_12_753"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_753" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> But in the schools it flourished in -many celebrated compilations, including one by the French Jesuit Father -Dominique de Colonne, which was in use until some few decades ago. Even -to-day, in so-called Literary Institutions, we come across survivals of -ancient Rhetoric, notably in chapters devoted to the art of oratory; -and fresh manuals on judicial or sacred eloquence (Ortloff, Whately, -etc.<a name="FNanchor_13_754" id="FNanchor_13_754"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_754" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>) are actually appearing, though rarely, to-day. Still, -Rhetoric in the ancient sense may be said to have disappeared from the -system of the sciences; to-day no philosopher would dream of following -Campanella in dedicating a special section of rational philosophy to -Rhetoric.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Modern signification of Rhetoric. Theory of literary form.</i></div> - -<p>In compensation for this process, the theory of elocution and beautiful -speech has been in modern times progressively emphasized and thrown -into scientific form. But the idea of such a science is ancient, as we -have seen; and equally ancient is the style of exposition, consisting -in the doctrine of a double form and the concept of ornate form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Concept of ornament.</i></div> - -<p>The concept of "ornament" must have occurred spontaneously to the mind -as soon as attention was directed to the values of speech by listening -to poets reciting<a name="FNanchor_14_755" id="FNanchor_14_755"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_755" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> or to oratorical contests in public gatherings. -It must very early have been thought that the difference<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> between -good speaking and bad, or between that which gave more pleasure and -that which gave less, between grave or solemn, and commonplace or -colloquial, consisted in something additional superimposed upon the -canvas of ordinary speech like an embroidery by a skilful orator. These -considerations led the Græco-Roman rhetoricians to adopt the practice, -like the Indians, who arrived at the distinction independently, to -distinguish the bare (ψιλή) or purely grammatical form from another -form containing an addition which they called ornament, κόσμος: <i>ornatum -est</i> (Quintilian will serve, as typical of all the rest) quod perspicuo -ac probabili plus est.<a name="FNanchor_15_756" id="FNanchor_15_756"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_756" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<p>The notion of ornament as something added on from outside forms the -basis of the theory which Aristotle, the philosopher of Rhetoric, gave -of the queen of ornaments, Metaphor. According to him the high pleasure -aroused by metaphor arises from the collocation of different terms -and the discovery of relations between species and genera, producing -"learning and knowledge by means of the genus" (μαθησιν καi γνῶσιν -διὰ τοῦ γένους), and that easy learning which is the greatest of human -pleasures,<a name="FNanchor_16_757" id="FNanchor_16_757"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_757" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> which amounts to saying that metaphor adds to the -concept under consideration a group of minor incidental cognitions, as -a kind of diversion and relief and pleasant instruction for the mind.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Classes of ornament.</i></div> - -<p>Ornaments were divided and subdivided in a number of different ways. -Aristotle (and previously Isocrates, rather differently) classified -the ornaments which diversify bare or nude form, under the heads of -dialect forms, substitutions and epithets, prolongations, truncations -and abbreviations of words, and other departures from common usage, -and, finally, rhythm and harmony. Substitutions were of four classes: -species for genus; genus for species; species for species; and -proportionate.<a name="FNanchor_17_758" id="FNanchor_17_758"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_758" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> After Aristotle, elocution was especially studied -by Theophrastus and Demetrius Phalereus; these rhetoricians and their -followers further solidified the classification of ornament<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span> by -distinguishing tropes from figures (σχήματα) and dividing figures -into figures of speech (scheimata τῆς λέχεως) and of thought -(τῆς διανοίας), figures of speech into grammatical and rhetorical, -and figures of thought into pathetic and ethic. Substitutions were -divided into fourteen principal forms, metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, -antonomasia, onomatopeia, catachresis, metalepsis, epithet, allegory, -enigma, irony, periphrase, hyperbaton and hyperbole; each divided -into subspecies and contrasted with its relative vice. Figures of -speech amounted to a score or so (repetition, anaphora, antistrophe, -climax, asyndeton, assonance, etc.); figures of thought to about the -same number (interrogation, prosopopœia, ætiopœia, hypotyposis, -commotion, simulation, exclamation, apostrophe, aposiopesis, etc.). -If these divisions have any value as aids to memory in relation to -particular literary forms, considered rationally they are simply -capricious, as is evidenced by the fact that many classes of the ornate -appear now under the heading of tropes, now of figures; sometimes -under figures of speech, then as those of thought, no reason for the -alteration is given except the arbitrary caprice of an individual -rhetorician which so decrees and disposes. And since one function -which may be fulfilled by the rhetorical categories is to point -out the divergence between two ways of expressing the same thing, -one of which is arbitrarily selected as "proper,"<a name="FNanchor_18_759" id="FNanchor_18_759"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_759" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> it is easy -to see why the ancients defined metaphor as "<i>verbi vel sermonis a -propria significatione in aliam cum virtute mutatio,</i>" and figure as -"<i>conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerenti -ratione.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_19_760" id="FNanchor_19_760"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_760" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concept of the Fitting.</i></div> - -<p>So far as we know, antiquity raised no revolt against the theory of -ornament or of double form. We do sometimes hear Cicero, Quintilian, -Seneca and others saying, <i>Ipsae res verba rapiunt, Pectus est quod -disertos facit et vis mentis, Rem tene, verba sequentur, Curam -verborum rerum volo esse sollicitudinem,</i> or <i>Nulla est verborum nisi -rei cohaerentium virtus.</i> But these maxims did not bear the weighty -meanings which we moderns might attach to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> them; they were perhaps in -contradiction with the theory of ornament, but as the contradiction was -unheeded, it was ineffective: they were the protests of common sense, -powerless to combat the fallacies of school doctrine. Moreover, the -latter was fitted with a safety-valve, a sage contrivance to disguise -its inherent absurdity. If the ornate consisted of a <i>plus,</i> in what -degree should it be used? if it gave pleasure, must we not conclude -that the more it were used, the greater the pleasure derived? would its -extravagant use be attended by extravagant pleasure? Herein was peril: -instinctively the rhetoricians hastened to the defence, snatching -up the first weapon that came to hand, namely, the fitting (πρέπον) -Ornament must be used carefully; neither too much too little; <i>in medio -virtus</i>; as much as is fitting (ἀλλά πρέπον). Aristotle recommends -a style seasoned with "a certain dose" (δεῑ ἃρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως -τούτοις.) for ornament should be a condiment, not a food (ἤδυσμα, οὐκ -ἒδεσμα). <a name="FNanchor_20_761" id="FNanchor_20_761"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_761" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> The fitting was a concept quite inconsistent with that of -ornament; it was a rival, and enemy, destined to destroy it. Fitting to -what? to expression of course; but that which is fitting to expression -cannot be called an ornament, an external addition; it coincides with -expression itself. But the rhetoricians contented themselves with -maintaining peaceful relations between the ornate and the fitting, -without troubling to mediate them through a third concept. The -pseudo-Longinus alone in answer to an observation of his predecessor -Cæcilius that more than two or three metaphors must not be used in -the same place, remarked that a larger number ought to be used where -passion (τὰ πάθη) rushes headlong like a torrent, carrying with it as -necessaries (ὡς ἀναγκαῑον) a multitude of such substitutions.<a name="FNanchor_21_762" id="FNanchor_21_762"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_762" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of ornament in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.</i></div> - -<p>Preserved in the compilations of later antiquity (such as the works of -Donatus and Priscian and the celebrated allegorical tract of Marcianus -Capella), and in the compendia of Bede, Rhabanus Maurus and others, -the theory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> of ornament passed to the Middle Ages. Throughout this -period Rhetoric, Grammar and Logic continued to form the <i>trivium</i> of -the schools. The theory was to some extent favoured in mediæval times -by the fact that writers and scholars made use of a dead language; -this helped to reinforce the idea that beautiful form was not a -spontaneous thing but consisted in an addition or embroidery. Under the -Renaissance the theory continued to flourish and was revived by study -of the best classical sources; to the works of Cicero were added the -<i>Institutiones</i> of Quintilian and the <i>Rhetoric</i> of Aristotle, with the -host of minor Latin and Greek rhetoricians, amongst whom was Hermogenes -with his celebrated <i>Ideas,</i> brought into fashion by Giulio Camillo.<a name="FNanchor_22_763" id="FNanchor_22_763"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_763" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<p>Even those writers who dared to criticize the organism of ancient -Rhetoric left the theory of ornament unassailed. Vives lamented -over the "exaggerated subtlety of the Greeks" which had multiplied -distinctions to infinity in this matter without diffusing light,<a name="FNanchor_23_764" id="FNanchor_23_764"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_764" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> -but he never took up a definite stand against the theory of ornament. -Patrizzi was dissatisfied with the insufficient definition of -ornament given by the ancients; but he asserted the existence of -ornaments and metaphors as well as seven different modes of "conjoined -speech,"—narrative, proof, amplification, diminution, ornament with -its contrary, elevation and depression.<a name="FNanchor_24_765" id="FNanchor_24_765"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_765" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> The school of Ramus -continued to entrust Rhetoric with the "embellishment" of thought. -Owing to the vast extension and intensification of life and literature -in the sixteenth century, it would be easy to quote phrases, as we have -done from ancient authors, asserting the strict dependence of speech -upon the things it wishes to express, and lively attacks on pedants -and pedantic forms and rules for beautiful speech. But what would be -the use? The theory of ornament was always in the background, tacitly -admitted as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> indisputable by all. Juan de Valdés, for instance, makes -the following confession of stylistic faith: "<i>Escribo como hablo; -solamente tengo cuidado de usar de vocablos que sinifiquen bien lo -que quiero decir, y dígolo cuanto más llanamente me es posible, -porqué, á mi parecer, en ninguna lengua está bien la afectación.</i>" -But Valdés also says that beautiful language consists "<i>en que digais -lo que quereis con las menos palabras que pudiéredes, de tal manera -que ... no se pueda quitar ninguna sin ofender á la sentencia, ó -al encarescimiento, ó á la elegancia.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_25_766" id="FNanchor_25_766"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_766" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Here it seems that -amplification and elegance are conceived as extraneous to the meaning -or content.—A gleam of truth is visible in Montaigne, who, confronted -by the laboured categories into which rhetoricians divide ornament, -observes: "<i>Oyez dire Métonymie, Métaphore, Allégorie et aultres tels -noms de la Grammaire; semble il pas qu'on signifie quelque forme de -langage rare et pellegrin? Ce sont tiltres qui touchent le babil de -vostre chambrière.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_26_767" id="FNanchor_26_767"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_767" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> That is to say, they are anything but language -remote from the <i>primum se offerens ratio.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Reductio ad absurdum in the seventeenth century.</div> - -<p>The impossibility of upholding the theory of ornament was first noticed -during the decadence of Italian literature in the seventeenth century, -when literary production became but a play of empty forms, and the -convenient, long violated in practice, was abandoned and forgotten even -in theory, and came to be looked on as a limit arbitrarily imposed on -the fundamental principle of ornamentation. The opponents of that style -loaded with conceits which is known as "secentismo" from its prevalence -in the seventeenth century (Matteo Pellegrini, Orsi and others) felt -the viciousness of the literary production of their day; they were -aware that decadence was due to the fact that literature was no longer -the serious expression of a content; but they were embarrassed by the -reasoning of the champions of bad taste, who were able to demonstrate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> -that the whole business conformed in every particular with the literary -theory of ornament, the common ground of both parties. In vain did the -former appeal to the "convenient," the "moderate," the "avoidance of -affectation," to ornament as "condiment, not food," and all the other -weapons which had sufficed in times when healthy literary production -and sound æsthetic taste had automatically corrected faulty theory: -the other party replied, there was no reason to be sparing in use -of ornament when it lay in masses ready to hand, or to avoid an -ostentatious display of wit when one had an inexhaustible supply.<a name="FNanchor_27_768" id="FNanchor_27_768"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_768" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Polemic concerning the theory of ornament.</i></div> - -<p>The same reaction against the abuse of ornament, against "Spanish and -Italian conceits" (whose supporters had been Gracian in Spain and -Tesauro in Italy), took place in France. "... <i>Laissez à l'Italie -De tous ces faux brillants l'éclatante folie"; "Ce que l'on conçoit -bien s'énonce clairement. Et les mots, pour le dire, arrivent -aisément.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_28_769" id="FNanchor_28_769"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_769" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Among the sharpest critics of conceits was the Jesuit -Bouhours, already quoted, author of the <i>Manière de bien penser dans -les œuvres d'esprit.</i> The rhetorical forms were the subject of warm -controversy. Orsi, on national grounds the opponent of Bouhours (1703), -asserted that all the ornamental devices of wit rested on a middle -term and could be reduced to a rhetorical syllogism, and that wit -consists of a truth which appears false or a falsehood which appears -true.<a name="FNanchor_29_770" id="FNanchor_29_770"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_770" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> If this controversy produced no great scientific result at -the time, at least it prepared the mind for greater liberty; and, as -we have remarked elsewhere,<a name="FNanchor_30_771" id="FNanchor_30_771"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_771" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> it may have influenced Vico, who, in -framing his new concept of poetical imagination, recognized that it -necessitated a wholesale reconstruction of the theory of rhetoric -and the conclusion that its figures and tropes are not "caprices of -pleasure" but "necessities of the human mind."<a name="FNanchor_31_772" id="FNanchor_31_772"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_772" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Du Marsais and metaphor.</i></div> - -<p>We find the theory of rhetorical ornament jealously kept intact by -Baumgarten and Meier, while in France it was as vigorously assailed -by César Chesneau du Marsais, who published in 1730 a treatise on -<i>Tropes</i> (the seventh part of his <i>General Grammar</i>)<a name="FNanchor_32_773" id="FNanchor_32_773"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_773" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> wherein he -develops, on the subject of metaphor, the observation already made by -Montaigne: indeed he was perhaps inspired by Montaigne, although he -does not mention his name. Du Marsais remarks that it is said that -figures are modes of speech and turns of expression removed from the -ordinary and common; which is an empty phrase, as good as saying "the -figured differs from the non-figured and figures are figures and not -non-figures." On the other hand it is wholly untrue that figures -are removed from ordinary speech, for "nothing is more natural, -ordinary and common than figures: more figures of speech are used -in the town square on a market-day than in many days of academical -discussion"; and no speech, however short, can be composed entirely of -non-figurative expressions. And Du Marsais gives instances of quite -obvious and spontaneous expressions in which Rhetoric cannot refuse -to recognize the figures of apostrophe, congeries, interrogation, -ellipsis, prosopopœia: "The apostles were persecuted and suffered -their persecutions with patience. What can be more natural than -the description given by St. Paul? <i>Maledicimur et benedicimus; -persecutionem patimur et sustinemus; blasphemamur et obsecramus.</i> -Yet the apostle makes use of a fine figure of antithesis; cursing is -the opposite to blessing; persecution to endurance; blasphemy to -prayer." But further, the very language of the figure is figured, -since it is a metaphor.—But after such acute observations, Du Marsais -ends by himself becoming confused and defines figures as "manners of -speech differing from others in a particular modification by which it -is possible to reduce each one to a species apart, and give a more -lively, noble or pleasing effect than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> can be gained by a manner of -speech expressing the same content of thought without such particular -modification."<a name="FNanchor_33_774" id="FNanchor_33_774"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_774" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Psychological interpretation.</i></div> - -<p>But the psychological interpretation of figures of speech, the first -stage towards their æsthetic criticism, was not allowed to drop here. -In his <i>Elements of Criticism,</i> Home says that he had long questioned -whether that part of Rhetoric concerning figures might not be reduced -to rational principles, and had finally discovered that figures consist -in the passional element;<a name="FNanchor_34_775" id="FNanchor_34_775"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_775" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> he set himself therefore to analyse -prosopopœia, apostrophe and hyperbole in the light of the passional -faculty. From Du Marsais and Home is derived everything of value in the -<i>Lectures on Rhetoric and belles lettres</i> of Hugh Blair, professor -at Edinburgh University from 1759 onwards;<a name="FNanchor_35_776" id="FNanchor_35_776"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_776" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> published in book form, -these lectures had an immense vogue in all the schools of Europe -including those of Italy, and replaced advantageously, by their "reason -and good sense," works of a much cruder type. Blair defined figures -in general as "language suggested by imagination or passion."<a name="FNanchor_36_777" id="FNanchor_36_777"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_777" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> -Similar ideas were promulgated in France by Marmontel in his <i>Elements -of Literature</i>.<a name="FNanchor_37_778" id="FNanchor_37_778"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_778" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> In Italy Cesarotti was contrasting the logical -element or "cypher-terms" of language with the rhetorical element or -"figure-terms," and rational eloquence with imaginative eloquence.<a name="FNanchor_38_779" id="FNanchor_38_779"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_779" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> -Beccaria, though a shrewd psychological analyst, held to the view of -literary style as "accessory ideas or feelings added to the principal -in any discourse"; that is, he failed to free himself from the -distinction between the intellectual form intended for the expression -of the principal ideas, and the literary form, modifying the first by -the addition of accessory ideas.<a name="FNanchor_39_780" id="FNanchor_39_780"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_780" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> In Germany an effort was made by -Herder to interpret tropes and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span> metaphors as Vico had done, that is to -say as essential to primitive language and poetry.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Romanticism and Rhetoric. Present day.</i></div> - -<p>Romanticism was the ruin of the theory of ornament, and caused it -practically to be thrown on the scrap-heap, but it cannot be said -to have gone under for good or to have been superseded by a new and -accurately stated theory. The chief philosophers of Æsthetic (not -only Kant, who as we know remained in bondage to the mechanical and -ornamental theory; not only Herder, whose knowledge of art seems to -have been confined to a little music and a great deal of rhetoric; -but such romantic philosophers as Schelling, Solger and Hegel) still -retained the sections devoted to metaphor, trope and allegory for -tradition's sake, without severe scrutiny. Italian Romanticism with -Manzoni at its head destroyed the belief in beautiful and elegant -words, and dealt a blow at Rhetoric: but was it killed by the stroke? -Apparently not, judging by the concessions unconsciously made by the -scholastic treatise-writer Ruggero Bonghi, whose <i>Critical Letters</i> -assert the existence of two styles or forms, which at bottom are -nothing else than the plain and the ornate.<a name="FNanchor_40_781" id="FNanchor_40_781"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_781" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> German schools of -philology have pretty generally accepted the stylistic theory of -Gröber, who divides style into logical (objective) and affective -(subjective):<a name="FNanchor_41_782" id="FNanchor_41_782"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_782" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> an ancient error masked by terminology borrowed from -the psychological philosophy in fashion at modern universities. In -the same spirit a recent writer rechristens the rhetorical doctrine -of tropes and figures by the title "Doctrine of the Forms of Æsthetic -Apperception," and divides them into the four categories (the ancient -wealth of categories reduced to a paltry four!) of personification, -metaphor, antithesis, and symbol.<a name="FNanchor_42_783" id="FNanchor_42_783"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_783" class="fnanchor">[42]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> Biese has devoted an entire -book to metaphor; but one searches it in vain for a serious æsthetic -analysis of this category.<a name="FNanchor_43_784" id="FNanchor_43_784"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_784" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p> - -<p>The best scientific criticism of the theory of ornament is found -scattered throughout the writings of De Sanctis, who when lecturing on -rhetoric preached what he called anti-rhetoric.<a name="FNanchor_44_785" id="FNanchor_44_785"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_785" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> But even here the -criticism is not conducted from a strictly systematic point of view. It -seems to us that the true criticism should be deduced negatively from -the very nature of æsthetic activity, which does not lend itself to -partition; there is no such thing as activity type <i>a</i> or type <i>b,</i> nor -can the same concept be expressed now in one way, now in another. Such -is the only way of abolishing the double monster of bare form which -is, no one knows how, deprived of imagination, and ornate form which -contains, no one knows how, an addition on the side of imagination.<a name="FNanchor_45_786" id="FNanchor_45_786"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_786" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_742" id="Footnote_1_742"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_742"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> For Gorgias' saying see Aristotle, <i>Rhet.</i> iii. ch. 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_743" id="Footnote_2_743"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_743"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Cicero, <i>Orat. ad Brut.,</i> introd.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_744" id="Footnote_3_744"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_744"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Quintilian, <i>Inst. orat.</i> xii. c. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_745" id="Footnote_4_745"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_745"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Fran. Patrizzi, <i>Della rhetorica,</i> ten dialogues, Venice, -1582, dial. 7; Tassoni, <i>Pensieri diversi,</i> bk. x. ch. 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_746" id="Footnote_5_746"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_746"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>De causis corruptarum artium,</i> 1531, bk. iv.; <i>De ratione -dicendi,</i> 1533.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_747" id="Footnote_6_747"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_747"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Cicero, <i>De or at:</i> i. chs. 10-11; Quintil. <i>Inst. oral.</i> -iii. ch. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_748" id="Footnote_7_748"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_748"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>De orat.</i> ii. chs. 16-17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_749" id="Footnote_8_749"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_749"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> P. Ramus, <i>Instil, dialecticæ,</i> 1543; <i>Scholæ in artes -liberales,</i> 1555 etc.; Talæus, <i>Instit. orator.,</i> 1545.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_750" id="Footnote_9_750"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_750"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Della rhetorica,</i> dial. 10, and <i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_751" id="Footnote_10_751"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_751"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Ration. Philos.,</i> part iii. <i>Rhetoricorum liber unus -juxta propria dogmata</i> (Paris, 1636), ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_752" id="Footnote_11_752"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_752"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Theoretische Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen überhaupt,</i> -Halle, 1744.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_753" id="Footnote_12_753"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_753"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. Urtheils kraft,</i> § 53 and <i>n.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_754" id="Footnote_13_754"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_754"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> H. F. Ortloff, <i>Die gerichtliche Redekunst,</i> Neuwied, -1887; R. Whately, <i>Rhetoric,</i> 1828 (for <i>Encyd. Brit.</i>); Ital. trans., -Pistoia, 1889.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_755" id="Footnote_14_755"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_755"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Aristotle, <i>Rhet.</i> iii. ch. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_756" id="Footnote_15_756"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_756"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Quintil. <i>Inst. orat.</i> viii. ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_757" id="Footnote_16_757"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_757"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Rhet.</i> iii. ch. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_758" id="Footnote_17_758"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_758"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Poet.</i> chs. 19-22; cf. <i>Rhet.</i> iii. cc. 2, 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_759" id="Footnote_18_759"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_759"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> See above, pp. 68-69.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_760" id="Footnote_19_760"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_760"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Quintilian, <i>Inst. orat.</i> viii. ch. 6; ix. ch. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_761" id="Footnote_20_761"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_761"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Aristotle, <i>Rhet.</i> iii. ch. 2; <i>Poet.</i> ch. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_762" id="Footnote_21_762"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_762"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>De sublimitate</i> (in <i>Rhet. græci,</i> ed. Spengel, vol. 1. -§ 32.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_763" id="Footnote_22_763"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_763"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Giulio Camillo Delminio, <i>Discorso sopra le Idee di -Ermogene</i> (in <i>Opere,</i> Venice, 1560); and trans. of Hermogenes (Udine, -1594).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_764" id="Footnote_23_764"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_764"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>De causis corruptarum artium, loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_765" id="Footnote_24_765"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_765"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Della rhetorica,</i> dial. 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_766" id="Footnote_25_766"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_766"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Diálogo de las lenguas</i> (ed. Mayans y Siscar, <i>Origines -de la lengua espanola,</i> Madrid, 1873), pp. 115, 119.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_767" id="Footnote_26_767"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_767"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Essais,</i> i. ch. 52 (ed. Garnier, i. 285); ci. <i>ibid.</i> -chs. 10, 25, 39; 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_768" id="Footnote_27_768"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_768"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Croce, <i>I trattatisti italiani del concettismo,</i> pp. -8-22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_769" id="Footnote_28_769"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_769"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Boileau, <i>Art poétique,</i> i. 11. 43-44, 153-154.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_770" id="Footnote_29_770"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_770"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> G. G. Orsi, <i>Considerazioni sopra la maniera di ben -pensare,</i> etc., 1703 (reprinted Modena, 1735, with all polemics -relating thereto).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_771" id="Footnote_30_771"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_771"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_230">230</a>-<a href="#Page_231">231</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_772" id="Footnote_31_772"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_772"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_225">225</a>-<a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_773" id="Footnote_32_773"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_773"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Des tropes ou des différens sens dans lesquels on peut -prendre un même mot dans une même langue.</i> Paris, 1730 (<i>Œuvres de -Du Marsais,</i> Paris, 1797, vol. i.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_774" id="Footnote_33_774"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_774"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Des tropes ou des différens sens dans lesquels on peut -prendre un même mot dans une même langue,</i> part i. art. 1; cf. art. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_775" id="Footnote_34_775"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_775"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Elem. of Criticism,</i> iii. ch. 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_776" id="Footnote_35_776"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_776"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Hugh Blair, <i>Lectures on Rhetoric and belles lettres</i> -(London, 1823).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_777" id="Footnote_36_777"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_777"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Lect. on Rhet. and belles lettres,</i> lecture 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_778" id="Footnote_37_778"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_778"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Marmontel, <i>Éléments de littéral,</i> (in <i>Œuvres,</i> Paris, -1819), iv. p. 559.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_779" id="Footnote_38_779"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_779"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Cesarotti, <i>Saggio sulla filos. del linguaggio,</i> part ii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_780" id="Footnote_39_780"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_780"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Ricerche intorno alla natura dello stile</i> (Turin, 1853), -ch. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_781" id="Footnote_40_781"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_781"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> R. Bonghi, <i>Lettere critiche,</i> 1856 (4th ed., Naples, -1884), pp. 37 65-67, 90, 103.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_782" id="Footnote_41_782"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_782"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Gustav Gröber, <i>Grundriss d. romanischen Philologie,</i> -vol. 1. pp. 200-250, K. Vossler, <i>B. Cellinis Stil in seiner Vita, -Versuch einer psychol. Stilbetrachtung,</i> Halle a. S., 1899; cf. -the self-criticism of Vossler, <i>Positivismus u. Idealismus in der -Sprachwissenschaft,</i> Heidelberg, 1904 (It. trans., Bari, Laterza, -1908).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_783" id="Footnote_42_783"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_783"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Ernst Elsteb, <i>Principien d. Literaturwissenschaft,</i> -Halle a. S., 1097. vol. i. pp. 359-413.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_784" id="Footnote_43_784"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_784"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Biese, <i>Philos, des Metaphorischen,</i> Hamburg-Leipzig, -1893.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_785" id="Footnote_44_785"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_785"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>La Giovinezza di Fr. de S.</i> chs. 23, 25; <i>Scritti varî,</i> -ii. pp. 272-274.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_786" id="Footnote_45_786"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_786"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_67">67</a>-<a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIc" id="IIc">II</a></h4> - - -<h5>HISTORY OF THE ARTISTIC AND LITERARY KINDS</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The kinds in antiquity. Aristotle.</i></div> - - -<p>The theory of artistic and literary kinds and of the laws or rules -proper to each separate kind has almost always followed the fortunes of -the rhetorical theory.</p> - -<p>Traces of the threefold division into epic, lyric and dramatic are -found in Plato; and Aristophanes gives an example of criticism -according to the canon of the kinds, particularly that of tragedy.<a name="FNanchor_1_787" id="FNanchor_1_787"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_787" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -But the most conspicuous theoretical treatment of the kinds bequeathed -us by antiquity is precisely the doctrine of Tragedy which forms a -large part of the Aristotelian fragment known as the Poetics. Aristotle -defines such a composition as an imitation of a serious and complete -action, having size,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span> in language adorned in accordance with the -requirements of the different parts, its exposition to be by action and -not by narration, and using pity or terror as means to free or purify -us from these same passions;<a name="FNanchor_2_788" id="FNanchor_2_788"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_788" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> he gives minute details as to the six -parts of which it is composed, especially the plot and the tragic -character. It has been often said, ever since the days of Vincenzo -Maggio in the sixteenth century, that Aristotle treated of the nature -of poetry, or particular forms of poetry, without claiming to give -precepts. But Piccolomini answered that "all these things and other -similar ones are shown or asserted with no other purpose but that we -may see in what way their precepts and laws must be obeyed and carried -out," just as, to make a hammer or saw, one begins by describing -the parts of which they are composed.<a name="FNanchor_3_789" id="FNanchor_3_789"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_789" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The error of which we take -Aristotle as representative lies in transmuting abstractions and -empirical partitions into rational concepts: this was almost inevitable -at the beginnings of æsthetic reflexion, and the Sanskrit theory of -poetry employed the same method independently when, for example, it -defines and legislates for ten principal and eighteen secondary styles -of drama; forty-eight varieties of hero; and we know not how many kinds -of heroines.<a name="FNanchor_4_790" id="FNanchor_4_790"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_790" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>In the Middle Ages and Renaissance</i>.</div> - -<p>After Aristotle, the theory of poetic kinds does not seem to have been -completely or elaborately developed in antiquity. The Middle Ages may -be said to have expressed the doctrine in treatises of the kind known -as "rhythmic arts" or "methods of composition." When the Aristotelian -fragment was first noticed, it is curious to see the way in which -the paraphrase of Averroes distorted the theory of kinds. Averroes -conceives tragedy as the art of praise, comedy as that of blame, -which amounts to identifying the former with panegyric, the latter -with satire; and he believes the <i>peripeteia</i> to be the same thing as -antithesis, or the artifice of beginning the description of a thing by -describing its opposite.<a name="FNanchor_5_791" id="FNanchor_5_791"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_791" class="fnanchor">[5]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span> This distortion demonstrates afresh the -merely historical character of these kinds and their unintelligibility -by the methods of pure logic to a thinker living in times and under -customs different from those of the Hellenic world. The Renaissance -seized upon Aristotle's text, partly expounded it, partly distorted it -and partly thought it out afresh, and thus succeeded in establishing -a long list of kinds and sub-kinds rigidly defined and subjected to -inexorable laws. Controversy now began over the correct understanding -of the unities of epic or dramatic poetry; over the moral quality and -social standing proper to the characters in this kind of poem and in -that; over the nature of the plot, and whether it includes passions and -thoughts, and whether lyrics should or should not be received as true -poetry; whether the material of tragedy should be historical; whether -the dialogue of comedy may be in prose; whether a happy ending may -be allowed in tragedy; whether the tragic character may be a perfect -gentleman; what kind and number of episodes is admissible in the poem, -and how they should be incorporated in the main plot; and so on. -Great anguish was caused by the mysterious rule of catharsis found in -black and white in Aristotle's text, and Segni naïvely predicted that -tragic poetry would be revived in its perfect spectacular entirety -for the sake of experiencing the effect spoken of by Aristotle, that -"purgation" which causes "the birth of tranquillity in the soul and of -freedom of all perturbation."<a name="FNanchor_6_792" id="FNanchor_6_792"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_792" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The doctrine of the three unities.</i></div> - -<p>Amongst the many undertakings brought to a glorious end by the critics -and treatise-writers of the sixteenth century, the best known is the -establishment of the three unities of time, place and action. One -cannot indeed see why they are called unities, for in strictness they -could at most be spoken of as shortness of time, straitness of space -and limitation of tragic subjects to a certain class of action. It is -well known that Aristotle prescribed unity of action only, and reminded -his hearers that theatrical custom alone imposed on the action a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> -time-limit of one day. On this last point the critics of the sixteenth -century accorded six, eight, or twelve hours according to individual -taste or humour: some of them (amongst them Segni) allowed twenty-four -hours, including the night as particularly propitious to assassinations -and the other acts of violence which usually form the plot of -tragedies; others extended the limit to thirty-six or forty-eight -hours. The last, and most curious, unity, that of place, was slowly -developed by Castelvetro, Riccoboni and Scaliger until the Frenchman -Jean de la Taille joined it as a third to the existing two in 1572, and -in 1598 Angelo Ingegneri finally formulated it more explicitly.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Poetics of the kinds and rules. Scaliger.</i></div> - -<p>The Italian treatises were widely read and regarded as authoritative -all over Europe, and awakened the first effort towards a learned theory -of poetry in France, Spain. England and Germany. A good representative -of his class is Julius Cæsar Scaliger, who has been considered, with -some exaggeration, as the true founder of French pseudo-classicism or -neo-classicism; as one who (it has been said) "laid the first stone of -the classical Bastille." But if he was neither the first nor the only -one, he certainly helped greatly to reduce "to a system of doctrines -the principal consequences of the sovranty of Reason in works of -literature," with his minute distinctions and classifications of kinds, -the insurmountable barriers he erected between them, and his distrust -of free inspiration and imagination.<a name="FNanchor_7_793" id="FNanchor_7_793"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_793" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Scaliger numbers among his -descendants (beside Daniel Heinsius) d'Aubignac, Rapin, Dacier and -other tyrants of French literature and drama: Boileau turned the rules -of neo-classicism into neat verses.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Lessing.</i></div> - -<p>It has been noticed that Lessing entered the same field; his opposition -to the French rules (which was an opposition of rule to rule, in which -he had been forestalled by Italian writers, for example by Calepio in -1732) is anything but radical. Lessing maintained that Corneille and -other authors had misinterpreted Aristotle, to whose laws even the -Shakespearian drama could be shown to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span> conform;<a name="FNanchor_8_794" id="FNanchor_8_794"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_794" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> but on the other -hand he strongly opposed the abolition of all rules and those who -shouted "genius, genius," placing genius above the law and saying that -genius makes the law. For the very reason that genius is law, replied -Lessing, laws have their value and can be determined: negation of them -would entail the confinement of genius to its first trial flights, -making example or practice useless.<a name="FNanchor_9_795" id="FNanchor_9_795"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_795" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Compromises and extensions.</i></div> - -<p>But the "kinds" and their "limits" could be maintained for centuries -solely by means of infinitely subtle interpretations, analogical -extensions and more or less concealed compromises. The Italian -Renaissance critics, while working at their Poetics in the style of -Aristotle, found themselves confronted with chivalric poetry, and had -to make the best of it; this they did by assigning it to a kind of poem -not foreseen by antiquity (Giraldi Cintio).<a name="FNanchor_10_796" id="FNanchor_10_796"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_796" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Here and there indeed -a rigorist was heard protesting that romances were in no way different -from heroic poetry, and were only "badly written heroics" (Salviati). -And since it was impossible to deny a place in Italian literature to -Dante's poem, Iacopo Mazzoni, in his <i>Defence of Dante,</i> overhauled -once more the categories of Poetics in order to find a niche for the -sacred poem.<a name="FNanchor_11_797" id="FNanchor_11_797"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_797" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> Farces made their appearance at this time, and Cecchi -(1585) declares "Farce is a third novelty, occupying a place between -tragedy and comedy ..."<a name="FNanchor_12_798" id="FNanchor_12_798"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_798" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The <i>Pastor fido</i> of Guarini was published, -neither tragedy nor comedy, but tragicomedy; and discovering no heading -among the kinds deduced from moral or civil philosophy suitable for -the intruder, Jason de Nores proceeded to rule it out of existence; -Guarini made a valiant defence and claimed special protection for his -beloved <i>Pastor</i> under a third, or mixed, style, representative of real -life.<a name="FNanchor_13_799" id="FNanchor_13_799"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_799" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Another<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> rigorist, Fioretti (Udeno Nisieli) proclaimed the -poem "a poetic monster, so huge and deformed that centaurs, hippogriffs -and chimæras are comparatively graceful and charming ..., fit to bring -a blush to the cheek of the muse, a disgrace to poetry, a mixture of -ingredients in themselves discordant, inimical and incompatible";<a name="FNanchor_14_800" id="FNanchor_14_800"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_800" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -but will this bluster drive the delicious <i>Pastor fido</i> from the hands -of lovers of poetry? The same thing occurred in the case of Marino's -<i>Adone,</i> described by Chapelain as "a poem of peace" for want of -a better definition, though other supporters called it "a new form -of epic poem";<a name="FNanchor_15_801" id="FNanchor_15_801"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_801" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> and the same thing happened again in the case of -the comedy of art and musical drama. Corneille, who had called down -a furious tempest from Scudéry and the Academicians on the head of -his <i>Cid,</i> remarked in his discourse on Tragedy, though basing his -position on that of Aristotle, that there was necessity for "<i>quelque -modération, quelque favorable interprétation,... pour n'être pas -obligés de condamner beaucoup de poèmes, que nous avons vu réussir sur -nos théâtres." "Il est aisé de nous accommoder avec Aristote</i>..."<a name="FNanchor_16_802" id="FNanchor_16_802"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_802" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> -he says in another place: a piece of literary hypocrisy which startles -by its verbal resemblance to "<i>les accommodements avec le Ciel</i>" of -the Tartuffian ethics. The following century saw the accepted kinds -augmented by "bourgeois tragedy" and pathetic comedy, nicknamed -"lachrymose" by its enemies; de Chassiron<a name="FNanchor_17_803" id="FNanchor_17_803"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_803" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> attacked, and Diderot, -Gellert and Lessing<a name="FNanchor_18_804" id="FNanchor_18_804"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_804" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> defended the new arrival. In this way the -schematism of the kinds continued to suffer violence and to cut a very -poor figure; nevertheless, in spite of adversity, it made every effort -to retain power even at the sacrifice of dignity: just as an absolute -king turns constitutional by force of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span> circumstance, and chooses the -lesser evil of squaring his divine right with the will of the nation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rebellion against rules in general.</i></div> - -<p>This retention of power would have been more difficult had any success -attended the attempts at rebellion against all laws, against law in -general, which broke out in varying degrees at the end of the sixteenth -century. Pietro Aretino made mock of the most sacred precepts: in a -prologue to one of his comedies he remarks derisively, "If you see more -than five characters on the stage at once, do not laugh; for chains -which would fasten water-mills to the river could not hold the fools of -to-day."<a name="FNanchor_19_805" id="FNanchor_19_805"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_805" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>G. Bruno. Guarini.</i></div> - -<p>A philosopher, Giordano Bruno, entered the lists against the -"regulators of poetry": rules, said he, are derived from poetry: "there -are as many genera and species of true rules as there are genera and -species of true poets"; such an individualization of kinds dealt them -a deathblow. "How then" (asks the interlocutory opponent) "shall -veritable poets be recognized?" "By their singing of verse" (answers -Bruno); "of that which, being sung, either delights or instructs, or -delights and instructs at the same time."<a name="FNanchor_20_806" id="FNanchor_20_806"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_806" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> In much the same way -Guarini defended his <i>Pastor fido</i> in 1588, declaring "the world is the -judge of poets; against its sentence there is no appeal."<a name="FNanchor_21_807" id="FNanchor_21_807"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_807" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Spanish critics.</i></div> - -<p>Amongst European countries, Spain was perhaps the sturdiest in her -resistance to the pedantic theories of the writers of treatises; -Spain was the land of freedom in criticism from Vives to Feijóo, from -the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century when decadence -of the old Spanish spirit allowed Luzán, with others, to introduce -neo-classical poetry of Italian and French origin.<a name="FNanchor_22_808" id="FNanchor_22_808"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_808" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> That rules -must change with the times and with actual conditions; that modern -literature demands modern poetics; that work carried out contrary to -established rule does not signify that it is contrary to all rule -or unwilling to submit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span> itself to a higher law; that nature should -give, not receive, laws; that the laws of the three unities are -as ridiculous as it would be to forbid a painter to paint a large -landscape in a small picture; that the pleasure, taste, approbation of -readers and spectators are the deciding element in the long run; that -notwithstanding the laws of counterpoint, the ear is the true judge of -music; these affirmations and many like them are frequent in Spanish -criticism of the period. One critic, Francisco de la Barreda (1622), -went so far as to compassionate the strong wits of Italy bound by fear -and cowardice (<i>temerosos y acobardados</i>) to rules that hampered them -on every side;<a name="FNanchor_23_809" id="FNanchor_23_809"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_809" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> he may have been thinking of Tasso, a memorable case -of such degradation. Lope de Vega wavered between neglect of rules in -practice, and obsequious acceptance of them in theory, alleging in -excuse for his conduct that he was forced to yield to the demands of -the public who paid money to see his plays; he said, "when I write my -comedies, I lock and double-lock the door against the precept-mongers, -that they may not rise up and bear witness against me"; "Art (that is, -Poetics) speaks truth which is contradicted by the vulgar ignorant"; -"may the rules forgive us when we are induced to violate them."<a name="FNanchor_24_810" id="FNanchor_24_810"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_810" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But -a contemporary admirer of Lope's work writes of him that "<i>en muchas -partes de sus escritos dice que el no guardar el arte antiguo lo hace -por conformarse con el gusto de la plebe ... dicelo por su natural -modestia, y porqué no atribuya la malicia ignorante à arrogancia lo que -es politica perfeccion.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_25_811" id="FNanchor_25_811"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_811" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>G. B. Marino.</i></div> - -<p>Giambattista Marino also protested "I assert that I have a more -thorough knowledge of the rules than have all the pedants in the -world; but the only true rule is to know how to break the rules at the -right place and time, and to conform with the custom and taste of the -day."<a name="FNanchor_26_812" id="FNanchor_26_812"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_812" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> The drama of Spain, the comedy of art, and other literary -novelties of the seventeenth century caused Minturno,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span> Castelvetro and -other rigid treatise-writers of the preceding century to be looked at -with contemptuous pity as "antiquaries"; this may be seen in Andrea -Perucci (1699), the theorist of improvised comedy.<a name="FNanchor_27_813" id="FNanchor_27_813"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_813" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> Pallavicino -criticized the writers on "the disciplines of beautiful speech" on -the ground that they "generally base their precepts on observing by -experience what things in writers give pleasure, rather than pointing -out what would naturally conform to the particular affections and -instincts implanted by the Creator in the souls of men."<a name="FNanchor_28_814" id="FNanchor_28_814"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_814" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>G. V. Gravina.</i></div> - -<p>A note of distrust towards the fixed kinds may be heard in the -<i>Discorso sull' Endimione</i> (1691), wherein Gravina severely blames -the "ambitious and miserly precepts" of rhetoricians, and makes the -penetrating comment: "No work can see the fight without finding itself -confronted by a tribunal of critics specially convened to examine it, -and questioned firstly as to its name and nature. Next begins the -action which lawyers call prejudicial, and controversy arises as to -its status, whether it is a poem, a romance, a tragedy, a comedy, or -another of the prescribed kinds. And if the said work have ignored the -slightest precept ... they decree forthwith its exile and perpetual -banishment. And yet, however they recast and expand their aphorisms, -they will never be able to include all the different kinds that can -be freshly created by the varied and ceaseless motion of human wit. -For this reason I cannot see why we should not free ourselves from -this insolent curb on the soaring grandeur of our imaginations, and -allow them to follow an open road amongst those immeasurable spaces -they are fitted to explore." He remarks on the work of Guidi which -forms the subject of his discourse, "I know not whether it be tragedy, -comedy, tragicomedy, or anything else invented by rhetoricians. It is a -representation of the loves of Endymion and Diana. If those terms have -sufficient breadth of extension, they will comprehend this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span> work; if -they have not, let another be framed (a power which may be granted to -any one in so unimportant a matter); if no such term can be invented, -let us not, for want of a word, deprive ourselves of a thing so -beautiful."<a name="FNanchor_29_815" id="FNanchor_29_815"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_815" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> These remarks have quite a modern ring, but Gravina can -hardly have thought out their implications very deeply, for later on he -wrote a special treatise on the rules of the tragic kind.<a name="FNanchor_30_816" id="FNanchor_30_816"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_816" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> Antonio -Conti too declared at times his antagonism towards the rules, but he -referred to the Aristotelian rules only.<a name="FNanchor_31_817" id="FNanchor_31_817"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_817" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fr. Montani.</i></div> - -<p>More courage was displayed by Count Francesco Montani of Pesaro in the -polemic roused by Orsi's book against Bouhours; in 1705 he wrote: "I -know that there are immutable and eternal rules, founded on such sound -good sense and solid reason as will remain unshaken as long as mankind -lives. But these rules, whose incorruptibility gives them authority to -guide our spirits to the end of time, are rare enough to be counted -with the nose, and it seems to me somewhat arbitrary to claim to -test and regulate our new works by old laws now wholly abrogated and -annulled."<a name="FNanchor_32_818" id="FNanchor_32_818"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_818" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critics of the eighteenth century.</i></div> - -<p>In France the rigorism of Boileau was followed by the rebellion of Du -Bos, who unhesitatingly declared that "men will always prefer poetry -which moves them to that composed according to rule,"<a name="FNanchor_33_819" id="FNanchor_33_819"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_819" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> and the like -heresies. In 1730, De la Motte made war against the unities of time -and place, asserting as the most general, and even superior to that of -action, the unity of interest.<a name="FNanchor_34_820" id="FNanchor_34_820"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_820" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Batteux tended to make free with -the rules; and Voltaire, though he opposed De la Motte and declared -the three unities to be the "three great laws of good sense," uttered -some bold sentiments in his <i>Essay on Epic Poetry,</i> and it was he who -remarked that "<i>tous les genres sont bons hors le genre ennuyeux,</i>" -and that the best kind is "<i>celui qui est le mieux traité.</i>" Diderot -was in certain respects a forerunner of Romanticism, and with him must -be mentioned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span> Friedrich Melchior Grimm, who was influenced by him. A -breath of liberty was wafted into Italy by Metastasio, Bettinelli, -Baretti and Cesarotti: in 1766 Buonafede notes in his <i>Epistola della -libertà poetica</i> that when erudite persons "define epic poetry, or -comedy, or odes, they ought to frame as many definitions as there -are compositions and authors."<a name="FNanchor_35_821" id="FNanchor_35_821"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_821" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> In Germany the first to rise in -rebellion against the rules (opposing Gottsched and his disciples) -were the representatives of the Swiss school.<a name="FNanchor_36_822" id="FNanchor_36_822"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_822" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> In England, after -examining the definitions by which critics endeavoured to distinguish -epic poetry from other compositions, Home wrote, "It affords no little -diversion to watch so many profound critics hunting after that which -does not exist. They presuppose—without shadow of proof—that there -exists a precise criterion by which to distinguish epic poetry from -all other kinds of composition. But literary compositions melt one -into another like colours: and if in their stronger shades it is easy -to recognize them, they are susceptible of such variety and of so many -different forms that it is impossible to say where one ends and another -begins."<a name="FNanchor_37_823" id="FNanchor_37_823"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_823" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Romanticism and the "strict kinds": Berchet, V. Hugo.</i></div> - -<p>Literary thought between the late eighteenth and the first decades of -the nineteenth century, that is to say from" the period of genius" -to that of romanticism properly so called, rose in rebellion against -separate individual rules and against all rules as such. But to -describe the battles fought, and their more important episodes; to -recount the names of captains victorious or discomfited, or to deplore -the excesses committed by the conquerors, is no part of our present -task. Upon the ruins of the strict kinds, the "<i>genres tranchés</i>" -beloved by Napoleon<a name="FNanchor_38_824" id="FNanchor_38_824"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_824" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> (a Romanticist in the art of war, but a -Classicist in poetry), flourished the drama, the romance and every -other mixed kind: upon the ruins of the three unities, flourished the -unity of <i>ensemble.</i> Italy made her protest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> against rules of style in -Berchet's famous <i>Lettera semiseria di Grisostomo</i> (1816); and France -made hers somewhat later in Victor Hugo's preface to <i>Cromwell</i> (1827). -Henceforth men discussed not the kinds, but Art. What is the unity of -<i>ensemble</i> but the demand of art itself, which is always an <i>ensemble,</i> -a synthesis? What else is the principle, introduced by August Wilhelm -Schlegel and adopted by Manzoni and other Italian romanticists, to the -effect that form of component parts must be "organic not mechanical, -resulting from the nature of the subject and its interior development -... not from the impress of an external and extraneous stamp"?<a name="FNanchor_39_825" id="FNanchor_39_825"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_825" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Their persistence in philosophical theories.</i></div> - -<p>But it would be quite wrong to suppose that this victory over the -rhetoric of kinds was either the cause or the consequence of a final -victory over its philosophical presuppositions. In pure theory, none -of the critics above named wholly abandoned the kinds and the rules. -Berchet admitted four elementary forms, that is four fundamental -kinds, in poetry; lyrical, didactic, epic and dramatic, claiming for -the poet only the right of "uniting and fusing together the elementary -forms in a thousand fashions."<a name="FNanchor_40_826" id="FNanchor_40_826"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_826" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Manzoni's only real quarrel was -with those rules "founded on special facts instead of on general -principles; on the authority of rhetoricians instead of reason."<a name="FNanchor_41_827" id="FNanchor_41_827"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_827" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> -Even De Sanctis was satisfied with a concept somewhat vague, though -true enough at bottom: "the most important rules are not those capable -of being applied to every content, but those which draw their force <i>ex -visceribus caussæ,</i> from the very heart of the content itself."<a name="FNanchor_42_828" id="FNanchor_42_828"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_828" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> -Even more diverting than the spectacle which had delighted Home, is -the sight of German philosophy according the honour of a dialectical -deduction to the empirical classification of kinds. We shall give two -examples, each representing one extreme end of the chain:</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Fr. Schelling.</i></div> - -<p>Schelling at the beginning of the century (1803), and Hartmann<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span> at -the end (1890). One section of Schelling's <i>Philosophy of Art</i> is -devoted to "the construction of individual poetic kinds"; in it he -remarks that were he to follow the historical order, Epic would come -first; whereas in the scientific order the Lyric occupies the first -place: indeed, if poetry is the representation of the infinite in -the finite, the Lyric, in which difference prevails (the finite, the -subject), is its first moment, corresponding with the first power of -the ideal series, reflexion, knowledge, consciousness, whereas Epic -corresponds with the second power, action.<a name="FNanchor_43_829" id="FNanchor_43_829"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_829" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> From Epic, which is <i>par -excellence</i> the objective kind (as being the identity of subjective and -objective), derive the Elegy and the Idyl if subjectivity be placed in -the object and objectivity in the poet: if objectivity be placed in -the object and subjectivity in the poet, didactic poetry results.<a name="FNanchor_44_830" id="FNanchor_44_830"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_830" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> -To these differentiations of the Epic, Schelling adds the romantic or -modern Epic, the poem of chivalry; the novel; and the experiments in -an epic of ordinary life such as the <i>Luisa</i> of Voss and the <i>Hermann -and Dorothea</i> of Goethe; and, co-ordinate with all the foregoing, the -<i>Comedia</i> of Dante, "an epic kind in itself" (<i>eine epische Gattung -für sich</i>). Finally, from the union on a higher plane of Lyric with -Epic, liberty with necessity, arises the third form, the Drama, the -reconciliation of antitheses in a totality, "supreme incarnation of the -essence and the in-itself of all art."<a name="FNanchor_45_831" id="FNanchor_45_831"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_831" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>E. von Hartmann.</i></div> - -<p>In Hartmann's <i>Philosophy of the Beautiful,</i> poetry is divided into -spoken poetry and read poetry. The former is subdivided into Epic, -Lyric and Dramatic, with further subdivisions of Epic into plastic -Epic, or strictly epic Epic, and pictorial or lyrical Epic; of Lyric -into epical Lyric, lyrical Lyric and dramatic Lyric; of Dramatic into -lyrical Drama, epic Drama and dramatic Drama. Read poetry (<i>Lese -poesie</i>) is again subdivided into predominantly epical, lyrical or -dramatic form with tertiary partitions of the affecting, the comic, the -tragic and humorous; and into poems "to be read at a sitting" (like the -short story) or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span> to be taken up again and again (like the novel).<a name="FNanchor_46_832" id="FNanchor_46_832"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_832" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The kinds in the schools.</i></div> - -<p>Without these highly philosophical trivialities the divisions of kinds -still wander through the books called <i>Institutions of Literature,</i> -written by philologists and men of letters, and the ordinary -school-books of Italy, France and Germany; and psychologists and -philosophers still persist in writing about the Æsthetic of the tragic, -of the comic and of the humorous.<a name="FNanchor_47_833" id="FNanchor_47_833"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_833" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> The objectivity of literary kinds -is frankly maintained by Ferdinand Brunetière, who looks on literary -history as "the evolution of kinds,"<a name="FNanchor_48_834" id="FNanchor_48_834"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_834" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> and gives sharply defined form -to a superstition which, seldom confessed so truthfully or applied so -rigorously, survives to contaminate modern literary history.<a name="FNanchor_49_835" id="FNanchor_49_835"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_835" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_787" id="Footnote_1_787"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_787"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Republic,</i> iii. 394; see also E. Müller, <i>Gesch. i. Th. -d. Kunst,</i> i. pp. 134-206; ii. pp. 238-239, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_788" id="Footnote_2_788"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_788"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Poet.</i> ch. 6</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_789" id="Footnote_3_789"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_789"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Annotazioni,</i> introd.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_790" id="Footnote_4_790"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_790"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Cf. for Sanskrit poetry S. Levi, <i>Le Théâtre indien,</i> pp. -11-152.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_791" id="Footnote_5_791"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_791"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Cf. Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. cit.</i> I., i. pp. 126-154, 2nd -ed.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_792" id="Footnote_6_792"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_792"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Introd. to his tr. of the <i>Poetics.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_793" id="Footnote_7_793"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_793"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Lintilhac, <i>Un Coup d'état,</i> etc., p. 543.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_794" id="Footnote_8_794"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_794"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Hamburg. Dramat.</i> Nos. 81, 101-104.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_795" id="Footnote_9_795"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_795"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> Nos. 96, 101-104.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_796" id="Footnote_10_796"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_796"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> G. B. Giraldi Cintio, <i>De' romanzi, delle comedie e delle -tragedie,</i> 1554 (ed. Dælli, 1864).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_797" id="Footnote_11_797"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_797"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Iacopo Mazzoni, <i>Difesa della commedia di Dante,</i> Cesena, -1587.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_798" id="Footnote_12_798"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_798"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> G. M. Cecchi, prologue to <i>Romanesca,</i> 1585.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_799" id="Footnote_13_799"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_799"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Cf. besides the two <i>Veratti,</i> the <i>Compendio della -poesia tragicomica,</i> Venice, 1601.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_800" id="Footnote_14_800"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_800"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Proginn. poet.,</i> Florence, 1627, iii. p. 130.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_801" id="Footnote_15_801"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_801"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Cf. A. Belloni, <i>Il seicento,</i> Milan, 1898, pp. 162-164.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_802" id="Footnote_16_802"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_802"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Examens,</i> and <i>Discours du poème dramatique, de la -tragédie, des trois unités,</i> etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_803" id="Footnote_17_803"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_803"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Réflexions sur le comique larmoyant,</i> 1749 (trans. by -Lessing, <i>Werke, vol. cit.</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_804" id="Footnote_18_804"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_804"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Gellert, <i>De comædia commovente,</i> 1751; Lessing, -<i>Abhandlungen von den weinerlichen oder rührenden Lustspiele,</i> 1754 (in -<i>Werke,</i> vol. vii.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_805" id="Footnote_19_805"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_805"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Prologue to the <i>Cortigiana,</i> 1534.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_806" id="Footnote_20_806"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_806"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Degli eroici furori</i> in <i>Opere italiane,</i> ed. Gentile, -ii. pp. 310-311.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_807" id="Footnote_21_807"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_807"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Il Veratto</i> (against Jason de Nores), Ferrara, 1588.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_808" id="Footnote_22_808"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_808"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. cit.</i> iii. pp. 174-175 (1st ed.), -i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_809" id="Footnote_23_809"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_809"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. cit.</i> iii. p. 468 (2nd ed.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_810" id="Footnote_24_810"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_810"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Arte nuevo de hacer comedias</i> (1609), ed. Morel Fatio, -11. 40-41, 138-140, 157-158.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_811" id="Footnote_25_811"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_811"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. cit.</i> iii. p. 459.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_812" id="Footnote_26_812"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_812"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Marino, letter to G. Preti, in <i>Lettere,</i> Venice, 1627, -p. 127.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_813" id="Footnote_27_813"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_813"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Dell' arte rappresentiva meditata e all' improvviso,</i> -Naples, 1699; cf. pp. 47, 48, 65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_814" id="Footnote_28_814"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_814"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Trattato dello stile e del dialogo,</i> 1646, preface.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_815" id="Footnote_29_815"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_815"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Discorso su l' Endimione</i> (in <i>Opere italiane, ed. -cit.</i>), ii. pp. 15-16.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_816" id="Footnote_30_816"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_816"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Della tragedia,</i> 1715 (<i>ibid.</i> vol. i.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_817" id="Footnote_31_817"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_817"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Prose e poesie, cit.,</i> pref. and <i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_818" id="Footnote_32_818"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_818"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> In Orsi, <i>Considerazioni, ed. cit.</i> ii. pp. 8, 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_819" id="Footnote_33_819"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_819"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Réflexions, cit.</i> sect. 34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_820" id="Footnote_34_820"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_820"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Discours sur la tragédie,</i> 1730.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_821" id="Footnote_35_821"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_821"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Opuscoli</i> of Agatopisto Cromaziano, Venice, 1797.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_822" id="Footnote_36_822"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_822"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> Danzel, <i>Gottsched,</i> p. 206 <i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_823" id="Footnote_37_823"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_823"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Elements of Criticism,</i> iii. pp. 144-145, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_824" id="Footnote_38_824"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_824"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> See conversation of Napoleon with Goethe, in Lewes, -<i>The Life and Works of Goethe,</i> ii. p. 441.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_825" id="Footnote_39_825"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_825"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Manzoni, -<i>Epistol.</i> i. pp. 355-356; cf. <i>Lettera sul romanticismo, ibid.</i> pp. -293-299.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_826" id="Footnote_40_826"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_826"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Lettera di Grisostomo, opere,</i> ed. Cusani, p. 227.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_827" id="Footnote_41_827"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_827"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Lettera sul romanticismo, ibid.</i> p. 280.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_828" id="Footnote_42_828"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_828"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>La giovinezza di F. de S.</i> chs. 26-28.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_829" id="Footnote_43_829"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_829"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Philos, d. Kunst,</i> pp. 639-645.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_830" id="Footnote_44_830"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_830"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 657-659.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_831" id="Footnote_45_831"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_831"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 687.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_832" id="Footnote_46_832"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_832"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>Philosophie d. Schönen,</i> ch. 2, § 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_833" id="Footnote_47_833"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_833"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> See, <i>e.g.,</i> Volkelt, <i>Ästh. d. Tragischen,</i> Munich, -1897; Lipps, <i>Der Streit über Tragödie,</i> etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_834" id="Footnote_48_834"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_834"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> See his other works, <i>L'évolution des genres dans -l'histoire de la littérature,</i> Paris, 1890 <i>seqq.,</i> and <i>Manuel de -l'hist. de la littér. française, ibid.,</i> 1898.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_835" id="Footnote_49_835"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_835"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Croce, <i>Per la storia della critica e storiografia -letter,</i> pp. 23-25.</p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIIc" id="IIIc">III</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTS</h5> - - -<p>To Lessing must be ascribed the merit and the sole glory of having -discovered that every art has its special character and inviolable -limits. But his merit lies not in his own theory, which, in itself, -is scarcely tenable,<a name="FNanchor_1_836" id="FNanchor_1_836"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_836" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> but in having, though by an error, aroused -discussion of a highly important æsthetical point till then wholly -overlooked. After some slight notice from Du Bos and Batteux, some -preparation of the field by Diderot<a name="FNanchor_2_837" id="FNanchor_2_837"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_837" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and Mendelssohn,<a name="FNanchor_3_838" id="FNanchor_3_838"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_838" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> and -long disquisitions by Meier and other Wolffians upon natural and -conventional symbols,<a name="FNanchor_4_839" id="FNanchor_4_839"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_839" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Lessing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> was the first to raise clearly the -question of the value attaching to the distinction between the various -arts. Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had enumerated -the arts according to denominations of current phraseology, and had -composed numbers of technical hand-books distinguishing major and -minor arts; but in Aristoxenus or Vitruvius, Marchetto da Padova or -Cennino Cennini, Leonardo da Vinci or Leon Battista Alberti, Palladio -or Scamozzi, it would be vain to look for the problem proposed by -Lessing, for the spirit of these technical treatise-writers is entirely -different. Some rudiments of the question may be detected in the -comparisons made, and the questions of precedence raised, between -poetry and painting or painting and sculpture, to be found now and -then in stray paragraphs of their books (Leonardo da Vinci pressed -the claims of painting, Michæl Angelo those of sculpture): the theme -eventually became a favourite one for academic discussion, and was not -despised by Galileo himself.<a name="FNanchor_5_840" id="FNanchor_5_840"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_840" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The limits of the arts in Lessing. Arts of space and arts -of time.</i></div> - -<p>Lessing was induced to raise the question in the attempt to controvert -the strange views of Spence concerning the close union between painting -and poetry among the ancients, and of Count Caylus, who held that -the excellence of a poem must be judged by the number of subjects -it offers to the brush of the painter. He was further instigated by -the comparisons between poetry and painting upon which were commonly -founded the most ridiculous rules for tragedy: the maxim <i>Ut pictura -poësis,</i> whose original motive was to emphasize the representative or -imaginative character of poetry, and the community of nature among the -arts, had been converted by superficial interpretation into a defence -of the most vicious intellectualistic and realistic prejudices. Lessing -argued in this wise: "If painting in its imitations employs precisely -a medium or symbol different from that of poetry (the former employing -spatial forms and colours, the latter temporal articulated sounds), -since the symbol must certainly be in close relation with that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span> -which is signified, coexistent symbols can only express coexistent -objects or parts of objects, and consecutive symbols can only express -consecutive objects or parts of objects. Objects mutually coexistent, -or having mutually coexistent parts, are called bodies. Bodies, then, -through their quality of visibility, are the true objects of painting. -Objects successively consecutive amongst themselves, or whose parts -are consecutive, are called in general actions. Actions, then, are -the suitable objects of poetry." Painting, undoubtedly, may represent -action, but only by means of bodies which indicate it; and poetry may -represent bodies, but only by indicating them by means of actions. -When a poet using language, <i>i.e.</i> arbitrary symbols, sets himself -to describe bodies, he is no longer a poet but a prose-writer, since -a true poet only describes bodies by the effect they produce on the -soul.<a name="FNanchor_6_841" id="FNanchor_6_841"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_841" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Retouching and developing this distinction, Lessing described -action or movement in a picture as an addition made by the imagination -of the beholder; so true is this, says he, that animals perceive -nothing save immobility in a picture. He further studied the various -unions of arbitrary with natural symbols, such as that of poetry with -music (in which the former is subordinate to the latter), of music -with dancing, of poetry with dancing, and of music and poetry with -dancing (union of arbitrary consecutive audible symbols with natural -visible symbols): of the pantomime of antiquity (union of arbitrary -consecutive visible symbols with natural consecutive visible symbols): -of the language of the dumb (the only art that employs arbitrary -consecutive visible symbols): and, lastly, of imperfect unions, such -as that of painting with poetry. If not every use to which language is -put is poetic, Lessing holds that not every use of natural coexistent -signs is pictorial: painting, like language, has its prose. Prosaic -painters are those who represent consecutive objects notwithstanding -the character of coexistence in their signs, allegorical painters -those who make arbitrary use of natural signs, and those who pretend -to represent the invisible or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> the audible by means of the visible. -Desirous of preserving the naturalness of symbolism, Lessing ended by -condemning the custom of painting objects on a diminished scale, and -concludes: "I think that the aim of an art should be that only to which -it is specially adapted, not that which can be performed equally well -by other arts. I find in Plutarch a comparison which illustrates this -admirably: he who would split wood with a key and open the door with an -axe not only spoils both utensils but deprives himself of the unity of -each alike."[7]</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Limits and classifications of the arts in later -philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>The principle of limitations or of the specific character of individual -arts, as laid down by Lessing, occupied the attention of philosophers -in later days, who, without discussing the principle itself, employed -it in classifying the arts and arranging them in series.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Herder and Kant.</i></div> - -<p>Herder here and there continued Lessing's examination in his fragment -on <i>Plastic</i> (1769);<a name="FNanchor_8_842" id="FNanchor_8_842"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_842" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Heydenreich wrote a treatise (1790) on the -limits of the six arts (music, dance, figurative arts gardening, -poetry and representative art), and criticized the <i>clavecin oculaire</i> -of Father Castel, a contrivance for the combination of colours which -should act in the same way as the series of musical notes in harmony -and melody,<a name="FNanchor_9_843" id="FNanchor_9_843"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_843" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Kant appealed to the analogy of a speaking man, and -classified the arts according to speech, gesture and tone as arts of -speech, figurative arts, and arts producing a mere play of sensations -(mimicry and colouring).<a name="FNanchor_10_844" id="FNanchor_10_844"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_844" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schelling.</i></div> - -<p>Schelling differentiated the artistic identity according as it -consisted in the infusion of the infinite into the finite, or of the -finite into the infinite (ideal art or real art): into poetry and art -proper. Under the heading of real arts he included the figurative arts, -music, painting, plastic (which comprehended architecture, bas-relief -and sculpture): in the ideal series were the three corresponding forms -of poetry, lyrical, epical and dramatic.<a name="FNanchor_11_845" id="FNanchor_11_845"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_845" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Solger.</i></div> - -<p>With a similar<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> method, Solger placed poetry, the universal art, -side by side with art strictly so called, which is either symbolical -(sculpture) or allegorical (painting), and, in either case, is a union -of concepts and bodies: if you take corporality without concept, you -have architecture; if concept without matter, music.<a name="FNanchor_12_846" id="FNanchor_12_846"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_846" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Hegel makes -poetry the bond of union between the two extremes of figurative art and -of music.<a name="FNanchor_13_847" id="FNanchor_13_847"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_847" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Schopenhauer.</i></div> - -<p>We have already seen how Schopenhauer destroyed the accepted -limitations of art and built them up again, following the order of -the ideas which they represent.<a name="FNanchor_14_848" id="FNanchor_14_848"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_848" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Herbart clung to Lessing's two -groups, simultaneous arts and successive arts, and defined the former -as "permitting themselves to be inspected from every side," the latter -as "rejecting complete investigation and remaining in semi-darkness": -in the first group he placed architecture, plastic, church music and -classical poetry; in the second ornamental gardening, painting, secular -music and romantic poetry.<a name="FNanchor_15_849" id="FNanchor_15_849"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_849" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Herbart.</i></div> - -<p>Herbart was implacable against those who look in one art for the -perfections of another; who "look on music as a sort of painting, -painting as poetry, poetry as an elevated plastic and plastic as -a species of æsthetic philosophy,"<a name="FNanchor_16_850" id="FNanchor_16_850"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_850" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> while admitting that a -concrete work of art, such as a picture, may contain elements of the -picturesque, the poetic and other kinds, held together by the skill of -the artist.<a name="FNanchor_17_851" id="FNanchor_17_851"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_851" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Weisse. Zeising.</i></div> - -<p>Weisse divided the arts into three triads, intended to recall the -nine Muses.<a name="FNanchor_18_852" id="FNanchor_18_852"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_852" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Zeising invented-a cross-division into figurative -arts (architecture, sculpture, painting), musical arts (instrumental -music, song, poetry), and arts of mimicry (dance, musical mimicry, -representative art), and into macrocosmic arts (architecture, -instrumental music, dance), microcosmic arts (sculpture, song, musical -mimicry) and historical arts (painting, poetry and representative -art).<a name="FNanchor_19_853" id="FNanchor_19_853"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_853" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Vischer.</i></div> - -<p>Vischer classified them according to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> the three forms of -imagination (figurative, sensuous and poetic), into objective arts -(architecture, plastic and painting), a subjective art (music) and an -objective-subjective art<a name="FNanchor_20_854" id="FNanchor_20_854"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_854" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> (poetry). Gerber proposed to recognize a -special "art of language" (<i>Sprachkunst</i>), distinguishable alike from -prose and poetry and consisting in the expression of simple movements -of the soul. Such an art would correspond with plastic in the following -scheme: arts of the eye—(<i>a)</i> architecture, (<i>b</i>) plastic, (c) -painting; arts of the ear—(<i>a)</i> prose, (<i>b)</i> the art of language, (c) -poetry.<a name="FNanchor_21_855" id="FNanchor_21_855"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_855" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>M. Schasler.</i></div> - -<p>The two most recent systems of classification are furnished by Schasler -and Hartmann, who have also submitted the schemes of their predecessors -to searching criticism. Schasler<a name="FNanchor_22_856" id="FNanchor_22_856"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_856" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> arranges the arts in two groups, -adopting the criterion of simultaneity and succession: the arts of -simultaneity are architecture, plastic and painting; of succession, -music, mimicry and poetry. He says that by following the series in -the order indicated, it will be seen that simultaneity, originally -predominant, yields place to succession, which predominates in the -second group and subordinates without wholly displacing the other. -Parallel with this, another division is evolved, deduced from the -relation between the ideal and material elements in each separate art, -between movement and repose; which begins with architecture "materially -the heaviest, spiritually the lightest of all the arts," and ends -with poetry, in which the opposite relation is observed. Curious -analogies are established by this method between the first and second -group of arts: between architecture and music; between plastic and -mimicry; between painting in its three forms of landscape, <i>genre</i> and -historical, and poetry in its three forms of lyric (declamatory), epic -(rhapsodic) and drama (representative).</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>E. v. Hartmann.</i></div> - -<p>Hartmann<a name="FNanchor_23_857" id="FNanchor_23_857"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_857" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> divides the arts into arts of perception and arts of -imagination: the former tripartite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span> into spatial or visual (plastic -and painting), temporal or auditory (instrumental music, linguistic -mimicry, expressive song) and temporal-spatial or mimic (pantomime, -mimic dances, art of the actor, art of the opera-singer); the second -contains but one single species, which is poetry. Architecture, -decoration, gardening, cosmetic and prosewriting are excluded from this -system of classification and lumped together as non-free arts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The supreme art. Richard Wagner.</i></div> - -<p>Parallel with this search for a classification of the arts, the same -philosophers were led into the quest of the supreme art. Some favoured -poetry, others music or sculpture; others again claimed the supremacy -for combined arts, especially for Opera, according to the theory of -it already advanced in the eighteenth century<a name="FNanchor_24_858" id="FNanchor_24_858"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_858" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> and maintained -and developed in our day by Richard Wagner.<a name="FNanchor_25_859" id="FNanchor_25_859"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_859" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> One of the latest -philosophers to raise the question "whether single arts, or arts in -combination, had the greater value," concluded that single arts as such -possess their own perfection, yet the perfection of united arts is -still greater, notwithstanding the compromises and mutual concessions -enforced upon them by their union; that single arts, from another -point of view, have the greater value; and lastly, that both single -and combined arts are necessary to the realisation of the concept of -art.<a name="FNanchor_26_860" id="FNanchor_26_860"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_860" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Lotze's attack on classifications.</i></div> - -<p>The capriciousness, emptiness and childishness of such problems -and their solutions must have excited feelings of impatience and -disgust, but we rarely find a doubt thrown on their validity. One such -dissentient is Lotze when he writes: "It is difficult to see the use -of such attempts. Knowledge of the nature and laws of individual arts -is but little increased by indication of the systematic place allotted -to each." He further observed that in real life the arts are variously -conjoined, forming themselves into no systematic series, while in -the world of thought an immense variety of orders can be created; he -therefore selected one of these possible orders, not because it was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span> -the sole legitimate one, but because it was convenient (<i>bequem</i>). His -series begins with music, "the art of free beauty, determined only by -the laws of its matter, not by conditions imposed by a given task of -purpose or of imitation"; followed by architecture, "which no longer -plays freely with forms, but subjects them to the service of an end"; -and then by sculpture, painting and poetry, excluding minor arts which -cannot be co-ordinated with the others, since they are incapable of -expressing with any approach to completeness the totality of the -spiritual life.<a name="FNanchor_27_861" id="FNanchor_27_861"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_861" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> A recent French critic, Basch, opens his treatise -with the following excellent remarks: "Is it necessary to show there is -no such thing as an absolute art, differentiating itself later by means -of one knows not what immanent laws? What exists is the particular -forms of art, or rather artists who have striven to translate, as best -they can, according to the material means at their command, the song of -the ideal in their souls." But later on he thinks it possible to effect -a division of the arts by starting "from the artist, instead of the -art in itself," by proceeding "according to the three great types of -fancy, visual, motor and auditory"; and as for the debated point of the -supreme art, he thinks it must be settled in favour of music.<a name="FNanchor_28_862" id="FNanchor_28_862"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_862" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p> - -<p>Schasler is not altogether wrong in his spirited counterattack on -Lotze's criticism; he protests against the principle of indifference -and convenience, and remarks that "the classification of the arts -must be regarded as the real touchstone, the real differential test -of the scientific value of an æsthetic system; for on this point all -theoretical questions are concentrated and crowd together to find a -concrete solution."<a name="FNanchor_29_863" id="FNanchor_29_863"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_863" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Contradictions in Lotze.</i></div> - -<p>The principle of convenience may be excellent as applied to the -approximative grouping of botanical or zoological classifications, but -it has no place in philosophy; and as Lotze, in common with Schasler -and other æstheticians, conformed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span> to Lessing's principle of the -constancy, limits and peculiar nature of each art, and therefore held -that the concepts of the individual arts were speculative and not -empirical concepts, he could not evade the duty of fixing the mutual -relations of these concepts, arranging them in series, subordinating -and co-ordinating them, and arriving at each of them either deductively -or dialectically. He ought, in order to get definitely rid of these -barren attempts at classification and at discovering the supreme -art, to have criticized and dissolved Lessing's principle itself: to -keep the principle and deny the need for a classification, as Lotze -did, was obviously inconsistent. But not a single æsthetician has -ever re-examined or investigated the scientific foundation of the -distinctions enunciated by Lessing in his fluent and elegant prose; no -one has probed to the bottom the truth which was illumined by Aristotle -in a single lightning-flash, when he refused to allow an extrinsic -difference, that of metre, as the real distinction between prose and -poetry:<a name="FNanchor_30_864" id="FNanchor_30_864"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_864" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> no one, that is to say, save perhaps Schleiermacher, who at -least called attention to the difficulties of the current doctrine.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Doubts in Schleiermacher.</i></div> - -<p>He proposed to start from the general concept of art and prove by -deduction the necessity of all its forms; and after finding two sides -to artistic activity, the objective consciousness (<i>gegenständliche)</i> -and the immediate consciousness (<i>unmittelbare)</i>, and observing that -art stands wholly neither in the one nor in the other and that the -immediate consciousness or representation (<i>Vorstellung)</i> gives rise to -mimicry and music, while the objective consciousness or image (<i>Bild</i>) -gives rise to the figurative arts, he then, proceeding to analyse a -painting, found the two forms of consciousness to be in this case -inseparable, and remarks: "Here we arrive at the precise opposite: -searching for distinction, we find unity." Nor did the traditional -division of the arts into simultaneous and successive seem to him -very solid, for "when looked at attentively, it evaporates entirely"; -in architecture or gardening, contemplation is successive, while in -the arts labelled as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span> successive, such as poetry, the chief thing -is coexistence and grouping: "from whichever side we look at it, -the difference is but secondary and the antithesis between the two -orders of art merely means that every contemplation, like every act of -production, is always successive, but, in thinking out the relation of -the two sides in a work of art, both seem indispensable: coexistence -(<i>Zugleichsein</i>) and successive existence (<i>das Successivsein</i>)." In -another passage he observes: "The reality of art as external appearance -is conditioned by the mode, depending on our physical and corporeal -organism, in which the internal is externalised: movements, forms, -words.... That which is common to all arts is not the external, which -is rather the element of diversification." When these observations -are compared with the sharp distinction he himself drew between art -and technique, it would be easy to deduce that he held the partitions -of the arts and the concepts of the particular arts to be devoid -of æsthetic value. But Schleiermacher does not draw this logical -inference, he wavers and hesitates: he recognizes the inseparability -of the subjective and objective, musical and figurative, elements in -poetry, yet he struggles to discover the definitions and limits of -the individual arts; sometimes he dreams of a union of the various -arts from which a complete art would spring; and when composing the -syllabus of his lectures on Æsthetic, he arranged the arts into arts -of accompaniment (mimicry and music), figurative arts (architecture, -gardening, painting, sculpture) and poetry.<a name="FNanchor_31_865" id="FNanchor_31_865"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_865" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Nebulous, vague, -contradictory as this may be, Schleiermacher had the acumen to distrust -the soundness of Lessing's theory and to inquire by what right -particular arts are singled out from art in general.</p> - - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_836" id="Footnote_1_836"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_836"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_113">113</a>-<a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_837" id="Footnote_2_837"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_837"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> D. Diderot, <i>Lettre sur les aveugles,</i> 1749; <i>Lettre sur -les sourds et muets,</i> 1751; <i>Essai sur la peinture,</i> 1765.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_838" id="Footnote_3_838"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_838"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> M. Mendelssohn, <i>Briefe über Empfind.,</i> 1755; -<i>Betrachtungen, cit.,</i> 1757.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_839" id="Footnote_4_839"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_839"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> J. Chr. Wolff, <i>Psychol. empirica,</i> §§ 272-312; Meier, -<i>Anfangsgründe,</i> §§ 513-528, 708-735; <i>Betrachtungen,</i> § 126.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_840" id="Footnote_5_840"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_840"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Letter to Lodovico Cardi da Cigoli, June 26, 1612.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_841" id="Footnote_6_841"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_841"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Laokoon,</i> §§ 16-20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_842" id="Footnote_8_842"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_842"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Laokoon,</i> appendix, § 43.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_843" id="Footnote_9_843"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_843"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Plastik einige Wahrnehmungen über Form und Gestalt aus -Pygmalions bildenden Träume,</i> 1778 (Select Works of Herder in the -collection <i>Deutsche Nationlitteratur,</i> vol. 76, part iii. § 2).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_844" id="Footnote_10_844"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_844"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>System der Ästhetik,</i> pp. 154-236.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_845" id="Footnote_11_845"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_845"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Kritik d. Urtheilskr.</i> § 51. 5 <i>Phil. d. Kunst,</i> pp. -370-371.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_846" id="Footnote_12_846"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_846"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 257-262.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_847" id="Footnote_13_847"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_847"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii. p. 222.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_848" id="Footnote_14_848"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_848"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_305">305</a>-<a href="#Page_306">306</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_849" id="Footnote_15_849"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_849"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Einleitung,</i> § 115, pp. 170-171.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_850" id="Footnote_16_850"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_850"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Schriften z. prakt. Phil,</i> in <i>Werke,</i> viii. p. 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_851" id="Footnote_17_851"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_851"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Einleitung,</i> § 110, pp. 164-165.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_852" id="Footnote_18_852"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_852"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Cf. Hartmann, <i>Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,</i> pp. 539-540.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_853" id="Footnote_19_853"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_853"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Ästh. Forsch.</i> pp. 547-549.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_854" id="Footnote_20_854"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_854"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> §§ 404, 535, 537, 838, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_855" id="Footnote_21_855"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_855"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Gustav Gerber, <i>Die Sprache als Kunst,</i> Bromberg, -1871-1874.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_856" id="Footnote_22_856"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_856"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Das System der Künste,</i> 2nd ed., Leipzig-Berlin, 1881.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_857" id="Footnote_23_857"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_857"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Phil. d. Sch.</i> chs. 9, 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_858" id="Footnote_24_858"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_858"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> by Sulzer, <i>Allg. Theorie,</i> on word <i>Oper.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_859" id="Footnote_25_859"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_859"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Rich. Wagner, <i>Oper und Drama,</i> 1851.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_860" id="Footnote_26_860"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_860"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Gustav Engel, <i>Ästh. der Tonkunst,</i> 1884, abstracted in -Hartmann, <i>Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,</i> pp. 579-580.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_861" id="Footnote_27_861"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_861"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Lotze, <i>Geschichte d. Ästh.</i> pp. 458-460; cf. p. 445.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_862" id="Footnote_28_862"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_862"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Essai critique sur l'Esth. de Kant,</i> pp. 89-496.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_863" id="Footnote_29_863"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_863"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Das System der Künste,</i> p. 47.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_864" id="Footnote_30_864"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_864"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Poet.</i> ch. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_865" id="Footnote_31_865"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_865"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> pp. 11, 122-129, 137, 143, 151, 167, -172, 284-286, 487-488, 508, 635.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IVc" id="IVc">IV</a></h4> - - -<h5>OTHER PARTICULAR DOCTRINES</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The æsthetic theory of Natural Beauty.</i></div> - -<p>I. Schleiermacher also rejected the concept of Natural Beauty, giving -Hegel greater praise than he deserved in the matter, because Hegel's -denial of this concept was, as we have seen, more verbal than real. -At all events, Schleiermacher's radical denial of the existence of a -natural beauty external to and independent of the human mind marked -a victory over a serious error, and appears to us imperfect and -one-sided only so far as it seems to exclude those æsthetic facts of -imagination which are attached to objects given in nature.<a name="FNanchor_1_866" id="FNanchor_1_866"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_866" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Important -contributions towards the correction of this imperfect and one-sided -element were supplied by the historical and psychological study of the -"feeling for nature," promoted successfully by Alexander Humboldt in -his dissertation to be found in the second volume of <i>Cosmos</i>,<a name="FNanchor_2_867" id="FNanchor_2_867"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_867" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and -continued by Laprade, Biese, and others in our own time.<a name="FNanchor_3_868" id="FNanchor_3_868"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_868" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In his -criticism of his own <i>Ästhetik,</i> Vischer completes the passage from -the metaphysical construction of beauty in nature to the psychological -interpretation of it, and recognizes the necessity of suppressing -the section devoted to Natural Beauty in his first æsthetic system, -and incorporating it with the doctrine of imagination: he says that -such treatments do not belong to æsthetic science, being a medley -of zoology, sentiment, fantasy and humour, worthy of development in -monographs in the style of the poet G. G. Fischer's on the life of -birds, or Bratranek's on the æsthetic of the vegetable world.<a name="FNanchor_4_869" id="FNanchor_4_869"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_869" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -Hartmann, as heir of the old metaphysics, reproaches<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span> Vischer for -this exclusion, and maintains that, in addition to the beauty of -imagination introduced by man into natural things (<i>hineingelegte -Schönheit</i>), there exist a formal and a substantial beauty in nature, -coinciding with realisation of the immanent ends or ideas of nature.<a name="FNanchor_5_870" id="FNanchor_5_870"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_870" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -But the way chosen ultimately by Vischer is the only one by which -Schleiermacher's thesis can be successfully developed so as to show -the precise meaning which may be given to the assertion of (æsthetic) -beauty in nature.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of æsthetic senses.</i></div> - -<p>II. That æsthetic senses or superior senses exist and that beauty -attaches to certain senses only, not to all, is a very old opinion. We -have seen already<a name="FNanchor_6_871" id="FNanchor_6_871"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_871" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> that Socrates, in the <i>Hippias maior,</i> mentions -the doctrine of beauty as "that which pleases hearing and sight" (τὸ -καlὸν eστὶ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆs τε καὶ ὃψεως ήδύ): and he adds, it seems -impossible to deny that we take pleasure in looking at handsome men -and fine ornaments, pictures and statues with our eyes, and hearing -beautiful songs or beautiful voices, music, speeches and conversations -with our ears. Nevertheless Socrates himself in the same dialogue -confutes this theory by perfectly valid arguments, amongst which is -that, besides the difficulty arising from the fact that beautiful -things may be found outside the range of the sensible impressions of -eye and ear, there is no reason for creating a special class for the -pleasure arising from impressions on these two senses, to the exclusion -of others. He also states the more subtle and philosophical objection -that that which is pleasing to the sight is not so to the hearing, and -<i>vice versa</i>; whence it follows that the ground of beauty must not be -sought in visibility or audibility, but in something differing from -either and common to both.<a name="FNanchor_7_872" id="FNanchor_7_872"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_872" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>The problem was never again, perhaps, attacked with such acumen and -seriousness as in this ancient dialogue. In the eighteenth century -Home remarked that beauty depended on sight, and that impressions -received by the other senses might be agreeable but were not -beautiful,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span> and distinguished sight and hearing as superior to those -of touch, taste and smell, the latter being merely bodily in nature -and without the spiritual refinement of the other two. He held these -to produce pleasures superior to organic pleasures though inferior to -intellectual; decorous pleasures, that is to say; elevated, sweet, -moderately exhilarating; as far removed from the turbulence of the -passions as from the languor of indolence, and intended to refresh -and soothe the spirit.<a name="FNanchor_8_873" id="FNanchor_8_873"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_873" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Following suggestions of Diderot, Rousseau -and Berkeley, Herder drew attention to the importance of the sense of -touch (<i>Gefühl</i>) in plastic art: of this "third sense, which perhaps -deserves to be investigated first of all, and is unjustly relegated to -a place amongst the grosser senses." Certainly "touch knows nothing of -surface or colour," but "sight, for its part, knows nothing of forms -and configurations." Thus "touch cannot be so gross a sense as it is -reputed, if it is the very organ by which we sensate all other bodies, -and rules over a vast kingdom of subtle and complex concepts. As the -surface stands to the body, so does sight stand in respect of touch, -and it is merely a colloquial abbreviation to speak of seeing bodies as -surfaces and to suppose that we see with our eyes that which we have -gradually learnt in infancy simply by the sense of touch." Every beauty -of form or corporeity is a concept not visible, but palpable.<a name="FNanchor_9_874" id="FNanchor_9_874"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_874" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> From -the triad of æsthetic senses thus established by Herder (sight for -painting; hearing for music; touch for sculpture), Hegel returned to -the customary dyad, saying that "the sensory part of art has reference -only to the two theoretic senses of sight and hearing"; that smell, -taste and touch must be excluded from artistic pleasures, since they -are connected with matter as such and the immediate sensible quality it -may possess (smell with material volatilization; taste with material -solution of objects; and touch with hot, cold, smooth and so forth); -and that hence they can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span> claim no concern with the objects of art, -which are obliged to keep themselves in real independence, rejecting -all relation with the merely sensory. That which pleases these senses -is not the beautiful of art.<a name="FNanchor_10_875" id="FNanchor_10_875"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_875" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>It was Schleiermacher once more who recognized the impossibility of -disposing of the matter in this summary fashion. He refused to admit -the distinction between confused senses and clear senses, and asserted -that the superiority of sight and hearing over the other senses lay in -the fact that the others "are not capable of any free activity, and -indeed represent the maximum of passivity, whereas sight and hearing -are capable of an activity proceeding from within, and are able to -produce forms and notes without having received impressions from -outside"; were eye and ear merely means of perception, there would -be no visual or auditory arts, but they also operate as a function -of voluntary movements which supply a content to the dominion of the -senses. From another standpoint, however, Schleiermacher thinks that -"the difference seems to be one rather of degree or quantity, and a -minimum of independence must be recognized as existing in the other -senses as well."<a name="FNanchor_11_876" id="FNanchor_11_876"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_876" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> Vischer remains faithful to the traditional "two -æsthetic senses," "free organs and no less spiritual than sensuous," -which "have no reference to the material composition of the object," -but allow this "to subsist as a whole and work upon them."<a name="FNanchor_12_877" id="FNanchor_12_877"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_877" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Köstlin -was of opinion that the inferior senses offer "nothing intuitible -separate from themselves, and are only modifications of ourselves, but -taste, smell and touch are not devoid of all æsthetic importance, since -they assist the superior senses; without touch an image could not be -recognized by the eye as being hard, resistant or rough; without smell -certain images could not be represented as sweet or scented."<a name="FNanchor_13_878" id="FNanchor_13_878"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_878" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>We cannot go into a detailed account of all doctrines connected with -sensationalistic principles,<a name="FNanchor_14_879" id="FNanchor_14_879"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_879" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> for all the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span> senses are naturally -accepted as æsthetic by the sensationalists, who use "æsthetic" -interchangeably with" hedonistic": it will suffice if we recall the -"learned" Kralik, who was ridiculed by Tolstoy for his theory of the -five arts of taste, smell, touch, hearing and sight.<a name="FNanchor_15_880" id="FNanchor_15_880"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_880" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The few -quotations already given show the embarrassing difficulty caused -by the use of the word "æsthetic" as a qualification of "sense," -compelling writers to invent absurd distinctions between various groups -of senses, or to recognize all senses as being æsthetic, thus giving -æsthetic value to every sensory impression, as such. No way out of -this labyrinth can be found save by asserting the impossibility of -effecting a union between such wholly disparate orders of ideas as the -concept of the representative form of the spirit and that of particular -physiological organs or a particular matter of sense-impressions.<a name="FNanchor_16_881" id="FNanchor_16_881"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_881" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of kinds of style</i>.</div> - -<p>III. A variety of the error of literary kinds is to be found in -the theory of modes, forms or kinds of style (χαρακτῆρες τῆς -φράσεως), considered by the ancients as consisting of three forms, -the sublime, the medium and the tenuous, a tripartition due, it would -seem, to Antisthenes,<a name="FNanchor_17_882" id="FNanchor_17_882"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_882" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> modified later into <i>subtile, robustum</i> -and <i>floridum,</i> or amplified into a fourfold division, or designated -by adjectives of historic origin as in the Attic, Asiatic or Rhodian -styles. The Middle Ages preserved the tradition of a tripartite -division, sometimes giving it a curious interpretation, to the effect -that the sublime style treats of kings, princes and barons (<i>e.g.</i> the -<i>Aeneid</i>); the mediocre, of middle-class people (<i>e.g. Georgies)</i>; the -humble, of the lowest class (<i>e.g. Bucolics;</i>) and the three styles -were for this reason also called tragic, elegiac and comic.<a name="FNanchor_18_883" id="FNanchor_18_883"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_883" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> It -is a well-known fact that kinds in style have never ceased to afford -matter for discussion in rhetorical text-books down to modern times; -for instance, we find Blair distinguishing styles by such epithets -as the diffuse, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span> concise, the nervous, the daring, the soft, the -elegant, the flowery, etc. In 1818 the Italian Melchiorre Delfico, in -his book on <i>The Beautiful,</i> energetically criticized the "endless -division of styles," or the superstition "that there could be so many -kinds of style"; saying that "style is either good or bad," and adding -that it is not possible "it should exist as a preconceived idea in the -artist's mind," but that "it should be the consequence of the principal -idea, <i>i.e.</i> that conception which determines the invention and the -composition."<a name="FNanchor_19_884" id="FNanchor_19_884"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_884" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of grammatical forms or parts of speech.</i></div> - -<p>IV. The same error reappears in the philosophy of language, as the -theory of grammatical forms or parts of speech,<a name="FNanchor_20_885" id="FNanchor_20_885"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_885" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> first created by -the sophists (Protagoras is credited with having first distinguished -the gender of nouns), adopted by the philosophers, notably by Aristotle -and the Stoics (the former was acquainted with two or three parts of -speech, the latter with four or five), developed and elaborated by the -Alexandrian grammarians in the famous and endless controversy between -the analogists and the anomalists. The analogists (Aristarchus) aimed -at introducing logical order and regularity into linguistic facts, -and described as deviations all such as seemed to them irreducible -to logical form. These they called pleonasm, ellipsis, enallage, -parallage, and metalepsis. The violence thus wrought by the analogists -upon spoken and written language was such that (as Quintilian tells -us) some one wittily (<i>non invenuste</i>) remarked that it appeared to -be one thing to talk Latin and quite another to talk grammar (<i>aliud -esse latine</i>, <i>aliud grammatice loqui</i>).<a name="FNanchor_21_886" id="FNanchor_21_886"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_886" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The anomalists must be -credited with restoring to language its free imaginative movement: the -Stoic Chrysippus composed a treatise to prove that one thing (one same -concept) may be expressed by different sounds, and one and the same -sound may express different concepts (<i>similes res dissimilibus verbis -et similibus dissimiles esse vocabulis notatas.</i>) Another anomalist -was the celebrated grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, who rejected -the metalepsis,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> the schemes, and the other artifices by which the -analogists tried to explain facts which did not fit their categories, -and pointed out that the use of one word for another, or one part of -speech for another, is not a grammatical figure, but a blunder, a thing -hardly to be attributed to a poet such as Homer. The upshot of the -dispute between anomalists and analogists was the science of Grammar -(τεχνη γραμματική), as handed down by the ancients to the modern -world, which is justly considered as a sort of compromise between the -two opposed parties because, if the schemes of inflection (κανόνες) -satisfy the demands of the analogists, their variety satisfies those -of the anomalists; hence the original definition of Grammar as theory -of analogy was changed subsequently to "theory of analogy and anomaly" -(ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνoμoίου θεωρία). The concept of correct usage, with -which Varro hoped to settle the controversy, fell into the trap (common -to compromises), merely stating the contradiction in set terms, like -the "convenient ornament" of Rhetoric or the kinds accorded a "certain -licence" in the literature of precept. If language follows usage (that -is to say, the imagination), it does not follow reason (or logic); if -it follows reason, it does not follow usage. When the analogists upheld -logic as supreme at least inside the individual kinds and sub-kinds, -the anomalists hastened to show that even this was not the case. Varro -himself was forced to confess that "this part of the subject really is -very difficult" (<i>hic locus maxime lubricus est</i>).<a name="FNanchor_22_887" id="FNanchor_22_887"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_887" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<p>In the Middle Ages grammar was cultivated to the point of superstition. -Divine inspiration was found lurking in the eight parts of speech -because "<i>octavus numerus frequenter in divinis scripturis sacratis -invenitur,</i>" and in the three persons of verbal conjugation, created -simply "<i>ut quod in Trinitatis fide credimus, in eloquiis inesse -videatur.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_23_888" id="FNanchor_23_888"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_888" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Grammarians of the Renaissance and later recommenced -the study of linguistic problems and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> worked to death ellipsis, -pleonasm, licence, anomaly and exception; only in comparatively recent -times has Linguistic begun to question the very validity of the concept -of parts of speech (Pott, Paul and others).<a name="FNanchor_24_889" id="FNanchor_24_889"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_889" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> If they still survive, -the reason may lie in the facts that empirical, practical grammar -cannot do without them; that their venerable antiquity disguises their -illegitimate and shady origin; and that energetic opposition has been -worn down by the fatigue of an endless war.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Theory of æsthetic criticism.</i></div> - -<p>V. The relativity of taste is a sensationalistic theory which denies -a spiritual value to art. But it is rarely maintained by writers in -the ingenuous categorical garb of the old adage: <i>De gustibus non -est disputandum</i> (concerning which it would be useful to enquire -when the saying was born, and what it fust meant: whether, too, the -word <i>gustibus</i> referred solely to impressions of the palate, and -was only later extended to include æsthetic impressions); as though -sensationalists, as if dimly conscious of the higher nature of art, -have never been able to resign themselves to the complete relativity -of taste. Their torments in the matter really move one to pity. "Is -there," Batteux asks, "such a thing as good taste, and is it the only -good taste? In what does it consist? Upon what depend? Does it depend -upon the object itself or the genius at work upon it? Are there, or are -there not, rules? Is wit alone, or heart alone, the organ of taste, or -both together? How many questions have been raised on this familiar -often-treated subject, how many obscure and involved answers have -been given!"<a name="FNanchor_25_890" id="FNanchor_25_890"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_890" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> This perplexity is shared by Home. Tastes, he says, -must not be disputed; neither those of the palate nor those of other -senses. A remark which seems highly reasonable from one point of view; -but, from another, somewhat exaggerated. But yet how can one dispute -it? how can one maintain that what actually pleases a man ought not -to please him? The proposition then must be true. But now no man of -taste will assent to it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span> We speak of good taste and bad taste; are all -criticisms which turn upon this distinction to be considered absurd? -have these everyday expressions no meaning? Home ends by asserting -a common standard of taste, deduced from the necessity of a common -life for mankind or, as he says, from a "final cause"; for without -uniformity of taste, who would trouble to produce works of art, build -elegant and costly edifices, or lay out beautiful gardens and so forth? -He does not fail to draw attention to a second final cause; that of -the advisability of attracting citizens to public shows and uniting -those whom class-differences and diversity of occupation tend to keep -apart. But how shall a standard of taste be established? This is a new -perplexity, which one cannot think to be escaped by observing that, as -in framing moral rules we seek the counsel of the most honourable of -educated men, not of savages; so to determine the standard of taste -we should have recourse to the few who are not worn out by degrading -bodily labour, not corrupted in taste, and not rendered effeminate -by pleasure, who have received the gift of good taste from nature, -and have brought it to perfection by the education and practice of a -lifetime: if, notwithstanding, controversies arise, then reference -must be made to the principles of Criticism as set forth by Home -himself in his own book.<a name="FNanchor_26_891" id="FNanchor_26_891"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_891" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Similar contradictions and vicious circles -reappear in David Hume's <i>Essay on Taste,</i> where Hume tries in vain -to define the distinctive characteristics of the man of taste whose -judgement must be law, and, while asserting the uniformity of the -general principles of taste as founded in human nature, and warning -the reader against giving undue weight to individual perversions and -ignorances, at the same time asserts that divergences in taste may be -irreconcilable, insuperable, and yet blameless.<a name="FNanchor_27_892" id="FNanchor_27_892"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_892" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<p>But a criticism of æsthetic relativism cannot be based upon the -opposite doctrine which, by its affirmation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_468" id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span> absoluteness, resolves -taste into concepts and logical inferences. The eighteenth century -offers examples of this mistake in Muratori, one of the first to -maintain the existence of a rule of taste and a universal beauty -whose rules are furnished by Poetics;<a name="FNanchor_28_893" id="FNanchor_28_893"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_893" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> in André, who said that -"the beauty in a work of art is not that which pleases at the first -glance of fancy through certain individual dispositions of the mental -faculties or bodily organs, but that which has a right to please the -reason and reflexion by its own inherent excellence or rightness and, -if the expression be allowed, by its intrinsic agreeableness";<a name="FNanchor_29_894" id="FNanchor_29_894"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_894" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> -in Voltaire, who recognized a "universal taste" which was -"intellectual";<a name="FNanchor_30_895" id="FNanchor_30_895"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_895" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> and in very many others. This intellectualistic -error, no less than the sensationalistic, was attacked by Kant; but -even Kant, by making beauty consist in a symbolism of morality, failed -to grasp the concept of an imaginative absoluteness of taste.<a name="FNanchor_31_896" id="FNanchor_31_896"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_896" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> -Succeeding generations of philosophers met the difficulty by passing it -over in silence.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, this criterion of an imaginative absoluteness, the idea -that in order to judge works of art one must place oneself at the -artist's point of view at the moment of production, and that to judge -is to reproduce, gathered weight little by little from the beginning -of the eighteenth century, when its first appearance is seen in the -work of the Italian Francesco Montani already quoted (1705), and by -the English poet Alexander Pope in his <i>Essay on Criticism.</i> ("A -perfect judge will read each work of wit With the same spirit that its -author writ."<a name="FNanchor_32_897" id="FNanchor_32_897"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_897" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>) A few years later Antonio Conti recognized part of -the truth in the <i>règle du premier aspect</i> advised by Terrasson as -a test for judging poetry, while noting it to be more applicable to -modern than to ancient works: "<i>quand on n'a pas l'esprit prévenu, -et que d'ailleurs on l'a assez pénétrant, on peut voir tout d'un -coup si un poète a bien imité son objet; car, comme on connaît -l'original, c'est-à-dire les hommes et les<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_469" id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span> mœurs de son siècle, -on peut aisément lui confronter la copie, c'est-à-dire la poésie qui -les imite.</i>" In judging ancient writers something more is necessary: -"<i>cette règle du premier aspect n'est presque d'aucun usage dans -l'examen de l'ancienne poésie, dont on ne peut pas juger qu'après -avoir longtemps réfléchi sur la religion des anciens, sur leurs lois, -leur mœurs, sur leurs manières de combattre et d'haranguer, etc. -Les beautés d'un poème, indépendantes de toutes ces circonstances -individuelles, sont très rares, et les grands peintres les ont toujours -évitées avec soin, car ils voulaient peindre la nature et non pas -leurs idées;</i>"<a name="FNanchor_33_898" id="FNanchor_33_898"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_898" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> the necessary criterion, therefore, is to be found -in history. The end of the same century saw the concept of congenial -reproduction sufficiently defined by Heydenreich: "A philosophical -critic of art must himself be possessed of genius for art; reason -exacts this qualification and grants no dispensation, just as she will -refuse to appoint a blind man as judge of colours. The critic must -not pretend to be able to feel the attraction of beauty by means of -syllogisms (<i>Vernunftschlüsse</i>); beauty must manifest itself to feeling -with irresistible self-evidence and, attracted by its fascination, -reason must find no time to linger over the why and wherefore; the -effect, with its delightful and unexpected possession and domination -of the whole being, should suffocate at birth any inquiry into origins -or causes. But this state of fanatical admiration cannot last long; -reason must inevitably recover consciousness of itself and direct -its attention upon the state in which it was during the enjoyment -of beauty and upon its present memories of that state...."<a name="FNanchor_34_899" id="FNanchor_34_899"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_899" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> This -was the wholesomely impressionistic theory which prevailed among the -Romanticists and was accepted even by De Sanctis.<a name="FNanchor_35_900" id="FNanchor_35_900"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_900" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Still there -was even then no definite theory of criticism, which demanded as its -condition of existence a precise concept of art and of the relations -of the work of art with its historical antecedents.<a name="FNanchor_36_901" id="FNanchor_36_901"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_901" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> The very -possibility of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_470" id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span> æsthetic criticism was questioned in the second half -of the nineteenth century, when taste was relegated to a place amongst -the facts of individual caprice, and a so-called historical criticism -was proclaimed the sole scientific criticism and expounded in works of -irrelevant learning or buried beneath the preconceptions of positivists -and materialists. Those who reacted against such extremalism and -materialism generally made the mistake of supporting themselves by a -kind of intellectualistic dogmatism<a name="FNanchor_37_902" id="FNanchor_37_902"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_902" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> or an empty æstheticism.<a name="FNanchor_38_903" id="FNanchor_38_903"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_903" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between taste and genius.</i></div> - -<p>VI. We have seen that in the seventeenth century, when the words -"taste" and "genius" or "wit" were in fashion, the facts they -designated were sometimes interchanged amongst themselves and came to -be considered as one single fact, while sometimes each was conceived -as distinct in itself, genius being the faculty of production, and -taste the faculty of judgement, taste being further subdivided into -the sterile and the fertile: a terminology adopted by Muratori<a name="FNanchor_39_904" id="FNanchor_39_904"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_904" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> in -Italy and Ulrich König<a name="FNanchor_40_905" id="FNanchor_40_905"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_905" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> in Germany. Batteux said, "<i>le goût juge -des productions du génie</i>"<a name="FNanchor_41_906" id="FNanchor_41_906"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_906" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>; and Kant speaks of defective works -having genius without taste or taste without genius, and of others in -which taste alone suffices;<a name="FNanchor_42_907" id="FNanchor_42_907"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_907" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> now we find him distinguishing the two -concepts as the judging and producing faculties, now he speaks of them -as a single faculty existing in various degrees. An inherent difference -between taste and genius was accepted by later writers on Æsthetic and -assumed its most rigid form in the hands of Herbart and his followers.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Concept of artistic and literary history.</i></div> - -<p>VII. The evolutionary theory of art made its appearance towards the -end of the eighteenth century. This was the time when the distinction -between classical and romantic art was first made; a classification -later augmented by an introductory section on Oriental art, owing to -the increase of knowledge concerning the pre-Hellenic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_471" id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span> world. Towards -the end of his life Goethe told his friend Eckermann that the concepts -of classical and romantic had been formed by himself and Schiller, for -he himself had upheld the objective method in poetry, whilst Schiller, -in order to champion the subjective form to which he inclined, had -written the essay <i>On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry</i>, in which the word -naïve (<i>naiv</i>) expresses the style later called classical and the -word sentimental (<i>sentimentalisch)</i> that later called romantic. "The -Schlegels," continues Goethe, "seized upon these ideas and disseminated -them, so that to-day everyone uses them and speaks of classical and -romantic, things perfectly unknown fifty years ago"<a name="FNanchor_43_908" id="FNanchor_43_908"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_908" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> (Goethe was -speaking in 1831). Schiller's essay bears the imprint of Rousseau's -influence and is dated 1795-6.<a name="FNanchor_44_909" id="FNanchor_44_909"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_909" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> It contains such statements as this: -"Poets are above all things the preservers of nature; and when they -cannot be so entirely, and have tried upon themselves the destructive -force of arbitrary and artificial forms or have fought against such -forms, they stand up to bear witness on her behalf. Poets, therefore, -either are nature or, having lost her, seek her. Hence arise two wholly -distinct kinds of poetic composition, exhausting between them the whole -field of poetry; all poets who are worthy of the name must belong, -according to the times and conditions in which they flourish, either -to the category of naïve or to that of sentimental poets." Schiller -recognized three kinds of sentimental poetry: satirical, elegiac and -idyllic; he defined a satirical poet as one "who takes as his object -the desertion of nature and the contrast of the real with the ideal." -The weak point of this division is the concept of two distinct kinds -of poetry, the reduction of the infinite forms in which poetry appears -to individuals, to two kinds. If one of these two kinds be taken the -perfect and the other as the imperfect kind, the mistake is made of -converting imperfection into a kind or species, the negative into a -positive.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_472" id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span> Wilhelm von Humboldt pointed out to his friend that if -form is the essence of art, there cannot be a kind of poetry, such -as the sentimental or romantic is supposed to be, in which matter -preponderates over form, for that would constitute a pseudo-art, not -a separate kind of art.<a name="FNanchor_45_910" id="FNanchor_45_910"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_910" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Schiller attached no historical meaning -to his classification, in fact he declared explicitly that in using -the words "ancient" and "modern" as equivalent to "ingenuous" and -"sentimental" he did not mean to deny that some "ancient" poets, in his -sense of the word, could be found among contemporary writers; the two -characters might even be united in the same poet or the same poetical -work, as (to give Schiller's own example) in <i>Werther</i><a name="FNanchor_46_911" id="FNanchor_46_911"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_911" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> The first to -assign a historical meaning to the division were Friedrich and Wilhelm -von Schlegel; the former in an early work of 1795, the latter in his -celebrated lectures on literary history given at Berlin in 1801-4. But -the two senses, systematic and historical, were variously alternated -and mixed by literary men and critics, and other distinctions were -added; "classical" was sometimes used to describe poetry of a frigid -and imitative style, while "romantic" poetry was the inspired; in some -countries the word "romantic" came to mean a political reactionary, in -Italy it stood for "liberal"; and so forth. In 1815, when Friedrich -Schlegel spoke of ancient Persian romantic poems, or when in our times -attention is called to the romanticism of the Greek, Latin or French -classics, the historical signification is lost in the theoretical, the -sense originally intended by Schiller.</p> - -<p>But the historical sense was prevalent in German idealism, which -inclined towards the construction of a universal history, including -that of literature and art, upon a scheme of ideal evolution. Schelling -made a sharp division between pagan and Christian art; the second -being held an advance upon the former which was the lowest step.<a name="FNanchor_47_912" id="FNanchor_47_912"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_912" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> -Hegel accepted this division and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_473" id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span> introduced a final regress by -dividing the history of art into three periods: symbolic (Oriental) -art, classical (Hellenic) and romantic (modern). Just as he conceived -Roman art (with its introduction of satire and other kinds indicative -of a failure to maintain harmony between form and content) as the -dissolution of classical art, a thought suggested by Schiller, so -he found in the subjective humour of Cervantes and Ariosto<a name="FNanchor_48_913" id="FNanchor_48_913"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_913" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> the -dissolution of romantic art; and he regarded this series as completing -the possibilities of art, though some interpreters think that by a -self-contradiction he admitted the possibility of a fourth period, an -art of the modern or future world. Indeed amongst his disciples we -find Weiss rejecting the Oriental period in order to save the triadic -division, and placing as third the modern period, synthesis of the -ancient and the mediæval:<a name="FNanchor_49_914" id="FNanchor_49_914"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_914" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Vischer too inclines to recognize a -modern or progressive period.<a name="FNanchor_50_915" id="FNanchor_50_915"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_915" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> - -<p>These arbitrary constructions reappear in the works of positivist -metaphysicians in the shape of an evolutionary or progressive history -of art. Spencer dreamed of writing some sort of treatise on the -subject, and in the published programme of his system (1860) we read -that the third volume of his <i>Principles of Sociology</i> was to contain -amongst other things a chapter on æsthetic progress "with the gradual -differentiation of fine arts from primitive institutions and from each -other, with their increasing variety in development, their progress in -reality of expression and superiority of end." No grief need be felt -that the chapter was left unwritten when we remember the samples of it -preserved in the <i>Principles of Psychology</i> and already reviewed in -these pages.<a name="FNanchor_51_916" id="FNanchor_51_916"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_916" class="fnanchor">[51]</a></p> - -<p>The strong historical sense of our own day is leading us further and -further away from the evolutionary or abstractly progressive theories -which falsify the free and original movement of art. Fiedler remarked -not without justice that unity and progress cannot be introduced -into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_474" id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span> a history of art, and that the works of artists must be judged -discretely as so many fragments of the life of the universe.<a name="FNanchor_52_917" id="FNanchor_52_917"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_917" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> -In recent times a remarkable student of the history of figurative -art, Venturi, has tried to bring evolutionism into fashion, and has -illustrated it in a <i>History of the Madonna,</i> in which the presentment -of the Virgin is conceived as an organism which is born, grows, attains -perfection, grows old and dies! Others have claimed for artistic -history its true character, intolerant of outward curb and rule, -drawing her ever-varied productions from the well-head of the infinite -Spirit.<a name="FNanchor_53_918" id="FNanchor_53_918"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_918" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p> - -<p><i>Conclusion.</i></p> - -<p>These hurried notes may suffice to show in how narrow a circle has -hitherto moved the scientific criticism of the errors we have called -"particular." Æsthetic needs to be surrounded and nourished by a -watchful and vigorous critical literature drawing its life from her and -forming in turn her safeguard and strength.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_866" id="Footnote_1_866"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_866"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_98">98</a>-<a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_867" id="Footnote_2_867"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_867"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Das Naturgefühl nach Verschiedenheit der Zeiten und -Volksstämme,</i> in <i>Cosmos,</i> ii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_868" id="Footnote_3_868"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_868"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> V. Laprade, <i>Le Sentiment de la nature avant le -christianisme,</i> 1866; also <i>chez les modernes,</i> 1867; Alfred Biese, -<i>Die Entwicklung des Naturgefühls den Griechen und Römern,</i> Kiel, -1882-1884; <i>Die Entwicklung des Naturgefühls im Mittelalter und in der -Neuzeit,</i> 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1892.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_869" id="Footnote_4_869"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_869"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Kritische Gänge,</i> v. pp. 5-23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_870" id="Footnote_5_870"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_870"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,</i> pp. 217-218; cf. <i>Philos, d. -Schönen,</i> bk. ii. ch. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_871" id="Footnote_6_871"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_871"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>-<a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_872" id="Footnote_7_872"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_872"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Hippias maior, passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_873" id="Footnote_8_873"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_873"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Elements of Criticism,</i> introd., and cf. ch. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_874" id="Footnote_9_874"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_874"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Herder, <i>Kritische Wälder</i> (in <i>Werke, ed. cit.</i> iv.), pp. -47-53; cf. <i>Kaligone (ibid.</i> vol. xxii.), <i>passim;</i> and fragment on -<i>Plastic.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_875" id="Footnote_10_875"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_875"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.</i> i. pp. 50-51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_876" id="Footnote_11_876"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_876"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 92 <i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_877" id="Footnote_12_877"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_877"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> i. p. 181.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_878" id="Footnote_13_878"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_878"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> pp. 80-83.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_879" id="Footnote_14_879"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_879"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> Grant Allen, <i>Physiological Æsthetics</i>, chs. 4 and -5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_880" id="Footnote_15_880"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_880"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Tolstoy, <i>What is Art?</i> pp. 19-22. Kralik is the author -of <i>Weltschönheit, Versuch einer allgemeinen Ästhetik,</i> Vienna, 1894.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_881" id="Footnote_16_881"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_881"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_18">18</a>-<a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_882" id="Footnote_17_882"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_882"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Cf. Volkmann, <i>Rhet. d. G. u. Röm.</i> pp. 532-544.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_883" id="Footnote_18_883"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_883"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Comparetti, <i>Virgilio net M. E.</i> i. p. 172.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_884" id="Footnote_19_884"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_884"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Nuove ricerche sul hello,</i> ch. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_885" id="Footnote_20_885"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_885"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_145">145</a>-<a href="#Page_146">146</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_886" id="Footnote_21_886"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_886"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Inst. Oral.</i> i. ch. 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_887" id="Footnote_22_887"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_887"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> For all this cf. the works of Lersch and of Steinthal, -which contain the more important texts.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_888" id="Footnote_23_888"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_888"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Comparetti, <i>Virgilio nel M. E.,</i> i. pp. 169-170.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_889" id="Footnote_24_889"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_889"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Pott, introd. to Humboldt, <i>cit.</i> Paul, <i>Principien d. -Sprachgeschichte,</i> ch. 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_890" id="Footnote_25_890"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_890"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Batteux, <i>Les Beaux Arts,</i> part ii. p. 54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_891" id="Footnote_26_891"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_891"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Elem. of Criticism,</i> iii. ch. 25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_892" id="Footnote_27_892"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_892"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Essays, Moral, Political and Literary</i> (London ed., -1862), ch. 23: <i>On the Standard of Taste.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_893" id="Footnote_28_893"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_893"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Perfetta poesia,</i> bk. v. ch. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_894" id="Footnote_29_894"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_894"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Essai sur le beau,</i> dise. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_895" id="Footnote_30_895"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_895"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Essai sur le goût, cil.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_896" id="Footnote_31_896"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_896"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_280">280</a>-<a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_897" id="Footnote_32_897"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_897"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Essay on Criticism,</i> 1711, part ii. 11. 233-234.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_898" id="Footnote_33_898"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_898"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Letter to Maffei, in <i>Prose e poesie,</i> ii. pp. cxx-cxxi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_899" id="Footnote_34_899"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_899"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>System d. Ästhetik,</i> pref. pp. xxi-xxv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_900" id="Footnote_35_900"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_900"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Amongst other places <i>Saggi critici,</i> pp. 355-358.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_901" id="Footnote_36_901"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_901"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_127">123</a>-<a href="#Page_127">127</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_902" id="Footnote_37_902"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_902"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> A. Ricardou, <i>La Critique littéraire,</i> Paris, -1896.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_903" id="Footnote_38_903"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_903"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> A. Conti, <i>Sul fiume del tempo,</i> Naples, 1907.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_904" id="Footnote_39_904"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_904"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Perf. poesia,</i> bk. v. ch. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_905" id="Footnote_40_905"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_905"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Untersuchung v. d. guten Geschmack,</i> 1727.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_906" id="Footnote_41_906"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_906"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Les Beaux Arts,</i> part ii. ch. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_907" id="Footnote_42_907"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_907"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Krit. d. Urtheilskr.</i> § 48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_908" id="Footnote_43_908"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_908"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Eckermann, <i>Gespräche mit Goethe,</i> under date March 21, -1831.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_909" id="Footnote_44_909"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_909"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung,</i> 1795-1796 (in -<i>Werke,</i> ed. Goedecke, vol. xii.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_910" id="Footnote_45_910"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_910"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Quoted in Danzel, <i>Ges. Aufs.</i> pp. 21-22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_911" id="Footnote_46_911"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_911"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>Üb. naive u. sentim. Dicht., ed. cit.,</i> p. 155, note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_912" id="Footnote_47_912"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_912"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_291">291</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_913" id="Footnote_48_913"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_913"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Vorles. üb. Ästh.,</i> vols. ii. and iii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_914" id="Footnote_49_914"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_914"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Cf. von Hartmann, <i>Dtsche. Ästh. s. Kant,</i> pp. 99-101.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_915" id="Footnote_50_915"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_915"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Ästh.</i> part iii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_916" id="Footnote_51_916"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_916"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_388">388</a>-<a href="#Page_390">390</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_917" id="Footnote_52_917"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_917"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> C. Fiedler, <i>Ursprung d. künstl. Thätigkeit,</i> p. 136 -<i>seqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_918" id="Footnote_53_918"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_918"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> Ad. Venturi, <i>La Madonna,</i> Milan, 1899. Cf. B. Labanca, -in <i>Rivista polit, e lett.</i> (Rome), Oct. 1899, and in <i>Rivisla di -filos. e pedag.</i> (Bologna), 1900; and B. Croce, in <i>Nap. nobiliss., -Rivista di lopografia e storia dell' arte,</i> viii. pp. 161-163, ix. pp. -13-14 (reprinted in <i>Probl. di estetica,</i> pp. 265-272). On the theory -of method in artistic and literary history cf. above, pp. <a href="#Page_128">128</a>-<a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_475" id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="BIBLIOGRAPHICAL_APPENDIX" id="BIBLIOGRAPHICAL_APPENDIX">BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX</a></h4> - - -<p>The first attempt at a history of Æsthetic is the work of J. Roller -(see above, p. 248) mentioned by Zimmermann (<i>Gesch. d. Ästh.</i> pref., -p. v) as being so exceedingly rare that he had never been able to see -a copy of the book. We ourselves have had the good fortune to find the -book in the Royal Library of Munich in Bavaria, by the help of our -friend Dr. Arturo Farinelli of Innsbruck University, and to obtain the -loan of it. It bears the title <i>Entwurf</i> | <i>zur</i> | <i>Geschichte und -Literatur</i> | <i>der Æsthetik</i> | <i>von Baumgarten auf die</i> | <i>neueste -Zeit.</i> | <i>Herausgegeben</i> | <i>von</i> | <i>J. Koller</i>. | <i>Regensburg</i> | in -der Montag und Weissischen Buchhandlung | 1799 (pp. viii-107, small -8vo); in the preface the author declares his intention of supplying -young men attending Lectures on the Criticism of Taste and the Theory -of the Fine Arts in the German Universities with a "lucid summary of -the origin and later progress of these studies," premising that he will -treat of general theories only and that his judgements are frequently -derived from reviews in literary periodicals. The introduction (§§ -1-7) treats of æsthetic theories from antiquity down to the beginning -of the eighteenth century; Koller observes that "the names and form -of a general Theory of Fine Art and Criticism of Taste were unknown -to the ancients, whose imperfect ethical theory prevented their -producing anything in this field." He dedicates § 5 to the Italians, -"who have produced little in theory"; indeed the only Italian books -mentioned are the <i>Entusiasmo</i> of Bettinelli and the small work of -Jagemann, <i>Saggio di buon gusto nelle belle arti ove si spiegano gli -elementi dell' estetica,</i> di Fr. Gaud. Jagemann, Regente agostiniano, -In Firenze, MDCCLXXI, Presso Luigi Bastianelli e compagni; 60 pp. -(concerning this, see B. Croce, <i>Problemi di estetica,</i> pp. 387-390). -The section on the History and Literature of Æsthetic begins with the -oft-quoted passage from Bülffinger ("<i>Vellem existerent,</i> etc.") and -passes at once to Baumgarten: "the theoretical epoch owes its existence -undeniably to Baumgarten; to him belongs the inalienable merit of -having first conceived an Æsthetic founded on principles of reason and -wholly developed, and of having tried to put it into practice by the -means offered him by his own philosophy." Immediately after this, Meier -is mentioned, followed by the titles, accompanied by brief<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_476" id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span> extracts -and remarks—a sort of <i>catalogue raisonné</i>—of many German books on -Æsthetic from those of K. W. Müller (1759) to one by Ramier (1799), -mixed with various French and English writings under the dates of their -German translations. Special emphasis is laid on Kant (pp. 64-74), with -the remark that, prior to the appearance of the <i>Critique of Judgment,</i> -æstheticians were divided into sceptics, dogmatics and empiricists: the -most powerful intellects of the nation inclined towards empiricism, so -much so that had Kant himself "been asked by what literature he had -been most strongly influenced in the development of his own thought, -he would certainly have named the acute empirical writers of England, -France and Germany"; but "by no pre-Kantian method had it been possible -to establish an agreement (<i>eine Einhelligkeit</i>) between men upon -matters of taste." The last pages call attention to the revival of -interest in æsthetic studies, which nobody would now dare call a waste -of time as in former days. "May Jacobi, Schiller and Mehmel soon enrich -literature by publication of their theories!" (p. 104).</p> - -<p>The rarity of Koller's book has led us to notice it at some length. -Apart from this the first general history of Æsthetic worthy the -name is that written by Robert Zimmermann, <i>Geschichte der Ästhetik -als philosophischer Wissenschaft,</i> Vienna, 1858. It is divided into -four books: "the first of these contains the history of philosophical -concepts concerning the beautiful and art from the Greeks down to the -constitution of Æsthetic as a philosophical science through the labours -of Baumgarten"; the second runs from Baumgarten down to the reform of -Æsthetic brought about by the <i>Critique of Judgment</i>; the third, from -Kant to the Æsthetic of idealism; the fourth, from the beginnings of -idealistic Æsthetic down to the author's own day (1798-1858). The work -is on Herbartian lines, and is remarkable for solid research and lucid -exposition, although the erroneous point of view and neglect of all -æsthetic movement other than Græco-Roman or German are grave defects; -besides, it is now sixty years out of date.</p> - -<p>Less solid and more compilatory in nature, whilst retaining all the -defects of the foregoing, is the history by Max Schasler, <i>Kritische -Geschichte der Ästhetik,</i> Berlin, 1872, divided into three books -treating of ancient Æsthetic and that of the eighteenth and nineteenth -centuries. The author belongs to the Hegelian school and conceives his -history as a propædeutic to theory, "in order, that is, to attain a -supreme principle for the construction of a new system"; he schematizes -the material of facts for each period into three grades of Æsthetic of -sensation (<i>Empfindungsurtheil,</i>) of intellect (<i>Verstandsurtheil</i>) and -of reason (<i>Vernunfturtheil.</i>)</p> - -<p>English literature has Bernard Bosanquet's <i>History of Æsthetics,</i> -London, 1892; a sober and well-arranged work, written from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_477" id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span> an eclectic -point of view between the Æsthetic of content and the Æsthetic of -form. The author, however, is wrong in believing he has passed over -"no writer of the first rank"; he has passed over not only writers but -some important movements of ideas, and in general he shows insufficient -knowledge of the literature of the Latin races. Another general -history of Æsthetic in English is the first volume of <i>The Philosophy -of the Beautiful, being Outlines of the History of Æsthetics,</i> by -William Knight, London, Murray, 1895: it consists mainly of a rich -collection of extracts and abridgements of ancient and modern books -treating of Æsthetic. In this respect the most noteworthy chapters -are those on Holland, Great Britain and America (10-13); the second -volume, published in 1898, has in an appendix, pp. 251-281, notices -upon Æsthetic in Russia and Denmark. Another recent publication is -George Saintsbury's <i>A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in -Europe from the Earliest Times to the Present Day</i>; vol. i., Edinburgh -and London, 1900, concerning classical and mediæval criticism; vol. -ii., 1902, criticism from the Renaissance to end of the eighteenth -century: vol. iii., 1904, modern criticism. The writer of this History, -equally skilled in literature and innocent of philosophy, has thought -it possible to exclude æsthetic science in the strict sense, "the -more transcendental Æsthetic, those ambitious theories of Beauty and -artistic pleasure in general which seem so noble and fascinating until -we discover them to be but cloud-appearances of Juno," and to limit his -treatise to "lofty Rhetoric and Poetic, to the theory and practice of -Criticism and literary taste" (book i. ch. I). Thus is produced a book -instructive in many ways but wholly deficient in method and definite -object. What is lofty Rhetoric and Poetic, the theory of Criticism and -literary taste, if not Æsthetic pure and simple? how can the history of -these be composed without due notice of metaphysical Æsthetic and other -manifestations whose interaction and development are the fabric of -history itself? Perhaps Saintsbury hoped to be able to write a History -of Criticism as distinct from that of Æsthetic; if that be the case, -he has been unsuccessful in writing either one or the other. Cf. <i>La -Critica,</i> ii. (1904), pp. 59-63.</p> - -<p>The generosity of the Hungarian Academy of Science has enabled us to -handle the History of Æsthetic (<i>Az Æsthetika története</i>) of Bela -Janosi, Budapesth, 1899-1901, in three volumes; the first volume treats -the Æsthetic of Greece; the second, of Æsthetic from the Middle Ages to -Baumgarten; the third, from Baumgarten to the present day. For us it is -a book sealed with seven seals, save for reviews which have appeared in -the <i>Deutsche Litteraturzeitung</i> of Berlin, August 25, 1900, July 12, -1902, and May 2, 1903.</p> - -<p>Amongst Latin countries, France has no special history of Æsthetic, -for this title cannot be given to the portion of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_478" id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span> second volume -(pp. 311-570) of the work by Ch. Levêque, <i>La Science du beau</i> -(Paris, 1862), under the heading <i>Examen des principaux systèmes -d'esthétique anciens et modernes,</i> where eight chapters are devoted -to an exposition of the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and -St. Augustine, Hutcheson, André and Baumgarten, Reid, Kant, Schelling -and Hegel. Spain, on the other hand, possesses the work of Marcelino -Menendez y Pelayo, <i>Historia de las idéas estéticas en España,</i> 2nd -ed., Madrid, 1890-1901 (5 vols., variously distributed amongst the -1st ed., 1883-1891, and the 2nd), which is not restricted, as the -title suggests, to Spain alone or to Æsthetic alone but, as the author -observes in his preface (i. pp. xx-xxi), includes the metaphysical -disquisitions on the beautiful, the speculations of mystics on the -beauty of God and on love; the theories of art scattered through -the pages of philosophers; the æsthetic considerations found in -treatises upon individual arts (Poetics and Rhetoric, works on -painting, architecture, etc.); and, finally, ideas enunciated by -artists concerning their own particular arts. This work is of capital -importance on everything to do with Spanish authors, and also in its -general part contains good treatments of matters generally passed over -by historians. Menendez y Pelayo inclines to metaphysical idealism, -yet seems not disinclined to welcome elements from other systems, even -empirical theories: in our opinion this vagueness has an unfortunate -effect on the work as a whole. Some years ago Professor V. Spinazzola -announced the forthcoming publication of a course of lectures given -by Francesco de Sanctis in Naples in 1845 on <i>Storia della critica da -Aristotele ad Hegel.</i> For the history of Æsthetic in Italy cf. Alfredo -Rolla, <i>Storia delle idee estetiche in Italia,</i> Turin, 1904; on which -see Croce, <i>Problemi di estetica,</i> pp. 401-415.</p> - -<p>We need take no notice of the historical remarks or chapters that -generally stand at the beginning of treatises on Æsthetic; the most -important occur in the volumes of Solger, Hegel and Schleiermacher. A -general history of Æsthetic, from the rigorous point of view of the -principle of Expression, has not been attempted before the present work.</p> - -<p>For the bibliography down to the end of the eighteenth century, -Sulzer's <i>Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste,</i> 2nd ed., with -additions by von Blankenburg, Leipzig, 1792, in four volumes, is -practically complete and is an inexhaustible mine of information. -For the nineteenth century much material is collected by C. Mills -Gayley and Fred Newton Scott in <i>An Introduction to the Methods and -Materials of Literary Criticism. The Bases in Æsthetics and Poetics,</i> -Boston, 1899. Besides Sulzer, we may mention æsthetic dictionaries -by Gruber, <i>Wörterbuch z. Behuf d. Ästh. d. schönen Künste,</i> Weimar, -1810: Jeithles, <i>Ästhetisches Lexikon,</i> vol. i. A-K, Vienna, 1835: -Hebenstreit, <i>Encyklopädie d. Ästhetik,</i> 2nd ed., Vienna, 1848.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_479" id="Page_479">[Pg 479]</a></span></p> - -<p>The following notes contain for the convenience of the student several -books which the author has not been able to see.</p> - - -<p>I. Concerning ancient Æsthetic no better or more comprehensive work can -be found than the <i>Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten,</i> -by Ed. Müller, Breslau, 1831-1837, 2 vols. For inquiries concerning -the Beautiful special reference should be made to Julius Walter, <i>Die -Geschichte der Ästhetik im Alterthum ihren begrifflichen Entwicklung -nach,</i> Leipzig, 1893. See also Em. Egger, <i>Essai sur l'histoire de la -critique chez les Grecs,</i> 2nd ed., Paris, 1886: Zimmermann, Bk. I.: -Bosanquet, ch. ii.-v. and Saintsbury, vol. i.</p> - -<p>Of the innumerable special monographs: for Plato's Æsthetic see Arn. -Ruge, <i>Die platonische Ästhetik,</i> Halle, 1832: for Aristotle's, Döring, -<i>Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles,</i> Jena, 1876: C. Bénard, <i>L'Esthétique -d'Aristote et de ses successeurs,</i> Paris, 1890: S. H. Butcher, -<i>Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art,</i> 3rd ed., London, 1902. For -Plotinus, E. Vacherot, <i>Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie,</i> -Paris, 1846: E. Brenning, <i>Die Lehre vom Schönen bei Plotin im -Zusammenhang seines Systems dargestellt,</i> Göttingen, 1864. On the <i>Ars -Poetica</i> of Horace, A. Viola, <i>L' arte poetica di Orazio nella critica -italiana e straniera,</i> 2 vols. Naples, 1901-1907.</p> - -<p>For the history of ancient Psychology see H. Siebeck, <i>Geschichte der -Psychologie,</i> 1880; A. E. Chaignet, <i>Histoire de la psychologie des -Grecs,</i> Paris, 1887; L. Ambrosi, <i>La psicologia dell' immaginazione -nella storia della filosofia,</i> Rome, 1898. For the history of -the philosophy of language see H. Steinthal, <i>Geschichte der -Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht -auf die Logik,</i> 2nd ed. Berlin, 1890-1891, 2 vols.</p> - - -<p>II. For the æsthetic ideas of St. Augustine and early Christian authors -see Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 193-266. For Thomas Aquinas, L. -Taparelli, <i>Delle ragioni del bello seconde la dottrina di san Tommaso -d'Aquino</i> (in <i>Civiltà cattolica</i> for 1859-1860): P. Vallet, <i>L'Idée -du beau dans la philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin,</i> 1883: M. de Wulf, -<i>Études historiques sur l'esthétique de St. Thomas,</i> Louvain, 1896.</p> - -<p>For the literary doctrines of the Middle Ages see D. Comparetti, -<i>Virgilio nel medio evo,</i> 2nd ed. Florence, 1893, vol. i., and G. -Saintsbury, <i>op. cit.,</i> vol. i. pp. 369-486. For the early Renaissance -see K. Vossler, <i>Poetische Theorien in d. italien. Frührenaissance,</i> -Berlin, 1900. For the Poetics of the high Renaissance see J. E. -Spingarn, <i>History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, with -special reference to the influence of Italy,</i> New York, 1899 (Italian -trans. with corrections and additions, Bari, 1905). See also F. de -Sanctis, <i>Storia della letteratura italiana,</i> Naples, 1870, <i>passim.</i></p> - -<p>For the traditions of Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_480" id="Page_480">[Pg 480]</a></span> Middle -Ages and Renaissance, for best and fullest information see Menendez y -Pelayo, <i>op. cit.,</i> vol. i. part ii. and vol. ii. For Italian treatises -on beauty and love see Michele Rosi, <i>Saggi sui trattati d' amore -del cinquecento,</i> Recanati, 1899, and F. Flamini, <i>Il cinquecento,</i> -Milan, Vallardi, N.D., ch. iv. pp. 378-381. For Tasso see Alfredo -Giannini, <i>Il "Minturno" di T. Tasso,</i> Ariano, 1899: see also E. Proto -in <i>Rass. crit. lett. ital.</i> vi. (Naples, 1901) pp. 127-145. For Leone -Ebreo see Edm. Solmi, <i>Benedetto Spinoza e L. E., studio su una fonte -italiana dimenticata dello spinozismo,</i> Modena, 1903: cf. G. Gentile in -<i>Critica,</i> ii. pp. 313-319.</p> - -<p>On J. C. Scaliger see Eug. Lintilhac, <i>Un Coup d'État dans la -république des lettres: Jules César Scaliger, fondateur du classicisme -cent ans avant Boileau</i> (in the <i>Nouv. Revue,</i> 1890, vol. lxiv. -pp. 333-346, 528-547). On Fracastoro, Giuseppe Rossi, <i>Girolamo</i> -<i>Fracastoro in relazione all' aristotelismo e alla scienza nel -Rinascimento,</i> Pisa, 1893. On Castelvetro, Ant. Fusco, <i>La poetica di -Ludovico Castelvetro,</i> Naples, 1904. On Patrizzi, Oddone Zenatti, <i>Fr. -Patrizzi, Orazio Ariosto, e Torquato Tasso,</i> etc. (Verona, per le nozze -Morpurgo-Franchetti, N.D.).</p> - - -<p>III. For this period of ferment see H. von Stein, <i>Die Entstehung -der neueren Ästhetik,</i> Stuttgart, 1886: K. Borinski, <i>Die Poetik der -Renaissance und die Anfänge der litterarischen Kritik in Deutschland,</i> -Berlin, 1886 (esp. the last chapter): also same author's <i>Baltasar -Gracian und die Hofliteratur in Deutschland,</i> Halle a. S., 1894, B. -Croce, <i>I trattatisti italiani del Concettismo e B. Gracian,</i> Naples, -1899 (in <i>Atti dell' Acc. Pont.</i> vol. xxix., reprinted in <i>Problemi di -estetica,</i> pp. 309-345), <i>Elizabethan Critical Essays,</i> edited with -an introduction by G. Gregory Smith, Oxford, 1904, 2 vols.: <i>Critical -Essays of the Seventeenth Century,</i> edited by J. E. Spingam, Oxford, -1908, 2 vols.: Leone Donati, <i>J. J. Bodmer und die italienische -Litteratur</i> (in the vol. <i>J. J. Bodmer, Denkschrift z. C. C. -Geburtstag,</i> Zürich, 1900, pp. 241-312): see also <i>Probl. di estetica,</i> -pp. 371-380.</p> - -<p>On Bacon see K. Fischer, <i>Franz Baco von Verulam,</i> Leipzig, 1856 (2nd -ed. 1875), cf. P. Jacquinet, <i>Fr. Baconis in re litteraria iudicia,</i> -Paris, 1863. On Gravina, Em. Reich, <i>G. V. Gravina als Ästhetiker</i> (in -the Trans, of the Viennese Academy, vol. cxx. 1890): B. Croce, <i>Di -alcuni giudizi sul Gravina considerate come estetico,</i> Florence, 1901 -(in <i>Miscellanea d' Ancona,</i> pp. 456-464), reprinted in <i>Probl. di -est.</i> pp. 360-370. On Du Bos, Morel,<i>Étude sur l'abbé du Bos,</i> Paris, -1849: P. Petent, <i>J. B. Dubos,</i> Tramelan, 1902. On Bouhours, Doncieux, -<i>Un jésuite homme de lettres au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle,</i> Paris, -1886. On the Bouhours-Orsi controversy, F. Fottano, <i>Una polemica nel -settecento,</i> in <i>Ricerche letterarie,</i> Leghorn, 1897, pp. 313-332: -A. Boeri, <i>Una contesa letteraria franco-italiana nel secolo XVIII,</i> -Palermo, 1900 (cf. <i>Giorn. stor. lett. ital.</i> xxxvi. pp. 255-256): B. -Croce, <i>Varietà di storia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_481" id="Page_481">[Pg 481]</a></span> dell' estetica,</i> §§ 1-2, in <i>Rass. crit. -lett. ital.</i> cit., vi. 1901, pp. 115-126, reprinted in <i>Probl. di est.</i> -pp. 346-359.</p> - - -<p>IV. On Cartesianism in literature see É. Krantz, <i>L'Esthétique de -Descartes étudiée dans les rapports de la doctrine cartésienne avec la -littérature classique française au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle,</i> Paris, -1882; see also the chapter on André, pp. 311-341, and the introduction -by V. Cousin to the <i>œuvres philosophiques du p. André,</i> Paris, 1843: -on Boileau, Borinski, <i>Poetik d. Renaissance,</i> c. 6, pp. 314-329; J. -Brunetière, <i>L'Esthétique de B.</i> in <i>Revue des Deux Mondes,</i> June 1, -1899.</p> - -<p>On the English intellectualist æstheticians see Zimmermann, <i>op. cit.</i> -pp. 273-301; also von Stein, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 185-216. On Shaftesbury -and Hutcheson see esp. Gid. Spicker, <i>Die Philosophie d. Grafen v. -Shaftesbury,</i> Freiburg i. B., 1872, part iv. on art and literature, pp. -196-233: T. Fowler, S. <i>and Hutcheson,</i> London, 1882: William Robert -Scott, <i>Francis Hutcheson, his life, teaching and position in the -history of philosophy</i>, Cambridge, 1900.</p> - -<p>On Leibniz, Baumgarten and contemporary German writers see Th. W. -Danzel, <i>Gottsched und seine Zeit,</i> 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1855: H. G. -Meyer, <i>Leibnitz und Baumgarten als Begründer der deutschen Ästhetik,</i> -Inaugural Dissertation, Halle, 1874: Joh. Schmidt, <i>L. und B.,</i> Halle, -1875: Ém. Grucker, <i>Histoire des doctrines littéraires et esthétiques -en Allemagne</i> (from Opitz to the Swiss writers), Paris, 1883: Fr. -Braitmaier, <i>Geschichte der poetischen Theorie und Kritik von den -Diskursen der Maler his auf Lessing,</i> Frauenfeld, 1888-1889. In the -last-named book the first part treats of the beginning of Poetics and -criticism in Germany, considered in their relation to the doctrines -of classical, French and English writers: the second part treats of -an attempt to found an æsthetic philosophy and theory of poetry upon -a basis of Leibnitian-Wolffian psychology: which includes a long -discussion of Baumgarten and quotations from two dissertations, Raabe's -<i>A. G. Baumgarten, æstheticæ in disciplinæ formam parens et auctor,</i> -and Prieger's <i>Anregung u. metaphysische Grundlage d. Ästh. von A. G. -Baumgarten,</i> 1875 (cf. vol. ii. p. 2).</p> - - -<p>V. On Vico as æsthetician see B. Zumbini, <i>Sopra alcuni principî -di critica letteraria di G. B. V.</i> (reprinted in <i>Studî di letter. -italiana,</i> Florence, 1894, pp. 257-268): B. Croce, <i>G. B. V. primo -scopritore della scienza estetica,</i> Naples, 1901 (reprinted from -<i>Flegrea.</i> April 1901), incorporated in the present volume as has been -mentioned already: see also G. Gentile in <i>Rass. crit. della lett. -ital.,</i> cit., vi. pp. 254-265: E. Bertana, in <i>Giorn. stor. lett. -ital.</i> xxxviii. pp. 449-451: A. Martinazzoli, <i>Intorno alle dottrine -vichiane di ragion poetica,</i> in <i>Riv. di filos. e sc. aff.</i> of Bologna, -July 1902: also the reply of B. Croce, <i>ibid.,</i> August 1902: Giovanni -Rossi, <i>Il pensiero di G. B. V. intorno alla natura della lingua e all' -ufficio dette lettere,</i> Salerno, 1901. The important<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_482" id="Page_482">[Pg 482]</a></span> position occupied -by Vico in respect to Æsthetic had been remarked earlier by C. Marini, -<i>G. B. V. al cospetto del secolo XIX,</i> Naples, 1852, c. 7, § 10. For -the influence exercised by Vico, B. Croce, <i>Per la storia della critica -e storiografia letteraria,</i> Naples, 1903 (in <i>Atti d. Acc. Pont.,</i> vol. -xxxiii.), pp. 7-8, 26-28 (reprinted in <i>Probl. di est.</i> pp. 423-425), -and G. A. Borgese, <i>Storia della critica romantica in Italia,</i> Naples, -1905, <i>passim.</i></p> - -<p>On Vico's thought in general, as well as on his Æsthetic, see B. Croce, -<i>La filosofia di Giambattista Vico,</i> Bari, 1911: English translation -by R. G. Collingwood, 1913. The copious literature concerning Vico is -given by B. Croce in <i>Bibliografia vichiana,</i> Naples, 1904 (reprinted -from <i>Atti dell' Acad. Pont.</i> vol. xxxiv.), and <i>Supplemento, ibid.</i> -1907, and <i>Secondo Supplemento,</i> 1910 (<i>Atti</i> cit., vols, xxxvii. and -xli.).</p> - - -<p>VI. On the literary doctrines of Conti see G. Brognoligo, <i>L' opera -letteraria di A. Conti,</i> in <i>Arch. veneto,</i> 1894, vol. i. pp. 152-209: -on Cesarotti, Vitt. Alemanni, <i>Un filosofo delle lettere,</i> vol. i. -Turin, 1894: on Pagano, B. Croce, <i>Varietà di storia dell' estetica,</i> § -3; <i>Di alcuni estetici italiani della seconda metà del secolo XVIII,</i> -in <i>Rass. crit.</i> cit. vii. 1902, pp. 1-17 (reprinted in <i>Probl. di -est.</i> pp. 381-450).</p> - -<p>On the German æstheticians, in addition to the various general -histories already quoted, see R. Sommer, <i>Grundzüge einer Geschichte -der deutschen Psychologie u. Ästhetik von Wolff-Baumgarten his -Kant-Schiller,</i> Würzburg, 1892. Greatly inferior is M. Dessoir, -<i>Geschichte d. neueren deutschen Psychologie,</i> 2nd ed., Berlin, 1897 -(the first half only is published, down to Kant exclusive).</p> - -<p>On Sulzer, Braitmaier, <i>op. cit.</i> ii. pp. 55-71: on Mendelssohn, -<i>ibid.</i> pp. 72-279: for Elias Schlegel, <i>op. cit.</i> i. p. 249 <i>seqq.</i>; -on Mendelssohn see also Th. Wilh. Danzel, <i>Gesammelte Aufsätze,</i> -Leipzig, Jahn, 1855, pp. 85-98: Kannegiesser, <i>Stellung Mendelssohns -in d. Gesch. d. Ästh.,</i> 1868. On Riedel, K. F. Wize, <i>F. J. Riedel u. -seine Ästhetik,</i> Diss., Berlin, 1907. On Herder, Ch. Joiet, <i>H. et -la renaissance littéraire en Allemagne au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle,</i> -Paris, 1875: R. Haym, <i>H. nach seinem Leben u. seinen Werken,</i> 2 -vols., Berlin, 1880: G. Jacobi, <i>H.'s und Kant's Ästh.,</i> Leipzig, -1907. For the ideas of Hamann and Herder concerning the origins of -poetry see Croce in <i>Critica,</i> ix. (1911), pp. 469-472. On the history -of Linguistic, see Th. Benfey, <i>Geschichte d. Sprachwissenschaft in -Deutschland,</i> Munich, 1869, introd.: H. Steinthal, <i>Der Ursprung der -Sprache im Zusammenhange mit d. letzen Fragen alles Wissens, eine -Darstellung, Kritik und Fortentwicklung der vorzüglichsten Ansichten,</i> -4th ed., Berlin, 1888.</p> - - -<p>VII. On Batteux see E. v. Danckelmann, <i>Charles Batteux, sein Leben u. -sein ästhetisches Lehrgebäude,</i> Rostock, 1902. On Hogarth, Burke and -Home, Zimmermann, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 223-273; Bosanquet, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. -202-210. On Home esp. J. Wohlgemüth,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_483" id="Page_483">[Pg 483]</a></span> <i>H. Home's Ästhetik,</i> Rostock, -1894: W. Neumann, <i>Die Bedeutung Homes für d. Ästhetik, u. sein -Einflüss auf d. deutschen Ästhetik,</i> Halle, 1894. On Hemsterhuis, Ém. -Grucker, <i>François H., sa vie et ses oeuvres,</i> Paris, 1866.</p> - -<p>On Winckelmann, Goethe, <i>W. u. sein Jahrhundert,</i> 1805 (in <i>Werke,</i> -ed. Goedecke, vol. xxxi.): C. Justi, <i>W. u. seine Zeitgenossen,</i> 2nd -ed., Leipzig, 1898. A criticism of Winckelmann's theory, by H. Hettner, -appeared in the <i>Revue Moderne,</i> 1866. On Mengs, Zimmermann, <i>op. cit.</i> -pp. 338-355. On Lessing, Th. Wilh. Danzel, <i>G. E. Lessing, sein Leben -und seine Werke,</i> Leipzig, 1849-1853: Kuno Fischer, <i>L. als Reformater -d. deutschen Litteratur,</i> Stuttgart, 1881: Ém. Grucker, <i>Lessing,</i> -Paris, 1891: Erich Schmidt, <i>Lessing,</i> 2nd ed., Berlin, 1899: K. -Borinski, <i>Lessing,</i> Berlin, 1900.</p> - -<p>On Spalletti see B. Croce, <i>Var.,</i> cit., § 3 (<i>Probl. d. est.</i> -pp. 392-398). On Meier, Hirth and Goethe, Danzel, <i>Goethe und die -Weimarsche Kunstfreunde in ihrem Verhältniss z. Winckelmann,</i> in -<i>Gesamm. Aufs.</i> pp. 118-145. On Goethe's Æsthetic esp. see Wilh. Bode, -<i>Goethes Ästhetik,</i> Berlin, 1901.</p> - - -<p>VIII. Critical expositions of Kant's Æsthetic are very numerous even -in Italy: for example, O. Colecchi, <i>Questioni filosofiche,</i> Naples, -1843, vol. iii.; C. Cantoni, <i>E. Kant,</i> Milan, 1884, vol. iii. In -German, esp. H. Cohen, <i>Kants Begründung der Ästhetik,</i> Berlin, -1889; also an important chapter in Sommer, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 337-352; a -sufficient representative of a host of others is the elaborate work of -Victor Basch, <i>Essai critique sur l'esthétique de Kant,</i> Paris, 1896. -See also, on an Italian trans. of the <i>Kr. d. Urth.,</i> B. Croce in -<i>Critica,</i> v. (1907), pp. 160-164.</p> - -<p>For Kant's lectures and the historical antecedents of his <i>Critique of -Judgment</i> (besides the dissertations of H. Falkenheim, <i>Die Entstehung -der kantischen Ästhetik,</i> Heidelberg, 1890, and Rich. Grundmann, <i>Die -Entwickel d. Ästh. Kants,</i> Leipzig, 1893) see the exhaustive work of -Otto Schlapp, <i>Kant's Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung d. Kritik d. -Urtheilskraft,</i> Göttingen, 1901.</p> - - -<p>IX. For the whole of this period, beside the general histories already -quoted which treat of it in great detail, see Th. Wilh. Danzel, <i>Über -den gegenwärtigen Zustand d. Philosophie d. Kunst u. ihre nächste -Aufgabe</i> (in the <i>Zeitschr. f. Phil,</i> of Fichte, 1844-1845, and -reprinted in <i>Gesammelte Aufsätze,</i> pp. 1-84): this treats of Kant, -Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and, more particularly, of Solger, -pp. 51-84: Herm. Lotze, <i>Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland,</i> -Munich, 1868 (in the coll. "History of the Sciences in Germany," -published by the Royal Academy of Sciences of Munich in Bavaria): -first book, history of general points of view from Baumgarten to the -Herbartian school: second book, history of individual fundamental -æsthetic concepts: third book, contributions to the history of the -theory of the arts: Ed. v.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_484" id="Page_484">[Pg 484]</a></span> Hartmann, <i>Die deutsche Ästhetik s. Kant</i> -(first part, historico-critical), Berlin, 1886, divided into two books. -The first book discusses the doctrine of the chief æstheticians and, -after an introduction on the foundation of philosophical æsthetic by -Kant, treats of the Æsthetic of the content, divided into that of -abstract idealism (Schelling, Schopenhauer, Solger, Krause, Weisse, -Lotze); of concrete idealism (Hegel, Trahndorff, Schleiermacher, -Deutinger, Oersted, Vischer, Zeising, Carrière, Schasler); of the -Æsthetic of feeling (Kirchmann, Wiener, Horwicz); the Æsthetic of form, -subdivided into abstract formalism (Herbart, Zimmermann), and concrete -formalism (Köstlin, Siebeck). The second book is concerned with the -more important special problems.</p> - -<p>On the Æsthetic of Schiller specially see, amongst numerous monographs, -Danzel, <i>Schillers Briefwechsel mit Körner,</i> in <i>Ges. Aufs.</i> pp. -227-244: G. Zimmermann, <i>Versuch einer schillerschen Ästhetik,</i> -Leipzig, 1889: F. Montargis, <i>L'Esthétique de Schiller,</i> Paris, 1890: -the chapter in Sommer, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 365-432: V. Basch, <i>La Poétique -de Schiller,</i> Paris, 1901.</p> - -<p>On the Æsthetic of Romanticism, R. Haym, <i>Die romantische Schule: -ein Beitrag z. Geschichte d. deutschen Geistes,</i> Berlin, 1870 (cf. -on Tieck, book i.; on Novalis, book iii.: for criticism of the two -Schlegels, bk. ii. and bk. iii. ch. 5): N. M. Pichtos, <i>Die Ästhetik -Aug. W. v. Schlegel in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung,</i> Berlin, -1893. On the Æsthetic of Fichte, G. Tempel, <i>Fichtes Stellung z. -Kunst,</i> Metz, 1901.</p> - -<p>On the Æsthetic of Hegel, Danzel, <i>Über d. Ästhetik der hegelschen -Philosophie,</i> Hamburg, 1844: R. Haym, <i>Hegel u. seine Zeit,</i> Berlin, -1857, pp. 433-443: J. S. Kedney, <i>Hegel's Æsthetics: a critical -exposition,</i> Chicago, 1885: Kuno Fischer, <i>Hegels Leben u. Werke,</i> -Heidelberg, 1898-1901, chs. 38-42, pp. 811-947: J. Kohn, <i>Hegels -Ästhetik</i> in <i>Zeitschrift für Philosophie,</i> 1902, vol. 120, fasc. ii.: -see also B. Croce, <i>Cio che è vivo e cio che è morto della filosofia di -Hegel,</i> Bari, 1907, ch. 6; Engl. tr. by D. Ainslie, 1915.</p> - - -<p>X. For the Æsthetic of Schopenhauer, Fr. Sommerlad, <i>Darstellung u. -Kritik d. ästh. Grundanschauungen Schopenhauers,</i> Diss., Giessen, 1895: -Ed. v. Mayer, <i>Schopenhauers Ästhetik u. ihr Verhältniss z. d. ästh. -Lehren Kants u. Schellings,</i> Halle, 1897: Ett. Zoccoli, <i>L' estetica -di A. Sch.: propedeutica all' estetica Wagneriana,</i> Milan, 1901: G. -Chialvo, <i>L' estetica di A. Sch., saggio esplicativo-critico,</i> Rome, -1905.</p> - -<p>For the Æsthetic of Herbart, beside Zimmermann, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 754-804, -see O. Hostinsky, <i>Herbarts Ästhetik in ihrer grundlegenden Theilen -quellenmässig dargestellt u. erläutert,</i> Hamburg-Leipzig, 1891.</p> - - -<p>XI. Of the Æsthetic of Schleiermacher, the fullest treatment is given -by Zimmermann, pp. 609-634, and von Hartmann, pp. 156-169.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_485" id="Page_485">[Pg 485]</a></span></p> - - -<p>XII. For the history of the theory of Language, beside Benfey, <i>op. -cit.</i> introd., see Max. Leop. Loewe, <i>Historiæ criticæ grammatices -universalis seu philosophicæ lineamenta,</i> Dresden, 1839: A. F. Pott, -<i>W. v. Humboldt und die Sprachwissenschaft,</i> introd. to the reprint of -Humboldt's <i>Verschiedenheit d. menschl. Sprachbaues</i> (2nd ed., Berlin, -1880, vol. i.).</p> - -<p>On Humboldt see esp. Steinthal, <i>Der Ursprung der Sprache,</i> pp. 59-81, -and Pott's introd. cit., <i>Wilh. v. Humboldt u. die Sprachwissenschaft.</i></p> - - -<p>XIII. For this period, treated with unnecessary fulness, see von -Hartmann, <i>op. cit.</i> bk. i.: more concisely by Menendez y Pelayo, vol. -iv. (1st ed.), part i. chs. 6-8.</p> - -<p>For the doctrine of the modifications of beauty see Zimmermann, <i>op. -cit.</i> pp. 715-744: Schasler, <i>op. cit.</i> §§ 517-546: Bosanquet, <i>op. -cit.</i> ch. 14, pp. 393-440: in greater detail, v. Hartmann, bk. ii. part -i. pp. 363-461.</p> - -<p>For the history of the Sublime see also F. Unruh, <i>Der Begriff des -Erhabenen seit Kant,</i> Königsberg, 1898. For Humour see B. Croce, <i>Dei -varî significanti della parola umorismo e del suo uso nella critica -letteraria,</i> in the <i>Journal of Comparative Literature</i> of New York, -1903, fasc. iii. (reprinted in <i>Probl. di est.</i> pp. 275-286) F. -Baldensperger, <i>Les Définitions de l'humour,</i> in <i>Études; d'hist. -litt.</i> Paris, 1907. For the history of the concept of the Graceful, F. -Torraca, <i>La grazia secondo il Castiglione e secondo lo Spencer</i> (in -Morandi, <i>Antol. della critica lett. ital.</i> 2nd ed., Città di Castello, -1885, pp. 440-444): F. Braitmaier, <i>op. cit.</i> ii. pp. 166-167.</p> - - -<p>XIV. For the history of Æsthetic in France during the nineteenth -century there is nothing so good as Menendez y Pelayo, vol. iii. -part ii. chs. 3-9; <i>ibid.</i> chs. 1-2 give full information concerning -Æsthetic in England.</p> - -<p>For Æsthetic in Italy in the first half of the nineteenth century, -Karl Werner, <i>Idealistische Theorien des Schönen in d. italienischen -Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,</i> Vienna, 1884 (from Trans, -of the Imperial and Royal Viennese Academy). On Rosmini see esp. P. -Bellezza, <i>Antonio Rosmini e la grande questione letteraria del secolo -XIX</i> (in the collection <i>Per Antonio Rosmini nel primo centenario,</i> -Milan, 1897, vol. i. pp. 364-385). On Gioberti, Ad. Faggi, <i>Vinc. -Gioberti esteta e letterato,</i> Palermo, 1901 (from the <i>Atti della R. -Accad. di Palermo,</i> s. iii. vol. vi.). On Delfico, G. Gentile, <i>Dal -Gcnovesi al Galluppi,</i> Naples, 1903, ch. ii. On Leopardi, E. Bertana -in <i>Giorn. stor. lett. ital.</i> xli. pp. 193-283; R. Giani, <i>L'estetica -nei pensieri di G. Leopardi,</i> Turin, 1904 (cf. G. Gentile in <i>Critica,</i> -ii. pp. 144-147). See also a book quoted by A. Rolla and B. Croce, -<i>loc. cit.,</i> containing a catalogue of Italian books on Æsthetic of the -nineteenth century (<i>Probl. di est.</i> pp. 401-415).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_486" id="Page_486">[Pg 486]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the theories of the Italian Romanticists, F. De Sanctis, <i>La poetica -del Manzoni,</i> in <i>Scritti varî,</i> ed. Croce, i. pp. 23-45; and the same -author's <i>La letteratura italiana nel secolo XIX,</i> ed. Croce, Naples, -1897, on Tommaseo, pp. 233-243: on Cantù, pp. 244-273: on Berchet, -pp. 479-493: on Mazzini, pp. 424-441. On Mazzini esp. F. Ricitari, -<i>Concetto dell' arte e della critica letteraria nella mente di G. -Mazzini,</i> Catania, 1896. For all these see G. A. Borgese, <i>Storia della -critica romantica in Italia,</i> cit.</p> - - -<p>XV. For the life of De Sanctis and the bibliography of his works see -<i>Scritti varî,</i> ed. Croce, ii. pp. 267-308, also the volume <i>In memoria -di Fr. de S.</i> edited by M. Mandalari, Naples, 1884.</p> - -<p>On De Sanctis as literary critic, P. Villari, <i>Commemorazione</i>: A. C. -de Meis, <i>Commem.,</i> in the above-mentioned vol. <i>In memoria</i>: Marc -Monnier in <i>Revue des Deux Mondes,</i> April I, 1884: Pio Ferrieri, -<i>Fr. de S. e la critica letteraria,</i> Milan, 1888: B. Croce, <i>La -critica letteraria,</i> Rome, 1896, ch. 5; <i>Fr. de S. e i suoi critici -recenti</i> (in <i>Atti dell' Accad. Pontan.</i> vol. xxviii. reprinted in -<i>Scritti varî,</i> append, ii. 309-352), and prefs. to vols, already -quoted, <i>La lett. ital. nel sec. XIX,</i> and <i>Scritti varî; De Sanctis e -Schopenhauer,</i> in <i>Atti della Pontaniana,</i> xxxii. 1902: Enr. Cocchia, -<i>II pensiero critico di Fr. de S. nell' arte e nella politica,</i> -Naples, 1899: G. A. Borgese, <i>op. cit.</i> last chapter and <i>passim.</i></p> - - -<p>XVI. On the last phase of metaphysical Æsthetic, G. Neudecker, <i>Studien -z. Geschichte d. deutschen Ästhetik s. Kant,</i> Würzburg, 1878, which -discusses and criticises more particularly Vischer (self-criticism), -Zimmermann, Lotze, Köstlin, Siebeck, Fechner and Deutinger. On -Zimmermann, von Hartmann, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 267-304: Bonatelli, in <i>Nuova -Antologia,</i> October 1867. On Lotze, Fritz Kogel, <i>Lotzes Ästhetik,</i> -Göttingen, 1886: A. Matragrin, <i>Essai sur l'esthétique de Lotze,</i> -Paris, 1901. On Köstlin, von Hartmann, pp. 304-317. On Schasler, see -the same, pp. 248-252, also Bosanquet, pp. 414-424. On Hartmann, Ad. -Faggi, <i>Ed. H. e l' estetica tedesca,</i> Florence, 1895. On Vischer see -M. Diez, <i>Fried. Vischer u. d. ästh. Formalismus,</i> Stuttgart, 1889.</p> - -<p>For French and English æstheticians, besides Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. -cit.,</i> on Ruskin, see J. Milsand, <i>L'Esthétique anglaise, étude sur J. -Ruskin,</i> Paris, 1864: R. de la Sizeranne, <i>Ruskin et la religion de la -beauté,</i> 3rd ed., Paris, 1898; cf. part iii. On Fornari, V. Imbriani, -<i>Vito Fornari estetico</i> (reprinted in <i>Studî letterarî e bizzarri e -satiriche,</i> ed. Croce, Bari, 1907). On Tari see Nic. Gallo, <i>Antonio -Tari, studio critico,</i> Palermo, 1884: Croce, in <i>Critica,</i> v. (1907), -pp. 357-361; also in pref. to vol.: <i>A. Tari, saggi di estetica e -metafisica,</i> Bari, 1910.</p> - - -<p>XVII. For positivist Æsthetic see Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. cit.</i> iv. -(1st ed.) vol. ii. pp. 120-136, 326-369: N. Gallo, <i>La scienza dell' -arte,</i> Turin, 1887, chs. 6-8, pp. 162-216.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_487" id="Page_487">[Pg 487]</a></span></p> - - -<p>XVIII. On Kirchmann, von Hartmann, pp. 253-265. For various recent -German æstheticians, Hugo Spitzer, <i>Kritische Studien z. Ästhet. der -Gegenwart,</i> Leipzig, 1897. On Nietzsche, Ettore G. Zoccoli, <i>Fred. -Nietzsche,</i> Modena, 1898, pp. 268-344: Jul. Zeitler, <i>Nietzsches -Ästhetik,</i> Leipzig, 1900. On Flaubert, A. Fusco, <i>La teoria dell' arte -in G. F.,</i> Naples, 1907: cf. <i>Critica,</i> vi. (1908), pp. 125-134. For -books on Æsthetic published during the last decade of the nineteenth -century see Luc. Arréat, <i>Dix années de philosophie,</i> 1891-1900, Paris, -1901, pp. 74-116. A few remarks on contemporary Æsthetic are made by -K. Groos in <i>Die Philosophie im Beginn. des XX<sup>en</sup> Jahrh.,</i> ed. by W. -Windelband, Heidelberg, 1904-1905. For latest books on Æsthetic see -<i>Critica,</i> ed. B. Croce (Naples), from 1903 onward, which publishes -reviews of them. There is also a review, started in 1906, published -at Stuttgart (ed. F. Enke), <i>Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine -Kunstwissenschaft,</i> edited by Max Dessoir.</p> - - -<p>XIX. The history of particular problems is usually omitted, or, at -best, erroneously treated in histories of Æsthetic: for example, see -the difficulty experienced by Ed. Müller, <i>Gesch.,</i> cit., ii. pref. pp. -vi-vii, in connecting his treatment of the history of Rhetoric with -that of Poetics. Some writers attach Rhetoric to the individual arts or -to artistic technique; others treat the doctrines of the modification -of beauty and of natural beauty (in the metaphysical sense) as special -problems; others, again, discuss the kinds or classifications in art -in an incidental manner, without seeking to incorporate them in the -principal æsthetic problem.</p> - -<p>§ 1. On the history of Rhetoric in the ancient sense see Rich. -Volkmann, <i>Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer -Übersicht dargestellt,</i> 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1885, of capital importance: -A. Ed. Chaignet, <i>La Rhétorique et son histoire,</i> Paris, 1888; rich in -material, but ill-arranged and with the preconception that Rhetoric -is still a defensible body of science. For special treatment see -Ch. Benoist, <i>Essai historique sur les premiers manuels d'invention -oratoire, jusqu'à Aristote,</i> Paris, 1846: Georg Thiele, <i>Hermagoras, -ein Beitrag z. Geschichte d. Rhetorik,</i> Strasburg, 1893. There is no -history of rhetoric in modern times. For criticism of Vives and other -Spaniards see Menendez y Pelayo, <i>op. cit.</i> iii. pp. 211-300 (2nd ed.). -For Patrizzi see B. Croce, <i>F. Patrizzi e la critica della rettorica -antica,</i> in the vol. of <i>Studî</i> in honour of A. Graf, Bergamo, 1903 -(<i>Probl. d. est.</i> pp. 297-308).</p> - -<p>For Rhetoric as theory of literary form in antiquity see Volkmann, -<i>op. cit.</i> pp. 393-566: Chaignet, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 413-539: also Egger, -<i>passim,</i> and Saintsbury, bks. i. ii. For purposes of comparison see -Paul Reynaud, <i>La Rhétorique sanskrite exposée dans son développement -historique et ses rapports avec la rhétorique classique,</i> Paris, 1884. -For the Middle Ages, Comparetti, <i>Virgilio<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_488" id="Page_488">[Pg 488]</a></span> nel medio evo,</i> vol. i., -and Saintsbury, bk. iii. There is need for a work on modern Rhetoric -in this sense also. For the form it assumed ultimately according to -the theory of Gröber see B. Croce, <i>Di alcuni principî di sintassi e -stilistica psicologiche del Gröber,</i> in <i>Atti dell' Accad. Pontan.</i> -vol. xxix. 1899: K. Vossler, <i>Literaturblatt für germ. u. roman. -Philologie,</i> 1900, N.I.: B. Croce, <i>Le categorie rettoriche e il prof. -Gröber,</i> in <i>Flegrea,</i> April 1900: K. Vossler, <i>Positivismo e idealismo -nella scienza del linguaggio,</i> Ital. trans. Bari, 1908, pp. 48-61 (cf. -<i>Probl. d. est.</i> pp. 143-171). Very incomplete observations on the -history of the concept of metaphor are made by A. Biese, <i>Philosophie -d. Metaphorischen,</i> Hamburg-Leipzig, 1893, pp. 1-16; but this book -has the merit of calling attention to the importance of the views and -influence of Vico.</p> - -<p>§ 2. For the history of the literary kinds in antiquity see the works -above quoted by Müller, Egger, Saintsbury, and the vast literature on -Aristotle's <i>Poetics.</i> For comparison with Sanskrit poetics, Sylvain -Levi, <i>Le Théâtre indien,</i> Paris, 1890, esp. pp. 11, 152. For mediæval -poetry see esp. Gio. Mari, <i>I trattati medievali di ritmica latina,</i> -Milan, 1899; and his recent edition of <i>Poetica magistri Iohannis -anglici,</i> 1901.</p> - -<p>For the history of the kinds under the Renaissance see principally -Spingarn, <i>op. cit.</i> i. chs. 3-4; ii. ch. 2; iii. ch. 3. Also Menendez -y Pelayo, Borinski, Saintsbury, <i>passim.</i></p> - -<p>Special works: on Pietro Aretino, De Sanctis, <i>Storia della letteratura -italiana,</i> ii. pp. 122-144: A. Graf, <i>Attraverso il cinquecento,</i> -Turin, 1888, pp. 87-167: K. Vossler, <i>P. A.'s künstlerisches -Bekenntniss,</i> Heidelberg, 1901. On Guarini, V. Rossi, <i>G. B. Guarini e -il Pastor Fido,</i> Turin, 1886, pp. 238-250. On Scaliger, Lintilhac, <i>Un -Coup d'État,</i> cit. For the three unities, L. Morandi, <i>Baretti contro -Voltaire,</i> 2nd ed., Città di Castello, 1884: Breitinger, <i>Les Unités -d'Aristote avant le Cid de Corneille,</i> 2nd ed., Geneva-Basle, 1895: -J. Ebner, <i>Beitrag z. einer Geschichte d. dramatischen Einheiten in -Italien,</i> Munich, 1898. On the Spanish polemic concerning comedy see A. -Morel Fatio on the defenders of comedy and of the <i>Arte nuevo,</i> in the -<i>Bulletin Hispanique</i> of Bordeaux, vols. iii. and iv.: on the dramatic -theories see Arnaud, <i>Les Théories dramatiques au XVII<sup>e</sup> -siècle, étude sur la vie et les œuvres de l'abbé D'Aubignac,</i> -Paris, 1888: Paul Dupont, <i>Un Poète philosophe au commencement du</i> -<i>XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, Houdar de la Motte,</i> Paris, 1898: Alfredo -Galletti, <i>Le teorie drammatiche e la tragedia in Italia nel secolo -XVIII,</i> part i. 1700-1750, Cremona, 1901. On the history of French -Poetics, F. Brunetière, <i>L'Évolution des genres dans l'histoire de -la littérature,</i> Paris, 1890, vol. i. introd.: "<i>L'évolution de la -critique depuis la Renaissance jusqu'à nos jours.</i>" On that of English -Poetics, Paul Hamelius, <i>Die Kritik in d. engl. Literatur des XVII en -u. XVIII<sup>en</sup> Jahrh.,</i> Leipzig, 1897: also the well-filled -chapter in Gayley-Scott, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 382-422, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_489" id="Page_489">[Pg 489]</a></span> sketch of a book -on the subject. For the romantic period see Alfred Michiels, <i>Histoire -des idées littéraires en France au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, et de leurs -origines dans les siècles antérieures,</i> 4th ed., Paris, 1863. For Italy -see G. A. Borgese, <i>op. cit.</i></p> - -<p>§ 3. For the early history of the distinction and classification of the -arts see the literature quoted above in relation to Lessing, and his -<i>Laokoon,</i> with notes by Blümner. For subsequent history, H. Lotze, -<i>Geschichte,</i> cit., bk. iii.: Max Schasler, <i>Das System der Künste -auf einem neuen, im Wesen der Kunst begründeten Gliederungsprincip,</i> -2nd ed., Leipzig-Berlin, 1881, introd.: Ed. v. Hartmann, <i>Deutsche -Ästh. s. Kant,</i> bk. ii. part ii. especially pp. 524-580: V. Basch, -<i>Essai sur l'esth. de Kant,</i> pp. 483-496.</p> - -<p>§ 4. For the doctrine of styles in antiquity see Volkmann, <i>op. cit.</i> -pp. 532-566. The history of grammar and parts of speech is treated -fully so far as Græco-Roman antiquity is concerned in Laur. Lersch, -<i>Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten,</i> Bonn, 1838-1841: better still by -Steinthal, <i>Geschichte,</i> cit. vol. ii. For Apollonius Dyscolus see -Egger, <i>Apollon Dyscole,</i> Paris, 1854. For the history of grammar in -the Middle Ages see Ch. Thurot, <i>Extraits de divers manuscrits latins -pour servir à l'histoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen âge,</i> -Paris, 1869. For modern times, C. Trabalza, <i>Storia della grammatica -italiana,</i> Milan, 1908. For the history of Criticism several books -mentioned under § 2 may be consulted: in addition to these, B. Croce, -<i>Per la storia della critica e storiografia letteraria,</i> containing -Italian examples (<i>Probl. d. est.</i> pp. 419-448): for the theories of -recent French criticism see Ém. Hennequin, <i>La Critique scientifique,</i> -Paris, 1888, and Ernest Tissot, <i>Les évolutions de la critique -française,</i> Paris, 1890. On the concept of "romanticism" see G. Muoni, -<i>Note per una poetica storica del romanticismo,</i> Milan, 1906: cf. B. -Croce, <i>Le definizioni del romanticismo,</i> in <i>Critica,</i> iv. pp. 241-245 -(reprinted in <i>Probl. di estetica,</i> pp. 285-294).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_490" id="Page_490">[Pg 490]</a><br /><a name="Page_491" id="Page_491">[Pg 491]</a></span></p> - - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<a id="INDEX"></a><span style="font-weight: bold;">INDEX</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Abelard, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -Absolute, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -Absolutism in æsthetic, <a href="#Page_122">122</a><br /> -Accarisio, A., <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Action, <a href="#Page_47">47</a><br /> -Addison, J., <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Adherent beauty, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<i>Adone, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>,</i> <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -<i>Advocatus diaboli,</i> <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<i>Aeneid,</i> <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Aeschylus, <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Æsop, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br /> -Æsthetic physics, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <i>and see</i> Vischer<br /> -Æsthetic progress, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Ahriman, <a href="#Page_78">78</a><br /> -Ainslie, D., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Alberti, L. B., <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -<i>Alceo,</i> <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -Alcibiades, <a href="#Page_170">170</a><br /> -Alemanni, V., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Alembert, d', <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Alexander, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Algarotti, <a href="#Page_359">359</a><br /> -Alison, A., <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -Allegorical meaning, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Allegory, <a href="#Page_34">34</a><br /> -Allen, Grant, <a href="#Page_390">390</a><br /> -Alphabets, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -Alunno, F., <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Ambiguity, <a href="#Page_71">71</a><br /> -Ambrosi, L., <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -<i>Aminta,</i> <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -Anacharsis, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Anacreon, <a href="#Page_51">51</a><br /> -Anagogic meaning, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -André, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a><br /> -Angelis, de, <a href="#Page_222">222</a> <a href="#Page_223">223</a> n.<br /> -Animals, thought in, <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br /> -Anstruther-Thomson, C., <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n.<br /> -Antisthenes, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Apollinesque art, <a href="#Page_412">412</a><br /> -Apollonius Dyscolus, <a href="#Page_464">464</a><br /> -Apollonius of Tyana, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br /> -Apparent feelings, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>-<a href="#Page_81">81</a><br /> -Appearance, <a href="#Page_17">17</a><br /> -Applied knowledge, <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br /> -<i>A priori</i> synthesis, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -Arabic art, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Archæology, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> -Archimedes, <a href="#Page_20">20</a><br /> -Architecture, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></span><br /> -Aretino, P., <a href="#Page_442">442</a><br /> -Ariosto, L., <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a><br /> -Aristarchus, <a href="#Page_464">464</a><br /> -Aristophanes, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a><br /> -Aristotelians, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Aristotle, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>. <a href="#Page_17">17</a> 6, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>. <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_427">427</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_464">464</a></span><br /> -Aristoxenus, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Armida, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br /> -Arnaud, <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Arnauld, A., <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -Arnold, D. E., <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Arréat, L., <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -<i>Ars Poetica,</i> <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a><br /> -Art and intuition, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and science, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for art's sake, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -Arteaga, S., <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Artificial beauty, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br /> -Arts, the various:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">classifications of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">limits of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">no separate æsthetics of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theories of, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></span><br /> -Ascetic view of art, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> -Asiatic style, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Association, æsthetic, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -linguistic, <a href="#Page_144">144</a><br /> -Ast, F., <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a><br /> -Astrology of æsthetic, <a href="#Page_110">110</a><br /> -Atoms, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -Attic style, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Attractive, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Aubignac, d', <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Augustine, St., <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a><br /> -Augustus, <a href="#Page_191">191</a><br /> -Authority, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -Averroes, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a><br /> -Azara, N. d', <a href="#Page_268">268</a><br /> -<br /> -Babylonian art, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Bach, J. S., <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Bacon, F., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a><br /> -Bain, A., <a href="#Page_390">390</a><br /> -Balbo, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Baldensperger, F., <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Balestrieri, P., <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -Balzac, L., <a href="#Page_204">204</a> n., <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br /> -Barante, de, <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Baretti, G., <a href="#Page_446">446</a><br /> -Barreda, F. de la, <a href="#Page_443">443</a><br /> -Bartoli, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Baruffaldi, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /> -Basch, V., <a href="#Page_456">456</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Bastile, the, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Batteux, C., <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a><br /> -Baumgarten, A. A., <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>-<a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>. <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></span><br /> -Beatrice, <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -Beauty, physical, <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reluctance to use the term, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of, in antiquity, <a href="#Page_163">163</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">in Middle Ages, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">in Renaissance, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>-<a href="#Page_181">181</a></span><br /> -Beauzée, N. de, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Beccaria, C., <a href="#Page_434">434</a><br /> -Becker, C. F., <a href="#Page_329">329</a><br /> -Bede, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Beethoven, n, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Bel, J. J., <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -Bellezza, P., <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Belloni, A., <a href="#Page_441">441</a> n.<br /> -"Below, æsthetic from," <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> -Bembo, P., <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Bénard, Ch., <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Benfey, T., <a href="#Page_325">325</a> n., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Beni, P., <a href="#Page_230">230</a><br /> -Benoist, C., <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Berchet, G., <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a><br /> -Bergson, H., <a href="#Page_416">416</a>-<a href="#Page_417">417</a><br /> -Berkeley, G., <a href="#Page_461">461</a><br /> -Bemhardi, A. F., <a href="#Page_324">324</a><br /> -Bertana, E., <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Bettinelli, S., <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a><br /> -Betussi, G., <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Biese, A., <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -<i>Birth of Tragedy, The,</i> <a href="#Page_412">412</a><br /> -Blair, H., <a href="#Page_434">434</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Blankenburg, von, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -Blümner, <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Bobrik, H., <a href="#Page_338">338</a><br /> -Boccaccio, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Bode, W., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Bodmer, J. J., <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a><br /> -Boeri, A., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Boileau, N., <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a><br /> -Bonacci, G., <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -Bonald, L. G. A. de, <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Bonatelli, <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Bonghi, R., <a href="#Page_435">435</a><br /> -Bonstetten, C., <a href="#Page_350">350</a><br /> -Borgese, G. A., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Borgia, <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br /> -Borinski, K., <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a> n., <a href="#Page_197">197</a> n.,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_211">211</a> n., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></span><br /> -Bos, J. B. du, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a> n., <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></span><br /> -Bosanquet, B., <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>-<a href="#Page_477">477</a><br /> -Bossu, le, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a><br /> -Bouhours, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a><br /> -Bouterweck, F., <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -Braitmaier, F., <a href="#Page_247">247</a> n., <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Bratranek, F. T., <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a><br /> -Breitinger, J. J., <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Brenning, <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Brocense, <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -Brognoligo, G., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Brosses, C. de, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Brunetière, F., <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Bruno, G., <a href="#Page_442">442</a><br /> -Bruyère, la, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a><br /> -Bryson, <a href="#Page_173">173</a><br /> -Bücher, C., <a href="#Page_401">401</a><br /> -<i>Bucolics,</i> <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Bülffinger, J. B., <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a><br /> -Bulk as a quality of art, <a href="#Page_108">108</a><br /> -Buonafede, A., <a href="#Page_446">446</a><br /> -Buonmattei, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Burke, E., <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a><br /> -Butcher, S. H., <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Byzantine art, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -<br /> -Cacophony, 150<br /> -Cæcilius, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Cæsar, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Calepio, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Callology, <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -Calvus, <a href="#Page_191">191</a><br /> -Camillo, G., <a href="#Page_430">430</a><br /> -Campanella, T., <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a><br /> -Cantoni, C., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Cantù, C., <a href="#Page_364">364</a><br /> -Caprice, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br /> -Carlyle, T., <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Carrière, M., <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a><br /> -Cartaut de la Villatte, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -Cartesianism, <a href="#Page_204">204</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>,<br /> -Casa, G. della, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Castel, L. B., <a href="#Page_453">453</a><br /> -Castelvetro, L., <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>,<br /> -193, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Castiglione, B., <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Catharsis, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -Catholicism, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -Cattani, F., <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Catullus, <a href="#Page_191">191</a><br /> -Causality, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Caylus, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Cecchi, G. M., <a href="#Page_440">440</a><br /> -Cecco d'Ascoli, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Cennini, C., <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Cervantes, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a><br /> -Cesarotti, M., <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_359">359</a>-<a href="#Page_434">434</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></span><br /> -Chaignet, A. E., <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Chapelain, G., <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -<i>Characteristics,</i> <a href="#Page_206">206</a> n.<br /> -charakteires teis phraseoos, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Charlemagne, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -Chassiron, P. M. de, <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -Cheerful, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Cherbuliez, <a href="#Page_382">382</a><br /> -Chiabrera, G., <a href="#Page_201">201</a><br /> -Chialvo, <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Chinese, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a><br /> -Chivalry, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br /> -Choice of subject in art, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-<a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -Christian art, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a><br /> -Chrysippus, <a href="#Page_464">464</a><br /> -Cicero, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></span><br /> -Cicognara, L., <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -<i>Cid,</i> <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -Cigoli, L. Cardi da, <a href="#Page_450">450</a> n.<br /> -Cimabue, <a href="#Page_124">124</a><br /> -Cintio, <a href="#Page_440">440</a><br /> -Classical art, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>-<a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>and see</i> Goethe, Schiller</span><br /> -Classification, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of arts, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of languages, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></span><br /> -Clerc, J. le (Clerico), <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -Cocchia, E., <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Cohen, H., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Colao Agata, D., <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Colecchi, O., <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Coleridge, S. T., <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Collingwood, R. G., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Colonne, D. de, <a href="#Page_426">426</a><br /> -Comic, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -Comparetti, <a href="#Page_463">463</a> n., <a href="#Page_465">465</a> n., <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Concept, the, <a href="#Page_42">42</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">æsthetic, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its place in art, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on intuition, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></span><br /> -Conceptualism, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -Condillac, S. B. de, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Content, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in art, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">æsthetic of, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></span><br /> -Conti, A., <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>-<a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a><br /> -Continuity, law of, <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br /> -Convention, <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> -linguistic, <a href="#Page_144">144</a><br /> -Conventional signs, <a href="#Page_124">124</a><br /> -<i>Convivio,</i> <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Cooking, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> -Coquettish, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Corax, <a href="#Page_423">423</a><br /> -Corneille, P., <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -Corniani, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Corso, R., <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Corticelli, S., <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -<i>Cosmos,</i> <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a><br /> -Court de Gébelin, A., <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Cousin, V., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -<i>Cratylus,</i> <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -Creuzens, C. de, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Critic, the, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br /> -Criticism, historical, <a href="#Page_128">128</a><br /> -<i>Critique of Judgment,</i> <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href="#Page_275">275</a> <i>seqq.<br /> -Critique of Pure Reason,</i> <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>-<a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a><br /> -Croce, B., <a href="#Page_419">419</a> n., <a href="#Page_481">481</a>-<a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Cromaziano, A., <a href="#Page_446">446</a> n.<br /> -<i>Cromwell,</i> <a href="#Page_352">352</a> n.<br /> -Crousaz, J. P. de, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -Cruel, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<i>Custom and Myth,</i> <a href="#Page_401">401</a> n.<br /> -<br /> -Dacianus, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -Dacier, A., <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Dacier, Mme., <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -Danckelmann, E. von, <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Dante, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></span><br /> -Danzel, T. W., <a href="#Page_244">244</a> n., <a href="#Page_284">284</a> n., <a href="#Page_289">289</a> n.,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_290">290</a> n., <a href="#Page_299">299</a> n., <a href="#Page_338">338</a>-<a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_482">482</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></span><br /> -Decorative art, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -Decorous, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Deduction, <a href="#Page_42">42</a><br /> -Defect, error of, <a href="#Page_156">156</a><br /> -<i>Defence of Poetry,</i> <a href="#Page_352">352</a> n.<br /> -Definition, <a href="#Page_42">42</a><br /> -Degeneracy, <a href="#Page_401">401</a><br /> -Degrees, relation of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of expression, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of ugliness, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></span><br /> -Delfico, M., <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a><br /> -Delminio, G. C., <a href="#Page_430">430</a> n.<br /> -Demetrius Phalereus, <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br /> -Descartes, R., <a href="#Page_204">204</a>-<a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a> n.<br /> -Dessoir, M., <a href="#Page_482">482</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Deutinger, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a><br /> -Diæresis, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -Diderot, D., <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a><br /> -Diez, M., <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Dignified, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Diogenes Lærtius, <a href="#Page_165">165</a> n., <a href="#Page_173">173</a> n.<br /> -Dionysiac art, <a href="#Page_412">412</a><br /> -Dionysius the Areopagite, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Direction of intention, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -Discrepancy of judgement, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br /> -Disgusting, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<i>Diversity of Structure of Human Languages,</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>On the,</i> <a href="#Page_325">325</a></span><br /> -<i>Divina Commedia,</i> <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>and see</i> Dante</span><br /> -Dolce, L., <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a><br /> -Donati, L., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Donatus, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Doncieux, <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -<i>Don Giovanni,</i> <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -Don Quixote, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br /> -Döring, <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Dreadful, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Duns Scotus, Johannes, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br /> -Dupont, P., <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -<br /> -Eberhard, J. A., <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Ebner, J., <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Eckardt, L., <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a><br /> -Eckermann, <a href="#Page_471">471</a><br /> -Eclogue, <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -Economic activity, <a href="#Page_55">55</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Economics, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<i>Effatum,</i> <a href="#Page_174">174</a><br /> -Egger, E., <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Egoism, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -Egyptian art, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Eighteenth century, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -<i>eikos,</i> <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -Elegiac, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Elementary forms of the beautiful, <a href="#Page_108">108</a><br /> -<i>Elements of Criticism,</i> <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <i>and see</i> Home<br /> -Elizabeth, Princess, <a href="#Page_204">204</a> n.<br /> -Ellipse, the, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -<i>Elocutio,</i> <a href="#Page_422">422</a><br /> -Elsteb, E., <a href="#Page_435">435</a> n.<br /> -Émeric-David, <a href="#Page_350">350</a> n.<br /> -Emotion and thought, <a href="#Page_22">22</a><br /> -<i>Emotions and the Will, The,</i> <a href="#Page_390">390</a><br /> -Empedocles, <a href="#Page_423">423</a><br /> -End of art, the, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> -Engel, G., <a href="#Page_455">455</a> n.<br /> -Enke, F., <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -<i>Enquiry into ... Ideas of Beauty and<br /> -Virtue,</i> <a href="#Page_207">207</a> n.<br /> -<br /> -Epic, <a href="#Page_36">36</a><br /> -Epicurus, <a href="#Page_173">173</a><br /> -<i>Epistle to the Pisones,</i> <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -Equicola, M., <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Eratosthenes, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -Eriugena, Johannes Scotus, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -ermeineia, <a href="#Page_422">422</a><br /> -<i>Erwin,</i> <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Eschenburg, J. J., <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -<i>Essay concerning the Human Understanding,</i> <a href="#Page_206">206</a> n.<br /> -<i>Essay on Criticism,</i> <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href="#Page_468">468</a><br /> -<i>Essay on Man,</i> <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Ether, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -Ethics, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a><br /> -Ethnopsychology, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a><br /> -Ettori, C., <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Euclid, <a href="#Page_267">267</a><br /> -Eupompus, <a href="#Page_172">172</a><br /> -Euripides, <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Evolution, <a href="#Page_133">133</a><br /> -Excess, error of, <a href="#Page_156">156</a><br /> -Experimental æsthetic, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> -Expression and intuition, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> -naturalistic sense of, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<i>Expression of the Emotions,</i> <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -Externalization, <a href="#Page_119">119</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -External language, <a href="#Page_25">25</a><br /> -<br /> -Faber, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Faggi, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Falkenheim, H., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Fancy, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br /> -Farinata degli Uberti, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -Farinelli, A., <a href="#Page_192">192</a> n.<br /> -<i>Faust,</i> <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -Fechner, G. T., <a href="#Page_394">394</a>-<a href="#Page_397">397</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a><br /> -Feeling, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Feijóo, B., <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a><br /> -Ferrant, Mme., <a href="#Page_236">236</a> n.<br /> -Fichte, J. G., <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a><br /> -Ficino, M., <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Ficker, F., <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -Fiedler, C., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>-<a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a> n.<br /> -Fioretti, B., <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -Firenzuola, A., <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Fischer, G. G., <a href="#Page_459">459</a><br /> -Fischer, K., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Flamini, F., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Flaubert, G., <a href="#Page_368">368</a><br /> -Flowers, language of, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -Fontenelle, B., <a href="#Page_204">204</a><br /> -Form, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">æsthetic of, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></span><br /> -Fomari, V., <a href="#Page_383">383</a> n.<br /> -Fortunio, G. F., <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Foscolo, U., <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -Fottano, F., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Fouillée, A., <a href="#Page_399">399</a><br /> -Fowler, T., <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Fracastoro, G., <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br /> -Franco, N., <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Frederick the Great, <a href="#Page_103">103</a><br /> -Frederick William, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br /> -French Revolution, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -Fulgentius, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Fulvio, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Fusco, A., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -<br /> -Gæta, M., <a href="#Page_230">230</a><br /> -Galileo, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Galletti, <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Gallo, N., <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Galluppi, P., <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -Gäng, F., <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Garcia, M. F., <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -Gayley, F. M., <a href="#Page_352">352</a> n., <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -<i>Gefallen,</i> <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br /> -Gellert, C., <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -Genius, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a><br /> -Gentile, G., <a href="#Page_272">272</a> n., <a href="#Page_419">419</a> n., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Geometrical figures, beauty of, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br /> -Geometry, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -<i>Georgics,</i> <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Gérard, A., <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href="#Page_200">200</a> n., <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Gerber, G., <a href="#Page_454">454</a><br /> -<i>Gerusalemme Conquistata,</i> <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br /> -<i>Gerusalemme Liberata,</i> <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br /> -<i>Geschichte des Materialismus,</i> <a href="#Page_404">404</a><br /> -Ghibellines, <a href="#Page_367">367</a><br /> -Giani, R., <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Giannini, <i>A.,</i> <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Giannone, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Gioberti, V., <a href="#Page_354">354</a>-<a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>. <a href="#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a><br /> -Giotto, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a><br /> -Godfrey, <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -Gods, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>-<a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Goethe, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>-<a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a> <a href="#Page_448">448</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></span><br /> -Goguet, A., <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br /> -Golden section, no, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a><br /> -Gorgias, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a><br /> -Gottsched, J. C., <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a> n., <a href="#Page_244">244</a> n., <a href="#Page_446">446</a><br /> -Graceful, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Gracian, B., <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a> n., <a href="#Page_432">432</a><br /> -Græco-Roman æsthetic, <a href="#Page_156">156</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Grammar, <a href="#Page_145">145</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_465">465</a><br /> -Grave, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Gravina, G. B., <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>. <a href="#Page_444">444</a><br /> -Greece, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">æsthetic in, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></span><br /> -Greek art, its alleged serenity, <a href="#Page_127">127</a><br /> -Griepenkerl, <a href="#Page_338">338</a><br /> -Grimm, F. M., <a href="#Page_446">446</a><br /> -Gröber, G., <a href="#Page_435">435</a><br /> -Groos, K., <a href="#Page_408">408</a>-<a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Grosse, E., <a href="#Page_397">397</a>-<a href="#Page_398">398</a><br /> -Grotius, H., <a href="#Page_225">225</a><br /> -Gruber, <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -Grucker, E., <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Grundmann, R., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Guarini, G. B., <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a><br /> -Guelfs, <a href="#Page_367">367</a><br /> -Guicciardini, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Guizot, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Guyau, J. M., <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a><br /> -<br /> -Hamann, J. G., <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Hamelius, P., <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Hamlet, <a href="#Page_49">49</a><br /> -Hanslick, E., <a href="#Page_412">412</a>-<a href="#Page_414">414</a><br /> -Harris, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Hartmann, E. von, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_409">409</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>-<a href="#Page_448">448</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>. <a href="#Page_473">473</a> n., <a href="#Page_484">484</a></span><br /> -Haym, R., <a href="#Page_482">482</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Hearing, arts of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -Hebenstreit, <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -Hedonism, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">æsthetic, <a href="#Page_82">82</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Hedonistic-moralistic æsthetic, <a href="#Page_156">156</a><br /> -Hegel, G. W. F., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a> <a href="#Page_291">291</a> n.,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_297">297</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>-<a href="#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></span><br /> -Hegelians, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a><br /> -Heine, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a><br /> -Heinsius, D., <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Helen, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br /> -Helmholz, <a href="#Page_391">391</a><br /> -Hemsterhuis, F., <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -Hennequin, E., <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -<i>Henriade,</i> <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -Herbart, J. F., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></span><br /> -Herder, J. G., <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>-<a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a></span><br /> -Hermagoras, <a href="#Page_424">424</a><br /> -Hermann, C., <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a><br /> -<i>Hermann und Dorothee,</i> <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a><br /> -Hermogenes, <a href="#Page_430">430</a><br /> -Herwigh, <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -Hetaira, art as, <a href="#Page_160">160</a><br /> -Hettner, H., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Heydenreich, K. H., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a><br /> -Hiatus, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -Hieroglyphics, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -Hippias, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -<i>Hippias Major,</i> <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a><br /> -Hirth, L., <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Historical materialism, <a href="#Page_40">40</a><br /> -History, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>-<a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -History of art, <a href="#Page_130">130</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">intellectualism in, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>-<a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i>seqq.</i>Hobbes, T., <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></span><br /> -Hogarth, W., <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Holland, <a href="#Page_392">392</a><br /> -Holstein-Augustenburg, Duke of, <a href="#Page_288">288</a><br /> -Home, H., <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></span><br /> -Homer, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></span><br /> -Homonym, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> -Horace, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a><br /> -Horrible, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Hostinsky, O., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Huarte, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Hugo, V., <a href="#Page_352">352</a> n., <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a><br /> -Human body, beauty of, <a href="#Page_105">105</a><br /> -Humanists, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -Humboldt, A. von, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a><br /> -Humboldt, W. von, <a href="#Page_325">325</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_334">334</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a> n., <a href="#Page_472">472</a></span><br /> -Hume, D., <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a><br /> -Humour, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a><br /> -Hutcheson, F., <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -<br /> -Iago, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -Idea, the, <a href="#Page_167">167</a><br /> -Idealism, absolute, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -Idealization, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a><br /> -Ideas in art, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> -Idyllic, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<i>Iliad,</i> <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a><br /> -Image, <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br /> -Imagination, <a href="#Page_170">170</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">arts of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></span><br /> -Imaginative absolute, the, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>-<a href="#Page_123">123</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">creation, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></span><br /> -Imbriani, V., <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Imitation, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br /> -Imposing, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Independence, the, of art, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -Indifferent, the morally, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /> -Individual, concept of, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br /> -Individuality in art, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -Indivisibility of the work of art, <a href="#Page_20">20</a><br /> -Induction, <a href="#Page_42">42</a><br /> -Inductive æsthetics, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> -Industrial arts, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<i>Ingegno,</i> <a href="#Page_189">189</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Ingenuous, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Intellectual intuition, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> -Interest, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a><br /> -Interjection, <a href="#Page_143">143</a><br /> -Internal language, <a href="#Page_25">25</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">form of language, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></span><br /> -Interpretation, historical, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> -Intuition, <a href="#Page_1">1</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not dependent on concepts, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not perception, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">independent of space and time, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not sensation, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and expression, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and art, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">intellectual, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></span><br /> -Inversion, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> -Irony, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a><br /> -Isocrates, <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br /> -Italian language, the, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -Italy, unification of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -<br /> -Jacobi, G., <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Jacquinet, P., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Jagemann, F. G., <a href="#Page_475">475</a><br /> -Janosi, B., <a href="#Page_477">477</a><br /> -<i>Je ne sais quoi,</i> <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br /> -<i>Jerusalem delivered,</i> <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br /> -Jesuits, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -Joan of Aragon, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Jodi, F., <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a><br /> -John of Salisbury, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -John the Scot. <i>See</i> Eriugena<br /> -Joret, C., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Jouffroy, T., <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a><br /> -Jourdain, Monsieur, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -Judgement, æsthetic, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a><br /> -<i>Julius and Raphæl,</i> <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Juno,295<br /> -Jupiter, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br /> -<br /> -Kaimes, Lord. <i>See</i> Home<br /> -<i>Kaligone,</i> <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-<a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a> n.<br /> -kalon, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /> -Kannegiesser, <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Kant, I., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_292">292</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>. <a href="#Page_344">344</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_426">426</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></span><br /> -Keckermann, B., <a href="#Page_425">425</a><br /> -Kedney, J. S., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Kinds, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>-<a href="#Page_38">38</a><br /> -Kirchmann, J. F. von, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a><br /> -Klopstock, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Knight, W., <a href="#Page_477">477</a><br /> -Knowledge, its two forms, <a href="#Page_1">1</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their relation, <a href="#Page_22">22</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Koch, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>-<a href="#Page_325">325</a><br /> -Kogel, F., <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Kohn, J., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Koller, J., <a href="#Page_247">247</a> n., <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a><br /> -König, J. U., <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a><br /> -Körner, C., <a href="#Page_288">288</a><br /> -kosmos, <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br /> -Köstlin, C., <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a><br /> -Kralik, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Krantz, E., <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Krause, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a><br /> -<br /> -Labanca, B., <a href="#Page_474">474</a> n.<br /> -Labels, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><br /> -Ladrone, C., <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -Laharpe, <a href="#Page_368">368</a><br /> -Lamennais, <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Lancelot, C., <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -Landscape, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br /> -Lang, A., <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -Lange, A. F., <a href="#Page_404">404</a><br /> -Lange, K., <a href="#Page_408">408</a><br /> -Language, <a href="#Page_142">142</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_172">172</a><br /> -<i>Laokoon,</i> <a href="#Page_451">451</a> n., <a href="#Page_452">452</a> n.<br /> -Laprade, <a href="#Page_459">459</a><br /> -Latius, W., <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -<i>Laune,</i> <a href="#Page_344">344</a><br /> -Laurenzano, Duke of, <a href="#Page_230">230</a><br /> -Law, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -Lazarus, M., <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a><br /> -Lee, Venion, <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n.<br /> -Leibniz, G. W., <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></span><br /> -lekton, <a href="#Page_174">174</a><br /> -Leo the Jew, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Leonardo da Vinci, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Leopardi, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br /> -Lersch, L., <a href="#Page_465">465</a> n., <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Lessing, G. E., <a href="#Page_266">266</a>-<a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>-<a href="#Page_452">452</a></span><br /> -<i>Letters on Æsthetic Education,</i> <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-<a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> -Levêque, C., <a href="#Page_381">381</a>-<a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -Levi, S., <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Lewes, G. H., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a> n.<br /> -lexis, <a href="#Page_412">412</a><br /> -Liberation, æsthetic, <a href="#Page_21">21</a><br /> -Lichtenthal, <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -Life in art, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -Limits of the arts, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of science, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></span><br /> -Line of beauty, the, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -Linguistic, <a href="#Page_142">142</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Lintilhac, E., <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Lipps, T., <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a> n.<br /> -Literal meaning, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Livy, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Locke, J., <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a> n., <a href="#Page_402">402</a><br /> -Loewe, M. L., <a href="#Page_325">325</a> n., <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Logic, i, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Lomazzo, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -Lombroso, C., <a href="#Page_401">401</a><br /> -Longinus (pseudo), <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Lope de Vega, <a href="#Page_443">443</a><br /> -Lotze, H., <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a>-<a href="#Page_457">457</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Louis XIV., <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br /> -Lucretius, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a><br /> -Luigini, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Luther, M., <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Lycurgus, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Lyric, <a href="#Page_36">36</a><br /> -<br /> -Macaulay, G. B., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a><br /> -Machiavelli, N., <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Maffei, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a> n.<br /> -Maggi, V., <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a><br /> -Majestic, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Malaspina, <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -Malebolge, <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -Malebranche, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -Mandricard, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -Manzoni, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a><br /> -Marcianus Capella, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Marco del Pino da Siena, no<br /> -Mari, G., <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Marini, C., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Marino, G. B., <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a><br /> -Marmontel, <a href="#Page_434">434</a><br /> -Maroncelli, P., <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -Marsais, C. C. du, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a><br /> -Martinazzoli, A., <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Masci, F., <a href="#Page_383">383</a><br /> -Materialism, <a href="#Page_64">64</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">historical, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></span><br /> -Mathematical logic, <a href="#Page_44">44</a><br /> -Mathematics, <a href="#Page_42">42</a><br /> -Matragrin, <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Matter, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -Mayer, E. von, <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Mazzini, G., <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a><br /> -Mazzoni, J., <a href="#Page_440">440</a><br /> -Mazzuchelli, <a href="#Page_193">193</a> n.<br /> -Meaning, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the four kinds of, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></span><br /> -Medea, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Mediæval art, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Meier, G. F., <a href="#Page_242">242</a>-<a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a><br /> -Meiners, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Meis, A. C. de, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Meising, <a href="#Page_379">379</a><br /> -Melancholy, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Memory, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -Ménardière, la, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br /> -Mendelssohn, M., <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a><br /> -Menendez y Pelayo, M., <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -Mengs, A. R., <a href="#Page_264">264</a>-<a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Mephistopheles, <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -Merits, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> -<i>Metacritica,</i> <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Metaphor, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br /> -Metaphysic, <a href="#Page_64">64</a><br /> -Metastasio, <a href="#Page_446">446</a><br /> -Meyer, H. G., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -<i>Meyers Konversazionslexicon,</i> <a href="#Page_371">371</a> n.<br /> -Michæl Angelo, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_450">450</a></span><br /> -Michelet, <a href="#Page_385">385</a><br /> -Michiels, A., <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Middle Ages, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Milizia, F., <a href="#Page_268">268</a><br /> -Milsand, J., <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Milton, J., <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -mimeisis, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>. <a href="#Page_165">165</a><br /> -<i>Minerva,</i> <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -<i>Minturno,</i> <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a><br /> -Mirandola, P. della, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Mixed beauty, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -Mock heroic, the, <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -Model language, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -Models in art, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a><br /> -<i>Modern Painters,</i> <a href="#Page_383">383</a> n.<br /> -Modes of expression, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -Modifications of the beautiful, <a href="#Page_339">339</a><br /> -Molière, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a> n., <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -Mommsen, T., <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Monboddo, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Montaigne, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a><br /> -Montani, F., <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a><br /> -Montargis, F., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Montesquieu, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Moral meaning, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Morals, art and, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-<a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>-<a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>-<a href="#Page_117">117</a><br /> -Morandi, L., <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Morato, P., <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Morel, <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Moritz, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Motte, de la, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a><br /> -Movement, arts of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -Moving, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Müller, E., <a href="#Page_161">161</a> n., <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Müller, K. W., <a href="#Page_476">476</a><br /> -Müller, Max, <a href="#Page_402">402</a><br /> -Muoni, G., <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Muratori, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>-<a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>,<br /> -200 n., <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a><br /> -<i>Murtoleide,</i> <a href="#Page_201">201</a><br /> -Music, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></span><br /> -<i>Musical Beauty, On,</i> <a href="#Page_412">412</a>-<a href="#Page_414">414</a><br /> -<i>Musterbegriffe,</i> <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Mysticism, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -<br /> -Nahlowsky, <a href="#Page_375">375</a><br /> -Napoleon, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a><br /> -Narrative judgements, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -Naturalism, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a><br /> -Natural signs, <a href="#Page_124">124</a><br /> -Nature, <a href="#Page_74">74</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">beauty of, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_459">459</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br /> -<i>Naugerius,</i> <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br /> -Nauseating, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Nef, W., <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br /> -Neo-Platonism, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Neoptolemus of Paros, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -Neudecker, G., <a href="#Page_373">373</a> n., <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Neumann, W., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Newton, I., <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -Nietzsche, F., <a href="#Page_411">411</a>-<a href="#Page_412">412</a><br /> -Nifo, A., <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Nobili, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Noble, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Nominalism, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -Non-enunciative judgements, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -Non-moral man, the, <a href="#Page_58">58</a><br /> -Nordau, M., <a href="#Page_300">300</a>-<a href="#Page_301">301</a><br /> -Nores, L. de, <a href="#Page_440">440</a><br /> -Normative sciences, <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br /> -Notation, musical, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -Noumenon, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br /> -Novalis, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a><br /> -<br /> -Object, art as, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> -Objective art, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /> -<i>Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime,</i> <a href="#Page_280">280</a><br /> -<i>Odyssey,</i> <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br /> -Oersted, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>-<a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a><br /> -Opera, <a href="#Page_455">455</a><br /> -Oratory, theory of, <a href="#Page_113">113</a><br /> -Orestes, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -<i>Organon,</i> <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -Oriental art, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -Originality, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -Origin of art, <a href="#Page_132">132</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of language, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></span><br /> -<i>Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and<br /> -Beautiful, Enquiry into the,</i> <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -<i>Orlando Furioso,</i> <a href="#Page_191">191</a><br /> -Ormuzd, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br /> -Ornament, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_422">422</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Ornithorhynchus, <a href="#Page_105">105</a><br /> -Orsi, <a href="#Page_190">190</a> n., <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a> n., <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a><br /> -Ortloff, <a href="#Page_426">426</a><br /> -Ossian, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a><br /> -Othello, <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -<br /> -Paciolo, L., <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Padova, M. da, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Pagano, M., <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a><br /> -Pain, <a href="#Page_74">74</a><br /> -Painting, theory of, <a href="#Page_113">113</a><br /> -Paisiello, <a href="#Page_339">339</a><br /> -Palæography, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> -Palermo, <a href="#Page_193">193</a><br /> -Palimpsests, <a href="#Page_127">127</a><br /> -Palladio, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Pallavicino, Sforza, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a><br /> -<i>Paradise Lost,</i> <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -Paradisi, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Parini, <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -Paris, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Parmenon, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Parrhasius, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br /> -Parts of speech, <a href="#Page_146">146</a><br /> -Pascal, B., <a href="#Page_195">195</a> n.<br /> -Pasquali, <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -Passion, <a href="#Page_21">21</a><br /> -Past, fascination of the, <a href="#Page_127">127</a><br /> -<i>Pastor Fido,</i> <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a><br /> -Pathetic, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Patrizzi, F., <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a><br /> -Paul, H., <a href="#Page_402">402</a>. <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a> n.<br /> -Paul, St., <a href="#Page_433">433</a><br /> -Pedagogic theory, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a><br /> -Pellegrini, M., <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a><br /> -Pellico, S., <a href="#Page_357">357</a> n.<br /> -Perception, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -<i>Perfetta Poesia.</i> <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a> n., <a href="#Page_200">200</a> n., <a href="#Page_202">202</a> n.<br /> -Pericles, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Peripeteia, <a href="#Page_437">437</a><br /> -Perizonio, I., <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -Permissible, the, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /> -Perucci, A., <a href="#Page_444">444</a><br /> -Petent, P., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Petrarch, <a href="#Page_363">363</a><br /> -Petrarchists, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -<i>Phædrus,</i> <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -<i>Phenomenology of the Spirit,</i> <a href="#Page_298">298</a><br /> -Phenomenon, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br /> -Phidias, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br /> -<i>Philebus, QZ,</i> <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -Philography, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Philology, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> -Philosophy, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of history, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>-<a href="#Page_40">40</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of nature, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br /> -<i>Philosophy of the Spirit,</i> <a href="#Page_298">298</a><br /> -Philostratus, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a><br /> -Photography, <a href="#Page_17">17</a><br /> -phrasis, <a href="#Page_422">422</a><br /> -Physical beauty, <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">laws of beauty, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></span><br /> -Physics, æsthetic, <a href="#Page_105">105</a><br /> -Physiognomy, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -Physiological æsthetics, <a href="#Page_390">390</a><br /> -Physiology, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -Pica, V., <a href="#Page_387">387</a><br /> -Piccolomini, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a><br /> -Pichtos. N. M., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Pico della Mirandola, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Pictet, <a href="#Page_382">382</a><br /> -Pinciano, A. L., <a href="#Page_186">186</a><br /> -Piquant, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Pisones, Epistle to the, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -Plainer, E., <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -Plato, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>. <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a></span><br /> -Platonists, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Play, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br /> -Pleasure, <a href="#Page_74">74</a><br /> -Pleonasm, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a><br /> -Pliny, <a href="#Page_172">172</a> n.<br /> -Plotinus, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></span><br /> -Ploucket, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Plutarch, <a href="#Page_158">158</a> n., <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a><br /> -Pneumatology, <a href="#Page_211">211</a><br /> -<i>Poeta nascitur,</i> <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -<i>Poetics. See</i> Aristotle<br /> -Poetry and prose, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>-<a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -<i>Politics</i> (Aristotle), <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -Polybius, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Polycletus, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Pope, A., <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a><br /> -Port-Royal, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a><br /> -Positivism, <a href="#Page_64">64</a><br /> -Pott, A. F., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Potter, P., <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br /> -Praxiteles, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br /> -Prehistoric art, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -prepon, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Prieger, <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -<i>Principles of Psychology,</i> <a href="#Page_388">388</a>-<a href="#Page_389">389</a><br /> -Priscian, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Probable, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>-<a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -Production in art, its stages, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -Progress, æsthetic, <a href="#Page_133">133</a><br /> -Prometheus, <a href="#Page_47">47</a><br /> -Proper expressions, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> -Prose and poetry, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>-<a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -Protagoras, <a href="#Page_464">464</a><br /> -Proto, E., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Proudhon, <a href="#Page_399">399</a><br /> -Pseudo-æsthetic concepts, <a href="#Page_87">87</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -psilei lexis <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br /> -Psychology, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -Puffendorf, <a href="#Page_225">225</a><br /> -<i>Pulchrum,</i> <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Pulci, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br /> -Puoti, <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Pure and applied knowledge, <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br /> -Pure beauty, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> -"Purebeauty, Sir," <a href="#Page_348">348</a>-<a href="#Page_349">349</a><br /> -Purification, <a href="#Page_167">167</a><br /> -Pyramidal grouping, <a href="#Page_110">110</a><br /> -Pythagoras, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Quadrio, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>-<a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a><br /> -Quatremère de Quincy, <a href="#Page_350">350</a><br /> -Quintilian, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>. <a href="#Page_427">427</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a><br /> -Quistorp, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a><br /> -<br /> -Raabe, <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Ramier, <a href="#Page_476">476</a><br /> -Ramus, P., <a href="#Page_424">424</a>-<a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a><br /> -Ranke, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Raphæl, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Rapin, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Realism, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br /> -Realistic art, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /> -<i>Recherche de la Vérité,</i> <a href="#Page_238">238</a><br /> -Referendum, æsthetics by, <a href="#Page_110">110</a><br /> -Reformation, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -Reich, E., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Reid, T., <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br /> -Reimarus, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Reinbeck, <a href="#Page_324">324</a><br /> -Relativism, <a href="#Page_122">122</a><br /> -Religion, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -Rembrandt, <a href="#Page_105">105</a><br /> -Remorse, <a href="#Page_58">58</a><br /> -Renaissance, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">art, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">poetics of the, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br /> -Repetition, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> -Representation, <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in history, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></span><br /> -Reproduction in art, its stages, <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -<i>Republic,</i> <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Repulsive, the, <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> -Rest, arts of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -Restorations, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> -Reynaud, P., <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Rhabanus Maurus, <a href="#Page_429">429</a><br /> -Rhetoric, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_422">422</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Rhetoricians, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Rhodian style, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Ricardou, A., <a href="#Page_470">470</a> n.<br /> -Riccoboni, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Richter, J. P., <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a><br /> -Ricitari, F., <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Rickert, H., <a href="#Page_419">419</a> n.<br /> -Ridiculous, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Riedel, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a><br /> -Rigoristic—hedonistic æsthetic, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a><br /> -Rinaldo, <i>102</i><br /> -<i>Rire, le,</i> <a href="#Page_416">416</a><br /> -<i>Risorgimento,</i> <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -Ritter, E., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a><br /> -Robortelli, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a><br /> -Roland, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -Rolla, A., <a href="#Page_478">478</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Rollin, <a href="#Page_257">257</a><br /> -Romantic art, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>-<a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>and see</i> Goethe, Schiller</span><br /> -Rome, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Roots, <a href="#Page_148">148</a><br /> -Rosenkranz, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a><br /> -Rosi, M., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Rosmini, A., <a href="#Page_155">155</a> <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a><br /> -Rossi, G., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Rossi, V., <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Roth, <a href="#Page_324">324</a><br /> -Rousseau, J. J., <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a><br /> -Ruge, A., <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Ruskin, J., <a href="#Page_382">382</a>-<a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -<br /> -Sad, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Sainte-Beuve, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a><br /> -Saintsbury, G., <a href="#Page_477">477</a><br /> -Saisset, E., <a href="#Page_382">382</a> n.<br /> -Salisbury, John of, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Salviati, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a><br /> -Salvini, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br /> -Sanchez, Francisco, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a><br /> -Sanctian method, <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -Sanctis, F. de, <a href="#Page_357">357</a> n., <a href="#Page_358">358</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_383">383</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></span><br /> -Sand, G., <a href="#Page_368">368</a><br /> -Sanskrit poetry, <a href="#Page_437">437</a><br /> -Santillana, Marquis of, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -Sarlo, F. de, <a href="#Page_419">419</a> n.<br /> -Savage art, <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br /> -Savonarola, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Scaliger, J. C., <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Scepticism, historical, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Schasler, M., <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></span><br /> -<i>Schein,</i> <a href="#Page_17">17</a><br /> -Schelling, F., <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>-<a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>-<a href="#Page_448">448</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a></span><br /> -scheimata, <a href="#Page_428">428</a><br /> -<i>Scherno degli Dei,</i> <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -Schiller, F., <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>-<a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>-<a href="#Page_473">473</a></span><br /> -Schlapp, O., <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a> n., <a href="#Page_280">280</a> n., <a href="#Page_281">281</a> n., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Schlegel, A. W. von, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a><br /> -Schlegel, Elias, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -Schlegel, F., <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a><br /> -Schleiermacher, F., <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_457">457</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></span><br /> -Schmidt, E., <a href="#Page_483">483</a><br /> -Schmidt, J., <a href="#Page_214">214</a> n., <a href="#Page_299">299</a> n., <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Schmidt, V., <a href="#Page_362">362</a><br /> -Schneider, <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -Scholasticism, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -Schopenhauer, A., <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_363">363</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></span><br /> -Schott, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Schubart, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Schütz, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Science, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and art, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">history of, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">natural, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></span><br /> -<i>Science of Language, Lectures on the,</i> <a href="#Page_402">402</a> n.<br /> -Sciences, normative, <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br /> -<i>Scientia qualitatum,</i> <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br /> -<i>Scienza Nuova,</i> <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Scioppio, G., <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -Scott, F. N., <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -Scott, W. R., <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Scotus, Duns, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br /> -Scotus Eriugena, Johannes, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Scudéry, <a href="#Page_441">441</a><br /> -Sculpture, theory of, <a href="#Page_113">113</a><br /> -<i>Seechia rapita,</i> <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -Segni, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a><br /> -Selection, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a><br /> -Semiotic, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -Seneca, <a href="#Page_172">172</a> n., <a href="#Page_428">428</a><br /> -Sensation, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -Senses, æsthetic, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> -Sentence, the, <a href="#Page_146">146</a><br /> -Ser Ciappelletto, <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br /> -Serenity, <a href="#Page_21">21</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">alleged, of Greek art, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></span><br /> -Serious, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Serpentine line, <a href="#Page_110">110</a><br /> -Sexual pleasure and art, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> -Shaftesbury, <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br /> -Shakespeare, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Shelley, P. B., <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Sicily, <a href="#Page_9">9</a><br /> -Siebeck, H., <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Sight, arts of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -Signs, natural and conventional, <a href="#Page_124">124</a><br /> -Simonides, <a href="#Page_157">157</a><br /> -Simple art, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> -Sincerity, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -"Sir Purebeauty," <a href="#Page_378">378</a><br /> -Sizeranne, R. de la, <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Smith, Adam, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>.<br /> -Smith, G. Gregory, <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Soave, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Sociability, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -Sociology, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a><br /> -Socrates, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></span><br /> -Solger, K. W., <a href="#Page_295">295</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></span><br /> -Solla, <a href="#Page_224">224</a> n.<br /> -Solmi, E., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Solon, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Sommer, R., <a href="#Page_284">284</a> n., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Sommerlad, F., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Sophists, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a><br /> -Sophocles, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Space, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>-<a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">arts of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Euclidean, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></span><br /> -Spalletti, G., <a href="#Page_269">269</a>-<a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Spaventa, B., <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a> n.<br /> -<i>Spectator, The,</i> <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a> n.<br /> -Speech, <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">parts of, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">primitive, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></span><br /> -Spence, <a href="#Page_450">450</a><br /> -Spencer, H., <a href="#Page_388">388</a>-<a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a><br /> -Sperone, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Spicker, G., <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -<i>Spiel,</i> <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Spinazzola, V., <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -Spingarn, J. E., <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Spitzer, H., <a href="#Page_299">299</a> n., <a href="#Page_300">300</a> <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Staël, Mme. de, <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Stefane, de, <a href="#Page_195">195</a> n.<br /> -Stein, H. von, <a href="#Page_262">262</a> n., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -Steinthal, H., <a href="#Page_174">174</a> n., <a href="#Page_256">256</a> n., <a href="#Page_329">329</a> <i>seqq.,</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></span><br /> -Stem, P., <a href="#Page_408">408</a><br /> -Stewart, D., <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Stoics, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a><br /> -Strabo, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -Stumpf, C., <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n.<br /> -<i>Sturm und Drang,</i> <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a><br /> -Style, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a><br /> -Subject, art as, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> -Subjective art, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /> -Sublime, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a><br /> -<i>Sublimitate, de. See</i> Longinus<br /> -Sully, J., <a href="#Page_380">380</a> n.<br /> -Sulzer, J. G., <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href="#Page_199">199</a> n., <a href="#Page_205">205</a> n.,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a> n., <a href="#Page_478">478</a></span><br /> -<i>Summum bonum,</i> <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -Superman, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -Süssmilch, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Syllogism, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>-<a href="#Page_44">44</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">æsthetic, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></span><br /> -Symbol, <a href="#Page_34">34</a><br /> -Symbolic art, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /> -Symbolism, <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br /> -Sympathetic, æsthetic of the, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<i>Symposium,</i> <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -Synæresis, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -Synecdoche, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -Synonym, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -Synthesis, intuitive, <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br /> -Szerdahel, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -<br /> -Tacitus, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Taille, Jean de la, <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -Taine, H., <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_392">392</a>-<a href="#Page_393">393</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_397">397</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a></span><br /> -Talia, <a href="#Page_353">353</a><br /> -Talon, <a href="#Page_425">425</a><br /> -Taparelli, <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Tasso, T., <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a></span><br /> -Tassoni, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a><br /> -Taste, <a href="#Page_191">191</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_470">470</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and genius, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"no accounting for," <a href="#Page_122">122</a></span><br /> -Tatio, A. N., <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -Technique, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of expression, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></span><br /> -Teleology, <a href="#Page_292">292</a><br /> -Telesio, B., <a href="#Page_231">231</a><br /> -Tempel, G., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Terrasson, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a><br /> -Tertullian, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Tesauro, E., <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a><br /> -Thales, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Theodorus, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Theodulf, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Theon, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Theophrastus, <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br /> -Theses, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> -Thiele, G., <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Thiers, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Thomas Aquinas, St., <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Thomasius, <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br /> -Thought and speech, <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br /> -Thucydides, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Thurot, C., <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Tieck, L., <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a><br /> -Tiedemann, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Time, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">arts of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></span><br /> -Timomachus, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Tisias, <a href="#Page_423">423</a><br /> -Tissot, E., <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Titian, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -Tolstoy, L., <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -Tommaseo, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a><br /> -Töpffer, <a href="#Page_382">382</a><br /> -Tomasi, <a href="#Page_383">383</a><br /> -Torraca, F., <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -Trabalza, <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -Tradition, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> -Tragic, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Tragi-comic, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Trahndorff, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>-<a href="#Page_335">335</a>. <a href="#Page_379">379</a><br /> -Transcendental æsthetic, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>-<a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -Translation, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -Trevisano, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n. <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></span><br /> -Trinity, the, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Triumph, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> -<i>Trivium,</i> <a href="#Page_430">430</a><br /> -Trojano, P. R., <a href="#Page_419">419</a> n.<br /> -Trublet, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -Truth in art, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -Typical, the, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Ugly, Æsthetic of the,</i> <a href="#Page_347">347</a><br /> -Ugly, the, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">overcoming of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Ulrich, <a href="#Page_470">470</a><br /> -Ulysses, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -Union of arts, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /> -Unity, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of work of art, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></span><br /> -Universal, <a href="#Page_42">42</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in art, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></span><br /> -Universal language, <a href="#Page_151">151</a><br /> -Unruh, F., <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -uponoia <a href="#Page_157">157</a><br /> -Useful, the, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -Utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /> -Utility and art, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /> -<br /> -Vacherot, E., <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Valdés, Juan de, <a href="#Page_431">431</a><br /> -Vallet, P., <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Value, <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">judgement of, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></span><br /> -Varchi, <i>igi,</i> <a href="#Page_358">358</a><br /> -Variety, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -Varro, <a href="#Page_465">465</a><br /> -Vater, <a href="#Page_324">324</a><br /> -Venturi, A., <a href="#Page_474">474</a><br /> -Venus, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Verbalism, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -<i>Vergnügen,</i> <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br /> -<i>Verisimile. See</i> Probable<br /> -Verism, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> -Verocchio, <a href="#Page_394">394</a><br /> -Véron, E., <a href="#Page_410">410</a><br /> -Vettori, <a href="#Page_182">182</a><br /> -Vibration, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -Vico, G. B., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a></span><br /> -Villari, P., <a href="#Page_486">486</a><br /> -Vincent, St., <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -Vinci. <i>See</i> Leonardo<br /> -Viola, A., <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Violent, the, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -Virgil, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -Vischer, F. T., <a href="#Page_336">336</a>-<a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_453">453</a>-<a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a></span><br /> -Vischer, R., <a href="#Page_405">405</a><br /> -Visconti, E., <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a><br /> -Vitruvius, <a href="#Page_113">113</a><br /> -Vivacity, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -Vives, L., <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a><br /> -Volkelt, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a> n.<br /> -<i>Völkerpsychologie,</i> <a href="#Page_403">403</a><br /> -Volkmann, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a> n., <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Voltaire, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a><br /> -Vossius, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Vossler, K., <a href="#Page_435">435</a> n., <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -<br /> -Wagner, A., <a href="#Page_362">362</a><br /> -Wagner, R., <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a><br /> -Walter, J., <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Waxworks, <a href="#Page_17">17</a><br /> -Webb, D., <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Weiss, <a href="#Page_473">473</a><br /> -Weisse, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>-<a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a><br /> -Weisshuhn, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Werenfels, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Werner, K., <a href="#Page_485">485</a><br /> -<i>Werther,</i> <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a><br /> -Westenrieder, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Whately, R., <a href="#Page_426">426</a><br /> -<i>What is Art?</i> <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Whitney, W. D., <a href="#Page_402">402</a>-<a href="#Page_403">403</a><br /> -Wilkins, <a href="#Page_210">210</a><br /> -Will, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br /> -Winckelmann, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>-<a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></span><br /> -Windelband, W., <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Wirth, <a href="#Page_337">337</a><br /> -Wit, <a href="#Page_189">189</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_470">470</a><br /> -Wittemberg, <a href="#Page_29">29</a><br /> -Wize, K. F., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Wohlgemüth, J., <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -Wolf, F. A., <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br /> -Wolff, J. C., <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a> n., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></span><br /> -Wolffianism, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br /> -Women on the stage, <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> -Wordsworth, W., <a href="#Page_352">352</a><br /> -Works of art, <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -Writing, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -Wulf, M. de, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a><br /> -Wundt, W., <a href="#Page_403">403</a><br /> -<br /> -Xenophon, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br /> -<br /> -Zanotti, F. M., <a href="#Page_239">239</a>-<a href="#Page_240">240</a><br /> -Zeising, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a><br /> -Zeitler, J., <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Zeller, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -Zenatti, O., <a href="#Page_480">480</a><br /> -Zeno (Stoic), <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Zeuxis, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -Zimmermann, G., <a href="#Page_484">484</a><br /> -Zimmermann, R., <a href="#Page_261">261</a> n., <a href="#Page_262">262</a> n.,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_270">270</a> n., <a href="#Page_290">290</a> n., <a href="#Page_299">299</a> n., <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_328">328</a> n., <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></span><br /> -Zoccoli, E., <a href="#Page_484">484</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a><br /> -Zola, E., <a href="#Page_411">411</a><br /> -Zumbini, B., <a href="#Page_481">481</a><br /> -</p> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Aesthetic as science of expression and -general linguistic, by Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AESTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION *** - -***** This file should be named 54618-h.htm or 54618-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/6/1/54618/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... 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