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diff --git a/old/54613-0.txt b/old/54613-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index f281a19..0000000 --- a/old/54613-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8115 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Battle for Khe Sanh, by Moyers S. Shore - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Battle for Khe Sanh - -Author: Moyers S. Shore - -Release Date: April 26, 2017 [EBook #54613] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BATTLE FOR KHE SANH *** - - - - -Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Brian Wilcox and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note:- - -The original spelling, hyphenation, and punctuation has been retained, -with the exception of apparent typographical errors which have been -corrected. - -Underlined text is denoted =thus=. - -Italic characters are denoted _thus_. - -Footnotes marked thus [12] have been moved to the end of the chapter in -which they occur. - -Footnotes marked thus (12) can be seen in Appendix A, as in the -original document. - -Footnote markers (44), (45), (136) and (154) were omitted in the -original document. The location of these markers is the transcriber’s -approximation. - - - - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE FOR KHE SANH - - HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION - HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS - WASHINGTON, D.C.] - -[Illustration: - - K.W. White - -SOUTHEAST ASIA] - - - - - THE BATTLE - FOR - KHE SANH - - By - - Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC - - [Illustration: U. S. Marine Corps Badge] - - - HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION - HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS - WASHINGTON, D. C. - Printed 1969 - Reprinted 1977 - -[Illustration: Oblique aerial photograph of the Khe Sanh Combat Base - -(United Press International Photo by Kyoichi Sawada)] - - - - - Library of Congress Card No. 75-603604 - - - For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government - Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - - Stock No. 008-065-00114-5 - - - - -PROLOGUE - - -It is with pleasure that the Marine Corps presents this account of -the Battle for Khe Sanh which stands as one of the most crucial and -bitterly contested struggles in the Vietnam War. Throughout the -existence of our Corps, thousands of men have been called upon to -further the cause of freedom on scores of battlefields around the -globe. At Khe Sanh, a new generation of Marines, aided by their gallant -U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and South Vietnamese counterparts, -admirably upheld this tradition and wrote a thrilling new chapter in -the history of armed conflict. - -The two senior U. S. commanders in Vietnam who supervised the -defense--General William C. Westmoreland, USA, and Lieutenant General -Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC--have contributed immeasurably to the -production of this work and have also provided their astute summaries -of the operation which appear in the following pages. I heartily -endorse their statements as well as the approach and conclusions of -this history. - -In addition, I am grateful to the individuals and agencies of all the -Services who have provided valuable assistance through written comments -and personal interviews which are reflected in the text. In particular, -I wish to extend our appreciation to Mr. David D. Duncan, a veteran -combat photographer who has graciously consented to our use of the -brilliant pictures he took during an eight-day visit to the combat -base. These truly professional shots graphically depict the face of the -siege and enhance the narrative. - -The sum total of these contributions, I feel, is an objective, readable -account of this important battle which honors the valiant American -and South Vietnamese troops who held Khe Sanh. I can think of no more -fitting tribute to these men--both living and dead--than to simply -relate the events as they happened. This, then, is their story. - -[Illustration: Handwritten signature] - - L. F. CHAPMAN, JR. - General, U.S. Marine Corps - Commandant of the Marine Corps - -REVIEWED AND APPROVED 28 May 1969 - - - - -FOREWORD - - -As the commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, -Vietnam, during the battle of Khe Sanh, I welcome publication by the U. -S. Marine Corps of this historical study. The Marines' heroic defense -of the Khe Sanh area against numerically superior North Vietnamese -forces stands out among the many battles fought to defend the Republic -of Vietnam against Communist aggression. - -The enemy's primary objective of his 1968 TET Offensive was to seize -power in South Vietnam by creating a general uprising and causing the -defection of major elements of the Armed Forces of the Republic of -Vietnam. In conjunction with this, the enemy apparently expected to -seize by military action large portions of the northern two provinces -lying just south of the Demilitarized Zone and there to set up a -"liberation government." The virtually unpopulated Khe Sanh Plateau, -which lay astride the enemy's principal avenue of approach from his -large base areas in Laos, was obviously an initial objective of the -North Vietnamese Army. Its seizure would have created a serious threat -to our forces defending the northern area and would have cleared the -way for the enemy's advance to Quang Tri City and the heavily populated -coastal region. There is also little doubt that the enemy hoped at Khe -Sanh to attain a climactic victory, such as he had done in 1954 at Dien -Bien Phu, in the expectation that this would produce a psychological -shock and erode American morale. - -My subordinate commanders and I were particularly sensitive to heavy -fighting in the populated areas, since this would result in substantial -destruction to the towns and villages and cause unnecessary suffering -by the civilian population. We wanted to avoid this situation to the -greatest extent possible by denying the enemy freedom of movement -through the Khe Sanh area and into the coastal region. At that time -we did not have sufficient troops, helicopters, or logistical support -in the northern provinces to accomplish this entirely through mobile -operations, and competing requirements for troops and resources did not -permit immediate reinforcement from other areas of South Vietnam. The -situation was further complicated by long periods of fog and low cloud -ceilings during January, February, and March, which made helicopter -operations difficult and hazardous. - -To maintain our presence on the Khe Sanh Plateau, our only choice at -the time was to secure the airstrip we had built on the plateau since -this facility was essential as the forward terminus of our supply line. -From here we could maintain our military presence in the area and, -through the use of our firepower, make it costly for large enemy forces -to advance while we awaited the end of the bad weather of the northeast -monsoon and constituted the forces and logistics necessary to strike -out on offensive operations. - -Another factor favoring the decision to hold Khe Sanh was the enemy's -determination to take it. Our defense of the area would tie down large -numbers of North Vietnamese troops which otherwise could move against -the vulnerable populated areas whose security was the heart of the -Vietnamese pacification program. Our decision to defend also held the -prospect of causing the enemy to concentrate his force and thereby -provide us a singular opportunity to bring our firepower to bear on him -with minimum restrictions. Had we withdrawn to fight the enemy's force -of over two divisions in the heavily populated coastal area, the use -of our firepower would have been severely restricted because of our -precautionary measures to avoid civilian casualties and minimize damage -to civilian property. - -Based on my decision to hold the Khe Sanh Plateau, Lieutenant General -Cushman's and Lieutenant General Lam's first task was to reinforce the -area with sufficient strength to prevent the enemy from overrunning it, -but at the same time to commit no more force than could be supplied by -air. While the battle of Khe Sanh was being fought, emphasis was placed -on the buildup in the northern provinces of the necessary troops, -helicopters, and logistic support for mobile offensive operations to -open Highway 9 and move onto the plateau when the weather cleared at -the end of March. - -This report provides a detailed and graphic account of events as they -unfolded. It centers about the 26th Marine Regiment, the main defenders -of the Khe Sanh area, who tenaciously and magnificently held off the -enemy during the two-and-one-half-month siege. Yet the battle of Khe -Sanh was an inter-Service and international operation. Consequently, -appropriate coverage is given to the contributions of the U.S. Army, -Navy, and Air Force, and to South Vietnamese regular and irregular -military units, all of whom contributed to the defense of the area -and to the destruction of the enemy. As Marine artillery from within -the fortified positions pounded the enemy, Army artillery located to -the east provided heavy, long-range fire support. Fighter aircraft -from the Marines, Air Force, and Navy provided continuous close air -support, while B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command dealt decisive -blows around-the-clock to enemy forces within striking distance of our -positions and against enemy supply areas. Further, Marine and Air Force -airlift together with Army parachute riggers logistically sustained the -defenders during the siege despite heavy enemy antiaircraft fire. - -In early April, when the weather cleared and the troop and logistic -buildup was completed, a combined force of U. S. Army, U. S. Marine, -and Republic of Vietnam units, coordinated by the U. S. Army's 1st -Cavalry Division (Airmobile), maneuvered to link up with the 26th -Marines and rout the remaining enemy elements. Meanwhile, U. S. Marine -Corps engineers expeditiously opened Highway 9 to the plateau. The -crushing defeat suffered by the North Vietnamese Army during the siege -cost the Communists untold casualties, shattered two of their best -divisions, and frustrated their dream of a second Dien Bien Phu. - -The battle of Khe Sanh is but one facet of the long and complicated war -in South Vietnam. It is one in which the aggressive nature of North -Vietnam, the resolute determination of our fighting forces, and the -local defeat of the armed enemy can all be clearly seen. - -[Illustration: Handwritten Signature] - - W. C. WESTMORELAND - General, United States Army - - - - -PREFACE - - -In the extreme northwestern corner of South Vietnam there stands -a monument to the free world. Unlike those which commemorate the -victories of past wars, this one was not built on marble or bronze but -the sacrifices of men who fought and died at a remote outpost to halt -the spread of Communism. This is the story of those men--the defenders -of Khe Sanh--and the epic 77-day struggle which not only denied the -North Vietnamese Army a much needed victory but reaffirmed to the world -the intention of the United States to hold the line in Southeast Asia. -In addition to having been a contest of men and machines, this was the -test of a nation's will. - -As a history, this work is not intended to prove any point, but rather -to record objectively the series of events which came to be called the -Battle of Khe Sanh. These events spanned a period from April 1967 to -April 1968. The rationale for the buildup along the Demilitarized Zone -and the commitment to hold the small garrison is presented as a logical -extension of the three-pronged strategy then employed throughout I -Corps and the rest of South Vietnam; this balanced campaign included -pacification programs, counterguerrilla activity, and large unit -offensive sweeps. Although isolated, the Khe Sanh Combat Base was -a vital link in the northern defenses which screened the Allied -counterinsurgency efforts in the densely populated coastal plains from -invasion by regular divisions from North Vietnam. By obstructing this -attempted invasion, American and South Vietnamese forces at Khe Sanh -provided a shield for their contemporaries who were waging a war for -the hearts and minds of the people in the cities, villages, and hamlets -farther to the south. In the process, a reinforced regiment--the 26th -Marines--supported by massive firepower provided by the Marine and Navy -air arms, the U. S. Air Force and Marine and Army artillery, defended -this base and mangled two crack North Vietnamese Army divisions, -further illustrating to Hanoi the futility of its war of aggression. - -Later, after the encirclement was broken and additional U.S. forces -became available, the Allies were able to shift emphasis from the fixed -defense to fast-moving offensive operations to control this vital area -astride the enemy's invasion route. In these operations, our troops -thrust out to strike the enemy whenever he appeared in this critical -region. This shift in tactics in the spring of 1968 was made possible -by favorable weather, the buildup of troops, helicopters, and logistics -that had taken place during the winter of 1967-68. An additional factor -was the construction of a secure forward base across the mountains to -the east of Khe Sanh, from which these operations could be supported. -The Khe Sanh Combat Base then lost the importance it had earlier and -was dismantled after its supplies were drawn down, since it was no -longer needed. The strategy of containing the North Vietnamese Army -along the border remained the same; but revised tactics were now -possible. - -But in 1967 and early 1968, neither troops nor helicopters, logistics -nor the forward base were available to support the more aggressive -tactics. The enemy lunged into the area in force, and he had to be -stopped. The KSCB with its airstrip was the pivotal point in the area -from which Allied firepower could be directed and which the enemy could -not ignore. It was here that the 26th Marines made their stand. - -This study also provides insight into the mechanics of the battle from -the highest echelon of command to the smallest unit. In addition, -appropriate coverage is provided to the supporting arms and the mammoth -logistics effort which spelled the difference between victory and -defeat. While this is basically a story about Marines, it notes the -valiant contributions of U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, as -well as the South Vietnamese. - -The account is based on records of the U. S. Marine Corps, selected -records of other Services, and appropriate published works. The -comments of and interviews with key participants have been incorporated -into the text. Although this monograph has been cleared for publication -by the Department of Defense, most of the documents cited retain a -security classification. - -[Illustration: Handwritten signature] - - R. E. CUSHMAN, JR. - Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps - Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS - - - Prologue v - - Foreword vi - - Preface ix - - Introduction 1 - - Part I: Background 3 - - Part II: The Lull Between The Storms 18 - - Part III: The Buildup and The Opening Round 29 - - Part IV: The "So-Called" Siege Begins 53 - - Part V: The Airlift 72 - - Part VI: Supporting Arms and Intelligence 93 - - Part VII: The Turning Point 113 - - Part VIII: The Breakout 132 - - Part IX: Epilogue 145 - - - Appendices: - - A. Bibliographical Notes and Footnotes 152 - - B. Glossary 169 - - C. Chronology 180 - - D. Task Organization 187 - - E. Command and Staff List, 3d Marines 193 - - F. Command and Staff List, 26th Marines 196 - - G. Military Map Symbols 203 - - - - -=The Battle for Khe Sanh= - -by - -Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -"Attention to Colors." The order having been given, Captain William -H. Dabney, a product of the Virginia Military Institute, snapped to -attention, faced the jerry-rigged flag-pole, and saluted, as did every -other man in Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines. The ceremony might -well have been at any one of a hundred military installations around -the world except for a few glaring irregularities. The parade ground -was a battle-scarred hilltop to the west of Khe Sanh and the men in -the formation stood half submerged in trenches or foxholes. Instead of -crisply starched utilities, razor sharp creases, and gleaming brass, -these Marines sported scraggly beards, ragged trousers, and rotted -helmet liner straps. The only man in the company who could play a -bugle, Second Lieutenant Owen S. Matthews, lifted the pock-marked -instrument to his lips and spat out a choppy version of "To the Colors" -while two enlisted men raced to the RC-292 radio antenna which served -as the flag-pole and gingerly attached the Stars and Stripes. As the -mast with its shredded banner came upright, the Marines could hear the -ominous "thunk," "thunk," "thunk," to the southwest of their position -which meant that North Vietnamese 120mm mortar rounds had left their -tubes. They also knew that in 21 seconds those "thunks" would be -replaced by much louder, closer sounds but no one budged until Old -Glory waved high over the hill. - -When Lieutenant Matthews sharply cut off the last note of his piece, -Company I disappeared; men dropped into trenches, dived headlong into -foxholes, or scrambled into bunkers. The area which moments before had -been bristling with humanity was suddenly a ghost town. Seconds later -explosions walked across the hilltop spewing black smoke, dirt, and -debris into the air. Rocks, splinters, and spent shell fragments rained -on the flattened Marines but, as usual, no one was hurt. As quickly as -the attack came, it was over. While the smoke lazily drifted away, a -much smaller banner rose from the Marines' positions. A pole adorned -with a pair of red, silk panties--Maggie's Drawers--was waved back -and forth above one trenchline to inform the enemy that he had missed -again. A few men stood up and jeered or cursed at the distant gunners; -others simply saluted with an appropriate obscene gesture. The daily -flag-raising ceremony on Hill 881 South was over. - -This episode was just one obscure incident which coupled with hundreds -of others made up the battle for Khe Sanh. The ceremony carried with it -no particular political overtones but was intended solely as an open -show of defiance toward the Communists as well as a morale booster for -the troops. The jaunty courage, quiet determination, and macabre humor -of the men on Hill 881S exemplified the spirit of the U. S. and South -Vietnamese defenders who not only defied the enemy but, in a classic -77-day struggle, destroyed him. At the same time, the fighting around -the isolated combat base touched off a passionate controversy in the -United States and the battle, therefore, warrants close scrutiny. -For proper prospective, however, one first needs to have a basic -understanding of the series of events which thrust Khe Sanh into the -limelight. In effect, the destiny of the combatants was unknowingly -determined almost three years earlier at a place called Red Beach near -Da Nang. - - - - -PART I - -BACKGROUND - - -When the lead elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, -commanded by Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, slogged ashore at -Da Nang on 8 March 1965, Communist political and military aspirations -in South Vietnam received a severe jolt. The buildup of organized -American combat units had begun. In May 1965, the 9th MEB was succeeded -by the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) which was comprised of -the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and, within a -year, the 1st Marine Division. The Commanding General, III MAF was -given responsibility for U. S. operations in I Corps Tactical Zone -which incorporated the five northern provinces and, on 5 June 1965, -Major General Lewis W. Walt assumed that role. (See Map 1). Major units -of the U. S. Army moved into other portions of South Vietnam and the -entire American effort came under the control of the Commander, U. S. -Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (ComUSMACV), General William C. -Westmoreland.(1) - -[Illustration: - - MAP 1 K. W. White - -I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE] - -The Marines, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam -(ARVN), set about to wrest control of the populace in I Corps from the -Viet Cong and help reassert the authority of the central government. -The Allies launched an aggressive campaign designed to root out the -enemy's source of strength--the local guerrilla. Allied battalion- and -regimental-sized units screened this effort by seeking out and engaging -Viet Cong main forces and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) elements. Smaller -Marine and ARVN units went after the isolated guerrilla bands which -preyed on the Vietnamese peasants. Thousands of fire team-, squad-, and -platoon-sized actions took a heavy toll of the enemy and the Viet Cong -were gradually pushed out of the populated areas. Whenever a village -or hamlet was secured, civic action teams moved in to fill the vacuum -and began the long, tedious process of erasing the effects of prolonged -Communist domination. Progress was slow. Within a year, however, the -area under Government security had grown to more than 1,600 square -miles and encompassed nearly half a million people. As government -influence extended deeper into the countryside, the security, health, -economic well-being, and educational prospects of the peasants were -constantly improved. There was an ever increasing number of enemy -defectors and intelligence reports from, heretofore, unsympathetic -villagers. By mid-1966, Allied military operations and pacification -programs were slowly but seriously eroding the enemy's elaborate -infrastructure and his hold over the people.(2) - -It soon became apparent to the leaders in the North that, unless they -took some bold action, ten years of preparation and their master -plan for conquest of South Vietnam would go down the drain. From -the Communists' standpoint, the crucial matter was not the volume -of casualties they sustained, but the survival of the guerrilla -infrastructure in South Vietnam. In spite of their disregard for -human life, the North Vietnamese did not wish to counter the American -military steamroller in the populated coastal plain of I Corps. There, -the relatively open terrain favored the overwhelming power of the -Marines' supporting arms. The enemy troops would have extended supply -lines, their movement could be more easily detected, and they would be -further away from sanctuaries in Laos and North Vietnam. In addition, -when the propaganda-conscious NVA suffered a defeat, it would be -witnessed by the local populace and thus shatter the myth of Communist -invincibility. - -If the Marines could not be smashed, and the Communists had tried -several times, they had to be diverted or thinned out. The answer to -the enemy's dilemma lay along the 17th Parallel. Gradually, they massed -large troop concentrations within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), in -Laos, and in the southern pan-handle of North Vietnam; in short, they -were opening a new front. Nguyen Van Mai, a high Communist official in -Phnom Penh, Cambodia, predicted: "We will entice the Americans closer -to the North Vietnamese border and ... bleed them without mercy." That -remained to be seen.(3) - -In response to the enemy buildup along the DMZ throughout the summer -and fall of 1966, General Walt shifted Marine units further north. -The 3d Marine Division Headquarters moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai, -and a Division Forward Command Post (CP) continued to Dong Ha so -that it could respond rapidly to developments along the DMZ. In turn -the 1st Marine Division Headquarters moved from Chu Lai to Da Nang -and took control of operations in central and southern I Corps. For -specific, short-term operations, the division commanders frequently -delegated authority to a task force headquarters. The task force was -a semipermanent organization composed of temporarily assigned units -under one commander, usually a general officer. Because of the fluid, -fast-moving type of warfare peculiar to Vietnam, the individual -battalion became a key element and went where it was needed the most. -It might operate under a task force headquarters or a regiment other -than its own parent unit. For example, it would not be uncommon for the -2d Battalion, 9th Marines to be attached to the 3d Marines while the 2d -Battalion, 3d Marines was a part of another command. Commitments were -met with units that were the most readily available at the time.(4) - -With the buildup of American troops in Quang Tri province, there -logically followed the buildup of installations. Dong Ha was the -largest since it served as the brain and nervous system of the entire -area. Eight miles to the southwest was Camp J. J. Carroll, a large -artillery base. The Marine units there were reinforced by several -batteries of U. S. Army 175mm guns which had the capability of firing -into North Vietnam. Located at the base of a jagged mountain ten -miles west of Camp Carroll was another artillery base--the Rockpile. -This facility also had 175mm guns and extended the range of American -artillery support almost to the Laotian border. In addition, the -Marines built a series of strongpoints paralleling and just south of -the DMZ. Gio Linh and Con Thien were the two largest sites. (See Map 2). - -During the remainder of 1966 and in the first quarter of 1967, the -intensity of fighting in the eastern DMZ area increased. Each time the -enemy troops made a foray across the DMZ, the Marines met and defeated -them. By 31 March 1967, the NVA had lost 3,492 confirmed killed in -action (KIA) in the northern operations while the Marines had suffered -541 killed. For the Communists, it appeared that direct assaults across -the DMZ were proving too costly--even by their standards.(5) - -[Illustration: - - MAP 2 E.L. WILSON - -NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE] - -The Khe Sanh Plateau, in western Quang Tri Province, provided the -NVA with an excellent alternative. The late Doctor Bernard B. Fall -compared the whole of Vietnam to "two rice baskets on opposite ends -of a carrying pole." Such being the case, Khe Sanh is located at the -pole's fulcrum in the heart of the rugged Annamite Range. Studded with -piedmont-type hills, this area provides a natural infiltration route. -Most of the mountain trails are hidden by tree canopies up to 60 feet -in height, dense elephant grass, and bamboo thickets. Concealment from -reconnaissance aircraft is good, and the heavy jungle under-growth -limits ground observation to five meters in most places. Dong Tri -Mountain (1,015 meters high), the highest peak in the region, along -with Hill 861 and Hills 881 North and South dominate the two main -avenues of approach.[1] One of these, the western access, runs along -Route 9 from the Laotian border, through the village of Lang Vei to Khe -Sanh. The other is a small valley to the northwest, formed by the Rao -Quan River, which runs between Dong Tri Mountain and Hill 861. (See Map -3). Another key terrain feature is Hill 558 which is located squarely -in the center of the northwestern approach. The only stumbling block -to the NVA in early 1967 was a handful of Marines, U. S. Army Special -Forces advisors, and South Vietnamese irregulars.(6) (See Map 3). - -The "Green Berets" were the first American troops in the area when, -in August 1962, they established a Civilian Irregular Defense Group -(CIDG) at the same site which later became the Khe Sanh Combat Base -(KSCB). The first Marine unit of any size to visit the area was the 1st -Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) which, in April 1966, was participating -in Operation VIRGINIA. In early October 1966, the 1st Battalion, 3d -Marines, which was taking part in Operation PRAIRIE, moved into the -base and the CIDG camp was relocated near Lang Vei, 9,000 meters to -the southwest where it continued surveillance and counterinfiltration -operations. The battalion remained at Khe Sanh with no significant -contacts until February 1967 when it was replaced by a single company, -E/2/9.[2] In mid-March 1967, Company E became engaged in a heavy -action near Hill 861 and Company B, 1/9 moved in to reinforce. After a -successful conclusion of the operation, E/2/9 returned to Phu Bai, and -B/1/9 remained as the resident defense company. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 3 K.W. White - -KHE SANH VALLEY] - -The KSCB sat atop a plateau in the shadow of Dong Tri Mountain -and overlooked a tributary of the Quang Tri River. The base had a -small dirt airstrip, which had been surfaced by a U. S. Navy Mobile -Construction Battalion (Seabees) in the summer of 1966; the field could -accommodate helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft. Organic -artillery support was provided by Battery F, 2/12 (105mm), reinforced -by two 155mm howitzers and two 4.2-inch mortars. The Khe Sanh area -of operations was also within range of the 175mm guns of the U. S. -Army's 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery at Camp Carroll and the Rockpile. -In addition to B/1/9 and the CIDG, there was a Marine Combined Action -Company (CAC) and a Regional Forces company located in the village of -Khe Sanh, approximately 3,500 meters south of the base.[3] - -All these units sat astride the northwest-southeast axis of Route 9 -and had the mission of denying the NVA a year-round route into eastern -Quang Tri Province. The garrison at Khe Sanh and the adjacent outposts -commanded the approaches from the west which led to Dong Ha and Quang -Tri City. Had this strategic plateau not been in the hands of the -Americans, the North Vietnamese would have had an unobstructed invasion -route into the two northern provinces and could have outflanked the -Allied forces holding the line south of the DMZ. At that time, the -Americans did not possess the helicopter resources, troop strength, or -logistical bases in this northern area to adopt a completely mobile -type of defense. Therefore, the troops at the KSCB maintained a -relatively static defense with emphasis on patrolling, artillery and -air interdiction, and occasional reconnaissance in force operations to -stifle infiltration through the Khe Sanh Plateau. In the event a major -enemy threat developed, General Walt could rapidly reinforce the combat -base by air.(7) - -On 20 April 1967, the combat assets at KSCB were passed to the -operational control of the 3d Marines which had just commenced -Operation PRAIRIE IV. The Khe Sanh area of operations was not included -as a part of PRAIRIE IV but was the responsibility of the 3d Marines -since that regiment was in the best position to oversee the base and -reinforce if the need arose. The need arose very soon.(8) - -On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Company B, 1/9 became heavily engaged -with an enemy force of unknown size north of Hill 861 and in the -process prematurely triggered an elaborate North Vietnamese offensive -designed to overrun Khe Sanh. What later became known as the "Hill -Fights" had begun. In retrospect, it appears that the drive toward -Khe Sanh was but one prong of the enemy's winter-spring offensive, -the ultimate objective of which was the capture of Dong Ha, Quang -Tri City, and eventually, Hue-Phu Bai.[4] That portion of the enemy -plan which pertained to Khe Sanh involved the isolation of the base -by artillery attacks on the Marine fire support bases in the eastern -DMZ area (e.g., Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Gio Linh, etc.). These -were closely coordinated with attacks by fire on the logistical and -helicopter installations at Dong Ha and Phu Bai. Demolition teams cut -Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Cam Lo to prevent overland reinforcement -and, later, a secondary attack was launched against the camp at Lang -Vei, which was manned by Vietnamese CIDG personnel and U. S. Army -Special Forces advisors. Under cover of heavy fog and low overcast -which shrouded Khe Sanh for several weeks, the North Vietnamese moved -a regiment into the Hill 881/861 complex and constructed a maze of -heavily reinforced bunkers and gun positions from which they intended -to provide direct fire against the KSCB in support of their assault -troops. All of these efforts were ancillary to the main thrust--a -regimental-sized ground attack--from the =325C NVA Division= which -would sweep in from the west and seize the airfield.[5](9) (See Map 4). - -The job of stopping the NVA was given to Colonel John P. Lanigan and -his 3d Marines. Although he probably did not know it when he arrived -at Khe Sanh, this assignment would not be unlike one which 22 years -before had earned him a Silver Star on Okinawa. Both involved pushing a -fanatical enemy force off a hill. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 4 K.W. White - -THE ENEMY PLAN] - -On 25 April, the lead elements of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, -commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilder, arrived at Khe Sanh. The -following day, 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. De Long, -which was taking part in Operation BEACON STAR east of Quang Tri City -was airlifted to the combat base. On the 27th, a fresh artillery -battery, B/1/12, arrived and reinforced F/2/12; by the end of the day, -the two units had been reorganized into an artillery group with one -battery in direct support of each battalion.(10) - -Late in the afternoon of the 28th, the Marine infantrymen were ready to -drive the enemy from the hill masses. These hills formed a near-perfect -right triangle with Hill 881 North (N) at the apex and the other two -at the base. Hill 861 was the closest to the combat base, some 5,000 -meters northwest of the airstrip. Hill 881 South (S) was approximately -3,000 meters west of 861 and 2,000 meters south of 881N. - -The concept of operations entailed a two-battalion (2/3 and 3/3) -assault for which Hill 861 was designated Objective 1; Hill 881S was -Objective 2 and Hill 881N was Objective 3. From its position south of -Hill 861, 2/3 would assault and seize Objective 1 on 28 April. The 3d -Battalion would follow in trace of 2/3 and, after the first objective -was taken, 3/3 would wheel to the west, secure the terrain between -Hills 861 and 881S, then assault Objective 2 from a northeasterly -direction. Coordinated with the 3/3 attack, 2/3 would consolidate its -objective then move out toward Hill 881N to screen the right flank of -the 3d Battalion and reinforce if necessary. When Objectives 1 and 2 -were secured, 3/3 would move to the northwest and support 2/3 while it -assaulted Objective 3. (See Map 5). - -[Illustration: - - MAP 5 K.W. White - -CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DURING HILL FIGHTS] - -[Illustration: Marines of Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines inch -their way toward the summit of Hill 881N during the Hill fights. (USMC -Photo A189161)] - -[Illustration: Close air support strikes of the 1st Marine Aircraft -Wing and massive artillery fires paved the way for infantry assaults. -(USMC Photo A421953)] - -After extremely heavy preparatory artillery fires and massive air -strikes, the 3d Marines kicked off the attack. On the 28th, 2/3 -assaulted and seized Hill 861 in the face of sporadic resistance. Most -of the enemy troops had been literally blown from their positions by -heavy close air support strikes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The -operation continued with a thrust against Hill 881S by 3/3. This area -was the scene of extremely bitter fighting for several days, because, -by this time, the NVA regiment which was originally slated for the -attack on the airfield had been thrown into the hill battles in a vain -effort to stop the Marines. After tons of artillery shells and aerial -bombs had been employed against the hill, Lieutenant Colonel Wilder's -battalion bulled its way to the summit and, on 2 May, secured the -objective. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel De Long's battalion -pushed along the ridgeline leading from Hill 861 to 881N. After -smashing a determined NVA counterattack on 3 May, the 2d Battalion -battered its way to the crest of Hill 881N and secured the final -objective on the afternoon of the 5th. The three hills belonged to the -Marines.(11) - -The supporting arms had done a good job, for the top of each hill -looked like the surface of the moon. The color of the summit had -changed from a vivid green to a dull, ugly brown. All of the lush -vegetation had been blasted away, leaving in its place a mass of -churned-up dirt and splintered trees. Hundreds of craters dotted the -landscape serving as mute witnesses to the terrible pounding that -the enemy had taken. What the NVA learned during the operation was -something the Marine Corps had espoused for years--that bombs and -shells were cheaper than blood. - -Thus, the "Hill Fights" ended and the first major attempt by the NVA -to take Khe Sanh was thwarted. All intelligence reports indicated -that the badly mauled =325C NVA Division= had pulled back to lick its -wounds, ending the immediate threat in western Quang Tri Province. With -the pressure relieved for the time being, General Walt began scaling -down his forces at Khe Sanh, because the next phase of the enemy's -winter/spring offensive involved a drive through the coastal plain -toward Dong Ha. - -From 11-13 May, 1/26 moved into the combat base and the adjacent hills -to relieve the 3d Marines. By the evening of the 12th, 2/3 had been -airlifted to Dong Ha and one artillery battery, B/1/12, was pulled -out by convoy. The following day, 3/3 also returned to Dong Ha by -truck. In the meantime, Company A, 1/26, was helilifted to Hill 881S -while Company C took up positions on Hill 861. Company B, 1/26, and -a skeleton headquarters of the 26th Marines arrived and remained at -the base, as did a fresh artillery battery, A/1/13. At 1500 on 13 -May, Colonel John J. Padley, Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines, -Forward, relieved Colonel Lanigan as the Senior Officer Present at Khe -Sanh.(12) - -In his analysis of the operation, Colonel Lanigan reported that his -men had been engaged in a conventional infantry battle against a -well-trained, highly-disciplined, and well-entrenched enemy force. -In the past, the NVA had used phantom tactics when engaging U. S. -forces--not so at Khe Sanh. The maze of bunker complexes served as a -grim reminder of their determination to stay and fight. They openly -challenged the Americans to push them off the hills, and the 3d Marines -rose to the occasion. The fierce resistance was overcome by aggressive -infantry assaults in coordination with artillery and close air -support, which according to Colonel Lanigan was the most accurate and -devastating he had witnessed in three wars. - -The Communists had anticipated a blood letting and they received -one. From 24 April through 12 May 1967, the NVA lost 940 confirmed -killed.[6] Even for the North Vietnamese, this was a massive defeat -which could not be easily absorbed. But the leaders in Hanoi were -committed to a course of action which traded human lives for strategic -expediency. Just like the monsoon rains, the enemy would come again.(13) - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] The number indicates the height of the hill in meters. - -[2] The designation E/2/9 stands for Company E, 2d Battalion, 9th -Marines. This type of designation will be used periodically for other -Marine units throughout the text. - -[3] The Combined Action Program was designed to increase the ability -of the local Vietnamese militia units to defend their own villages. -These units, referred to as Popular Forces, were reinforced by groups -of Marines who lived, worked, and conducted operations with their -Vietnamese counterparts. A Combined Action Company was an organization -controlling several Marine squads which served with different Combined -Action Platoons. Combined Action Company Oscar (CACO) was the unit -operating in the Khe Sanh area. A Regional Forces company was comprised -of local South Vietnamese soldiers along with their American and ARVN -advisors who were under the operational control of the Vietnamese -Province Chief. - -[4] The III MAF and enemy operations during the period of the NVA/VC -winter-spring offensive (1966-1967) will be the subject of a separate -monograph prepared by the Historical Branch. - -[5] The diversionary attacks were all launched apparently on schedule. -On 27 and 28 April, the previously mentioned Marine fire support and -supply bases were hit by some 1,200 rocket, artillery, and mortar -rounds. Route 9 was cut in several places. The Special Forces Camp -at Lang Vei was attacked and severely mauled on 4 May. Only the main -effort was detected and subsequently thwarted. - -[6] Marine losses were 155 killed and 425 wounded. - - - - -PART II - -THE LULL BETWEEN THE STORMS - - -With the departure of the 3d Marines, a relative calm prevailed at Khe -Sanh for the remainder of the year. Although occasional encounters and -sightings indicated that the Communists still had an interest in the -area, there was a marked decrease in large unit contacts and the tempo -of operations slackened to a preinvasion pace. Such was not the case in -other portions of Quang Tri Province. - -During the summer and fall of 1967, the center of activity shifted -to the eastern DMZ area. After being battered and thrown for a loss -on their end sweep, the Communists concentrated on the middle of the -line again. With an estimated 37 battalions poised along the border, -the NVA constituted a genuine threat to the northernmost province. At -times as many as eight Marine battalions were shuttled into the area -for short-term operations and three or four were there full time, but -the enemy's intensified campaign created a demand for more troops. -As a result, General Westmoreland was forced to make major force -realignments throughout South Vietnam to satisfy the troop requirements -in I Corps.(14) - -General Westmoreland drew the bulk of these reinforcements from areas -in Vietnam which, at the time, were under less pressure than the five -northern provinces. During April and May 1967, Task Force OREGON, -comprised of nine U. S. Army battalions from II and III Corps, moved -into the Chu Lai-Duc Pho region and was placed under the operational -control of General Walt. By the end of May, five battalions of the 5th -and 7th Marines at Chu Lai had been released for service further north. -Two of these units moved into the Nui Loc Son Basin northwest of Tam -Ky to conduct offensive operations and support the sagging Vietnamese -Revolutionary Development efforts. The other three settled in the Da -Nang tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) and in turn released two -Marine battalions, 1/1 and 2/1, which moved to Thua Thien and Quang Tri -provinces. - -In addition to his in-country assets, General Westmoreland also -called on Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific, for -reinforcements. Besides the two Special Landing Forces afloat with the -U. S. Seventh Fleet, the Pacific Command maintained a Marine Battalion -Landing Team (BLT 3/4) as an amphibious reserve on Okinawa.[7](15) -Actually, this unit was part of the BLT rotation system whereby -battalions were periodically shuttled out of Vietnam for retraining and -refurbishing in Okinawa before assignment to the SLF. ComUSMACV needed -the unit and got it. On 15 May, 3/4 began an airlift from Okinawa to -Dong Ha by Air Force and Marine C-130 aircraft and within 31 hours the -1,233-man force was in-country. After the realignment of units in I -Corps was complete, there was a net increase of four USMC battalions in -the DMZ area making a total of seven. Additionally, the SLFs, cruising -off the Vietnamese coast, provided two more battalions which could be -landed quickly and added to the III MAF inventory. SLF Alpha (BLT 1/3 -and HMM-362) was placed on 24-hour alert to come ashore and SLF Bravo -(BLT 2/3 and HMM-164) was given a 96-hour reaction time.(16) - -During the second half of 1967, the enemy offensive south of the DMZ -was a bloody repetition of the previous year's effort. With more -courage than good sense, the NVA streamed across the DMZ throughout the -summer only to be met and systematically chewed up in one engagement -after another. In July, the enemy, supported by his long-range -artillery along the Ben Hai, mounted a major thrust against the 9th -Marines near the strongpoint of Con Thien. Reinforced by SLFs Alpha and -Bravo, the 9th Marines countered with Operation BUFFALO and, between -the 2d and 14th of July, killed 1,290 NVA. Marine losses were 159 dead -and 345 wounded.(17) - -[Illustration: Action near the DMZ was characterized by hard fighting -in rugged terrain. A Marine of 3/4 moves forward during Operation -PRAIRIE. (USMC Photo A187904)] - -[Illustration: Marine Battalion Landing Teams aboard U. S. Seventh -Fleet shipping augmented III MAF forces. USS =Iwo Jima= stands off -South Vietnamese coast. (USMC Photo A650016)] - -After this crushing defeat, the NVA shifted its emphasis from direct -infantry assaults to attacks by fire. Utilizing long-range rockets and -artillery pieces tucked away in caves and treelines along the DMZ, the -enemy regularly shelled Marine fire support and logistical bases from -Cam Lo to Cua Viet. One of the most destructive attacks was against -Dong Ha where, on 3 September, 41 enemy artillery rounds hit the base -and touched off a series of spectacular explosions which lasted for -over four hours. Several helicopters were damaged but, more important, -a fuel farm and a huge stockpile of ammunition went up in smoke. -Thousands of gallons of fuel and tons of ammunition were destroyed. The -enormous column of smoke from the exploding dumps rose above 12,000 -feet and was visible as far south as Hue-Phu Bai.(18) - -The preponderance of enemy fire, however, was directed against Con -Thien. That small strongpoint, never garrisoned by more than a -reinforced battalion, was situated atop Hill 158, 10 miles northwest -of Dong Ha and, from their small perch, the Marines had a commanding -view of any activity in the area. In addition, from one to three -battalions were always in the immediate vicinity and deployed so that -they could outflank any major enemy force which tried to attack the -strongpoint. Con Thien also anchored the western end of "the barrier," -a 600-meter-wide trace which extended eastward some eight miles to Gio -Linh. This strip was part of an anti-infiltration system and had been -bulldozed flat to aid in visual detection.[8](19) - -Because of its strategic importance, Con Thien became the scene of -heavy fighting. The base itself was subjected to several ground -attacks, plus an almost incessant artillery bombardment which, at its -peak, reached 1,233 rounds in one 24-hour period. Most of the NVA and -Marine casualties, however, were sustained by maneuver elements in -the surrounding area. Operation KINGFISHER, which succeeded BUFFALO, -continued around Con Thien and by 31 October, when it was superseded by -two new operations, had accounted for 1,117 enemy dead. Marine losses -were 340 killed.[9](20) - -While heavy fighting raged elsewhere, action around Khe Sanh continued -to be light and sporadic. Immediately after its arrival on 13 May, -Colonel Padley's undermanned 26th Marines commenced Operation -CROCKETT.[10](21) The mission was to occupy key terrain, deny the enemy -access into vital areas, conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations to -destroy any elements within the TAOR, and provide security for the base -and adjacent outposts. Colonel Padley was to support the Vietnamese -irregular forces with his organic artillery as well as coordinate -the efforts of the American advisors to those units. He also had the -responsibility of maintaining small reconnaissance teams for long-range -surveillance.(22) - -To accomplish his mission, the colonel had one infantry battalion, -1/26, a skeleton headquarters, and an artillery group under the control -of 1/13. The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant -Colonel James B. Wilkinson, maintained one rifle company on Hill -881S and one on 861; a security detachment on Hill 950 to protect -a communication relay site; a rifle company and the Headquarters -and Service Company (H&S Co) for base security; and one company in -reserve. The units on the hill outposts patrolled continuously within -a 4,000-meter radius of their positions. Reconnaissance teams were -inserted further out, primarily to the north and northwest. Whenever -evidence revealed enemy activity in an area, company-sized search and -destroy sweeps were conducted. Although intelligence reports indicated -that the three regiments of the =325C NVA Division= (i.e. =95C=, -=101D=, and =29th=) were still in the Khe Sanh TAOR, there were few -contacts during the opening weeks of the operation.(23) - -Toward the end of May and throughout June, however, activity picked -up. On 21 May, elements of Company A, 1/26, clashed sharply with -a reinforced enemy company; 25 NVA and 2 Marines were killed. The -same day, the Lang Vei CIDG camp was attacked by an enemy platoon. -On 6 June, the radio relay site on Hill 950 was hit by an NVA force -of unknown size and the combat base was mortared. The following -morning a patrol from Company B, 1/26, engaged another enemy company -approximately 2,000 meters northwest of Hill 881S. A platoon from -Company A was helilifted to the scene and the two Marine units killed -66 NVA while losing 18 men. Due to the increasing number of contacts, -the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kurt -L. Hoch, was transferred to the operational control of its parent unit -and arrived at Khe Sanh on 13 June. Two weeks later, the newly arrived -unit got a crack at the NVA when Companies I and L engaged two enemy -companies 5,000 meters southwest of the base and, along with air and -artillery, killed 35.(24) - -Operation CROCKETT continued as a two-battalion effort until 16 July -when it terminated. The cumulative casualty figures were 204 enemy KIA -(confirmed), 52 Marines KIA, and 255 Marines wounded. The following -day, operations continued under a new name--ARDMORE. The name was -changed; the mission, the units, and the TAOR remained basically -the same. But again the fighting tapered off. Except for occasional -contacts by reconnaissance teams and patrols, July and August were -quiet.(25) - -On 12 August, Colonel David E. Lownds relieved Colonel Padley as the -commanding officer of the 26th Marines. At this time the 3d Marine -Division was deployed from the area north of Da Nang to the DMZ and -from the South China Sea to the Laotian border. In order to maintain -the initiative, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who had -relieved General Walt as CG, III MAF in June, drew down on certain -units to provide sufficient infantry strength for other operations. -Except for several small engagements Khe Sanh had remained relatively -quiet; therefore, on the day after Colonel Lownds assumed command, the -regiment was whittled down by two companies when K and L, 3/26, were -transferred to the 9th Marines for Operation KINGFISHER. Three weeks -later, the rest of 3/26 was also withdrawn and, as far as Marine units -were concerned, Colonel Lownds found himself "not so much a regimental -commander as the supervisor of a battalion commander." The colonel, -however, was still responsible for coordinating the efforts of all the -other Allied units (CACO, CIDG, RF, etc) in the Khe Sanh TAOR.(26) - -[Illustration: Colonel John J. Padley turns over the colors and the -26th Marines to Colonel David E. Lownds on 12 August 1967. (Photo -courtesy Colonel David E. Lownds)] - -As Operation ARDMORE dragged on, the Marines at Khe Sanh concentrated -on improving the combat base. The men were kept busy constructing -bunkers and trenches both inside the perimeter and on the hill -outposts. On the hills, this proved to be no small task as was pointed -out by the 1/26 battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson: - - The monsoon rains had little effect on 881, but when the first - torrential rains of the season hit 861 the results were disastrous. - The trenchline which encircled the hill washed away completely on - one side of the position and caved in on another side. Some bunkers - collapsed while others were so weakened they had to be completely - rebuilt. Because of the poor soil and the steepness of the terrain, - the new bunkers were built almost completely above ground. To - provide drainage, twenty-seven 55 gallon steel drums, with the tops - and bottoms removed, were installed in the sides of the trenches - around 861 so water would not stand in the trenches. (Culvert - material was not available.) All bunker materials, as well as other - supplies, were delivered to the hills by helicopter. Attempts were - made to obtain logs for fighting positions and bunkers in the - canopied jungle flanking the hills. This idea was not successful. - The trees close to 881 and 861 were so filled with shrapnel from - the battles the previous spring that the engineers did not want to - ruin their chain saws on the metal.... In spite of the shortages, - Marines of 1/26 worked extremely hard until every Marine on 881(S) - and 861 had overhead cover.(27) - -Another bit of foresight which was to prove a God-send in the -succeeding months was the decision by higher headquarters to improve -the airstrip. The original runway had been a dirt strip on top of which -the U. S. Navy Seabees had laid aluminum matting. The 3,900-foot strip, -however, did not have a rock base and as a result of the heavy monsoon -rains, mud formed under the matting causing it to buckle in several -places. Upon direction, Colonel Lownds closed the field on 17 August. -His men located a hill 1,500 meters southwest of the perimeter which -served as a quarry. Three 15-ton rock crushers, along with other heavy -equipment, were hauled in and the Marine and Seabee working parties -started the repairs. During September and October, U. S. Air Force -C-130s of the 315th Air Division (under the operational control of -the 834th Air Division) delivered 2,350 tons of matting, asphalt, and -other construction material to the base by paradrops and a special -low-altitude extraction system. (See page 76) While the field was shut -down, resupply missions were handled by helicopters and C-7 "Caribou" -which could land on short segments of the strip. Work continued until -27 October when the field was reopened to C-123 aircraft and later, to -C-130s.(28) - -On 31 October, Operation ARDMORE came to an uneventful conclusion. The -absence of any major engagements was mirrored in the casualty figures -which showed that in three and a half months, 113 NVA and 10 Marines -were killed. The next day, 1 November, the 26th Marines commenced -another operation, new in name only--SCOTLAND I. Again the mission and -units remained the same, and while the area of operations was altered -slightly, SCOTLAND I was basically just an extension of ARDMORE.(29) - -One incident in November which was to have a tremendous effect on the -future of the combat base was the arrival of Major General Rathvon -McC. Tompkins at Phu Bai as the new Commanding General, 3d Marine -Division. General Tompkins took over from Brigadier General Louis -Metzger who had been serving as the Acting Division Commander following -the death of Major General Bruno Hochmuth in a helicopter crash on 14 -November. In addition to being an extremely able commander, General -Tompkins possessed a peppery yet gentlemanly quality which, in the -gloom that later shrouded Khe Sanh, often lifted the spirits of his -subordinates. His numerous inspection trips, even to the most isolated -units, provided the division commander with a first-hand knowledge of -the tactical situation in northern I Corps which would never have been -gained by simply sitting behind a desk. When the heavy fighting broke -out at Khe Sanh, the general visited the combat base almost daily. Few -people were to influence the coming battle more than General Tompkins -or have as many close calls.(30) - -During December, there was another surge of enemy activity. -Reconnaissance teams reported large groups of NVA moving into the area -and, this time, they were not passing through; they were staying. -There was an increased number of contacts between Marine patrols and -enemy units. The companies on Hills 881S and 861 began receiving more -and more sniper fire. Not only the hill outposts, but the combat base -itself, received numerous probes along the perimeter. In some cases, -the defensive wire was cut and replaced in such a manner that the break -was hard to detect. The situation warranted action, and again General -Cushman directed 3/26 to rejoin the regiment. On 13 December, the -3d Battalion, under its new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. -Alderman (who assumed command 21 August), was airlifted back to Khe -Sanh and the 26th Marines.(31) - -On the 21st, the newly-arrived Marines saddled up and took to the -field. This was the first time that Colonel Lownds had been able to -commit a battalion-sized force since 3/26 had left Khe Sanh in August. -Lieutenant Colonel Alderman's unit was helilifted to 881S where it -conducted a sweep toward Hill 918, some 5,100 meters to the west, -and then returned to the combat base by the way of Hill 689. The 3d -Battalion made no contact with the enemy during the five-day operation -but the effort proved to be extremely valuable. First of all, the men -of 3/26 became familiar with the terrain to the west and south of -Hill 881S--a position which was later occupied by elements of the 3d -Battalion. The Marines located the best avenues of approach to the -hill, as well as probable sites for the enemy's supporting weapons. -Secondly, and most important, the unit turned up evidence (fresh -foxholes, well-used trails, caches, etc.) which indicated that the NVA -was moving into the area in force. These signs further strengthened the -battalion and regimental commanders' belief that "things were picking -up," and the confrontation which many predicted would come was not far -off. Captain Richard D. Camp, the company commander of L/3/26 put it a -little more bluntly: "I can smell ... _[_enemy_]_."(32) - -[Illustration: General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the -Marine Corps, talks with his son, First Lieutenant Walton F. Chapman, -during the General's visit to Khe Sanh in January 1968. Lieutenant -Chapman served with the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines and spent a good -portion of the siege on Hill 950. (USMC Photo A190283)] - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[7] The two Special Landing Forces of the Seventh Fleet are each -comprised of a Marine Battalion Landing Team and a Marine helicopter -squadron, and provide ComUSMACV/CG, III MAF with a highly-flexible, -amphibious striking force for operations along the South Vietnam -littoral. During the amphibious operation, operational control of the -SLF remains with the Amphibious Task Force Commander designated by -Commander, Seventh Fleet. This relationship may persist throughout -the operation if coordination with forces ashore does not dictate -otherwise. When the Special Landing Force is firmly established ashore, -operational control may be passed to CG, III MAF who, in turn, may -shift this control to the division in whose area the SLF is operating. -Under such circumstances, operational control of the helicopter -squadron is passed by CG III MAF to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. - -[8] The system was an anti-infiltration barrier just south of the DMZ. -Obstacles were used to channelize the enemy. Strongpoints, such as Con -Thien, served as patrol bases and fire support bases. - -[9] In addition to the action near the DMZ, there was one other area -in I Corps that was a hub of activity. The Nui Loc Son Basin, a rice -rich coastal plain between Hoi An and Tam Ky, was the operating area of -the =2d NVA Division=. Between April and October 1967, Marine, U. S. -Army, and ARVN troops conducted 13 major operations (including 3 SLF -landings) in this region and killed 5,395 enemy soldiers. By the end of -the year, the =2d NVA Division= was temporarily rendered useless as a -fighting unit. - -[10] The official designation of the unit at Khe Sanh was Regimental -Landing Team 26 (Forward) which consisted of one battalion and a -lightly staffed headquarters. The other two battalions were in-country -but under the operational control of other units. The rest of the -headquarters, RLT-26 (Rear), remained at Camp Schwab, Okinawa as a -pipeline for replacements. RLT-26 (Forward) was under the operational -control of the 3d MarDiv and the administrative control of the 9th -MAB. Any further mention of the 26th Marines will refer only to RLT-26 -(Forward). - - - - -PART III - -THE BUILDUP AND THE OPENING ROUND - - -With the beginning of the new year, Khe Sanh again became the focal -point of enemy activity in I Corps. All evidence pointed to a North -Vietnamese offensive similar to the one in 1967, only on a much larger -scale. From various intelligence sources, the III MAF, 3d Marine -Division, and 26th Marines Headquarters learned that NVA units, which -usually came down the "Santa Fe Trail" and skirted the combat base -outside of artillery range, were moving into the Khe Sanh area and -staying.[11](33) At first, the reports showed the influx of individual -regiments, then a division headquarters; finally a front headquarters -was established indicating that at least two NVA divisions were in the -vicinity. In fact, the =325C NVA Division= had moved back into the -region north of Hill 881N while a newcomer to the area, the =304th -NVA Division=, had crossed over from Laos and established positions -southwest of the base. The =304th= was an elite home guard division -from Hanoi which had been a participant at Dien Bien Phu.[12](34) The -entire force included six infantry regiments, two artillery regiments, -an unknown number of tanks, plus miscellaneous support and service -units. Gradually, the enemy shifted his emphasis from reconnaissance -and harassment to actual probes and began exerting more and more -pressure on Allied outposts and patrols. One incident which reinforced -the belief that something big was in the wind occurred on 2 January -near a Marine listening post just outside the main perimeter.(35) - -The post was located approximately 400 meters from the western end of -the airstrip and north of where the Company L, 3/26 lines tied in with -those of 1/26. At 2030, a sentry dog was alerted by movement outside -the perimeter and a few minutes later the Marines manning the post -reported that six unidentified persons were approaching the defensive -wire. Oddly enough, the nocturnal visitors were not crawling or -attempting to hide their presence; they were walking around as if they -owned the place. A squad from L/3/26, headed by Second Lieutenant Nile -B. Buffington, was dispatched to investigate. Earlier in the day the -squad had rehearsed the proper procedure for relieving the listening -post and had received a briefing on fire discipline. The training was -shortly put to good use. - -Lieutenant Buffington saw that the six men were dressed like Marines -and, while no friendly patrols were reported in the area, he challenged -the strangers in clear English to be sure. There was no reply. A second -challenge was issued and, this time, the lieutenant saw one of the -men make a motion as if going for a hand grenade. The Marines opened -fire and quickly cut down five of the six intruders. One enemy soldier -died with his finger inserted in the pin of a grenade. The awesome -hitting power of the M-16 rifle was quite evident since all five men -were apparently dead by the time they hit the ground. The lone survivor -was wounded but managed to escape after retrieving some papers from a -mapcase which was on one of the bodies. Using a sentry dog, the Marines -followed a trail of blood to the southwest but gave up the hunt in the -darkness. The direction the enemy soldier was heading led the Marines -to believe that his unit was located beyond the rock quarry. - -The importance of the contact was not realized until later when -intelligence personnel discovered that all five of the enemy dead were -officers including an NVA regimental commander, operations officer, and -communications officer. The fact that the North Vietnamese would commit -such key men to a highly dangerous, personal reconnaissance indicated -that Khe Sanh was back at the top of the Communists' priority list.(36) - -This series of events did not go unnoticed at higher headquarters. -General Cushman saw that Colonel Lownds had more on his hands -than could be handled by two battalions and directed that 2/26 be -transferred to the operational control of its parent unit. On 16 -January, 2/26, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Heath, Jr., -landed at the Khe Sanh Combat Base; its arrival marked the first time -that the three battalions of the 26th Marines had operated together -in combat since Iwo Jima. The rapid deployment of Lieutenant Colonel -Heath's unit was another example of the speed with which large number -of troops could be committed to battle. The regimental commander knew -that he would be getting reinforcements but he did not know exactly -when they would arrive; he was informed by telephone just as the lead -transports were entering the landing pattern. The question that then -arose was: "Where could the newcomers do the most good?"(37) - -Outside of the combat base itself, there were several areas which -were vital. The most critical points were the hill outposts, because -both General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds were well aware of what had -happened at Dien Bien Phu when the Viet Minh owned the mountains -and the French owned the valley. It was essential that the hills -around Khe Sanh remain in the hands of the Marines. Shortly after its -arrival in mid-December 1967, 3/26 had relieved 1/26 of most of this -responsibility. Company I, 3/26, along with a three-gun detachment of -105mm howitzers from Battery C, 1/13, was situated atop Hill 881S; -Company K, 3/26, with two 4.2-inch mortars, was entrenched on Hill -861; and the 2d Platoon, A/1/26 defended the radio-relay site on Hill -950. This arrangement still left the NVA with an excellent avenue of -approach through the Rao Quan Valley which runs between Hills 861 and -950. The regimental commander decided to plug that gap with the newly -arrived 2d Battalion.(38) - -At 1400 the day it arrived, Company F, 2/26, conducted a tactical -march to Hill 558--a small knob which sat squarely in the middle of -the northwestern approach. The rest of the battalion spent the night -in an assembly area approximately 1,300 meters west of the airstrip. -The following day, Lieutenant Colonel Heath moved his three remaining -companies and the CP group overland to join Company F. Once the Marines -were dug in, the perimeter completely encompassed Hill 558 and blocked -enemy movement through the Rao Quan Valley.(39) - -Even with 2/26 in position, there was still a flaw in the northern -screen. The line of sight between K/3/26, on Hill 861, and 2/26 was -masked by a ridgeline which extended from the summit of 861 to the -northeast. This stretch of high ground prevented the two units from -supporting each other by fire and created a corridor through which -the North Vietnamese could maneuver to flank either Marine outpost. -About a week after his arrival on Hill 558, Captain Earle G. Breeding -was ordered to take his company, E/2/26, and occupy the finger at a -point approximately 400-500 meters northeast of K/3/26. From this new -vantage point, dubbed Hill 861A, Company E blocked the ridgeline and -was in a good position to protect the flank of 2/26. Because of its -proximity to K/3/26, Company E, 2/26, was later transferred to the -operational control of the 3d Battalion. Although these units did not -form one continuous defensive line, they did occupy the key terrain -which overlooked the valley floor.(40) - -With the primary avenue of approach blocked, Colonel Lownds utilized -his remaining assets to provide base security and conduct an occasional -search and destroy mission. The 1st Battalion was given the lion's -share of the perimeter to defend with lines that extended around three -sides of the airstrip. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's Marines occupied -positions that paralleled the runway to the north (Blue Sector), -crossed the eastern end of the strip, and continued back to the west -along the southern boundary of the base (Grey Sector). The southwestern -portion of the compound was manned by Forward Operating Base-3 (FOB-3), -a conglomeration of indigenous personnel and American advisors under -the direct control of a U. S. Army Special Forces commander. FOB-3 tied -in with 1/26 on the east and L/3/26 on the west. Company L, 3/26, was -responsible for the northwestern section (Red Sector) of the base and -was thinly spread over approximately 3,000 meters of perimeter. The -remaining company from the 3d Battalion, M/3/26, was held in reserve -until 19 January when two platoons and a command group were helilifted -to 881S. Even though it held a portion of the perimeter, Company D, -1/26 became the reserve and the remaining platoon from M/3/26 also -remained at the base as a reaction force.[13](41) - -In addition to his infantry units, the regimental commander had an -impressive array of artillery and armor. Lieutenant Colonel John A. -Hennelly's 1/13 provided direct support for the 26th Marines with -one 4.2-inch mortar battery, three 105mm howitzer batteries, and one -provisional 155mm howitzer battery (towed). The 175mm guns of the U. S. -Army's 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery at Camp Carroll and the Rockpile -were in general support. Five 90mm tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion, -which had been moved to Khe Sanh before Route 9 was cut, were attached -to the 26th Marines along with two Ontos platoons from the 3d Antitank -Battalion.[14] These highly mobile tracked vehicles could be rapidly -mustered at any threatened point so Colonel Lownds generally held his -armor in the southwestern portion of the compound as a back-up for -L/3/26 and FOB-3. All told, the Khe Sanh defenders could count on -fire support from 46 artillery pieces of varied calibers, 5 90mm tank -guns, and 92 single or Ontos-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles. With an -estimated 15,000 to 20,000 North Vietnamese lurking in the surrounding -hills, the Marines would need it all.(42) - -Ironically, the incidents which heralded the beginning of full-scale -hostilities in 1968 occurred in the same general area as the encounter -which touched off the heavy fighting in 1967. On 19 January 1968, -the 3d Platoon, I/3/26 was patrolling along a ridgeline 700 meters -southwest of Hill 881N where, two days before, a Marine reconnaissance -team had been ambushed. The team leader and radioman were killed and, -while the bodies had been recovered, the radio and a coded frequency -card were missing. The 3d Platoon was scouring the ambush site for -these items when it was taken under fire by an estimated 25 NVA troops. -The Marines returned fire, then broke contact while friendly artillery -plastered the enemy positions. - -[Illustration: Five M-48 tanks of the 3d Tank Battalion lent the weight -of their 90mm guns to the defense of the combat base. (USMC Photo -A190884)] - -[Illustration: Two Ontos platoons of the 3d Antitank Battalion were on -hand at Khe Sanh. The Ontos sports six 106mm recoilless rifles with -coaxially mounted .50 caliber spotting rifles. (USMC Photo A369169)] - -The next morning, Company I, commanded by Captain William H. Dabney, -returned to the scene in force. The captain actually had two missions: -first, to try and make contact with the enemy, and, second, to insert -another reconnaissance team in the vicinity of the ambush site. Two -platoons and a command group from Company M, 3/26, commanded by Captain -John J. Gilece, Jr. were helilifted to 881S and manned the perimeter -while Company I moved out to the north.[15] The terrain between 881S -and its northern twin dropped off into a deep ravine and then sloped -gradually upward to the crest of 881N. The southern face of 881N had -two parallel ridgelines about 500 meters apart which ran up the hill -and provided the company with excellent avenues of approach. These two -fingers were dotted with a series of small knobs which Captain Dabney -had designated as intermediate objectives. - -The Marines moved out at 0500 proceeding along two axes with the 1st -and 2d Platoons on the left ridgeline and the 3d Platoon on the right. -The ground fog was so thick that the men groped along at a snail's pace -probing to their front with extended rifles much the same way a blind -man uses a walking cane. For that reason, Captain Dabney had placed -Second Lieutenant Harry F. Fromme's 1st Platoon and Second Lieutenant -Thomas D. Brindley's 3d Platoon in the lead because both units had -patrolled this area frequently and the commanders knew the terrain -like the back of their hands. In spite of this, by 0900 the entire -force had covered only a few hundred meters but then the fog began to -lift enabling the Marines to move out at a brisker pace. The company -swept out of the draw at the northern base of 881S, secured its first -intermediate objective without incident, and then advanced toward a -stretch of high ground which was punctuated by four innocent-looking -little hills. These formed an east-west line which ran perpendicular -to and bisected the Marines' intended route of march. As it turned out -this area was occupied by elements of an NVA battalion and each mound -was a link in a heavily-fortified defensive chain.(43) - -As the element on the right moved forward after a precautionary 105mm -artillery concentration, the enemy opened up with small arms, .50 -caliber machine guns, and grenade launchers (RPGs). The resistance was -so stiff that Captain Dabney ordered Lieutenant Brindley to hold up his -advance and call for more artillery while the force on the left pushed -forward far enough to place flanking fire on the NVA position. The 1st -and 2d Platoons, however, fared no better; volleys of machine gun fire -from the other enemy-owned hills cut through the Marine ranks like -giant scythes and, in less than 30 seconds, 20 men were out of action, -most with severe leg wounds. Caught in a cross fire, the captain -ordered Fromme to hold up and evacuate his wounded. Again, Lieutenant -Brindley's men on the right surged forward in the wake of 155mm prep -fires. The assault, as described by one observer, was like a "page out -of _[_the life of_]_ Chesty Puller."[16] - -[Illustration: The ambush of a Marine reconnaissance team near 881N on -17 January 1968 was the prelude to the opening battle three days later. -(USMC Photo A188243)] - -[Illustration: A view of Hill 881N (1) from its southern twin. Action -on 20 January took place on ridgelines (2) and (3). (Photo courtesy -Major William H. Dabney)] - -Brindley was everywhere; he moved from flank to flank slapping his -men on the back and urging them on. The lieutenant led his platoon up -the slope and was the first man on top of the hill but, for him, the -assault ended there--he was cut down by a sniper bullet and died within -minutes.[17](44) - -During the advance, the recon team, which had volunteered to join the -attack, veered off to the right into a small draw and became separated -from the rest of the platoon. When the enemy troops were finally driven -off the hill, they fled to the east and inadvertently smashed headlong -into the isolated team. After a brief but savage fight, the North -Vietnamese overran the team and made good their escape; most of the -recon Marines were seriously wounded and lay exposed to direct fire -from the enemy on the easternmost hill. Several other men in the 3d -Platoon were hit during the wild charge and by the time the objective -had been taken, the radioman--a corporal--discovered that he was the -senior man in the platoon. He quickly reported that fact to Captain -Dabney.(45) - -The company commander saw that the enemy defense hinged on the center -hill which the 3d Platoon had just taken. If he could consolidate that -objective, Dabney would have a vantage point from which to support, -by fire, assaults on the other three NVA positions. Second Lieutenant -Richard M. Foley, the Company I Executive Officer, had moved up to take -command of the 3d Platoon and he reported that while the unit had firm -possession of the hill, there were not enough men left to evacuate -the casualties. In addition, he could not locate the recon team and -his ammunition was running low. Dabney, therefore, ordered Lieutenant -Fromme's 1st Platoon to remain in place and support the left flank of -the 3d Platoon by fire. With Second Lieutenant Michael H. Thomas' 2d -Platoon which had been in reserve on the left, the company commander -pulled back to the south, hooked around to the east and joined Foley's -unit on its objective. The officers tried to evacuate the wounded and -reorganize but this attempt was complicated by the fact that one half -of the hastily formed perimeter was being pelted by .50 caliber machine -gun and sniper fire from the enemy's easternmost position. - -At this point, there were two acts of extraordinary heroism. Lieutenant -Thomas, who was crouched in a crater alongside the company commander, -was informed of the wounded recon Marines who lay in the open at the -eastern base of the hill. Even though it was courting certain death to -do so, Thomas jumped out of the hole without hesitation and started -down the hill. He had only gotten a few steps when an enemy sniper -shot him through the head killing him instantly.[18] In spite of what -happened to the lieutenant, Sergeant Daniel G. Jessup quickly followed -his lead. While the NVA hammered away at the exposed slope with -continuous machine gun and sniper fire, the sergeant slithered over -the crest and crawled down the hill to locate the recon unit. Once at -the bottom, he found the team in a small saddle which was covered with -elephant grass; two of the Marines were dead and five were seriously -wounded. Jessup hoisted one of the wounded men onto his back and made -the return trip up the fire-swept slope. Gathering up a handful of -Marines, the sergeant returned and supervised the evacuation of the -entire team. When all the dead and wounded had been retrieved, Jessup -zig-zagged down the hill a third time to gather up weapons and insure -that no one had been left behind. For his calm courage and devotion to -his comrades, Sergeant Jessup was later awarded the Silver Star. - -The heavy fighting raged throughout the afternoon. Lieutenant Colonel -Alderman, his operations officer, Major Matthew P. Caulfield, and -representatives of the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) flew -from Khe Sanh to Hill 881S by helicopter so they could personally -oversee the battle. During the action, Company I drew heavy support -from the recoilless rifles, mortars, and 105mm howitzers on Hill 881S, -as well as the batteries at Khe Sanh. In addition, Marine jets armed -with 500-pound bombs streaked in and literally blew the top off of -the easternmost enemy hill, while other fighter/bombers completely -smothered one NVA counterattack with napalm. A CH-46 helicopter from -Marine Aircraft Group 36 was shot down while attempting to evacuate -casualties but another Sea Knight swooped in and picked up the pilot -and copilot. The crew chief had jumped from the blazing chopper while -it was still airborne and broke his leg; he was rescued by Lieutenant -Fromme's men. This, however, was the only highlight for the North -Vietnamese because Company I had cracked the center of their defense -and, under the savage air and artillery bombardment, the rest of the -line was beginning to crumble.(46) - -Lieutenant Colonel Alderman realized that his men were gaining the -advantage and requested reinforcements with which to exploit the -situation. Colonel Lownds, however, denied the request and directed -the 3/26 commander to pull Company I back to Hill 881S immediately. -The order was passed on to Captain Dabney and it hit him like a -thunderbolt. His men had been fighting hard all day and he hated -to tell them to call it off at that point. Nonetheless, he rapidly -disengaged, collected his casualties, and withdrew. The struggle -had cost the enemy dearly: 103 North Vietnamese were killed while -friendly losses were 7 killed, including two platoon commanders, and -35 wounded. As the weary Marines trudged back to Hill 881S, they were -understandably disappointed at not being able to continue the attack. -It wasn't until later that they learned why they had been halted just -when victory was in sight.[19](47) - -Colonel Lownds' decision to break off the battle was not born out of -faintheartedness, but was based on a valuable piece of intelligence -that he received earlier in the afternoon. That intelligence came in -the form of a NVA first lieutenant who was the commanding officer of -the =14th Antiaircraft Company=, =95C Regiment=, =325C NVA Division=; -at 1400, he appeared off the eastern end of the runway with an AK-47 -rifle in one hand and a white flag in the other. Under the covering -guns of two Ontos, a fire team from the 2d Platoon, Company B, 1/26, -took the young man in tow and, after Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson -had questioned him briefly, the lieutenant was hustled off to the -regimental intelligence section for interrogation. The lieutenant -had no compunction about talking and gave the Marines a detailed -description of the forthcoming Communist offensive. As it turned out, -the accuracy of the account was surpassed only by its timeliness, -because the first series of attacks was scheduled for that very -night--against Hills 861 and 881S. At the time Colonel Lownds received -this news, Company I was heavily engaged 1,000 meters north of its -defensive perimeter and he definitely did not want Captain Dabney -and his men to be caught away from their fortified outpost when the -NVA struck. Consequently, Lieutenant Colonel Alderman's request for -reinforcements to press his advantage was denied.(48) - -When the first enemy rounds began falling on Hill 861 shortly -after midnight, Marines all along the front were in bunkers and -trenches--waiting. The heavy mortar barrage lasted - about 30 minutes and was supplemented by RPG, small arms, -and automatic weapons fire. This was followed by approximately 300 -NVA troops who assaulted Hill 861. The van of the attacking force was -made up of sapper teams that rushed forward with bangalore torpedoes -and satchel charges to breach the defensive wire. Assault troops then -poured through the gaps but were met and, in most sectors, stopped cold -by interlocking bands of grazing machine gun fire. - -In spite of the defensive fire, enemy soldiers penetrated the K/3/26 -lines on the southwestern side of the hill and overran the helo landing -zone. The Company K perimeter encompassed a saddle, thus the crest of -861 was actually two hills; the landing zone was on the lower one and -the company CP was perched atop a steep rise to the northeast. Before -the enemy could exploit the penetration, the Marines counterattacked -down the trenchline and pinched off the salient. After vicious -hand-to-hand fighting, the men of Company K isolated the pocket and -wiped out the North Vietnamese. Had the enemy been able to flood the -breach with his reserves, the situation might have become extremely -critical. When the fighting subsided, 47 NVA bodies were strewn over -the hilltop while four Marines died holding their ground.[20](49) - -During the attack on 861, the 3d Battalion command group remained on -Hill 881S because bad weather prevented Lieutenant Colonel Alderman -and his operations officer from returning to the combat base.[21](50) -Major Caulfield contacted the Company K command post by radio and found -out that the fighting was indeed heavy. The company commander, Captain -Norman J. Jasper, Jr., had been hit three times and was out of action; -the executive officer, First Lieutenant Jerry N. Saulsbury, was running -the show. The company gunnery sergeant was dead, the first sergeant was -badly wounded, and the radio operator had been blinded by powder burns. -Major Caulfield later recalled that the young Marine remained at his -post for almost two hours before being relieved and was "as calm, -cool, and collected as a telephone operator in New York City," even -though he could not see a thing.(51) - -Some men on the hill had a rather unusual way of keeping their spirits -up during the fight as First Sergeant Stephen L. Goddard discovered. -The first sergeant had been hit in the neck and was pinching an artery -shut with his fingers to keep from bleeding to death. As he moved -around the perimeter, the Top heard a sound that simply had no place -on a battlefield--somebody was singing. After tracing the sound to a -mortar pit, Goddard peered into the emplacement and found the gunners -bellowing out one stanza after another as they dropped rounds into the -tubes. The "ammo humpers" were also singing as they broke open boxes of -ammunition and passed the rounds to the gunners. Naturally, the name of -the song was "The Marines Hymn."(52) - -One decisive factor in this battle was that Hill 881S was not attacked. -Company I did not receive a single mortar round and the reprieve left -the Marines free to lend unhindered support to their comrades on 861. -The bulk of this fire came from the Company I 81mm mortar section. -Since Lieutenant Colonel Alderman and Major Caulfield were concerned -about the possibility of their position being attacked, they were -careful not to deplete their ammunition. Major Caulfield personally -authorized the expenditure of every 20-round lot so he knew exactly how -many mortar rounds went out that night--680. The mortar tubes became -so hot that the Marines had to use their precious drinking water to -keep them cool enough to fire; after the water, the men used fruit -juice. When the juice ran out, they urinated on the tubes. The spirited -support of Company I and its attached elements played a big part in -blunting the attack.(53) - -There are two plausible explanations for the enemy's failure to -coordinate the attack on Hill 861 with one on 881S. Lieutenant Colonel -Alderman and Major Caulfield felt that Captain Dabney's fight on the -afternoon of 20 January had crippled the NVA battalion which was slated -for the attack on Hill 881S and disrupted the enemy's entire schedule. -On the other hand, Company I had emerged from the engagement with -relatively light casualties and was in fighting trim on the morning -of the 21st. Another possibility was the manner in which Colonel -Lownds utilized artillery and aircraft. The regimental commander -did not use his supporting arms to break up the attack directly; he -left that job up to the defenders themselves. Instead, the colonel -called in massive air and artillery concentrations on points where the -enemy would more than likely marshal his reserves. Much of the credit -belong to Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's batteries at the base. One -infantry officer on Hill 881S, who observed the fire, described the -Marine artillery as "absolutely and positively superb." Throughout the -battle, the North Vietnamese assault commander was heard frantically -screaming for his reserves--he never received an answer. The fact that -the initial attack on 861 was not followed up by another effort lent -credence to the theory that the backup force was being cut to pieces to -the rear while the assault troops were dying on the wire.(54) - -The Marines did not have long to gloat over their victory because at -0530 on the 21st the KSCB was subjected to an intense barrage. Hundreds -of 82mm mortar rounds, artillery shells, and 122mm rockets slammed into -the compound as Marines dived into bunkers and trenches.[22](55) Damage -at "ground zero" was extensive: several helicopters were destroyed, -trucks and tents were riddled, one messhall was flattened, and fuel -storage areas were set ablaze. Colonel Lownds' quarters were demolished -but, fortunately, the regimental commander was not in his hut at the -time. One of the first incoming rounds found its mark scoring a direct -hit on the largest ammunition dump, which was situated near the eastern -end of the runway. The dump erupted in a series of blinding explosions -which rocked the base and belched thousands of burning artillery and -mortar rounds into the air. Many of these maverick projectiles exploded -on impact and added to the devastation. Thousands of rounds were -destroyed and much of this ammunition "cooked off" in the flames for -the next 48 hours. In addition, one enemy round hit a cache of tear gas -(CS) releasing clouds of the pungent vapor which saturated the entire -base.(56) - -The main ammunition dump was just inside the perimeter manned by -Company B, 1/26, and the 2d Platoon, commanded by - Second Lieutenant John W. Dillon, was in the -hotseat throughout the attack. The unit occupied a trenchline which, -at places, passed as close as 30 meters to the dump. In spite of the -proximity of the "blast furnace," Lieutenant Dillon's men stayed in -their positions, answered with their own mortars, and braced for the -ground attack which never came. Throughout the ordeal, the 2d Platoon -lines became an impact area for all sizes of duds from the dump which -literally filled the trenchline with unexploded ordnance. In addition, -the men were pelted by tiny slivers of steel from the exploding -antipersonnel ammunition which became embedded in their flak jackets, -clothing, and bare flesh.(57) - -The fire raging in the main dump also hampered the rest of the -1st Battalion. The 81mm mortar platoon fired hundreds of rounds -in retaliation but the ammo carriers had to crawl to and from the -pits because of the exploding ammunition. Captain Kenneth W. Pipes, -commanding officer of Company B, had to displace his command post three -times when each position became untenable. Neither was the battalion CP -exempt; at about 1000, a large quantity of C-4 plastic explosives in -the blazing dump was touched off and the resulting shock waves cracked -the timbers holding up the roof of Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's -command bunker. As the roof settled, several members of the staff were -knocked to the floor. For a moment it appeared that the entire overhead -would collapse but after sinking about a foot, the cracked timbers -held. With a sigh of relief, the men inside quickly shored up the roof -and went about their duties.(58) - -The sudden onslaught produced a number of heroes, most of whom went -unnoticed. Members of Force Logistics Group Bravo, and other personnel -permanently stationed at the ammunition dump, charged into the inferno -with fire extinguishers and shovels to fight the blaze. Motor transport -drivers darted from the safety of their bunkers to move trucks and -other vehicles into revetments. Artillerymen quickly manned their guns -and began returning fire. The executive officer of 1/13, Major Ronald -W. Campbell, ignored the heavy barrage and raced from one shell hole to -another analyzing the craters and collecting fragments so that he could -determine the caliber of the enemy weapons as well as the direction -from which they were being fired. Much of the counterbattery fire was a -direct result of his efforts.(59) - -Three other artillerymen from Battery C, 1/13, performed an equally -heroic feat in the midst of the intense shelling. When the dump -exploded, the C/1/13 positions, like those of 1/26, were showered with -hundreds of hot duds which presented a grave danger to the battery. The -battery commander, Captain William J. O'Connor, the executive officer, -First Lieutenant William L. Everhart, and the supply sergeant, Sergeant -Ronnie D. Whiteknight, immediately began picking up the burning rounds -and carrying them to a hole approximately 50 meters behind the gun -pits. For three hours, these Marines carried out between 75 and 100 -duds and disposed of them, knowing that any second one might explode. -When the searing clouds of tear gas swept over the battery, many -gunners were cut off from their gas masks. Lieutenant Everhart and -Sergeant Whiteknight quickly gathered up as many masks as they could -carry and distributed them to the men in the gun positions. The "cannon -cockers" donned the masks and kept their howitzers in action throughout -the attack.(60) - -By this time, most of 1/13 had ceased firing counterbattery missions -and was supporting the defense force at Khe Sanh Village. An hour after -the KSCB came under attack, the Combined Action Company (CACO) and a -South Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF) company stationed in the village -were hit by elements of the =304th NVA Division=. The enemy troops -breached the defensive wire, penetrated the compound, and seized the -dispensary. Heavy street fighting ensued and, at 0810, the defenders -finally drove the enemy force from the village. Later that afternoon, -two NVA companies again assaulted the village but, this time, artillery -and strike aircraft broke up the attack. Upon request of the defenders, -Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalion fired over 1,000 artillery -rounds with variable time fuzes which resulted in airbursts over the -defensive wire. During the action, a single Marine A-6A "Intruder" -knifed through the ground fire and killed about 100 of the attackers. -Those enemy soldiers who persisted were taken care of by close-in -defensive fires and, when the fighting subsided, an American advisor -counted 123 North Vietnamese bodies on or around the barbed wire.(61) - -Following the second attack, Colonel Lownds decided to withdraw these -isolated units to the confines of the KSCB. The village, which was -the seat of the Huong Hoa District Headquarters, was not an ideal -defensive position. The Allies were hampered by restricted fields of -fire and there was a temple just outside the village which overlooked -the perimeter. Most important, a regiment of the =304th NVA Division= -was operating in the immediate vicinity. The colonel decided that he -would rather evacuate the village while he could, instead of waiting -until its occupants were surrounded and fighting for their lives. -Helicopters flew in and picked up the Marines and U. S. Army advisors; -the Vietnamese troops and officials of the local government moved -overland. Upon arrival, the CACO and RF companies, which totaled about -250 men, took up positions in the southwestern sector of the base and -were absorbed by FOB-3.[23](62) - -There was one other encounter on the 21st. At 1950, the 2d Platoon, -L/3/26, reported 25-30 enemy soldiers crawling toward the wire -bordering Red Sector. The Marines opened fire and, within an hour, -killed 14 North Vietnamese. Remnants of the attacking force were seen -dragging dead and wounded comrades from the battlefield. Cumulative -friendly casualties for the day, including those incurred on Hill 861, -were 9 killed, 37 wounded and evacuated (Medevaced), plus 38 wounded -but returned to duty.(63) - -When the events of the 21st were flashed to the world via the news -media, many self-appointed experts in the United States began to -speak out concerning the feasibility of maintaining the garrison at -Khe Sanh. Those who opposed the planned defense felt that the Marines -had been able to remain there only at the pleasure of the NVA. They -pointed out that, in the preceding months, the installation had been -of little concern to the North Vietnamese because it was ineffective -as a deterrent to infiltration. The undermanned 26th Marines could -not occupy the perimeter, man the hill outposts, and simultaneously -conduct the constant, large-unit sweeps necessary to control the area. -Therefore, the enemy could simply skirt the base and ignore it. A -build-up, however, would make the prize worthwhile for the NVA, which -badly needed a crushing victory over the Americans for propaganda -purposes. By concentrating forces at Khe Sanh, the theory went, the -Allies would be playing into the enemy's hands because the base was -isolated and, with Route 9 interdicted, had to be completely supplied -by air. Fearing that Khe Sanh would become an American Dien Bien Phu, -the critics favored a pull-out. - -[Illustration: General William C. Westmoreland, -ComUSMACV (Photo courtesy Office of -the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army)] - -[Illustration: Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, -Jr., CG, III MAF (USMC Photo A190016)] - -In Vietnam, where the decision was being made, there was little -disagreement. The two key figures, General Westmoreland and General -Cushman, "after discussing all aspects of the situation, were in -complete agreement from the start."(64) There were several reasons -they decided to hold Khe Sanh at that time. The base and adjacent -outposts commanded the Khe Sanh Plateau and the main avenue of approach -into eastern Quang Tri Province. While the installation was not 100 -percent effective as a deterrent to infiltration, it was a solid block -to enemy invasion and motorized supply from the west. Had the Allies -possessed greater strength in the northern provinces, they might have -achieved the same ends with large and frequent airmobile assaults--a -concept which General Cushman had advocated for some time. In January -1968, he had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the -logistical bases for such operations. The weather was another critical -factor because the poor visibility and low overcasts attendant to the -monsoon season made helicopter operations hazardous to say the least. -Even if the III MAF commander had the materiel and manpower for such -large airmobile assaults, the weather precluded any such effort before -March or April. Until that time, the job of sealing off Route 9 would -have to be left up to the 26th Marines.(65) - -An additional consideration for holding the base was the rare and -valuable opportunity to engage and destroy an, heretofore, elusive -foe. Up to this time, there was hardly a commander in Vietnam who, at -one time or another, had not been frustrated in his attempts to box in -the slippery NVA and VC units. At Khe Sanh, the enemy showed no desire -to hit and run but rather to stand and fight; it was a good idea to -oblige him. In effect, the 26th Marines would fix the enemy in position -around the base while Allied air and artillery battered him into -senselessness. Furthermore, the defense was envisioned as a classic -example of economy of force. Although there was conjecture that the NVA -was trying to draw American units to the DMZ area, the fact remained -that two crack NVA divisions, which otherwise might have participated -in the later attacks on Hue and Quang Tri City, were tied down far from -the vital internal organs of South Vietnam by one reinforced Marine -regiment.(66) - -Thus, with only two choices available--withdraw or reinforce--ComUSMACV -chose the latter. In his "Report On The War In Vietnam," General -Westmoreland stated: - - The question was whether we could afford the troops to reinforce, - keep them supplied by air, and defeat an enemy far superior in - numbers as we waited for the weather to clear, build forward bases, - and made preparations for an overland relief expedition. I believed - we could do all of those things. With the concurrence of the III - Marine Amphibious Force Commander, Lieutenant General Robert E. - Cushman, Jr., I made the decision to reinforce and hold the area - while destroying the enemy with our massive firepower and to - prepare for offensive operations when the weather became favorable. - -General Westmoreland reported his decision to Washington and more -troops began to pour into the combat base.(67) - -On 22 January, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant -Colonel John F. Mitchell, was transferred to the operational control -of the 26th Marines and arrived at 1900 the same day. Ever since the -three high ranking NVA officers were killed outside Red Sector, General -Tompkins and Colonel Lownds were concerned over the unhealthy interest -that the North Vietnamese were showing in the western perimeter. When -1/9 arrived, the colonel directed the battalion commander to establish -defensive positions at the rock quarry, 1,500 meters southwest of the -strip. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell moved his unit overland and set up -a kidney-shaped perimeter around the quarry with his CP perched atop a -hill. In addition, he dispatched a platoon from Company A approximately -500 meters further west to set up a combat outpost on a small knob. -The 1/9 lines curved near, but did not tie in with, those of L/3/26; -the small gap, however, could easily be covered by fire. The western -approach was firmly blocked.(68) (See Map 6). - -General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds also discussed plans for the -opposite side of the compound. This approach would have been the -most difficult for the North Vietnamese to negotiate because the -terrain east of the runway dropped off sharply to the river below. -This steep grade, however, was heavily wooded and provided the enemy -with excellent concealment. The NVA troops, masters at the art of -camouflage, could have maneuvered dangerously close to the Marine lines -before being detected. - -The main reason for concern, however, was the testimony of the -cooperative NVA lieutenant who had surrendered on the 20th. According -to the lieutenant, the eastern avenue of approach was the key with -which the Communists hoped to unlock the Khe Sanh defenses. First, the -NVA intended to attack and seize Hills 861 and 881S, both of which -would serve as fire support bases. From these commanding positions, the -enemy would push into the valley and apply pressure along the northern -and western portion of the Marines' perimeter. These efforts, however, -were simply a diversion to conceal the main thrust--a regimental ground -attack from the opposite quarter. An assault regiment from the =304th -Division= would skirt the base to the south, hook around to the east, -and attack paralleling the runway through the 1/26 lines. - -[Illustration: Two key figures in the defense of Khe Sanh: Major -General Rathvon McC. Tompkins (L), CG, 3d MarDiv, and Colonel David E. -Lownds (R), CO, 26th Marines. (Photo courtesy Colonel David E. Lownds)] - -[Illustration: General Tompkins (L) made helicopter trips into Khe Sanh -almost daily in spite of heavy enemy fire. (Photo courtesy David D. -Duncan)] - -[Illustration: - - MAP 6 - -LOCATION OF OUTPOSTS - - E. L. WILSON] - -Once the compound was penetrated, the North Vietnamese anticipated that -the entire Marine defense system would collapse.(69) - -On 27 January, the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, the fifth and final -battalion allotted for Khe Sanh, arrived.[24](70) Understandably, -Colonel Lownds moved the ARVN unit into the eastern portion of the -perimeter to reinforce the 1st Battalion. Actually, the Marines were -backing-up the South Vietnamese because the Ranger Battalion occupied -trenches some 200 meters outside the 1/26 lines. Lieutenant Colonel -Wilkinson's men had already prepared these defensive positions for the -new arrivals. The new trenchline extended from the northeast corner of -Blue Sector, looped across the runway, paralleled the inner trenchline -of 1/26, and tied back in with the Marine lines on the southeastern -corner of Grey Sector. (See Map 7) The only gap was where the runway -extended through the ARVN lines; this section was covered by two -Ontos. At night, the gap was sealed off with strands of German Tape--a -new type of razor-sharp barbed wire which was extremely difficult to -breach. The North Vietnamese would now have to penetrate two lines of -defense if they approached from the east.(71) - -As January drew to a close, the situation at Khe Sanh could be summed -up in three words--enemy attack imminent. As a result of rumblings of a -large-scale Communist offensive throughout South Vietnam, the scheduled -Vietnamese Lunar New Year (TET) ceasefire was cancelled in I Corps and -the 26th Marines braced for the inevitable. While they waited, they -filled sandbags, dug deeper trenches, reinforced bunkers, conducted -local security patrols, and, in general, established a pattern which -would remain unbroken for the next two months. The NVA also established -a routine as enemy gunners daily shelled the base and hill outposts -while assault units probed for a soft spot. Thus the two adversaries -faced each other like boxers in a championship bout; one danced around -nimbly throwing jabs while the second stood fast waiting to score the -counterpunch that would end the fight.(72) - -[Illustration: - - E. L. WILSON - - MAP 7 - -KHE SANH COMBAT BASE] - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[11] The Santa Fe Trail is a branch of the Ho Chi Minh Trail which -closely parallels the South Vietnam/Laos border. - -[12] In addition, one regiment of the =324th Division= was located -in the central DMZ some 10-15 miles from Khe Sanh and maintained a -resupply role. In the early stages of the siege, the presence of the -=320th Division= was confirmed north of the Rockpile within easy -reinforcing distance of Khe Sanh; thus, General Westmoreland and -General Cushman were initially faced with the possibility that Khe Sanh -would be attacked by three divisions plus a regiment. General Tompkins, -however, kept constant pressure on these additional enemy units and -alleviated their threat. - -[13] On the 21st, a platoon from A/1/26 reinforced K/3/26 on Hill 861 -and a second platoon from Company A later followed suit. Throughout -most of the siege the line up on the hill outpost remained as follows: -Hill 881S--Company I, 3/26 plus two platoons and a command group from -Company M 3/26; Hill 861--Company K, 3/26 plus two platoons from -Company A, 1/26; Hill 861A--Company E, 2/26; Hill 558--2/26 (minus the -one company on 861A); Hill 950--one platoon from 1/26. - -[14] The Ontos is a lightly armored tracked vehicle armed with six -106mm recoilless rifles. Originally designed as a tank killer, it is -primarily used in Vietnam to support the infantry. - -[15] Captain Gilece was wounded by sniper fire and on 1 February, First -Lieutenant John T. Esslinger, the executive officer, assumed command. - -[16] Lieutenant General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, a legendary figure -in Marine Corps history, is the only Marine to have won the Navy Cross -five times. - -[17] Lieutenant Brindley was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. - -[18] For his actions throughout the battle, Lieutenant Thomas was -posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. - -[19] NVA casualties were obviously much greater than 103 dead because -the Marines counted only those bodies found during the withdrawal. - -[20] Many more North Vietnamese died that night than were found. The -stench from the bodies decaying in the jungle around the hill became so -strong that the men of K/3/26 were forced to wear their gas masks for -several days. - -[21] Throughout the night, Lieutenant Colonel Alderman supervised -defensive operations from 881S and was assisted by an alternate -battalion command group at the base which was headed by the 3/26 -Executive Officer, Major Joseph M. Loughran, Jr. - -[22] On Hill 881S, Captain Dabney watched several hundred 122mm rockets -lift off from the southern slope of 881N--a scant 300 meters beyond -the farthest point of his advance the day before. The enemy defensive -positions between the two hills were obviously designed to protect -these launching sites. At the combat base, the barrage did not catch -the Marines completely by surprise; the regimental intelligence section -had warned that an enemy attack was imminent and the entire base was on -Red Alert. - -[23] The Huong Hoa District Headquarters operated from within the KSCB -throughout the siege. - -[24] ARVN battalions were considerably smaller than Marine battalions -and the 37th Ranger was no exception. Even by Vietnamese standards, the -unit was undermanned; it had 318 men when it arrived. - - - - -PART IV - -THE "SO-CALLED" SIEGE BEGINS - - -When the Communists launched their TET Offensive on 30 January, they -struck in force almost everywhere in South Vietnam except Khe Sanh. -Their prime targets were not military installations but the major -population centers--36 provincial capitals, 64 district capitals, and -5 autonomous cities. The leaders in Hanoi were apparently becoming -dissatisfied with their attempts to win in the South by a protracted -war of attrition and decided on one massive stroke to tip the scales in -their favor. Consequently, the enemy unleashed some 62,000 troops, many -of whom infiltrated the cities disguised as civilians, in hopes that -they could foster a public uprising against the central government and -encourage mass defections among the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. -Virtually all available VC main and local force units were thrown into -the initial attacks. With the exception of Hue and Da Nang, NVA units -were generally committed a few days later to reinforce the assault -troops.(73) - -The sudden onslaught initially achieved surprise but, in the final -analysis, the overall military effort failed miserably. Allied forces -reacted quickly and drove the invaders from the cities and towns, -killing approximately 32,000 (as of 11 February) hard-core guerrillas -and North Vietnamese soldiers in the process. Many Viet Cong units, -with no other orders than to take their initial objectives and hold -until reinforcements arrived, were wiped out completely. Ironically, -these elite cadres were the backbone of the guerrilla infrastructure -in the South which the Communists, up to that point, had tried so hard -to preserve. In Saigon and Hue, die-hard remnants held out for several -weeks but, for the most part, the attacks were crushed within a few -days. The general uprising and mass desertions never materialized; -on the contrary, the offensive tended to galvanize the South -Vietnamese.(74) - -Even though he paid an exorbitant price, the enemy did achieve -certain gains. If the Communists' goal was to create sensational -headlines which would stun the American people--they succeeded. To the -strategists in Hanoi, an important byproduct of any military operation -was the associated political ramifications in the United States; -namely, how much pressure would certain factions put on their leaders -to disengage from the struggle in South Vietnam. To the delight of the -Communists, no doubt, the TET Offensive had a tremendous psychological -impact in the U. S. and, as usual, the response of the dissidents was -vociferous. Much of the reaction was completely out of proportion to -the actual military situation but it had a definite demoralizing effect -on the American public--the long-range implications of which are still -undetermined.(75) - -Another casualty of these nation-wide attacks was the pacification -program in rural communities. When the Allies pulled back to clear the -cities, they temporarily abandoned portions of the countryside to the -enemy. Upon return, they found that progress in the so-called "battle -for the hearts and minds of the people" had received a temporary set -back.(76) - -To achieve these ends, however, the enemy troops brought senseless -destruction to Vietnamese cities and heaped more suffering upon an -already war-weary populace. Thousands of innocent civilians were killed -and hundreds of thousands made homeless--mostly in Saigon/Cholon and -Hue. Four days after the initial attacks, the central government -formed the Central Recovery Committee which, with U. S. assistance, -launched Project RECOVERY to help alleviate the misery of the people. -Had this program not been implemented, the Communists might have come -much closer to achieving their goal of overthrowing the government. In -addition to the destruction in the cities, the enemy violated a sacred -religious holiday and, what's worse, actually desecrated a national -shrine by turning the majestic Hue Citadel into a bloody battlefield. -For these acts, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese earned the -deep-seated hatred of many South Vietnamese who in the past had been, -at best, neutral.(77) - -Whether or not Khe Sanh was, in fact, the ultimate enemy objective -or merely a diversion for the TET Offensive has not yet been -established with certainty. The U. S. command in Saigon believed that -the Communists' goal was to create a general uprising, precipitate -mass defections in the RVN armed forces, and then seize power. The -concentration of NVA regular forces in the northern two provinces was -primarily to support this overall objective but it was also possible -that the enemy had a secondary aspiration of shearing off and seizing -the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area should his primary effort fail. Thus -Khe Sanh was envisioned as an integral part of the master plan, or as -General Westmoreland called it "an option play." - -Subsequent events tended to vindicate that evaluation. Since the -initial nation-wide attacks had been conducted primarily by Viet Cong -guerrillas and main force units, the NVA regular forces remained -relatively unscathed and, with two of the four North Vietnamese -divisions known to be in I Corps poised around the 26th Marines, there -was little doubt as to where the next blow would fall. Furthermore, the -enemy's extensive preparations around the base reinforced the belief -that this effort was a major offensive and not just a feint. Before -investing the garrison, the North Vietnamese dug positions for their -long-range artillery pieces. Later, they emplaced countless smaller -supporting weapons, established numerous supply depots, and began the -ant-like construction of their intricate siege-works. This intensive -build-up continued long after most of the fighting associated with the -TET Offensive was over.(78) - -The enemy had much to gain by taking Khe Sanh. If they could seize -any portion of Quang Tri Province, the Communists would have a much -stronger bargaining position at any future conference table. In -addition, the spectre of Dien Bien Phu which was constantly raised in -the American press undoubtedly led the enemy to believe that the coming -battle could not only prove successful but decisive. If the garrison -fell, the defeat might well turn out to be the =coup de grace= to -American participation in the war. At first, the Marines anticipated -a major pitched battle, similar to the one in 1967, but the enemy -continued to bide his time and the battle at Khe Sanh settled into one -of supporting arms.(79) - -At Khe Sanh, the periodic showers of enemy artillery shells were, -quite naturally, a major source of concern to General Tompkins and -Colonel Lownds and they placed a high priority on the construction -of stout fortifications. Understandably, not every newcomer to Khe -Sanh immediately moved into a thick bunker or a six-foot trench -with overhead cover. The colonel had spent most of his tour with a -one-battalion regiment and had prepared positions for that battalion; -then, almost overnight, his command swelled to five battalions. The -new units simply had to build their own bunkers as quickly as they -could.(80) - -[Illustration: Marines at the combat base run for cover when warning of -enemy rocket or artillery attack is sounded. (USMC Photo A190245)] - -[Illustration: Machine gunners lie on top of trench cover while they -search for enemy movement. (USMC Photo A190929)] - -The regimental commander placed a minimum requirement on his -subordinates of providing overhead cover for the troops that would -stop, at least, an 82mm mortar round. The FSCC determined that one -strip of runway matting and two or three layers of sandbags would -fill the requirement. The average bunker usually started as an 8x8 -foot dugout with one 6x6 inch timber inserted in each corner and the -center for support. The overhead consisted of planks, a strip of runway -matting, sandbags, loose dirt, and more sandbags. Some enterprising -Marines piled on more loose dirt, then took discarded 105mm casings -and drove them into the top of the bunker like nails. These casings -often caused pre-detonation of the heavier-caliber rounds. The combat -engineers attached to the 26th Marines could build one of these bunkers -in three or four days; the average infantrymen took longer. Overhead -cover for the trenchlines consisted of a strip of matting placed across -the top of the trench at intervals and reinforced with sandbags. The -defenders could stand up in the trench during periods of inactivity and -duck under the matting when enemy rounds started to fall.(81) - -The Marines were also faced with another question concerning their -defenses: "How large an artillery round could you defend against -and still remain within the realm of practicality?" Since the 26th -Marines was supplied solely by air, building material was a prime -consideration. Matting and sandbags were easy enough to come by but -lumber was at a premium. Fortifications which could withstand a hit -from an 82mm mortar were a must because the North Vietnamese had an -ample supply of these weapons but the base was also being pounded, to -a lesser degree, by heavier-caliber guns. With the material available -to the 26th Marines, it was virtually impossible to construct a shelter -that was thick enough or deep enough to stop the heavy stuff.(82) - -This fact was borne out when Colonel Lownds decided to build a new -regimental CP bunker. The engineers supplied the specifications for an -overhead that would withstand a 122mm rocket; to be on the safe side, -the colonel doubled the thickness of the roof. The day before the CP -was to be occupied, a 152mm round landed squarely on top of the bunker -and penetrated both layers.(83) - -The massing of enemy artillery made the hill outposts that much -more important. Had they been able to knock the Marines from those -summits, the North Vietnamese would have been able to fire right down -the throats of the base defenders and make their position untenable. -As it was, the companies on Hills 881S, 861, 861A, and 558 not only -denied the enemy an unobstructed firing platform from which to pound -the installation, they also served as the eyes for the rest of the -regiment in the valley which was relatively blind to enemy movement. -For observation purposes, Hill 881S was the most strategically located -and a discussion of the enemy's heavy weaponry will point out why. - -While the 60mm and 82mm mortars were scattered around in proximity -of the combat base (roughly within a 2,000-3,000 meter radius), the -NVA rocket sites and artillery pieces were located well to the west, -southwest, and northwest, outside of friendly counterbattery range. One -particularly awesome and effective weapon was the Soviet-built 122mm -rocket, the ballistic characteristics of which had a lot to do with -the way the North Vietnamese employed it. When fired, the projectile -was fairly accurate in deflection but, because it was powered by a -propellant, the biggest margin of error was in range. Consequently, -the North Vietnamese preferred to position their launching sites so -the gunners could track along the long axis of a given target; thus, -longs and shorts would land "in the ballpark." The KSCB hugged the -airstrip and was roughly in the shape of a rectangle with the long axis -running east and west. This made the optimum firing positions for the -122mm rocket either to the east or west of the base on line with the -runway. There was really only one logical choice because the eastern -site would have placed the rockets within range of the Americans' 175s -and extended the enemy's supply lines from Laos. To the west, Hills -881S or 861 would have been ideal locations because in clear weather -those vantage points provided an excellent view of Khe Sanh and were -almost directly on line with the airstrip. Unfortunately for the NVA, -the Marines had squatters' rights on those pieces of real estate and -were rather hostile to claim jumpers. As an alternative, the North -Vietnamese decided on 881N but this choice had one drawback since the -line of sight between that northern peak and the combat base was masked -by the top of Hill 861. Nevertheless, the enemy emplaced hundreds of -launching sites along its slopes and throughout the siege approximately -5,000 122mm rockets rained on Khe Sanh from 881N.(84) - -Because of their greater range, the enemy's 130mm and 152mm artillery -batteries were located even further to the west. These guns were -cleverly concealed in two main firing positions. One was on Co Roc -Mountain which was southwest of where Route 9 crossed the Laotian -border; the other area was 305, so called because it was on a -bearing of 305 degrees (west-northwest) from Hill 881S at a range -of about 10,000 meters. While the heavy caliber artillery rounds -which periodically ripped into the base were usually referred to as -originating from Co Roc, 305 was the source of about 60-70 percent -of this fire, probably because it was adjacent to a main supply -artery. Both sites were vulnerable only to air attack and were -extremely difficult to pinpoint because of the enemy's masterful job -of camouflage, his cautious employment, and the extreme distance from -friendly observation posts. The NVA gunners fired only a few rounds -every hour so that continuous muzzle flashes did not betray their -positions and, after each round, quickly scurried out to cover the guns -with protective nets and screens. Some pieces, mounted on tracks, -were wheeled out of caves in Co Roc Mountain, fired, and returned -immediately. Though never used in as great a quantity as the rockets -and mortars, these shells wreaked havoc at Khe Sanh because there was -very little that they could not penetrate; even duds went about four -feet into the ground.(85) - -The 3/26 elements on Hill 881S were a constant thorn in the enemy's -side because the men on that most isolated of the Marine outposts could -observe all three of the main NVA firing positions--881N, 305, and Co -Roc. When rockets lifted off of 881N or the guns at Co Roc lashed out, -the men of Company I could see the flashes and provided advance warning -to the base. Whenever possible they directed retaliatory air strikes -on the offenders.[25] Whenever the enemy artillery at 305 opened up, -the muzzle flashes were hard to see because of the distance and the -everpresent dust from air strikes, but the rounds made a loud rustling -noise as they arched directly over 881S on the way to Khe Sanh. When -the Marines heard the rounds streak overhead, they passed a warning to -the base over the 3d Battalion tactical radio net, provided the net was -not clogged with other traffic. The message was short and to the point: -"Arty, Arty, Co Roc" or "Arty, Arty, 305."(86) - -At the base the Marines had devised a crude but effective early warning -system for such attacks. Motor transport personnel had mounted a horn -from a two-and-a-half ton truck in the top of a tree and the lead wires -were attached to two beer can lids. When a message was received from -881S, a Marine, who monitored the radio, pressed the two lids together -and the blaring horn gave advanced warning of the incoming artillery -rounds. The radio operator relayed the message over the regimental net -and then dived into a hole. Men in the open usually had from five to -eighteen seconds to find cover or just hit the deck before "all hell -broke loose." When poor visibility obscured the view between 881S and -the base, the radio operator usually picked himself up, dusted off, and -jokingly passed a three-word message to Company I which indicated that -the rounds had arrived on schedule--"Roger India ... Splash."(87) - -[Illustration: A Marine forward observer keeps a watchful eye on enemy -trenches. (USMC Photo A190933)] - -[Illustration: "Arty, Arty, Co Roc" was the title of a popular folksong -in 3/26. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -[Illustration: Colors over Hill 881S. (Photo courtesy Major William H. -Dabney)] - -[Illustration: Water on Hill 881S was scarce and beards flourished. -2dLt Richard M. Foley, XO of India, 3/26. (Photo courtesy Major William -H. Dabney)] - -The fact that Company I on 881S was the fly in the enemy's ointment -was no secret, especially to the enemy. As a result, North Vietnamese -gunners made the Marines' existence there a veritable nightmare. -Although no official tally of incoming rounds was recorded, Captain -Dabney's position took a much more severe pounding than any of the -other hill outposts. Volume, however, was only part of the story -because the incoming was almost always the heavier stuff. The hill -received little 60mm or 82mm mortar fire but a deluge of 120mm mortar -and 100mm artillery rounds. There was also a smattering of 152mm shells -from Co Roc. The shelling was the heaviest when helicopters made -resupply runs. - -The firing position which plagued the Marines the most was located to -the southwest of the hill in a U-shaped draw known as "the Horseshoe." -There were at least two NVA 120mm mortars in this area which, in -spite of an avalanche of American bombs and artillery shells, were -either never knocked out or were frequently replaced. These tubes -were registered on the hill and harassed Company I constantly. Anyone -caught above ground when one of the 120s crashed into the perimeter -was almost certain to become a casualty because the explosion produced -an extremely large fragmentation pattern. Captain Dabney figured that -it took one layer of runway matting, eight of sandbags, and one of -either rocks or 105mm casings to prevent penetration of a 120mm with -a quick fuze--nothing the Marines had on 881S could stop a round with -a delayed fuze. Because of the shape of the hill, the summit was the -only defendable terrain and thus provided the enemy with a compact -target; this often resulted in multiple casualties when the big rounds -landed within the perimeter. The only thing that the Marines had going -for them was that they could frequently spot a tell-tale flash of an -artillery piece or hear the "thunk" when a mortar round left the tube -but the heavy shells took their toll. On Hill 881S alone, 40 Marines -were killed throughout the siege and over 150 were wounded at least -once.(88) - -Considering the sheer weight of the bombardment, enemy shells caused a -relatively small number of fatalities at the base. Besides the solid -fortifications, there were two factors which kept casualties to a -minimum. The first was the flak jacket--a specially designed nylon -vest reinforced with overlapping fiberglass plates. The jacket would -not stop a high-velocity bullet but it did protect a man's torso and -most vital organs against shell fragments. The bulky vest was not -particularly popular in hot weather when the Marines were on patrol -but in a static, defensive position the jacket was ideal. The second -factor was the high quality of leadership at platoon and company level. -Junior officers and staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) constantly -moved up and down the lines to supervise the younger, inexperienced -Marines, many of whom had only recently arrived in Vietnam. The -veteran staff NCOs, long known as the "backbone of the Corps," knew -from experience that troops had to be kept busy. A man who was left to -ponder his problems often developed a fatalistic attitude that could -increase his reaction time and decrease his life time. The crusty NCOs -did not put much stock in the old cliche: "If a round has your name on -it, there's nothing you can do." Consequently, the Marines worked; they -dug trenches, filled sandbags, ran for cover, and returned to fill more -sandbags. Morale remained high and casualties, under the circumstances, -were surprisingly low.(89) - -Although the NVA encircled the KSCB and applied constant pressure, -the defenders were never restricted entirely to the confines of the -perimeter. The term "siege," in the strictest sense of the word, was -somewhat of a misnomer because the Allies conducted a number of daily -patrols, often as far as 500 meters from their own lines.[26](90) These -excursions were primarily for security and reconnaissance purposes -since General Tompkins did not want his men engaged in a slugging match -with the enemy outside the defensive wire. If the North Vietnamese were -encountered, the Marines broke contact and withdrew, while supporting -arms were employed.(91) - -One vital area was the drop zone. When the weather turned bad in -February, the KSCB was supplied primarily by parachute drops. Colonel -Lownds set up his original zone inside the FOB-3 compound but later -moved it several hundred meters west of Red Sector because he was -afraid that the falling pallets might injure someone. Lieutenant -Colonel Mitchell's 1/9 was given responsibility for security of the -drop zone and his patrols conducted daily sweeps along the periphery of -the drop area to flush out enemy troops who might try to disrupt the -collection of supplies. In addition, combat engineers swept through the -zone each morning and cleared out any mines the enemy set in during the -night. Thus the defenders at Khe Sanh were never - completely hemmed-in, but the regimental commander -admitted that any expedition beyond sight of the base was an invitation -to trouble.(92) - -The Allies did more than prepare defenses and conduct patrols because -the NVA launched three of its heaviest ground attacks during the -first week in February. In the predawn hours of 5 February, the North -Vietnamese lashed out at the Marine base and adjacent outposts with -nearly 200 artillery rounds while a battalion from the =325C NVA -Division= assaulted Hill 861A. Colonel Lownds immediately placed all -units on Red Alert and, within minutes, 1/13 was returning fire in -support of E/2/26. - -The fight on Hill 861A was extremely bitter. At 0305 the North -Vietnamese opened up on Captain Breeding's positions with a tremendous -82mm mortar barrage. This was followed by continuous volleys of RPG -rounds which knocked out several Marine crew-served weapons and -shielded the advance of the NVA sappers and assault troops. The North -Vietnamese blew lanes through the barbed wire along the northern -perimeter and slammed into the Company E lines. Second Lieutenant -Donald E. Shanley's 1st Platoon bore the brunt of the attack and reeled -back to supplementary positions. Quickly the word filtered back to the -company CP that the enemy was inside the wire and Captain Breeding -ordered that all units employ tear gas in defense but the North -Vietnamese were obviously "hopped up" on some type of narcotic and the -searing fumes had very little effect. Following the initial assault -there was a brief lull in the fighting. The NVA soldiers apparently -felt that, having secured the northernmost trenchline, they owned the -entire objective and stopped to sift through the Marine positions for -souvenirs. Magazines and paperbacks were the most popular. Meanwhile, -the temporary reversal only served to enrage the Marines. Following a -shower of grenades, Lieutenant Shanley and his men charged back into -their original positions and swarmed all over the surprised enemy -troops.(93) - -The counterattack quickly deteriorated into a melee that resembled a -bloody, waterfront barroom brawl--a style of fighting not completely -alien to most Marines. Because the darkness and ground fog drastically -reduced visibility, hand-to-hand combat was a necessity. Using their -knives, bayonets, rifle butts, and fists, the men of the 1st Platoon -ripped into the hapless North Vietnamese with a vengeance. Captain -Breeding, a veteran of the Korean conflict who had worked his way up -through the ranks, admitted that, at first, he was concerned over how -his younger, inexperienced Marines would react in their first fight. -As it turned out, they were magnificent. The captain saw one of his -men come face to face with a North Vietnamese in the inky darkness; -the young American all but decapitated his adversary with a crushing, -round-house right to the face, then leaped on the flattened soldier -and finished the job with a knife. Another man was jumped from behind -by a North Vietnamese who grabbed him around the neck and was just -about to slit his throat, when one of the Marine's buddies jabbed -the muzzle of his M-16 between the two combatants. With his selector -on full automatic, he fired off a full magazine; the burst tore huge -chunks from the back of the embattled Marine's flak jacket but it also -cut the North Vietnamese in half. Since the fighting was at such close -quarters, both sides used hand grenades at extremely short-range. The -Marines had the advantage because of their armored vests and they would -throw a grenade, then turn away from the blast, hunch up, and absorb -the fragments in their flak jackets and the backs of their legs. On -several occasions, Captain Breeding's men used this technique and "blew -away" enemy soldiers at less than 10 meters.(94) - -No one engaged in the donnybrook was exactly sure just how long it -lasted--all were too busy fighting to check their watches. More than -likely, the enemy was inside the wire less than a half hour. During -the fighting, Captain Breeding fed fire team-sized elements from the -2d and 3d Platoons into the fray from both flanks of the penetration. -The newcomers appeared to be afraid that they might miss all the action -and tore into the enemy as if they were making up for lost time. Even -though the E/2/26 company commander was no newcomer to blood and gore, -he was awed by the ferocity of the attack. Captain Breeding later said: -"It was like watching a World War II movie. Charlie didn't know how to -cope with it ... we walked all over them."(95) Those dazed NVA soldiers -who survived the vicious onslaught retreated into another meatgrinder; -as they ran from the hill, they were blasted by recoilless rifle fire -from 2/26 which was located on Hill 558. - -At approximately 0610, the North Vietnamese officers rallied the -battered remnants and tried again, but the second effort was also -stopped cold. By this time, Captain Breeding, who was busier than the -proverbial one-armed paper hanger, was assisting in the coordination -of fire support from five separate sources (i.e. Hills 861A, 881S, -558, the KSCB, and the 175mm gun bases). The Marines of Captain -Dabney's I/3/26, located on Hill 881S provided extremely effective and -enthusiastic support throughout the attack. In three hours, Captain -Dabney's men pumped out close to 1,100 rounds from only three 81mm -mortars, and the tubes became so hot that they actually glowed in the -dark.[27] Again, the bulk of the heavy artillery fire, along with radar -controlled bombing missions, was placed on the northern avenues leading -to the hill positions. The enemy units, held in reserve, were thus -shredded by the bombardment as they moved up to continue the attack.(96) - -After the second assault fizzled out, the North Vietnamese withdrew, -but enemy gunners shelled the base and outposts throughout the day. -At 1430, replacements from 2/26 were helilifted to Hill 861A. Captain -Breeding had lost seven men, most of whom were killed in the opening -barrage, and another 35 were medevaced so the new arrivals brought -E/2/26 back up to normal strength. On the other hand, the NVA suffered -109 known dead; many still remained in the 1st Platoon area where they -had been shot, slashed, or bludgeoned to death. As near as Captain -Breeding could tell, he did not lose a single man during the fierce -hand-to-hand struggle; all American deaths were apparently the result -of the enemy's mortar barrage and supporting fire. The Marines never -knew how many other members of the =325C NVA Division= had fallen -as a result of the heavy artillery and air strikes but the number -was undoubtedly high. All in all, it had been a bad day for the -Communists.(97) - -The North Vietnamese took their revenge in the early morning hours of -7 February; their victims were the defenders of the Special Forces -camp at Lang Vei. At 0042, an American advisor reported that the -installation was under heavy attack by enemy tanks. This was the first -time that the NVA had employed its armor in the south and, within 13 -minutes, 9 PT-76 Soviet-built tanks churned through the defensive wire, -rumbled over the anti-personnel minefields, and bulled their way into -the heart of the compound.[28](98) A battalion from the =66th Regiment, -304th NVA Division=, equipped with satchel charges, tear gas, and -flame-throwers, followed with an aggressive infantry assault that was -coordinated with heavy attacks by fire on the 26th Marines. Colonel -Lownds placed the base on Red Alert and the FSCC called in immediate -artillery and air in support of the beleaguered Lang Vei garrison. -Although the Marines responded quickly, the defensive fires had little -effect because, by that time, the enemy had overrun the camp.[29](99) -The defenders who survived buttoned themselves up in bunkers and, at -0243, called for artillery fire to dust off their own positions.(100) - -Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's artillerymen responded with scores of -deadly air bursts which peppered the target area with thousands of -fragments. The 1/13 batteries fired over 300 rounds that morning and -the vast fire superiority was echoed in the radio transmission of one -Lang Vei defender who said: "We don't know what you're using but for -God's sake keep it up." That was one of the last transmissions to -Khe Sanh because, at 0310, the Marines lost communications with the -camp.(101). - -Part of Colonel Lownds' mission as coordinator of all friendly forces -in the Khe Sanh area was to provide artillery support for Lang Vei -and, if possible, to reinforce the camp in case of attack. Under the -circumstances, a relief in strength was out of the question. In early -January, when M/3/26 was in reserve, Lieutenant Colonel Alderman and -Major Caulfield had conducted a personal reconnaissance of Route 9 -between the KSCB and Lang Vei to determine the feasibility of moving -a large unit overland. Their opinion was that any such attempt would -be suicidal because the terrain bordering Route 9 was so well suited -for an ambush it was an "NVA dream." Any column moving down the road, -especially at night, would undoubtedly have been ambushed.[30](102) -If the Marines went directly over the mountains, they would have to -hack through the dense growth and waste precious hours.[31](103) A -large-scale heliborne effort was ruled out because the North Vietnamese -apparently anticipated such a move and withdrew their tanks to the only -landing zones near the camp which were suitable for such an operation. -Even with tactical aircraft providing suppressive fire, a helo assault -into the teeth of enemy armor was ill-advised. The most important -factor, however, was that NVA units in the area greatly outnumbered any -force Colonel Lownds could commit.(104) - -Since a relief in force was undesirable, plans for a hit and run rescue -attempt were quickly drawn up at General Cushman's headquarters. Once -General Westmoreland had given the green light, Major General Norman J. -Anderson, commanding the 1st MAW and Colonel Jonathan F. Ladd of the U. -S. Army Special Forces, worked out the details. Two major points agreed -upon were that the helicopters employed in the operation would be those -which were not essential to the 26th Marines at the moment and that -Marine fixed-wing support would be provided.(105) - -As soon as it was light, the survivors of the Lang Vei garrison managed -to break out of their bunkers and work their way to the site of an -older camp some 400-500 meters to the east. Later that same day, a -raiding party composed of 40 CIDG personnel and 10 U. S. Army Special -Forces advisors from FOB-3 boarded Quang Tri-based MAG-36 helicopters -and took off for Lang Vei. A flight of Huey gunships, led by Lieutenant -Colonel William J. White, Commanding Officer of Marine Observation -Squadron 6, as well as jet aircraft escorted the transport choppers. -While the jets and Hueys covered their approach, the helicopters -swooped into a small strip at the old camp and took on survivors, -including 15 Americans. In spite of the heavy suppressive fire provided -by the escorts, three transport helos suffered battle damage during the -evacuation. One overloaded chopper, flown by Captain Robert J. Richards -of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262, had to make the return trip -to Khe Sanh at treetop level because the excess weight prevented the -pilot from gaining altitude.[32](106) - -There was a large number of indigenous personnel--both military and -civilian--who could not get out on the helicopters and had to move -overland to Khe Sanh. A portion of these were members of the Laotian -Volunteer Battalion 33 which on 23 January had been overrun at Ban -Houei San, Laos (near the Laotian/South Vietnam border) by three NVA -battalions. The remnants fled across the border and took refuge at Lang -Vei and when the Special Forces camp fell, the Laotians continued their -trek to the east with a host of other refugees. At 0800 on the 8th, -about 3,000 approached the southern perimeter at Khe Sanh and requested -admittance. Colonel Lownds, fearing that NVA infiltrators were in their -midst, denied them entrance until each was searched and processed. This -took place near the FOB-3 compound after which some of the refugees -were evacuated. The Laotians were eventually returned to their own -country.(107) - -Also on the morning of 8 February, elements of the =101D Regiment=, -=325C Division= launched the first daylight attack against the 26th -Marines. At 0420, a reinforced battalion hit the 1st Platoon, A/1/9, -which occupied Hill 64 some 500 meters west of the 1/9 perimeter. -Following their usual pattern, the North Vietnamese tried to disrupt -the Marines' artillery support with simultaneous bombardment of the -base. To prevent friendly reinforcements from reaching the small hill -the enemy also shelled the platoon's parent unit and, during the fight, -some 350 mortar and artillery rounds fell on the 1/9 positions. The NVA -assault troops launched a two-pronged attack against the northwestern -and southwestern corners of the A/1/9 outpost and either blew the -barbed wire with bangalore torpedoes or threw canvas on top of the -obstacles and rolled over them. The enemy soldiers poured into the -trenchline and attacked the bunkers with RPGs and satchel charges. They -also emplaced machine guns at the edge of the penetrations and pinned -down those Marines in the eastern half of the perimeter who were trying -to cross over the hill and reinforce their comrades.(108) - -The men in the northeastern sector, led by the platoon commander, -Second Lieutenant Terence R. Roach, Jr., counterattacked down the -trenchline and became engaged in savage hand-to-hand fighting. While -rallying his troops and directing fire from atop an exposed bunker, -Lieutenant Roach was mortally wounded. From sheer weight of numbers, -the North Vietnamese gradually pushed the Marines back until the enemy -owned the western half of the outpost. At that point, neither side was -able to press the advantage. Pre-registered mortar barrages from 1/9 -and artillery fire from the KSCB had isolated the NVA assault units -from any reinforcements but at the same time the depleted 1st Platoon -was not strong enough to dislodge the enemy.(109) - -One Marine had an extremely close call during the fight but lived to -tell about it. On the northern side of the perimeter, Private First -Class Michael A. Barry of the 1st Squad was engaged in a furious hand -grenade duel with the NVA soldiers when a ChiCom grenade hit him on -top of the helmet and landed at the young Marine's feet. PFC Barry -quickly picked it up and drew back to throw but the grenade went off -in his hand. Had it been an American M-26 grenade, the private would -undoubtedly have been blown to bits but ChiCom grenades frequently -produced an uneven frag pattern. In this case, the bulk of the blast -went down and away from the Marine's body; Barry had the back of his -right arm, his back, and his right leg peppered with metal fragments -but he did not lose any fingers and continued to function for the rest -of the battle.(110) - -In another section of the trenchline, Lance Corporal Robert L. Wiley -had an equally hair-raising experience. Wiley, a shell-shock victim, -lay flat on his back in one of the bunkers which had been overrun by -the enemy. His eardrums had burst, he was temporarily paralyzed and -his glazed eyes were fixed in a corpse-like stare but the Marine was -alive and fully aware of what was going on around him. Thinking that -Wiley was dead, the North Vietnamese were only interested in rummaging -through his personal effects for souvenirs. One NVA soldier found the -Marine's wallet and took out several pictures including a snapshot of -his family gathered around a Christmas tree. After pocketing their -booty, the North Vietnamese moved on; Lance Corporal Wiley was later -rescued by the relief column.(111) - -At 0730, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell committed a second platoon, -headed by the Company A commander, Captain Henry J. M. Radcliffe, to -the action. By 0900, the relief force had made its way to the eastern -slope of the small hill and established contact with the trapped -platoon. During the advance, Companies B and D, along with one section -of tanks, delivered murderous direct fire to the flanks and front -of Captain Radcliffe's column, breaking up any attempt by the enemy -to interdict the linkup. After several flights of strike aircraft -had pasted the reverse slope of the hill, the company commander led -his combined forces in a frontal assault over the crest and, within -15 minutes, drove the North Vietnamese from the outpost. Automatic -weapons chopped down many North Vietnamese as they fled from the hill. -The battered remnants of the enemy force retreated to the west and, -once in the open, were also taken under fire by the rest of the Marine -battalion. In addition, the artillery batteries at KSCB contributed to -the slaughter and, when the smoke cleared, 150 North Vietnamese were -dead. Although the platoon lines were restored, Colonel Lownds decided -to abandon the position and, at 1200, the two units withdrew with their -casualties. Marine losses that morning on the outpost were 21 killed -and 26 wounded; at the base, 5 were killed and 6 wounded.(112) - -During the next two weeks, the NVA mounted no major ground attack but -continued to apply pressure on the KSCB. There were daily clashes along -the Marine lines but these were limited to small fire fights, sniping -incidents, and probes against the wire. A decrease in activity along -the various infiltration routes indicated that the enemy had completed -his initial buildup and was busily consolidating positions from which -to launch an all-out effort. The Allies continued to improve their -defenses and by mid-February most units occupied positions with three -or four layers of barbed wire, dense minefields, special detection -devices, deep trenches, and mortar-proof bunkers. The battle reverted -to a contest of supporting arms and the North Vietnamese stepped up -their shelling of the base, especially with direct fire weapons. -Attempts to silence the enemy guns were often frustrated because the -Marines were fighting two battles during February--one with the NVA, -the other with the weather.(113) - - - - -PART V - -THE AIRLIFT - - -The weather at Khe Sanh throughout February could be characterized -in one word--miserable. General Tompkins remarked that, for combat -purposes, the weather was the worst that he'd ever seen. The northeast -monsoons had long since spilled over into the Khe Sanh Valley and every -morning the base was shrouded with ground fog and low scud layers which -dissipated around 1000 or 1100. When the sun finally managed to burn -through, the cloud ceiling retreated slightly but still hovered low -enough to prevent the unrestricted use of airborne artillery spotters -and strike aircraft. It was during these periods, when the overcast was -between 100 and 500 feet, that enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire -was the heaviest. The NVA forward observers, perched along the lower -slopes of the surrounding hills, called in and adjusted barrages with -little fear of retaliation against their own gun positions. Later in -the afternoon, when the fog rolled in again and obscured the enemy's -view, the incoming tapered off.[33](114) - -The Marines adjusted their schedule accordingly. They usually worked -under the cover of the haze in the morning, went underground during the -midday shelling, and returned to their duties later in the afternoon. -While the extremely low cloud cover occasionally befriended the men -at the base, it constantly plagued the pilots whose mission was to -resupply the 26th Marines. - -The job of transporting enough "bullets, beans, and bandages" to -sustain the 6,680 Khe Sanh defenders fell to the C-130s of Marine -Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 and the U. S. Air Force 834th -Air Division; the C-123s of the 315th Air Commando Wing; the UH-34, -CH-46, and UH-1E helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36); and -the CH-53 choppers of MAG-16.[34](115) - -[Illustration: Ground fog in the morning and late afternoon shrouded -the base obscuring the view of both the enemy and the Marines. (Photo -courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -[Illustration: The reduced visibility from fog and haze hampered air -operations. Crews of Marine UH-1E gunships wait for ceiling to lift. -(Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -Even under ideal circumstances, the airlift would have been a massive -undertaking. The difficulties, however, were compounded by the poor -visibility which was below minimum for airfield operations 40 percent -of the time and the heavy volume of antiaircraft and artillery fire -directed at the incoming transports. The NVA had moved several -antiaircraft units into the hills east of the airstrip forcing the -C-130 Hercules, the C-123 Providers, and the helicopters to run the -gauntlet during their final approach. Under cover of the heavy fog, -some audacious NVA gun crews positioned their antiaircraft weapons -just off the eastern threshold of the runway and fired in the blind -whenever they heard the drone of incoming planes. Several aircraft were -hit while on GCA final and completely in the soup.[35](116) Immediately -after touchdown, the aircraft were subjected to intense mortar and -rocket fire; in fact, the incoming was so closely synchronized with -their arrival, the fixed-wing transports were nicknamed "mortar -magnets" by the Marines.(117) - -[Illustration: View of airstrip at Khe Sanh facing east. (Photo -courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -[Illustration: U. S. Air Force C-130 about to touch down after -approaching from the east. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -The key to survival for the pilots was a steep approach through the -eastern corridor, a short roll-out, and a speedy turnaround after -landing. A small ramp paralleled the western end of the strip which the -transport crews used as an unloading point. After roll-out, the pilot -turned off the runway onto the easternmost taxiway, then wheeled onto -the ramp while the loadmasters shoved the pallets of supplies out the -back.[36] All outgoing passengers were loaded on the double because the - -planes rarely stopped rolling. The pilot completed the loop by turning -back onto the runway via the western taxiway and took off in the -opposite direction from which he landed. It was not uncommon for the -entire circuit to be completed within three minutes; even then, the -planes were tracked by exploding mortar rounds.(118) - -On 10 February, a tragedy occurred which resulted in a drastic -alteration of the unloading process. A Marine C-130, heavily laden -with bladders of fuel for the 26th Marines, was making its approach to -the field under intense fire. Just before the giant bird touched down, -the cockpit and fuel bags were riddled by enemy bullets. With flames -licking at one side, the stricken craft careened off the runway 3,100 -feet from the approach end, spun around, and was rocked by several -muffled explosions. The C-130 then began to burn furiously. Crash crews -rushed to the plane and started spraying it with foam. The pilot, Chief -Warrant Officer Henry Wildfang, and his copilot suffered minor burns as -they scrambled out the overhead hatch in the cockpit. Fire fighters in -specially designed heat suits dashed into the flaming debris and pulled -several injured crewmen and passengers to safety--rescue attempts came -too late for six others. One of those killed in the crash, Lieutenant -Colonel Carl E. Peterson, the 1st MAW Engineer Officer, was a reserve -officer who only a few months before had volunteered for active duty. -As a result of this accident and damage sustained by other transports -while on the ground, C-130 landings at Khe Sanh were suspended.(119) - -[Illustration: Death of a Hercules. A C-130 of Marine Aerial Refueler -Transport Squadron 152 burns after crashing at the base. (Photo -courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -[Illustration: Crash crew at Khe Sanh pours foam on a burning CH-46 -helicopter following an enemy artillery attack. (USMC Photo A190350)] - -With the field closed to C-130s, a U. S. Air Force innovation--the -Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System or LAPES--was put into -effect. This self-contained system, which had been used extensively -during the renovation of the airstrip in the fall of 1967, enabled -the aircraft to unload their cargo without landing. When making a -LAPES run, the Hercules pilot made his approach from the east during -which he opened the tail ramp and deployed a reefed cargo parachute. -Prior to touchdown, he added just enough power to hold the aircraft -about five feet above the ground. As the plane skimmed over the runway -and approached the intended extraction point, the pilot electrically -opened the streaming chute which was attached to the roller-mounted -cargo pallets. The sudden jolt of the blossoming chute snatched the -cargo from the rear hatch and the pallets came to a skidding halt on -the runway. The pilot then jammed the throttles to the firewall, eased -back on the yoke, and executed a high-angle, westerly pull-out to avoid -ground fire while the Marines moved onto the runway with forklifts -and quickly gathered in the supplies. The system was quite ingenious -and allowed the aircraft to pass through the V-ring in a matter of -seconds.[37] Even though the airmen could not control the skidding -pallets after release, some pilots perfected their individual technique -and were able to place the cargo on a 25-meter square with consistency. -On one occasion, however, an extraction chute malfunctioned and the -cargo rocketed off the western end of the runway; the eight-ton pallet -of lumber smashed into a messhall located near the end of the strip and -crushed three Marines to death.(120) - -Another technique--the Ground Proximity Extraction System or GPES--was -also used but to a lesser degree than the LAPES. (15 GPES deliveries -during the siege as compared to 52 LAPES.) Both utilized the low -approach but with GPES the cargo was extracted by a hook extended from -a boom at the rear of the aircraft. As the C-130 swooped low over the -runway, the pilot tried to snag an arresting cable similar to the one -used on aircraft carriers; only his hook was attached to the cargo -bundles and not the plane. Upon engagement, the pallets were jerked -from the rear hatch and came to a dead stop on the runway. With the -GPES, the chance of a pallet skidding out of control or overturning was -greatly reduced. The only problem that occurred was not with the system -itself but with faulty installation. The Marines who initially emplaced -the GPES were frequently chased away from their work by incoming mortar -rounds and, as a result of the periodic interruptions, the cable was -not anchored properly. The first C-130 that snagged the wire ripped -the arresting gear out by the roots. After the initial bugs were -remedied, the system worked so successfully that, on one pass, a load -containing 30 dozen eggs was extracted without a single eggshell being -cracked.(121) - -Most of the time, however, the low overcast precluded the use of either -extraction system and the preponderance of supplies was delivered by -paradrops. This technique called for close air/ground coordination and -the C-130 pilots relied on the Marine Air Traffic Control Unit (MATCU) -at Khe Sanh to guide them in to the drop zones. The Marine ground -controller lined the aircraft up on the long axis of the runway for a -normal instrument approach and when the Hercules passed a certain point -over the eastern threshold of the field, the controller called "Ready, -Ready, Mark." At "Mark," the pilot pushed a stop watch, activated his -Doppler navigational system, turned to a predetermined heading and -maintained an altitude of between 500 and 600 feet. The Doppler device -indicated any deviation from the desired track to the drop zone, which -was west of Red Sector, and the release point was calculated by using -the stop watch--20 to 26 seconds from "Mark," depending on the winds. -At the computed release point, the pilot pulled the C-130 into an -8-degree nose-up attitude and 16 parachute bundles, containing 15 tons -of supplies, slid from the rear of the aircraft and floated through the -overcast into the 300-meter-square drop zone. Under Visual Flight Rules -(VFR), the average computed error for the drops was only 95 meters. -Even when these missions were executed completely under Instrument -Flight Rules (IFR), the average distance that the bundles landed from -the intended impact point was 133 meters--well inside the drop zone. -On a few occasions, however, the parachute bundles missed the zone and -drifted far enough away from the base to preclude a safe recovery. In -these rare instances, friendly artillery and air strikes were brought -to bear on the wayward containers to keep them from falling into the -hands of the enemy. During the siege, Air Force C-130 crews conducted a -total of 496 paradrops at Khe Sanh.[38](122) - -Although the paradrops were sufficient for bulk commodities such -as rations and ammunition, there were certain items which had to -be delivered or picked up personally. Medical supplies, special -ammunition, and other delicate cargo would not withstand the jolt -of a parachute landing. In addition, there were replacements to -be shuttled into the base and casualties to be evacuated. With the -cancellation of all C-130 landings, this job was left up to the sturdy -C-123 Providers of the 315th Air Commando Wing as well as MAG-36 and -MAG-16 helicopters. The choppers could maneuver around areas of heavy -ground fire, land, unload, take on medevacs, and depart very quickly -but their payloads were limited. On the other hand, the C-123s had a -larger cargo capacity but were restricted to a more rigid approach and -provided better targets both in the pattern and on the ground.[39](123) -The Providers, however, required much less runway from which to operate -than the C-130s and could land and take off using only 1,400 of the -3,900 foot strip. This saving feature enabled the pilots to make a -steep approach, short roll-out, and rapid turnaround. The crews still -had to undergo those frantic moments on the ground when the geysers of -dirty-black smoke bracketed their aircraft. Nevertheless, the dauntless -C-123 crews continued their perilous missions throughout the siege with -great success.(124) - -No discussion of the airlift would be complete without mention of -the MAG-36 and MAG-16 helicopter pilots who flew in and out of Khe -Sanh daily delivering supplies, delicate cargo, reinforcements, and -evacuating casualties. The chopper crews were faced with the same -problems that plagued the fixed-wing transports--low ceilings and enemy -ground fire--but to a greater degree because of their slow speed and -vulnerability. MAG-36 operated primarily from Quang Tri and Dong Ha, -and was reinforced from the group's main base at Phu Bai. These valiant -pilots and crewmen in their Huey gunships, CH-46 transports, and UH-34s -flew long hours, day and night, in all kinds of weather to sustain the -Marines in and around Khe Sanh. The CH-53s of Da Nang-based MAG-16, -with their heavier payload, also made a sizeable contribution to this -effort.(125) - -[Illustration: C-130 Hercules conducts paradrops west of Red Sector. -(USMC Photo A190803)] - -[Illustration: A UH-34 of MAG-36 departs Khe Sanh on its way to the -hill outposts. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -The resupply of the hill outposts was a particularly hazardous aspect -of the overall mission. Approximately 20 percent of Colonel Lownds' -personnel occupied these redoubts and, for all practical purposes, -were cut off from the rest of the garrison. The road north of the base -was not secure and the perimeters atop the hills were too small and -irregular for parachute drops; the only way that the isolated posts -could be sustained was by helicopter. When the dense monsoon clouds -rolled into the valley, the mountain tops were the first to become -submerged and, as the overcast lifted, the last to reappear. During -February, several of the outposts were completely obscured for more -than a week and resupply was impossible. During these periods, the -North Vietnamese took advantage of the reduced visibility and emplaced -heavy automatic weapons along the neighboring peaks and waited for the -ceiling to lift which invariably heralded the arrival of helicopters. -As a result, the UH-1Es, UH-34s, and CH-46s were subjected to a hail of -enemy bullets during each mission.(126) - -When the helicopters proceeded to the hills singly or in small groups, -each mission was a hair-raising experience for both the chopper crews -and the men on the ground. A good example of what often transpired -during those frantic moments occurred early in the siege on Hill 881S -when Captain Dabney called for a chopper to evacuate a badly wounded -Marine. One corporal was assigned as a stretcher bearer because he -had a badly impacted wisdom tooth and, once aboard, he could ride -out on the helicopter and have the tooth extracted at the main -base.[40] Because of the 120mm mortars located in the Horseshoe and the -antiaircraft guns which ringed the hill, the men on 881S had to employ -a variety of diversions to keep the enemy gunners from getting the -range of the incoming choppers. In this instance, they threw a smoke -grenade a good distance away from the actual landing zone in hopes that -the gunners would register on the smoke and the helicopter would be in -and out before the North Vietnamese could readjust. This meant that the -helo had about 19 seconds to get off the ground.(127) - -The ruse did not come off as planned. The stretcher bearers had -barely loaded the wounded man aboard the helicopter, a CH-46, when -120mm mortar rounds bracketed the aircraft and spurred the pilot to -action. The helo lurched into the air and the sudden jolt rolled the -corporal with the bad tooth over the edge of the tail ramp; he held on -desperately for a few seconds but finally let go and fell about 20 feet -to the ground. Cursing to himself, the young man limped back to his -trench and waited for another chance. - -Later that day, a UH-34 swooped in to pick up another casualty and the -prospective dental patient quickly scrambled aboard. This trip also -covered about 20 feet--10 feet up and 10 feet down--because the tail -rotor of the UH-34 was literally sawed off by a burst from an enemy -machine gun just after the bird became airborne. After the swirling -craft came to rest, the passengers and the three-man crew quickly -clamored out the hatch and dived into a nearby trench. A heavy mortar -barrage ensued during which several more men were hit. - -By the time another CH-46 arrived on the scene, the passenger list had -grown to 14, including 10 casualties, the crew of the downed helo, and -the original dental case. Because of the heavy concentration of enemy -fire in the original zone, the Marines had blasted out another landing -site on the opposite side of the hill. The chopper touched down and 13 -of the 14 Marines boarded before the crew chief stated emphatically -that the aircraft was full. As luck would have it, the young Marine -with the swollen jaw was the 14th man. Thoroughly indignant, the -three-time loser returned to his position and mumbled that he would -rather suffer from a toothache than try and get off the hill by -helicopter.[41](128) - -It was the consensus of both the ground commanders and pilots alike -that the problem of getting helicopters to and from the hills was -becoming critical. The technique then employed was resulting in -casualties among both the air crews and the infantry units, as well as -a rapid rise in the attrition of MAG-36 helicopters. The Huey gunships, -though putting forth a valiant effort, did not possess the heavy volume -of fire required to keep the approach lanes open. As a result, the 1st -MAW adopted another system which provided more muscle.(129) - -The solution was basically a page out of the Fleet Marine Force Manual -for Helicopter Support Operations. All helicopter flights to the hill -outposts were to be escorted by strike aircraft which would provide -suppressive fire. The A-4 Skyhawks of Chu Lai-based MAG-12 were -selected as the fixed-wing escorts and the little jet was perfect for -the job. Affectionately referred to as "Scooters" by their pilots, -the A-4 was a highly maneuverable attack aircraft; its accuracy, -dependability, and varied ordnance load had made it the workhorse of -Marine close air support for many years. - -[Illustration: After introduction of the Super Gaggle, CH-46 -helicopters with their 4,000-pound external loads proceeded to the hill -outposts in convoy. (USMC Photo A422061)] - -[Illustration: A-4 Skyhawks of Marine Aircraft Group-12 provided -suppressive fire during resupply missions. (USMC Photo A421671)] - -Generals Cushman and Anderson conceived the idea and the details were -worked out by Colonel Joel B. Bonner, Lieutenant Colonel William J. -White, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Carey at 1st MAW Headquarters. -The operation went into effect on 24 February. Because of the large -number of aircraft utilized in each mission--12 A-4s, 1 TA-4, 12 -CH-46s, and 4 UH-1E gunships--the overall effort was nicknamed the Super -Gaggle by its planners. The difficulty in execution was primarily one -of coordination and control because of the various agencies (i.e. -MAG-36, MAG-12, 3d MarDiv G-4, Dong Ha Logistics Support Area, and the -units on the hill outposts) which were involved. Additional factors -that had to be considered were departure weather, destination weather, -and coordination of friendly artillery and air strikes around Khe Sanh. -Lieutenant Colonel Carey, the 1st MAW Operations Officer and one of the -planners, later described the mechanics of the Super Gaggle: - - Success of the effort was predicated on timing, coordination, and - often times luck. Luck, as used, refers to the ability to guess - whether the weather would hold long enough to complete an effort - once it got underway. The effort began with the TA-4 on station - determining if sufficient ceiling existed for the "Scooters" - of MAG-12 to provide sufficient suppressive fires to assure - success.... Once the TA-4 called all conditions go, an "H" hour - was set and the Super Gaggle began. Twelve A-4s would launch from - Chu Lai while simultaneously 100 miles to the north 12-16 helos - would launch from the Quang Tri helo base and proceed to the Dong - Ha LSA (Logistics Support Area) for supply pickup. The object was - for all aircraft to arrive in the objective area on a precise - schedule. So the operation generally consisted as follows: (1) - Softening up known enemy positions by four A-4s, generally armed - with napalm and bombs; (2) Two A-4s armed with CS (tear gas) tanks - saturate enemy antiaircraft and automatic weapons positions; (3) - 30-40 seconds prior to final run in by the helos two A-4s lay a - smoke screen along selected avenues of approach.... (4) While helos - make final run into the target, four A-4s with bombs, rockets, and - 20mm guns provide close-in fire suppression.... Once the helos - commenced their descent the factors of weather, their 4,000-pound - externally carried load, and the terrain would not permit a second - chance. If an enemy gun was not suppressed there was no alternative - for the helos but to continue. They (the transport pilots) were - strengthened with the knowledge that following close on their - heels were their gunships ready to pick them up if they survived - being shot down. Fortunately, these tactics were so successful - that during the entire period of the Super Gaggle only two CH-46s - were downed enroute to the hill positions. The crews were rescued - immediately by escorting Huey gunships.[42](130) - -These missions, however, looked much more orderly on paper than they -did in the air and the operation lived up to its name. Only those who -have experienced the hazards of monsoon flying can fully appreciate the -veritable madhouse that often exists when large numbers of aircraft -are confined to the restricted space beneath a low-hanging overcast. -Coupled with this was the fact that the fluffy looking clouds around -Khe Sanh housed mountains which ran up to 3,000 feet. No doubt, the -aircrews involved in the Gaggle were mindful of the standard warning -issued to fledgling aviators: "Keep your eyes out of the cockpit; -a mid-air collision could ruin your whole day." Even though the -missions were well-coordinated and executed with a high degree of -professionalism, it often appeared that confusion reigned because -planes were everywhere. A-4s bore in on the flanks of the approach -lanes blasting enemy gun positions and spewing protective smoke; -CH-46s groped through the haze trying to find the landing zones; the -hornet-like UH-1E gunships darted in from the rear in case someone was -shot down; and the lone TA-4 circled overhead trying to keep his flock -from running amuck. During the missions to 881S, the men of India and -Mike, 3/26, added to the hullabaloo with a little twist of their own. -When the CH-46s settled over the hill, the Marines on the ground tossed -out a few dozen smoke grenades for added cover and then every man in -the perimeter fired a full magazine at anything on the surrounding -slopes which appeared hostile. With some 350 men hosing down the -countryside at the same time, the din was terrific. - -Neither the deluge of lead from 881S nor the suppressive fire of the -jets and gunships kept the NVA completely quiet. The 120mm mortar -crews in the Horseshoe were especially active during the resupply -runs to 881S and always lobbed some rounds onto the hill in hopes of -knocking down a helicopter. These tubes had been previously registered -on the LZs and the smoke screens had little effect on their fire; as -a result, the Marines frequently shifted landing zones.[43] The smoke -did block the view of the North Vietnamese machine gunners and they -were forced to fire blindly through the haze--if they dared fire at -all. The choppers still took hits but nowhere near as many as before -the Gaggle was initiated. The CH-46 pilots, poised precariously above -the LZs during the few agonizing seconds it took to unload their cargo, -often heard the sickening smack which meant that a bullet had torn into -the fuselage of their thin-skinned helos. The members of the two-man -Helicopter Support Teams (HST), 3d Shore Party Battalion who were -attached to the rifle companies were also prime targets. These men had -to stand up while they guided the choppers into the LZs and, every few -days, they had to attach bundles of cargo nets, which accumulated from -previous missions, for the return trip to Dong Ha. This was dangerous -for the aircrews as well as the HST men because, during the hook-up, -the pilots had to hold their aircraft in a vulnerable position a few -feet above the ground with the nose cocked up and the belly exposed -to fire from the front. While they attached the bundles, the ground -support personnel could hear the machine gun rounds zing a few inches -over their heads and slap into the soft underside of the suspended -helicopter. Not all the bullets and shell fragments passed overhead; on -881S, the defenders were operating with their fourth HST when the siege -ended. - -In spite of the seriousness of the situation, the Gaggle was not -without its lighter episodes. In one instance, an HST man attached -to I/3/26 hooked up an outgoing load and gave the pilot the "thumbs -up" when he discovered that he had become entangled in the pile of -nets. The CH-46 surged into the air with the startled Marine dangling -helplessly from the bottom of the net by one foot. But for the quick -reaction of his comrade on the ground who informed the pilot by radio -that the chopper had taken on more than the prescribed load, the young -cargo handler would have had a rather interesting trip to Dong Ha. The -CH-46 crews also provided a human touch during these missions. When the -Sea Knights swept over the hills, it was not uncommon to see a machine -gunner on board quit his weapon for a second, nonchalantly pitch a case -of soda pop out the hatch, and then quickly return to blaze away at the -enemy positions. At 1st MAW Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Carey, who -had been an infantryman in Korea before he went to flight school and -who sympathized with the men on the outposts, felt that a small gesture -acknowledging their continued outstanding performance was in order. -Special efforts were made to obtain quantities of dry ice for packing -and one day, without notice, hundreds of Dixie-cups of ice cream were -delivered to the men on the hills as part of the regular resupply. This -effort was dubbed Operation COOL IT. The only hitch developed on 881S -where the Marines, unaware of the contents, allowed the cargo to remain -in the LZ until after dark when it was safe to venture out of the -trenchline. The ice cream was a little sloppy but edible and greatly -appreciated. - -The introduction of the Super Gaggle was a turning point in the -resupply effort. Prior to its conception, the Marines on the outposts -dreaded the thought of leaving their positions to retrieve cargo--even -when it included mail--because of the heavy shelling. With a dozen -Skyhawks pasting the surrounding hills during each mission, this -threat was alleviated to a large degree and casualties tapered off. -The Company I, 3/26, commander later stated: "If it weren't for the -Gaggle, most of us probably wouldn't be here today." The helicopter -pilots, knowing that their jet jockey compatriots were close at hand, -were also able to do their job more effectively. In the past, the -transport crew chiefs occasionally had to jettison their external load -prematurely when the pilot took evasive action to avoid ground fire. -When this occurred, the cargo nets usually slammed into the perimeter -and splattered containers all over the hilltop.[44](131) With the Super -Gaggle, the pilots had less enemy fire to contend with and did not bomb -the hills with the cargo pallets as much; as a result more supplies -arrived intact. In addition, the system greatly facilitated the picking -up of wounded personnel.[45] - -The Marine helicopters continued their flights to and from Khe Sanh -throughout the siege. In spite of the obstacles, the chopper pilots -crammed enough sorties into those days with flyable weather to haul -465 tons of supplies to the base during February. When the weather -later cleared, this amount was increased to approximately 40 tons a -day. While supporting Operation SCOTLAND, MAG-36 and MAG-16 flew 9,109 -sorties, transported 14,562 passengers, and delivered 4,661 tons of -cargo.(132) - -Colonel Lownds was more than satisfied with the airborne pipeline -which kept his cupboard full and he had quite a cupboard. The daily -requirement for the 26th Marines to maintain normal operations had -jumped from 60 tons in mid-January to roughly 185 tons when all five -battalions were in place. While the defenders didn't live high off -the hog on this amount, at no time were they desperately lacking the -essentials for combat. There were periods on the hills when the Marines -either stretched their rations and water or went without, but they -never ran short of ammunition. Understandably, ammunition had the -highest priority--even higher than food and water. A man might not be -able to eat a hand grenade but neither could he defend himself very -effectively with a can of fruit cocktail. This did not mean that the -men of the 26th Marines went hungry. On the average, the troops at the -base received two C-Ration meals a day and this fare was occasionally -supplemented with juice, pastry, hot soup, or fresh fruit. The men on -the hills subsisted almost entirely on C-Rations and the time between -meals varied, depending on the weather. Within the compound, water was -rationed only when the pump was out of commission and that was a rare -occurrence. Lieutenant Colonel Heath's position on Hill 558 was flanked -by two streams so 2/26 was well supplied but the Marines on the other -four outposts depended on helilifts for water; it was used sparingly -for drinking and cooking.[46](133) Besides the essentials, the 26th -Marines also required tons of other supplies such as fortification -material, fuel, tires, barbed wire, and spare parts--to name a few. -PX items were on the bottom of the bottom of the priority totem pole -because, as Colonel Lownds remarked: "If you have to, you can live -without those." On the other hand, mail had a priority second only to -ammunition and rations. The men at Khe Sanh received over 43 tons of -mail during the worst month of the siege.(134) - -[Illustration: A CH-46 helicopter of Marine Aircraft Group-36 evacuates -wounded from Hill 861A (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -[Illustration: U. S. Navy doctors and corpsmen, wearing helmets and -flak jackets, treat wounded at Charlie Med aid station. (Photo courtesy -David D. Duncan)] - -One portion of the airlift which affected morale as much as the arrival -of mail was the swift departure of casualties. A man's efficiency was -greatly improved by the knowledge that, if he were hit, he could -expect immediate medical attention and when necessary, a speedy -evacuation.[47] Those with minor wounds were usually treated at the -various battalion aid stations and returned to duty; the more seriously -injured were taken to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion. Charley Med, -as this detachment was called, was located just south of and adjacent -to the aircraft loading ramp. There, U. S. Navy doctors and corpsmen -treated the walking wounded, performed surgery, and prepared the -litter cases for medevac. From Charley Med, it was a short, but -often nerve-racking trip to a waiting aircraft and a hospital at -Phu Bai. During the siege, the courageous men of Charley Med, often -working under heavy enemy fire, treated and evacuated 852 wounded -personnel.(135) - -Thus the Marine and U. S. Air Force transport pilots, helicopter crews, -loadmasters, and ground personnel kept open the giant umbilical cord -which meant life for the combat base. Without their efforts, the story -of Khe Sanh would undoubtedly have been an abbreviated edition with -a not-too-happy ending. On the other hand, accounts of the heroism, -ingenuity, and skill demonstrated by these men would fill a book. But -there were other things besides manna falling from the heavens at Khe -Sanh and the vital role of the transports was frequently eclipsed by -the efforts of air crews who carried a much deadlier cargo.(136) - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[25] One Marine, Corporal Robert J. Arrota, using a PRC-41 UHF radio -which put him in direct contact with the attack pilots, personally -controlled over 200 air strikes without the aid of a Tactical Air -Controller (Airborne); his peers gave him the title of "The Mightiest -Corporal In The World." - -[26] Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, whose battalion held the rock quarry -perimeter, later commented that his troops patrolled out to 1,200 -meters. The units at the base never went that far until the siege was -lifted. - -[27] The men of Company I used the same methods to cool the mortar -tubes that they used during the attack against 861 on 21 January. - -[28] The defenders later reported knocking out at least one and -probably two tanks with rocket launchers. - -[29] The 26th Marines FSCC had prepared extensive defensive fire plans -for the Lang Vei Camp. In the early stages of the attack, the camp -commander did not request artillery and later asked for only a few -concentrations. He never asked for the entire schedule to be put into -effect. - -[30] Documents taken off a dead NVA officer later in the battle -indicated that the enemy hoped that the attack on Lang Vei would draw -the Marines out of Khe Sanh so he could destroy the relief column. - -[31] In November 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, on direction -of the regimental commander, had sent a rifle company to determine -possible direct routes through the jungle. The company commander, -Captain John N. Raymond, reported that his unit, avoiding well-used -trails to preclude ambush, had made the trip in about 19 hours. - -[32] On the return trip to the KSCB, Captain Richards flew over the -outskirts of Khe Sanh Village. A NVA soldier suddenly stepped out of -one hut and sprayed the low-flying chopper with a burst from his AK-47 -assault rifle. The rounds ripped out part of Richards' instrument panel -and one bullet zinged about two inches in front of his nose before -passing through the top of the cockpit. A Marine gunner on the CH-46 -quickly cut down the North Vietnamese but the damage had already been -done. Even though he was shaken by the experience, the pilot nursed his -crippled bird back to the base and landed safely. Once on the ground, -he quickly switched helicopters and returned to Lang Vei for another -evacuation mission. For his actions during the day, Captain Richards -was later awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. - -[33] The weather during February was bad for operations but not -particularly uncomfortable. The mean temperature was 71 degrees, the -average humidity was 92 percent, and an average weekly rainfall was -.04 inches. The wind was out of the east with an average velocity of 6 -miles per hour. - -[34] Organizationally, the USAF C-130s belonged to the 315th Air -Division but that unit did not operate in Vietnam. Five to seven -aircraft from each of the 315th's squadrons were on temporary duty -in Vietnam and were under the operational control of the 834th -Air Division. The 315th Air Commando Wing and its C-123s were -organizationally part of the 834th. - -[35] One NVA gun crew came in too close for its own good. The 1/26 -commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, dispatched a platoon from -Company D to attack this position which was off the northeastern end -of the airstrip. While the 81mm mortars of 1/26 provided support, the -platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Daniel L. McGravey, and his men -aggressively assaulted the position. During a brisk fire fight, they -killed several North Vietnamese, captured the antiaircraft weapon, and -took the gunner prisoner. - -[36] If a pilot made his approach from the west, which was not often -the case, he had to taxi all the way back down the runway to the -loading ramp. - -[37] V-ring is a term used on the rifle range to describe the -bull's-eye of a target. - -[38] Disparities in official records make it difficult to determine -the exact tonnage delivered to Khe Sanh by air. The USAF Historical -Division Liaison Office states that, of the 14,356 tons delivered -during the siege, Air Force planes were responsible for 12,430 tons -(8,120 tons by paradrop, LAPES and GPES; 4,310 by aircraft landing -at the field). On the other hand, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records -show that Marine helicopters alone carried 4,661 tons of cargo. About -three-fourths of the helicopter tonnage, however, was lifted directly -from Dong Ha to the hill outposts and thus did not pass through the -main base at Khe Sanh. Neither total includes the contributions made by -Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152; the records of that unit -only indicate the tonnage transported throughout the whole of I Corps -and do not break it down to the amount delivered to individual bases -such as Khe Sanh. - -[39] This resulted in another fiery crash on 6 March when a C-123 was -shot down while on approach to the field and all aboard (43 USMC, 1 -USN, and 4 USAF) were killed. - -[40] Having the ambulatory cases serve as stretcher bearers was -standard operating procedure on 881S. These men stayed on the chopper -and did not have to make the return trip to their trenches under fire. -When uninjured Marines served in this capacity there was the added -danger that the helicopter would take off before they could debark and -they would end up at Khe Sanh. In one instance after the siege was -lifted, Captain Dabney spent a day at the combat base because he did -not get off a medevac chopper fast enough. - -[41] During the course of the battle, 881S became a small graveyard -for helicopters; at least five were downed on or around the hill. -Consequently, Company I gained a reputation among chopper crews which -lasted long after the siege was over. When the 3d Battalion later -departed Khe Sanh, Company I eventually moved to Hill 55 near Da Nang. -One afternoon, while evacuating a wounded Marine, a CH-46 developed -engine trouble and the pilot decided to shut down for repairs. Another -flight was sent to pick up the wounded man and as the lead pilot -approached he came up over the radio and asked his wingman where the -landing zone was. The wingman replied: "Just look for the downed -chopper, India _[_Company I_]_ always marks their zones that way." - -[42] For comparison as many as 16 helicopters were utilized up to four -times in one day during the Super Gaggle without a loss. Prior to the -conception of this technique, as many as three choppers were shot down -in one day around Khe Sanh. - -[43] There is an interesting possibility as to why the mortars in -the Horseshoe were never silenced. Fourteen years earlier, at Dien -Bien Phu, the North Vietnamese used an ingenious method to protect -their heavier siege mortars from air attacks and they may well have -repeated it at Khe Sanh. The mortar crews selected a site on the slope -of a hill, figured the elevation and deflection necessary to hit one -specific target, and then dug a small tunnel at that precise angle into -the side of the hill. The mortar was emplaced at the bottom of the -tunnel with connecting caves which housed the gunners. When fired, the -mortar rounds traveled up the shaft, sometimes as far as 50 feet before -reaching the surface. The foliage was cleared away from the mouth of -the tunnel so that the rounds did not hit the overhanging branches and -detonate prematurely. Mortars emplaced in this manner were, of course, -limited to only one target and, as far as the gunners in the Horseshoe -were concerned, that target was 881S. When the siege was later broken -and Marine units began to maneuver in the terrain surrounding the hill -mass, they were never taken under fire by the 120mm mortars even though -they did receive fire from smaller caliber weapons. Hill 881S, however, -continued to be hit periodically by the 120mms. - -[44] Of all the jettisoned loads, those containing water were the most -spectacular. On one occasion, a CH-46 carrying plastic containers of -water was forced to release the net about 200 feet above the ground. -The containers broke open in midair and the contents cascaded on the -hill below. The Company E, 2/26, commander, Captain Breeding, later -recalled that it produced one of the prettiest waterfalls he'd ever -seen. - -[45] It is no exaggeration to say that MAG-36 helicopters played a -decisive role in the battle. The maintenance of the hill outposts was -imperative if Khe Sanh was to be held, and these units depended on the -helicopters for survival. - -[46] During one period of extremely bad weather, the platoon from -A/1/26 which held positions on Hill 950 went without resupply for nine -days and the water shortage became a major problem. Lieutenant Colonel -Wilkinson authorized the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Maxie -R. Williams, to send a squad out to a small stream which was about -two hours march from the perimeter. In addition to finding water, the -Marines surprised a group of North Vietnamese and killed nine of the -enemy. One Marine was also killed. - -[47] Bad weather occasionally precluded the immediate evacuation of -casualties from the hill outposts. - - - - -PART VI - -SUPPORTING ARMS AND INTELLIGENCE - - -The amount of air and artillery support that the 26th Marines received -during the defense of Khe Sanh was enormous. Few regiments ever had -such an overwhelming amount of firepower at their disposal. The -reason was that General Westmoreland gave SCOTLAND priority over all -other operations in Vietnam. The well-publicized struggle had long -since become more than just another battle; it was a symbol of Allied -determination to hold the line in Vietnam. The stubborn resistance of -the 26th Marines had generated an emotional impact that was felt not -only in the United States but around the globe. Thanks to a small army -of war correspondents and reporters, millions of people followed the -battle day by day and, in essence, the military prowess of the United -States was exposed to the world. - -The agency at the combat base which was responsible for coordinating -the vast array of supporting arms was the 26th Marines FSCC which was -headed by the 1/13 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly. The FSCC, -with its artillery and air representatives, was an integral part of -the regimental staff and it planned and supervised the execution of -all fire missions within the SCOTLAND area of operations. Subordinate -to the FSCC, was the 1/13 Fire Direction Center (FDC), headed by -Captain Lawrence B. Salmon, and the Khe Sanh Direct Air Support Center -(DASC), under Major Charles D. Goddard. The FDC served as the brain -of the artillery battalion where initial fire requests were received -and transformed into numerical data for the gun crews. To speed up the -process, Captain Salmon relied heavily on the Field Artillery Digital -Automatic Computer or FADAC. The DASC had displaced to the KSCB on -19 January with the sole mission of handling the deluge of incoming -aircraft. Requests for air support from the FSCC were channeled through -the DASC to the Tactical Air Direction Center of the 1st MAW. Whenever -the wing could not completely fill a quota, liaison teams within the -DASC called on the other services for assistance. Once the schedule was -met and the strike aircraft arrived on station, the Marine DASC, aided -by an Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) from Seventh Air -Force, coordinated all air operations within the Khe Sanh TAOR.[48](137) - -This mammoth air umbrella, called Operation NIAGARA, lasted from 22 -January until 31 March and was truly an Allied effort. At one time or -another, the Khe Sanh DASC utilized the assets of all services: 1st -MAW, Seventh Air Force, Strategic Air Command, U. S. Navy Task Force -77, Vietnamese Air Force, and various U. S. Army aviation companies. -The majority of the sorties, however, were flown by U. S. Marine, Navy, -and Air Force crews. Their mission was to "destroy enemy forces in -the SCOTLAND ... TAOR, interdict enemy supply lines and base areas, -... and provide maximum tactical ... air support to friendly forces." -Generally, the type of strike fell into one of three categories: -close air support, B-52 Arc Light strikes, or radar-controlled -bombing.[49](138) - -Close air support missions were utilized against pinpoint targets in -proximity of friendly troops. Along with radar-controlled bombing, this -type of air strike was the most responsive to the needs of the ground -commanders and the most accurate; the attack pilots, however, required -reasonably good weather to be able to hit their targets. There were -usually fighter/bombers overhead at Khe Sanh around the clock; if not, -they could be quickly scrambled from hot pads or diverted from other -missions. When the pilots arrived on station, they checked in with -the DASC and were handed off to a Marine or Air Force Tactical Air -Controller (Airborne) who personally directed the strike. There were -seven TAC(A)s assigned to the 26th Marines; the Air Force personnel -were members of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron and the -Marines were from Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36 and Marine -Observation Squadron 6. At least five of these pilots, flying O1-E -Birddogs or UH-1E gunships, remained over the battlefield during the -day and maintained direct communications with both the attack aircraft -and the troops on the ground. In this manner, the TAC(A)s could rapidly -employ the jets wherever they were needed the most and the close -supervision reduced the chance of accidentally bombing friendly forces. - -During the day, the air around Khe Sanh was filled with the -high-pitched shriek of jet engines: Marine, Navy, and Air Force -F-4 Phantoms; Marine and Navy A-6 Intruders, A-4 Skyhawks, and F-8 -Crusaders; Air Force F-105 Thunderchiefs and F-100 Super Sabers. In -addition to the jets, the South Vietnamese prop-driven A-1 Skyraider, -a rugged attack aircraft of Korean War vintage, was in evidence. At -times, the sky overhead resembled a giant beehive. When a flight -arrived on station, the Khe Sanh DASC normally directed it into a -holding pattern until a TAC(A) or a Forward Air Controller on the -ground was free to handle the strike. These patterns sometimes extended -up to 35,000 feet with scores of planes gradually augering their way -downward as each preceding flight unloaded its ordnance and scooted for -home. - -When a TAC(A) picked out a lucrative target or was assigned one by -the FSCC, he cleared the strike aircraft into his area. The pilots -then broke up whatever formation they were in, slipped into trail, -and snaked their way through holes in the overcast--all the while -keeping a sharp eye out for helicopters. Below the clouds, the TAC(A)s -and attack pilots often had difficulty finding each other because of -the ever present haze and dust. Even on a clear day, the camouflaged -Birddogs and Hueys were hard to spot because they blended in so nicely -with the surrounding landscape. To expedite the link-up, the jet -pilots frequently used Automatic Direction Finders to get a fix on the -TAC(A)s radio transmissions. All the while, the airborne spotter was -passing on pertinent information such as target description, elevation, -run-in heading, direction of pull-off, number of passes, direction -and distance of nearest friendly troops, and whether ground fire was -expected. - -[Illustration: Marine and Air Force TAC(A)s controlled strike aircraft -from light observation aircraft called Birddogs. (USMC Photo A402048)] - -[Illustration: UH-1E Gunships of Marine Observation Squadron-6 were -also used to direct close air support missions. (USMC Photo A421451)] - -When the controller and his flight made visual contact, the real work -began. The TAC(A) made a marking run during which he either fired a -smoke rocket or pitched out a colored smoke grenade on the position he -wanted hit. Once the attack pilots had the smoke, the TAC(A), and the -nearest friendlies in sight, they rolled in on the assigned heading and -made dummy passes until the controller was satisfied that the jets were -lined up on the right target. He then cleared them in for hot passes. -While the jets streaked in, the controller monitored his VHF tactical -net to the ground troops and gave short corrections to the attack -pilots over his UHF radio. An example of an average commentary follows: - - TAC(A): Number One, from my smoke go six o'clock at 100 meters.... - PILOT: Roger, One's? in hot.... TAC(A): I have you in sight, you're - cleared to fire.... TAC(A): PILOT: Ones off target.... Switches - Safe.... TAC(A): Number Two, from One's hits come three o'clock at - 50 meters.... PILOT: Roger, Two's in hot ... etc., etc. - -The aircraft continued their race track pattern until all ordnance was -expended at which time the leader announced that his flight was pulling -off "high and dry."[50] - -The TAC(A) would then swoop low over the smoke-shrouded target and -attempt to record the results of the strike. This Battle Damage -Assessment (BDA) was relayed to the departing pilots for their -intelligence debriefing back at homeplate. An example of one such -transmission would be: - - Your BDA follows: 5 KBA (killed by air); two bunkers, 1 automatic - weapon, and 50 meters of trenchline destroyed; one secondary - explosion. You have been flying in support of the 26th Marines; - your controller has been SOUTHERN OSCAR. Good shooting and good - afternoon, gentlemen. - -While the strike pilots checked out with the Khe Sanh DASC and headed -for home, the TAC(A) looked for another target and waited for another -flight.(139) - -One of the most unusual incidents involving the use of strike aircraft -occurred near Hill 881S and the key figure in the episode was a Marine -from American Samoa--Lance Corporal Molimao Niuatoa. The corporal was a -bull of a man, who because of his origin and wedge-shape physique was -nicknamed "Pineapple Chunk." (A second American Samoan in the company -of considerably smaller stature was dubbed "Pineapple Tidbit.") But it -was not the muscles which distinguished Niuatoa, it was his eyes; the -man had absolutely phenomenal vision. During his recruit training, this -gift had enabled him to post a score of 241 out of a possible 250 on -the rifle range. Besides his vision, the corporal had the patience of -Job and a deep power of concentration--qualities which were essential -in his job as an artillery spotter. - -One day, Corporal Niuatoa, using a pair of 20-power naval binoculars, -was scanning in the direction of 305 when he picked up the muzzle flash -of an enemy artillery piece; he then saw the gunners hurriedly cover -the weapon with a screen. As the round sputtered overhead on its way to -Khe Sanh, the corporal noted the position and reported his discovery -to the company commander. Referring to a map, Captain Dabney could not -get anything other than a general idea of the location because the site -was from 12,000 to 13,000 meters away and the terrain in that area was -so mountainous that he could not pinpoint the exact contour line. Not -so Corporal Niuatoa, he could see exactly where the gun was and kept -his eyes glued to the binoculars. Normally, he would have adjusted on -the target with marking rounds but the site was beyond the range of -friendly artillery. The only way the gun could be taken out was with -aircraft. - -While Pineapple Chunk maintained his reference point, an O1-E Birddog -aircraft arrived on the scene, and was directed to the general area of -the artillery position. On the heels of the spotter craft came several -flights of Marine A-4 Skyhawks armed with 500-pound bombs. Although -the TAC(A) didn't know exactly where the target was, he rolled in -and cranked off a smoke rocket. The puff from the 2.75-inch rocket -wasn't visible to the Marines on 881S but the billowing clouds left by -the 500-pound bombs of the first A-4 were. Using standard artillery -terminology, Corporal Niuatoa adjusted: "Left 2,000, add 1,000." -The corrections were passed to the TAC(A) who fired another rocket, -on which an A-4 pilot placed another string of bombs. Gradually, -the bracket was closed until a Skyhawk in the fourth flight scored -a direct hit and the gun position erupted in a series of secondary -explosions.(140) - -[Illustration: Marine F-4B Phantom delivers Snakeye bombs on enemy -trenches. Large tail fins retard the descent of the bombs. (Photo -courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -[Illustration: Corporal Robert J. Arrotta (center), controlled over 200 -airstrikes from Hill 881S. (Photo courtesy Major William H. Dabney)] - -The NVA troops, however, were not always on the receiving end; they -frequently dished it out. In addition to numerous helicopters shot -down around the combat base, several of the speedier jets were also -knocked out of the sky. During one close air support mission, an A-4 -flown by Major William E. Loftus of Marine Attack Squadron 311 received -heavy battle damage and the pilot realized that he could not make it -to the coast. Not wanting to end up in "Indian Country," he nursed his -crippled Skyhawk toward Khe Sanh and ejected right over the base. As -the smoking A-4 knifed into the lush jungle growth and erupted in a -brilliant orange fireball, Major Loftus floated down and landed in an -outer ring of barbed wire just outside the Company B, 1/26 perimeter. -Lieutenant Dillon, the 2d Platoon commander, took several men out and -helped extricate the major who had become hopelessly entangled in his -parachute shroud lines and the barbed wire. After being freed, Major -Loftus grinned and told the lieutenant: "If you weren't so damn ugly, -I'd kiss you." After a quick medical check-up, the major climbed aboard -a helicopter and returned to his squadron at Chu Lai for another plane -and another day.(141) - -One of the closest escapes, however, occurred to the southwest of -the base. In late January, Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Hagaman, -Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323, and his Radar -Intercept Officer, Captain Dennis F. Brandon, were leading a flight -of F-4B Phantoms against what the TAC(A) described as a "suspected" -antiaircraft position. The enemy gunners confirmed their presence -during the first pass. As Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman's F-4B, armed with -napalm and 250-pound Snakeyes, skimmed low over the treetops, the North -Vietnamese cut loose and laced the belly of his plane with a stitch of -50 caliber shells. The aircraft shuddered under the impact and burst -into flames. Captain Brandon, a backseat veteran with over 300 combat -missions, knew instantly when he heard the series of ominous "thuds" -that the Phantom had been mortally wounded; he quickly pulled his -face curtain and ejected. Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman stayed with the -bucking Phantom momentarily in a vain effort to stabilize the aircraft -by using his rudders. The delay almost cost the pilot his life because -the F-4B began to tumble end-over-end barely 100 feet above the ground. -Suddenly the world outside became a spinning blur of blue and green. -The second time that he saw green--indicating that the aircraft was -inverted--Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman started to pull his alternate -ejection handle which was located between his knees. In the second that -it took the escape mechanism to function, the Phantom flipped upright -and the ejection cartridges blasted the pilot from the flaming cockpit. -Seconds later, the plane cartwheeled into the ground and exploded. The -pilot was so low when he "punched out" that the chute had scarcely -deployed when his feet touched the ground. Both crewmen hid in the -tall elephant grass within earshot of the North Vietnamese who were -searching for them. Within minutes, rescue helicopters lumbered on -the scene and, while the downed crew's wingman made dummy passes to -discourage the enemy soldiers, the choppers darted in and plucked the -shaken, but otherwise uninjured, Marines to safety.[51](142) - -If there was anything that could top that performance, it was the -spectacular air shows provided daily by B-52 Stratofortresses of the -4133d Provisional Heavy Bombardment Wing, based at Andersen Air Force -Base, Guam, and the 4258th Strategic Bombardment Wing in Thailand. The -B-52 pilots did not count on finesse as much as they did on sheer power -because each Stratofortress carried a 27-ton payload of 108 mixed 500- -and 750-pound bombs. Since these giants had the means to virtually -move mountains, the Arc Light strikes were used on area targets such -as troop concentrations, marshalling points, supply depots, and bunker -sites. The result of the enemy build-up around the base was an enormous -number of targets located in dispersed but common areas and such -complexes were ideal for heavy bombers. These targets were programmed -into computers aboard the aircraft and the strikes were conducted from -altitudes above 30,000 feet. To the bomber crews, it was an impersonal -type of warfare because, from above the overcast, they rarely even saw -their bombs explode. The bombs did not have to be seen to be felt.(143) - -When several flights of B-52s worked over a target, the results -were awesome. The exploding bombs churned up strips of the terrain -several thousand meters long and the ground for miles around literally -shook from the blasts. Many enemy casualties were sustained from the -concussion alone. One entry from a captured North Vietnamese diary -read: "18 February: The heavy bombing of the jets and B-52 explosions -are so strong that our lungs hurt." In some instances, NVA soldiers -were found after an Arc Light strike wandering around in a daze with -blood streaming from their noses and mouths.[52] Often the internal -hemorrhaging induced by the concussion was so severe that it resulted -in death. Quite understandably, such missions could not be unleashed -too close to the Marines.(144) - -In the early stages of the conflict, Arc Light strikes were not -authorized within a prescribed distance of friendly lines. The same -rule had applied during the heavy fighting at Con Thien the year before -and the NVA had taken advantage of the buffer zone by moving troops and -supplies in as close to the Marine base as possible to avoid the bomber -raids. They tried the same thing at Khe Sanh. When American airborne -observers noted enemy bunker complexes cropping up near the KSCB, the -no-bomb line was moved in to about half of the original distance. At -first the regimental commander was afraid that the resulting concussion -would collapse his own bunkers and trenches; as it turned out, the -enemy fortifications were the only ones which suffered. The first -few B-52 raids inside the old line touched off scores of secondary -explosions and undoubtedly snapped the North Vietnamese out of their -sense of security. The closer strikes also served as a morale booster -for the defenders who flocked from their bunkers to watch, what the -Marines called, "Number One on the hit parade."(145) - -According to the regimental Target Intelligence Officer (TIO), Captain -Mirza M. Baig, the B-52 was an accurate weapons system which the FSCC -employed around Khe Sanh much the same as the other supporting arms. -About 95 percent of the Arc Light missions were targeted at the 26th -Marines headquarters.[53] Requests were submitted to the 3d Marine -Division Air Officer 15 hours prior to the drop at a rate of 8 strikes -every 24 hours. Up to three hours before the strike, the TIO, upon -direction, could divert the bombers to new unscheduled targets, but -after that the Stratofortresses were restricted to their original -target. The response time was later trimmed even more by using cells -of three B-52s which left Guam and Thailand every three hours; this -put the bombers over Khe Sanh every hour and a half. In spite of -this streamlining, the B-52s were never as responsive or flexible -as the droves of fighter/bombers which were overhead constantly. -Nevertheless, the devastating power and psychological effect produced -by the Stratofortresses, coupled with the surprise factor, made them an -extremely valuable adjunct.[54](146) - -The type of strike which most impressed the regimental commander, -however, was the ground-controlled radar bombing. Although these raids -lacked the punch of an Arc Light strike, they were as accurate and -flexible as dive-bombing attacks and could be conducted in the worst -weather. In fact, the technique was designed especially to cope with -the inherent bad weather which accompanied the monsoons in Southeast -Asia when attack aircraft could not get below an overcast to hit the -target. - -The controlling agency at Khe Sanh for these strikes was Air Support -Radar Team-Bravo (ASRT-B), Marine Air Support Squadron 3 which had -moved from Chu Lai on 16 January. The ground controllers operated -from a heavily reinforced van which housed their sensitive computer -equipment and used the TPQ-10 radar to guide aircraft to their target; -thus, the missions were called TPQs.[55](147) The radar emitted a -pencil-shaped beam which detected and locked on to the aircraft. Using -target coordinates provided by the FSCC, the controller programmed -the enemy position, ballistic characteristics of the bombs, current -winds, and other pertinent data into a computer which was connected to -the radar. The computer also received inputs from the radar and, in -turn, provided corrections in airspeed, altitude, and heading which -the operator passed on to the pilot. The controller closely monitored -his set and, at a predetermined release point, called a "Mark" to the -pilot who "pickled" his bombs.[56] In specially-equipped aircraft, such -as the A-4 Skyhawk and the A-6 Intruder, the bombs could be released -automatically from the ground. One ground controller could handle a -single plane, a section (two planes), or a division (four planes) on -the same pass as long as the pilots flew in a tight formation and the -radar did not break lock. One of the controllers' favorite aircraft -was the A-6 because it packed such a heavy wallop; a single Intruder -usually carried 28 500-pounders. Any fighter/bomber, however, could be -used as long as it carried low-drag ordnance and the pilot could make a -smooth run.(148) - -Even though most TPQs were conducted from around 14,000 feet, the -accuracy of ASRT-B was phenomenal. When new personnel arrived at -Khe Sanh, they were given several check drops on a nearby hill to -test their proficiency before the newcomers were allowed to conduct -strikes near friendly troops. The first drop was always within 40 -meters of the target and, after they adjusted there was virtually no -error. Calibration drops were also conducted twice weekly to ensure -the accuracy of the equipment. One member of the FSCC stated that, if -he were in a foxhole and under attack, he would have no qualms about -calling an ASRT-B controlled TPQ within 35 meters of his position. -The rule of thumb which the FSCC generally applied when determining a -safe distance for normal operations, however, was one meter from the -friendlies for every pound of conventional ordnance being delivered. -Thus, for TPQs, a 250-pound bomb would not normally be dropped within -250 meters of Allied troops, a 500-pounder within 500 meters, and so -on. This criteria was not established because the men on the ground -lacked confidence in the system but because of the large fragmentation -pattern produced by the bombs. Besides, anything inside the prescribed -radius could be handled just as effectively by artillery, mortars, and -direct fire weapons. In an emergency, the regimental commander would -have undoubtedly lifted the restriction. Concerning the quality of -support he received from ASRT-B, Colonel Lownds said, "Anything but the -highest praise would not be enough."(149) - -[Illustration: A-6 Intruder, under TPQ control, provides precision -bombing around Khe Sanh despite poor weather. (USMC Photo A422000)] - -[Illustration: B-52 Stratofortresses flew strikes daily in support of -the 26th Marines. (Photo courtesy USAF)] - -In addition to its accuracy, the TPQ system was extremely flexible. -A strike could be programmed and executed within 10 or 12 minutes -utilizing any available aircraft. Most of the missions were at night -when it was inefficient and dangerous to conduct dive-bombing strikes. -As a matter of routine, two Marine and three Air Force flights were -scheduled every hour unless an emergency developed. On 18 February, -ASRT-B set a new squadron record for a single 24-hour period by -controlling aircraft which delivered 486 tons of ordnance on 105 -separate targets. After that, the record was approached frequently but -never broken. During the siege, ASRT-B controlled 4,989 TPQs in support -of the 26th Marines.(150) - -Beginning on 20 February, ASRT-B also assisted with supply drops -whenever the Khe Sanh MATCU was inoperable. Normally, the controllers -could have guided the transport pilots to an exact release point but, -at Khe Sanh, the C-130s had to fly directly over the station and the -TPQ-10 would break lock.[57](151) Therefore, the ASRT personnel used the -same technique as the MATCU controllers and called a "Mark" when the -Hercules was over the eastern threshold and the pilots completed the -runs with Doppler navigation and stop watches. The only problem was -that, when the ASRT conducted supply drops, it was drawn away from the -primary mission of handling TPQs.(152) - -While air support was vital to the defense of the base, Colonel Lownds -felt that his artillery played an equally important role. When the -fighting first broke out, the colonel surmised that the side which -managed to keep its artillery intact would win the battle. The Marine -artillery emerged almost unscathed. Many incoming rounds landed within -the battery positions, however, very few actually hit the gun pits and -throughout the operation only three artillery pieces at the base were -destroyed; one was a 155mm howitzer parked alongside the loading ramp -awaiting airlift to Dong Ha.[58] Generally the pieces, were tucked away -inside heavily sandbagged revetments and, while the crews were often -showered with fragments, it would have taken a direct hit, squarely on -top of the weapon, to knock out a howitzer. Fortunately for the Marine -gunners, the North Vietnamese scored only one such a hit which led the -regimental commander to the conclusion: "Either they were amazingly -inaccurate or we were amazingly lucky."(153) - -The enemy's failure to silence Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's batteries -was a big point in favor of the Marines. While American news reporters -gave wide coverage to the number of shells falling on the base, they -frequently neglected to mention that 1/13 answered each enemy round -with 10 of its own. Throughout the battle, 1/13 cranked out 158,891 -mixed rounds in direct support of the 26th Marines. The methods -employed by the FSCC were reminiscent of those used in World War I. -Time On Target (TOT) by massed batteries, Harassment and Interdiction -(H&I) by battery volley instead of a single piece, artillery boxes, -rolling barrages, and battery zones were a few techniques adopted by -the FSCC which more than lived up to its motto: "Be Generous."[59](154) - -Since the enemy did most of his maneuvering under the cover of -darkness, that was when the Marine and Army batteries were the most -active. Captain Baig, who wore one hat--Target Intelligence Officer--in -the S-2 section and another--Target Information Officer--in the FSCC -later described a good night's work: - - An average night's pattern of pre-planned fires was as follows: - Combined TOTs from 9 batteries (4-6); separate battalion TOTs - (Army 4-6, Marine 10-15), battery multiple volley individual - missions (40-50); battery H&Is (20-30). Normal 1 gun, 1 round - H&Is were not used; this type of fire was of little value. Marine - and Army artillery were employed in target areas and at ranges to - reduce to a minimum check fires caused by the arrival of TPQ and - reconnaissance aircraft. Later, as we learned finesse, air was - given the targets south of the base and west of the maximum range - of the 175mm guns; 1/13 was given any targets whose range required - a maximum ordinate of less than 14,000 feet (altitude of TPQ run); - and the 175mm guns were assigned targets to the north, northwest, - and east of the base. Such were the pre-planned fires.(155) - -[Illustration: A 105mm howitzer of 1/13 lashes out at NVA troops -surrounding Khe Sanh. The artillery battalion was in direct support of -the 26th Marines. (USMC Photo A190832)] - -[Illustration: The 175mm guns of the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, USA -were in general support of the Khe Sanh garrison. This gun was located -at Camp J. J. Carroll. (USMC Photo A190709)] - -In addition to volume, reaction time was a key factor. Unless friendly -aircraft in the target area necessitated a check fire, artillery -response was immediate--no matter what the weather. To test the -proficiency of the Fire Direction Center and the gun crews, Colonel -Lownds periodically walked into the FSCC bunker, pointed to a spot on -the huge map which adorned the wall and directed Lieutenant Colonel -Hennelly to hit it. The coordinates were quickly sent to the FDC where -they were either fed into the FADAC computer or worked out manually and -the firing data was then passed on to the gun crew. After adjusting -the tube, the gunners slammed a round home and sent it on its way. -The entire process usually took less than 40 seconds. This "instant -artillery" constantly hampered enemy movement within the TAOR and -helped break up numerous attacks.(156) - -The defensive fire plan adopted by the FSCC was separate from and -not to be confused with the final protective fires employed by the -defenders who manned the perimeter. The artillery batteries were used -to prevent the enemy assault forces from reaching the wire and to cut -off the lead elements from reinforcements. The fact that the North -Vietnamese usually attacked with their battalions in column made it -somewhat easier for the FSCC to isolate the assault elements from -the reserves. When the enemy launched his attack, the FSCC placed a -three-sided artillery box around the lead battalion; three batteries -of 1/13 executed this mission. The fourth battery then closed the -remaining side, which faced the friendly positions, with a barrage that -rolled from one end of the box to the other--much like a piston within -its cylinder. The NVA force in the box could not escape and could not -avoid the rolling barrage. Those North Vietnamese who spilled out of -the open end of the box were subjected to the final protective fires of -the Marines along the perimeter. - -At the same time 1/13 worked over the assault force, the FSCC put a -secondary box into effect for the benefit of the back-up units. The -Army 175mm batteries were responsible for two sides which were about -500 meters outside the primary box. On order, the gunners rolled their -barrages in toward the sides of the primary box and back out again. -The third side was sealed by continuous flights of aircraft under the -control of the TPQ-10 radar. Whenever B-52s could be diverted in time, -Arc Light strikes were used to saturate the approach routes to the -battle area.(157) - -Another key factor in the defense of Khe Sanh was the manner in which -Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's FSCC coordinated their air effort with -the artillery so that the two components were complimentary. One prime -example was the Mini-Arc Light which was devised by the Assistant Fire -Support Coordinator, Captain Kenneth O. W. Steen and the TIO, Captain -Baig. As the name implies, this technique was used against an area -target the same as a B-52 strike, only the former could be organized -and employed much quicker. When intelligence reports indicated that NVA -units were in a certain region, the FSCC plotted a 500 by 1,000-meter -block in the center of the suspected area or across a likely route -of march. Two A-6 Intruders, each armed with 28 500-pound bombs, -were called on station for a TPQ and the batteries at Khe Sanh, Camp -Carroll, and the Rockpile were alerted for a fire mission. Thirty -seconds before the two A-6s dropped, the 175mm batteries, concentrating -their fire on one half of the block, salvoed the first of approximately -60 rounds. At the same time the A-6s rippled their load down the -middle of the block, the 1/13 batteries opened up on the second half -with around 200 155mm, 105mm, and 4.2-inch rounds. The trajectory and -flight time of all ordnance were computed so that the bombs and initial -artillery shells hit at the same instant. The saturation of the target -area was such that any enemy soldiers caught in the zone during the -bombardment simply ceased to exist.(158) - -During the second week in February, a special Mini-Arc Light was -directed against a major NVA headquarters. Two members of the 26th -Marines S-2, Majors Robert B. Coolidge and Jerry E. Hudson, learned -from their various sources that a force-wide meeting of NVA commanders -and their staffs would occur in an abandoned schoolhouse near the -Laotian border. A beefed-up Mini was prepared to welcome the delegates. -For this strike, the target block was reduced to 500 by 300 meters -around the schoolhouse which would take in, as one of the planners -stated, "the hangers-on and other idlers who usually congregate around -large staffs." Twenty minutes after the meeting was scheduled to start, -the trap was sprung. Two Marine A-6 Intruders and four F-4B Phantoms -unloaded 152 500-pound bombs into the block in concert with the -opening volleys of eight artillery batteries (total of 350 artillery -rounds).(159) The target was obliterated, but whether or not this -unusual ambush netted any NVA brass-hats was never ascertained. - -The Micro-Arc Light was executed in the same manner as the Mini except -smaller amounts of ordnance were used and the block was cut down to -500 by 500 meters. Any aircraft on station would suffice, preferably -ones armed with 12 to 16 500-pounders. Artillery fire was reduced to -30 rounds from the 175mm guns and 100 mixed rounds from Lieutenant -Colonel Hennelly's battalion. The advantage of the Micro was that it -could be put into effect within 10 minutes while it took roughly 45 -minutes to plan and execute the Mini. On an average night, three to -four Minis and six to eight Micros were executed, usually to the south -and southeast of the base; both were extremely effective.(160) - -The massive firepower supporting the Marines would have been almost -useless had they not known where and when to employ it. The 26th -Marines intelligence section was responsible for this facet of the -operation and these people had more than a passing knowledge of the -enemy's past strategy. At Dien Bien Phu and Con Thien, the Communists -had followed a fairly predictable pattern--not unlike the classic -siege of the 18th Century. There were three distinct phases involved -in this type of campaign: arrival on the scene and encirclement of the -garrison, construction of siege works and support facilities, T-ing -the sapheads and final assault. After investing the base, the North -Vietnamese first established numerous forward logistic bases within -a few thousand meters of the base. Under the cover of darkness, the -enemy soldiers dug a series of shallow trenches, interlaced with supply -bunkers, leading from these points toward the American positions. The -first trenches began to appear at Khe Sanh around 23 February and the -heaviest concentration was to the south and southeast. Once in close, -the main trenches branched off into ones which paralleled the Marines -lines; these secondary trenches, which from the air looked like long -fingers reaching greedily toward the base, were the ones from which the -NVA assault troops intended to attack.(161) - -At first, the defenders tried to prevent the enemy from moving in too -close to the base. The routes into the valley were saturated; artillery -H&I fire and frequent air strikes were employed but such tactics -only tended to slow down the enemy and force him to bypass certain -routes--they did not stop him. Constant, massed artillery would have -effectively blocked infiltration but that alternative was, from a -logistics standpoint, impossible. The S-2 personnel recommended that -the best way to counter the enemy was to allow the North Vietnamese to -close and pursue their siege tactics and then, to borrow a phrase used -by General "Chesty" Puller (then a colonel) on 28 November 1950 when -his regiment was surrounded near the Chosin Reservoir in Korea, "that -simplifies our problem of finding these people and killing them."(162) - -The S-2 section utilized a multitude of sources to develop an accurate -picture of the enemy's activity around the base. While much of this -information was self-generated, the 26th Marines received substantial -intelligence support from the MACV, III MAF, and 3d Marine Division -Headquarters. Ground and aerial observers, photo reconnaissance, -infrared imagery, target lists of higher headquarters, crater -analysis, shell/flash reports, and agent reports were all tools of the -intelligence community at Khe Sanh. By comparing this information with -the knowledge of enemy doctrine as applied in past situations, the S-2 -staff was able to accurately estimate the intentions of the NVA on a -day-to-day basis. - -One good example of how this intelligence produced hard results -occurred in late February. From their various inputs, the two men who -were responsible for the earlier attack on the NVA staff conference, -Majors Coolidge and Hudson, pinpointed the exact location of 12 -artillery positions and 2 major ammunition depots. These targets were -concentrated in two main areas to the south of the base. Air strikes -were called in on the enemy positions and, after the planes departed, -the whole area erupted in secondary explosions which lasted for the -next 40 minutes. Two weeks later, these officers repeated a similar -performance in another area.(163) - -The activities of the intelligence community at Khe Sanh and higher -headquarters were vital to the conduct of the battle. Almost every -major attack against the 26th Marines was picked up well in advance by -the S-2 section. Whenever enemy activity was detected, the information -was passed to the FSCC and this was the signal for Colonel Lownds -to put his defensive fire plan into effect. The base was placed on -Red Alert, the primary and secondary boxes fired, and saturation air -strikes were employed. This method of cutting off the attack force by -massed fires, once the S-2 section had provided a warning, proved to be -a decisive factor in thwarting the major enemy thrusts which came late -in February.(164) - - - - -PART VII - -THE TURNING POINT - - -While the supporting arms continued to whittle away at the enemy's -strength, the defensive posture of the 26th Marines grew more -formidable with each passing day. By the end of February, the -Americans and South Vietnamese had erected some 510 bunkers, dug -miles of trenchline, and laid hundreds of minefields and trip flares. -Each sector was guarded by a maze of double-apron, tanglefoot, and -concertina barbed wire obstacles.[60] The Marines also had sophisticated -anti-infiltration equipment such as the Night Observation Device, the -PPS-6 ground-surveillance radar, and the Starlight Scope; all of which -could detect infiltrators along the wire during night-time and other -periods of reduced visibility.(165) Wherever these apparatus were -employed, the number of enemy killed along the perimeters increased and -the number of probes decreased. - -In addition to the standard issue, the men improvised many of their -own jerry-rigged gadgets. Drawing from his childhood experiences on -the farm, Colonel Lownds devised a type of electric fence which was -employed along some of the company fronts in the main perimeter. The -plan was simple; the Marines figured out which strands of barbed wire -the enemy would more than likely cut to penetrate those obstacles and -they attached trip wire in a circuit. Flashlight batteries were the -power source and the network of wires tied into a central switchboard -located in each company CP. When a North Vietnamese soldier clipped -the barbed wire, he short-circuited the system and one of the warning -lights on at the switchboard went out. A few grenades in the right -place or a broadside from a Claymore mine and the snooper usually -became another grim statistic. - -On the hill outposts, the =fougasse= was used extensively. The Marines -dug holes along the slopes which faced the enemy and embedded barrels -or cans of mixed gasoline and diesel fuel. The detonator for this -volatile concoction was usually a grenade, a blasting cap, or a pound -of C-4 plastic explosive taped to the container. The triggering device -was a wire leading back up the hill to the Marine positions. When -attacked, the defender simply jerked the wire and detonated the lethal -munitions.(166) - -The Scout Sniper Platoon attached to the 26th Marines provided -another kind of deterrent. At least one team of these hand-picked, -specially-trained sharpshooters was assigned to each company. Using -commercial, bolt-action rifles with high-powered scopes, the snipers -preyed on individual NVA soldiers who carelessly exposed themselves -around the fringes of the perimeter. Patience was a must in this -business and the marksmen often waited for days until their quarry -appeared. When the snipers finally got a chance to practice their -deadly art, the results were almost unbelievable. As though they -were firing for record on a rifle range, they calculated the wind, -adjusted their slings, took steady positions, and slowly squeezed -off their shots. Many North Vietnamese who felt safe beyond 1,000 -meters of the Marine positions never received a chance to ponder their -mistake. The psychological impact was also a factor. One can imagine -the eerie feeling experienced by an NVA soldier who had just seen a -comrade "zapped" and never heard the report of the rifle that did the -trick.(167) - -[Illustration: Sniper attached to Company E, 2/26 on Hill 861A waits -for a target. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -[Illustration: Men of 1/26 lay wire along Blue Sector. Dong Tri -Mountain is in the background. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)] - -By no stretch of the imagination did the 26th Marines have a monopoly -on good snipers. The NVA marksmen, armed with rifles and scopes which -were comparable to those of their American counterparts, lurked -around the edges of the perimeters--especially the hill outposts--and -waited for a target. Although none of this deadly business could be -categorized as humorous, there was one sniper incident on Hill 881S -which could not help but evoke a chuckle. The men of Company I had -been cursed with the presence of a particularly accurate sniper who -was located in the brush to the south of their perimeter. The rifleman -scored frequently and had wounded 10 Marines in the period of about a -week, all of whom were medevaced. In addition to being a hazard, the -sniper was also a general nuisance. A man moving from one place to -another within the perimeter was always hurried on his way by slugs -which kicked up dirt at his heels or buzzed past his head like angry -hornets. Thus, the Marines were constantly waiting for the culprit to -expose himself and one day a glint off the telescopic sight proved -to be his undoing. The Marines marked his position and, on Captain -Dabney's order, lugged a 106mm recoilless rifle from the northern -side of the hill, sighted in, and blew the sniper away--tree and all. -The victory was short lived because his successor proved equally as -effective. More Marines were hit. The second rifleman lasted about as -long as the first before he suffered the same fate at the hands of the -106mm gunners. - -His replacement, however, was a complete wash-out. Expending between 20 -and 30 rounds a day, the misfit flailed away for over a week without -hitting anyone. In the process, he too gave himself away. After the -Marines had manhandled the 106 into position for the third time, and -were sighting in, one private, after deep thought, approached the -company commander with a proposition: "Skipper, if we get him, they'll -just replace him with someone who might be able to shoot. He hasn't hit -anyone so why not leave him there until he does." It was so ordered. -The sniper's ineptitude had saved his life and he blasted away for the -rest of the battle and never touched a soul.[61](168) - -The incident with the snipers pointed out the advantage of having 106mm -recoilless rifles on the hills. Unlike the artillery pieces at Khe -Sanh, the 106mms were used in a direct fire role and because of their -extremely flat trajectory, they could be employed when attack aircraft -were in the target area. Another feature which endeared these weapons -to the Marines was their extraordinary accuracy. The recoilless rifles -were used with great finesse, especially against the well-camouflaged -enemy gun positions which ringed the outposts. In most cases, it -required minute adjustments to put a round squarely on target and knock -out these emplacements. This was evident in one instance when a 106mm -on 881S was used to silence an NVA 12.7mm machine gun which had been -spraying Marine helicopters. - -The automatic weapon was situated inside the mouth of a small tunnel -which had been cut deep into the side of a hill located north of the -Company I, 3/26, perimeter. The tiny aperture, which faced south, -restricted the gunner's fields of fire but that was no drawback because -he only concentrated on the resupply choppers as they hovered over -the Marine positions. On the other hand, the small opening prevented -the gun from being knocked out by anything except a direct hit from -the front. Once the men on 881S had pinpointed the heavily camouflaged -site, they went to work with their 106mm. Out of necessity, their -firing routine was erratic; the gunners cranked off a round, dived for -cover when enemy mortars responded, jumped up, adjusted the weapon, and -fired again. While spotters guided them with such unorthodox jargon as -"Right a tad," or "Up a hair," the gunners repeated the process and -slowly closed in on the enemy position. Finally, one glowing round -disappeared completely into the side of the hill and a split second -later there was a muffled explosion from deep within. Smoke belched -out the mouth of the tunnel and the NVA machine gun was no more. This -performance was repeated several times during the battle with the same -results.(169) - -The three 105mm howitzers on 881S were also used extensively in -the direct fire role and were especially useful against targets of -opportunity. The ever-present fog around the hill reduced the number -of such targets but on one occasion a momentary break in the weather -yielded an extremely lucrative prize. When the fog suddenly lifted, -an alert Company I machine gunner spotted a 20-man column of North -Vietnamese slowly climbing Hill 758 which was due south of 881S. They -were carrying what appeared to be several mortar tubes. The Marine -immediately opened fire and even though the range was 1,200 meters he -managed to hit several of the enemy soldiers. Instead of scattering, -the remaining NVA troopers clustered around their fallen comrades and -this proved to be a fatal error. The C/1/13 gunners attached to Company -I sprang to the 105mm howitzer on the south side of the hill, quickly -knocked aside the parapet, and depressed the tube for a downhill shot. -Using a combination of point detonating and VT fuzes which were set to -explode 50 feet above the ground, the gunners slammed a dozen rounds -of direct fire into the midst of the tightly packed enemy soldiers. -By the time the fog closed in again, there was no sign of life on the -opposite slope. The action was so brief, that the first report received -at the 3/26 CP was a laconic message from Captain Dabney that 20 North -Vietnamese had been sighted, engaged, and killed. - -There were also innovations inside the compound. Ever since 21 January, -the NVA gunners had concentrated their fire on the base ammunition -dumps. Originally there were two large caches but the main one was -totally destroyed on the opening day of the battle. After that, -Colonel Lownds decentralized his stores in several widely-scattered -berms which were large, 12-foot-deep trenches, gouged out of the -ground by bulldozers. One end of the berm was sloping so that 2-1/2 -ton trucks could be driven down a corridor between two flanking stacks -of ammunition which lined the sides of the trench. This arrangement -greatly facilitated loading because the Marines could stand on top of -the stacks and pass rounds onto the bed of the truck which was at their -level. The driver then backed out of the berm and took the ammunition -to the distribution points of the various units. The ammunition was not -only dispersed, it was also segregated according to type. This way, -if a berm of artillery high-explosive shells was hit, fire fighters -were not hampered by tear gas or white phosphorous fumes. On three -occasions, ammunition stores were hit but the resulting devastation -never reached the proportion of that on the 21st.(170) - -Although the berms were prime targets, the ASRT, MATCU, FDC, 26th -Marines communications center, and other units which depended on -sophisticated and delicate equipment suffered from the heavy shelling. -Consequently, they all had one common problem--maintenance. The normal -difficulties associated with keeping the various radars, radios, -antennae, generators, and cooling components in an "up" status were -complicated by the constant incoming, the dust, and the limited supply -of replacement items. The vans and bunkers were heavily sandbagged -but antennae and some communication lines were exposed and frequently -knocked out by enemy rounds.[62](171) The speed with which the vital -installations were returned to operation served as a tribute to the -technicians who maintained the equipment under the most adverse -conditions imaginable. In one instance, a 122mm rocket exploded a scant -seven meters from the ASRT-B van and sheared off most of the radio -antennae. Thanks to several trouble shooters who braved the intense -barrage and repaired the damage, the station was back on the air within -20 minutes.[63] Such performances were routine. The ASRT normally -operated 23 hours a day and shut down one hour for maintenance. -The MATCU, which was essential for ground-controlled approaches and -paradrops, was kept operable 95 percent of the time.(172) - -Major John A. Shepherd, Communications Officer of the 26th Marines, was -responsible for the vast network which enabled the ground commanders to -keep abreast of the situation and in touch with their units. The major -praised the accomplishments of his men, stating that they "provided -support in winning every battle, firing every round of artillery, -controlling every air strike, and providing the means to receive every -bean and bullet." There were six radio relay teams which kept open 52 -channels between Khe Sanh and the outside world. In addition, there -were five external teletype nets in operation 24-hours a day. Radio -relay provided voice and teletype links to agencies at Dong Ha and Da -Nang. For classified information, there were two secure voice circuits -operating full time. One net linked the Combat Operations Center of the -26th Marines to that of the 3d Marine Division at Dong Ha. The other, -the Regimental Tactical Net, enabled Colonel Lownds to disseminate hot -information to his battalion commanders. - -To protect it against the artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks, -all communication equipment was either underground or heavily -sandbagged. Major Shepherd moved his communications center into a -shelter which was made from 4 conex boxes, 16 feet underground.[64] -This nerve center housed the teletype equipment and switchboards -which provided service for 65 on-base subscribers and 40 external -radio relay voice circuits. In spite of the protective measures, the -antenna and internal wire system sustained damage on a daily basis. -Following every barrage, wiremen tracked down cuts and spliced them -and repaired damaged antennae so that the various nets were back in -operation within minutes. The maintenance and repair of the electronic -devices used for perimeter security placed an additional burden on the -communicators.(173) - -While trucks and forklifts were not exactly delicate equipment, the -base motor transport personnel had their share of problems. These -vehicles were used constantly. During the summer and fall of 1967, -they were used to haul rock for the repair of the runway. Throughout -the siege, the drivers carried ammunition from the berms to the -distribution points and supplies from the drop zone to the combat -base. Many of the trucks were in bad shape and mechanics worked around -the clock to keep them rolling. The biggest headache was caused by -flat tires, of which the constant shelling produced an abundance; the -drivers became paste and patch experts of the highest order. More often -than not, these men were caught out in the open when the enemy decided -to pound the base. Since their cargo usually contained high explosives, -the drivers had good reason to be apprehensive. Some simply bailed out -of the cabs during the attacks and dived for cover; others, performing -a wild imitation of the Grand Prix, raced for revetments. Needless -to say, the base speed limit of five miles per hour was frequently -violated.(174) - -When there wasn't any work to do, many Marines created some and the -threat of enemy tunnels provided a powerful motivation. When the word -spread that the enemy might try to dig under the base, the tunnel -ferrets went to work. Many of the defenders became fascinated with the -prospects of uncovering a "mole" and their antics were near comical. It -was not uncommon to see a man crawling around in front of his position, -patting the ground with the flat side of a shovel, and listening for -hollow spots. Others drove metal stakes into the ground and listened -with stethoscopes by the hour for tell-tale signs of digging. If they -heard something, the next step was to dig a large hole in front of the -enemy so that he would tunnel himself into a trap. Some self-appointed -water witches walked around with divining rods and waited for the -downward tug which meant that they had discovered a subterranean -intruder. When the news media got into the act and publicized the -possibility of tunnels, the regimental commander began receiving scores -of letters from around the world with "If I were you" themes. One -American planter who lived in Sao Paulo, Brazil, wrote and suggested -that the Marines purchase commercial sensors like the ones he used to -detect bugs which fed on the roots of his trees. Another suggested that -the defenders strap hand grenades onto rats and turn them loose in the -tunnels.(175) - -Unknown to the Marines at the time, the enemy never tried to tunnel -under the base. The KSCB sat atop a plateau, and the slopes were -wrinkled with deep ravines. Colonel Lownds later surmised that the -enemy would have had to go so deep to keep from breaking the surface -that such excavations were impractical. The men of Company K, 3/26 did, -however, discover one tunnel leading toward Hill 861 and called in air -strikes against it; at the base itself, the North Vietnamese limited -their digging to trenches.(176) - -Unlike the phantom tunnels, the trenches were very real and served as -a constant reminder of the enemy's intentions. These networks were -quite understandably a source of concern to the defenders who watched -with fascination and no small apprehension as the trenchlines drew -closer and closer each day. Working at night or under the cover of -fog, the North Vietnamese often moved their lines forward as much as -200-300 meters at a time. There were several methods used to counter -the trenches with artillery and tactical air strikes being the most -prevalent. Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's batteries provided constant -fires during the night especially to the east and southeast where the -heaviest enemy siegeworks were concentrated. The VT-fuzed ammunition -with its deadly airbursts no doubt hampered the enemy efforts -considerably. During the day, attack aircraft hit the trenches with -every type of aerial ordnance from 20mm cannon fire to 2,000-pound -bombs. At night, TPQs were run to within about 250 meters of the -wire while Mini and Micro Arc Lights were targeted from 500 to 1,500 -meters.(177) - -In addition, the Marines along the perimeters concocted their own -schemes which added to the displeasure of the enemy. During the day, -Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's men registered on the close-in trenches -with their M-79 grenade launchers; these shotgun-like weapons fired a -40mm projectile to a maximum range of about 375 meters and produced a -frag pattern approximately 5 to 10 meters in diameter. At night when -the North Vietnamese were digging, the Marines periodically lobbed -these rounds into the trenches and disrupted the sappers.(178) - -In spite of the harassment, the NVA launched several attacks against -the base from the trenchlines during the last 10 days in February. -At 1245, 21 February, the North Vietnamese fired 350 mortar, rocket, -recoilless rifle, and artillery rounds into the eastern sector and -followed up with a company-sized probe against the 37th ARVN Ranger -Battalion. The enemy troops, however, did not attempt to close with the -South Vietnamese and, after a distant fire fight, withdrew at about -1500. Although no body count was ascertained, the Rangers estimated -that 1/13 artillery and their own defensive fires had claimed from 20 -to 25 of the enemy. Six Marines from 1/26 and 18 Rangers were wounded -during the encounter.(179) - -On 23 February, the base received the worse shellacking of the -siege. In one eight-hour period, the installation was rocked by 1,307 -rounds--a total which surpassed the daily high received at Con Thien in -1967. Many of the rounds came from the 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces -in Laos. The runway took several hits but the Seabee and Marine working -parties filled the craters and quickly replaced the damaged strips -of runway matting. At 1600, the barrage touched off a fire at one of -the supply points and 1,620 rounds of 90mm and 106mm ammunition were -destroyed. Cumulative friendly casualties for the day were 10 killed, -21 medevaced, and 30 wounded but returned to duty.(180) - -Two days later the Marines suffered one of their most serious setbacks. -On the morning of the 25th, the 1st and 3d Squads, 3d Platoon, B/1/26 -departed Grey Sector on a patrol to the south of the base; the patrol -leader was a second lieutenant. The two squads were reinforced by an -81mm mortar FO, an S-2 representative, a Kit Carson Scout, one rocket -team, and a machine gun section (two guns).[65] Each man carried 500 -rounds of ammunition and six grenades; each machine gun team had 1,800 -rounds. Their mission was to sweep to the south along a well-defined -route and attempt to locate an enemy mortar which had been harassing -the Marines. The patrol leader was assigned three checkpoints from -which he was to radio his position and progress to the company -commander, Captain Pipes. The lieutenant was under strict orders to -follow the planned route and keep within sight of the base as much as -possible.(181) - -Around 0900, the two squads reached their first checkpoint; the -lieutenant made the required radio report and the Marines started on -the second leg of their trek. Unknown to Captain Pipes, the patrol had -deviated from course and was actually about 600 meters south of its -scheduled route. Shortly after his first transmission, the lieutenant -spotted three NVA soldiers walking along a road which branched off -Route 9 and ran northwest into the FOB-3 compound. The North Vietnamese -were apparently trying to suck the Americans into a trap--a trick as -old as war itself. In spite of warnings from the Kit Carson Scout, -the young patrol leader took the bait and pursued the three men; the -decision was to cost him his life.(182) - -The Marines moved south across the road, chased the North Vietnamese -and ran head-on into an ambush. A heavily reinforced NVA company -was entrenched just south of the road in a crescent-shaped bunker -complex, the tips of which curved to the north. When the trap was -sprung, the patrol was caught squarely in the center and, in essence, -was double-enveloped by stationary positions. At first the Marines -opened up and gained the advantage but the enemy fire gradually built -to an overwhelming crescendo and the patrol became pinned down. When -the lieutenant realized the full implications of his predicament, he -dispatched the 1st Squad to flank the NVA emplacements from the west. -The maneuver might have worked but the squad leader did not hook out -far enough to the west before turning back in on the enemy positions. -Instead of hitting the tender flank, the 1st Squad walked into more -blistering, frontal fire. When the lieutenant was unable to raise -the squad leader on the radio, he sent one of his few unwounded men, -Hospitalman 3d Class Frank V. Calzia, a U. S. Navy corpsman, to find -out what had happened. The corpsman returned later and reported that -every man in the 1st Squad, except one, was dead.(183) - -Captain Pipes immediately realized that his men were in trouble -and, upon direction of higher authority, sent the 2d Platoon to the -aid of the patrol. The cunning North Vietnamese anticipated such a -move, however, and positioned a blocking force in the path of the -relief column. The two separated Marine units were engaged in heavy -fighting for about four hours before the remnants of the patrol could -break contact and withdraw through the positions of the 2d Platoon. -Marine tanks rumbled into the southern portion of the compound but -supporting fires were restricted by ground fog and the proximity of -the combatants. As he pulled back, the patrol leader was hit in both -femoral arteries and bled to death before reaching the perimeter. -His radioman, Corporal Rolland R. Ball, a full-blooded Sioux Indian, -carried the lieutenant's body back to the base. Friendly casualties -during the day were 1 killed, 25 missing and presumed dead, 13 -medevacs, and 8 wounded but returned to duty; the bodies of the missing -men were all recovered. Enemy losses were undetermined. The action on -the 25th sobered the men of Company B and there was one predominant -thought in their minds. Captain Pipes probably understated the feelings -of his men when he said: "We are anxious to repay the loss." Before the -siege ended, Company B did just that.(184) - -The flurry of activity to the east and south of the base led General -Tompkins and Colonel Lownds to believe that the major enemy thrust was -imminent. Recalling the accuracy of the North Vietnamese lieutenant's -previous predictions, they felt sure that the attack would come from -the east. From various other reports, they knew that large NVA units -were massing around a deserted plantation to the south and an old -French fort near the junction of Route 9 and the two roads which tied -in with the KSCB. Although the North Vietnamese had not secured the -hill outposts according to the first phase of their plan, time was -running out. Each day, the skies over Khe Sanh cleared a little more -as one of the enemy's greatest allies, the monsoons, slowly abandoned -him. If American airpower, unhindered by the weather, were ever fully -brought into play, the enemy's task would have been next to impossible. -The NVA launched a heavy attack against the base on 29 February; -whether it was in fact the main prong of the Communist offensive, -historians may never know for sure.(185) - -Largely because of the quick response by the FSCC and the overwhelming -firepower at its disposal, the enemy attack never got up a full head -of steam. Early in the evening of 29 February, current intelligence -showed that the enemy was on the move. Each succeeding report indicated -that the North Vietnamese were heading toward the eastern perimeter. -The FSCC sprang into action and called on all assets to saturate the -enemy's route of march. Massed artillery, TPQs, as well as Mini and -Micro Arc Lights were targeted in blocks to the east, southeast, and -south. Flights of B-52s, diverted from other targets, arrived overhead -in two and a half hours and added to the carnage before the enemy -troops had moved completely through the killing zone.(186) - -At 2130, a battalion from the =304th NVA Division= launched the first -attack against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. The South Vietnamese -responded with their final protective fires; 1/13 contributed -thousands of conventional and special artillery rounds while strike -aircraft streaked in and raked the attacking force. The enemy pulled -back without even breaching the outer defenses. The first assault -was followed by one at 2330 and another at 0315 (1 March); both were -similarly stifled short of the wire. The North Vietnamese finally -called it quits and withdrew with those bodies which they could -retrieve. When the Rangers investigated the next morning, they found 78 -dead NVA soldiers huddled in three successive assault trenches a few -hundred meters from the perimeter. Some were in a kneeling position -as if they had been killed just before going over the top. Many had -been peppered by the artillery airbursts and were covered with small -holes. Crude devices made from bamboo strips and laced with blocks of -TNT lay beside many of the bodies. These were obviously to be used as -bangalore torpedoes but the sappers never had the chance. The slaughter -along the perimeter, however, was nothing compared to the losses -sustained by the NVA reserves.(187) - -While the S-2 personnel could never ascertain the exact number of -enemy killed, they felt reasonably certain that an entire NVA regiment -had been virtually wiped out. The eastern approach was saturated with -tons of high explosives; the road junction, the plantation, the old -French Fort, and all bottlenecks along the enemy's route were heavily -hit. Montagnard tribesmen, who inhabit the surrounding hills, later -reported finding from 200 to 500 North Vietnamese bodies at a time -stacked in rows along the trails and roads leading to the base. It was -obvious that they had been caught while on the march and mangled by -air raids and piston-like artillery concentrations. While many of the -defenders at the KSCB never fired a shot, what was believed to be the -long-awaited enemy onslaught came and passed with a whimper instead of -a roar.(188) - -Even though the North Vietnamese continued to probe throughout March, -it was obvious that they had shot their bolt on the night of 29 -February/1 March. The NVA never mustered another large ground attack -against the base; the battle had reached a turning point. Having had -their fingers burned too often, the North Vietnamese settled into a -wait-and-see strategy. They continued to pound the base with artillery -but exerted no major ground effort; instead they lurked in the hills -and waited for patrols which ventured too far from the perimeter.(189) - -The waiting game proved to be just as disastrous for the enemy as had -his previous strategy. The month of March was marked by clear skies -over Khe Sanh and there were only five days during which weather -hampered flight operations. While the overcast had never interfered -with Arc Light strikes or TPQs, the retreat of the monsoons was a -blessing for the attack pilots and fighter/bombers swarmed into the -valley like locusts. The number of close air support sorties in March -almost doubled the amount flown the previous month. Any enemy movement -within the TAOR during the day invariably drew a flight of sleek jets, -prop-driven A-1 Skyraiders, or helicopter gunships within minutes. The -trenches and bunker complexes inside the B-52 line were also worked -over daily to insure that the NVA stayed at arm's length. What's more, -the unrestricted visibility enabled the TAC(A)s and airborne observers -to ferret out and call in artillery on the enemy gun positions which -had been hammering the base. For the most part, 1/13 had been limited -to intelligence-generated concentrations during February, but the -good weather in March provided Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's men with -something they could sink their teeth into--observed targets. Enemy -gunners no longer enjoyed a reprieve and each round they fired was an -invitation to instant retaliation. With Birddogs or Hueys overhead, the -enemy seldom even fired and this was no small consolation to the men at -the base. The clear skies and accurate supporting fires were a potent -combination and the number of confirmed enemy dead recorded in March -increased approximately 80 percent over February.(190) - -The enemy's plight at Khe Sanh was echoed, albeit in veiled terms by -his propaganda broadcasts. The Radio Hanoi, English-speaking announcer, -Hanoi Hanna--the Communist's anemic version of Tokyo Rose--gradually -shifted her theme from, "We will crush Khe Sanh" to "Ho Chi Minh would -be unhappy if we wasted our time on only 6,000 Marines." The Communists -also attempted to sell the line that 20,000 North Vietnamese had "tied -down" the 26th Marines. Such rationale smacked of sour grapes. This -illogical reasoning would be similar to a defeated football coach -saying that he didn't really want to win the game, only keep the other -team "tied down" for an hour or so. At the KSCB itself, there were a -few feeble attempts to sway the defenders. On 10 March, an incoming -mortar round released about 200 propaganda leaflets. The following -day, an NVA loudspeaker blared a message to the 37th ARVN Ranger -Battalion which invited the South Vietnamese to "join their brothers -from the North in driving out the Americans." There were no takers. The -psychological effort was just one more indication that the enemy was -hurting.(191) - -About mid-March, the 26th Marines S-2 began noting an exodus of major -NVA units from the Khe Sanh TAOR. Most of these reports came from -mountain tribesmen who provided valuable information on enemy troop -dispositions throughout the siege. The =325C NVA Division Headquarters= -was one of the first to pull out toward Laos, followed by elements of -the =95C= and =101D Regiments= which also relocated to the west. About -the same time, the =304th NVA Division= withdrew several thousand -meters to the southwest. The enemy still retained enough troops -around the base to maintain pressure and thus the shelling and probes -continued.(192) - -Closely correlated with the enemy's retrograde movement was another -large influx of refugees into the KSCB. Most were Montagnards who had -inhabited the smaller villages surrounding the base and unfortunately -had become the pawns of war. When the fighting first broke out, the -Allies advised them to evacuate their homes and move overland to Cam -Lo or else they would be exposed to fire from both sides. During -the period 23-28 January, 1,050 Vietnamese and tribesmen with their -families were air evacuated to Da Nang and then on to Quang Tri City. -About the same time, some 1,800 tribesmen completed an overland trek -from Khe Sanh to Cam Lo by way of the the Ba Long Valley. Later an -additional 3,000 or more attempted to reach Cam Lo, but during the -journey, the North Vietnamese intercepted this group and directed them -back into the Khe Sanh area. Presumably, the NVA used the Montagnards -to screen troop movements and confuse American intelligence. The next -surge of refugees into the combat base occurred in early February -following the attack on Lang Vei. On 7 March, the tribesmen again -started to filter into the base. They were screened, interrogated, and -processed for evacuation in the FOB-3 compound. As many as 661 were -airlifted to eastern Quang Tri Province in a single day and the total -for March was 1,432.(193) - -Although the enemy had scaled down his forces, the heavy incoming -continued to plague the Marines. On the average, the base received -about 150 rounds a day during March. During the course of a normal -day, the preponderance of fire was from the 82mm mortars but on peak -days the greatest number of rounds was from the heavier artillery. -On 23 March, the KSCB received its heaviest daily saturation of the -month--1,109 rounds. Of these, over 30 percent were from the enemy's -big guns in Laos. In addition to the indirect fire, the Marines took a -sprinkling of recoilless rifle shells; but these weapons were easy to -spot because of their large back blast and thus were vulnerable to air -attack and counterbattery fire.(194) - -During March, the defenders, on order of General Cushman, began to push -out from the perimeter. On 8 March, the ARVN Rangers conducted a series -of sweeps east of the runway. The first patrol made no contact but the -next two became heavily engaged with an NVA force of unknown size. The -Rangers attacked and poured into the enemy trenches, got eye-ball to -eye-ball with "their brothers from the North" and killed 26. On the -24th, a patrol from Company A, 1/9, made contact with two NVA platoons -which were dug in approximately 1,500 meters northwest of Lieutenant -Colonel Mitchell's main perimeter. The Marines attacked the enemy -emplacements and in a four-hour battle killed 31 North Vietnamese. -During the fighting, a UH-1E helicopter of VMO-6 was shot down while -supporting the Marines but the crewmen were rescued.[66] Friendly -casualties were five killed, four medevaced, and two with minor wounds. -The largest encounter, however, came on 30 March when Company B, 1/26, -received a chance to settle an old score. The target area was the same -complex, approximately 850 meters south of the perimeter, where the -B/1/26 patrol had been ambushed on 25 February.(195) - -The attack had been planned by the battalion commander, Lieutenant -Colonel Frederick J. McEwan (who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson -on 1 March) and his operations officer, Major Charles E. Davis III, -with careful attention to every detail. In fact, the 1/26 staff had -been working on this attack for a month. The sweep was also closely -coordinated with the FSCC to ensure that the maximum supporting arms -were available. To support Company B, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's -staff worked out a variation of the defensive fire plan with nine -batteries participating. Marine artillery (1/13) formed the primary -box and rolling barrage while the Army 175mms and TPQ-10 controlled -aircraft were responsible for the sides of the secondary box. The -latter fell on the high ground adjacent to the objective which might -influence the battle. The plan called for Captain Pipes to move his -unit into the primary box and follow approximately 75 meters in trace -of the rolling barrage. As the company advanced, the entire cylinder -also advanced. Outside the primary box, the sides of the secondary -would open and close over the terrain like a giant accordion. One -extremely important factor was that the artillery fire would not -necessarily alert the enemy of the impending attack because the same -technique had been used so frequently in that area. The element of -surprise still belonged to the Marines. - -At 0800, Captain Pipes' men swept out of a draw and, under the cover of -heavy fog, crossed the access road which ran from the Route 9 junction -to the FOB-3 compound. This jumping off point had been secured by one -platoon during the night. To their front and flanks, waves of exploding -artillery shells churned up the terrain. At the same time, four 106mm -recoilless rifles and six .50 caliber and M-60 machine guns provided -overhead fire; a type of support "which would have warmed the heart of -'Manila John' Basilone."[67] The crescent-shaped defenses, manned by -an NVA battalion, were roughly 100 meters southeast of the road and -extended along a 700 meter front. The enemy troops occupied heavily -fortified bunkers, trenches, and fighting holes. Although the objective -was indeed formidable, Company B was not to be denied that day.(196) - -After about 10 minutes of continuous supporting fire, Company B moved -swiftly into final assault positions and Captain Pipes directed the -FSCC to collapse the two artillery boxes. The fire was shifted to -cut off any enemy reinforcements from reaching the battle area and -to suppress NVA artillery and mortars. As if on cue, the dense fog -suddenly lifted; the last thing that many enemy soldiers saw that -morning was two Marine assault platoons with fixed bayonets only a few -yards in front of their positions. The surprise was complete. Pipes' -men poured into the trenches and swarmed over the startled defenders -before they could react. While one element laid down a base of fire -with small arms and machine guns, Marines armed with flame-throwers, -grenades, and satchel charges rushed through the trenches to sear and -blast enemy emplacements. The men of Company B carried out their grisly -work for over three hours and, by noon, the trenchworks had become a -smoking tomb for 115 North Vietnamese. - -The only effective resistance during the battle was enemy mortar fire. -Eventually, the NVA placed about 100 rounds on the attacking force. One -of these scored a direct hit on the company CP and killed the radio -man, the artillery FO, and the 81mm mortar FO. The company commander -was also hit. A mortar fragment passed through Captain Pipes' arm and -lodged in the side of his chest about two inches from his heart. Pipes -not only survived, he continued to direct the attack. - -With the loss of his two forward observers, the captain had to -handle the coordination of supporting arms by himself. Fortunately, -Lieutenant Colonel McEwan and Major Davis had made allowances for such -a possibility. During the planning phase, they plotted general fire -zones in the objective area and assigned each one a call sign (e.g. -Apples, Oranges, Grapes, etc.) Captain Pipes knew where these zones -were located and whenever he wanted to hit a target he simply told the -FSCC, "Fire Apples" or "Fire Oranges." In short order, the designated -zone was saturated with mortar and artillery rounds. Pipes utilized -this technique throughout the rest of the battle.(197) - -Once the Marines had consolidated the objective, they collected their -casualties which included nine dead and returned to the perimeter. -As Company B retired, the primary and secondary boxes closed back -in around the Marines and walked them home. During the battle, the -raiding force was shielded by some 2,600 artillery shells and 1,000 -mortar rounds. On the return trip, NVA artillery tracked the column; -ironically, one casualty during the withdrawal was an NVA prisoner who -was killed by his own fire. Lieutenant Colonel McEwan later described -the operation as a "classic raid." He attributed the success to the -detailed planning, the coordination with the FSCC, and Captain Pipes' -precise execution which "adhered to the tactical fundamentals and -principles of war."[68] For his part, the captain was later awarded -the Silver Star and the entire company received a warm congratulatory -message from General Westmoreland. The debt had been paid in full.(198) - -This purge to the south of the base marked the last significant -encounter of SCOTLAND and, at 0800 on 31 March, the operation was -officially terminated. The operational control of the 26th Marines was -passed to the U. S. Army 1st Air Cavalry Division (1st ACD), commanded -by Major General John J. Tolson, III, and Operation PEGASUS commenced. -The Army division, along with the 1st Marines and the 3d ARVN Airborne -Task Force started the push from Ca Lu to reopen Route 9, relieve the -pressure on the KSCB, and destroy remnants of the NVA units in the -Khe Sanh TAOR. In effect, the siege was over. Cumulative friendly -casualties for SCOTLAND, which began on 1 November 1967 were 205 -friendly KIA, 852 medevaced, and 816 minor wounded. The extent of NVA -losses was never determined and more than likely never will be. The -Marines counted 1,602 enemy bodies along the perimeters but the total -number of North Vietnamese dead was probably between 10,000 and 15,000. -The enemy always carried off his dead when possible and many others -undoubtedly died in the surrounding hills and were not found by anyone. -There was little doubt that the heart of two crack NVA divisions had -been ripped out at Khe Sanh. The full impact of the suffering endured -by the enemy, however, did not become evident until the Marine, Army, -and ARVN troops began mopping up operations around the base.[69](199) - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[48] Marine control of air support within the Khe Sanh TAOR resulted -from negotiations between CG, III MAF and the Seventh Air Force. -General Cushman was delegated authority for Colonel Lownds to -control, through his FSCC, all supporting fire, including air strikes -within a circle which encompassed the range of the regiment's 155mm -howitzers. During the period 22 January-13 February, operational -difficulties caused ComUSMACV to give Commander, Seventh Air Force full -responsibility for the overall NIAGARA air effort through the ABCCC. - -[49] Close air support in Vietnam includes all air attacks that are -coordinated with the supported force. Radar-controlled bombing and B-52 -strikes, in this context, can be called close air support but, for -the purposes of this study, the three above mentioned categories will -be considered separately. Although the delivery method is technically -not a criteria, close air support in this text will refer to those -missions where fixed-wing pilots, under the direction of an airborne or -ground controller, visually acquire and attack a target in proximity to -friendly forces. - -[50] High and dry meant that all ordnance had been expended. Another -frequently used term was "ammo minus." - -[51] Both crews suffered sore backs from the ejection but no other -injury. Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman became the third CO in a row from -VMFA-323 to leave an F-4B via the ejection route. Captain Brandon -returned to action and eventually compiled 400 combat missions--a first -for Marine Radar Intercept Officers. - -[52] To catch stunned survivors above ground, the 1/13 batteries -frequently put massed artillery fire into the target area 10 to 15 -minutes after the bombers departed. - -[53] General Westmoreland gave his constant personal attention to the -targeting of these strikes and while most of the targets were generated -by the 26th Marines Headquarters, General Westmoreland personally -approved the requests. Based on intelligence he also directed or -diverted B-52 raids from Saigon. To keep right on top of this aspect of -the battle, the general slept at night in his Combat Operations Center -during the siege. - -[54] The 26th Marines Command Chronology does not list sorties but -strikes which were made up of several aircraft and 430 strikes were -recorded. - -[55] The van, as well as crew living quarters, was emplaced underground -and was heavily sandbagged. The sturdiness of the bunker was an -important factor because of the heavy shelling. One enemy round scored -a direct hit on top of the bunker with no damage to the fragile -equipment. The computer van remained operational throughout the siege. - -[56] The term "pickled" is slang used by pilots which means to drop -their ordnance. - -[57] When a TPQ-10 broke lock, the radar beam strayed from the aircraft -and inputs to the computer were interrupted. The operator also lost -visual contact on the radar screen. - -[58] One 105mm howitzer on 881S was also destroyed. - -[59] Not every artillery round that left Khe Sanh was high explosive. -During March, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalion had accumulated -more ammunition than it could safely store. Since the ammo would not -fit in the berms and presented a hazard above ground, the decision was -made to fire it all. This excess included some 90-odd rounds of green -smoke. On 17 March--St. Patrick's Day--the Marines fired all the green -smoke rounds on known enemy positions to honor the patron saint of the -Fighting Irish. - -[60] Tanglefoot, as the name implies, is a barbed wire entanglement -that is stretched low to the ground and is usually used between larger -barriers. Concertina comes in rolls which are laid side by side or on -top of each other. Double-apron obstacles are simply barbed wire fences -in depth. - -[61] To rub salt into the wound, the Marines devised a red -flag--Maggie's Drawers--like the ones used on rifle ranges to signal -that the shooter had missed the entire target, and waved it every time -the sniper fired. - -[62] To keep the North Vietnamese from zeroing in on his communication -bunkers, Colonel Lownds ordered that fake antennae be placed on every -structure at Khe Sanh--including the four-holers. - -[63] The ASRT-B radar antennae sustained over 200 hits from shell -fragments but continued to function near maximum efficiency throughout -the siege. - -[64] A conex box is a large metal container primarily used to sea-lift -cargo. - -[65] Kit Carson Scouts were enemy ralliers who scouted for the Allies. - -[66] The pilot was badly burned in the crash and died that night. - -[67] Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone was a Medal of Honor winner in -World War II. During an action at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal, -Basilone's machine gun section fired over 26,000 rounds in one night -and helped break up a fanatical Japanese attack. Manila John was later -killed on Iwo Jima. - -[68] Another interesting point was that the attack was largely carried -out by inexperienced troops. During the siege, Company B suffered -considerable casualties and most of the replacements were fresh from -the States. Major Davis later commented that the conduct of these -Marines during the operation spoke highly of the type of training that -they received before arriving in Vietnam. This ability to adapt quickly -plus the high quality of small unit leadership was, in Davis' opinion, -a key factor in the Marine victory. - -[69] The breakdown of fixed-wing tactical sorties under Operation -NIAGARA follows: Marine-7,078, Seventh Air Force-9,684, and U. -S. Navy-5,167. These figures were derived from 1st MAW Command -Chronologies and Project CHECO, Southeast Asia Report. The two sources -do not agree on Marine sorties (Project CHECO credits USMC aircraft -with 6,385); 1st MAW records in this case have been cited. Statistics -for B-52 strikes and Marine helicopter operations have been previously -incorporated in the text. - - - - -PART VIII - -THE BREAKOUT - - -The blueprints for a major Allied drive into the Khe Sanh Plateau had -been on the drawing boards at III MAF Headquarters in the embryo stage -since late January. The 1st ACD was slated for the campaign since that -division had displaced from Bong Son, in II Corps, and arrived at Phu -Bai on 22 January. Three days after he assumed operational control of -the new division, General Cushman directed General Tolson to prepare -a contingency plan for the relief of Khe Sanh. This action eventually -resulted in Operation PEGASUS but there was a series of events which -delayed its start until April. The first was the disruptive Communist -TET Offensive and the resulting Battle of Hue City which raged until 25 -February. Throughout February and early March, the 1st ACD was busily -engaged in and around the old imperial capital. Logistics was another -consideration. General Westmoreland had initiated a supply build-up in -I Corps during December 1967 but III MAF did not yet have sufficient -stock levels to support an operation the size of PEGASUS, especially -while the heavy fighting still continued in Hue. Finally, the poor -weather prevented large-scale helicopter operations in the Khe Sanh -area.(200) - -An alteration of the command structure in I Corps also indirectly -affected the proposed operation. Until the early part of 1968, the -three divisions in I Corps (1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv, and the U. S. Army -Americal Division) were under the direct control of General Cushman, -CG, III MAF. General Westmoreland, however, was convinced that a -critical, if not the most critical, phase of the war was taking shape -in I Corps and had begun to pump reinforcements into the two northern -provinces. These included the 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne Division. -To keep closer tabs on the action in the north, General Westmoreland -also established a forward echelon of his MACV Headquarters, under -the Deputy, ComUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, at Camp Hochmuth, -Phu Bai on 9 February. There was little formal change in the command -structure; General Abrams simply acted as an agent for ComUSMACV in -an advisor/coordinator role. On 10 March, however, the structure did -change; MACV Forward was converted to Provisional Corps, Vietnam (PCV) -and placed under the operational control of General Cushman, CG, III -MAF. PCV's new commander, Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, U. -S. Army, assumed control of all American combat forces operating in -the northern two provinces, less the southern portion of Thua Thien. -At that time the three major U. S. units in the area were the 3d -MarDiv, the 1st ACD, and the 101st Airborne Division. In addition, the -reinforced ARVN 1st Division was operating in this region. In essence, -PCV was established to provide closer supervision over growing U. S. -forces and coordination with the Vietnamese units in the northern -area.(201) - -As the operations around Hue tapered off, General Cushman, on 29 -February, directed General Tolson to take the plans for PEGASUS back -off the shelf. During the first week in March, General Tolson met -in Da Nang with Generals Cushman and Abrams for a discussion of the -operation.[70] The mission was threefold: relieve the Khe Sanh Combat -base, reopen Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh, and eradicate any NVA -elements within the area of operations. In addition to the three -brigades of the 1st ACD, General Tolson was to assume operational -control of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 3d ARVN Airborne -Task Force. D-day was tentatively set for 1 April--depending on -the weather. With the basic directives, General Tolson returned to -Camp Evans, and settled down to detailed planning with his division -staff. During the next few weeks, there were numerous planning and -coordination meetings with III MAF, PCV, the 3d Marine Division, 1st -Marine Aircraft Wing, Seventh Air Force, and representatives of the -attached units.(202) - -The logistics portion of the plan hinged around construction of a base -and airfield near Ca Lu which could accommodate C-7 Caribou transports -and later C-123s. Before work could be initiated, elements of the 3d -MarDiv had to secure and repair the stretch of Route 9 between Ca Lu -and the Rockpile so that supplies, fuel, ammunition, and construction -material could be stockpiled. Once this was accomplished, a joint task -force of engineers--the 11th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, -the 1st ACD's 8th Engineer Battalion, and Navy Mobile Construction -Battalion 5--began construction of an airfield, parking ramps, -logistical facilities, and defensive positions. By the time the lead -assault elements were ready to jump off in the attack, the installation -was 83 percent completed. The base was dubbed Landing Zone (LZ) Stud. - -On 25 March, D-6, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 CavSqd), operating -from LZ Stud, began extensive reconnaissance in the PEGASUS area of -operations to pave the way for the initial air assaults. The mission of -the unit was "to find the enemy, destroy his antiaircraft capability, -acquire hard intelligence for exploitation, and locate and prepare -suitable landing zones." Since General Tolson had little concrete -information on exact enemy locations, the activities of the 1/9 CavSqd -were essential to the operation. The squadron fanned out from LZ Stud -in ever increasing concentric circles under the cover of tactical air, -B-52 strikes, and the 8-inch and 105mm batteries which had been moved -to Ca Lu. During this phase, the air cavalrymen called in 632 tactical -air strikes, 49 specially fuzed construction sorties (Daisy Cutters), -and 12 Arc Light strikes on enemy antiaircraft positions, troop -concentrations, and future landing zones.(203) - -As a prelude to PEGASUS, the 3d MarDiv launched a regimental-size, -diversionary attack in eastern Quang Tri Province. On 30 March, Task -Force KILO, comprised of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; the U. S. Army -3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; and the 3d Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment -pushed northward from Dong Ha on a search and destroy sweep through -the Gio Linh coastal plain area between the Cua Viet River and the -DMZ. In addition, a company from the 101st Airborne Division was used -as a reconnaissance force and to convey a picture of greater weight -and diversity of attack. Although the foray was primarily designed to -confuse the NVA and draw attention away from the mailed fist which -was poised at Ca Lu, the Allies of Task Force KILO killed 150 North -Vietnamese during the first day.(204) - -At 0700 on D-day (1 April), two battalions controlled by the 1st -Marines (2/1 and 2/3), which had moved from Phu Bai to LZ Stud several -days before, spearheaded the attack to the west. Meeting only light -resistance, 2/1 wheeled to the north of Route 9 and secured its -objective while 2/3 swept through and consolidated the area to the -south of the road. With both flanks screened by the infantry, the 11th -Engineer Battalion began the mammoth task of renovating Route 9. Later -in the day, elements of the 3d Brigade (Bde) 1st ACD leapfrogged by -helicopter to positions midway between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. The 1st and -2d Squadrons, 7th Cavalry swarmed into LZ Mike which encompassed Hill -248, approximately 7,500 meters east of the KSCB. This high ground to -the south of Route 9 was cradled on three sides by branches of the -Quang Tri River. To the north some 3,000 meters, the 5th Battalion, -7th Cavalry air-assaulted the southern slope of Dong Chio Mountain -which was designated LZ Cates. This stretch was particularly critical -because the road was sandwiched between the Quang Tri River on the -south and the nearly perpendicular cliffs which towered menacingly -over Route 9 to the north. Following the initial waves, the 3d Brigade -Headquarters displaced to LZ Cates and established a CP. By 1650, the -Flying Horsemen were in place and continued to expand both zones while -105mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were helilifted -in for direct support. Throughout the PEGASUS area of operations, the -Americans established defensive perimeters and passed the night with -little or no contact.(205) - -While the combat engineers continued their steady movement along Route -9, additional elements of the airmobile armada were thrown into the -action. On D plus two, the 2d Brigade, 1st ACD which had been staging -at Ca Lu conducted a vertical envelopment into LZ Tom and LZ Wharton -which were roughly 6,000 and 8,500 meters southeast of Khe Sanh. The -air assault went smoothly even though the zones were shelled by NVA -gunners. By the end of the day, all 2d Brigade units were in position -along with three batteries of the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery. In the -meantime, the 3d Brigade and the 1st Marines expanded their TAORs along -Route 9.(206) - -On 4 April, General Tolson began to put the squeeze on enemy elements -to the south of the KSCB. Moving northeast from LZ Wharton, the 1/5 -CavSqd attacked the old French fort near the junction of Route 9. At -the same time, the 26th Marines, which had been attached to the 1st ACD -since 31 March, began the long awaited breakout from the base. At 0600, -three companies of Lieutenant Colonel John J. H. Cahill's 1/9 (relieved -Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell on 1 April) moved out of the rock quarry -perimeter and advanced on Hill 471 which was 2,500 meters due south of -the airstrip. The hill was a key terrain feature since it overlooked -the road junction and that segment of Route 9 which snaked to the -southwest. The area was also occupied by major elements of the =304th -NVA Division=. After heavy prep fires, the Marines stormed up the -slope in the face of light enemy fire and secured their objective at -1720.[71] Thirty North Vietnamese bodies were strewn over the hilltop. - -The men of 1/9, however, were in for a long night. Later that night, -the enemy lashed out at the hill with 192 mortar and artillery rounds. -The barrage was undoubtedly designed to soften up the Marines for a -counterattack the next morning. The North Vietnamese might as well have -saved their ammunition and their counterattack.(207) - -At 0515, the =7th Battalion=, =66th Regiment=, =304th NVA Division=, -charged up Hill 471 in a vain attempt to knock 1/9 from the crest. The -=66th Regiment= was definitely a hard-luck outfit; it had been bloodied -at Khe Sanh Village on 21 January and again during the abortive attack -against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, on 29 February/1 March. The -enemy's string of bad luck remained unbroken on the morning of 5 -April. Lieutenant Colonel Cahill's Marines stood their ground, poured -withering fire into the onrushing enemy troops, and, with the aid -of artillery and tactical air strikes, smashed the North Vietnamese -attack. During the one-sided exchange, one Marine was killed and 19 -wounded; the =66th Regiment= left 122 dead on the slopes. This fight -was one of the major highlights of Operation PEGASUS.[72](208) - -The surge of Allied units into the previously uncontested domain of -the =304th NVA Division= continued for the next few days.[73] On -the afternoon of the 5th, the last element of the 1st ACD--the 1st -Brigade--departed Ca Lu aboard droves of helicopters and swooped into -LZ Snapper, 7,500 meters south of the base. The following morning, -the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry (2d Brigade) moved northeast from LZ -Wharton and relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cahill's battalion on Hill 471. -After relief was effected, 1/9 initiated a drive toward Hill 689 some -4,500 meters to the northwest. On the opposite side of the KSCB, the -5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1st Brigade) conducted a landing just 500 -meters north of the Blue Sector wire. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 26th -Marines fanned out to the north and northwest of their hill outposts. -Company G, 2/26 bumped into an NVA company that afternoon and killed 48 -of the enemy. - -The initial relief of the combat base occurred at 1350 on 6 April when -the lead company of the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force was airlifted to -Khe Sanh and linked up with the 37th Rangers. This move was primarily -intended as a morale booster for the 37th. Two days later, after 2/7 -CavSqd had completed the sweep along Route 9 and linked up with the -26th Marines, the official relief took place. At 0800 on 8 April, the -3d Brigade airlifted its CP to the base and became the new landlord. -Relieved of its duties along the perimeter, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan's -1/26 saddled up and attacked to the west that day but made little -contact.(209) - -Traditionally, the lifting of a siege has been the occasion for great -emotional outbursts, bands, and stirring oration; in this regard, the -relief of Khe Sanh was somewhat of a disappointment. General Tolson -intended for the link-up to be "as business like as possible with a -minimum of fanfare" so that he could get the Marines on the offensive -again. A few newsmen at the base snapped pictures of Marines shaking -hands with the Cavalrymen but the men usually shrugged indifferently -afterwards and went about their business. The defenders generally -looked on the proceedings with sort of a "ho-hum" attitude, perhaps -they felt that they had not been rescued from anything. In fact, they -were right; the enemy threat had been squelched weeks before PEGASUS -had gotten off the ground. "I've been at Khe Sanh for nine months," the -regimental commander stated, "and if they keep me supplied, I could -stay here another nine months." No doubt most men were glad they did -not have to remain because the stand at Khe Sanh had not been "all -peaches and cream," but, as far as the defenders being snatched out of -the jaws of destruction--it just did not happen that way.(210) - -With the arrival of the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force, all maneuver -elements involved in PEGASUS were on the Khe Sanh Plateau. On the 8th, -the three South Vietnamese battalions (minus one company) leapfrogged -from Quang Tri to LZ Stud and then conducted a helicopter assault into -LZ Snake about 2,000 meters southwest of the base. In effect, the -encirclement was complete; only, this time, pressure was being applied -in the opposite direction. As the Allied oil slick spread over the -valley, the Americans and South Vietnamese uncovered ghastly evidence -of how badly the NVA had been beaten. The various units found hundreds -of North Vietnamese in shallow graves; hundreds more lay where they -fell. A total of 557 individual weapons, 207 crew-served weapons, and -2 antiaircraft pieces were either captured or destroyed. In addition, -17 vehicles, ranging from PT-76 tanks to motor scooters, and tons of -ammunition, food, radios, and individual equipment were discovered. The -mountains of captured or abandoned enemy stores indicated that either -Operation PEGASUS had caught the NVA completely flat-footed or the -remnants of the two enemy divisions were in no shape to cart off their -equipment and supplies.(211) - -Even though the rest of the operation centered around completing -work on Route 9 and sifting through the debris of battle, there were -several contacts with the retreating enemy. On 8 April, the ARVN forces -turned back an NVA counterattack west of the base and killed 78 in the -process. The same day, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, assaulted and -seized Hill 689 with no opposition but discovered 37 NVA killed during -a fight the previous night. Air and artillery also hammered away at the -NVA; on one occasion, a U. S. Army airborne observer spotted 100 North -Vietnamese in the open and called in artillery fire which accounted for -30 of the enemy. While the NVA pulled away to the west, the engineer -task force crept toward the base from the opposite direction, and at -1600 on 11 April, Route 9 was officially declared open. The engineers -had repaired 14 kilometers of road, replaced 9 vital bridges, and -constructed 17 bypasses; General Westmoreland applauded their feat as -"herculean."(212) (See Maps 8 and 9). - -[Illustration: - - MAP 8 K.W. WHITE - -OPERATION PEGASUS] - -[Illustration: - - MAP 9 K.W. WHITE - -OPERATION PEGASUS] - -The day before the road was completed, General Tolson received a visit -from the PCV commander, General Rosson, which resulted in an alteration -of Operation PEGASUS. General Rosson directed his division commander to -begin extracting units to Quang Tri and Camp Evans in preparation for -an assault into the A Shau Valley (Operation DELAWARE). General Tolson -anticipated that the operation would last much longer and had initially -planned to expand his sweeps far to the south, north, and northwest. -In addition, the 1st Marines was slated for air assaults into a valley -west of the Rockpile. The A Shau Valley, however, was a major enemy -base area and logistics complex which supported his operations in Thua -Thien and Quang Nam provinces. To launch a mobile strike into this -region and destroy the enemy's base had been a major MACV objective of -long standing. Support of this operation had been one of the reasons -for the troop and logistical buildup in the northern area which had -begun the previous December. The weather in the A Shau Valley was now -ideal for airmobile operations and General Westmoreland was anxious -to get DELAWARE underway before the end of April. The following day, -the 11th, all air assaults were cancelled and General Tolson began to -withdraw elements from Khe Sanh. The 1st Brigade, less one battalion, -was airlifted to Quang Tri City and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, -which had fought so valiantly, was pulled out and sent to Da Nang. Two -days later, the division command post and elements of the 3d Brigade -departed for Camp Evans.(213) - -Another noteworthy departure was that of Colonel Lownds. The colonel, -who did his job well enough to earn the nation's second highest -award--the Navy Cross--turned over the reins of the 26th Marines to -Colonel Bruce F. Meyers on 12 April. The new commander wasted no time; -he planned and executed the attack which in effect, ended the Battle -for Khe Sanh. It was scheduled for 14 April--Easter Sunday. - -Ironically, the last engagement took place between Hills 881S and -881N precisely where, on 20 January, the whole affair had begun. The -3d Battalion, 26th Marines which had started the fight was also on -hand to finish it. Ever since the 4th, Lieutenant Colonel John C. -Studt's battalion (relieved Lieutenant Colonel Alderman on 15 March) -had been sweeping to the north and northwest of Hill 881S and, on -several occasions, had taken fire from 881N. The enemy troops still -clung tenaciously to that piece of real estate from which they had -directed rocket fire against Khe Sanh and antiaircraft fire against the -helicopters resupplying the Marines on 881S. Lieutenant Colonel Studt's -mission was to secure the terrain between the two hills, then attack -and seize 881N.(214) - -Since the enemy gunners had zeroed in on the slopes of 881S with their -mortars, Lieutenant Colonel Studt moved his attacking elements into -position the night of the 13th. The assault companies of 3/26 slipped -out of the defensive wire under the cover of darkness and moved down -the forward slope of the hill along routes which were protected by -security patrols. As he watched the Marines file by, the battalion's -operations officer, Major Caulfield, could not help but be concerned -about them. Most of the men had spent the past two and a half months in -a foxhole or trench; they had received minimum rations and a maximum -of enemy shelling. All were tired and dirty; some suffered from large -body sores because the water received by these men had gone into their -bodies and not on them. Even though they were Marines, the major -wondered how they would perform the next morning. At 0800, he received -his answer.(215) - -The attack, which the troops referred to as their "Easter Egg Hunt," -was preceded by a deluge of supporting fire. Colonel Meyers, who flew -to 881S by helicopter, observed the attack and personally ensured -that sufficient supporting arms were employed. In addition to the -artillery of 1/13 at Khe Sanh and the 175mm bases, 155mm and 8-inch -batteries of the 1st ACD at LZ Stud were called on to help cave in -the enemy bunkers. Strike aircraft worked over the hill with bombs, -rockets, and napalm. The Marines who remained on 881S also provided -heavy support. Besides the 60mm and 81mm mortars, these men had pooled -all eight of the battalion's 106 recoilless rifles, the two remaining -105mm howitzers, and six .50 caliber machine guns which had been -salvaged from downed helicopters or stripped off of trucks at the base. -As the assault troops advanced, the weapons on 881S provided direct -overhead fire which sometimes preceded the front ranks by no more than -50 meters. As usual, the recoilless rifles were extremely effective. -One observer later remarked that when the lead elements approached a -treeline, no chances were taken; the 106 gunners fired a broadside and -the treeline was simply blown away.(216) - -Because of the weight and speed of the attack, the enemy was never able -to recover. Moving behind a wall of steel, the battalion clawed its way -through the defenses between the two hills and prepared for the final -push. Major Caulfield, who had worried about the Marines' weakened -condition the night before, soon found the opposite was true--he was -having trouble holding them back. At one point, a group of NVA soldiers -who had been hammered senseless by the prep fires, broke from their -positions and fled into the open. An airborne spotter directed the -companies to hold up while he called in air and artillery. Scanning the -front lines, Major Caulfield noticed that a handful of Marines with -fixed bayonets were in hot pursuit of the enemy. The major contacted -the company commander by radio and told him to collar his troops. The -reply was, "Sir, I can't stop them...." Neither could the enemy.(217) - -The men of 3/26 stormed the hill, swarmed over the crest, and killed -anyone who stood in their way. At 1428, the objective was secured and -the men signaled their victory in traditional Marine Corps fashion, as -Colonel Meyers later described: - - On Sunday, 14 April (Easter), I helicoptered to 881S and with - Captain Bill Dabney, Company Commander of I/3/26, personally - watched the U. S. Colors (which had been fortuitously carried in a - squad leader's pack) hoisted again over 881N. This was the signal - (visual) that Lieutenant Colonel John Studt's assault had been - completed. I watched the jungle utility-clad Marine "shinny-up" a - shrapnel torn tree whose limbs had been sheared from the intensive - prep fires, and affix the Stars and Stripes.(218) - -With the enemy either dead or gone, the hill again lost its value. -Terrain wasn't so important in the fluid Vietnam war, but people were -and, in that respect, Lieutenant Colonel Studt's men had completed a -very successful operation--106 North Vietnamese were dead. In addition -to the enemy dead on the objective, air strikes and artillery fire had -completely blanketed three large groups of NVA fleeing from the hill -but because of the dense vegetation and the approaching darkness, no -bodies were recovered. Two slightly shot-up North Vietnamese, one of -them an officer, were captured and flown back to Khe Sanh in Colonel -Meyers' helicopter. Considering the strength of the enemy defenses, -Marine casualties were surprisingly light--6 killed and 19 medevaced. -Lieutenant Colonel Studt stated: "... stand off plastering with -supporting arms ... prior to each assault was the key factor here."(219) - -That night the battalion commander and his operations officer stood at -the gate on 881S and slapped the men on the back as they trooped back -into the perimeter. One Marine, a tall, lanky, slow-talking Kentuckian, -held out a captured rifle for Lieutenant Colonel Studt's inspection--it -was filthy. During the attack, the Marine had come face to face with -the owner; both men raised their rifles simultaneously and pulled the -trigger but only the M-16 barked out--the enemy's rifle jammed. The -survivor's explanation was simply, "I cleaned my weapon last night, he -didn't."(220) - -The next morning at 0800, PCV terminated PEGASUS. The operation was -very successful and all objectives were achieved; Route 9 was open, -the enemy had been routed, and the base itself was relieved. The North -Vietnamese had lost another 1,304 killed and 21 captured, while 41 U. -S. Army troops, 51 Marines, and 33 South Vietnamese died. Air support -again had played an important role. There were 45 B-52 Arc Light -strikes and 1,625 tactical sorties conducted during PEGASUS. Of the -latter number, 650 sorties were flown by Marines, 463 by the U. S. Air -Force, 436 by carrier-based Task Force 77, and 77 by the U. S. Army -and VNAF. From 31 March to 8 April, U. S. Air Force C-130 and C-123 -aircraft delivered 843 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by paradrop and the -low altitude extraction system. On 9 April, the strip was reopened to -C-130s and the supply level at the KSCB began to grow large enough so -that the 1st ACD could draw from the 26th Marines stockpile.(221) - -With the termination of PEGASUS, the 3d Marine Division again assumed -responsibility of the Khe Sanh area. Task Force GLICK, comprised of the -26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 2d Brigade(-), 1st ACD, launched -Operation SCOTLAND II at 0801, 15 April. The 26th Marines, however, -did not remain in the operation very long. Three days later, the new -commanding officer and two of his battalions were transferred to Quang -Tri Base and, for the men who had taken 77 days of the best the NVA -could offer, the defense of Khe Sanh was over.[74](222) - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[70] It was around this time that PCV was formed and General Abrams -departed I Corps. General Rosson then became a key figure in the -planning of the operation. - -[71] Although the rifle companies encountered only slight resistance -during the assault, the Company A command group, while advancing toward -the objective, took a direct hit from an enemy mortar. The Air Officer, -Captain Walter C. Jones, III was killed as was one radio operator; the -battalion Operations Officer, Major Ted R. Henderson, was seriously -wounded and evacuated. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel -Cahill and his Artillery Officer, First Lieutenant John K. LeBlond, Jr. -were also wounded at that time but were able to continue. - -[72] In addition to the Marine killed during the attack, nine were -killed by enemy shelling the night before. A total of 57 Marines were -medevaced. - -[73] The =325C NVA Division= had long since departed the area and left -the =304th= to continue pressure on the 26th Marines. Some elements of -the =304th= swung to the north of the base and replaced units of the -=325C=. - -[74] The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines did not return to Quang Tri with -the regiment but was transferred to the operational control of the -4th Marines at Camp Carroll. General Tompkins saw to it that each man -who returned from Khe Sanh immediately received a hot shower, a clean -uniform, and a big steak dinner. As an added touch, the 3d Marine -Division band was on hand, and greeted each arrival with a stirring -rendition of the "Marines Hymn." - - - - -PART IX - -EPILOGUE - - -On 23 May 1968, several members of the 26th Marines who had fought -at Khe Sanh had a reunion of sorts in Washington, D. C. and the -surroundings were a far cry from the dirt and grime of the combat -base. The "CP" belonged to the President of the United States, Lyndon -B. Johnson. In the Cabinet Room of the White House, the Commander in -Chief paused to honor the men of the 26th Marines and awarded the -Presidential Unit Citation to the regiment. Colonel Lownds, whose -large handle-bar mustache had been shaved off at the direction of -"the highest possible authority"--his wife, and Sergeant Major Agrippa -W. Smith, senior enlisted man at the KSCB, were on hand to receive -the award. While it was fitting that the 26th Marines be cited as a -unit, the President also praised the South Vietnamese, U. S. Army, U. -S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, and Marine aviation and support units which -contributed so gallantly to the defense of the installation.(223) - -In some quarters, however, there were still grumblings over the Khe -Sanh issue. During the siege, there had been a virtual storm of protest -from critics who opposed the Administration's decision to hold the -base. These doomsday prophets suffered from what some military experts -referred to as the "Dien Bien Phu Syndrome." Many noted intellectuals -were in the van of this group and throughout the battle they could not -be convinced that air and artillery support would provide the margin of -difference; they warned that the tiny base would suffer the same fate -which had been meted out to the French garrison 14 years earlier.(224) - -[Illustration: During the presentation of the Presidential Unit -Citation to the 26th Marines, President Lyndon B. Johnson (C) -congratulates Sergeant Major Agrippa W. Smith (L) while Colonel David -E. Lownds (R) looks on.] - -There are several reasons why Khe Sanh did not become another Dien Bien -Phu. The first and most obvious being that the Americans possessed the -overwhelming supporting arms which were not available to the French. -Contrary to the predictions of many critics, air and artillery were -decisive and more than made up for the numerical superiority of the -enemy. Over 100,000 tons of bombs and 150,000 artillery rounds were -delivered--and delivered intelligently--by the Americans during the -siege. Much of the credit goes to the regimental commander and his -staff who knew how to coordinate their different sources of firepower -to achieve maximum results. The NVA learned this during the five major -attacks against the base and hill outposts. - -The ability to keep Khe Sanh resupplied was another major factor. -The NVA encirclement did not coincide with the monsoon season by -accident. With Route 9 interdicted, the fate of the garrison hinged -on the success or failure of the airlift and apparently the North -Vietnamese anticipated that it would fail. The fact that the airlift -was successful in the face of heavy enemy fire and the foulest weather -imaginable is indeed a tribute to the aircrews and recovery personnel -but the resupply effort went much deeper than just delivering the -goods. The Force Logistics Command at Da Nang augmented by U. S. Army -sources at Cam Ranh Bay was responsible for the mountain of supplies -and material which sustained the 26th Marines. An excerpt from the -works of Winston Churchill which was selected as the motto of the -Force Logistics Command best describes the vital role these logistics -agencies played: "Victory is the beautiful colored flower. Supply is -the stem without which it could never have blossomed."(225) - -Another important facet of the defense was the close supervision and -leadership provided by the senior commanders, namely CG, 3d MarDiv, -CG, III MAF, and ComUSMACV. Since much of the supporting arms and all -of the logistical support was handled by agencies external to the 26th -Marines, constant coordination among these three headquarters was -imperative. General Tompkins was the pivotal figure of the triumvirate. -During his daily trips to the base, the general learned first hand -what the regimental commander needed; he not only saw that Colonel -Lownds received adequate support but he insured that the defenders made -the most of their resources. In so doing he exposed himself to heavy -enemy antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar fire as did General Cushman -during his periodic visits to Khe Sanh. Commenting on the strong role -played by the 3d Marine Division commander, General Cushman later said, -"General Tompkins made or approved every major decision during the -battle."(226) - -The real hero of Khe Sanh, however, was on the opposite end of the rank -scale--the individual fighting man. For 77 days the defenders waited -in the trenchlines while the bulk of the credit and publicity went to -the artillery, fighter/bombers, and B-52s. On several occasions the -supporting arms could not prevent major enemy assaults from reaching -the wire; at this point, it was the Marines or ARVN Rangers, armed with -rifles, grenades, and bayonets, who stopped the North Vietnamese--often -in bitter hand-to-hand combat. Without exception, the battalion -commanders were lavish in their praise of the young Americans and South -Vietnamese who held the perimeter and denied the enemy a much-needed -victory. In spite of the inherent hardships which accompanied the siege -and the incessant shelling, the defenders were always itching for a -fight. The most overused expression during the battle was, "I wish they -(North Vietnamese) would hurry up and come so we can get this thing -over with." When asked by a reporter if the NVA troops could take Khe -Sanh, one officer answered, "Hell no, those 19-year-old Marines won't -let them."[75](227) - -Finally, much of the credit for the American success at Khe Sanh -belongs to the NVA. The North Vietnamese obliged the 26th Marines -by standing toe to toe in a slugging contest during which they were -outgunned and outfought; in effect, the enemy destroyed himself. If -there was one salient feature which resulted in the enemy's defeat it -might well be his rigid adherence to a siege strategy in the face of -certain failure. Even when it became obvious that the Americans were -aware of their master plan, the North Vietnamese doggedly pursued -their siege tactics without alteration. The extremely lucrative target -presented by the massed NVA forces which ringed the base was one of the -main reasons the garrison was maintained. Thus, the question may be -legitimately asked, "Who besieged whom?"(228) - -To a lesser degree, there was a controversy over who or what had won -the battle. Proponents of air power and strategic bombing were the most -vocal; they felt that the B-52 had been the most decisive instrument -of defense. While the Stratofortress was a valuable asset and, without -doubt played a major role, any attempt to single out one supporting -arm as the ultimate weapon in the battle would be futile. The B-52 was -but one part of an intricate defensive fire plan. The bombers struck -targets beyond 1,100 meters of the base; tactical air and artillery -took up the slack to within about 250 meters and the organic weaponry -of the defenders provided close-in fires. The system was balanced -and effective but, if any part were eliminated, the defenders would -have paid a much higher price in casualties. Both General Tompkins -and Colonel Lownds were unstinting in their praise of all supporting -arms, as well as the logistical effort; they stressed, and stressed -heavily, that the defense of Khe Sanh was a joint endeavor. The highly -successful results were achieved through the contributions of all U. S. -Services and the South Vietnamese. While the Marines had been unable to -find an infantryman who could carry a 27-ton payload, neither had the -U. S. Air Force come up with a B-52 which could man a foxhole. Both, in -their own way, were essential.(229) - -The Khe Sanh story again became news in late June 1968 and the old -controversy over strategy was rekindled. Prior to leaving his post as -ComUSMACV on 11 June, General Westmoreland visited PCV Headquarters in -I Corps and approved the recommendations of Generals Cushman and Rosson -to raze the KSCB and withdraw all Allied forces to the Ca Lu area. -While General Westmoreland made the decision prior to his departure, -he did not close the base at that time, because mopping-up operations -were being conducted around Khe Sanh. In addition, large amounts of -supplies had been stockpiled there and the general deemed it more -economical to maintain the base while these stocks were consumed in -support of the operations rather than backhaul them to Ca Lu. For these -reasons, he left the choice concerning the optimum time to dismantle -the installation up to his successor, General Abrams. When bulldozers -finally began to level the bunkers and structures which had housed the -26th Marines throughout the siege, the American people wondered why -the base had been so tenaciously defended if it was to be eventually -abandoned. Had American blood been shed in vain? Critics of the -hold-out policy argued that, in the final analysis, they had been right -and those who decided to defend the base had been wrong. Such rationale -pinpointed the inability of many Americans to break away from the -techniques employed in past wars and recognize the peculiarities of the -conflict in Vietnam. - -There were several reasons for the deactivation of the KSCB since, -for all practical purposes, the base had outlived its usefulness. -The rationale endorsed by General Cushman and General Rosson was -threefold. First, the enemy had reduced his forces and changed his -=modus operandi= in the Khe Sanh area. Secondly, the NVA artillery in -Laos had accurately targeted the base and access road which compounded -the casualty and resupply problems. Finally and most important, General -Cushman had sufficient assets in June to pursue the mobile offensive -strategy which he had advocated strongly for such a long time. Two U. -S. Army divisions (i.e. 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne) with their -inherent helicopter resources had been shifted to III MAF and, during -March and April, the tremendous logistics burden associated with -the introduction of these 50,000 men into northern I Corps had been -alleviated. Since he had sufficient maneuver elements to go on the -offense in western Quang Tri Province, General Cushman no longer needed -five battalions buttoned up in Khe Sanh.(230) - -An additional consideration for the abandonment of the base was -President Johnson's announcement on 31 March that the U. S. would end -air strikes in North Vietnam.[76] While the decision was a major step -toward peace, it also enabled thousands of NVA support personnel who -were responsible for road repair in North Vietnam to move further -south. These workers constructed a network of infiltration arteries -which bypassed the combat base and the continued policy of positioning -static Allied defense installations in the path of these routes would -have been inefficient and undesirable. In this regard, the best defense -was a highly mobile offense and while a forward operating base for such -operations was essential, the LZ Stud/Ca Lu area was much better suited -than Khe Sanh.(231) - -By the time PEGASUS was over, LZ Stud was in full operation. The -airstrip was extended to accommodate C-123s, a Force Logistics Area was -established, and local defenses were strengthened. The base was outside -the range of the North Vietnamese 130mm and 152mm guns in Laos and the -stretch of Route 9 from Ca Lu to the Rockpile and eventually Dong Ha -was easier to keep open. Thus, two factors--enemy shelling and resupply -problems--which had negated the effectiveness of Khe Sanh as a base of -operations were absent at LZ Stud. - -While not physically located on the Khe Sanh Plateau, the forces at -LZ Stud controlled it. Two forward fire bases were established in -the vicinity of the old combat base from which extensive patrolling -was conducted. Ground patrols were supplemented by air surveillance. -Whenever contact with the enemy was made, lighting-fast helicopter -assaults were launched from LZ Stud and were supported by the artillery -of the forward fire bases, tactical aircraft, and Huey gunships. -The enemy was attacked by these mobile forces whenever and wherever -he appeared. When a major NVA unit was encountered, sufficient -reinforcements were also injected by helicopter. So, the only thing -that changed on the Khe Sanh Plateau, besides the face of the combat -base, was the style and tempo of operations.(232) - -The new strategy by no means diminished the accomplishments of the -men who had held Khe Sanh; it was simply a continuation of the -battle in another form. When the leaders in Hanoi finally accepted -President Johnson's peace overtures and consented to meet with U. S. -representatives in Paris, there was one thing that the North Vietnamese -negotiators did not possess--the battle standard of the 26th Marines. -An editorial in the =Washington Star= provided an appropriate tribute -to the men of Khe Sanh: - - To be sure, Khe Sanh will be a subject of controversy for a long - time, but this much about it is indisputable: It has won a large - place in the history of the Vietnam war as an inspiring example of - American and Allied valor. One day, in fact, the victory over the - siege may be judged a decisive turning point that finally convinced - the enemy he could not win.(233) - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[75] Many of these young men exhibited a maturity beyond their years. -One message, scrawled on the back of a C-ration carton by an anonymous -Marine, was found after the siege. It read: "Life has a special flavor -to those who fight for it that the sheltered never know." - -[76] The attacks were halted except in the area north of the -demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly -threatened Allied forward positions and where the movements of their -troops and supplies clearly related to that threat. - - - - -APPENDIX A - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND FOOTNOTES - - -=Explanatory Note=: Unless otherwise noted the material in this -monograph is derived from Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, and General -William C. Westmoreland, USA, =Report On The War In Vietnam=, hereafter -Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report On The War=; Maj John J. Cahill, USMC, -and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in -Vietnam, Jan-Jun65"; FMFPac, Operations of U. S. Marine Forces Vietnam, -Mar67-Apr68, hereafter =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=; FMFPac, U. S. -Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary, Volume -I: Narrative, hereafter =FMFPac HistSum=; III MAF Command Chronologies -Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =III MAF CmdChron=; 3d Marine Division Command -Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =3d MarDiv CmdChron=; 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =1st MAW -CmdChron=; 26th Marines Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter -=26th Marines CmdChron=; 1/26 Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, -hereafter =1/26 CmdChron=; 2/26 Command Chronologies, Jan68-Apr68, -hereafter =2/26 CmdChron=; 3/26 Command Chronologies, Jun67-Apr68, -hereafter =3/26 CmdChron=; 3d Marines Khe Sanh Operations After Action -Report, 9Jun67, hereafter =3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR=; VMGR-152 Command -Chronologies Jan68-Apr68, hereafter =VMGR-152 CmdChron=; Marine Corps -Command Center, Status of Forces, Apr68, hereafter =MCCC Status of -Forces=; Defense Intelligence Bulletins Dec67-Apr68, hereafter =DIA -IntBul=; Six Month Evaluation Report, prepared by HQ, MACV 31May68; -Presentation of LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968 General -Officers Symposium Book, HQMC, dtd 15Jul68; CG, FMFPac msg to CMC -dtd 200327Z Mar68; Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation -PEGASUS (C), hereafter =PEGASUS AAR=; Gen William C. Westmoreland ltr -to CMC dtd 14Dec68, Subj: Review of the draft manuscript "The Battle -of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Westmoreland Comments=; LtGen -Lewis W. Walt Interviews with HistBr dtd 17Dec67 and 14Jan69; LtGen -Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, -G-3, HQMC, dtd 26Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," -hereafter =Cushman Comments=; LtGen Herman Nickerson, USMC, memo to -Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Review of draft -manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Nickerson -Comments=; LtGen William B. Rosson, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 18Dec68, Subj: -"The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Rosson Comments=; -LtGen John J. Tolson, III, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 21Jan69, Subj: "The -Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Tolson Comments=; MajGen Norman J. -Anderson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: -Khe Sanh Historical Monograph, hereafter =Anderson Comments=; MajGen -Louis Metzger, USMC, memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, -dtd 23Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter -=Metzger Comments=; MajGen John R. Chaisson comments on draft -manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Chaisson -Comments=; Interview with MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, USMC, dtd -26Aug68 No. 3088 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter -=Tompkins Interview=; Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) comments on draft -manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," dtd 9Dec68, hereafter =DCS/Air -Comments=; BGen Robert P. Keller, USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief -of Staff, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 17Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe -Sanh," hereafter =Keller Comments=; BGen Harry C. Olson, USMC, ltr -to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 13Jan69, Subj. "The Battle of Khe -Sanh," hereafter =Olson Comments=; BGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, ltr to -CMC (Code AO3D) dtd 22Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter -=Hoffman Comments=; Chief, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office ltr -to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Review of Historical -Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, Historical Studies Branch, USAF -Historical Division ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 22Jan69, -Subj: Review of Historical Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, -Project CORONA HARVEST ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 15Jan69, -Subj: Review of Draft Manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter -=Air Force Historical Comments=; Interview with Col David E. Lownds, -USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 801 674/4 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), -hereafter =Lownds Jul Interview=; Col David E. Lownds, USMC, Interview -with HistBr dtd 13Sep68, hereafter =Lownds Sep Interview=; Col Frank -E. Wilson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 6Jan69, Subj: -Review of "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Wilson Comments=; Col -Bruce F. Meyers, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 16Dec68, -Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Meyers Comments=; Interview -with Col Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd 24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History -Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Col Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., -USMC, dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); -Col Robert D. Brown, USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: "The -Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Brown Comments=; Col Robert E. Brofft, -USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: Monograph, "The Battle of -Khe Sanh," hereafter =Brofft Comments=; LtCol John F. Mitchell, USMC, -ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 31Jan69, Subj: Comments on "The -Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Mitchell Comments=; LtCol Harry L. -Alderman, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, Subj: "The Battle -of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Alderman Comments=; LtCol James B. Wilkinson, -USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Response -to HQMC ltr AO3D-rem S807 373 of 6Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," -hereafter =Wilkinson Comments=; LtCol John A. Hennelly, USMC, comments -on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh" of 15Feb69, hereafter -=Hennelly Comments=; Interview with LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna, USMC, -dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol -Francis J. Heath, Jr., USMC, comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle -of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Heath Comments=; LtCol Frederick -J. McEwan, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 30Dec68, Subj: -Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =McEwan -Comments=; LtCol Johnny O. Gregerson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC -dtd 3Jan69, Subj: Review of a draft copy of the historical monograph: -"The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Gregerson Comments=; -LtCol John C. Studt, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd 24Dec68, Subj: -"The Battle of Khe Sanh" manuscript, hereafter =Studt Comments=; -Interview with LtCol Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548 -(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol William J. White, USMC, -comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" -n.d., hereafter =White Comments=; Interview with Maj William J. -Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, -HQMC); Maj John A. Shepherd, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, -dtd 2Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter -Shepherd Comments; Taped comments of Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC, -on the draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" dtd -2Jan69, hereafter =Caulfield Comments=; Interview with Maj Matthew -P. Caulfield, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, -HistBr, HQMC); Maj Wayne M. Wills, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, -dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Historical Monograph, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, -Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Wills Comments=; Maj Harper L. Bohr, USMC, -ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Comments concerning "The -Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Bohr Comments=; Maj Jerry E. Hudson, -USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Review of Historical -Monograph of Khe Sanh, hereafter =Hudson Comments=; Maj Mirza M. -Baig, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC dtd 23Dec68, Subj: -Comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" -hereafter =Baig Comments=; Maj William H. Dabney, USMC, comments on -draft manuscript n.d., "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter -=Dabney Comments=; Maj William H. Dabney, USMC, Interview with HistBr -dtd 10Jan69; Maj Earl G. Breeding, USMC, comments on draft manuscript -dtd 22Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter -=Breeding Comments=; Interview with Capt Earl G. Breeding, dtd Jul68, -No. 2121 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj Kenneth W. -Pipes, USMC ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., Subj: Khe Sanh -Manuscript, hereafter =Pipes Comments=; Interview with Capt Kenneth -W. Pipes, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, -HQMC); 1stLt James M. Alexander, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, -HQMC, n.d., Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter -=Alexander Comments=; Interview with 1stLt James M. Alexander, USMC, -dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); -Interview with 1stLt William L. Everhart, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 -(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Sgt Timothy -B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, -HQMC); Interview with HM3 Frank V. Calzia, USN, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 -(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LCpl Michael A. Barry, USMC, -Interview with HistBr dtd 17Feb69; Cornelius D. Sullivan, =et al.=, -=The Vietnam War: Its Conduct and Higher Direction= (Washington, D. -C.: The Center For Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1968) -(U), hereafter Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=; Bernard B. Fall, -=The Two Viet-Nams= (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965 ed.) (U); -Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, =Soldiers of the Sea= (Annapolis: -United States Naval Institute 1962 ed.) (U); Capt Ken Kashiwahara, -USAF, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh," =The Airman=, v. XII, no. 7 (Jul68) (U), -hereafter Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; =Washington Star=, -25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U); =Washington Star=, 9Jun68, p. 1-E -(Early Bird); =Baltimore Sun=, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U). All -documentary material cited is located in the HistBr, G-3 Division, -HQMC and, unless otherwise noted, carries an overall classification of -Secret. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - (1) Major John J. Cahill, USMC and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. - S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65," pp. 67, 68, - 126 (S). - - (2) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jun67, pp. 5-12 (S). - - (3) =Ibid.= - - (4) =3d MarDiv CmdChron=, Oct68, p. 11 (S). - - (5) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Mar67, p. 15 (S). - - (6) =3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR=, p. 7 (S); Bernard B. Fall, =The Two - Viet-Nams= (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1965 ed.), p. 3. - - (7) =Westmoreland Comments.= - - (8) =3d Marines=, =Khe Sanh AAR=, p. 12 (S). - - (9) Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt Interview with Historical - Branch dtd 17Dec68 and 14Jan69 (S). - - (10) =3d Marines, Khe Sanh AAR=, pp, 7-30 (S). - - (11) =Ibid.= - - (12) =Ibid.=, pp. 32-33 (S). - - (13) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, May67, p. 11 (S). - - (14) =Ibid.=, pp. 7-10, 19 (S). - - (15) =FMFPac HistSum=, pp. 7-17 (S). - - (16) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jul67, pp. 9-13 (S). - - (17) =Ibid.= - - (18) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Sep67, pp. 52-73 (S); =3d - MarDiv ComdChron=, Sep67, p. 25 (S); Chaisson Comments; Personal - observations of the author. - - (19) =Westmoreland Comments=; =Metzger Comments=. - - (20) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Oct67, pp. 24-36 (S). - - (21) =Metzger Comments.= - - (22) =26th Marines CmdChron=, May67, p. 4 (S). - - (23) =Ibid.= - - (24) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jun67, p. 4 (S). - - (25) =Ibid.=, Jul67, p. 4 (S). - - (26) Col Lownds tape No. 801 674/4 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, - Aug67, p. 4 (S); =Metzger Comments=. - - (27) =Wilkinson Comments.= - - (28) Col Lownds Tape No. 801 674/4 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, - Aug67, p. 4 (S), =Brown Comments=. - - (29) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Nov67, p. 4 (S). - - (30) =Cushman Comments=; =Hoffman Comments=. - - (31) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Dec67, p. 4 (S). - - (32) =Alderman Comments.= - - (33) =Bohr Comments.= - - (34) =Hudson Comments.= - - (35) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jan 68, pp. 8, 9; =III MAF - CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, - p. 60 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= (S). - - (36) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 10 (S); - =Caulfield Comments=. - - (37) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. - 4 (S). - - (38) =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 3 (S). - - (39) =2/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 2 (S). - - (40) =Ibid.=; =Breeding Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=. - - (41) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =Lownds Sep - Interview= (S). - - (42) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jan68, p. 10 (S). - - (43) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =3/26 CmdChron=, - Jan68, p. 3 (S); =Alderman Comments=; =Dabney Comments=; - =Caulfield Comments=. - - (44) =Ibid.= - - (45) =Dabney Comments.= - - (46) =Ibid.=; =26th CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =3/26 - CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 3 (S); =Alderman Comments=; =Dabney - Comments=. - - (47) =Ibid.= - - (48) =Cushman Comments=; =Tompkins Interview= (S); =Lownds Sep - Interview= (S); =Wilkinson Comments=; =Pipes Comments=; =26th - Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 5 (S). - - (49) =Caulfield Comments.= - - (50) =Alderman Comments.= - - (51) =Caulfield Comments.= - - (52) =Ibid.= - - (53) =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan 68, p. 3 (S); =Caulfield Comments=. - - (54) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with Major Matthew P. - Caulfield, USMC dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, - HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Caulfield Comments=. - - (55) =Dabney Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=. - - (56) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Lownds Sep - Interview=; =White Comments=. - - (57) =Pipes Comments.= - - (58) =Wilkinson Comments.= - - (59) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Hudson Comments=. - - (60) Interview with First Lieutenant William L. Everhart, dtd - 10Feb68 No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); - =Hennelly Comments=. - - (61) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 9 (S); =FMFPac Marine Opns - in Vietnam=, Jan68, p. 11 (S); =Tompkins Interview= (S); =Hudson - Comments=. - - (62) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S). - - (63) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 9 (S). - - (64) =Cushman Comments.= - - (65) =Ibid.=; =Westmoreland Comments=. - - (66) =Westmoreland Comments.= - - (67) =Ibid.=; Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 163. - - (68) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 4, 11 (S); =Lownds Sep - Interview= (S). - - (69) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =Baig Comments=. - - (70) =Wilkinson Comments.= - - (71) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Lownds Sep - Interview=; =Wilkinson Comments=. - - (72) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =III MAF - CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3-10 (S). - - (73) Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 158. - - (74) Presentation of Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., - USMC, in 1968 General Officers Symposium Book, dtd 15Jul68 (S). - - (75) Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=, pp. 101-104. - - (76) =Ibid.=, Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 235. - - (77) =Ibid.= - - (78) Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=, p. 99. - - (79) =Ibid.= - - (80) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S). - - (81) =Ibid.= - - (82) =Ibid.=; CG FMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S). - - (83) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S). - - (84) =Dabney Comments.= - - (85) =Ibid.= - - (86) =Ibid.= - - (87) =Ibid.=; =Caulfield Comments=. - - (88) =Dabney Comments.= - - (89) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S). - - (90) =Mitchell Comments.= - - (91) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S); =Tompkins Interview= (S). - - (92) =Ibid.=; =Mitchell Comments=. - - (93) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 8 (S); Interview with - Captain Earl G. Breeding, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 2121 (Oral - History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S): =Breeding Comments=. - - (94) =Ibid.= - - (95) =Ibid.= - - (96) =Ibid.=; =Dabney Comments=. - - (97) =Ibid.= - - (98) =White Comments.= - - (99) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8-10 (S); =Tompkins - Interview= (S). - - (100) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul Interview= (S); =Hennelly Comments=. - - (101) =Hennelly Comments.= - - (102) =Hudson Comments.= - - (103) =Wilkinson Comments.= - - (104) =Lownds Sep Interview=; =Caulfield Comments=. - - (105) =Anderson Comments.= - - (106) =Westmoreland Comments=; =White Comments=; =26th Marines - CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 4-8 (S). - - (107) =DIA IntBul.= - - (108) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8, 48 (S); =Mitchell - Comments=. - - (109) =Ibid.= - - (110) Lance Corporal Michael A. Barry Interview with HistBr, dtd - 17Feb69. - - (111) =Ibid.= - - (112) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8, 48, 49 (S); Mitchell - Comments. - - (113) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 49 (S). - - (114) =Ibid.=, p. 51 (S). - - (115) =Air Force Historical Comments=; =1st MAW CmdChron=, Feb68, - p. 8 (S). - - (116) =Wilkinson Comments=; =White Comments=. - - (117) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 51 (S); Kashiwahara, - "Lifeline to Khe Sanh". - - (118) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview= (S). - - (119) =VMGR-152 CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 4 (S); =Gregerson Comments=. - - (120) Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; =Meyers Comments=; - =Brown Comments=; =Air Force Historical Comments=. - - (121) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul Interview= (S). - - (122) =Ibid.= - - (123) Information provided by the Marine Corps Command Center on - 19Feb68. - - (124) =Ibid.= - - (125) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); =Wilson Comments=. - - (126) =Ibid.= - - (127) =Dabney Comments.= - - (128) =Ibid.= - - (129) =Wilson Comments.= - - (130) =DCS/Air Comments.= - - (131) =Breeding Comments.= - - (132) See =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to - CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S). - - (133) =Wilkinson Comments.= - - (134) CG FMFPac Msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S); =Lownds Jul - Interview= (S). - - (135) See =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S). - - (136) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S). - - (137) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S); =Lownds - Sep Interview=; Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, - USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, - HQMC) (S); =Hennelly Comments=; =Gregerson Comments=; =Air - Force Historical Comments=. - - (138) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S). - - (139) =Ibid.=, Debrief Sheets (S). - - (140) =Dabney Comments.= - - (141) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Feb 68, p. 2-2 (S); =Pipes Comments.= - - (142) Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd - 2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (C). - - (143) Information supplied by U. S. Air Force Public Information - Office, 16Oct68 (U); =Chaisson Comments=; =Air Force - Historical Comments=; =Brofft Comments=. - - (144) =Tompkins Interview= (S). - - (145) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Kashiwahara, "Lifeline - to Khe Sanh." - - (146) =Air Force Historical Comments=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, - Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S); =Tompkins Interview=; =Baig Comments=. - - (147) =Gregerson Comments.= - - (148) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S); Interview with Major William J. - Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, - HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Gregerson Comments=. - - (149) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with First Lieutenant - James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History - Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Hennelly Comments=. - - (150) Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, - No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview - with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. - 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =26th Marines - CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar 68 (S); =Gregerson Comments=. - - (151) =Ibid.= - - (152) =Ibid.= - - (153) =Lownds Interview=; =Hennelly Comments=. - - (154) =Hennelly Comments.= - - (155) =Baig Comments.= - - (156) =Hennelly Comments.= - - (157) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S); - =Baig Comments=. - - (158) =Ibid.= - - (159) =Baig Comments.= - - (160) =Ibid.= - - (161) =Ibid.= - - (162) =Ibid.=; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. A. - Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, - HistBr, HQMC) (S); Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, - =Soldiers of the Sea= (Annapolis: United States Naval - Institute 1962 ed.) p. 563. - - (163) =Baig Comments.= - - (164) Six Month Evaluation Report, HQ USMACV, 31May68 (S); - Interview with Colonel Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd 24Jun68, - No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S). - - (165) =1/26 CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to CMC dtd - 200327Z Mar68 (S); Information provided by Research, - Development, and Study Division, HQMC, 8Nov68 (U); =Lownds - Jul Interview= (S). - - (166) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); =Lownds Jul and - Sep Interviews= (S). - - (167) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S). - - (168) =Dabney Comments.= - - (169) =Ibid.= - - (170) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with Sergeant Timothy - B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, - HistBr, HQMC) (S). - - (171) =Baltimore Sun=, 25 May, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U). - - (172) Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC, - dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, - HQMC) (S); Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, - dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) - (S); Interview with Colonel Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC, - dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) - (S); Interview with Major John A. Shepherd, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, - No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S). - - (173) =Shepherd Comments.= - - (174) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S). - - (175) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S). - - (176) =Ibid.=; =Tompkins Interview= (S). - - (177) =Keller Comments.= - - (178) =Wilkinson Comments.= - - (179) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, Encl 1 (S). - - (180) =Ibid.= - - (181) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with HM3 Class Frank V. - Calzia, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, - HQMC) (S). - - (182) =Ibid.=; Interview with Captain Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC, dtd - Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S). - - (183) =Ibid.= - - (184) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, Encl 1 (S). - - (185) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S). - - (186) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, p. 4 (S); =Baig - Comments=. - - (187) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =Wilkinson - Comments=. - - (188) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview=. - - (189) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, p. 8 (S). - - (190) =Ibid.=, pp. 11, 12. - - (191) =Ibid.=, p. 7. - - (192) =Ibid.=, pp. 7, 8. - - (193) =Ibid.=, p. 6. - - (194) =Ibid.=, p. 10 (S). - - (195) =Ibid.=; =White Comments=. - - (196) =Ibid.=; =McEwan Comments=; =Pipes Comments=. - - (197) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, pp. 9, 10, and Encl 1. - - (198) =Ibid.=; =Baig Comments=. - - (199) MCCC, Status of Forces, Apr 68 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= - (S); =PEGASUS AAR=, pp. 1-4. - - (200) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C); =Westmoreland Comments=; =Cushman - Comments=. - - (201) =Ibid.= - - (202) =Tolson Comments.= - - (203) =Ibid.= - - (204) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C); =Rosson Comments=. - - (205) =Ibid.= - - (206) =Ibid.= - - (207) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S). - - (208) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C). - - (209) =Ibid.= - - (210) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S); =Tolson - Comments=. - - (211) =PEGASUS AAR=, pp. 13, 14 (C). - - (212) =Ibid.=, Encl 1. - - (213) =Ibid.= - - (214) =3/26 CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Studt Comments=; =Meyers - Comments=. - - (215) =Ibid.=; =Caulfield Comments=. - - (216) =Ibid.=; =Dabney Comments=. - - (217) =Caulfield Comments.= - - (218) =Meyers Comments.= - - (219) =3/26 CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Meyers Comments=; =Studt - Comments=. - - (220) =Caulfield Comments.= - - (221) =PEGASUS AAR.= - - (222) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Caulfield - Comments=. - - (223) =Baltimore Sun=, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U); =Washington - Star=, 25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U). - - (224) =Ibid.= - - (225) =Olson Comments.= - - (226) =Cushman Comments.= - - (227) =Alderman Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=. - - (228) =Baig Comments.= - - (229) =Tompkins Interview=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S). - - (230) =Westmoreland Comments=; =Cushman Comments=; =Rosson - Comments=. - - (231) =Ibid.= - - (232) =Ibid.=` - - (233) =Washington Star=, 9Jun68, p. 1-E (Early Bird) (U). - - - - -APPENDIX B - -GLOSSARY - - - AAR After Action Report - - ABCCC Airborne Command and Control Center - - A-4 Skyhawk A single-seat, lightweight, jet attack - bomber in service with Navy and Marine - Corps squadrons. Built by Douglas. - - AN/PRC-25 U. S.-built, short-range, portable, - frequency-modulated radio set used to - provide two-way communication in the - 30 megacycle to 75.95 megacycle band. - - AN/TPQ-10 U. S.-built, ground-based radar system - used to guide aircraft on bombing missions. - - A-1 Skyraider U. S.-built, prop-driven, attack aircraft - built by Douglas. - - Arc Light Operational name for B-52 strikes in South - Vietnam. - - ARVN Army of The Republic of Vietnam. - - A-6A Intruder U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine, - low-altitude, jet attack bomber - specifically designed to deliver ordnance - on targets completely obscured by weather - or darkness. Carries a heavier and more - varied load than any other U. S. naval - attack aircraft. Built by Grumman. - - ASRT Air Support Radar Team - - BDA Battle Damage Assessment - - Bde Brigade - - B-52 Stratofortress USAF eight-engine, swept-wing heavy jet - bomber. Built by Boeing. - - BLT Battalion Landing Team - - CAC Combined Action Company - - CACO Combined Action Company Oscar - - CavSqd (e.g. 1/9) 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry - - C-4 Plastic explosives - - CG, 1st MarDiv Commanding General, 1st Marine Division - - CG, FMFPac Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, - Pacific - - CG, 3d MarDiv Commanding General, 3d Marine Division - - CG, III MAF Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious - Force - - ChiCom Chinese Communist - - CH-53A Sea Stallion U. S.-built, single-rotor, - heavy assault transport helicopter powered - by two shaft-turbine engines with an - average payload of 12,800 pounds. - Full-sized rear opening with built-in - ramp permits loading of 105mm howitzer and - carriage. External sling will accommodate - a 155mm howitzer (towed). Carries crew of - 3 plus 38 combat troops or 24 litters. - Built by Sikorsky. - - CH-46D Sea Knight U. S.-built, medium transport, - twin-turbine, tandem rotor helicopter - with an average payload of 4,800 pounds. - Has rear loading ramp and external sling - mount. Carries crew of 3 plus 25 combat - troops or 15 litters and 2 attendants. - Built by Boeing. - - CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group - - Claymore U. S.-built, directional antipersonnel - land mine employed above ground and - normally in an upright position. - - CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps - - CmdChron Command Chronology - - CO Commanding Officer - - ComUSMACV Commander, U. S. Military Assistance - Command, Vietnam - - CP Command Post - - CS Designation for tear gas - - DASC Direct Air Support Center - - D-Day Day scheduled for the commencement of an - operation. - - DIA IntBul Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence - Bulletin - - DMZ Demilitarized Zone - - EC-121 Super USAF and USN four-engine, prop-driven, - Constellation long-range, heavy transport modified with - special equipment for radar early warning - patrols and electronic warfare duty. - Built by Lockheed. - - FADAC Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer - - FDC Fire Direction Center - - F-8 Crusader U. S. Navy and Marine Corps supersonic, - single-seat, single-engine, jet fighter - with afterburner. Primarily used in South - Vietnam in an attack role. Carries - air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance. - Built by LTV Vought Aeronautics. - - F-4B Phantom II U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine, - two-seat, supersonic fighter/attack jet - with afterburners; has dual role of - interceptor and bomber. Of all U. S. naval - attack aircraft, F-4B carries second - largest payload. Built by McDonnell. - - F-4C U. S. Air Force model of the Phantom II. - - 1st ACD 1st Air Cavalry Division - - 1st MarDiv 1st Marine Division - - 1st MAW 1st Marine Aircraft Wing - - FOB-3 Forward Operating Base 3 - - F-100 Super Sabre Single-engine, jet (with afterburner) - sweptwing, supersonic fighter-bomber; in - production since 1953, the F-100 was the - first supersonic operational fighter - developed for the U. S. Air Force. - Carries air-to-air and air-to-ground - ordnance. Built by North American. - - F-105 Thunderchief U. S. Air Force supersonic, single-seat, - single-engine, jet fighter/bomber with - afterburner. Built by Republic. - - FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific - - FO Forward Observer - - FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center - - GCA Ground Controlled Approach - - GPES Ground Proximity Extraction System - - Grenade Launcher, U. S.-built, single-shot, break-open, - M-79 breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires - 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately - 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained - rate of aimed fire of 5-7 rounds - per minute and an effective range of 375 - meters. - - Gun, 100mm M1944 Soviet-built, dual purpose field and - antitank gun introduced toward the close - of World War II; it weighs 7,628 pounds, - is 30.9 feet in length and has a muzzle - velocity of 900 meters per second. Maximum - range is 21,000 meters and maximum rate - of fire is 8-10 rounds per minute. Is - recognizable by long tube, double-barrel - muzzle brake, dual wheels, and sloping - shield. - - Gun, 130mm Soviet-built fieldpiece which utilizes - either a limber for transport or is - self-propelled. Towed weapon weighs 19,000 - pounds, is 38 feet in length, and has a - muzzle velocity of 930 meters per second. - Maximum range is 27,000 meters and maximum - rate of fire is 6-7 rounds per minute. - Tube has a multi-perforated muzzle brake. - - Gun, 175mm U. S.-built, self-propelled gun which - weighs 62,100 pounds and fires a 147-pound - projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 - meters. Maximum rate of fire is 1/2 round - per minute. - - Hand Grenade, U. S.-manufactured, hand-thrown bomb, - Fragmentation which weighs approximately one pound, - M-26 and contains an explosive charge in a - body that shatters into small fragments; - it has an effective range of 40 meters. - - H&I Harassment and Interdiction - - H&S Co Headquarters and Service Company - - HistBr Historical Branch - - HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - - Howitzer, 105mm U. S.-built, towed, general purpose light - M2A1 artillery piece; the weapon is mounted - on a carriage equipped with split box - trails and pneumatic tires. On-carriage - sighting and fire control equipment are - used both for direct and indirect fire. - The piece weighs 4,980 pounds, is 19.75 - feet in length, has a muzzle velocity of - 470 meters per second, and a maximum range - of 11,155 meters. Maximum rate of fire - is 4 rounds per minute. - - Howitzer, 155mm U. S.-built, towed, medium artillery piece - M1 mounted on a two-wheel, split-trail - carriage with detachable spades. The - howitzer is fired from a three-point - suspension, with the trails spread and - the carriage resting upon an integral - firing jack, the wheels being clear of the - ground. The piece weighs 12,700 pounds, - is 24 feet long, has a muzzle velocity of - 560 meters per second and a maximum range - of 15,080 meters. Maximum rate of fire - is 3 rounds per minute. - - Howitzer, 8-inch U. S.-built, self-propelled heavy artillery - M-110 piece; 37 feet long tracked carriage is - identical to that of 175mm gun. M-110 has - a maximum range of 16,930 meters and a - rate of fire of 1/2 round per minute. - - HQMC Headquarters, United States Marine Corps - - IFR Instrument Flight Rules - - KBA Killed By Air - - KIA Killed In Action - - KSCB Khe Sanh Combat Base - - LAPES Low Altitude Proximity Extraction System - - LSA Logistics Support Area - - LZ Landing Zone - - MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - - MAG Marine Aircraft Group - - Machine Gun, U. S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, - .50 Caliber air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs - approximately 80 pounds without mount or - ammunition; it has a sustained rate of - fire of 100 rounds per minute and an - effective range of 1,450 meters. - - Machine Gun, M-60 U. S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, - air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which - weighs approximately 23 pounds without - mount or ammunition; it has a sustained - rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and - an effective range of 1,100 meters. - - ____ Marines Designation of Marine regiment - - MATCU Marine Air Traffic Control Unit - - Medevac Medical evacuation - - Mortar, 60mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, - single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon, - which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled - and fires an assortment of high explosive - and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum - rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and - sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per - minute; the effective range is 2,000 - meters. - - Mortar, 81mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, - single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, - which weighs approximately 115 pounds - when assembled and fires an assortment of - high explosive and pyrotechnic rounds; - it has a sustained rate of fire of 2 rounds - per minute and an effective range of - 2,200-3,650 meters, depending upon the - ammunition used. - - Mortar, 82mm Soviet-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, - single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon - which weighs approximately 123 pounds - when assembled and fires high explosive - and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum - rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and - a maximum range of 3,040 meters. - - Mortar, 120mm Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, - smooth-bore, drop or trigger fired, - single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon, - which weighs approximately 606 pounds when - assembled and fires high explosive and - pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum rate - of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a - maximum range of 5,700 meters. - - Mortar, 4.2 inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded, - M2 drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, - baseplate and standard; weapon weighs 330 - pounds, is 4 feet in length, and has a - maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of - fire is 20 rounds per minute and utilizes - both high explosive and pyrotechnic - ammunition. (Five M2s were employed at - KSCB) - - Mortar, 4.2-inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded, - M98 Howtar mortar; a towed weapon, the Howtar is - mounted on a carriage with two pneumatic - tires. Tube and carriage weigh 1,289 - pounds; maximum range is 5,500 meters. - (Two Howtars were employed at KSCB) - - M-16 U. S.-built, magazine-fed, 5.62mm - gas-operated, air-cooled shoulder weapon - designed for either semiautomatic or full - automatic fire; fully loaded weighs 7.6 - pounds, fires a maximum rate of 150-200 - rounds per minute, and has a maximum - effective range of 460 meters. - - 9th MAB 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade - - 9th MEB 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade - - NVA North Vietnamese Army - - O1-E U. S.-built, single engine, two-seat, - prop-driven light observation aircraft - built by Cessna. - - Ontos U. S.-built, lightly-armored tracked - vehicle armed with six coaxially mounted - 106mm recoilless rifles. Originally - designed as a tank killer, the Ontos is - primarily used in Vietnam to support the - infantry. - - PCV Provisional Corps, Vietnam - - PF Popular Forces - - PMDL Provisional Military Demarcation Line - - RC-292 U. S.-built, elevated, wide-band, modified - ground-plane antenna designed to operate - with and increase the distance range of - various radio sets. - - Recoilless Rifle, U. S.-built, single-shot, recoilless, - 106mm, M40A1 breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 - pounds when assembled and mounted for - firing; it has a sustained rate of fire - of 6 rounds per minute and an effective - range of 1,365 meters. The weapon can - be singly or Ontos mounted. - - RF Regional Forces - - RLT Regimental Landing Team - - Rocket, 122mm A Soviet-built, four-piece, fin-stabilized, - 9-foot long rocket weighing 125 pounds; - maximum range is approximately 17,000 - meters. Launcher tube and mount weigh - 121 pounds and are 8.1 feet in length. - - RPG-2 A Soviet-and Chinese Communist-built - antitank grenade launcher; a smooth-bore, - muzzle-loaded, shoulder-fired, recoilless - weapon which fires a 40mm spin-stabilized - round. The weapon weighs 6.3 pounds, is - 3.2 feet in length, has a muzzle velocity - of 84 meters per second, and an effective - range of 100 meters. Maximum rate of fire - is 4-6 rounds per minute utilizing High - Explosive Antitank ammunition. - - SLF Special Landing Force - - S-2 Intelligence section or officer - - TA-4 Two-seat trainer model of the A-4 Skyhawk - - TAC(A) Tactical Air Controller (Airborne) - - TAFDS Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System - - Tank, PT-76 Soviet-built, 15.4-ton, amphibious tank - with a crew of 3; primary armament is - turret mounted 76mm gun and maximum - thickness of armor is 0.6 inches. - - Tank, M-48 U. S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew - of 4; primary armament is turret-mounted - 90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one - .50 caliber machine gun. Can be configured - with water fording equipment. - Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour - and an average range of 195 miles. - - TAOR Tactical Area Of Responsibility - - TET Vietnamese Lunar New Year - - 3d MarDiv 3d Marine Division - - III MAF III Marine Amphibious Force - - TIO Target Intelligence/Information Officer - - TOT Time On Target - - UHF Ultra High Frequency - - UH-1E A single-engine, Marine, light - Huey Gunship attack/transport helicopter noted for its - maneuverability and firepower; carries a - crew of three with seven combat troops or - three litters, two sitting casualties and - a medical attendant, or 3,000 pounds of - cargo. It is armed with air to ground - rocket packs and fuselage mounted, - electrically fired machine guns. - - UH-34D A single-engine, Marine, medium transport - Sea Horse helicopter with a crew of three; carries - 16-18 combat troops or 8 litters or a - normal 5,000 pound payload. - - USAF United States Air Force - - USA United States Army - - USMC United States Marine Corps - - USN United States Navy - - VC Viet Cong - - VFR Visual Flight Rules - - VHF Very High Frequency - - Viet Minh The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam, - Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led - coalition of nationalist groups which - actively opposed the Japanese in World - War II and the French in the early years - of the Indo-China War. - - VMA Marine Attack Squadron - - VMFA Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron - - VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler Transport - Squadron - - VMO Marine Observation Squadron - - VNAF Vietnamese Air Force - - VT Variable Timed fuze for artillery shell - which causes airburst over target area. - - - - -APPENDIX C - -CHRONOLOGY - - - 1962 - - Aug U. S. Army Special Forces establish CIDG camp at - Khe Sanh. - - - 1966 - - Apr 1/1 sweeps Khe Sanh plateau during Operation - VIRGINIA. - - Oct 1/3 occupies KSCB; CIDG displaces to Lang Vei. - - - 1967 - - Feb 1/3 replaced by single company, E/2/9. - - 15 Mar Company B, 1/9, replaces E/2/9 as resident defense - company. - - 20 Apr Combat assets at KSCB pass to operational control - of Col Lanigan's 3d Marines which commences Operation - PRAIRIE IV. - - 24 Apr B/1/9 patrol engages large enemy force north of - Hill 861 and prematurely triggers attack on Khe - Sanh; "Hill Fights" begin. - - 25 Apr 2/3 and 3/3 airlifted to KSCB to counter enemy drive. - - 28 Apr After heavy prep fires, LtCol DeLong's 2/3 assaults - and seizes first objective--Hill 861. - - 2 May LtCol Wilder's 3/3 seizes Hill 881S after four days - of heavy fighting. - - 3 May 2/3 repulses strong enemy counterattack south of - 881N. - - 5 May 2/3 secures final objective--Hill 881N. - - 11-13 "Hill Fights" terminate with 940 NVA and 155 Marine - May KIA. 3d Marines shuttled to Dong Ha as 26th Marines - (FWD) and 1/26 move into Khe Sanh. - - 13 May Col Padley, CO 26th Marines (FWD), relieves Col - Lanigan as Senior Officer Present at Khe Sanh. - Elements of 1/26 occupy combat base, Hills 881S, - 861, and 950. Operation CROCKETT commences. - - 13 Jun Due to increasing enemy contacts, LtCol Hoch's - 3/26 airlifted to KSCB. - - 16 Jul Operation CROCKETT terminates with 204 NVA and 52 - Marines KIA. - - 17 Jul Operation ARDMORE begins. - - 12 Aug Col Lownds relieves Col Padley as CO, 26th Marines. - - 13 Aug Due to lack of significant contact around Khe Sanh, - Company K and L, 3/26, transferred to 9th Marines - and Operation KINGFISHER. - - 17 Aug Khe Sanh airfield closed to normal traffic for - repair of runway. - - 3 Sep Remainder of 3/26 withdrawn to eastern Quang Tri - Province. - - 27 Oct Air strip reopened to C-123 aircraft. - - 31 Oct Operation ARDMORE terminated with 113 NVA and 10 - Marines KIA. - - 1 Nov Operation SCOTLAND I begins. - - 28 Nov MajGen Tompkins assumes command of 3d MarDiv. - - 13 Dec LtCol Alderman's 3/26 returns to Khe Sanh because - of increased enemy activity in Khe Sanh TAOR. - - 21 Dec 3/26 conducts five-day sweep west of base and uncovers - evidence of enemy buildup around KSCB. - - - 1968 - - 2 Jan Five NVA officers killed near western edge of main - perimeter. - - Intelligence reports indicate influx of two NVA - divisions, and possibly a third, into Khe Sanh TAOR. - - 16-17 LtCol Heath's 2/26 transferred to operational control - Jan of 26th Marines and arrive KSCB; 2/26 occupies Hill - 558 north of base. - - ASRT-B of MASS-3 displaces from Chu Lai to Khe Sanh - to handle ground controlled radar bombing missions. - - 17 Jan Team from Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion - ambushed near Hill 881N. - - 19 Jan While searching ambush site, patrol from I/3/26 comes - under fire from estimated 25 NVA troops and withdraws - under cover of supporting arms. Two platoons - from M/3/26 helilifted to Hill 881S as reinforcements - for I/3/26 which prepares for sweep toward - 881N the next day. - - 20 Jan Capt Dabney's I/3/26 attacks and, with the aid of - air and artillery, badly mauls NVA battalion entrenched - on southern slopes of 881N; 7 Marines and - 103 North Vietnamese KIA. - - On strength of testimony of captured NVA lieutenant - that enemy attack is imminent, I/3/26 is withdrawn - to 881S and base placed on Red Alert. - - DASC of MASS-3 displaces to Khe Sanh. - - 20-21 Estimated NVA battalion attacks K/3/26 on Hill 861. - Jan After penetrating southwestern portion of Marines' - perimeter, the enemy is repulsed leaving 47 dead; NVA - reserves are hit by heavy air strikes and artillery - fire. - - 21 Jan KSCB comes under heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket - attack which destroys main ammunition dump. NVA - battalion attacks and partially overruns Khe Sanh - village before CAC and RF companies drive off enemy. - After second attack, Col Lownds withdraws defenders - to confines of combat base. - - 22 Jan ComUSMACV initiates Operation NIAGARA to provide - massive air support for Khe Sanh. - - LtCol Mitchell's 1/9 arrives KSCB and takes up positions - which encompass rock quarry southwest of - combat base. - - E/2/26 is relocated from Hill 558 to prominent ridgeline - northeast of 861 as covering force for flank of - 2/26; E/2/26 passes to operational control of 3d - Battalion. New position is called 861A. - - 23-28 Large number of tribesmen and families are evacuated - Jan from Khe Sanh area to avoid hostile fire. - - 27 Jan 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion arrives KSCB and takes up - positions in eastern sector of combat base. - - 30 Jan Communists launch nation-wide TET Offensive. - - 5 Feb NVA battalion attacks E/2/26 on Hill 861A in concert - with heavy shelling of KSCB. Enemy gains foothold - in northern sector of Company E perimeter but is - driven out by savage counterattack; 109 NVA and 7 - Marines KIA. - - 7 Feb Special Forces camp at Lang Vei overrun by enemy - battalion supported by PT-76 Soviet-built tanks; - first use of NVA tanks in South Vietnam. - - 8 Feb Some 3,000 indigenous personnel, both military and - civilian, from Lang Vei move overland to Khe Sanh. - After being searched and processed, several hundred - refugees are air evacuated. - - 8 Feb A/1/9 combat outpost 500 meters west of 1/9 perimeter - hit and partially overrun by reinforced NVA battalion. - During three-hour battle, reinforcements drive NVA - from Marine position and with aid of supporting arms - kill 150 North Vietnamese; Col Lownds decides to - abandon outpost and units withdraw to 1/9 perimeter. - - 10 Feb Marine C-130 of VMGR-152, hit by enemy fire during - approach, crashes after landing at Khe Sanh and six - are killed. - - Feb-Apr Paradrops, low-altitude extraction systems, and - helicopters are primary means of resupplying 26th - Marines due to bad weather and heavy enemy fire. - - 21 Feb After heavy mortar and artillery barrage, NVA company - probes 37th ARVN Ranger lines but withdraws after - distant fire fight. It is estimated that 25-30 NVA - were killed. - - 23 Feb KSCB receives record number of incoming rounds for - a single day--1,307. - - First appearance of enemy trench system around KSCB. - - 25 Feb B/1/26 patrol ambushed south of KSCB; 23 Marines KIA. - - 29 Feb-1 Estimated NVA regiment maneuvers to attack 37th ARVN - Mar Ranger positions but fail to reach defensive wire. - - 6 Mar USAF C-123 shot down east of runway; 43 USMC, 4 USAF, - and 1 USN personnel killed. - - 7 Mar Large groups of refugees begin to filter into - the combat base and are evacuated. - - 8 Mar ARVN patrols attack enemy trenchline east of runway - and kill 26 North Vietnamese. - - 15 Mar American intelligence notes withdrawal of major NVA - units from Khe Sanh area. - - 23 Mar KSCB receives heaviest saturation of enemy rounds for - the month of March--1,109. - - 24 Mar A/1/9 patrol kills 31 NVA west of 1/9 perimeter. - - 25 Mar 1/9 CavSqd, 1st ACD begins reconnaissance in force - operations east of Khe Sanh in preparation for - Operation PEGASUS. - - 30 Mar B/1/26 attacks enemy fortified position south of combat - base and kills 115 North Vietnamese; 9 Marines are KIA. - - Operation SCOTLAND I terminates with 1,602 confirmed - NVA and 205 Marines KIA; estimates place probable - enemy dead between 10,000 and 15,000. - - Task Force KILO launches diversionary attack along - Gio Linh coastal plain to divert attention away from - Ca Lu where 1st ACD, and 1st Marines are staging for - Operation PEGASUS. - - 1 Apr Operation PEGASUS begins; 2/1 and 2/3 (1st Marines) - attack west from Ca Lu along Route 9. Elements of - 3d Bde, 1st ACD conduct helo assaults into LZ Mike - and Cates. Joint engineer task force begins repair - of Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. - - 3 Apr 2d Bde, 1st ACD assaults LZs Tom and Wharton. - - 4 Apr 1/5 CavSqd moves northwest from LZ Wharton and attacks - enemy units near old French fort; 1st Battalion, 9th - Marines moves southeast from rock quarry and assaults - Hill 471. - - 5 Apr 1/9 repulses enemy counterattack on Hill 471 and - kills 122 North Vietnamese. - - 1st Bde, 1st ACD departs Ca Lu and assaults LZ Snapper. - - 6 Apr One company of 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force airlifted - to KSCB for the initial link up with defenders. - - Elements of 2d Bde, 1st ACD relieve 1st Battalion, 9th - Marines on Hill 471; 1/9 commences sweep to northwest - toward Hill 689. - - 6 Apr 1st Bde, 1st ACD helilifted north of KSCB. 2/26 and - 3/26 push north of combat base; Company G, 2/26 engages - enemy force and kills 48 NVA. - - 8 Apr 2/7 CavSqd links up with 26th Marines and conducts - official relief of combat base. 1/26 attacks to - the west. - - 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force air assaults into LZ Snake - west of Khe Sanh and kills 78 North Vietnamese. - - 10 Apr LtGen Rosson arrives Khe Sanh and directs LtGen Tolson - to disengage and prepare for Operation DELAWARE in - A Shau Valley. - - 11 Apr Engineers complete renovation of Route 9 and road is - officially opened. - - Elements of 1st ACD begin withdrawal to Quang Tri City - in preparation for Operation DELAWARE; 37th ARVN - Ranger Battalion airlifted to Da Nang. - - 12 Apr Col Meyers relieves Col Lownds as CO, 26th Marines. - - 14 Apr 3/26 attacks Hill 881N and kills 106 NVA; 6 Marines - are KIA. - - 15 Apr Operation PEGASUS terminated; Operation SCOTLAND II - begins. - - 18 Apr 26th Marines withdrawn to Dong Ha and Camp Carroll. - - 23 May President Johnson presents the Presidential Unit - Citation to 26th Marines and supporting units during - White House ceremony. - - 23 Jun Although forward fire support bases are maintained in - Khe Sanh area, the KSCB is dismantled and abandoned. - LZ Stud at Ca Lu is selected as base for air mobile - operations in western DMZ area. - - - - -APPENDIX D - - -=TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 24 APRIL-13 MAY 1967= - - =A. 3D MARINES (-) (REIN)= 24APR-13MAY67 - - HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 24APR-13MAY67 - - 2D BATTALION (REIN) 26APR-13MAY67 - HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY(-)(REIN) - DET, HQBN, 3D MARDIV - DET, HQCO, 3D MAR - DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1ST BN, 12TH MAR - DET, 15TH DENTAL CO - 2D CLEARING PLT (REIN), CO B, 3D MED BN - 1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN - 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D MT BN - 1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN - DET, LSU, FLC - - COMPANY E (REIN) - 1ST SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT - FAC TEAM - DET, MED PLT - DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC - DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12 - 1ST SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN - DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN - - COMPANY F (REIN) - DET, H&S CO - 2D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT - FAC TEAM - DET, MED PLT - DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC - DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12 - 2D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN - DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN - - COMPANY G (REIN) - DET, H&S CO - 3D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT - DET, MED PLT - DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC - DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12 - - COMPANY H (REIN) - DET, H&S CO - 4TH SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT - FAC TEAM - DET, MED PLT - DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC - DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12 - 3D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN - DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN - - COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67 - - COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67 - - COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 13 MAY 67 - - COMPANY D, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67 - - COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 12-13MAY67 - - 3D PLT (REIN), CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN - - 2D PLT (REIN), CO A, AT BN - - 3D PLT, CO B, 3D RECON BN - - 2D PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D TANK BN - - 106MM RR PLT - - 3D BATTALION (-) (REIN) - COMMAND GROUP "A" - - COMPANY K 25-27APR67 - FO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12 - DET, H&S CO - FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT - FAC TEAM (-) - DET, MED PLT - - COMPANY M 27APR-1MAY67 - FO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12 - FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT - SCOUT/DOG TEAM - SCOUT TEAM, 3/3 - - COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 25-27APR67 - - COMPANY K, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 25APR-13MAY67 - - COMPANY M, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 29APR-13MAY67 - - COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES 1MAY-3MAY67 - - COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 5-13MAY67 - - COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 12-13MAY67 - - - BASE DEFENSE/RESERVE - - COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 24-27APR67 - - COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES 27APR-1MAY67 - - COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 1-12MAY67 - - COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 4-5MAY67 - - 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 12-13MAY67 - - - SUPPORTING UNITS - - DIRECT SUPPORT - - BATTERY F (REIN), 2/12 24APR-13MAY67 - BATTERY B, 1/12 27APR-11MAY67 - BATTERY A, 1/12 13MAY - - -TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 20 JANUARY-1 APRIL 1968 - - =A. 26TH MARINES= - - HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 20JAN-31MAR68 - - 1ST BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - 2D BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - 3D BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - =B. ATTACHED AND SUPPORTING UNITS= - - =(1) U. S. MARINE CORPS= - - 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES (LESS CO "C") 22JAN-31MAR68 - - CO "C", 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 23JAN-31MAR68 - - 1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES 20JAN-31MAR68 - - 1ST PROV, 155MM HOWITZER BTRY 20JAN-31MAR68 - - - DET, 1ST SEARCHLIGHT BTRY 12TH MARINES 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 3D ENGINEER BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - COMPANY "B", 3D RECON BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - 3D PLATOON, COMPANY "D", 3D RECON - BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - 1ST PLATOON, COMPANY "A", 5TH RECON - BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - COMPANY "A" (-) 3D ANTITANK - BATTALION (REDESIGNATED ANTITANK - COMPANY (-), 3D TANK BATTALION) 20JAN-31MAR68 - - COMPANY "A", 3D SHORE PARTY BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, H&S COMPANY, 3D SHORE PARTY - BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68 - - 2D CLEARING PLATOON, COMPANY "C" - 3D MED BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68 - - OTTER PLATOON, H&S COMPANY - 3D MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, COMPANY "B", 9TH MOTOR - TRANSPORT BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, COMPANY "A", 9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT - BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, SU#1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 3D DENTAL COMPANY 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEADQUARTERS - BATTALION, 3D MARINE - DIVISION (POSTAL, PHOTO, EXCHANGE, - ISO, AO'S, STAFF AUGMENT) 20JAN-31MAR68 - - COMBINED ACTION COMPANY "O" - 3D COMBINED ACTION GROUP, III MAF 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, COMM CO, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, - 3D MARINE DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 5TH COMM BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 7TH COMM BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND 20JAN-31MAR68 - - SUB-TEAM #1, 17TH INTERROGATOR-TRANSLATOR - TEAM 20JAN-31MAR68 - - COMPANY "B", 3D TANK BATTALION, 3D - MARINE DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET "01", HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE - SQUADRON, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET "01", MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON, - MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 15MAR-31MAR68 - - DET "2" MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON - 3, MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP-18 16JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE - SQUADRON-36, MARINE AIRCRAFT - GROUP-36 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT-62, - MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-36 20JAN-31MAR68 - - =(2) U. S. NAVY= - - DET "B", CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, - MOBILE UNIT-301 20JAN-11FEB68 - - DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-10 20JAN-19FEB68 - - DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-53 20JAN-13FEB68 - - DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-5 20JAN-24JAN68 - - =(3) U. S, ARMY= - - DET. A-101, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 44TH ARTILLERY 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 65TH ARTILLERY 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 238TH COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR - UNIT, 108TH FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP 22JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 1ST PLATOON (SMOKE), 25TH - CHEMICAL COMPANY 9FEB-31MAR68 - - 544TH SIGNAL DET, 37TH SIGNAL - BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - =(4) U. S. AIR FORCE= - - DET, (OPERATING LOCATION AJ), 15TH - AERIAL PORT SQUADRON 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 366TH TRANSPORT SQUADRON, 366TH - COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET, 903D AERO MED EVAC SQDN 20JAN-31MAR68 - - DET "A", 834TH AIR DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68 - - =ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM= - - 37TH ARVN RANGER BATTALION 27JAN-1APR68 - - - - -APPENDIX E - -=COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 3D MARINES, 24 APR-13 MAY 1967= - -(Period covered during "The Hill Fights") - - -=3D MARINES= - - Commanding Officer Col John P. Lanigan - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Executive Officer LtCol Jack Westerman - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-1 WO Charles M. Christensen - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-2 Capt Adolfo Sgambelluri - (24Apr67-7May67) - Capt James D. McGowan - (8May67-13May67) - - S-3 Maj Floyd A. Karker - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-4 Maj Howard L. Long - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Communications Officer Capt Curtis G. Arnold - (24Apr67-1May67) - Capt George W. Brooks - (2May67-13May67) - - -=2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES= - - Commanding Officer LtCol Earl R. DeLong - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Executive Officer Maj Wendell O. Beard - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-1 2dLt Billy L. Heaton - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-2 Capt Robert N. Bogard - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-3 Capt Douglas W. Lemon - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-4 Capt Robert R. Green - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Headquarters and Service Company Capt Stuart R. Vaughan - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "E" Capt Alfred E. Lyon - (24Apr67-3May67) - 1stLt John F. Adinolfi - (4May67-12May67) - Capt Alfred E. Lyon - (13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "F" Capt Martin Sorensen - (24Apr67-9May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "G" Capt James P. Sheehan - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "H" Capt Raymond C. Madonna - (24Apr67-13May67) - - -=3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES= - - Commanding Officer LtCol Gary Wilder - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Executive Officer Maj Rudolph S. Sutter - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-1 2dLt John C. Ralph - (24Apr67-11May67) - - S-2 2dLt Evander R. McIver III - (24Apr67-11 May67) - 2dLt Michael T. Montgomery - (12May67-13May67) - - S-3 Capt Thomas A. Stumpf - (24Apr67-13May67) - - S-4 SSgt William T. Pope - (24Apr67-30Apr67) - 1stLt John H. Admire - (1May67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Headquarters and Service Company Capt Robert W. Poolaw - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "I" Capt Christian L. Harkness - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "K" Capt Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr. - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "L" Capt John W. Ripley - (24Apr67-13May67) - - Commanding Officer - Company "M" Capt William R. Griggs - (24Apr67-13May67) - - - - -APPENDIX F - -=COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 26TH MARINES, 20 JAN-1 APR 1968= - -(Period covered in Presidential Unit Citation) - - -=26TH MARINES= - - Commanding Officer Col David E. Lownds - (12Aug67-1Apr68) - - Executive Officer LtCol Louis A. Rann - (28Sep67-1Apr68) - - S-1 1stLt Robert J. Mariz - (29Jan68-29Jan68)(KIA) - Capt Arnold R. Nelson - (30Jan68-8Feb68) - Capt Anthony V. Latorre, Jr. - (9Feb68-1Apr68) - - S-2 Capt Harper L. Bohr, Jr. - (1Aug67-7Feb68) - Maj Jerry E. Hudson - (8Feb68-17Mar68) - Capt Thorvald P. E. Holm - (18Mar68-1Apr68) - - S-3 Maj Wayne M. Wills - (1Aug67-22Jan68) - LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna - (23Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-4 Maj Aubrey L. Lumpkin - (17Mar68-1Apr68) - - Communications Officer Maj John A. Shepherd - (16Nov67-1Apr68) - - -=1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES= - - Commanding Officer LtCol James B. Wilkinson - (5Jul67-29Feb68) - LtCol Frederick J. McEwan - (1Mar68-1Apr68) - - Executive Officer Maj Charles E. Davis III - (23Dec67-31Jan68) - Maj Howard J. McCarty - (1Feb68-1Apr68) - - S-1 1stLt Stephen A. Fitzgerald - (13Dec67-31Jan68) - 1stLt William J. Ferral - (1Feb68-1Apr68) - - S-2 1stLt Anthony E. Sibley - (6Dec67-13Feb68) - 1stLt Ernest E. Spencer - (14Feb68-1Apr68) - - S-3 Maj Bruce A. Greene - (23Dec67-29Jan68) - Maj Charles E. Davis III - (30Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-4 Capt Robert C. Onslow - (6Nov67-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Headquarters and Service Company 1stLt Robert A. Brown - (20Dec67-16Feb68) - 1stLt Paul G. Lojkovic - (17 Feb68-20Mar68) - Capt Lajon R. Hutton - (21Mar68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "A" Capt Ray G. Snyder - (15Dec67-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "B" Capt Kenneth W. Pipes - (20Dec67-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "C" Capt David L. Ernst - (15Jan68-15Feb68 - 2dLt Paul W. Bush - (16Feb68-2Mar68) - Capt Walter J. Egger - (3Mar68-22Mar68) - Capt Lawrence E. Seaman, Jr. - (23Mar68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "D" 1stLt Ernest E. Spencer - (1Aug67-13Feb68) - Capt Edward J. Hughes, Jr. - (14Feb68-1Apr68) - - -=2D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES= - - Commanding Officer LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr. - (Jan68-1Apr68) - - Executive Officer Maj Royce L. Bond - (Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-1 1stLt Richard J. Gustafson - (16Jan-1Apr68) - - S-2 1stLt Edwin R. Matthews - (Jan68-11Feb68) - SSgt Horace E. Roland - (12Feb68-9Mar68) - 1stLt John C. Wainio - (10Mar68-1Apr68) - - S-3 Maj Gerald F. Kurth - (Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-4 Capt Erwin J. Martikke, Jr. - (Jan68-18Mar68) - Capt Earle G. Breeding, Jr. - (19Mar68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Headquarters and Service Company Capt Stanley M. Hartman - (Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "E" Capt Earle G. Breeding Jr. - (Jan68-8Mar68) - 1stLt Joseph R. Meeks - (9Mar68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "F" Capt Charles F. Divelbiss - (Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "G" Capt Lee R. Overstreet - (Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "H" Capt Charles O. Broughton - (Jan68-1Apr68) - - -=3D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES= - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harry L. Alderman - (21Aug67-14Mar68) - LtCol John C. Studt - (15Mar68-1Apr68) - - Executive Officer Maj Joseph M. Loughran, Jr. - (9Sep67-1Apr68) - - S-1 1stLt Edward J. Paurazas Jr. - (21Dec67-1Apr68) - - S-2 2dLt Jay G. Marks, Jr. - (14Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-3 Maj Matthew P. Caulfield - (24Nov67-1Apr68) - - S-4 1stLt Jack A. Brage - (16Nov67-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Headquarters and Service Company Capt Alfred Lardizabal, Jr. - (29Nov67-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "I" Capt William H. Dabney - (24Nov67-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "K" Capt Norman J. Jasper, Jr. - (23Nov67-22Jan68) - 1stLt Jerry Saulsbury - (23Jan68-27Jan68) - Capt Paul L. Snead - (28Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "L" Capt Richard D. Camp, Jr. - (30Jun67-29Jan68) - Capt William F. Hurley - (30Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "M" Capt John J. Gilece, Jr. - (29Nov67-31Jan68) - 1stLt John T. Esslinger - (1Feb68-23Mar68) - Capt Walter R. Jenkins - (24Mar68-1Apr68) - - -=1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES= - - Commanding Officer LtCol John F. Mitchell - (1Jan68-31Mar68) - LtCol John J. H. Cahill - (1Apr68) - - Executive Officer Maj Joseph A. Donnelly - (1Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-1 1stLt Peter A. Woog - (1Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-2 1stLt Robert J. Arboleda - (1Jan68-1Apr68) - - S-3 Maj Edward M. Ringley - (1Jan68-16Feb68) - Capt Charles B. Hartzell - (17Feb68-10Mar68) - Maj Ted R. Henderson - (11Mar68-1Apr68) - S-4 1stLt John M. Georgi - (1Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Headquarters and Service Company 1stLt Michael J. Walker - (9Jan68-13Feb68) - Capt John W. Cargile - (14Feb68-31Mar68) - Capt Edward R. Miller, Jr. - (1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "A" Capt Henry J. M. Radcliffe - (1Jan68-31Mar68) - Capt. Henry D. Banks - (1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "B" Capt Robert T. Bruner - (1Jan68-26Jan68) - 1stLt Arthur N. Mangham, Jr. - (27Jan68-2Feb68) - Capt John R. Williams, Jr. - (3Feb68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "C" Capt John W. Cargile - (9Jan68-13Feb68) - Capt Ralph H. Flagler - (14Feb68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "D" Capt Don F. Schafer - (1Jan68-31Mar68) - Capt John W. Cargile - (1Apr68) - - -=1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES= - - Commanding Officer LtCol John A. Hennelly - (10Dec67-1Apr68) - - Executive Officer Maj Ronald W. Campbell - (13Jul67-1Apr68) - - S-1 2dLt Daniel W. Kelly - (19Nov67-1Apr68) - - S-2 1stLt Walter K. Jones - (21Dec67-4Mar68) - 1stLt Leslie M. Palm - (5Mar68-1Apr68) - - S-3 Capt Lawrence R. Salmon - (13Jul67-8Mar68) - Maj Gerald R. Houchin - (9Mar68-1Apr68) - - S-4 1stLt Harold P. Klunk - (1Dec67-20Feb68) - Capt Tommy J. Hicks - (21Feb68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Headquarters Battery 1stLt Ralph W. Dunn, Jr. - (2Aug67-20Feb68) - 1stLt Walter K. Jones - (21Feb68-15Mar68) - Capt Jerome P. Rogers - (16Mar68-21Mar68) - 1stLt Jacob W. Hughes, Jr. - (22Mar68-lApr68) - - Commanding Officer - Battery "A" Capt Dennis L. Pardee - (Aug67-29Feb68) - Capt Victor B. Snider - (1Mar68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Battery "B" 1stLt George G. Wood - (21Jan68-29Feb68) - Capt James C. Uecker - (1Mar68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Battery "C" Capt William J. O'Connor - (28Nov67-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Mortar Battery Capt Michael T. Pierson - (5Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - 1st Provisional 155 - Howitzer Battery, 3/12 Capt Joseph Taylor - (5Jan68-29Feb68) - Capt Stephen J. Hayes - (1Mar68-1Apr68) - - -=ATTACHED UNITS= - - Commanding Officer - Company "A", 3d AT Battalion Capt James O. Lea - (20Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "B", 3d Tank Battalion Capt Daniel W. Kent - ( -24Jan68) - Capt Claude W. Reinke - (25Jan68-1Apr68) - - Commanding Officer - Company "A", 3d Shore Party - Battalion 1stLt Robert L. Singleton - (28Jan68-4Mar68) - Maj Howard W. Wahlfeld - (5Mar68-1Apr68) - - - - -[Illustration: APPENDIX G] - -The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia -in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown -here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed -to five points, this device has continued on Marine buttons to the -present day. - -[Illustration] - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Battle for Khe Sanh, by Moyers S. 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